Preface

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of States is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. Under the direction of the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, the staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which was signed by President George H. W. Bush on October 28, 1991, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series must include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purpose of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of the Foreign Relations of the United States that documents the most significant foreign policy issues and major decisions of the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. Five volumes in this subseries, volumes XII through XVI, cover U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. This specific volume documents United States policy toward the Soviet Union from June 1972 until August 1974, following closely the development of the ad-
ministration’s policy of Détente and culminating with President Nixon’s resignation in August 1974.


This volume continues the practice of covering U.S.-Soviet relations in a global context, highlighting conflict and collaboration between the two superpowers in the era of Détente. Chronologically, it follows volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, which documents the May 1972 Moscow Summit between President Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. This volume includes numerous direct personal communications between Nixon and Brezhnev covering a host of issues, including clarifying the practical application of the SALT I and AMB agreements signed in Moscow. Other major themes covered include the war in Indochina, arms control, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), commercial relations and most-favored-nation status, grain sales, the emigration of Soviet Jews, Jackson-Vanik legislation, and the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The private backchannel, documented through telephone transcripts and memoranda of conversation, between Henry Kissinger, who for most of this period served as Secretary of State, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin continued to function as the principal line of communication between the two superpowers. The backchannel was key to making progress on the most problematic issues in U.S.-Soviet relations, and provided a face-to-face means of diffusing potentially confrontational subjects, such as growing Soviet concern about the United States’ recently established relationship with China. This period included high-level meetings and summits, both in the United States and the Soviet Union, documented here in detail, including Kissinger’s conversations with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko leading up to Nixon’s final visit to the Soviet Union in June 1974. These frequent meetings and discussions allowed the United States and the Soviet Union to avoid open conflict and, to the extent possible, cooperate on managing crises around the world.

Taken as a whole, the five Soviet Union volumes in the Nixon-Ford subseries, 1969–1976, document the core issues of the Cold War, as seen through the prism of U.S.-Soviet global relations. This volume provides an account of the U.S.-Soviet worldwide confrontation, competition, and cooperation during the 26 months covered. Extensive annotation directs the reader to relevant sources in other *Foreign Relations* volumes, and to archival and published sources. Editorial Notes provide helpful background and explanatory information. Readers interested in the larger context of relations between the United States and Soviet Union should consult additional volumes of the subseries including, volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972; volume E-2, Documents on Arms Control.

**Editorial Methodology**

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation and reporting telegrams are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the documents were drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide sum-
maries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 USC 2111 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to notify the Nixon Estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon Estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All Foreign Relations volumes that include materials from NARA’s Nixon Presidential Materials are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

Nixon White House Tapes

Access to the Nixon White House tape recordings is governed by the terms of the PRMPA and an access agreement with the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Adminis-
tration and the Nixon Estate. In February 1971, President Nixon initiated a voice activated taping system in the Oval Office of the White House and, subsequently, in the President’s Office in the Executive Office Building, Camp David, the Cabinet Room, and White House and Camp David telephones. The audiotapes include conversations of President Nixon with his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, other White House aides, Secretary of State Rogers, other Cabinet officers, members of Congress, and key foreign officials. The clarity of the voices on the tape recordings is often very poor, but the editor has made every effort to verify the accuracy of the transcripts produced here. Readers are advised that the tape recording is the official document; the transcript represents an interpretation of that document. Through the use of digital audio and other advances in technology, the Office of the Historian has been able to enhance the tape recordings and over time produce more accurate transcripts. The result is that some transcripts printed here may differ from transcripts of the same conversations printed in previous Foreign Relations volumes. The most accurate transcripts possible, however, cannot substitute for listening to the recordings. Readers are urged to consult the recordings themselves for a full appreciation of those aspects of the conversations that cannot be captured in a transcript, such as the speakers’ inflections and emphases that may convey nuances of meaning, as well as the larger context of the discussion.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended, on Classified National Security Information and other applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security, as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2007 and was completed in 2009, resulted in the decision to withhold two documents and make excisions in six documents.

The editors are confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume, and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide an accurate and comprehensive account of the
VIII  Preface

Nixon administration’s complex policy toward the Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

Acknowledgements

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), at College Park, Maryland. The editors wish to express gratitude to the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing access to the Nixon Presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access. Special thanks are due to John Earl Haynes of the Library of Congress who facilitated access to the Kissinger Papers. The editors were able to use the Kissinger Papers with the kind permission of Henry Kissinger. The Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense provided full access to their records.

Douglas E. Selvage and Melissa Jane Taylor collected the documentation for this volume, made the selection, and annotated the documents under the supervision of M. Todd Bennett, Chief of the Europe and Global Issues Division, and Edward C. Keefer, General Editor of the series. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Susan Weetman, Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. Renée A. Goings did the copy and technical editing. Do Mi Stauber Indexing Service prepared the index.

Bureau of Public Affairs
November 2011

Ambassador Edward Brynn
Acting Historian
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Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The 1991 Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It also requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support, cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department’s indexed central files through July 1973 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Many of the Department’s decentralized office files covering the 1969–1976 period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Nixon and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Henry Kissinger has approved access to his papers at the Library of Congress. The papers are a key source for the Nixon–Ford subseries of Foreign Relations.

Research for this volume was completed through special access to restricted documents at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the Library of Congress, and other agencies. While all the material printed in
XII Sources

this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still classified documents. In the time since the research for this volume was completed, the Nixon Presidential Materials have been transferred to the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in Yorba Linda, California. The Nixon Presidential Library staff is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication.

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XV

The Nixon Presidential Materials are the single most important source of documentation for those interested in U.S.-Soviet relations during the Nixon administration. Foreign policy research in the Nixon Materials centers around the National Security Council (NSC) Files, which include the President’s Trip Files, Subject Files, Country Files, and Kissinger Office Files. The NSC files contain about 1,300 archive boxes of materials. Of these the Kissinger Office Files, which include the memoranda of conversation of all of Kissinger’s negotiations in the USSR, and the President’s Trip Files, contain the most important information on high-level policymaking for this volume. Additionally, the NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) outline the policy decisions made by the Nixon administration as they relate to the USSR, including the National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) and National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs).

In addition to the NSC Files, the Nixon Materials include important collections like the Kissinger Telephone Conversations. The transcripts of those conversations, especially those with Dobrynin, provide information on the exchange of information between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as illustrate the development of détente.

The editors had access to the Nixon Intelligence Files at the National Security Council and the files of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. The files of the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly the National Intelligence Council (NIC) Registry of finished intelligence, were essential for intelligence reports and assessments on which the Nixon administration based its policy decisions.

The editors made considerable use of materials already compiled for other volumes in the Foreign Relations series, including those of the Middle East, Vietnam, SALT, and earlier Soviet volumes. Readers interested in these subjects should consult the relevant volumes for further information on the specific sources used in research.

The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet re-
sources on its website and suggests that readers refer to that site on a regular basis.

**Unpublished Sources**

**Department of State**

*See National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 59 below.*

**National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland**

**Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State**

*Central Files 1970–1973*

- POL US–USSR, general US–USSR relations
- POL USSR 7, visits and meetings of Soviet leaders
- POL 1 US–USSR, general US–USSR relations
- POL 1 USSR, general political affairs of the USSR
- POL 15–1 USSR, head of state, USSR
- POL 17 US–USSR, diplomatic and consular relations between the US and USSR

*Lot Files*

- Records of Henry Kissinger, Lot 91D414

**Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (now at the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California)**

Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Kissinger Telcons)
- Chronological File
- Dobrynin File

National Security Council (NSC) Files
- Country Files—Europe—USSR
- Haig Chronological Files
- NSC Institutional Files (H-Files)
- Presidential/HAK Memcons
- President’s Trip Files
- VIP Visits
- Kissinger Office Files
- Subject Files

NSC Institutional Files (H-Files)
- National Security Council Meetings
- National Security Council Minutes
- Policy Papers (National Security Decision Memoranda)
- Study Memoranda (National Security Study Memoranda)
XIV  Sources

White House Central Files
    President’s Daily Diary
White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files
    President’s Office Files
White House Tapes

Central Intelligence Agency
    DCI Executive Registry Files: Job 80–M01048A
    NIC Files: Job 79–R01012A

Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan
    National Security Adviser
        Memoranda of Conversations
    NSC Institutional/Historical Records

Library of Congress, Washington, DC
    Manuscript Division
        Papers of Henry Kissinger
        Chronological Files
        Geopolitical Files
        Memoranda of Conversation
        Miscellany, Record of Schedule

National Security Council
    Nixon Intelligence Files
        Subject Files

Published Sources

    _____, Documents on Germany, 1944–1985.
Abbreviations and Terms

ABM, anti-ballistic missile
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AD, Anatoly Dobrynin
ADC, aide-de-camp
AFL–CIO, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations

B, Brezhnev
B–1, U.S. strategic bomber

CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation
CCD, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CDU, Christian Democratic Union (Federal Republic of Germany)
CEO, Chief Executive Officer
CES, Conference on European Security
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIB, Current Intelligence Bulletin
CIEP, Council on International Economic Policy
CIEPDM, Council on International Economic Policy Decision Memorandum
COB, close of business
CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSU, Christian Social Union (Federal Republic of Germany)
CW, chemical weapons; chemical warfare

D, Dobrynin
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DGB, Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German Trade Unions Federation)
DMZ, Demilitarized Zone
DRV, Democratic Republic of Vietnam

EEC, European Economic Community
Eur, Europe
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Exdis, exclusive distribution
EXIM, Export-Import Bank

FBS, forward based systems
FPC, Federal Power Commission
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FM, Foreign Minister

G, Leonard Garment
GA, General Assembly
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDR, German Democratic Republic
GNP, Gross National Product
XVI Abbreviations and Terms

HAK, Henry A. Kissinger
Hakto, series indicator for messages from Henry Kissinger to the White House
HK, Henry Kissinger

ICBM, inter-continental ballistic missile
ICC, International Control Commission
ICCS, International Commission of Control and Supervision
ILA, International Longshoremen’s Association
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

K, Kissinger
KGB, Soviet Committee for State Security
KT, kiloton

LDC, less developed country
LNG, liquefied natural gas

M, million
MBFR, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFN, most favored nation
MIRV, multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles
MRV, multiple re-entry vehicles

NAC, North Atlantic Council (NATO)
NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIAM, National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum
NIC, National Intelligence Council
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate

Nine, the countries of the European Community: Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Ireland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom

NLF, National Liberation Front (Vietnam)
Nodis, no distribution
NPT, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC, National Security Council
NSCIC, National Security Council Intelligence Committee
NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum
NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum
NYT, New York Times

OAS, Organization of American States
OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness

P, Peter Peterson
PLO, Palestine Liberation Organization
PM, Prime Minister
PNE, peaceful nuclear explosion
PRC, People’s Republic of China
PRG, Provisional Revolutionary Government, political wing of the South Vietnamese Communist movement

RG, Record Group
RN, Richard Nixon
rpt, repeat
RV, re-entry vehicle

SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SC, Security Council
SCC, Standing Consultative Commission (SALT)
SLBM, submarine launched ballistic missile
SPD, Social Democratic Party (Federal Republic of Germany)
Specat, Special Category Message
SRG, Senior Review Group

TASS, official Soviet news agency
TIAS, Treaties and Other International Agreements Series
Tohak, series indicator for White House messages to Kissinger
Topet, series indicator for White House messages to Peterson
TTB, Threshold Test Ban
TV, television

UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNCURK, United Nations Committee for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
USIA, United States Information Agency
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UST, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements

WH, White House
WSAG, Washington Special Actions Group

YAK–40, Soviet airliner used by Aeroflot

Z, Greenwich Mean Time
Persons

Agnew, Spiro, Vice President of the United States until October 1973
Aleksandrov, Andrei M., Assistant to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev
Alkhimov, Vladimir, Soviet Deputy Foreign Trade Minister
Andropov, Yuriy Vladimirovich, Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB)
Antonov, Sergei, General, KGB, head of section responsible for foreign leaders’ security
Arends, Leslie, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Illinois)
Asad, Hafez, Syrian President

Bahr, Egon, State Secretary (Foreign, Defense, and German Policy) in the West German Federal Chancellery; also West German Minister for Special Tasks from December 1972
Beam, Jacob D., U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union until January 1973
Bennett, Jack, Deputy Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs from 1971 until 1974; Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs from 1974
Boumediene, Houari, Algerian President
Brandt, Willy, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany until May 1974
Brezhnev, Leonid I., General Secretary, Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Bunker, Ellsworth, Ambassador at Large; alternate head of the U.S. delegation to the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference from December 1973 until January 1974
Burns, Arthur, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board

Chou En-lai, see Zhou Enlai
Churchill, Winston S., British Prime Minister from May 1940 until July 1945 and from October 1951 until April 1955
Clift, A. Denis, member, National Security Council Staff
Colby, William, Director of Central Intelligence from September 1973
Colson, Charles, Special Counsel to the President until 1973
Connally, John B., Jr., Secretary of the Treasury until June 1972
Cooper, John Sherman, Senator (R-Kentucky) until January 1973; U.S. Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic from December 1974

David, Edward E., Jr., Science Adviser to the President and Director, White House Office of Science and Technology
Davis, Jeanne W., member, National Security Council Secretariat
Dayan, Moshe, Israeli Defense Minister
Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping), Vice Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China
Dent, Frederick B., Secretary of Commerce from February 1973 until March 1974
De Palma, Samuel, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until June 1974
Dinitz, Simcha, Israeli Ambassador to the United States from 1973
Dobrynin, Anatoly F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Eagleburger, Lawrence, Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State
Eban, Abba, Israeli Foreign Minister until June 1974
Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States from January 1953 until January 1961
XX  Persons

Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State

Fahmy, Ismail, Egyptian Foreign Minister from 1973
Flanigan, Peter, Executive Director, Council on International Economic Policy from February 1972
Fletcher, James C., Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Ford, Gerald R., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R–Michigan); House Minority Leader; Vice President from December 1973
Fulbright, J. William, Senator (D–Arkansas) until 1974; Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Garment, Leonard, Special Counsel to the President
Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry, French Minister of Economy and Finance until May 1974; President of France from May 1974
Goldwater, Barry, Senator (R–Arizona); Republican nominee in the 1964 Presidential election
Grechko, Andrey Antonovich, Soviet Defense Minister
Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister
Guzhenko, Timofey, Soviet Minister of Maritime Fleet

Haig, Alexander M., Brigadier General, USA; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until May 1973; White House Chief of Staff from May 1973
Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia
Haldeman, H.R., White House Chief of Staff until May 1973
Hammer, Armand, Chief Executive Officer, Occidental Petroleum Company
Hartman, Arthur A., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from January 1974
Heath, Edward, British Prime Minister until March 1974
Helms, Richard, Director of Central Intelligence until February 1973
Humphrey, Hubert H., Senator (D–Minnesota)
Hussein, I, ibn Talal, King of Jordan
Hyland, William G., member, National Security Council Operations Staff/Europe from 1970 until 1972; Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State from January 1974

Ismail, Hafez, Adviser for National Security Affairs to Egyptian President Sadat

Jackson, Henry M., Senator (D–Washington); Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee
Javits, Jacob K., Senator (R–New York)
Jobert, Michel, French Foreign Minister from April 1973
Johnson, U. Alexis, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until February 1973; Ambassador at Large; Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks from February 1973

Kendall, Donald, Chief Executive Officer, PepsiCo. Inc.; U.S. Director of the U.S.–USSR Economic and Trade Council
Kennedy, Edward M., Senator (D–Massachusetts); possible Democratic Presidential candidate in 1976
Kennedy, John F., President of the United States from January 1961 until November 1963
Kennedy, Richard T., Colonel, USA; member, National Security Council Staff
Khrushchev, Nikita S., General Secretary, Communist Party of the Soviet Union from September 1953 until October 1964
Persons XXI

Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; also, from September 1973, Secretary of State
Korniyenko, Georgi M., Head of the USA Division, Soviet Foreign Ministry
Kosygin, Aleksey N., Chairman, Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union
Kuznetsov, Vasily V., Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Le Duan, First Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party (functional equivalent of General Secretary)
Le Duc Tho, Special Adviser, and de facto head of, to the Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the Paris Peace Talks
Lehman, John, member, National Security Council staff
Lin Biao, former Vice Premier of the People’s Republic of China
Lodal, Jan M., Director of Program Analysis, National Security Council
Lynn, James T., Under Secretary of Commerce until 1973; Secretary of Housing and Urban Development from 1973

Malik, Yakov A., Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations
Mansfield, Michael J., Senator (D–Montana); Senate Majority Leader
Manzhulo, A.N., Soviet Deputy Foreign Trade Minister
Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), Chairman, Chinese Communist Party
McGovern, George S., Senator (D–South Dakota); Democratic Presidential nominee in the 1972 election
Meir, Golda, Israeli Prime Minister until June 1974
Mills, Wilbur D., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–Arkansas); Chairman, House Ways and Means Committee
Mitchell, John, Attorney General from 1969 until 1972
Moorer, Thomas H., Admiral, USN; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff until 1974
Moorhead, William S., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–Pennsylvania)
Muskie, Edmund S., Senator (D–Maine)

Nasser, Gamal Abdel, Egyptian President from June 1956 until September 1970
Negroponte, John D., member, National Security Council Staff
Nguyen Van Thieu, President of the Republic of (South) Vietnam
Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States from January 1969 until August 1974

Patolichev, Nikolay Semenovich, Soviet Foreign Trade Minister
Percy, Charles, Senator (R–Illinois); member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Peterson, Peter G., Secretary of Commerce until February 1973; U.S. Chairman of the U.S.–USSR Joint Commercial Commission
Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Podgorny, Nikolay V., Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union
Pompidou, Georges, President of France until April 1974

Rabin, Yitzhak, Israeli Prime Minister from June 1974
Ratliff, Rob Roy, member, National Security Council staff; Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee
Reagan, Ronald, Governor of California
Ribicoff, Abraham A., Senator (D–Connecticut)
Rockefeller, David, Chairman, Chase Manhattan Bank; Director, Council on Foreign Relations
Rockefeller, Nelson A., Governor of New York
Rodman, Peter W., member, National Security Council Staff
Rogers, William P., Secretary of State until September 1973
Roosevelt, Franklin D., President of the United States from March 1933 until April 1945
Rush, Kenneth, Deputy Secretary of Defense from February 1972 until February 1973; Deputy Secretary of State from February 1973 until May 1974

Sadat, Anwar, Egyptian President
Sapi, Yosef, Israeli Minister of Industry from 1969 until 1970
Saqqaf, Omar, Saudi Foreign Minister
Scali, John, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from February 1973
Scheel, Walter, Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany until 1974; Acting Chancellor until May 1974; thereafter President
Schlesinger, James R., Director of Central Intelligence from February until July 1973; Secretary of Defense from July 1973
Schmidt, Helmut, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from May 1974
Scott, Hugh D., Jr., Senator (R–Pennsylvania)
Scowcroft, Brent, Brigadier General, USAF; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; after February 1973, Military Assistant to the President
Selassie, see Haile Selassie
Semenov, Vladimir S., Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister; Chief, Soviet Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
Shultz, George P., Secretary of the Treasury from June 1972 until May 1974
Sihanouk, Norodom, leader of the Cambodian Government in exile in Beijing
Simon, William E., Deputy Secretary of the Treasury from January 1973 until May 1974; thereafter Secretary of the Treasury
Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until February 1974
Smirnov, Leonid Vasilyevich, Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union
Smith, Gerard C., Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Chief, U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks until February 1973
Sokolov, Oleg M., First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in the United States
Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, member, National Security Council staff until 1974; Counselor of the Department of State from January 1974
Stalin, Joseph, General Secretary, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from April 1922 until March 1953
Stein, Herbert, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers until 1974
Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from August 1972 until January 1974; U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from March 1974
Suslov, Mikhail Andreievich, member, Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Symington, Stuart S., Senator (D–Missouri) until September 1976

Taft, Robert A., Jr., Senator (R–Ohio)
Teng Hsiao-ping, see Deng Xiaoping
Thieu, see Nguyen Van Thieu
Timmons, William B., White House Congressional Liaison

Ustinov, Dmitriy F., Secretary, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Vanik, Charles A., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–Ohio)
Vorontsov, Yuri, Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in the United States; Chargé of the Embassy in Ambassador Dobrynin’s absence
Waldheim, Kurt, Secretary General of the United Nations
Wilson, Harold, British Prime Minister from October 1964 until June 1970 and from March 1974

Xuan Thuy, Chief of the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the Paris Peace Talks

Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), Premier of the People’s Republic of China
Ziegler, Ronald L., White House Press Secretary
Zumwalt, Elmo R., Admiral, USN; Chief of Naval Operations until July 1974
Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the Foreign Relations of the United States statute that requires inclusion in the Foreign Relations series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford Presidencies.

Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency

The Truman administration’s concern over Soviet “psychological warfare” prompted the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4–A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4–A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.¹

The CIA’s early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4–A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct “covert” rather than merely “psychological” operations, defining them as all activities “which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if un-

¹ NSC 4–A, December 17, 1947, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 257.
covered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.’’

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: ‘‘propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [sic] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.’’

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA’s administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions. In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA’s activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper ‘‘scope and magnitude’’ of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA’s authority over guerrilla warfare. The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA’s covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific projects

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2 NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, is printed ibid., Document 292.
3 Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, ‘‘Implementation of NSC–10/2,’’ August 12, 1948, is printed ibid., Document 298.
from the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives originally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA’s latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency’s responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among State, Defense, and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.5

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the “NSC 5412/2 Special Group” or simply “Special Group,” emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA.6 The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the


6 Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents, pp. 63, 147–148; Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book 1, Foreign and Military Intelligence (1976), pp. 50–51. For texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2, see Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, Documents 212 and 250.
group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.\(^7\)

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy’s request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of $25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.\(^8\)

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.\(^9\)

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson

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\(^7\) Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, p. 63.

\(^8\) Ibid., p. 82.

assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging these responsibilities.\textsuperscript{10}

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of “Special Group 5412” to “303 Committee” but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.\textsuperscript{11}

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.\textsuperscript{12}

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation not reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40,\textsuperscript{13} which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership of the Committee.

\textsuperscript{11} For text of NSAM No. 303, see ibid., Document 204.
\textsuperscript{12} Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 56–57.
NSDM 40 reaffirmed the DCI’s responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and “politically sensitive” covert operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA’s individual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d’état against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.14

President’s Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding Congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the President had signed a “finding” and informed Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security.15

Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major Congressional investigations of CIA activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory Group, composed of the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously-approved operations. EO 11905 also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in poli-

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14 Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 54–55, 57.

15 Public Law 93–559.
technical assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities.\textsuperscript{16}

Soviet Union,
June 1972–August 1974

Post-Moscow Summit Discussions and Issues,
June–August 1972

1. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 8, 1972, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Anatoli Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Dobrynin had just returned from Moscow and was effusive about the meeting. He had a message from Brezhnev to me personally commenting on my constructive handling of the negotiations. The Soviet leaders were convinced that I had made a major contribution to the success of the Summit and they wanted me to know their appreciation. Brezhnev looked forward to my return to Moscow early in September. And if I came before September 15, he hoped that I would be his guest in the Crimea.

Dobrynin had a message also from Brezhnev to the President. He thanked the President for the manner in which he conducted the Moscow negotiations. He pointed out that there were many successes at the Summit but the greatest success in the eyes of the Soviet leaders was the personal relationship established between Brezhnev and the President.

Dobrynin then said that he looked forward to further discussions with me on a variety of issues, especially the Middle-East. Gromyko had been very pleased by our discussions, particularly by the direct

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 12. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the White House Map Room.

2 A reference to the Moscow Summit, May 22–30, 1972. The records of the meetings between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev, as well as documentation on discussions leading up to and preparations for the summit, are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972.
way in which I had handled it. He also thought that we should start
talking about the trade negotiations. In fact, Kosygin had said to him
that it was obvious that Rogers didn’t know what he was talking about
and that unless Kissinger got involved, Kosygin did not have too much
confidence.

I asked Dobrynin about the plan to send Podgorny to Hanoi. Do-
brynin replied that Podgorny was still planning to go. They had sent a
summary of the conversations with me to Hanoi but indicated that
Podgorny stood ready to give a fuller explanation. Hanoi had not yet
replied and therefore the matter was still in abeyance. He expected that
the trip would take place in the near future though.

I gave him a letter from the President to Brezhnev (Tab A) and
promised him copies of clarifying statements on SLBM’s which we
were preparing for congressional presentation. [These were delivered
to Dobrynin later in the day (Tab B).]3

There was some desultory small talk and then the meeting broke
up.

Tab A

Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary
Brezhnev4

Washington, June 8, 1972.

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

In the days since departing from Moscow, I have reflected a great
deal upon our historic week of meetings. It will be judged not only by
the agreements that were reached but by the impetus it gave to future
negotiations and agreements and by the way in which we build upon
the foundations which we jointly established for our future relations.
The week in Moscow was thus both a culmination of over three years of
common efforts, by which we prepared what was accomplished, and a
starting point for even more fruitful bilateral cooperation and for new
advances toward the goal of a peaceful world.

In expressing to you and your colleagues Mrs. Nixon’s and my
own gratitude, and that of all those who accompanied us, for the warm
hospitality shown to us throughout our stay, I should like to stress

3 Attached but not printed. Brackets are in the original.
4 Top Secret. A handwritten notation at the top of the page reads: “Handed by K to
D, 10:50 am, Thurs, 6/8/72, Map Room.”
again the importance I attach to the direct and personal contact we were able to establish. I say this not in order to give exaggerated weight to the role of any one individual, or because good personal relationships are all that is needed to solve the great problems of our day. I do believe, however, that when responsible leaders can communicate frankly and clearly with each other, it helps to create the conditions in which those problems can be dealt with concretely and realistically. It is in this spirit that I expect to be in frequent touch with you about any major moves we are planning as well as on all matters of common concern.

In this spirit, I thought it might be useful, Mr. General Secretary, to set down my views of the tasks ahead of us. I would welcome your reaction to these views so that our representatives can then proceed from a common appreciation of what we should seek to accomplish in the months before us.

In the field of bilateral cooperation, I believe we should act promptly to give substance to the agreements we have reached. In particular, with regard to the agreements on science, technology and the environment, senior American officials will be available at an early date to meet with your responsible officials to work out detailed programs. In the areas of health and outer space, the relevant agencies of our governments already have excellent working relationships, but I am certain that these have received added momentum from the summit meetings.

With respect to the agreement to prevent incidents at sea, full implementing instructions have been issued to all our commanders. I am gratified that good personal and working relationships have been established between our respective naval officers up to the highest levels, and I am confident that the agreement will put an end to the potentially dangerous frictions that occasionally arose in the past.

With regard to economic and commercial relations, I have already indicated to you that Secretary Peterson will plan to visit Moscow in July, if this meets with your convenience, so that the joint commercial commission can begin its work promptly and complete the provisions

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5 For the text of the agreements, signed at the Moscow Summit, see Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, pp. 921–926.
6 For the text of the agreement, see ibid., pp. 926–927.
7 The text of the U.S.-Soviet joint communiqué issued on May 29 after the Moscow Summit reads in part: “In the interests of broadening and facilitating commercial ties between the two countries, and to work out specific arrangements, the two Sides decided to create a U.S.-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission. Its first meeting will be held in Moscow in the summer of 1972.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, p. 637) The formation of the commission was first announced on May 26 in Moscow by Peter Flanigan. See “Joint Commission Set Up To Resolve Trade Issues,” The New York Times, May 27, 1972, p. 1.
of a trade agreement. I believe it would be desirable for both sides to review the discussions held during my visit to Moscow, as well as those held earlier in Moscow and Washington, so that the decisions necessary to remove the remaining obstacles to agreement can be made at the highest political levels by the time the commission convenes. Our discussions in Moscow undoubtedly served to clarify the factors which influence decisions in both our governments, and I am hopeful that we will therefore be able to approach the next phase of these negotiations with fuller mutual understanding. I am convinced that we have only scratched the surface of the possibilities in the commercial field. Dr. Kissinger is already working with Secretary Peterson on how to push forward some of the projects discussed in Moscow including those concerning natural gas.

Finally, in the area of bilateral relations, I share what I know to be your desire to proceed at an early date to the next stage of the negotiations to limit strategic arms. I plan very shortly to submit the treaty limiting ABM systems and the interim agreement on offensive strategic arms\(^8\) to our Congress. From my initial discussions with key members of the two houses of the Congress, I am confident that the agreements we concluded will command a substantial majority. There will, of course, be considerable public discussion, and indeed some controversy, about certain of the terms of these agreements. I consider such discussion vital because it is essential that a historic agreement affecting basic security interests should be fully understood by the public. I believe you are aware that certain aspects of the agreement, especially those dealing with offensive weapons, are viewed by some in this country as disadvantageous to the United States. While I am convinced that the “freeze” agreement represents a fair compromise, safeguarding the security of both sides, I know you will understand that members of my Administration who will appear as witnesses before the relevant Congressional committees will be required to give a full explanation of the terms of the agreement and of their implication for our security.

Once the process of debate, explanation and approval has been completed, we will be in a position to move ahead with the follow-on negotiations looking to an early agreement for the permanent limitation and, hopefully, an actual reduction of offensive strategic weapons.

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\(^8\) The United States and the Soviet Union signed two strategic arms limitation accords on May 26: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The former limited each signatory’s deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to two designated areas, including the national command authority. The latter limited the overall level of strategic offensive missile forces. For the text of the SALT treaties, see Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, pp. 918–921.
However, even before that I believe we should, through our confidential channel, seek to clarify the issues for the next stage. Moreover, it would be helpful if, through the same channel, we can communicate regularly to ensure that the implementation of the initial agreements is carried out to the satisfaction of both sides and in a way that avoids misunderstandings. Obviously, the negotiations for a follow-on agreement will have the best chance of succeeding in an atmosphere of confidence about the implementation of the first agreement.

Turning to European questions, I am gratified that we have reached understandings concerning the beginning of multilateral conversations looking to the convening of a full conference on European security and cooperation and of preparatory talks aimed at negotiations on reciprocal reductions of armed forces and armaments,9 first of all in Central Europe where the military concentrations on both sides are the greatest. These questions of course involve the interests of many other states who expect to make their contribution to mutually acceptable progress. In the weeks ahead, I look forward, however, to a continued exchange of views in the confidential channel so that both our governments can proceed in these negotiations with the fullest possible understanding of each other’s interests and objectives.

I welcomed the opportunity to discuss with you and your colleagues the possibilities of a satisfactory settlement in the Middle East. The problems involved present perhaps the greatest challenge to the statesmen of all the concerned countries; the manner in which our two nations approach these problems is a practical test of the basic principles which we signed on my last day in Moscow.10 I am prepared to build upon the discussions we conducted in Moscow by further confidential exchanges.

Our lengthy conversations about the conflict in Indochina11 served, I believe, to deepen the comprehension by each side of the attitude of the other. I believe it was clear that both our countries want to see peace come to this anguished region. I will not deviate from my

9 The text of the U.S.-Soviet joint communiqué reads in part: “The U.S. and the USSR are in accord that multilateral consultations looking toward a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe could begin after the signature of the Final Quadripartite Protocol of the Agreement of September 3, 1971.” It continues, “Both Sides believe that the goal of ensuring stability and security in Europe would be served by a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments, first of all in Central Europe.” In conclusion, an “Appropriate agreement should be reached as soon as practicable between the states concerned on the procedures for negotiations on this subject in a special forum.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, p. 640)

10 For the text of the “Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” May 29, see ibid., pp. 633–635.

11 For the memoranda of these conversations, May 23 and 24, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Documents 263 and 271.
commitment to an honorable conclusion of the conflict and my representatives will remain ready to engage in prompt, productive negotiations to that end. I will be fully alert to any indication that the other side is prepared to pursue this path. I am looking forward to the results of the mission you mentioned during my last meeting with you.

Mr. General Secretary, I shall await with interest your own reflections on the considerations I have outlined in this message. The long road that brought us to the Moscow summit was not an easy one, and it was marked by many detours. Given the many important differences which we both recognize remain and will continue to remain between us, the road to the next summit meeting will undoubtedly not be an easy one either. But we now know how to prepare and we can accelerate the process. I hope that when the not too distant time comes that we may repay here the hospitality extended to us in the Soviet Union, we will be able to show new accomplishments in the cause of peace for our two countries and the world as a whole. That should be the goal of all our endeavors in the weeks and months ahead.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

2. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

Important Items

1. I saw Dobrynin at 12:30 pm today due to a conflict in his schedule. I told him that in response to his message of yesterday and after discussing the issue with you and the President we wished to confirm that there would be no air activity over Hanoi or Haiphong during the period just prior to the arrival of the Soviet Delegation and through

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 12. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “HAK has seen.”

2 Not found.
their departure. I told him that this was consistent with the discussions held by the President with the Soviet Leaders at the time of the Moscow Summit, adding that if I could have a firm assurance of the time that the Soviet Delegation would be spending in Hanoi it might be possible to add some additional restrictions but in any case it would be impossible to halt U.S. air activity throughout North Vietnam. Dobrynin stated that he thought the group would be there three or four days and could not be sure precisely but that in any event the period would be so brief that it would not result in a major military implication for the U.S.

I then told Dobrynin that you had asked me to see him urgently and inform him that during the February visit to Peking it had been agreed that you would make a subsequent visit to that capitol and that in recent days Peking had expressed a great sense of urgency that your followup visit take place very soon. I pointed out that we had been attempting to delay the visit but that the June 26 visit of the leaders of the House, the Democratic Convention during which it would be impossible for you to be in Peking for domestic political reasons and in light of the actions planned for September, you and the President had determined that it would be necessary for you to accept Peking’s invitation and that you planned to be in Peking for three full days next week, arriving Monday evening and departing Friday a.m.4 I emphasized that matters of Soviet interest would be assiduously avoided and that the President was most anxious that the Soviet leaders were aware of his determination to abide strictly to the provisions of the principles arrived at by the two parties during his visit to Moscow.5 Dobrynin seemed a little disturbed and noted that we were aware of the Congressional visit and the Democratic Convention long before now and he, therefore, wondered why the Soviet side had not been informed of your visit to Peking earlier. I pointed out that we had hoped to have it occur much later but that Peking was insistent and that they had made reference to the situation in Southeast Asia. Therefore, in the light of all these factors the President had decided to proceed next week. I mentioned that this decision had just been made and that you had flashed me from Tokyo so that Ambassador Dobrynin would be informed as soon as possible. I pointed out that the visit was not known by any other U.S. officials and that we now planned to make a low-keyed announcement on Wednesday at 11:00 a.m. I also pointed out that you were very anxious to meet with the Ambassador at breakfast on Tuesday morning and would cover in greater detail the circumstances surrounding your visit to Peking. He stated that he was scheduled to

3 Kissinger accompanied Nixon on his trip to China, February 21–28.
4 June 19–23.
have breakfast with Secretary Peterson on Tuesday and I told him that I
would take care of that problem and he offered to meet with Peterson
Wednesday, Thursday or Friday.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than U.S.-Soviet
relations.]

10. Breakfast is set up in the Map Room at 8:30 am tomorrow
morning with Dobrynin.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than U.S.-Soviet
relations.]

3. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger) and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin1

Washington, June 13, 1972, 4:53 p.m.

D: Hello, Henry.
K: Anatol, two things.
D: Yes.
K: One, on that trip—I mean, not mine but yours.2
D: Yeah.
K: We have put on the restriction I mentioned to you this
morning.3
D: Until—
K: And we will maintain it until he leaves if it is within a reason-
able time.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger
Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 14, Chronological File. No classification
marking. Blank underscores are omissions in the original
2 Kissinger is referring to Podgorny’s upcoming trip to Hanoi.
3 According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, he met with Dobrynin in the Map
Room for breakfast, 8:32–10:16 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger
Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1967–76) In a June 13 memorandum, Haig wrote Kissinger:
"Inform Dobrynin that in light of the brevity of Podgorny’s visit to Hanoi, you have pre-
vailed upon the President to extend the bombing restrictions to a line south of 20° latitude
throughout the period of Podgorny’s visit. Mention that this restriction is being applied
in the face of strong bureaucratic opposition but that we are making this exception as an
expression of our good will and interest in Podgorny’s activities in Hanoi.” (National Ar-
chives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country
Files—Europe—USSR, Map Room, Aug. 1972–May 31, 1973 (1 of 3)) No other record of
the meeting has been found.
D: Yeah, I understand. Okay, thank you.
K: Yes, but it is important that you tell me as soon as you can once you know the time is.
D: I will check with them but I am sure nobody could answer me right now because it will depend—he probably already arrived today or if he doesn’t arrive but how many days, I just tell you reasonably it probably take around four days but nobody could tell as of now. Particularly, because it is not just a quick visit in a sense, that is, a visit from this till this one. He will just have an informal discussion with them but it will not be long, I am sure about this.
K: Well, if you could let me know, then I will not put an arbitrary restriction on.
D: Yeah, I understand. May I put it this way, I will say to—by Saturday or what you say, or you don’t want really—better not to mention, of course, specifically but—
K: Well, we have now put it on through Saturday their time.
D: I see.
K: But if your leader should stay an extra day, could you let me know?
D: Okay.
K: And we will not do anything while he’s there.
D: Yeah, I understand. Okay, I think it’s fair enough. Saturday, yes, their time.
K: As it is now, the orders are to go through Saturday.
D: Yes, understand.
K: But if you let me know before, say Friday, or let Haig know that he’s staying, say through Sunday.
D: Yeah.
K: We will not do anything while he’s in the country.
D: I understand. It involved that ______ you mentioned?
K: Exactly.
D: Okay, thank you.
K: Secondly, I have on this issue of how we present the treaties.4
D: Yes.
K: We have found a formula which I think you might find interesting. We will invite the two foreign relations committees and the two armed services committees—

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4 In his June 13 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig wrote: “Inform Dobrynin that we are transmitting the SALT legislation to the Hill at noon today.” He recommended that Kissinger explain “the packaging of the legislation” and the “general format of testimony.”
D: The whole committees.
K: The whole committees. And the Joint Atomic Energy Committee to the White House together with the press—
D: Huh?
K: The press pool.
D: I see.
K: And I will present them. The President will introduce me and I will introduce me [it?] and I will present it.
D: Um-humm. It's quite a performance (laughter).
K: So it will not be on television but it will be a very full press coverage.
D: I see. You’ll be in the White House?
K: And it will be in the White House.
D: Is it any timetable or you cannot say?
K: We haven’t told the press so it’s strictly for you.
D: I understand.
K: Thursday morning at 9:00.5
D: Oh, Thursday morning. So it’s really before you go?
K: Yes.
D: I see. I think it’s a very good idea.
K: It will not make my reception much warmer when I say friendly things about you.
D: (laughter) So I see you are not really exhausted by your trip to the Orient. Still there are some ideas following.
K: Okay.
D: Okay, thank you. So we will—somebody will be in touch with you.
K: Good.
D: You are leaving on the end of Thursday or Friday?
K: I’m leaving either at the end of Thursday or Friday morning.
D: Just for my own information.
K: But you will let Haig know?
D: Yeah. He knows?
K: Yes, he’s fully informed.
D: Yeah. Okay about this one. And we will have this warm line I hope.

K: Oh, that will be established within the shortest time.
D: Yes, I understand that today. Have you had a chance to speak with Pete [Peterson], not yet?
K: Oh, yes, I had lunch with Peterson and I think you will find his approach very constructive and positive.
D: Oh, I think it sounds very positive...

4. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon

Moscow, June 21, 1972.

Dear Mr. President:

Having read your letter, I would like first of all to say that I fully share your positive assessments of the May talks, of their results and of the contacts that were established between us. I would like, in turn, to share with you some of my thoughts that come in this connection.

No doubt, a great job has been done—a good foundation has been laid for a fundamental improvement of Soviet-American relations. Now the main thing becomes—and I note with gratification that you are of the same opinion—to consistently put into life what we have agreed about.

I can inform you that all Soviet ministries and agencies involved have received concrete instructions on that score. And our representatives are ready to continue talks on those questions the discussion on which was impossible to complete during the Moscow meeting; this refers first of all to commercial and economic ties.

We are getting prepared also for the continuation of the official negotiations as well as, naturally, of the confidential contacts on strategic...

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 12. Top Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. A handwritten notation reads: “Delivered to Gen. Haig by Mr. Sokolov at 9:30 a.m. on 6/22/72.” In message Tohak 15, June 22, Haig forwarded to Kissinger in Beijing a copy of the letter and wrote: “As you will note it is a general smorgasbord without any specific indications of real progress, other than an obvious reference to the fact that Hanoi is willing to enter into give-and-take secret negotiations during which our positions would be carefully considered.” (Ibid., Box 993, Alexander M. Haig Chronological File)

arms limitation. We are in accord with you too, that it would be useful to continue the bilateral exchange of views on European matters.

The Soviet people welcome the turn for the better that appeared in our relations, and they expect this to strengthen peace and thus to serve the benefit of all mankind. So far as we can judge, most Americans think likewise.

It is clear by now that in other countries of the world too, the reaction to the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting, with certain nuances present, is on the whole quite positive. The peoples directly connect their hopes for a general warming of the international climate with a betterment of Soviet-American relations.

At the same time, as we can see, many—both in our countries and in others—while giving due credit to what has been accomplished, pay attention also to the fact that there still remain dangerous hotbeds of tension in the world. In the spirit of frankness that marked our conversations in Moscow, I would like to say that this, regrettably, is indeed so.

First of all, of course, there is the matter of Vietnam. I will not come now to repeat our position on the Vietnam question. It was expressed to you in Moscow with all clarity and in full.

As you know, a Soviet delegation headed by N.V. Podgorny visited Hanoi the other day. In accordance with the wishes you expressed, the delegation brought to the attention of the DRV leadership the information about the position of the American side on Vietnam as it had been stated to us in the conversations in Moscow.

The Vietnamese leaders displayed an attentive attitude to this information. On their part they stressed great significance which they attach to the Paris negotiations and spoke of their readiness to the resumption of both plenary sessions and private meetings. It was stated that Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thui will shortly return to Paris with this aim in view.

As we understood the Vietnamese side has a business-like approach toward the resumption of the Paris talks and thinks that the talks can be constructive if the American side displays a broad realistic approach to the situation at hand and readiness to conduct really serious negotiations with the North Vietnamese side for the settlement of the war in Indochina on a basis, just for all. We did not understand the matter in such a way that the Vietnamese side proceeds on the basis

3 Podgorny visited North Vietnam from June 15 to 20.
that only its proposals should be considered at the talks, and this is important.4

We are deeply convinced as before that the way to end the war in Vietnam goes not through its intensification and expansion but through a search of mutually acceptable solutions at the negotiation table.

It seems, Mr. President, that now, taking everything we tell you into account, the American side would do a right thing if it proposed to the Vietnamese side a concrete date of the renewal of the talks and did not complicate the situation by bombings and other military actions in Vietnam (the more so that it does not solve the problem), and also raised the blockade of the entries to the North Vietnamese ports, i.e. that U.S. step is most unpopular with the world public opinion and it affects many countries in the world.5

The situation in the Middle East remains to be dangerous as well, and that was also a subject of frank talks in Moscow. A radical change of the situation there can be achieved only by speedily going over to practical measures on peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We are looking forward to receive from you concrete considerations on that matter in pursuance of those general principles that were talked over in the course of the Moscow meeting.

It is perfectly clear that our coordinated efforts in the interests of removing hotbeds of tension existing in the world, would also fully correspond to those basic principles which, as we have agreed, our countries should be guided by in relations with each other and generally in their activities on the international scene. It would serve at the

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4 In a draft message to Kissinger on June 22, Haig wrote: “After sending the Brezhnev letter early this morning Dobrynin called late this afternoon and made the point that Brezhnev was most anxious that we consider very carefully his language on Vietnam. He pointed out what Dobrynin considers to be three significant portions of the paragraph on Vietnam: (a) The fact that the North Vietnamese had agreed to resume both private and plenary sessions in Paris. (I did not tell Dobrynin that we had had this information earlier from the North Vietnamese) (b) The fact that the North Vietnamese had agreed to ‘business-like’ discussions. Dobrynin stated that this meant there would be no resort to polemics or propaganda during the talks. (c) Dobrynin emphasized that the North Vietnamese had apparently agreed to listen to and negotiate on the basis of our proposals as well as their own.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 993, Alexander M. Haig Chronological File)

5 Haig wrote in message Tohak 15 to Kissinger: “The Soviet reference to the cessation of bombing and mining does not appear especially starchy. From my humble perspective and prior to having the benefit of your guidance and assessment of the situation there, it would appear that our best bet is to lay on in the weeks ahead, especially between now and the next secret meeting, the most concentrated bombing of high-value targets in North Vietnam that they have ever experienced.” Haig stated “that we have got just about all the diplomatic leverage we could hope for both with respect to Moscow and the PRC but that if we are expecting this leverage to do the trick at the negotiating table we may well be disappointed.”
same time the purpose of extensifying and intensifying the cooperation between our countries in most varied fields for the mutual benefit both of our two peoples and of all mankind.

A great work, both for you and for us, lies ahead. Indeed, the leaders of the two powers face a task, tremendous in its scope and complexity, to bring about a turn in the relations which were shaping up in the course of more than a quarter-century and which gave rise to their traditions, their customs and, if you please, their own force of inertia.

Tenacious efforts are needed to overcome them all. In this connection I would like to emphasize once again, on the basis of the experience we gained, the usefulness of regular contacts. Such contacts will be useful also for discussing problems, arising in the course of implementation of the treaties and agreements signed in Moscow.

We believe that mutual understanding and mutual account of positions of the sides should be a permanent part of our countries’ policies. All this is important too for making conditions favorable for further improvement of the relations between the USSR and the USA, including the next Soviet-American summit meeting, which you refer to in your letter, and the preparation of which, as experience shows, should be thought about and looked after in advance.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

6 Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

5. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

Washington, June 24, 1972, 10:28 a.m.

AD: Welcome back, Henry.

HAK: I just tried to reach you.

AD: Thank you very much. How are you?

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 14, Chronological File. No classification marking. Brackets are in the original. Blank underscores are omissions in the original.
HAK: I’m fine. Shall we have lunch on Friday?²
AD: Do you prefer breakfast or lunch—I think lunch is better.
HAK: Shall I come over there? I don’t mind being corrupted. I
wanted to say two things—When we send over an announcement³—I
tried to reach you last night and couldn’t get you.
AD: Yesterday I was out until around 11:00.
HAK: I tried to reach you to read the announcement to you that we
are putting out—we sent it over—it is nothing. About the Chinese talks.
Did you get it?
AD: No, not yet.
HAK: We sent it over this morning.
AD: I got here just 15 minutes ago. What is it about?
HAK: It is about nothing—I will read it to you now. It just says PM
Chou En-lai and other Chinese officials had discussions with Dr. Kiss-
inger and his party . . . reads rest of Saturday announcement.
AD: That’s all?
HAK: It was essentially a review of the situation and they of course
asked questions about the meaning of various agreements—if you can
imagine.
AD: No, no, it is imaginable.
HAK: I explained exactly in the terms of more or less our public
presentations. And they were not crazy about Article 3 of our general
principles. And then there was some Vietnam discussions. I’ll go over
with you on Monday—but nothing of startling interest.
AD: It’s all right. I’d like to talk to you about several things in-
cluding strategic arms—you remember? Then about signing here about
the Deputy of Trade and I would like to discuss it with you—but you’ll
be there in your office let’s say within an hour?
HAK: Yes.
AD: I will call you because he might arrive on Sunday—
HAK: This coming Sunday?
HAK: Yes. Deputy of Trade you say?
AD: Yes, he is the First Deputy of ______ Policy. In connection with
what the President discussed in Moscow. Maybe in an hour or a half an
hour I will call you back.

² They met on Monday, June 26; see Document 6.
³ For the text of the official joint statement on Kissinger’s talks in China, issued si-
multaneously in Washington and Beijing on the morning of June 24, see Robert B.
Semple, Jr., “Kissinger Detects No Change on War After China Visit,” The New York
Times, June 25, 1972, p. 1. The records of Kissinger’s meetings with Chinese leaders are
231–234.
HAK: One other thing that needs no saying. I don’t know whether you read that Joe Alsop column\(^4\) yesterday.

AD: No.

HAK: Well, it is pure, absolute total (?) mystery.

AD: What did he say?

HAK: He said that I was going there to discuss military measures against a Soviet attack.

AD: Why would he write something like this?

HAK: Anatol, I do not understand it. First off I do not believe there will be a Soviet attack, secondly, I have said a thousand times that I have never discussed any military measures with him—you know—it is not that sort of a relationship.

AD: That is why I was wondering why. It is interesting why he would do it.

HAK: I cannot understand it.

AD: He has a good personal relationship . . .

HAK: He has an excellent relationship with me—I am so furious with him that I have ordered both Haig and of course myself to cut off all contact with him. Because this is the—he has an excellent relationship with me and for that reason it’s going to mean a significance that it wouldn’t normally have.

AD: Because—this is the point, there is no reason why—two or three days ago he wrote an article about all the Soviet ambassadors\(^5\)—I don’t know if you remember—going around saying that there—

HAK: Well, you saw the article he wrote about me that I will be made Secretary of State\(^6\)—do you think that will do me any good?

AD: (laughs) It would be flattering from the point of view of the common public, I should say.

HAK: From the point of view of the common public, it is flattering, but from the point of view of Washington it is a disaster—you know that.

AD: Yes, I know.

HAK: But believe me—I haven’t seen the article about you—

AD: No, no there was no article about me—just that all the Russian ambassadors that they were telling everyone that the military advance of the North Vietnamese is a complete failure.

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\(^6\) Not further identified.
HAK: Well, he doesn’t get that from me either.

AD: To put that in my mouth, I am saying everyone—it is nothing really otherwise, you know.

HAK: You know, Anatol, both you and I know he is violently anti-Soviet for a reason we both know and he is making the maximum amount of mischief. I normally don’t comment to you about newspapers, but I have—and to do that while I am in Peking, so it isn’t speculation, it’s like he really knew something.

AD: As if it were a special kind of connection [laughs].

HAK: Well, I can tell you I don’t know what the Chinese think, but they must be furious.

AD: It doesn’t bother about their feelings specifically.

HAK: Of course, you know if it wasn’t [laughs], we wouldn’t do it, it would be insane in the light of our present relationship, but it is an absolute outrage.

AD: I will call you in a half an hour.

HAK: I will be giving a brief press conference this morning just describing the schedule of my trip of China—it’s just mechanical.

AD: I see—just in Peking or your travels around Peking.

HAK: Just Peking. Oh, there was another article in the newspapers incidentally that I had visited the Polytechnical Institute and talked to their rocket experts—total nonsense.

AD: Yes, and last night or the week before it was the guest house where you stayed there were so many people around arriving for the special meeting.

HAK: Again, total nonsense. The day I went—you know they followed it and they were usually cut off by security people—I can tell you what I did but that morning I went to the Sports Academy where they train acrobatics and ping pong players which is about two miles from the Polytechnical Institute—and I went to the Sports Academy, so they—I never went to the Institute or saw that scientist. For example, one night they said I had a late meeting at the Great Hall of the People—somebody must have put this stuff out in Peking, because what happened was that I went to an Opera performance at the Great Hall of the People which ended at 11:00.

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7 For a summary of Kissinger’s comments, see Semple, “Kissinger Detects No Change on War After China Visit,” The New York Times, June 25, 1972, p. 1. In a telephone conversation on June 24 at 12:25 p.m., Kissinger discussed the press conference with President Nixon, who asked: “Did you get across the point, which I think is very important, you know, that our relations with them [the Chinese] are very good—that’s the thing.” When Kissinger replied affirmatively, Nixon said: “that’s the thing that I think will really bust or burn the Soviet’s ass.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 14, Chronological File)
AD: Did you have American newspapermen there?

HAK: No, this was the local press and of course the Chinese controlled them completely—I cannot control what they do, but I did not see a single newsmen and there was no particular meeting in fact the last night we had been outside the guest house.

AD: They’re probably just trying to arrive at a colorful . . . saying you are in Peking.

HAK: You call me at 11:00, I’ll be back in my office—11:15.

AD: Okay, I’ll call at 11:15.

HAK: Good.8

8 In the telephone conversation with Nixon at 12:25 p.m., Kissinger said: “I talked to Dobrynin again this morning.” Nixon responded: “Oh, tell me about that.” Kissinger replied: “Slobbering all over me, saying how serious his leaders are and when can I let him know whether we are ready to negotiate. I said on Monday I’ll give him an answer. Because I think we should first notify the North Vietnamese. They shouldn’t hear it from them.”

6. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 26, 1972, 1:30–3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

The meeting was extremely cordial. We had some introductory pleasantries during which Dobrynin asked how the Chinese addressed me. I said one thing that impressed me about them was that they always called me “Excellency.” That fitted in well with my vanity. Dobrynin said, well, if he had known that he would have briefed Brezhnev to call me “Excellency,” too. But now it was too late, because I was beyond the “Excellency” level with Brezhnev, who considered me as a co-worker.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 12. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Brackets are in the original. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy.
My Trip to China

Dobrynin then asked me about the Chinese trip—what had been most significant. I followed the strategy of telling him things which, if they got leaked back to the Chinese, would appear like a provocation and therefore highly improbable. I said that the Chinese were, of course, extremely concerned about the Summit—especially they were concerned by the Declaration of Principles which had an aspect of condominium. They wondered whether this meant that the United States and the Soviet Union were prepared to cooperate in carving up China. (I drew this from a presentation Chou had made to me a year earlier.) Dobrynin said, "Can they really mean it?" I said I had no way of knowing, but this seems to be a fear. Dobrynin wanted to know what they thought about Japan, and specifically my trip to Japan.² I said I couldn't say that they were overjoyed by my trip, but they understood its basic necessity. I pointed out, however, that they were not eager to see the Japanese invest in Siberia. Dobrynin said that their Ambassador in China had the impression that the Chinese were reconciled to the Security Treaty. I said that it was hard to judge; they were still talking against it but perhaps not with the same intensity. Dobrynin asked whether the Chinese were raising European matters. I said only that I had the general impression that they favored European unity, but this obviously was not a major subject of consultation. Dobrynin asked me about the Chinese attitude towards the Middle East. I said they seemed to me to be supporting in effect the Fedayeen position. Dobrynin said yet it was odd that they refused to participate in the five-power talks in New York.

Dobrynin volunteered the fact that the Soviet press had handled my visit to China in a very restrained way and that it was understood in Moscow that my visit had really been at the Chinese initiative. It indicated the good basis which our relationship had reached.

Vietnam

Dobrynin next asked whether we had made any decisions with respect to Hanoi. I said we had received word from Hanoi that they would not accept the 28th because Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy would still be in Vietnam but that they were prepared to resume plenary sessions on the 13th and private talks on the 15th. We had accepted the plenary for the 13th but had moved the private talk to the 19th in order not to interfere with my trip to the West Coast. Dobrynin suggested that this would create great confusion in Hanoi since he doubted that they really understood the notion of a vacation; and they probably wondered whether there was some profound ulterior motive. Do-

² Kissinger was in Japan from June 8 to June 12.
brynin said that they have a very odd way of doing business and that they are watching them sometimes in Moscow with consternation and always with fascination because they seem to do everything according to a set pattern that is almost impossible to change.

I asked him why Podgorny’s trip was delayed so long. He said the North Vietnamese had been extremely difficult. They claimed that the Politburo members were out of town and that therefore they could not receive him for two weeks after the Summit. When Podgorny was in Hanoi, they took the position that they would have to hear from Peking about my trip first before they could take a final decision. They did promise, however, that they would study the proposition of Brezhnev very attentively. In about two weeks, the Soviets would inquire what had happened to it.

One obstacle, he continued, was that the North Vietnamese completely misread the American domestic situation. They were easily taken in by loud sympathizers of a point of view that had really very little objective support in the United States, and he could not be sure that they were not waiting for the election. Dobrynin asked whether I said anything in Peking that would undercut the Soviet position. I said, on the contrary, I took a slightly tougher line in Peking than in Moscow, stressing primarily the ceasefire elements and not going into any detail on the political solution. In other words, Hanoi would hear nothing from Peking that would give them comfort on the political solution and that, indeed, would go as far on the political side as we had gone vis-à-vis Moscow. Dobrynin seemed relieved by this.

I asked Dobrynin in passing how it was that Brezhnev had misunderstood me so much that he could think I had offered a two-month period of resignation for Thieu. Dobrynin laughed and said Brezhnev hadn’t misunderstood it. He had simply told the Politburo that he had obtained it from the President. At that point, Gromyko had nudged Dobrynin and said, “Do you believe that Kissinger said more than one month?” Brezhnev hearing them talk said, “Kissinger didn’t say it, but I got it out of the President.” Finally, Brezhnev agreed that all the agreement called for was that, if nothing else stood in the way but an extension of the resignation deadline, it could be considered.

Economic Relations

We then turned to other matters. Dobrynin told me about the visit of the Deputy Minister of Trade3 to the United States. He said he was under instructions to settle the grain issue in the sense desired by the President, but he wanted the discussions to be kept quiet. He said,

3 M.R. Kuzmin.
“This Minister has been kept in New York at my instructions and considered himself under house arrest,” jokingly.

We left it that Dobrynin would let me know the next day what the subjects were that were being discussed, and I would then tell him into what bureaucratic channel to put it. He did say, however, that the Soviet Union was prepared to make a rapid grain deal in order to be helpful to the President. I told him this was very much appreciated.

Dobrynin then produced a note [Tab A] on a technical issue of how to repay a part of the debt which was a portion, in turn, of the $500 million Lend-Lease ceiling that had been agreed upon. I told him I would have an answer to him in two days.

SALT

Finally, Dobrynin gave me a paper on the Soviet understandings with respect to the SALT agreements [Tab B]. This was in answer to our note of a week earlier and substantially accepted our proposal.

4 Attached but not printed.

7. Editorial Note

On July 8, 1972, at Washington, Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson, U.S. Chairman of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission; Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz; and M.R. Kuzmin, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR, signed an agreement regarding Soviet grain purchases in the United States. The three-year agreement provided for Soviet purchases of a total of $750 million in U.S. grains, the largest Soviet purchase of U.S. grain to date. (Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1972, pages 144–145)
8. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

San Clemente, July 12, 1972, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

The President’s Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, 11:30 a.m., Wednesday, July 12, 1972

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The President welcomed Ambassador Dobrynin to San Clemente. The Ambassador said he liked San Clemente the best of all the President’s residences. The top people needed time to think, he said, and this was a good place for it. General Secretary Brezhnev, too, was a very busy man; he always had piles of papers to work on. The next time the President came to the Soviet Union he must come to the General Secretary’s resort on the Black Sea.

Dr. Kissinger pointed out that first Mr. Brezhnev would have to come here. Ambassador Dobrynin replied that we can do both in the next four years.

The President then observed that the progress in U.S.-Soviet relations was due to the work accomplished through the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel. When he thought of what had really happened on the critical issues, it was clear that what progress we made in the future depended on this channel. There must be an understanding at the highest level.

The President stressed that nobody’s interest was served by having the Vietnam war continued. The only question was how to end it. But both sides must want to end the war.

The bigger problem, the President continued, was how we could build on the achievements of the Moscow Summit and make further breakthroughs. He cited the possible understanding on non-use of nuclear weapons as an example.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 12. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the President’s office at the Western White House. Nixon was in San Clemente from July 1 to July 18. Dobrynin was on a business trip to the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco when Nixon invited him to spend a few days in San Clemente.

Ambassador Dobrynin replied, “You can count on us.” General Secretary Brezhnev was looking forward to Dr. Kissinger’s return visit around September 10 or a little afterward.

The President cited the Middle East as the other problem that we were interested in pursuing actively. He was looking forward to the General Secretary’s return visit to the United States. Could we develop the agenda for our future work? the President then asked. Dr. Kissinger mentioned the El Paso natural gas project. The President said that the vistas for trade can be very big.

The Ambassador concluded by saying that General Secretary Brezhnev sent the President his best personal wishes. The Moscow Summit had positive results and was so evaluated in Moscow. The Soviet leaders looked forward to both Secretary Peterson’s forthcoming visit and Dr. Kissinger’s visit in September. If the two countries could reach a nuclear agreement, it would considerably ease the world situation, he added.

There were additional pleasantries, and the meeting ended.

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9. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Executive Director of the Council for International Economic Policy (Flanigan) to President Nixon**

Washington, undated.

**SUBJECT**

CCC Regulations Affecting US-Soviet Grain Sale and Maritime Agreement

In accordance with NSAMs 220 and 340 of February 5, 1963 and January 25, 1966, Commodity Credit Corporation regulations include the provision that any commodity exported under a financing agreement shall not be shipped from the United States on a vessel which has called at a Cuban port or a North Vietnamese port. The Secretaries of State, Commerce and Agriculture have sent you the joint memorandum at Tab A reviewing the dangers this presents to the new $.75 billion US-Soviet grain sale and the related US-Soviet maritime agreement.

Our best estimate is that approximately 90% of the Russian ships which could be utilized to carry the grain have been to Cuban or North Vietnamese ports since the effective dates of NSAMs 220 and 340. Thus, Soviet agreement to shipping arrangements consistent with NSAMs 220 and 340 is improbable.

The specific problem is that of having Soviet tankers call first at Cuban ports to deliver oil, then at US ports to pick up CCC-financed grain shipments—an arrangement that would be prohibited by NSAM 220 policy. The underlying problem that thus arises is an indirect relaxation of our shipping sanctions against Cuba.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–235, Policy Papers, NSDM 179. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action. Sonnenfeldt forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under a covering July 15 memorandum with the recommendation that he sign it. According to an attached routing memorandum, it was sent to the President for decision on July 17.


4 Attached but not printed is the undated memorandum from Peterson, Butz, and Acting Secretary Johnson.
The 1971 US–USSR grain deal\(^5\) provided for carriage in third-flag ships, avoiding this problem. As noted in the joint memorandum, the maritime negotiations to date are premised on a targeted one-third US and one-third Soviet participation in bilateral shipping (the provision for US participation being essential for ILA/maritime unions’ willingness to work Soviet ships in US ports).\(^6\)

The carriage of oil to Cuba makes grain shipments to Russia an economically attractive round trip for the Soviet vessels. Unless these ships can be so employed, the entire US-Soviet maritime agreement may be unacceptable to the USSR.

State, Commerce and Agriculture believe that, if the grain sale is not to be jeopardized, there will have to be a change to the policy of applying NSAM 220 to CCC commercial export credit sales. The Departments note that any such change would pose substantial foreign policy and domestic political problems:

—The availability of major US grain shipments would make Soviet shipping to Cuba more attractive to the Soviets—this would indirectly benefit Cuba.

—The US has urged other nations not to trade with Cuba; resistance to this policy has increased significantly; any change in US policy—even on a one-time basis or only in recognition of the realities of Russian bulk ship operations—will undoubtedly be read as a softening of our position and be seized upon by others as justifying a broadening of their ties with Cuba, including resuming or expanding trade. Thus, our difficulties in holding the line on existing policy will be sharply increased by the proposed action.

—Any such relaxation in the economic blockade of Cuba by the United States and others would raise strong objections among anti-Cuban and anti-Communist elements in the United States.

In light of these problems, the State Department recommends that the minimum relaxation necessary in NSAM 220 policy be made—i.e., a one-time exception for the US-Soviet grain sale, an exception applying only to Soviet, not third-flag ships. Further, State recommends that

\(^5\) On June 10, 1971, the White House announced the removal of export controls on agricultural products, among other things. The restriction that required that half of all grain shipped to the USSR be on American vessels was lifted, and longshoremen, who initially protested loading the grain on non-American ships, eventually consented to loading American grain on Soviet ships. See Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House* (New York: Summit Books, 1983), pp. 343–349.

\(^6\) On July 9, the *Washington Post* reported with regard to the grain agreement (see Document 7) that “all but one maritime union—the International Longshoremen’s Association, headed by Thomas W. (Teddy) Gleason, have agreed to a compromise U.S. government proposal under which one-third of the cargo would be hauled in U.S. flag ships, one-third in Soviet ships and one-third in ships of other countries.” (Carroll Kirkpatrick, “Russia to Buy $750 Million in U.S. Grain,” *Washington Post*, July 9, 1972, p. A1)
this decision be carefully conveyed to OAS member states before it is made public knowledge.

Because commercially financed US exports are prohibited from being shipped on Soviet ships, Commerce and Agriculture believe a broader relaxation exempting CCC commercial export sales from NSAM 220 policy is preferable. They believe this can be justified because of the short-term credit, largely commercial nature of the program. They note that NSAM 220 does not apply to EX-IM, and they suggest that it should not apply to CCC.

There are two significantly different interpretations and resultant courses of action, one favored by Henry Kissinger and the other favored by Peter Flanigan.

Kissinger’s Position

In my opinion, we have not yet sufficiently tested the Soviets to see if they can be pressured into agreeing to shipping arrangements consistent with our NSAM 220 policy. It is conceivable, considering, for example, the philosophy underlying the Summit Declaration of Principles on unacceptability of unilateral advantage and the very great interest the Soviets have in US grain, that the Soviets might agree to carry this grain in Soviet ships not engaged in the Cuban trade. Accordingly, Secretary Peterson should be instructed to press the Soviets hard on this issue. If you agree, I will personally review the importance of this approach with Pete Peterson before his Moscow trip.

If this does not succeed, the foreign policy and domestic risks of changing NSAM 220 policy have to be weighed against the risk of jeopardizing the grain sale to the Soviets. I believe that the grain sale is of sufficient importance to take the risks that may be involved with making a one-time NSAM 220 policy exception solely for purposes of the sale. I agree with State that the one-time exception will pose lesser problems from the foreign policy viewpoint. Most important it would avoid giving the impression that there has been a general relaxation in our policy toward Cuba.

I do not concur with the Commerce/Agriculture recommendation that CCC export sales be exempted from NSAM 220 policy at this time, because this complex subject has not yet received sufficient study—the overall implications for US policy toward Cuba and North Vietnam have not yet been fully thought through. A prompt interagency study on this issue is required.

I recommend that you approve guidance that would:

—Instruct the Peterson Delegation to make a determined effort to obtain Soviet agreement to shipping arrangements consistent with NSAM 220;
—If this effort fails, authorize the Delegation in the maritime negotiations to agree to shipping arrangements solely for purposes of the grain deal based on a one-time exception to NSAM 220 policy; and

—At the same time, instruct the US agencies concerned to undertake a detailed review of the overall CCC exemption issue for consideration by the SRG.

Accordingly, I recommend that you approve the NSDM at Tab B\(^7\) transmitting the above instructions.\(^8\)

*Flanigan’s Position*

In my opinion, Peterson will be put in an untenable position if he insists that they, after buying $750 million of US grain, are directed after the fact not to use their ships for its transport. Ninety percent of the Soviet fleet has been to Cuba, and the economies of the grain deal demand use of two ships. I do not believe Secretary Peterson should be asked to take this unreasonable position.

It is agreed that the grain agreement and the shipping agreement are of sufficient importance to warrant taking the foreign policy and political risks involved in changing the NSAM 220 policy only in regard to shipping. Although we must expect similar policy changes by other OAS members, we can still maintain our overall policy of economic denial to Cuba.

I recognize that this rationale can also be applied to NSAM 340 and North Vietnam, but I view even indirect relaxation of that policy as politically untenable.

I believe that a one-time exception is more damaging to our position than waiving the CCC prohibition. The immediate risks of criticism and relaxation of economic sanctions by other OAS nations are no greater in exempting all CCC commercial export sales than a “one-time” exception, and in addition is more rationally defensible. In addition, it obviates the necessity of subsequent “one-time exceptions” when the next grain deal, or another commercial deal, is consummated, which deals are the purpose of the Peterson visit.

I do concur that State should carefully convey the decision to OAS member states before it is made public knowledge.

I recommend that you approve guidance that would instruct the Peterson Delegation to agree to shipping arrangements based on a change in the interpretation of NSAM 220 to the CCC regulations.

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\(^7\) Printed as Document 11.

\(^8\) Kissinger initialed the Approve option on behalf of Nixon.
Accordingly, I recommend that you approve the NSDM at Tab C\(^9\) transmitting the above instructions.

\(^9\) Attached but not printed.

10. **Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev**\(^1\)

San Clemente, July 18, 1972.

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Your letter of June 21, 1972\(^2\) was most welcome, continuing as it did the very frank and concrete exchanges that characterize this channel.

Since receiving it, I have been very pleased to see even further progress in the various fields of bilateral cooperation in which agreements were completed at the summit. My Science Advisor, Dr. David, has informed me that his visit to your country\(^3\) was rewarding and that a number of interesting and mutually beneficial joint projects in science and technology are underway. I am also pleased to see that there have been further advances in health and space cooperation.\(^4\) I look forward to similar progress with respect to environmental cooperation.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 12. Top Secret. A handwritten note at the top of the letter reads: “Delivered by hand to Sov. Embassy 1:45 pm, July 19, 1972.” Haig, who drafted the letter, wrote in a July 13 note to Kissinger: “Henry: I have included the items you asked for in a new redraft: (a) moved the European issues to the smorgasbord portion at the beginning of the letter, (b) made special reference to your Moscow visit and included reference to the Middle East and the nuclear field in conjunction with that visit, and (c) made special reference to Dobrynin's discussion with the President and the special channel.” (Ibid.)

\(^2\) Document 4.

\(^3\) Edward David, Science Adviser to the President and Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology, visited Moscow for talks with V.A. Kirillin, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Science and Technology, from July 2 to 8. On July 7, they signed a record of their discussion providing for closer scientific and technical cooperation. (Department of State *Bulletin*, August 21, 1972, pp. 216–217)

\(^4\) In an August 12 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger discussed cooperation in outer space: “Delegations from NASA and the Soviet Academy of Sciences met from July 6 to 15 at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston to continue work on the planned 1975 joint manned Apollo–Soyuz space mission.” The memorandum also discussed progress
On European questions and strategic arms limitation as well, Dr. Kissinger will continue to be in private contact with your Ambassador. The senior officials of this Government are reviewing these issues intensively under my direction in the light of our talks in Moscow. I understand that other Western governments are also preparing in detail for the multilateral consultations on the European conference and on reciprocal troop reductions. American representatives are participating actively in this and I hope, as agreed in our final communique, that exchanges between governments can proceed without undue delay.

I was especially gratified that our governments were able to reach a major agreement in regard to trade in agricultural products. The constructive spirit of the Soviet negotiators was greatly appreciated. You are probably aware that the agreement has been widely and favorably commented on in this country. Both our governments can take satisfaction that a new and fruitful economic relationship is in process of developing between our countries along with the major improvement in our relations in other areas.

In this connection, Secretary of Commerce Peterson and a delegation of senior U.S. officials will shortly be leaving for the USSR to participate in the first sessions of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission. As I mentioned to you in Moscow, Mr. Peterson is exceptionally well qualified for his task. He will be under instruction to proceed in a constructive spirit and with the aim of making major progress in placing U.S.-Soviet commercial relations on a mutually profitable and permanent basis. I am prepared to move rapidly in this regard and with a far-seeing attitude, along the lines we discussed in Moscow. Mr. Peterson and his colleagues will be ready to discuss and move toward a solution of all the elements of a trade agreement between our countries, as well as the question of lend-lease and the various joint projects previously discussed in a preliminary way. I am also confident that the maritime agreement can be completed. I shall follow these negotiations closely, and Dr. Kissinger will, as in the past, be prepared to work with Ambassador Dobrynin to ensure the progress that both of us desire.

At this juncture, there can be no doubt that our relations are now on a positive course which offers great hope for the future. For this reason, I place utmost stress on Dr. Kissinger’s September visit to the Soviet Union as a logical continuation of the progress made thus far. He will be prepared to discuss in the frankest terms major steps which

in cooperation in medical science and public health. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 720, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Vol. XXIV)

5 See Document 7.
should lead to further understandings between our two governments in the area of the Middle East and in the nuclear field.

In your letter, you referred at length to the conflict in Indochina. I greatly appreciate what you said concerning President Podgorny’s trip to Hanoi, which we had of course followed with interest in view of your comments in Moscow. It is quite evident that President Podgorny’s visit had a positive impact. In the meantime, it has been agreed to resume negotiations in Paris, both in plenary sessions and in private. I am profoundly convinced that conditions exist to move these negotiations ahead, and quite possibly even to achieve the breakthrough that will end the conflict and the agony of the peoples involved and open the way to an equitable and honorable political solution. In this connection, I was naturally interested in your impression that the North Vietnamese side is not proceeding on the basis that only its proposals should be considered in the talks. If this indeed turns out to be the case, it should be possible to make progress, since, as you know, we for our part are prepared to give full weight to the views and proposals of the other side. The proposals I outlined on May 8 and which were explained and elaborated in our discussions in Moscow represent a serious effort to take account of the position and interests of the other side. The American negotiators in the Paris talks will continue to proceed in this spirit.

I believe the time is ripe for both sides to grasp the opportunity that now exists to achieve a settlement. Your letter and other private communications from you indicate that you share this view. I am most grateful to you for the efforts you have already made to facilitate a peaceful solution.

Mr. General Secretary, this, as you know, is a year of intense political activity in my country, preparatory to our Presidential election. If I may close on a somewhat personal note, I cannot help recall a similar period exactly twenty years ago. As a result of that election, in 1952, I first assumed national office. The ensuing years were marked by many ups and downs in the relations of our two countries. But one can truly say that in 1972 the general trend is now “upward.” There is every reason to believe that this favorable trend will continue. From our talks I know that the leaders on both sides are committed to this course, which fully reflects the interests and desires of our people. I agree with you that tenacious effort and continuing close contact are required to maintain the momentum that has been achieved.

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6 A reference to Nixon’s nationally televised address on May 8 during which he discussed negotiations to end the war in Vietnam. See Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 583–587.
I have reiterated my personal interest in this to your Ambassador during his recent visit to San Clemente. As the Ambassador will undoubtedly report to you, we had an opportunity to discuss these important issues at some length in the relaxed atmosphere of the summer White House. During these discussions we again reviewed the importance and desirability of maintaining and indeed strengthening this special channel between us—a channel which has proven so instrumental in achieving the new spirit of cooperation that now characterizes our relations and which affords promise of even greater progress in the period ahead.

I look forward to hearing your further thoughts on all the questions which are of common concern.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

7 See Document 8.

11. National Security Decision Memorandum 179


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Agriculture

SUBJECT
CCC Regulations Affecting US-Soviet Grain Sale and Maritime Agreement

The President has reviewed the joint State/Commerce/Agriculture memorandum of July 2 on this issue, and he has decided as follows.

During forthcoming negotiations with the Soviet Union, the United States should make a determined effort to obtain Soviet agree-

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–235, NSDM 179. Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Attorney General, and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs.

2 See Document 9.
ment to shipping arrangements consistent with National Security Action Memorandum 220 of February 5, 1963. If, however, in the course of the maritime negotiations the Soviets raise continuing objections on this issue blocking otherwise successful conclusion of the maritime negotiations, the Chairman of the US Delegation is authorized to make a one-time exception to the provisions of NSAM 220 solely for the purposes of the grain sale agreement and shipments in Soviet ships relating thereto. In the event it becomes necessary to make this policy exception, the Department of State should carefully present this decision to OAS member states before the matter becomes public knowledge.

The President, at the same time, directs a thorough review of the applicability of NSAM 220 and NSAM 340 to Commodity Credit Corporation export sales. This study should include a detailed review of the foreign policy, national security, economic and statutory implications in any interpretation or revision that would make NSAMs 220 and 340 inapplicable to CCC programs.

This study should be prepared by an Ad Hoc NSC Group comprising representatives of the recipients of this memorandum, other interested agencies and representatives of the NSC and CIEP staffs chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State. The study should be forwarded to the Chairman, NSC Senior Review Group by August 30, 1972.

Henry A. Kissinger

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3 See footnote 2, Document 9.
4 See footnote 3, Document 9.
12. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift and John Lehman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)\textsuperscript{1}


SUBJECT

Soviet Jewry—1) Shapiro Case
2) President’s Position

I. Shapiro Case

Bill Timmons has sent you the memorandum at Tab A\textsuperscript{2} informing you that Senator Robert Taft, Jr., is under great pressure from his constituent Judith Silver Shapiro to get US action that would permit her Soviet husband to emigrate to the United States. Taft has expressed the specific hope to Timmons that the President will take this up with Ambassador Dobrynin.

On July 15, Jeanne Davis sent Timmons a proposed reply to Senator Taft on the Shapiro case (Tab B),\textsuperscript{3} and it is possible that these memos have crossed. As noted in the proposed reply, the President has great sympathy for Mrs. Shapiro, and he has directed the United States to do everything it appropriately can to help.

State Department has been pressing the Soviet Embassy hard on this issue. As recently as July 18, however, DCM Vorontsov told Dick Davies that the decision depended on Moscow. It is State’s impression that the Soviets will proceed with Shapiro’s July 26 trial for draft evasion, but that the trial sentence will not be severe.

As we have just sent Timmons the proposed reply to Senator Taft, you may wish to call him, note that the reply states the case correctly, and that the President has instructed State to do what it can to make the Soviets see reason and permit Shapiro to emigrate.

II. Soviet Jewry

The problems we are having with the Shapiro case raise the broader problem we are experiencing with the currently approved statement of the President’s position on Soviet Jewry. The text of this statement is as follows:

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 720, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Vol. XXIII. Confidential. Sent for action.
\textsuperscript{2} Attached but not printed is Timmons’ July 8 memorandum.
\textsuperscript{3} Attached but not printed.
"On behalf of the President, I want to thank you for your message about the summit talks in Moscow and the subject of Soviet Jews.

As you know, the United States firmly supports the right of all people to emigrate, and this Administration has consistently upheld that doctrine. In travelling to Russia, the President was fully aware of the deep concern in this country for the plight of minorities who are denied fundamental freedoms, and you may be assured that our steadfast commitment to the principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been made known to the Soviets.”

State is feeling the pressure of growing public and Congressional correspondence on the Summit talks/Soviet Jewry issue, correspondence either complimenting the President or questioning whether he did raise the issue. Accordingly, drawing on Mr. Kissinger’s May 29 Kiev press conference and a June 7 statement by Herb Klein,4 State would like to revise its public responses by adding the following (see State’s memorandum at Tab C):5

"President Nixon is well aware of the feelings of many Americans concerning the plight of Jews in the USSR and joins in their deep concern. I can assure you that he expressed our concern with the situation to all the top leaders of the Soviet Union.”

This additional statement would appear to be clearly unacceptable, and State should be told to stick with the existing guidance. The memorandum for Jeanne Davis’ signature to State at Tab D6 would do this.

However, when one takes into account 1) the continuing correspondence and 2) the publicized statement by the President’s campaign staff that he will be taking a strong stand on Soviet Jewry, we still need a clearer statement of the President’s position on Soviet Jewry.

It is our understanding that, prior to the Republican Convention, the President plans to meet with prominent Jewish-Americans including the President of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry. If this is so it would appear to be the logical time for an up to date statement of the President’s views on Soviet Jewry, and updated guidance to State could be provided following that meeting. If, however, such a meeting is not scheduled, it would seem important that the NSC and interested offices in the White House develop an updated statement for consideration by the President. May we have your guidance on this issue?

4 White House Director of Communications for the Executive Branch. The statement confirmed that both Nixon and Rogers raised the issue of Jewish emigration at the Moscow Summit. (The New York Times, July 8, 1972, p. 7)
5 Attached but not printed is a July 17 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger.
6 Attached but not printed is Davis’ undated memorandum to Eliot.
Recommendations

1) That you call Bill Timmons with regard to Senator Taft’s inquiry, drawing on the information in Section I of this memorandum.

2) That you approve the memorandum for Jeanne Davis’ signature to State directing State to stick with the currently approved language in replying to letters on Soviet Jewry.\(^7\)

3) That you authorize NSC staff working with interested White House offices to develop an updated statement on Soviet Jewry for consideration by the President.\(^8\)

\(^7\) Haig checked the Approve option.

\(^8\) Haig did not check either the Approve or the Disapprove option. He wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “nonsense—this case is a false [sic]—we are not going to jeopardize between now and November what we’re doing w/Sovs on this issue.” On July 26, Haig wrote to Kissinger: “Judy Shapiro’s husband received a sentence of 12 months at corrective labor today which means that he doesn’t go to prison, but stays at his own home and job, etc., and it allows him to emigrate. He (Shapiro) told reporters his light sentence was a result of his wife’s pressure and U.S. Government pressure on the Soviets.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 994, Alexander M. Haig Chronological File) On August 7, Kehrli wrote in a memorandum to Kissinger that Judy Shapiro “said on Today that she’s still not heard from the WH re: requests to get U.S. help for her husband. She feels the Shapiro case would give RN a chance to show U.S. Jews he’s concerned with plight of Soviet Jews.” Haig replied to Kehrli on August 10 that the issue had “already been raised with Ambassador Dobrynin. The matter is of such sensitivity that no further action should be taken.” (Ibid., Box 995, Alexander M. Haig Chronological File)
Council on International Economic Policy Decision Memorandum 9


TO  
The Secretary of State  

SUBJECT  

Lend-Lease Negotiations with the USSR  

The President has reviewed progress on lend-lease negotiations with the Soviet Union, considered the recommendations contained in the State Department’s memorandum of July 10, 1972, and directed that the following should govern the US position when negotiations are resumed with the USSR:

—We should initially indicate that, for the purpose of these negotiations, we are willing to settle for a stream of payments sufficient to retire $500 million at 5% or $750 million at 2%, beginning in 1972 and terminating in 2001.

—Our negotiator is empowered, with the concurrence of the Chairman of the US side of the US-USSR Commercial Commission, to fall back progressively to a position of $500 million at 4½% or $687.5 million at 2%.

—If the Commercial Commission’s negotiations in other areas seemingly might justify other terms, such as extending the terminal payment date, our negotiator should request the Chairman to seek further guidance from the President.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–235, NSDMs 151–200, Originals. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Treasury and Commerce. On July 21, a copy of the NSDM was forwarded to Moscow for Peterson in telegram 131920/Topet 17. (Ibid., Box 953, VIP Visits, Pete Peterson’s Moscow Visit (Commerce), 17 Jul–3 Aug 72 [2 of 2]) Peterson visited Moscow from July 20 to August 1 for the first meeting of the U.S.-USSR Joint Commercial Commission.

2 The Department’s summary of the status of Lend-Lease negotiations with the Soviet Union as of July 10 is ibid., Box 720, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Vol. XXIII, June–July 1972 [1 of 1].
—If an overall agreement is not reached with the Soviets, our negotiator should indicate that we would expect the Soviets to resume payments owed to us on the “pipeline” account.3

Henry A. Kissinger

Peter M. Flanigan

3 A reference to the lend-lease “pipeline account,” which provided American goods to the Soviets immediately following World War II, and which the Soviets had been paying off since 1954.

Council on International Economic Policy Decision Memorandum 101


TO

The Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT

Commercial Commission Negotiations and Related Matters

Based on the President’s meeting with the Secretary of Commerce in San Clemente,2 the papers of the Backstop Group, and other related documents, the President has made the following decisions:

—The Secretary of Commerce, as Chairman of the US side of the US-USSR Commercial Commission, while in Moscow in addition to directing negotiations on subjects within the terms of reference of the Commission should coordinate US positions on other economic issues, including those which will be negotiated concurrently by representatives of other agencies. Specifically, this includes lend-lease and shipping negotiations, and presentation of our positions regarding taxes and possible extension of Export-Import Bank credit.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–235, NSDMs 151–200, Originals. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State and Treasury. On July 21, a copy of the NSDM was forwarded to Moscow for Peterson in telegram 131924/Topet 18. (Ibid., Box 953, VIP Visits, Pete Peterson’s Moscow Visit (Commerce), 17 Jul–3 Aug 72 [2 of 2])

2 No record of the meeting was found.
—The delegation is authorized to negotiate a trade agreement on the basis of the draft discussed by the ad hoc CIEP group on July 17\(^3\) with changes then agreed, with Article 11 deleted from the text of the agreement.

—A shipping agreement is a high priority objective, with the issue of the freight rate differential to be settled in such a way as to minimize the current and future subsidy burden on the US, with a three-year renegotiation clause as a minimum.

—The delegation should encourage the Soviets to join the Universal Copyright Convention. An offer to negotiate a tax treaty may be used as an incentive for the Soviets to do so. You should not offer to negotiate a bilateral copyright agreement.

—On the question of arbitration, you should attempt to reach agreement as per Article 10 of the Trade Agreement\(^4\) but not enter into at this time any agreement regarding establishment of a bilateral arbitration panel and procedure with the USSR.

—With respect to business facilities as per Article 9 of the Trade Agreement, you may offer reciprocal diplomatic immunity for a limited number of Soviet and American trade officials and their acts ad referendum pending further study of the consequent legal status of Soviet officials operating in the US and their powers to conduct commercial dealings.

—Were the Soviets to offer a satisfactory lend-lease settlement, you could separately, by letter, assure them of the President’s willingness at the earliest appropriate moment—bearing in mind Congressional considerations—to seek authorization from the Congress for the granting of MFN treatment to the Soviet Union.

—if it is not possible to break the link between the Soviets beginning new lend-lease payments and entry into effect of MFN, we should attempt to maximize the front-loading of pipeline payments with only non-pipeline payments triggered by entry into force of MFN.

—The delegation should submit daily progress reports including texts of new proposals made to and by Soviet representatives.

Henry A. Kissinger

Peter M. Flanigan

\(^3\) Not found.

\(^4\) The trade agreement was signed in Washington October 18; see Document 65.
15. **Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon**

Moscow, July 20, 1972.

Dear Mr. President,

One of the questions which were not completed during our meeting with you in Moscow is the question of concluding a Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the mutual non-use of nuclear weapons. All of us were so absorbed by the consideration of other questions and projects which had become ripe for completion, that we did not make our way to this question in real terms.

Yet, a positive outcome of our consideration of this extremely important question would have major long-term consequences not only for the relations between the USSR and the USA, but also for the world as a whole. From what you said at the meeting with me on this subject, and from our appreciation of the significance of this question it follows, in our opinion, that it should be dealt with the view of working out, in a possibly not prolonged time, a document acceptable to both sides.

We proceed on this basis and, on our part, have most carefully studied the text which you left with me during our concluding conversation.2

I think that we should find a necessary combination of the principal idea without which the document is totally impossible—prevention of a nuclear war between our countries, with the way in which they should build their relations. In short, we are ready to express in the Treaty the idea that the very development of the relations between the two powers should not contradict the task of not permitting a nuclear war between them.

From our clarified draft3 you will see that we have taken into account your considerations on other articles of the Treaty as well.

In conclusion I think it will be appropriate to stress once more that it is important that any changes and amendments should not nullify the very idea of not permitting a nuclear clash between the Soviet

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 12. Top Secret. A handwritten notation at the top of the first page of the letter reads: “Handed to K by D, 12:00 pm, July 21, 1972.”

2 Nixon handed over the draft during his penultimate conversation with Brezhnev in Moscow on May 29 at 10:20 a.m. The draft treaty is ibid., Box 487, President’s Trip Files, President’s Conversations in Salzburg, Moscow, Tehran and Warsaw, May 1972, Pt. 2. The record of the meeting is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 299.

3 See Document 17.
Union and the United States of America. We believe that other states irrespective of the degree of their political closeness to you or to us can only positively meet such a major act in relations between the US and the USSR, since it will further strengthen the basis under the Soviet-American relations for which we both already exerted such serious efforts during our recent meeting in Moscow.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

4 Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

16. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 20, 1972, 3:42–4:46 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

I saw Dobrynin and told him I had three matters to discuss.

Middle East

I wanted to give him a message from the President regarding events in Egypt.2 We were not aware of these events beforehand. We had not yet fully understood their significance. Nor did we know the extent of Soviet withdrawal. In any event, I wanted Dobrynin to know that the President had issued the strictest orders that there would be no U.S. initiatives toward Cairo and that we would not try to gain unilateral advantages. On the contrary, we would proceed within the letter and spirit of my conversations with Gromyko in Moscow in June [May].3

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 12. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the White House Map Room.

2 On July 18, President Sadat ordered the withdrawal of all Soviet advisers from Egypt.

3 For the memoranda of these conversations, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Documents 293 and 295.
Dobrynin said he appreciated this and handed me a letter [Tab A] which in effect stated that this Soviet move was a unilateral step in the direction of the proposition they had made to us last year and that now it was up to us to take some reciprocal action. I said we would study the letter and no doubt there would be some formal response.

**SALT**

Secondly, I told Dobrynin that we accepted the Soviet changes in the SALT interpretive statement [Tab B] and that we should get it signed at an early occasion. I asked him whether he thought Smith or I should sign it. He said the Soviet side would prefer it if I signed it so that we could avoid getting it in all the newspapers.

**Vietnam**

Thirdly, I told Dobrynin about my meeting with the North Vietnamese in Paris. I said the meeting up to now was quite inconclusive. The tone of the North Vietnamese was more acceptable than it had ever been in the past and the discussions left open the possibility that there might be a settlement. The North Vietnamese side did not make any very concrete proposals, and frankly neither did we. We only presented the military side of the proposals we had discussed in Moscow. Dobrynin asked why we had not presented the part that had been discussed with Brezhnev. I said because we did not want to get it refused and produce a deadlock. Dobrynin said, “How stupid of me. I should have recognized this and it was a correct tactic. You are a good chess player. My leaders will fully understand.” I said I hoped that if there were a settlement the Soviet Union would exercise restraint in the shipment of supplies. He said, well, right now there was a problem about getting supplies in altogether, so it was not the most acute issue.

We then turned to other matters. We discussed my trip to the Soviet Union. I suggested arriving on September 10 and staying for something like three days. Dobrynin said he would check in Moscow and let me know. Dobrynin also mentioned that there was a chance that he might be called back to Moscow for three or four weeks. In that event he would be back in Washington around August 25. In any event he would be in Moscow when I was there. We then parted on an extremely cordial note, with Dobrynin expressing profuse thanks for everything that had been done for him on his visit to the West Coast.

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4 Not attached. All following brackets are in the original.
5 The note is attached, but not printed.
17. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 21, 1972, 12:40–1:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Dobrynin saw me at his request with a message that I would be welcome to arrive on September 10, that Brezhnev would conduct the conversations with me himself, and that the Soviet side would prefer to make the announcement only after I had left, just as we had done last time. I said that under present circumstances, with the election campaign, this would be a very difficult thing to do and would raise needless issues of secrecy. I, therefore, proposed making the announcement on the Monday or Tuesday of the week preceding my departure. Dobrynin said he would check with Moscow and let me know.

Nuclear Understanding
Dobrynin then handed me a letter from Brezhnev [Tab A] and the draft treaty [Tab B] on renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. The draft had been adjusted so that now NATO allies would be covered but third countries would not be. Dobrynin asked what I thought of it. I said, “Let me understand: Under Article 3 of this treaty, if you attack NATO we attack the Warsaw Pact; Article 1 renouncing the use of nuclear weapons does not apply.” He said, “That is correct.” I asked him, “Are you prepared to express this in some agreed understandings that could be published?” He said yes. I then said, “Let me ask another case: Supposing we attack a country that is not allied with you but whose independence you value, such as India, would you then be prohibited from using nuclear weapons by this treaty?” Dobrynin said, “Yes, by this treaty.” In other words an attack on China would bar us from using nuclear weapons.

Middle East
Dobrynin then asked a number of questions about what approaches we had made to Egypt, and I assured him that we had not made any. But he seemed very uncertain.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the White House Map Room.
2 Printed as Document 15. All brackets are in the original.
3 Attached but not printed.
This conversation, like the one the day before, ended on an extremely cordial note with profuse thanks by Dobrynin for everything that had been done on the West Coast.

18. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Peterson Backchannels on Cuban Shipping Restrictions and Soviet Maritime Agreement

Secretary Peterson (and Sonnenfeldt) have sent you several messages requesting guidance on issues arising out of NSAM 220² restrictions on use of Soviet ships for US trade that have previously been engaged in Cuban trade.

—He has today proceeded on his instructions in NSDM 179,³ that require him to make a determined effort to conclude the maritime agreement without violating or relaxing NSAM 220.

—This instruction allows him the fallback position of making a one-time exception for CCC grain sales, with provision that this be carefully explained to OAS members.

—He, Peterson, notes that he has an implicit second fallback which arises from a loophole of the NSAM—that is, that exception for Soviet ships could be made provided there is an assurance that those particular ships will not be used in Cuban trade in the future.

In a private meeting with Patolichev⁴ he raised the broad question of our Cuban shipping restrictions, and, while the Soviets generally

² See footnote 2, Document 9.
³ Document 11.
⁴ Sonnenfeldt reported on Peterson’s meeting with Patolichev in attached back-channel message 2746 to Kissinger, July 25 (Tab B). Peterson also reported on the meeting in telegram 7226 from Moscow, July 25. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 953, VIP Visits, Pete Peterson’s Moscow Visit (Commerce), 17 Jul–Aug 72 [2 of 2])
said this was our problem, they did ask enough questions to suggest that they might be willing to find some middle ground.

Specifically, they caught on to Peterson’s distinction between ships that had traded with Cuba and ships calling on Cuba in the future. He thus has laid some groundwork for the alternative to the one time exception: i.e., a Soviet assurance that ships in US trade will not henceforth be involved in Cuban trade (Tab B).

He raises several broader issues which he believes must be addressed at the highest level now (Tab C).5

1. If a one-time exception is made for CCC grain, how do we deal with other contingencies, namely, that Soviet ships calling at Cuba ports can also come to US ports to load regular cash cargoes. In practice Soviet ships have never done so. Once the exception is made for the CCC grain shipments, then we may have to expect the Soviets to make port calls for cash transactions and these are permissible under NSAM 220.

—He asks your advice as to whether this is a political issue or a legal one.

—If it is only legal, then Peterson can simply tell them that the Cuba restriction only applies to government financed cargo, and they are free to use ships for other cargoes as they choose.

—If it is a political problem, then such ships may be the first to appear and begin eroding our Cuban policy of restrictions.

2. Peterson suggests the following scenario:

—To make a determined effort to exclude Cuba tainted ships.

—Second, to persuade the Soviets to exclude these Cuban tainted ships for a period of six months while we review the situation.

—Third, get the Soviets to exclude for six months, and ask them to consider setting up a special Soviet-American shipping company with assurance that ships they use will not henceforth be used in Cuban trade; this means expanding Cuban restrictions to all types of cargo.

—Fourth, suggest that the Soviets forthwith set up a special shipping company with the same assurance; this means Cuban tainted vessels might call at US ports within a few weeks of agreement.

Sonnenfeldt has sent in his version of options, cleared with Peterson (Tab D).6 He seems to be favoring establishing a Soviet shipping company immediately, with Soviet assurances against future use.

5 Attached but not printed is backchannel message 2739 from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, July 24, which contained a message from Peterson to Kissinger. Paragraph 6 of Peterson’s message set forth his proposed negotiating scenario, which Haig summarizes here.

6 Attached but not printed is backchannel message 2740 from Sonnenfeldt to Haig, July 24.
In sum, there are these questions to answer:

1. Should Peterson continue to explore the possibility of obtaining Soviet assurance against using their Cuban-tainted ships henceforth for US-Soviet trade; if so, and he makes any progress, this would probably obviate fallback to the one-time exception for CCC grain.

2. If this does not pan out and he moves to the one-time exception, how should he deal with other types of Soviet shipping—those involving cash sales and commercially (non-governmental) financed sales? Should he encourage the Soviets to begin making calls for such cargo by ships coming from Cuba, as is legally possible now, or discourage them from drawing the conclusion that we would welcome this?

Recommendation

Obtaining a Soviet assurance against future use of ships on Cuba trade would be a highly desirable solution and there is no reason for Peterson not to pursue it, especially since he has already implanted the seed with Patolichev.

If this peters out, as is probable, or becomes too complicated with qualifications and bargains, then he can go to the one-time exception as authorized. However, he should hold the line on other Soviet shipping, even though NSAM 220 does not prohibit it. This still should be decided in September if at all possible, after some study and bureaucratic massaging.

If you agree with this, a message to Peterson is at Tab A.

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7 Kissinger did not check any of the options. The attached July 25 routing memorandum from Jon Howe of the NSC Staff to Haig noted that Kissinger had approved the backchannel message and “it was dispatched this evening at 9:00 p.m.” The approved backchannel message from Kissinger to Peterson, July 25, at Tab A, reads: “You are correct in concluding that Cuban aspect of maritime talks is primarily a political one. For now, you should proceed along lines you suggest in your 2739, paragraph 6. You may explore for possible Soviet assurances against future use of Cuba-tainted ships. If such exploration seems to be fruitless, then you can proceed to fall back on one-time exception as authorized by President (TOPET 11). As for related question of non-CCC grain cargoes, you should not encourage Soviets to believe that one-time exception means we would look with favor on their using U.S. ports from or to Cuba, even though this is permissible under NSAM 220. This should be part of broader policy determination in September.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 953, VIP Visits, Pete Peterson’s Moscow Visit (Commerce), 17 Jul–3 Aug 72 [1 of 2])
19. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Peterson’s Negotiations

The attached cable (Tab B)\(^2\) contains Peterson’s views as of COB Monday.\(^3\)

SUMMARY:

Lend-Lease

Maintain for the time being our position of $500 million at 5% until they give us a counter offer. (This is below the 5½% Summit position, but well above Peterson’s 3¾% fall back.)

Overall Strategy

Get as much as we can on MFN, business facilities, arbitration, etc. without giving anything away on lend-lease or credit at this time; and smoke them out on where problems lie so that by Wednesday night we will know what we need to do to “define the package.”

Strategy

Start with Patolichev and suggest that since this is “highest level proposal” arrange sessions with Patolichev and Kosygin to review a proposal that only he and Kosygin-level know about. Peterson also wants “very confidential discussions” with Kosygin and Brezhnev without the Ambassador and “others.” To facilitate this, he suggests that you deal with Dobrynin, but not contact him until Peterson gives you a signal.

Overall Package

—Attempt to get a lend-lease settlement of $500 million at 2% plus an additional amount equal to interest on the $500 billion for the past twenty years, which is $200 million. This, according to Peterson, would enable us to demonstrate that we had won on the principle of back in-

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\(^2\) Attached but not printed is backchannel message 2741 from Peterson and Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, July 24.

\(^3\) July 24.
terest, but permit the Soviets to “save face,” i.e., by not going above 2% interest.

—**MFN:** Agree to submit MFN in latter part of the year, but try hard to get our version of MFN approved before making this commitment. This would probably include the Soviets making an initial lend-lease payment at or before the time they are made eligible for Ex-Im credit, with a moratorium provision on further lend-lease payments until MFN comes into effect.

—**Ex-Im:** Assure Soviets of a Presidential Ex-Im determination and $150 million for Kama River projects\(^4\) by a specified date—say September 25 of this year.

—**Joint Projects:** Make a commitment to a high-level mechanism to evaluate and push specific projects. Peterson would head this. A group would be invited to the US in August in connection with this effort.

—**Business Facilities:** Soviets want diplomatic immunity for a limited number of trade representatives in the US. In Washington at the Patolichev meetings Peterson took a strong stand against this. Now the US bureaucracy is for it and our delegation is trying to define immunity in precise terms as to nature and numbers. This could be thrown into the pot.

**Comment**

I have no major substantive problems with Pete’s scenario. There are a number of loose ends and unanswered questions which will probably be clarified in subsequent memos from Peterson. For now his main objective seems to be to smoke out the problems so that we will have a clearer idea of what the issues are. There will be a number. The Soviets have consistently rejected the concept of paying back interest on lend-lease. This is precisely the problem we had hoped to avoid through the “stream of payments” approach—which would have allowed us to focus on the amount of annual repayments rather than entering into theological arguments on principle, interest, or back interest. In this way the Soviets would not have to cave on any of their principles, but we could if we wish indicate that we had gotten annual payments equivalent to what we would have gotten had the Soviets paid back interest, an interest rate higher than 2% etc. The whole thing, however, is optics, and as long as Peterson can get an annual rate of repayment equivalent to $500 million at between 3¾ and 4%, that is acceptable.

Another issue is that of Peterson’s dealing with Kosygin and Brezhnev on the trade package. There is little in this that must be negotiated directly with these two. For us to push for them—if we are—seems a bit presumptuous at this point, especially when we are not about to conclude a trade agreement in Moscow. If negotiations are begun at the highest Soviet level, there will be intense pressure on us to move more quickly than we wished to. And that would raise problems when Patolichev visited here, since the Soviets might want the President to get involved in these negotiations.

Attached at Tab A is a brief cable to Peterson commenting on the attached cable (Tab B).

5 The attached July 25 backchannel message from Kissinger to Peterson and Sonnenfeldt was initialed by Haig for Kissinger. It reads in part: “I agree in principle with the substance of your package proposal and scenario. With regard to strategy, I question the advisability of detailed discussions at this time with Kosygin and Brezhnev. This might put undue pressure on us to move faster than we wish. And it would involve questions of reciprocal treatment when Soviet delegation visits Washington in September. I agree, therefore, that you should get as much cleared up through regular channels as possible. With regard to lend-lease, couldn’t the problems of back interest be subsumed under a stream of payments approach, which would allow each country to indicate to its domestic audience the components of whatever amount was repaid?”
20. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


**SUBJECT**

Peterson’s Negotiations: Shipping and Dates for Next Meeting

Secretary Peterson is thinking of *September 15–25 for the next meeting of the Soviet-American Commercial Commission in Washington*. He wants to know whether this is acceptable time frame, and, if so, whether dates should be included in the communiqué (Tab B).\(^2\)

On Cuban shipping, the Soviets took one step back in response to Peterson’s proposal. He proposed that (a) no Soviet ships involved in Cuban trade be used until January 1, when the Maritime Agreement would go into effect; and (b) thereafter the Soviets would set aside a special group of ships that would henceforth not be involved with Cuba, North Vietman, or North Korea. A few US ships would be used during the moratorium.

*Patolichev objected to setting aside* a group of Soviet ships and proposed instead an arrangement whereby Soviet ships would carry cash cargoes while US ships would carry government-financed cargoes. Soviets would not bunker in our ports, however. He apparently agreed to moratorium, but this is not clear (Tab C).\(^3\)

In a later head-to-head talk, Peterson made a special pitch for Soviet understanding of our union problems and how Cuban angle could blow whole deal. He asked that this be given high level attention.

Sonnenfeldt thinks that the best tactic is to let the Soviets think over Peterson’s presentations. Peterson may see Brezhnev in the Crimea on Sunday,\(^4\) but the result may be that there will be no maritime agreement to sign during the trip.

**Comment:** Peterson has not used the fallback position of one-time exception for the grain deal which must wrap up the maritime agreement. However, the idea of a moratorium and special group of Soviet

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 953, VIP Visits, Pete Peterson’s Moscow Visit (Commerce), 17 Jul–3 Aug 72 [2 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for action. Haig did not initial the memorandum.

\(^2\) Attached but not printed is backchannel message 2759 from Sonnenfeldt to Haig, July 27.

\(^3\) Attached but not printed is backchannel message 2760 from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, July 27.

\(^4\) July 30.
ships is not dead, and would be the more favorable solution. It will almost certainly require higher level decision than Peterson’s counterpart.

*Since Peterson departs tomorrow for Kiev, he needs immediate answers:*

—Are September 15–25 dates acceptable?

—Should he make concession of one-time exception to reach maritime deal or allow matter to slide?

**Recommendations**

1. Because of your scheduling it might be best if the next meeting were in early October rather than mid-September.

2. On substantive issue, it is impossible to run the tactics from here, especially since Peterson will be seeing Brezhnev. The cable at Tab A\(^5\) gives him some leeway to work on a deal as he has already discussed with Patolichev, but advises him that if he cannot reach a satisfactory bargain, he will have to decide whether to use his authority to grant one-time exception.

3. That you approve the telegram at Tab A.

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\(^5\) The undated draft backchannel message from Kissinger to Peterson, initialed by Haig for Kissinger for transmission, reads as follows: “Believe you should continue as you have in pressing for moratorium until January 1, plus some kind of Soviet assurances on special company. Alternative of Soviets carrying only cash cargoes raises political problems you outlined in earlier messages. If this line does not work out, you still have authority to make one-time exception. You are in the best position to judge, especially after discussion with Brezhnev, whether there is some promise of maritime agreement along lines you have been exploring with Patolichev or whether you should move to one-time exception. While conclusion of agreement in Moscow is desirable, a few weeks delay would not be an unmanageable problem. Early October is better for next meeting of Commission.”
21. **Notes of Conversation Between Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev and Secretary of Commerce Peterson**

Crimea, July 30, 1972.

Accompanying Secretary Peterson were Ambassador Beam, Lynn, Sonnenfeldt and the Secretary’s Assistant, Sweitzer. Accompanying Brezhnev were Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev, his Deputies Manzhulo and Alkhimov, and Zinoviev, Head of the American Department of the Foreign Trade Ministry.

Brezhnev states that the trade work should be looked upon as a continuation of the businesslike, constructive meetings held with the President at the Summit. He hopes that the day’s talks could be frank because there could be no other tone given the importance of the talks. Brezhnev has good memories of the Summit and what was accomplished there.

Peterson responds by conveying greetings from the President. He states the President remembers the Summit with enormous warmth and commented to Peterson that he has never seen such hospitality. Patolichev has also gone to great lengths to make our trade delegation feel welcome.

Brezhnev states that he is pleased inasmuch as hospitality is a part of the Russian character. In the village he came from people were constantly inventing occasions to entertain each other and would spend so much on hospitality they would have to buy food on credit the next day.

Peterson refers to the fact that the President also stated that he and Brezhnev share a desire to take the long view and the broad view but to combine it with taking very concrete, forward steps. The President likes big steps. In this connection, the President asked Peterson to tell Brezhnev of the President’s pleasure with the grain and scientific agreements which had been recently signed.

Peterson states that the President’s and our view is that if we are going to set up trading and commercial relationships on a long-term, permanent basis, we should set up our commercial institutions on the same basis. For example, copyrights, arbitration and tax treatment are important to show our press and our people that we have a long-term relationship in mind. Brezhnev then interjects that we will immediately

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 953, VIP Visits, Pete Peterson’s Moscow Visit (Commerce), 17 Jul–3 Aug 72 [1 of 2]. Secret; Nodis. The notes were sent from Peterson to Nixon under an August 8 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

2 Not further identified.
have to start arguing. On his own domestic side, he is trying to make staffs smaller and cut overhead. He is convinced that Patolichev and Peterson can handle such matters. Why create additional institutions? (This was all said in a semi-humorous way.)

Peterson states that in many ways the US and the USSR are extremely natural trading partners. In addition to being the two largest economies, there is a very good fit between the two economies. The United States has traditionally exported agricultural products and about 60% of our exports are of high technology products. Every good commercial relationship must be balanced. One of the real challenges is to build Soviet exports to the US. A real opportunity in this regard is in the field of energy and raw materials. We should start joint projects soon in raw materials. As an example, we have proposed projects involving the production of platinum for sale into the United States. We need platinum to meet the automobile pollution problem, and the requirements will be quite large. Such projects will have both practical and symbolic value. Also, the President had told Peterson about Brezhnev’s discussions with the President on gas, and had pushed Peterson on it. Peterson and Patolichev and others within our respective delegations have had many discussions on that.

Brezhnev then interjects that he must right away issue a severe reprimand to Patolichev, and to the extent he can, to Peterson, for working too slowly on gas. He adds that Peterson must know what a reprimand means in the Soviet Union. He tells us to advise the President of such reprimand and the need for quicker movement on gas projects. (Again, all this reprimand talk was in a humorous tone.) He states the President should know Brezhnev wants to move more quickly on gas.

Peterson states he will be candid on gas. We have proposed to set up a specific group under the Joint Commission to work on gas, but we assure that such work is not to be slow. The group is needed because the problem needs focus and definition. In energy, the US is “polluted” with too many environmentalists. They want no local drilling and want no deep water ports. They are very unrealistic. However, before too many months have passed, we will find our country coming closer and closer to agreement that we have a real need for increased energy resources. This question of energy needs and policy was getting the focused attention of the US Government at the direct instructions of the President. Peterson sincerely believes that after the election our country will be more realistic about energy needs and will proceed more rapidly to get deals going in that particular field. The first basic step is to

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get widespread public agreement that the energy problem is a real one. In the meantime, there is important work to get started on. For example, there are many different opinions, conflicting assertions, on the Soviet gas projects. Some sources say the costs are $3–4 billion, while others say $7–8 billion. Some say it is feasible to lay big pipe in permafrost; others say the permafrost situation presents many difficult and imposing problems. Thus, work by the joint US–USSR group on gas projects is very important to get agreement on the technological and economic facts upon which decisions can be made.

Peterson adds there is another important thing the US is doing on gas. We like to get the private sector involved in big projects, not just the government. At the President’s direction, Peterson has met three or four times with seven or eight of the biggest financial people in the United States, including David Rockefeller, Andre Meyer, who is a senior partner of the investment banking firm Lazard Freres, and the head of our largest bank, Bank of America. These meetings are to explore potential of the private sector for financing these very large deals, as well as to explore whether we need new financial institutions in the United States to handle government participation in such financing. At present, the Export-Import Bank is largely set up to handle ordinary exports. The largest amount of Export-Import credit to any country outstanding is only slightly over $1 billion. The gas deals alone would far exceed this kind and level of financing. The President wants us to think in new, bigger terms for deals that are large and complex. We also have within the United States coordination problems. For example, the Federal Power Commission determines prices at which gas can be sold, and that body must be brought into the issue. The FPC is independent from the President. If we are to get not only more government money, but also private money, we also have to figure out how to bring in the private financial sector.

Peterson concludes this portion of his presentation with the statement that he will accept Brezhnev’s reprimand, but we are not sitting on our fannies. Brezhnev says a weak excuse (again humorously). Brezhnev adds that businessmen work quickly. Peterson points out that his background is being a businessman but he must be a slow businessman. Brezhnev says he is just joking. Peterson says all he can do is assure Brezhnev that the President is interested and that at his direction Peterson is spending a lot of time with the gas companies and intends to spend a lot of future time on this problem.

Brezhnev then states that he should first emphasize the importance of his Summit talks with the President. There was plenty of “speculation” in the world about such meetings. The greater majority of rumors are now positive—rather reserved but clearly pronounced. History will estimate it. Given the circumstances in the USSR and in the
United States, the facts of the Summit aimed at favorable development—to improve the relations of the two nations, all to the benefit of both peoples and for relaxation of tension. What would be more noble. Perhaps the Summit meetings would not solve all problems, but everything shows the efforts were noble and not wasted. World opinion confirms this. The Party and the Soviet nation accepted the Summit results very well. The subject was treated with great understanding and attention. The Party is well organized and educated and can properly judge such things, and there was favorable acceptance. Brezhnev hopes deeds do not differ from the words. He is not criticizing US society but reserves the right to do so elsewhere. The US has created for itself different institutions which argue with each other. But the tendency in the United States is expressed favorably. Remnants of past opinion on Bolsheviks, Brezhnev, Patolichev, et al are not good, but in general a reasonable approach is predominating in the US. Brezhnev’s impression is that all United States institutions “shall take” a positive decision on all that was done at the Summit, and he hopes that this is the case.

Then moving to trade matters, Brezhnev states there were decades when the United States did not want to trade and these years were just wasted. Nothing was achieved by that attitude. It was a waste in the life of the society of the United States. We could have helped each other. In a modern world, trade has not just commercial but political importance. In this sense, the Summit decisions have tremendous “colossal” importance for the future. The President is taking steps to implement these decisions. Peterson’s trip is an example, which Brezhnev appreciates highly.

Brezhnev states that the task now is to overcome and remove all the obstacles and difficulties with respect to trade relations. There should be large sized transactions to the benefit of both countries. As a political matter, it is important to resolve all these trade problems. The President and the USSR acted correctly, courageously and far sightedly when they signed the statement of principles at the Summit. Such principles should provide the base for the solution of other problems. Everybody in both countries seems to accept this, showing that the solutions at the Summit were correct. Congress is about to ratify important agreements that were two years in the making. Therefore, Brezhnev thinks that in trade matters the two nations should be doing the same. There must be principles. To clarify, trade has to be on a reciprocal basis. Businessmen sometimes lose three cents and make ten cents but that is how life is. Therefore, principles are important. If they are not established—take MFN—we can’t have trade; it would be impossible. This is not news to the US. Brezhnev said the same thing to the President, and the President realized this perhaps better than Brezhnev. This is the first question to be resolved.
Secondly, Brezhnev states, we are big countries with huge territories and huge resources. The USSR has “tremendous reserves of raw materials for generations”—ores for non-ferrous metal, rare metals, timber, “trillions” of gas and oil reserves, etc. Now that the Soviet Union is stronger, it is opening those “vast treasures” to increase the standard of living for the Soviet people. If we talk of large projects, no others can do what our two countries can do together. We two countries can do big trade together.

Brezhnev states that the Soviet industries and products have been oriented toward exporting to its traditional partners, the Socialist countries, Western Europe, the Near East, etc. This kind of trade is already provided for in plans into the 1980s. If you take the populations of these traditional trading partners, they are bigger than the United States—Turkey, Italy, France, etc. The USSR cannot throw that trade away. If we are talking about development of US–USSR trade in a big way, trade in a conventional way would be a waste of time. It must be bigger. He alludes to the story of the man selling eggs. The man is asked what he is paid for the eggs per dozen, and he says two rubles. He is then asked what he sells them for and the man says two rubles. The response of the questioner is then: “What do you get out of all this?” The man says, “Well, I am in business!” Trade between the US and the USSR can have tremendous benefits not only in commercial terms but in political terms—increasing standards of living. Payment for projects in the USSR concerning ores, timber and processing equipment, for example, could be made in products—for example, gas, oil and mineral fertilizers. A big deal has already been done in grain. The USSR wants to increase meat consumption and this means a rise in cattle breeding. Under certain circumstances, there could be future grain deals if we have good relations. This is a lesser item but it could continue.

Brezhnev goes on to speak further of gas. It is in the ground. It has to be transported and this can be done in either gas or liquid form. Gas is an important money maker for the USSR. Peterson should trust the US businessmen. Long-term deals are in order and the Soviet Union is prepared to make 25–30 year deals. Short terms are not profitable. The Soviet Union does not have the money for the US gas deals in the five-year plan. It would take credit. At present 8500 kilometers of pipelines are being built by the USSR for domestic and Western Europe gas supplies. It is no secret as to the number of pipe plants the USSR has but it is also buying pipe from Sweden, Germany and Italy. There are no tricks or devices. Brezhnev knows his economy. Is it profitable for the US to do a gas deal? It is up to the United States. The United States is farsighted but competing with its friends in the world. It needs “something in its hands it can use,” in its world trade. “No political precondi-
tions, terms, no nothing.” The US cries poor that it hasn’t got $3 billion but the US “wastes” a lot more in “certain places” (we all took this to be an obvious reference to Vietnam).

Going on, Brezhnev states that, of course, these gas projects take time. To calculate the specifics the US has experienced people and so does the Soviet Union. Then the matter can be resolved. Perhaps 80% of the gas to the US and 20% for Soviet use. These are details. The Siberian gas project is a big operation. The USSR has also had negotiations with Japan. The USSR believes it should do the Japanese gas project because there are some goods in Japan the USSR is interested in. Recently there have been rumors the US and Japan want a joint approach. The US must arrive at an understanding with the Japanese. The investment step is the heart of the matter. The terms of supply and the rest were merely matters of techniques. For example, the Soviets could guarantee us a fixed quantity at a price for a certain term and the US wouldn’t have to worry about all the problems.

Brezhnev also mentions the possibility of other big projects, such as cellulose plants to be built in the USSR—perhaps a 50–50 deal. On platinum, he states he does not know the details but Patolichev is to continue looking into such a project. He mentions the USSR truck industry as a big item for development. Also a couple of big fertilizer plants, both phosphorous and nitrogen. Summarizing, he states projects could be on a “colossal” basis, worthy of the two countries.

Brezhnev states further that we can also exchange consumer goods and capital goods such as machinery. Would require credits. The United States has credits that could be made available. This requires good will and a reasonable approach. The United States should roll away the superstition and get rid of the biased opinion that used to exist against the USSR in the US. Gas is not dependent on political systems.

Peterson states he is a businessman and believes that gas alone could make the US the USSR’s biggest trading partner by 1980. If Peterson were to make the decision, he would do it. Peterson states, however, that it may take a few months to convince others in the US what Peterson believes is an obvious fact. He reassures Brezhnev that he had heard him loud and clear on gas.

Peterson states that on trucks (Kama River) and joint projects, we would be able to move soon. It is very important to get a few deals started soon, even if not the biggest ones. Once we get a few projects started, the American mentality is that other businessmen will want to do the same thing. Thereupon Brezhnev refers to Henry Ford and how,

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4 See footnote 4, Document 19.
after discussions between Ford and Kosygin on the Soviet auto plant, there were such noises in the United States “Poor Henry Ford” had to suppress what he had talked about with Kosygin and the Italians ended up building the plant.

Brezhnev states that during the current five-year plan, the USSR wants to build another truck and automobile plant in Siberia, involving 150,000 units a year. This plant could be built with the US.

Peterson states that the Ford experience was pre-Summit. Already people in the United States are saying that there have been no more important, bold meetings in the modern history of the world than the Summit meetings. Brezhnev interjects that if God is willing (crossing himself) and he comes to the US he will explain to our businessmen. Peterson states that the Summit has changed things and uses as an example our attitude toward participation in the Kama River truck plant. He further states jokingly that modestly he will also point out that the Ford project was pre-Peterson, and that Patolichev knows we are ready to go on the Kama River plant.

Brezhnev states there are 250,000 million people in the USSR, and the US should take a realistic look at the country. Peterson should look hard at the Soviet requests to him. Peterson should treat the interest rate issue with a “Godly” attitude. The issue of whether 3 or 6% is important.

Peterson offers Brezhnev a bet that he states Brezhnev probably won’t take—that if we can get by the small technical problems in the next couple of months, the US will be the largest trading partner of the USSR by the end of this decade easily.

Brezhnev states that the US social problems are harder to solve than in the USSR, for example, unemployment and poverty. The US should take that into account. The USSR is prepared to “help out” with these problems through trade. He adds that if we were enemies, the USSR would foster crises in the United States.

Peterson states that we do have different systems and different views about our systems. As the Summit showed, both sides agree that “in a nuclear age there are no winners and losers.” The same is true in trade. Both nations want peace and also have in common our efforts to improve the standard of living in our countries.

Brezhnev interjected that if we don’t trade, both peoples live less good lives. Brezhnev refers to his learning about an American game of “chicken” where autos come at each other in the same lane and wait to see who will divert first. In such a case, Brezhnev said that we both know who would be left and we would have to ask ourselves how we felt about that.

Peterson states history will make Brezhnev and Nixon the greatest peacemakers in history, and beyond this each dollar saved will go into
the pockets of our people. Brezhnev replied that history inevitably judges leaders and inevitably such judgment is either good or bad. For example, the Soviet people have a good impression of Roosevelt\(^5\) and not so favorable impression with regard to certain other Presidents.

On the subject of allocation of national resources as between defense and consumer expenditures, Peterson states that as the President’s Assistant he made a special study of Japan. Japan has had the greatest increase of GNP of any major country. It puts only 0.8% of GNP into defense. Brezhnev interjects that the Japanese advantage is both the lack of defense expenditures and its cheap labor. Peterson continues that the difference in what Japan spends on defense in relation to the US is almost exactly the amount of investment the Japanese put into plant and equipment annually.

Brezhnev states that he appreciates setting up the special working group on gas, and he authorizes Patolichev to proceed. He urges that businessmen be given a free hand. They should be pushed together. He raised this with the President. He asks Peterson to tell the President that he raised the gas project many times with Peterson. Also to tell him that Brezhnev is confident that the understandings and agreements between us will be realized.

Peterson states that the President directed Peterson to bring Principle Seven of the Summit principles into a reality.\(^6\) Brezhnev then reads it. Brezhnev then tells Peterson to “tell the President that Comrade Brezhnev is glad Peterson had me read it and we will abide by it.”

Brezhnev states that we have to solve lend-lease and states that he gave his point of view to the President. They agreed to resolve the problem on “that principle.” Brezhnev doesn’t like unpleasant words but it is an old problem. The United States got nothing. If Brezhnev had been General Secretary at the time and as farsighted as he is now, he would have had the USSR act in a different way. He would have had the USSR return all the lend-lease property left after the war. Thereupon the USSR would not be a debtor. Now, instead, the USSR even has to pay interest. The USSR now “has to pay” and Brezhnev wants to resolve this unpleasant problem. Brezhnev wants the President to understand the USSR proposals on time periods and feasibilities of payment.

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\(^5\) Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States from 1933 to 1945.

\(^6\) Presumably a reference to the Basic Principles. Article 7 reads, “The USA and the USSR regard commercial and economic ties as an important and necessary element in the strengthening of their bilateral relations and thus will actively promote the growth of such ties. They will facilitate cooperation between the relevant organizations and enterprises of the two countries and the conclusion of appropriate agreements and contracts, including long-term ones.” ([Public Papers: Nixon, 1972](#), p. 634)
Brezhnev states he will raise one more issue, that was not on the agenda. If the US will offer “Godly” credit terms, the Soviets would discuss a long-term deal on soybeans, and makes another reference to our needing something in our hands vis-à-vis the problems with our new competitors.

Jokingly, Peterson refers to a possibility of our forming a trading bloc with the USSR if that problem is that serious.

In closing, Brezhnev tells Peterson to give Brezhnev’s best regards to the President, Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger. He also asked Peterson to advise the President that the USSR keeps working in the spirit of the Summit and nothing will shake its position in this regard. “We must not be hesitant.”

Following the meeting, Peterson and Brezhnev met privately for about 15 minutes. At this point, Brezhnev told Peterson that he wanted him to give a private message to the President on the lend lease issue. Brezhnev said this was a very difficult issue for him and he wanted the President to know that he was not able to go beyond the 2% interest. Peterson mentioned the proposal made to the Soviets to split the difference between the old interest rate of 2% and new interest rates of 6\% to 7% and that he had very much hoped that this would get both sides off the hook. Brezhnev said he understood this but he still wanted me to relay the 2% interest message to the President.
22. Editorial Note

On August 1, 1972, Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson concluded the talks of the U.S.–USSR Joint Commercial Commission in Moscow. In a news conference at the Embassy in Moscow, he presented a general summary of his conversations with Soviet General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev and of the ongoing commercial negotiations with the Soviet Union.

On the issue of U.S. credits to the Soviet Union, Peterson said that it was “clear from this visit that interest rates are viewed differently in our society and here.” He continued: “More than once during our discussions we have heard reference to the idea of ‘godly’ interest rates. I take this as a euphemism for low interest rates. Well, we know that there are many bankers who lend money who think that God is high in the heavens. And it might be argued, therefore, that there are somewhat different perceptions of what ‘godly’ interest rates mean. It is no secret that in the course of the grain agreement the Soviet Union had hoped for long-term arrangements up to 10 years and very low interest rates at 2 percent. I think that what has emerged from these sessions is growing acceptance of the basic principle that if the President decided to make any determination, it cannot be one that involves concessionary rates or concessionary procedures. He means that interest rates and terms must be the same as those offered other countries and that the procedures by which we approve credit must be the same as for other countries.”

With regard to most-favored-nation status (MFN) for the Soviet Union, Peterson said: “If we were to grant each other most-favored-nation treatment, the symmetry is obviously something less than perfect. Here, the state trade monopoly buys everything and sells everything for what are clearly reasons of its own. For that reason, what it buys, what it sells, who it buys from, who it sells to, and what it pays can obviously be subjective decisions, not market decisions. And therefore there is potential for discrimination, whether that is the intent or not.” He continued that “in a non-market economy, it means that such issues as dumping become a real possibility, whether intentional or not.” He concluded, “It is important, therefore, in building a permanent commercial relationship that we anticipate these possibilities and decide how they are to be handled.”

Turning to lend-lease, Peterson said, “I think the two governments have come somewhat closer together on the lend-lease issue.” He continued, “I think it is entirely possible that this is one of those issues that in the final analysis will have to be resolved at the highest level of both governments.” At another point, he noted, “it is very unlikely that our President will extend Exim credit until the lend-lease problem is satis-
factorily resolved. In turn, the Soviet Union does not wish to pay its lend-lease amounts until the MFN question is satisfactorily resolved.” He stated that “it would not be at all surprising if on one or two of these critical items, we will find ourselves in a situation in which decisions at the highest level of the two governments will be involved.” (Department of State Bulletin, September 11, 1972, pages 285–288)

In response to a question regarding the connection between the commercial talks and political considerations, Peterson said, “The more favorable the political environment, the more political tensions are reduced, given the kind of system we have in the United States, the more likely, I think, that the American public, the Congress, and others will support the concept of expanded trade, support the concept of expanded credit.” (Ibid., page 292) In an article published in The New York Times, reporter Hedrick Smith suggested that Peterson’s remarks “implied that Soviet help in easing tension in such areas as Vietnam would influence Washington.” (“Big Issues Block U.S.-Soviet Trade,” The New York Times, August 2, 1972, page 47)

On August 4, National Security Council Staff member Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who had accompanied Peterson to Moscow, reported his views in a memorandum to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger. Sonnenfeldt, who sent the memorandum in advance of Kissinger’s conversation with Dobrynin scheduled for later that day, wrote, “Here, again, we have press problems: the NYT stories that we are stalling to extract Vietnam help from the Soviets.

“— Tell D. [Dobrynin] that none of these stories came from us. The only thing Peterson said—as the Soviets know—was that trade is related to the political environment. This is elementary and Moscow knows this as well as we do.

“— We were not stalling in the Moscow talks. On the contrary we found the Soviets almost completely inflexible and got the impression—which Peterson mentioned to Patolichev—that the Soviets might be supposing that because of the election the President was so eager for a deal that they can afford to play a game of chicken with us.

“— Our position is that since the Soviets raised the issue of an overall trade agreement, we, too, want to go for an integrated, comprehensive deal which commands Congressional and public support. Hence, we cannot accept the Soviet Lend-Lease position and have to insist on such points as arbitration and copyright. We also have to push for adequate business facilities for U.S. firms and must protect ourselves on the anti-dumping issue. We are not trying to squeeze the Soviets and fully recognize that they have problems on these matters; but our point is that if there is to be a comprehensive approach, it must be viable and cannot leave the President exposed.
“—We remain very interested in joint ventures and Peterson’s tactic, on instructions, was to try to identify some deals that we can move on urgently—like platinum. Gas is so complex that it takes more time; we don’t want to get hung up on those complexities.

“—The Soviets should do careful homework and we will be ready before your trip in September to receive a senior official from Moscow to get the issues narrowed. We will also do careful homework in the meantime.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13)

23. Memorandum of Conversation¹


PARTICIPANTS
Russian Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

The meeting took place in an extremely cordial atmosphere.

SALT

Dobrynin began the meeting by a rather strong attack on the Jackson Resolution.² He said it would be very difficult to understand in Moscow why such a measure should be pushed by the Administration.³ I said it was not pushed by the Administration, but indeed that

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The luncheon meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy.
² On August 3, the U.S. Senate ratified the ABM Treaty by a vote of 88–2. On the same day, Senator Henry M. Jackson (D–WA) substituted his own version of a resolution approving the U.S.-Soviet Interim Agreement on limiting offensive strategic nuclear weapons, i.e. the SALT agreement. Jackson’s amendment to the original resolution approving the agreement “put Congress on record as favoring the principle of numerical equality on offensive weapons in any treaty negotiated in the next round of the strategic arms limitations talks.” Jackson’s resolution also contained an admonition that if Moscow took any steps—even ones permitted under the Interim Agreement—that endangered U.S. strategic forces, “this would be ground for abrogating the agreement.” (John W. Finney, “Senate Approves Missile Pact with Soviet on Missiles, 88–2,” The New York Times, August 4, 1972, p. 1)
³ The New York Times reported that Jackson’s substitute resolution approving the Interim Agreement was “apparently supported by the White House.” (Ibid.) In an August 4 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt recommended that Kissinger tell Dobrynin that “regardless of what The New York Times may say, we did not put Jackson up to the resolu-
we had declared our neutrality. Dobrynin said it would never make any sense in Moscow that Senator Scott would put his name on a resolution not supported by the White House. He thought it was very unfortunate and that we would pay a price totally out of proportion to any possible gain. He said that we should remember that Brezhnev and the President signed it jointly; how would we feel if the Soviets attached reservations on their part even if they repeated things that had already been agreed upon? I told Dobrynin I would have to see what could be done at this late stage. Dobrynin said that he had no official authority but he wanted to tell me that it really would make a great deal of difference if some progress could be made.

**Nuclear Understanding**

We then turned to my trip to the Soviet Union. Dobrynin said they expected some definite progress on the nuclear understanding, and they were prepared to sign it early in October when he thought it would do us a great deal of good. I said we would do our best, but that their present draft was not quite acceptable. He said it would help if I could give him a counterdraft. I said I would do my best. Dobrynin pointed out that he would return to the Soviet Union on August 14th for about two weeks, so that it would really be quite important to have such a draft available by then.

**Economic Relations**

We then talked about the economic negotiations. Dobrynin pointed out that there had not been as much progress as we had expected, but he assumed that this was due to our desire to keep matters in status quo until September. He asked whether I thought we would settle for 3% on the Lend-Lease. I said we would have to study it but we would certainly make a major effort to get the Lend-Lease agreement settled in September, particularly if they were willing to meet us some part of the way.

Dobrynin reiterated Brezhnev’s great interest in the LNG project. I again pointed out that we were in principle willing, but that it was a technically complex issue which required further study.

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4 See Document 17 and footnote 3 thereto.

5 A reference to a proposed gas deal between the Soviet Union and the United States, in which the United States would assist in the development of Soviet liquefied natural gas fields in exchange for imports. Regarding Brezhnev’s interest in the project, see Document 21. See also Document 69.
Middle East

In a half-hearted way Dobrynin asked whether we had any papers on the Middle East. I told him that we hadn’t made too much progress but I didn’t have the impression that he really wanted to pursue the topic.

Spy Cases

We reviewed the status of the $200 thousand payoff for Markelov and Ivanov and the legal steps that had to be taken to return $180 thousand from it.6

Kissinger Trip

Dobrynin told me that during my visit Brezhnev personally wanted to conduct the negotiations. But since no official decision to that effect had been made, he could not give me the formal notification. Also, he thought that the Soviet Union would agree to an announcement on September 5th, though again no official position had been taken.

Vietnam

I then handed Dobrynin our opening statement and draft plan from our August 1st meeting with the North Vietnamese7 for the personal information of Brezhnev.

Dobrynin said that the only information they had about the July 19th meeting8 was that I had presented my proposals in a very conciliatory way but I had not gone beyond what had already been presented in Moscow. He asked me whether I had anything to add. I said no, I didn’t wish to add anything to what they had already been told by their allies.

I told Dobrynin that I hoped that North Vietnam would not confuse the impact of the election. They should know that under pressure we always moved forward. Dobrynin remarked that the North Viet-

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6 Igor Ivanov, a chauffeur for the Soviet trade agency Amtorg, was convicted of espionage in October 1963. Ever since, pending appeals, he had been free on $100,000 bail. Valerii Markelov, a Soviet translator at the UN, had been arrested on February 14, 1972, for espionage. Haig wrote in a memorandum to Kissinger on August 3 that “Justice is moving rapidly on Ivanov so that the $80,000 [of the original bail] can be returned by the end of the week or the first of next week to the Soviets.” Haig also reported that Justice was recommending “that we move on the 15th to get the $100,000 back in the Markelov case at a time when the regular judge [who was then on vacation] will be back temporarily and can do it quietly and gracefully.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 995, Alexander M. Haig Chronological File)


8 See ibid., Document 207.
namese were undoubtedly counting on the fact that we would become more conciliatory under the pressure of the campaign. In his judgment they would wait until the end of September to see whether the President still held a substantial lead, and then they would make a move if they thought there was no probability of an electoral outcome. He said he had begun to wonder whether McGovern represented really a new alignment of forces or was similar to the Goldwater phenomenon. I said we would soon know, but that we would not pay any attention to domestic politics; we would pursue the strategy which we consider to be in the national interest. Dobrynin said that there could be no doubt that they wanted to win.

We agreed to meet again on August 11th.

24. Memorandum for the President’s File by the Executive Director of the Council for International Economic Policy (Flanigan)


At 10:30 on August 11 the President met for 30 minutes with Secretary Peterson, Dr. Kissinger, and Peter Flanigan in the Oval Office. Secretary Peterson was to report on the Peterson-led delegation to Moscow for the first meeting of the US–USSR Commercial Commission.

Peterson told the President that the Soviets were hard negotiators and were occasionally sticklers for a non-substantive point. Peterson was convinced, however, that the Soviets need the deal more than the U.S. does from an economic point of view, and that Brezhnev needs it from a personal point of view.

In describing his long meeting with Brezhnev on the Black Sea, Peterson said that the two issues obviously important to Brezhnev were a gas deal and the settlement of lend-lease.

With regard to a gas deal, the President made clear that he wanted at least a very strong appearance of interest on our side. He recognized Brezhnev’s personal commitment here, and wanted to meet it by very obvious cosmetic actions if we could not meet it by substantive actions.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 89, Memoranda for the President, Beginning August 6, 1972. No classification marking.

2 See Document 21
With regard to lend-lease, Peterson urged that if the President agrees to a lend-lease settlement (Peterson believes concessions in this area are possible), he insist the lend-lease settlement be a part of an overall deal and that the President stay tough on a comprehensive trade agreement. The President agreed with this proposal.

The President instructed Kissinger to work out a message\(^3\) which could be sent to Brezhnev regarding our interest in a gas deal, and also to give thought to the best way to reach a lend-lease settlement.

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\(^{3}\) Not found.

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25. **Memorandum of Conversation**\(^1\)

Washington, August 11, 1972, 1:15–3 p.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
His Excellency Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United States

The lunch was shifted to the Soviet Embassy from the Map Room at the last moment because the President’s departure for Camp David had brought the press to the South Lawn.

Dobrynin began the lunch by reflecting about the Presidential campaign. He was not clear in his own mind whether McGovern represented a new phenomenon or simply a reflection of a political accident. He asked how McGovern would react in a crisis. I replied that it was hard to predict but the possibility of a violent, outraged reaction to provocation could not be excluded. Dobrynin replied that in that case it was important to keep tension high but just below the level of explosion.

**Economic Relations**

Turning to economic issues Dobrynin asked how I assessed Peterson’s trip. I replied that the topics were complex and technical. It

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy. At the meeting, Kissinger handed Dobrynin a draft announcement of Kissinger’s upcoming trip to Moscow from September 10 to 13. (Ibid.)
was therefore inevitable that discussions would be prolonged. I said that I expected to settle the Lend-Lease issue when I visited Moscow in September at a figure between our last two proposals (4½% to 2%). I would also be prepared to suggest major progress on LNG following Brezhnev’s injunction that there should be deeds not words. I pointed out that we were planning to establish a Presidential Commission on gas in the latter part of September to give a focus to our policy. The Soviet leaders could help by making sure we were informed about their dealings with private U.S. companies or there was likely to be total chaos. Dobrynin indicated that he considered this approach extremely positive.

I said that we would have Lynn stand by to join me in Moscow and therefore suggested putting the economic issue first on the agenda. Dobrynin indicated a readiness to go along with this.

Nuclear Understanding

The conversation next turned to the nuclear agreement. Dobrynin said that Brezhnev was very eager for it to come off. I told him sketchily of my conversation with the British.² They had been appalled at the whole idea. I was now asking them to redraft an acceptable first clause without having shown them the Soviet text. Dobrynin replied that he had expected this reaction but Britain should be reassured by Article III. I pointed out that this should be introduced only after the principle of an agreement was established. Dobrynin indicated continued great concern. I said that I would try to have a draft by August 18.

Middle East

Dobrynin next produced a letter from Brezhnev (attached)³ urging a resumption of bilateral Middle East negotiations. He hoped I would have a concrete scheme in September. I indicated that it would be difficult to come up with a comprehensive scheme given all the other pressures on me. Dobrynin suggested that some concrete proposal regarding what we meant by security zones would advance matters. He eschewed the pretense that the Soviet withdrawal represented an ad-

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² Kissinger wrote in his memoirs: “At the end of July 1972, I had used the regular visit to Washington by Sir Burke Trend, the British Cabinet Secretary to show him the Soviet draft of July 21 [see Document 17]. I asked for British advice, and indicated that we would proceed only in tandem with London. On August 10 the Foreign Office sent its Soviet expert, Sir Thomas Brimelow, and a small group of advisers to Washington to review the project in detail.” Kissinger continued, “In his [Brimelow’s] view, the Soviets wanted to reduce the margin of their own uncertainty while seeking to magnify allied inhibitions against the use of nuclear weapons. Our course must thwart those designs. Brimelow, as did we, judged existing Soviet drafts unacceptable. I outlined a possible strategy of seeking to transform the Soviet approach into a statement of principles of political restraint proscribing the threat of force, nuclear or conventional.” (Years of Upheaval, p. 278)

³ Attached but not printed.
VANCE payment on the offer of last October. He said it was important not to permit small countries to dominate great powers. Sadat had miscalculated. He had thought the request to leave would produce negotiations. Instead the Soviet Union had pulled everybody out. When the Egyptian military realized the implications for maintainence and overall combat effectiveness it might turn out that the chapter was not yet closed.

**Korea**

Dobrynin pointed out that my suggestion to avoid a UN debate on Korea in return for the disbandment of UNCURK during the year had been transmitted to Pyongyang. No reply had as yet been received.

**Vietnam**

Dobrynin then turned to Vietnam. His impression was that the North Vietnamese were still counting on our Presidential elections—not in the sense of counting on a McGovern victory but because they thought we would make concessions under the pressures of a campaign. I asked him what he thought. He said Hanoi had proved its lack of concern by launching an offensive so close to the summit. Dobrynin thought that if the President was still far ahead in late September a break might come. Dobrynin did not think much of Hanoi’s last proposal which he described as an offer to Thieu to negotiate his own demise.

**Other Bilateral Matters**

Dobrynin asked about when he would receive the bail for Markelov and Ivanov and I reassured him that it would be soon.

Dobrynin then asked informally whether I could use my influence with Time-Life to prevent the showing of the film on Khrushchev’s life. He said it would be most appreciated in Moscow. I told him I would talk to Donovan.

We agreed to meet again on August 18 at the White House.

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5 A reference to the Easter Offensive, March 30–October 22.


7 See footnote 6, Document 23.

8 In a telephone conversation on August 28 at 3:42 p.m., Kissinger told Dobrynin that he had spoken with Hedley Donovan, Editor-in-Chief of Time, Inc. Kissinger reported that Donovan had said “they have not yet sold that film” and that “at least they won’t do it this year.” Kissinger continued: “I would assume that we will have announced the Brezhnev visit some time early next year, and then we can delay it again until after that.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 14, Chronological File)
26. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon

Moscow, August 16, 1972.

Dear Mr. President,

In addition to our recent exchange of letters on the Middle East I would like to express now some considerations on a wider range of questions in connection with your letter of July 18 and your conversation with our Ambassador in San Clemente.

Development of events during the period of time since the meeting in Moscow confirms, in our view, that this meeting and its results favorably influence the relations between our two countries and also have broader international impact. It is of course important that well-started work on implementation of the agreements and arrangements achieved in Moscow should be continued further on.

We have underway, as in the United States, the process of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and everything necessary is being done that this Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms enter into force in the possible nearest time. It is necessary, however, that meanwhile no steps or statements are made which would cast a shadow on the big work done in achieving these agreements.

We are contemplating now the questions to be concentrated upon during the forthcoming second stage of negotiations on further limitation of strategic offensive arms. We will be prepared to exchange opinions with you on these questions—using for this purpose, in particular, Dr. Kissinger’s visit to Moscow in September—in order to give then appropriate instructions to our delegations at the negotiations.

We are gratified to note the progress already achieved by appropriate Soviet and American authorities in implementation of the agree-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Top Secret. A handwritten notation at the top of the letter reads: “Handed to General Haig by Amb. Dobrynin at 12:30 pm on 8/17/72.” The text of the letter was forwarded to Kissinger in Saigon on August 17 in message Tohak 72. (Ibid.) Kissinger was on a secret trip to Paris, Switzerland, Saigon, and Tokyo. He visited Saigon from August 17 to 19.


3 Document 10.

4 See Document 8.
ments signed in Moscow on cooperation between the USSR and the US in the fields of science and technology, research in outer space, medical science and public health.

There is some movement forward also in the commercial and economic field. We have come [far?] in particular for concluding an agreement on purchases in the United States during a number of years of a big quantity of grain. You attached as I remember great importance to the achievement of such an agreement. At the same time it should be put straight that the main questions, solution of which is necessary for a sharp increase in the commercial and economic field—and first of all the questions of the most favored nation treatment, credits and debt-payments on the lend-lease—remain still unsettled. As I have already told your Secretary of Commerce Mr. Peterson\(^5\) we expect that more understanding of the political aspects of these questions will be displayed by the US side. For example, it would be hardly right to apply purely commercial approach to the solution of the problem of payment of interest in connection with the debt for the lend-lease supplies, having in mind the circumstances of this debt’s origin.

In the European affairs the questions of preparing and convening the All-European Conference are now moving to the forefront and demand practical solution. We believe the time has come to fix a concrete date of beginning the multilateral preparatory consultations. This would give more purposefulness to the preparatory work. With due account also of the considerations of the American side it appears to be possible to take up such consultations in any case not later than November 1972 with a view that a meeting itself, as we have agreed with you, should be convened without undue delay.

Now a few words on the question of reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe. We together with our allies have always attached importance to this problem, have undertaken appropriate initiatives and at the present time continue to contemplate the most appropriate ways of its solution. However, the question of reduction of armaments in Europe should in no way,—and as we believe, this is the essence of the understanding reached between us in Moscow on this question,—be used for delaying and complicating the multilateral consultations on preparing and carrying out the All-European Conference.

Unfortunately, Mr. President, the continuing war in Vietnam remains to be a source of negative influence on international relations in general and, it should be put straight, on the relations between our two countries.

\(^5\) See Document 21.
It goes without saying that we positively regard the fact that in Paris both official and unofficial meetings have been resumed and that some forward movement has begun to show in the course of the meetings, which took place. As it has been confirmed by your remarks as well, the efforts taken by us contributed to the progress at the meetings in Paris.

Now an especially responsible moment has come in the Vietnamese affairs—in fact, a question is being decided whether it will be possible to put the Vietnam problem on reliable rails of political settlement or the war there will still continue for an indefinitely long time with all ensuing consequences. One would like to hope that those possibilities for political settlement that exist will not be lost.

In this connection one cannot but feel serious concern about the incessant and even increasing bombing of the DRV territory by American air force and other military actions by the United States against the DRV. Information coming from Vietnam shows that the actions there of the US armed forces have the nature of genuine terror against the population of that country and of systematic destruction of its economy.

Besides the fact that the increasing of bombing and other military actions against the DRV in no way can promote the search for mutually acceptable decisions at the table of negotiations, the following point is important here. In these circumstances an opportunity is being restricted, if not to say more for rendering assistance to political settlement of the conflict on the part of those who would like to do it.

We have already informed you, Mr. President, about our willingness to receive Dr. Kissinger on September 11 in Moscow in order to discuss the course of implementation of the agreements reached during the meeting in May, as well as to continue the search for ways of settlement of those problems which still complicate our relations.

In conclusion, I would like to tell you once again that we highly value and consider it very important and useful the established practice of confidential exchange of views between us. Especially important is that frankness which is notable for this exchange of views. In our opinion, only such approach can secure a basis for mutual trust so necessary for genuine improvement of Soviet-American relations which we are sincerely striving for.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

6 Printed from a copy with this typed signature.
27. Backchannel Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) in Saigon

Washington, August 17, 1972, 2325Z.

WHS 2136/Tohak 63. Press stories from Moscow that Soviets instituting new system of exit fees ranging from $5000 to $25,000 for educated Jews wishing to emigrate to Israel has stirred up storm among Jewish community. Previously, there had been general $1000 exit fee.

In response to numerous calls, Rogers has agreed to meet with three co-chairmen of Conference on Soviet Jewry Friday. They are Stein, Maass and Max Fisher. Although in that meeting, Rogers expects only to listen to Jewish leaders he is seeking authority to call in Dobrynin to caution him that if true the above reports will cause major political problem for President. I understand John Mitchell and Colson favor such démarche. There are also indications that Democrats on Hill may attempt to get some sort of resolution condemning Soviet

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 23, HAK Trip Files, HAK’s Secret Paris Trip, Switzerland, Saigon, Tokyo, August 13–19, 1972, To/Frm 86971 & Backchannels. Secret; Eyes Only; Flash. A stamped notation on the message indicates it was received in the White House Situation Room at 8:23 p.m. on August 17.

2 August 18. At 6:45 p.m. on August 17, Haig spoke by telephone with Rogers, who warned that the Soviet position on the educational fee could “blow up in a problem for the President quickly,” and promised when meeting the Jewish leaders “to try and cool them off.” (Ibid., Box 998, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons, 1972, [1 of 2])

3 Jacob Stein, Richard Maass, and Max Fisher.

4 Rogers checked with Haig during their August 17 telephone conversation about calling in Dobrynin privately. Haig thought the President “will go along, but I think we had better check with him simply because he has been so adamant about this subject.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons, 1972, [1 of 2])

5 Colson wrote Haig regarding the Soviet exit fees on August 17: “All of our Jewish experts say that we are about to lose all of the important ground that we have gained with the Jewish vote over the present brouhaha with the Soviets. Is there no end to what has to be done to keep their vote solid? I am sorry to bother you with this one, but our Jewish polls tell us we have real problems.” Haig replied in a memorandum to Colson on August 19: “I can assure you that we are wrestling intensively with this issue. However, for far more important reasons than the Jewish vote, it is essential that there be absolutely nothing said on this subject by any White House officials. I will keep you posted on how this explosive issue evolves.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 995, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Chron Aug 10–24, 1972)
measures and criticizing President for insensitivity.\textsuperscript{6} Situation is of course exacerbated by Rockefeller episode.\textsuperscript{7}

Rogers has been trying to reach President on this but so far has not apparently succeeded. I believe in the circumstances a low-key talk to Dobrynin by Rogers is proper course. Would appreciate your urgent reaction.

Recommend the following:

I call Dobrynin in your behest and tell him that this matter could stir terrible domestic political crisis since liberal Democrats are already moving fast to establish barriers against further U.S./Soviet relations, trade, etc. Following this call we could then give Rogers authority to talk to Dobrynin and I will alert Dobrynin that Rogers will formally contact him so that we can publicly confirm that we have discussed with Soviets. Should Dobrynin have some contrary information, we can set the Democrats up for subsequent criticism for over reaction and at the same time not disturb our relations with the Soviets.

\textsuperscript{6} Rogers also told Haig during their August 17 phone conversation that the Democrats wanted the grain deal with the Soviet Union called off unless the Soviets voided their ruling on the educational fee. Rogers suggested that “it could have a serious effect on our relations with the Soviet Union and have a serious effect on the President’s political . . .” (Ibid., Box 998, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons, 1972, [1 of 2])

\textsuperscript{7} In a message to Kissinger on August 14, Haig wrote: “We have had exciting 24 hours, with Governor Rockefeller announcing in Israel that you had told him that an agreement had been worked out in Moscow at the time of the Summit which would provide for 35,000 Jews to emigrate each year. Without the benefit of talking to the Governor, I pulled back gently from that position and gave Ziegler the following guidance: (1) The U.S. position on the right of emigration is clear; and (2) up to June of this year there have been over 15,000 Jews who emigrated. At this rate, there will be between 30,000–35,000 by the end of the year. We have nothing more to add other than to confirm in a Question and Answer that the subject was discussed in Moscow.” (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 23, HAK Trip Files, HAK’s Secret Paris Trip, Switzerland, Saigon, Tokyo, August 13–19, 1972, To/Frm 86971 & Backchannels)
28. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the 
President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs 
(Haig) and Secretary of State Rogers

Washington, August 18, 1972, 8:45 a.m.

R: Hello, Al.
H: Good morning, sir. The President called down. I passed that 
word up on the Jewish problem.

R: OK.
H: Haldeman says the President does not want any démarches yet.
R: OK.
H: With the Soviets. And hoped that we could keep the meeting 
today which he recognizes is a real tough one for you, with the mini-
minimum possible profile.

R: Yeh, well we’ll try to keep it without any profile. (Laughter)
H: OK. I don’t know how long this is going to hold, but he [Nixon] 
said he’d just rather wait because he thinks the other side is gonna 
overreact and the Soviets are fairly subtle too. They’ve got some things 
in the fire.

R: Yeah. Well that’s fine with me. I think we had to see them 
though.

H: Oh, yeah.

R: I mean see the Jewish leaders. So I think by talking to them 
they’ll recognize the better thing is not to do it all publicly. But I’m 
going to try to convince them to let us just handle it the way we handle 
a lot of these other things and don’t—keep the lid on and don’t get out 
and . . .

H: But he hopes there won’t be any promise, you know, that we’re 
going to hit the, you know, that they won’t . . .

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, 
Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons, 1972 [1 of 2]. No classification 
marking. In message Tohak 78, August 18, Haig informed Kissinger that he had carried 
out the instructions regarding Rogers’ proposed meeting with Dobrynin over the exit fee 
issue. Haig wrote that “I have brutalized Rogers after clearing it with the President, and 
there will be no contacts whatsoever with the Soviets.” He continued: “The meeting with 
Rogers and the Jewish leaders will proceed without press in the most low-keyed way this 
afternoon. I have talked to Rogers about it personally, and he understands and will com-
ply. There will be no public statement by the White House or State. Ron [Ziegler] will de-
fer to State.” (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 23, HAK Trip Files, HAK’s Secret Paris 
Trip, Switzerland, Saigon, Tokyo, August 13–19, 1972, To/Frm 86971 & Backchannels)

2 A reference to Rogers’ meeting with the co-chairmen of the Conference on Soviet 
Jewry. No record of the meeting was found, but the three Jewish leaders briefed the press 
after the meeting. See “U.S. Is Said to Tell Soviet of Its Concern Over Jews,” The New York 
R: Oh, I won't make any promise, hell no. I don't think there's anything we can do. All I want to do is just welcome them in and keep them quiet.

H: Keep them quiet.

R: OK, fine Al.

H: Thank you sir.

29. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Peterson to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Executive Director of the Council for International Economic Policy (Flanigan)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Meeting of Peterson and Lynn with Dobrynin (August 15, 1972)

Dobrynin stated that Patolichev’s heart spasm suffered at the airport when we left was quite serious; he had gone to the hospital but was now home recovering.

Peterson gave his favorable impressions of Brezhnev, and Dobrynin indicated his longtime close relationship with Brezhnev. Dobrynin wants copies of our pictures of the Brezhnev meeting.

Peterson went through the press clippings offsetting Schwartz article which claimed that we are tying progress on trade to assistance by the Soviets on Vietnam.\(^2\) Also, Peterson indicated how he is emphasizing big joint gas and raw material deals. Dobrynin seemed satisfied.

Peterson spoke frankly on our real impression of the Moscow trade talks—that notwithstanding what we considered to be a forthcoming package proposal to Patolichev in our private sessions, they had not moved, and in fact had taken a couple steps backward. He pointed out we had said this candidly to Patolichev the day before we left and had then pointed out that if their lack of movement was by reason of an impression the President needed agreement before the

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election or for our economy, they were seriously mistaken. Peterson added that we want an agreement, but believe that the agreement must be comprehensive and fair so as to avoid misunderstandings later on.

Peterson gave some examples of the things we interpreted as lack of movement on their part or steps backward.

First, on lend lease, the Soviets gave no indication of movement on the 2% interest rate even though we had been given the impression pre-Moscow that they were willing to negotiate the rate. There was also no give on their part on other issues such as postponements and making one or more initial payments not conditional on Congressional granting of MFN.

Second, on MFN, notwithstanding discussions in earlier meetings in 1971 and 1972, in which the Soviets understood that our export controls were not negotiable, the Trade Ministry deputy in the Work Group on the trade agreement was interjecting MFN treatment on exports as opposed to treating MFN solely as an import question.

Third, on business facilitation, Patolichev and his people acted like the Moscow trade center, with office and hotel facilities, was a completely new thought even though the Moscow Chamber of Commerce and Ministry of Science and Technology were pushing a U.S. pavilion, had given copies of the plans for the center to our Embassy and had shown interest in Dr. Hammer’s proposal to have U.S. participation in building the hotel. Dobrynin took a copy of the plan and promised to advise as to what is really going on—how firm the plans are for the center.

Peterson also referred to our proposal for an MFN concept on office facilities for our businessmen, which also had received a cool reaction from Patolichev. Dobrynin indicated that in the last three or four months the Soviets had decided on a rule that if a foreign company is doing business in the USSR at a $10 million a year rate it would be entitled to accreditation and office space. (This was very interesting to us because Patolichev never has given a hint that they have a formula.)

Fourth, on arbitration, Peterson commented that the Soviets were unwilling to write a clause making it clear that if an American businessman wants arbitration to be in a third country under third country rules the Soviets will not insist on Moscow arbitration.

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³ Armand Hammer, Chairman of Occidental Petroleum Corporation, announced on July 19 that his corporation had signed a five-year technical assistance agreement with the Soviet Government to “include exploration, production and use of natural gas and crude oil; agricultural fertilizers and chemicals; metal treating and plating; design and building of hotels; and utilization of solid wastes.” (“Occidental, Soviet Unveil Five-Year Technical Accord,” Wall Street Journal, July 19, 1972, p. 2)

4 Peterson described this proposal during his press conference of August 1; see Document 22.
Peterson also outlined our proposals on copyrights and taxes, including the reasons why satisfactory resolution of the copyright issue could favorably influence receptivity here on the whole trade package, including MFN. Dobrynin stated he did not think ideological problems were the cause of Soviet slowness to respond on the copyrights. Joining the international convention was turned down sometime back, but at that time it seemed clear that this was the thing to do as a matter of economics—they would earn a lot less royalties than the amount they would have to pay. He thinks it is an economic issue and if they conclude that with the change in balance of publishing it is now good business to join, they will.

At the conclusion of Peterson’s outline of examples of lack of movement, Dobrynin asked whether we had expressed our concern to Brezhnev. Peterson pointed out that we made our package proposal to Patolichev on Friday, we met with Brezhnev on Sunday, gave Patolichev our impression of the lack of progress on Monday and left Tuesday morning.\(^5\) Peterson pointed out that in our meeting with Brezhnev, he had stated that he didn’t want to get into the details. Thus we felt it better to wait for Patolichev’s response on Monday. Dobrynin then indicated that we shouldn’t be discouraged because the lack of movement on Monday was probably due to a lack of time for Patolichev to go through the governmental processes to get further instructions.

Peterson then outlined our Moscow discussions on the gas and other special projects. He surveyed the complexities of the decision-making process in the U.S. Government on the gas issue and said he was afraid the Soviets had a mistaken impression that the matter was entirely in Peterson’s hands and that he could simply tell U.S. companies to go to it and they would. He stated his own opinion that these projects should be carried out and that within a few months there would start to be affirmative action on the gas.

Dobrynin indicated his own personal awareness of the complexity from our standpoint, including sophistication on the FPC issues as exemplified by the Algerian gas case.\(^6\) He said one of the problems was that other countries such as France and Japan do direct their companies to a large degree, and it will take some time for the Soviet trade people to understand that the U.S. does not play the same role. He pointed out

\(^5\) Friday, August 11; Sunday, August 13; Monday, August 14; Tuesday, August 15.

\(^6\) In June 1972, the Federal Power Commission approved the importation of 1 billion cubic feet of LNG from Algeria. On August 18, the FPC held a rehearing of the issue in response to complaints from applicant companies that the project would not be “feasible financially” unless the FPC removed various conditions that it had imposed on the planned LNG imports. (Douglas Watson, “Rules by FPC Seen Peril to Gas Imports,” Washington Post, August 19, 1972, p. B1)
that Kuzmin, who did the grain deal, was puzzled by our reluctance to recommend U.S. banks to issue the CCC letters of credit on the grain purchases. Since Dobrynin had known David Rockefeller from U.N. days, he called Rockefeller to ask if interested. He was and called Dobrynin later to thank him.

On the gas, Peterson pointed out we were confused by what seemed to be somewhat contradictory signals from the Soviets on the gas deals involving our West Coast. On the one hand, in Moscow we were given the green light to have our companies proceed jointly with the Japanese. On the other hand, we now had word that the Soviets were advising the Japanese that because the U.S. companies seemed to lack interest, the Soviets were going to proceed with the Japanese. Dobrynin promised to get a better reading on the situation and advise us by the end of the week. (He did and told us it was perfectly all right for us to work jointly with the Japanese on the Yakutsk project.)

Dobrynin was also very interested in other projects that might be put together promptly. We identified platinum, iron pellets, and the hotel, the fertilizer plants talked about by Hammer and the phosphorus and nitrogen fertilizer plants and cellulose plants which Brezhnev had mentioned.

Dobrynin observed, off the record, that one of the problems in getting good communications on such projects and accelerating them is that his Embassy has had very poor commercial competence. The reason, he says, is that there has been so little economic action between our countries. Commercial work at the Embassy has not been very important in the past. Now that trade is moving to the forefront, he is trying to beef up their expertise in the Embassy. He was recently amazed to find that on certain aspects of our laws, he knew a lot more than his commercial people did.

At the close of the meeting Dobrynin observed that what is sometimes needed is a clear direction from above to get on with work and to keep the subordinates from being too stubborn on certain specifics. As an example, he pointed out that Brezhnev had finally stepped into the drafting of the SALT papers and overruled the position their negotia-

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7 See Document 7.
8 See footnote 3, Document 8. Haig wrote Kissinger in message Tohak 58, August 17: “In two recent telegrams, Embassy Tokyo has reported that the Soviets have approached Japanese business interests for discussions of natural gas deals involving the Yakutsk fields which the Soviets previously talked about to U.S. firms and to Peterson. The Soviets apparently left the impression that deals with us were not working out and they were therefore approaching Japanese business representatives in early September.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 23, HAK Trip Files, HAK’s Secret Paris Trip, Switzerland, Saigon, Tokyo, August 13–19, 1972, To/Frm 86971 & Backchannels)
tors had been taking on the wording of a particular clause. Our impression was that Dobrynin was not sympathetic to the sphinx-like approach taken by the deputy-level Soviet trade negotiators in Moscow.

30. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Your Next Meeting with Dobrynin

1. MBFR/CSCE

Beam saw Kuznetsov this morning, as instructed, and drew a very negative reaction to his effort to obtain a Soviet commitment to begin preliminary MBFR talks in conjunction with our agreeing to November 22 as the opening date of CSCE consultations. At Tab A are (1) Beam’s instructions, (2) Beam’s reporting cable and (3) a memo on how you may want to pursue this with Dobrynin—try to get general Soviet agreement to start the MBFR talks within about the same time frame as CSCE talks. You could try to set this up so that you can get this Soviet agreement in Moscow, but it may not be possible to keep the bureau-

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2 Attached but not printed is telegram 149897 to Moscow, August 17.


4 In the attached August 21 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt wrote that Kuznetsov “asserted our approach can only be interpreted as making preparatory CSCE talks conditional on beginning exploratory talks on force reductions. Such a linkage, the Soviet side decisively rejects.” Sonnenfeldt recommended three potential courses of action to Kissinger: “How to proceed: we can (1) accept the CSCE date, and hope to badger the Soviets into MBFR; (2) send MBFR invitations and separately inform the Soviets that we will accept CSCE date in the ‘near future’ without conditions; and (3) stand fast, and continue discussions with the Soviets to nail down parallelism (this would probably be a subject for you in Moscow).”
cracy and the NATO allies quiet for three weeks. (Beam’s reporting message was blasted all over hell and gone.) There also is a slight problem that if it turns out that you pull this one off in Moscow, all the old fears about bilateralism will be aroused again.

Consequently, since Kuznetsov did remain silent when Beam asked him to name a date for the opening of MBFR talks, irrespective of any connection with CSCE, you might try first of all to enlist Dobrynin’s help in getting further consideration in Moscow, making clear that while we are not crudely linking our acceptance of November 22 for CSCE talks with the opening of the MBFR talks, there is a political connection which we just cannot ignore. We also have at stake the credibility of what was agreed at the Moscow summit.

2. Soviet Ships to Chicago

At Tab B5 is an updated memo on this messy matter. You may want to call Peterson about it in Miami6 before proceeding with Dobrynin, since it might be preferable to have him make the pitch to the latter and keep you out of it. But there has to be fast action and it has to be through Dobrynin. If the Soviets do not withdraw their request to send the ships and they go in—the first one is scheduled for Saturday—Gleason is going to blow his stack and there may be serious political embarrassment.

The Soviet problem undoubtedly is partly bureaucratic. The Shipping Ministry is probably upset that Peterson talked to Patolichev on something they think is their baby. But Patolichev is well plugged in to Brezhnev and with Dobrynin’s help I think we can avoid a blow-up.

3. Trade Talks

Peterson had a long talk with Dobrynin last week (Tab C)7 the account of which you should read. He took quite a hard line on matters where the Soviets have not yielded an inch or backpedaled. I think this sets up what you will wish to do in Moscow (see my memo in your

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5 In the attached memorandum to Kissinger, also August 21, Sonnenfeldt wrote: “Working through normal channels, the Soviet Embassy and a U.S. shipping agent have submitted a request for three Soviet merchant ships to call at Chicago between August 26 and September 15, 1972, to load soybeans destined for the USSR. If we are not to imperil the very delicate U.S.-Soviet maritime negotiations and to avoid the risk of upsetting the ILA’s Gleason with a resultant public statement adverse to the Administration’s interests, it will be necessary for you to intervene with Ambassador Dobrynin to have the Soviets withdraw these requests and to have the cargoes moved instead in third-flag shipping.” On the reaction of Gleason and the ILA to the U.S.-Soviet maritime negotiations, see footnote 6, Document 9.

6 Peterson was in Miami at the Republican National Convention.

7 Printed as Document 29.
Moscow book)\(^8\) provided we get Peterson and Lynn to get the work done. As far as Dobrynin is concerned you may want at this session to tell him that you will be prepared to talk about economic problems, that they should do their homework since it will be necessary to deal with the issues in a comprehensive manner though in terms of principles rather than specific detail.

If you want to have Lynn to cover commercially, you should alert Dobrynin to the need to issue a visa, to have him met at Moscow airport and to house him—all of this will have to be done by the Soviets.

You should be aware that Commerce today is handing the visiting head of the American Department of the Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry our latest version of a trade agreement. This, too, will keep matters in a holding pattern pending your Moscow trip.

On gas, you may simply want to tell Dobrynin that we are continuing to work up our position\(^9\) and expect to have concrete ideas when you get to Moscow.

4. Jewish Emigration

There are newspaper stories that the US has been in touch with the Soviet Government to express its concern about the new Soviet law requiring an emigration fee for educated persons going to “Capitalist” countries. As best as I can determine this is not accurate; however, our consular section in Moscow has been trying to get the text of the new law, so far without success. The issue continues to figure quite prominently in diplomatic traffic between the US and interested Western countries and the Israelis are continuing to keep it alive.\(^10\) Dobrynin no doubt understands our problem though it may actually help him in reporting on it if you point out that forces hostile to US-Soviet rapprochement are using it against the Administration in this country.

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\(^9\) See Documents 24 and 29. On August 21, Kissinger discussed the gas issue in a telephone conversation with Peterson, who said: “You know that we don’t need the gas and we can get it domestically.” Kissinger replied: “But we want it for political reasons.” Peterson then added “even for economic reasons,” and “whatever happens in the United States we’re going to need this gas desperately.” Kissinger replied, “I don’t give a damn.” Peterson continued: “And my feeling is that even if we didn’t need it, unless I am mistaken, the carrot here is of sufficient attractiveness that [it] would be worth a little dough.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 14, Chronological File)

\(^10\) In message Tohak 78, August 18, Haig informed Kissinger that Meir had publicly attacked the Soviets regarding the exit fee issue. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 23, HAK Trip Files, HAK’s Secret Paris Trip, Switzerland, Saigon, Tokyo, August 13–19, 1972, To/Frm 86971 & Backchannels)
5. Nuclear Use

The next text is at Tab D. By way of explanation you may simply want to say that (1) we have gone as far as we can in referring to the actual ban on use, (2) since this is obviously integrally related to political/military relations, the rest of the document seeks to define the evolution in our relations that will make a ban feasible, (3) the issue is highly complicated (viz. the debate we are now being subjected to in the Senate on SALT) and we are going just as far as we can.

6. Vietnam

By way of background, you should be aware that Soviet propaganda—like the Brezhnev letter\(^{11}\)—is hitting hard on the bombing. So did Soviet coverage of Le Duc Tho’s Moscow stopover, which was unusual in that a communiqué was issued at all. (Kirilenko and Katushiev\(^{12}\) saw him in the absence of more senior leaders.)

7. Middle East

You may want to deny any intention of seeing Heikal\(^{13}\) in Munich. (The Egyptians quite predictably are now busy telling the world that they hope to enlist our help both on hardware and diplomatically. This ought for now to be permitted to stand on its own without encouragement from us.)

Tab D

Draft of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War\(^{14}\)

DECLARATION

Guided by the objectives of strengthening world peace and international security:

Conscious that nuclear war could have devastating consequences for mankind:

Proceeding from the desire to bring about conditions in which the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war could be reduced and ultimately eliminated:

\(^{11}\) Document 26.

\(^{12}\) Andrei Kirilenko and Konstantin Katushev, members of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee.

\(^{13}\) Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, editor of the newspaper *Al Ahram* and confidante of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

\(^{14}\) No classification marking.
Proceeding from the basic principles of relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972:

Proceeding from their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations regarding the maintenance of peace, refraining from the threat or use of force, and the avoidance of war, and in conformity with the various agreements to which either has subscribed:

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have agreed the following:

I. The United States and the Soviet Union declare that in their international relations they will make it their goal to create conditions in which recourse to nuclear weapons will not be justified.

II. The two parties agree that the conditions referred to in the preceding paragraph presuppose the effective elimination of the threat or use of force by one party against the other, by one party against the allies of the other, and by either party against third countries in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security.

III. The two parties agree to develop their mutual relations in a way consistent with the above purposes. If at any time relations between states not parties to this declaration appear to involve the risk of a nuclear conflict, the two parties, acting in accordance with the terms of this declaration, will make every effort to avert this risk.

IV. Nothing in this declaration shall affect the obligations undertaken by the parties towards third countries, nor shall it impair the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. In particular, nothing in this declaration shall affect the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.

31. Editorial Note

President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger met briefly with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin from 10:56 to 11:10 a.m. on the morning of August 21, 1972. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1967–76) Although no memorandum of conversation has been found, Kissinger discussed his meeting with Dobrynin in a telephone conversation with Nixon at 12:28 p.m. on August 21. He told Nixon that “Dobrynin was very fascinating about Vietnam—he said he wanted us to know that they [the So-
viets] were real eager to get it settled.” The transcript of their conversation continues:

“RN: Good, was he?

“HK: Heard that when Le Duc Tho came through Moscow, he did see a Politburo member but only number 5—that Brezhnev and the others, even though they were there, wouldn’t see him. He said they are playing it very stupidly, they are still hoping we will make additional concessions.

“RN: The Russians are?

“HK: No, no, the North Vietnamese.

“RN: The Russians want the damn thing settled. I don’t think they ever did until we went over there—but they do now.

“HK: They did ever since about April when they realized that it was really risking their relations with us.

“RN: Sure, that’s what I mean. As long as it would irritate us without irritating their relations on bigger things, it was okay, but now it’s that way around, and frankly, I think the Chinese think the same thing.

“HK: No question about it. That’s true about both of them.

“RN: Okay, Henry, thank you very much.

“HK: Right, Mr. President.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 14, Chronological File)
32. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS
Russian Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

The meeting was to review outstanding issues prior to Dobrynin’s departure for Moscow.

Vietnam

Dobrynin opened the meeting by reading me a long account of the report that Le Duc Tho had given summing up our three Paris meetings (July 19, August 1, and August 14). It was on the whole a fair and correct report. According to Le Duc Tho, I had agreed to the fact that there were two governments and two and a half political forces in South Vietnam. I had indicated that we would move to some middle ground between their position and ours, but I had been too vague in my formulations. The North Vietnamese concern was that I was trying to get them into a position where they agreed on certain principles and would have to negotiate the details with the South Vietnamese, a process which might take forever. The North Vietnamese were also very much afraid that we would go back into South Vietnam after the election. Finally, they insisted that what we really wanted was for them to operate within the existing constitution—maybe without Thieu but at least with a structure which could survive without Thieu. All of these were matters that they found very hard to accept.

On the other hand, Dobrynin continued, they had reported in Moscow that we had been more flexible, and that they were on the whole more optimistic than they had been before I had given them credit for having made a concession with respect to Thieu’s staying in

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The breakfast meeting took place in the White House Map Room. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, he met with Dobrynin from 9 to 10:40 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1967–76) In a subsequent telephone conversation at 1:13 p.m., Kissinger and Dobrynin discussed CSCE, MBFR, and the issue of opening Consulates in Leningrad and San Francisco. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 14, Chronological File) For the portions of the conversation dealing with CSCE and MBFR, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 107.

office until after a settlement. And also by setting up the forums. Another difference between them and us was that we allegedly wanted to have all forums operate side by side, while they wanted to have everything settled with us before they opened the other forums.

I told Dobrynin that a number of things were based on a misunderstanding. We accepted the priority of the DRV–U.S. forum, but it seemed to me that they were working against their purposes if they waited until we could settle all their ten points. It would be close to the end of the election period, and in that case even if they opened the other forums it would be too late for us really significantly to affect them, so I felt they were being counterproductive. The difference between them and us was that we wanted to move each point as it was concluded into the other forums, while they wanted to have everything done. But since they had a veto over it, we would probably eventually yield on it.

Secondly, with respect to the political evolution, the real difference was that they wanted a guarantee of their takeover from us, while we wanted to start a political evolution—which as a historian I had to say they had a very good chance of winning but which they were not guaranteed to win, and in which they would have to engage in a contest. I knew this was a fine line and I knew that they might be reluctant to accept it, but nevertheless it was not a trivial approach. Thirdly, if we wanted to waste time we would follow their procedure, because as far as we were concerned domestically the only thing that mattered was a signing in principle.

Dobrynin asked whether we were willing to go into some detail. I said yes, but in the nature of things no matter how detailed our settlement with them was, there would have to be implementing negotiations. Dobrynin said that he thought they were extremely serious about wanting a settlement, but it took them a long time to make up their minds. However, they attempted to present their situation in Moscow as heading into very serious negotiations.

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3 The DRV 10-point proposal was made at the August 1 meeting.

33. Editorial Note

On August 30, 1972, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Haig wrote Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger: “Earlier yesterday, I had talked to Len Gar-
ment, Special Consultant to the President on Minorities and the Arts, about the problem of Soviet Jewry which is apparently growing and which McGovern hopes to exploit. This was complicated yesterday by a letter sent out of the Soviet Union by a group of Soviet Jewish leaders, a copy of which was furnished to McGovern.” Referring to Senator George McGovern, the Democratic candidate for President, Haig wrote that he understood that “McGovern will try to exploit the letter.” Haig had asked Garment to contact Senator Jacob Javits (R–NY) to discuss the matter. Haig informed Kissinger: “I insisted to Garment yesterday and again late last night to tell Javits to reaffirm strongly his conviction that the President and the White House are very concerned about the plight of the Soviet Jews, to reassure him that this matter was discussed during the summit and on his own to urge the Jewish leaders to understand that quiet diplomacy has accomplished far more than an extensive trumpeting so far. Javits, of course, can go much farther on this issue that can any White House official and especially the President.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 995, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files)

On August 31, Haig forwarded Kissinger the text of a letter from Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, received that day, in which she asked President Nixon to send “a direct confidential message to the people in the Kremlin expressing your reaction to the outrage” of the Soviet exit fees for emigrants. Haig wrote Kissinger in a covering memorandum: “Now that the Prime Minister has formally raised this issue in a direct communication with the President, we will have to consider very carefully the best means by which to proceed. Sometimes our Jewish friends know just what not to do at the right moment.” (Ibid.)

On September 6, Garment phoned Kissinger regarding the Soviet exit fee issue. He told Kissinger that “the Russian issue is flooding my desk and phone at this point and I need some guidance.” The relevant portion of the transcript of their telephone conversation continues as follows:

“K[issinger]: Is there a more self-serving group of people than the Jewish community?

“G[arment]: None in the world.

“K: I have not seen it. What the hell do they think they are accomplishing?

“G: Well, I don’t know.

“K: You can’t even tell the bastards anything in confidence because they’ll leak it to all their _______

“G: Right. Very briefly, what seems to be coming through just dozens of conversations is basically this, and there are political as well as some other dangers involved—that the intellectuals and Jewish com-
munity in the Soviet Union are just saying that in a sense they will have their position compromised by the Soviets through a trick of timing and that the Russians feel secure until November in going ahead with the attacks because of the concern on our part of . . .

"K: They’re dead wrong. After November they’re even safer.

"G: That may well be. I think then in any event . . .

"K: You can say—well, what we are doing, we’ve talked in a low key way to Dobrynin. Next week, we’ll call him into the State Department. If the Jewish community doesn’t mind, after I’ve been in the Soviet Union and have done some national business, so we’ll do it on Wednesday [September 13] or Thursday [September 14] next week. Don’t tell them that.

"G: No, I won’t tell them anything.

"K: But next Thursday, we’ll call them in.

"G: And defer any meetings between any of our people and the Jewish groups until after Wednesday.

"K: That’s right. After Wednesday you’ll be able to say that the issue has been raised both with Dobrynin and with the Minister.

"G: I think between now and November a certain amount of theater is needed to keep the lid on. That’s basically what seems to come through to me. After that I just don’t know; there are various people that are talking about forming committees to raise the money and doing a variety of things.

"K: They ought to remember what this Administration has done . . .

"G: Yes, all of that can be pointed out, but nevertheless, here they are subject to presses [pressures?] of this sort and I’m simply asking.

"K: No, no, you’ve been great on it.

"G: Well, I’m doing a job and all I want to know is how to handle it.

"K: Our game plan is that we cannot possibly make a formal protest while I’m on the way to Russia.

"G: Right. I understand that.” (Ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 14, Chronological File)

Secretary of Commerce Peterson also raised the issue of Jewish emigration with Kissinger during a telephone conversation on September 7. He told Kissinger that he had heard “from three different sources that there’s a strong movement on the Hill to tie the Soviet Jewry issue with anything that has anything to do with the Soviet Union.” The relevant portion of the transcript of their telephone conversation continues as follows:

"K[issinger]: But that won’t be effective until after the election.
“P[eterson]: Well there’s strong pressure in this one group that I met with that’s been confirmed since then to submit MFN legislation, but to tie the issue to that and then to use the submission of the bill to get extremely vocal about it. Javits and a number of others are very active on it.

“K: Yeah, but they’ll subside after the election.

“P: Yeah, now I don’t know how much it hurts you, however, to do it prior to the election because that’s what they’re going to do. Okay, I just wanted you to know about it.

“K: No, I didn’t know about it; it will hurt me but . . . It will hurt, but what can we do? There’s no sense; you can’t make a deal with Javits on things like this. Don’t you think?

“P: Well, you know him much better than I do. I don’t know what he’d . . . he’s got great respect for you. I don’t know. I’ll tell you what I can do if we can be helpful. I can find out who the Senators and Congressmen are beside him, and if in your absence, you want anybody to try to pacify them so they don’t get out on the floor and create problems for you while you’re over there, that might help. Or I can drop it, whatever you wish.

“K: No, if you could find out in a way that doesn’t draw too much attention to it, that would be very helpful.

“P: All right, you’ll get it in the morning.” (Ibid.)

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34. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 5, 1972, 8 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador

The meeting began with an exchange of pleasantries in which we talked to each other about each other’s vacations. Dobrynin said he never had a chance to see Brezhnev who was traveling around the country, but that they had had an extensive phone conversation.

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¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The dinner meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy.
Kissinger Visit

Brezhnev was looking forward very much to receiving me and intended to conduct the two days of conversations himself. In fact Brezhnev had called a meeting of the Politburo for the earliest time that Dobrynin could get back in order to go over the positions.

Dobrynin asked a number of questions. First, with respect to the length of my stay, he proposed the 11th and 12th in Moscow, then leaving on the 13th for Leningrad and on the 14th we could leave directly from Leningrad to our destination. I asked, what if we did not finish our work? He said in that case it would be better if we stayed the morning of the 13th in Moscow. It was clear that the Soviets were not eager to have us in Moscow on the 13th, from which I assumed that perhaps Le Duc Tho was coming through.

Dobrynin then raised some social questions, such as whether I wanted to see Giselle at the Bolshoi. I told him it was one of my favorite ballets.

Nuclear Understanding

He then reviewed the list of subjects. He said, first of all there is the nuclear understanding. He said the Soviet side had the impression that the nuclear understanding as we had drafted it\(^2\) was primarily useful as a justification to go to nuclear war, not as a way of avoiding it. Had we really lost interest in the subject? I said no, we had not lost interest but we had major difficulty with the Soviet proposition. Dobrynin asked whether we would be prepared to pursue explorations with a view to coming to a conclusion. I said yes, but of course conclusions could never be guaranteed. Dobrynin said that it would be very helpful if I could prepare something in writing that reflected our concerns, so that they could perhaps come back with a counterproposal to keep the conversations going. I told Dobrynin that I would do that.

I pointed out that for us the important paragraph was paragraph 2 of our declaration. Dobrynin said that might be handleable if paragraph 1 could be strengthened. I said we would have to continue working at it.

SALT

He then asked about SALT. What did we think? Could the Provisional Agreement\(^3\) be made permanent? I said, in principle, yes, but the numbers would have to be modified. He asked whether we had done

\(^2\) See Tab D, Document 30.
\(^3\) Presumably a reference to the Interim Agreement.
any thinking. I said yes, but it was in a very preliminary stage. He said it would be very helpful for the meeting with Brezhnev if they could have an outline to consider. For example, would we be willing to make the present agreement permanent? I said no, the numbers would have to be modified. Dobrynin asked whether we had given any thinking to qualitative restrictions. Would it be possible, for example, to have a provisional qualitative agreement as a forerunner to a permanent one just as the interim quantitative agreement was a forerunner to a permanent one? I said that was an interesting question which we should discuss.

**Leningrad Consulate**

Dobrynin then turned to the issue of the Leningrad consulate. He said that Brezhnev was willing to make a special promise that the construction of the Leningrad consulate would be completed by July 1. Would I be prepared to open it? I said it would be bureaucratically difficult to open the consulate on such short notice. I would prefer to come back from Leningrad having looked at the consulate with a decision that it be opened.\(^4\) Dobrynin said, “Well, in that case we will handle it in diplomatic channels.” I said—and I don’t know whether the offer will still be good—I said it didn’t make any sense to me that if I gave him a promise that the consulate would be opened by, say, October 15, why this could not be done. Dobrynin said he would check with Moscow.

**MBFR/CSCE**

We then turned to MBFR and CSCE. Dobrynin said he was somewhat baffled. On the same day that I had told him that the MBFR discussions would not have to start on the same date as the European Security Conference, Beam had come in and had made exactly the opposite point.\(^5\) I said that by now Dobrynin should know who represented American policy. Dobrynin said he did, but Gromyko was not yet used to Ambassadors who didn’t exactly know their government’s views. At any rate, if we were prepared to agree to a European Security Conference on November 22, they would be prepared for MBFR exploratory discussions by the end of January. And if then the European Security Conference would take place during the summer of 1973, the MBFR Conference could take place in the fall of 1973. I told him that this looked like a realistic procedure.

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\(^4\) [text not declassified]

\(^5\) See Document 30 and footnotes 4 and 5 thereto.
Economic and Maritime Agreements

We then reviewed our economic proposal. I substantially followed the talking points prepared by Peterson [Tab A]. Dobrynin said he thought there was a basis for an agreement.

The next subject concerned maritime agreements, and there too I followed the talking points prepared [Tab B]. The end result was that it was agreed that the schedule laid down for both of these topics could be followed.

Dobrynin said he thought major progress would be made on my trip.

Middle East

Dobrynin asked where we stood on the Middle East. I said I didn’t know how to proceed because I didn’t know who really could be talked to. Dobrynin said that he thought that Sadat was a little bit deranged, but still one should look for the possibilities of settlement six months, a year, or two years from now. Could I come up with some proposal of what the security zones would look like? I said yes, I would, and I would give it to him in an oral form.

Japan and China

We then turned to Japan. Dobrynin asked what I thought of the Japanese rapprochement with China. I said we were somewhat relaxed because we saw them competing everywhere potentially and this present infatuation must be replaced sooner or later by some concrete steps. Dobrynin said this might be true theoretically but we should never underestimate the anti-white bias of these two nations, and they might just get together on the basis of both hating whites. In that case he hoped that we would understand that the material forces at our disposal and the Soviet Union’s could be brought to bear much more rapidly than anything the other side could do. I said we were aware of this but I didn’t believe matters would reach this point.

Brezhnev Visit

There was a concluding discussion about Brezhnev’s visit to the United States. Dobrynin suggested that he might come in September together with the General Assembly. I said that would be a poor time.

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6 Not attached. Peterson’s talking points, August 28, are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 74, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Moscow Trip—Economic Talks, Henry A. Kissinger. These and the following brackets are in the original.

7 Not found. Haig forwarded talking points prepared by Sonnenfeldt on the “shipping problem” as an attachment to a memorandum to Kissinger, September 4; it is ibid., NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13.
for us because we wanted the trip primarily as a U.S.-Soviet measure. Dobrynin said, “Well, then late May or early June would be appropriate.” I told him that this seemed good to us too.

35. Message From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon

Moscow, undated.

It is perfectly obvious that a Treaty between the USSR and the US on the non-use of nuclear weapons would be of major consequences not only for the relations between our two countries, but also for the development of international situation as a whole. Therefore it is important to reach a clear understanding of the substance and scope of obligations which would be undertaken by the parties under that Treaty. It is our conviction that the more definitely the essence of the idea, for which the USSR and the US are concluding that Treaty, i.e. prevention of a nuclear collision between them, is expressed in it, the more important the Treaty would be. It is from this angle that we approach the questions raised by the American side in the conversation with our Ambassador on July 21, 1972.²

1. The most serious of those questions is the following. If to presume that the USSR Warsaw Treaty allies or the US NATO allies are attacked with only conventional weapons by the US or the USSR respectively (alone or together with their allies), does the other nuclear side have the right to use nuclear weapons for repelling such an attack? As we understand, the US Government believes that the answer to that question should be in the affirmative.

We also believe that with regard to such a situation (which, of course, is a purely hypothetical one) it is not possible to deprive one of the right to turn, for defensive purposes, to the use of nuclear weapons in order to fulfill appropriate allied obligations. That possibility is contained in Article III of our draft Treaty. However, admitting in principle such a possibility, we would like to emphasize that the idea of the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 79, D: Nuclear Understanding, Exchange of Notes. No classification marking. A handwritten notation at the top of the paper reads, “Handed to HAK by D, 7 Sept. 1972.” According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, he and Dobrynin met briefly in the Map Room of the White House from 5:15 to 5:17 p.m. on September 7. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1967–76)

² See Document 17.
Treaty would be served by such a mode of actions in that presumed situation when both the USSR and the US firmly proceed from the necessity to localize the use of nuclear weapons and undertake nothing that could increase the danger of our two countries mutually becoming objects of the use of nuclear weapons.

All this line of reasoning should be supplemented with a very substantial argument. The situation which we consider, so as to have common understanding of the Soviet-American draft Treaty, which is being worked out, would be far less probable or rather even practically excluded if this Treaty is signed and becomes one of the new and most important factors of international life.

2. As for the other two questions raised in the abovementioned conversation, the answer to them, in the opinion of the Soviet side, can only be negative.

If to assume that the USSR or the US might use nuclear weapons (Middle East was mentioned as an example) also to assist states with regard to which neither the USSR nor the US have direct treaty obligations, this would devalue our Treaty. In particular, it would render worthless Article II of the draft Treaty which is the one that provides for prevention of a situation when, as a result of actions by third states, the USSR and the US may find themselves drawn into collision with the use of nuclear weapons.

These same views and arguments of ours may be fully applied as well to a third situation, which the American side termed as seriously upsetting the global balance and to illustrate which a most hypothetical example of introduction of Soviet or US troops into India was used.

Thus, the Soviet side believes that the Treaty should exclude a possibility of using nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union and the US against each other in the two situations outlined above. Otherwise, such a Treaty would be almost pointless. It would be even natural to ask oneself a question: in what situations would it be valid at all?

3. On our part we could also mention situations the emergence of which—though they do not look very real—cannot be completely excluded. Say, one of the US allies (there are nuclear powers among them) will attack a Soviet Union’s ally. The kind of reaction of the USSR with regard to the state that made such an attack, is not to be questioned—it will be determined by the allied duty of the USSR. But a question suggests itself—how in that situation matters would stand directly between the USSR and the US, having in mind that the Treaty on the non-use of nuclear weapons would be in effect between them?

We mentioned this example as yet another illustration of the complexity and versatility of the whole problem. It is the very nature of the problem that makes us to emphasize that a true criterion for the working out the Treaty is rather the will of our countries to solve the
task of preventing a nuclear war between them and to develop their relations proceeding from the solvability of that task and its historic importance than attempts to foresee in advance various situations—possible and impossible.

4. We proceed from the assumption that all this strictly confidential exchange of views serves on this stage only one purpose: a more precise and more profound understanding by the Soviet leaders and President Nixon of the contents of the Treaty being worked out.

It is expected in Moscow that President Nixon would consider, taking into account L.I. Brezhnev's message of July 20, 19723 and our present additional clarifications, our new draft Treaty, forwarded to him, in a positive manner.

3 Document 15.

36. Message From the U.S. Leadership to the Soviet Leadership1

Washington, undated.

Prevention of Nuclear War

1. The President has considered our discussions on this subject of great importance.

2. We believe that the drafts on this subject should take the following points into account:
   — We believe it important to avoid any formulation that carried an implication of a condominium by our two countries;
   — We believe it important that an agreement between our two countries should not carry any implication that we were ruling out only nuclear war between ourselves but were leaving open the option of nuclear war against third countries;
   — We think it important that in concentrating on the prevention of nuclear war we should not at the same time appear to be legitimizing the initiation of war by conventional means;

—We think it important that past agreements, whether alliances or other types of obligations, designed to safeguard peace and security should be enhanced by any additional agreement between ourselves relating specifically to the prevention of nuclear warfare;

—We regard the considerations of paragraph II of the U.S. draft important even though the wording can be modified to meet some of the objections raised by Ambassador Dobrynin.

3. Within this framework the President is prepared to continue the exchanges in the confidential channel with the objective of developing a mutually satisfactory text. Negotiations in this channel are always conducted with a view to reaching some agreement.
Kissinger’s Trip to Moscow, September 1972

37. Editorial Note


Kissinger then proceeded to Moscow, where he met with Soviet General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko, and Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. Planning for Kissinger’s visit began even prior to the Moscow Summit. During his secret pre-Summit trip to Moscow in April 1972, Kissinger indicated that he might return again in September. On April 23, Kissinger suggested to Gromyko that “we then continue discussions during the summer. Conceivably, I could come back here in September, on which occasion we could reach agreement on an overall solution [in the Middle East].” (Ibid., volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 150)

Dobrynin recalled from his July visit to San Clemente what President Nixon’s goals were for Kissinger’s September trip: “Work [on the next summit] could start, Nixon said, in September with a visit to Moscow by Kissinger, and this was Nixon’s immediate agenda: Europe presented no major difficulties, and he agreed to an East-West conference on European security, which was sought by many European countries and supported by Moscow. Confident that the SALT treaty would be ratified, he suggested we start exchanging ideas through our private channel on the second stage. The United States was also sounding out its allies on limiting conventional weapons. The trade and economic discussions begun in Moscow should be continued because they showed promise, he said, but they might encounter difficulties in the Congress. He also wanted to consider further joint steps on the Middle East and Vietnam, the latter especially because of its paramount importance in view of the election campaign just starting.” (Dobrynin, In Confidence, page 258) Kissinger, during his August 11 conversation with Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy, indicated that a lend-lease agreement and economic issues would be a high priority during the September negotiations to the point that Under Secretary of Commerce James Lynn was prepared to join him in Moscow (see Document 25).
Kissinger noted in his memoirs that he arrived in London on September 14 in order to brief Prime Minister Edward Heath about his meetings with the Soviets. It was announced that Kissinger would then proceed to Paris where he would brief President Georges Pompidou. “But habits of secrecy are hard to break. In order to gain the six hours needed for meeting Le Duc Tho I flew to Paris by a small plane from a British military airport early in the morning of September 15. To mask my movements, Do Not Disturb signs were left on the doors of our suites at Claridge’s Hotel, and the Presidential plane remained at Heathrow until it flew off to Paris later in the day.” (Kissinger, *White House Years*, pages 1331–1332)

38. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, September 11, 1972, 11 a.m.–3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, Secretary General, CCP  
A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States  
A. M. Alexandrov, Assistant to the Secretary General  
Manzhulo, Deputy Minister Foreign Trade (Latter part)  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
James T. Lynn, Under Secretary of Commerce  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff  
Commander Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

The meeting began with a friendly and vigorous greeting by Brezhnev and his party who were standing behind the table on the side where the Americans were supposed to sit. In responding to Dr. Kissinger’s compliments concerning Brezhnev’s negotiating skill, the Secre-
tary General commented that he wanted to get Dr. Kissinger to a state
where he simply nodded his head without having heard what Brezhnev said. After several crisp but warm exchanges, the two sides
sat down.

Kissinger began the meeting by handing over pictures of his ride
with Ambassador Dobrynin in the hydrofoil boat which had been a gift
to President Nixon on the occasion of his visit to the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev (Observing pictures of Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador
Dobrynin on the hydrofoil): Has President Nixon ridden on the new
hydrofoil? I don’t see President Nixon on it.

Kissinger: Last Friday he took a group of his friends out.

Brezhnev: Is it still located on the Potomac?

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: Well, two boats are better than one.

Kissinger: We hope that by the time the General Secretary comes to
the United States you will be able to have a ride in it.

Brezhnev: That would not be a bad idea and you could fill me with
meat pies.

Kissinger: I will bring some of my own but the ones you have here
are really better.

(Brezhnev appeared to be reading letter from the President con-
cerning Hydrofoil, although it is in English.)

Brezhnev: I would like to understand what you would like to
discuss first. I would invite Manzhulo to be present for illumination on
trade issues if you wish to discuss them. But I also would be glad to
start with any question.

Kissinger: I think it is a good idea to begin with economics. Then
Secretary Lynn and whomever you designate can leave and come back
later after they have held discussions. In that way we can make
progress because I am here to achieve whatever agreement we can.

Brezhnev: Certainly. I am certainly agreeable to that. But first I
want to greet you. You have been given a most responsible mission in
following up on problems pursuant to what President Nixon and I dis-
cussed when he visited here. On my part, I will make every effort to be
responsive to the important task that has been entrusted to us. It is a
most important mission. This is in accordance with what Ambassador
Dobrynin had discussed with you in Washington.

Let me, before we turn to specific matters, say a few words. Time
has elapsed since our last talk with President Nixon and members of
his party. A good deal of work went into that visit and the agreements
signed were of momentous significance. These actions were important
indicies of our relationship. Public opinion in the Soviet Union ac-
cepted them, both the Communist party and the people and the general public, and this includes public opinion throughout the world. China of course is an exception and that is no news. They tried to distort the visit. As we see it, public opinion in the United States for the most part also took a positive attitude. There does exist hope that the U.S.-Soviet relationship will take a positive course. Although there are shades of differences, the general view is favorable, with the exception of the few of those who are in opposition. I believe we are moving on a constructive course. I hope we won’t disappoint all those who hope for favorable developments toward peace and tranquility in the world. I have said it before but I wanted to repeat it. I hope that we will have frank and forthright discussions and that they will be based on complete confidence in each other.

Kissinger: Your remarks reflect the sentiments of the President. Improving relations between our two countries is a central tenet in our foreign policy. Our two countries must maintain peace, not just to remove crises, but to improve our basic relations for peace in the world. We have made a fundamental decision, this Administration has, that our relations affect the peace in the world. They affect confidence and constructive relations in the world. We have conducted our relation with you on the basis of confidence and so have you. We do not seek little advantages in particular areas. We have shown restraint towards each other. You have done so and so have we. And we have made preliminary steps for advances here. When you come to the United States next year, we may be able to achieve advances as big as those that were made at the Summit. Meanwhile, we will make progress on a number of topics. We will proceed with an attitude of frankness, candor and a desire for constructive relations that has been set by the President. In this spirit we will conduct ourselves.

(Brezhnev reads notes while HAK’s comments are being translated. Has glasses on and marks some of the notes before him.)

Brezhnev: I am pleased to hear that. We too feel that we should proceed in that framework. Those who persist in negative speculations in the world have existed for a long time and will continue to exist. I have on occasion had to call to the attention of President Nixon and yourself anti-Soviet propaganda in the United States. It is not conducive to good relations or in bringing about greater understanding by the U.S. public toward the Soviet Union. Even we, and we perhaps are stauncher in this respect, are disenchanted at how things go on propaganda, but we hope our talks will be stronger than any speculation and that the results will be highly esteemed by history. If we are prone to minor irritants, we can never agree on any point.

Kissinger: We have done and hope to do more to steer public opinion more directly toward that which encourages constructive rela-
tions. We are sometimes held responsible by our own press for Soviet propaganda directed against us. So both of us have a responsibility. As I see it, there are two things we must accomplish:

—How to implement the Summit agreements.
—New departures to give even more momentum to what was started at the Summit.

These are the two tasks before us as we proceed.

Brezhnev (smoking and appearing thoughtful): So it is. I agree. So let us start acting.

Kissinger: First, one practical matter. I will work this out with your Foreign Minister if you prefer, but there are certain topics to discuss. Because of our peculiar way of running our government, I would like to have our Ambassador at one or two of our meetings. If we know what subjects will come up, then we might be able to select some of them for him to attend. (Gromyko and Brezhnev whisper.)

I might tell the Secretary General that after November we intend to simplify our method of government so that may simplify his task in the future. We never had a chance to thank you in May for the delicacy with which you handled our peculiarities.

Brezhnev (Smiling): Your internal setup is your affair. The present method is OK. If you worsen it, I will be troubled.

Kissinger: We will try to improve it.

Brezhnev: Don’t worsen it. So far we have had a good relation. You twist things around in such a complex way, that you are never out of options. But if you channel different things and it is a river, it can flood.

Kissinger: We will have this channel. It is just that we may be able to save you some additional effort.

Brezhnev: Good. Then let us move to more concrete things. What do we start with?

Kissinger: Since Under Secretary Lynn is here why don’t we begin with economics. Then we can make an agenda for other topics. He can work out the details with whomever you designate. Then before we leave we will work out an economic arrangement. After that we will leave it up to you.

Brezhnev: Let us begin with economics. I agree. Let us make Mr. Lynn’s destiny more easy. Why make such a burden on one so young. He will be free to drink vodka and whiskey with you the rest of the time.

Lynn: That is a delightful prospect.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger wants to escape discussion of this complex subject.
(The interpreter then inserted that the Secretary General was concerned that Dr. Kissinger would not find any whiskey in the guest house. But the Secretary General said he could find you some moonshine.)

Lynn: We had a good discussion on that in the Crimea.²
Brezhnev: You have no objection to Manzhulo sitting in.
Kissinger: No.
(Alexandrov leaves the room; Manzhulo enters.)
Brezhnev: I asked Alexandrov to get some tea and coffee and food because Dr. Kissinger is more condescending with meat patties in front of him. Last time you added only two kilograms to your waistline. That is not enough.
Kissinger: Not enough? My suits don’t fit.
Brezhnev: I have that problem and I am always having to take my coats either in or out. My tailor always leaves some room so he can either put more on or take it off.
Kissinger: I have tried to lose some weight but I will put it on here.
Gromyko: You look thin.
Brezhnev: You did not spend enough time at the Olympic games to get some weight off. Did you have a good discussion with Brandt?
Kissinger: We discussed the Security treaty, bilateral arrangements, membership in the UN, the FRG and Berlin.³ I am prepared to discuss this with you sometime during my stay here.
Brezhnev: Thank you. I am very glad to discuss that with you. On my part I will give you our considerations relating to those issues.
Kissinger: I don’t know how the General Secretary wants to proceed. Do you want my thinking on what has transpired? Or should we begin by discussing these papers? Whatever you prefer.
Brezhnev: Any way you see fit. As I see it, the agenda includes questions such as MFN and lend lease. These are two major issues. It also includes questions such as the future economic relations between our two countries, various economic principles and specific matters in the spirit of your discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin. And there are also matters such as the gas deposits at Tyumen and Yakutsak. We

² See Document 21.
³ Kissinger met Brandt on September 10 at the Chancellor’s villa in Feldafing outside Munich; Bahr and Hillenbrand also attended the meeting. Telegram 1583 from Berlin, September 12, transmitted an account of the discussion. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–US)
can comment on these concrete matters. Also we can discuss the
granting of credits, sales of equipment and in addition we can discuss
various observations and anything you have to say on this subject.
Also, I will want to hear your views about the political aspect of eco-

dnomic cooperation. You might also discuss the reaction of your
business community to our improving relations.

Kissinger: I have a few observations on the spirit of our discussions
and then we can turn to concrete measures and the specific points you
have raised Mr. General Secretary. Our two countries have a curious
economic relationship. We are the two largest economies in the world
and yet we have insignificant relations with respect to trade. They are
insignificant in relation to our size and political importance. More im-
portant than any specific measure is to make a fundamental change in
our overall economic and commercial ties. We would like to proceed on
as broad a front as possible and not exhaust ourselves on any particular
topic. That is why we believe it desirable to discuss a number of issues
such as lend lease, credits, MFN, trade and gas. We hope to get all of
these issues settled more or less simultaneously, at least in principle.
Let me explain our attitude toward the lend lease agreement. We know
what you suffered in World War II. We know that the fact that you
have to pay interest to pay for that is morally repugnant to you, as the
General Secretary explained so eloquently at the Summit.

Brezhnev: I tried to be as lucid as possible with Peterson. I trust he
brought to the President my views. I talked to him man to man.

Kissinger: You were very impressive. We have taken what you
have said extremely seriously. Our problem is this year. Immediately
upon settlement of lend lease we would make $150 million available as
credits on the Kama River project4 with a $500 million line of credit by
the end of 1974. Legislation will be submitted to the Congress immedi-
ately in the new session for MFN. In addition, the President will put his
prestige behind not just the gas project but also there will be other joint
projects for national resources, a whole range of projects. We must
create a climate where Congressional opinion is receptive. In that re-
gard, I want to call your attention to this critical lead editorial on wheat
sales (passes a copy of the Washington Post editorial of August 20, 1972
to Secretary General Brezhnev). (Tab A)5

Gromyko: It is an article from the Washington Post.

4 See footnote 4, Document 19.
5 Tab A, a copy of the editorial, “Wheat Sales to Russia,” Washington Post, August
20, 1972, p. C8, is attached but not printed.
Kissinger: Half of a percent amounts to $2 million a year over 30 years. This is a tiny fraction of what we want to make available to you on credit. For this reason we want a lump sum—that is a global sum with somewhat confused interest rates. This will help us in our presentation to Congress. It will appear higher than it actually may be and can be used as a basis for credit for MFN and for gas projects on which I will talk to you at much greater length. $500 million does not include any credits that might be available to you on the gas project. These might be given in addition.

Brezhnev: That is just a newspaper, not the government policy.

Kissinger: Yes, but it is significant because it came from a liberal newspaper. It is the liberal groups who normally favor expanding trade and we will need the support of these groups to get passage of MFN. They influence our Senators whose support we need to expand our trade relationships. So it is not an insignificant newspaper in this respect as your Ambassador will no doubt confirm.

Brezhnev: Tomorrow I can instruct Pravda to criticize the Ministry of Trade for paying too high an interest rate on grain. It is not a side issue, but let’s talk about the terms of lend lease, when we will sign lend lease and when we will sign MFN. We are people of business and if you have a like attitude we can make policy. (Pounds his book emphatically while making this point.)

Kissinger: If you have read editorials in the Washington Post over the weeks you must get the idea that we can’t instruct them.

Brezhnev: Have another sweet. Let’s not get away from the spirit.

Kissinger: I agree. Let’s forget about it.

Brezhnev: One of the reasons I took a three week trip to Siberia was to get away from all sorts of articles. It was a very great pleasure this year. The harvest there was very good. I visited five areas. People there assured me we would have 1.6 million poods of grain. (One pood equals 36.11 pounds.) This will be mostly wheat but also some buckwheat. The harvest has been good in these areas and should ease our domestic situation considerably. The Volga area was hit hard but Siberia is coming to the rescue. We seldom have a year where all areas are good or all areas are bad. But if you take statistics over a considerable period, you hardly ever get one area that demonstrates uniformity throughout.

Brezhnev: The Volga in the central belt is usually the best and that in Siberia not as good. This year, it is vice versa. Kazakhstan is the danger area in this regard. The rain fall is not normally high there, but it is good this year. They are producing one billion poods of grain and it is only the second time in history in this virgin land that we have reached that high a level. And finally at my last destination I had a con-
ference with economic experts on crops in the five central Asian districts which mostly produce cotton and will reach a level of 7,150,000 tons of cotton this year. This is an all time record of great importance for our economy. Generally during my trip it was very interesting for me to meet the local peoples and leaders. I gained a great deal concerning local people and personalities (gestures, smiling). Only the time differences bother me. Four hours after breakfast one wants to go to sleep.

Kissinger: You have the same problem I have in going around the world. It is very tiring.

(Gromyko and Dobrynin comment on seven or eight hours time difference between Moscow and Washington.)

Brezhnev: In my experience once I had to go to Vladivostok to make an award. They scheduled a meeting for twelve noon but for me it was 4:00 a.m. I just could not get awake and I didn’t even leave the country.

Kissinger: Our plan is to answer your questions and to make an agreement in principle during this visit. You could then send a delegation to complete trade and lend lease agreements. This could be done during the first week in October. On Export-Import credit, we could find you eligible and in October we would make available $150 million of credit for the Kama River project. This fall we would have a Presidential statement on the national interest of the United States in a gas agreement. We would also view sympathetically Export-Import credit. We would set up a joint task force on gas to coordinate activities. Finally, we would encourage the maximum private investment. We would also encourage participation by other countries.

By the way, I was talking to David Rockefeller about mobilizing capital this fall. Legislation on MFN status will be submitted to the Congress in January. A trade agreement is necessary in order to submit the MFN legislation. Certainly, the whole package would be completed in two years and maybe by next year. All of this package can be completed, at least all of those actions which come under the jurisdiction of the Executive Branch. These can be done this year. This is our concrete program to answer your questions. This is what the President will do this year and we will wrap up the whole thing next year.

(Brezhnev writes note to Dobrynin; Dobrynin consults with him.)

There is no sense submitting MFN to the Congress this year. There are only three weeks left and our control will be better in the next Congress if we win the election, which is the probable outcome. The new Congress will begin to organize itself in January.

(Brezhnev consults with Gromyko.)
We can give credit without Congressional approval. That we will do in the fall. The gas can start without Congressional approval also. In other words, we can now take steps on Export-Import and on gas.

Brezhnev: And as regards to the sum for lend lease, what would the sum be? Do you want a lump sum without mentioning interest?

Kissinger: The sum we proposed to the Ambassador was $800 million by the year 2001. This is according to the same specific arrangements which I mentioned to your Ambassador.

Brezhnev: Let’s be very specific. When the President was in Moscow we mentioned $500 million, including the amount on credit.

Kissinger: Including the pipeline?6

Brezhnev: We call it the credit agreement. Now we reached then an understanding in principle. We would pay this sum in payments to the year 2001. You have indicated to our Ambassador that you find it more convenient from the standpoint of Congress that we pay a lump sum. From the standpoint of the Supreme Soviet it is not too convenient to name a large sum. But in all negotiations one must endeavor to meet the other side half way. I agree to a lump sum. I will meet you half way on that.

Kissinger: It will be very helpful to us.

Brezhnev: The U.S. is insisting on a very high interest rate. We have stated before that it is very difficult. In fact, it is quite impossible for us. This has been stated before. We do not want to repeat ourselves. Now maybe we could give on the following and agree to mention a lump sum and pay the first installment at the time of the signing. It would amount to $27 million or so. It doesn’t really matter. You could then give us a stay of payment for five years, but the remaining payments would be completed by 2001. We will increase payments so as to take care of all of them by 2001. It will be easier for us after a five-year term. It will be easier to find the money and it would all be paid up by the year 2001. So it would be completed sooner than you anticipated.

Kissinger: We had suggested three postponements.

Brezhnev: So if we take this principle you have suggested, the initial installment would be bigger and then would get smaller and smaller to the year 2001. In other words we have a declining schedule. We want an initial stay of five years, but with completion of payments by the year 2001. I do not think this is bad for the United States. If you agree on this, we can pass to the issue of a lump sum.

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Kissinger: We were talking about equal payments to the year 2001. We would give three postponements which you would have to request. They would not be automatic.

Brezhnev: After the first installment, at what years would the postponements relate to? What years would you propose to have the postponements?

Kissinger: The point is that it would not be automatic. You would request them.

(Spirited talking across the table by a number of participants.)

Lynn (explaining the basis for the UK agreement): They made an agreement that they would not take an immediate postponement and that any postponement would be based on economic need. This was the basis for agreement with the UK.

Kissinger: Ambassador Dobrynin is aware that instead of five postponements, we are talking about three.

Brezhnev: I can give you a signed agreement right now stating that after the first payment and a five-year postponement, we would pay the remaining amount and it would be completed by the year 2001.

Kissinger: You must understand the problem:

—First, we talked about three postponements and not five.
—Secondly, in our agreement with the British, we agreed to postponements only if the economic situation required it. In other words, it is based on the economic situation. We required the UK to have an economic problem before receiving a postponement.
—Thirdly, it will be difficult to go to the Congress and say that we are finally ready to settle lend lease and that the Soviet Union agrees but wants a five-year postponement. It would be a difficult psychological atmosphere. An additional difficulty is that the pipeline is due in the next three years anyway.

I believe that two payments at the outset would help our problem with the lend lease people. After that there could be an understanding that there would be some possibility of postponement. It would be unmanageable if we extend credit now in return for your postponing payments on your debt to us. I am looking at our domestic situation.

Brezhnev (Pointing finger): I can just as easily refer you to our economic situation. We have to pay out to you. Our problem will be twice yours. From the point of view of the Supreme Soviet, a lump sum is difficult. These are no easy economic terms and they come during the final years of our five year development plan which are the most difficult for us. But the basic difference is you are getting the money. We are paying it. In the same period, we will have to pay large sums for our purchases in your country, including the interest rate on the wheat sales. The timing is what is the problem. The coincidence of timing in these
events. That is what motivates us in putting forth these letters. We are not trying to impose a combination on you. It is just too great a strain.

Kissinger: I understand. We both have the same problem.

Lynn (to Kissinger): It will all come out the same in the end.

Kissinger: But our domestic problems are now. What we are trying to do is to justify paying out more to you than we are getting back. On lend lease, we have to wait to justify the credit. If a settlement begins with postponement it eventually comes out the same way. It isn’t what we are getting. What we get, we want to justify so that we can give more.

(Brezhnev smokes all the time, using his hands while talking. Gromyko maintains a stony poker face.)

Brezhnev: I don’t think that is in fact quite so. If you agree to grant us credits, we will have to repay with interest. If you do not give credit to us, you will give the credit to someone else. That is the normal way of operating of people who do business. On most favored nation what benefit did the U.S. gain from this policy in the past? Neither pluses nor minuses. If you do extend MFN to us, it will be profitable for us but the growth will be reciprocal in trade and so forth. It will not entail losses for the United States. The situation now is no trade. Since there is no MFN, no growth is possible. Finally, an understanding on these matters is important. It may be difficult in a purely commercial area, but by and large it is regarded by everyone as mutually advantageous. Lend lease and Most Favored Nation are not just gratuities. We look forward to devising ways of utilizing MFN in order to increase economic cooperation. We will meet you half way. We have accepted the principle of a lump sum. With the President we spoke of the sum of $300 million. Then we spoke of $400 million and finally the sum of $500 million. That is where we were at the time of the Summit. Since then you have suggested a lump sum. We could mention say a lump sum of $650 million, with a first payment and then a postponement for five years. I would be willing to talk to my comrades about a postponement of four years, but we must finish our five-year plan.

We are boldly going forward to meet you on that and after the postponements we would insure all of it was paid up by the year 2001.

Another matter is how we set it on paper. Postponement is a tactical question, but we should have an understanding about a respite. We will be paying out large sums for wheat purchases and then lend lease will be done at the same time. That is what we want to base our understanding on. Perhaps you would see a way to get President Nixon to finalize the whole thing. Perhaps you can get in touch with the President.

Kissinger: I can reach the President but we need to get the proposition in manageable form first. I know we can’t accept $650 million.
ondly, it is very difficult to begin the process by a four-year postponement. It is a suggestion I will have to discuss with Washington. A global sum is subject to some discussion but not the sum of $650 million. Suppose we say we will grant four postponements. Under the pipeline you are obliged to pay separately anyway. After MFN was approved, you could make one postponement and then have one more payment. Then there could be two years of postponement. Then there would be one more postponement for you to use at your discretion which we do not have to fix now. In other words, we would have one payment after MFN was approved by the Congress. And then the following year there would be a postponement. Then the next year you would pay and then the following two years there would be a postponement. In other words to sum it up, after the first five years you would have three postponements. This of course would have to be a secret agreement.

Gromyko: Can the fourth postponement follow the first one?

Kissinger: What I am proposing that we agree to now is that of the first five payment periods, there would be a postponement of three. There would have to be an understanding between us. President Nixon in his next term would be responsible for three of the postponements while he was President. This will not be easy. (Secretary Lynn echoes the difficulties this will cause.) I am thinking out loud. I am not sure the President will agree.

(Gromyko makes a comment with a chuckle.)

Brezhnev: All right. Let’s make the sum $651 million. I will add one million with the wave of a hand. This will show you how generous I am.

Kissinger: Without Politburo authority?

Brezhnev: Or I could change it to $649 million. Yes, I can make this change so I am sure the President can also decide matters like that as well.

Kissinger: We first mentioned the sum of $1 billion and then $900 million when Secretary Peterson was here. Now we are down to $800 million. I know $650 million is impossible. However, $798 million might be conceivable (with a smile).

Brezhnev: We started with $300 million and it rose to $500 million.

Kissinger: But that was the principle without interest.

Brezhnev: You must remember that we pay, you get. I am referring to $650 million with a $500 million base.

Kissinger (to the translator): You have not translated my proposition. On the issue of postponements the British gave us a letter indicating that they would not repeat not take a major part of their postponements in the early period. They made them in 1957, 1964, 1965,
and 1968. Thus, they were over an eleven-year period. You want to do yours over a five-year period. We will be asked about this and whether there is a similar letter from you. We will not be able to say what we have just told you. $650 million represents less than two percent interest on the $500 million figure. I have enough experience with the General Secretary to know that he is probably prepared to discuss this further.

Brezhnev (pointing figure and gesturing): Of course we are prepared to return again and again if the sum is too small for you. It is however a great burden for us. We could give you a letter stating that after four postponements we would ask for no others on the lump sum. Then we would make a first payment and then ask for four and give you a letter saying that we would ask for no more and would make our payments complete by the year 2001.

Kissinger: I understand your problems. We would want no letter. We could write this into the agreement but it would be a mistake at the time the agreement was published to state that the postponements had already been agreed to.

Brezhnev: I was simply trying to make an analogy. If the U.K. gave you letters in that regard, we could do that also.

Kissinger: The letter said six or seven postponements. The U.K. gave us a letter but it stated that they would not take the postponements in the early part of the agreement. It was the opposite of your case. In this case we do not need a letter.

Brezhnev: This is a very big problem for us, particularly with regard to currency balance. We will be spending more than one billion dollars for U.S. purchases. This is an enormous sum.

Kissinger: Do you mean for wheat?

Brezhnev: Yes, for a three-year period. This will correspond to the period when lend lease is being paid. That is why we want deferment after one payment to settle the wheat. There are some of the payments we must make in cash. Some are not on credit. We want this done too. But it is not just politically difficult, but it is also difficult from the purely economic sense. If we agree to the Tyumen and Yakutsk gas line of credit, we have to spend enormous credits of our own domestically. It is a big deal with profits for the United States. It is not a single complex. We must take a look at the broad issues and the figures involved. On the Yakutsk gas project, if you want to do this jointly with Japan, we would have no objection. You could reach agreement with Japan yourself. We can’t just wave them aside and say that it is purely a U.S. and Soviet agreement.

Kissinger: My view is that your allies may try to discourage them. Your allies may object strenuously.
Brezhnev: What an absurd premise.

Kissinger: Japan will not do it alone. The real problem is whether we can get them to do it with us at all. My judgment is that their greed will help them overcome any political problems.

Gromyko: First they were trying to talk you into it. Now you are trying to talk them into it. Such is life.

Brezhnev: On gas we expect to have 13 trillion cubic meters. The Yukutsk deposit consists of three trillion cubic meters. We could sign an agreement for 25 to 30 years. On Tyumen the deal is now for 10 trillion but it would be up to 100 trillion. Therefore, you could sign there for 50 years. There could be a total of 25 trillion liters per annum to the United States. The Yakutsk gas will take 3 or 4 billion dollars and the Tyumen may take even more than that. On the other hand, the scale is enormous. The U.S. with its powerful economy should make large scale deals on this, not ten but twenty-five trillion liters of gas per annum. Of course you have to make a great investment but we too also on our side. It will take a whole new complex that we must build. This will cause very great tension for us. That is why in this context $650 million is difficult in light of other things. It is not small.

Kissinger: I agree we should take a broad view. We are talking about very large sums, and a complete change in our economic relations and that alone will have a significant effect for all of international affairs. We are talking about a revolution in economic relations which when compared to twenty five million or less a year is trivial. When I talk to Rockefeller about mobilizing credit, what he worries about is repayment. The lend lease money itself is trivial for us. There will be additional anxieties at the onset if we have postponements on lend lease. We can’t of course postpone the pipeline. On lend lease, you have agreed to one payment now and then to wait until 1976. Payment would be on the order of $25 million. This is the only difference between us.

If you take this as a regular postponement it is easier than four postponements in repaying by 2001. If there is one payment, then four postponements and payment by 2001 it doesn’t do us any good. The normal way would be to add on the postponed sums after 2001. The global sum between the two percent rate and $800 million rate is three or four million. (Four and a half million a year on the $800) But we are talking about a series of measures of great scope. We do not want to be on the defense, spending all of our time explaining to Congress why you are not paying. They will think we are being taken advantage of with a disadvantageous lend lease settlement on top of gas credit. You and I must look on the big economic view. $650 million is out of the question. It will be difficult to reach agreement on a scheme in which
you have four postponements and you take three of these in the first four years. Are you confused by my presentation?

Brezhnev: You mean paying by 2001 is no good.

Kissinger: I did not explain the process. It is easier for us to add these payments on to the end than for you to make them up at the end. Economically it is easier of course the way you suggested, but politically we want to take the postponements one at a time and not know formally in advance. It would be acceptable to have an understanding, although it would not be formalized.

Brezhnev: So you are proposing that we pay in 1973 the first sum. Then in 1974 and 1975 we do not, in 1976 we do. What about 1977?

Kissinger: You could take two postponements. This way you could pay in 1973 and have postponements in 1974, 1975, and 1977 and then pay the whole thing.

Brezhnev: You get in touch with your President. I have to get in touch with my colleagues. The global sum of $800 million is quite unacceptable.

Kissinger: Both of us have declared what is unacceptable. Now we must find a solution. You have my proposal of $798 and there is yours of $651.

Brezhnev: We are making progress.

Kissinger: It is like Chinese border relations. (Laughter)

Brezhnev: We mentioned $500 million in Moscow. You mentioned $800. Why not split it in half, one hundred fifty and one hundred fifty and meet halfway?

Kissinger: It is true that you did mention the sum of $500 million.

Brezhnev: Why don’t you take one pie now and defer two for later. (Laughter)

Kissinger: On the sum of $500 million we were talking about a sum without interest. At a two percent interest rate, it would be $660 million, so you have actually reduced the sum by $10 million in even payments.

Brezhnev: When you suggested your interest rate, we shouldn’t talk about that. That is company level talk. We are not corporation executives. If we meet each other half way, one side cannot take ten steps while the other side takes only two steps.

Kissinger: If I get the General Secretary to take two steps toward me, I will consider that an accomplishment. But there is more to this than splitting the difference.

Brezhnev: You are trying to get me confused with these figures. (Laughter)
Kissinger: The real difference is between $650 million and $800 million. Both of these figures include interest and then we are talking about comparable figures.

Brezhnev: That is so high, we couldn’t discuss it. Please get this across to the President.

Kissinger: The figure $650 million I cannot present. Of course if you demand I will present it but I can tell you now we are wasting our time. The answer to $650 million would be no. It would be tragic if I am here for two days and we don’t get an agreement. I am not trying to be a clever bargainer. I just wanted to tell you frankly he will not accept that figure. And what is worse, Congress will not agree. It could jeopardize all the other agreements.

Brezhnev: To be very frank what sum, even at the cost of a strain with Congress, what sum could you accept?

Kissinger: This is not good bargaining, but the absolute minimum we could accept would be $750 million. When the sum of $500 million was released to the press, it was with a five percent interest rate. If we were simply paying off lend lease, we could probably go to Congress.

Dobrynin: $750 million would really be $700 million, because the $750 million includes the pipeline.

Kissinger: It would include the pipeline. Is that understood?

Brezhnev: Well then for the time being let me convey my comments on postponement, that is on the total sum and on postponement. I will talk with my comrades. We might be able to go down to four postponements and perhaps even reduce that. In the meantime, we will be waiting for the reply from your President. On postponements they would come at a time that credits for gas and so forth would be operative.

Kissinger: My plan only adds one payment. There would be a payment, postponement, one payment and then three postponements. That is in order to prevent Congressional difficulties. We also understand that the two pipeline payments are not deferred. You owe us on the pipeline. We have held up that for this year but it will have to be paid this year and next.

Brezhnev: Would lend lease begin in 1973? This year the pipeline was postponed.

Kissinger: The first lend lease payment would be in 1973 if we pass MFN.

Brezhnev: Then in 1974 under your scheme there would be a postponement and in 1975 pay and in 1976 and 1977 postpone. What about 1978?

Kissinger: My recommendation would be that you pay in 1978 and take your other postponement in 1979.
Brezhnev: If we come to agreement, then we could pay both of them together as of 1973.

Kissinger: It is our understanding that there is no dispute about the pipeline. Our proposal is that in 1972 and 1973 you pay the pipeline. After that it is all paid off and this is not a factor.

Secretary General Brezhnev then walked out of the room.

Dobrynin: If you propose $700 million with the understanding that there is [omission in the original] million in the pipeline, it would be better to put it this way to the Secretary General. Of the $750, $48 of it would be to the pipeline, $702 for lend lease.

Kissinger: As I understand it, when Congress passes MFN next year then the first payment would be made and that would be followed by a postponement.

Dobrynin: It is my impression that he meant . . .

Manzhulo: He said $650 million.

Kissinger: I understand that. These numbers are starting to sound familiar. They are similar to those for SLBM and ICBMs; therefore we have a global figure.

Gromyko: When can you get an answer from your President?

Kissinger: What am I supposed to ask? Whether $650 million is acceptable? Alright, I will get this out. You understand my point that we do not have any formal agreement as to when there is a postponement.

Dobrynin: Yes, we understand. (Note: Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt and Lynn consulted and began drafting a cable to Washington. After an interval the group returned to the room.)

[In essence the two proposals were:

—on the Soviet side a $650 million lump sum with one payment followed by four postponements.

—the U.S. counter proposal is for $750 million with one payment followed by one postponement and then a payment. This would be followed by two postponements and then perhaps one payment and then one or two postponements.]

7 Kissinger wrote Haig in message Hakto 11, September 11, regarding lend-lease: “Brezhnev maintains they cannot go above 650 million principle and 150 interest. I have come down from our 800 million to 750 million as absolute minimum. But Brezhnev wants President’s response re 650 million. I think he may yield.” Kissinger asked Haig to send him a telegram “from President by flash so I can show it to Soviets.” Kissinger provided a draft of the telegram from Nixon to himself, which Haig sent back to Kissinger the same day as message Tohak 28, which stated that “650 million would be totally unacceptable to Congress and would therefore risk defeat of entire economic package for Soviets.” It continued: “You [Kissinger] are authorized to offer 750 million as absolute minimum consistent with basic objective of building new economic relationship with USSR.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 24, HAK Trip Files, HAK’s Germany, Moscow, London, Paris Trip, Sep. 9–15, 1972, HAKTO 1–35)
Gromyko: There is bad news from the Middle East. Very bad.
Kissinger: Your Government has behaved very properly and with
great discretion.
Gromyko: I had in mind the events which occurred a day or two
ago.
Kissinger: We had done our best to try to prevent it. We had not
been told the complete truth. (By the Israelis.) Note: There was then a
brief discussion of the Olympics. With reference to the basketball game,
Kissinger stated it was bad enough to lose, but we were also tortured
by the illusion of victory.)
Secretary General Brezhnev then returned to the meeting.
Brezhnev: Have you reached an agreement? I thought I was intimi-
dating you so I left.
Kissinger: Your colleagues have been reminding us of all our
defeats.
Brezhnev: They have been telling us that Kissinger agrees to $650
million.
Kissinger: As the base sum (without interest).
Brezhnev: I am only kidding. We cannot make a payment of this
much. We have put it all into one lump sum for you. Why don’t we
have a break for lunch now. I want to do some additional thinking.
Kissinger: Should I send a telegram?
Brezhnev: After lunch we can take the time we need.
Gromyko: (Consulting with Brezhnev) Yes, you should do it by
cable.
Brezhnev: We can perhaps break until 6:00 p.m. Then we can take
up several other issues. For example, we could discuss the agreement
on non-use, SALT, European Security, Vietnam, Middle East, and Ger-
many. Then we could start again at 10:00 a.m. tomorrow morning. It
has not been very productive today. The President is going to receive
two telegrams. One from you and one from me. I will tell him that ei-
ther Kissinger is misreading his directives or else that I cannot recog-

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8 On September 9, Israel launched air raids against Palestinian guerrilla bases in
Lebanon and Syria in retaliation for the kidnapping and murder of Israeli athletes at the
Munich Olympics. On September 12, Vorontsov delivered a note to Haig from the Soviet
leadership protesting the Israeli action, which Haig forwarded to Kissinger in message
Tohak 40, September 12. The Soviet note called the air attacks “a premeditated provoca-
tion by Israel against Syria and Lebanon.” It continued: “If no effective measures are
taken by those who bear the main responsibility for preserving international peace and
security, if Israel is not called to order and if Israel continues to aggravate the situation,
then it may lead to very dangerous consequences for the cause of peace in the Middle
East.” (Ibid., TOHAK 1–116)
nize Kissinger. I am not sure he is here. He wants me to take him to Lake Baikal. How easy it was to get his agreement.

Kissinger: Now I am in trouble with the military men and the President. I have one thought about postponement. We might combine your idea and our idea. I have not checked with Washington, but we might want to consider a certain number of consecutive postponements. You would still pay by the year 2001. In the agreement we could write a clause saying if postponements were taken in the first ten years, nevertheless the global sum would be paid by 2001. There could perhaps be one payment and three consecutive postponements followed by one payment and then take the fourth postponement. The whole would be paid off by 2001. This would establish a compromise between your position and ours. We would be proceeding from a global sum of $750 million.

Brezhnev: I thank you for these additional considerations. We can certainly think things over. However, the total sum looks very big. If there is nothing new after the break, all to the good. We will take time to talk things over.

Kissinger: One thing, it would be helpful to me to know what you plan to discuss this evening. I need to know this in terms of assigning my colleagues.

Brezhnev: We could discuss non-use and European matters as a minimum, certainly, the Security Conference. We are hoping to finalize this matter too.

Kissinger: You will defeat us in the last three seconds. (Referring to Russian defeat of U.S. Olympic basketball team.)

Brezhnev: I now know that there is a God above. Brandt must be feeling very bad.

Kissinger: Yes, he was very upset. I don’t know how they let the terrorists slip through. The Germans are given to extremes. They are now so concerned not to show too many in uniform. In 1936 there were too many uniformed people. This time, too few.

Brezhnev: Generally, they have been a very well disciplined nation. All through the war their discipline was good. When their leader said advance, they advanced. Retreat, they retreated. (Gesturing) It is true that after they surrendered not a single shot was fired at the back of our soldiers’ heads. After one battle I went to a Division area where some of my friends were and I was returning to my command post down a road strewn with vehicles. I did not have my ADC, just my driver and myself. And as we approached a little forest area about half a kilometer from the roadside, I saw a squad of armed Germans. They were coming in my direction. Night had fallen. I didn’t know whether to turn back but I finally decided to go along nonetheless. I saw they
were headed by an officer. As they approached, they said, “Good evening, General” and all came to attention, (Brezhnev stands up gesturing) and clicked their heels. (Brezhnev imitates.) They asked which way to surrender. I told them that it was five or six kilometers away to the south. No one will touch you if you proceed in an orderly manner. The Germans stood up and saluted and I drove off. I thought some SOB would hit me in the back but instead they simply lined up and marched in the direction I had indicated. I crossed myself.

Kissinger: I had a similar experience. A German division surrendered to our unit. The problem was how to get them one hundred miles back. I told my commander to let me handle it. I told the German Division Officer that if he would give his word of honor, he would be allowed to proceed without escort. The German responded that he hadn’t spent thirty years in the Army to disgrace himself now. And as it turned out he didn’t lose a man. All he had with him was someone to show him the way.

Brezhnev: Let’s take a break.

Kissinger: Should Lynn talk about other aspects of trade in the interim. He could review our other proposals?

Brezhnev: Certainly. Talk over the other aspects. This evening we can perhaps first cover the economic problem and then shift to the nuclear problem, European Security, troop reductions.

Kissinger: May I ask our Ambassador to join us for the European subjects?

Brezhnev: Sure.

Kissinger: Then tomorrow we would discuss SALT, Vietnam, and other topics.

Brezhnev: Maybe we could move more quickly. We really need to speed up.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger must agree with us.

Kissinger: I appreciate the opportunity to talk to Mr. Brezhnev.

Brezhnev: We have spent four hours on the single question. At this rate it will take thirteen days. I will put this in my telegram to President Nixon. He will do it then.

Kissinger: You are trying to destroy my confidence.

Brezhnev: That is what I am worried about.

Kissinger: When I get in trouble because of you, maybe I can get a job in the Soviet Union. Your Ambassador tells me it will not be in the office of foreign affairs, perhaps defense.

Brezhnev: I will find something better.
39. **Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)**

Moscow, September 12, 1972, 0155Z.

Hakto 13. After over seven hours with Brezhnev this evening on lend-lease we have following situation.\(^2\)

1. He says he absolutely cannot go above global figure of 725 million dollars.

2. He says their balance of payments problems due to grain purchases, shipping and other commitments for balance of their present five year plan are so severe that he cannot accept compressed pipeline payments of 24 million each in 1972 and 1973.

First question is whether 725 million global figure would be feasible for us. Payments would still be arranged to conclude in 2001.

As regards second problem above, two possible compromise suggestions have occurred to us:

First possibility.

1. Soviets pay their regular pipeline installment of 11 plus million dollars this year. As you know they have been ready to do so but we have agreed to hold up from month to month pending resolution of lend-lease negotiations.

2. In 1973, they would pay a 24 million dollar pipeline installment.

3. Beginning 1974, assuming MFN some time in 1973, they would begin regular payments stream to 2001 on global sum, except that part of each payment would be on account of pipeline.

Second possibility.

1. Pay pipeline installments for four years, 1972–75 of 11.5 plus million per year to retire pipeline debt.

2. Balance of global sum, after deducting pipeline, would be paid in equal installments beginning 1976 through 2001. I suspect in this variant we might ask for somewhat higher global sum. If so, how much should it be?

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 24, Trip Files, HAK’s Germany, Moscow, London, Paris Trip, Sep. 9–15, 1972, HAKTO 1–35. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Flash. A stamped notation indicates it was received at 9:29 p.m. on September 11.

\(^2\) Document 38 accounts for a 4-hour discussion Kissinger had with Brezhnev regarding lend-lease. No records of other meetings on September 11 were found.
3. Because of delayed beginning of regular lend-lease installments, this variant would contain no postponement rights or perhaps only one.

I urgently need for use tomorrow morning Peterson’s and Flanigan’s reaction to these propositions or any other precise alternative he can come up with. I recognize time pressures, but any supporting arithmetic—such as size of annual installments under variants and global figure and rationale for Congress—would be extremely useful.

40. **Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) in Moscow**

Washington, September 12, 1972, 0712Z.

Tohak 47/WH 29377. There follows the proposal worked out jointly by Secretary Peterson and Peter Flanigan. Both agree that it will meet requirements.

*Begin text:*

For: Henry A. Kissinger  
From: Secretary Peterson

I have reviewed the following message on lend-lease with Flanigan and it represents joint view.

Should you need more precise computer-type interest rate calculation, please wire back and we will try to get computer operating tonight.

On another subject, there are strong indications of a grain elevator strike by maritime unions. While it is not directed at only Soviet Union grain shipments, Gibson thinks it could have been touched off by delays on maritime deal.\(^1\) I asked him to get specific reasons for strike by mid-morning.

In any event, you should know this puts extra pressure on a maritime deal as soon as possible.

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\(^2\) The Maritime Agreement was signed in Washington on October 14. See Document 61.
Also, newspaper story here by Kaiser of Post on Jim Lynn’s being with you made it necessary for me to meet with bureaucracy today to review situation. It will be very helpful if you can limit announcements on commercial negotiations to most general kind of language and thereby permit us to again reassure bureaucracy that Manzhulo and Alkhimov will be coming back to negotiate in depth.

Warm regards.

To: Henry A. Kissinger
From: Peterson/Flanigan
Subject: Lend Lease

1. We believe that comprehensiveness of trade package is more important than the differences between any of the options. Cannot tell from your telex how you are handling trade aspects but believe lowering of global sum provides requirement and opportunity to get comprehensive trade aspects wrapped up including market disruption, business facilities, arbitration, copyrights, etc. In short we are concerned about settling lend lease prior to getting comprehensive trade aspects settled, particularly at lower global sum. Congress and lobbyists will forget about rather minor differences in lend lease settlement long before they have to deal with specific trade package.

2. You could try again to get $750 million global sum and still be responsive to five year balance of payments problems by suggesting that $25 million additional beyond $725 million be paid in $1 million annual payments for last 25 years only, with none of these extra payments in the first five years of professed balance of payments problems.

3. Do not like your second possibility. Seems very much like grace period concept which is probably hard to sell to Congress, particularly since we could presumably have made available large Ex-In credits long before the regular lend lease payments began in 1976. Remind you that Congressman Moorhead seems to have hangup on grace period concept. We do not have time to get access to a computer at this late hour, but we suspect second possibility also reduces effective interest rate substantially more.

4. As to your first possibility:

A. Can you get the last $11.5 million of pipeline in 1974 since propose handling of this last $11.5 million over remaining years until 2001 is a retreat from what we already are getting on pipeline, or if not, then could you split the last $11.5 million into two payments of about $5.75 million each, payable in 1974 and 1975 which at least completes pipeline payments at same time as current pipeline payments are due.

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B. It would also be obviously very well [received?] if you could negotiate no postponements since we could then say to Congress that we did not yield on two of the important variables, grace period and postponements.

C. Have they accepted the concept of regular lend lease payments starting when MFN actually granted? If so, I remind you that this would also mean doubling up if we get MFN in 1973 or 1974. We propose this since it gives Congress an incentive to hurry up and also gets us more cash earlier. Frankly, with an economy of the size of the Soviet Union doing several billion dollars of trade with the Western world annually, it is rather hard to believe that balance of payments projections are so refined that $11 million one way or the other makes that much difference.

5. There is no way we can compute effective interest at this late hour without a computer. We would estimate your first possibility would turn out to yield effective interest rate of between 2.80 percent and 2.90 percent. If you use only the non-pipeline amount of $454 million as the base and do not compute interest on regular lend lease payments until these payments start, interest rate is about 3 percent. If this is all you can get, we can probably sell it but it does intensify the need for a comprehensive trade deal. Also, lower global settlement makes it all the more necessary that we have freedom to market deal in any way we wish since more than ever it now looks as though the British analogy is far better than talking about interest rates on basis of summit settlement.
41. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, September 12, 1972, 12:10–1:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Foreign Minister
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of USA Division, Foreign Ministry
A.M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Soviet Notetaker
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
James T. Lynn, Under Secretary of Commerce
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff Member
William G. Hyland, NSC Staff

SUBJECT

Economic Relations

Brezhnev: Has nothing happened?

Dr. Kissinger: I have been trying to get an answer from Washington. I gave it to Ambassador Dobrynin. We have an answer involving a double payment on the pipeline.²

Brezhnev: Is this a new idea?

Dr. Kissinger: I will take responsibility for an agreement and I will have to get it blessed in Washington. I could accept the figure of $725 million. Also I have a new idea on how to handle the combination of pipeline and lend-lease payments. We will do it the way we handled the postponements. I will take responsibility for this, but I am almost certain it will be accepted, but it should not be the subject of correspondence.

The idea is this: This year you will make the regular pipeline payments; next year you make a double payment; in 1974 you make the first lend-lease payment, but not the pipeline payments; in 1975 we postpone the lend-lease payment, but you pay the remainder of the pipeline. In 1976–77 you postpone lend-lease.

On this basis you pay off the pipeline on the exact schedule, but double 1973–74 into one payment. The concerns you mentioned yes-

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¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 74, Country Files—Europe—USSR, HAK Trip to Moscow, Sept. 1972, Memcons (Originals). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Council of Ministers Building inside the Kremlin. Brackets are in the original.

² See Document 40.
terday will not arise. I am not authorized to make this proposal, but I believe I can convince the President if I can explain it to him personally.

Brezhnev: And in 1978?
Dr. Kissinger: One payment.
Brezhnev: 1979?
Dr. Kissinger: Postponed.
Brezhnev: And 1980 and so on will be equal payments?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: [Draws line through notes he has been making.] OK. We have already spent too much time on this subject. Although there were difficulties in approach, I want to pay tribute to the fact that the President agrees to the sum of $725 million. I therefore accept this variant. I trust that my comrades will share this view. We can consider the matter closed. We can list the additional requirements for you to convey to the President. I accept this in connection with the President’s acceptance of $725 million. I am deeply gratified. It reflects the interest of maintaining the policy founded during the President’s visit to Moscow.

Yesterday our conversations were very businesslike. There were no disputes, they were charming, and the results were positive. Why should we note anything that happened yesterday? Since the President has accepted the figure we suggested yesterday, it is with profound gratification that I therefore accept responsibility for accepting the schedule of payments.

I had a new idea when I was driving home last night. It was hard to tear one’s self away from the talks. I thought it would be a good idea to study the formalization of the agreements from a legal viewpoint, so that no misunderstandings arise and neither side runs the risk of falling short. I am referring to the fact that we begin payment only after granting of MFN. There must be a guarantee on this.

Dr. Kissinger: [Interrupting translation]: We will put it into the agreement.

Brezhnev: Then there is no problem. [Continuing earlier remarks]: So that there is no uncertainty standing in the way, we guarantee payments down to last kopek. When will the other elements be put into place? We should not go into details, but preparations should be made. Will we hear confirmation of MFN in near future? Will it be submitted to Congress in January? Will the President announce his intention in October that MFN will be submitted next year?

But, first of all, do you accept our acceptance on payments? I confidently accept your statement that you will do all you can to persuade the President. I accept our understanding to be a de facto understanding.
Dr. Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we concluded our discussions because they have been frank and open as have characterized our negotiations. We have always been able to settle our problems because our discussions are open.

Second, I am delighted to accept your assistance [assurance] that you accept our proposals. I will confirm our acceptance to your Ambassador on Monday.³ We can decide if we want to say anything publicly as a result of this meeting.

Third, Mr. Lynn should now talk with Mr. Manzhulo to settle as much as possible on the trade and lend-lease agreements. The more they can settle the easier it will be for us to sell this package. If they can make progress this will be very helpful.

You should send delegations to Washington to complete the agreements in legal form. They could be signed on October 10. We will have a legal obligation to obtain MFN, and your payments do not start until then. The President will make a statement, as necessary, that he submits and recommends to the Congress granting of MFN. If he is re-elected, in the first term of a re-elected President the Congress will be forthcoming. I also confirm the granting of Ex-Im credits in October for the Kama River project and we will set up a mechanism for the natural gas project, as discussed yesterday. But it would help the general atmosphere surrounding these agreements if we could settle one or two other issues simultaneously: the copyright agreements, arbitration and the establishment of a trade center. We would like to settle all of them, but even if only two are settled it would enable us to sell a difficult package more effectively.

This completes economic matters. I understand you are sending a maritime delegation to Washington. In this connection we will announce that a subsidy will be granted to ships carrying grain. This will cost us $50 million. As soon as the maritime agreement is concluded we can break the current deadlock. Meanwhile your ships can call on West Coast and Great Lakes ports in October, but the grain moves in American ships.

In view of the broad scope of the agreements to be signed on October 10, I should tell your Ambassador how your delegations should conduct their conversations in Washington. In any event, I herewith confirm that we will conclude all the agreements on October 10; as soon as you can you should get delegations to Washington, to conclude the agreements within the framework of our agreements.

³ September 18.
Brezhnev: Lynn and Manzhulo should be locked in a room with no food until they reach agreement—but Gromyko says give them water.
Dr. Kissinger: I agree.
Brezhnev: But if they reach agreement, we will give them a gala reception.
Dr. Kissinger: This evening.
I have a personal interest in the copyright agreements: I will earn royalties from my books.
Brezhnev: On the President’s statement to the Congress, when will he make it? I am not posing a condition, but merely wondered.
Dr. Kissinger: At the time of signing the treaty we will repeat the statements when we explain it to the press.
Brezhnev: On the copyright, we will resolve it and pay you. There will be no discriminations, but we will only pay you!
Dr. Kissinger: Then I can drive through Washington in a Soviet automobile and no one will pay any attention.
[During the translation, Brezhnev asked for the Minister of Maritime Transport.]
[When the remarks on giving instructions to the Soviet delegation to the translator, Brezhnev injected: This was necessary in order to preserve the channel: some of your suggestions will come from us. Dobrynin remarked to Brezhnev that he will work with Dr. Kissinger to preserve the channel. Brezhnev answered: Exactly. Dr. Kissinger said if Dobrynin and I can be in contact, we can settle matters. Brezhnev replied, we accept that.]
Brezhnev: Well, may I say on behalf of myself and my comrades that the discussions we began yesterday and today are a good step toward upholding mutual interest based on foundations created during the President’s visit. There is a lot of work to be done to promote better understanding and cooperation. That which was accomplished in these two days was very good indeed . . .
Dr. Kissinger: I share your view . . .
Brezhnev: [Examining the payments schedule; asking Gromyko, in Russian:] How long will President Nixon be in office?
Dr. Kissinger: President Nixon can make postponements for the first three payments, and we will leave a letter for his successor.
Brezhnev: Then we can send off a good telegram to the President. There is one thing, I am not very well versed in the difficulties of the trade negotiations. If I could be informed, I could facilitate matters or perhaps make them more difficult. I do not think Manzhulo will take decisions without me [laughter on the American side]. So if you could tell me about the difficulties confidentially, I could take Dr. Kissinger’s
example and advise him [Manzhulo] when to advance and when to fall back.

Dr. Kissinger: I have not been doing much advancing.

[Brezhnev nods to Mr. Lynn to proceed.]

Mr. Lynn: On the question of arbitration, we need a clear signal to our bureaucracies on both sides that international arbitration machinery can be located in third countries.

Brezhnev: I do not know what third countries should be involved. If there are matters [to be settled], we will take it to Dr. Kissinger. Why should Holland decide for us? This may not be necessary. Do we need third countries?

Lynn: We want this item so that businessmen can support the agreements.

Brezhnev: If the experts agree, I have no objections.

Lynn: Second, we should agree that MFN applies to exports and imports, except those items that fall under national security.

Also, Mr. Manzhulo had difficulty with our reference to GATT. We have handled this by a reference to GATT that I think he would find satisfactory.

The next point concerns diplomatic immunity for trade representatives in the Soviet Union and in the U.S. I believe this can be handled satisfactorily.

In working out MFN reciprocal treatment of goods, there are contained in side letters references concerning quantities of goods. This is the so-called market disruption clause. We need a mechanism to advise . . .

Brezhnev: I am beginning to see that we will be able to get a protocol by this evening. So we can get into other matters.

[At this point Minister Guzhenko came into the room and began reporting to Brezhnev in Russian. After a conversation in Russian, Brezhnev said that his Minister claimed that we wanted to exclude Soviet ships that called on Cuba; since this was 90 percent of the ships, we could not implement the agreement. Brezhnev said that we claimed no sailors should take part in loading.]

[Dobrynin intervened in Russian to explain something, and then Guzhenko continued, apparently informing Brezhnev that there had been a communication from the Americans through Ambassador Dobrynin solving these problems. Brezhnev seemed unaware of what he meant, but Dobrynin reassured him that the issues were resolved.]

Brezhnev concluded that Lynn had the responsibility for reaching an acceptable agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: Let them continue working on details. I think all the problems are solved. If necessary, Lynn can stay.
Brezhnev: Our work has succeeded.
[Lynn departed and the meeting turned to other subjects.]

Kissinger subsequently wrote to Haig regarding the meeting in message Hakto 18, September 12: “After further ninety minutes of discussion today, tentative agreement was reached on lend-lease package based on global figure of 725 million and generally on first alternative compromise suggestion sent you last night. Brezhnev also agreed that total trade package should be expeditiously completed and Lynn currently meeting with Soviet counterpart to get as far as possible. Brezhnev has promised his support for a forthcoming solution.” Kissinger continued: “Please tell President that October 10 is target date for completion and signature of comprehensive trade package and lend-lease settlement.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 24, Trip Files, HAK's Germany, Moscow, London, Paris Trip, Sep. 9–15, 1972, HAKTO 1–35) The agreements were not signed until October 18. See Document 65.

42. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, September 12, 1972, 1:20–6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Foreign Minister
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
Georgi M. Kornyiенко, Chief of USA Division, Foreign Minister
A.M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Soviet Notetaker
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff Member
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
William G. Hyland, NSC Staff
Comdr. Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

SUBJECT
Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons

Dr. Kissinger: I delayed so long on the other subject [trade and lend-lease] to avoid discussing this.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 74, Country Files—Europe—USSR, HAK Trip to Moscow, Sept. 1972, Memcons (Originals). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Council of Ministers Building inside the Kremlin. Brackets are in the original.
Brezhnev: But this is a very important matter. No other question could do so much to improve the situation and political atmosphere as this. No agreements on gas, on maritime shipping, can do so much to restrict war. No other leading statesmen will go down more in history than the one who signs this [agreement]. The question is how to approach it. Our draft is a good one. We could go to lunch if you accept it. We took into account your draft;\textsuperscript{2} I decided to send you a draft\textsuperscript{3} so you could discuss it with the President before you left.

Dr. Kissinger: I have no draft from you.

We had an opportunity to discuss the issue with the President, and we sent you some of our considerations, prior to coming here.

Brezhnev: In fact we began discussions on this here in Moscow.

Dr. Kissinger: In April . . .

Brezhnev: After preliminary discussion with you and at the summit, we sent you a draft treaty.\textsuperscript{4} We have confirmed that there is general agreement and a desire to reach a solution. It is one of the decisions of paramount importance for our relations. It will be a great contribution to world détente and greater security not only for our people but worldwide. A good beginning was made in Moscow. Now the task is to elaborate and finalize a treaty. You gave us a draft and we gave a draft and received modifications from you. Now it is clear that our countries will never allow the use of nuclear weapons against one another, but we must give a clear-cut commitment on the way to act in possible situations.

[Noting paper in his hand] I was reading your paper and thought it was ours!

We can reply to your questions. Other questions are merely theoretical and will not arise in practice. One could think of 20 hypothetical questions of this kind, but they will never arise in practice. We should avoid those that never arise in practice.

A most important consideration is the use of force against each other and against each other’s allies—as expressed in Article III. I agree with the President that the treaty must not look as if the two most powerful nations are dictating to the world. But this is between our two nations. The entire tonality reflects this. We proceed from the assumption that each has allies, you the NATO allies and we the Warsaw Pact allies.

Thus, if you agree we can go through the text. We can constitute an internal drafting commission. If we honestly fulfill our obligations the

\textsuperscript{2} Tab D, Document 30.

\textsuperscript{3} Brezhnev is apparently referring to the undated message from the Soviet leadership to Nixon, Document 35.

\textsuperscript{4} See Document 17.
other nations can be reassured. Your initial draft, as I recall, made an obligation “to create conditions in which use of nuclear weapons was not justified.” This formulation is not specific. After all we could say this and there would still be war. But our own draft says no interference in the internal affairs of the other . . .

Dr. Kissinger: This is not in your draft.

Brezhnev: Your formulation is too loose. It is not binding. We need a document to present to parliaments. Of course some countries may not like it. Britain, France, Germany, China, Korea, whatever. But if our two countries agree, the UN will not find reason for criticism. We retain the right of self-defense. These are important pronouncements, in the interest of the U.S. and the Soviet Union that this be preserved. If only “every effort” is made, the results have less value, and give rise to doubts.

One idea came to me yesterday. Even if we sign an agreement on nuclear weapons, we might fight a conventional war. We could have 150 divisions and you 150 divisions and we could fight to a standstill. We could follow up this treaty with a treaty on non-use of force generally. If we two enter into a treaty, there can be no nuclear war in the future. Because no other power would resort to nuclear war. If we do not use nuclear weapons, no one else would dare to launch them. Certainly not France but they are not military allies of yours. If we now can proceed further, we could turn ourselves into editors and make a draft. Let us agree that bargaining is impossible. This does not relate to rubles. This is a matter of four points.

Alexandrov: The interpreter left out an important statement, that France is not likely to attack you!

Brezhnev: I have a suggestion. To enable you to have free time and attend an important function, we might have a break. We could meet at 5:30 and go to 10:00–11:30. We missed a meal yesterday but we felt light without our dinner.

Dr. Kissinger: What else will be discussed?

Brezhnev: SALT.

Gromyko: European Security.

Brezhnev: There was a party official named Svirsky. During the period when we took young people from villages to go to the countryside, not all were enthusiastic, and each gave reasons for not going. They came in for a hearing and explained their reasons. Svirsky said, I am in favor and you are against; we agree; you will go!

[The meeting adjourned until 6:00 p.m.]

Brezhnev: Why did Gromyko take so long to feed you?

Dr. Kissinger: He gave us a preview of his UN speech.

It took only two minutes.
Brezhnev: We will not send him and save money.

Dr. Kissinger: He also agreed that when he makes the speech, he will wear a Nixon hat.

Brezhnev: He cannot wear a Nixon hat unless he gets paid. We will make some money. [To Gromyko:] Split 50–50.

We are in a better mood. When we get a settlement the mood improves. Why don’t we follow this procedure: You say that all the questions that came up you agreed to. We are serious, not selfish; we do not seek any advantages.

Dr. Kissinger: But I make simple problems complicated.

Brezhnev: I have noticed that you have a special talent. If any question needs solving we can call on Dr. Kissinger to make it complicated and then settle it.

Dr. Kissinger: In that way I get the credit. You invent problems and then remove them. This is a political art.

Brezhnev: The complications are never explained, but the solutions are. I am happy to see Dr. Kissinger looking so well as when we started. I remember our discussing this with you the first time.

Dr. Kissinger: Those were important discussions.

Brezhnev: Yesterday and today . . . When I went down to see you [last night] I thought I couldn’t come out [without talking to you] . . .

Dr. Kissinger: We were very close. We had to find ways to start a new initiative in all fields.

Brezhnev: We feel that the basic principle is to lay a foundation, that we began in the course of our bilateral discussions. It would have been quite improper to embark on the summit without looking ahead to see what the prospects were. We were right in splitting up the tasks and having separate discussions. In May we decided to have this question [non-use of nuclear weapons]. The question is quite complicated. There have been many decades in building up tensions, and it is leading to bring matters back to normalcy, or better.

I endeavored in a rough way to set out the basic principles on the non-use of nuclear weapons. Let me not make a secret of the fact that it would not be justified to delay too long. I am not humoring you. But to add this to what has already been achieved would enhance the prestige of our two nations.

Dr. Kissinger: The President believes that our relations should be, and are, developing on the principle of reciprocity and equality in the interest of the peace in the world. He devotes more time to this than any other foreign policy question. We look at every problem, not only on its merits but on the basis of its contribution to the objective of relaxing tensions and developing cooperation. We have as a cardinal principle of our policy not to take advantage of tactical situations, but
to show restraint in every respect and to take account of the interests, principles and concerns of the Soviet Union. These basic principles will motivate our policy in the next Administration. A beginning was made at the Moscow summit. We can give a greater impetus in these discussions, and when the General Secretary visits the United States, this can be an event not only of social importance, but of tremendous historical significance. We would like that visit to be marked by the same order and scope of significance as the Moscow summit. As a general objective we could bring these discussions to a culmination during the visit, but before we can do that we will require precision.

First, with respect to preventing nuclear war, there are absolutely no differences. We believe nuclear war would be a catastrophe for our two peoples. Nobody understands this better than our two countries, because we are the only countries equipped to understand. We sometimes read in the press who is ahead or who is behind. A basic strategic advantage is impossible. Victory in a nuclear war is unobtainable. To engage in a nuclear war would be suicidal and an act of criminal folly. This is your objective, and we agree with this objective. Indeed it is a noble one.

At the same time, if we concede that our two countries are the two strongest nations, then our relations have significance beyond formal statements. As we look at the past, rightly or wrongly, many nations have feared military aggression and they believed they were free of this fear because of the protection of nuclear weapons. A treaty of this kind would have profound significance for these countries. While banning use between us, we do not want to create the impression that it is permitted against third countries. This is not your view.

Third, the General Secretary spoke of the problem that after banning nuclear war, there would remain the possibility of conventional war. He flatters us by saying we could have 150 divisions in our country. We do not have the population to man the headquarters that would be required. [Brezhnev on translation of this does not understand, but when explained that we have such large headquarters, he said the staffs are never in the front line.]

We do not want to give the impression that conventional war is permitted nor give the impression that under the protection we have from the non-use of nuclear weapons against one another, we could use conventional weapons. That is why we referred to the condition listed in our second paragraph. The General Secretary called attention to the vague language in Article I. It is drafted so vaguely that it is meaningless, he said. If we set a goal and fail to achieve it we have nothing. As he pointed out, we could still have the conditions but also a nuclear war. This could be strengthened by saying “They have an obligation . . .”
We are not drafters, but I agree we could strengthen this paragraph.

Brezhnev: [interrupting during the translation] Maybe vague was too strong a word. He might say too indefinite.

Kissinger: . . . and then use other parts of our draft. My understanding of the General Secretary’s remarks—I do not recall this exactly—is that we should attempt to compare texts and have a drafting commission. I discussed this with the President and we are prepared to do this in principle. We should attempt to set as our goal a document that achieves the objectives the General Secretary set forth, and if we can, this will be one of the most fundamental documents of the post-war period. Therefore, it must be treated with extreme care and precision.

[At this point Brezhnev asked that no notes be taken, and proceeded to relate a story about a dog race in America. The dog’s owner was exhorting the dog to win, and the dog kept replying, “Don’t worry.” As he rounded the grandstand, running last, the owner shouted at him, but the dog merely replied, “Don’t worry.” Finally, the race ended and the irate owner asked the dog what happened, and the dog replied, “Well, it just didn’t work out.” Brezhnev continued that the dog made “every effort” but failed, and this was his point in relation to the discussion on nuclear weapons: We cannot just make “every effort.”]

Brezhnev: There are two points: As for our side there is no hesitation in our desire to reach an agreement. We have no ulterior motives. Our position is based on a sincere desire to create confidence and obligations which the Soviet Union and the United States will never allow war to break out in general, and nuclear war in particular, between our two countries. This approach was the basis of our Party Congress. The last Congress, the 24th, underlined this desire.

We earnestly believe in, and are aware of, the immense historical importance that both the people of the Soviet Union and the United States and all people attach to peace. This is why we are convinced advocates of a solution. Now when it is clear and obvious that we are indeed mighty powers and have means to destroy each other completely, we must devote prime attention to military fears, but proceed from humane desire for the entire world to breathe a sigh of relief. From all the utterances of the President and from what we have said, our basic objectives coincide and we are both guided by a noble desire to finally see this problem settled.

This is the basic desire that underlies our proposal to incorporate this basic idea in clear-cut language, without wishy-wishy formulations after which we would have to say “we tried but it didn’t work” [referring with gestures to the dog story].
I am trying to think about the reasons for doubts or hesitation. There may be still doubts or distrust of the Soviet Union in your minds. If so, it is impossible to address a solution of this problem. If we deal on the basis of mistrust, this is an insincere approach. I do not believe this is so. The President and the American people are aware of the horrors of war in this era. They do not want to end their days in bunkers. They want to see agreement.

Or is it a question of allies or allied commitments? The fact is that the allies are 100 times weaker than the United States and do not possess nuclear weapons, and it is natural for them to want the cover of the United States. If the Soviet Union solemnly declares that we will not use nuclear weapons against the United States, you can be 200 percent certain that we will not use conventional weapons either, against the United States or its allies. Such a prospect would be completely contrary to the declarations of the Party Congress of our party. So the prospect of the Soviet Union using nuclear weapons against the allies drops away.

There remains the possibility of accretions of a historical nature. Perhaps people like the UK want to dissuade the President from taking steps on such important measures. If we listen to the whispering of our allies we cannot move forward. I say this and try to discuss possible ulterior reasons because there must be an explanation for concluding an agreement and for not concluding one. The basic idea of reaching an agreement is rooted in the minds of all people. If we do not reach agreement, we sow suspicion and in the minds of all the people.

I am proceeding from this motive and I made reservations on clauses that do not contain clear-cut commitments. That is why I jokingly mentioned the story about the dog race.

I certainly believe sincerely that during the President’s Administration there cannot be war. We believe this cannot happen. But who knows who comes to office? Anything can happen. If we accomplish something, it will be effective not only for President Nixon’s time but in the future. We can show all nations that nuclear weapons will not be used, because our two countries will not allow it. This will reflect noble global policies of peace. Whether this goal is achieved under the present or future leadership, the people will erect a monument to those leaders who achieve it.

On other aspects, amendments and modification are quite possible to take into account the observations of the President, made recently, and to prevent the impression that we two want to rule the world. In taking account of allies, we should give careful thought to the way to formulate the document to make it effective. But the basic goal is most important. I have elucidated an assessment of these goals. We will not
go back on these because they reflect the basic nature of our Party. Despite slanders from some quarters, we are dedicated to peace.

As for possible attempts to frustrate our efforts from other quarters—those who might be anti-U.S. or anti-Soviet, or vested interests, we must not be prone to influence by them. If we do not confront these influences and not make concessions to them we will not succeed. Compromise is possible in elections but no compromise is possible in this aspect. As for allied warnings, we must create respect for our motive. But these are not basic aspects, only to be borne in mind. That is our basic thinking to be conveyed to the President.

[During translation Brezhnev excuses himself.]

Dr. Kissinger [to Dobrynin]: It is possible to strengthen paragraph one, if you take account of our paper.

Gromyko: We will work out a formulation, but the crucial point is the first one in our draft. Will it be a treaty?

Dr. Kissinger: We have not fully decided on the form it will take.

Gromyko: A declaration is not an obligation.

Dobrynin: But Dr. Kissinger now says either an agreement or a treaty.

Gromyko: It should be one solemn document.

Dr. Kissinger: The whole concept is revolutionary and shakes the foundation of the post-war world. That is why we have a two-stage approach. In this way many of the countries concerned will become used to the change from the first to the final stages. The next stage could move forward right away.

Gromyko: Both stages should be prepared and agreed at the same time.

[Brezhnev returns]

Brezhnev: How do you see it?

Dr. Kissinger: We just had some preliminary exchanges with the Foreign Minister. What you have said is truly of fundamental importance. You want our two countries to take the lead in overturning the military basis of the post-war period. Since we took the lead in creating the conditions, we have an obligation in removing the military confrontation. We do not quarrel with your objective of removing the danger of a nuclear war.

It is also true that the consciousness of nations proceeds unequally. We are concerned that this document contribute to international stability and not create such a sense of insecurity in the world that would have a totally unsettling effect. That is why I asked your Ambassador if there was any objection if we talked to our allies, not to give them a veto but to give them some sense of the impact.
Second, that is why we think it important at least to consider proceeding in stages. In April, I was surprised at the revolutionary and startling document you gave me. But if it is culminated in two stages, while the first stage suffers from vagueness, the world would be used to the idea that something more fundamental was to follow. The second stage would be a more basic document. We are not determined on this but advance it for your consideration. We believe your document emphasizes obligations at the expense of considerations. Your document almost describes how nuclear war could come about rather than how it could be prevented.

Consideration should be given, again, to two stages, first, a more general declaration, and later, at the time of your visit a more formal document. If we find it more desirable we could work on both documents. We will undertake to give more specificity to paragraph one and not like the dog story. You should look over our paper to take account of our considerations. We could take both documents and compare them in a businesslike way and decide how to proceed. As for other countries you mentioned, France wants the benefits of an alliance without the risks. Perhaps you may have allies like this. We have to take their views into account. In the past, if a measure genuinely contributes to world peace and is of benefit to everybody, we have found that the allies will support it.

It is inevitable, that we, as the two strongest powers, encounter suspicions. This is the price we pay for the opportunities before us. We should not settle this in the abstract, but solve it concretely, in the way I have indicated. I propose that we follow this procedure.

Brezhnev: [referring to Dr. Kissinger’s statement on overturning the military basis] You are quite right, because your and our military must reappraise their doctrines. Until now everything planned against each other. But now we must reappraise their requests which are all based on one overtaking the other, more and more money. I am being frank in the utmost but that is true picture.

[Referring to maintaining the confidential channel:] When you [Sonnenfeldt and Lynn] were in the Crimea, I did not mention this subject. I can guarantee, however, that if this subject came up tomorrow, each and every one of our allies would raise no objections. Of course we have seven, you have 11.

Gromyko: Fourteen.

Brezhnev [brushing the numbers aside]: Speaking frankly, I cannot agree with you. I guess for the time being I do not have the possibility of talking Dr. Kissinger into this. What can I do?

Gromyko [interrupting]: He does not agree with idea of two stages, but wants one solemn document.

Brezhnev [continuing]: You should pass my request to the President to look into our intention and aims in pursuing and continuing to work on a clear document. If we split it into stages it would look like we were kicking it aside into a commission, even though our aim is clear. We feel there is a fundamental understanding; I am referring to the first clause, as we see it. As regards the other clauses, there could be other work. Efforts should be made to persuade the allies, but proceeding stage-by-stage sows seeds of doubt in the document, and would mobilize opposition. Let those who want to, criticize a signed document. There would be all sorts of talks and conjectures in The New York Times, practice shows this to be true. I recall the clamor about the summit meeting, whether it should be held. There was clamor from China and Korea and others, and from your allies. If we had hesitated, there would have been no summit. But we were firm and carried the day.

Gromyko: We have given careful consideration to formulations you conveyed through our Ambassador for some preliminary stage in the process. And you reached the same conclusion that you repeated today. If we take into account the need to prepare public opinion for a treaty that both sides undertake not to use nuclear weapons, that was already achieved last May. [Reading from Soviet-American Principles:] “Therefore they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war.” Judging by the reaction in the world to this clause, it was highly assessed. I think, therefore, that, bearing in mind the documents signed in May, public opinion has already been prepared for bolder steps. The preliminary task is resolved. It is better to prepare for the next step, that is to sign a treaty. Lastly, we understood that you are suggesting not categorically two stages. If we understood you correctly, we should take the most concrete path.

Dr. Kissinger: The arguments you have advanced are very persuasive. There may be difficulties in either approach, formal or not. I would like to discuss this with the President. When you come to Washington on October 2, we will give you an answer on the direction to follow. It is possible to begin to work on a formal document, and then come back to a declaration, when we see what the final document looks like. I will speak to the President and give you an answer on October 2, but in a private meeting.

Brezhnev: I would ask that you report to the President the following consideration. The stage-by-stage approach is unacceptable because if an initial document is adopted time needs to pass, until there is a special occasion to explain why there is a need to take the next step. We will be adopting a vague document, and then passing to a more specific one. Under your system four years pass and President Nixon
leaves. That is why we need a more definite document. Additional work can be done to finalize it, to ensure that there is no diktat over others. If we reach an understanding on basic principles, then after your report, work can go on in the private channel.

The question is where and when the document is to be signed. I take it that you want to sign at the time of our visit. We have taken no decision on this. We are most appreciative of the invitation. But this is a general question not connected to the visit. President Nixon signed important documents and I must consider what is signed in Washington. The documents signed in Moscow were welcomed, despite some opposition in the Senate. It is important that appropriate conditions be created for the visit to Washington, but the most important is to work for peace.

Dr. Kissinger: To take the last point, we are looking forward to the visit. Without offending others in your leadership, the President expects to receive the General Secretary. The results must be at least of the same magnitude as when the President visited Moscow. We will sign agreements of great importance. We are prepared to begin work on the agenda. Something in this [the nuclear] field would be appropriate to your visit.

I am impressed by the force of your arguments, and I will speak to the President. If he decides to forego the intermediate stage, we can work on a more formal document. We will let you know through the channel, but it is my impression that we can proceed in the sense that the General Secretary outlined.

Brezhnev [interrupting translation]: Concerning the visit, after the President’s departure, we had an informal exchange, but no formal decision was reached. The opinion was voiced that it would be expedient for me to make the visit. We still have quite enough time to make a public announcement. Quite frankly, something on the Middle East and Vietnam would lead to a better atmosphere surrounding the visit, and would be more propitious for US-Soviet relations.

Dr. Kissinger: We can settle on a mutually agreed time, so that your visit will make a contribution. We can announce it, but not wait until just before your arrival.

Brezhnev: We can complete our discussion and agree with the view you expressed. You will report the logic of our arguments. We want to act on the basis of confidence and decency in our mutual interests and in the spirit of the aims discussed in Moscow. We can continue through the channel with the aim of reaching agreement.

Parallel with the practical preparations for the visit, we should be preparing and coordinating practical agreements to be signed at that time, as President’s visit to Moscow [was prepared]. As for courtesy, I
have no doubts. I prefer businesslike talks, jokes, discussion man-to-man and productive results rather than ceremonial aspects.

We have made progress in these discussions.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we have made a step forward. We will tell the Foreign Minister our answer, and I think we certainly can proceed as I have said. On our behalf we want to make your visit a significant event and an historic occasion. We will do for you no less than was done for the President, in very difficult circumstances for you. Washington is not characteristic of the United States. The President hopes that you will visit California and Florida. A visit to Florida is obligatory, since that is where the hydrofoil is. This will be an opportunity to visit the first Soviet installation in the United States! But I will not bother with details. We will do our utmost to make the visit not only politically, but humanly and symbolically successful. The President asked me to say this, and I took the liberty of interrupting our discussions.

Brezhnev [interrupting translation]: A Soviet naval installation in the USA! This is important in itself.

Please thank the President, I agree to practical preparations being started. I can say this now. In the course of those preparations we will define what specific documents will be agreed; since we have agreed on the start of preparations we have accomplished 50 percent of the job.

I don’t doubt the courtesy; the most important thing is the results.

Let me add one point: The President in his discussions expressed the thought that such visits might take place more frequently—not formal, but brief meetings. We might take a few days off, and see other places, but have businesslike talks and agreements, if not as momentous as ones of last May.

Dr. Kissinger: We agree with that.

Brezhnev: And we do not rule out requests to allow Dr. Kissinger to come here from time to time to take part in talks.

Dr. Kissinger: I am counting on it.

Brezhnev: I say this from past experience [of our talks].

Dobrynin: Then you can see the ballet.

Brezhnev: I thought of taking you into the country, in Zavidovo, where I have a place. We could have some shooting. Do you shoot?

Dr. Kissinger: Not much experience.

Brezhnev: Well, we can agree and continue through the channel.

[The meeting then ended.]
43. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, September 12, 1972, 9–10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Foreign Minister
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the USA
Georgi M. Kornienko, Chief of USA Division, Foreign Ministry
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
William G. Hyland, NSC Staff
Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff
John D. Negroponte, NSC Staff

Brezhnev: There is one question on which I would appreciate your advice. American businessmen come here and they want to meet with Premier Kosygin. If Kosygin or I receive them, they say that they can talk seriously about projects and purchasing of equipment. Now, say that some industrialists come here and we agree to receive them, what is the reaction of your government? They may not be on President Nixon’s side. They may be Democrats or Republicans, I don’t know.

The American press says that I am walled off from receiving Americans, but you are here and I am receiving all of you at one time. For instance, Mr. Hammer is here and has put in a request to see me.

Dr. Kissinger: As far as we are concerned, we do not insist that visits should be confined to Republican businessmen. We would understand if you received someone who had different views than the Administration. Your Foreign Office could advise you about the relative significance of various visitors. When you see them, you can assume that whatever you may say will become public. Second, you can assume that your visitor will turn the conversation to his business advantage. Third, you cannot assume that businessmen have an understanding of their own interests. When I lectured once at one of your institutes, I said that, while I did not propose to debate Leninism in Moscow, there was one aspect I wanted to challenge: the idea that American businessmen understood their own interests or how to pursue them. I can give you our opinion on where businessmen stand

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 74, Country Files—Europe—USSR, HAK Trip to Moscow, Sept. 1972, Memcons (Originals). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Council of Ministers Building inside the Kremlin. Brackets are in the original.
and what they can deliver. In any case, the American Government has no objection to your receiving businessmen.

[Brezhnev at this point told a story: There were two old friends who spent each evening together in a local pub. They would have a drink and sit there. One would sigh and say, “da, da” (yes, yes). Then the other evening a third man joined them. The first of the old friends sighed and said, “da, da,” and then the second did the same. The third man who had joined them, sighed and said, “da, da, da.” The next evening the two old friends were alone at their usual place, and the first said what did you think of our friend who joined us? And the second man said, I don’t care for him, he is too talkative.]

Brezhnev: On the European Security Conference, there is a certain measure of agreement reached: Interim consultations on the timing of multilateral consultations are to start on November 22 in Helsinki.2 We can register general agreement in Helsinki on an understanding that we will make every effort to achieve productive results, and then continue bilateral consultations.

So, if Dr. Kissinger has no objections we will register agreement on this basis and make every effort to insure that the Conference is held in the first half of 1973. And naturally we will continue contacts through our channel. Does Dr. Kissinger agree with this?

Dr. Kissinger: Not completely.

[Dobrynin and Gromyko begin explaining to Brezhnev that there is more involved and he should read the rest of his notes. Brezhnev understands and continues.]

Brezhnev: So, there is a second half. We agree that about three months after the start of the consultations (for CSCE) consultations could begin on procedural matters on reducing forces and armaments in Europe.3 We are prepared to enter into these consultations with a view to holding a conference after the completion of the European Security Conference. But there is no linkage between the timing, the venue and participants.

Dr. Kissinger: We can agree with this in principle. Let me be specific: We do not think it a good idea that these two consultations take place in the same place. We accept, and prefer, that they not be physi-

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2 See Document 34.

3 In an undated memorandum to Kissinger, sent just before Kissinger’s departure for Moscow, Sonnenfeldt wrote with regard to CSCE that “we have to decide, fairly soon, how to respond to the Finnish invitation for November 22, but we cannot accept the date until we have a firmer commitment to MBFR.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 73, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Moscow Trip, September 1972) The full text of the memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 110.
cally together. Indeed, to prevent the issues of MBFR from being introduced into CSCE, we want the procedural meeting on MBFR before the actual CSCE. We want a preparatory meeting on force reductions before CSCE, but three months may be a little long. It would be most expedient to have them at the end of January, 1973; for the preparatory talks on MBFR, the last week in January might be appropriate. The actual conference should be after the completion of CSCE if it starts at the end of June, the MBFR Conference could be about the end of September—somewhere in September–October. If these principles are agreeable we will then agree to the November 22 starting date for CSCE preparations. We can tell you later how to manage this bureaucratically.

Brezhnev: Let us agree.

Dr. Kissinger: I will need a proposal from your side while we are here, and an unsigned proposal to take up with our allies. After consultations we could then announce our agreement at the beginning of October.

Brezhnev: I agree, that it is all on this.

SALT

[Brezhnev asks Dr. Kissinger to begin; he is looking through his papers, obviously unable to find the right ones.]

Dr. Kissinger: There are two problems: one is substantive, one is procedural. The procedural one is when to start the next round of talks, and the substantive question is what to aim for. With respect to procedures we could begin around November 15 and the first round could be similar to SALT I; that is to discuss general principles and a work program. This could go until Christmas and then we could resume after the first of the year to get into the actual work.

Brezhnev: On this I feel you could tell President Nixon in principle I agree, and will give the details of our reply later. Because of my travels in the past weeks, I have had no exchanges [within the government] but I would be prepared to agree on mid-November.

As regards the substance, we will give our reaction through the channel. In principle we agree to taking up this line of work, but I have only glanced at your documents. We will delve into more details. For now, I guess we will repeat last year’s performance but this will help speed it up. If you have any more proposals to make, this would help.

Dr. Kissinger: If, prior to November, your Ambassador and I could have concrete exchanges it would be helpful, because our delegation is composed of people who want to win the Nobel prize, or to defeat “us” (gesturing to the American side of the table). They have complicated ideas that they tell to your delegations and then report to us that they are your ideas. So if we can first have an exchange in the channel, you
will know what we think and we may have something further in this channel. I do not exclude that we could achieve something by the time of your visit.

Brezhnev: I agree. I have never known contacts through the channel not to be conducive to progress. On other matters, however, I have to talk with my military people.

Dr. Kissinger: I have one general comment. One objective is how to make the Interim Agreement a permanent one. To do this we have to look at numerical ratios differently. We have studied this and have concluded there can be a permanent agreement by wider coverage than those weapons in the interim agreement. Beyond making a permanent agreement, we have the problem that so far we have only dealt with numbers. But as the General Secretary has said, numbers of weapons are no longer as important as quality. Qualitative changes can produce greater advances than numbers. Therefore, a beginning should be made on limiting qualitative forces that threaten the strategic force of the other side. We can decide whether this should be included in a permanent agreement or a provisional agreement. We can leave this open for discussion. But I wanted to open our thinking on this to the General Secretary.

[Meanwhile Brezhnev found the papers he was searching for, and showed them to Gromyko and said something to the effect: can we agree with this? Gromyko replied no, and added some remarks to Brezhnev.]

Brezhnev: To this should be added: since the general idea underlying the second round is to create the possibility that the appearance of new weapons should be narrowed not broadened, and to convert the interim agreement into a permanent one, we will have to deal with qualitative problems that affect the balance. And with air forces, we will have to deal with bases for nuclear aircraft. But this is just thinking out loud. Let the delegation decide and work through the channel.

Dr. Kissinger: We will leave it that we are aiming for opening on November 15th and before this we will be in touch in the channel on substance. We can announce in mid-October that we will begin in November.

Brezhnev: I agree.

We have been working most fruitfully today. We agreed to complete our talks by 10:00. I need to spend an hour on internal matters. We have some questions for tomorrow: Vietnam, the Middle East, German admission to the UN and others, but you wanted to go to Leningrad.

Dr. Kissinger: I am here for discussion with the General Secretary. We can defer Leningrad. We could also talk about the Far East tomorrow.
Brezhnev: Next time you might go to Pitsunda or Leningrad. You are going to Paris. Le Duc Tho was here, passing through but I did not see him. . . . So we can meet at 11:00 tomorrow.

[All rise to leave, and Brezhnev begins talking again, and finally sits down to relate the following story: His father was a metallurgist, and so was Brezhnev and his son, the whole family. One day during the fall of France in 1940, his father was reading the newspaper, and he turned to Brezhnev and asked him what was the highest mountain. Brezhnev guessed and said Mount Everest. His father then asked how high was the Eiffel Tower. Brezhnev did not know, but said 300 meters. His father said he had an idea. To build a tower like the Eiffel tower on top of Mount Everest and then hang the war mongers—Hitler and his gang—from the tower, and then give telescopes to people so everyone could see their fate. Then there would be no wars.

Brezhnev recalled his father’s words when the war criminals were hanged at Nuremberg. His father was a simple man, but that is how the people felt about war. The Russian people know war first hand. Perhaps if New York had been bombed or the United States touched by the war, the American people could understand better. In any case, as his father said, we must prevent wars. This is why he, Brezhnev, attached so much importance to his work with the United States. They must build for the future.

Dr. Kissinger replied that this was a very moving story, and that he could say for the President that if in the next four years we could secure the foundation of peace for 15 years, this would be an historic achievement. Brezhnev agreed that they should work for this even more than 15 years.

At the end, in small talk, Brezhnev said that the work had gone well today only after Negroponte joined the talks; he was a good man and should be at all the talks.]
44. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, September 13, 1972, 11:10 a.m.–3:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister
Anatoli Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
A. M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Soviet Notetaker
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff Member
Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff Member
John D. Negroponte, NSC Staff Member

SUBJECTS

Vietnam; Middle East; Germany; Far East

Dr. Kissinger: There’s a new building in Camp David. Dobrynin was there, and we will show you the cabins. There’s a new building and that’s where the President wants you to stay.

Mr. Brezhnev: Thank you for your courtesy. Even long before my visit, I am contemplating a letter to the President, through Dobrynin and not through you, because I will write that the visit depends on how Kissinger behaves and what I mean by that I will only tell President Nixon. Now you are worried.

Dr. Kissinger: I am glad that the discussion proceeds without threat or pressure and strictly on the basis of reason.

Mr. Brezhnev: And profound respect.

Dr. Kissinger: True.

Mr. Brezhnev: Sometimes our conversations have been acute but never with offense. I never bear malice towards anyone, but I like justice and I think it should be a basic principle—objectivity and straightforwardness. If anyone lets me down once, he loses my confidence. I feel that is the correct line to be taken.

Dr. Kissinger: There are inevitable disagreements. As long as we retain confidence and move in the spirit which the General Secretary has so movingly described yesterday, then we can work together and handle difficulties.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 74, Country Files—Europe—USSR, HAK Trip to Moscow, Sept. 1972, Memcons (Originals). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Kremlin. All brackets except those indicating corrections are in the original.
Mr. Brezhnev: Of course, there can be debate and discussion but so long as we stay to the principles of our first meeting, then we can move ahead. If we backslide, then we are in trouble. Now, indeed, the whole world knows the history of the relations between our two countries, particularly since World War II. Today the world witnesses a new stage and looks to us to see if we are serious or merely engaged in tactical maneuvers on the part of our two countries. If the whole world’s people are let down over the hopes generated, then this will undermine the confidence in the President and ourselves. And that is precisely why I am so determined to go forward towards the solution of the important problems we have before us. If we take bold steps towards realizing those sound ideas on which we base our discussions, people will understand and take to heart. But if we do it gradually, then their ardor will cool off towards these new and momentous developments. Even though our two social systems are different, it does not preclude going ahead on the basis agreed at our first meeting.

This is the spirit of our meeting and I wish to reaffirm that on this basis we are prepared to go ahead. I hope you will convey this spirit to the President. (Brezhnev makes an aside in Russian to Gromyko and then says:) I have my contradictions with Gromyko.

Mr. Gromyko: Within this government.

Mr. Brezhnev: Because I said what he said yesterday. He said I took his bread. So I offer him a bun, and he says it is not enough. He wants some butter.

Dr. Kissinger: Our experience with Gromyko is also the same. You offer him one thing and he always asks for something additional and then says it is a Soviet concession that he accepts it.

Mr. Brezhnev: We keep criticizing him for his willingness to make concessions. He has good qualities; he gets things done. As a result of his long years in the Foreign Ministry he gets too soft in his dealings with the United States. Sometimes a willingness to make concessions gets to be a way of his doing things. I’m giving him one more year or so and then deal with him.

Dr. Kissinger: I want to say on behalf of the President—I had a long talk with him before I came here—that the sentiments expressed by the General Secretary yesterday and this morning reflect exactly our policy. The most important achievement of our Administration will be if we can reverse the pattern of hostility and move to a cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union and both make ourselves responsible to further the peace of the world. We agree that if big steps can be taken—and there has already been much progress—after the General Secretary’s visit to the United States the process will become irreversible, and it cannot be disturbed by anybody in our country or outside forces, and this will be our policy during the next four-and-a-half years.
Mr. Brezhnev: I too feel that the shortest road to achieve the goals that we have set for ourselves would be to formalize all we discussed the day before yesterday, yesterday, and today. Of course, our earlier talks have been useful but, if we could formalize them, it would be a useful step. Then the forthcoming visits, not just one but several, will create the atmosphere we wish and seek in our relations.

Dr. Kissinger: As the General Secretary said yesterday, we have never failed to come to agreement in these talks, and we won’t interrupt this record now. As for repeated visits, and I say there’s an element of selfishness in this, the President feels that the sooner the General Secretary comes to the United States, the sooner the President can return to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Brezhnev: That is indeed so.

Now I think we have certainly dealt with sufficient bilateral questions in the past two days, but we must be both alive to the fact that we conduct bilateral relations not in the stratosphere but in a world where quite a few states are looking at us and assessing our actions and assessing the general world situation. We must realize that all we do is against a background of events in Europe, the Middle East, and Vietnam. We cannot abstract ourselves from all of these events. Otherwise we would be misunderstood by the world at large.

Therefore, I want to say a few words about the Middle East and Vietnam. I don’t want to repeat the acute but nevertheless just assessments that we said to President Nixon on Vietnam and the Middle East, even though it was perhaps unpleasant to say what we did.

But in concise form I do want to point out it is our earnest view that it serves the best interest of the United States and the U.S. Government and President Nixon, particularly in light of the forthcoming election, if Vietnam could be resolved as soon as possible because it has been going on far too long. Obviously it is one of the most unworthy, unpleasant, dark spots on the United States record. In all the years it has gone on it has yielded the United States nothing. Nor can it yield the U.S. anything as it goes on. I am sure you are aware of that fact. It is also necessary to point out to the President that, though he said at the election four years ago that he would negotiate an end to the Vietnam war during his first term, he is approaching the election with the war still on his hands and this circumstance is being exploited by his domestic opponent in the U.S. I don’t want to interfere in U.S. internal affairs but it is a fact that the United States public is not indifferent to how things go in Vietnam. You are quite familiar with our position on Vietnam and there have been no changes. I recall our conversation with President Nixon.

President Nixon observed that Dr. Kissinger should do more thinking on Vietnam and that you should come up with something. We
saw this not as a jocular statement but a serious one. I know you are meeting with them soon and have met with them in the past. If you can inform us on the progress of the talks, I would be grateful and I can give you some of our thinking on the eve of your visit to Paris to meet with the North Vietnamese. It is a fact that the war in Vietnam and the actions there of the United States and the plan which the United States obviously has adopted, which is to settle the problem militarily, even though we have said 100 times that this is completely impossible, all this sometimes sadly complicates the relations between us and impedes the solution of certain issues for both of us. I do not reveal any secret if I say that.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I am grateful for this opportunity to talk to you about Vietnam. We recognize you conduct your policy on a principled basis and therefore you are opposed to our course in Vietnam. Yet the Vietnam problem concerns us both, because not only are we both directly affected, but it also forces us to take steps regarding other countries which we otherwise would not take. It is not only a United States problem, but also a problem which concerns the whole world. I am prepared to talk with great frankness and in some detail, but I just wonder how much detail the General Secretary would like to hear.

Mr. Brezhnev: Just as you see fit. The important thing is not the history but the way you contemplate ending the war as President Nixon avowed that he was going to close this shameful chapter in your history.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me give you an explanation of where I think we stand concretely and then, if the General Secretary has any questions, he can raise them.

There are a number of things to keep in mind. First, the United States domestic situation. The General Secretary pointed out that the Vietnam situation affects our domestic situation adversely. As it turns out, it has proven to be a liability for our opponents. That is to say that the margin of support for the President is two to one. In May it was 44 percent to 41 percent, today it is 60–30. If one asks specific questions, the margin is even greater. For example, 58 percent to 18 percent disapprove of McGovern’s statement about the bombing, and 51 percent to 26 percent disapprove his criticism regarding my travels on negotiations, and 76 percent to 21 percent believe President Nixon is doing everything possible to end the war. This is an example of our domestic situation. It does not affect our judgment. We were not affected when the polls were unfavorable, and we will not be affected now that they are favorable. We are not under pressure to end the war. The reason why we want an early end to the war is that it has become a senseless war
with the sacrifices out of proportion to what is being achieved. Therefore we are serious about ending the war.

Now let us go into the negotiations, and I will tell you exactly where we stand. First, I will discuss the basic problem. I have thought a great deal about why these negotiations have failed, why precisely this negotiation has failed, which we are most eager to conclude, while others with other countries have succeeded and many of them on more difficult issues.

When we talk to the General Secretary for example and with Soviet leaders, they are very tough, they defend their interests with great passion, but it is possible to set objectives and work towards them in stages. These objectives are allowed to animate the discussions themselves. By contrast, when we talk to the North Vietnamese, they behave as if we are settling a traffic accident in a police court. I understand the political issues are paramount to them, but they constantly try to close loopholes and they miss the strategic opportunity. I can’t understand why as Marxists they cannot leave anything to the historical process. On May 31, 1971 we proposed a withdrawal within 9 months of a ceasefire and exchange of prisoners, and that nine month period was negotiable.² It could have been six months. Instead we had a long philosophical discussion about the connection between political and military matters on which we wasted four months and they never seriously talked to us. I give this only as an example, and then I will go into the current negotiations.

Now let me discuss the current situation. The General Secretary said we want a military victory. This is not true. We want a negotiated settlement. The one thing we cannot accept is a proposition whereby we do the political work for the other side. Hanoi wants us to end the war, not by withdrawing our forces, which we are prepared to do, or by ending our military operations, which we are prepared to do, but by overthrowing the existing structure for another structure. Now they have a slightly different formulation, but I can show you how their political proposal would have the objective consequence of immediately imposing their preferred form of government on South Vietnam. We want to separate the military outcome from the political outcome, and we want to withdraw and start a political process whereby the Vietnamese can express themselves. We want the outcome to reflect Vietnamese conditions and not a United States imposition. If the DRV had any confidence in its own political strength, then it would not reject our position. No self-respecting country can accept what they are proposing. I will explain in detail how this comes about.

Now in addition, and I’m being very honest with you, they do many things which are extremely infuriating to us without doing them any good. They are releasing three prisoners of war to a peace group. If they had released them to us, it would have created a moral obligation on our part to reciprocate. Instead they are releasing them to a group with no significance in the United States. They are releasing them to this group which is a disadvantage to them because everyone knows they are doing this to exploit the situation for propaganda purposes.

The release will be, we think, on a Soviet plane, which is a disadvantage to our relations. If they release them to us, I can assure you we would have had to reciprocate.

Mr. Dobrynin: It is just a regular Soviet flight.

Dr. Kissinger: I know, but people won’t realize that. If they had put them on an ICC plane to Vientiane, this would be a positive transaction.

For months they said we haven’t responded to their seven points. On August 1 we responded point by point. We accepted six of them and we advanced a compromise formulation on the other. They didn’t react at all. They in turn put forth ten points and seven principles.

On August 14 we accepted the seven principles and suggested they be signed as a document between us. They refuse to sign the principles we accepted and they had advanced as their own proposals. Then they say there is no progress. Now I understand their strategy is to pretend that there is a stalemate so that there is public pressure on us, and at the same time to have real progress in the negotiations. They have made it really difficult. Negotiating with the North Vietnamese is very difficult. I just wanted to explain this and then I propose to tell you about the negotiations, where do we stand and what we propose to do.

I want to make clear that on July 19 we proposed exactly what the President told the General Secretary we would propose, namely, a ceasefire and a resignation by President Thieu two months before the election, and they haven’t even answered that. Now there is the following contradiction in their position: on the one hand they say we should withdraw and on the other hand they say we cannot withdraw until we have done their political work for them. On the one hand, they say we want a military victory, on the other hand they reject a ceasefire. They have rejected a total ceasefire; they have rejected an unconditional ceasefire; they have rejected a temporary ceasefire; they have rejected a

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3 See ibid., Document 226.
5 See ibid., Documents 237 and 246.
6 See ibid., Document 207.
reduction of hostilities. We are realists. We know that if we stopped
certain activities, it would be hard to resume them.

Thirdly, they accuse us of not recognizing the PRG. Let us be real-
ists. If a ceasefire took place, there would be de facto recognition of the
PRG. It would establish clear areas of control, one for the PRG, and the
other for Saigon. The most effective way to gain recognition of the po-
litical forces would be to do what the General Secretary suggested in
May, namely, a ceasefire. If I may say so, if the North Vietnamese had
accepted your idea and our proposal of a ceasefire which we made,
they would be in an incomparably better position today than under ex-
isting circumstances.

Now where do we stand? I will tell you what we are going to tell
them Friday in Paris, except for one point.7 We will propose a with-
drawal of all our forces within three months of a settlement, that after a
settlement Vietnam be neutral, a ceasefire and that after a settlement
we are willing to accept a limit on military and economic aid in some
relation to the military aid they accept. But we are also prepared to
have a private undertaking with them afterwards about the extent of
our aid. And we will table sweeping political proposals. We cannot do
what they ask, which is to install their government. I will tell you
frankly, we have spent a month of enormous controversy with Saigon
about what to table on Friday, and it would be a mistake for the DRV to
say that it is nothing, because neither public opinion nor President Nix-
on will have any further patience for negotiations. I will give Ambassa-
dor Dobrynin the full text Monday of my opening statement, but I feel
morally obliged to table the proposal with the DRV first. You'll be able
to judge for yourself. We have gone to the absolute maximum and ac-
cepted many of their principles.

Now what is the real issue? The real issue isn’t the paper that will
be signed. They want guarantees, but what are the facts? Dulles8 didn’t
go into Asia because of how the Geneva Accords9 were drafted. He
went in because of the objective tendencies of our policy and because
he drew lines against his concern over the Communist world. The
United States is not looking for an excuse to go into Indochina; we are
looking for an excuse to get out. It is absurd to believe that if we can
coexist with Moscow, that we cannot coexist with Hanoi. If we can
work out agreements with the General Secretary of the world’s largest
Communist party and one of the most powerful countries in the world,

7 September 15; See ibid., Documents 262 and 263.
8 John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State, 1953–1959.
9 The Geneva Accords were a collection of agreements rather than a single docu-
ment. For these agreements, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume XVI, The Geneva
Conference, pp. 1505–1539.
why can’t we deal with an insignificant little country in Southeast Asia that represents no threat to the U.S.? If we can get a settlement, even if every clause is not precisely worked out, then that will start a real political process and change the situation. If not, the war will continue, and perhaps intensify and at this point continued military operations are to their disadvantage.

If an agreement is reached soon, we are prepared to implement it faithfully. We are also prepared, if you want, to give you assurances which they insist we give to them. So we would risk not only our relations with them but also with you.

These are the basic issues and I can give you the details. I am sorry I have talked so long.

Mr. Brezhnev: When you say withdrawal three months after a settlement, what do you mean?

Dr. Kissinger: A signed agreement. All forces would be withdrawn, including air forces. I shall give your Ambassador on Monday the text of my statement and the text of my proposal, so you can judge personally whether we have acted in good faith and openly as we have done once before.

Mr. Brezhnev: That is all, Dr. Kissinger?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but I am prepared to answer any question on the details.

Mr. Brezhnev: I can ask, have asked, and should ask quite a few questions to which it is difficult to find answers. You made a statement justifying the United States position, yet the war is going on with people being killed along with United States soldiers. That in itself shows that there can’t be any justification for what is going on.

I would not like to delve into the substance of the various proposals or the responsibility on the Vietnamese side. Obviously both sides have certain deficiencies in their proposal. That is not the overriding consideration. The main thing is to solve the problem of ending the war, and this we feel the United States is in a position to do, and we can’t understand why the United States does not want to. What interest is the United States protecting by its military actions? Does the U.S. understand that war is abhorrent to the entire world? What goals does the United States have?

Those are the basic issues. Otherwise, it’s a long, weary process and you ask me questions and I ask you questions and we make a legal analysis of the negotiations in Paris. That’s not the issue. It is on the United States and not Vietnam that ending of the war depends. It does not depend on long speeches and various formulas.

What the Vietnamese demand foremost is the withdrawal of United States forces and the United States must reply. It is not a ques-
tion of how many months. I think the Vietnamese would readily agree if you said by October 15th you would completely withdraw. At the same time, of course, there would be a ceasefire. That’s how the Vietnamese themselves pose the problem. Then, of course, a coalition government is to be established. If the United States were to accept these three principles, then there would be no more bloodshed in Vietnam and no more bombing.

You say the Vietnamese refuse to make concessions. They say you refuse. The crux is that you should withdraw and there should be a ceasefire and a coalition government, a coalition government in which the North Vietnamese would have no part. That is the quickest way to end the war.

The Vietnamese may have certain shortcomings in the way they negotiate, but a country like the United States could perhaps help the Vietnamese in negotiations.

There is no risk for the United States to lose face. Rather it is the contrary. There are no complexities for the United States. It is hardly right to justify the war by the fact that a greater percentage of United States population supports the policy in Vietnam. A few more months may pass and all that may change as it has in the past. It is not a basis for policy.

I do not wish to indulge in sharply worded statements. Our position remains unchanged and it is our earnest desire to see the U.S. Government and President take steps to really put an end to the war. It should also be clearly understood that Vietnam affects our own relations and cannot fail to have a certain influence upon them.

I see three basic elements in order to reach a settlement. First, your complete withdrawal of forces; second, a ceasefire; third, the creation of a coalition government naturally involving the resignation of Thieu and some agreed period for release of prisoners of war.

There is another consideration. Even if you withdraw your forces from Vietnam, it is still a fact that an enormous number of troops and naval ships are stationed in countries neighboring Vietnam. That, too, has a bearing on the situation in Vietnam. What I want to do is to wish you success in the talks in Paris. I would hope our wishes could be taken into account. These are the same wishes I expressed in May at a meeting when Dr. Kissinger said measures would be taken to end the war, and these have not yet happened. As for information about the talks, we would appreciate whatever you provide through Ambassador Dobrynin.

Dr. Kissinger: I appreciate the farsighted way in which the General Secretary has posed the issue. Let me say without prolonged discussion, I would like to comment on the three principles the General Secretary has mentioned. We agree to withdrawal. We agree to ceasefire.
These are not in dispute. If you have information to the contrary, it is not correct. There is no dispute about this.

Regarding a coalition government, it is not quite correct to say that North Vietnam does not want to participate. At the last meeting they said the entire North Vietnamese army is under South Vietnamese command and must remain in South Vietnam after a settlement. And that can hardly be considered new [non] participation in the political life of the country. The specific proposal on Friday which we will make to the other side will enable members of the NLF to participate in the Government of South Vietnam in a particular formula. I will transmit it to the General Secretary and he can judge our proposals.

I appreciate the General Secretary’s remarks and they will be transmitted precisely to the President and will be taken extremely seriously.

One other point I want to tell the General Secretary personally—we can’t make it part of the negotiations—that after a settlement there will be a substantial reduction of our naval forces and a gradual reduction of the forces stationed in neighboring countries. I can give this as a personal promise of President Nixon, though for obvious reasons we cannot make the deployment of forces outside of Vietnam part of a settlement with the DRV. But I can give this as an absolute assurance of the President which we will honor.

Mr. Brezhnev: The Vietnamese also say that they are not empowered to decide things affecting neighboring countries because after all, the Geneva Accords related to Vietnam and not to other countries.

Dr. Kissinger: Then it would help if they got their troops out of there. [The other countries of Indochina]. I can also tell the General Secretary that, if he wishes we would not object to his telling the DRV about our assurances regarding deployments of our forces outside Indochina. It is up to him but he is authorized to tell them as far as we are concerned. We haven’t told them [interpreter asks question]. I think they are talking about Thailand.

Mr. Brezhnev: It is my own personal impression that at the forthcoming meeting the Vietnamese intend to reach either final agreement about ending the war and a subsequent political set-up or once again, they will reaffirm their will to resist more resolutely and to fight more staunchly. If you consider it useful to take this into account, I would be pleased. It is not for us to get involved in the negotiations. It is for you and for you [them?] to draw the consequences. My impression is that they take into account both your electoral situation and possible post-election developments, and our talks here.

Dr. Kissinger: I can assure you that I will go with an attitude of making a maximum effort to settle the war at the next meeting or shortly afterwards. If that is their attitude, they will find us meeting them in a very forthcoming spirit.
Mr. Brezhnev: Let us end on that.
Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Mr. Brezhnev: Well, do you think we should now take up the question of the Middle East because that is a subject which leaves an imprint on our relations and sometimes complicates them. This was also an issue we discussed at our last meeting. There is nothing new in the channel lately and if you have anything new to say, I would be happy to have your opinions because the situation there remains very acute and is becoming more and more tense.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Secretary-General, of course, there are a number of developments in the Middle East since we met, and not all of them have been favorable; in fact, none have been favorable to a settlement. I agree with you, the situation is not improving. I also must say on behalf of the President that some of the charges made by the Egyptian leaders against you reflect the serious and responsible role you have played in the Middle East and the careful way you have carried out your discussions with us. It has been carefully noted and appreciated by President Nixon and puts on us a certain responsibility to deal towards you in the same spirit.

Mr. Brezhnev: That is a logically correct analysis. It is a logical and absolutely correct analysis by the United States.

Dr. Kissinger: That does not mean that the people we are dealing with are always logical. [Brezhnev makes off-record remark.] Regarding our general attitude towards the Middle East, we have established and communicated to you the principle that this area is a good test of our relations and that it will always be an area of the world where one side or another has an opportunity to make tactical gains.

For the sake of the principles you described and the fact that with two great countries neither should be put at a permanent disadvantage, we have adopted the policy that we will take no major initiative in this area except in full consultation and discussion with you. Now we have, as I told your Ambassador, restrained some of the more impatient members of our government from making immediate moves in the Middle East. We are confronted constantly with overtures through various channels to the point that we cannot tell who speaks for whom or whether some of these people are just speaking for their own fevered imaginations. In any event, before we act on any information we receive we will discuss it with you and do it in concert with you in a spirit consistent with the principles we have established. We are not now in receipt of any information. But in any event, we will not act on the sly, which was one comment you made.

Mr. Brezhnev: What then are we to do nonetheless?

Mr. Kissinger: First . . . I don’t know what your information is from the Middle East, how you receive it. We receive such floods of informa-
tion which are contradictory. We should check with each other to see whether there’s any basis for the information received. We’ll inform you and you decide whether to inform us and decide what to do. Second, we are prepared to continue to elaborate the principles which the Foreign Minister and I worked out. I have developed, as I mentioned to you, Ambassador, some ideas about the nature of security zones which he asked for.\(^{10}\) Perhaps we could submit them to the Foreign Minister when he comes to Washington on October 2, in some detail plus discuss other principles that we develop here.

Mr. Brezhnev: There’s such a flood of information, you never get to the bottom of knowing who’s to blame for what.

Dr. Kissinger: And who represents whom. I read in the papers something saying I was supposed to meet Heykal in Munich.\(^{11}\) It was not true, but over the years at least five people have tried to set up a meeting with Heykal, and I don’t know if they even represent him. I don’t even know who Heykal is. Of course, I know his title, but I don’t know what he stands for.

Mr. Brezhnev: You didn’t meet him in the elevator?

Dr. Kissinger: That was our cover, and now you know.

Mr. Brezhnev: I agree. I would just then ask you in all seriousness to think over possible ways to act in this problem. We stated our position very well at the last meeting and have not changed. We should not freeze ourselves in the present position. Indeed Foreign Minister Gromyko is coming to your country soon and we expect then you will give us some formulations, ideas on what to do.

Dr. Kissinger: We believe after the election we will be much freer to act than we are now. [Pointing to some photographs of the meeting just handed to Brezhnev by an aide.] If these are pictures, can you sign them?

Mr. Brezhnev: Not before the end of the Vietnam war. You will get nothing from me until the end of the Vietnam war, not even photographs. I will sell them to the *Times*. [There is further banter about selling the pictures.] So you agree to discuss with Gromyko some new formulations? Of course I will sign them. [Brezhnev autographs photos.]

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, along the lines we told your Ambassador in Washington about security zones.

Mr. Brezhnev: Just to return to one of the points, not for any discussion, I just want to observe the war in Vietnam places us in a very

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\(^{10}\) See Document 34.

\(^{11}\) See footnote 13, Document 30.
difficult situation. At certain phases it reduces our ability to make still more serious improvement in Soviet-American relations. I hope you’ll take this into account.

Dr. Kissinger: We recognize this problem for the General Secretary, and we believe he has handled it with the greatest statesmanship up until now. We can assure you we will do everything possible to remove this particular obstacle in our relationship. [Brezhnev hands over three photos.]

Mr. Brezhnev: What else. Perhaps German affairs.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, the General Secretary mentioned German affairs yesterday, and then perhaps I can make some comments regarding the Far East.

Mr. Brezhnev: We have all along sought to promote a settlement between the two German states to the best of our ability. You and we helped Brandt on the ratification but that is past. There are still further outstanding issues. One of the most important is the admission of the two Germanies to the UN, then negotiations between the two Germanies. That is their own business, but we have an interest. My latest information is that there has been some progress. There is also the question of quadrilateral rights of the allies arising from the post-war agreement. This arises because of the UN issue. We have drafted a formula here relating to the rights of the four powers. [Brezhnev reads a text which he then hands to Dr. Kissinger. Text at Tab A.]

“The Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States and France note the existence of the necessary prerequisites for the admission of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations and state in this connection that the admission of the GDR and the FRG to the UN does not affect the question of the rights and responsibility of the four powers under the wartime and post-war agreements and decisions."

When do you think we can practically expect a settlement of the question of the admission of two Germanies to the United Nations?

Dr. Kissinger: I talked to Bahr and Brandt in Munich. As you know, in principle we are not opposed to the admission of two German states. We believe that if a satisfactory formula can be found for the four power responsibilities, and I frankly want to examine this, then I pro-

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12 A reference to the West German Bundestag’s ratification on May 19 of the Moscow Treaty with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty with Poland. The texts of the agreements are in Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1103–1105 and 1125–1127.
13 Attached but not printed.
14 See footnote 3, Document 38.
pose the following process. My understanding from Bahr is that he expects to conclude the agreement with the GDR by November 1.\(^{15}\)

We’ll certainly encourage this from our side and if you could encourage your German allies it would be helpful. After the agreement is signed, we are prepared at this UN session, to support observer status for both Germanies at the UN and, after it is ratified, we are prepared to support membership.

It looks all right to me, but there are always details. But I am sure we can settle it.

Mr. Brezhnev: We are encouraging our allies.

Dr. Kissinger: I have that impression. We can be in touch.

Mr. Gromyko: We do, however, still have some serious disagreements. To a great extent it will depend on the attitude of the West Germans.

Dr. Kissinger: You are, of course, informed of the latest meeting.

Mr. Brezhnev: You mean the one of two days ago?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I had the impression from Bahr that he was optimistic that it could be settled by November 1 and I strongly urged him in this direction. Speaking confidentially, I urged him that those issues related to Berlin that he simply say that they should be handled in accord with the Berlin Agreement so we do not have to get into new legal arguments. But this is between us. This was my advice to him.

Mr. Alexandrov: In order not to go through this once more.

Dr. Kissinger: In order not to negotiate again.

Mr. Brezhnev: That is the right thing to do.

Mr. Dobrynin: Otherwise it’s a waste of time.

Dr. Kissinger: But what I told Bahr, my remarks to Bahr, should be treated especially confidentially and not repeated to him. It’s my idea.

Mr. Brezhnev: Don’t worry.

Dr. Kissinger: I was also urged by opposition leaders\(^ {16}\) to use my influence in the opposite direction.

Mr. Gromyko: Are you going to do it?

Dr. Kissinger: No, I am going to do it in the direction I indicated to you. We will use our influence to settle by November 1 and then support observer status afterwards, before ratification.

\(^{15}\) The FRG and the GDR were negotiating a treaty on relations between the two states.

\(^{16}\) Reference to the Social Democratic opposition parties in the Bundestag, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU).
Mr. Gromyko: Although in all fairness we should say that the GDR is already entitled to ask for observer status. We must be clear on this issue. The Federal Republic already has observer status.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand your point but it is a complex issue which will create enormous debate, and we are only talking really only about a period of six weeks.

Mr. Brezhnev: But perhaps that step—observer status—now could have some positive role for subsequent events. I ask you to put that to President Nixon in my name.

Dr. Kissinger: If it were done now, before the signing of the general treaty, there would be an enormous crisis in Germany. Moreover, Brandt doesn’t want it. It would complicate our relations with him. It would reduce our influence in the treaty negotiations. I will, of course, mention everything you say to the President, and your views are always taken seriously. But, I believe it is more practical not to mention observer status now and raise it immediately after signature and then I can assure you it will go through quickly.

Mr. Brezhnev: I just want President Nixon to hear this in my name as I said it.

Dr. Kissinger: I will convey what you said to the President.

Mr. Brezhnev: I would see this as an important step in our relations.

Dr. Kissinger: I will raise it with him.

Mr. Brezhnev: We will have to come to it sometime.

Dr. Kissinger: I will raise it, but I think it will be settled anyway before the end of the General Assembly. But I will mention it to the President.

Mr. Gromyko: It also would certainly produce a very favorable impression in the GDR. We cannot conduct negotiations only on the strings of tension. This would be a great positive effect.

Mr. Brezhnev: I am sure this would prompt the GDR to take a more amenable stand and to make more concessions. It would show that an objective approach was being taken to the whole situation.

Dr. Kissinger: I will report fully to the President. I will discuss the matter and I will let your Ambassador know our reaction, that is if we ever see him again in Washington.

Mr. Brezhnev: That depends on how you act to prepare all these questions for agreement. If not, I will send him to the Crimea and keep him there.

Dr. Kissinger: He will be badly missed. I do not know if you saw the photograph of him in Hollywood, the one in which he was holding a rock over my head in his usual negotiating method.
Mr. Brezhnev: I have no knowledge of this so far.

Dr. Kissinger: It was his usual method—a big rock over my head.

Mr. Gromyko: There is a famous sculpture in clay by the Soviet sculptor Chadre which shows a Soviet worker bending to pick up a rock and the title is “Weapon of the Proletariat.”

Mr. Brezhnev: Did Brandt ask you to convey anything to us?

Dr. Kissinger: There was no special request but he did confirm his desire to come to an agreement by November 1. But his basic attitude towards relations with the East, as you know, is extremely positive.

Mr. Brezhnev: What is his assessment of his prospects for the elections?

Dr. Kissinger: All leaders to whom I spoke were confident they would win the elections. My assessment is that if he completes the treaty before November 1 and there is no crisis which we don’t expect, then I think his chances are reasonably good. Whatever the result, it will be very close, and therefore, the management of the government will be very difficult no matter who wins the election. He has been hurt by the events at the Olympics, not in a negative sense of losing votes, but because he thought the good sentiment created by the Olympics and himself being photographed there and so forth would add to his votes. He has lost that possibility. The Olympics hurt him, Schiller’s resignation hurt, and the scandal of the two secretaries paid by the German magazine hurt him. It will be a very close election. If the Christian Democrats win, it should be by a narrow margin and the possibilities of radical changes in policy will be very limited. We will use our influence in the direction of the continuation of the present course. We, in any event, will not attempt to influence the outcome of the elections. We will do nothing to encourage Brandt’s opponents and we are thinking of doing a few things that will show our close association with the policies of Brandt.

Mr. Brezhnev: That is extremely important indeed, because I think given the desire President Nixon can do a great deal to help Brandt.

Dr. Kissinger: Everything here is confidential. These are very sensitive comments when we talk about the domestic situation of other countries, but the General Secretary has correctly understood our attitude, and indeed we have asked Brandt to suggest some symbolic steps which we could take to help him.

Mr. Brezhnev: In all confidence, too, I had occasion to observe over the past two years the policies and actions of Brandt. He is a wise politician and it is wise to go on dealing with him. He is better than the

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17 West German Economic Affairs Minister Karl Schiller, who resigned in July.
others. Because Brandt should, of course, be regarded as a politician whose general line is leading towards the general reduction of tensions in Europe. Both you and we are interested in seeing that happen. That should be the principal criterion, especially since the alternative is someone else in office who will want to return to the past situation. We shall pay attention to Brandt and if you and we are of like opinion, we should find a way of helping Brandt.

Dr. Kissinger: There’s no need to discuss this now because the elections are two months away. We’ll pursue the course discussed with the General Secretary. If for some reason the opponents should win, we will use our influence with them not to change policy, but if that happens we will be in touch before then anyway. There is no need to discuss this now, and I don’t expect this.

Mr. Brezhnev: You wanted to discuss the Far East.

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to make a few remarks to the Secretary General about the Far East and how we see the evolution, in the nature of explaining our thinking rather than a specific policy discussion.

I always read in the newspapers, and in other articles, that we are playing a balance of power game between Peking and Moscow and that we are using it to affect Soviet policies. I wanted to use this opportunity to tell the Secretary General that we are not pursuing so naive and shortsighted a course. There is little relationship in the power between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, and we recognize that for the immediate future, while China may be a powerful country in the distant future, at this particular moment the peace of the world depends to a very large extent on the ability to negotiate our relationships. And therefore, any attempt to use the People’s Republic of China against the Soviet Union, even if we could do so, would be foolish and is therefore not our policy.

Whenever we are in Peking we avoid any discussion of issues that affect the Soviet Union. For example, we avoid discussing the border issue on the grounds that we are not ever going to become involved and therefore any information with respect to it is not operationally in any sense useful to us. And on other topics concerning your bilateral relations we don’t believe we have a right to express an opinion. You never ask us to discuss China policy with you. You can be certain that we pursue the same course in Peking.

In the immediate future there is no equivalence in power between the People’s Republic and the Soviet Union. If one looks at the longer term, the situation could arise where efforts might be made for a policy directed at both of us and an attempt to separate each of us from other countries.
This is particularly a problem in relation to Japan. In recent discussions with the Japanese Foreign Minister\(^{18}\) we gained the impression—again this is very personal—that there are some tendencies in Japanese politics that believe that we should base our China policy on Taipei and that Japan should base its China policy on Peking. We would take care of the defense of Taiwan, and they would take care of the relations with mainland China and form a sort of détente. And they would kindly offer in that situation to act as a broker.

If such a shortsighted policy were being pursued then perhaps we might see the large industrial capacity of the one together with the more subtle views of the other, which would be a formidable combination. And this development could even have an orientation based on racial grounds rather than political grounds. If that were to occur, we believe a serious situation could arise for both of us.

We believe that it is in both of our interests that Japan’s relations in the Far East not be tied exclusively to one country, but also to others such as the Soviet Union. This is why investment in resources has a certain political significance and not only an economic significance.

So we will, of course, continue our relations with the People’s Republic and have periodic exchanges and periodic visits there—less frequent than in the past year—and periodic exchange of views. We are in no sense synchronizing our policies and in no case will we conduct our policy in a manner that could be directed, or indirectly considered to be directed, against the Soviet Union.

We are prepared to exchange views with you on the long-range tendencies that might affect the peace of the world and the security of our two countries.

Mr. Brezhnev: Well, we must, of course, sober-mindedly assess the situation here, and it is a fact that developments in the world situation, and first and foremost in our relationships, are influenced by the Chinese question. We sometimes mention China directly; more often we keep it in mind mentally. We have certainly duly assessed the statement made by the President and other Americans’ statements regarding the priority of US-Soviet relations in American foreign policy, and that is indeed our impression. At the same time it has to be said that China is certainly not enthusiastic over the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

[Dr. Kissinger interjected that “that was putting it mildly”—this was not translated.]

They do not like our taking the line of our developing our relations to mutual advantage in friendship and cooperation. If one assesses the

\(^{18}\) Ohira Masayoshi.
present policies of the Chinese, they are primarily aimed against the positive processes now underway in Soviet-American relations. From all that is published in the press and from the information provided by our ambassadors, Peking has taken a negative attitude to the recent Soviet-American summit meeting in Moscow. According to Peking’s comments, our relationships are nothing but collusion between two superpowers, and this line can be seen not only in the direct assessment of our direct relations but also concerning the European Conference, German affairs, the Middle East, etc. In short, any bilateral contract is interpreted by them to be collusion.

Dr. Kissinger: The Secretary General may want to know . . . [not translated].

Mr. Brezhnev: If I might just continue.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it’s better.

Mr. Brezhnev: The entire trend of Chinese policies is directed toward ranging the United States against the Soviet Union and is aimed at our becoming involved in confrontation with one another. I recall a slogan uttered by Mao here in Moscow the last time he was here for an international conference. [Quoting the Chinese saying] “I sit on the mountain and watch two tigers fighting.”

That is the precise policy the Chinese are pursuing. They are claiming to play a dominant role in world politics. But there are various slogans the Chinese use to justify their position, such as their slogan about the world village against the world city.

Dr. Kissinger: That was Lin Piao.

Mr. Brezhnev: All this reaffirms that same trend. On the other hand, we have not been, nor are we now, for isolation of China in the world. The position taken by the Supreme Party organ, the Party Congress, is that we favor normal Soviet relations with China. Nor are we against the development of relations between the U.S. and China. Of course, we are not indifferent to the basis on which these relations develop.

I am happy to accept the statement that you made, Dr. Kissinger, on this score against the background of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the one hand and the United States and China on the other hand. All sorts of guesswork is involved in various quarters. Some people talk about various triangles and quadrangles and various other geometric figures. Some people endeavor to act on the sly concerning these problems. It is a certain fact that China’s policy is mainly spearheaded against the Soviet Union. A great deal is due to the various internal problems and instability in China.

This is confirmed by events connected with Lin Piao. I wish to say here confidentially a few words about Lin Piao’s fate.
Lin was in disagreement with Mao’s policy and when things had come to a head he tried to escape from China aboard an aircraft. We have made a thorough investigation of all the circumstances surrounding the plane crash. Perhaps the plane ran out of fuel or there was engine trouble or perhaps they had time to shoot at it and knock it down . . . anyway, it fell on the territory of the Mongolian People’s Republic, and the Mongolians invited our experts there. We made an investigation—we have all the expert photos and documents. Our people investigated the whole thing.

Actually in China his daughter betrayed him; when the conflict came to a head he was betrayed by his daughter. As for this information on his daughter, we don’t take that at face value—that is Chinese information.

Dr. Kissinger: The rest is yours.

Mr. Brezhnev: We had treated Lin Piao earlier when he came to Moscow for medical treatment; we have documents in the files; X-rays of his teeth, etc. It is confirmed definitely that the body is Lin Piao’s, probably together with some members of his family. It proves beyond a doubt that Lin Piao was in the plane that crashed. Some in China now try to spread incorrect versions of what was supposed to happen. The crash was a fact and so was Lin Piao’s presence.

I mention this to show that there is very serious internal dissension in China. It is still a country with an unstable internal situation. There is a need for us to follow closely the events in China, both the domestic situation and the foreign policy. But we are at the same time endeavoring to pursue principle, to follow a policy aimed at friendship with the Chinese people.

I would agree with what you say, that we should follow events closely and endeavor to prevent too great a rapprochement. The combination of Japan and China, a combination which could rest on nationalistic, racial principles, such a combination could indeed play a pernicious role in that area of the world.

I also want to say that the development of good relations between the Soviet Union and Japan would not in any way run counter to the interests of the United States. Considering our attitude toward Japan specifically, our policy cannot and will not be against the interests of American-Japanese relations, and we will continue negotiations with Japan regarding the treaty between the two countries with that principle in mind.

It is quite clear that China will attempt to do all it can to impede our relationship with you and also with Japan, and we will certainly have to act proceeding from these facts.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me make a few comments on this, if you will permit me. We know curiously little about the domestic developments
in China. In all our visits there we see only a particular group of leaders. Therefore we are very grateful for the information you have provided, and you can be sure that it will be treated in the strictest confidence and told to nobody but the President. Whenever you believe that information is useful, it will be treated in the same way and with the same people.

Secondly, concerning the two tigers fighting. It is a settled principle of our policy that this will not happen. On the contrary, we have discussed sufficiently at these meetings how we want to adopt an exactly contrary course and not permit any country to put us against each other. So we are very much aware of this.

Thirdly, we are occasionally asked by other countries what their course should be. For example, Bahr, which I very confidentially mentioned to the Ambassador, asked us sometime ago what our view was on the Federal Republic of Germany’s relationship with the People’s Republic. We answered, of course, that this was a matter of domestic jurisdiction and sovereignty for the Federal Republic. I added that we thought that the weight of their interests lay in Europe and not outside of Europe. We thought that we made that basic view fairly clear.

Concerning Japan, we agree that the improvement of your relations with Japan will not be at the expense of our relations with Japan. We therefore encourage not only the development of economic relations between you and Japan, but also a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union.

And finally we will, of course, continue normalizing relations with the People’s Republic at a not extremely fast rate. We will do nothing to discourage an improvement in their relations with you, and we will consider that a positive development and not one we have any interest in impeding.

I want to thank the Secretary General for having spoken with such frankness, and we will always reciprocate in the same spirit.

Mr. Brezhnev: The Chinese have a very tight, small group of leaders. If anyone tries to meet you without authority . . . [Brezhnev gestures as though he were cutting off his neck with his hand.] During the time of the Cultural Revolution they ranged twenty men in the public square and executed them in public. It is a country where marshals could be put in cages and carried around and beaten up.

Dr. Kissinger: Really? I didn’t know that. [Not translated.]

Mr. Brezhnev: Of course, this is for the President’s information.

Dr. Kissinger: Only for him. You can be sure that it will not be given to anyone else.

Mr. Brezhnev: There may come a time when we wish to make a public statement on this.
Dr. Kissinger: That is your privilege. You can do with the information what you wish. Until you publicize it, we will keep it confidential.

Mr. Brezhnev: I hadn’t anticipated that we would be discussing the case of Lin. Next time you come, I will show you all the documents and photos.

Dr. Kissinger: That would be very interesting.

Mr. Brezhnev: It would seem that our discussion is nearing a close.

Dr. Kissinger: Correct.

Mr. Brezhnev: Just a few words on Korea. The last time we had a discussion on this subject, and we communicated to the Koreans that this time they should not raise the issue at the UN. I am not going into the details, but recent information from the Koreans is that they insist on the Korea issue being on the agenda of the UN General Assembly but they agree that the issue be debated after the United States elections, that is to say during the second half of the General Assembly. Perhaps you could consider this and convey it to President Nixon.

Dr. Kissinger: I will and I will study that constructive position.

Mr. Brezhnev: Finally, perhaps not for the record, I was very sensitive to the facts that relate to the Jackson Amendment regarding the Moscow treaty. It appears that his actions were concerted in advance. I am speaking in a personal way. Then there is another fact that deeply affected me. You appropriated large sums of money for new strategic arms at an accelerated pace. I am not saying this for discussion, but I hope that in future talks some attention will be devoted to this matter because we have a freeze and an agreement to make the interim agreement a permanent one. When we agree that one agenda item will be on non-use and then comes the United States decision to spend increased money on arms—it is only tomorrow that I will tell my comrades that I raised the matter with you. It is not proper to discuss it now but it is just my feeling that this runs counter to the spirit of earlier talks.

I think the talks were useful and I thank you personally for your constructive approach and your patience, and your efforts to make these talks productive. This has been a good meeting and I hope that all we discuss will become reality. In October we will announce the Lend Lease agreement and so forth. In short all that we discussed here will bear fruit. I convey my best wishes to President and Mrs. Nixon and you will bring him a personal memento. As for a personal note, I have not had time to write, and I will give it to you before you leave if I have time.

Dr. Kissinger: First, regarding the Jackson Amendment, to do the subject justice I would have to go into all of its intricacies. If it passes the

19 See footnote 2, Document 23.
Senate it will not pass the House. If the Senate passes it, arrangements have been made for the conference report to drop it. Secondly, special arrangements have been made to seek passage this week. I haven’t mentioned this to the Foreign Minister yet, but I hope he will be able to participate in the ceremony solemnly depositing the instrument of ratification.

Regarding the expenditures, we leave it to your Ambassador to explain to you the personality of our Secretary of Defense. Requests for funds are those already made, but he is justifying them by the SALT agreement. To explain that is a boring domestic issue and this did not require a presidential decision.

Regarding our meetings here, you have been courteous and the meetings have been most productive. We expect at the end of October to conclude a trade agreement including most favored nation status, the extension of export-import credits and also expect the announcement of the beginning of SALT and the preparatory meeting of CES and the exploratory meeting on force reductions. So we can say our relations have had an enormous impetus and have been given concreteness by what we have agreed here. Let me thank you for your courtesies, hospitality and the enormous comforts we have enjoyed during our stay and, as I said yesterday, we are now not only developing relations between our two countries but also very strong personal bonds and I look forward to a very early return to your country.

Mr. Gromyko: And to Leningrad.

Dr. Kissinger: To Leningrad and to see Giselle.

[During the course of translation of Mr. Brezhnev’s remarks above the following additional exchange occurred:]

Dr. Kissinger (to the interpreter): You might point out that if you are speaking about the Minister of Defense—on a personal basis—that he will not be long with us, so that situation will change.

Mr. Brezhnev: The absolute figures have increased.

Dr. Kissinger: By about 50 million. There are two things, he submitted a budget in January and then increased it in April and then there was a small increase in June. He justified the April increase with the May treaty. It is a bit strange.

Mr. Brezhnev: So long as the situation doesn’t arise where our military people don’t start that way before we’re back in the old arms race.

Dr. Kissinger: Some Senator told me as a joke that he didn’t know how many SALT agreements we could afford before going bankrupt. Also, we have agreed that our new Defense Minister could come here in the new Administration and we would reciprocate; or your Defense Minister could come here first if you wish.
Mr. Brezhnev: Yes, but we haven’t addressed that question yet. We promise you that. (Referring to Dr. Kissinger’s seeing Giselle on his next trip.) And please don’t forget to give President Nixon my very best wishes.

Dr. Kissinger: I certainly will.

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45. Intelligence Memorandum

Washington, September 13, 1972.

Without question, the Soviet leadership, and Brezhnev in particular, has not had the best of summers. The crucial questions are how the leadership will respond to problems in key policy areas—both domestic and foreign—and especially how Brezhnev will react if he feels his own position is threatened.

The leadership probably sees little choice but to conduct itself in the measured manner it has adopted when faced with similar problems in the recent past. In foreign policy setbacks such as the ouster from Egypt and in domestic reversals, such as the poor agricultural situation, we expect the Soviet leaders to fight to limit their losses, to attempt to consolidate and play up their “victories” and to avoid the dramatic.

The leadership situation is not likely to alter very much in the immediate future. Brezhnev is more answerable than before for policy failures because of his forward position within the leadership, but our knowledge of how much pressure he is under as a result of current problems is extremely limited. With the power he has acquired, he is better equipped to stave off any challenges. Looking some months ahead, he could find himself under growing pressure if adversity should multiply in foreign and domestic affairs. The vagaries of international affairs and the final reckoning of this year’s harvest are unknowns that will influence the political situation in Moscow. The first indication of pressure building against Brezhnev would probably be a

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 03-02194R, Box 1, Folder 37. Secret; Codeword; No Foreign Dissem. This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and was coordinated with the Office Economic Research. The Office of National Estimates agrees in general with its findings.
reappearance in public forums of veiled polemics against his policies. We have not seen this yet.

If Brezhnev should feel his position threatened, some policy adjustments might be required. It is commonly, and probably reasonably, assumed that if Brezhnev is threatened politically, the threat would come from the “left,” i.e., from those who say he puts too much trust in the capitalist enemy and not enough in his socialist brethren. The usual manner of coping with such a threat is to move toward the position of the opponents, cutting at least some of the ground from under them. Brezhnev might follow this course a short distance, particularly in rhetorical terms, but he is more likely to defend himself by hardening his position on internal rather than on external affairs. His position is strong enough and his commitment to his policies (particularly on major East-West matters) deep enough for him to seek compensating successes, or at least deals that can be made to look like compensating successes. These he could present to his colleagues on the Politburo and in the party as justification for his continued leadership.

Relations with the US

The Soviets evidently believe that the prospects for improved relations with the US are better now than they have been for quite some time. They have said this publicly, even though they have been careful to balance expressions of optimism with statements of continued concern over the uncertainties in the relationship. A prominent Soviet commentator recently summed up what appears to be the current official view. The situation established since the Moscow summit is “quite delicate,” he said, and so the seeds of trust and mutual understanding that were planted last May must be “carefully cultivated.”

Nowhere have the Soviets made greater efforts to promote an atmosphere of accord than in the area of direct bilateral relations. They have maintained, and, in some instances intensified, highly visible contacts with US officials; they continue to point up the new opportunities for expanded trade and other economic dealings; they have been at least circumspect and often cordial in their public treatment of the President and have assessed his prospects for re-election as high; and at times they have muted criticism of US policy at the expense of their clients.

Moscow continues to insist that the USSR be recognized as an equal and treated accordingly. The Soviets have stressed this as one of the major benefits of the summit and of their general policy of pursuing better relations with the US. Any action by the US that leads Moscow to think the US is slipping away from equality is a cause for concern. Moscow’s concern has been particularly manifest in recent comments on efforts in the Senate to qualify the SALT agreements.
Apart from emergency imports of US grain necessitated by a serious shortfall in the harvest, the USSR has reason to be pleased with the immediate state of US-Soviet economic relations. The Soviet leadership is doubtless unhappy about the huge trade deficit—possibly as much as a billion dollars—that the USSR will run in 1972 and 1973 as a result of the grain purchases. On the other hand, the Russians have placed orders that should result in imports of much-needed US machinery and equipment worth about $150–200 million in 1972.

The most immediate problem for the Soviets is their grain supply. Because of poor weather this year, the 1972 grain crop will fall far short of requirements. As a result, US exports of grain and soybeans should reach $650–700 million in 1972, the exact amount depending on actual shipping dates. Moreover, the delayed ripening of grain in the crucial Virgin Lands of Siberia and Kazakhstan could cause above-normal harvest losses during the coming weeks and generate a need for further imports. Below-average prospects for potatoes and fodder crops—grain substitutes—make the grain deficit particularly painful for the leadership. The Soviets will not know the full extent of their grain requirements until mid-October, after the harvest.

The Soviet leadership almost certainly realizes that its grain problem is not the result solely of one poor weather year. To support the Brezhnev meat program, substantial imports of grain may be necessary even in normal weather years. There is evidence that the USSR is trying to signal the US and Canada to expand their grain acreage so as to ensure a source of Soviet imports in the future at favorable prices. This implies that the USSR recognizes it may be in the market for significant quantities of US grain in the future.

Negotiations for a comprehensive US-Soviet trade agreement are still stalled, despite the upsurge in US-Soviet trade in 1972 and a continued high level promised for 1973. There is no indication as yet that the Russians are willing to make significant concessions in order to complete a trade agreement. Lack of settlement of these issues does not affect trade prospects. Export controls have become only a minor issue, because most of the needed automotive, petroleum, and consumer goods equipment is available. In addition, US business is proving eager to deal with the USSR, and the Soviets are fanning this interest by holding out prospects for large and seemingly lucrative contracts. The USSR will require long-term credit for equipment purchases in the future, but delay in obtaining US Export-Import Bank credits should not affect trade at present since the USSR seems able to secure adequate financing elsewhere.

In short, the USSR feels no sense of urgency to settle the problems at issue in the current trade agreement negotiations. The Soviet leaders’
bargaining position could be less strong, however, if they have to continue large purchases of grain from the US over the next several years. [Omitted here are Soviet views of various geographic regions.]

At Home

The Soviet leadership, in the person of Brezhnev, announced programs of peace and butter at the 24th Party Congress in the spring of 1971. Both planks were put to the test during the next year by President Nixon’s trip to Peking, by an upsurge in fighting in South and Southeast Asia, by the five-year plan, and by a critical attitude expressed by some Soviet leaders, particularly Mashkov and Shelest. In spite of such problems, Brezhnev, using the Congress programs, succeeded by the eve of the Moscow summit in enhancing his political position and his public role as principal Soviet leader and international statesman.

The trends of the preceding year have continued since the President’s trip to Moscow. Soviet foreign policy remains subject to shocks, while many of the fruits of détente remain unpicked and some are in jeopardy. Harvest shortfalls this summer appear to have postponed significant progress toward the regime’s already rather uncertain goals for agriculture and the consumer. Nonetheless, the summit and Brezhnev’s political moves have practically silenced public questioning of basic policies. Evidence of the steady accretion of Brezhnev’s authority continued to the end of July. Although his just-completed tour of the eastern grain and cotton belts testifies to the concern over this year’s harvest, it also illustrates again Brezhnev’s forward position in the leadership.

Brezhnev emerged from the summit to salvos of official praise. Party meetings were called throughout the country, and the central press repeated reports of approval for the foreign policy activities of not only the Politburo but also of Brezhnev “personally,” the latter a new formulation. When he received Commerce Secretary Peterson on 30 July \(^2\) at his Crimean retreat, Brezhnev displayed unusual self-assurance and knowledge on matters of economic relations, and Soviet delegates at the sessions of the joint commercial commission in Moscow invoked his authority on particular questions.

Soviet officials have as much as admitted that serious reservations had to be overcome in going ahead with the summit, and the publicity given the subject afterwards suggests that the leadership continues to feel uneasy about domestic reaction. The party meetings were accompanied by forceful public justifications of the summit by important officials and commentators. For example, Vadim Zagladin, deputy to the

\(^2\) See Document 21.
recently elected candidate member of the Politburo, Ponomarev, insisted on the need for a flexible approach in pursuing the international interests of the socialist camp and condemned those who “arbitrarily interpret” the international duty of socialist states. These apologetics were certainly aimed at foreign critics of the summit, but the language was broad enough to be applicable to unconvinced Soviets. Public lectures in Moscow and Leningrad showed the skepticism of many Soviet citizens. In his speech on 27 June during Castro’s visit to the USSR, Brezhnev firmly reasserted the Soviet Union’s support of revolutionary forces in the world.

Perhaps in part to satisfy the conservatives, the regime continued its push for discipline in domestic affairs that had begun before the President’s visit. Several moves concerning the cultural bureaucracies brought greater central and party control over the arts and education. In two speeches before propagandists in June, Suslov prescribed an unflagging battle against bourgeois propaganda and influence and against such social evils as drunkenness, greed, sloth, nationalism, and chauvinism. On 21 June the regime capped the arrests of dissidents earlier in the year with the detention of an important leader of the dissident movement, Petr Yakir.

As in the past, however, the authorities brought themselves no peace by these actions. Immolations and rioting in Lithuania in May were a disturbing sign of minority national feelings in this 50th year of the formation of the Soviet Union, which is being celebrated inter alia as a victory of Soviet nationality policies. Academician Sakharov continued to issue public challenges to the regime on questions of human rights. The fees for schooling slapped on would-be emigrants in August demonstrated the difficulties the leadership is having in coping with the consequences of the growing Jewish exodus, especially as it affects the educated classes.

The concomitant to the peace program announced at the Party Congress was the promise of a new era for the Soviet consumer. Its bases were an ambitious investment program in agriculture, including livestock production, and less precisely defined measures concerning the production and distribution of consumer goods. During the summer, however, it became clear that significant progress in these fields would be delayed. Since Brezhnev is closely identified with these programs, he has a personal stake in how profound and prolonged these economic difficulties turn out to be in the months ahead. In his tour of the Virgin Lands, he was seeking a successful harvest and, no doubt, doing some personal politicking among regional leaders.

Heavy purchases of foreign grain to offset a disappointing harvest will make it more difficult for the Soviet Union to make purchases abroad for other sectors of the economy and may tend to sharpen ri-
valry between various interest groups. Gosplan is reported already to have placed restrictions on hard currency outlays for consumer goods. At mid-year, growth of industrial production was sagging, and performance in consumer durables and in soft goods and processed foods was lackluster. According to recent reports, some work slowdowns occurred in Moscow in August. In the past such strikes have been triggered by increased work norms. Scattered strikes could also reflect workers’ concern over the adequacy of food supplies this fall and winter. Discontent might grow if supplies of consumer goods become more limited.

46. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

London, September 14, 1972, 0825Z.

Hakto 27. 1. I read your cable with the incredulity that tends to accompany my reading of the Washington mood on the trips. Does anyone, in his right mind, believe I can bring something home on the Jewish issue?² Has everyone forgotten that we are charged with the foreign policy of the U.S.? On the other hand I think a call by Humphrey and Javits on Dobrynin might be helpful.³

2. Here is what has repeat has been accomplished:

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 24, HAK Trip Files, HAK’s Germany, Moscow, London, Paris Trip, Sep. 9–15, 1972, HAKTO 1–35. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The message is incorrectly dated September 4. A stamped notation on the message indicates it was received at 4:58 a.m. on September 14. After departing Moscow, Kissinger stopped in London on September 14 to meet with British Prime Minister Edward Heath.

² In a message on September 13, Haig wrote Kissinger: “The President has not commented on the progress reports I gave him but there is obviously no worrying going on with respect to what you may or may not be doing in Moscow. The general impression I get is that the President and at least Haldeman are very anxious for you to come home with as good a package as you can get. I do think that the President hopes that you will have been able to get some Soviet assurances on the Soviet Jewry problem. As you know, the staff will not leave him alone.” (Ibid., TOHAK 1–116)

³ In message Tohak 82, Haig wrote Kissinger that “Senator Javits called me last night” and said that “he and Senator Humphrey have been urged by their Senate colleagues to see Dobrynin and make a formal Senatorial démarche. I told Javits it would be best to hold up on any such action, and in any event Dobrynin was in Moscow and that such a démarche should not be made at the Ministerial level. Javits agreed and this issue, which is approaching a boiling point, should remain under control until you return.” (Ibid.)
A) A settlement of the lend-lease issue.
B) A breakthrough in the trade negotiations in which we are getting ninety percent of our maximum program.
C) A date for opening SALT.
D) A break in the deadlock on MBFR and CSE so that both conferences can be announced next month.
E) Very satisfactory talks on Vietnam.
F) Major progress on next year’s summit.
G) Other crucial matters to be discussed when I return.

3. In these circumstances, to wait with a briefing by me till Monday is madness. A briefing on Saturday would enable me

A) To emphasize the President’s role in these negotiations and focus attention on his relation to Brezhnev.
B) Set the frame-work without killing the October announcements.
C) Get ahead of the power curve on speculation; in short do what the briefings in the summit week did.

4. Failure to brief on Saturday would

A) Enable each Department to get out what was achieved and their version of what was attainable.
B) Enable each Department to claim credit for itself.
C) Get so much speculation started that we will never catch up with it again.

5. In other words, please go back to Haldeman and the President on this. Rogers will be no happier either way. The President should understand that he is on the threshold of the greatest spurt in foreign policy since the summit and that it has to be properly set up with him as the focal point.

Warm regards.

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4 Monday, September 18. In message Hakto 20 to Haig, September 13, Kissinger wrote: “I think I should brief press Saturday a.m. [September 16] before they run wild.” (Ibid., HAKTO 1–35) Haig wrote Kissinger in message Tohak 82 that Haldeman “believes that you should have the press conference on Monday, after staying at Camp David Friday night and ostensibly reporting to the President both Friday night and Saturday morning. In this way, we will get both the weekend play and an early week heavy play riding the communiqué and the Q’s and A’s out until Monday. In a substantive sense, I also support this game plan since we are bound to have some bureaucratic problems with Rogers and Peterson and there could be some additional problems develop with our NATO allies which could be put more effectively to rest after some delay between the surfacing of the communiqué and the consultations and the Monday press briefing.”

5 In message Tohak 97, September 14, Haig informed Kissinger “the President agreed that you can proceed on Saturday. He insisted, however, that you could only do so after you brief Rogers and at first insisted that you see Rogers before you see him to keep him out of a tense meeting with the two of you. I insisted that he see you first and he finally agreed.” (Ibid., TOHAK 1–116) According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, on September 16, he met with Rogers for breakfast from 7:25 to 8:08 a.m., met with the President from 9:46 to 10:42 a.m., and held his press briefing at 11:33 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1967–76) Records of the meetings were not found. The news conference was reported in The New York Times, September 17, 1972, p. 1.
Economic Normalization and Soviet Jewish Emigration, September–December 1972

47. Editorial Note

On September 18, 1972, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger phoned Senator Hubert Humphrey (D–MN) to discuss the issue of exit fees for Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union. The transcript of their telephone conversation reads in part: “K[issinger]: Nice to talk to you. I’m calling you about the letter you wrote the President a week or so ago about the Jewish problem in the Soviet Union. H[umphrey]: Yes. K: And I just wanted to tell you personally I don’t want to have it made public that I did raise it in a number of meetings. H: Fine, Henry. K: The problem is that I think we’ve got to lower the visibility of the debate because they can’t yield to pressures from a foreign country. I’m not saying they’re going to yield anyway. I’m not asking you to lower this. H: Listen, I understand that. K: As a government we have to do it in as quiet a way as we can. We could score a lot of points in the campaign by saying what I said and to whom I said it. H: Yes. K: But we’re not going to say anything publicly. I wanted you to know though that something has been done.”

(National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 15, Chronological File)

On September 21, Kissinger phoned Secretary of Commerce Peterson regarding the protests of Senators Percy, Ribicoff, and apparently Javits about the Soviet exit tax. According to the transcript of the conversation, Kissinger told Peterson: “everyone’s feeling here—including my own—is we just don’t want—it’s just not easy to have a discussion with these three guys. I am going to get it quieted down by Rabin. My experience with Percy is when he says he’ll help, he says something that hurts. He is running for reelection and I don’t think he is going to do anything that would hurt him. P[eterson]: What do you think about Ribicoff? K: I think Rabin can handle Ribicoff, but I don’t see what there is to gain from Ribicoff. I am going to talk to Javits alone today.” Noting that “a guy named Vanik [Congressman Charles Vanik (D–OH)] is putting a rider on the foreign aid bill,” Kissinger said that it “would be useful” if “we could try to stop them from putting on legislation long before MFN ever comes up.” The transcript continues: “K: But I just don’t think you can do it with that gang. I mean they are the less likely group—Ribicoff is a devout Jew and on what basis is he not going to do it? P: Well, is there anything you can tell him about what you said to the Soviets? Part of it is they don’t think we’re doing anything. K: Well, my frank opinion is I would just as soon isolate them...”
gradually and we will get them through the Israelis. P: Uh-humm. Do you get any response, Henry, from the Soviets on what their attitude is? K: Well, I think if we all would shut up, there’s a chance of getting them—slowing down the administrative implementation.” (Ibid., Box 16, Chronological File)

On September 21 at 3:11 p.m., Congressman Leslie Arends (R–IL) (misidentified as Aarons in the original transcript) phoned Kissinger: “A[rends]: I hate to bother you but you know about the Vanik Amend- ment which he is going to offer to this— K: Oh, about the Jews? A: Yeah. K: Well, in rough terms. A: The unfortunate part about it though—Gerry [Gerald R. Ford, House Minority Leader (R–MI)] and I have just been sitting here trying to figure out something—Gerry will be back in a minute—is that the Parliamentarian is apparently going to say that this is germane. That’s hard for me to believe, but this is the last word. And I’d like to read this thing to you in just a minute. It says, ‘None of the funds appropriated or made available pursuant to this Act for carrying out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, may be used to provide loans, credits, financial and investment assistance or insurance guarantees on sales to or investments in any nation which re- quires payment above nominal and customary costs for exit visas, permits, or for the right to emigrate.’ This is tough. K: You know our view on this. A: I know the view on the thing. Now the question is in my mind and that Gerry and I discussed is did you get hold of Rabin yesterday? K: Well, the one thing I cannot afford is to have spread all over the Capitol Hill whatever I may discuss with Rabin. A: That’s right, that’s right. And we don’t want you to tell us what Rabin said or anything but I mean you were going to— K: I have talked with him and will work on him. A: Alright. K: But for Christ’s sake, don’t mention it.” (Transcript of telephone conversation, September 21; ibid.)

At 3:19 p.m. on September 21, Kissinger phoned Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yitzhak Rabin: “K: Mr. Ambassador, I have just been told that Congressman Vanik is putting forward a Resolution cutting off all assistance, guarantees and so forth to any country that has emigration fees. R[abin]: Congressman? K: Vanik. And I’m getting desperate [calls] from Gerry Ford and others saying they’re all being put into a horrible fix. I really believe this is going to backfire against the Jewish Community as soon as people get their breath. R: I should say to you I know it’s not so easy to find out because as a matter of fact I’m not aware of any real demand by any Jewish organization about it.” Kissinger noted that “our people are really getting concerned and I don’t know what you can do and I don’t want you to do any one thing.” Kissinger mentioned “general public pressure,” and added, “people don’t mind, but if it happens to help the opposition candidate—.” Rabin replied, “I understand.” (Transcript of telephone conversation; ibid.)

SUBJECT

Soviet Jews

It seems increasingly likely to me that the only way educated Jews are going to get out of the Soviet Union will be by paying the education tax. Many Jews in the Soviet Union are beginning to assess their situation in the same way, relating it in large part to the success of the Summit and the bilateral stake in commercial arrangements now under negotiation, but also recognizing that pressure from other Russian nationality groups for increased freedom is affected by the Jewish emigration. In the short run (until November) the leaders of the Soviet Jewish émigrés do not want any concession on the issue; they hope that commercial pressures stirred by political protests will force a Soviet backdown. After that, my information is they will want help, in whatever form possible.

My personal view is that the Soviets have an arguable point, in the context of their ideology, in demanding some repayment for the state investment in education. It is the size of the tax, and the obvious inability of Russian Jews to raise large sums of money without outside help that makes the procedure so odious, and justifies the characterization of

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 721, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Vol. XXVI. No classification marking. Sent via Haldeman. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates the President saw it. In a September 20 covering memorandum to Haldeman, Garment wrote: “I discussed this subject with Henry Kissinger, gave him a draft, and am sending him a copy of the attached memorandum to the President. He said I could cite his general concurrence.”

2 In a memorandum to Garment, September 5, Seattle lawyer and principal legal assistant to the Attorney General of Israel, Leonard W. Schroeter, reported on a trip to the Soviet Union, where he spoke with leaders of the Jewish community in Moscow, Leningrad, Riga, and Minsk. He wrote: “The Soviet Jewish leaders believe that the only hope of rescinding the tax is if, prior to the American elections, massive political and economic pressure can be mounted in the West. If this does not occur, they consider the chances of rescission remote. Thus, they give us a period of less than two months to accomplish the goal of securing rescission of the ukase.” Garment forwarded Schroeter’s memorandum to Nixon as an attachment to his own memorandum, undated, regarding Nixon’s upcoming meeting with Max Fisher, September 26. (Ibid., President’s Office Files, Box 90, Memoranda for the President, Beginning September 24, 1972)

3 Schroeter wrote in his September 5 memorandum to Garment that Soviet Jewish leaders “also advise us, with the strong request that this not become known to the Soviet Union, that if this goal [rescission] is not accomplished within the next two months, it will be essential to physically save them—to raise the sums of money involved. This is due to their assessment of the gravity of the situation and the extreme danger facing Jews in the Soviet Union.”
“ransom.” I understand that some Russian Jews are beginning to panic, to commit economic crimes (black market operations) in order to raise the tax money, and anxiety is expressed about show trials and other repressive moves.

In a conversation with Al Haig a few weeks ago, I suggested that thought be given now to stimulating the creation of some nongovernmental and basically non-Jewish apparatus (perhaps a private Commission) to begin to set the basis for the negotiation of reasonable terms of compensation to the Soviets, and then to undertake to raise the funds, preferably from nongovernmental sources. The idea was generated by comments at a private meeting of the USIA Advisory Commission (Stanton, Hobe Lewis, John Shaheen, James Michener), all of whom argued that such a procedure was feasible and even desirable. Herb Stein, in a private conversation, expressed similar sentiments, as did Jack Javits, who talked generally along these lines when I spoke to him last Friday (a memorandum of my conversation with Javits is attached). Arthur Burns has suggested that some part of the Soviet Lend-Lease debt might be utilized as a source of funding for the education tax.

In the short run there will be a great deal of generalizing about the inhumanity of the Soviet decree—and justifiably so. But we are confronted with escalating political pressure involving potential barriers to important U.S.-Soviet agreements and we must therefore start to deal with the reality of the Soviet situation. If our information is that they’re not going to back down, and if we are to do what is humane and practical, something more substantive than a speech in the UN, a handholding conference with Jewish leaders, or a démarche to Dobrynin will be needed, and fairly soon. The objective at this point should be, quite simply, to develop some realistic modus operandi which will enable the Jews to emigrate and the Soviets to save face.

Whatever is done should be organized informally, and quietly set in motion before the election. I think some of the people I’ve mentioned above would be prepared to help organize that effort. I emphasize that the approach should involve a serious and businesslike negotiation, addressed fundamentally to the question of reasonable terms, and based on the premise that there is legitimacy to the Soviet demand for some capital compensation from trained people who decide to leave the country and renounce their citizenship. The major hurdle, at the outset, would be the current Jewish position of opposition to any pay-

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4 Frank Stanton, former President of Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS); Hobe Lewis, President of Reader’s Digest; John Shaheen, President of Macmillan Ring-Free Oil Company; James Michener, author.
5 A memorandum of Garment’s conversation with Senator Javits is not attached.
ment, but there is a reasonable chance, I think, that this can be altered by discussions with responsible Jewish leadership here and abroad.

Leonard Garment⁶

⁶ Garment signed “Len” above this typed signature.

49. National Security Decision Memorandum 190
Council for International Economic Policy Decision Memorandum 12


TO
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT
Lend-Lease Negotiations with the USSR

I have reviewed the status of lend-lease negotiations with the Soviet Union. The US position at the resumption of negotiations shall be based on the following points:

1. The agreement shall state the total Soviet obligation to the United States, including principal and interest on the “pipeline” account and the regular lend-lease debt. I reserve the decision concerning the amount of the total obligation until I have had an opportunity to review the progress of all commercial and related negotiations scheduled to resume in September.

2. All Soviet payments are to be completed by the year 2001.

3. Payments shall be as follows:

—Based on a “pipeline” debt of $46 million at 2⅞% interest there shall be one Soviet “pipeline” payment in 1972 representing a quarter of the total “pipeline” debt; a double “pipeline” payment in 1973 representing half the total “pipeline” debt; and a final “pipeline” payment in 1975 representing the last quarter of the total “pipeline” debt.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury.
Beginning in 1974 or with the granting of MFN status to the USSR, whichever is later, there shall be a stream of payments of equal annual installments on the regular lend-lease debt to be completed by the year 2001.

4. The Soviet Union shall have the option to defer a total of four annual installment payments on the regular lend-lease obligation, with the stipulation that if this option is exercised the final payment of the total obligation shall still be completed by the year 2001. Annual installments shall be adjusted to reflect any installment not paid by reason of the USSR’s exercising its deferment option. The interest on deferred installments shall be 3½%.

The US negotiator shall work out a precise US negotiating position based on the above points in coordination with, and with the approval of the Secretary of Commerce whose representative shall participate in all aspects of the negotiations.

NSDM 180/CIEPDM 9 of July 20, 1972\(^2\) is superseded by this Memorandum.

The contents of this Memorandum shall be made known to authorized officials of the US Government on a highly restricted “exclusively need to know” basis. Stringent measures are to be taken to prevent leaks concerning these negotiations and to ensure that there are no contacts with or briefings of the press except as expressly authorized by me. There are to be no briefings or consultations with the Congress until expressly authorized by me.

Richard Nixon

\(^2\) Document 13.

TO

The Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT

Commercial and Related Negotiations with the USSR

REFERENCE

NSDM 181/CIEPDM 10, July 20, 1972

The pending negotiations with the Soviet Government on various commercial and related issues should be completed at the earliest feasible date.

US positions on the substantive issues involved will be based on the Decision Memorandum under reference and on developments in the negotiations since that Memorandum was issued.

The negotiations of a Maritime Agreement with the USSR should be completed at the earliest feasible date proceeding from the status of the negotiations at the time of your visit to the Soviet Union and developments since that time.

A separate Decision Memorandum will be issued concerning the negotiations of a Lend-Lease settlement.

Richard Nixon

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Secret; Nodis. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of State and Treasury.

2 Document 14.

3 Document 49.
51. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers


SUBJECT
Lend-Lease Negotiations With the USSR

The President wishes you to be aware of the following additional details related to his decisions promulgated in NSDM 190/CIEPDM 12:

—The total Soviet obligation to the United States referred to in numbered Paragraph One of that memorandum has been agreed with the Soviets to be $725 million.

—The President does not wish this sum, nor the amount of annual lend-lease installments deriving therefrom to be inserted in the agreement, or referred to in the lend-lease negotiations, until the final stage of those negotiations.

In instructing the U.S. Negotiator, the President has asked that you keep the above in mind so that the U.S. Negotiating Team will implement NSDM 190/CIEPDM 12 accordingly. He has emphasized that knowledge of the fact that a figure has been agreed upon should be held exclusively to you.

Henry A. Kissinger

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Nodis; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.

2 Document 49.
52. **Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**

Washington, September 26, 1972.

**SUBJECT**
Handling of Soviet Non-Use of Force Resolution in the UN

The Soviets have now completed the preliminaries for introducing a General Assembly Resolution on the renunciation of the use of force and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. They have made oral démarches to us and other UN members seeking support and have left the usual aide mémoire. Under normal circumstances, the Soviet item would go to the First Committee, where the debate will occur, as it did last year on their World Disarmament Conference item.

Given the nature and intent of the Soviet proposal we can expect certain fireworks between the Chinese and the Soviets in the debate. *The question is what position the United States should take.*

Thus far the Department of State, without White House clearance, has, as expected, issued totally negative instructions with the following points (Tab A):

— the proposed Soviet resolution will not add anything to the UN Charter;

— restating Charter language tends to detract from the Charter, if the language varies;

— we have strong reservations about calling on the Security Council to make GA Resolutions binding;

— injection of this issue into the Security Council is likely to result in an acrimonious debate and harm the Council’s effectiveness (*sic*);

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3 In September 1971, the Soviet Union introduced a resolution seeking to place on the agenda of the UN General Assembly a proposal to convene a World Disarmament Conference. See ibid., Documents 336–340. General Assembly Resolution 2833 was adopted on December 16.

4 Attached but not printed is telegram 173183 to USUN, September 20. For text, see ibid., Document 341.
—we are “concerned” about Gromyko’s proposed exception to the effect that people of “oppressed colonial countries” could legitimately use all available means;
— we think the way to make recourse to force less likely is to pursue genuine and constructive negotiations.

These are standard debating points, but clearly negative. Presumably, this is the line we will take in any debates, but how we might vote is another matter. We would probably abstain, if there is no further guidance from the White House, and might support it if there is wide support in the GA.

The problem is that by taking a negative line we tend to range ourselves on the side of the opponents who, in addition to the Chinese, may be quite small in number and oppose a proposition that is certain to pass, at least in the GA.

On the other hand, it would be too cynical to support the Soviet proposal, which, though probably harmless as a UN resolution, accomplishes little and has some anti-Chinese overtones.

One way out may be to use the constitutional argument that the Security Council not be involved, and in the debate take the position that we support the idea and principle but see no need for further reiteration by the General Assembly. We could indicate that we will abstain, if the item proves contentious in debate.

In any case, we need guidance on how you want to handle it:

1. By requesting cables for clearance:
   — this runs certain risks and is tiresome, but the most direct way of controlling the tactics.

2. By asking for a position paper and holding an SRG:
   — this allows the establishment of control, through post SRG NSDM, etc., but takes some time and will probably yield no new ideas.

3. Issuing instructions now on how to deal with it along the lines described above (i.e., relative neutralism with the intention of abstaining).

Recommendation

That you indicate how you prefer to proceed:

1. Clear cables
2. Ask for SRG paper
3. Issue directive now

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5 Kissinger checked his approval of the second option.
53. **Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)**

New York, September 26, 1972, 4:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

President’s Meeting with Jewish Leaders

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Major General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Leonard Garment
(See attached list for Jewish Leaders)

[Omitted here is discussion of U.S. policy toward Israel.]

—As for the problem of Soviet Jews and the emigration tax, the problem has always been what is actually the best way to help the Russian Jews. It is clear that if we make this an issue of prestige or a test of manhood between ourselves and the Soviets, the Soviets will only dig in their heels and the situation will become worse. The Soviets are well aware of our views on this issue, from the Presidential level on down. It is, however, impossible to make public all the facets of this complex and troublesome problem. In this instance, there had to be a degree of trust in America’s leadership. Above all, the issue does not lend itself to politicization in the domestic environment. Certainly, the objective observer must understand that the emigration of Soviet Jews thus far has been no accident. In the long run, the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union cannot but have an ameliorating effect on the welfare of the Soviet Jews themselves, whereas an abrupt test of the So-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 720, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Vol. XXV, September 1972 [1 of 3]. Secret. The meeting took place in the Carpenter’s Suite at the Waldorf Astoria in New York. The original is incorrectly dated September 27. On September 25, Kissinger forwarded a set of talking points to Nixon for the meeting. In a covering memorandum, Kissinger wrote: “Given the natural tendency of any group such as this with a strong special interest to over-interpret what they hear, it seems to me important to stay fairly close to the suggested talking points.” (Ibid.) Kissinger also spoke with Rabin, September 25, telling him: “One other thing as long as I have you on the phone, the President is very nervous about this meeting with the Jewish leaders tomorrow. I don’t know whether you have any influence on them to keep them from harassing him too much.” Rabin replied: “I don’t believe there will be any harassment there. They’ll ask questions. I think what they’ll try—two of them talked to me and they would like practically to get the . . . If he could start with a few words rather than to let them set a tone, if I may advise.” Kissinger replied: “Right.” (Transcript of telephone conversation, September 25; ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 15, Chronological File)

2 Attached but not printed. The list is also in the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files)
Viet leadership which constitutes a challenge to a principle which they, themselves, consider to be an internal matter can only complicate the situation.

At this point, the group asked several questions. Rabbi Klapperman went into a lengthy exposition of the importance of taking positive action to improve the plight of Soviet Jews who in the face of the Soviet head tax could spend a lifetime accumulating funds before they could hope to emigrate. The President reiterated the need for trust, and emphasized his compassionate feelings for this humanitarian dilemma. He also noted his strong opposition to the so-called quota system which, if applied here in the United States, would give him no more than a quarter of a Kissinger in a key advisory role!

At the conclusion of the meeting, the President invited the participants to bring their problems at any time to General Haig or Dr. Kissinger. The meeting adjourned.3

3 According to a synopsis of the meeting prepared by Lawrence Y. Goldberg, Nixon concluded the meeting by saying: "I very much appreciate your concern. I am aware of the facts that you have mentioned. We are in the closest touch with the situation. The Prime Minister says—we will trust you, but we will watch you, too. Today, a little girl handed me a note at the Statue of Liberty. It asked that I do something to get her uncle out of the U.S.S.R. I am thinking about that little girl. Trust me and my motives. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President’s Office Files, Box 90, Memoranda for the President, Beginning September 24, 1972)

54. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1


SUBJECT

Dark Side of US-Soviet Relations

The seemingly routine telegram at Tab A2 offers a reminder of the Soviets’ continuing “Cold War” approach to the United States’ modest


2 Attached but not printed is telegram 9846 from Moscow, September 27.
request for improved diplomatic facilities and treatment in the Soviet Union.

It is almost incredible that the Soviets have the gall to continue this attitude when, at the same time, we are making substantial bilateral progress on a number of post-Summit fronts—including progress on the trade front!

My earlier memoranda have reviewed the problems with regard to the Leningrad consulate and the new chanceries. The Soviets have now informed State that the proposed building plus penthouse formula for their Mt. Alto site is unacceptable and they cannot agree to our requested height for the new US chancery in Moscow.

You are personally aware of Embassy Moscow’s wretched conditions. The Soviets have not budged on a playground for the Embassy children. As reported in the cable at Tab A, the subject of a new facility for an Anglo-American school is brushed aside by Korniyenko (we have been pushing this for 10 years), who also expresses complete ignorance of US recreational boating requests which the Embassy has been making for months—all this at a time when the Soviets have been enjoying their new Pioneer Point dacha in Maryland, complete with two speed boats soon to be joined by a hydrofoil.

It seems to me that the time has come in our relations when the Soviets should be made aware that the President expects simple, human requests made by our people in Moscow and Leningrad to be treated in the same positive spirit reflected in other aspects of our post-Summit relations.

I think you ought to take this up with Dobrynin.

Recommendation

That you inform Dobrynin of our displeasure over the continuing negative attitude being taken by Soviet authorities to the most elemental US requests such as those relating to schooling and recreational facilities in the USSR.
55. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 2, 1972, 1:20–3:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Victor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
Europe; Nuclear Understanding; Jackson Amendment; Middle East

[The conversation began over cocktails in a room adjoining the dining room.]

Dr. Kissinger: When I tell people that I find you pleasant and amusing they think I have been totally corrupted by my visits to Moscow. [Gromyko reacted to this with his best deadpan expression.]

FM Gromyko: It is very interesting what is happening with the Chinese and Japanese. You know you have much better relations with the Chinese than we do, and of course you have much better relations with the Japanese than we do.

Ambassador Dobrynin: So when you refer to your Asian ally we can’t be sure who you mean!

Dr. Kissinger: Frankly, I think the Japanese have been much too eager the way they have been going about it. There was no need for them to do it this fast.2

FM Gromyko: Orientals are like this. They have a different sense of time than western countries. With western countries—with the British, with the French—the sooner you reply the better. When one makes a proposal it is a good thing to reply quickly. With orientals it is just the opposite. They may wait a week or a month or six months and not respond. They feel it is inconsistent with their dignity to reply quickly.

Dr. Kissinger: Your Vietnamese allies also have a strange negotiating technique. A few months ago they proposed a series of principles. With some slight changes, making the obligations mutual instead of unilateral, we accepted them. A week later they came back with a

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy. Brackets are in the original.

2 A reference to the joint statement issued on September 29 by Japan and the People’s Republic of China announcing the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two nations.
wholly new set of principles. We accepted those, too. But then a week after that they rejected them all completely, saying we didn’t need any principles.

[The group then went into the next room for lunch.]

FM Gromyko: All three of my leaders, Mr. Brezhnev, Mr. Podgorny and Mr. Kosygin, asked me to convey their regards to you.

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you. I have the warmest recollection of my visit to the Soviet Union\(^3\) and the way I was treated.

FM Gromyko: And our talks were very good.

Dr. Kissinger: Our last talks were very good. We have the whole Jewish community after us as a result!\(^4\) Seriously, we will handle this. We will not raise the subject again. Liberal journalists in this country who used to criticize us for years for being too tough with you now criticize us for not being tough enough. But this is simply amusing for our domestic politics; it has no foreign policy significance.

[Luncheon was then served.]

Dr. Kissinger: The reason Anatoliy is so successful is that he controls my supply of caviar. I can always tell the state of Soviet/US relations by how forthcoming he is.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Then more supply is needed.

Dr. Kissinger: I hear that the supply is a problem now.

FM Gromyko: It is true. I have heard that the fish in the Caspian Sea are going more over to the Iranian side, perhaps because there is less pollution. You know we have a big fish called the Beluga. One fish can give a 100 kilos of caviar. These fish are in the Volga in Siberia, and in Lake Baikal. You know Lake Baikal is very beautiful.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, Anatoliy showed me a film about that once. It was very beautiful.

Ambassador Dobrynin: If you go there we will make another film of it, with you there. We will call it “Lake Baikal and Henry”—or “Henry and Lake Baikal,” whichever you prefer.

Dr. Kissinger: I may bring a movie star with me next time to the Soviet Union. General Antonov\(^5\) will be pleased.

Ambassador Dobrynin: There is a story about Hammarskjold and Khrushchev.\(^6\) Khrushchev invited Hammarskjold to come out in a boat.

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\(^3\) Kissinger visited Moscow from September 9 to 15. See Documents 37–39 and 41–44.

\(^4\) See Document 46.

\(^5\) Sergei Antonov, General, KGB.

\(^6\) Dag Hammerskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations from April 1953 to September 1961, and Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU from September 1953 to October 1964.
This was at Pitsunda on the Black Sea. Hammarskjold thought it would be a big boat where he could sit on the bridge and drink his cocktail; it turned out to be a two-man row boat. Not only did Hammarskjold have to row—this was probably the first physical thing he ever did in his life—but also there was no room for an interpreter. So the two of them were out there alone for almost an hour and could not speak a word. When they came back Hammarskjold said it was an excellent conversation!

There is also a story about Kosygin and Castro who went out in a small boat. Their interpreter had to swim along behind them! But the interpreter was a cowardly bureaucrat and did not admit that he could not swim. So the interpreter would push his head above water and translate—glub, glub—and then disappear again beneath the water!

FM Gromyko: It was simultaneous translation!

Dr. Kissinger: You knew Roosevelt, didn’t you? You were at Yalta. What was your impression of his health?

FM Gromyko: He was healthy but tired. He had a very far away look.

Amb. Dobrynin: What were the relations between Roosevelt and Stalin?

FM Gromyko: Once when we were at Yalta, Stalin, Molotov and I visited President Roosevelt at Livadia Palace, which the President was using as a residence. When we were leaving and going down the stairs Stalin said to us, “He is a very good and very able man. Why has nature punished him?”

Dr. Kissinger: You know, before his paralysis he was a very frivolous man. He had the reputation of being a playboy. Mr. Foreign Minister, you have an astonishing range of experience in your career.

FM Gromyko: At Yalta, Stalin was having dinner with us. We were all sitting around a table like this. Beria was sitting here, and Molotov and myself. We were at the Yusupov Palace. Stalin turned to Beria on his right and said, ”You know, you are a Russian Himmler”, and everybody laughed. Stalin laughed, Molotov laughed, I laughed.

Dr. Kissinger: Did Beria laugh?

FM Gromyko: Yes!

Dr. Kissinger: He loses either way, if he agrees or if he does not agree!

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7 Fidel Castro, Prime Minister of Cuba.
8 Vyacheslav Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars from December 1930 to May 1941.
9 Lavrentiy Beria, head of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) from November 1938 to January 1946.
FM Gromyko: This was often the style of Stalin’s humor.

Ambassador Dobrynin: How did Stalin prepare himself for these meetings? Do the papers exist?

FM Gromyko: I don’t know. They are probably in the files.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Did he order papers from the Foreign Ministry? He did not have good relations with Molotov.

FM Gromyko: Probably. I was in Washington and I was not yet his deputy.

Ambassador Dobrynin: The Foreign Minister was Ambassador at age 33.

Dr. Kissinger: It is not unusual to want to promote able young men. The problem is how to come to someone’s attention. How did this happen?

FM Gromyko: Stalin knew me. When I was first appointed Minister-Counselor to Washington, Stalin heard about it and called me for a conversation. So later he knew me.

Dr. Kissinger: I was always enormously impressed with Stalin’s foreign policy after the war. Russia had suffered tremendously, and we had the atomic bomb. Russia was enormously weak but managed to create the impression of great strength.

FM Gromyko: But we never had so many tanks and other equipment as we did at the end of the war.

Dr. Kissinger: But it took great strength of will on Stalin’s part to create the impression.

FM Gromyko: Stalin’s main aim was to keep the obligations with the allies. We could have taken Western Europe in a few days. But his main obligation all the time was to keep the obligations he made with our allies. And the main obligation of the allies was to keep Germany peaceful.

Dr. Kissinger: What was his greatest quality?

FM Gromyko: There were two things. A very powerful and deep intellect.

Dr. Kissinger: I believe it.

FM Gromyko: And a very strong character and will.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s enough. That is a powerful combination. I think his foreign policy before the war was correct, from the Soviet point of view. The treaty with the Germans.

FM Gromyko: We all thought at the time and afterwards that it was correct. After all, what did we agree to with the Germans? We agreed not to attack. Who can object to that?

Dr. Kissinger: But you were not ready for a war in 1939.
FM Gromyko: The result would have been the same. But yes, it would have been more difficult.

Where were you during the war?

Dr. Kissinger: I was in a very lowly position. First in the Infantry then in the Counter Intelligence Corps. In Hannover during the occupation I put up a poster that all of those who were interested in police work should come to us. So one day a man came to me, and I said “What were you doing during the war?” He said, “I was with the Staatspolizei.” I didn’t think this was significant, so I said jokingly, “The Geheime Staatspolizei? He said, “Sure!” So I arrested him. He was very hurt. He said, “What do I have to do to show you that I really want to work for you?” I said, “Tell me who your colleagues are.” He said, “Sure.” So he went out and rounded up 45 of his Gestapo colleagues! I was decorated for this but I didn’t do any of the work; I just gave him a driver and a police escort. Most of them were not Nazi, he said. And I believe him. It just shows their bureaucratic mentality.

FM Gromyko: What rank did you have?

Dr. Kissinger: I was a Sergeant when the war ended.

Ambassador Dobrynin: You would have been a General but unfortunately the end of the war intervened!

What is your protocol rank now?

Dr. Kissinger: I am equivalent to an Under Secretary. I could have it changed but it is not worth it.

Ambassador Dobrynin: If you go to Vietnam you could be a four-star General.

Dr. Kissinger: Anatoliy is always trying to get me to go to Vietnam.

Ambassador Dobrynin: In Vietnam if you were going to be a member of the Coalition Government the North Vietnamese would drop their proposals for a Coalition Government.

Dr. Kissinger: Each side can appoint whomever it wants! This is North Vietnamese technique, seriously; even when we agree on some points they never agree on any agreed language; they always come up with some entirely new document with new language which we have never seen before. It makes it impossible to agree on anything or to make any progress.

Ambassador Dobrynin: No, Henry, I have always meant to explain this to you. What they are trying to do is to come up with a paper that you will look at and then accept all at once. Now you always have to think it over so long.

Dr. Kissinger: This is the decisive stage in the negotiation.

Ambassador Dobrynin: What will happen?

Dr. Kissinger: We will make one more serious effort.
FM Gromyko: On the question of the rights of the four powers, the formula that our Ambassador received from you [U.S. draft of September 18, Tab A] is something that simply cannot be discussed. It cannot be discussed. I can’t imagine who it was prepared for. Let’s agree this way! With regard to the admission of the two Germanies to the United Nations—this is why the matter of rights and responsibilities was raised in the first place—the matter of rights and responsibilities simply is not touched upon; it does not arise. This is the best formula for us and for you. So as not to create the impression that it was discussed. Otherwise someone might develop a taste for reviewing these matters, and in some years from now they may want to review them.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t understand. How does it differ from what you said?

Ambassador Dobrynin: Yours said [shows copy of Soviet text handed over in Moscow, Tab B]—it mentions all sorts of things about a peace settlement and unification and so forth.

Dr. Kissinger: Unification? Where does it say that? Peace settlement? We can take that out. [He puts brackets around the clause “which they retain pending a peace settlement for Germany”].

FM Gromyko: First, the word “Germany” is mentioned. We do not know such a phenomenon. Second, a peace treaty is mentioned; this cannot be. Third, everything is in terms of whether these rights exist or they do not exist, whether we respect rights or do not respect them. We think all three points are not justified. We should not create the impression that this is being discussed, or else three or five years from now someone will develop a taste to take up the matter of rights and responsibilities.

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10 Attached but not printed at Tab A is the U.S. draft which reads: “The governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States and France . . . have agreed to support the application for UN membership when submitted by the FRG and GDR and to affirm in this connection that such membership shall in no way affect or change the four power rights and responsibilities, which they retain pending a peace settlement for Germany, or the agreements, decisions and practices and procedures which relate to them.” Kissinger bracketed the phrase, “which they retain pending a peace settlement for Germany.”

11 Reference to the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, signed September 3, 1971, by the United States, USSR, France, and the United Kingdom. The negotiations that preceded the agreement dealt with the status of West Berlin and access to and from the city. For documentation pertaining to the Berlin negotiations, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Documents 136 and 215. For the text of the Quadripartite Agreement, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1135–1143.

12 Attached but not printed. The text is contained in Document 44.
Dr. Kissinger: I can see your point with respect to the clause “which they retain pending a peace settlement for Germany.” Two of your points apply to this clause; that can be deleted. Let me tell you that the main operational difference between your version and our version, in our mind, was that we added the phrase about practices and procedures to the clause about rights and responsibilities. That was the important part for us. Your third point is about whether we should affirm these rights and responsibilities at all. On this there is a difference of opinion. The reason we feel we must have it is because by entrance into the United Nations the GDR acquires a character of sovereignty which up to now we have not admitted, and transit rights across a sovereign country are not the same as transit rights across a country whose sovereignty we did not admit.

FM Gromyko: But the strongest possible guarantee of your and the British and the French position is our wording “does not affect the question of.”

Dr. Kissinger: The real difference is that our version says, “does not affect the rights.” Your version says, “does not affect the question of the rights.”

FM Gromyko: The difference is that ours does not imply anything about substance.

Dr. Kissinger: I would say just the opposite. To affirm the rights is not to detract from them. The implication of yours is that the question is still open. So sometime in the future or someone—for example your German allies—could take advantage of this. If you affirm that it does not affect the rights and the responsibilities, then the only question open is what are these rights. The answer is in the Berlin Agreement.

FM Gromyko: But we are saying that the question can never be raised. In connection with UN membership. The phrase “does not affect [nye zatragivayetsa] is in the sense of is” not involved.”

Dr. Kissinger: What is your objection to the other language?

FM Gromyko: It means that we are discussing the question of rights and admit the possibility of changing them.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. It is an interesting point. Let me think. Now if we agreed to drop this clause about a peace settlement and if we agreed to add the phrase “the question of,” would you agree to add the phrase about practices and procedures?

Ambassador Dobrynin: Why do you need that? What does it mean?

Dr. Kissinger: If it is not affected, what difference does it make? Of course, this whole thing has already been discussed with our allies and we will have to discuss it again. Now if we take your phrase we are
saying that the whole complex of the Berlin machinery is not affected. Is that right?

FM Gromyko: The whole question is not affected.

Dr. Kissinger: That I am willing to concede. But we will place great stress on this phrase with respect to what has developed in the body of arrangements on Berlin. I can understand that you don’t want to affirm them individually, but we need some reference to the whole body.

FM Gromyko: But which “procedures”? Several questions arise from this phrase. Do you mean multilateral, bilateral?

Dr. Kissinger: But all we are saying is that they cannot be challenged on the basis of UN membership. We are not codifying them for all eternity. Our concern is not to create new pressures as a result of voting for UN membership.

FM Gromyko: Maybe we will give thought to it.

Dr. Kissinger: We will give thought to it. We ought to handle it like the Berlin thing. I understand your point exactly, and I think you understand mine. I’ll talk to Stoessel. We will give you a document which you won’t find acceptable, but we will agree ahead of time on how it will come out.

FM Gromyko: When can we get a final result?

Dr. Kissinger: What I have given you is what the allies want. We will try to nudge them in the direction of what you want. Would you consider something like “procedures, decisions and practices”—we’ll leave out “procedures”—if we dropped out the clause about peace settlement and added “the question of”?

FM Gromyko: It creates difficulties for us.

Dr. Kissinger: What I am proposing will create difficulties for me too. Home\(^{13}\) came to me and you told him that you didn’t think any declaration at all was required. Or so he thought you meant. He said to me Britain would not go along unless there was some declaration that rights and responsibilities were not affected. I will talk to Stoessel tonight and tell him what we want. I wanted it to develop more slowly, but let’s get it done. I don’t think we can do less than what I have told you. We can insert the phrase “question of,” but we need “decisions and practices.”

FM Gromyko: What decisions? Joint decisions?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

FM Gromyko: Decisions of the four parties?

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\(^{13}\) Sir Alec Douglas-Home, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.
Dr. Kissinger: That’s right. You will still get a document that looks a bit different. Then we will handle it like the Berlin negotiation. You make a counter proposal.

FM Gromyko: Not unilateral decisions, just multilateral decisions.

Dr. Kissinger: Right.

FM Gromyko: Why do you want to lay yourselves at a future time open to some review?

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t. All I am doing is to describe the body that cannot be reviewed, if we put in “question of.”

FM Gromyko: Then it is “the question of the rights, responsibilities, agreements, decisions and practices is not involved.”

Dr. Kissinger: Right.

FM Gromyko: Please think it over.

Jackson Amendment

Dr. Kissinger: Ziegler made a statement today about the Jackson Amendment. I will send it to you. The question we had asked was, does the President’s signing of the Jackson Resolution mean it is now obligatory? He said, no. The obligatory part is the treaty signed by the President and General-Secretary Brezhnev. The Jackson Amendment is advisory, but of course we will take it very seriously. [Ziegler text at Tab C]15

Ambassador Dobrynin: This was a lot of trouble. Why do you think Jackson did it?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, because he wants to be a candidate in 1976. And also he had a commitment to parts of the ABM.

Nuclear Understanding

FM Gromyko: Now the nuclear.

Dr. Kissinger: I told Anatoliy that your allies in Asia are unhappy with your UN initiative.16 They will like this even less. I haven’t asked their opinion.

14 On September 25, the Senate approved the Interim Agreement on SALT, along with a revised version of the Jackson Amendment (see footnote 2, Document 23). The White House endorsed Jackson’s amendment after he modified it by omitting the provision permitting U.S. abrogation of the agreement if any Soviet action threatened the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The White House and Jackson agreed to a substitute provision that if a U.S.–Soviet treaty on offensive nuclear arms was not negotiated by 1977, the United States could repudiate the Interim Agreement—a position that the administration had previously supported. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. III., 1969–1972, p. 897)

15 Attached but not printed is the transcript of Ron Ziegler’s October 2 White House press conference. Ziegler stated: “The Jackson Amendment, as you know, and as we have discussed here before, is advisory in nature and will be, of course, taken into account seriously in the U.S. preparation of the SALT II phase, but it does not become a part of the interim agreement which was signed by the President.”

16 See Document 52.
FM Gromyko: No one knows about this.

Dr. Kissinger: Except the English. I also mentioned it very vaguely to Bahr, but I didn’t show him anything.

FM Gromyko: And his comment was?

Dr. Kissinger: He didn’t know enough about it to say anything. But he was quite positive. Incidentally we are having him over here and having pictures taken, before the German election.

Our biggest problem still is with the nature of the document—whether it is a treaty, an agreement, or a declaration—and secondly, the nature of the obligation that should be stated. We think we have made some progress in the second paragraph.

Ambassador Dobrynin: I like that, we took it from his declaration and he says it is progress!

Dr. Kissinger: Frankly, between the President’s attention to the campaign and my attention to Vietnam, we have not had as intensive a time to devote to other matters as we wished. On Vietnam, since no one else knows anything, I have to do it. What we have done is—it is still in the form of a declaration, but we can discuss this. We have taken into account your concerns about actions by third countries. This is paragraph 1. [He hands over U.S. draft at Tab D. Gromyko and Dobrynin read it.]

We have added a new sentence. We “intend to work toward the establishment of binding obligations whereby the use of nuclear weapons would be effectively precluded.”

FM Gromyko: But it still only a goal. It is only “intend.”

Dr. Kissinger: We can strengthen it, to make it “will.” [Marks on his own copy.]

FM Gromyko [to Dobrynin in Russian]: It is not right, it is completely not right. This is sad. [To Dr. Kissinger in English] Let me be frank. It looks like the President and you are changing. This is certainly not in the spirit of the preliminary exchange between the President and the General-Secretary in Moscow. It is weaker than the basic declaration signed in Moscow.

Dr. Kissinger: Our intention was not to be weaker but to make a step forward. The President will tell you this. The problem is we have difficulty going as far as you want.

FM Gromyko: It is weaker.

Dr. Kissinger: Then that is bad drafting. It was certainly not our intention to make it weaker.
FM Gromyko: But nothing is done. There is no obligation, there is not the slightest sign of our Article 1 reflected in this. [To Dobrynin in Russian] Nothing of it remains.

Dr. Kissinger: That was not our intent. I think that a declaration that we intend to establish a binding obligation is a step forward. This was certainly not in the basic principles.

FM Gromyko: I think not, because it means that now they are afraid to undertake an obligation. This is tantamount to justifying the use of nuclear weapons.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Why is it so difficult for you to accept this? Do you intend to use it?

Dr. Kissinger: Obviously not. Because our allies are more dependent in their conception on the use of nuclear weapons in their own defense.

Ambassador Dobrynin: But this is covered by Article 3 about existing alliances.

Dr. Kissinger: Article 2 is a considerable improvement. Let us do the following: I understand your point. You think that anything that does not create a binding obligation is not a great advance. Instead of playing around with Article 1 we should consider the basic idea of Article 1—the binding obligation—and put the qualifications in the other Articles. I know you are not inviting qualifications, but your point is that if it is worth doing at all it must have a binding obligation in it and if we need qualifications we should propose those and put them in elsewhere. That’s what you are saying.

FM Gromyko: Absolutely right.

Dr. Kissinger: If so, we have been looking at it in the wrong way. We have been trying to modify Article 1. We should see if we can essentially accept Article 1 and then go through the rest of the document.

17 Article I of the latest Soviet draft, handed by Dobrynin to Kissinger on September 21, reads: “The Soviet Union and the United States of America undertake not to use nuclear weapons against each other. Accordingly the Soviet Union and the United States will build their relations so that they should not contradict the obligation assumed by the sides under this Article.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13)

18 Article III of the latest Soviet draft reads: “Nothing in this Treaty shall affect the obligations undertaken by the parties toward other states, or any obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. The Treaty shall not affect the right of individual or collective self-defense, as provided for in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.”

19 Article II of the Soviet draft reads: “The Soviet Union and the United States shall prevent such a situation when, as a result of actions by third states, they would find themselves involved in a collision with the use of nuclear weapons. In case of a military conflict involving states—not parties to this Treaty, the Soviet Union and the United States shall apply all efforts to prevent an outbreak of nuclear war.” (Ibid.)
FM Gromyko: There are plenty of qualifications already in the document.

Dr. Kissinger: I know you are not inviting qualifications. I prefer if you would not consider this as our formal reply.

FM Gromyko: You’ll have a new paper before I leave New York?
Dr. Kissinger: No. You must realize that this is a big step for us.
FM Gromyko: What should I say in Moscow?
Dr. Kissinger: You can say, as the President will say to you, we will still consider it very seriously. You have answered many of our concerns. We have not had an opportunity to devote much time to it, so we now have to face Article 1. There is no way around it. What you have now given us makes it easier for us to consider Article 1.
FM Gromyko: When do I get a definite answer?
Dr. Kissinger: Early November.
FM Gromyko: In November.

Dr. Kissinger: Definitely in November. Frankly, it depends on when I can get a day or half a day with the President alone to go over the details with him. There are many other issues on which I have wide latitude because I know his views. But on this one, I will have to discuss it with him.

**Middle East**

FM Gromyko: Alright. Now the Middle East. I would like to listen to you. I remember what you said to the General-Secretary and the Prime Minister.

Dr. Kissinger: As I told Anatoliy, we think we know how we might get a settlement with Jordan, but we don’t think it is a good idea to have a separate settlement with Jordan. So we think a settlement with Egypt is the heart of the problem. We have not spoken with anyone. We are not aware of any secret Israeli plan, whatever you may read, or any secret Israeli/Egyptian talks.

Our view is that it is important to make an initial major step with respect to Egypt. I was never wild about the idea of an interim settlement but I believe the biggest problem is to get Israel to make an initial step back. The longer it stays the way it is, the harder it will be. Therefore, we should try to get the situation into a state of flux. Without a final determination, we should approach the problem from a standpoint of security, of security zones, without raising the issue of sover-

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20 Sonnenfeldt forwarded a revised draft text to Kissinger on September 27, along with two other variants. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Map Room, Aug. 1972-May 31, 1973, 3 of 3)
eignty. For example, the notion that Egyptian sovereignty extends up to the 1967 borders but for a certain period the Sinai will be divided into zones—one zone where both sides can station their forces, other zones where there can be some patrolling but no stationed forces, and maybe a buffer zone between them. Thus, for example, Sinai could be divided into five regions. In that event Egyptian civil administration would extend immediately to the borders.

I doubt Israel would accept this. In fact I am sure Israel would not accept this without massive pressure. If it is conceivable we could perhaps apply something like it to the Golan Heights. The major problem is to get some movement, or else the situation will be frozen so no movement can ever get started. Once movement starts, other pressures can continue to work.

FM Gromyko: I have two questions. First, does the United States accept the principle of withdrawal from all occupied territory? Second, does the United States accept the principle of a package deal? An all-embracing settlement?

Dr. Kissinger: When you say all-embracing, you mean Syria, because we can get the others.

FM Gromyko: I mean vertical as well as horizontal. I mean that the Suez Canal cannot be separated from withdrawal and the Palestinian question and Gaza and . . .

Dr. Kissinger: We would like to separate out the question of the Canal, but I see that the others are related to each other. But in my view the only justified solution is one all sides can accept. We would like to make progress towards a settlement. If it can be achieved only by a global approach, we will consider a global approach. Our view up to now, which has not changed, is that we should see if we can get a settlement on the Suez Canal first.

FM Gromyko: But Egypt will not accept this.

Dr. Kissinger: So we will look at the other approach. My own view, as I have told Anatoliy, is that a global approach will lead to no settlement. This is what Israel would prefer, because it means no settlement will occur. They would love to discuss this.

FM Gromyko: What nonetheless do you think practically can be done? Before November, or after November.

Dr. Kissinger: After November we should take the principles we agreed on in Moscow and apply them concretely to each area, to Egypt, to Jordan and to Syria. And then discuss how one tries to implement the right solution—whether to pass a UN resolution or apply direct pressure. If pressure is ever to be applied to Israel, it is better to do it earlier in the Administration.
FM Gromyko: We have talked with some Arabs in New York, and they have indicated again, they have reiterated, that they can’t accept a partial settlement without it being part of a global settlement and without withdrawal of Israeli forces. Then am I right that you are not prepared now to discuss this in a concrete way?

Dr. Kissinger: To discuss what?

FM Gromyko: The whole problem.

Dr. Kissinger: The only thing I mentioned was security zones. I have said I could not come up with a very concrete plan by now. What we should discuss is what do you mean by a concrete proposal.

FM Gromyko: Speaking concretely, what do you think about withdrawal? Are you in favor of complete withdrawal or not? Second, on the question of a partial or all-embracing settlement, it is a fact that without an all-embracing settlement a partial one won’t give results, because the Arabs reject it. As for Sharm el-Sheikh you know our position: Egyptian sovereignty plus a temporary stationing of UN personnel. With respect to the Gaza, the people there must determine their own destiny.

Dr. Kissinger: All this is in the paper you gave us.

FM Gromyko: There must be some solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees. On Suez, Egypt is prepared to allow peaceful passage of Israeli shipping. With respect to Israel’s independence and sovereignty and existence, we agree to this, and the Arabs too, although without enthusiasm! With respect to guarantees, we are prepared to join with you in the most rigorous way possible, that is in the United Nations Security Council. Well, if we agreed on this, then we together could bring the necessary influence to bear on the parties concerned.

In short, what is your advice to me? What should I report to the General-Secretary on your views?

Dr. Kissinger: On the problem of guarantees, the history of UN guarantees does not create confidence that they operate when they are needed. This is the President’s view: We will work for a common position we can agree to, on the basis of the principles we reached in Moscow. But at some time, it is essential to recognize realities. The Arabs may recognize Israel’s right to exist, but the same was true of India and Pakistan before the war. The peculiarity of the Middle East is that war arises among countries who are already at war; everywhere else war arises among countries who are already at peace! What we need is some concern for security. We are prepared to bring pressure on Israel short of military pressure. We will not allow outside military pressure. Economic or moral pressures we are willing to do.

FM Gromyko: You did not reply. What should I tell the General-Secretary?
Dr. Kissinger: On some of the proposals you have suggested, we disagree. On others we agree; on others we should discuss.

FM Gromyko: When?

Dr. Kissinger: Early November, after the election. Say the 15th or the 14th or the 13th.

Amb. Dobrynin: You will need one week after the election for celebration!

[At 3:45 the meeting ended. Dr. Kissinger had to return to the White House and would come back to the Embassy at 4:15 to pick up the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador and accompany them to Camp David.]

Tab D

U.S. Draft

Washington, October 2, 1972.

DECLARATION

Guided by the objectives of strengthening world peace and international security:

Conscious that nuclear war could have devastating consequences for mankind:

Motivated by the desire to bring about conditions in which the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war could be reduced and ultimately eliminated:

Proceeding from the basic principles of relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972:

Proceeding from their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations regarding the maintenance of peace, refraining from the threat or use of force, and the avoidance of war, and in conformity with the various agreements to which either has subscribed:

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have agreed the following:

Article I.

The United States and the Soviet Union solemnly declare that their goal is to create international conditions and obligations that will re-
move the danger of nuclear war. Accordingly they will work toward
the establishment of binding obligations whereby the use of nuclear
weapons would be effectively precluded.

Article II.

The United States and the Soviet Union agree that the fulfillment
of the undertakings referred to in Article II presupposes effective elimi-
nation of the threat or use of force in international relations generally:
and, in particular, the effective elimination of the threat or use of force
in relations between themselves, by one party against the allies of the
other and by either party against third countries.

Article III.

Consistent with Articles I and II, the United States and the Soviet
Union will make every effort to ensure that actions by third countries,
including military conflicts involving states not parties to this Declara-
tion, will not result in a nuclear war.

Article IV.

Nothing in this Declaration shall affect the obligations undertaken
by the parties toward other states, or any obligations assumed under
the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Nothing in this
Declaration shall affect the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense as provided in Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
56. Memorandum for the President’s File

Camp David, October 2, 1972.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The conversation began with social talk comparing Camp David to resorts in the Caucasus, and also on the subject of General-Secretary Brezhnev’s forthcoming visit to the United States.

The President opened the conversation by saying we had to lay the groundwork for a successful visit by the General-Secretary in May. On the nuclear-use treaty we could find an agreement. The President wanted the Foreign Minister to tell the General-Secretary that the U.S. side set it as a goal. We also had to work on the Middle East early in the next term and simultaneously with the nuclear-use issue. With respect to the Middle East, the U.S. would like significant progress made before the May meeting. After the election we would have a mandate to move forcefully in this field. We could not leave the problem unsolved. We had to grapple with the problem early. The President was taking personal responsibility in these three areas—in SALT, on the Middle East, and on the nuclear treaty.

Foreign Minister Gromyko then said he wanted to thank the President for setting out his views so clearly. We could say, on the Brezhnev visit, on his behalf, there were real possibilities for this visit, growing out of developments since the summit. The visit of Dr. Kissinger to Moscow had been very helpful. The General-Secretary was preoccupied with the conditions that would surround his visit, and the President’s statement now meant that an impasse would not be permitted. The Soviet side believed that the obligations of the two powers in the document should be stronger than in the basic document of principles. (The Foreign Minister, in effect, made the Brezhnev visit conditional on the nuclear treaty.)

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. This meeting took place from 5:32 to 6:32 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) In a letter to Brezhnev, September 21, thanking the Soviet leader for the hospitality shown Kissinger in Moscow and reaffirming plans to invite Brezhnev to the United States, Nixon wrote by hand at the bottom of the letter: “I shall show Foreign Minister Gromyko the accommodations we are preparing at Camp David for you + your party. It should be beautiful there in May.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13)
The Middle East was also significant, the Foreign Minister continued. A solution was in the long-term interest of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet side was not guided by momentary considerations. They were not satisfied with the present state of affairs in the Middle East. They would take note of what we could and could not do before November, but we should be guided by the long-term interests of both countries. We should have a practical approach. If there was no progress it would pull our relations back. Here too it had to be found that withdrawal from Arab territories was essential. Both sides had to be prepared to exercise joint efforts.

The conversation then turned to Vietnam. The Foreign Minister said the Soviet side was convinced it was an acute problem in relations between our two countries. It had a great influence on our relations. If the problem was removed, this could improve U.S.-Soviet relations.

The President said he wanted to cover this subject privately. When Dr. Kissinger next went to Paris he would lay on the table a comprehensive proposal to settle the war. If the U.S. were dealing with the Soviet Union, we would be able to settle this next week. This would be our final proposal, the President emphasized. It would be the ultimate, the last offer we could make. If the other side said no, then the negotiation track was closed. We would then have to turn to some other methods, the election having been concluded. It was our final proposal, he repeated.

Foreign Minister Gromyko replied with some laudatory words about Dr. Kissinger’s role in the negotiations. The conversation then ended.
57. National Security Study Memorandum 162


TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT

US Position on the Soviet UN Proposals for Non-Use of Force and Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The President has directed that a study be prepared on US approaches in dealing with the Soviet proposal for a General Assembly Resolution on the renunciation of the use of force and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The study should include a brief review of the background to this issue, including previous Soviet proposals on this issue in the UN or otherwise, proposals by other countries, pertinent UN Resolutions, and past US positions. In addition, the study should set forth the current US positions for handling this item, the attitude of UN members, and options that the US might adopt for dealing with the issue in the UN. The study should include a brief analysis of Soviet motives and objectives in submitting their proposal and the consequences of its adoption.

This study should be developed by an Ad Hoc Group, chaired by a representative of the Department of State, and comprised of representatives of the addressees of this memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council Staff. The study should be forwarded to the Senior Review Group by October 11.

Henry A. Kissinger

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–207, NSSM 151–NSSM 200. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the JCS. Sonnenfeldt forwarded the NSSM to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, September 30, which reads: "As you requested, we have asked for a quick interagency paper on this issue." (Ibid., Box H–194, NSSM 162)

2 See Document 52.
58. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS
Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Senators Fulbright, Javits, Symington, Scott, Mansfield, Aiken, Sparkman, Spong, Percy, Muskie, and Cooper
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Tom Korologos, White House Staff
David Abshire, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.]

Senator Fulbright: Are the Russians helping us at all [on Vietnam]?

Dr. Kissinger: Both the Russians and Chinese are Communists. This sets limits on what they can do. I don’t believe they can actually cut off aid. There is strong evidence that the Russians are urging them seriously to accept our proposals—our previous proposals, which don’t even go as far as our current ones. As far as the Chinese are concerned, we have received a sensitive report of a very fundamental criticism by the Chinese of the whole Vietnamese strategy. And there is collateral evidence: The North Vietnamese Ambassador delivered to Chou En-lai a three-page document listing all their grievances and their demands for support. The Chinese newspaper then had a two-line item in reply that “this was the nature of U.S. imperialism and that the Vietnamese people would win their just struggle.” This is not exactly overwhelming support. There is another sort of example. I was in Moscow when Le Duc Tho was there. I saw Brezhnev for 25 hours; Le Duc Tho saw the Number 14 member of the Politburo for an hour and a half. Soviet statements used to talk about support for the “ultimate victory of their sister socialist state.” This time the Soviets only talked about their support for the “defense of their sister socialist state.”

Whether this is enough? I know you have heard this from two, maybe three Administrations. All I can say is how it looks to us. The Vietnam war has indeed an unusual ability to break people’s hearts.

[Omitted here is discussion of Europe and SALT.]

Senator Percy: There are a lot of questions I would like to ask you about: Japan, and your trade talks with Gromyko, but particularly the Soviet Jewry question.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1026, Presidential/HAK Memcons. Confidential. The meeting took place at the Senate Office Building.
Dr. Kissinger: I have often noticed that analysts and intelligence people always assume that the other government is rational and they therefore ascribe horrible reasons for things that may possibly be just a horrible foul-up. Now I don’t exclude that the head tax was put on by some junior administrative official trying to score some political points, without any overall view or any view of the consequences. I have reason to believe this. At the same time you have to remember that the Soviet Union does not routinely allow emigration in the first place.

We are of course opposed to it. The question is the most effective way of dealing with it. We have to oppose formal steps, but I can see utility of the Senate registering its concern in a non-obligatory way. But at some point the public pressure has to stop. Once this concern is registered, the best act of statesmanship would be to give them some months to dig out, that is, if they want to dig out. If there is a confrontation they cannot possibly yield to what they see as interference in their domestic affairs.

Now on these negotiations themselves, the trade talks. We want to make deals that are in the interest of the United States. We don’t consider the trade agreements as doing the Soviets a favor. The deals give more elements of the Soviet bureaucracy more of a stake in good relations with us. They make them more dependent on commercial relations with the outside world. Now I don’t say that this will avoid a major war, but maybe in marginal cases it will have an impact. The irony is we were denounced for linkage, we were criticized for being too tough with them, and now we are told that we are giving the store away. There is a big difference between saying that the general political atmosphere has to be conducive to trade relations—that is, saying that unless they behave responsibly in general in keeping the peace, we cannot see a place for trade relations—and on the other hand pressing them for concessions in a very specific domestic legislative area. This would only prove what the hardliners have always said would happen if they opened themselves to trade relations—and on the other hand pressing them for concessions in a very specific domestic legislative area. This would only prove what the hardliners have always said would happen if they opened themselves to trade relations with the United States—namely blackmail. In an area not unrelated to this question, take the Middle East. Read what Sadat said. You know that the Russians showed restraint there; that is why he kicked them out.

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2 On October 4, Kissinger told Rabin in a telephone conversation with regard to the Soviet exit tax: “I had a talk with Gromyko and with Dobrynin. Now but this is only for the Prime Minister [Meir]. I talked to them about it. They both said it was a stupid mistake by a Ministry that they didn’t know anything about and if they had known about it, it wouldn’t have happened. Then Gromyko asked me, but unfortunately, it was in the hearing of someone else, what I would recommend as a personal advice how they could get out of the situation. And I said well, one advice would be to see what they can do about the implementation. And he said well, maybe we’ll publish some administrative rules.” (Ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations [Telcons], Box 14, Chronological File) Information about Kissinger’s conversation with Gromyko appeared on the front page of the Washington Evening Star.
Now our policy is this: We will make no agreement that cannot stand on its own feet. We will make it dependent to some extent on their overall restraint in the conduct of foreign policy. But we don’t want to try to blackmail them on specific items, especially ones that they consider within their domestic jurisdiction. On the trade agreement, it will be done within the next few weeks. It will include the following: a settlement of the lend-lease debt in terms larger than some thought, although this will be discussed; almost our maximum program in terms of trade centers, international arbitration, particular rules on convertibility (they are even coming over on copyright, though this will be a separate matter); and some protection against dumping.

So I think of the Trade Agreement as one which can establish a whole new order of U.S.-Soviet political relations. When they are engaged in joint projects with us, in many intangible and some tangible ways they will have to consider the risks they will run in a crisis. It is unfortunate that it had to come in the context of this reprehensible head tax. Were it not for this, all you gentlemen would see it clearly as representing a major change in the political relationship with the Soviet Union. We have negotiated this a long time and we feel that we cannot fail to go through with it.

Senator Symington: Is there anything in this multi-billion dollar natural gas deal in Siberia? 3

Dr. Kissinger: This is one of the things they want in there.

Senator Fulbright: They want, or we want?

Dr. Kissinger: They. But this will be mostly done by private capital.

[At this point a bell rang and the group decided to go onto the floor for a vote and then come back. On the way out Senator Symington said, “What I get from you Henry is the idea that for this we got them to press Hanoi.” Dr. Kissinger replied, “that is part of it, but nevertheless the terms of these agreements have to be commercially acceptable.” At 6:00 p.m. the group returned.] 4

Senator Muskie: It might be of interest if you could tell us the extent to which the President has discussed with the Soviet leaders the question of Soviet Jewry. I discussed it with the Soviets once and I know their reaction.

Dr. Kissinger: Their reaction used to be explosive, even when there was no specific grievance involved. A total refusal to discuss it. In this case I took it up when I was there, at several levels; I did it again this week, Secretary Rogers did it. They are more defensive this time. The

3 See Document 69.
4 Brackets in the original.
problem is, they cannot be seen to yield to outside pressure, but they are more prepared to discuss it than on any previous occasion.

[Omitted here is discussion of SALT and European security.]

Dr. Kissinger: The biggest problem in arms control is to insure that nuclear war becomes, remains, an absurdity.

Senator Fulbright: Right.

Dr. Kissinger: We hope to get into the position where even the most mediocre leader will realize instantly that the decision to launch nuclear war means national suicide.

Senator Fulbright: I think nuclear war is irrelevant now. All this together makes it now irrelevant. Do you think the Soviets have this understanding?

Dr. Kissinger: At the level of Brezhnev they have this understanding. But toward the end of the SALT negotiations in Moscow, we negotiated with a man named Smirnov, a Deputy Prime Minister, who is in charge of all their defense programs and who is a fanatic.

Senator Fulbright: Like Foster. 5

Dr. Kissinger: I won’t compare them! When I talked with him, I gave an attenuated version of what I have just told you now about our purpose in the negotiations being to make all these weapons unusable. This prompted a tremendous outburst. It was very shocking to him to say such things about the weapons he was in charge of! I even had Gro- myko on my side, and we finally calmed him down.

You know at the beginning of SALT I the Soviet Foreign Ministry officials engaged in the negotiations didn’t even know the numbers of the Soviet missiles. All of this information was restricted to the military people. On any military question the judgment of the professional military is conclusive, and Foreign Ministry people are not entitled to comment. So what worries me about the Soviet Union is not that their leaders have some master plan for superiority—which I don’t believe—but that their bureaucracy will just keep on busily working away and these programs will continue. Now in this period when one thinks of the decision that is required, this is the problem. What might happen if they do achieve some nuclear advantage is that they will show greater boldness in local crises.

Senator Scott: There are some activists here who think there is a great advantage in destroying everything, so the world can start over again purified.

Dr. Kissinger: That is beyond rationality. In my view the top Soviet leaders are tough and brutal but they are not mad men.

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Senator Cooper: Khrushchev once said to Kennedy, just before Kennedy became President, that the U.S. really wants to make war. Now do the Soviets still talk like that?

Dr. Kissinger: No. We can even compare the three times that Gromyko has talked with the President. The first year all it consisted of was formal statements on both sides and little else. Last year there was a little more conversation. This year it was a much more relaxed conversation. They talked back and forth about issues the way people really talk. Even since my April trip—then Gromyko was reading from a set-piece Foreign Ministry paper; now we have a much looser conversation. There is more of a sense that we two are the only two nations who could blow up the world, and there is a realization that they and we have managed a number of things together successfully—the Berlin Agreement, the Trade Agreement, SALT and the new SALT. So I think the pattern of thinking of Soviet leaders is changing. They are less boisterous certainly than Khrushchev.

Senator Sparkman: Will you be starting negotiations soon on the mutual reduction of forces and the European Security Conference?

Dr. Kissinger: The tentative plan is to have a preparatory meeting on the Security Conference at the end of November and have a preparatory meeting on MBFR at the end of January, and then the substantive meeting on the European Security Conference would be in June and the substantive meeting on MBFR would begin around September.

Senator Sparkman: Are the prospects good?

Dr. Kissinger: The European Conference is not a very difficult thing. MBFR on the other hand is a bitch of a problem. In SALT you realize you had two nations and only a few categories of weapons systems, and yet those were tremendously complicated negotiations. In MBFR, you are dealing with 13 nations and a whole range of weapons categories. But I am quite optimistic on that one too.

Senator Fulbright: In trade you mentioned the $10 billion gas deal.

Dr. Kissinger: Actually there are many different fields. How we slice it up is not yet clear.

[The meeting thereupon came to an end.]

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7 See ibid., Documents 337 and 338.

8 See Document 56.

59. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Soviet Jewry

Leonard Garment’s memorandum of September 19 reviews various aspects of the Soviet Jewry issue including the political problems we may confront with regard to the imposition of exit fees on would-be Soviet emigrants.

There can be no doubt that the Soviet Government views this issue as lying totally within its internal jurisdiction. The Soviets believe themselves under no obligation and do not wish, as a general rule, even to discuss this internal issue with other governments.

Viewing in this perspective, I believe the current U.S. policy on Soviet Jewry and the related problem of exit fees is the correct policy and should be continued in the coming weeks. Under this policy, the United States shows deep sympathy toward the problems being experienced by Soviet Jews. At the same time, we maintain the correct diplomatic posture.

In brief, the U.S. policy on Soviet Jewry states that the United States Government deeply sympathizes with the plight of those who are denied the fundamental human right of emigration. It offers the assurance that the steadfast commitment of the United States to the principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been made known to the Soviets.

While criticism of this policy can be expected from various quarters, especially prior to the election, I believe it is a policy which is respected by responsible Jewish leaders in the United States. Further, we should not let the possibility of Congressional moves linking improved U.S.-Soviet trade relations to the Soviets’ dropping of the exit fees dictate a change in U.S. policy. This issue does not have to be faced until after a trade agreement has been reached and parts of that agree-

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 721, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Vol. XXVI. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Under a September 22 covering memorandum, Sonnenfeldt forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger, with the recommendation that he sign it. (Ibid., Box 720, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Vol. XXV)

2 Document 48.

3 Nixon underlined most of this sentence and wrote in the margin: “I agree.”
ment, as required, are submitted for Congressional approval. At that time, I believe the Administration will be able to offer a sound defense of its policies on Soviet Jewry and improved U.S.-Soviet trade.

Accordingly, I do not think it would be wise to branch out with new policy moves on Soviet Jewry at this time. I would specifically recommend against the idea of encouraging the establishment of a non-governmental commission that would get involved with compensation to the Soviets for Soviet Jewish emigrants.4

4 Nixon bracketed the entire paragraph, underlined its first sentence, and wrote at the bottom of the page: "K—I totally agree. If the U.S. Jewish groups go for McGovern—that gives us a freer hand to do what is right for U.S.—as distinguished from internal Jewish political interests."

60. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Commerce Peterson1

Washington, October 13, 1972, 11:10 a.m.

HK: Pete, how are you?

PP: Welcome back. Hope you had a great trip.2 We got both a solution and a problem. We have had the world’s worse time on maritime3 that you and I should sit down and discuss, but I just got—

HK: Dobrynin called me last night and asked me if I was backing your position and I said absolutely.4 It was world price plus a dollar.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 16, Chronological File. No classification marking.

2 Kissinger was in Paris from October 7 to October 12 to meet with Le Duc Tho.

3 There was a dispute between Peterson and Soviet Minister for Merchant Marine Timofey Guzhenko, in Washington for negotiations since September 27, regarding the maritime agreement. Specifically, they differed over the general rate per ton to be charged to the USSR for the carriage of cargo on U.S.-flag vessels. Dobrynin and Kissinger discussed the negotiations during a telephone conversation, October 6, in which Kissinger told Dobrynin that Peterson was asking for the world price plus $2.00. Dobrynin responded that it would create difficulties if he had to cable Moscow “without any explanation that we have to pay world rate plus $2.00.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 16, Chronological File)

4 A record of Kissinger’s October 12 telephone conversation with Dobrynin is ibid.
PP: Yeh, plus $10 is the way it’s going to work out.

HK: Or whatever.

PP: But just thought that was extremely desirable given all of the—

HK: Yeh, I backed you and he said he’d give on it.

PP: This is what I heard last night—but I didn’t know if you knew that. So I think we are now virtually in shape probably for signing tomorrow. Now on the lend-lease issue, there is still an awful lot of stickiness on this interest rate question and they claim there was an understanding and all that sort of business. I would like you to think about a concept that maybe you can’t react quickly, I don’t know, but it’s as follows. Keep in mind the way we are going to merchandize this thing to the public is to use a British settlement—and I have never taken you through these numbers except to demonstrate to you you will recall, that if we use the principle based on the British settlement, it is much, much less than 500M—it’s numbers like 200 300 400 M dollars which permits us to claim a healthy interest rate—now the difficulty we have in inserting numbers like we are now talking about which is 3 and they say only 2.7 on a mortgage basis and this kind of business is in the middle of this nice rhetoric about good interest rates, we got a much lower interest rate number. Now there are two possibilities that occur to me—both of which are somewhat different than your understanding but I don’t want to try them unless you in general approve. Suppose Henry for the moment we didn’t have any interest rates announced and one alternative would be to add the interest rate at, you know, whatever it is, 2.9, 2.8 or 3.0 to the 7.25 and come up with a new global sum of 7.60 let’s say, which would then say that there are postponements, you know, that they can take, now the advantage—

HK: Yeh, I understand.

PP: Okay—the advantages of that are obvious—it’s global, we don’t get interest rates, the disadvantage that it obviously triggers—that they are going to take postponements which is both an advantage and a disadvantage, given what we all know. The second approach would be to say it is two numbers—either the number we have or the larger number—depending upon whether they do take settlements—I mean postponements and the payments we have agreed on are such and such and avoid the interest rate question—

HK: Yeh, but who will be bothered by the goddamn interest rate?

PP: Well, the people who will be bothered by it are the people whom we are saying we got a damn good interest rate on—the Congress and others, we can demonstrate a fabulous interest rate based on the British deal, and what I am trying to do Henry is get off of this 500M dollar wicket which I think is the wrong wicket to be on—I think we can say the 500M included back interest and should not be consid-
ered a principle—but that get’s us to using British principle calculation. My question is if they are willing to do it how would you feel about it—or would you rather we would not discuss it or what? I think it is better and so do most people think it is better than what we got now. And my assumption is they have had to go all the way up to the top anyway, to review this interest rate question, so it isn’t as though it’s going back—

HK: My concern is that—I made a deal in Moscow\(^5\) and I have got to preserve the position and when I make a deal it isn’t the beginning of another goddamn negotiation, but it sticks.

PP: Right. Now your deal I think Henry—I don’t think you have any idea how much interest was involved. Your real deal was obviously 7 and a quarter plus 35.

HK: I understand that.

PP: So you’re not going back on your word at all. It is just the question of whether it is presented as a global number or not—the essence of the deal is identical because they are going to take them right if there is any question about that.

HK: But then we have to say right away we have reason to believe they are going to take them?

PP: That is the disadvantage of the first option—they would obviously be taking them—on the other hand the number is bigger—the second option just gives you two ranges—

HK: That is impossible—that requires too much explanation.

PP: What do you mean—the 7.25 and the 7.60?

HK: Yeh. That’s just too cute. I mean the 7.60 has a certain advantage—

PP: Because under that we’d never get an interest rate—would say it’s a theological issue, we don’t want to get into it, and we interpret it one way and they interpret it another way.

HK: That’s right.

PP: I have a feeling they’d at least consider it, but I do not want to be—

HK: Well you see his\(^6\) problem is this: he obviously claimed at home, he scored a spectacular victory by getting me down to 7.25, I think he was willing to settle for 7.50, I let him have those .25 because I wanted him to win something.

PP: Right, I understand perfectly.

HK: Now my worry is that if we go to the higher figure, he has the same bunch of clucks at home that we are trying to bamboozle here.

\(^5\) See Document 41.

\(^6\) Brezhnev.
PP: Yeh, but my assumption is Henry it was with all the wires going back and forth now this issue of interest on postponements—

HK: The average American will just consider it a good deal anyway.

PP: Yeh, for him the larger the better—the number you see.

HK: Well, that’s right but if—it’s not that much, you know, what the hell, because he figured nothing—I mean every congressman I have talked to thinks around $500—you have been terrific on that.

PP: What I think Henry, I don’t hear you responding to this point by now the issue of interest on postponements, I assume has been thoroughly ventilated—

HK: Not that part of it—I am just wondering from—I am more interested in him looking good than in our looking good.

PP: Right, but now let me tell you what I would do. If we were to go to the second basis which gets us out of interest rates totally, then I’d be willing to yield another 1⁄10 point—.1 or .2 for precisely the reason you mentioned. It makes him look good and who the hell cares over here whether it is 7.60 or 7.56. And then that gets their friend Alkhimov off the hook because he is in real trouble.

HK: Well, let me think about it for 15 minutes and call you back?

PP: All right, I am in the middle of meetings so I will be listening to you when you call—because Patolichev will be in there.

HK: Okay good.

PP: All right.7

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7 In a subsequent telephone conversation at noon, Kissinger told Peterson: “Pete, my instinct is this—I would do whatever is easier for the Russians and rather take the heat on a lower interest rate. I mean, if you can get the higher figure as a global sum without getting them climbing walls, fine. I think we ought to settle for what we’ve got because I think we’ve tested their patience enough.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 16, Chronological File)
Washington, October 14, 1972, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting with Minister Guzhenko

PARTICIPANTS
Minister Timofey B. Guzhenko
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Secretary Peter G. Peterson
Peter M. Flanigan

The purpose of the meeting was to provide an opportunity for the President to briefly meet Minister Guzhenko after the successful conclusion of negotiations on the US–USSR Maritime Agreement. The Agreement was signed immediately prior to this meeting at the Department of Commerce.

Under the Agreement a third of all the grains purchased by the Soviet Union, as well as other US–USSR trade, will be available for carriage in American bottoms. Ships of both countries will be free to call at 40 ports in each country. Oceanographic ships will also have port privileges.

Both the President and Minister Guzhenko agreed that the negotiations had been difficult, especially with regard to rates, but that the current Agreement will be of great future benefit to both countries. The President stressed his appreciation to the Soviets for their understanding of our position. The President stated that although the Agreement has a narrow focus, the implications are broad for the continuing good relations between our two countries. As our two nations get closer together through this Maritime Agreement, the President indicated that it should help our two countries become closer on political

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President’s Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 90, October 8, 1972. No classification marking. The meeting took place in the Oval Office from 11:33 to 11:53 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

2 For the text of the agreement, with memoranda of understanding and an exchange of letters (23 UST (Pt.4) 3573–3687), see Department of State Bulletin, December 4, 1972, pp. 664–665. The agreement was summarized in The New York Times, October 15, 1972, p. 1.

3 The final agreement provided for a rate of $9.40 per ton for the carriage of Soviet freight on U.S. flag vessels with the exception of Soviet grain purchases, which would be carried at a 10 percent higher rate.
matters. As an example of this the President referred to Julie's warm welcome from the Soviet sailors on the Tovarishch in Baltimore. Both the President and Minister Guzhenko felt that this successful Agreement will set the proper atmosphere for future trade negotiations.

Minister Guzhenko extended a personal thank you to the President for allowing Julie to come to the Tovarishch. He also extended an invitation to both Julie and Tricia to visit the USSR in the near future.

Secretary Peterson expressed his gratitude to Minister Guzhenko for his cooperation in the difficult negotiations.

The President gave a set of cuff links to Minister Guzhenko.

Ambassador Dobrynin then gave the President a private message.

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5 Tricia Nixon Cox, Nixon’s elder daughter.

6 The message was a letter from Brezhnev to Nixon, October 12. Referring to Kissinger’s most recent visit to Moscow, September 9–15, and Gromyko’s visit to Washington, October 2–3, Brezhnev wrote: “As a whole, for the last weeks we managed, in my view, to do something useful in a sense of further moving ahead on the way of the general improvement and deepening of the Soviet-American relations. Of course, both we and you see that the solution of certain questions is not in such fast progress as one would wish it to be; it is not infrequently that difficulties and complications arise even with regard to those questions a definite agreement on which has been earlier achieved as, for example, on the Maritime agreement. I hope that negotiations on trade and economic questions now under way in Washington will lead to the signing of the projected agreements which would constitute another important link in the relations between our countries that are being improved.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13)
Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As you know, one of the remaining issues in the effort to achieve a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict relates to the question of restricting military supplies to both North and South Vietnam by outside powers. The DRV has insisted that there can be no international restrictions on the amount of military aid it will receive from outside powers while on the other hand there must be precisely such restrictions in regard to aid for South Vietnam.

While I am prepared to accept limitations on American military aid to South Vietnam under the terms of a settlement, you will I am sure understand that a one-sided limitation will not be understood by the American public, on whose support the viability of any agreement depends. Moreover, such a one-sided arrangement would violate the principle of reciprocity and equality of commitments which must be the foundation of any lasting settlement—and which is the foundation upon which it has been possible to build the significant progress that has been achieved in our own bilateral relations in the recent period.

In view of your stated interest in an early settlement of the Vietnam conflict, Mr. General Secretary, it therefore becomes important for me to have a clear indication of your own intentions regarding the supply of military aid to North Vietnam in the event of a settlement.

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2 During their telephone conversation at 9:55 a.m., Kissinger told Dobrynin that if the Nixon administration knew Moscow’s intentions with regard to military supplies to North Vietnam after a peace settlement, “it would really then enable us to take greater risks.” Kissinger continued: “It seems to me you know, I don’t want to speak for your government, it seems to me improbable that you would—that under conditions of peace your incentive would certainly—would seem to me to be less.” Kissinger subsequently added that such a Soviet commitment “might then enable us to make a very rapid settlement.” Dobrynin replied: “Well, it’s a rather difficult question, but of course I will send immediately this [letter] to the First Secretary because it is a question of rather serious importance as you perfectly understand.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 15, Chronological File)
The question of how any restrictions may be formulated in the actual agreement on the settlement is less important than the actual conduct, in practice, of the country which is after all the principal military supplier of the North Vietnamese. To be quite frank and specific, therefore, I am writing this letter to you in our private channel to ask you whether your Government would be prepared to express intentions in regard to military supplies to North Vietnam in case a rapid peace settlement is arrived at. Such an indication from you would do much to accelerate agreement between the U.S. and the DRV.

I know that you will recognize that this is a crucial aspect of any settlement of the conflict in Vietnam and that it will require urgent attention if such a settlement is to be achieved in the near future.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

63. Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Group for National Security Study Memorandum 162

Washington, undated.

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 162

U.S. Position on the Soviet UN Proposals for Non-Use of Force and Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

[Omitted here are the table of contents and sections 1 through 7.]

8. Options

The evaluation of various options which follows is intended to facilitate a decision on the posture which the United States should adopt now toward the Soviet draft resolution. That posture must be subject to further review as the Assembly debate unfolds for a number of reasons.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–194, NSSM 162. Secret. Eliot sent the study to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, October 17. Davis forwarded it to the Senior Review Group under a covering memorandum, October 25. (Ibid.) The group, chaired by a Department of State representative, included members from the JCS and NSC. NSSM 162 is Document 57. For the full text of this study, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, Document 346.

2 See Document 52.
The Soviets are probably not willing to accommodate the Chinese but might perhaps be willing to amend their resolution to gain the support of the U.S. and others. They might, for example, be willing to make clear that the use of nuclear weapons is included in the prohibition of the use of force and delete the language regarding a “decision” by the Security Council. On the other hand, they might be pressed by some LDC’s to include objectionable language reflecting the position that assistance to national liberation groups is not covered by the resolution.

Also, it is not yet clear what positions other countries will be adopting toward the resolution, i.e., whether the resolution is seriously or lightly regarded, whether it is seen as involving essentially a USSR–PRC confrontation and, if so, whether there is a general disposition to stand back from it. It is not even clear at this stage that the Soviets will press their resolution to a vote if it receives scanty support. The unfolding of these variables could not only redefine the language and interpretation of the resolution but will also determine whether it is a matter of greater or lesser political significance.

The Ad Hoc Group has considered and discarded a completely “neutral” posture. Although it may be possible for the U.S. to hide behind others to some extent in relation to the proposal, it will not be possible to remain completely non-committal because of past U.S. positions on non-use of force and because a complete failure to express U.S. reservations would be immediately misunderstood by others as leaning in the Soviet direction. The delegation could, however, regardless of what final position the U.S. might take on the substance of the matter, adopt a position of relative inactivity. This could govern our initial posture in deciding whether to speak in the debate, whether to seek amendments either directly or through others, and whether to seek or encourage the introduction of competing resolutions. Whatever position is adopted by the U.S., close consultation with our Allies is essential.

A. Support Resolution in its Present Form

In seeking our support the Soviets have sought to interpret their resolution as ruling out all use of force, conventional and nuclear, but as permitting use of all means (including nuclear) by a country that is attacked. This, of course, is essentially our position with regard to the defense of Western Europe, and the Soviets may have some hope that

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3 China objected to the USSR’s proposal because it failed to distinguish between aggression and self-defense. China favored a no-first-use policy regarding nuclear weapons, which the USSR refused to accept. Thus, the Soviet proposal would have allowed the USSR to retaliate with nuclear weapons, if they were attacked first, regardless of the type of weaponry used. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1972, pp. 9–11)
we will associate ourselves with their initiative or at least go along with it. Conceivably we could do so, explaining to the PRC that this is our traditional position and that our support of it in the UNGA is not intended to have any special significance relative to USSR–PRC relations. It seems highly unlikely that the PRC would accept any such explanation. The Chinese would almost certainly treat our position as a deliberate and direct association with the USSR on the most sensitive and important security issue between it and the USSR.

As for our European allies, we could also attempt to persuade them that we were only reiterating the fundamental position which validated our nuclear deterrent in Europe, but they would almost certainly be dismayed at what they would regard as a radical change in the U.S. position. They would point out that the interpretation we were attributing to the Soviet resolution could hardly be derived from a direct reading of its text. They would undoubtedly see our position as a departure from our traditional insistence on the invalidity of unenforceable “prohibitions of the use of nuclear weapons” and would regard that reversal as casting new and fundamental doubts on our political will to make the nuclear deterrent effective.

Pro

—Would contribute to possibility that Soviets might be willing to be more forthcoming toward us in other contexts.
—Puts US on affirmative side of so-called “peace initiative.”

Con

—Would raise serious doubts among our Allies about the reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
—Would clearly be regarded by the PRC as U.S. taking sides with the Soviets against them.
—Would attribute a more serious nature to Soviet proposal than most other countries now seem inclined to give it.
—Would acquiesce in a most undesirable precedent affirming Security Council competence to revise Charter treaty obligations and establish general rules of conduct binding on members.
—Would be inconsistent with our traditional position that reiteration of UN Charter principles is unnecessary and can detract from the Charter.

B. Support or Accept Resolution if Suitably Amended

Within this option we could seek amendments which would make the resolution acceptable to us, either submitting these ourselves or urging friendly countries to do so. Alternatively, we could be prepared only when asked to tell the Soviets and others what changes would
permit us reluctantly to go along with the resolution if it were then generally acceptable in the GA.

For the resolution to be acceptable to us, it would have to make clear that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is not a separate matter but is included in the general prohibition of the use of force, the language regarding the Security Council would have to be removed, and the resolution would have to be entirely consistent with the UN Charter. The Ad Hoc Group believes the U.S. should not accept any exceptions to the prohibition on non-use of force for national liberation groups.

If the Soviet Union were prepared to move to a resolution acceptable to us, the PRC might find itself isolated. In this situation, the PRC could either support directly, abstain, oppose, or suggest a procedure such as acceptance of the resolution by the UNGA by acclamation (thus avoiding a vote). This latter procedure was used, for example, in relation to last year’s World Disarmament Conference resolution when the PRC apparently wanted to avoid having to have its vote recorded.4

Pro

—Might afford better chance of resolution ultimately acceptable to our friends, especially in NATO.
—Might possibly reduce friction between PRC and Soviets on this issue and reduce the possibility of the U.S. being caught in the middle.
—Would still put the U.S. in a relatively affirmative posture toward so-called “peace initiative.”
—Would be consistent with U.S. view that prohibition of nuclear force is included within and subject to Charter’s general rule on non-use of force.
—Would appear consistent with U.S. willingness in other contexts (e.g., US/USSR Declaration of Principles) to support adoption of non-use of force principles if properly formulated.
—Might be regarded by the Soviets as helpful if they are otherwise faced with defeat of their resolution.

Con

—Might still carry negative implications, particularly for some of our allies, regarding the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent—unless the amendments were to result in a text completely acceptable to us and all our allies.
—Collaboration with Soviets would have political overtones for our allies regardless of substance of our consultations.

4 See footnote 3, Document 52.
—Might still be considered by the PRC as favoring a Soviet initiative at their expense, especially because of the implication that nuclear weapons would be treated as any other weapons.

—Might be viewed by the Soviets as vitiating their initiative and hence contrary to our obligation to work with them toward détente.

—Could lend credence in the eyes of LDCs to the PRC charge of “superpower collusion.”

—Would be inconsistent with our traditional position that reiteration of UN Charter Principles is not necessary and can detract from the Charter.

—Would attribute a more serious nature to Soviet proposal than most other countries now seem inclined to give it.

C. Support If Amended as in Preceding Option But With Addition of an Assurance by Nuclear States Regarding Non-Nuclear States

This Option would add a provision that nuclear states intend to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons state that is not engaged in an aggression assisted by a nuclear weapons state. This formula is very close to one advanced privately to the USSR in February 1968 (described at page 5 above). The statement of intention by the nuclear weapons states would be included in the resolution itself or could be requested by the GA for action in the Security Council. In 1968, the Soviets found the U.S. proposal “completely unacceptable” since the USSR was unwilling to give the same guarantee to countries with nuclear weapons on their territory as to those without such weapons. President Johnson withdrew authorization to use the earlier formula in April 1968.

It is unlikely that the Soviets are now willing to consider such a provision.

The U.S. delegation could either advance the proposal itself or get it advanced by a friendly country. It could be put up as a trial balloon or, alternatively, be promoted vigorously. Full advance consultation with our allies would be necessary.

Pro

—Could advance our policy of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons by reassuring non-nuclear weapon states that in certain types

—The referenced portion of the study reads as follows: “During the non-proliferation treaty negotiations in 1968, the U.S. proposed to the USSR a limited non-use of nuclear weapons undertaking for the benefit of potential non-nuclear parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Negotiations were not successful.” The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty seeks to limit the production of nuclear weapons. Open for signature beginning July 1, 1968, it went into force on March 5, 1970. Over 180 countries have signed the treaty. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XIV, Soviet Union, Document 277.
of conflicts nuclear weapons would not be used against them, thus creating a disincentive to obtaining nuclear weapons for themselves or seeking the assistance of a nuclear weapon state in an armed conflict.

—Could give the U.S. a measure of credit for leadership on a significant arms control matter.

—Would move non-use of force discussions to a more serious plane.

Con

—Would likely to be unacceptable to the Soviets, as it was in 1968.

—Might be interpreted by Soviets as an effort to destroy their initiative and, hence, contrary to our obligation to work together toward détente.

—Might not receive appreciable support because it would not apply to certain types of conflicts.

—Might lead the Soviets to issue a competing proposal protecting non-nuclear states. Such a proposal would be more attractive than our own.

—Could stimulate reopening of the issue of whether non-nuclear signatories of the NPT should receive increased security compensation for their adherence to the NPT.

— Might not be sufficient time available to consult adequately with our allies regarding a U.S. initiative of this importance.

—Might be prejudicial to careful consideration of a later initiative in subsequent arms control negotiations where it might contribute more substantially to general arms control.

D. Opposition to Resolution

Within this option there is a wide range of possible activity, from vigorous opposition in urging other governments to adopt the same position to a quiet restraint in which the delegation would indicate its difficulty with resolution only if others asked. In the voting the delegation could under this option oppose or abstain, depending upon the developing situation in New York.

The U.S. delegation would refuse to suggest any amendments, saying that the resolution is so defective that it does not warrant an effort to try to improve it. It would be possible to begin with a negative position and then move to a somewhat more affirmative one if the resolution were being changed to take into consideration our objections.

Pro

—Would reassure some NATO allies.

—Would suggest to the PRC that we are not facilitating a formula which they would view as condoning a Soviet nuclear attack or pressure against them.
—Would be consistent with our earlier position on attempts to re-state Charter Principles and with our opposition to granting the Security Council power to establish genuine and binding rules of conduct.
—Would keep us detached from troublesome amendment process where solutions satisfactory to all major participants may be unattainable.

**Con (All these liabilities would be greatly reduced if our opposition were of a quiet or restrained character rather than more obvious and active)**

—Would be resented by the Soviets, particularly as we would appear to be aligning ourselves with the PRC against them.
—If pursued actively, our position would probably not be supported by certain NATO allies, including some of our close friends, on the grounds that less aggressive tactics could be adequate to protect alliance interests.
—Could be misunderstood as opposition to a peace initiative.
—Could be distorted as an inconsistency in view of our past willingness to support non-use declarations, e.g. in the Moscow Declaration of Principles.
—Could be interpreted as attributing a more serious nature to the Soviet proposal than most other countries now seem inclined to give it.
—Might lose some opportunities to promote favorable changes in the resolution by failing to hold out the prospect of possible U.S. support if the resolution is acceptably amended.

9. **Recommendations**

The Ad Hoc Group, in view of the considerations expressed above, reached the following consensus:

Our initial stance should be a relatively inactive one. We do not think it would be reasonable to support the resolution as it is. Nor should we promote amendments initially because the Soviet initiative may fail to attract much support or even interest.

We should privately and quietly point out to the delegates the problems we see in the draft, especially the role contemplated for the Security Council, the explicit and separate prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and in general the doubtful utility of trying to refine Charter language.

We would tell others that we could not support the resolution in its present form. (One possibility is that no resolution may be voted upon as a result of Chinese-Soviet conflict on the item.)

While we would not ourselves propose amendments, if the Soviets (or others) propose some to us we would say that we would consider them. We would not give any undertaking to press such amendments
with others. We will, of course, keep in constant and close touch with our Allies regarding the resolution.

Depending on the nature of amendments offered by the Soviets and by others, and depending on the degree of interest generated by their draft resolution and by amendments to cure its deficiencies, we would then consider whether to take a more active posture and whether to move from “relatively inactive opposition” to acceptance of a suitably amended resolution.

[Omitted here are three annexes.]
64. National Security Decision Memorandum 192
Council for International Economic Policy Decision Memorandum 15¹

Washington, October 18, 1972.

TO
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT
Lend-Lease Negotiations with the USSR

REFERENCE
NSDM 190/CIEPDM 12²

The President has made the following decisions:
1. The “total Soviet obligation to the United States” referred to in paragraph 1 of the NSDM/CIEPDM under reference shall be set at $722 million.
2. The US negotiators are authorized to reduce the interest rate on deferred installments referred to in paragraph 4 of the NSDM/CIEPDM under reference to 3%.

Henry A. Kissinger³
Peter Flanigan

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–208, NSDM 151–NSDM 200, Originals. Secret; Nodis. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury.
² Document 49.
³ In message Tohak 36 to Kissinger, who was in Paris for the peace negotiations, October 18, Haig wrote: “As a result of a call from me to Dobrynin last night and a last minute crunch session among Peterson, Sonnenfeldt and Patolichev at Peterson’s house last night, the lend-lease package was settled at a surface formula of 722/3. While this was our rock bottom position, Pete is confident that he can handle it on the Hill and I believe the Soviets are returning home with the feeling that they redressed the problems resulting from the maritime agreement.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 25, HAK Paris/Saigon Trip, TOHAK, October 16–23, 1972)
⁴ Haig signed for Kissinger above Kissinger’s typed signature.
65. Memorandum for the President’s Files

Washington, October 18, 1972.

SUBJECT
Meeting with Minister Patolichev, Ambassador Dobrynin, William P. Rogers, Peter G. Peterson, Peter M. Flanigan, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt, October 18, 1972

At 2:30 on Wednesday, October 18, 1972, the President met with USSR Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolay Semenovich Patolichev, Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Secretaries Rogers and Peterson, Peter M. Flanigan and Helmut Sonnenfeldt (NSC) in the Oval Office. This meeting followed a ceremony at the State Department at which the Lend-Lease settlement and comprehensive trade agreements were signed.

Patolichev began by extending Chairman Brezhnev’s regards to the President, and the President in turn asked Patolichev to offer his regards to the Chairman. Patolichev, noting that the agreements signed earlier that day were based on the Moscow documents, said this would help toward better relations; he added that though discussions leading up to the agreements had been serious, the participation and interest of the President had been felt. The President responded that Mr. Brezhnev’s interest had also been felt as had the confidence he had shown in his minister. Patolichev confirmed that Brezhnev had indeed been kept fully informed during the discussions and would not let minor disagreements get in the way of progress.

The President observed that the agreements had significance beyond the economic interests affected and could create a climate for progress in the political field; he noted that the two countries are the most productive in the world and that this big step was appropriate to these big countries; he also expressed his desire to make more progress every year. Patolichev replied that we had just removed the obstacles and that economic action would follow shortly. The President added that he was thinking of big deals such as a gas deal.

The President asked Patolichev to tell Chairman Brezhnev that he, the President, would personally follow-up in the economic field and hoped the Chairman would also. He stated he saw the political differ-

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President’s Office Files, Box 90, Memoranda for the President, October 15, 1972. No classification marking.
2 Rogers and Patolichev signed the trade agreement; Peterson and Patolichev the lend-lease agreement. For the text of both agreements, see Department of State Bulletin, November 20, 1972, pp. 595–604. The agreements were summarized in The New York Times, October 19, 1972.
ences diminishing and economic relations becoming more and more important, and that therefore he would follow it personally. Patolichev replied he would deliver this message the next day; he was certain it would be warmly received, and that both he and the Chairman would follow the progress carefully. The President noted that he was impressed with Brezhnev’s ability to keep his eye on the big picture while knowing the details.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Secretary Rogers said that the United States owed a debt of gratitude to the two ministers, Patolichev and Peterson, that had concluded the agreements.

The President observed that this was a special day—for in addition to concluding the historic trade agreements, he was also receiving the leaders of the Congress as they adjourned. He noted that we would need the Congress next year to implement the MFN provision of the trade agreement.

Peter M. Flanigan

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3 Flanigan initialed above this typed signature.
66. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting

Washington, October 27, 1972, 4:46–4:58 p.m.

SUBJECT
Soviet UN Proposals for Non-Use of Force and Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons: NSSM 162

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State
U. Alexis Johnson
Samuel DePalma
Robert Martin
Col. Harry Johnson

Defense
Kenneth Rush
Armistead Selden
Dwayne Anderson

JCS
Vice Adm. John P. Weinel
R/Adm. James H. Doyle, Jr.

CIA
Richard Helms
Charles Peters

ACDA
James Leonard

NSC
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
William Hyland
Fernando Rondon
Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
It was agreed that:
— the U.S. Delegation to the UN General Assembly will take the position that we favor reaffirmation of the renunciation of the use of force, but consider it unnecessary, and that we object to any distinction between categories of weapons.

Mr. Kissinger: I thought we might have a brief meeting on this Soviet resolution on non-use of force (copy attached), primarily because of the way it positions us with the Chinese and the Soviets and the pressures we will be under from both sides, particularly the Chinese. We have already had some messages from them indicating that they consider it an anti-Chinese resolution and they hope we won’t be taken in by it.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–194, NSSM 162. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

2 See Document 57 for the NSSM and Document 63 for the study in response to it.

3 Attached but not printed is the Soviet draft resolution on “Non-Use of Force in International Relations and Permanent Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons,” UN Doc. A/L.676, September 26. See Document 52.
Mr. Johnson: They’re right, it is an anti-Chinese resolution. That’s what it’s designed for and the Soviets hope to bring us into it. Our position is very simple—we think we should stay as far away from it as possible. We have nothing to gain by working with the Soviets on this. We can take the line that, if the prohibition of the use of force is already in the UN Charter, why say it? If this resolution is different, how is it different? This is a Peking–Moscow fight. We have instructed our delegation not to discuss it, not to take any initiative, and not to talk about any defects in it or we will be asked how we would correct the defects. We do expect the Soviets to get a majority for it.

Mr. Kissinger: When does it come up?

Mr. DePalma: The debate begins November 2 and is expected to last four days.

Mr. Johnson: And when the vote comes, we will abstain.

Mr. Kissinger: This is not the time to get either the Soviets or the Chinese mad at us.

Mr. DePalma: The Soviets are leaning hard on us. They are saying that they have bought our position. That we told them our position was to stand by the Charter prohibition on the use of force and that that’s what they’re doing. They are linking it to Article 51 of the Charter. They say they have come around to our point of view.

Mr. Johnson: They’re not that naive.

Mr. DePalma: No, they’re not. They know full well what they’re doing and the probable effect on the Allies. They have come around 180 degrees and they think it would be nice to have the UN and the world community endorse their position against the Chinese.

Mr. Johnson: This says that if they are attacked by the Chinese, the Soviets can use nuclear weapons. The Soviets interpret this as UN sanction for them to use nuclear weapons against the Chinese.

4 In a memorandum to Kissinger, October 24, Sonnenfeldt wrote: “Whatever the Soviets may have in mind in advancing this in the UN, one aspect stands out clearly: it is directed against China. This item is the latest in a series of anti-Chinese initiatives. The Soviets have deliberately taken the old Chinese disarmament position and have advanced it piece by piece in the UN and elsewhere, with the aim no doubt of creating a record of Chinese obstreperousness in opposing their own ideas.” Sonnenfeldt noted that the Chinese “denounced the latest Soviet proposal as a ‘hoax,’ invalidated by Soviet support of India and designed to perpetuate the nuclear domination of the U.S. and the USSR.” He concluded: “Thus, a Sino-Soviet clash is likely in New York. Whatever position we adopt will be read in light of this Sino-Soviet dispute.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–194, NSSM 162) For the full text of Sonnenfeldt’s memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, Document 347.

5 The instructions were sent in telegram 195162 to USUN, October 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 18–6) For the text, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, Document 348.
Mr. DePalma: And the Chinese made this point right away.

Mr. Kissinger: Will the resolution pass?

Mr. DePalma: The General Assembly has a long record of passing resolutions on the non-use of nuclear weapons. This is, in fact, a cut-back of the position they have taken in the past. I can’t believe the Assembly won’t pass it.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we separate the prohibition on the recourse to force from the use of nuclear weapons?

Mr. DePalma: We have always taken that position. The Soviets specifically want the reference to nuclear weapons.

Mr. Kissinger: I’m concerned with saying something that leans a little their way but, in fact, stops any operational procedures. The Chinese wouldn’t be bothered by a resolution against the use of force.

Mr. Johnson: But if it’s only that, how is it different from the Charter? And if it is different, how is it different?

Mr. Kissinger: What would we say in the debate? Would we have to speak at all?

Mr. DePalma: It depends on how the debate goes. It’s hard to believe that we wouldn’t have to speak. We could make our traditional speech on the non-use of force—we could refer to the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations which was one of the best of these statements.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we postpone the debate next week? Next week is a bad time—we don’t want either of these countries mad at us.

Mr. Johnson: The Russians have made this a priority item.

Mr. Selden: Can we get someone else to amend it?

Mr. Johnson: What attitude would the Chinese take to that?

Mr. Kissinger: The Chinese won’t object to reaffirming the objection to the use of force. They will object to linking this with the use of nuclear weapons since this, in effect, legitimizes the use of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Johnson: If someone else wants to try to amend it, we could take a look at the amendment.

Mr. Kissinger: So we can take the position that we favor the reaffirmation of the objection to the recourse to force, but consider it unnecessary, and that we oppose any distinction between categories of weapons.

Mr. Leonard: We may end up in a very small group. The French have told the Russians they will go along.

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Mr. Johnson: I agree, we may end in a small group, but we always have been on this issue.

Mr. Kissinger: How about the British?

Mr. DePalma: They’re okay as of now. But the French have said they would agree if the resolution contained a reference to Article 51.

Mr. Johnson: What about an amendment to the referral to the Security Council in the second paragraph?

Mr. DePalma: This is very troublesome. We can’t accept the idea of the Security Council adopting this as a binding declaration.

Mr. Kissinger: The Chinese would veto it.

Mr. DePalma: The Soviets have indicated they would drop this if necessary.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Helms) How do you feel about it?

Mr. Helms: I agree that we should stay as far away from it as possible and then make a statement against sin and reaffirming the Charter objection to the use of force.

Mr. Kissinger: Okay, but can we make sure we won’t infuriate the Chinese. I’d rather pay a little price with the Russians if we absolutely have to, but we shouldn’t get in the middle of their fight.

67. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

Washington, November 8, 1972, 9:55 a.m.

D: Good morning, Henry.

K: We didn’t carry Siberia.²

D: Oh. My impression on the contrary, it carried all my country because even now in my Embassy I am listening “Four more years, four more years.”

K: Is that what you’re saying?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 27, Chronological File. No classification marking. Blank underscores are omissions in the original.

² A reference to Nixon’s November 7 re-election victory.
D: Exactly. In my Embassy everybody is shouting with beginning four years this 12 o’clock at night. So I hear even from Moscow the same—I mean, the same sounds. Did you receive—there was a message from Mr. Podgorny to President.

K: I haven’t received it yet, no.

D: No. There is a message. It’s—I could give you but it’s technical information but they send it through telegraph in this case.

K: Right.

D: It get to me. It goes like this one. “Mr. President: Please accept our congratulations on the occasion of re-electing you on the post of the President of the United States of America. I note it with the greatest respect of the process of a building relations between our two countries. A firm foundation for each was laid down by the summit meeting in Moscow in May. We would like to express the conviction that in the coming period the third American relation will receive further favorable development in the interest of the Soviet and American peoples, in the interest of the international security and _____ the peace throughout the world. And it’s signed Podgorny.”

K: Well, that’s a very warm note and it exactly reflects our own attitude.

D: Yes, it—

K: And you can tell your leaders that accelerating even further the improvement of relations will be one of our principal objectives.

D: I definitely will.

K: And this you know to be the case.

D: Yes.

K: And it will be one of our principal goals.

D: And my best regards to you personally, Henry.

K: Thank you.

D: And to President. And I am looking for 4 more years to work with you together.

K: I look forward to working with you as we have in the last years.

D: Definitely.

K: … one of our most satisfactory relationships here.

D: Thank you very much. I will convey them to Moscow to Brezhnev and to Podgorny. What your plans, Henry? Now you are going—

K: I am going to Miami with the President today.

D: Oh, today, yeah. You really think you want in this—I didn’t receive really any—

K: Oh, from Vietnam?
D: Yeah.
K: Oh, yes. They have now proposed November 14th.³
D: November 14th.
K: Yes. And we will accept for the 15th because I’m sending Haig to Vietnam to Saigon.
D: Oh, uh-huh, before.
K: Before because I don’t want again to meet with either Vietnamese party without having the other one under control.
D: Oh, I think this is wise course really. Not to have a second [sense].⁴
K: So I think this time—
D: It will be in Paris?
K: It will be in Paris. And I think if they come there with a—you know, with a spirit of making some changes but keeping the essence of the agreement, we’ll settle it next time.
D: Yeah, I think. Henry, by any chance to give them preliminary summary of what you are going to do or not yet, you didn’t decide it?
K: We haven’t decided yet whether to do it. Do you think it would be a good idea?
D: Well, I am—This is my personal feeling as I mentioned but maybe now it isn’t when they already give okay maybe it’s not a matter of importance because I really have felt that maybe it was a good idea to show them—
K: Well, between you and me, if they hadn’t accepted it, I might have done that eventually.
D: Yeah, but if they accept, maybe there is no specific need really.
K: Yeah.
D: Because of the different atmosphere.
K: Yeah.
D: When will you be back from Florida?
K: I’ll be back on Monday, I’m sure.⁵
D: On Monday.
K: Yes.
D: Well, I hope that we will have a chance to meet together to make a look through … because by the end of the month I would like to go home for vacation.

³ A reference to the reconvening of the Paris peace negotiations with Le Duc Tho.
⁴ Brackets in the original.
⁵ November 13.
K: Definitely. No, we must get together before I go to Paris.
D: Yes. So we could arrange something. But you will be here on Monday. I will give you a call and we’ll arrange it—
K: It probably will have to be Monday because I am leaving Tuesday.
D: Oh, you are leaving. Maybe we can arrange a lunch?
K: I think I have a lunch but let’s definitely get together Monday.
D: On Monday. Okay, so I will give you a call in the morning and then you will—
K: We’ll get together Monday afternoon, later afternoon.
D: Okay.
K: Good.
D: Well, once again, Henry, from deep in my heart I really like this development because I really have a very nice relationship—
K: I don’t know whether one can have a feeling of personal friendship with a Communist diplomat but I have it.
D: (laughter) So my best personal regards towards you and to the President. Please regard my personal regards too.
K: Thank you.
D: And thank you very much, Henry.
K: Bye.
D: Bye, bye.

68. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger) and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

November 9, 1972, 3:05 p.m.

D: Hello, Henry.
K: Anatol!
D: How are you?
K: Okay.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 27, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Key Biscayne and Dobrynin was in Washington.
D: What the weather there is?
K: The weather is perfect.
D: You have already swum a little bit?
K: I what?
D: Did you swim a little bit?
K: Yes, and I took a long walk. I may even take off a half a pound.
D: I know it is a difficult struggle.
K: It is a hopeless struggle. (Laughter)
D: (Laughter) And it is difficult for me too. Henry, I just received from Mr. Brezhnev a telegram addressed to the President.² I would like to read it to you.
K: All right.
D: “I and my colleagues have learned with deep satisfaction that the course you have taken towards lessening of international tension and towards improvement of relations between our countries received now such a convincing support by the American voters. We believe that this factor played a significant role in the decision of the population of your country which was passed on the election day.

“That is why Nikolai V. Podgorny, Alexey N. Kosygin, my other colleagues in the leadership and I personally express satisfaction on your re-election as President.

“I wish to express the conviction that the relationship and mutual understanding, already built between us as a result of the Moscow meeting, will not only continue but will also be deepened. We hope that in not distant future the deeds that have been started will come to successful completion and that a next important step will be made in the development of the Soviet-American relations. That would correspond both to the interests of our two countries and to the interests of world peace.

Sincerely, L. Brezhnev”
(November 9, 1972)

K: This is a very, very nice telegram. As it happened, I was going to call you and then Col. Kennedy said you were coming in anyway. Because the President asked me to acknowledge the telegram from Podgorny³ and to tell you first, of course, that he will write a personal reply to Brezhnev,⁴ but to tell you that the peace started in the first, and will

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² The letter is NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 14.
³ See Document 67.
⁴ The letter has not been found.
be accelerated in the second; that this improvement in our relations is one of the cardinal principles of his policy.

D: I understand.

K: And we really look forward to working even more closely with you in the second term.

D: I understand. You say he will write Mr. Brezhnev and—

K: And you can tell that already to Mr. Brezhnev. I will bring a reply with me on Monday.⁵

D: On Monday?

K: How about you and I having lunch on Tuesday.

D: On Tuesday, fine.

K: I’ll be back Monday but I’m busy. The meeting has been put off four days.⁶

D: Oh, I see! When it will be now?

K: On the 20th.

D: On the 20th. Okay, what time?

K: When we have time.

D: Yes, on the 20th. Okay, so this will—

K: Definitely fixed for this Sunday.

D: Okay, you look to me or I will come to you?

K: Why don’t you come to me.

D: Okay, at one o’clock. I leave this with Col. Kennedy, but you can relate it to the President.

K: We will relay it to the President today.

D: Yes.

K: Are you going to release it to the press?

D: I don’t know about this one—this is what sent to the President. He asked to do this way, Mr. Brezhnev. He said if possible to forward to you and the President in Florida. Because he said be in touch with Mr. Kissinger but this you should stress more briefly by telephone directly to the President, but I don’t know whether I could do it or not.

K: Right. I will transmit it to the President within the next half hour.

D: Yes, okay. But if you think it best for me I could do it with pleasure, or is it more difficult?

K: Why don’t I ask him?

D: Okay, I will leave it here, okay?

⁵ November 13.

⁶ A reference to the Paris peace negotiations with Le Duc Tho.
K: Well, I think he’s out on a boat.
D: Oh, I see.
K: But he can call you at the Embassy.
D: That is no problem, and I will receive it with pleasure. I have now read it to you but if possible I would like—Mr. Brezhnev asked me if possible to reach him by telephone.
K: Well, let me see whether I can get the President.
D: If it possible you would do, I would like to read it to him myself.
K: Right. Well—
D: You understand why?
K: I, of course, understand why. The only thing is, of course, if this becomes public your Chinese allies will declare war on us.

(Laughter)
D: I don’t know. It would be my guess you don’t relay it to the public—this one—Podgorny’s is already published.
K: I’m joking, we are proud of it.
D: Podgorny’s has already been published I know, but—
K: There’s nothing to hide in our relationship with you, it’s one of the best things we’ve done.
D: I understand, but this here—if he personally wrote it and he usually on very rare occasions he wrote to me a telegram. He wrote this time and said please do it first if possible. Well of course you know I’m going through you, but at the same time—
K: Why don’t you stay there for five minutes and I’ll see if I can reach the President.
D: Okay, I will remain here, okay.
K: And I’ll call you back.
D: Okay, thank you very much.
K: Right.
D: Right.

69. Editorial Note

On December 12, 1972, Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff wrote a memorandum to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger regarding Project North Star, a proposal to import liquefied natural gas from the Soviet Union to the
United States. Sonnenfeldt wrote: “The U.S. consortium of Texas Eastern, Tenneco, and Brown & Root is continuing discussions with the USSR on the proposed $5–6 billion deal that would have gas piped from the Urengoy fields in North Central Siberia to Murmansk, thence by tanker in liquefied form to the Eastern Seaboard of the United States. The Soviets attach very high priority to this proposal—both Brezhnev and Kosygin push it whenever they can—however, several obstacles are blocking progress. As you know, the Soviets would have the project financed by the United States; the consortium is looking to some agency of the U.S. Government for the money, and at present, existing U.S. monetary institutions such as EXIM are not able to handle a project of this magnitude. Added to the financial problem, several agencies, including Defense, Interior, OEP and Peter Flanigan’s CIEP are opposed to the Soviet gas proposal—as is Senator Jackson—arguing 1) it is a security risk to make the Eastern Seaboard dependent on USSR LNG, and 2) rather than laying out billions to buy very expensive USSR gas, it would make more sense to provide the price incentives necessary to encourage further gas exploration within the United States.” Sonnenfeldt continued: “Thus, there is little progress in the consortium’s negotiations with the USSR at present. At the same time, the gas task force has little more than scratched the surface of its work—one meeting and a few largely negative working papers from the agencies. With Peterson about to leave office, the work of the task force is languishing. And, as Flanigan is opposed to the USSR gas projects, it would appear that CIEP has little interest in spurring the work on to conclusion.” Sonnenfeldt also summarized developments with regard to proposed U.S.-USSR-Japanese projects regarding natural gas in Yakutsk, Tyumen, and Sakhalin. He noted, “While the Yakutsk, Tyumen, and Sakhalin proposals are all important, and will require the attention of Secretary Shultz or whoever else is given Pete Peterson’s responsibilities in this field, they do not have the same political urgency in terms of U.S.-Soviet relations as does the North Star project.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 721, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Vol. XXVII)

On December 15, Sonnenfeldt sent Kissinger a follow-up memorandum on the “impact of new U.S. energy policy on possible U.S.–USSR gas deals.” He wrote: “On December 13, Peter Flanigan chaired a Cabinet-level meeting to review preparations for the President’s energy policy message, now scheduled to go to the Hill sometime in February.” Sonnenfeldt continued: “Natural gas was among the subjects discussed, and it is becoming increasingly clear that, based on present thinking, the energy policy message will give strong Administration support to providing incentives to industry—by deregulating prices for new gas—to increase development of untapped U.S. gas reserves. Not once during the two-hour meeting was the subject of USSR LNG raised—which is not surprising, considering the widespread dis-
enchantment with the USSR proposals among the agencies, OEP and CIEP. It would seem quite possible that the energy message may be drafted in language which while perhaps not precluding Soviet gas deals will make them even more difficult to realize—should the President wish to have such deals considered sympathetically for reasons broader than U.S. energy considerations alone. I recommend that you advise Peter Flanigan that you would like to review the energy policy message as soon as it is in draft form.” (Ibid.) Kissinger signed an attached memorandum to Flanigan, dated December 23, asking “to review a draft of the proposed Presidential message on energy policy, as well as any other related draft documents planned for release with the message.”

Summit Preparations; Jackson–Vanik Amendment; Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons, December 1972–April 1973

70. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Your Next Meeting with Dobrynin

SALT

The talks are to recess next week. There is an ad referendum agreement to resume February 27 but this awaits your approval.

The only concrete result will be a memorandum on the Standing Consultative Committee (SCC). This also awaits your approval. (Smith has wired you separately on it.)\(^2\) Guidelines for regulations governing the operations of the SCC are hung up with the agencies here but we hope to get this straightened out before the recess. If not, the memorandum alone could be signed. There also will be a broadly-phrased work program.

Substantively, the talks are really deadlocked over our insistence that we concentrate on equal aggregates in central systems (including throw weight) and Soviet insistence that we in effect not tamper with the interim agreement but add on to it a series of measures affecting FBS, submarine operations and aircraft armaments.

The Soviets have talked to Smith about the possibility of some additional interim agreement(s) for the next summit but it is not clear

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Map Room, Aug. 1972–May 1973 [1 of 3]. Confidential; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A handwritten note at the top of the memorandum reads: “Map Room, Breakfast, Dec. 16, 1972, 8:30 a.m.” According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, he met with Dobrynin in the Map Room from 8:42 to 9:50 a.m. on December 16. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1967–76) No other record of Kissinger’s conversation with Dobrynin has been found.

\(^2\) Smith’s backchannel messages to Kissinger regarding the SCC, SALT 56 and 58, December 14 and 15, are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel, SALT, 1972. The draft memorandum of understanding establishing the SCC, transmitted in telegram 65 from the SALT II delegation, is ibid., Box 888, SALT TWO I—(Geneva), November 21, 1972–March 1973.
what measures they have in mind other than those with clearly detrimental effects for us.

The Soviets, I believe, owe you a reaction to your written response to the paper Dobrynin gave you some weeks ago, and the contents of which they have since put on the table in Geneva.

There has been some probing by Soviet delegates on qualitative restraints (MIRVs) but no initiative—indeed, the inference has been left that we should make the proposals.

It seems to me that since you have already left the message that there may be some bargaining room on matters of Soviet concern if they show flexibility on what bothers us, you should stand pat for now. I would judge that the Soviets feel some pressure to come up with potential deals for the Brezhnev visit (whenever that may in fact occur) and that we should be relaxed in this regard for now. Our message on central systems should stand undiluted as the Soviet leaders gather for their anniversary celebration.

Other Arms Control

You should have a separate memo on the list of possible agreements that you have previously discussed. None look immediately promising to me except something on chemical weapons. But we have put on a work program to reexamine all the items. If Dobrynin refers to these matters, you may want to tell him that we are looking at them very carefully and hope they are doing so also and that the area of chemical weapons may be more promising than the others.

CSCE

The preparatory meeting in Helsinki recessed today for a month. There has been much fencing about whether discussion of an agenda for the conference should come before settling the date, place and mo-
dalities of a conference. The Soviets want the latter done first; NATO the former. The Soviets have played up to our delegation to some extent but right now there is no special US-Soviet problem. A progress report is at Tab A.6

MBFR

The Soviets owe the Western countries a reply to their invitations for the January preliminary talks7 and it is assumed that this will be forthcoming after the Communist summit in Moscow next week. There may be some haggling over participants (we have the formula concerning rotating flank participation) but otherwise the January talks seem to be on the rails. The Soviets did recently approach the State Department with a request for some of our MBFR studies to help them in theirs.8 State will reject this. It is of course tricky because of the enormous Allied sensitivities about US-Soviet deals. It will be interesting to see if you get an echo from Dobrynin on this point. If you do, we might actually consider giving Vorontsov a general feel for some of our work, perhaps after the January talks.

Bilateral Issues

(Note: If you have not been in touch with Peterson today, you may want to get a fill-in on his meeting with Dobrynin on Dec. 14.)9

1) US–USSR Trade Policy. With the President’s replacement of Peter Peterson and promotion of Jim Lynn, the Soviets are watching closely for any changes in US trade policy toward the USSR. We have told State to advise Embassy Moscow that should Patolichev or any other member of the Soviet hierarchy raise the subject they should be told that no change in US policy is anticipated and that US Chairmanship of the Joint Trade Commission after Secretary Peterson leaves will be subject to Presidential determination.

Dobrynin may want your views on the mood of the Congress and the President’s plans with regard to MFN for the USSR. (Kosygin, as you know, raised this with Senator Humphrey, and in discussing MFN with Patolichev and Arbatov, Humphrey said that the Jackson Amend-

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6 Attached but not printed is a December 14 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger.
8 The request was not found.
9 No record of the meeting was found.
ment reflecting concern over the issue of Jewish Exit Fees was not an electoral issue that would go away.) 10

—You should say that the President still plans to submit MFN legislation early in the new session of the Congress.

—Add that the Exit Fee issue is taken very seriously on the Hill, that anything the Soviets can do to ease the concerns of the Congress in this regard can only be expected to help the prospects for MFN passage.

2) Natural Gas. You have my memoranda of December 12 & 14 on the status of the US–USSR natural gas proposals and the problems being encountered. 11 We have told the USSR that we hope to complete the deliberations of our interagency task force on Soviet gas projects by the end of January 1973. Accordingly, Dobrynin may inquire as to the current US position. (Again, this is an issue which Kosygin raised with Humphrey.)

—Tell Dobrynin that the issue is still under consideration; because of the complexities involved you would not want to commit yourself to a specific deadline.

—Say that the Administration is currently reviewing the overall energy policy of the United States and that this involves many considerations in addition to those directly related to the US–USSR gas proposals, further complicating the picture.

—(Note: I do not think you should be overly optimistic at this point about an early, favorable governmental decision with regard to billions of dollars of monetary backing for the US companies interested in developing Soviet gas resources.)

3) Grain Deal. Four US ships loaded with wheat are currently enroute to Odessa. Dobrynin may remind you of the private understanding with regard to the Maritime Agreement 12—i.e., that we would be ready to reconsider the question of Soviet ships being permitted to call at Cuba before coming to the United States to pick up wheat. 13 Should he do so, attempt to discourage early action on this.

—Say that the maritime agreement is just in the process of being implemented, that it might be a mistake to consider the possibilities of


11 See Document 69.

12 See Document 61.

13 See Document 18.
any changes before Americans become better adjusted to this new facet of US–USSR relations.

—Note that Union leader Curran\(^{14}\) has already expressed misgivings that the United States may at some point back away from its insistence on such points as carriage of one-third of the cargoes in US ships—that the grain deal is being watched closely by suspicious people.

4) Science and Technology Summit Agreement. Deputy Chairman Kirillin was forced to request a second postponement of the first meeting of the US-USSR Joint Commission on Science and Technology—this time because of ill health. Dobrynin is currently expecting Ed David to propose a new date for the meeting, the Soviets having asked if it might be possible to hold it in early to mid-January. I see no need for you to raise the subject, but should Dobrynin do so:

—Say that you haven’t had a chance to discuss this with David, but that you see no reason not to schedule the meeting as soon as it is mutually convenient to do so.

—Add that it would be a mistake to let this initial implementing step drag on too long, bearing in mind the President’s desire to have all Summit Agreements moving ahead smoothly and productively.

—Further, you may wish to ask for Dobrynin’s views on the desirability of earmarking the proposed US–USSR Agriculture Research Agreement for the Brezhnev visit, as discussed below.

5) Brezhnev Visit. A recent article in the Washington Post\(^{15}\) reported Dobrynin at a Yugoslav Embassy function in late November as saying that the Brezhnev visit would not take place in the spring of 1973 but would be put off until later in the year to permit the Soviets to take a better look at the current status of US–USSR relations. Should you wish to raise the Summit with Dobrynin, including possible agenda items, you have my memorandum of November 29 and one of December 6\(^{16}\) which suggest several possibilities (in addition to arms control agenda items). These can be summarized briefly as follows:

a) Agricultural Research. It is now planned that the first meeting of the Science and Technology Commission will approve an Agricultural research agreement between the US and Soviet Agriculture departments—an agreement dealing with research in the fields of farm crops

\(^{14}\) A reference to Joseph Curran, President of the National Maritime Union.


\(^{16}\) Sonnenfeldt’s memorandum of November 29 on possible agenda items on space cooperation for Brezhnev’s visit is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Map Room, Aug. 1972–May 1973 [3 of 3]. The December 6 memorandum was not found.
and farm animals and the mechanization of agricultural production. There have been indications that the Soviets would rather have this as a separate agreement not linked to the overall science and technology agreement.

—You may wish to ask Dobrynin if the Soviet Government would prefer to upgrade this agreement and retain it for formal signing during the Brezhnev visit.

b) Space Cooperation.17 NASA Administrator Fletcher recently suggested three new cooperative projects to Keldysh—Keldysh said he would study them.18 These involve: 1) a joint unmanned Mars mission; 2) cooperative arrangements whereby the US would process real-time data from the USSR’s next Mars lander; and 3) a joint project involving the orbiting of a satellite around Venus to collect scientific data via ejected-balloon-borne equipment.

—You may wish to note that NASA has raised these possibilities with the Soviet Academy and ask Dobrynin if there has been any reaction thus far, and more generally, what the Soviet reaction would be to marking an additional step in US–USSR space cooperation during the Brezhnev visit.

c) Moon Treaty. The Soviets have been pressing for UN acceptance of their proposed Moon Treaty.19 There has been considerable give and take on the draft treaty provisions and it is now possible that the UN Outer Space Legal Subcommittee will resolve the outstanding issues at its meeting next spring and that a treaty will be ready for approval by the UNGA next fall.

Should the President and Brezhnev decide that it would be desirable to sign a bilateral agreement on use of the moon and other celestial bodies—an agreement that takes into account the UN’s efforts—this option would appear to be available for the Brezhnev visit.

—You may wish to ask Dobrynin for his reaction to arranging for a bilateral moon-and-other-celestial-bodies treaty signing during the Brezhnev visit.

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17 President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed an agreement on space cooperation on May 24, during the Moscow Summit. A draft text of the agreement was transmitted in telegram 4915 from Moscow, May 24; see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 281. The final agreement is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, pp. 924–925.

18 Sonnenfeldt’s memorandum, November 29, summarizing Keldysh’s talks with Fletcher during the former’s visit to the Houston Space Center, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Map Room, Aug. 1972–May 1973 [3 of 3]. James Fletcher was the NASA Administrator; Mstislav Keldysh served as President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

19 The Moon Treaty was submitted to the UN General Assembly by the USSR in 1971. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1972, pp. 40–42.
Soviets Very Itchy About the Future. Judging from Zhukov’s recent comments\(^{20}\) and other indications, the Soviets are quite uncertain about what is going on here. They are trying to figure out who is up and who is down and they are uncomfortable about getting used to new faces. The changes at Commerce and concurrent reports about John Connally’s influence seem to worry them particularly. Dobrynin may be asked to report his impressions and give an assessment when he sees Brezhnev not only of personnel changes per se but of policy implications, especially in light of the Vietnam situation.

You are presumably up to date on the Cox visit to Moscow\(^{21}\) which Jeanne Davis has been handling. The Soviets have been cooperative.

\(^{20}\) Presumably a reference to the comments made by Yuri Zhukov, editor of Pravda, reported in the Los Angeles Times: “An authoritative spokesman for the Soviet point of view, Yuri Zhukov, wrote in Pravda, the official Communist Party newspaper last week, that participants in the security conference should ‘confirm the inviolability of European borders’ and commit themselves to develop their mutual relations on the principles of good-neighborliness and cooperation and renunciation of the use of force in settling outstanding issues.” (“Proposed Europe Talks Facing 1st Serious Test,” Los Angeles Times, November 19, 1972, p. 2)

\(^{21}\) Tricia Nixon Cox, the President’s daughter, visited the Soviet Union in early January 1973.

71. Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev\(^{1}\)


Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I should like to avail myself of Ambassador Dobrynin’s return to Moscow to continue our full and frank exchange of views in the private channel. May I use this opportunity to extend to you, your colleagues and your people best wishes on the occasion of the anniversary which you will shortly be celebrating.\(^{2}\) Since we are approaching the end of

\(^{1}\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 14. Top Secret. A handwritten notation at the top of an attached note from Kissinger to Dobrynin reads: “Hand-delivered to the Embassy at 5:40 p.m., 12/18/72.” Kissinger also attached to the letter a copy of a message delivered to the North Vietnamese in Paris the same morning. The message reiterated the importance of a speedy peace agreement.

\(^{2}\) See footnote 4, Document 70.
1972, may I likewise extend my personal good wishes for the coming year and express the hope that the positive and constructive relationship that has developed between our two countries will be further broadened and deepened in the period ahead. A high point next year will be your visit to this country to which we look forward with keen expectations as another milestone in our common effort to cooperate in the cause of peace and progress for all nations.

Looking back over the past year, our two countries have reasons to view what has been accomplished with considerable satisfaction. The agreements concluded at the meetings in Moscow and since then represent a solid beginning of a new and more fruitful era in cooperation. In Moscow, I recall, we both agreed that our people would evaluate our work on the basis of whether we could put into practice the documents and principles we had signed. In our bilateral relations and in various aspects of international relations, we have continued to make steady progress since the summit. The momentum has been reinforced and should now be accelerated.

The success we have enjoyed in this past year presents us with a challenging agenda for the coming year. The high hopes in both countries for further agreements in limiting strategic arms compel us to a more intense effort when the negotiations resume in February. Evidently, our task will be more difficult, and this is understandable because we will be considering both a new range of measures as well as long-term commitments suitable to a permanent agreement. As you know from our exchanges in this channel, our concerns are with the central weapons systems that can threaten the stability of strategic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. You have expressed parallel concerns with various other weapons systems and other issues. We will need to consider most carefully in this channel how we can devise a framework for balancing the concerns of each side. During the period when the formal talks are in recess, I hope we can pursue these issues in the private channel in order to give impetus to the negotiations when they resume. We should use the private channel to seek to crystallize a significant agreement that could be signed at the summit.

There are other areas of arms control—for example, chemical weapons—where I believe progress is possible.

In addition I am prepared to continue the discussions on working out a mutually acceptable agreement relating to the non-use of nuclear weapons. I have kept in close touch with the exchanges on this subject that have taken place between Foreign Minister Gromyko, Ambassador Dobrynin and Dr. Kissinger and will continue to do so as these exchanges continue.
In European affairs, as you have pointed out, there are now new prospects for dealing with matters of security and cooperation and the reduction of armed forces. The initial contacts in Helsinki suggest that we can accelerate the preparations and define an agenda that will allow a full conference to be convened in June. We are also preparing for the initial talks on mutual reductions of armed forces. While the talks in January, as we have agreed, will be preliminary, we hope that some discussions can take place that will point up the issues that will be negotiated beginning next autumn.

Our Allies, as well as countries allied to the Soviet Union are deeply involved in both of these negotiations, and I am not suggesting that the United States and the Soviet Union can or should arrange the outcome without their participation or against their interests. Nevertheless, our two countries can facilitate the course of these talks and help ensure their success, and to this end we are prepared to remain in contact through this channel.

There are two areas where, quite frankly, we have met disappointment—in arranging peace in Vietnam and in moving toward a settlement in the Middle East.

Our views on the Vietnam negotiations have been conveyed to you, and there is little to add at this time. The Soviet Union has played a constructive role in these past months, and any further efforts would be greatly appreciated. I assure you that such a peace remains my paramount goal, as I know it also remains your goal.

In the Middle East, we are both limited in our roles, but within those limits we are prepared to pursue discussions in the interest of finding a means to revive the negotiations on either an interim agreement, or, if you think it more feasible, on a lasting settlement. In any case, this is a topic we should consider high on the agenda for the coming year.

In the present phase of our relationship, it appears that we will be more involved in negotiations that concern other countries—such as discussions about European security and cooperation, the Middle East, and even those aspects of the strategic arms limitation talks that touch

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3 On November 6, Sonnenfeldt forwarded to Kissinger a note Dobrynin had presented to Rogers that morning. In his covering memorandum, Sonnenfeldt wrote: “The substance of the Soviet communication is that the sequence of the initial CSCE and MBFR talks is accepted for November 22 and January respectively, and a tentative timetable for actual negotiations in June and September–October, respectively. The Soviets also accept that initial MBFR talks will develop an agenda and take place in a city other than Helsinki.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 25, HAK Paris/Saigon Trip, TOHAK HAKTO 11/4/72–1/7/72 California Before Elections)

4 See Document 62.
the interests of others. At the same time, we still have room for considerable expansion of our bilateral relations. As is customary in our government, we have been making some changes of personnel for the second term, and when this is completed we will be making appropriate adjustments in our representation in the bilateral commissions we have established. I want to assure you, Mr. General Secretary, that questions of Soviet-American relations are not involved in our personnel changes. We fully intend to continue with an active program in each of the major areas of cooperation. It is particularly gratifying to note, for example, that in cooperation in outer space the technical experts seem to be making important progress.\(^5\) Progress has also been notable with regard to cooperation on environmental problems and on health matters.\(^6\) We look forward to further advances in the important area of science and technology.\(^7\)

Next year, early in the Congressional term, we will submit legislation to facilitate Soviet-American trade. There will be difficulties in this area, but I will stand fully behind this legislation.

Meanwhile, we should continue our discussions on the question of long-term ventures for the supply of various kinds of natural resources, in particular natural gas.\(^8\) I hope we can make early progress in reaching understandings between our governments that take account of the very long-term character of the relationships involved and of the unprecedented magnitude of the investments required. I would hope, therefore, that contacts between responsible officials on both sides as well as between experts will be pursued in this spirit.

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\(^5\) See Document 70. Kissinger wrote in a memorandum to Nixon, November 8, that five U.S.-Soviet working groups were busy planning for a joint manned Apollo–Soyuz test flight, scheduled for 1975. “Additional, bilateral work continues on cooperative projects in the fields of space meteorology; study of the natural environment; exploration of the near-earth space, the moon and planets; and space biology and medicine,” Kissinger added. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 721, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Vol. XXVI)

\(^6\) Kissinger wrote in his November 8 memorandum to Nixon: “The September 18–21 meeting of the Joint Committee on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection resulted in a memorandum of implementation providing for 30 initial U.S.-Soviet environmental projects in the 11 subject areas of the agreement.” He also outlined joint endeavors in mental health, environmental health, and cancer research.

\(^7\) In his November 8 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger reported that a tentative agreement had been reached to hold the first meeting of the Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in Washington. “The Commission is expected to approve the reports of its working groups for cooperative programs in agricultural research, chemical catalysis, water resources, energy, computer applications to management and applications of microbiology. It was also expected to approve a memorandum of cooperation in agricultural research between Agriculture and the USSR’s Ministry of Agriculture.”

\(^8\) See Document 69.
In sum, Mr. General Secretary, 1973 will be a year of great expectations in Soviet-American relations, highlighted by your visit to the United States. There are a number of questions which I believe can be brought to fruition during that visit. We want to make it comparable in every way to the summit meeting in Moscow. To do so will require both sides to undertake detailed preparations and agree on an agenda of issues on which we might complete agreements here in Washington.

In certain areas, it may be wise to focus on reaching agreements in principle which would then be refined in subsequent contacts. This could be the case in the field of arms control and on certain of the broader political issues that remain. In other areas, chiefly that of bilateral relations, I believe it would be desirable to prepare specific and concrete additional agreements which could be announced at the time of the visit. If this general approach meets with your approval, the most efficient way to proceed would be to have your Ambassador and Dr. Kissinger identify the various subjects involved early in the New Year so that we then have common objectives to aim for in the ensuing months before your visit.

I shall await your reaction to these considerations with interest and meanwhile Mrs. Nixon joins me in wishing you and your family a healthy and happy New Year.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon
72. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Your Meeting With Dobrynin, January 3, 1973\(^2\)

I do not know to what extent you may have covered various bilateral or international issues with Dobrynin before his departure for Moscow. In any case, the excerpt from my memorandum for the last meeting is still valid if you wish to use it (Tab A).\(^3\) In addition, there are some other bilateral issues which I am discussing in detail in another memorandum being sent you separately for decision that you may also wish to look over before the meeting (Tab B).\(^4\)

Vietnam

In the past two weeks the Soviets have employed some fairly strident rhetoric in denouncing the bombing; they have also “demanded” signing of the peace agreement (Kosygin), promised all-out aid until the “just cause triumphs” (Suslov) and linked the future of Soviet American relations to peace in Vietnam (Brezhnev). They have also leaked news stories suggesting that Brezhnev’s visit is being postponed because of Vietnam (more on this below).

In general, the Soviets have offset their rhetoric with expositions on their foreign policy at the year’s end that suggest no important shift in their general line. This may be the cause of certain signs of strain in their relations with Hanoi. Most odd, was the failure of Truong Chinh\(^5\) to be received by Brezhnev, Kosygin or Podgorny, particularly since

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\(^2\) According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, he met with Dobrynin for lunch at the Soviet Embassy from 1:20 to 3:50 p.m. on January 3. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1967–76) No record of Kissinger’s conversation with Dobrynin has been found.

\(^3\) Attached but not printed is an excerpt of Document 70.

\(^4\) Attached but not printed is Sonnenfeldt’s January 2 memorandum regarding possible agenda items for a Brezhnev summit.

\(^5\) Truong Chinh, Politburo member and Chairman of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
Brezhnev received all of the leaders of the governing communist party delegations who visited Moscow for the 50th anniversary celebrations.

_Brezhnev Visit_

The Soviets were rather quick to follow Brezhnev’s speech\(^6\) with private and publicized hints that the visit was off until next fall, implying that there was a connection to Vietnam. The source of these “signals” was Victor Louis’ remarks to Ambassador Beam and then in Louis’ article for the _London Daily News_. Earlier in December, the Washington press was citing Dobrynin as the source of speculation about postponement.

While I do not know what you and Dobrynin may have discussed on this aspect, _you may want to warn him about taking this issue into the press_. If the visit is to be postponed because of the decreasing likelihood of substantial accomplishments, there should be a coordinated line (perhaps by setting an actual date and announcing it).

Even if there has been no parallel development in your channel, these hints may be intended to probe our willingness to consider postponement without Dobrynin having to make an overture. If this is the case, there are sound arguments for postponing until the fall, as long as it is clear that this represents no change in the state of relations. (Whatever happens, postponement or not, will be read in the Vietnam context.)

_Replay to the President_

The President’s letter\(^7\) ended with an invitation for Brezhnev’s views, and Dobrynin may be bringing a reply. Judging from what Brezhnev has said in public, the reply will probably be moderate in tone, but without any major new ideas. Probably there will have to be in this more formal version of the special channel something on Vietnam, if only for Brezhnev’s record.

_SALT_

While the Soviet delegation took a rather propagandistic position in Geneva, Brezhnev’s speech on December 22 [21] seemed to offer more on SALT than his delegation. He listed (1) turning the Interim Agreement into a permanent one; (2) passing from limitations to gradual reductions; (3) establishing some kind of limit to qualitative development.

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\(^6\) Brezhnev’s December 21 speech, which linked ending the war in Vietnam and U.S.-Soviet relations, was summarized in “Excerpts from the Kremlin Address of Soviet Leader,” _The New York Times_, December 22, 1972, p. 10.

\(^7\) Document 71.
As you know, what the Soviets seem to have in mind is some add-ons to the Interim Agreement, but raising at this authoritative level both reductions and qualitative limitations may be an offer to work out some package arrangements (as May 20). His willingness to raise these issues publicly after we had skirted qualitative limits in Geneva but had proposed reductions, may foreshadow a more interesting line in the private channel. He may respond to our suggestion that we needed a framework for reconciling our different approaches. You have an earlier memo on the Soviet MIRV approach; copy at Tab C.

If Dobrynin raises SALT, you might ask what Brezhnev had in mind in mentioning reductions and qualitative limits. You might note that their delegation seemed to want to discuss MIRV’s, but we cannot be sure whether this represents Soviet interest or the prodding of our own people. You could urge him to spell out their ideas as soon as possible before the negotiations resume. (You may want to alert him to changes in our delegation and in ACDA.)

CSCE

The Soviets in Helsinki seem disappointed that our delegation has not established closer working contacts. In particular they were concerned that we might retreat from the “understanding” to begin the formal Conference in June; see earlier memo at Tab D. Now that the real issues of setting an agenda will come before the Conference on January 15, the Soviets will be testing our repeated willingness to talk to them bilaterally.

We cannot go very far in this direction without raising alarm among the Allies. However, since we are tougher than our allies on some issues, such as promoting freer movement and resisting permanent machinery, in giving in to Allied consensus, we can appear to be more cooperative with the Soviet position.

You may wish to impress on Dobrynin that we need to go into the agenda in more detail than Moscow wants, if we are to open the Conference in June. If the Soviets have some major problems in Helsinki, they should probably raise them with you first of all because our delegation will be instructed to cooperate closely with our Allies and cannot play a role as mediator with the Soviet side.

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8 The SALT negotiators reached agreement on the Interim Agreement on May 20.
9 Attached but not printed.
MBFR

The Soviets have still not answered our invitation to talk in January in Geneva.\(^{11}\) Apparently, they are having major problems with the Romanians, who object to being excluded. The Romanians, however, do not want to invoke their Warsaw Pact membership as grounds for participation. Therefore, the Romanians are pushing the line that CSCE should take up military security issues (which we and the Soviets oppose) and that participation in MBFR should not be restrictive.

In light of all the problems we have encountered in trying to keep our Allies from raising substantive issues in the initial talks, \textit{you may want to warn Dobrynin that the Soviets should be prepared for more of a substantive exploration than we originally envisaged.}\(^{11}\)

You might want to reassure him that we do not intend to press for any agreements in this phase, or start a major debate, but that our Allies will almost certainly go over what NATO has already said in public, i.e., “balanced” reductions, undiminished security, a phased approach, and the importance of constraint on movement. The Soviets should be prepared to accept an agenda that includes principles and constraints as well as verification, area, size and type of reductions, as separate issues without prejudice to the order or potential substance.

\textit{Bilateral issues} are in the earlier memorandum at Tab A. Of considerable importance, Ed David is resigning—reported in the January 2 \textit{Star}. This means a new US Chairman will be required for the US–USSR Science and Technology Joint Commission.

\textbf{Nuclear Non-Use}

The President’s letter raised this and offered to continue developing an agreement. You should be aware that Brezhnev in his speech called attention to the UN resolution on this matter,\(^{12}\) and offered to conclude an agreement with any nuclear power. You might wish to make the point that such a project is more plausible after another SALT agreement, than now, especially if the Soviets are willing to consider a permanent replacement for the Interim Agreement, rather than only a series of add-ons.

\(^{11}\) See footnote 7, Document 70.

73. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–M01048A, Box 8, Tensions in the USSR. Sensitive; Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages not declassified.]

Tab A

Washington, undated.

Ongoing Operations

[2 pages not declassified]

74. Editorial Note


The same day, Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev wrote a letter to President Nixon congratulating him on the conclusion of the agreement. Brezhnev wrote: “There is no doubt that consistent realization of the achieved agreement on peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, while eliminating one of the most dangerous hotbeds of international tension, will in many ways facilitate the healthening [sic] of the entire world situation.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 15)
On February 2, Nixon replied to Brezhnev and thanked him for his message. Nixon wrote with regard to the Paris Peace Accords: “We are now in the first stages of implementing that agreement. I am certain that if all concerned act in accordance with both the letter and the spirit of this agreement, major benefits will be rapidly felt not only by the people of Vietnam but by the world as a whole. You may be sure that the United States will do its full share to assure the faithful implementation of the agreement and to heal the wounds of war. I am confident that you agree with me that restraint by all interested countries is of great importance.

“I agree with your statements concerning the beneficial effects of the Vietnam settlement on our mutual relations. We have already demonstrated that even while the Vietnam conflict was still going on, major forward steps could be taken by our two countries. This process should undoubtedly be accelerated now.” (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 70, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin & Kissinger, Vol. 5)

75. Message From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon

Moscow, undated.

When we look back at the road covered in Soviet-American relations since the May meeting, we naturally feel satisfied with the positive changes in the relations between our countries. It is also quite understandable at the same time that our thoughts are more and more returning to those matters which happen to be yet unresolved. In this connection we would like to draw the President’s attention first of all to the following two questions.

First. We proceed from the fact that we have an understanding of principle with the President on the question of non-use of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union and the United States against each other. The conclusion of such a treaty would be really a considerable step forward, which would be of long-run positive consequences both for the relations between our countries and for the whole world.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 15. Top Secret. A handwritten notation at the top of the page reads: “Handed to HAK by Dobrynin 1/28/73.”
The sides, as is known, have already exchanged several drafts of such a document. At the time when our Minister A. A. Gromyko was in Washington at the beginning of last October, the President said that the work on the text of such a document might be continued in the month of November. But until now it did not turn out to be possible to do so, though we, on our part, are prepared to take up that matter at any moment. We believed before and we believe now that the more definitely the essence of the basic idea is expressed in such a treaty—*not to allow a nuclear confrontation between our countries*—the more significant the conclusion of this treaty between the USSR and the US would be.

At the same time we agree that the formulation of that basic idea could be supplemented—and it has already been taken into account in our latest draft treaty—*with the provisions that our countries will build their relations in such a way that those relations would not be in contradiction with the parties' obligations not to use nuclear weapons against each other as well as with their undertakings regarding non-use of force in general.*

We consider it also very important that in the treaty there should be clearly expressed the determination of our countries to prevent such situation when they would turn to be involved in the conflict with the use of nuclear weapons as a result of actions of the third states.

In our opinion, it is quite possible to solve also the question of consorting the obligations of the sides, to be taken in accordance with the treaty, not to use nuclear weapons against each other with the allied obligations of the sides towards the third states.

Thus we are ready and invite the President to directly engage ourselves in the interests of the cause of peace in the business of completing the working out of a document, which would formalize the agreement concerning non-use of nuclear weapons and would become the major event of world politics not only for 1973 but also for a far longer foreseeable period of time.

*Second.* L. I. Brezhnev paid attention to the readiness of the President expressed in the message of December 18, 1972 to continue the discussion of the questions of the Middle East settlement, which the President quite justly ranks among the foremost foreign policy tasks, which demand the exertion of efforts on the part of our states in this 1973.

Consequently, we on our part repeatedly raised the question concerning the necessity of seeking a constructive settlement of the Middle

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2 See Document 56.
3 Presumably the draft Dobrynin gave to Kissinger on September 21, 1972; see footnotes 17 and 18, Document 55.
4 Document 71.
East conflict and suggested to resume an active discussion of this question, particularly through the confidential channel.

However, in reply to our appeals we were told that the US were totally absorbed in the Vietnamese affairs and therefore could not for a while pay due attention to the subject of the Middle East.

Speaking about this question, it is necessary to emphasize that time is passing while the situation in the Middle East remains complicated and dangerous. If effective measures are not taken the events there can get out of control. There is no doubt that if hostilities in the Middle East erupt once again then—taking into account existent ties with this area of other states including major powers—there could develop quite unwelcome consequences for the cause of international security, and it is difficult to envisage what would be the end of it and for how long these complications would persist.

As is known, in the course of the Soviet-American exchange of opinion, including that on the highest level, a thought has been repeatedly stressed that the United States and the Soviet Union should not allow that the development of events in that area would lead to a confrontation between our countries; it was stressed that it is necessary and possible to find a solution answering to the interests of all states in the Middle East, to the interests of our states and the interests of peace in general. This has been pointed out personally by President Nixon as well, who not [just?] once spoke about his readiness to use his influence for the solution of the Middle East problem in this very spirit.

We think that both the USSR and the US really can use their influence, their weight, and nature of their ties with the countries-participants in the conflict in order to finally bring the whole matter to the liquidation of the military hotbed in the Middle East.

In this connection a postponement of the exchange of views between us on this important problem seems to be unjustified. There can be of course an order of priority in the solution of problems, but there are problems which can and should be solved in parallel with other urgent international issues. We believe that in the interests of big policy it is exactly in this way that we should approach the solution of the Middle East problem.

As for the Soviet Union, we are prepared for a confidential exchange of views with the American side on this problem. The President knows well the essence of the Soviet position. We have consistently proceeded and proceed from such provisions of principle, which are contained in the known resolution of the Security Council.5

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The key question of a settlement in the Middle East is, undoubtedly, the question of Israeli troops withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967. If it is solved, then there can be no doubt that there will be no special difficulties in solving other questions of the settlement as well, such as providing for the security and independent existence of the state of Israel and of other countries of that area; establishing demilitarized zones, providing for the freedom of navigation of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Aqaba, respect for the rights of the people of Palestine etc. Of course, the whole complex of the Middle East settlement should cover not only Egypt, but Syria and Jordan as well.

We have expressed those thoughts to the President more than once. Some time ago we have already forwarded to the US Government concrete proposals on this matter as well. We still believe that these proposals constitute an appropriate basis for agreement.

Now as never before the time factor has become of decisive importance in the question of political settlement in the Middle East. We are well aware of the feelings of the Arabs. Further existence of the deadlock in the settlement, for which Israel is to blame, cannot but force the Arab countries to seek a way out along the lines of using military methods to solve the lingering crisis no matter what would be the attitude of others to it.

Only substantial progress in the settlement through political means can prevent such a dangerous turn of affairs. We hope that in accordance with the results of the negotiations in Moscow we can start in the near future an exchange of views aimed at working out joint agreement on the settlement of the situation in the Middle East.

76. Editorial Note

During the first six weeks of 1973, Congress continued to discuss linking the granting of most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status to the Soviet Union with the issue of Soviet exit fees. On February 6, Secretary of State Rogers reported in his evening report to President Nixon: "Senator Jackson will join Chairman Mills and Congressman Vanik Wednesday [February 7] to announce submission in the House of the Vanik bill to bar MFN to the USSR until the Jewish emigration tax is reduced. Vanik claims 238 co-sponsors (218 is a majority) and late reports put the figure at 250. Mills will be a co-sponsor. Jackson will probably not announce submission of his identical text but may reveal how
many co-sponsors he now has—according to his staff, at least 76. Vanik told us this afternoon that his move is designed as a demonstration to the Soviets and the Administration that the Congress means business. Jackson’s staff take a similar position that this is another turn of the screw.” In his evening report to the President the following day, February 7, Rogers confirmed that Mills announced his co-sponsorship of the Vanik–Jackson bill. He added: “Privately, Vanik yesterday urged us to work out a compromise with the Soviets, and Jackson’s and Javits’ staffs have repeated their requests for a report on the Department’s negotiations with the Soviets on the subject.” (Both National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 49, President’s Daily Brief, February 1–15, 1973)

On February 15, National Security Council Staff member Helmut Sonnenfeldt wrote to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger: “Wilbur Mills has informed Shultz that MFN must be submitted as part of comprehensive trade legislation. Accordingly, current thinking of Treasury, State, and CIEP is to handle USSR MFN request as part of broader MFN request in comprehensive trade bill with President requesting authority—much along lines of current Exim authority—to permit entry into effect of MFN with any country when he finds it is in national interest to do so.” Sonnenfeldt continued: “This approach has its pitfalls: Jackson Amendment on Soviet exit fees may jeopardize or delay overall trade bill; and grouping the Romanians together with the USSR in this ‘any country’ language may get Romania hung up on the Soviet exit fee issue.” (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 30, HAK Trip Files, HAK Bangkok, Vientiane, Hanoi, Hong Kong, Peking, Tokyo Trip, Feb. 7–20, 1973, TOHAK 141–200)

77. Note From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


HAK

Attached is a memorandum on the nuclear non-use problem together with some new drafting.

I have not in this paper attempted to relate this issue explicitly to the more complex problem of balancing our overall Soviet relations with our Chinese relations since I cannot very confidently judge what it may be desirable to do with respect to the former in the light of the most recent developments in the latter. Your trip\(^2\) and its results and consequences may of course make it desirable to inject some momentum into our Soviet relations—although it is not self-evident that the initiative in this respect needs or ought to be all ours. Undoubtedly, the Soviets are edgy, not only because of your China trip but because many aspects of our relations are beset by problems: CSCE and MBFR are moving slowly or stalled because we cannot easily control Allied behavior\(^3\) (itself a reflection of Allied suspicions and anxieties about our Soviet relations and of uncertainties in our European relations due to economics); SALT is stalled over a seemingly basic incompatibility of interests and objectives; the gas deals are hung up because of our uncertainties over energy policy and bureaucratic snarls; the US-Soviet Commercial Commission is stalled because we have not appointed a successor to Peterson. I cannot judge how maneuvering over the Middle East interacts with all of this. Brezhnev is almost certainly in an uncomfortable position with his colleagues and he must worry about the outlook for his trip to the US. (The fact that other, less central aspects of our bilateral relations are doing reasonably well is not enough to offset the various difficulties cited above.)

The Soviets will undoubtedly try to turn the non-use issue into a catalyst that breaks the logjam on other matters and as the center-piece of what might be accomplished during a Brezhnev trip. But this is precisely our dilemma: this issue almost certainly cannot be solved by us

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\(^2\) Kissinger visited China February 15–19 as part of an 11-day trip to Asia.

without either doing grave damage to our Chinese relations or further complicating those with Western Europe.

Perhaps, before you go further on any of the alternatives suggested in the attached paper, we should try to talk all this out.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Attachment

Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

The Nuclear Non Use Proposal

From the outset the Soviet proposal raised a series of the most delicate and dangerous problems for us. The stipulations in their first few drafts would have left the Allies and China exposed to Soviet attack and even implied that we engage in joint action against third countries. In the drafting and redrafting we have managed to soften these implications by adopting “presuppositions” about the general renunciation of force (Article II) and by limiting any joint obligations (Article III) against third party conflicts to generalities—“make every effort.”

Soviet concessions in the remainder of the draft—agreeing to our “create conditions” language and our “presuppositions”—are linked to the adoption of the central Soviet proposition. Every Soviet draft begins with a straightforward renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. No American draft has gone this far.

Thus, the central dilemma has not been resolved. There is still a conflict between our respective perceptions of the effect of this document on the international community. We wish to leave the impression that should there be a conventional conflict we would not be barred from nuclear use. Obviously no piece of paper restricts us in wartime, but to create the impression in peacetime that we are limited to a conventional conflict strikes at the heart of our nuclear guarantees for our Allies. On the other hand, to the extent that we try to protect the option

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4 Sonnenfeldt initialed above his typed signature.
5 Sent for action.
of using nuclear weapons we create a China problem. Peking’s fear is that the Soviets will gain a US endorsement of the legitimacy of using nuclear weapons against third parties that commit “aggression” by conventional means. At least this was the principal argument in the bitter Sino-Soviet debate on this at the UN last fall.⁶

There is probably no way to reconcile these two aspects. The outcome of our exchange with the Soviets, no matter how clever the drafting, will tilt us toward protecting NATO and leaving China uncovered, or protecting China but leaving Western Europe unprotected. Moreover, we may get the worst case—alienating both NATO and China. This raises the question of what could compensate us?

The Soviet Angle

It is apparent that the Soviets attach great weight to this project. Obviously, they realize that from their standpoint it is a winner—whatever the outcome, the very nature of the subject may cast doubt on our Allied commitments or give the impression of a freer Soviet hand against China. By tying the agreement to the Brezhnev visit, they have sought to impress us with the seriousness of the project and have raised the stakes. Even if they have other reasons for deferring a spring visit, they are now less likely to back away from the linkage of this project and the outcome of the next summit.

For Brezhnev it would probably represent the crowning achievement of his “peace program.” Considering the various political undercurrents in the Soviet leadership (the Shelest affair and Polyansky's demotion)⁷ and the aggravating political strains of the economic situation, it may be that Brezhnev can sell further détente only if he can show more tangible results vis-à-vis China or Europe. If so, this gives us some tactical leverage in terms of negotiating a better document, but it also reduces Soviet ability to defer or abandon it altogether.

The Allied Problem

By discreetly airing this project with some of the Allies we have conditioned them to accept something of this sort this year. At the same time, the UK reaction indicates a deep concern over the entire affair.⁸ They grudgingly agree that the document they helped draft might be published at the summit, and then “confidential and unpublicized”

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⁶ See Document 66.
⁷ Pyotr Shelest, head of the Communist Party in the Ukraine, was ousted on May 25, 1972. (“Shelest is Removed as Ukraine’s Leader,” The New York Times, May 26, 1972, p. 5) Dmitri Polyansky was demoted from First Deputy Premier to Agricultural Minister. (“Soviet Farm Minister Out; His Superior Demoted,” ibid., February 3, 1973, p. 5)
⁸ See footnote 2, Document 25.
discussion continue. They are operating, however, from an outdated draft that was artfully obscure. (In fact, I am not sure that we ever actually gave the British draft to the Soviets.) In any case we have now gone beyond that draft, and the British (and French) reaction to the latest US draft would probably be even more reserved. As the British memorandum points out this affair could blow up in public. Even if it does not, awareness of the existence of the negotiations probably deepens the suspicions in the Alliance that the US is subordinating its Allied commitments to a larger understanding with the USSR.

This has to be seen in the context of the infection that seems to be setting in among the Europeans. A series of seemingly marginal issues in MBFR and CSCE, following the surprises of the May summit, the leisurely and vague discussions of FBS, are all accumulating to transform what might have been tactical misunderstandings into a major malaise. Adding this non-use project at this time, before another SALT agreement, or the completion of CSCE and a round of MBFR could intensify the trouble. (I am not arguing the rights or wrongs of these European anxieties or of the other issues like Vietnam, on which we and the Europeans have differed. The observable fact is that the Alliance has not learned to manage the psychological aspects of détente.)

Our Options

Our strategy has been to gain time and to envelop the basic Soviet proposition with a series of conditions that avoid binding commitments and project the final agreement into the future. The Soviets have accepted some of this, but without giving up their central demand for a clear renunciation of nuclear use.

The UK suggested something along the lines of continuing study, and this seems to raise the question of a commission. The commission idea, however, works two ways: (a) a commission would seem to put an agreement even further into the future, but (b) it might also reinforce anxieties over a private Soviet-American dialogue on a subject of overriding importance to Europe, Japan and China.

We seem to have the following choices:

1. To postpone the project on the grounds that it is still premature; we would propose reconsidering after another SALT agreement, after CSCE and at least some progress in MBFR. This has some logic; a properly caveated agreement to consider “binding obligations” might seem a plausible follow on to SALT II and would be more palatable in the relaxed atmosphere of post-CSCE Europe. The Soviets would not take this setback gracefully, and it might have to be coupled with some new SALT proposals.
2. Alternatively, we could fold this problem into SALT. Since we have had the accidents agreement,\(^9\) and have the SCC,\(^10\) we could announce that non-use of force including nuclear use, was being considered in the context of a permanent agreement. One advantage is that by linking the two issues we gain some more leverage on SALT—it might even be a way out of FBS problems—i.e., non-circumvention combined with removing the danger of nuclear war being two principles that might be agreed to under the rubric of “restraint.” It has the advantage of the strictly bilateral SALT context.

3. Alternatively, we could use the commission concept to reduce the entire project to a very brief hortatory declaration, devoid of the details in the existing draft. The declaration would, as at present, declare the goal of removing the danger of nuclear war, state agreement to work toward establishing binding obligations, and establish a commission to examine the matter; the SALT SCC could be the commission since it is charged with certain strategic topics, or a special Joint Commission could be created.

—This has the advantage of avoiding some of the disputation on the non-use of force and the use of nuclear weapons that are subject to differing interpretations. It could be presented to the Allies as a minimal step, worth considering. We could then consult with them openly, with no implications that policies have changed.

—It might placate the Soviets—though this is uncertain.

—We could tell the Soviets that the existing drafting could be used to produce a declaration at a later time.

—It is consistent with our “phased” approach which we have tried to sell to Brezhnev.

4. We could insert the commission into the current drafts, presumably using the creation of the commission as the rationale for going into the detail contained in the current drafts. We would set forth some of the propositions as subjects for the Commission to examine rather than agreed principles.

—As noted, the Commission does not work entirely in our favor. A new Soviet-American institution to deal with nuclear strategy and use cuts across our Allies’ planning.

—On the other hand, the existence of a commission placates the Soviets, without forcing us to make an outright commitment.

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\(^9\) For the text of the agreement on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, signed at Washington September 30, 1971, (22 UST 1590; TIAS 7186), see Department of State Bulletin, October 18, 1971, pp. 400–401.

\(^10\) See Document 70.
At Tab A is a redraft of our existing paper, with the Commission inserted and the old draft suitably modified. At Tab B is the short hortatory declaration, which focuses on the establishment of the Commission. Tab C is a possible SALT announcement.\footnote{Tabs A–C are attached but not printed.}

\footnote{Tabs A–C are attached but not printed.}

78. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon\footnote{Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 15. Top Secret. A handwritten notation at the top of the letter reads: “Delivered by Vorontsov at 1:50 pm, Feb. 22, 1973.” On March 7, Kissinger forwarded the letter to Nixon. In a covering memorandum he wrote that Brezhnev “is obviously extremely eager for an early Summit. All prior conditions have now been dropped and his mention of slipping from May to June is a smokescreen to cover the fact that they are now pushing for June instead of November.” Kissinger wrote that with regard to Brezhnev’s proposed topics for the summit: “To lay the groundwork in all these areas will require an immense amount of preparatory work. It is obvious that Mr. Brezhnev is most anxious to point to concrete results from the summit.”}


Dear Mr. President,

I have noted with satisfaction that—as it follows from your letter of February 2, 1973,\footnote{See Document 74.}—we both are of the same opinion that with the end of the war in Vietnam the process of improvement of the Soviet-American relations, in which the Moscow meeting last year played a prominent role, can and should be now expedited.

In full concurrence with our approach is also the hope, expressed by you, that still prior to my visit to the United States a progress will be reached in the matters which constitute the subject of discussions between us.

On our part we are ready without further delay to deal with the matters which for this or that reason are yet unfinished, and also to work over some new initiatives. Our new meeting—towards which you and I should confidently move—must, by the very logic of matters, bring no less ponderable fruitful results than the first one.

In this connection and taking into account the postponement on your initiative of the beginning of the concrete preparatory work for
the meeting, I think that accordingly my visit to the United States will be more realistic to contemplate not for May, but for June.

True, not much time is left even till June. That is why we both need to exert efforts in order to finish in the remaining period the preparatory work—first of all the working out of a Treaty between our countries relating to the non-use of nuclear weapons against each other, the conclusion of which will undoubtedly be an important result of a new Soviet-American meeting on the highest level. Not long ago I have expressed to you my considerations as to further work on this document.3 I have expressed myself also on another important problem—the Middle East settlement, this is the second most important unfinished problem.

Taking note of a mention in your letter that you are instructing Dr. Kissinger to continue discussing in constructive spirit both these questions with Ambassador A. Dobrynin on his return to Washington, I would like to hope that this discussion will be constructive and fruitful. We would consider it advisable if later, say in April—in case it is acceptable to you—Dr. Kissinger will come to Moscow to finish the preparatory work for the meeting.

We agree that it would be useful to try through the confidential channel to crystallize a certain kind of an agreement on limitation of the strategic arms as well, which could be formalized in an acceptable form during the meeting as you have put it in your letter of December 18, 1972.4

The transformation of the Interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms into a permanent one with a certain broadening of its content will be by itself an important step confirming the seriousness and long-term character of the intentions of the sides in this respect. It would be natural at the same time if agreement on more complete measures of limiting strategic offensive arms takes into account the concern of each side as to those types of offensive arms which are not covered by the Interim agreement but which cannot be overlooked from the point of view of stability of the very foundations of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. And in this case, of course, the subject of consideration can be not only the quantitative side, but possibly also the limitation to a certain degree of a qualitative improvement of strategic arms.

Being ready for search of such a wider arrangement of permanent character and considering it to be a preferable one we are ready at the

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3 See Document 75.
4 Document 71.
same time to consider a possibility to conclude separate agreements of a narrower scale which would serve as additions to the Interim agreement. It is possible to have in mind also a preparation of some intermediate document containing agreed provisions of principle which would serve as starting points for working out later of a concrete agreement (or agreements) on an appropriate number of questions.

If to proceed further in the field of bilateral questions then one naturally begins to think of trade and economic areas of our relations. In this area as well a good beginning was laid down, good agreements were signed. It is important now to implement them. In this connection we recall with satisfaction that in your letter of December 18, 1972, you expressed determination to stand in the US Congress fully behind necessary changes in the legislation so that these agreements can finally take force and be completely fulfilled. Taking note of the progress in development of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in a number of areas of science and technology, on the environment and health we believe that there are still some unused reserves here as well.

Besides the possibility of concluding some additional agreements on cooperation in such, for example, areas as the agriculture, peaceful use of nuclear energy, exploration of the World ocean, we apparently ought to prepare and sign a long-term general agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on exchanges, contacts and co-operation, which would on the whole regulate this sphere of the Soviet-American relations. The present practice of concluding such general agreements on a two-year basis seems to be inadequate for a new stage of these relations.

Turning to the problems of international character I wish to point out a further progress, achieved not without the participation of our two countries, in the European affairs. A new phase is beginning in their development—the signing of the Treaty of basic principles in relations between the GDR and the FRG\textsuperscript{5} completes the whole series of important acts of international law which fixes the results of post-war developments in Europe. In this field it remains to realize with no undue delay the existing understanding on the GDR and the FRG entry into the United Nations.

The conference on the questions of European security and cooperation can and should became a next important step in the life of Europe and in the international life in general. We are confident that our two countries are able to further play a constructive role in the preparation and carrying out of this conference and we were glad to see in your

\textsuperscript{5} For the text of the treaty, announced on November 7, 1972, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1215–1230.
letter of February 2, 1973, readiness to facilitate its successful outcome; in the same vein we are ready to agreed actions also on the problem of reductions of the armed forces and armaments in Europe, on which the preparatory consultations are now being conducted in Vienna. There will be, of course, no objections on our part to an exchange of views also on the substance of this problem during our meeting.

In conclusion I would like to stress once again the necessity and importance of an advance preparation of such results of a new Soviet-American summit meeting which would bring our relations to a new higher level. The atmosphere in which the meeting would take place will have an important significance for its success.

Respectfully,

L. Brezhnev

6 Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

79. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 6, 1973, 6:12–7:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Anatoli Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The meeting took place at Dobrynin’s request.

He had returned the day before from the Soviet Union, under the following circumstances. Within 48 hours of my return from China the President received a letter from Brezhnev which transparently suggested that the Summit meeting considered for May should be postponed until June but that a definite date be set for June. The fact of the matter was that no date had been considered for May and that the two dates being considered were June and November. Dobrynin had origi-
nally intended to return around March 10, but I had pointed out to Vorontsov that I would leave for vacation on March 11—whereupon Brezhnev sent him back immediately.  

In this meeting Dobrynin now conveyed to me effusive expressions of Brezhnev looking forward to the Summit meeting, which he thought could be even more successful than the last one and mark a decisive turn in the relationship of our two countries. In addition, Dobrynin stressed that if the meeting was as successful as they hoped, there should be a return visit of the President to the Soviet Union the next year which would be not only business but a public visit by the President to the principal cities of the Soviet Union accompanied by Brezhnev. Dobrynin also conveyed an invitation from Brezhnev to me to visit the Soviet Union prior to the Summit.

I then reviewed with Dobrynin the various outstanding issues. He stressed that particular importance was attached to the nuclear treaty, that they wanted some discussions of the Middle East and a number of bilateral issues. I suggested that we meet for lunch on Thursday to continue the conversation in greater detail.

As we parted, Dobrynin said that if I wanted to, he would be glad to receive any information I had on my China trip, but he wasn’t asking for it. I told him I would be glad to give it to him.

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3 In a telephone conversation on March 6, 12:24 p.m. Dobrynin told Kissinger: “Brezhnev sent me in a rather urgent plane to keep an eye on you.” Their conversation continued: “D[obrynin]: (laughter) Well, Brezhnev hoped that you will not go on a vacation until they finish the major things I guess. K[issinger]: No, no, no. D: And before it will be clear that you could go to Moscow. K: Oh, no, I’ll go to Moscow. D: Yes. Well, that’s why he hoped that this will be clear before you went for a vacation. K: But he didn’t put it in his letter. D: Well, he did—He called me and I will tell you when I will see you what happened really. I was in from Moscow—then he called me and he asked me, ‘Did you tell Henry that I invite him?’ I said, ‘Yes, I did.’ But from what I saw in telegram, it is not clear; he wanted it to be in letter.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 19, Chronological File)

4 March 8. See Document 81.
80. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s File

Washington, March 8, 1973, 1–1:10 p.m.

SUBJECT
The President’s Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Ambassador Dobrynin had just returned from consultations in Moscow.

The President greeted him and said he was very pleased that General Secretary Brezhnev had now given us his answer on the proposed date for the Summit meeting. [The Soviets now wanted June.] The President expressed his determination that the Summit meeting must succeed.

Ambassador Dobrynin agreed, and then raised various matters with respect to the General Secretary’s visit. Brezhnev deeply appreciated receptions and formal protocol. The details of what to arrange and how to arrange it were, of course, up to the President.

Brezhnev’s approach to the Summit could be summed up as follows, the Ambassador continued: This particular meeting could set a new line for both countries in the direction of a deeper relationship, both state-to-state and President-to-General Secretary. The results of this meeting, Brezhnev hoped, would be such that next year the President could visit the Soviet Union again and this time travel widely around the country with the General Secretary and meet the Russian people directly. This would have a great symbolic significance about our relationship.

Brezhnev also believed that Summit meetings should be well-prepared, and they should become more regular. Their purpose should be to neutralize those forces which were attempting to undermine our agreements and our policies of rapprochement.

Ambassador Dobrynin concluded by citing the issues which Brezhnev regarded as the highest priority for the Summit—the nuclear treaty and the Middle East.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 15. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Brackets are in the original.

2 See Document 78.
81. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 8, 1973, 1:10–2:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Anatoli Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Following the meeting with the President, I met with Dobrynin for luncheon in the Map Room.

Dobrynin opened the conversation by asking me about my China trip. I said that it dealt almost exclusively with bilateral matters and had been fully covered in the communiqué. I said obviously the People's Republic wanted to stress its improving relationship with the United States and since we had no objections to that, we played along with it. On the other hand, such improved relations would never be directed against any other country.

He asked me whether the border issue had been discussed at all. I said no, and I frankly don't understand it well enough to have a sensible discussion. He asked whether I believed that the Chinese leaders really thought they were under a threat by the Soviet Union. I said I could only judge their public comments and there seemed to be some concern. He asked why military men were included in the discussions. I said that to the best of my knowledge military men had not been included. He said that Yeh Chien-ying had been listed in the Chinese press. I said that he attended only a banquet and none of the formal talks. I said that we would conduct our relationship with both of the Communist countries strictly on the basis of reciprocity and in no case would we cooperate with one against the other.

We then turned to U.S.-Soviet relations. Dobrynin stressed again the enormous importance that Brezhnev attached to the nuclear treaty. He said it was, to be sure, primarily psychological, but it would give Brezhnev a great opportunity then to turn matters around completely in his own country. I said the trouble for us was the binding obligation

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 15. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation took place in the Map Room. The memorandum is attached at Tab B to a memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, undated, summarizing his conversations with Dobrynin on March 6 and 8.
2 See Document 80.
3 For the text of the communiqué following Kissinger's trip to China, February 15–19, see Department of State Bulletin, March 19, 1973, p. 313.
4 Marshall Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying), member of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and Politburo.
not to use nuclear weapons, which was bound to create a confusing situation in the United States and among many of our allies. On the other hand, we were prepared to have an understanding on the special obligations of the two nuclear superpowers to preserve the nuclear peace, and we were drafting something along that line which I would submit to him the following week.\(^5\) He said again that this was a very key issue. I replied that I recognized this, but that we had to defend this to many audiences and we could not justify it simply on the ground that it would help Soviet psychology.

We then turned to the Middle East. Dobrynin asked me how the talks with Ismail\(^6\) had gone. I gave him a brief summary of the Ismail discussions primarily along procedural lines, that is to say, stressing the heads of agreement to be followed by an interim agreement to be followed by detailed negotiation. I stressed the view that in my personal view there was no possibility of a settlement along the lines of the paper that Gromyko had given me during my visit last April.\(^7\) I said that represented the formal Arab position and under those circumstances there would never be a reason for me to get involved. Dobrynin said, what else did you expect Gromyko to do? Why should he get ahead of the Egyptians? I told him that as long as I was negotiating with the Egyptians I saw no point in our discussions going beyond the statement of general principles, which could lead to an interim agreement. He did not balk at that proposition.

I then raised the issue of Vietnam. I said that the question of their military supplies was of course of great importance to us. We had noticed an enormous amount of infiltration, and I wanted to make two things clear. One, while we could understand military supplies during wartime, the continuation of the current level could not be considered a friendly act and could only have mischievous consequences. Secondly, if there were a massive attack there would be the most serious consequences. There should be no doubt about that.

Dobrynin said that he could assure me that there had been no speedup in military deliveries. I said this was in no sense the point. There didn’t have to be a speedup. Because under ceasefire conditions and no air attacks on the supply pipeline the North Vietnamese were in a position to build large stockpiles leading to another offensive. It

\(^5\) See Document 85.


would have obvious implications for the Summit if it coincided again with the Summit, but it would have the profoundest consequences for Soviet-American relations if it followed the Summit.

Dobrynin asked whether we were making the same démarche to the People’s Republic. I said he could count on Most Favored Nation treatment with respect to the People’s Republic and that we would make the same approach to both countries. Dobrynin said that Chinese behavior had been very curious. They had not let several hundred tanks go through and some supply trains disappeared completely; he supposed that some of the build-up was the result of matériel that the Chinese had been holding on their side of the border. I told Dobrynin that whatever the reason, this was a matter that should require the most careful attention. Dobrynin said he thought it would be very appropriate for me to raise this with Brezhnev at the end of April.

We then turned to SALT. Dobrynin raised the issue. Dobrynin said that in his opinion it wasn’t easy to make progress on SALT unless there was the nuclear treaty. The Soviet military were taking the position that it was too soon to have a follow-on agreement when the first one was less than a year old. Moreover, we had to understand that in the Soviet system, unless Brezhnev personally gave an order, SALT would move very slowly. For example, he could tell me in confidence that the Soviet Ministry of Defense had deliberately put its most unimaginative and unenterprising general on the SALT Delegation consistently. When Semenov asked the general to request instructions from the Ministry of Defense, his standard answer was that the Minister of Defense, if he wanted to give instructions, would issue them, and that he did not have the right to request them. When the Foreign Ministry called the Defense Ministry the experience was summed up by an exchange he, Dobrynin, had had with Grechko in which Grechko said, “If you want my personal opinion I’ll give it to you. If you want my official opinion the standard answer is no.”

For all these reasons, Dobrynin then said, it was essential to do two things. One, unless we made a concrete proposal which went to Brezhnev and which Brezhnev could then push on his bureaucracy, there was no chance of any real progress. Secondly, we had to give Brezhnev some excuse to do it. I told him we could live without a SALT Agreement this year but when we had a concrete proposal we would be prepared to advance it.

We then reviewed a number of the second-level issues, without anything of notable significance, except that Dobrynin asked us to make a specific proposal on chemical warfare if we wanted an agreement in that area.

We agreed to meet the following week in order to continue the discussions, especially on the nuclear treaty.
82. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Possible Proposal for a CW Agreement at the Summit

As you requested, attached is a proposal on chemical weapons as a possible agreement between the President and Brezhnev during the latter’s visit. It builds on the 1972 Moscow Joint Communiqué which indicates the USA and USSR would “continue their efforts to reach international agreement regarding chemical weapons.”

The Senior Review Group just considered the NSSM 157 study,\(^2\) US position on chemical weapons prohibitions, and I understand that a draft memorandum for the President will be forwarded to you shortly on this matter. If the President decides to ban at least CW agent production (State and Defense’s choice), this would provide the opportunity for proposing a relatively short moratorium on the production of such agents as an impetus to negotiations at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). (Including open-air testing of lethal agents themselves in the moratorium might be considered, but this would probably involve a bureaucratic struggle.)

If a decision is reached soon on NSSM 157, we would probably be in a position to table a draft treaty in Geneva at the CCD either in late April or early May after our consultations with NATO Allies and Japan. Thus, an agreement with Brezhnev would follow soon thereafter and would be related to the CCD negotiations.

You should be aware that it is quite well known that we have produced no stocks since the mid-1960’s and plan no production for stockpiling purposes at least for the next two years (but, subject to Congressional approval, production of binary artillery shells could probably begin in 1975). Therefore, a moratorium of about 2–3 years would not require a significant change on our part. Of course it cannot be verified, and this might raise Congressional problems.

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You should also be aware that although the Soviets have asked us for counterproposals at the CCD and suggested they are open to limited treaty proposals, they have to date supported the comprehensive approach to prohibit the development, production, and stockpiling of CW agents and munitions. Thus, a ban on production may not satisfy the Soviets.

Attached (Tab A)\(^3\) is a paper you could give to Dobrynin. It suggests two points: a moratorium and a commitment to achieving more permanent international agreement. The language is somewhat technical but this must be carefully drawn in view of the widespread production of chemicals for peaceful use.

\(^3\) Attached but not printed.

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83. **National Security Study Memorandum 176\(^1\)**


TO

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee

SUBJECT

Review of US-Soviet Bilateral Issues

The President has requested the Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee, to conduct a review of all bilateral issues that are presently the subject of discussion or negotiations with the Soviet Union. Additionally, as part of this review, he has requested a canvass of all agencies to identify possible new areas for bilateral agreement as well as areas for augmentation of existing US-Soviet agreements.

The review should include a description of each issue, its current status, the prospects for agreement, and the possible interrelationship with other questions being discussed with the Soviet Union. Additionally, the review should identify any problems anticipated in negotia-

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–207, NSSM 151–NSSM 200. Secret. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
ting an agreement on each issue as well as the anticipated timeframe for successful negotiations.

The review should address the advantages and disadvantages relating to possible renegotiation of the two-year Cultural Exchanges Agreement\(^2\) as a long-term, general agreement.

In keeping with the President’s directive, those issues being considered as possible future sub-agreements within the work of the US–USSR Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation—i.e., agricultural research, transportation and oceanography—should be included in the review. While these issues may be discussed by the science and technology commission, no final agreements or understandings should be concluded on these subjects at the forthcoming meeting of the commission.

The review should not include such issues as SALT, CSCE and MBFR; nor should it include any issues relating to the US-Soviet Trade Agreement and the work of the US–USSR Joint Commercial Commission.

The Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee, is requested to submit the review no later than March 26, 1973, for consideration by the NSC Senior Review Group. The President has directed that no agreements with the Soviet Union be initialled or otherwise concluded without his approval.

Henry A. Kissinger

84. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, March 14, 1973, 11 a.m.–2 p.m.

SUBJECT

Shultz Meeting with Brezhnev

PARTICIPANTS

Soviet
L. I. Brezhnev
A. M. Aleksandrov
Victor Sukhodrev

American
George P. Shultz
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Lewis W. Bowden

Brezhnev opened the conversation by asking whether this was not the Secretary’s first visit, and the Secretary replied that it was. When asked whether he had seen much of the city, the Secretary replied that he had and it was very interesting. Brezhnev said that Mrs. Shultz was probably seeing more and could tell him about it later.

Brezhnev said the Soviets attributed immense importance to the events of last May, which represented a turning point in our relations, though not everyone seemed to realize that. Indeed, Brezhnev said, when one thinks it over, one asks himself why between our two peoples there should be abnormal, unbusinesslike, and unfriendly relations. Of course, if one wants to he could find a thousand reasons for bad relations, but if one goes into these deeply the reasons are worthless. Therein lies the basic, immense importance of what has been accomplished.

Brezhnev felt that he and President Nixon had started to break down barriers between us that had existed in many spheres for a long time. He thought the May meeting had been well received by world public opinion. He thought we had made considerable forward movement since May, though unfortunately not all we had agreed to then had been accomplished. So far as the Soviet Union was concerned, Brezhnev said, they had been very serious and felt that everything should be carried out.

Brezhnev said that of course people evaluated the May events differently. We both had our friends and our foes. So far as he and his colleagues were concerned, however, they looked forward with optimism.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 15. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in Brezhnev’s office at the Kremlin. Shultz was in Moscow to brief the Soviets on the trade bill. On March 23, Sonnenfeldt forwarded the memorandum of conversation to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, which Kissinger initialed.
to the future as concerned our relations. Tell the President we will do everything we charted in Moscow, which we feel was the beginning of a great future between us. For long years there were tensions between us; there was the cold war; there were no good contacts between our businessmen and economic organizations. We should get down to the bottom of why that happened. The legacy of the past can be overcome, but it will require time.

Brezhnev said that last year he and the President had agreed that we would achieve our aims and that the improvement in relations between us would come faster if we worked harder at it. He noted their appreciation for the work already done by the President and the Administration to follow up the May commitments. He felt that after Congress approved the agreement, or agreements, he was not sure how many were involved, the road ahead would be easier for us to advance along.

At the same time, Brezhnev said we should also note the existence of objective factors which had facilitated an improvement in our relations. For example, the resolution of the Viet Nam conflict had clearly improved the atmosphere, as had approval of the Viet Nam agreements. There were also to be considered the more frequent contacts between our businessmen and people from the State Department and the White House.

Brezhnev characterized the meeting today as taking place at a time which was in effect a new phase in Summit contacts and clearly a further stage in the development of relations between us. So far as economic-commercial relations went, he felt it was natural that developed countries like the U.S. and the USSR should, with good will, find broad avenues for mutually beneficial cooperation. He stressed that he had made this point to the President. There was an additional consideration. That was that great countries like ours ought to have great big deals, even though one could not slight the smaller things between us in this field. He said that in the press one could see references to both of us as “superpowers” and to our efforts at cooperation. He thought that was really all to the good. He asked rhetorically whether we were to blame that we are great powers. History had made that happen. The USSR had almost 250 million people; the United States some 230–240 million. We both have enormous economic potential.

The trade agreement we had signed,² said Brezhnev, foresees a three-fold increase in trade between us but he pointed out trade must be a mutually advantageous undertaking. To take a simple example, he said, if I buy something from Sonnenfeldt, it is normal that he will

² See footnote 4, Document 14.
make a profit of 10 to 15%. Then if I turn and sell it on my own market, I can also expect to earn maybe 10%. But if Sonnenfeldt wants to sell me something and ruins me that is no good at all. There must be mutual benefit.

Brezhnev said that in this connection, people had started to use a broader concept than merely “trade,” and that was the concept of “economic cooperation.” For example, many countries were interested in this kind of cooperation involving basic raw materials. In the case of the Soviet Union there were oil, gas, timber, non-ferrous metals and coal, just to name a few. Those who would be parties to such deals were interested, however, in long-term agreements. Short-term agreements were of no value because they could not be economically justified. It seemed clear that long-term agreements were more effective from both the economic and the political points of view. Among other things, such agreements would strengthen mutual confidence and raise the economic level of the participants. We are aware that President Nixon favors this type of relationship with the USSR.

Over the past year or so, Brezhnev continued, there had been much talk about Soviet gas; many countries were interested. Gas was one of the Soviet national treasures. He noted that clever people had found ways to make a great variety of things from this raw material such as fibers, a source of energy, and so forth. They would unquestionably find other uses for it in the future. Nearly 20 years ago there had been a much different view of the potential use of gas.

Seen against this background, it was not fortuitous that countries everywhere in Europe and Japan were pressing the Soviet Union all the time to deliver more gas. The United States was also interested, of course. Up to the present, Brezhnev said, the Soviets had done virtually everything themselves to develop their gas resources, especially in the laying of pipelines. Pipe itself had turned out to be the big problem. However, he felt that once the pipelines had been built for Europe the possibilities for selling gas were almost unlimited.

Brezhnev emphasized that he was speaking absolutely frankly. Even though the new pipelines could make a difference, the Soviets could not possibly satisfy all the demands that they were getting for more gas, both from other socialist countries and from Western countries. Only yesterday, for example, the Italians had pressed for more gas.

Notwithstanding these enormous demands on Soviet gas resources, Brezhnev said, the Soviet Union stood ready to share this national treasure in certain measure with the United States as a means of making our relations, which were already friendly, even stronger. It remained for the engineers, economists and businessmen on both sides to
examine the technical and economic aspects and come up with accurate calculations respecting costs and so forth.

Brezhnev said at this point he thought that what he was about to say should not be made part of the record. From what his specialist told him, he felt that a trillion cubic feet of gas could be made available to the United States. This could mean deliveries over a period of 30 years. Outlays from the United States would be required in terms of equipment and other things. As a matter of fact, Brezhnev said, the reserves were probably even greater than now estimated, which would make it possible for us to think in terms of deals even longer than 30 years. Since the Secretary would be now directly involved with Soviet matters, he felt that this might give him food for thought.

Gas was only one avenue of possible cooperation however, Brezhnev said. Another possibility would be for the United States to deliver complete plants to the Soviet Union for the production of mineral fertilizers, cellulose, ores, etc. Under the concept of industrial cooperation, repayment for these complexes could be effected by deliveries of a portion of the output, say 10–15%, over a long period such as 20 years. The U.S. could then sell these deliveries in third countries if it so desired. Both in the areas mentioned and in others such as nickel and tin possibilities would be opened up for very broad cooperation between us.

This is not a remote idea, Brezhnev said. He could, for example, cite a recent agreement with West Germany for the construction in the USSR of a metallurgical combine for the production of steel through a process by-passing the blast furnace. The combine would operate on the basis of Soviet natural gas and West Germany would take in payment a part of the product of the combine. If such undertakings were possible with West Germany, then why not with the United States?

Brezhnev said we should be more energetic in finding fields of cooperation between us, because this would lay the foundation for building mutual confidence and respect. This was not only good for the matter at hand, it also would contribute to peace on our planet. This was an “epochal question” which could contribute in an immensely important way to political developments. He felt sure this was also President Nixon’s position, that is, the more we could resolve economic problems the more easily we could resolve political problems.

Brezhnev recalled that he and the President had discussed a Summit meeting in 1973, and the possibility that there could be such a meeting every year. Please tell the President he said, that we are firmly committed to this goal. If anything of a practical nature needs to be done to make that come about we should let him know.

President Nixon and he had also agreed, Brezhnev said, that Soviet-American relations could not be insulated from world events,
since we both participated in those events and influence them, or at least should try to influence them. He personally was very happy to see talks going forward on strategic arms, the reduction of troops in Europe, and the good cooperation between our delegations in Helsinki on European security matters. At the same time, he could not help but observe that there were certain forces within the United States and outside who were attempting to spoil the relationship that had been developed. Despite these forces, we must both persevere to attain the goals we have set. Here Brezhnev said he wishes us to understand he was expressing the sentiments of the whole Soviet leadership and the government. At this point, Brezhnev said he would finish and let the Secretary talk. He apologized for having gone on at such length, noting that he had not talked with many Americans lately. The only one had been Armand Hammer, whom he termed an interesting man.

Brezhnev then added he had been informed about specific items which his people wish to buy with the U.S. credit. There were many interesting items. He mentioned this because he believed he and President Nixon had laid out plans last year which would bear fruit and therefore he was thinking ahead. [This seemed to imply an awareness that the talks on the credit were snagged.]

Brezhnev observed that if his colleagues had made Secretary Shultz suffer as he had then he would be tired when he got home after his long trip. He recalled, however, that the President last spring had also been tired and had still managed to do a lot of very important work in Moscow. He sympathized with the problem of fatigue but noted that he himself puts out a great deal of energy. Of course, for him this was easier since he was at home.

Secretary Shultz said he was happy to hear Brezhnev’s description of the unfolding of Soviet-American relations. He recalled very clearly how tired the President had been when he returned from Moscow but notwithstanding that the President had gone directly to Congress to report to it and the American people on his trip. He had conveyed very accurately the spirit of his meetings in Moscow and the message was warmly received by both Congress and the people. Brezhnev interjected here that the first meeting with the President had occurred in the office in which they were sitting and the Secretary said indeed the Kremlin was historic for many reasons, including that one. Brezhnev then wryly observed that everybody talked about the Kremlin this, the Kremlin that, much in the same way people spoke about the White

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3 On his return from Moscow on June 1, 1972, the President spoke at 9:40 p.m. to a joint session of Congress at the Capitol. The address was broadcast live on radio and television. See Public Papers: Richard Nixon, 1972, pp. 660-666.
House this and the White House that, but he thought this reflected the feelings people have about where the decisions are made and where criticism is to be directed.

Secretary Shultz said he had been many times with the President, sometimes alone, sometimes with Henry Kissinger and others, and heard him speak of his trip to the USSR and the relationship between our two countries. There was, he thought, a striking parallel between the President’s views and those Mr. Brezhnev had expressed. Brezhnev replied he was indeed happy to hear that since he had the freshest memory of their conversations. In fact, he recalled virtually every word. As he saw it, the big tensions between our countries and between the leaders disappeared in the course of their first meeting. This was a process that had continued since. It was not a matter of personal ambition, but he felt the personal relationships established were of the greatest importance for our two countries and should be brought to their logical conclusion.

Brezhnev then said he was not a diplomat, only a former engineer, but he would like to say that it was not an unimportant fact that the American people had reelected President Nixon to his second term by a great majority. This had come after his visit to Moscow and means that the American people approve of his line of cooperation with the USSR, though that of course was not a direct issue in the campaign. Secretary Shultz replied that was right and he believed it expressed the yearnings for peace throughout the world. The President’s visit to the USSR was the largest step that could be taken toward world peace. Clearly the American people were responding favorably to the move. Brezhnev commented that obviously plain people everywhere wanted peace.

Secretary Shultz observed that frequently in their talks the President had emphasized that economic-commercial relations between our two countries was an essential part of our broader relations, and not just a matter of day-to-day trade. The President was therefore seeking to develop things that have a longer-range significance, not only the economic aspects but other aspects as well. Here, the Secretary noted that we have restructured a part of our government to deal better with the USSR in the economic-commercial sphere. Also he would like to point out that he and Dr. Kissinger were and would be closely associated in the new structure when looking at economic relations with the USSR.

Brezhnev said with a straight face that turned into a smile that Secretary Shultz should tell Kissinger he very much welcomed cooperation between the Secretary and Dr. Kissinger but he, Brezhnev, hoped there would also be cooperation between the Secretary and the Soviets. But seriously, he continued, we are grateful for the coincidence of views between us and the President on the development of economic
ties. The Soviets had noted our structural changes and that the Secretary had been invested with the noble task of heading it. “We know you enjoy the confidence of the President.”

Pensively, Brezhnev said that it was really impossible to over-estimate the importance of mutual confidence. We must both try in every way to develop and strengthen that, not allow it to be just a fleeting thing. As the Russians say, “There is no confidence without love.” Though the word “love” was not appropriate here between politicians, the confidence part was. So, now you go ahead and cooperate with Kissinger, whom I haven’t seen for some time. Perhaps I should send him a telegram and ask him why he hasn’t been telling me anything since he is dealing with the Soviet Union. You and he should tell me what you are saying about us! Turning serious again, Brezhnev said he knew Kissinger and knew that cooperation between him and the Secretary would be serious and fruitful.

At this point there was a humorous exchange, with the Secretary saying that if Sonnenfeldt was willing to sell something to Brezhnev for only 10 percent he was not sure he ought to be dealing with such matters. Sonnenfeldt remarked that he was supposed to get two percent commission from the Lend-Lease settlement and Brezhnev shot back quickly that that settlement was not yet in effect and might not be.

The Secretary then said he would like to say a word about the matter of confidence and our Congress where certain questions were already being debated. He would like to assure Brezhnev that the President was working hard on the problems relating to Congress and in the spirit which had been developed during his Moscow visit. But we do have serious problems with the Congress. The President was seeking various ways to break the log-jam created by attitudes in Congress. The Secretary said he had explained this matter in detail yesterday to Novikov and so would not go into it closely here. The important thing was to have confidence that the President was working to see that the agreements we signed would be carried out. He is working in the most arduous way and in the politically most sensible way.

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4 See footnote 2, Document 65.
5 In a memorandum to Nixon, March 15, Shultz summarized his meeting with Deputy Premier Ignatiy Trofimovich Novikov: “I set forth in detail possible strategies we might pursue on MFN, described our new organizational arrangements on trade relations, reviewed the agricultural picture and informed him of our readiness to let gas companies proceed with further feasibility studies, though without commitment on our part with respect to eventual financing and pricing policies. Novikov showed intense interest and reacted positively throughout. I believe relationship with him will prove useful over time.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 15)
Brezhnev then asked what was the Secretary's evaluation of the spirit of the talks he had had with Novikov, Baybakov and Kuzmin. He commented all three were fully abreast of Soviet policy thinking. Secretary Shultz replied he had received a great deal of information from Baybakov about the planning process and about the relationship between planning the internal economy and foreign trade. The explanations had been very helpful. With Novikov, the Secretary said, there had been a fruitful two-way exchange on the organization of work between us in the economic field, on matters relating to oil and gas, the question of MFN status for the USSR, and to a lesser extent on agricultural matters and the desirability from both our standpoints for early information about any Soviet grain purchases so we could plan our planting and our transport arrangements. In general, the Secretary said all the conversations with Soviet officials had been useful and their general tone had been constructive, especially the talk with Novikov.

Brezhnev commented that Novikov, Baybakov and Kuzmin were very well informed on economic-commercial matters, were close to the Soviet leadership and knew their opinions and the nuances of policy. Novikov was perhaps the most competent person in the foreign economic field in his capacity as a deputy to Kosygin dealing on a daily basis with economic matters. These three men accurately reflect Soviet positions on policy.

Brezhnev said he had had a conversation with Novikov just before the Secretary and his party went to the Bolshoi Theater and been filled in on their talk. As concerned business facilities in Moscow, Brezhnev said Novikov had already spoken to people about the establishment of permanent trade missions between us, and that he supported this idea.

With respect to agriculture, Brezhnev said there was really not much he could tell the Secretary at this time but he would like to assure him that a constructive solution to that question (advance knowledge of purchases) would be found and they would let us know. Brezhnev said he was convinced that we did need to coordinate these matters between us rather than continue in the hit-and-miss way we have had before. Both our economies require planning and we should go down the road of better coordination. As of now, he said, they could not give us an absolute figure but should be able to come up with more or less realistic figures for maybe the next five to ten years.

Secretary Shultz commented it was hard to be exact where nature's whim played such an important role but we did need some figures for planning various things on our side. He told Brezhnev that the Soviets

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6 No record of Shultz' meeting with Nikolay Konstantinovich Baybakov, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Deputy Minister of Trade M. R. Kuzmin, was found.
could pass any information they consider highly confidential to us with assurance that it would not leak out. Brezhnev said that was indeed the spirit in which he informed the President of various matters. In fact, that was an important aspect of our relationship. He thought that recently the passing of information between us had been improving.

Secretary Shultz said he would like to return to gas. We realized that this subject was of deep significance to both countries. It involved a long term, a large scale, required mutual confidence, and had mutual benefit. Brezhnev commented that the latter aspect was essential since otherwise our businessmen would not go for it, nor would the Soviets. But Brezhnev thought their and our experts would be able to calculate quite accurately who would get what benefit and what the proper time-frame should be. From what he understood, 30–40 years seemed to be indicated. It might be difficult for us all to see the ultimate fruit of such long-term agreements. In any event, he thought it would be difficult for him personally though he would certainly like to live that long. He said his 87-year old mother lives in Moscow and is now looking forward to her 90th birthday. She has a great interest in things, sees movies, and watches television, and is always full of lively comments on things. Brezhnev hoped he would be the same at her age.

The Secretary said he shared Brezhnev’s assessment of the gas outlook. There were many technical questions to be solved and the economic aspects must be carefully examined. We already know, however, what the general future demand picture for a clean energy source like gas is likely to be. The possibilities here are of great promise. While recognizing the uncertainties, we are ready to tell our companies, especially those involved in the “North Star” project that the United States Government has no objections to their going ahead with their studies, which we hope will have a successful outcome.

Brezhnev said that at a recent official conference with the Siberian oil people and various ministers he had heard that the reserves in the area under discussion amounted to some 20.5 trillion cubic meters. This amount was already proved out and more reserves were being discovered all the time. Under certain conditions, therefore, the Soviets could talk to us about even larger amounts of gas than were mentioned earlier. It was now up to the specialists to make their fine calculations. Brezhnev said he understood there were problems of a technical nature such as high pipe-pressure, laying pipe on the sea bottom and so forth, but he thought the specialists would solve those. He personally was more interested in the political aspect of the projects under discussion because this was the real meaning of such a long-term relationship between us in the economic field.

Secretary Shultz replied that was very well put. In fact, it seemed to him that there was a kind of parallel between the ever-expanding gas
reserves Brezhnev had mentioned and the expanding possibilities for our relationship. Brezhnev said that was right, that was the scale they were thinking about. As regards quantities, selling the US 300 million cubic feet was peanuts. (At this point, Brezhnev autographed three photographs which had been taken at the outset of the meeting and later handed them over to the Secretary.)

The Secretary said he wanted to say one further word about our problems in Congress with the MFN issue. He had given Novikov a very detailed explanation about the possible strategies. We would keep Dobrynin informed on how we see the process unfolding. We have given this background so that you will understand the processes involved and, to the extent possible, you will in your own activities see the relationship to the way in which matters go forward. (This latter part was at first incorrectly translated and Mr. Sonnenfeldt asked that the interpreter render it exactly. This was done.)

Brezhnev said he had said at the outset that he was happy to hear any advice of what the President thought they (the Soviets) could appropriately do within their possibilities. He had to be cautious because he realized this was a U.S. internal matter. He added that they would take no steps without the President’s consent. So far as the agreements of last year were concerned, the Soviets felt duty bound to do everything necessary to carry them out. It was no secret that this was fully in our interest, meaning by this our common interest. The Secretary commented that was a very helpful statement and repeated his assurance that we would keep Dobrynin informed.

Brezhnev asked the Secretary to give the President his and his colleagues’ best regards. They all wished him the best of health and success in his activities, especially as regarded progress on our agreements and in developing other areas of our future relations. Brezhnev underscored the very important stage in our relations at which we now find ourselves.

Secretary Shultz remarked that the two preceding nights he and his party had seen excellent performances in Moscow which pointed up the importance of doing things to the best of one’s ability. He would like to present to Brezhnev a small gift which represented the fine work done by the Steuben company, which was well known for its glass objects. Since the gift was a horse’s head, perhaps the General Secretary could use it to play chess. Brezhnev replied he used to play chess but had no time now. He promised to keep the little glass horse’s head on his desk at home. He said the Secretary had caught him unawares but he would find something for him. Brezhnev made a parenthetical remark on the very wide uses of glass, from plates in windows to the finest art objects. Mr. Sonnenfeldt commented that the Secretary might have to make 31 more visits to the USSR to bring Brezhnev the re-
main pieces for a complete chess set. Brezhnev immediately quipped he would support the Sonnenfeldt line and that indeed the Secretary must come back to Moscow. There was much planning to do.

Brezhnev then asked whether the Secretary would be returning directly to the US from Moscow. Secretary Shultz replied he would be stopping in Bonn, then in Paris where a large meeting of Finance Ministers would be held Friday on international monetary arrangements.

Brezhnev asked the Secretary to tell the President he has received a message from the Japanese Prime Minister. It was a calm, businesslike message on relations between Japan and the USSR in which the Japanese suggested a new round of conversations on a peace treaty. These would follow up those started by Gromyko in Tokyo last year. Brezhnev stressed that the message had nothing to do with any third country but was confined to questions of general relations between the USSR and Japan, including references to their desire to develop further economic relations in the fields of oil, gas, and other resources. Brezhnev said he would soon tell the President in detail about this message through Dobrynin but wanted Secretary Shultz to be informed now on the general contents. He said he had told the Japanese Ambassador he agreed to such discussions and would plan to answer the message in the near future, with a suggestion that an appropriate time be arranged through diplomatic channels.

Brezhnev said he hoped the Secretary would find solutions to the problems to be discussed in Paris. He also asked vaguely about the talks between the US and the GDR on the establishment of diplomatic relations. (This was not pursued.)

Secretary Shultz said there was no problem with the Soviet press release which Mr. Aleksandrov had handed to Mr. Sonnenfeldt. He continued that he would be meeting the press before leaving Moscow and would brief them in general terms about his reception but would not tell them what the Soviet side had said because it was their privilege to release that.

After everyone had got up from the table, Brezhnev took the Secretary over to a large plaque (about 6’ x 4’) resting on a stand. He explained that the plaque had been made of various kinds of wood by people on the island of Sakhalin in honor of the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. The Secretary commented it was an unusual piece of work. Thereupon, Brezhnev went into the next room and returned with a portrait of himself (about 3’ x 2’) done in the same wood-mosaic style. He explained how the work had been put together

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7 Diplomatic relations between the United States and the GDR were established on September 4, 1974.
and seemed obviously pleased with it. Brezhnev then disappeared with
his portrait and returned with a color-photograph blow-up of President
Nixon and Kosygin signing an agreement last May, with himself in the
center of the picture. Mr. Sonnenfeldt observed that neither Kissinger
nor he was visible in the photograph though they had been present. He
joked that they had been purged from the Photo but Brezhnev only
smiled.

After a brief leave-taking, the Secretary and those accompanying
him departed.

85. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


Kissinger: Mr. President.
Nixon: Yeah?
Kissinger: We are having a problem with the Russians, which has
been caused by a total lack of discipline in the State Department. On
Wednesday, Dobrynin called me with a message from Brezhnev to you
that they had heard that we were submitting a resolution at the Human
Rights Commission in Geneva calling for free emigration of people all
over the world.²
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Kissinger: I called Rush. Rush said he would stop it.
Nixon: Right.
Kissinger: He would stop our doing something. I notified Gro-
myko that we were not proceeding. I offered it to Dobrynin on your be-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes,
Oval Office, Conversation No. 881–2. No classification marking. The editor transcribed
the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² No record of Kissinger’s March 14 telephone conversation with Dobrynin was
found. However, in two subsequent conversations on March 15, at 9:50 a.m. and 11:05
a.m., Dobrynin and Kissinger did discuss the resolution before the Human Rights Com-
misson. (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 19, Chrono-
logical File) The United States submitted a resolution in the Human Rights Commission
on the right to leave any country and return to one’s own country. The resolution was
withdrawn, and the United States supported a similar resolution that was adopted on
12/(XXIX) None of the draft texts nor the final resolution mentioned Soviet Jews.
half, saying you had ordered it stopped. This morning Rush calls me in extreme agitation, saying a) they had never understood, had never realized, that we were in fact submitting a resolution; that the fellow had gone ahead and submitted the resolution anyway.

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: That we were faced now with the problem of withdrawing it, which we can’t do because the Jewish people would scream their heads off if we withdrew a resolution on free emigration.

Nixon: Just say we won’t press it.

Kissinger: Oh, that I’ve already done.

Nixon: Hmm.

Kissinger: But we will say [unclear] to the Russians after having given them an assurance.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: I told them to call the guy back to give us an explanation of how he could proceed without instructions. He’s, unfortunately, the head of some Jewish organization on top of it.

Nixon: Who is it? [unclear]

Kissinger: The guy we got there.

Nixon: That’s not what I asked you. I know—

Kissinger: [unclear]

Nixon: I must say this: I know this is not Rogers. I know that he couldn’t, he [unclear]—

Kissinger: No, no, no it’s not Rogers—

Nixon: I know this is not Rush.

Kissinger: It is certainly not Rush—

Nixon: It’s somebody down the line and I—

Kissinger: It is some son-of-a-bitch—

Nixon: —I think he’s got to be disciplined.

Kissinger: And you know as well as I do—

Nixon: I—I’ll tell you what I think we ought to do. I think the bastard ought to be recalled. I really do. He did—he did this without—

Kissinger: You know, Mr. President, that these bastards don’t submit resolutions without somebody covering their tail in the Department. Now, a) I agree. Rogers had nothing to do with this. He, he—

Nixon: He [unclear].

Kissinger: Rush was trying to stop it, and he is even more burned up than I because they lied to him. But I told Dobrynin and he went through the roof, and he rarely loses his temper. He says it makes him look like a fool, makes us look very bad.
Nixon: Send a message to Brezhnev right away with this [unclear]. See, he probably [unclear]. What are we going to say to him? Do we say [unclear]?—?

Kissinger: I—I’ve asked Rush to—

Nixon: I’m almost thinking of this: I think what [unclear]. I thought we would write a letter to a Congressman or something stating my position as to Jewish emigration. I feel so strongly about it.

Kissinger: Well, I think it’s too dangerous for you, Mr. President.

Nixon: Oh, screw it. I’m not running for anything.

Kissinger: No, but you need some support. But—

Nixon: I’m not getting any.

Kissinger: Well, I’ve asked Rush to send us a written report, and I’m going to send that to Dobrynin.

Nixon: In the Senate, the Democratic Caucus endorsed a resolution urging the administration to substantially reduce the contingent of all the U.S. troops stationed overseas. Three Senators were against this. Scoop Jackson continued [unclear].

Kissinger: It’s a disgrace. It is a national disease. These people. [knocking noise] I mean, the pressures we’re under—

Nixon: [unclear]—

Kissinger: —from these people, from the Jewish community.

Nixon: Well, the Jewish community I understand. I—you know what I mean. I can disagree with them, but I understand. But I don’t understand the Congressmen and Senators joining with them.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: You understand?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: We all have pressures. Christ, if I were Jewish, I’d probably be kicking them in the ass, too. It’s stupid.

Kissinger: [unclear]

Nixon: My point is [unclear] I got [Max] Fisher to toe the line I want.

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: I told Fisher [unclear] because the door will slam shut. I want you to get one fact for me: how many Jewish people were allowed to emigrate in ’71 as compared to ’72, after we moved? I want to add that I think if we could show, without saying we did it, that the number that emigrated after our meeting with the Russians was greater. It was substantially increased in ’72, I think. Weren’t they? [unclear]—

Kissinger: Well, they were at the same level—

Nixon: Ok.
Kissinger: —but I can get Dobrynin to give me those.

Nixon: Oh, on Dobrynin, just say that I was—that I called you on the carpet this morning, and I raised hell, and I am—that I have, I have demanded the man be brought back. And then, tell him that I had a meeting with Jewish leaders here in the office yesterday and laid down the law to them that I would totally oppose it, publicly, if they’d even insist. Well, why don’t you do that?

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: And put a note from me, personally, to Brezhnev on it.3 I really think I should do it—

Kissinger: And I think I’ll ask Rush to call up Dobrynin and apologize.

3 No record of the note was found.

86. Editorial Note

Throughout the last week of March and the early days of April 1973, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger exchanged and discussed drafts regarding a nuclear non-use agreement with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. Kissinger also consulted with the British Embassy in Washington about the draft agreement.

On March 21, Minister Yuri Vorontsov delivered the latest Soviet draft of the agreement to Scowcroft. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 15) In a memorandum to Kissinger, March 26, Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the NSC Staff analyzed the new Soviet version. Sonnenfeldt wrote that it “moves further away from the contingent quality of our last draft.” The new version, he wrote, “now becomes a bilateral non-aggression pact, with particular emphasis on nuclear war, and some reassuring phrases for third countries.” Sonnenfeldt noted that a revised Article VI of the agreement “introduces two qualifications that may have some meaning.” He continued:

“—The Agreement does not affect the ‘inherent right of collective self-defense’ (in our draft), but the Soviets add ‘provided for in Article 51 of the Charter.’ We had this earlier but dropped it at UK suggestion for the broader right of self-defense. Presumably, the Soviets want to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate rights to self-defense.
This requires a lawyer’s judgment; my instinct is against adding the Article 51 reference.

“The obligations toward third countries are also not impaired or affected, but the Soviets add a qualifier that relates to those obligations undertaken ‘in appropriate treaties and agreements’—presumably narrowing the effect to formal arrangements only. (Is our nuclear commitment to NATO in a treaty or agreement, for example?)

“It could be that these two changes are designed with China in mind—in that the U.S. has no treaty obligations and China could only appeal to self-defense under the Charter.” (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Map Room, Aug. 1972–May 31, 1973)

On March 27, Kissinger contacted Minister Richard Sykes at the British Embassy regarding the latest Soviet draft (telephone conversation, March 27; ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 19, Chronological File), and on March 30, British Ambassador Cromer forwarded to Kissinger a telegram from Sir Thomas Brimelow, Permanent Under-Secretary in the British Foreign Office, commenting on the latest Soviet draft. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Map Room, Aug. 1972–May 31, 1973) On March 31, Kissinger contacted Dobrynin and told him “we have had a long message from the English with their views.” He said that “we want to study it because we don’t want to hand over a document the day we get the message. And secondly we want to study it to see whether we can accommodate some of their concerns, which will not require a major change, incidentally.” (Ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 19, Chronological File) Sonnenfeldt submitted two subsequent drafts to Kissinger on March 31 and April 1, revised on the basis of comments from the British and from Kissinger. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Map Room, Aug. 1972–May 31, 1973 [3 of 3]) On April 2, a revised U.S. draft of the nuclear non-use agreement was delivered to Dobrynin. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 16)

Dobrynin discussed the revised U.S. draft with Kissinger in a telephone conversation at 6:25 p.m. the same day. Dobrynin said the U.S. draft “is a complete disappointment to me frankly.” He told Kissinger: “Now in Moscow it will look like a step back from what we already discussed two weeks ago. I am perfectly sure of this reaction because it’s from the text from your declaration which was a half year ago.” Dobrynin objected to the revised second paragraph of Article I of the U.S. draft agreement, which stated that the United States and the Soviet Union “agree that they will, in the conduct of their international relations do their utmost to create conditions in which recourse to nuclear weapons will not be justified, to prevent the development of situations
capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, and to avoid military confrontations.” Kissinger told Dobrynin that “the British attach enormous importance to that one sentence.” He added that “it therefore would make it a lot easier to sell it if the British would join us.” Kissinger said that he would discuss Dobrynin’s comments with President Nixon the following afternoon. (Ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 19, Chronological File)

Kissinger called Sonnenfeldt after his phone conversation with Dobrynin. He told Sonnenfeldt that Dobrynin “is shedding bitter tears over the phrase ‘conditions in which nuclear war would not be justified.’ I told him he should wait 24 hours before transmitting it; I’ll talk to the President again, which doesn’t mean we’ll have to change it. You know, there is in fact an argument to be made that even if we are going to drop it out we could drop it in Moscow.” Sonnenfeldt replied that “there is a chance if we hang in there and tell them that this is just how it’s got to be that they may accept it.” The conversation continued: “HAK: And there is an advantage in showing the British we submitted it. Sonnenfeldt: Yes, because we’re going to have a big problem when this thing surfaces so we might as well show the agony that we went through. Because it’s in there twice now, in the preamble and the article. HAK: Which is one reason why we could drop it from the article. Sonnenfeldt: Yes, I think though that their objection is largely bureaucratic and can’t really be substantive because they got the first sentence and this thing is almost totally illogical.” (Ibid.)

On April 3, Kissinger phoned Dobrynin and told him that the President “would like to submit the document as it is.” Kissinger added: “On the other hand, he [Nixon] will look with great sympathy at counter-proposals from Mr. Brezhnev. But he feels that he must at least submit it—that one phrase.” Dobrynin replied that “this phrase is three times repeated.” Kissinger told Dobrynin: “Well, I can tell you that we will be very receptive to deleting it from Article I. I mean I tell you that on an informal basis.” The conversation continued: “HAK: Anatole, we have never failed to complete an agreement and we will not fail this time. We will not fail this early in the Administration and this late in our relationship. But we have to go through some steps and you have to go through some. Dobrynin: I understand. All right. HAK: Particularly when we have to discuss the history at some point.” (Ibid.)
87. Message From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon

Moscow, undated.

We would like to say frankly that we ourselves do not have data regarding the weapons deliveries from North to South Vietnam. As for the Soviet Union, it stands—as we have repeatedly and quite definitely stated—for the strict implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement on Vietnam of January 27 by all its parties. We proceed also from the fact that the agreement signed at the Paris International Conference on Vietnam must be strictly and punctually observed. It is in this way that the Soviet Union on its part is and will be active.

While the war was in progress in Vietnam, we, as is known, helped the DRV with armaments but the situation has changed with the end of the war and with attainment of peace. We want, strictly confidentially, to bring to the personal knowledge of President Nixon the fact that in these new conditions our present deliveries to North Vietnam are connected only with peaceful purposes of economic restoration of that country. At the same time, we would like to draw the attention of the President to the following circumstance: When our weapons were delivered to the DRV, it was done primarily through the territory of China or the Chinese ports. It is quite possible that part of the weapons sent at that time and destined for the DRV might have settled somewhere in China. We do not exclude a possibility that those weapons might have reached the DRV later.

In the communication transmitted to us by the US side, there was a hint that there is a possibility that the United States may again embark on the road of military actions in Vietnam or, in other words, on the road of violation of the peace agreements. Taking into account what in the present circumstances would be the consequences of such actions for the situation not only in Vietnam but in the whole world as well, we

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 496, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 16. Top Secret. Kissinger forwarded the message to Nixon as an attachment to a summary memorandum, April 17. Kissinger wrote that the note came “in response to our representations regarding weapons deliveries in Vietnam” (see Document 81). Dobrynin had delivered the message to Scowcroft on March 23. That day, Scowcroft forwarded it to Kissinger, who was in Mexico, in message Tohak 93, with the question: “Do you wish the message to be given to the President?” (Ibid.)


3 Not further identified.
would like to believe that things would not turn in that direction. We believe that restraint and equanimity will be displayed by the US and that adherence to peaceful aims regarding which there was an understanding reached between us at the meeting in Moscow, as well as to the provisions of the Act solemnly signed by the two of our countries together with other participants of the Paris conference will be clearly demonstrated. (According to the information reaching us from various sources, considerable quantities of American armaments are being received as before by Saigon authorities. To what extent this information corresponds to the real state of affairs is, of course, known better to the US authorities.)

88. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

MFN for the USSR; Shultz Meeting

Since Secretary Shultz explained to Deputy Premier Novikov and then to Brezhnev the possible strategies we may use to deliver on the President’s commitment to obtain MFN for the USSR, the Soviets have permitted Jewish emigration to flow more freely. (See the status report at Tab B.) There is also talk in Moscow that the emigration tax law is “up in the air”.

In light of this Secretary Rogers has sent the President a memo (Tab A) expressing the judgment that it may now be possible to find a compromise solution that satisfies all the parties. He advocates a tacit
arrangement with the Soviets involving an annual emigration rate of at least 36,000 Jews, one sixth of whom would be individuals with higher education; there would also be assurances that through use of waivers inability to pay the education tax would not prevent emigration. In addition, there would be some less specific understanding that there would be no harassment of applicants for emigration. The Secretary’s memo gives reasons why such a deal might be acceptable in Moscow if it assured the Soviets of MFN and continued EXIM access.

Procedurally, the Secretary would seek to get American Jewish and then Israeli support for this approach. Assuming success in this, as he does, the Secretary would then approach Dobrynin to get Soviet assurances that the proposed arrangement is acceptable. Then the sponsors of the Jackson–Mills–Vanik proposal would be approached and assured that firm though informal commitments had been made by the Soviets in exchange for prompt granting of MFN. These legislative sponsors would get off the hook by issuing a statement to the effect that the Administration had provided assurances that it had reason to believe that Jewish emigration would continue at no less than present quantitative and qualitative levels and that the tax would not be applied so as to restrict emigration.

The course of action proposed by Secretary Rogers rests on at least two key judgments: that the Soviets will accept a specific, if informal deal; that even if they do, Jackson et al will consider this particular one sufficient to withdraw their requirement for periodic Presidential findings that the Soviets are allowing free emigration. I question both judgments; and I also consider it unlikely that any such deal could remain unpublicized, no matter how informal it was. Once public, the Administration would of course have become a party to a Soviet emigration quota of 36,000 heads a year and someone will be bound to calculate the per capita remittances we are making to the USSR through EXIM loans and tariff concessions for people released. This may be a harsh and prejudiced assessment and you may well have a different view of what is undoubtedly a genuine effort to get us out of the dilemma we now face. You may wish to discuss this proposal with Secretary Shultz, whose own preference has been for attempting to erode support for the Jackson amendment by the strategy he explained to Brezhnev. It, too, of course would require cooperative Soviet action on abrogate any Soviet decrees or regulations; Congressional approval of MFN and credit guarantees would be assured.”

5 Rogers wrote in his March 23 memorandum to Nixon: “First, I will invite the three American Jewish leaders with whom I have dealt on this matter, Messrs. Fisher, Stein, and Maass, to Washington to seek their support. Simultaneously, we will seek the active support of the Israelis.”

6 See Document 76.
the emigration front as a crucial element but would, I believe, depend more on a pattern of observable performance by the Soviets than on an explicit numerical deal. (Maybe, after CSCE, the Soviets could even take their law off the books.)

At some point, Shultz and you may want to sit down with Jackson and Mills and, I suppose Vanik, to see whether such an observable pattern of extensive emigration would persuade them to alter the terms of their measure:

— to a proposition under which MFN etc. would continue unless the President found that there were unreasonable impediments to emigration;

—or, less desirably, to a requirement for periodic renewal of MFN by the President, based on a finding of no unreasonable impediment.

You may also want to discuss with Secretary Shultz the bureaucratic issues raised by Secretary Rogers' memo since that document would clearly place the key actions within the Department of State (except for the ultimate steps with the Congress, where he recommends the President's personal involvement).

There is also still a question about whether to put the request for MFN authority in the overall trade bill. The pros and cons are still what they were: incorporation may deter some present supporters of the Jackson–Vanik–Mills measure because they may not want to risk a Presidential veto of the whole package; at the same time, we can always separate the MFN portion later. Against incorporation is the argument that in the end the President may have to confront a veto of the whole trade bill. (Note: If Jackson–Vanik–Mills passes in its present form, the President is almost forced to veto since otherwise he cannot continue to grant EXIM and CCC credit facilities to the USSR without certifying that free emigration exists in the USSR.)

You should also nail down the proposition that however the legislation comes out, the President should have authority to move on his MFN commitment to Romania.7

Recommendation:

Following your discussion with Secretary Shultz,8 I will need your guidance on how you wish to deal with the Rogers memo to the President.

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89. Message From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon

Moscow, undated.

I am instructed to underline that this information is addressed in a confidential way for the President and Dr. Kissinger. Having in mind their expressed wishes and in the interests of better understanding by the White House of the real state of affairs we give to the President the information on the question which falls completely within the internal jurisdiction of the Soviet state. We expect that this fact will be duly appreciated and hope that the White House will use the information in the interests of the Soviet-American relations.

Applications of Soviet citizens, who wish to go for permanent residence to other countries, are considered and decisions concerning such applications are made on the individual basis with concrete circumstances taken into account. As a rule, these requests are granted. For example, speaking about persons, who in 1972 expressed the desire to go to Israel, such permissions were received by 95.5% of those, who made the applications. A similar approach on this matter will be maintained.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 15. Top Secret. A handwritten notation at the top of the page reads: “Handed by D to K, 10:30 am, 3/30/73.” According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, he met with Dobrynin from 10:30 to 11:10 a.m. on March 30. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1967–76) In a note to Kissinger, April 5, Sonnenfeldt wrote: “This statement goes a long way toward giving assurances that the education tax provisions of the decree of August 3, 1972, have been set aside and will remain so. The reference to a decision by the Council of Ministers gives this assurance additional weight.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Map Room, Aug. 1972–May 31, 1973 [1 of 3])

2 Apparently, the Soviets had presented an earlier statement to Kissinger on the exit fee issue. A transcript of a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Dobrynin on March 17 reads in part: “K: Well, on the MFN I can already answer. D: Yes, what is answer. K: We think it will go through the House in the first week of August. D: I see. K: And in the Senate, oh, sometime during October we think. D: October, yeah. Just approximate so to speak. K: Yeah. D: What could—are you sure now things will go right? K: Well, we are meeting with the Congressional people tomorrow on—with your paper. And we can hand that out, can we? D: What can you hand? K: We can give them the text which you gave us. D: I think it’s better to say, not to give them the text. K: Not to give it. D: Just to read it. I think you can give just a summary, that’s all.” The earlier Soviet statement was not found. (Ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 19, Chronological File)
in the future.\textsuperscript{3} Incidentally, it can be noted that more than two thousand people, who received the permission to leave for Israel in 1972, in the end \textit{did not wish} to make use of those permissions.

Therefore, a noisy campaign waged in the Western countries concerning strict limitations, allegedly existing in the USSR, on the departure for foreign countries is obviously artificial and ill-meaning.

As for the question about the refunding of state educational expenses by Soviet citizens leaving for permanent residence abroad, the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of August 3, 1972 and a decision taken in accordance with it by the USSR Council of Ministers on this question allow, while giving permissions to Soviet citizens to leave for abroad, to exempt them fully from reimbursing the mentioned expenses.

Thus, the authorities, when considering the applications of Soviet citizens who wish to go abroad, have the right to make decisions of collecting from those persons only state duties, usual in such cases, and that is what they are being guided by. Accordingly, only such usual and insignificant duties, which were also collected before the decree of August 3, 1972, are being collected and will be collected from the persons, who are leaving the Soviet Union for permanent residence in other countries. It goes without saying that, as it is done in other states, we have cases and may have such cases in the future when citizens are denied permission to go abroad because of the state security reasons.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{3} Sonnenfeldt wrote in his April 5 note to Kissinger: “As regards the volume of emigration, the statement reiterates previous assertions that 95.5 percent of the applications for emigration are being acted on favorably. This fails to deal with one of the principal arguments of the supporters of the Jackson amendment: that people are being deterred from applying in the first place; and that many of those who do apply are then persecuted.” Sonnenfeldt continued: “In terms of the Congressional Problem, it would of course be helpful if additional assurances can be obtained that there will be no actions to deter applications and no reprisals against those who do apply, even in the period between application and actual departure.”

\textsuperscript{4} Sonnenfeldt wrote in his April 5 note to Kissinger: “Incidentally, the reference to denial of permission to emigrate for state security reasons is, I believe, consistent with the Human Rights convention.”
90. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\footnote{Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 721, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Vol. XXVIII. Confidential. Sent for immediate action.}


SUBJECT

Public Statements on Soviet Emigration and MFN

This morning’s \textit{Washington Post} article quoting Deputy Secretary Rush’s views on Soviet emigration policy, the desirability of separating this issue from MFN, and the possibility of a new wave of anti-semitism in the USSR should MFN be denied,\footnote{“Exit Called Easier for Soviet Jews,” \textit{Washington Post}, March 30, 1973, p. A21.} points to the need for keeping the Administration’s public position on these issues appropriately cleared and coordinated.

As you know several high-level members of the Administration including Secretary Shultz, Peter Flanigan and now Deputy Secretary Rush have addressed the subject in one way or another—as has the State press spokesman. Considering the importance of these issues, the President runs the risk of unnecessary problems and complications if divergencies appear in such statements that may be turned to advantage by one interest group or another.

The memorandum for your signature to State, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture and CIEP at Tab A\footnote{Printed as Document 91.} would state that the President has directed that all proposed public statements on Soviet emigration policy and MFN for the USSR be submitted to the White House for clearance.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.
91. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT

Public Statements on Soviet Emigration and MFN

The President has directed that Administration officials planning statements on the subjects of Soviet emigration policy and the issue of Most Favored Nation treatment for the Soviet Union submit the text of the proposed statement to the White House for clearance.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 721, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Vol. XXVIII. Confidential. A copy was sent to the Executive Director, CIEP.

92. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT

Jewish Demonstrations During Brezhnev Visit

There are growing indicators that planning is underway by various US Jewish organizations for anti-Soviet demonstrations during General Secretary Brezhnev’s visit to the United States.

On March 28, the Executive Director of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, Jerry Goodman, raised the subject during a meeting with State officials (memo of conversation at Tab A). Goodman said that the National Conference and other cooperating organizations were interested in learning the dates of Brezhnev’s visit as they would have to plan some sort of reception. He spoke of the possibility of demonstrations involving hundreds of thousands.

On March 30, Evans and Novak reviewed the possibility of anti-Soviet demonstrations in more vivid, journalistic terms (clipping at Tab B), writing that the National Conference is planning major demonstrations in every city Brezhnev will visit, that the issue is out of the hands of responsible US Jewish leaders, that it involves the entire US Jewish community, and that only formal Soviet elimination of the exit fee decree will head off the demonstrations.

This memorandum is to advise you of the growing information pointing to the possibility of major, anti-Soviet demonstrations during the Brezhnev visit. In the normal course of meetings with representatives of the US Jewish community between now and the visit, I think we can expect State to continue to urge caution and generally advise against any such demonstrations. You may wish to consider arranging for additional, private meetings with respected Jewish leaders to discuss the importance of avoiding demonstrations that might work an adverse effect on the visit and on the possibilities for future liberalization of Soviet emigration policy.

2 Attached but not printed.
93. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee (Rush) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Review of US-Soviet Bilateral Issues

SUMMARY

This is in response to NSSM–176 and, as directed, does not include such issues as SALT, CSCE, MBFR, nor any issues relating to the US-Soviet Trade Agreement and the work of the US–USSR Joint Commercial Commission.

US-Soviet dealings now cover a wide range. There are several possibilities for future agreements and for augmentation of existing agreements with the USSR, as well as numerous issues now under discussion or pending. Among the pending matters is the question of the term and nature of a new Exchanges Agreement, due for renewal at the end of this year.

Possible Future Agreements

A promising area for future US–USSR agreement is the project for opening additional consulates. The Soviets raised this question, suggesting an American consulate in Odessa in exchange for a Soviet consulate in New York.

Another area of possible future agreement is the proposal for a bi-national park. This project would set aside territories in Alaska and Siberia as nature preserves open to the citizens of both countries, with transportation between the two areas. The Department of Interior and the National Science Foundation have reservations on this project, described in Attachments II and III.

Augmentation of Existing Agreements

The recent meeting of the US–USSR Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation revealed that the agricultural sub-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–198, NSSM 176 [1 of 2]. Secret.
2 Document 83.
3 See footnote 2, Document 83.
4 Attachments II and III are not attached.
5 For a synopsis of this meeting, which began in Washington on March 21, see Department of State Bulletin, May 7, 1973, pp. 584–585.
agreement could be signed at an appropriate time and that a sub-agreement in transportation might be reached by early June. There are no prospects for an early sub-agreement in oceanography.

Under the space agreement there are possibilities for future cooperation in the acquisition and enhancement by NASA of Soviet photos of Mars, and two probes, one by each side, of both Mars and Venus.

In the field of civil aviation, there have been indications of Soviet interest in increasing frequencies and extending Aeroflot service to Washington. Several US carriers are seeking permission from the Soviets for charter flights to the USSR during the coming summer.

There are also possibilities for augmentation of our agreements with the Soviets on Preventing Incidents at Sea, Maritime Affairs, and Fisheries, and in the field of social security.

Possible Renegotiation of the Exchanges Agreement

The Exchanges Agreement is due for renewal at the end of 1973, and negotiations will be held late this year or early in 1974. This agreement covers a broad range of activities which are not included in the specialized agreements (e.g., cultural, educational and information activities as well as certain scientific and technical exchanges), and also provides guidelines to ensure that the conditions of exchanges and cooperative activities under the specialized agreements are uniform and consistent with internal security.

It has been proposed that the Exchanges Agreement be renegotiated as a long-term, general agreement. There appears to be little advantage to us in this idea. The current format provides not only the “umbrella” of general principles under which all exchanges with the Soviet Union are carried on, but also the implementation of programs with specific numbers and quotas. These specifics reduce Soviet opportunities to engage in exchange activities high on their priority list without allowing us reciprocal activities high on our priority list. There might be some advantage in negotiating the next Exchanges Agreement for three years (1974–76) rather than the normal two years, since this would bring the Exchanges Agreement into phase with the Summit

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6 See footnote 19, Document 70.
8 For the text of the Agreement on Preventing Incidents at Sea, signed on May 25, 1972, see ibid., June 26, 1972, pp. 926–927.
9 See Document 61.
11 Not further identified.
Cooperative Agreements, permitting an overall review of the various agreements before their renewal.

Issues Now Under Discussion

Progress toward the establishment of consulates in Leningrad and San Francisco would permit a formal opening at an early date.

Several consular problems are now under discussion with the Soviets. Chief among these are the tardy Soviet response to our lists of Soviet citizens attempting to emigrate to join their American families, Soviet controls on travel of foreigners within the USSR, limitations on the movement of US and Soviet diplomatic and official personnel, and access to the American Embassy in Moscow by Soviet and third-country citizens.

Another pending matter is the issue of unresolved private claims. The Soviets have proposed a joint high-level announcement of the participation of the Bolshoi ballet and theater in the Bicentennial Celebrations in 1976.

Ground could be broken for the new Soviet and American Embassy buildings as early as this summer.12

Kenneth Rush

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12 The full report of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–198, NSSM 176 [1 of 2].

94. Meeting Between President Nixon and the Bipartisan Congressional Leadership1


[Omitted here is discussion of domestic and Latin American economies.]

Nixon: We have not mentioned the MFN thing. It’s a very delicate matter, I know. I just want to leave this one thought with those—I real-
ize that an overwhelming number of the Senate would be useful and would like to have a vote at the present, have indicated that we should not go forward with MFN, Most Favored Nation, unless—in other words, going forward with it, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned it’s a condition on their doing something with regard to Jewish emigration. Now, I have respectfully suggested [that] I understand how important it is with the domestic political situation. I’m keenly aware of that because I’ve talked to all these people, too, you know. I would also respectfully suggest, however, that I—and this is not exactly parallel, but as you might recall, that when I went to China, and then later when [unclear] Mike [Mansfield] went later, and Gerry Ford and Hale Boggs with him, that there were many in this country that thought that the China initiative should be conditional on their release of [CIA employee John T. “Jack”] Downey. Now, let me say: had we publicly ever said that Downey would still be there? Let me say also that if we publicly indicated that that was something we were conditioning our new relationships on it, that not only would he be there, but we wouldn’t move forward on the relationship, which is, as I said, it’s still a dialog, a negotiation so to speak. But he’s out now. But they had to make that decision.

Now, if you look at the Jewish emigration thing, nobody could feel more strongly than I do about not only that kind of policy of the Communist government of the Soviet Union and of most Communist governments, but others, not only with regard to the Jewish minorities, but of any other minorities as well. But if you condition—if you condition publicly, the Congress does—action in the field of most favored nation on the basis of what they do internally about Jewish emigration, they’re going to do three things: One, the door will come down hard and there will be no Jewish emigration. None, because we, the major advocates, the major proponents of it, will have no voice there. And they can’t do anything with the Congress saying to them, “Look, you do this or else.” It’s like we wouldn’t be able to do it if the Soviet Union would say to us, “Look, we’re not going to buy your grain unless you have a better program of equality of opportunity for black people in the United States.” It’s an internal matter for us, that’s an internal matter for [unclear]. We’re both probably wrong, but the point is it’s our problem just as it’s theirs. But let’s not argue that, because, first, publicly doing it isn’t going to help the Jewish emigration. Second, it will mean that the initia-

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3 Downey was captured in 1952 and remained imprisoned in China until his release on March 12, 1973.
tive with regard to arms limitation, which we’re going to discuss this year, it means that the discussions we’re going to have with them—and need to have—with regard to the Mideast, it means that the discussions we’re going to have with them and other countries later on in the year, this is subject Bill [Rogers] was raising with regard to MBFR—Mutually Balanced Force Reduction—will be seriously jeopardized. Now, what is the alternative? All that I can say is this, and I mentioned this to a couple of the leaders that have raised this, and all I can say is that: Believe me, we are doing everything that we can. Not only on these public things that we’ve talked about, but on matters like this. But, I must respectfully suggest that before the Congress specifically puts down a condition of that sort, think about what effect it’s going to have on our foreign policy generally in these other fields, and also think of the counterproductive effect it will have without question in terms of helping those we’re trying to help. I want to say finally, too, that progress has been made in this field. I won’t say what at this point. We expect some more, but it’s progress that they have to make, rather than doing it because we demanded it. And that’s what we would do, too. Now, I have talked quite frankly with you about this and I know how strongly others feel about it, but I think you should know how we feel and what we’re trying to do.

Mansfield: Mr. President?

Nixon: Sir?

Mansfield: May I just say this before we adjourn? I put the bill in in the House with [unclear name]. After I did, this deputy came to visit me from the Russian Government. He was most interested in learning just one thing. Now, if we actually do this on our own before you legislate are there going to be other conditions that you impose on us later? Because there—that has been the history of all this in our situation. We’ve had one condition this year, another condition next year, and so on. I assured him that if his government would move on its own to ease this situation that I would do everything within my power to get the House to pass Most-Favored-Nation treatment for Russia. There would be no further conditions and I would resist any further conditions being imposed by people debating in the Congress or the administration. He left me saying that he was going back to the Polit’s, uh, Bureau [Politburo], whatever it’s called—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Mansfield: —to insist that they make this change and do it over a period of a few weeks before we could get to final consideration of Most-Favored-Nation treatment. Now, I think—George, you probably found that to be the case when you were in Russia, didn’t you? That they wanted to—?

Shultz: They wanted to make the grain deal.
Nixon: Yeah.
Shultz: It was very much on their minds—
Mansfield: Yep.
Shultz: It’s not only substantive, but symbolic—
Mansfield: Well absolutely. With this matter of extending Most-Favored-Nation treatment is not [unclear]. Now, [unclear] hits the fact that they belong to the human rights organization at UN and [unclear] they’re committed under its treaty [unclear] to do exactly what we’re asking them to do. Well, I think they ought to do it.
Nixon: Now, Mike, I’m going to stop you on this and suggest—let us reserve judgment on this. Give some, see what happens, and then—but being in a position where we are—where we don’t in effect torpedo our whole foreign policy because of this one issue. That’s the whole point.

[Omitted here is discussion not related to the Soviet Union.]

95. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 10, 1973, 8:40–9:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

The meeting took place in order to discuss our counterdraft on the nuclear treaty, which I had sent Dobrynin from San Clemente on April 2. [Tab A]

The US draft of April 2 had added language into the Preamble to protect third countries and had reworked both Articles I and II to incorporate language about our “goal to create conditions” which would exclude the use of nuclear weapons.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 496, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 16. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Map Room at the White House. Sonnenfeldt sent Kissinger an April 9 briefing memorandum prior to the meeting with Dobrynin. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Map Room, Aug. 1972–May 31, 1973 [1 of 3])

2 Attached but not printed. See Document 85. All brackets are in the original.
Dobrynin handed me the attached communication from Brezhnev to the President on the subject [Tab B]. He pointed out that the impact of our draft had been very unfortunate. It was in effect a return to the declaration of last summer, which showed that no progress had been made despite all the assurances given by the President and the hope held out by me. He said this was now a rather serious matter in the Soviet Union. First of all, this was likely to be the most significant achievement of the Summit, and therefore if it went by the board it was hard to see what would come out of the Summit. Second and most importantly, he could assure me that it had profound consequences for the Soviet domestic situation if this overture of Brezhnev’s were going to fail. He would therefore, ask me to look very carefully at the draft again. He thought that Moscow would accept inclusion of reference in the preamble to conditions if we could restore much of the first article. I told him he would have an answer by Thursday.

Dobrynin then handed me a communication about the European Security Conference [Tab C], the gist of which was that progress had been disappointingly slow even though the Soviet Union had made major concessions. He wondered whether a more effective procedure might not be for him to meet with Rush periodically on European Security Conference matters. I told him that it would be better for Stoessel to meet with Vorontsov and then they could pass their problems on to Dobrynin and me.

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3 Attached but not printed. Brezhnev wrote that an agreement once seemed at hand as “our positions have become closer and that the only thing that remained was to work over the wording of certain provisions in order to complete the preparation of the document.” After having received the U.S. draft, however, Brezhnev had reached a “somewhat different conclusion.” The Soviet Premier appreciated the fact that “the President is directly dealing with this matter.” But, he added, “we would not be frank, if we do not say after having studied the latest proposal of the U.S. side, that we are becoming greatly concerned.”

4 Presumably the draft Dobrynin gave Kissinger on April 21, 1972. See Document 17.

5 April 12. Kissinger discussed the draft treaty in daily telephone conversations with Dobrynin April 12–14 and 16–17. Kissinger also discussed it in telephone conversations with Sonnenfeldt on April 13 and 17. (All National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 19, Chronological File) Based on the conversations, Kissinger forwarded a revised draft to the British Embassy on April 18. (Ibid., Box 496, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 16) Kissinger discussed the revised draft with Brimelow in a telephone conversation on April 19. With regard to various formulations discussed by Kissinger, Brimelow said: “I don’t see that we have any major interest either way.” (Ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 19, Chronological File)

Finally we dealt with the issue of Jewish emigration, on which Dobrynin handed me the two attached communications [Tab D]. I asked him whether we could use them officially with the Congress, and Dobrynin said yes, that we could.

He finally handed me a communication about the conversations that had been taking place in Moscow with Madame Binh [Tab E]. I told him in all seriousness that if these violations continued, I would guarantee some decisive American counteraction and we would be back to the situation of last year. Every country had an obligation to maintain the ceasefire in Vietnam and we could not, as a great power, tolerate its brutal flouting within three months of the Agreement before the Agreement had been given any chance at all of working. I also pointed out to him that we would appreciate Soviet influence with Hungary and Poland to assure better compliance with the Agreement, and particularly if the ICCS collapsed just before the Summit that too would have very grave consequences. Dobrynin told me he would communicate this to Moscow.

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7 Attached but not printed. For a summary, see Document 96.
8 Attached but not printed. The note reported on the visit of Nguyen Thi Binh, Foreign Minister of the Communist People’s Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, to Moscow. According to the note, Binh, who had led the PRG delegation at the Paris Peace Talks, “cited a number of facts demonstrating that Saigon authorities have in fact been trying, since the first day after the signature of the Paris agreement, to hinder in all ways possible its implementation in every respect.”
Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Soviet Statement on Emigration

Attached is a revised version of the Soviet statement.\(^2\) I have put it into somewhat smoother English, but have made no substantive changes other than to eliminate the paragraph about the “noisy campaign.” (Tab A)

As you will see, following the formal text, I have appended, in reasonably smooth English, the additional Soviet points of substance as four points. Again, I have not used those items that are not directly pertinent, i.e., the points about Israel\(^3\) and the possibility of Dobrynin meeting jointly with you and Congressmen.\(^4\) Dobrynin should realize that once you have made use of the Soviet statement, he and his Embassy will in fact be under pressure to confirm it. (State, once it hears of these texts may well ask to see the original Russian to check the translation.)

You should focus on supplementary point #3. This is the one that emphasizes that the exemption procedure was already provided for in the decree of August 3 and in a Council of Ministers decision based on the decree and that therefore there is no need to suspend or repeal the decree. Indeed, the whole Soviet emphasis, not surprisingly, is on exemption rather than repeal. But this is a key issue for Jackson et al. Even with the Soviet assurance that there is no time limit on the right of So-

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 496, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 16. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Urgent; sent for information.

\(^2\) Dobrynin gave Kissinger the statement on April 10; see Document 95.

\(^3\) The Soviet statement reads: “Concerning a transfer of the information received from us by the White House to the Government of Israel. It is a matter for the President to decide how to use our communication and whom he will inform about its contents. We, on our part, do not want to bind ourselves by this or that advice, which would indirectly mean the acknowledgment of some ‘special rights’ of Israel in this question. There should be no doubt about it, we do not acknowledge any such rights.”

\(^4\) The Soviet statement reads: “Concerning Dr. Kissinger’s idea of holding together with the Soviet Ambassador a meeting with senators and congressmen. We do not consider it to be expedient. It goes without saying that the USSR Ambassador cannot put himself in a position of a ‘person testifying’ to American congressmen. It is for the President himself and for the American side in general to give explanations in general about a real status of affairs in this question, taking into account the communication transmitted by us.”
viet authorities to decide to grant exemptions, Jackson will, on past form, demand full repeal of the law; or else he will argue that his amendment should likewise be put on the books, as a weapon to use in case the Soviets decide to terminate or modify the full exemption provisions of their decree.

You should also be aware that CIA (see CIB, April, 11, 1973, page 7)\textsuperscript{5} and others continue to report that the Soviets remain highly selective in granting exit permission. This relates to the point I previously made to you that the Soviet claim that 95.5% of those who apply receive permission does not reflect whatever numbers may be deterred from applying in the first place.

\textbf{Tab A}

We have received the following official statement from the Soviet leadership\textsuperscript{6} on the question of emigration of Soviet citizens.

“Applications of Soviet citizens who wish to leave the USSR for permanent residence in other countries are considered, and decisions concerning such applications are made on an individual basis, taking account of concrete circumstances. As a rule these requests are granted. For example, with regard to persons who in 1972 expressed the desire to go to Israel permission was received by 95.5% of those who applied. A similar approach will be maintained in the future. (It may be noted that more than 2000 persons who received permission to leave for Israel in 1972 did not in fact make use of that permission.)

“As regards the refunding of state educational expenses by Soviet citizens leaving for permanent residence abroad, the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of August 3, 1972, and a decision taken in accordance with it by the USSR Council of Ministers, provide that Soviet citizens who receive permission to emigrate can be exempted fully from refunding the expenses mentioned above. Accordingly, Soviet authorities, in considering the applications of Soviet citizens wishing to emigrate, have the right to decide that only state duties normal in such cases be collected from such persons. The authorities are now being guided by this right. Consequently, only such normal and insignificant duties—which were also collected before the decree of August 3, 1972—are being collected, and will be collected, from those persons who are leaving the Soviet Union for permanent residence in other countries.

\textsuperscript{5} A reference to Central Intelligence Bulletin, No. 40, 11 April 1973, located in the National Archives, CIA Records Search Tool (Crest).

\textsuperscript{6} Kissinger struck out the word “Government” and wrote in: “leadership.”
“It goes without saying that as is true with other states, there are cases in the USSR, and there may be such cases in the future, where citizens are denied permission to go abroad for reasons of state security.”

In response to certain questions raised by Dr. Kissinger in connection with the above statement, the Soviet Government has further stated that:

1. The above statement should be regarded as an official one.
2. The phrase in the statement that “only such normal duties—which were also collected before the decree of August 3, 1972—are being collected and will be collected” has no time limit attached to it, and any interpretation implying the existence of a time limit would not correspond to the position of the Soviet Government.
3. The exemption from the requirement to refund state educational expenses is being granted on the basis of the terms of the decree of August 3, 1972, itself and of a subsequent decision taken in accordance with that decree by the USSR Council of Ministers. In the Soviet view, this situation obviates the need for suspending or repealing the decree of August 3, 1972.
4. [sic] The President and members of the Administration are free to transmit the contents of the official Soviet statement and these additional explanatory points to the Congress.7

7 Scowcroft forwarded Sonnenfeldt’s version of the Soviet statement to Rogers under a covering memorandum, April 17, which noted that Nixon planned “to take up this issue tomorrow with the Bipartisan Leadership Meeting.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 496, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 16) No record of Nixon’s meeting with Congressional leaders, April 18, has been found. According to The New York Times, the President told Congressmen that the Soviets were easing obstacles to Jewish emigration to Israel by suspending a tax imposed on educated applicants for emigration. (“President Urges Senators Not to Link Soviet Trade and Exit Tax,” April 19, 1973)
97. Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


[Omitted here is discussion of the President’s meeting with Joseph Sisco.]

Nixon: Now, on Moscow I think we ought to give that to State as a career appointment.

Kissinger: That’s fine.

Nixon: And it’ll—it’ll—so, tell the second—who’s the guy, the second man that we’ve got over there now?

Kissinger: Toon?²

Nixon: No! God no! No, n-n-n-no, no, no, no. I mean our man in the State Department.

Kissinger: Oh, Rush?


Kissinger: Casey?³

Nixon: No. [chuckles] You get, get—no, the career guy, the Alex Johnson job.

Kissinger: Oh, oh. Porter?⁴

Nixon: Just tell Porter I want the man that they want that they think is best qualified in the career service to become Ambassador to Moscow because it doesn’t make any difference to us. Does it, Henry?

Kissinger: No. No. We want—

Nixon: Not at all.

Kissinger: —to do our business here.

Nixon: We’re going to do the business here. So tell them that. That’s—

Kissinger: [unclear] the better off we are.

Nixon: Right. So let’s get it, then that’ll, that’ll give them—they’ve all been, you know, screaming that they don’t have any major appointments. Let’s give that one to them.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 38–11. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. This is part of a conversation that took place from 6 to 6:07 p.m.

² Malcolm Toon, Ambassador to Yugoslavia. Adolph Dubs was the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Moscow.

³ William J. Casey, Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs.

⁴ William J. Porter, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
Kissinger: Right. On—I think that’s absolutely right—
Nixon: Good, good.
Kissinger: I think—
Nixon: You—you take care of that. Ok?
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: Fine.
[Omitted here is discussion of Thailand.]

98. Message From the U.S. Leadership to the Soviet Leadership

Washington, undated.

Trade Issues at the US-Soviet Summit

The summit meeting will provide an opportunity to review the progress made in trade and economic relations since the meeting in Moscow and to set goals for the period ahead.

In accordance with his commitment and the terms of the US-Soviet trade agreement of last October, the President has submitted to the Congress a request for authority to extend MFN treatment. The President will be prepared to give the General Secretary a status report on this legislation and an estimate of when it may be possible for the United States to take action with respect to MFN.

Apart from the question of MFN, there are no major outstanding issues with respect to the implementation of the trade agreement of last

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 496, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 16. Top Secret. A handwritten notation at the top of the note reads, “Delivered to the Soviet Embassy, 6:30 pm, Tuesday, April 17, 1973.” In a telephone conversation with Kissinger on April 14, Dobrynin said that “there is the question of Most Favored Nation—Brezhnev understands it has some kind of problems and he asks what the President is doing.” Dobrynin said: “What he is asking now—he is asking to you and the President if you could give him his ideas or his thoughts on this question—what does he think about the timing of all this [sic] things to happen.” He also asked on behalf of Brezhnev “what kind of agreements does the President think can be done during Brezhnev’s visit in the economic fields.” Kissinger agreed to provide a response to Brezhnev’s questions. (Ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 19, Chronological File)

2 On April 10, the President submitted to Congress the Trade Reform Act of 1973, which granted to the President the authority to extend most-favored-nation status to any nation when he deemed it in the national interest to do so. See Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 258–270.
October. However, the two leaders could set a new goal for total trade between our two countries over a three-year period, for example, 2–3 billion dollars. The President would also be prepared to consider favorably the possibility of raising the level of credit to be extended by the Export-Import Bank to the USSR beyond the $500 million previously agreed. In this connection, it will be helpful to have Soviet estimates of expected credit requirements over the next three years.

The two leaders will probably wish to look beyond the trade agreement and near-term trade and to discuss further the question of longer-term economic relations. In particular, they could review the status of negotiations between American companies and Soviet authorities concerning the export of Soviet natural gas to the United States. The American companies are currently proceeding with their feasibility studies and with work on a protocol looking toward specific contracts, having received Administration approval for these actions at the time of Secretary Shultz’ visit to Moscow. In light of the progress achieved in this area at the time of the summit, the two leaders could issue a joint statement endorsing cooperation in regard to natural gas, welcoming the progress made and looking toward the realization of these mutually advantageous projects.

The final communiqué should record the satisfaction of both sides with the progress made in trade and economic relations since the Moscow summit and refer to the goal for total trade over the coming three years mentioned above. The communiqué could also incorporate a statement on the natural gas projects as indicated above.

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3 See Document 84.

99. Editorial Note

On April 19, 1973, President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, Special Counselor to the President Leonard Garment, and White House Congressional Liaison William E. Timmons met with the following Jewish leaders in the Cabinet Room: Max M. Fisher, Jacob Stein, Richard Maass, Charlotte Jacobson, Al E. Arent, Rabbi Israel Miller, Herman Weisman, David M. Blumburg, Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg, Paul Zuckerman, Mel Dubinsky, Phillip Hoffman, William Wexler, Albert Spiegel, Jerry Goodman, and Yehuda Hellman. According to a tape recording of the meeting, Kissin-
ger read the message he had received from Dobrynin on March 30 (see Document 89) regarding Jewish emigration and the head tax: “Applications of Soviet citizens who wish to leave the USSR for permanent residence in other countries are considered. And decisions concerning such applications are made on an individual basis, taking account of concrete circumstances. As a rule, these requests are granted (which is an interesting statement). For example, with regard to persons who, in 1972, expressed a desire to go to Israel, permission was received by 95.5 percent of those who applied. A similar approach will be maintained in the future.” Kissinger continued: “As regards the refunding of state educational expenses by Soviet citizens leaving for permanent residence abroad [unclear interjection by Nixon] the decree of the Presidium of the USSR’s Supreme Soviet of August 3rd, 1972, and the decision taken in accordance with it by the USSR Council of Ministers, provides that Soviet citizens who receive permission to emigrate can be exempted fully from refunding the ex in considering the applications of Soviet citizens wishing to emigrate, have the right to decide that only state duties normal in such cases be collected from such persons. The authorities are now exercising this right. Consequently, only such normal and insignificant duties, which were also collected before the decree of August 3rd, 1972, are being collected, and will be collected, from those persons who are leaving the Soviet Union for permanent residence in other countries.”

Kissinger then commented on the message, saying: “In other words, they are saying that they will not collect the head tax. When we received this, I transmitted it, of course to the President and he asked me to put a number of supplementary questions to Dobrynin. First, he said, is this an official communication, or just a personal expression? Second, how do we know that this is not just now—when they say it’s not being collected or will be collected—how do we know this doesn’t have a time limit on it? Thirdly, he said, does this mean the law is being repealed? And fourthly, he asked, can we communicate this to other people?” In response to these questions the Soviets sent a subsequent message on April 10 (see Documents 95 and 96). Kissinger read: “That in reply to certain supplementary questions, the Soviet Government provides the following information: A) the above statement—that is to say the one on March 30th—should be regarded as an official Soviet statement. Two, the phrase—or B) the phrase in that statement—that only such normal duties which were also collected before the decree of August 3rd, 1972 are being collected, and will be collected’—has no time limit attached to it, and any interpretation implying the existence of a time limit, does not correspond to the position of the Soviet Government.” After a brief interjection by the President, Kissinger continued: “C) the exemption from the requirement to refund state educational expenses is being granted on the basis of the terms of the decree
of August 3rd, 1972, itself, and on the subsequent decision taken in accordance with that the decree by the USSR Council of Ministers. In the Soviet view, this situation obviates the need for repealing the decree of August 3rd.”

Kissinger provided commentary on the second message: “In other words, the decree makes it possible for them to suspend the requirement to refund state educational expenses. So it’s a face-saving—Mr. President, it’s a face-saving formula of saying they’re not going to repeal the law, but they said the exemption from the requirement to refund state educational expenses is being granted on the basis of the law.”

After some discussion among the group, Nixon responded: “What they are saying is that their law of August is still in force—in force—but that the law expressly provides for exemption, and their action in providing for exemption here is consistent with the law. The law remains, but, actually, under that law, we get an exemption. And that’s it. That’s really what you’re getting here, and I think that’s the face-saver.”

Kissinger continued reading the message: “D) then is just a technical point: ‘The President is free to transmit the contents of the official Soviet statement, as well as of these additional explanatory points to the Congress.’”

Kissinger commented on the communication: “So, this, therefore, has a high degree of formality attached to it. These are the communications which, in our judgment, effectively restore the situation to what it was on August 1st, 1972, so that then—now our problem is this: do we use the MFN legislation, which has—we’ve already used effectively to get the head tax repealed—to attach additional riders to it, and, therefore, sabotage the whole context of the negotiations into which this was built, including Soviet restraint in the Middle East? Or, do we go back to what was the original approach: namely, steady Presidential pressure, in his channel, on the Soviet Government to help improve the situation, as it was on August 1st, 1972, which we’re not declaring to be satisfactory. This is the issue which we now face, and this is why we have made such a strong case—”

Nixon briefly reflected on what the message meant in regard to MFN and the Jackson Amendment. He then concluded: “If the Jackson Amendment is passed, you know, with a straight-out declaration that makes the Soviet back down before the whole world on this thing that it would seriously jeopardize the possibility of going forward with the meetings we’re going to have.” The tape recording of the conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Cabinet Room, Conversation No. 123–1. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.
The hour-long meeting, after which the Jewish leaders issued a statement, was reported in *The New York Times*. ("Nixon Tells Jewish Leaders Soviet Union Has Ended Exit Tax," April 20, 1973)

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100. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 25, 1973, 12:15–12:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Jay Lovestone, AFL–CIO
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

Dr. Kissinger: Can you hold the labor movement here together in regard to foreign policy?

Mr. Lovestone: As long as Meany² is alive. I don’t think anybody can make a sharp turnabout. We are going to go much further than the Jackson amendment on MFN to Russia.

Dr. Kissinger: My feeling is I think it is wrong to make American foreign policy dependent on one minority.

Mr. Lovestone: I look at it as tit-for-tat. We see certain things we want. Tear down that wall, and self-determination. We can say that. You can’t.

Dr. Kissinger: We can’t. We will have to oppose you.

Mr. Lovestone: Tomorrow night Meany is making a very strong speech.³ It will not be anything insulting; it is a tightly reasoned speech.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you writing it?

Mr. Lovestone: It doesn’t matter, it is already written.

Dr. Kissinger: [Smiling]⁴ The trouble with you fellows is that you are soft.

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² George Meany, President of the American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL–CIO).


⁴ These and following brackets are in the original.
Let me tell you my analysis. I have no illusions about the Soviets. If I were a member of the Politburo I could make a great case against Brezhnev in regard to the détente. He has received nothing.

Mr. Lovestone: Yes, he has gotten some things.

Dr. Kissinger: He has the long-term trend in Europe going for him. But the economic situation is bad.

Mr. Lovestone: They are in a serious situation; they are not bankrupt, but they have serious problems. Their productive capacity in comparison to ours is 40 percent.

Dr. Kissinger: Their system doesn’t work. It is impossible to run a modern economy by state planning.

Mr. Lovestone: They are not stopping or reducing their armament production. The ideological drive in the army has been stepped up a little.

I think the most heroic people in the world today are the Jews in Russia. The President has stood up well. He is very popular over there.

Dr. Kissinger: For them to abrogate the head tax in a formal communication to another government is incredible.\(^5\) They can keep people from emigrating in other ways.

Mr. Lovestone: In November they warned people to talk discreetly over the telephone. There is the problem of tapping over there too.

We are sending Brown\(^6\) from Africa to Europe to step up our European work.

Dr. Kissinger: Right now we are trying to get a little breathing space and get the Vietnam war agitation quieted down and to manipulate the Chinese-Soviet situation.

Mr. Lovestone: The Chinese will help you.

Dr. Kissinger: They will work with us. By the way, Woodcock\(^7\) wants to see me.

Mr. Lovestone: I’ll tell you why, it is the old issue [the promise to Russia]. We will fight it.

Dr. Kissinger: Shall I see him at all? Can I take the position that we will be going by what the AFL–CIO says?

Mr. Lovestone: Say that it has always been the position of the American party. If you turn him down, he won’t shed any tears. He doesn’t really believe in it himself. They don’t even have any money to pay dues, they are in bad shape financially.

\(^5\) See Documents 89, 95, and 96.
\(^6\) Not further identified.
\(^7\) Leonard Woodcock, President of the United Automobile Workers (UAW).
Dr. Kissinger: Why?

Mr. Lovestone: The strike. This is a crazy country. General Motors helped them while they were on strike against them. Our warfare is civilized warfare. You saw the steel and rubber agreements. The trade union movement is a solid, practical, living union.

Tomorrow in his speech Meany is going to ask why people poke fun at patriots.

Dr. Kissinger: Good. I don't know what we would do without you. The businessmen in this country are a disgrace. Look at Kendall of Pepsi Cola, he would sell the country for a contract. You people in the labor unions, we could not have gotten through Vietnam without you. Should I come by sometime and talk to Meany?

Mr. Lovestone: By all means. He would like to see you.

Dr. Kissinger: I will see him. I just want him to know that I saw you.

Mr. Lovestone: He knows. I was late because we were going over the manuscript and I told him I had an appointment with you. We will bring in Lane Kirkland, the Secretary of the Treasury. He is number one in the running as his successor.

Dr. Kissinger: How old is Meany?

Mr. Lovestone: 79.

Dr. Kissinger: And you?

Mr. Lovestone: I am going on 73. I have lived through Lenin, I have spent a weekend with Hitler. I have seen a lot.

Dr. Kissinger: I would like to be in touch with you. If you have something on your mind, will you call me? I am a very busy man, and sometimes I don't have the time.

Mr. Lovestone: I know, and I hate to bother you. Generally I am not here on Monday or Friday. On Monday and Friday I usually am in my office in New York.

This week there is a meeting at the U.N. of Latin American countries. One gets up and says, “I am a Mexican, and I am proud of it.” If you listen to them they are happy.

Dr. Kissinger: Do they do anything after you listen to them?

Mr. Lovestone: They should not have the feeling that they are kept people. Now the Europeans are trying to come in.

Dr. Kissinger: From a leftist position?

Mr. Lovestone: No.

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8 Donald Kendall, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of PepsiCo.
When Brandt is here he wants to discuss AFL–CIO/DGB relations. State replied correctly that this was a concern of the organizations and not of theirs. Now they want us to come over. Vetter\(^9\) is coming here and wants to talk to Mr. Meany. Meany sent them a short note saying fine for a brief meeting and they blew the whole thing out of proportion.

They are going to welcome Shelepin\(^10\) and I am going to publish at the same time an indictment of Shelepin as a murderer. And they are going to be in trouble for that one. They are going to call him a diplomat. He can’t come into Germany without risking arrest.

Dr. Kissinger: For more than 50 years, more like 100 years, they have destroyed the peace of the world. The Germans are not vicious, they are stupid. Brandt thinks he can play Brezhnev against Nixon, and also play a little with the Chinese. He thinks he can conduct a foreign policy that even we find hard to do.

Mr. Lovestone: Leber\(^11\) is a good man. Before I go let me say one more thing. We have made three proposals. The first is to have a meeting with all the parties. We then wanted the DGB to declare a moratorium for one year in the exchanges with the Iron Curtain countries. But they wouldn’t buy this. Finally, we proposed to bring here as our guest the head of the metal trades. They bought this, but wouldn’t buy the others.

Dr. Kissinger: I would like to stay in close touch with you. We are going to have a rough four years.

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\(^9\) Heinz Oskar Vetter, Chairman of the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), an umbrella organization of German trade unions.

\(^10\) Alexander Shelepin, head of the KGB from 1958 to 1961 and member of the Politburo from 1964 to 1975.

\(^11\) Georg Leber, West German Minister of Defense.
Kissinger’s Pre-Summit Trip to Moscow, May 1973

101. Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev


Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I should like to take advantage of Ambassador Dobrynin’s trip to Moscow to send you this personal message of greeting. Dr. Kissinger will shortly be meeting with you and some of your colleagues to review the state of preparations for our forthcoming talks in the United States. He will have detailed instructions from me to pursue the various subjects on which we have exchanged views in our confidential channel and on which I expect to talk with you personally during our meetings.

I believe that Ambassador Dobrynin and Dr. Kissinger have already made substantial progress on a number of topics in their frequent exchanges here in Washington. Moreover, both of us can take satisfaction in the fact that, in general, relations between our two countries are on a constructive course across a very broad front. Consequently, the prospects for our meetings appear very promising and I am confident that the tradition begun last year in Moscow will be continued here by a new series of significant agreements and understandings that will benefit not only the peoples of our two countries but the cause of world-wide peace and progress.

Reviewing the numerous specific issues on which we have been communicating, I believe we have a basis for concluding new agreements to expand concrete bilateral cooperation in such areas as agriculture, oceanography and others. You may be certain that all the pertinent agencies of our government will work constructively with your representatives to work out appropriate documents so that they can be promulgated at the time of our meeting. I will also look forward to a review of what has already been accomplished in trade and economic relations between our countries; after the many years of almost no economic relations, I believe the achievements to date are considerable. But we shall obviously want to use our meeting to give even greater impetus to these relations and to look beyond the next few years to

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long-term cooperative projects, including those related to natural gas. Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to give you a status report on our efforts to obtain Congressional approval this year for the implementation of the US-Soviet trade agreement. My assessment is that the prospects in this regard are very promising.

Dr. Kissinger will also be authorized to discuss with you and your colleagues the situation in the negotiations on strategic arms limitation and, on the basis of views and documents already exchanged, to seek jointly with you to make significant progress in preparation for our meeting. I am prepared to reach mutually acceptable understandings both on the principles and the substance of a permanent agreement. It also seems possible now to envisage a significant step toward the removal of the danger of nuclear war, along the lines that we have discussed.

In addition to the above subjects, Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to review all other subjects of mutual interest, such as cooperation and security in Europe, the Middle East, and problems relating to the implementation of the agreements ending the conflict in Vietnam.

May I close this message by assuring you, Mr. General Secretary, that your visit to this country is being awaited with keen anticipation both because of the concrete results that can be expected from it and because of the symbolic significance, which cannot be overrated, of this event for the future friendship of our two countries and for world peace. In the coming weeks, we will be working with your representatives to make all the necessary arrangements and I will personally be eager to hear of any special wishes that you may have. I do not know if we will be able to meet the high standards of hospitality which you set during my visit to your country, but I can assure you that nothing will be left undone to make your stay with us a successful and happy occasion. Mrs. Nixon and I have the most pleasant memories of the days we spent in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev and Mrs. Brezhnev and you, as well as the other members of your delegation, will be received in the United States with the warmest hospitality.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

Dear Mr. President,

I received your letter of May 1, which was delivered by Ambassador Dobrynin, and I decided to reply to it immediately.

I share your confidence that the tradition begun at the Moscow meeting last year will be continued at our meeting in the USA by a new series of significant agreements and understandings that will benefit not only the peoples of our two countries but the cause of worldwide peace and progress.

Up to now considerable work has been accomplished in preparing appropriate documents which are to be adopted as a result of the meeting. But there is yet quite much to be done.

We hope that during the forthcoming visit to Moscow by Dr. Kissinger, who, as you wrote, will have detailed instructions from you, we shall be able to make a substantial progress in completing the preparation of those documents.

It applies, first of all, to the agreement on preventing nuclear war.

We shall, undoubtedly, be prepared to discuss with him also the question of what could be an outcome of the discussion at the meeting of the strategic arms limitation problem.

We are now completing the work, taking into account Dr. Kissinger’s formulations, on the draft of the document, proposed by us, regarding the basic principles of negotiations on further limitation of strategic arms. And we shall be, of course, prepared to consider the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable understanding on the substance of the questions as well.

Another important matter, which, undoubtedly, will be a subject of our discussions with you, is the situation in the Middle East, that, unfortunately, remains extremely dangerous. In order to give, at last, necessary impetus to the Middle East settlement on the basis of the UN Security Council known resolution, it would be important in our view to reach mutual understanding between the USSR and the US regarding the principles on which the settlement should be built. We suggest that

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2 Document 101.
the work on such principles be done while Dr. Kissinger is here so that at our meeting they will be finally agreed upon, and corresponding steps will be taken on their basis for the speediest achievement of a settlement in the Middle East.

I was glad to know from your letter that you authorized Dr. Kissinger to review other subjects of mutual interest as well, such as security and cooperation in Europe and the implementation of the Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam. That fully corresponds to our own intentions. We share your opinion that as a result of our meeting even greater impetus be given to the development of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations between the USSR and the US, including those on a long-term basis.

As for preparing for the signing at the meeting of several agreements on cooperation between the USSR and the US in a number of fields of science, technology and agriculture, our drafts of possible agreements of that series have been recently transmitted by Ambassador Dobrynin through Dr. Kissinger,3 and appropriate Soviet agencies are ready to begin at any time the work on agreeing those drafts with their colleagues on the American side.

In conclusion, I would like to say, Mr. President, that I appreciate the attention, that you personally pay to the preparation of our visit to the United States. We would like to believe that visit will be fruitful as it is being expected by both sides.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev4

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3 On April 30, Dobrynin delivered draft agreements to Kissinger on agriculture; contacts, exchanges, and information; ocean exploration; peaceful uses of atomic energy; and transportation. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 70, Exchange of Notes Between Kissinger and Dobrynin, Vol. 5)

4 Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Acting Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Transportation
The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
The Director, National Science Foundation

SUBJECT
US-Soviet Bilateral Issues

The President has reviewed the response to NSSM 176 together with subsequent agency submissions relating to the desirability and possibility of new bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The President has directed that the following guidance shall be followed in discussions and negotiations between U.S. and Soviet representatives on the subjects of agriculture, transportation, oceanography, urban and community development, exchanges and cultural relations and civil aviation. The President emphasizes that such negotiations should be conducted on their merits, and that the United States should avoid proposing concessions solely in order to expedite agreement.

—Agriculture. The President has directed that the United States explore with the Soviet Union the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet agreement on cooperation in the field of agriculture. Bearing in mind the work already accomplished in this area, the President directs the Secretary of Agriculture, in coordination with the Department of State, to arrange for bilateral talks with the appropriate Soviet Ministries as soon as mutually convenient. These negotiations should have as their objective the development of a draft bilateral agreement for further consideration by

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–208, NSDM 151–NSDM 200, Originals. Secret. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the JCS. Sonnenfeldt forwarded the draft NSDM to Kissinger on April 30 for his signature. (Ibid., Box H–239, Policy Papers, NSDM 215 [2 of 2])

2 Document 93.

3 On April 30, along with the draft NSDM, Sonnenfeldt forwarded additional responses to NSSM 176 to Kissinger from the Departments of State, Agriculture, Transportation, and Housing and Urban Development; and the National Science Foundation. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–239, Policy Papers, NSDM 215 [2 of 2])
the U.S. and Soviet governments. The Secretary of Agriculture is directed to submit a report on the status of these negotiations no later than June 4, 1973, for review by the President.

—Transportation. Taking into account the growing U.S.-Soviet interest in the development of organizational arrangements for mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of transportation, the President directs the Secretary of Transportation, in coordination with the Department of State, to arrange for U.S.-Soviet bilateral talks as soon as mutually convenient to explore the possibility of a government-to-government agreement in this area. These negotiations should have as their objective the development of a draft bilateral agreement for further consideration by the U.S. and Soviet governments. The Secretary of Transportation is directed to submit a report on the status of these negotiations no later than June 4, 1973, for consideration by the President.

—Oceanography. The President has directed that the United States explore with the Soviet Union the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet agreement on cooperation in the field of oceanography. Accordingly, he directs the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the Department of State, the National Science Foundation and other appropriate U.S. agencies, to arrange for U.S.-Soviet talks on this subject as soon as mutually convenient. These negotiations should have as their objective the development of a draft U.S.-Soviet bilateral agreement for further consideration by the U.S. and Soviet governments. The Secretary of Commerce is directed to submit a report on the status of these negotiations no later than June 4, 1973, for consideration by the President.

—Urban and Community Development. Taking into account the initial discussions of the Joint U.S.-Soviet Working Group on the Enhancement of the Urban Environment, the President directs the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to arrange for discussions on community development with the appropriate Soviet Ministries as soon as mutually convenient. These discussions should have as their objective a thorough assessment of the desirability of and the potential for government-to-government cooperation in this area. The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development is directed to submit a report on the results of these discussions no later than June 4, 1973, for consideration by the President.

—Exchanges and Cultural Relations. The President has directed that the United States explore with the Soviet Union the possibility of augmenting the U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Exchanges and Cooperation in

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4 On April 25, Lynn informed Kissinger that the first meeting of the working group was “in progress.” (Ibid.)
Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural and Other Fields. The President directs the Secretary of State to arrange for U.S.-Soviet talks on this subject as soon as mutually convenient. These negotiations should have as their objective the development of a draft augmented agreement, extending the duration and expanding the scope of the present agreement, for further consideration by the U.S. and Soviet governments. The Secretary of State is directed to submit a report on the results of these negotiations no later than June 4, 1973, for consideration by the President.

—Civil Aviation. The President has directed that the United States explore with the Soviet Union the possibility of augmenting the U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Civil Air Transport. The President directs the Secretary of State to arrange for U.S.-Soviet talks on this subject as soon as mutually convenient. These negotiations should have as their objective the development of a draft, augmented bilateral agreement for further consideration by the U.S. and Soviet governments. The Secretary of State is directed to submit a report on the status of these negotiations no later than June 4, 1973, for consideration by the President.

The President has directed that no agreements with the Soviet Union be signed, initialled or otherwise concluded without his approval.

Henry A. Kissinger

5 See footnote 2, Document 83.
6 See footnote 7, Document 93.
104. Memorandum of Conversation

Zavidovo, May 5, 1973, 11:30 a.m.–1:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Georgi M. Kornienko, Head of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interpreter
Andrei Vavilov, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff
Mr. Philip Odeen, NSC Senior Staff
Mr. William Hyland, NSC Staff
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

Nuclear Agreement; SALT

[Before the meeting began, the General Secretary took Dr. Kissinger out onto the balcony and showed him the view. A Soviet photographer, and Mr. Sonnenfeldt, took several pictures of the General Secretary and Dr. Kissinger both out on the balcony and in the office.

[The group took their seats at the table in Brezhnev’s office. The General Secretary took out a hunting knife and put it on the table in front of him, to everyone’s amusement.]

Nuclear Agreement

Brezhnev: Mr. Kissinger and friends, may I welcome you all once again and express my satisfaction with the fact that we are meeting as arranged. In terms of time and significance, this is a very important meeting indeed. I do not doubt we should regard this meeting as a di-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Kissinger Conversations at Zavidovo, May 5–8 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at Brezhnev’s office in the Politburo Villa at Zavidovo, the Politburo’s hunting preserve located outside of Moscow. Brackets are in the original.

2 Kissinger summarized the meeting for Nixon in message Hakto 7, May 5, which reads in part as follows: Brezhnev “confirmed again his great stake in forthcoming summit. Brezhnev gave heavy emphasis to importance he attaches to Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War making clear he seeks major psychological impact from it.” (Ibid., Box 32, HAK Trip Files, HAK Moscow, London Trip, May 4–11, 1973, HAKTO & Misc)
rect continuation of all that was achieved last year and as advance preparation for the forthcoming meeting with the President, this time in the United States.

My colleagues and I highly value the desire of President Nixon and his assistants and the Administration generally to achieve the agreements on which we achieved understanding last year. If we seriously reflect on the substance and character of the processes underway at present, and what we are seeking to achieve, we can say without error this is a truly historic phase in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. The distinctive aspect of this process is that it is directed to the very noble objective of peaceful coexistence, peaceful friendship between two great states. The fact that this objective is indeed a noble one is true beyond doubt, and no one or no group in the world can question that this objective is a noble one. And I want to emphasize that all the more complex and responsible is our accomplishment at this meeting, which is to achieve an accord which would be in line with this objective. Unfortunately, history has piled up far too many adverse things, not only between the Soviet Union and the United States but also between many states in the world. We belong to a generation of people and statesmen who must step over many phases and go faster towards the ideals of mankind, faster than was the case in the past.

I wanted to make these few remarks by way of introduction, because I and our entire leadership attach very great importance to the forthcoming meetings and to the agreements which we must prepare.

I had occasion to say yesterday, and I want especially to emphasize today, that I am sure the President has given you broad authority and instructions to achieve the mission we have been entrusted with. Dr. Kissinger, we have before us a very wide-ranging agenda, many issues and documents to discuss, but there are some that have very top priority. I think it has already been agreed between us what the most important document is, the document that would truly emphasize the significance of the forthcoming meeting between the Soviet Union and the United States and to raise that meeting to that level that we all want to see it at.

Therefore, if there are no objections on your part, we want to start with that topic, namely the atomic problem.

Without so far as going into concrete content of each paragraph and article of the future document, I want to tell you at this point how we see the nature of this document in general. This is to be an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, that is, an agreement between our two nations. And in saying that, I am assuming we must do all we can to elaborate a clearcut and lucid agreement and terms that relate to the two nations, that is the Soviet Union and the
United States. But of course the world so far is a very complex one. Therefore it is quite natural we will have to formulate in this document certain provisions which would cause no alarm or concern among your allies and ours and the other countries in the world.

Dr. Kissinger: I wouldn’t bet on that.

Brezhnev: [Pauses] I think nonetheless that we should do all we can to alleviate such concern.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: I believe not only on a personal plane but also as states and statesmen, we must see that it goes down in history as something which will be seen as a great exploit. And if we achieve this it will be indeed a great exploit. None of us in this world is eternal but history is eternal. The leadership may change and the Supreme Soviet may change and the Senate may change, but history will still be there. And it is from these positions that we should endeavor to approach an agreement on the nonuse of nuclear weapons against each other.

I will not now speak of the significance of this entire problem on a personal plane, that is, for the President or Brezhnev or someone else; that is something we can consider when we have dotted all the i’s on it. Of course, the United States is a country with a very rich history, starting from the first President to the present one. There are many aspects to this history. But I believe this one document, if it is signed in the form I see it in now, will make the present President of the United States the greatest President in the history of that country. And history may also make some reference to us. In any case, history won’t blame us for it.

Dr. Kissinger: History will record who initiated the document, too. Just about a year ago.

Brezhnev: I think history will probably record both—all those who had a bearing in the elaboration of this document. After all, if one man says hello and another says hello, that means they both greeted each other.

We did in fact begin discussion of this subject last year, and probably each of us has on more than one occasion reflected on the wordings that could be used in this document. I reflected on this last night, after reading it again. I would like first, before we go into a concrete discussion, to pose a question to you all, and also to myself in fact: What are we trying to achieve? What aim are we pursuing? If we know what our aim is, we can find a correct way of finding measures to get there. If we cannot, our aim will be crippled.

[Before Sukhodrev’s translation, Brezhnev gets up and asks if Dr. Kissinger would like the window open. Dr. Kissinger says yes.
Brezhnev then opens the door to his bedroom, which adjoins the office. “We have no secrets from our friends!” says Aleksandrov. “It is an open door policy!” says Dobrynin. The General Secretary then returns to the table.

Brezhnev: Why I say this is, Dr. Kissinger, on the whole this is a good document. But if we now take up and try to clean it up a bit and try to remove all that might cause concern among other countries, the document will then be a wonderful document and will be radiant with the objectives we are trying to invest it with.

There is some fresh air coming in now.

And at least here in this group we should not pass over in silence the fact that there do exist in the world other nuclear powers as well, and there have to be such points in the agreement to show them it would be wrong to play with nuclear war.

At this point I would like to stop my remarks. And if you have no objection, Mr. Kissinger, I would like to do the practical work.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, if I may first make a few remarks on the state of the United States-Soviet relations, what in our view the significance of the Summit could be, and then this agreement.

Brezhnev: I’ll be happy to hear what you have to say, and then I will say a few words in return.

Dr. Kissinger: First, on behalf of my colleagues and I am sure on behalf of the President, I want to express thanks for the warmth of the reception here. I know this is an unusual thing for the General Secretary to receive guests from abroad in these surroundings and devote so much time to them. We take it as a symptom and symbol of the importance that is on the Soviet side attached to the relationship that has developed between our two countries.

Brezhnev: That is true.

Kissinger: We too attach enormous importance to this relationship, and indeed we consider it the cornerstone of a policy of peace. This historic achievement of the General Secretary and the President at the Summit last year and what has developed since then goes beyond the agreements that were signed, but goes to a qualitative transformation

3 Kissinger wrote in his memoirs: “No Western leader had ever been invited to Zavidovo; the only other foreigners to visit it, I was told, had been Tito [President of Yugoslavia] and President Urho Kekkonen of Finland. In light of what has happened since, the atmosphere of jovial if heavy-handed camaraderie may seem transparent. But at the time our Soviet hosts, headed by Brezhnev, certainly did their best to convey that good relations with the United States meant a great deal to them. They went out of their way to be hospitable, on occasion stiflingly so.” (Years of Upheaval, p. 228)
of the relationship between Moscow and Washington. Under extremely difficult circumstances—even more difficult for the Soviet Union than for the U.S.—both sides recognized that they have a responsibility for maintaining peace in the world. We proved to each other in the Berlin negotiations and in the strategic arms limitation negotiations and in many others that when the Soviet Union and the U.S. agree, it is to the benefit of their own peoples, and also to the benefit of the peoples of the world, and that constructive solutions can be found to problems around the world.

We’ve taken account of this reality not only in formal agreements but even in the day-to-day conduct of our diplomacy, to a point where it is safe to say the Soviet Ambassador in Washington is informed of major steps earlier than our own government. I certainly see him more than I see my own staff.

Brezhnev: I’m the last one who gets informed of these things. Our Ambassador is first, but I’m last. That’s my situation.

Dr. Kissinger: Soon we’ll give him a job in our government.

Brezhnev: Then it goes through Gromyko, and if it pleases him I’m told about it.

Dr. Kissinger: Our settled policy is to attempt to resolve no major issue unilaterally without full discussion with the Soviet Union. And the reason is not only objective realities, which are of course decisive, but also because of the personal relationship that has developed between the Secretary General and the President.

Brezhnev: I’m pleased to hear it.

Dr. Kissinger: That is why the meeting between the President and the Secretary General is so important. This is why the President will spend more time to prepare for this meeting and to make the General Secretary comfortable than on any meeting with any other visitor to Washington. The President still has four years of his term, and while we don’t pass judgment on Soviet internal developments we don’t have the impression the General Secretary’s position is growing weaker. [Brezhnev chuckles.] The General Secretary and the President have more time before them to make major accomplishments in U.S.-Soviet relations than in any time in the history of our relationship. It is in this spirit that we approach the totality of our relationship, and it is in this context that we wish to approach this treaty—this agreement.

Brezhnev: I referred to our assessment of the very important significance of all that was accomplished last year in our conversation last
night.  

Dr. Kissinger: We don’t have one.

It is a sign of our relationship that we trust your interpreters more than ours.

Brezhnev: I’m sure Sonnenfeldt and Sukhodrev give them to each other.

Kissinger: I’m glad he gives them to someone. He never gives them to me.

Gromyko: That is internal matters!

Brezhnev: We said last year we and the President achieved a great step forward. It is impossible to overestimate what was achieved last year, though it was hard to tell in the first days afterward. What was achieved was that our two countries turned to meet each other. In our Central Committee Plenary meeting—and I’m sure you are aware of the significance of a plenary meeting of the Central Committee—we took a one-way attitude to U.S.-Soviet relations in our resolution. And I had a great deal more to say on the resolution. And in my speech in Red Square on May 1st I devoted some words to U.S.-Soviet relations.

And please thank the President for the time he is devoting to these meetings. And if he comes here again—if not in 1973 then certainly in 1974—it will be the most significant in his career. We know the President hasn’t visited many cities here, and he will be able to. And by then in the political sphere the documents we achieve in this meeting will achieve their significance.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me speak concretely about what we can achieve at the Summit, and in this context I will speak about this document.

Brezhnev: Please.

Dr. Kissinger: The reason our relations have improved so, if I may say, drastically is that we have proceeded with two methods—one phil-

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4 In message Hakto 6 to Scowcroft, May 5, Kissinger wrote that the President should be informed that “Brezhnev, who is staying out here with Gromyko came to my house last night for preliminary talk in which he displayed his eager anticipation of U.S. trip and meetings with the President. On substance, he obviously wants to wrap up nuclear agreement but it looks as though we will have some tough haggling because of their determination to emphasize [garble] that have condominium overtones. On SALT, I get strong impression that they do not want anything concrete at summit but seek agreement on principles. I intend to stress very strongly the desirability of making summit as concrete as possible on SALT.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 32, HAK Trip Files, HAK Moscow, London Trip, May 4–11, 1973, HAKTO & Misc.)

5 In his speech, Brezhnev remarked that he would “facilitate favorable development of Soviet-American relations on the principle of mutual respect and mutual advantage.” (“Brezhnev Cites Need for Closer East-West Ties,” Chicago Tribune, May 2, 1973, p. A2)
osophical, in general about the direction we want to go, and the second concrete, to pursue the routes we had indicated. Both are very important. If we did only the philosophical or the general things, they would be only like academic documents. If we did only very precise agreements, we would never get beyond the present. Last year we adopted some very important principles, whose significance will become increasingly evident as time goes on, and we also made an historic agreement as the first step of limitation of strategic arms. This year we are discussing this agreement with respect to the prevention of nuclear war—an agreement which I will explain in a minute has many difficulties as well as opportunities—as well as the principles of strategic arms limitation. But it is also important to show practical progress, content, in at least one major field.

Therefore we attach importance to having some concrete progress in some aspect of strategic arms limitation, and we should use the time before the summit to do this. That would give the principles of arms limitation and the nuclear agreement some concrete quality, and we should use that to demonstrate the direction we want to go. This will be important to give our public opinion and other countries assurance that we are moving in a decisive and precise manner, and avoids the danger that the general principles stated in this agreement as well as in the SALT agreement and Basic Principles are superficial platitudes, and will give us the opportunity to deal with the inevitable criticism that will arise.

So we hope we can have some concrete discussion while I am here, and so we can instruct our delegations to proceed at a somewhat faster rate so we can achieve some understandings before the Summit.

Now let me turn to this document.

In many respects this has been a very difficult exercise for us. Without the personal relationship that exists between the General Secretary and the President, there is no possibility that it could ever have reached this point—no possibility whatsoever. It is a testimony to the importance we attach to Soviet-American relations and to our realization that a maximum effort must be made and the maximum responsibility rests on the two nuclear super powers to preserve the peace in the world. Similar proposals to this have been made by the Soviet leaders since 1946, going back to the days of Stalin, and never got beyond the initial stages because of mistrusts between the leaders and because of the objective difficulties in the world. We will be very severely criticized by some of our allies, and, if history is a guide, by some of your allies as well.

Brezhnev: But in the final analysis everybody will be grateful. I am sure in the final analysis it will be appreciative of the efforts made by the United States and the Soviet Union.
Dr. Kissinger: We are proceeding nevertheless because we believe the potential of this agreement is very great, especially if it can be translated in a concrete achievement.

Incidentally, I forgot to add, our own government will not be pleased when they see this result of our discussions, and they will accuse me of being susceptible to the General Secretary’s overpowering personality.

Brezhnev [Smiles]: The Soviet Union pledges to protect you from that. [Laughter] If that isn’t done [translating it into concrete achievement] the whole document will become meaningless.

I already had occasion to tell you, Dr. Kissinger, we are taking the most serious approach to this problem. The President and the American people can believe this. I say so on behalf of the Communist Party and the Soviet people.

Dr. Kissinger: We are convinced of that, and we are therefore proceeding, against very strong opposition. Proceeding with this agreement in this circumstance explains why it is important for us to be meticulous about certain impressions it may create with respect to third countries. But we are also proceeding because we share the General Secretary’s view that this can be a major step forward to the consolidation of peace in the world and toward accelerating the relationship of our two countries toward their responsibility for preserving peace in the world.

Because of the special manner in which this document has been negotiated, it is very important between now and the Summit that our two sides agree and coordinate on who is informed and in what manner, so the consequences can be managed. But the General Secretary can count on the fact that we will use all our efforts—and we will succeed—to bring along all countries and the domestic groups. And as we have done in all our agreements with the General Secretary, we will take most serious measures and achieve a major step.

Again, it would help enormously—and we attach the greatest importance—to accompany it with some limited step in the field of strategic arms talks.

As for the rest, the attitude expressed by the General Secretary towards approaching this document is exactly our own, and we must make it the best possible document commensurate with the historic importance we hope it will have as it guides our relationship.

Dr. Kissinger: [After Brezhnev begins his next remarks, but before the translation] I have the unfortunate sense that I understand everything you are saying even before the translation. Your Foreign Minister has an advantage over ours on this subject.

Brezhnev: But Dr. Kissinger has read it. You have to look at it more seriously than the President.
[Translation resumes] If I may ask a question as we go along, you observed about whom we should consult or inform of the gist of this before signing. So, far, as we agreed, we work only through Ambassador Dobrynin, and none of our friends has any knowledge of this. If you think someone else should be informed, we should talk about this. Should we inform anyone? I am sure all our friends will think very highly of this.

Dr. Kissinger: Excuse me.

Brezhnev: I am preparing to visit the Polish People’s Republic and the German Democratic Republic and I am not planning to inform them of the progress made or of this general subject. They are aware of the general issue, but we have not informed them of it. If we had violated our agreement President Nixon would be justified in saying, “We cannot deal with them.” There are some documents from President Nixon or you that only a few of my colleagues and not the entire leadership see. So there is a guarantee of complete secrecy.

Our friends and allies won’t be concerned about this. They will approve.

Dr. Kissinger: Not one ally.

Brezhnev: One can’t imagine Britain or France being concerned. I just received a congratulatory letter on my Lenin Peace Prize from our ally [Ceausescu].

Dr. Kissinger: Our situation is rather more complicated than yours. But we will keep you fully informed and won’t do anything without telling you.

Brezhnev: Thank you. I know you have in fact begun the process of informing some countries of this project. I don’t know in what detail. I am sure France and Brandt and Britain will have each its own attitude. But it should be something good for all.

Dr. Kissinger: We will manage this. And we will assume the responsibility and we will manage the consequences. In any case, we haven’t discussed a draft, but only the general terms.

Brezhnev: We have not discussed it even in a general way.

Dr. Kissinger: We have always informed your Ambassador ahead of time and will do so in the future.

Gromyko: That we know.

Dr. Kissinger: We will not proceed on this project in any unilateral manner and will not proceed without your agreement.

Brezhnev: I did visualize to myself we would be preparing this document and not excluding you would want to consult with some-

6 Nicolae Ceausescu, President of Romania, 1965–1989.
body. But we proceed from the assumption that the document will be completed and signed regardless of the views of third countries. Otherwise there will be thirty different opinions, from Japan to Guinea.

Dr. Kissinger: If we consulted Japan, we might as well put it in The New York Times. If we agree on this document, we will not be thwarted by other countries.

Brezhnev: I am convinced nonetheless, in the long run they will all be appreciative of our efforts. One frequently has to hear, “These two superpowers are trying to impose their will on other powers in the world.” No one asks what are we being blamed for? What is it we are trying to impose—war or peace? Peaceful coexistence or war? If you asked publicly from a rostrum to those who complain what they are blaming us for, they could not find an answer. It is rubbish. They would be thrown out of the meeting place.

I know concern exists in Europe because of old mistrusts and suspicions. France and Germany mistrust each other, France being a nuclear power, while Germany is not. Then there is the Italian aspect—with Italy having no nuclear weapons and American bases on it. But won’t what we are doing be a guarantee of their tranquility? What could be more horrifying than the prospect of nuclear weapons being dropped on their towns and villages? So we should look at the long term and not just the momentary things.

In each line and each word we have endeavored to plant the principle of peaceful coexistence, with the incorporation of mutual respect in all fields—science, culture, trade—and this is in fact what this document would mean although outwardly it means military matters. But the main philosophical content is a stronger peace in the world. In signing it—and I trust I will be charged with this—we will be implementing an aspect of peace. And I am sure this aspect will relate to all your allies and all peoples. Signing it will open up such prospects for peace that we can’t fully discern them today. This will raise the prestige of our governments to an all-time high. Nothing in history can compare with this. You mentioned certain difficulties in certain fields. But I don’t think this can be directed against this agreement. Britain has certain prestige concerns and Italy has its own. But why this concern?

In this country only certain people are familiar with it. Not every member of our Politburo is familiar with it.

Dr. Kissinger: No member of our Cabinet knows anything about it. I may have to ask for asylum here when this becomes known.

Brezhnev: It won’t be an asylum. It will be a good life.

Dr. Kissinger: Who do I work out the details with? Dobrynin?

Brezhnev: Our Council of Ministers don’t know—except Gromyko, if you count him. If the first Summit made a big step, the next one will be an even bigger step in our relationship.
I think it is pretty useful if so far we have been firing at the outer lines of the defenses of this agreement and have not yet penetrated it. We have been firing all around the perimeter. [Laughter] The document has now been completely encircled. But that is important too. Both sides have to have conviction.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. So far we have talked only about the general atmosphere. To discuss the direction. And I agree it is important.

Brezhnev: We have achieved certain things in arms limitation, arms freezing, but this one is of big strategic-political significance. And as we see it, after adoption of this document, it will be much easier for us to talk on all other issues.

Dr. Kissinger: I have exhausted my reservoir of philosophy on this subject—but I reserve the right to return to philosophy on other subjects!

Brezhnev: Of course. We have three days of very hard work ahead of us. If we show this memorandum of conversation to President Nixon he will think we did not work very hard and we just enjoyed ourselves.

Dr. Kissinger: You can be sure President Nixon will read every word.

Brezhnev: I will send President Nixon a picture of you with a hunting rifle.

Gromyko: Not through the confidential channel, but directly to the President!

Brezhnev: I will add a message to show President Nixon what Dr. Kissinger was doing in the Soviet Union.

Dr. Kissinger: I will send him a photo of the General Secretary with Bonnie Andrews.7

Brezhnev: No photographers were around.

Dr. Kissinger: Sonnenfeldt was hiding in the bushes.

Brezhnev: That was a courtesy to a guest. But none of us can hide from the all-seeing and all-discerning Mr. Sonnenfeldt.

Kissinger: Someone said to me, “Sonnenfeldt has the best intelligence network in Washington. Unfortunately it is directed against you.” I have given up now; I tell him everything because he finds out anyway.

Brezhnev: We each have our aides-de-camp who bring cars around, and so forth, and act as general-purpose assistants. Once I was working here at Zavidovo. Andrei Mikhailovich [Aleksandrov] was here. We were working here late; a big group was around. One of my stenographers was here, Viktoria. People were taking a stroll around

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7 A member of the NSC Secretariat.
and I sat down on a bench next to this building, the stenographer and myself, and a big bush was right behind us. There seemed to be nobody around. Just opposite us was a window with the officer on duty. I didn’t have a match. I called to the officer for a lighter or matches. Up pops my aide-de-camp from behind a bush with my lighter! [Laughter]

Sonnenfeldt: Who was he protecting?

Brezhnev: I don’t get that myself! He said he was just there by accident. That is a true story.

Perhaps as we turn to discuss the substance of the document, certain other points about the general atmosphere may crop up, but it is difficult to introduce anything new on this now.

We can say our general views on the European Conference are now defined. Chancellor Brandt was in the United States. I don’t know the results of that. Then there was the scheduled meeting with the United Kingdom, and with President Pompidou of France.

I made several visits to various countries—Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia—last year. I also intended to visit Romania to sign a new Friendship Treaty there, but I fell ill so it was put off. I am also planning a visit to the Polish People’s Republic. Since Comrade Gierek has taken over. I am also planning to visit the German Democratic Republic also because of its new leader, Honecker. Both have recently been awarded Soviet decorations in connection with their 60th birthdays. Now it appears I will have to go before my visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, to spend one day in Poland and the German Democratic Republic. But in no way will we inform them of this.

Somewhere around the 10th or the 12th, the Federal Republic of Germany Bundestag is scheduled to ratify the Treaty with the German Democratic Republic.

Dr. Kissinger: That is our impression.

Brezhnev: Brandt told me that. But there will be no informing them, just a friendly visit. In terms of time I have been pressed up against the wall. But I just have to spend a day and night in each of those countries.

Dr. Kissinger: It is physically very exhausting.

Brezhnev: I will have to attend ceremonies, attend dinners, and have meetings with the leaders. I like the business discussions. But the ceremonial part is not to my liking. Dining is not business. This is all something invented by Foreign Office people, and we are suffering.

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Gromyko: Mankind was certainly thrown back by diplomatic protocol.

Brezhnev: They tell me there was a conference of Foreign Ministers to simplify protocol, and protocol ended up more complicated.

Gromyko: Mankind didn’t breathe a sigh of relief. In fact protocol was invented by an all-European Conference at a Summit.

Dr. Kissinger: At Vienna. During the negotiations on the Treaty of Westphalia, they spent three weeks discussing which Ambassador would go through the door first.

Gromyko: I myself in Vienna saw the hall in the palace which has four doors through which the three emperors were to walk at exactly the same second, including our Emperor Alexander I.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: You see how difficult it is, Dr. Kissinger. We keep walking around this. [Laughter] There is a beaten track around it now.

Dr. Kissinger: But the last half hour you have been surrounding us.

Brezhnev: Once in the Ukraine, one man surrounded a whole group. An old man approached us who was guarding his watermelons. People were stealing them. He told us how he took care of it. A truck of young people came through down the road. The fields had corn on one side and melons on the other. The horses stopped, then the boys jumped off and started stealing. He came out of his hut and shouted out to nonexistent people: “Misha, hold the horses! Where’s your stick! Chase them! Hit him! Hit that one!” He raised such a hue and cry that you thought a division was advancing. So they all ran away, leaving the horses—which were from his own farm. The boys were from his own farm too. That is how one man surrounded ten. He told the story well, but would not tell it again. We gave him some vodka.

But we have straight positions here, so no one is surrounding the other.

Well, Dr. Kissinger, do you want to say anything else on this? Should we turn to the document specifically or take a little break?

Dr. Kissinger: Why don’t we take a little break? Produced by objective necessity.

Brezhnev: Should we have lunch? When? It is almost 2:00 p.m.

Dr. Kissinger: Why not now?

Brezhnev: Lunch and a little rest. How much time do you need?

Dr. Kissinger: Five hours! [Laughter]

Brezhnev: So little?

Gromyko: It is now 7:00 a.m. in Washington. Time to start working.

[They confer]
Dr. Kissinger: We are ready anytime.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, perhaps we should take a three-hour break now. I had been thinking of taking you through the forest today—but we can put it off until tomorrow. We can resume at 5:00 today.

Dr. Kissinger: The Foreign Minister unfortunately has iron endurance. I experienced it at the Summit.

Gromyko: I tried to keep up with you.

Brezhnev: Would you be agreeable to discussing the document in substance at 5:00 p.m.?

Dr. Kissinger: We will be ready.

Brezhnev: Bon appetit!

[The meeting then ended. General Secretary Brezhnev accompanied Dr. Kissinger and his party on foot back to Dr. Kissinger’s residence.]
105. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Zavidovo, May 5, 1973, 7 p.m.–12:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of Central Committee, CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
Georgi M. Kornienko, Head of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interpreter
Andrei Vavilov, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff
William Hyland, NSC Senior Staff
Philip Odeen, NSC Senior Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Richard Campbell, NSC Staff

SUBJECT
Nuclear Agreement

Brezhnev: Did your people commute here by helicopter?
Kissinger: No, they are all staying here now.
Brezhnev: I flew here once by helicopter, at night. We told them to light bonfires here; they lit four, and we landed right in the middle of them. We flew Podgorny, Kosygin and myself—all three.
Kissinger: Can you go from Moscow to here, or do you have to go from the airport?
Brezhnev: On one occasion I took off from the Kremlin Square where the bell is. Also there is a heliport on Leningrad Prospect, a regular heliport to the three main Moscow airports.
Kissinger: The arrangements are now working beautifully, and Washington knows how to get in touch with us.
Brezhnev: That is bad. We should do something to break off all communications for a whole week.
Kissinger: That would be exciting.
Brezhnev: The world would be excited—no Kissinger!
Kissinger: Except the Foreign Minister’s colleagues in the State Department—they would be celebrating.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Kissinger Conversations at Zavidovo, May 5–8 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at Brezhnev’s office in the Politburo Villa. Brackets are in the original.
Brezhnev: When they were searching for Nobile, there were businessmen who used it for their own commercial advantage. One man wrote from Odessa: “I am searching for Nobile.” So the telegraph office accepted it as urgent. The next line said “Send 3 sacks of potatoes.” [laughter] We will send a message saying: “We are looking for Kissinger.”

Kissinger: That means that the White House will have lost all its assistants.

Brezhnev: But the main one will be Kissinger.

You don’t know how tempted I am to take you out into the forest now and show you the wild boars. They have live ones two times as big as the stuffed one you see.

Kissinger: I won’t go!

Brezhnev: I will go with you.

Gromyko: What they do to the best hunter—they leave him ½ kilometer from the tower. He is surrounded by wild boars but they leave him 2 guns. [laughter]

Kissinger: I thought it was a race between him and the biggest boar.

Brezhnev: Mr. Kissinger, believe only me! Sometimes someone will say “I’ll go first and you go behind me.” It looks like he is taking the responsibility. But boars always attack from behind!

Our boars eat everything and leave nothing.

Kissinger: Your boars always encircle you first!

Brezhnev: They don’t waste such time; they want to eat.

Kissinger: I am carrying our only copy of the document while I am hunting.

Brezhnev: But I will have a second copy.

Aleksandrov: And I will have a third here.

Brezhnev: Let’s get down to business. The only thing remaining is to draw up the document—on how to bomb everybody. [laughter]

Kissinger: That would attract attention!

Brezhnev: We are men of large-scale action.

Kissinger: A document on how to establish hegemony.

Brezhnev: We will only say we are always struggling for peace. By way of a joke: Two men meet. One says “There will be no war—but a struggle for peace. It will be so acute that there will be no stone left un-

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2 Umberto Nobile (1885–1978), an Italian aeronautical engineer best known for having flown over the North Pole from Europe to Alaska. On an expedition in May 1928, Nobile and his crew crashed leading to an international search.
turned!” [laughter] All that goes into an arsenal of jokes, predinner and post-dinner stories.

I had a brief conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin and he asked me “When are you going to talk to Dr. Kissinger?” I didn’t get what he was driving at: Now we are done with jokes. It means we must get down to business.

Kissinger: That is how he treats me in Washington.

Brezhnev: My God.

Kissinger: Ever since he got a direct line to my office, he’s been impossible.

Brezhnev: Cut it off. I am glad you are comfortable here. But in Moscow they might ask me to report back to them what we are doing here. It is easy for you to just go to Camp David. It is more complicated here. Dr. Kissinger is in a better position. You must have been born under a lucky star. [Sonnenfeldt whispers something to Kissinger] Sonnenfeldt is very pleased.

Sonnenfeldt: His last birthday was in Moscow.

Brezhnev: I forgot last year to present you with an old Russian drinking cup. In addition to the 49-year old brandy.

Anyway, I have not been getting any calls from Moscow, which is good. But they have been sending me my papers. The communications officers come every ½ hour. About half of them are not worth the trip here, but they feel they have to. Some papers I can dispense with for a half year, but they have to send it with a note “Leonid Ilyich, this might be of interest to you.”

Kissinger: Do you have a secretariat that selects for you what should come out here?

Brezhnev: Our Finance Minister won’t give me enough of a staff. [laughter]

My staff keeps telling me that we have so many people on this job. But that is America. They keep telling me, “look what America has.”

Kissinger: One half sends messages to the other half.

Brezhnev: There is a book—by Parkinson—that says if any department has 2,000 people it has no mission to perform, but one half sends paper to the other half. They have nothing to do.3

So here I am, shaking before you [Kissinger laughs], waiting for you to tell us when to begin. And not just you, Gromyko and Dobrynin.

Kissinger: Not to speak of Kornienko.

Brezhnev: Kornienko, too, is in the same company.

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Kissinger: Well, we were going to go through the document to see if either side wanted to make changes. Of course we have exchanged messages on this for some time. So we have only very little to suggest. And I think we have reached this point by each side having understanding of the point of view and necessities of the other. [Kornienko gets up]

When Kornienko gets up, I know things are going to get difficult.

Brezhnev: I am afraid of that too. I am afraid if your colleagues get up.

Kissinger: They are too terrified.

Brezhnev: Of what?

Sonnenfeldt: Of whom?

Kissinger: In America they sit at attention. But not abroad, in a socialist country.

Brezhnev: Look at Aleksandrov [whose arm is in a cast]. He sits like that because he is injured. A sacrifice for peace!

Dr. Kissinger, will you start? Or shall we? The important thing is to read through the entire document.

Kissinger: Why don’t we go through the entire document, and each side can make suggestions where it has one.

Brezhnev: When I met some American Senators I said that Sukhodrev’s name is not “dry wood” but “tree of life.”

Sukhodrev: The General Secretary suggests I read the English version of our text.

Kissinger: I am assuming we are operating from the document we have been using in Washington [U.S. working draft of May 3, Tab A]. You haven’t been producing a new document?

Brezhnev: What my colleagues are suggesting is that we should go immediately to the key Article I, and I agree with them. They are both Americans [Dobrynin and Kornienko], and they press down on me.

Will your side read your text of Article I?

Gromyko: Again a concession!

Kissinger: It was a debate on how to spring the trap door. I feel like a man with a noose around his neck, with people debating how to spring it.

Brezhnev: That is not the important thing. The important thing is . . .

Kissinger: . . . that I hang!

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4 Attached but not printed. See Documents 85 and 95.
Brezhnev: ... that the noose will be well-soaped. I want you to have a soft armchair.

Kissinger: May I make a suggestion? So we both should know what we are operating from.

We have a document that has what I think is understood. Both sides can tell what changes they want to make in it. Then we can discuss Article I first.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, sincerely, that is of no consequence to me. The important thing is to get to it.

Kissinger: My proposal is that each side should indicate now what changes it wants—in the Preamble, and in Articles I, II, III, IV, and V. Then I’ll be delighted to discuss Article I. But I can’t until we know what other changes you are suggesting.

Gromyko: Why don’t you read Article I, then we’ll make only a few changes.

Kissinger: [laughs] If we can get a sense of what you want ...

Gromyko: If we agree on this article, it will be much easier to discuss the others.

Kissinger: We’ll discuss Article I first, and you don’t have to make any decision on anything else. But we want to know what follows.

Gromyko: We consider it the crucial article, and I think you do too.

Kissinger: Why can’t you tell us what you have in mind?

We have a text, which we had assumed was more or less agreed, with some minor changes.

Brezhnev: I will read.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, that isn’t the point. I would be delighted to read. I don’t insist the Soviet side read first. My proposal is ...

[Brezhnev and Gromyko argue. Gromyko laughs.]

Brezhnev: Try arguing with him [Gromyko]. Let’s read it.

Kissinger: Go through the whole thing.

Brezhnev: Mr. Kissinger, if we read it, nothing will escape your attention. If you see anything you don’t like, you tell us.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, that will get us to Article I first.

Dobrynin: The Preamble, then Article I.

Kissinger: Now that I know your concerns are in the Preamble and Article I, and our concerns are in Article IV, we’ve told each other what we want. So we can proceed.

Brezhnev: Article I.

Kissinger: My understanding is ... Let’s summarize where we stand, so we are clear. You want some changes in the Preamble and in Article I.
Brezhnev: Right.

Gromyko: Changes as compared with what? You suggested certain forms of words which we haven’t agreed.

Dobrynin: Henry, we have some suggestions on the Preamble, nothing really.

Kissinger: It was my impression—perhaps due to my own inadequacies—that what your Ambassador and I discussed was agreed.

Dobrynin: On Articles I and II.

Kissinger: And there has been a substantial amount of time to react. Since we are already going to have a disagreement on substance, let’s not also have a disagreement on procedure. All right, let’s discuss Article I.

Brezhnev: I’m interested in substance. We can start reading from the end; it’s a document. And probably each side has some comments to make on any part of the agreement. At this first stage let’s go through it.

Kissinger: Before we do, the General Secretary and the Foreign Minister must understand that this has been a very difficult exercise for us. We have already made major changes in Washington. I was very tempted to hold them back and make them to the General Secretary. We’ve agreed to many things because we know of the personal interest of the General Secretary in this. So the margin of change for us is very small.

Dobrynin: So look at what we’re going to propose.

Brezhnev: Let’s agree on one thing. Neither you nor I are making any concessions. Let’s not call them that. What we’re trying to do is improve this document, which is important to our two countries. Improving this document to bring it to a state in both form and content that will be understood correctly by everyone in the world. And to insure that after signing the document, both . . .

Kissinger: The General Secretary proposed I read it in English. Is that correct? Or do you want to give us your changes?

Dobrynin: [to Kissinger] Wait until you see what his proposal is.

Kissinger: Can we hear it? By what method will we learn the Soviet position on Article I? I will agree to any proposal that produces the Soviet position.

Brezhnev: Last night I read this document again in detail and asked my comrades for explanations on various points. But right now I do suggest we start on Article I.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: “The Soviet Union and the United States of America solemnly agree that an objective of their policy is to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons.”
Gromyko: The exact text.

Dobrynin: As agreed.

Brezhnev: It’s the Foreign Ministry that gets everything confused.

Kissinger: I thought that now that the Foreign Minister is on the Politburo he would not pay attention to all these details. [laughter]

Brezhnev: He’s not yet in the part.

That’s the first paragraph of Article I. Then: “Accordingly, they agree that they will act in such a way as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, to avoid military confrontations and to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between themselves.” Full stop.

Kissinger: What comes next?

Brezhnev: As I said, we’re concluding an agreement between our two sides, between the United States and the Soviet Union, and we would therefore feel that we could refer to various other parties further on in the agreement. The first article is the “strike force;” what we say here is that we will act in such a way as to avoid exacerbation of our relations. Even here there are things I don’t like, but because so much work has gone into it, I’ll leave it. I trust the people who worked on it. We’re not saying there will never be a nuclear war between us, but only that we will “act in such a way as to.” So a lot of meaning is in here. Only in the last line are we saying we will act in such a way as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war. Our side is not happy with this either, because our side would rather say that we will not use nuclear weapons. The meaning is that there is the possibility that we can act and act but there will still be war. Besides all we do mention here, why mention others here? We can put them in another page.

Kissinger: That is all you want to change in Article I?

Brezhnev: Yes, that is all we have in Article I.

Let me explain. When Russians start reading the text, they will understand the United States and the Soviet Union are taking measures to reach their aim of preventing situations, and so forth, and on that basis to reach their endeavor to prevent nuclear war. That’s what President Nixon said in his Inaugural Address—to go from an era of confrontation to negotiation.5 So it is a sort of translation of his words. We are not proposing deleting the last line; we are proposing to put it somewhere else. But Article I should be our aim. Our policy is aimed at averting nuclear war, and that’s something no one can object to. In accordance with

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5 In his second Inaugural Address, January 20, 1973, Nixon stated: “We shall continue, in this era of negotiation, to work for the limitation of nuclear arms and to reduce the danger of confrontation between the great powers.” For the full text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 12–15.
that aim, as it says, they will act in such a way. So there is no indication that there is a categorical agreement between us not to go to nuclear war. In Russian it sounds a bit weak. Since so much work has been done, we won’t make other changes, but we propose to end the sentence after “themselves” and transfer the rest of the sentence elsewhere in the text.

So we’ve not changed anything at all in the text itself but we are, as it were, turning it towards our two nations. And so that other countries will be less critical, we propose moving that sentence elsewhere in the text where it will be appropriate.

Is there anyone in the United States who wants nuclear war? Anyone in West Germany? If we do this, Article I will squarely state that it applies only to the United States and the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: This proposal can have two significances. It can either have been the result of meticulous drafting, with obligations toward each other in one paragraph and obligations toward others in the other paragraph. It could make a big difference. So I would be interested in knowing what other changes you are making in the document.

Brezhnev: We could discuss that, and see where it could go.

Kissinger: Well, could we get an exact text so we could study it in detail? Then we could see.

Brezhnev: Tell me, do you believe that in general this reference to third countries has to be included in the treaty as such?

Kissinger: Yes. I disappointed the Foreign Minister, but I have to be honest.

Mr. General Secretary, let me be frank with you. This will be a significant document, and its significance won’t be from the fact that it doesn’t mean anything. If we say it is just general and has no concrete significance, even then there is a great problem. We have a massive difficulty on two fronts: One in relation to other countries, and one in relation to domestic opinion. With the former we will be accused of making an agreement that spares us from nuclear war and leaves open others to the threat of nuclear war. In the domestic situation, the problem is more difficult for us. It has always been a Soviet proposal, and always opposed by the United States. It is a bigger change in our policy than in yours. We have to show some moral commitment to not leaving others open. This is a moral imperative for us. We have to show it is not just for us, but for others too.

Brezhnev: Let me explain. I’m not rejecting this idea completely and out of hand, and I indeed agree with you. It is indeed impossible without some kind of concern for third countries, otherwise it would be kind of hard.
I suggest we put a full stop after “themselves.” Then a separate sentence immediately following. We add: “The sides are also agreed to do all in their power to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between either party and third countries.”

Dobrynin: In the same article.

Brezhnev: We’re in fact making it somewhat broader. We’re saying we do all we can. That in fact will be a broader interpretation.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, your Ambassador was so convincing when he criticized “do all we can.” Why don’t we use the same words as the Foreign Minister suggested: “act in such a manner as . . .”? Otherwise, it looks like we are doing it in a different way with third countries than with ourselves.

Brezhnev: The two powers can take obligations only on something they can agree to. But where they reach agreement on something like this, it is between them. In logic, with respect to third countries, it’s right to say it depends on them. So quite logically, it has to be a formulation that is somewhat different. Otherwise, someone will say “How can you take measures with third countries?” It’s a matter of iron logic.

Kissinger: The Foreign Minister will agree with me; not every Foreign Minister in the world has so subtle an intellect. If we say they have an obligation with the two, we can’t distinguish it from the second. I think we should either raise both to the same level, and either say “act in such a manner” or “do all in their power” in both. I must reiterate that the Foreign Minister’s logic and argument are extremely subtle.

I might add, as a logical point, that if one country acts so as to exclude nuclear war and the other country does not, it creates a new situation.

So we, Mr. General Secretary, to sum up—we agree with your proposal to separate the two ideas. The only counterproposal we make is to use the same phrase. “The two powers also agree they will act in such a manner as to exclude . . . ” Or, if you wish, we will say “do their utmost” in both sentences.

Brezhnev: After we’ve all thought this over, let me add, Dr. Kissinger, besides all the other qualities he has, he also has subtlety in logic. What pleases me most is that when we met on Lenin Hills I kept trying to get you to admit that Logic is Science. [laughter]

Let’s do this. In any event we have to introduce this element about third countries. I agree; that stems from the logic of this document and its substance. Therefore we will agree—you agreed we shall separate the obligation for us two from the obligation regarding third countries.

Kissinger: As long as the obligations are identical.

Brezhnev: Yes. So, full stop after “themselves.” Then, “the two parties also agree they will act in such a manner as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between either party and third countries.”
Kissinger: All right. I accept that.

Brezhnev: So on the one hand, we separate the two forms, and on the other hand, we give emphasis to the second.

Kissinger: I will be criticized by Mr. Sonnenfeldt, but rather than argue for 15 minutes I will say the General Secretary has certainly improved the document.

Brezhnev: He shouldn’t say that.

Sonnenfeldt: I only criticized him for not doing it himself.

Brezhnev: It gives emphasis. It looks like an obligation on our part.

Kissinger: I agree.

I have a very stylistic point that I can raise with the Foreign Minister. It’s not important. Where it says “in such a manner as to . . .,” we should also say “as to avoid” and “as to exclude.” It makes no difference in Russian.

Brezhnev: [to Sukhodrev] It’s our obligation.

[At this point there was a short break]

Kissinger: We have improved the document.

Brezhnev: First we refer to ourselves, and then to what we will do jointly.

Kissinger: There is one logical [issue] which we have to straighten out. We should say “each will act in such a manner . . .”

Gromyko: It may be joint action, or separate action. It is not excluded. It could be either. This does not mean joint.

Kissinger: Yes, but here we’re talking about what the parties will do. Otherwise it would seem like joint action. Joint action is covered in Article IV.

Kornienko: But if that is accepted, you’ve contradicted your own formula for having them both the same.

Kissinger: Mr. Kornienko is right. We can accept “each” above, too. Or, because up above is clearly joint, we can explain the difference and leave “they” in the first phrase and have “each” below.

Brezhnev: By logic, there should not be the inference that in each and every case we will necessarily act together. But that’s what our formulation says, that “they will act in such a manner . . .” Surely, you can’t read into that a mandatory joint action in all cases. That formulation doesn’t necessarily mean there will be collective action.

Kissinger: Where we’re talking about our relations, it is all right to say “they will act.” But when you are speaking about intentions to third countries, it is important to avoid the impression that this refers only to joint action or primarily to joint action.

Brezhnev: Done. I agree. Then, “The two parties also agree that each of them will act in such a manner as to exclude an outbreak between themselves and third countries.”
Kissinger: It will have to be “itself.” Could I have 15 minutes with Sonnenfeldt to find another objection?
Brezhnev: Banned.
Kissinger: Accepted.
Brezhnev: Agreed. The Preamble now?
Kissinger: That Foreign Minister—I hope you keep him busy on the Politburo with other matters. I hear that on the Politburo you don’t specialize.
Brezhnev: I tell you very confidentially we’re going to remove him from foreign affairs and put him in charge of agriculture [Laughter], and his main task will be to raise the milk yield of cows.
In the Preamble, you have this addition, “Proceeding equally from the desire to bring about conditions in which the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war anywhere in the world would be reduced and ultimately eliminated.”
Kissinger: It was your subtraction. An addition to your March draft.
Brezhnev: We accept it.
Kissinger: Oh, I’m so used to dealing with your North Vietnamese allies.
While we’re at it, we can drop “equally.” It makes no sense.
Kornienko: I was mystified by it.
Sonnenfeldt: It is from an earlier draft.
Brezhnev: Also in the Preamble you suggested transferring from Article II the words, “reaffirming that the development of U.S.-Soviet relations is not directed against third countries and their interests.” We agree. [Laughter] And that is the fourth time we have agreed.
Kissinger: I reject your acceptance! [Laughter]
Brezhnev: I see some respect is being shown to me. Anyway, if your side wants this in, we will accept. It is a “strike point,” right in the beginning. It is important to have it in there, because when people start to read this, they’ll see even before getting to the substance that we’re concerned about third countries.
Kissinger: I must say I now prefer that you don’t keep your Ambassador in Washington, because you are easier to deal with.
Brezhnev: We’ll keep him there a while longer; you can’t do without him.
Kissinger: I was joking. I must say he’s done well. He has made an enormous contribution to U.S.-Soviet relations.
Brezhnev: And also in the Preamble you proposed the transfer to the Preamble from Article VI the following words . . . I want once again to agree with you, but this is the last time. Any article.
I still want to say a few words about the science of logic. I think every substantive article in the agreement should be higher in meaning than the Preamble. In the Preamble we should have general objectives, but in every article there should be substantive obligations. In Article VI [of the Soviet draft of March 21, Tab B] we have the following words: “the obligations undertaken by the United States and the Soviet Union towards third countries in appropriate treaties and agreements.” You want to transfer the words “in conformity with the various agreements to which either has subscribed.” We prefer to leave them where they were, in paragraph (c) of [our] Article VI. We think this weakens it. Our purpose is to heighten the assurance to third countries. We think it would improve the text.

Kissinger: Can we reserve this until we get to Article VI?
Brezhnev: Certainly.
Dobrynin: But we don’t have anything else on Article VI.
Kissinger: Yes, but we were going through this systematically. Can we take a short break on this Article VI?
[There was a break from 8:15–9:26 p.m.]
Kissinger: When we go hunting you’ll have a boar with a weak heart standing by.
Brezhnev: We can go watch them feed. It will take one-half hour.
Kissinger: We’d be delighted.
We can leave it in Preamble, this phrase “and in conformity with the various agreements to which either has subscribed.” Our suggestion is, we write Article VI (c): “the obligations entered into by the United States and Soviet Union towards their allies or other third countries in appropriate treaties and undertakings.” And let me explain why we use the word “undertakings” rather than “agreements.” Let me explain. If you say “agreements” it implies bilaterally. But we have a number of obligations in which the President may have said . . . Take the Monroe Doctrine. That’s not an agreement; it’s a unilateral American undertaking.

There are a number of situations in the world where we’ve undertaken a unilateral obligation where there was no agreement in the formal sense. If we say here “agreements,” there would be some ambiguity. So we want to say “in appropriate agreements and undertakings.”

Gromyko: As a rule, today agreements and treaties are something published. But if you take unilateral undertakings it might be some-

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6 Attached but not printed. See Document 85.
thing no one knows about. Unilateral is much easier to keep secret, and there are probably 1,000 times more unilateral undertakings than treaties and agreements. We’d then simply be losing ground from under our feet.

Kissinger: We can leave it out altogether.

Gromyko: We’re not saying unilateral undertakings are being left null and void; we’re only saying agreements are valid. They’re unilateral because they’re not incorporated in agreements.

Kissinger: No, if we make a unilateral undertaking towards, say, Bulgaria, then whether you agree with it is immaterial, as long as Bulgaria agrees with it. I used a theoretical case; I don’t want to get your Bulgarian friends in trouble. *XJ

Gromyko: That’s not characteristic. There are many unilateral undertakings not acknowledged or accepted by others.

Kissinger: That’s a different case. In 1971, during the India-Pakistan crisis we called to your attention a letter President Kennedy had written to Ayub Khan in 1962, with the agreement of Ayub Khan. Indeed at his request. Now, that is not a formal agreement. But it was also an undertaking of the U.S. and it produced an obligation.

Brezhnev: Much as I want an agreement on all this—and you’ve seen evidence of this—this is something the Soviet Union cannot accept under any circumstances. And I’ll explain why. And, if for instance, if we write it into this, the first thing that comes to mind is a statement the President made in China. You recall what he said—in effect, “that the great American people would be together with great Chinese people.” At the banquet. I asked you about it. We didn’t make trouble about it. You gave us an explanation.

We certainly know President Nixon is a highly educated man and politician. You know what our reaction was. On no occasion did we return to that, nor will we. But if we inscribe this in the agreements, people will ask about this statement by the President: Is this an obligation to China? This would mean we would be referring to these statements. And I may have made statements like this, about “American imperialism,” etc. But we’re trying to do something else here.

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7 For the text of Kennedy’s December 5, 1962, letter to Pakistani President Ayub Khan, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XIX, South Asia, Document 217.

8 At a banquet in Beijing, February 21, 1972, Nixon stated: “the Chinese people are a great people, the American people are a great people. If our two people are enemies the future of this world we share together is dark indeed. But if we can find common ground to work together, the chance for world peace is immeasurably increased.” For the full text of Nixon’s toast, made during his trip to China, February 21–28, 1972, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 368–369.
It would apply to undertakings of yours to South Korea, and South Vietnam. If we start interpreting obligations in the broader way, we’d be putting the entire agreement in a difficult way.

I’ve done some reflecting on Article I, and I would accept leaving it as you suggested—without a full stop. To leave it as your original wording. We’d then not be complicating matters. And, in substance, we accept two of your additions to the Preamble. Then as regards the phrase in the Preamble, we would leave the phrase “in conformity with the various agreements to which either has subscribed.” And repeat this idea as it stands in Article VI, that is, “obligations undertaken by the United States and the Soviet Union toward third countries in appropriate treaties and agreements.”

Gromyko: In the Preamble, without word “various.”
Kissinger: We can do without “various.”
Kissinger/Sonnenfeldt: Take out “the” also.
Brezhnev: If you take this addition in the Preamble you get two things—the Charter of the UN and “in conformity with agreements . . .”
Gromyko: You don’t need “various.”
Kissinger: Agreed.
Gromyko: The Preamble, “in conformity with agreements,” but leave Article VI as follows: “obligations undertaken by the United States and the Soviet Union towards third countries . . .”
Kissinger: Ours says “towards their allies or other third countries.”
Dobrynin: We can do that.
Kissinger: I still regret the paragraph in Article I we worked so hard on.

Sukhodrev reads: “The obligations undertaken by the United States and the Soviet Union towards their allies and third countries in appropriate treaties and agreements.”

Brezhnev: [Gets up, turns TV on.] You’re going to be on TV, showing you resisting agreement. I’ve seen films of you taken in the U.S.

Kissinger: Where? [Laughter] I’ve asked General Antonov but he won’t answer. Could he give me, for my memoirs, the dossier he has on me? It would save me collecting material.
Brezhnev: Antonov’s functions are only internal. Honestly.
Kissinger: I know. Can we take a short break?
Brezhnev: I must say, I’m pleased with how we have been negotiating.
Kissinger: It’s a serious document and will have very great significance.
[There was a short break—10:05–10:30]
Kissinger: We understand your point about banquet speeches and implied understandings.

Brezhnev: Please, Dr. Kissinger, don’t repeat that particular part of the conversation to the President.

Kissinger: No, but it was a very good illustration.

Brezhnev: It could be asked of you by anybody.

Kissinger: On the other hand, we’re concerned, as I pointed out, with matters that are not necessarily formal agreements but nevertheless have a certain formality. And, therefore, we’d like to propose the following: “towards their allies or other third countries in treaties, agreements and other appropriate instruments.” So it’s clear we’re not talking about speeches.

I must explain, I must discuss this with the President. He’s gone over this very carefully.

Gromyko: In fact, in Russian “treaties and agreements” covers all situations.

Kissinger: In fact, “appropriate instruments” would cover situations like Israel. I’m being honest with the General Secretary, as he is with me. This is more relevant than the China case.

Nothing is accomplished if after this agreement so many explanations have to be given that the document is rendered worthless.

Brezhnev: I don’t think it is worthless.

Kissinger: No, I think it will be an important document. If you want to say “documents,” it’s all right.

Aleksandrov: It’s only one word in Russian.

Dobrynin: Do you have a document with Israel?

Kissinger: There are so many Presidential letters on the subject that it’s covered. But I wouldn’t include speeches.

Sukhodrev: Read it again.

Kissinger: [Reads it again] “Towards their allies or other third countries in treaties, agreements and other appropriate instruments.” The word “appropriate” also puts it on a level with treaties and agreements.

Gromyko: In Russian, you don’t need “other third countries.” Don’t need “third.”

Kissinger: That’s a good point. We’re really improving the document.

Gromyko: We’re trying to facilitate it.

Kissinger: I know.

Brezhnev: We agree.

So, we’re all set on the Preamble?
Kissinger: I wanted to save this for the end, but since the General Secretary raised it . . . We can’t oppose an article we had proposed. But we think the version we worked out before [Article I with two sentences], while it changes nothing and is no different, will have a very helpful psychological impact. The version the General Secretary and I worked out would frankly help us in Washington when we send this back. Even more importantly, when published, it would have a very great symbolic impact to single this out. Therefore, I’d like to put to the General Secretary that separation of these two ideas would give the first paragraph a great impact and end the need for explanations which there would be if they were run together. And, since part of the impact will be psychological . . . But I don’t insist.

Brezhnev: I’m giving up my version and agreeing with the original one—“and third countries.” Are we agreed on the Preamble, and Article I?

Kissinger: For tonight. [Laughter] No, it is agreed.

Brezhnev: So, that’s done. Article II, I’d suggest dropping, “and also from encouraging any third country in the use of force.” We don’t need that.

Kissinger: Yes. All right. Article III.

Brezhnev: Brandt may not like that.

Kissinger: You’ll see him before we do.

Brezhnev: You just saw him.

Kissinger: But we didn’t show him the document.

Brezhnev: We had two meetings with him. I must say we’ve gone a long way with him. I see no particular difficulty in a meeting with Brandt.

Kissinger: I think so.

Brezhnev: The main road has been traversed, and the basic issue will be how to develop further relations and friendly atmosphere between the two countries, in the economic field, technological cooperation, trade, things like that. When I spoke with him at Oreanda, he had some views of his own on the situation in Europe and force reductions in Europe. He was modifying his views, and it will take another meeting with him.

Kissinger: I think his basic direction is a positive one.

Brezhnev: And I don’t expect, and don’t have any intention of, going into anything anti-American.

So what else do we have?

Kissinger: We’ve got one suggestion for Article IV. It was our article, and it was bad drafting. Our concern is not to appear that we have the right to settle conflicts involving other countries. Here. [Hands over
Tab C] I’ve underlined what is new. It makes it exactly coterminous with Article I.

Brezhnev: I’ll tell you, to accept the wording of Article IV as it stood took some courage, on both our sides. I’d say your addition would tend to soften the significance of our agreement. It would then appear that in some part of the world, if a danger occurred, we couldn’t even enter into consultations. There are certain things in this agreement relating not to us but relating to the danger of war in the world. Consultations don’t mean that after consultations we immediately become allies and attack somebody. If we consult, we might decide to make a joint approach to the UN Security Council or General Assembly or something else. It doesn’t mean we become allies.

Kissinger: Nothing prevents us from having consultations. But this is a formal obligation in this agreement. Even with the qualification we made, there is a major requirement for consultation in most conceivable circumstances. For all the matters under Article I, the two sides consult.

Gromyko: What we have here, what you say is that the situation arises only if a danger of war between the U.S. and USSR is involved. You know certain countries haven’t signed the Non Proliferation Treaty. What if certain countries—I won’t name them, say X, Y, Z—are getting weapons and start a war. What do we do? No might?

Kissinger: We always have the right to consult.

Gromyko: Why not provide it?

Kissinger: May I point out that this was really the idea of the Soviet draft of July 21 and September 21, in which you only referred to the danger of war involving us.

Dobrynin: But the idea goes back to the draft handed to Brezhnev by the President last May.

Kornineko: We took it from the President.

Kissinger: But that draft wasn’t approved by Sonnenfeldt.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, could you tell me what is the motive behind this addition?

Kissinger: Yes, I’ll explain to you. As I pointed out this morning, we’ll have formidable difficulty with this with friends and with those who’ll say this is an American-Soviet attempt to run the world. So we’d

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9 Attached but not printed. The underlined portion of the new U.S. draft of Article IV, dealing with bilateral consultations to avert war, reads: “the risk of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union or between either of them and third countries.”

10 See Document 17 and footnotes 17 and 18, Document 55.

like to confine it for these purposes to those subject matters covered in Articles I and II, and also make an effort to avoid the risk. This doesn’t mean in the communiqué we can’t have a more sweeping clause about consultations. We’d certainly consider the communiqué an “appropriate instrument.”

Gromyko: Provided it is bilateral!
Kissinger: So we think this would, for purposes of this agreement—this is already an important step forward.
Brezhnev: It narrows it down though.
Kissinger: It narrows it somewhat from the Article we in fact gave you. It was never in a Soviet draft.
Dobrynin: It became common property!
Kissinger: No, I understand.
Gromyko: We have this text given us by President Nixon last year, “in event of conflict . . .” The minimum effort we can make is consultations.

Kissinger: Yes, but we’ve studied the problem.
Kornienko: It’s the minimum.
Kissinger: I can say in the Soviet drafts of July and September . . .
Kornienko: In July we used the President’s text.
Kissinger: Also, you have to remember it was a general declaration [last May] not a treaty. In any case, we find ourselves in the position of the General Secretary after the break, when he reconsidered Article I.
Brezhnev: I wanted to go to Washington; now you’re standing in the way.

Kissinger: [Laughs] We’ll definitely meet in Washington.
Brezhnev: I was getting ready, already wanting to know the weather, whether it will be too hot or too cold.
Kissinger: It won’t be too cold.
Brezhnev: I guess I’ll just have to go to Honolulu and go back.
Kissinger: I guarantee you will receive a very warm reception.
Brezhnev: We agree with the President that in view of our relationship we should meet every year—1973, 1974, 1975, 1976.
Let’s leave this as it was.
Kissinger: No, that we can’t do.
Brezhnev: Then what do we do? Can we think it over overnight?
Kissinger: Certainly.
Dobrynin: Can you inform the President of my personal request.
Kissinger: Yes.
Brezhnev: We can consider the rest as agreed?
Kissinger: No, I have to consult the President about [your] Article VI. And we have Article V.

Brezhnev: Your Article V. We don’t have it at all.

Kissinger: I’m beginning to wonder about your Ambassador.

Brezhnev: You can at least praise him.

Kissinger: You don’t have it? Doesn’t he transmit it?

Dobrynin: He has it.

Kissinger: He just doesn’t want it. OK. I’ll agree to drop it.

Brezhnev: At our meetings, we and the President will agree on who we want to be doing these consultations. It should be at least on the level of you and Gromyko or me and the President.

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Brezhnev: I’ll write him a letter, or he’ll write one, or you will go to Geneva. Now, Article VII in our text. We have the following Article VII; “this Treaty will be of unlimited duration. Done in Washington,” etc.

Kissinger: We accept. [Kornienko hands over the copy Tab D.]

Brezhnev: [Gets bottle of brandy] Dr. Kissinger, I shall be hoping to get a positive reply from the President concerning our work. Then we’ll celebrate properly. The President is a long way away, and you and I can have a preliminary treat. I put this [brand] preliminarily on the paper, and give it to you as a souvenir.

Kissinger: If you hear someone singing under your window, you’ll know who it is!

Brezhnev: A serenade.

Kissinger: Let me speak frankly. I’m quite optimistic about Article VI. But less so regarding Article IV. I’ll put the General Secretary’s request to the President. But I wanted to be honest with the General Secretary regarding the situation.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I have the feeling, on the basis of personal relations between the President and myself and proceeding from the objectives we are both seeking, I’m sure he’ll give it appropriate consideration.

Kissinger: I don’t want to raise false hopes. I know the President. You’ve dealt with me enough to know that very often I can decide it. But in this case he’s taken a very direct and personal interest, and recognizing the significance of this document. . . .

Brezhnev: You know how you can be of one opinion, and sleep on it. Just as we agreed to your amendments.

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12 See Document 106.

13 Attached but not printed.
Kissinger: But they are all in the Preamble!
Dobrynin: And Article I.
Brezhnev: The whole agreement is important.
Kissinger: But no one derives obligations from the Preamble.
Brezhnev: Let me say I am sure we will agree tomorrow. Once we agree on it here, we can get it approved by our leadership and you and Gromyko can initial it here.
Kissinger: Initial it while I am here? I can certainly get the President’s approval. But no one here knows of this. For us to initial an agreement that no lawyer has looked at is an irregular procedure.
We know that our relationship with you is involved here.
Brezhnev: But when you came here, we did not change anything we had agreed.
Kissinger: What I would like to do is let lawyers look at it and have the translations checked. We won’t change any of it. And initial it within a week.
Brezhnev: My request does not mean you have to tell your lawyers you have signed something. But it would make for greater stability. It is one thing if technical questions arise. I have no doubts about the Russian text. I am sure you have no doubts about the English text.
Kissinger: But you have had all the resources of the Foreign Ministry at your disposal, through the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I have done this on my own, with the President.
Brezhnev: We have only a restricted group in the Foreign Ministry working on this.
Kissinger: But in any case he has been able to check it with a restricted group of experts.
Brezhnev: On this side I am the lawyer—I am ready to assume responsibility. The Government, the Politburo and the Supreme Soviet all trust me in elaborating this.
Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, my megalomania is well developed, but I would not presume to possess the same degree of authority as the General Secretary. But I must say there is no example where if I tell you the President agrees on the substance of an agreement you need fear we will reopen negotiations on substance.
You will be able to report to your colleagues—if we agree tomorrow—that it is agreed.
We know the importance of this to our relations. It would defeat our entire purpose if we tried to reopen it.
Brezhnev: In short, I had those two personal requests—one on the article and on the initialing. It would not be formal initialing, but just . . .
Kissinger: What is the difference?

Gromyko: Well, let us say that this would be defacto initialing but without any legal procedures. And as in the case of any initialing, it would mean that the text has been agreed upon.

Kissinger: What we could do is say it has been agreed in substance, but subject to legal and translation review.

Gromyko: Subject to legal approval.

Kissinger: The lawyers will have to check on whether we say “parties” or “signatures.” It says “United States and Soviet Union.” Should it say USSR? There are so many legal things. I am talking about form, not substance.

Brezhnev: Well, anyway, communicate my requests to the President, and add my regards and my respects.

Kissinger: This I will do. But on initialing, I do want to say the issues we will raise will not have to involve you. We are talking about minor technical issues.

Brezhnev: I will be hoping you will get the President’s consent tomorrow.

Kissinger: Well, initialing is almost impossible for us. What I can do is give you assurance that the substance is agreed upon. In writing, if you want it. That I can do.

When we are preparing for the Summit meeting, there is no possibility we would engage in a maneuver and overturn it. No possibility whatever. I will be glad to give you this assurance in writing.

Brezhnev: So I guess the best thing we can do now is recess. Or set up a Joint Soviet-American Commission! Let Sonnenfeldt and the Ambassador work until morning.

Kissinger: As a practical matter, what we will have to do is get a lawyer together with your Embassy and go over this. It would take two days. We could even have a formal initialing. It is agreed then.

Brezhnev: Yes.

Kissinger: It will be our easiest problem. To get an answer we will need until tomorrow afternoon. We will do other business tomorrow.

Brezhnev: We will have a great deal of work ahead on other issues, which I believe will be easier. There will also be certain questions on which I would like to gain your advice.

I want to confirm once again that we have not been consulting with anyone. But already it has been agreed I will be in West Germany on the 18th. Herr Brandt has visited with President Nixon. I will not raise any question on this, but he may. So I would certainly like to have the benefit of your advice. I am not asking for an answer today, but I would like your advice. Also certain matters of a sensitive nature.
And I think we should determine the final date for the visit. And the schedule. I have no claims or special requests and I would be happy to follow any advice of the President. Personally I would like to devote the maximum attention to discussions. The rest should be only an “applied aspect.” It is always interesting to see things and places, but that is not the objective of the visit. On all these things we should be as clear as possible.

Now, all this brings me to this view. I would like Dr. Kissinger to be here on the 5th, 6th, 7th and also the 8th of May at Zavidovo. I will write a personal letter to the President that after my visit I am asking him to give Dr. Kissinger to have the opportunity to visit Moscow for four days, when in practice you will see Leningrad and see Giselle and the Black Sea.

Kissinger: I must say the General Secretary has got more mileage out of the prospect of my visiting Leningrad than out of an actual visit. [Laughter]

Brezhnev: Now you have come in a good mood.

Kissinger: I am beginning to doubt whether there is such a thing as the ballet in the Soviet Union and whether Leningrad exists. [Laughter]

Brezhnev: There is! It does!

Kissinger: I agree. We should do everything to prepare the visit.

Brezhnev: I may also thank you for the souvenir I received today. But I took care even in Moscow to get something for you. What I selected has been sent over from Moscow for your colleagues.

Kissinger: But we can not take a boar on a plane. [To Sukhodrev] Did you translate the boars in this neighborhood are believing in God again?

Brezhnev: Every boar we shot here is sent to a special laboratory. There have been occasions of one out of one hundred or so where the laboratory says the boar is no good. But otherwise they are in very good condition. They are well prepared. Frozen stiff. You get good clean meat like in the butcher shop. You can bring back a boar to prove you shot it. It looks like real.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, If I shot a boar, I will know you had someone in the bushes. Or that it had a weak heart.

Brezhnev: I won’t tell you who it was, but one winter we had a high-ranking guest, and went out to get a moose. A professional hunter was standing near the guest. The moose came running toward the guest and he fired his gun. We could see he had missed, but the professional hunter fired at the same instant and the reports coincided. He had the complete illusion he had done it.

Kissinger: That will happen to me!
Brezhnev: We all congratulated him. We use a rifle, not a shotgun. A Bullet. A very powerful rifle too. A 9 mm bullet.

Hyland: An AK–47.

Brezhnev: I try to get him in that area [the back of the neck]. If you shot him in the heart, he can still go 200 yards.

Kissinger: That is encouraging.

Gromyko: The tusks can be as big as this [holds up a large pen]. There was one occasion on which the boar ran upstairs of the tower after me! [Laughter]

Brezhnev: Many a huntsman’s tale is told during a hunt—but many things happen in reality too.

Myself, Kosygin and Marshal Malinovski were meeting with Gomulka, Kliszko, and Cyrankiewicz, and we met at a reserve which is partly in Belorussian territory and partly in Poland. We went to the Belorussian part. You do it on towers, and we were out to shoot boar. It was autumn, we use grain and potatoes as the bait. There are also bison in that area. After two hours we don’t see Malinovsky around any more. We were hungry, we wanted to eat. We waited two hours more. We began to get concerned. Finally he came. He said, “A bison came up, ate the grain and potatoes, went up to the tower and fell asleep on the steps.” You can’t shoot bison. It’s prohibited. Malinovski shouted at him, and stamped his feet, but couldn’t get him off the tower steps! A hunter finally chased him with his car!

Once a boar chased Gromyko and Grechko up a tower!

Kissinger: What if you aim for the neck and hit the behind?

Brezhnev: He chases the hunter.

Kissinger: That’s what I suspected!

Brezhnev: Once or twice some boars chased humans. They were two males, probably wounded ones. A hunter had to chase them. They said to me, go shoot it. My doctor was with me. There were several of us. When the boars saw us, they all fled, except one that ran toward us. I climbed out of the car. Everyone else stayed in the car and shouted at me to get back in. I held the door open and stood on the ground. I decided to see how good a shot I was and what courage I had. I let him approach to ten meters and fired at the middle of his head. He fell on the spot.

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Once I ran into one. With a flashlight, I found a female with small ones. I fired at it. She reared up and fell dead.

I’ve been here 15 years. Those were the only two times I’ve ever seen them head for men. Usually they run away.

Hyland: Tomorrow will be the third.

Kissinger: Statistics never help you when you’re the victim!

Brezhnev: Maybe they’ll be attracted by hearing a foreign language. So you’d better speak only Russian.

[The meeting then adjourned.]

106. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)

Zavidovo, May 6, 1973, 0110Z.

Hakto 8. 1. Following hour delay, during which Brezhnev took me for ride in Rolls Royce and then in his hydrofoil, had a five and a half hour session on nuclear project.2

2. One issue relates to final article in which we say among other things that the agreement will not affect commitments we have towards other countries. Soviets want to say that commitments must be in treaties and agreements while we would have preferred simply referring to commitments in order to cover not only NATO but also less formal obligations contained in treaties, agreements and other appropriate instruments are not affected by the new agreement.

3. Second major issue relates to article on consultations in event there is risk of nuclear war involving US or USSR. We want language that confines consultation requirement only to situations where there is risk of US-Soviet nuclear war or nuclear war between USSR and third country or US and third country. Soviets want consultation clause that applies to nuclear war risk between any non-signatories to agreement. Brezhnev has insisted that I check with President to get approval for

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2 See Document 105.
latter broad formula which is of course one that has overtones of condominium and gives major trouble to Chinese.

4. Final problem is that Brezhnev is trying to get me to initial the agreement here before departure. I have refused on grounds that we need lawyers and translators to check over the text. But I may have to tell Brezhnev in writing that substance of agreement is settled and will not be affected by any legal and linguistic review.

5. I would like you to send me a message written in a way that I could show it to Dobrynin and Soviets stating that:

   A. Formula indicated in para 2 above is the furthest President can go in meeting Soviet desires.

   B. President cannot accept consultation requirement for risks of nuclear war involving exclusively non-signatories of the agreement though US and Soviets are of course free to consult under any circumstance they choose, apart from this agreement. If issue not soluble President prepared to drop whole article.

   C. President cannot authorize initialing of text by me in Moscow but would be prepared to have me give Brezhnev assurance in writing that substance of agreement reached in Moscow is settled and will not be changed by necessary review by legal and language experts. Your message should stress that this whole project has been one of great difficulty for the President to approve, that he anticipates many questions in Congress and from Allies and others when agreement is disclosed and that above points are limit to which he can go.

6. Please provide response by evening Sunday Moscow time.

7. Please ensure President is aware of these developments and, particularly, understands issue in paragraph 4 and 5C. above.

8. Warm regards.

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107. Memorandum of Conversation

Zavidovo, May 6, 1973, 12:15–2:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
Georgi M. Kornienko, Head of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Victor M. Sukhodrev, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interpreter
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff
Mr. William Hyland, NSC Staff
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff
Richard Campbell, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

CSCE, MBFR, Nuclear Agreement, UN Membership for FRG and GDR

Gromyko: As I said as you came in, I suggest we talk about European affairs. That is how we agreed with the General Secretary, and if we have time we might pass on to other matters.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: I would like to put forward the general idea that we might start off by talking about the all-European Security Conference. Here, strokes all that consider preparatory work, but the consultations seem to be lacking the necessary dynamism, if I may use that word, and considering the understanding we reached to begin the Conference in June. That seems to be the general view.

Several days ago your representative at Helsinki suggested to our representative, that perhaps it would be wise at this time to officially inform the Finns in the nearest future that we have in view convening the actual Conference at the end of June, so they could start the necessary preparations. That suggestion made by your representative is certainly in line with our wishes. And if that is the case perhaps we can reach an understanding among our two delegations to exert their efforts with allies and friends to give it that dynamism which I said the consultations lack.

Kissinger: Who handles the Swedes?

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Kissinger Conversations at Zavidovo, May 5–8, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Winter Garden in the Politburo Villa. Brackets are in the original. The portions of this memorandum of conversation on CSCE and MBFR are also printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 147.

2 Stage I of CSCE convened on July 3 in Helsinki.
When we were here in September, we agreed in principle to the convening of the Security Conference at the end of June. We maintain our position. There is no reason to delay the opening of the Conference. We believe it is possible to open then. We have already talked with Brandt in Washington in that sense; we expressed our view. We see no obstacle on his side.

The difficulty on the Security Conference is not between you and us. The difficulty is that the Foreign Ministries in almost every country that have been inactive before, now have been given something to do. There are endless papers and preparations. There is no issue between you and us. The problem is in other countries.

We believe the schedule we agreed upon with the General Secretary will be kept.

There is another question of whether the final meeting will be at the Head of State level or the Foreign Minister level. It will in any event be at the Politburo level. [Gromyko and Dobrynin smile]

Gromyko: We are certainly pleased with your confirming the time limits we agreed upon last year, to hold the Conference at the end of June. We believe we should on both sides continue our efforts to stick to that time limit and to act accordingly with allies and other participants to the Conference. So if there are any waverers, we can bring influence to bear.

As regards the suggestion to have the Conference in three stages, Comrade Dobrynin informed me that just before his departure you informed him of the idea of the first two stages—the Foreign Ministers and then the Commission. You have reservations with the third stage—but are giving it sympathetic consideration.

Kissinger: If the first two go well, it will be all right for the heads to meet. If not, the Foreign Ministers.

Gromyko: We think to hold the final stage at the highest level would be in the interest of all sides. No one could deny that a meeting at the highest level would be significant. The very fact of a meeting of the highest statesmen would be of paramount importance. Therefore I wish to say on behalf of the General Secretary, we are earnestly hoping that the President and you as the closest assistant will have that goal.

We appreciate your remark that it will be—at least in the Soviet Union—at the Politburo level.

Kissinger: I told your Ambassador the American equivalent of the Politburo, but I doubt he reported it.

Gromyko: He didn’t. It is the most confidential part of the confidential channel!

Kissinger: We won’t be the obstacle to such a meeting, I believe, if matters take a reasonable course. This is one subject that the President
and the General Secretary might discuss in the United States. It is not a matter of principle for us.

Gromyko: We don’t think that a meeting at the highest level will be protracted. It should be well prepared.

Kissinger: How many heads are there?

Sonnenfeldt: Thirty-one.

Kissinger: I insist that Princess Grace be included.\(^3\) I already consulted her preliminarily in Washington. Her attitude was positive.

Gromyko: Thirty-four heads.

Kissinger: Including Liechtenstein and the Vatican.

Sonnenfeldt: The Vatican can give an invocation.

Kissinger: All thirty-four will want to speak. They are not usually selected for their retiring natures.

Gromyko: Who will represent Spain?

Kissinger: Franco.\(^4\) [Laughter]

Gromyko: Maybe we should stop there and not go deeper!

Kissinger: San Marino will be there too.

Dobrynin: Yes.

Kissinger: Did you know that San Marino’s Foreign Minister was in China?

Gromyko: Really? Did they conclude a Treaty against us?

Kissinger: I don’t know, but the Chinese Foreign Minister was going to go there on his European tour. I don’t know why.

We will give it sympathetic consideration. If all goes well, there won’t be any problem.

Gromyko: As for representation at the highest level, there can be cases where a country can choose who it wishes to represent it. As for the United States and the Soviet Union, it is clear who will represent them.

Kissinger: We will give it sympathetic consideration. It is not a question of principle for us. It won’t be a problem.

Gromyko: We could briefly discuss certain other matters—I list them not in order of importance. I recall you had a conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin on the possibility of exchange of information on military maneuvers, and the possible exchange of observers at those maneuvers, with the aim of lessening tensions. Also we mentioned an exchange of observers on a voluntary basis. The suggestion was then made by others at Helsinki, not by the United States and the Soviet

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\(^3\) Grace Kelly, Princess of Monaco.

\(^4\) General Francisco Franco, Spanish Chief of State.
Union, on the exchange of information on large scale troop movements, within borders or without, regardless of maneuvers. This goes beyond the understanding between us, and we accepted your idea. It would lead us into a jungle which we could not escape. The problem of what is considered a large-scale movement. Where is the criterion by which to judge? So we think the suggestion is an unconvincing one, and we should abide by our previous understanding.

We want to raise this because we think the U.S. representative at Helsinki doesn’t always stick to the understanding we reached.

Dobrynin tells me instructions have been sent to your representative at Helsinki, but we don’t know what the instructions are.

Kissinger: Let me explain. We have discussed with Ambassador Dobrynin the scenario we plan to follow. Our difficulties arise from the fact that our own allies are taking extremely strong positions. It is difficult for us not to support our allies in the discussions. Our instructions are for our representative to talk to your representative on the suggestion of maneuvers. We expect you will reject our proposal. If our intelligence is correct, you won’t accept—though we don’t tell you how to run your Foreign Office. Our representative will then tell our allies that we made a major effort.

Gromyko: Thank you for that clarification, which concerns your tactical approach. I appreciate your understanding of our situation.

Kissinger: But our Ambassador doesn’t yet know this. After he reports your negative reaction, we will send him new instructions.

Gromyko: It is clear, clear. I trust you will agree that regarding the question of large-scale maneuvers, there will be as many views as there are states in the world. It is not in our interest to engage in a dispute on this.

Kissinger: If there are any difficulties, your Ambassador will let me know and I will straighten it out.

Gromyko: I trust most probably your attentions has been drawn to the question of the principle of inviolability of borders in the list of major political principles. You know one of the Commissions at work in Helsinki is at work on political principles. In our view, the principle of inviolability of boundaries should occupy the principal place, and we are operating from the assumption that our two sides have an understanding on that.

Kissinger: When did we do that?

Gromyko: There is no need to go into the positions of previous U.S. Presidents, but suffice it to say it was in the Communique last May. Suffice it to say, we expect the United States and the Soviet Union will proceed from the joint line as expressed in the Communique and that it
will be reflected in the principles and will occupy the first priority place it deserves.

Kissinger: In the Communiqué we had both the inviolability of frontiers and the renunciation of force. The German position is to accept the inviolability of frontiers in the context of renunciation of force, but in a sense that preserves the possibility of German reunification or European unification. The Germans are prepared to have the same language as in the Moscow Treaty.  

Gromyko: Nothing in the Moscow Treaty has that language about the context.

Kissinger: Basically this is a matter between you and the Germans, whom you will be seeing soon. We are not urging the Germans in any particular direction.

As the Germans explained to us in Washington, their concern is that they want inviolability linked sequentially with renunciation and we of course agree. But this is a matter for you to discuss with them.

Gromyko: The notion that the principle of inviolability of boundaries should be reflected in context with the question of the non-use of force is a false and artificial invention. It suffices to read the Soviet-Federal Republic of Germany treaty to see they are listed as two separate points. In fact we drew West Germany’s attention to this fact, and they agreed with us there were no grounds for the view. This is what they said to us, and they have abided by this understanding. But they have said since that non-use of force should be in the first position and inviolability should be in the second. You can’t have it that one principle absorbs or swallows the others; they should be equal. The West Germans corrected their position—at least they say they understand our position. But they still say they want non-use first and inviolability second—not in the sense of interdependability but by enumeration.

[Kissinger:] You know how wars begin. We think inviolability should be first. But in the Soviet-German Treaty you listed non-use first and non-violability second.

Gromyko: They are not listed in that way to show any interdependability—but because that Treaty was written in ascending order.
[laughter]

Kissinger: [Showing Gromyko the final page of the Soviet-FRG Treaty, on which his signature is the last]: I must point out that your ego is rising to my level: The signatures rise to Gromyko! [Laughter]

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5 See footnote 12, Document 44.
6 These brackets were added by the editor to indicate a correction.
If I may quote the Foreign Minister, it would help us with Bonn. Because they pointed out that in the Moscow Communiqué we listed the non-use of force last. We neglected to point out that it was written in rising order and that your Treaty had it first.

Gromyko: We are not suggesting in any way that in listing principles we should explain that the first one is of the first importance and that the others are in declining scale. But surely as politicians we must realize what the situation is. When I referred to the Soviet-German Treaty, I did so only as . . .

Kissinger: It is an almost Talmudic point. I think that if non-violability is second and renunciation is first it could be solved. But it is between you and the Germans. I must tell you the Germans made an extremely strong case to us, and you can expect very strong representations from them in Bonn.

Gromyko: In what sense?

Kissinger: The Germans claim that the implication of Articles 2 and 3 [of the Soviet-German Treaty] is that they have agreed to inviolability only in the context of nonuse—“in accordance with the foregoing purposes.” That is their view. They can’t agree to something which prevents changes of frontiers by peaceful means. It also would rule out the unification of Europe. They haven’t explained to me how they can achieve both the unification of Germany and the unification of Europe. But I can’t solve all problems.

Gromyko: Let me give you the precise explanation on this score. That is their unilateral interpretation. It is not a bilateral one. In the negotiations, we did not set that as an objective. That is my first point. My second point is that when the Treaty was already drafted and in the final stage and Foreign Minister Scheel came to Moscow and raised it in conversation with me whether it might be possible to make even some slight and weak linkage—not even in the sense of interdependence or subordination, but just some weak linking—to that I said there is no question, and we will not accept any moving of any comma or anything in this Treaty. That was the only time this came up.

Third, it is sometimes asked, what is the situation? Does the Soviet Union categorically rule out completely the possibility of any voluntary corrections or rectification of borders? This was something that the West German representatives raised during the negotiations with them on the Treaty. We said that wasn’t the issue at stake; we didn’t want the Treaty to include any clause which could in any way justify a revanchist political struggle in favor of a change of boundaries. We could not give our blessing to a struggle for a change of boundaries. This was what we wanted. They are trying to substitute one question for another.
You say this is primarily between the Soviet Union and West Germany. We are in contact with them on this point. What they say is, let’s list that principle [inviolability] but as a separate and independent principle. By recognizing it as separate and independent they are taking a realistic stand. But we think it should be first and we want you to support our stand. This reflects the view of President Nixon, because it is in the US-Soviet Communiqué. I keep showing you the document but you don’t want to look.

Kissinger: I understand it. I am following the theory of the Foreign Minister who said that in the Soviet-German Treaty it was rising.

Kornienko: It doesn’t mean every document is in that form!

Kissinger: Don’t you have a standard form?

I won’t play any games. We don’t think any one is more important than others. [In the US-Soviet Communiqué] they are also related because they are in the same sentence.

In our nuclear document we try to link Article I and II with the language “in accordance with the purposes of Article I.” I would be disconcerted to hear that these are not interrelated, since the Foreign Minister says Article 2 and 3 of the German Treaty are not interrelated.

Gromyko: All the principles are interrelated. All principles of international relationships are, and one can’t say that some are for the short term and the others last for 150 years. We would have complete chaos.

Kissinger: Can I get the Foreign Minister’s understanding, at least on the matter of bilateral concern, namely the nuclear treaty, that Article I and II are related to each other?

Gromyko: We understand it very simply: Article I relates to the prevention of nuclear war, and Article II relates to the prevention of war in general.

Kissinger: Our argument is that nuclear war cannot be prevented unless war in general is prevented.

Gromyko: There can be a situation where there is war but not a nuclear war. You have seen it yourselves in Vietnam.

Kissinger: We don’t want to make it possible for a signatory to start a conventional war and cite Article I to prevent nuclear war. That is certainly the position we will take.

Gromyko: What is the analogy?

Kissinger: Last night, Article II says, “in accordance with Article I and to realize its objectives.”

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7 As discussed the previous evening; see Document 106.
Gromyko: Article II is about the prevention of war in general and Article I applies to nuclear war. Article II is broader in scale.

Kissinger: If Article II is violated, Article I becomes inapplicable.

Dobrynin: The second includes the first.

Kissinger: That is what I am saying. If Article II is violated, Article I is inapplicable.

Gromyko: No, no, no. You know many cases of war without nuclear war. What if something happens in the Middle East—let’s pray to the gods it doesn’t—

Kissinger: We are talking about the signatories. If something happens between Israel and the Arabs, it is their problem.

Gromyko: We are taking on an obligation.

Kissinger: If the Soviet Union or the United States engages in war against third countries, then we substantially return to the situation that now exists. Article II prohibits the use or threat of force against third countries and against us too. If you land in Alaska . . .

Gromyko: Both would be violated.

Kissinger: We don’t want to say that if Article II is violated, Article I is enforced. The question is, if one of us—it is of course inconceivable—

Gromyko: There are other articles in there—the UN Charter, self-defense. A treaty is after all signed in order to implement it. References to various articles are standard for a treaty.

Kissinger: To return, I can’t defend the German treaty since I had nothing to do with it. But in our treaty I must establish that there is a connection between Articles I and II.

Gromyko: Yes, in the sense that they both try to stop war.

Kornienko: You mean when the Treaty is signed you will stop bombing Cambodia?

Kissinger: No. You can’t prevent us from continuing a war we have started! Back to the Germans. You get in touch with us after your consultation with Bonn. We have no fixed view on the order of clauses and principles. We will certainly place no obstacles to the Germans and you. Let us know through your Ambassador.

Gromyko: We will certainly inform you after our visit on how matters stand.

So we can end our discussion of this.

Now another question that arises is one that concerns the Mediterranean and the Middle East in the context of the European Conference. We proceed from the fact that it would not be in either your or our interest to make the subject of the Middle East a subject of the discussion of the Conference or reflected in the document in any way. We have
enough business on Europe. Otherwise we would have to invite representatives of the Middle East, North Africa and Israel. We would have to stop up our ears because they would all be willing to swear.

Kissinger: We basically agree with you. It may be that Cyprus or Greece may want some reference, but we basically don’t want to get into the Mediterranean.

Gromyko: We are pleased to hear your attitude. If a country like Greece wants to say something in its statement, that is okay. But no discussion of the issue or inclusion in the final document.

Kissinger: We see it the same way—no wide-ranging discussion. But if when we meet, we find some countries won’t sign the document without some reference in the document, then you and we should have reference. We can leave it to the Conference. I notice that some Africans are invited to submit written views.

We won’t encourage that.

Gromyko: The important thing is not to discuss that question. Princess Grace might want to circulate a document and we can’t prevent her.

Kissinger: I must confess that I am more interested from the point of view of personality than in her documents.

I would have to go to Monaco to explain the intractability of the Soviet Foreign Minister. It is a long subject.

Dobrynin: Two weeks it would take!

Gromyko: Then we would have to go to explain our position.

Kissinger: Peaceful competition! We don’t claim exclusive rights!

Gromyko: Another question relative to the European Conference, which will probably come under item 3 of the agenda as it is today—exchange of people and cultural ties. We want you to know we are in no way afraid of the cultural exchange of people. But the sole point is—here, no one should try to grab someone by the throat and claim that one has forced that. The sole point is, this should take place on the basis of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. We are not the only one. There are many other countries who feel the same way. If this is the view of our two countries then there will be no difficulty at the Conference. We should rule out being bogged down in detailed discussions and trying to trip up someone.

There have never been any difficulties in negotiating cultural exchanges with the United States. We are doing it right now.

Kissinger: I can assure the Foreign Minister we are not approaching human contacts particularly with the aim of embarrassing the Soviet Union. We approach it concretely, not as a means to accomplish something abstract. We will treat it as embodying and reflecting the principles we have agreed upon.
Gromyko: I listen to that with satisfaction. That is exactly how we see it.

Kissinger: On many of these, after we have stated our general principles, we should stay in contact as specific issues come up.

Gromyko: There is another matter: we gave you our draft of the possible final draft of the document on political issues [Tab A]. I am sure you have reviewed it. We did it with the aim of setting up on common ground.

Kissinger: We have studied your proposition and we have many comments and amendments and suggestions.

There are two problems: the evolution of the preliminary Conference has affected some of your draft.

We have not informed the French and the Germans. Have you?

Gromyko: Not concretely.

Kissinger: Not to the French at all. Some to the Germans. I was talking about it with Bahr in September. But I didn’t show a draft.

Gromyko: You have studied it completely?

Kissinger: What we would like to do is do a counterdraft, after consultation with our allies. We would like your authorization to do it in a formal way. We will talk to the three and we will let you have our views by the end of the month.

Gromyko: All right.

The draft we handed you dealt with preliminary matters. It is not a principal question whether it would be one or two. You are free not to wait until our new draft. Let’s leave it open, whether it will be an all-embracing document or two documents—on political matters and then on economic and cultural matters. Maybe one, maybe two.

As to the agenda, now we should look about the possibility of establishing some kind of organ—a committee, or commission. I would like to say a few words.

As I said at Camp David, we have no special interest in an organ. The Soviet Union will continue to exist even if it is not set up—but nevertheless, we feel it could be useful linkage between the Conference and a later meeting on troop reduction. Just a consultative, purely consultative organ, for preparation for consultation by governments. This would be all right. We think at least there is nothing bad in it.

Kissinger: How do you visualize the consultative organ?

Gromyko: Since it will function between the first Conference and the second, in idea it will be permanent. It is a matter of convenience

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8 Attached but not printed at Tab A is “General Declaration on Foundations of European Security and Principles of Relations Between States and Europe.”
and open for consideration. We are open minded. One thing more: it should be written that it will be consultative.

Kissinger: We will reserve our judgment. We had thought of some kind of administrative organ for distributing papers—as a sort of a clearing house.

Gromyko: All right. In Vienna, it looks like the Hungary question has been solved. What is going on?

Kissinger: It took three months. It nearly broke up the NATO alliance. Our debates with our allies are more serious than with you.

Gromyko: If you ever need advice on allies, let us know.

Kissinger: We will reserve our judgment. We had thought of some kind of administrative organ for distributing papers—as a sort of a clearing house.

Gromyko: All right. In Vienna, it looks like the Hungary question has been solved. What is going on?

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Gromyko: If you ever need advice on allies, let us know.

Dobrynin: We will help you.

Gromyko: By September–October, the all-European Conference will be over. I hope, in view of the mountain of paper. Last fall we agreed on September–October.9

Kissinger: Can we at least agree on a time interval between the end of the CSCE and the beginning of MBFR?

Gromyko: And you suggest?

Kissinger: Say one month?

Gromyko: I think it would be acceptable. I will tell the General Secretary.

Kissinger: Good.

Gromyko: Do you have any bright ideas for this?

Kissinger: It would be constructive if you pulled your forces out of East Germany. It would create a good atmosphere.

You are asking me in what direction the Conference should go and what it should accomplish?

Gromyko: Yes. It is a sort of goal.

Kissinger: We submitted our analysis to our allies. Do you have it? My understanding is that whenever we distribute something to our allies you get in it in 48 hours. Is it true?

Gromyko: Why 48?

Dobrynin: Sometimes we get a distorted view from the allies and want to hear it from the horse’s mouth!

Gromyko: You can wait until you are ready.

Kissinger: No we are ready. We want to treat this as seriously as SALT. We are genuinely trying to examine what proposals we can make which both sides can feel improves their security or at least doesn’t hurt it. One question is whether the reductions should include

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9 The CSCE convened in Geneva for Stage II, the working phase, from September 1973 to July 1975.
only stationed or also national forces. The difficulty with national forces is it is hard to monitor reductions. And national forces are not of the quality of stationed forces. I am thinking of the Polish Army band.

The second point, what I said about maneuvers in connection with the CSCE—if it is not addressed in the CSCE it will at least have to be addressed in MBFR.

Another issue is whether we speak in terms of units or in terms of numbers. Do we say three regiments, or 50 men from each regiment? If we say 50 men it is harder to verify whether they have left. This will have to be addressed—for both sides.

Then ceilings. I joke about all Soviet forces. We won’t reject it. But probably they will be smaller margins.

In the President’s Foreign Policy Report\(^\text{10}\) we discuss this quite openly. In the Arms Control section. It discusses our philosophy, though not the numbers.

We are genuinely interested in achieving some common ceiling.

Then the countries in the area should not be used to circumvent the agreement. Some allies fear you might put into Budapest what you take from Central Europe. I asked why would they do it in Budapest if they can put them in Brest, which is closer to Central Europe.

Dobrynin: When?
Kissinger: June, July. When the General Secretary comes we can begin discussion.

Of course, we look at it from our point of view. And certainly we are approaching it without giving ourselves the benefit of the doubt. But we also consider your point of view. So we are not making insolent proposals.

Once we know the views of our allies—by June or July—we can begin to exchange ideas.

[Kornienko gets up and gives Gromyko a paper]

Never in all our years has Kornienko not given a paper that was trouble.

Gromyko: This is a subject that I had in the back of my mind, but we could do it later.

Kissinger: No, he is a great professional.

Gromyko: This concerns the question of the two Germanies joining the United Nations.

\(^{10}\) President Nixon’s Fourth Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy, May 3, emphasized the effort to reduce arms competition, the treaties signed to that end, and how these efforts and treaties aided in his efforts to move from confrontation to negotiation. For the text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 365–376.
Kissinger: Do you want to express a view? I saw it was a whole page.
Gromyko: It can be one sentence.
Kissinger: I accept.
Dobrynin: DeGaulle’s method. But in a positive way.
Kissinger: Our view is that after ratification of the German Treaty—which will be before your visit.
Gromyko: By the Bundestag. Not the other formalities.
Kissinger: That is only another month.
Gromyko: It is the Bundestag that ratifies, then it goes to the Bundesrat.
Kissinger: The latter has two choices. If it rejects it, the Bundestag can override by an absolute majority. Last year it was a problem, but it wouldn’t be this year. The Bundesrat can also give an advisory opinion. But even if it rejects it, it won’t be a problem.
Gromyko: I think before the visit to the United States it will be completed even from the formal point of view.
Kissinger: Yes, I agree. After the formal ratification, we will proceed with the recognition of the German Democratic Republic. Then we will be prepared to support, in conjunction with the Federal Republic of Germany, the admission of the two Germanies to the United Nations.
Gromyko: When?
Kissinger: We would prefer not to have a special session for it, but have it in a regular General Assembly session.
Gromyko: The outcome is the same.
Kissinger: The outcome is the same and we will not in any event oppose it. If you agree in Bonn, we won’t disagree. As long as no other issue is raised at that session.
Gromyko: Preliminarily it can be agreed that no other question can be raised.
Kissinger: Preliminarily, if the Federal Republic of Germany is not opposed. I am not insulting their Foreign Minister if I say he doesn’t have the new Politburo member’s precision of mind. That is true of most Foreign Ministers.
Dobrynin: We won’t go into detail!
Gromyko: Now it is 20 to 3. Americans are more punctual in regard to meals, so we won’t deign to keep you more.
Kissinger: Anatol, can I see you for a minute?
[He hands over the list of Soviet Jews, Tab B]¹¹
Can our Embassy reveal the meetings with Brezhnev, Gromyko and Dobrynin? Just to confirm the meetings with the people.
Dobrynin: Yes. Brezhnev and Gromyko.

¹¹ Attached but not printed.

108. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Zavidovo, May 7, 1973, 11:35 a.m.–2:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Georgi M. Kornienko, Head of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interpreter
Andrei Vavilov, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff
Mr. Philip Odeen, NSC Senior Staff
Mr. William Hyland, NSC Staff
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff
Richard P. Campbell, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
Nuclear Agreement; SALT

Brezhnev: Did you have a rest?
Kissinger: Yes, thank you. The air is so nice.

Brezhnev: I hadn’t been out in the fresh air as much as I was yesterday. If it were not for my colleagues here, I would have been in bed until 6:00. Dobrynin, Gromyko, and Aleksandrov made so much noise they woke me up. We should try to get away into the forest.

Gromyko: You might get as far as the taiga.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Kissinger Conversations at Zavidovo, May 5–8, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Brezhnev’s office in the Politburo Villa. Brackets are in the original.
Brezhnev: The Siberian forests.
Has anything new reached us overnight? On either side?
Sonnenfeldt: You have our messages, we have yours.
Kissinger: No, we don’t have theirs.
We could stop the machinery of your government by giving you copies of all our cables.
Brezhnev: Terrible.
Aleksandrov: You shouldn’t underestimate ours!

Nuclear Agreement

Kissinger: I had a communication from the President, and then I had another. We are talking about the agreement. I think the best thing I could do to show our attitude is to read it to you. Then there were subsequent events. Because he has agreed to two modifications in these instructions. They are technical changes.

Let me read you the first one: “I have read the report . . .” Should I read it all, or give it to you?

Sukhodrev: It is a text. If you could give it to me . . .

Sonnenfeldt: Will you give it back?

Kissinger: We demand reciprocity.

Brezhnev: Regarding telegrams on our side, I haven’t been getting any telegrams or phone calls.

Kissinger: [reads Tohak 60, Tab A]:2 “I have read the report of your discussions with General Secretary Brezhnev concerning the agreement on prevention of nuclear war and have carefully considered the points which have been raised. You should adhere strictly to the following guidance:

“(a) With regard to Article VI, you must not go beyond present formula, that is, you should refer only to commitments and not repeat not specify treaties and agreements.

“(b) I cannot in this agreement accept a consultation requirement when the risks of nuclear war involve only nonsignatories. The US and USSR are of course free to consult under any circumstances they choose. If the General Secretary is not prepared to accept this, I am prepared to drop whole article.”

“Under no circumstances can I authorize you to initial text while in Moscow. I would, however, be prepared to have you give General Secretary Brezhnev assurance in writing that the substance of the agree-

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2 Attached but not printed is message Tohak 60, May 6. Another copy is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 32, HAK Trip Files, HAK Moscow, London Trip, May 4–11, 1973, TOHAK 1–74)
ment reached in Moscow is settled and will not be changed in the course of necessary review by legal and language experts. As you know, I am very concerned about this whole project. It is only with the greatest difficulty that I have approved even the positions outlined above. There will be many troublesome questions in Congress and from allies and others when this agreement is disclosed. We are now at the limits of flexibility on this whole issue, and you should not go beyond the above position in accommodating Soviet wishes.”

You see, he accuses me of accommodating Soviet wishes. [Hands cable to Sukhodrev, who translates aloud into Russian, then hands back.]

After receiving this, I got in touch with Washington again.³ The President was in the Bahamas; he is now in Washington. I pointed out to him two matters, one with respect to Article VI, and some suggestions regarding Article IV. I explained to the President more fully why the Soviet side wanted some reference to formal instruments—without giving him the full details. I pointed out that the Soviet side had also made some adjustments in the proposal they had made to us. And he then agreed to accept Article VI as we had drafted it the other evening. In other words, that is agreed to by the President now. [They explain to Brezhnev.]

With respect to Article IV, this instruction gives us only two choices: either accept it as it is, or drop it altogether. After discussing it with the President, he has agreed to a third possibility, that is to omit reference to third countries altogether.

Let me read the phrase we could omit: “Or if relations between states not parties to the agreement appear to involve the risk of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union or between either of them and third countries.” And leave the rest. [They confer]

Aleksandrov: Is this an alternative to your previous proposal?

Kissinger: There are three alternatives: Accept the proposal we made Saturday night,⁴ or drop the paragraph altogether, or just drop the phrase about third countries.

Aleksandrov: What is your preference now?

Kissinger: Our preference now is... We’re content with the one we gave you, or we are prepared to drop the part in brackets. I would probably on the whole prefer to omit that one clause. [They confer]

Brezhnev: You obviously have very good communication with Washington. It didn’t take much time. Now we will have to communi-

³ This message was not found.
⁴ See Document 105.
cate with Moscow, and it will take three days. We will shoot two boars a day, so it will be six more. [They confer]

Shall we adjourn for 1½ days? We have to think things over.
No, let us have a recess of 10 minutes.
Kissinger: Good.
Can I bother you with a pure drafting change? A minor thing.

[12:15–12:30 p.m., break]

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, since we have involved the President too in our discussions, and so as not to complicate matters, and also bearing in mind yesterday’s conversation which explained the substance of matters, I feel we can now stop this discussion and adopt Article IV as you suggested day before yesterday—with which the President is in agreement.

Kissinger: Yes. I have one stylistic change. It is really pure grammar. At the beginning, where it says “If at any time relations of one or both of the parties to this agreement with each other or with third countries . . .” it’s really confusing in English. I would like to say, “If at any time relations between the Parties or between either Party and a third country appear to involve the risk . . .” [He hands over Tab B]

[Russians confer.]

Brezhnev: The first boar we shot that we estimated at 80 kilograms, turned out to be 96 kilograms. The second one that we shot through the throat—they are now working on them here. I told them we wanted to see them when they had processed them.

Gromyko: “A third country” or “third countries”? Let’s say “third countries.”
Kissinger: That’s fine. Agreed.
Gromyko: You might have a fight with Laos and Vietnam and not just Vietnam.
Kissinger: We would never dare fight against both Vietnam and Laos. [laughter] In Laos not even the Communists fight.
Gromyko: So who is fighting?
Kissinger: The North Vietnamese against the Thai!
Brezhnev: For ten years I keep hearing that the Plaine des Jarres has been occupied and reoccupied. They must have broken all the jars by now.
Gromyko: “Third countries” can apply to either singular or plural.

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5 See Document 107.
6 Attached but not printed is the text of the proposed amendment.
Kissinger: It is a subtle point. You are right. Otherwise it might suggest it is all right to go to nuclear war if more than one third country is involved.

SALT

Brezhnev: Maybe we can now talk about strategic arms limitation.

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: If you have no objection, I would like to say a few words and then we could have a discussion.

Kissinger: Please do.

Brezhnev: This question of strategic arms limitation has already, so to say, become a permanent item on the agenda of our dialogue with the President. Here let me point out that it is not just that the agreements signed last year directly bind our two parties to actively continue discussions; we are bound to do that not just because we signed those agreements. I would like to emphasize that we, the Soviet Union, really believe that new steps toward limiting the strategic offensive arms of the two sides would be in line with the interests of the two sides and the mutual interests. But also they would to a great extent meet the broad interests of peace as a whole. That is our broad goal in this. When we reflect on the ways to bring about the solution to this important problem—a problem which is at the same time a complex one—we quite definitely come to the conclusion it would be preferable as the main direction of our efforts to seek to turn the Interim Agreement on the limitation of offensive arms into a permanent treaty. That is clear, I trust.

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: That is, convert the Interim Agreement into a permanent treaty. If we could achieve that, it would naturally be a broad and long-term arrangement and would indisputably be a big contribution to the cause of permanently restraining the arms race. That is the indisputable conclusion. No one could criticize us for that. It is clear that such questions can’t be resolved mechanically or automatically. Willy-nilly, the question will arise of quantitative aspects and the qualitative freezing of these arms. The question will inevitably arise of the qualitative improvement of such arms. Then in the next phase we could envisage the gradual reduction of those arms. We are regarding as preferable this approach to the problem.

While considering reaching a broad agreement of such a permanent nature, we would also be willing to work toward agreement on certain narrower questions of limitation, agreements that would supplement our Interim Agreement. I think that, broadly speaking, this is in line with the thinking of the President and the US administration in
general. Our considerations on this score were recently set out in a draft submitted by our delegation at Geneva.

At the same time the thought has arisen in our minds that the negotiations on further limitation of strategic arms would be considerably facilitated and advanced if during our meetings with the President we could concert and formalize general principles on which these agreements could be based. Even though we did not have too much time, we did make an effort to draw up a new version of such a document, which takes into account some of the formulations you communicated to us. We could give you our draft today, so you could look at it and perhaps do some preliminary work on it here. I assume you would want to get in touch with the President. We would certainly consider it highly desirable if we could concert on it and reach the final drafts while you are here. For that you will need another week here!

Kissinger: You won’t have any boars left!

Brezhnev: That would take a year.

That, Dr. Kissinger, is a kind of preamble to our discussion of this question. I think it is fully in line with what we talked about yesterday. Because unless we at a high level give clearcut guidance on this question, our delegates at Geneva will go into a five-year period of work.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we agree with many of the things you have outlined. We believe the objective of the negotiations at Geneva should be to turn the Interim Agreement into a permanent agreement, with the appropriate numbers and so forth. And we also agree in the next phase the objective should be to bring about reductions. Finally, we agree it should be possible to achieve an agreement on those, either in the form of permanent agreements or adding them to the Interim Agreement.

Where we perhaps disagree or have a different emphasis is about the significance of the principles standing alone. We are prepared to work on some principles, but in order to make them significant, they have to provide a link to some concrete arrangement. This is why last September when I was here, we gave you an outline of some ideas that could be used to approach the discussion of strategic arms limitation talks. And that is why last week we gave you some other considerations.

As I explained to the General Secretary yesterday, if we simply publish general principles, we will be involved in a domestic debate in the United States for no very concrete achievement. And therefore, we continue to believe these principles should be joined with some concrete achievement in the field of strategic arms limitation. We have given you some ideas last week that were rather comprehensive but were at the same time put in this form in order to expedite the agreement.
I have also proposed informally here a more limited version of what we proposed last week, that both sides stop deploying multiple warheads on their land-based missiles for the duration of the Interim Agreement. Yet another possibility is that we agree, for the period of the Interim Agreement, not to deploy long-range missiles on our airplanes, which is one of the proposals on your list, in return for your agreement not to deploy multiple warheads on your large missiles.

Dobrynin: Is it “or” or “and”?

Kissinger: We are prepared to do both.

And for all these reasons, we believe one of these three possibilities should be joined to the discussion of principles. Otherwise, it would be very difficult to explain what exactly these principles are supposed to accomplish. And also it will help with the reception of the other agreement, by proving there is a movement in the limitation of strategic arms. And to maintain the momentum of our achievement of last year.

These various proposals have not been made for a unilateral American advantage. In fact, if there is no concrete achievement in the near future, the momentum of our own programs is going to become stronger and stronger.

Thus I am prepared to discuss these principles with you and also further measures of agreement by the time you and the President meet.

[Brezhnev picks up a knife.] I must have said something wrong, because the General Secretary is playing with his knife.

Brezhnev: No, it is just to keep my hands occupied.

In this discussion, I would not like anyone to minimize the importance of these principles, particularly since what we intend to do today is to give you our principles which have been reviewed with due account of your observations. So we would be proceeding from the assumption that the final decision would be taken at the final Summit meeting, but we could reach an agreement here on the basic text, with the possibility of today or tomorrow considering any other changes you would like to suggest.

On the substantive side, let me just say the principles should not be regarded as necessary only for our side. They should be for both sides and should be the basis for subsequent negotiations on both sides. Let us recall how the process developed of hammering out the principles underlying the freezing of strategic arms. It took a long time, but they finally were worked out in the agreement we are now following. It took a long time to work out the Basic Principles of Relations, but now they are a law governing our relations. So I see no need for an addition to make it significant. We recognize you have certain domestic considerations of the momentary nature, but we take a profound view, and we can consider any additional questions and issues you may raise.
Unfortunately there is one fact which impedes normal progress and discussion between us on this question. After the Interim Agreement we have on no occasion said anywhere, even privately between ourselves, that we obtained unilateral advantages over the United States. We have been saying everywhere that it is based on the equality of both sides. But in your country anyone can come up and accuse the President of having acted unilaterally and given the Soviet Union advantages. He has no proof, but can just shout about it. If that approach is taken, any agreement can be toppled. That is an erroneous method. In that agreement many of our scientists and military people worked on it for 2½ years; they must have studied the implications. After all that work, some newspaper accuses the President of acting wrongly; this creates a certain opinion in the United States. But we, never even privately, never said we had achieved an advantage over the United States. We speak only of an equal agreement.

In your country things sometimes proceed differently. If we try to meet those doubts and allegations that are put forward in the United States, then we would have to act always to provide the United States with those advantages to the United States to preclude any such charges. This is in line with the President’s thinking, I think. In the United States anyone could become a news secretary and take any line.

To take one example, we could give one of our journalists some advice to write an article in that vein—he could write that the United States has its submarines anywhere in the globe that can attack from anywhere, whereas ours must traverse long distances to retaliate. This could undermine the leadership of this country.

But, as I said, never are we refusing to consider any proposal you are giving us. But in terms of propaganda we should have complete honesty in coverage.

In the Soviet Union you won’t find any example of journalists casting aspersions on agreements reached. That is the kind of society we live in.

This is why I am indignant at what Jackson is saying. He is saying that here the Soviets are eating bread made with US wheat at cheaper prices. If he had to eat this bread, it would stick in his throat. And the price—we bought it at 60¢. Why didn’t he say we also bought it when the price went to 96¢ and to $1.06? The price reflects the actual situation in trade. It always changes. Why didn’t he say that the freight rates went up?

As I see it, our task with the President—whose efforts we highly value and appreciate—we must cast aside all this prattle in the press and discuss the relationship as we discussed yesterday. That is my frank and honest opinion. We should be frank and honest.
What we are up against in the case of Jackson, is, in his bitter opposition to the President he is engaging in demagoguery not only on the question of emigration of Soviet nationals, but also about Soviet grain. He is trying in every field to oppose the President. We can see that.

The situation is, on the one hand Jackson keeps talking about grain purchases and the advantages we allegedly derived, and on the other hand businesses and Shultz, when I talked to him, are interested in entering in an agreement on long-term grain purchases. I didn’t give him an answer then, but I can say that a long-term agreement in grain is possible. We won’t always have problems with the harvest. In the interest of good relations we are prepared to enter into such an agreement.

To return to the principles, they have to be a proof of mutual understanding. Both sides have to agree that it is useful. If you think they are inconsequential, we can simply work out some narrow agreement. I don’t rule out the possibility that on the basis of these principles we could work out some agreement on some narrower concrete issue. The principles could help get an agreement. If we adopt them, then Semenov and Johnson at Geneva could look to the principles and follow them.

I am thinking that the President is right that without some joint principles the Geneva delegates would enter a five-year work period. But with the principles they could be speeded up.

Dr. Kissinger, perhaps we should act this way, to insure our work is more fruitful. We gave you a draft and you gave us one, and we prepared one taking yours into account. We can give it to you now, and you can have a recess and consult Washington.

Kissinger: That is an agreeable procedure. But since the General Secretary touched on so many subjects, I would like to say a few words on them.

Brezhnev: Certainly some of my remarks were mainly by way of illustration.

Kissinger: The General Secretary made some observations about the attitude of our press and certain other opponents of Soviet-American relations. He spoke about other aspects of Soviet-American relations, for example, the grain purchases and how they are interpreted. Also he commented on our motives in trying to get progress concretely in SALT. And then he spoke about the relation of the principles to concrete progress in SALT. If I could make a few comments on this.

Brezhnev: Certainly.

Kissinger: First, if we were guided by our press or our opponents, we would be conducting opposite policy from what we are doing. As
events in recent months make clear, we don’t control it. The press is mainly against us. They are looking for things to criticize the President and will do it whatever we do. To what extent we can influence the press—and your Ambassador is good at it—you won’t find an example in the past 1½ years of anything inspired by the White House that harms Soviet-American relations. All of what we do is in a positive direction.

Brezhnev: Not all the press [is hostile.]

Kissinger: No, but a good part of the press. We are not trying to win over the press, or meet the criticism of the press. Because no matter what we do, the press will find some reason to criticize it. Our goal is to move toward the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union on a broad basis in the recognition that our two countries have a special responsibility to preserve the peace and to look into the future and build this relationship on a very solid basis.

Brezhnev: That last portion of your remarks we can single out and sign it jointly as an agreement and broadcast it over the radio at 8:00 p.m. and have it in the papers in the morning. I say that to fully associate myself with it.

Kissinger: I understand.

Brezhnev: I would single it out to the President.

Kissinger: I can do that.

Some of our critics take one issue, grain or MFN, in isolation. We look at all of it as part of a broad basis of our relationship. We don’t seek to be paid for every item but find our compensation in the broad basis of our relationship—as you do. And that is a big difference between us and Senator Jackson, for example.

So on objectives, I believe we and the General Secretary are agreed.

Now let me turn to the specific issues of SALT and how they affect this relationship.

In the General Secretary’s remarks, I detected an interpretation that we think—or at least some of our critics think—that the Interim Agreement was unequal or disadvantageous to us and that we are trying to compensate for this by putting the Soviet Union at a disadvantage in the subsequent agreement. This is an erroneous interpretation.

First, we don’t think that the Interim Agreement was disadvantageous to us. For the period it covers, it reflects the objective situation. We have both acknowledged in writing that we will do what we intended to do in the first place. If we are speaking frankly. Some people who were perfectly willing to leave us with 41 American submarines in the absence of an agreement suddenly began screaming bloody murder when we agree we would be limited to 41—even though we had no intention of asking for more than 41. So all of this is irrelevant. So we
don’t think of the Interim Agreement as disadvantageous to the United States.

But obviously in an interim agreement, there are always fluctuations existing in different programs entering inventory, and adjustments are possible. In a permanent agreement we have to look at the figures in a different context.

Brezhnev: Let me say again, those last remarks I have heard, I listened to with profound satisfaction. [refers to the penultimate paragraph of above]

Kissinger: So the permanent agreement is more difficult to negotiate because it covers a period obviously longer than five years and must take into account the fluctuations over a longer period. If we make any additions to the Interim Agreement it must be on the basis of equality.

It cannot be disadvantageous to one or the other. So when we design proposals we make a serious effort to take account of the mutual interest—though undoubtedly we are more conscious of ours than of yours.

Now let me say something about the relationship of the principles to the final settlement. The General Secretary pointed out that the permanent agreement and the Interim Agreement were achieved because we first started with principles. The fact was we started very concretely, and the agreement on May 20, 19717 defined very precisely the direction we were going to go, and we did not spend much time on general information.

It is clear from the proposals already exchanged in Geneva that there are very concrete differences. But the principles will be very abstract—and probably the principles can only be achieved if they are so general that they can be interpreted by each in the way it prefers. So the result will only be to produce in the principles the same difficulty we have already encountered in Geneva. And it will be hard to explain—to ourselves—why we were unable to agree on even a limited concrete step if we have principles that are supposed to be so good at solving concrete problems. [They explain it to Brezhnev.]

It is like Security Council Resolution 242! Resolution 242 is a principle that was adopted five years ago, and by itself it has not led to a resolution of any of the disputes.

But we will be prepared to look at any Soviet proposals on principles. I won’t have to refer them to Washington for initial discussion, but I would like a few hours to look at them here. But I would like to ask the General Secretary to ask his Government to work on some pro-

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7 The Interim Agreement was signed on May 20, 1972.
posals that are equal, and that have some concreteness, and can give
significance to the progress made.

I have given the General Secretary and also the Ambassador three
possible approaches.

Dobrynin: Two.

Kissinger: Well, one is numbers plus multiple reentry vehicles on
land-based missiles. The second is only MIRVs on land-based missiles.
The third is no MIRVs on SLBMs, and limits on long-range missiles on
airplanes.

Dobrynin: That is today’s.

Kissinger: Right.

Brezhnev: So I would then suggest I give you our latest version of
the text of principles, so you can either approve it or suggest amend-
ments. Second, I don’t exclude reaching some agreement between the
Interim Agreement and the permanent agreement, including even
reductions.

On European problems, I heard a report on your discussion yes-
terday, and I see no problem. I convey my appreciation to President
Nixon for the same basic view. As for the French and the Federal Re-
public of Germany, I am sure any problems can be worked out by Pom-
pidou and you and my visit to Brandt.

On the communiqué of my visit to the United States, I would like
to give you our draft of the communiqué that could result. We have this
draft that sums up the general discussion we have had. Naturally it will
take work to get it into final form. But I think I should give it to you
today.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: I also have a document to give you on the Middle East.

Gromyko: Principles.

Brezhnev: Then I would further suggest we give you all these, the
three documents for your consideration. We could now adjourn, study
the documents, have lunch, and resume the discussion at 6:00 or 7:00
p.m.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: We also, I guess, have to discuss the matters of trade,
and so on. But we could do that tomorrow.

Kissinger: And we have a number of things to settle—minor
things—the timing of the announcement, the announcement of my
visit. I am instructed by the President to find out how we can make
your visit as comfortable as possible. I will be blamed only for not
finding out your wishes.
Brezhnev: I agree, the announcements are easy. As to my wishes. I will tell you.

[Sonnenfeldt hands over the US draft of the Communique, Tab C.]8

Kissinger: And one other subject we have to discuss while I am here is Indochina.

Brezhnev: When I enumerated the documents we will hand over, I presume we will discuss those.

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: Indochina we can discuss tomorrow morning.

Kissinger: Fine.

Brezhnev: Let us recess now.

Kissinger: Until 7:00 p.m.

Brezhnev: I agree.

Sonnenfeldt: Can you give us the documents now?

Brezhnev: No! It is enough that we mention them!

[Kornienko gives the documents: SALT principles, Tab D; Soviet draft communique, Tab E; Middle East principles, Tab F]9

I want to tell you I have sent three copies to Moscow of the nuclear treaty, to the three people that it concerns. Only for familiarization: Podgorny, Kosygin, Grechko: three copies to be returned to me. And we will tell them I have agreed to it.

And the President told you to leave a written assurance that it would not be changed.

Kissinger: I will leave it when we go.10

Brezhnev: And our people will work out a brief announcement of your visit.

Kissinger: Fine.

Brezhnev: I will have a talk with you about my wishes.

Kissinger: We can do that in a smaller group.

Brezhnev: It is very simple. I will fly over; you will meet me; we talk; we eat; we sleep. A very ordinary life. I won’t arrive in an interplanetary rocket. I like walking, and driving a car.

Kissinger: One thing our Secret Service won’t allow you to do is drive your own car.

Brezhnev: I will take the flag off the car, put on dark glasses, so they can’t see my eyebrows, and drive like any American.

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8 Not found attached.
9 Not attached. The Soviet draft of SALT Principles is attached to Document 109 at Tab A. The Soviet paper on the Middle East is attached to Document 112 at Tab A.
10 See Document 114.
Kissinger: I have driven with you and I don’t think you drive like an American!

Brezhnev: Do they still have that emblem on the old Lincoln Mark III? We could enter in a little business deal now, and have the emblem of a wild boar on one of your cars. [laughter]

Kissinger: You will start shooting at it.

Brezhnev: I just read a book about Brazilian football. There was a great Brazilian player, Gorincha, better than Pele. There was a bar in his town, and it was going broke. The owner was a friend of Gorincha, and Gorincha announced a reception for all his friends in that bar. After that the place was chock full all year.

So when we take up the idea of using a boar as an emblem, we will say it was the boar shot by Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Brezhnev. Either we will be ruined in one day, or we will make a fat profit.

Gromyko: Can we have three small boars who are assistants?

Sonnenfeldt: We were very careful to shoot smaller boars than the General Secretary.

Brezhnev: Bon appetit.

[The meeting then adjourned.]
109. Memorandum of Conversation

Zavidovo, May 7, 1973, 7:40–11:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the USA
Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to Brezhnev
Georgi M. Kornienko, Head of USA Division, Foreign Ministry
Andrei Vavilov, Foreign Ministry
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Foreign Ministry, Interpreter
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff
Philip Odeen, NSC Senior Staff
William Hyland, NSC Senior Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Richard Campbell, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
Nuclear Treaty; SALT Principles; Middle East; Communiqué’s of HAK visit and Brezhnev visit

Brezhnev: I have one major question. The rest—the Middle East, the principles—are minor matters. Can we trust him—Gromyko?

Kissinger: I have often wondered. He knows more than any other Foreign Minister.

Brezhnev: I always think of the Chinese. They once ate one of their Political Guidance officers in a troop unit. Another man asked, “How could you do that? He is such a fine man.” The Chinese answered, “We don’t eat bad people.” [Laughter]

Gromyko: That is the best statement we have heard from the Chinese in recent years.

Aleksandrov: That is a fact. In regions of China they still do that.

Brezhnev: In better years of Soviet-Chinese relations, my brother was sent to China to help them build factories. He did not want to go. I told him he had to go, as a good Communist, if he was sent. The Chinese then used to send some of their people to the Soviet Union for industrial training. When my brother was working at the plant the Chinese followed his every step and wrote down every instruction. He invited them to his home for drinks. They became good friends. One of

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Kissinger Conversations at Zavidovo, May 5–8, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Brezhnev’s office in the Politburo Villa. Brackets are in the original.
them said, “Yakov, you Russian people are so diligent and strong. But you have one drawback. Among people like you there are so few good-looking people. We Chinese are all goodlooking.” [Laughter] That is a true story. Honestly.

Is everything settled? Let us go out to the forest. We will leave all the rest behind, Sonnenfeldt and Gromyko. We will take the lead. We will have a high level meeting at one of the towers.

Nuclear Agreement

Gromyko: A tower meeting. [Laughter]

Brezhnev: I for one have fulfilled my mission. I have written notes to my three comrades I told you about [on the nuclear agreement]. I sent it off, and received a reply. They have all approved our talks. So there is no need to go anywhere anymore. It is all settled. We have done some clean work.

Kissinger: So we can just go to the National Parks in the United States and take walks.

Brezhnev: We can go to Lake Baikal.

Kissinger: I have great respect for the General Secretary, but I don’t think my destiny included ever leaving Moscow.

Brezhnev: That is the past. Now your destiny is never to leave Zavidovo.

So we have grounds for gratification.

Kissinger: I am sure the President will have the same feeling.

Brezhnev: My one regret is that the President is not here at this moment. We would both have reason to be in a good mood. He would say, “If there is any misunderstanding, let Kissinger handle it.”

Kissinger: And that it is my fault.

Brezhnev: Who could fault you?

Kissinger: That is what I keep saying in America but I can not convince everybody.

Brezhnev: A Swedish professor wrote that laughter adds ten years to your life. A second is running and the third is skipping rope. That is his formula for prolonging the life span. I would prefer laughter, but I think you should try skipping rope.

Kissinger: All the things I enjoy shorten life!

Brezhnev: That is a preamble.

Kissinger: We have reviewed the Principles.²

² Attached but not printed at Tab A is the Soviet draft, “Basic Principles on Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.” The Soviet draft of principles was handed to the U.S. delegation earlier that day. See Document 108.
Brezhnev: Aside from sending my comrades the document, itself, I also wrote them a brief note that our talks were going well, and in a good atmosphere—but we won’t be able to finish work until Sunday.3

SALT Principles

Kissinger: That is good news. I am enjoying it. We will certainly have a permanent agreement by then.

Brezhnev: Unless they keep giving us cookies and porridge.

I keep thinking, why should Dr. Kissinger and Comrade Brezhnev do all the hard work? We should have a little cabaret brought in. None of these people are old enough.

Sonnenfeldt: We will go back to our girls.

Kissinger: The General Secretary has made so much progress with Mrs. Andrews that she won’t talk to us anymore.

Brezhnev: I have not seen her lately. Where is she?

Kissinger: We are afraid that if we gave you two chances we would lose her completely.

Brezhnev: I will look into that. Let us tomorrow—Dr. Kissinger and we and all your girls—we will have dinner together. It is the only chance for us to be all together.

Kissinger: Are the Foreign Minister and Sonnenfeldt invited also?

Sonnenfeldt: Only if we eat our boar.

Brezhnev: Maybe we should go see our boars.

Gromyko: No, anyone who wants to see our boars has to buy tickets.

Brezhnev: I have never seen greater liars than hunters. And so, where are we?

Kissinger: On the principles, Mr. General Secretary, we, of course, have had only a few hours to study them. But we recognize a very serious effort has been made on your part to take into account our considerations.

Brezhnev: That is already a good thing. It would be worthwhile putting off discussion until tomorrow morning. You would see evidence of even greater effort. I feel you have no objections and are just pretending.

Kissinger: May I tell the General Secretary about your Vietnamese ally?

Brezhnev: Certainly.

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3 May 13.
Kissinger: Mr. Le Duc Tho comes to every meeting and starts with the same speech. It is like a prayer. It is an invocation. I won’t repeat the whole thing; it takes exactly 45 minutes. He always has one phrase, “If you make a big effort, we will make a big effort.” One day he said, “If you make a big effort, we will make an effort.” Mr. Special Advisor, did I hear you drop the adjective? He said, “Yes, because yesterday we made a big effort and you only made an effort.” [Laughter] It is a true story. This is why it took us three years to negotiate.

Brezhnev: With us it is easier.

Kissinger: There is no question about that.

Brezhnev: We have experience in negotiating. I have noticed that you have only made some efforts. [Laughter] And it will take some time to make more effort.

Kissinger: After I have seen Leningrad, I will make a big effort.

Brezhnev: I will write President Nixon and you will have a smooth road ahead of you to Leningrad. It should not be a flying visit, in haste. There is much to see.

Kissinger: Then I will have trouble leaving Leningrad.

How should we proceed? Should we give you our comments?

[The Soviet draft is at Tab A]

Brezhnev: All right. Whatever is appropriate.

Kissinger: We agree on the Preamble.

In the first principle we would like to change the word “converting” to “replacing.”

Gromyko: Either way would be all right.

Kissinger: “Replacing” we think is more in keeping with Article VII and indicates broader scope than the Interim Agreement.

Dobrynin: It could have broader scope.

Kissinger: It could; it doesn’t have to. That is the only change we propose for Article I.

Brezhnev: You know what that looks like? When I lived in the Ukraine—and it is the same thing still—my parents’ house stood on the avenue leading to the local cemetery. My mother was already an aged woman at that time. Whenever a funeral procession and music went by, everyone went to watch. Everyone said, “There is another dead person being carried off.” They would say, “They are taking another dead person back.”

Sukhodrev: That is hard to translate. It is Ukrainian.

Kissinger: In the second principle, we would like to substitute the word “agreements” for “arrangements.” “New agreements” instead of “new arrangements.” We gave you the word “arrangements” but on reconsideration we thought it should be “agreements.”
Gromyko: In Russian it is practically the same. Use whichever you prefer.

Kissinger: All right. We have trouble with the phrase “equal security”—not on substance, but because the phrase “equal security” has become a code word. We are drawing on the Principles.

Dobrynin: Our is from the Communiqué.4

Kissinger: We are going in the ascending order that the Foreign Minister suggested.

Dobrynin: So there we are.

Kissinger: “Recognition of each other's security interests based on the principle of equality.” It is drawn verbatim from the Basic Principles.5 The rest is the same.

I have known Foreign Ministers who don’t know the difference between the Principles and the Communiqué. They would be easier to deal with.

Third, we would like to add to the end of the third principle: “including types of multiple reentry vehicles.”

Dobrynin: You did not have it before.

Kissinger: No, we have reflected.

Sukhodrev: Is that MIRV or MRV?

Kissinger: “Multiple reentry vehicles,” which covers both.

I will skip IV. For the time being.

Number V: we would like to add the word “must be adequately verifiable by national technical means. We would like to add “adequately.”

[They confer over the Russian translation.]

Mr. Foreign Minister, it is the least important change we are making.

Hyland: They are having trouble with “verifiable.”

Dr. Kissinger: I understand your point. It is a different point.

Dobrynin: You have changed the substance. “Verifiable” and “verified” are different things.

Dr. Kissinger: “Verified” is a statement of fact. Here we are stating principles and requirements. And obligation. We don’t have any subject matter for verification. “Must be subject to verification by national technical means.”

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4 Dobrynin is presumably referring to the joint communiqué issued at the end of the May 1972 Summit. For the text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 635–642.

5 Presumably a reference to the Basic Principles agreed to at the Summit. See ibid., pp. 633–634.
Gromyko: All right.

Dr. Kissinger: VI: In English ours is better. “Under agreed conditions.” We could find another phrase to meet your point: “under conditions established in the agreements to be . . . ”

Gromyko: If you mean conditions, you mean conditions expressed in the agreement?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: It is all the same. “Under conditions expressed in the agreement.”

Dr. Kissinger: “Under conditions which will be established in the agreements to be concluded.”

Number VII: We made a big effort and we agree with your text. Let me say one thing when you see our text: We replied to your text very quickly. This is not a carefully prepared document.

With respect to the eighth point, you have accepted our formulation—but we would like to understand a little better what you mean by “mutual restraint” and what you are applying it to. Because we are no longer very happy with our formulation.

Gromyko: That is pointing at the Ambassador.

Dr. Kissinger: On this subject, for some reason, he is very difficult.

Gromyko: Because you do not have a hunting knife at your side when you are negotiating with him.

Dr. Kissinger: My question is—you introduced the idea of “mutual restraint”—

Dobrynin: It was introduced 100 times by Semenov.

Dr. Kissinger: If we want to do that, we can ship all the documents to Semenov and Johnson and let them do it.

I want to know concretely what kinds of weapons you have in mind.

Brezhnev: There are different things that could be implied. If we agreed on the freezing of military budgets, that could be one question.

Dr. Kissinger: We can live without the paragraph.

Sukhodrev: The whole paragraph?

Dr. Kissinger: Because we are trying to understand what it will be applied to.

Brezhnev: How would you interpret it, without elucidation on our part?

Dr. Kissinger: What could happen is—I am just trying to think what one result of this could be. We could say that every time you put in a new missile, a modernized missile, into existing silos—which we have the impression you intend to do—that you are not exercising re-
straint. You could say every time we improve a missile—a little later on, it won’t happen for a year or two—that we are not exercising restraint. With respect to nuclear delivery systems not subject to limitation, later still you will say something about our bombers. Since I do not know what Smirnov is planning, I do not know what you will be doing that we will object to.

So our fear is that this paragraph either means nothing at all or it will lead to constant controversy.

Brezhnev: We will take that into account.

Dobrynin: What else do you have?

Gromyko: Nine?

Dr. Kissinger: Nine, we agree. We accept it as it is.

Gromyko: It is a well-balanced principle.

Kissinger: I had better examine it! Number X we would like to delete. Number XI we substantially accept. We would like to add, “so that it can be signed in 1974.” At the end.

Now we return to Number IV, in which we prefer our original formulation. [Tab B]¹⁶

Dobrynin: That you gave in Washington? Or here?

Dr. Kissinger: Here. Those are all the changes we have!

Brezhnev: Let us put it aside, to think it over.

So, the next document?

Dr. Kissinger: The Communiqué.

Brezhnev: The Communiqué. Maybe we could put it off for now. We have five weeks.

Dr. Kissinger: I have just a few comments. It is up to you.

I think the draft is a good basis from which to work. We think our draft on bilateral agreements is perhaps a little more extensive and we can put them together.⁷ We don’t have to do that now.

Brezhnev: We agree.

Dr. Kissinger: Our principal problem has to do with some of the terminology. Since the draft is a Soviet draft, some phrases have a certain Soviet cast and we perhaps find more neutral formulations.

[Brezhnev gets up and goes out. Small talk.]

Should we wait for the General Secretary? I don’t think it has his undivided attention.

Dobrynin: We should wait.

¹⁶ Not found attached.

⁷ The U.S. and Soviet drafts of the Washington Summit communiqué were exchanged during the earlier May 7 meeting. See Document 108.
Dr. Kissinger: I have some very general comments. We can certainly reach an agreement.

I see this draft has a number of the Foreign Minister’s pet projects. I think that on the principle of reciprocity we should have a Foreign Minister who knows every detail of every document and you should have one who is just starting out. [Laughter]

Gromyko: Your fourth principle, I must say, is hard. It is too one-sided. We tried to make it neutral in this one. Not the early one, but this one.

Dr. Kissinger: No, I can see you have made an effort. [Laughter]
Gromyko: Not a big effort!
Dobrynin: Just a small one!

Dr. Kissinger: You will say every plane outside the United States is a unilateral advantage.

Dobrynin: It is true.

Kissinger: I regret telling that story about Le Duc Tho. We could perhaps give that fourth paragraph to Semenov and Johnson to work on.

Gromyko: May I ask you, who is the most difficult negotiator you have dealt with?

Dr. Kissinger: The Joint Chiefs of Staff! [Laughter] The North Vietnamese are the most difficult in their methods. The Japanese are the most difficult in keeping what they negotiate.

I must say that the North Vietnamese have the ability to say untruths with more skill and elegance than any.

We had photos of 300 tanks. They said it was civilian goods! It is prohibited to carry civilian goods in tanks. Who is your most difficult?

Gromyko: For the Foreign Ministry it is the Ministry of Finance!

[Laughter]

Sonnenfeldt: I met him. He is nice.
Gromyko: He is. That is why I said “Ministry”?

Dr. Kissinger: What foreigners do you find most difficult?

Gromyko: [Pauses] It changes.

Dobrynin: It is more a matter of personality than nationality.

[Brezhnev comes back.]

Brezhnev: All settled?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I think your original idea was correct. There is a basis for agreement here, and there is no need to go into it here.

If Dobrynin and I do it through our channel, we can have a major portion of it done by the end of May.
Brezhnev: Is there anything unacceptable in it?

Dr. Kissinger: Some nuances. We would like to formulate the reference to the nuclear agreement with greater care and with greater detail. We would like to include a reference to Article II as well as Article I. That is a drafting detail. Where it refers to other countries and what other countries should do, we are a little reluctant to tell other countries what to do. We discussed this last year in the Communique.

Brezhnev: Let us say Kissinger will be responsible for the Communique.

Kissinger: It will be a good Communique.

Brezhnev: Dobrynin will improve it too.

Dr. Kissinger: In principle it is acceptable.

*The Middle East*

Brezhnev: Let us turn to an easy question now, the Middle East. Let us send Dr. Kissinger to the Middle East for two weeks.

Gromyko: President Nixon and I will write out a brief lucid instruction, and it is done with.

Kissinger: You know the story of the scorpion who wanted to cross the Suez Canal. He asked a camel if he could ride on his back. The camel said, “If I do and you sting me, I will be dead.” The scorpion said, “I will drown also, so you have every guarantee.” So the camel took the scorpion on his back and they started across. In the middle of the Canal the scorpion stung the camel and as they drowned the camel asked, “what did you do this for?” The scorpion said, “you forgot this is the Middle East.” [Laughter]

Gromyko: Very good.

Brezhnev: I have heard a different version, a scorpion—on the back of a frog. And the frog said, “That is just my nature!”

Kissinger: There is a story about an Arab lying in his tent trying to take an afternoon sleep. There were a lot of children making a lot of noise. So he told the children, “In the village they are giving away free grapes and you should go there.” So the children went away to the village. It got very quiet. Just as he was falling asleep he said to himself, “You idiot, what are you doing here if they are giving away free grapes?” So he went to the village. [Laughter]

So I think it would take three weeks.

Brezhnev: Three! Since this is the evening of jokes, I will tell you one.

Kissinger: I was hoping to trigger you—you are much better at it.

Brezhnev: Sometimes in our negotiations something happens that applies to Jackson. Two Jews meet. One asks, “Abraham, why are you not going to Israel? You applied for a permit and everything seemed to
be settled.” The other replied, “Some goddamn fool wrote an anonymous letter on me alleging I am not a Jew.” [Laughter]

So with the communique we still have time, and Mr. Nixon can still take a look at it. The experience of the Moscow Summit shows it can be done.

Sonnenfeldt: Kornienko and I spent all night on it.

Brezhnev: Is not that a pleasant way? Let me tell you another story: Two Jews meet: One asks, “Abraham, did you hear that Isaac’s dacha burned down?” Abraham says, “So what, it is none of my business.” “It is really none of my business either,” the first one says, “but it is pleasant nonetheless.”

Kissinger: When your Ambassador and I drove in from the airport we discussed our mutual interest, first, that there should not be a war at all, and, . . .

Brezhnev: Let me suggest, we could discuss the principles we handed over some later time, and just discuss the general situation now.

Kissinger: I would be prepared.

As a result of this I asked our intelligence people to make an analysis of what they know, and I would be glad to discuss this with you.

Brezhnev: Please, I do think it is important.

Kissinger: Because we have a major and an immediate interest. The major interest is to avoid war altogether; the immediate interest is to avoid a war before the General Secretary’s trip to the United States.

The general assessment of our people is that it is unlikely that the Egyptians and the Syrians will start military operations in the next six weeks. And we also know from our sources that at a high level you have been urging restraint. We have this from our own sources too. Some of your lower level people are sometimes more adventurous.

Brezhnev: That is absolutely true; at the high level we are urging restraint. Then I guess we should discuss which one of us has more adventurists in our midst, the Soviet Union or the United States.

Kissinger: I am sure we have some too.

Brezhnev: We withdraw that from the discussion anyway.

Kissinger: We have some military information—I do not know if you want to go through it—of various movements in the Arab world.

Sukhodrev: Troop movements?

Kissinger: Airplanes, military forces. I can run through it.

Brezhnev: Yes.

Kissinger: Within Egypt, they have moved what we call SA–6 surface-to-air missiles to within 20 miles of the Suez Canal. They have received 30 Mirage fighters from Libya. They have moved TU–16 bombers, which you gave them, from Aswan to Cairo. There is a high state of alert in the Egyptian Air Force, and reservists have been recalled. They have moved some commando units closer to the Suez Canal. We have information that at the Arab Chiefs of Staff meeting, April 21–25, there was an atmosphere of despair and foreboding because of the Egyptian determination to go to war regardless of the consequences. A Moroccan squadron of planes has gone to Syria. Two squadrons of Algerian MIG–21 aircraft have gone to Libya. They also may have sent MIG–16 and 19’s to Syria. But you would know that better than we. They also plan to send Sudanese ground forces to Egypt and there is a vaguer plan to send some to Syria.

So there are these movements of these other Arab forces. Our assessment is it is still largely psychological. But we do take it very seriously, and there is a possibility that there is a plan to do something before the summit to force us into joint action.

As I told your Foreign Minister, I am planning to meet Ismail next weekend in Paris, probably Paris.9

Brezhnev: That’s not bad intelligence. Israel also is recalling its reservists and has banned holidays and vacations for doctors. And they have deployed advance hospitals with a capacity for 1,000 wounded. I’m not familiar with other substantial latest developments, but we can both note from our discussions that certain preparations are under way. And on the part of all these countries together—Egypt, Israel, Syria, Libya and others—they can be assumed to have concentrated an army jointly of some million men. I’d say if we were to pool the intelligence available to both sides, we would be close to an accurate estimate. That is, of course, what amounts to a serious problem. I wouldn’t go so far as to take it for absolute truth, but according to TASS in Syria and Lebanon all sorts of committees are being formed and all sorts of military meetings are being held—not just to have a few drinks but to discuss military matters.

In any event, there are grounds to draw the conclusion that in this area where we would both like to see a just peace and guarantees for states, the course of events is proceeding in the wrong direction. If you take a superficial look at this general picture, the United States would seem to be taking a tranquil attitude toward these events, obviously

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drawing its own conclusion as to the possible results of a new military flare-up. I can conceive of the idea that perhaps they are thinking that the Russians can do everything in that area.

Kissinger: What do you mean?

Brezhnev: I’ll explain. In the sense that we can tell the Arabs not to fight. All that has been done until now in the direction of urging restraint has had its positive results in the sense of contributing to such restraint. And our influence could go on having a positive effect in that direction, provided the Arab states could see prospects ahead for a basis being found for a peaceful solution to the problem. But the mistake of the US—and obviously ourselves too—may lie in fact that neither side can count on its influence being effective if the sides there don’t see prospects for a peaceful settlement. If we don’t take steps in that direction, i.e., practical steps toward a settlement, we can’t count on a peaceful solution. All our hopes in that area will be proved untrue. Because the Arabs have before them the task of returning their lands and in those circumstances if Israel, counting on the success achieved in the short war, remains in place, we might not be able to maintain the status quo in the situation, and then we may be confronted by events that will present us both—the US and the Soviet Union—with complex problems.

I want to be quite frank. And in that spirit of frankness I want to say that all good things done by us in the direction at the Summit of achieving détente and avoiding a confrontation will all be scrapped, and no one will believe us any more. No one can say what practical nature such a war will assume. Secondly, beyond all doubt in that case the whole world will be in turmoil over this war—propaganda, mass media, everything.

That is how we view the general situation. It’s our feeling that you and we can prevent such a course of events only if we can work out some principles and measures aimed at putting both sides on the right track.

Such, as I say, is our view of the general situation. We had a brief opportunity to exchange a few words on this yesterday.\textsuperscript{10} It will certainly be very strange indeed and incomprehensible if two big states as the US and the Soviet Union should prove to be so impotent as to be unable to solve this problem. This is something no one in the world could understand. That is, I feel, the political basis upon which we should try to think about some practical measures. On this topic we have officially stated 150 times, and I wish to confirm this again, and you can say this to President Nixon: This isn’t a question involving the specific interests

\textsuperscript{10} See Document 107.
of the Soviet Union and the United States. It is a question concerning the need to restore order and assure a tranquil life for all the states in the area.

I’d also like Dr. Kissinger to communicate to President Nixon another important fact: We’ve never spoken with the Arab states—nor do we intend to take any action in that regard—in the sense of impinging upon the economic interests of the Arab countries regarding the interests of third countries. If I’m saying something that is not true, this will one day come out anyway. I stress this fact because we know there exist certain traditional ties regarding oil and other areas, and that is entirely the business of Britain, France and the US. And that is something we don’t interfere in at all. Our only interest is to preserve the peace.

Let’s reflect on this a little bit. In June, I’m supposed to be the guest of President Nixon personally, and I’m certainly counting on good results from that. Then, suddenly a war breaks out. Last year, you started a vicious bombing campaign in Vietnam and resorted to measures you had never done before, but nevertheless we gave President Nixon a warm reception in the Soviet Union. And our entire Party took an understanding attitude toward this. But if war breaks out now, the country will take an entirely different attitude.

Kissinger: That’s a delicate way of putting it.

Brezhnev: And in this country too, there would be a different attitude: a wave of protest among the working class and the intelligentsia. All this cannot allow us to simply turn a blind eye on this question. And all of the calculations and hopes that somebody might exert a beneficial influence or that one side may prove stronger, may be toppled. It is very easy to make a mistake in this field.

I don’t have much more to say. It’s quite enough for a general discussion.

Kissinger: I appreciate the General Secretary’s remarks and the spirit in which he made them.

First—this isn’t exactly relevant to what the General Secretary said, but it is important to his trip. We will make an absolutely maximum effort to prevent actions by minority groups inconsistent with the spirit of the development of Soviet-American relations, and will not allow any special groups to interfere with our foreign policy. This is separate from what the General Secretary said.

Brezhnev: To that I approach in this way: I am not going on a visit to any groups in the United States. I am going to visit the President. I am not interested in any actions by groups of 100 to 200 people somewhere; though they can be unpleasant. Any country, by normal international standards, tries to treat guests in a normal way regardless of
the color of their skin or flag. No one will try to overturn my car. Nor am I going in the expectation of having the American people rise up with red flags. I have been abroad and seen people raise their own flags. Here too, foreign visitors come—the King of Afghanistan, Emperor Haile Selassie, King Hassan—and we fly our flag and theirs. If someone shouts catcalls, that’s their business. When I visited France, there was concerned discussion of anti-Sovietism—not because they were afraid of me but because they thought they should treat guests civilly in accordance with international law.

They don’t have to shout hurrahs. I’m quite sure indeed there are certain groups in the United States that would be very eager to inflict inconveniences during my visit or commit some act. But in that respect I value very highly the concern of President Nixon to avoid that.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, let me turn to the specific problem of the Middle East. We agree substantially with your analysis of the situation. We agree there are great dangers, produced by the despair of the Arabs produced by their lack of a sense of proportion, on one hand, and the intransigence of the Israelis on the other side. The trouble is, the Arabs cannot win a war, and the Israelis cannot achieve a peace by their own efforts and on their present course. Now, in this situation, it is clear that unless some new element is introduced into the situation, the stalemate will continue. And again we substantially understand your point of view. But we have to be realistic in recognizing the scope of effective action. You have referred to the fact that some people overestimate what you can do with the Arabs, and this is probably true. But some people also overestimate what we can do with the Israelis, especially in a short period of time. The present situation is intractable because both sides would rather go to war than accept the program of the other.

Brezhnev: I would like to speak about our influence over the Arab governments. I spoke in the sense that it is hard to exert influence when there is no prospect for the liberation of occupied territory. The Arabs will ask us what we are in favor of. What are we proposing? If, on the other hand, the U.S. supports the present position of Israel, of course Israel will fly with wings in the air shouting “America will help us; what have we to fear?” So there are two sides to the question of influence.

When the United States really took the path of searching for peace in Vietnam, then we really started using our influence in Vietnam. We sent Katushev, and when that wasn’t enough, Podgorny, then Katushev again. And those efforts were contributions to the achievement of the agreement to end the war. But if you say you can’t influence Israel, how can you count on us to influence the Arabs?

Kissinger: We can influence Israel, and we are prepared to do so, up to a certain point. What is important is to know what that realistic
point is. We can’t influence Israel in the direction of the maximum Arab position.

I told your Ambassador: When I met Ismail he said Israel had to withdraw. I asked “In return for what”? He said, an end of the state of belligerence. When I asked him what this was, it was indistinguishable from the present ceasefire. Then after that, Israel still had to have negotiations with the Palestinians. Only then would there be a state of peace. It is hard to convince the Israelis why they should give up the territory in exchange for something which they already have, in order to avoid a war they can win—only to have to negotiate then with the most intransigent element of the Arabs.

I give this example to show the complexity of the situation.

So we have been looking for some realistic formulation—not an Israeli one but perhaps one somewhat more flexible than the Arab one—that will perhaps start a process that will give the Arabs some hope that progress is being made. And we are prepared to discuss this with the Egyptians and with you. One difficulty is, when I look, for example, at the principles you handed us—and we won’t have time to discuss them tonight—I see this is essentially the Egyptian position. If we on our side give you then a set of proposals that is the same as the Israeli position, then there will be total deadlock. What we should do is to work out principles that are sufficiently general to urge on both sides and get negotiations going simultaneously on a provisional solution and an overall solution. At the same time we can try to work out concrete provisions for certain parts of it. If we discuss the situation only abstractly, it will only result in a continuation of the status quo or some irrational outburst of violence.

Brezhnev: I’ve been listening very attentively, and I would like again to introduce one element and to say that as I see it, the Arab world—that is, those directly linked with the military actions of Israel—and and Israel itself is waiting to see what will happen after the Brezhnev visit to the United States, and what Nixon and Brezhnev will have to say on the situation in the Mideast, and how what they say can influence the settlement of the conflict. If they simply read, instead of realistic things, a mere weak brew, it will be hard for them to find anything on which to act. Now they know preparations for this are under way, and this is a restraining factor. If on the eve of my visit, or during my visit, no signal is given to Golda Meir or Sadat or Assad, then it is very difficult to foresee what will happen. After all, all these are sovereign states—not our colonies, not your colonies. What can be expected in the U.S. is heating up in connection with this visit. Not so in this country. How then can Brezhnev go to the U.S. if we don’t have something realistic? We’ll lose the very ground from under our feet, and lose
all the progress in our efforts for peace. It is a very complex problem, and it needs every effort.

When we sign the main document, the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, everyone will understand what it means. There will be explanations, but the document is clear. It means there will be no war. But here, on this problem, if we pass over it in silence or have only a weak brew, it will have a harmful effect from the political point of view. Our interests are involved because this is very close to our borders, and the U.S. is very close. So it is impossible not to take some steps, or else President Nixon and I might find ourselves in an impossible situation. After all, nothing in this world is eternal—similarly the present military advantage enjoyed by Israel is not eternal either. Israel is somewhat concerned that some have severed diplomatic relations with her, and the front around her is growing tighter. But now she’s easy because she enjoys the support of the United States—but is that an eternal category? Maybe it will be shown as a result of my visit that both the U.S. and the USSR are quite impotent in the Mideast, but in practice that is not so.

All I’ve been saying on this score is something on which I’ve not consulted my colleagues. They are my own feelings and thoughts.

Kissinger: One problem about the Mideast is that there have been endless theoretical debates, and every side wants their total program. We are interested in concrete discussions, but they have to be in some realistic framework. You fear the Arabs may start a war if their objectives are not satisfied, or it is also possible Israel will start a war if they fear their concerns are not met.

Last night in the tower you spoke of the spirit of compromise. I agree we should have concrete discussions on a set of principles which we can try to urge on the parties to implement.

Brezhnev: Yesterday I was very modest in my discussion with you, because I felt it was a subject for fuller discussion.

Kissinger: No, I don’t consider it a formal statement.

Brezhnev: We were talking on a different plane.

Kissinger: Good, I agree.

Brezhnev: That’s all very true, but also it has to be borne in mind. But for six years we have been saying principles, principles, principles, but going no further.

Kissinger: I agree. That’s what I’ve been saying about SALT. It would be useful if one could think of some concrete steps that could be taken immediately, that could at least start the process.

In the case of our Berlin negotiations, Mr. General Secretary, we went through many years of abstract discussions, but then settled it in six months, nine months—by becoming very concrete and both sides
making some concessions. I think the same procedure might work in the Mideast.

Gromyko: In the case of West Berlin, it took about three years.

Kissinger: But when we started getting serious between us, it took about a year.

Gromyko: The general bilateral talks took three years; the formal talks took one year. But that’s just a factual statement of the case.

Brezhnev: But finally, can we at least agree on a first point, a second point, a third, a fourth, and a fifth point? Because now we have no points; all we have is this weak brew.

Last year we had a discussion that seemed to inspire us with hopes that in 1973 some concrete measures might be possible. Now we’re already in the fifth month of 1973 and we’ve not yet even begun to talk about concrete measures.

So where do we go from here?

Kissinger: Well, of course, we have your proposed principles. And I will see—I expect—Mr. Ismail the end of the next week. And I will inform your Ambassador of the results, as I did last time. And perhaps out of these discussions some concrete statement can be developed that can be urged on both sides. And in the meantime we can discuss in a preliminary way the principles you gave us. But I would frankly like to hear what Ismail has to say before I make a final judgment.

Brezhnev: So you feel that it would be best first to wait for the results of your meeting with Ismail before becoming very concrete?

Kissinger: Yes. And frankly, this is what Ismail said to me last time I met him.

Brezhnev: I too have met our Ismail, another Ismail [referring to Egyptian War Minister Ahmed Ismail’s visit to Moscow following Hafiz Ismail’s visit.] I will probably become an Ismail too. And you too will become an Ismail. And then we will be two Ismals.

Announcements

Brezhnev: On another subject, the question of the communiqué of your visit—it raises no problems. I’ll look through it tomorrow. Since we’re deep into the night, I seem to agree with it.

Sukhodrev [Reads] “Talks between L.I. Brezhnev and Kissinger . . . At invitation of the Soviet side, Dr. Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security Affairs was in the USSR from May 4 to May 9. He had discussions with the General Secretary of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A. A. Gromyko, took part in the discussions. These discussions covered a wide range of subjects of mutual interest. The discussions were conducted in a friendly atmosphere. Both sides expressed their
satisfaction at the comprehensiveness and constructiveness of the ex-
change of views that took place.”  

Kissinger: Good.

Brezhnev: There is little draft on my visit to the United States that
we can hold in reserve for now: “On the forthcoming visit of L.I.
Brezhnev to the United States of America: On the invitation of the Pres-
ident of the United States, Richard Nixon, extended by him during his
stay in Moscow in May 1972, and in accordance with subsequent agree-
ment, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L.I.
Brezhnev will pay an official visit to the United States from June 18 to
June 26, 1973.”

Kissinger: Or should we say, “starting June 18. Departure will be
by mutual agreement only.” That was a joke.

Brezhnev: What happens if President Nixon asks me to stay an-
other two days? Will you kick me out?

Kissinger: That’s what I meant. What if you come on the 16th?

Dobrynin: The official visit is the 18th.

Kissinger: Right.

Brezhnev: We will keep this to ourselves. It has been fully con-
sulted on here. This is for the information of the President.

Kissinger: And we will publish a unilateral statement of gratifica-
tion with our stay.  

Brezhnev: Thank you.

We then have the question of Vietnam. And also the question of
economic relations will be an important topic of my talks with Presi-
dent Nixon. So perhaps we can start on that tomorrow.

Kissinger: All right.

Brezhnev: Then some minor points. But I can mention one thing. If
the agreement on the major issue is signed, then I am prepared to sign
it.

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: And I will be accompanied on my visit by Mr. Gro-
myko. As for the other people who might sign other agreements, we
haven’t finalized it.

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11 The text of the communique was sent to Washington in message Hakto 24, May 8.
(National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, Box 32, HAK Trip Files, HAK Moscow,
London Trip, May 4–11, 1973, HAKTO & Misc)

12 Both a joint U.S.-Soviet statement and a White House statement were released on
1973, p. 3.
Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, of course it is up to you if you want to bring them as part of your entourage, or have them come separately.

We’ve instructed our agencies to begin talking to your side about these various draft agreements. They will be solved.

Brezhnev: [In English] Very good. [In German] “Sehr gut.”
Gromyko: In American, “OK.”
Brezhnev: “OK.”

Kissinger: We still have these SALT Principles. We can decide it afterwards.

Brezhnev: Anyway, we have something to work on tomorrow.
[Brezhnev goes out for a minute, then returns.]
Gromyko: Now we go boar hunting. You have to go down from the tower and look for them. I will explain the principles to you.

Kissinger: We should work out some basic principles of hunting. I can give lectures on it now.

Brezhnev: There is a story about a lecturer who used to get up and speak as follows: “The main merit of the previous speaker is that he has raised this issue. What does this mean, comrades? What if Dr. Kissinger had not raised this issue? It would never have been raised. The question would have been in a recumbent position. This is very important. Now the question is no longer recumbent; now it is a standing question. A standing question is not a recumbent question. Therefore I’d like to emphasize the fact . . . ” And so on for a half hour.

Kissinger: Was he from Harvard?
Brezhnev: He was from the Institute.
Gromyko: Can we assume that the final communique of the visit is substantially agreed?

Kissinger: Well, as far as the main content—but as far as language is concerned . . . The main headings.
Gromyko: We gave it to you as a preliminary document.
Brezhnev: So in a preliminary way, it is agreed upon. One idea I have I should raise, so it is no longer recumbent. [Laughter]

Kissinger: It will certainly be better as a standing question. [Laughter]
Brezhnev: I’m quite certain if I don’t raise it, it will be recumbent. I did promise to raise it with you this morning, but because we’re so busy I didn’t get to raise it until tonight. You’ll appreciate this later: A recumbent question you can see only on one side, but a raised question you can see from all sides. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Or we can consider the recumbent aspect and then turn it over. Because while it’s recumbent we won’t be distracted by the other aspects.
Brezhnev: That’s a good idea. But a recumbent idea is like a stone.
Kissinger: I am certain I will lose this exchange.
Brezhnev: I can give a brief two-hour lecture at the university on this question.
Kissinger: And it will make more sense than some of the usual lectures.
Brezhnev: I want to go, on the way out, to look at the trophies.
[The meeting then adjourned. The General Secretary and his party accompanied Dr. Kissinger and his party back to Dr. Kissinger’s villa, stopping on the way at the refrigerator sheds to inspect the boars shot the previous evening.]

110. **Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)**

Zavidovo, May 8, 1973, 0040Z.

Hakto 19A. Please inform President as follows:

1. I had about eight hours with Brezhnev today in formal sessions, following several hours Sunday when we talked informally while he took me to his hunting preserve.

2. Agreement on prevention of nuclear war is now agreed with all our points accepted.

3. The Soviets gave us a set of principles to govern the negotiations for a permanent agreement on SALT. This document was a response to one we had submitted earlier which in turn had been a counterdraft to an earlier Soviet version. I again made strong argument that principles alone would not advance SALT Two very far since they were bound to contain much compromise language which would later be subject to dispute. I agreed to continue working on principles but urged major effort to obtain some concrete agreement, to supplement present Interim

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2 See Documents 108 and 109 for the records of the May 7 meetings.
3 May 6. No record of these informal conversations was found.
4 Attached to Document 108 at Tab D, not found; also attached to Document 109 at Tab A.
Agreement, on urgent aspects of MIRV problem, as discussed in Verification Panel and approved by you. So far, Brezhnev has shown no inclination to proceed with concrete negotiations. As regards the principles, there are the expected differences on such points as forward-based systems and it is unlikely that a document can be agreed here during my stay. This will give us opportunity to decide whether it is desirable to have such a document on principles promulgated at the summit.

4. Soviets have also given me a new paper on the Middle East which does not however materially go beyond existing Arab positions. Brezhnev has several times stressed his concern that conflict may break out before, during, or shortly after his visit. He says that he can exert effective influence on Arabs only if latter see hope of a settlement. I have stressed the need to get away from abstractions and maximum positions and our readiness to play role in realistic negotiations, including our willingness to exert influence on Israelis in that case. I suggested leaving further US-Soviet exchanges until my next meeting with Ismail next week.

5. Brezhnev gave me a proposed summit communiqué which in general is a basis for an agreed text, but it will take a good deal more work to get it into acceptable language.

6. In informal talk, Brezhnev continues to give vent to extreme suspicion of and hostility toward Chinese. This also seems to inhibit Soviet willingness to move rapidly on SALT.

7. On Tuesday, which will be last day of meetings here, I expect to deal with Vietnam problems and return to SALT issues. Brezhnev also wants to talk about trade relations.

8. There will be a brief communiqué at the completion of my visit and a separate announcement of the dates of Brezhnev’s US visit for separate later release, perhaps May 14.

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6 Attached to Document 108 at Tab F, not found; also attached to Document 112 at Tab A.

7 Attached to Document 108 at Tab E, not found.

8 May 8.

9 Nixon responded to Kissinger in message Tohak 92, May 8, stating: “Be sure Brezhnev knows that any major hostile action by North Vietnam between now and the time of his visit would have a disastrous effect here. You are right about SALT II. But Brezhnev must be made aware of major disappointment in the summit if we come up only with general principles.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 32, HAK Trip Files, HAK Moscow, London Trip, May 4–11, 1973, TOHAK 75–139)
111. Memorandum of Conversation

Zavidovo, May 8, 1973, 2:10–4:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Georgi M. Kornienko, Head of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interpreter
Andrei Vavilov, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff
Mr. Philip Odeen, NSC Senior Staff
Mr. William Hyland, NSC Staff
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff
Richard P. Campbell, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

Economic and Other Bilateral Relations; (Briefly) Middle East and Vietnam

[Outside, Brezhnev tells Dr. Kissinger he has incriminating documents on him. Dr. Kissinger replies, “I knew that sooner or later you’d get them.” Inside Brezhnev’s office, Brezhnev hands over photos of the boar hunt the night before.]

Dr. Kissinger: I wonder if I could ask General Secretary to sign some of these.

Brezhnev: For a thousand dollars.

Gromyko: A hundred million each.

[Brezhnev signs three of them.]

Dobrynin: You look like revolutionary partisans.

Brezhnev: I think we look more like gangsters. [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you very much. It will be a very pleasant souvenir. It is a good photograph.

Brezhnev: Let’s take up a new field today, the prospects for economic cooperation. If you have anything you would like to say, I would like to hear it. If not, I’ll say something.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me say a few general words on this subject. Then we can discuss any specific matters the General Secretary would like to raise.
Brezhnev: I agree.

Dr. Kissinger: First, our general philosophy with respect to commercial relations and cooperative projects. We have always taken the view these were closely related to the general context of Soviet-American relations and part of our political relationship. And whereas in the first part of the Administration this delayed it, now it accelerates it. We evaluate our relationship as very positive politically and we are determined that in the economic field matters keep pace. And we are determined to resist any attempt to impose additional conditions on the Soviet Union in addition to agreements we have already reached. Our immediate objective has to be to obtain the legislation for Most Favored Nation status for the Soviet Union. The President has asked me to tell the General Secretary—he will repeat it to you personally—we will put the full prestige of the Presidency behind it. We expect to have it certainly before the end of the year. We can then begin full implementation of the trade agreement we signed last year, and we would then be prepared to begin immediately negotiations for follow-on agreements of even wider scope. In fact, we would be prepared to begin preliminary discussions on follow-on negotiations even before MFN, though it would have to be done fairly quietly so it doesn’t add to the Congressional problem, that is, jeopardize the trade bill. But it is up to you. If you’d like to begin some preliminary discussions, we will be prepared to do that.

We are also glad it has been possible to work out some export-import credits of over $200 million, and we still have in mind the target figure of last October, $500 million, and we are prepared to go beyond that.

On the trade agreement, I believe one good place to begin discussions is in the Economic Commission.

On cooperative projects, we are very impressed by the imaginative ideas the General Secretary has developed. We are in principle very receptive to this approach. We believe our two countries are complementary in the economic field and there are vast possibilities that we have only begun to explore. We have given strong encouragement to various companies interested in your gas deals and we have also encouraged the Japanese to invest in Siberia.

The big obstacle at this moment is the reluctance of some of our companies to invest in the required amounts without some governmental guarantee. This is a problem to which we will turn energetically as soon as Congressional approval for Most Favored Nation is ob-

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2 See footnote 2, Document 98.
tained. In the meantime, we have taken action to raise the price of American natural gas. This is a domestic matter; but the purpose is to make Soviet natural gas more competitive and to justify and stimulate greater investment.

With respect to agriculture, we believe the General Secretary’s idea he mentioned the other day, of long-term agreements . . .

Brezhnev: I give you these cookies on a mutually-advantageous basis.

Dr. Kissinger: I will have to change all my pants again.

Brezhnev: That doesn’t relate to the substance of the matter!

Dr. Kissinger: A long-term agreement has the advantage that we can arrange long-term assurance of supplies and can ensure the transportation. It also will enable us to give the Soviet Union preference over other countries. For example, I just received word that India is seeking a long-term arrangement for agricultural products and credits. And the governmental credits available are for periods of three years, and you are familiar with these conditions. On this we have no flexibility. The Indians requested credits for five to eight years, but we have a law against it.

But I think when the General Secretary and the President meet, one of our objectives should be to plan ahead three to five years on an acceleration of our commercial relationship and work out big goals. Some goals can be stated publicly—such as long-term plans. Others, such as Soviet credit requirements, we shouldn’t publicly state. But in either event, our objective should be a maximum expansion of this relationship.

Many of our ideas are reflected in the draft communique you handed us, which we find acceptable in outline. And we can refine it in light of the conversations the General Secretary and President will have.

This is our general approach, Mr. General Secretary, and I believe it is one of our most positive aspects of our relationship.

Brezhnev: Good. I would say on that subject that since last year’s meeting with the President, in this field as in others quite visible progress has taken shape, and the positive elements that have appeared cannot be allowed to pass unnoticed. We can both state as regards this field that several agreements already have been signed between our two countries, directed at normalizing and developing concrete economic ties. And a still more concrete expression of this process is the fact that several big and mutually-advantageous projects have been

4 Attached to Document 108 at Tab E; not found.
agreed upon between the Soviet Union and American companies. I think it is well worth noting that the volume of trade has been growing. In 1972, 538 million Rubles, compared to 187 million Rubles in 1971. That is gratifying.

On the other hand, we can’t fail to note the fact that trade so far has been primarily of a one-way nature. In 1972 Soviet exports were 76.5 million Rubles, while imports to the Soviet Union from the United States amounted to 461 million Rubles. It stands to reason that such a situation cannot last for long; it is not normal. Therefore, it is obvious that this economically abnormal situation should be rectified and this disproportion be removed. It is up to both sides to display interest in achieving this.

In this area we come up with the MFN treatment problem. We are familiar with the general situation with respect to that question. I cannot give you any recommendation how this best should be resolved. I could say the best way is just to announce the granting of MFN tomorrow. You can’t do that, but we count on the assurance from the President that always guarantees that the decision will be taken in the fall. And we place the highest value on this assurance.

But before that happens, we will have our summit meeting. In that meeting, it is impossible to avoid talking about commercial matters.

Dr. Kissinger: Absolutely.

Brezhnev: A few words on what short-term measures should be taken. We could agree beforehand to note in the joint communiqué the progress already accomplished, and we could reaffirm the attitudes of both sides to go on deepening our commercial relationships. We feel it is possible to share the President’s view that we agree—and this too could be in the communiqué—that the general volume of trade between the USSR and the United States within the next three years could be raised to the amount of $3 billion. By way of developing broader and longer term economic ties, we could state the intentions of both sides to maintain and give every support to cooperation of American companies and Soviet companies. We could even perhaps have an indication of the fact that such projects could be agreed upon for 40 years or even 50 years, which is a good enough period. In this connection, the question arises whether it might be a good idea to create a special commission to deal with gas. We could give them long range tasks.

Dr. Kissinger: Is the General Secretary thinking of more than the gas sub-group set up under our existing trade commission?

Brezhnev: That group is not really a very specific one. They have meetings but they are rather sporadic.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. Because of the transition of Peterson, this has not been as active as it might have been.
Brezhnev: This could be a permanent group that could work throughout the duration of the project. First it would work on the negotiations to arrange for the project. Controlling and technical functions, because the President and I could not go into detail.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. We already agree in principle. After your meeting with the President, we will issue an instruction to the agencies.

Brezhnev: That is as far as gas is concerned. You have expressed your readiness to grant to the Soviet Union through the Export-Import Bank credits to the amount of $500 million. Last year the President said, in addition to the $500 million he had already given, he would be able to grant another $500 million. This year he committed the United States Government to the step of going beyond $500 million.

Dr. Kissinger: Beyond $500 million, but he did not say how far beyond.

Brezhnev: Beyond $500 million.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and this without prejudice to the longer-term arrangements.

Brezhnev: We therefore will be calculating that credits over and above $500 million will be used for current purchases in the United States of agricultural and certain industrial goods which we made projections of, and various household goods.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I am not familiar with the details, but we will consider it. This is why at the Summit we should have projections in mind so we can be concrete.

Brezhnev: Part of the credit we would use to purchase equipment and part to purchase consumer goods.

Dr. Kissinger: I will give an answer to your Ambassador in principle within two weeks.

Brezhnev: This subject concerns credit for projects, not the large-scale projects like gas.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: Not gas or other things in Siberia. We could absorb U.S. credits to the amount of $200 billion.

Dr. Kissinger: For current purchases?

Brezhnev: I am giving a very rough figure. Out of it we could spend perhaps on consumer goods—this would be good for the United States.

Dr. Kissinger: The largest credit ever extended for Ex-Im Bank was $1.1 billion for Brazil and Japan.

Brezhnev: Brazil is not the same as the Soviet Union.

Dr. Kissinger: I know, but ...
Brezhnev: If you give each town and city in this country one ex-
change, it won’t be enough. One cannot live just by working on the
basis of precedents. Twenty years ago something was not even in ex-
istence. I am sure no company would enter into what was not a
mutually-advantageous deal. After all, we would pay the interest rates.
America’s greatest dream is to get an interest rate . . .

Dr. Kissinger: Not since inflation. It barely covers the inflation!

Brezhnev: You want us to cover all your sins?

Dr. Kissinger: It is a good idea but I don’t think you will do it.

Brezhnev: These are not my words. I am quoting your magazine
Amerika, which I read. It had an article about “what others think of us.”
It has remarks by philosophers, statesmen and writers—like Bernard
Shaw. That is where I read the only thing that Americans think of is
profits.

Dr. Kissinger: We have to replace the editor of that magazine! We
didn’t need to bring that quote to the attention of the country of Lenin.

Brezhnev: I wondered why Americans had that quote.

Dr. Kissinger: One trouble foreign governments have, and intelli-
gence services have, is that they assume everything we do has a ra-
tional explanation.

They never take into account stupidity! [Laughter]

Brezhnev: That is why I wanted to say on measures that could be
carried out in the short term, the next three years or so.

On longer-term arrangements, I will repeat now for the President
that in the field of agriculture we would also agree to enter into
long-term agreements. That is a view shared by all my colleagues. I am
sure in this field we could reach an understanding.

We have already discussed the question of gas. That would be a
large-scale deal. If that deal could help the United States over a 50-year
period to rectify the situation in the United States regarding power
sources . . . I am sure our gas will be competitive. All this goes to the
matter of mutual respect and to improving relations between our two
countries.

I would like to say also to the President that this is not the only
question or area in which we would be willing to enter into long-term
agreements. We would be prepared to discuss long-term cooperation
in copper, nickel and certain other rare metals, in timber, but I think I
have already explained in what way. Plants and factories should be
built that could turn out the most up-to-date modern products—
products that the United States would need for the next 50 years. And
we would repay the United States in the product itself, in the finished
product.
This is a secondary question, and it could be the subject of an agreement. We could agree that the repayment would be 10–20 years and that through that period you would dispose of 80% of the product, and we could send it to any address you chose, and we would take 20% for ourselves.

Just half an hour ago, I asked Comrade Aleksandrov for factual material, and I received this from Moscow. In 1972 we simply burned the gas by-product as a waste product to the degree of 16 billion cubic meters. And every year they are increasing the extraction of oil in that area, and this increased the gas by-product. It could reach 30 billion in a few years. We would intend to build a plant for the processing of the gas, with the intent to turn it into a wide variety of products. Our planning organizations intend to collect gas in that area and build processing plants.

I have not consulted on this and the idea came to me this morning—but I think I can safely say: your companies could build that plant, take that gas, and make some necessary products. That could be a deal lasting 50 years, and again, repayment would be by delivery of finished goods. Given the necessary goodwill, we could have a further arrangement whereby the United States could use the product even after the repayment period, but under new commercial conditions.

The reason that I mention this, is that these are realistic things. Provided your companies are interested. The advantage lies in its long-term nature. The experts will have to go into it, of course. We won’t have Brezhnev and Kissinger sign it.

I don’t know of any other country in the world that could offer such advantageous terms.

That is our general approach.

I am not mentioning the fact that Armand Hammer will be doing something in the chemical field. Boeing has offered some cooperation in the technical field, and we have instructed our people to talk to them a bit and see if it is mutually advantageous.

I just talked by phone with Moscow. Comrade Kosygin has a letter that West European banks have asked us about the amount of credit we wanted to receive from West Europe. I am not familiar with the background of this question; we are still going to study it. But speaking in confidence, I feel that by virtue of objective laws, various nations and companies, the world and individual nations, are now entering a period when it is becoming a vital necessity to enter into vital cooperation in this way—without, of course, ignoring other possibilities. There have been discussions—I am not sure whether they have concluded—on the building by West German firms of a giant metallurgical plant on the Kursk metal deposits. It will be a big factory, five million tons capacity. I myself have seen a letter from an Italian company which of-
ferred to build on the basis of our kerosene, and certain other things, an artificial fiber and artificial fur plant with a capacity of 90 thousand tons. Which means, in terms of clothing items, 505 million sets of various articles—jackets, pants and pullovers. France is building for us three plants in Orenburg to purify gas and remove sulphur. It will give us one million tons of sulphur.

These are all examples just taken from memory. Indeed life itself is confronting us with new forms of cooperation. Surely we can, none of us can be conservatives, forever; none of us can stand still. When I talk about this, I have no figures on the profit or actual monetary gain that we or the American companies will gain. For calculations of that sort, we have our relevant experts. I was trying to show the scale of what we can do.

Speaking on a purely personal plane, I want all this to happen while President Nixon is in office.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary. I have listened to your presentation with great interest.

Brezhnev: [Interrupting] Sorry, Mr. Kissinger. Then we have agreed to building in Moscow a trade and exhibition center and to the expansion of the US Embassy in Moscow to cover the trade office. There are minor matters about who will build, but we will agree.

I thought America was a much richer country. Now I see America is afraid of large-scale deals; she wants to deal in kopeks, not rubles. I told the visiting American Senators last week that American business circles were richer than all of America.5

Dr. Kissinger: But businessmen are timid. Contrary to Leninist theory, they don’t understand their interests.

Brezhnev: A kind of leftover from the past.

Dr. Kissinger: To invest on a large scale in the Soviet Union is a new experience for them. I know, I have talked to David Rockefeller. I understand the Chase Bank is thinking of an $80 million loan.

Dobrynin: For agriculture.

Dr. Kissinger: And when they learn how to deal with Communist countries, it will accelerate.

But let me comment on your remarks in two categories: first, the short-term, and second, the large-scale projects.

On short term, which will be reflected in the communiqué, we agree in principle with everything you said. We will have to look into

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5 An account of the meeting between the Congressional delegation and Brezhnev is in telegram 4580 from Moscow, April 24. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 722, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Vol. XXIX)
the amounts of loans, and so forth, but we are sure it will keep pace with the expansion of our trade. Also, if the communique reflects a very positive spirit, which I think it will, this will accelerate the process in the short and middle term.

Another necessity is to create a focus in our government that understands the political goals we set ourselves and can gear our commercial policies to them. One reason we have moved Sonnenfeldt to Treasury is to make sure that East-West trade, specifically the US-Soviet Economic Commission, is given political guidance which frankly in the last months it has lacked. So we will give the maximum influence to our government in the next weeks on these subjects.

Incidentally, on that figure of $3 billion over three years, that was meant to be cumulative, not annual.

With respect to the long-term projects, first, gas. We will activate the Gas Committee immediately after the summit, if not before. As for the other ideas the General Secretary mentioned, of course, a great deal will depend on the stability of our political relations. But I am assuming those will continue to improve. If that happens, we have two problems: one is to stimulate the imagination of American business to explore the possibilities of investment in the Soviet Union. The second is to find credit guarantees for the amount of investment necessary.

With regard to the first problem, we are now already actively encouraging American business to invest in the Soviet Union. I gave you as an example the Chase Manhattan Bank. It is just an example.

With regard to the second, credit facilities, we have had internal discussions with former Secretary Connally and others on how it is best approached. As soon as the MFN problem is settled with Congress, we intend to turn to the realization of these ideas of the General Secretary.

But we agree that the direction sketched by the General Secretary is the course we should follow. We will organize ourselves within the government both as to direction and facilities to this end, and if our political relations continue to develop, this progress will be achieved. And I agree with the General Secretary, it must be achieved while President Nixon is still in office. [Brezhnev goes out briefly and then returns.]

Brezhnev: I have reached an agreement with the United States. I have the President’s full agreement on all questions. So from now on all things will move smoothly, much easier than with you, Comrade Kissinger.

Kissinger: I have been promoted to Comrade.

Brezhnev: I am sorry to leave you for a few minutes; it was on internal matters. I couldn’t get in touch with the President.
Dr. Kissinger: It is impossible. He returned to Washington last night.6

Brezhnev: How do you reach the President on an island?

Dr. Kissinger: We cable to Key Biscayne. They radio-phone to the President telling him that a message is coming by boat. He became so restive he sent me a rather sharp message; usually he is more patient with me.

Brezhnev: Good. I think we have exchanged views on commercial matters.

[Sukhodrev then translates the last paragraph of Kissinger’s last statement.]

Brezhnev: Yes indeed, and that will leave a mark in history. Of course, from that point of view it is important that the man who replaces the President is like that. You mentioned one possibility, Rockefeller.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a different Rockefeller.

Aleksandrov: He has never been in the Soviet Union, has he?

Dr. Kissinger: No.

Brezhnev: Kosygin told me over the phone that he was meeting with Lindsay.7

Dr. Kissinger: He is not one of our best friends.

Brezhnev: We know that.

Perhaps I might briefly refer to one other question. Since we are both of one mind on the need for our meeting to be hallmarked by the maximum number of agreements, and by way of further expansion of this sphere of Soviet-American relations, you know we have proposed to the President that several more agreements be signed during the meeting. I might just list them: on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; on cooperation in the field of agriculture; on cooperation in the field of research in the world’s ocean; in the field of transport; a general agreement on contacts, exchanges and cooperation in various fields of science and cultural affairs, this time for five

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6 Nixon was in Key Biscayne, Florida, from May 3 to May 7. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) On May 6, Kissinger received message Tohak 58 from Scowcroft, which indicated that the “message regarding the nuclear treaty” had been given to the President along “with the statement that a reply was urgently needed before noon.” Nixon, however, had “left to go fishing for two to three hours and said that he would make a decision upon his return.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 32, HAK Trip Files, HAK Moscow, London Trip, May 4–11, 1973, TOHAK 1–74)

7 John V. Lindsay, Mayor of New York City.
years. And we are proceeding from the fact that the agreement on the most important topic, and also perhaps on nuclear energy, could be signed by the President and myself. And other bilateral agreements could perhaps be signed by Gromyko and your Secretary of State.

Dr. Kissinger: On the list you submitted, Mr. General Secretary, I see no difficulty in concluding them, except in the field of peaceful nuclear energy, where we have enormous legal obstacles which may not be overcome by the time of the Summit.

Brezhnev: I think we should try, and it might turn out to be easier.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree, we will make an effort. It is the one area where there may be a problem.

Brezhnev: If we don't get to an agreement on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, we might reach an agreement on military uses. [Laughter] As soon as we get to peaceful uses, Americans will always have problems.

Dr. Kissinger: We have instructed all our agencies to proceed to the completion by June 1, actually.

Brezhnev: Actually, that agreement would fit in very well with our first agreement, and second, it is a question in which great interest is displayed by both American and Soviet scientists. A prominent group of intelligentsia on both sides will be brought together.

Dr. Kissinger: If there are any difficulties, we can discuss them. I must say, the General Secretary omitted from the list of agreements to be signed the strategic arms limitation field. As I told your Ambassador this morning,8 for the other agreement to stand alone would be very difficult. And that it should be signed by the General Secretary and the President. As for the others, it is entirely up to you. We are prepared to have all of them signed by Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Brezhnev: We can reach an understanding on this very easily.

Dr. Kissinger: You just tell us what you want. We can do it either way.

Brezhnev: Also I certainly believe that there are three things that could be signed by the President and myself: first, the agreement on nuclear war, second, the agreement on peaceful nuclear energy, and if we reach an agreement on the SALT principles, they too. As for the others, they can be signed either by Minister Gromyko or others. But that can be discussed later.

8 No record of this conversation was found.
In order to speed up the work, we should discuss who should go where to finish it, e.g., whether our people should go to the United States or the other way around.

Dr. Kissinger: We gave instructions to our people to approach yours.

Dobrynin: You can decide what you want.

Dr. Kissinger: You make a decision and let us know.

Dobrynin: I will take the last two: transport, the general exchange agreement, and oceanography. Your embassy will take nuclear energy and agriculture.

Dr. Kissinger: I think nuclear energy should be in Washington. You will take cultural exchange and transport and oceanography. And we will take here agriculture and atomic energy.

Dobrynin: OK.

Dr. Kissinger: We will give instructions tonight.

Brezhnev: For the next phase of our work, I suggest this procedure. Quite frankly I was acutely distressed with the result of the discussion on the Middle East question, and to prevent what would be an unnecessary explosion and so as not to spoil the general picture for us—for the United States and the Soviet Union—I would request you talk it over once again with Gromyko and Dobrynin. They are more peaceable.

And after that discussion, I would like all those in the room to have supper together.

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you.

Brezhnev: And after supper we might have an hour’s discussion on other matters.

Dr. Kissinger: All right.

Brezhnev: Supper at 10. Usually we do it later.

Dr. Kissinger: All right. The only problem is where should we have the discussion of Southeast Asia.

Brezhnev: Tonight perhaps. You mean Vietnam?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: You could at least start on that with Mr. Gromyko and follow up later with the General Secretary.

Dr. Kissinger: All right.

Brezhnev: I don’t really see any disagreement.

Dr. Kissinger: We really have to express our strong view that the violations are very serious and that we cannot as a great power tolerate such violations indefinitely without taking strong counteraction.

I can discuss the details with the Foreign Minister.
Brezhnev: As signatories of the Final Act of the Paris Conference, I can say that we will do all in our part to insure the vigorous implementation of the accord. How can we sign the agreement and see such violations take place?

Dr. Kissinger: I know in your formal note you said ours was one-sided. You have to in a note. But the North Vietnamese violations are cynical and constant, not accidental. We have prepared here a report on the violations [Tab A]. It is only a brief summary. When should we meet, Mr. Foreign Minister?

Gromyko: 6:00 p.m.

Dr. Kissinger: May I say one thing about the Middle East, Mr. General Secretary? When my trip to the Soviet Union was being planned, a detailed discussion of the Middle East was not foreseen. It was only the night before I left, when the President had already left, that I learned the General Secretary’s desire to discuss the subject in detail. And I myself was leaving in four hours.

We share the General Secretary’s concern that there must not be an outbreak of war either before or after his visit to the United States, and we will cooperate seriously in that effort. I will go over the principles with the Foreign Minister, and then I will meet with Mr. Ismail, and after that we should see if we can develop a concrete procedure that gets the process started.

Brezhnev: Right, discuss it with him.

[The meeting then ended.]

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9 See footnote 2, Document 87.

10 Attached but not printed. For the Soviet note, see Document 87.
112. Memorandum of Conversation

Zavidovo, May 8, 1973, 6:10–8:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
Georgi M. Kornienko, Head of USA Division, Foreign Ministry
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Foreign Ministry, Interpreter
Andrei Vavilov, Foreign Ministry
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Richard P. Campbell, NSC Staff

SUBJECT
Middle East; Indochina

Middle East

Gromyko: You should smoke those cigarettes, called Nefertiti.
Dr. Kissinger: Oh, because you want to talk on the Middle East.
Gromyko: From the time of the Pharaohs. Take a deep breath.
Dr. Kissinger: I thought we would talk about Vietnam first. One of my advisors said we should treat the Middle East with the same seriousness with which you treated Vietnam.

Gromyko: But the war is over in Vietnam. In the Middle East it may start. We should stop a war first.

Dr. Kissinger: The Foreign Minister knows we can’t settle the Middle East.

Gromyko: In point of fact, we approached the American side on several occasions, saying there should be discussion on the Middle East at the Summit as it was at the last Summit. We have a definite view, namely that of L. I. Brezhnev, that you are underestimating the danger of the situation.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not underestimating the danger; we don’t know how to handle it.

Gromyko: Surely we can’t seriously accept the statement that you really don’t know what to do regarding a settlement. It is impossible seeing the United States and the Soviet Union as impotent regarding finding a way to resolve the Middle East issue. I recall what President

Nixon said when I was in Washington,\textsuperscript{2} and in the United Nations regarding a solution of the Middle East. You yourself touched on this. Now some taboo is imposed on the Middle East problem. We can’t accept the proposition that the U.S. is impotent, any less that the two are. We see this as the unwillingness of the U.S. for reasons of its own, to try to find a real solution. Naturally, we too have our concepts on this score.

Dr. Kissinger: It is not unwillingness to find a solution. The question is to what extent we are asked to bring pressure on basis of the maximum program of one side. I see no difference between your proposal and the Egyptian position. These principles [Soviet paper of May 7, Tab A]\textsuperscript{3} look like what the Egyptians would produce if we asked them for principles. What is there that they would find difficult?

Gromyko: Surely you will see that the Arabs, and the Egyptians notably, are advancing several other proposals that don’t appear in these principles.

Dr. Kissinger: Like what?

Gromyko: Like the questions of the Palestinians, of Jerusalem. So our principles don’t embrace all their proposals, which go much further. What we did was accept the barest minimum.

Kissinger: The question of Jerusalem is taken care of by total withdrawal from all territories.

Gromyko: Essentially.

Kissinger: Totally. This is more than King Hussein is asking. He would settle for less than this.

Gromyko: Yes, but is King Hussein supposed to be a criterion for us? He is free to fall on his knees and give up his territory. He can speak on behalf of Jordan but he is not competent to speak on our behalf.

Kissinger: But Jerusalem was his city. He is competent to speak on that.

Gromyko: Apart from that, the question also has a fundamental character of principle. Furthermore, you are familiar with the history of the Jerusalem problem.

Kissinger: Probably, unfortunately, not as much as you. This is one difficulty I am facing. But we can play around with these principles. What is the peculiar nature of what you and we could do? If we are

\textsuperscript{2} See Document 56.

\textsuperscript{3} Attached but not printed is the Soviet draft paper, “Principles of Middle East Settlement.” The principles called for “the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied in 1967” and stated that “the international lines of demarcation, which existed between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries as of June 4, 1967 shall be recognized as the final boundaries between them.”
going to support the maximum Egyptian position, we can do it alone. The question is to put pressure on Israel. The advantage of doing it jointly with the Soviet Union is because the Soviet Union is an important power in the Mideast. Secondly, if we did it jointly, you could urge Egypt and we could urge Israel toward some middle position.

But your principles of yesterday are a step backward from what we had last year. Last year they had the advantage of vagueness. The advantage of vagueness is that each side can interpret them as they want while the process is started, and with the principles pointing in the general direction. That would be useful.

But if the principles are one-sided, they are of no use, and not consistent with the current situation. The current situation is that there is a need for something to move the sides off a deadlock. We agree that Israel bears a heavy responsibility.

As I said to your Ambassador, detailed discussion of the Mideast was not on the agenda. Therefore, I am not prepared—I am prepared, but I did not have a chance to talk to the President.

Gromyko: I certainly don’t know any exchange regarding the agenda for this meeting that didn’t include a reference to discussion of the Middle East. We said we should discuss all the subjects that might be brought up at the Summit. There was no communication on our side in which this wasn’t raised. How can it be unexpected?

Kissinger: I think you know from the reports of your Ambassador what was expected on this trip. The Middle East was not emphasized until a letter was delivered the night before I left. It was delivered at 7:00; I left at midnight.

Gromyko: Surely we are not asking you to discuss the details of the problem. These one and one-half pages are not details; they are only broad categories, large-scale principles of the problem. We can discuss this endlessly. Let me ask you, what is your present position on the question of territories and the withdrawal of Israeli forces?

Kissinger: To be frank, Mr. Foreign Minister, it is an almost impossible process if I talk to you and I talk to Egypt, and you talk to Egypt. It becomes a three-cornered discussion with everybody talking to everybody. It will never work. I thought the General Working Principles of last year [Tab B] were a basis that two sides might at some point give to the parties. They were agreed, except for a reserved point.

Gromyko: There were two reserved points.

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4 Document 102.
Kissinger: We said, “The U.S. position is that completion of the agreements should at some stage involve negotiations among the signatories.” Do we have the same text?

Gromyko: On withdrawal.

Kissinger: On withdrawal we had the same text but different interpretations. It was not resolved.

Gromyko: You had a reservation on withdrawal point, the second point.

Kissinger: What was the reservation? It wasn’t a formal reservation.

Gromyko: I think we had a different understanding of second point. We meant “all territories,” and you knew that.

Kissinger: Oh, yes.

Kornienko: You promised an answer in a week and we never heard from you.

Kissinger: Maybe when you and Rodman conformed the text you made a side deal. Let’s look at the situation. We and Ismail discussed the idea of trying to reconcile sovereignty and security. Ismail promised us a paper, which he never gave us.

Who is supposed to move the Israelis? Not you, us. We are prepared to make an effort, but we are looking for some formula that won’t produce a confrontation immediately, that includes some of the Egyptian positions, but not all, that includes some of the Israeli positions but not all. This is what we are trying to do with Israel. I thought the advantage of the General Working Principles was that they were so vague that we could use them to break the deadlock and start a negotiation. The General Secretary said to me yesterday that the Soviet Union, once it recognized that a genuine process in Vietnam was possible, was prepared to exercise its influence. We recognize that, and appreciate that. [In the Middle East] there is no process now. One side is cynical; the other side is hysterical. You know from your own contacts that the Israelis won’t even state what their positions are.

Gromyko: Let me ask you a direct question.

Do you agree that Israeli forces must withdraw from all occupied territory? If so, it won’t be difficult to settle the other questions, such as security zones.

Kissinger: Frankly, I think even then there would be major difficulties. But I have explained I don’t think Israel intends to withdraw

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6 Kissinger summarized his February meetings with Ismail in his March 8 meeting with Dobrynin. See Document 81.
7 See Document 109.
from all the occupied territory—the Golan Heights, Sharm el-Sheikh. I think the problems in Jordan are manageable. We were sorely tempted to bring great pressure for a settlement in Jordan. But we thought we should start with a country that we both had an interest in. My honest judgment is that it is not for the U.S. to force that in the first stage of negotiations.

Gromyko: If the United States thinks that the Soviet Union will be a partner to agreements promoting the Israeli occupation of Arab lands—if that is your position, it is a profound mistake. It shows we are talking two different languages; and we might as well draw an X through this paper. It shows we are diametrically opposed. You would want to give Israel a prize in the form of occupied Arab territory; but we are in favor of their vacating them. We are for the security of all, including Israel. Israeli leaders keep talking of the need for security; virtually at every corner they shout about it. We are prepared for an agreement guaranteeing the security of every nation in the area. But that is not their real concern; what they really want is to appropriate the Arab territories.

Kissinger: It is incorrect to say we want to help Israel appropriate these territories, because we are in favor of substantial withdrawal. We believe there has to be a negotiation at some point between the parties. As we said, it may be possible to find some compromise between Egypt’s insistence on withdrawal from all the territories and Israel’s insistence on occupying some territory. After all, what is the present situation? If the stalemate continues, there will be a war; Egypt will lose. There will be pressure for the great powers to do something. Again it will be the maximum Egyptian program. That’s why we are looking for a way out of this difficulty.

Gromyko: You know we may achieve even further success in other fields, but events in the Middle East may throw us back and even break our already achieved plans. I’m sure the United States and President Nixon are fully aware of this fact.

Kissinger: May I ask what the General Secretary and the Foreign Minister expect of me here that would meet these needs?

Gromyko: We feel it is necessary to try to search for a solution to the Middle East problem directed toward a settlement. There the skeleton for such a solution is the question of withdrawal of Israeli forces. But if you take the position of support for Israeli intentions to appropriate Arab lands, that is difficult. Even if it is only 30%, 50% of Arab lands, it’s no difference. Because it is a matter of principle. What sense is there in discussing questions such as security zones, U.N. personnel, if the basic premise of your position is that Israel does not want to vacate part of the territories? If you raise the issue in this way—that you agree Israel should withdraw completely but at the same time we should discuss
these other issues such as security zones, UN personnel, and free passage—that would be in a sense logical and we would be prepared to discuss them in complex. What is more, we ourselves suggested discussing other matters provided the basic thesis regarding withdrawal is recognized. But the way you raise it rules out the possibility of this being discussed. If of two participants one wants to negotiate and the other does not on the basis of withdrawal, it is impossible to count on any possibility of forward movement.

Kissinger: First of all, as I have explained on several occasions today, I am somewhat uneasy at the method with which I am being confronted with the Middle East problem. When I talked to Mr. Ismail, I talked to your Ambassador.

Gromyko: We got a report.

Kissinger: We discussed what we should talk to the Soviets about. He said we will use the Soviet Union to bring pressure on you, but nevertheless we want detailed discussions with you. I told your Ambassador this. There are many things the Egyptians say but don’t do.

They also said they would have a paper. We agreed we would discuss details with them, and general principles with you. We’ve discussed security zones. My impression is Israel won’t leave. It is my impression; not U.S. policy. We are prepared to discuss zones in the context of the principle of total withdrawal, provided there is some negotiation between the parties on rectification if they can agree. So we don’t exclude total withdrawal. But we are also prepared to discuss security zones concretely. If Ismail ever produces the paper he promised, I will have a better understanding of the two sides and we can discuss this.

Gromyko: You don’t exclude the possibility of Israeli withdrawal. Am I right in assuming you would be prepared on the basis of this premise—total withdrawal—to look for a solution to certain concrete problems relating to the security of Israel and other states so as to reach a solution of the whole complex?

Kissinger: That would certainly greatly facilitate the process, if we could have some understanding of security arrangements, based on the premise of complete withdrawal.

Gromyko: Discuss all the combinations and problems?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: Then perhaps you could set out some of your considerations on the questions relating to security for Israel. But of course bearing in mind that Israel is not the Great God Sabaoth, so we should discuss not only security for Israel but for other countries as well. If you are prepared to do that, we could discuss it through the confidential channel and try to find some common ground. In the process of ex-
changing views we would of course have to consult with the countries in the area.

Kissinger: I would rather wait until a later date on the concept of security zones. Because this is exactly what I asked Ismail for, and he promised me a paper on it and I don’t know if he will produce it at the next meeting.

Gromyko: Since all this entire subject is of greatest importance, as the potential opportunities in it are great as well as the potential dangers, let me ask you one direct question: With the reservations you set out regarding certain security questions relating to Israel, do you accept the principle of Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories provided—as I repeat—if there are security provisions guaranteeing total security for all countries in the Middle East?

Kissinger: Yes, under those circumstances.

Gromyko: Because we both voted for the creation of Israel, and I led the delegation to the UN General Assembly. The very instant we confirm a satisfactory solution, and it takes shape, we would be prepared to resume diplomatic relations and exchange representatives with Israel, and would be prepared to place our signatures in the most solemn possible way to a guarantee of it.

Kissinger: I have just had experience with a peace agreement that was very solemnly signed. Of course you would be reliable. On the theory of 100% security for all states—though of course it is difficult to determine that—we could go along with the principle of withdrawal of Israel to its borders.

Let me ask: It is easier for both of us to bring pressure or use our influence if there is an ongoing process of negotiations than in the abstract. Can you visualize a process of negotiation that we could influence? It is hard to make peace between two countries that won’t talk to each other.

Gromyko: I am not too sure of the answer L. I. Brezhnev would have given. I want to put forward my own view. I don’t know if Ambassador Dobrynin will agree. He does—usually he doesn’t. You know the attitude of the Arabs toward direct negotiations. We feel if a definitive solution were discernible and everything was placed on a firm foundation, some formula could be found along the lines of, for example, the Rhodes formula, it could not be ruled out entirely. Something of this nature. Rather flexible, of this nature.

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8 The Rhodes formula refers to the negotiating mechanism used at the armistice talks in Rhodes, Greece, from January to March 1949, in which UN mediator Ralph Bunche met with each delegation on substantive items until discussions reached an advanced stage, at which point joint informal meetings were held.
Kissinger: When you are vague, it is always deliberate.
Gromyko: We can’t vouch for the Arabs, and this is of the nature of an assessment.
Kissinger: Yes.
Gromyko: But we are not only onlookers, and we are able to put forward our own judgment on this score. And we believe this could be of possible significance. A few years ago it was discussed, but there was no firm foundation for it. The whole thing rested on quicksand. If this rested on firm soil we wouldn’t rule out a concrete solution in this respect, though it is hard to tell what concrete form it would take.
Kissinger: I thought at one time, and I mentioned to your Ambassador, that if something like these principles—with something like their vagueness—could be given to both sides and accepted by both . . . And at the same time there were negotiations simultaneously on an interim settlement and general settlement on the basis of these principles . . .
Gromyko: Interim and general.
Kissinger: Interim and general. Thus, the vagueness of number 2, of which Kornienko complained, has its advantages. Israel would not be required to face this issue right away. If it succeeds, it would produce Israeli withdrawal from the Canal—the first concrete withdrawal in six years. Then it would produce concrete positions—not reconcilable positions, but positions. Then once things start moving, you and we could exert our influence concretely.
I was asked theoretically in the Vietnam negotiations, are you willing to pressure Thieu? I would evade the question, because “pressure for what?” But you know we did.
In order to do this, it would be important for the Arabs not to require every last detail in the first set of principles, and to keep in mind there are many opportunities. And they are better off with a process underway than with the present position—and as every year goes by Israel becomes more intractable.
Gromyko: What paper do you have before you?10
Kissinger: Last year’s.
Gromyko: We didn’t agree on the understanding on total withdrawal.
Kissinger: Of course.

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9 A reference to the second principle in the May 1972 U.S. paper, which called for a withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territory acquired during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. See footnote 5 above.
10 A reference to the May 1972 paper. See footnote 5 above.
Gromyko: Shouldn’t we have a joint understanding along the lines you said? Provided everything else is agreed?

Kissinger: Before we accept an understanding on number 2? Yes. 100% security—that’s an unfair formulation. I don’t think you have 100% security.11

Gromyko: Let us talk in mutually agreeable terms on security.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, if we speak as realists to each other, the art now consists of getting some formulation which Israel will accept—though they will know what direction we will push them. And the Egyptians have to show some moderation. If Jerusalem were designing Cairo’s policy, they would do what they are doing now. That is a personal comment.

Gromyko: Suppose we left the language as it is [in last year’s principles] and added the language “mutually acceptable arrangements for security have to be worked out.” Not 100% security.

Kissinger: I won’t hold you to that, 100%. But that is conceivable. When we do this, particularly if it isn’t started with some moderation, there will be tremendous domestic pressures. I know the General Secretary gets restless when I mention domestic pressures but it is a fact of our lives.

Gromyko: It bothers me too.

Kissinger: But your temperament is less volatile.

Gromyko: But I have some antitoxin.

Kissinger: I have to talk to the President, and the Egyptians. But my view is that the principles last year had great advantage of being vague and could establish a link that gives you and us the opportunity to bring pressure during negotiations, especially if we have a prior understanding of direction.

Gromyko: I have two observations: First, we have to reach an official joint understanding that we understand point 2 in such a way. Second, as you said, let’s work out an interim and joint settlement. If the interim is part of the joint and can’t be considered separate, how can we work out the joint settlement?

Kissinger: Not you and we, but them.

Gromyko: The interim as separate, or as part of the whole?

Kissinger: As a first step toward the whole. What I understood Ismail to say is this: He wants some “heads of agreement,” which I take to be principles. After these are established, he is prepared to have simultaneous discussions of both the interim and general. This is what he said to me.

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11 The word “you” was underscored by hand.
Gromyko: I don’t know his thoughts. The interim presumably is part of the general. From the point of view of time, it may be part or first.

Kissinger: Why should you care what comes first if parties are satisfied with this?

Gromyko: The parties differ on this, because the Arabs—as far as we know—don’t accept that the interim should be separate.

Kissinger: But the negotiations would be simultaneous.

Gromyko: The negotiations, but what about the outcome, the results? Suppose everything in the interim is worked out, and the general; the interim could be the first step of it.

Kissinger: That’s one way.

Gromyko: What we can’t accept is that the interim is worked out and the rest is left hanging.

Kissinger: But isn’t it true you can accept everything the Arabs can accept?

Gromyko: We didn’t talk to them exactly as we are talking to you. But from what we know of their position—it is not an easy task—

Kissinger: [laughs] I agree.

Gromyko: We think this isn’t ruled out. If you talk to the President, and if you will go along with this goal, it will be extremely helpful.

Kissinger: We have never had the idea of going alone, and we have always meticulously informed your Ambassador.

Gromyko: You made a very good statement. Now it should be backed by actions. [laughter] I remember President Nixon in the UN; I not only applauded physically at the end but also mentally several times during it.

Kissinger: Unfortunately, he followed Haile Selassie, so most of the delegates were asleep.

Let me discuss it with the President. This is a possible approach. I can’t go further today.

Let me say: If we get the Arab-Israeli issue hot in the U.S. at the same time as MFN is up, major problems will result. Dobrynin knows this. That’s one of the issues. Because to get Israel to negotiate on the basis of any paper will take extreme pressure.

Gromyko: How long will it take? Your Secretary of State said 15 years. It is a joke.

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12 A reference to Nixon’s address before the 24th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 18, 1969. The address focused on how world peace could be restored and maintained. For the text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 724–731.
Kissinger: The Secretary of State thinks the time between the interim and overall will take 15 years, and that Sadat is agreed to that. That’s not my impression.

But if we can find convincing security arrangements, then the whole thing can be placed in a different context.

Gromyko: I see you take a more favorable view of last year’s paper. If that is so, we could accept number 2 as formulated by you, and then when we get to formalization of this document we can get an understanding of what we understand by it. Then we can get rid of the thorny problem of negotiations between the parties. And you promised to give us clarification of number 8 which you haven’t done.13

Kissinger: I want to study it more. But it is clear that last year’s was closer to what could possibly be submitted to the parties than this year’s.

Ten days from now I will have a nervous breakdown, meeting Ismail and Le Duc Tho on the same day. I’m not sure I’ll survive.

Gromyko: Let me just say that this paper we’ve just given you is our draft, not something we have coordinated with the Arabs.

Kissinger: I will not discuss it [with Ismail]. I will not discuss either draft. I will not discuss any joint Soviet-American discussions. I would appreciate it if you didn’t discuss our discussions here.

Gromyko: We will not. It is entirely between us.

Kissinger: You can be assured that I will not discuss even the existence of our discussions, let alone the content.

Gromyko: The only thing we will tell the Arabs, provided some prospect appears to some understanding, is that it was agreed that the President and General Secretary would have discussions on the Middle East because of the interest of the two powers in the situation. That you won’t object to.

Kissinger: No. That’s inevitable.

Since I won’t discuss these principles or this discussion, it would be difficult for me if he heard it from you.

Dobrynin: You heard him say we won’t.

Kissinger: No, you have confirmed it.

I’ll get in touch with Anatol after I return from Paris, let’s say around the 26th, or 27th, to formulate concrete ideas. I will talk to the President right away about this procedure. First, I will get his reaction to proceed, then on the content.

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13 The eighth principle in the May 1972 paper held that a country would cease to be responsible for upholding its obligations if another country were deemed to be in violation of the agreement. See footnote 5 above.
What is your idea? To publish principles at the Summit?

Gromyko: That of course will be subject to our agreement, but we don’t exclude the possibility of publishing. If they assume a positive nature, which is the only basis they can take, then it might be a good idea.

Kissinger: This is something we could discuss later.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: Should we leave this?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: I think we have made some progress in understanding how we might proceed.

Indochina

Dr. Kissinger: Let me say a few words about Vietnam. We have given you a list of violations,14 which I know you will be reading immediately.

Gromyko: With inspiration.

Dr. Kissinger: We can even give you the exchanges between us and the North Vietnamese, so you can judge what has been taking place. [Sanitized texts of U.S.–DRV exchanges between March and April were later given to Dobrynin.]

Let me give our judgment of the problem. We are not asking you to judge such a complex situation. When we made the Agreement,15 certainly we knew history would not stop in Indochina. Certainly we knew that people who had been fighting for 25 years won’t give up their objectives. Certainly we understand revolutionaries would never settle for abstract peace, according to Marxism.

Gromyko: You’re too flexible on Marxism.

Dr. Kissinger: We are? They aren’t.

Gromyko: Real Marxism has only one version.

Dr. Kissinger: But I have been told it in three different capitals. [Laughter] You will be interested to know that in Hanoi they think they have the real version. [Laughter]

Gromyko: As I sometimes say before journalists, no comments.

Dr. Kissinger: Excessive humility is not a Vietnamese trait.

All this being so, we concluded a solemn agreement. We expected there would be some time of observance of the Agreement, then other events would follow. We have no interest in reentering. You will see from the messages, we have no reason to break the Agreement.

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14 Attached to Document 111 at Tab A.
15 The Paris Peace Accords; see Document 74.
There have been some South Vietnamese violations. Observance of agreements is not a Vietnamese trait. But the North Vietnamese violations have been fundamental. There are provisions against the introduction of troops and equipment except through checkpoints. They’ve introduced 400 tanks, 250 artillery pieces. We spent three weeks discussing the DMZ, they’re ignoring it. Article 20 requires withdrawal from Laos and Cambodia; they ignore it. Then they say it is civilian goods. It is supposed to come through checkpoints; it is an interesting theory that if it does not come through checkpoints it is civilian. And they have infiltrated 30,000 personnel.

To be frank, we thought, since we introduced a lot of equipment before the agreement, we thought for a while it was their compensation. But it is continuing. We will certainly do something. We told you this last year. If there is an offensive, we will certainly do something.

It is senseless. Therefore we think every signatory to this agreement [the Final Act] should use its influence. And also regarding military equipment, though we have your communication on this.

I won’t read you every violation.

Another point. Your allies from Poland and Hungary could be more helpful regarding violations, which they refuse to do. We should use our influence.

Another problem is the problem of Cambodia. We have no desire for a predominant position in Cambodia. The North Vietnamese have 30,000 troops there. Regarding Sihanouk, it is a peculiar situation to have a royal prince in a Communist capital. This situation was not foreseen in early Marxism. We would prefer a coalition basis that included all elements—we would prefer to do it without Sihanouk—but we are prepared to discuss it.

Gromyko: You didn’t say anything about violations by South Vietnam. Or they are saints?

Dr. Kissinger: I think the South has committed violations in a number of categories. One, in tactical sense, when it is very difficult to tell who started what minor military engagement. I am sure they are doing their share. Second, regarding political prisoners.

Gromyko: A large-scale violation.

Dr. Kissinger: You will see from these exchanges that some violations are technical and some are real. We brought about the release of 5,000—not to the other side, but to their towns and villages. We have obtained the permission of Saigon that the ICCS can visit each of the 5,000 to verify the release. The PRG refused. Second, the South Vietnamese claim 40,000 civilians have been abducted. The other side claims it has only 637 civilian prisoners. Now 40,000 may be too high; but 637 is certainly too low.
We are prepared to use as much influence as possible on the South Vietnamese to get them to stop their violations. We will never get perfect compliance by both North and South. But we can certainly get sufficient improvement to reduce the risk of new conflict, which is our major concern.

I am taking Graham Martin\textsuperscript{16} to my meeting with Le Duc Tho, so he can hear what the North Vietnamese complaints are. When he goes to Saigon he will know of any agreement we reach with the North Vietnamese.

Gromyko: We were certainly very unpleasantly surprised when soon after the signing of the Paris Agreement and Act there began large-scale violations of the Agreement. We have had a mass of information regarding violations by Saigon. We have been and are in favor of the strictest possible observance of both the Agreement and the Act. But we can use our political weight, and proceeding from our known policies on this, but the main thing depends on the parties concerned, that is the signatories of the Paris Agreement. We are of the view that in certain respects the U.S. is behaving badly.

Dr. Kissinger: Like where?

Gromyko: We don’t think you are unable to bring influence to bear on Saigon, notably on the subject of the release of political prisoners.

I would not like to go deep into this subject, but merely to say we have ample information on this subject, just to draw your attention.

Second, to draw your attention to the conducting of military operations by the U.S. in Cambodia, and it now appears in Laos. After the signing of the Act, which contained references to Laos and Cambodia and maintaining the peace in those countries, the U.S. is continuing military operations. This has created a rather negative impression in the Soviet Union and many are asking what is it all about. We would certainly welcome rectification of the situation in both Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia; we would certainly welcome an end to all violations of the Agreement. We trust you don’t suspect we are taking any other stand on this; we are in favor of strict observance of both agreements.

You will recall we have had occasion to get in touch in Washington on certain aspects of the matter. I won’t repeat this now.

Let me just end by saying that the Soviet Union will do all in its power and will use all its influence and weight in favor of observance of the Agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: That is important. Let me make two comments.

Regarding Laos, we have done only two things, both when there was a specific attack by the Pathet Lao, and at the request of the Government that Hanoi recognizes.

Second, it is important to recognize that Hanoi has totally refused to comply with the provisions in Laos. There was an unconditional obligation for withdrawal. There was no condition of a political settlement. Then there was the agreement with Souvanna for withdrawal in 90 days; they haven’t done it. They are continuing violations.

Regarding Cambodia, we have a formal understanding with North Vietnam regarding seeking a ceasefire in Cambodia. We unilaterally stopped all military operations, and Lon Nol unilaterally halted offensive operations—though it is not easy to distinguish this from the usual behavior of the Cambodians.

We would be prepared for a solution analogous to Laos. We would discuss it, though it is not for us to negotiate it. We will stop military actions as soon as an agreement is reached. We have no purpose than to end the war. There has to be some minimum observation of an international agreement we have signed.

I will discuss this in Paris.

Gromyko: How do you envisage developments in Cambodia?

Dr. Kissinger: I visualize discussions between the insurgent side and Phnom Penh side to establish a ceasefire first, then some coalition structure in Phnom Penh in which all factions are included. We would prefer it without Sihanouk, but all sides would be represented. Sihanouk would be a disturbing element, for reasons which I don’t need to enumerate—it would introduce a great-power element. And in this context, the composition of the Phnom Penh side is also open to discussion. I am speaking frankly.

Gromyko: It appears to us that the position of Lon Nol is precarious. That is probably . . .

Dr. Kissinger: . . . true. But things in Cambodia never are quite as serious as they look.

Gromyko: Do you see any possibility for Sihanouk?

Dr. Kissinger: It is a possibility, but we would prefer to avoid it. When I was in Peking I refused to meet with him. We have ignored various overtures from him.

Dobrynin: Now you are prepared to accept him?

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17 The Lao Communists.
18 Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos.
19 General Lon Nol, President of the Khmer Republic, or Cambodia.
20 During Kissinger’s February 15–19 visit to China.
Dr. Kissinger: No, we are prepared to meet with people technically with him. We are not sure of their loyalty.

Gromyko: He is angry at you, and at us.

Dr. Kissinger: That is another reason not to encourage his return. We feel some of his so-called ministers, if they returned, might have different loyalties when in their country.

Gromyko: When will President Thieu be out, by the way?

Dr. Kissinger: A minor question!

Gromyko: That was an American promise.

Dr. Kissinger: That was never part of the American proposal. Only as part of an election in which all parties participate. Not even Le Duc Tho has asked for this.

Gromyko: That doesn’t mean we can’t ask for it.

Dr. Kissinger: But our objective is to ease the situation.

Gromyko: Does his presence help?

Dr. Kissinger: Le Duan’s presence doesn’t help.

Gromyko: That is in a different part of Vietnam. When are the general elections there?

Dr. Kissinger: He has announced them for August 26.

Dobrynin: Unilaterally.

Gromyko: One-sided elections. He will reelect himself.

Dr. Kissinger: No, it is for the Assembly.

Gromyko: Well, what do you expect in the South of Vietnam in the future? Do you think in the last few days it is somewhat more quiet?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, according to my reports, somewhat quieter. But the rains have started.

Gromyko: So nature works in a positive direction.

Dr. Kissinger: But in the north of South Vietnam, it is becoming dry. I think if it is quiet there for a year or two, great power interests would be further dissociated.

Gromyko: When do you meet the North Vietnamese representatives?

Dr. Kissinger: May 17.22 It is the day we agreed upon.

Gromyko: You will go home first?

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21 Ho Chi Minh’s successor and founder of the Indochinese Communist Party who served as General Secretary of the Communist Party in Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. He will almost certainly come through Moscow. You can tell him that if he makes a big effort, I will make a big effort.

Gromyko: Do you like him?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. He is pleasant, and intelligent, in the Vietnamese way.

I have to tell you about our negotiations on Laos and Cambodia. In Article 20, we said “the parties shall respect the Geneva Agreements.” He had trouble with that because in Vietnamese it meant only future, and implied they weren't complying with it now. We agreed on “must.”

Gromyko: Shall we meet at 10:00 for dinner?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Thank you.

[The meeting then ended.]

113. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)

Zavidovo, May 9, 1973, 1254Z.

Hakto 30. Please inform President as follows.

1. Spent another eight-plus hours with Brezhnev and Gromyko Tuesday. We covered bilateral issues, including trade, summit communiqué. A series of new bilateral agreements should be negotiable by the time of Brezhnev visit which though not major in themselves will keep momentum going. On trade, Brezhnev again displayed great eagerness for long-term projects as well as major additional credits. I gave generally favorable response but pointed out that specifics should be worked out in joint US-Soviet Commercial Commission and that immediate task for us is to get MFN legislation for which I assured Brezhnev you would fight.

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2 See Documents 111 and 112.
2. In separate session with Gromyko I hit hard on Vietnam peace agreement violations, serious consequences of DRV offensive and obstructionist behavior of Poles and Hungarians. Gromyko, like Brezhnev earlier, said Soviets support strict observance of agreements by all sides. Relationship of Vietnam situation to Brezhnev trip to US can hardly be lost on Soviets. On Middle East, Soviets toward end of session seemed to recognize uselessness of the maximalist position in their paper which they had given me earlier and showed some flexibility. We will explore in the next few weeks whether something can be done at the summit.

3. During four hour dinner Brezhnev was voluble and jovial and again struck theme of long-term US-Soviet friendship and his high regard for you, and displayed great anticipation of his US trip. I stressed several times the need for new concrete SALT accomplishment, a point I also made strongly with Dobrynin. Soviets claim they have not had time to study our specific proposals. Whether this is true or not, Brezhnev can be in no doubt that for US the nuclear war prevention agreement can not stand alone as major summit accomplishment.

4. I will have more considered overall assessment of this trip and how it fits into our present situation and general foreign policy strategy on my return.

114. Letter From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev


Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have been authorized by President Nixon to inform you that the text of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War is agreed between us in substance.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Kissinger Conversations at Zavidovo, May 5–8, 1973. No classification marking. The letter is on White House stationery but it was presumably prepared in Zavidovo to be given to Brezhnev before Kissinger's departure.

See Document 108 and footnote 2 thereto.
115. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


[Omitted here is discussion related to Kissinger’s trip to the Soviet Union.]

Kissinger: On China, I’m getting worried. I’m beginning to think that they [the Soviet Union] want to attack China. [unclear, Brezhnev?] took me hunting. He—you hunt there from a tower. You sit in a tower and shoot these poor bastards as they come by to feed. They put out the food. Well, when night fell, and he had killed about three boars and God knows what else—and that’s when it was dark—he unpacked a picnic dinner and said: “Look, I want to talk to you privately—nobody else, no notes.”\(^2\) And he said: “Look, you will be our partners, you and we are going to run the world”—

Nixon: Who’d he use as translator on that?

Kissinger: Sukhodrev. And he said: “The President and I are the only ones who can handle things.” He said: “We have to prevent the Chinese from having a nuclear program at all costs.” I’ve got to get that information to the Chinese, and we’ve got to play a mean game here—

Nixon: I know.

Kissinger: —because I don’t think we can let the Russians jump the Chinese.

Nixon: No.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 916–14. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. This is part of a conversation that took place from 10:15 a.m. to 12:03 p.m.

\(^2\) No record of this conversation was found.
Kissinger: I think the change in the world balance of power would be—

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: —too unbelievable.

Nixon: We all know that.

Kissinger: And, uh—so he [unclear] on politics, he said: “Anything you want,” he said, “the Republicans have to be back in in ’76.” He said: “Anything we—”

Nixon: He didn’t give you the crap on Watergate [unclear] been exposed to here?

Kissinger: The only thing on Watergate that Dobrynin said—

Nixon: Don’t let it get you down, Henry—

Kissinger: No. And, now, Dobrynin, the basic—the only thing Dobrynin is complaining about is the amateurishness of the guys who did it. He said: “Why did you do it out of the White House?”

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: But, I’m just telling you what Dobry—that’s the only—

Nixon: Well—

Kissinger: —the only concern the Russians have is they hate the Democrats. I mean, you should hear Brezhnev on Jackson. It’s not to be believed.

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: And he says they want you [unclear]—

Nixon: Oh—did they get into the business of—of the—that dog-gone exit visa, and that other thing?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: I worked with the Senators [unclear]—

[unclear exchange]

Kissinger: —promised it wouldn’t be re-introduced. I gave them a list of those 42 people who are being kept.

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: And they promised—

Nixon: And if we look at all we can do [unclear] “Just don’t let it”—I keep threatening the Senators that if they continue to insist on Jackson, it’ll blow the whole thing. Now, you know it won’t, but my point is—

Kissinger: Oh, it will. Who knows?

Nixon: What I meant is, it won’t because we’re going to get Jackson modified.

Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Jackson’s got to be modified in a way that they could be
given [unclear]. I have threatened the hell out of the Senators.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: But, did he mention—is there anything they know about
that?

Kissinger: Well, he said that if the Jackson Amendment goes
through, no Jew is going to leave the Soviet Union again.

Nixon: That’s right.

Kissinger: He—he said to me—

Nixon: That’s the point I’ve been making.

Kissinger: Well, you can’t repeat this, but he said—he took me
aside privately, he said: “Do you know what your people are doing?”
He said: “The Jews are already the privileged group—in a way, a privi-
leged group. They live in cities, they’re the only group that can have an
exit visa. No one else receives an exit visa, and you people keep humili-
ating us you’re going to create worst anti-Semitism ever in the Soviet
Union.” And I believe that it’s true.

Nixon: We can—we’re going to work on the Jackson Amendment.
I’m working my tail on it, Henry, but …

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East.]

116. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Reports on Meetings with Brezhnev

Atmosphere and Mood

Brezhnev’s hospitality was effusive, if unpredictable. The
meetings with him were frequently delayed and his invitations to go
boating and hunting came at literally the last minute. He took pleasure
in showing off his apartment, where all our regular sessions took place.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-

fice Files, Box 68, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 17,
On at least two occasions he was apparently infuriated by our position on the Middle East and the nuclear agreement, but preferred to postpone our meetings until he had calmed himself, rather than launching into a tirade directly at me as he had done last year.\(^2\) Brezhnev’s grasp of substance this time seemed less impressive than previously; he was uninterested in details, except on the nuclear agreement, and his attention span was short. He also seemed preoccupied, frequently getting up to make phone calls or leaving the meetings for short intervals. At the same time, he took some 25 hours of his time during the four days to spend with us. The entire time was spent at his country place, where no westerners have ever been invited. Indeed, some of the Russians had never seen it. It has several large houses and a big indoor swimming pool. A lake for boating and a huge hunting preserve are adjacent.

Even though it becomes stifling after a day or two, Brezhnev undoubtedly intended his reception to be one extreme cordiality and, as such, a symbol of his respect for you and of his obvious conviction that his relationship with you enhances his own authority and prestige. This is one reason Brezhnev is looking forward to his visit and his meetings with you with considerable eagerness. He sees a trip to the United States and its political results as perhaps the crowning achievement of his political career. He has the greatest personal respect for you and considers you a man he can deal with forthrightly.

At the same time, he is apprehensive. He is nervous about possible incidents, particularly since he plans to bring his family. He is quite upset with what he believes is domestic opposition in the U.S. to improved Soviet-American relations. Though partly tactical, his obsession with Senator Jackson was a recurrent theme in our conversations. Probably, he does fear that a ground swell of Anti-Sovietism on the Jewish question might poison the atmosphere of the visit.

The Nuclear Agreement

The agreement on the prevention of nuclear war is obviously the key to the visit in Brezhnev’s eyes. He has probably staked his position on the outcome of this project. It was the one thing that occupied his undivided attention. In the drafting sessions he almost outsmarted himself in an effort to insure that it was essentially completed before I departed.

You will recall that your initial strategy was to dangle the prospect of this agreement as a sort of regulator on Soviet conduct this past year.

And this has been effective. At the same time, given the agreement’s sensitive nature and its psychological overtones, it is difficult for this agreement to stand alone. It was envisaged that we might have to use it as a device to offset a tougher stand on Indochina if events led in that direction. Since the Soviets seem to be acting with restraint as far as the North Vietnamese are concerned, we have in the last three months turned to the substance of the nuclear agreement with effective results.

As regards the substance of the agreement, you will recall that originally the Soviets proposed in effect a straightforward bilateral non-aggression treaty, including a ban on use of nuclear weapons between the US and the USSR. When we countered with a broad declaration without commitments, the Soviets offered a text with overtones of US-Soviet condominium and with a free hand for themselves vis-à-vis China.

In the meetings with Brezhnev the issues centered around the first two articles which contain the key provisions on nuclear use and the use of force. The first provision of Article I is a general statement of objectives only: to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons. This was our basic approach, and the Soviets reluctantly accepted it. It involves no commitment not to use nuclear weapons. The second half of this article, however, makes attainment of the objective dependent on additional obligations, taken from the Basic Principles of May 29, 1972, that both sides would avoid exacerbating their relations, avoid military confrontations and exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between themselves and between either party and third countries.

There were three major disputes.

—First, the Soviets wanted to limit the non-use clause to the US and USSR, thus giving themselves a free hand to use nuclear weapons against third parties (China or NATO) while binding the US not to use nuclear weapons against the USSR. The second aspect was the exact operational language in describing the obligations. We preferred to say that both sides would “act in such a manner as” to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war, while the Soviets preferred to say do their utmost or do everything in their power. This phraseology plus their interpretation of the freedom against third countries was obviously out of the question.

At the first negotiating session Brezhnev wanted to drop out obligations to third countries or build them up to the point that US and USSR would seem to be settling all international conflicts. This was left unresolved, but when we resumed on Sunday evening, I read your instructions and Brezhnev yielded to our version.

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3 See Documents 105 and 110.
4 See Document 108 and footnote 2 thereto.
Thus on the critical aspect of this agreement we have succeeded in moving from a strictly bilateral non-aggression formula to a broad restraint on Soviet policy, which fully protects third countries. This is spelled out in more explicit terms in Article II, which is linked to the first Article, in that any use of force or threat of use would violate the agreement and make the nuclear aspects inoperative.

Thus, there is no way that the Soviets can use force or provoke a confrontation without throwing over this agreement.

—Article IV also produced a major debate. This calls for consultations between the US and USSR, if our relations or if relations between either country and third states risk a nuclear conflict. Originally this article also included a consultation provision that would have applied should relations between other states risk a nuclear war, for example, between India and China. We felt this was another attempt at a US-Soviet condominium, and a possible basis for Soviet intervention in such third country conflicts. Thus we pressed hard to limit the commitment to consult only in those instances where there would be a risk of war between the US and USSR arising out of a third country conflict or crisis or between one of the parties and a third country.

Again your instructions turned Brezhnev around, though he thoroughly understood that in doing so he abandoned any claim to use consultation as the basis for intervention in a crisis that did not threaten the US or the USSR.

—Finally, in the last article we had a bitter dispute over the last clause which states that the agreement does not affect or impair the obligation undertaken by the US towards its allies or other countries, “in treaties, agreements and other appropriate instruments.” The Soviets wanted to limit this statement to treaties and agreements, thus excluding any unilateral obligation the US might undertake, for example, a moral commitment to Israel or the Monroe Doctrine. After adamantly rejecting the addition of “appropriate instruments,” Brezhnev finally yielded on this point as well.

All of these concessions, which he accepted after I read your instructions, led him to blow up. Dobrynin claimed Brezhnev was infuriated, but nevertheless he has accepted our essential demands.

We have now succeeded in building up clear provisions against Soviet use of nuclear weapons against third countries. I believe we have also succeeded in creating a web of conditions in the first three articles in which the Soviets cannot turn on NATO or China, without violating this agreement. In addition, the agreement is so drawn that none of our NATO commitments, including the use of nuclear weapons in case of overwhelming attack, is impaired. Of course, none of this would ultimately deter the Soviets but the increasingly complex relationship
we are developing—in this agreement and in economics, in SALT, etc. will have to be a critical calculation in Brezhnev’s decision-making.

In sum, your instructions to stand firm on the substance of this agreement enabled us to nail down broader inhibitions on Soviet policy. China will remain the unknown, and it is clear from his conversation that Brezhnev is obsessed with his China problem. Whether he decides to use force is the major question, but this current nuclear project with him could divert him from that course.

**SALT**

Brezhnev’s eagerness for the nuclear project was of some value as a lever in pressing him to deal more concretely with SALT. Shortly before my departure for Moscow, the Soviets gave us some very general, but disadvantageous Basic Principles of a permanent SALT agreement. Article IV of their draft was a sweeping proposal to include all of our aircraft stationed abroad, and Article X was a strict prohibition against transferring any offensive weapons or technical assistance to third countries (e.g., the UK). Otherwise, the draft was non-substantive, and failed to deal with numerical levels or MIRVs.

Our counter draft introduced more substance. We proposed that ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers would be subject to equitable limits and that other nuclear delivery systems would be handled by a joint pledge not to circumvent the agreement. We dropped out the question of non-transfer entirely, and added a specific reference to limiting multiple reentry vehicles.

The Soviets returned another draft that accepted much of our paper, and considerably softened their original position on our overseas bases and aircraft and softened the non-transfer clause though the latter is still unacceptable. I pressed Brezhnev to deal with specific substance particularly on MIRVs. I argued that after more than 3 years of negotiation any principles would have to be more than platitudes. I outlined three approaches stemming from Verification Panel studies:

1. to deal with both numerical levels of major intercontinental systems and with MIRVs by freezing the status quo, in which the Soviets could not test or deploy MIRVs on land-based ICBMs and we would stop at our current deployment of around 350 Minuteman III;
2. we could deal with MIRVs separately along the same lines;
3. we could ban the

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5 The Soviet draft of the Basic Principles of the SALT agreement was transmitted in backchannel message WH 30981 from Johnson in Geneva to Kissinger, May 2, 2349Z. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Messages, 1973, SALT, Geneva)

6 The U.S. counter draft is in the second section of backchannel message WH 30981.


8 See footnote 5, Document 110.
USSR from putting MIRVs on their very heavy ICBMs (the SS–9 type), and in turn we might ban ballistic missiles from our bombers.

Brezhnev, in effect, ruled out MIRV limits for now, though he claimed he had not had time to study our proposals. He argued that we could easily violate a MIRV freeze, by continuing our deployments and the USSR could not monitor our compliance. He also claimed a MIRV freeze on land-based ICBMs would be unequal. He described a new MIRV system with 4–8 independently-guided reentry vehicles, each with its own computer. This sounds plausible but we have not picked this up in any Soviet tests.

**Vietnam**

I took a strong position with Brezhnev on Vietnam. He seemed to understand the gravity of the situation, and claims that the Soviets are exercising and urging restraint.

I think that he recognizes that we may be forced to take some strong steps; with the summit in view, he will probably use whatever influence he wields in Hanoi to dampen down the situation.

**China**

We discussed this only in a very private meeting, but Brezhnev went quite far in denouncing the Chinese and warning us of their perfidy. His remarks also had some ominous overtones, suggesting that he has been turning over in his mind the possibilities of a confrontation or even an attack. He claimed China was the only threat to the USSR and in effect, probed the possibility of taking joint action against Chinese nuclear facilities, or at least having the US remain passive while the Soviets did so. Indeed, Dobrynin asked me for the first time whether we had any agreement with China; I told him we did not, but that we had clear national interests. Our discussions could leave no illusion in Brezhnev’s mind that we would simply give him a free hand.

China thus remains a major variable in Soviet policy; it could lead to a major crisis in the next 12–18 months. But it is also a point of critical leverage for us.

It may be that sometime late in the summer we would want to arrange with the Chinese for a visit by Chou En-lai to the UN in the fall and a meeting with you in Washington. In any event, we must look at our contingency planning for the event of Soviet military action against China.

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9 No record of this conversation was found. See Document 115.
Europe

There was not much to discuss on Europe, since most of the issues are tactical, and Brezhnev left them to Gromyko. Their main interest is that the European Security Conference start in late June. On MBFR they offered to begin some discreet bilateral talks during the summer. They seemed unprepared to discuss the substance of MBFR and frankly, I think they are quite unsure of how to proceed.

Economics

Brezhnev’s economic position is our second point of leverage. He outlined an economic relationship involving a long term grain agreement and credits for purchasing consumer goods and equipment of about $2 billion. He wants to consummate this at the summit, at least in general terms. There are some technical problems in granting credits of this size, but it is clear that if we are interested, a much broader economic arrangement with the USSR, one that would tie the USSR to the US as much as any factor, is possible. This explains Brezhnev’s fears about the fate of MFN in the Congress, and explains why he was willing to make some concession on Jewish emigration.

Other Bilateral Questions

The Soviets and we have been reviewing areas of bilateral cooperation beyond those agreed at the Moscow summit. We have had a detailed NSSM study done10 and the agencies are now under instruction to move rapidly with the Soviets in such fields as cultural exchange, transportation, agricultural research, oceanography and, possibly peaceful uses of atomic energy.11 Brezhnev agreed to issue similar instructions to the Soviet side.

The Outlook

On the basis of Brezhnev’s mood and the contents of the talks, it is likely that you will hold the high cards at the summit. Judged against the background of recent changes in the Soviet leadership, and the strong public commitment Brezhnev has made to a conciliatory relationship with you, he must succeed in Washington. Your China policy and Soviet economic difficulties are your strong points.

At the same time, the probable results can mark a further advance in our relations. By the time he departs the US on June 26, he should be deeply committed to a more positive relationship with the US. He will, of course, try to exploit it, especially against the Chinese and also in Europe. But your trip to Europe this fall, and the careful efforts we have

10 For NSSM 176 and its response, see Documents 83 and 93.
11 See Document 103.
made to keep the British, Germans and French informed on the key Soviet-American issues should enable you to offset whatever tactical moves Brezhnev makes in the wake of the summit.

117. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon


Dear Mr. President,

You have already been informed, of course, by Dr. Kissinger of the talks we had with him in Moscow. On my part, I feel that the exchange of opinion which took place, was useful, from the point of view of moving ahead in the questions that will be the subject of our discussions during my visit to the US next June.

It is good, first of all, that we have agreed on the main issue—regarding the agreement between the USSR and the US on the prevention of nuclear war, which will be signed by you and me.

I would like to tell you, Mr. President, that the present finally agreed text allows us to say that we will do a great thing of real historical importance. And we have no doubts that this agreement corresponds to the interests of not only our two countries, but of the peoples of the whole world as well.

I regard as useful also the exchange of views on the limitation of strategic arms. True, we were not able yet to finally agree on the document regarding the principles of further talks on that matter because of the shortness of time. But we have in mind, as it was agreed with Dr. Kissinger, to proceed with this work in the confidential channel. We continue to believe that the adoption of such a document at the meeting would give a necessary impetus to those talks.

I would like to emphasize, Mr. President, that we are for continued active talks on that problem, for search of mutually acceptable solutions in the field of the limitation of strategic arms with the use for that purpose of both the confidential channel and the negotiations in Geneva.

Among other bilateral issues, touched upon in the talks with Dr. Kissinger, of important significance are, of course, the questions of trade and economic ties. The general approach of yours and ours to the development of those ties seems to be identically positive. Yet the creation of necessary favorable prerequisites in the sense of equal conditions for trade and credits is naturally required for the realization of our common interest in widening and deepening trade and economic ties, in finding new forms for those ties. We took note of the explanations and appropriate assurances on the matter given by Dr. Kissinger on your behalf.

As for the international problems, we always believed that one of the most critical issues is that of the Middle East. And now great dangers are in wait of us in the Middle East. The developments there can take such a turn which neither we, nor—I believe—you would like to happen. We frankly expressed to Dr. Kissinger our appraisal of the present situation. Our statements might have sounded quite blunt to Dr. Kissinger, yet the bluntness is dictated by the explosiveness of the situation itself.2

In the conversation with Dr. Kissinger it was said—and I would like to repeat it to you personally—that if the main question of withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories, occupied in 1967, is settled, then all the other questions, including those of the security of Israel and of other countries of the region, can be solved; frankly speaking, they will not then be an obstacle for the settlement. And it is the leaders of Israel themselves who constantly maintain, that those are the very questions, i.e. the questions of security, which concern them.

Dr. Kissinger also offered a number of considerations on how, in the US opinion, it would be possible to act further on the questions of the Middle East settlement. Certain ideas, expressed by him, went, in our view, in the direction of facilitating the search of a solution of the main question—that of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories. But, frankly speaking, there is a lack of completeness here. We hope that necessary clarity will be added to the US position on this question when we receive the communication from you on that matter, as was promised by Dr. Kissinger, within 7 or 10 days after his return to Washington.3

We, on our part, are prepared to work on the Middle East problem, sparing neither time nor efforts, before my visit to the US. There may not be any doubt that the fixation at our meeting of exact and clear understanding between ourselves regarding the ways of the Middle East

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2 See Document 112.
3 See Document 120.
settlement on a just and solid basis would be another major milestone both in the relations between our countries and in the normalization of the world situation as a whole. I believe that this is a feasible task and the achievement of such mutual understanding would undoubtedly give a due impetus to the peaceful settlement in the Middle East and to the working out by the parties concerned of concrete measures of its implementation.

No special difficulties appeared in the exchange of opinion with Dr. Kissinger on European questions, including those related to the preparation and the holding of the all-European conference. Apparently, our representatives have to continue to maintain regular contacts on those matters. There will be, of course, enough here for you and me to talk about—in a wider and more long-term perspective.

In conclusion, I would like once more to note the constructiveness of the talks with Dr. Kissinger and the atmosphere of frankness, in which they were held and which increasingly characterize our relations. The talks were a useful prelude to the important negotiations which we shall have with you in the month of June.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

4 Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

118. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee (Ratliff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Covert Activities against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Attached is a status report and renewal of CIA’s eight-project covert action program of publishing, distribution and contacts directed at

1 Source: National Security Council, Nixon Administration Intelligence Files, Subject Files, USSR. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Outside System. Sent for action. Sonnenfeldt and Kennedy concurred.
intellectuals in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Tab A).\(^2\) CIA has sponsored some of these activities for more than 22 years. The program includes the publishing and distribution efforts formerly sponsored by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. An expenditure of $3,759,000 is planned for Fiscal Year 1974.

Included in the program are:

[Omitted here are the organizations receiving support.]

State, Defense, JCS and CIA 40 Committee principals approve continuation of this program.

Recommendation:

That you approve continuation of this covert action program.\(^3\)

Tab A

Memorandum for the 40 Committee\(^4\)


SUBJECT

Covert Action Activities Directed at the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

1. Summary

CIA conducts a coordinated covert action program designed to sustain pressures for liberalization and socio-political change from within the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc. This program, which supports media publication and distribution to Soviet and East European citizens, consists of the following individual projects:

[Omitted here is a list of the organizations receiving support.]

2. Status Report

This covert action program is a coordinated publishing and distribution effort directed against the Soviet/East European target. Books and periodicals produced under this program have the objective of stimulating and sustaining pressures for political liberalization within the Soviet Union and other Eastern European nations. The program aims at and, in a measure, has succeeded in generating pressures on

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\(^3\) Kissinger initialed his approval on June 18.

\(^4\) Sensitive; Secret; Eyes Only.
these regimes from indigenous dissidents who have been seeking increased intellectual freedom, social and economic reforms, and, for non-Russians, a recognition of their national identity, culture and heritage. This program also uses CIA propaganda assets in non-Bloc areas to place items reporting Soviet repressive acts and encouraging free world support for the dissident movement.

The USSR is experiencing a marked increase in political and religious dissent and nationalist anti-Russian sentiment in its various republics. Arrests and convictions of dissenters are increasing, and under the guise of a comparatively generous emigration policy Jewish dissenters have been permitted to leave the country, ridding the Soviets of a troublesome group. There is no abatement in the well-established Soviet practice of committing dissident intellectuals to mental institutions in an effort to reorient their thinking.

The Russian dissident democratic movement is still producing the bi-monthly *Chronicle of Current Events*, a samizdat (self-published) record of repressive measures and arrests taking place in the Soviet Union. The *Chronicle* is exfiltrated to the West in spite of the vigilance of the KGB and the increase of repressive measures. Entire manuscripts of books which cannot be published in the USSR are being made available for publication abroad. CIA’s covert media program supports their initial publication in many instances and their subsequent infiltration into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Responses from individuals in the target area substantiate the receipt of this material. The effectiveness of the program is also clearly demonstrated by vituperative attacks in Bloc printed media and on the radio. These attacks are made not only against the books and periodicals, but also against individual authors and the editors of our publications. These editors have been brought to national attention within their former homelands by their constantly being portrayed in regime propaganda as bourgeois anti-Communist traitors.

Impressive testimony to the validity and impact of our efforts to communicate developments and provide moral support to Soviet citizens has been volunteered by a group of recent émigrés with whom we have held wide-ranging discussions in Europe and the United States. These well-educated, perceptive observers represent the post-Stalín era professional intelligentsia and afford a unique insight into that critical community.

The group unanimously described Russian-language communication of news, information and ideas as the most important service the West can render their self-styled democratic movement, and specified broadcasting, newspapers, periodicals and books as the prime Western vehicles for informing and stimulating the expansion of the movement. Materials thus disseminated enable the Soviet intelligentsia to criticize
their society more articulately and provide heartening evidence of the
free world’s moral support. One of the regime’s principal curbs on the
movement’s expansion is constant economic pressure. Dissidents are
dismissed from their jobs, are unable to obtain new ones, and find eco-
nomic survival increasingly difficult. Thus, the émigrés emphasized
the importance and sustaining influence of prompt, detailed and con-
tinuous international reporting of every known act of regime repres-
sion, as well as objective and sophisticated comment on other negative
aspects of Soviet society.

Soviet reader interest in CIA-reprinted Russian literature may be
gauged by Moscow black market prices: [8 lines not declassified] The lat-
ter, first published over twenty years ago, will be reissued shortly with
our assistance.

All of the persons of varying national backgrounds who are associ-
ated with this program have several years of experience in combating
communism and Soviet-inspired repression in their own countries.
Many were involved in underground operations as young men during
World War II, and almost all have prices on their heads. [2½ lines not de-
classified] The rich background provided by the cumulative experience
of these men is invaluable to CIA in assuring an effective propaganda
program designed to encourage a more genuinely liberal internal poli-
ty and a freer flow of ideas from the West, leading to genuine détente.

During the past year more than 500,000 books, periodicals and
pamphlets have been distributed to individuals in the target areas or to
travelers from the Bloc. The content and quality of these publications
have been improved through closer coordination of these activities
within CIA, and new distribution techniques have been introduced to
evade Bloc censorship and border controls. Nearly every significant
samizdat document which has been received in the West has been pub-
lished and redistributed in the target area. Dissident events within the
Soviet Union and the East European countries continue to receive wide
publicity, not only in the Bloc, but throughout the remainder of the
world. During the coming year it is planned to continue this program,
expanding wherever possible.

3. Alternatives

The United States Government could disassociate itself partially or
completely from Soviet Bloc émigré activities and discontinue or scale
down the support given to this type of publication and distribution
program. This would inevitably result in a loss of capability to maintain
pressure on the Soviet and East European governments for liberalizing
measures. Cessation of U.S. Government support to all or part of this
program would serve to dishearten and thereby lessen the effec-
tiveness of those Soviet and East European residents who are presently
sustained both by the materials the programs provide and the feeling of contact with émigrés and the West. The Soviet leadership would also tend to view such a step as evidence of Western disinterest in their repressive policies, which would likely be intensified.

The publication and distribution of this type of literature to a receptive Communist audience could be subsidized by other Government agencies, or by private enterprise. There are, however, no known initiatives on the part of any other agency to enter this field, and such initiatives would lack the unattributable nature of the CIA program. Sponsorship by private corporations, institutions or universities would lack the elements of governmental control and coordination which are essential to the effective operation of the program.

4. Risks and Contingency Planning

[Omitted here is the section on “Risks and Contingency Planning.”]

5. Coordination

This covert action program was last approved by the 40 Committee on 22 September 1971. The current submission was approved on 2 January 1973 by the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

6. Cost

The FY 1972 costs and FY 1973 budget for this covert action program are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 1972</td>
<td>$3,014,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1973</td>
<td>$3,561,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Funds for these programs are included in CIA’s FY 1973 budget.

7. Recommendation

It is recommended that the 40 Committee approve the continuation of this covert action program directed against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, including the projected funding level.
The Washington Summit, June 1973

119. National Intelligence Estimate


THE SOVIET APPROACH TO SUMMIT II

Précis

This paper does not presume to develop a scenario for the Washington Summit or to describe Soviet negotiating positions in detail. Its purpose is to describe the broad aims and calculations which will underlie the Soviet, and Brezhnev’s personal, approach to the occasion.

Some of the principal observations made are as follows:

—The present Soviet course of seeking normalization and détente in relations with the West is not conceived as a brief tactical phase; Brezhnev’s policy has strong backing at home and it is likely to endure for some time.

—The policy springs from a calculation that a skillfully managed détente can enhance the USSR’s relative power position, especially in Europe. It springs equally from recognition of vulnerabilities, especially economic weaknesses, which the Soviets believe cooperation with the West can help to overcome.

—Brezhnev’s main purpose in Washington will be to give momentum to the recent positive development of Soviet-American relations; he will be less concerned to achieve substantive agreements of major significance.

—He will give great emphasis to economic relations, especially pushing MFN, promoting investment in Soviet resource development on favorable terms, and facilitating arrangements for acquiring US technology.

—The occasion is unlikely to produce any major changes in Soviet positions on SALT or MBFR; Brezhnev might, however, join in some move to expedite negotiations.

—On crisis areas like Indochina and the Middle East, the Soviets may convey willingness to cooperate tacitly, but they are unlikely to

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem; [handling caveat not declassified]. A note on the original indicates that the NIE was prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the NSA, the AEC, the FBI, and the Treasury; and was concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board.
enter upon joint, explicit arrangements with the US which their friends would see as “collusion.”

— Even if Summit II does not produce important and concrete results on many specific issues, the atmospheric effects will almost certainly be positive and will confirm Brezhnev’s belief that the present course of Soviet policy is the correct one.

The Estimate

1. Brezhnev comes to Washington more confident of his position and policies than he has been at any time in his years of power. He can approach Summit II with all the authority he needs to pursue a central goal, one which he sees as serving vital Soviet foreign policy and domestic requirements at this time; further progress toward a modus vivendi with the West and, as a major part of this, the further development of Soviet-US bilateral relations.

Basic Policy Determinants

2. The present Soviet policy as a whole proceeds from the Brezhnev leadership’s conviction that the USSR currently has opportunities to improve its relative position, especially in Europe, but also has serious vulnerabilities. Both argue for eased relations with the West. On the optimistic side, the Soviet leaders believe that present international trends offer the USSR a chance to gain ground on the US in international power, and they see in “peaceful coexistence,” dynamically managed, a safe way of grasping the chance. The Soviets, having substantially achieved strategic parity, now find the US to be curtailing its international commitments and troubled by various problems at home; they see the Atlantic alliance as agitated by divisive trade and monetary issues, and seemingly unsure of its purposes and policies in the security sphere. By this kind of Soviet reckoning, the West, including the US, is ready for détente with the USSR—and more likely now than previously to make concessions to get it.

3. But Moscow’s confidence is mixed with anxieties about other aspects of its international position and about obvious weaknesses in its domestic base. Because of this, there is reason to believe that Soviet policy is not now in one of those purely tactical and transient phases of détente so familiar in the past. The Soviets have reasons—arising out of weakness as well as strength—to seek a genuine, albeit limited, accommodation with the US and its European allies.

— The Soviet leaders recognize that a measure of mutual confidence is necessary if the costs and risks of uncontrolled competition in strategic weapons between the superpowers are to be avoided. Moreover, they are under pressure to devote resources in increasing quantity to domestic non-military purposes.
—They also appreciate that some degree of understanding, and even cooperation, between the superpowers could well be necessary to prevent the intensification of regional conflicts into which both might be drawn.

—Because of their fundamental and abiding concern with China, the Soviets want to limit Sino-American rapprochement. They fear, apparently to an irrational degree, that the mutual hostility between themselves and China, combined with the latter's moves toward normalization of relations with the US, Europe, and Japan, could one day lead to the USSR's isolation in world politics.

—They see cooperation with the US as conducive to the process of negotiation in Europe from which they hope to achieve stabilization of their sphere in Eastern Europe, gains in trade and technology, and eventually greater influence in Western Europe.

—The Soviets now frankly recognize that they cannot by their own efforts overcome the technological backwardness that keeps them from joining the front ranks of the advanced industrial states. Failures in agriculture imply some dependence on grain imports for years to come. The Soviets believe—and their expectations seem exaggerated—that they can develop broader economic relations with the West which can go far toward solving these problems.

Internal Factors

4. There has been internal resistance to the current foreign policy line: apparently at the top political level (the demotion and eventual dismissal from the Politburo of Shelest was probably partly due to this factor), and probably less directly from defense interests, worried about the possible consequences of arms negotiations, and from elements in the party and police bureaucracies, which fear the internal consequences of wider contacts with the West. And Soviets at many levels will continue to ask why their government, even while tightening internal discipline, should move toward cordial relations with the old capitalist enemy. Such attitudes will help to reinforce certain instincts of the Soviet leaders themselves and will set limits on how far they will want to go in East-West détente. Signs that this policy was having seriously unsettling effects within the USSR—or, equally, in Eastern Europe—would almost certainly cause them to apply the brakes.

5. Brezhnev's personal role has been pivotal. Although not the sole architect of current foreign policies, he has now made them his own, and he has at least had primary responsibility for overcoming the resistance to these policies and for shaping the political consensus which supports them. Obviously, then, he has no small political investment in their success or failure, both as a vehicle for projecting Soviet
influence abroad and as a device for extracting help for the Soviet economy. He could be hurt politically, or might himself choose to shift direction, if present expectations were seriously disappointed. Moreover, Brezhnev is now 66, and many of his principal colleagues are even older; they cannot continue indefinitely and new men will thus be moving into the top positions.

6. It follows that the line Brezhnev now espouses is not irreversible. But the chief elements in this policy have been working their way to the surface throughout the post-Stalin period; important aspects of it are likely to persist, simply because to move in other directions—toward isolationism or confrontation tactics—would hardly seem to be attractive alternatives, given the USSR’s domestic imperatives and the problem of China. Thus there are strong incentives on the Soviet side to make Summit II a success and to continue on the détente course.

Brezhnev’s Expectations for Summit II

7. Brezhnev will be interested in the aura the Summit will generate as well as its substantive content. He is likely to view Summit II chiefly as an opportunity to reinforce the momentum established at Summit I. He has less need for specific accomplishments now than then, but the general picture conveyed—at home, in the US, and around the world—as to the state of US-Soviet relations is important to him. He wants, for instance, to show that US-Soviet relations are progressing at least at an equal pace with the improvement in US-Chinese relations.

8. Brezhnev will also be seeking —on this, his first visit to the US and the first visit by a Soviet party chief since 1959 —to stimulate a conciliatory attitude toward himself and Soviet aims on the part of the American public, with the accent probably on the genuineness of Moscow’s desire to see the Cold War ended and a new page in East-West relations opened. Realizing that Congress will have an influential role with respect to projects of considerable interest to him (e.g., trade and MFN legislation), he will probably be attempting to make a favorable impression in that quarter. He will no doubt want, at the same time, to cultivate his relationship with the President and to indicate that he values the President’s sponsorship of a relaxation in US-Soviet relations. He will thus probably temper any inclination to extract negotiating advantage from current controversies in the US. He would expect that such a demeanor could be more beneficial for the USSR’s relations with the US over the longer run.

9. In his bargaining posture, Brezhnev will naturally want to radiate confidence in Soviet strength and a sense of equality. He will take the position that the further development of Soviet-American relations is no less in the US’ interest than in the USSR’s. US-made “linkages”, besides representing less than the best bargain as the Soviets see it, also
suggest to them that the US is attempting to use Soviet vulnerabilities in one area to extract concessions in another, and this stirs old feelings of inferiority. Nonetheless, Brezhnev is surely realist enough to recognize that the US will expect a return for helping him with his economic difficulties and not taking advantage of his China problem. He will probably anticipate that the US will be asking him to show movement on such matters as force reductions in Europe (MBFR) and to exercise restraint in the Middle East and Vietnam. In addition, he will know that he will be asked to explain the Soviet position on Jewish emigration.

**Areas for Discussion**

10. *Economic and Trade Relations.* As Brezhnev acknowledged during his recent visit to West Germany, the USSR is beginning to move away from its traditional policy of autarky. The Soviets are prepared to accept a certain degree of dependence on the West in order to overcome their technological lag and get help in developing their natural resources. They have evidently gone some way toward convincing themselves—perhaps over-optimistically—that there is substantial opportunity for developing US-Soviet economic relations to their advantage. They have good political as well as economic reasons for wanting to see this happen; among these is their desire to be acknowledged as a great power qualified to be treated as an equal in economic as well as other dealings. And their economic motivation in itself is very strong. They will have to have increased trade, and especially substantial new credits, to cover the cost of additional imported technology and know-how. Much of the assistance they seek could be obtained from Western Europe and Japan. But they feel that the US and Soviet economies are more nearly similar in scale, and they have a high regard for American technology. They probably reckon that the opening up of US-Soviet economic relations would, in any case, stimulate a competitive reaction on the part of other Western nations.

11. Brezhnev will probably be pressing harder to produce signs of progress in this area than in any other. He has considerable personal knowledge of and interest in the USSR’s agricultural problems. Even if the need for foreign wheat becomes less acute than it was last year, there will be a continuing need for substantial imports of feed grains, important for the expansion of the Soviet livestock base. A long-term US-Soviet grain deal could have advantages for the USSR in terms of a guaranteed source of supply, assured prices, and fixed delivery schedules. Brezhnev will surely be interested in learning what the prospects are for a deal at the right price. He will expound on the potential of the Soviet market for American business, argue the USSR’s reliability

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2 Brezhnev met with Brandt on May 28.
as a trading partner, and stress that the USSR could help the US with its energy problem. In particular, he will want to stimulate official and private interest in joint US-Soviet ventures for the development of Soviet resources—natural gas being one obvious example—since the Soviets see this as the most feasible way for them to finance any very large increase in imports. At the same time, he will, as already noted, be lobbying, with an eye particularly on the US Congress, for long-term, low-interest credits and MFN treatment. Without doubt, he will try to have the final communiqué on his visit contain the strongest possible expression of the President’s desire to see US-Soviet economic relations grow.

12. SALT. Brezhnev will arrive fully briefed on the issues underlying the present impasse at Geneva. Even if certain limited SALT agreements are ready for signature, he will understand that Summit II cannot be capped by major strategic arms agreements as Summit I was. He may be inclined simply to project a positive attitude toward the negotiations and otherwise confine himself to probing for give in the US position. On certain issues—US nuclear-armed systems stationed in Europe, for example—he will almost certainly reiterate the Soviet maximal position, without necessarily expecting this to have any specific result. Yet Brezhnev certainly does not want the Geneva negotiations to become completely stalled; he could consider the Summit the right moment for decisions to be made at the highest political level which would move the talks forward. What he might propose or accept in this regard can only be conjectured: he might be prepared to join in a declaration setting general priorities for the present phase of SALT, or even perhaps to agree to issue instructions to both delegations to focus next on the problem of qualitative controls, e.g., MIRVs/MRVs.

13. European Security Issues. The Soviets remain convinced that a European security conference (CSCE) could help them to increase their political influence and economic ties in Western Europe, as well as contribute to the consolidation of their position in Eastern Europe. Moscow is less interested in the negotiation on MBFR, or at least less certain as to what benefits might be derived from that negotiation. What Brezhnev would like to obtain from the US at this point are assurances on the content and timing of CSCE—commitment, in the one case, not to press hard on the issue of freedom of communication between Eastern and Western Europe, and, in the other, agreement to allow CSCE to be completed before MBFR is convened. He will be aware that this matter can stir trouble in US-allied relations. As for MBFR, Brezhnev will probably see the need, being in the US capital, to display a constructive attitude, and also the advantage of playing on West European concerns about US-Soviet bilateralism. He might think he could do both by proposing that the reductions process begin with the US and the USSR making to-
ken cuts or at most by carrying out something like a 10 percent cut on either side.

14. Middle East. The USSR accepts as a minimum that it and the US have a common interest in avoiding direct confrontation in the Middle East. After its experience with Egypt, it is also generally uneasy about its relations with the radical Arab states and about its lack of leverage in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time, the USSR is undoubtedly under pressure from its frustrated Egyptian clients to get the US to exert pressures on Israel. Thus Brezhnev will hope, whether through an initiative of his own or through his response to a US initiative, to have the Summit produce some evidence of the determination of the Great Powers to renew efforts for a political settlement. If he does have his own proposals to make, none are likely to be new; they will place heavy stress on the need for the US to get Israel to commit itself to vacating occupied Arab territories.

15. Moscow sees the Middle East not only as the arena of Arab-Israeli struggle but also as a prime theater of Soviet-American competition. This places strict limits on how far Brezhnev would be willing to go at the Summit in any explicit, joint undertakings with the US aimed at reducing the likelihood of conflict. If, in fact, conflict or the clear threat of it were to develop, Moscow would probably enter direct communications with the US in an attempt to exercise some form of “crisis management.” The Soviets do not see the present situation as requiring measures of this kind—which could make them vulnerable to charges of “collusion.” It is a near certainty that the Russians will continue to insist that they will not negotiate a Middle East arms control agreement except as part of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli issue.

16. Vietnam. The Soviets would be concerned also in the case of Vietnam lest they expose themselves to allegations of “collusion” with the US. They would probably be disinclined on this account to engage overtly with the US in measures aimed at preserving the cease-fire, other than to reaffirm the validity of the Paris Agreements. They would be strongly averse to committing themselves expressly to limiting the delivery of arms to North Vietnam. Yet the Soviets almost certainly believe that their interests on the whole would not be well served by a re-heating of the war, and Brezhnev may be prepared to go at least as far as to convey this attitude to the US. He might perhaps, in addition, indicate implicitly his readiness to exercise restraint in arms supplies, at least as long as the cease-fire is in effect.

17. China. The problem of China will be very much on Brezhnev’s mind throughout the Summit, even if it is not directly discussed. While Brezhnev may believe that exposing Soviet anxieties about China would weaken his negotiating hand, his interest in the subject is bound
to emerge in some way. He will, at least, be seeking to find clues as to where the US is planning to go in its relations with Peking and to get across the idea that beyond a certain point the US would be purchasing improved relations with the Chinese at the expense of its relations with the USSR. Although it would suit him to do so, he will recognize that he would have little chance of succeeding in an attempt to insinuate anti-Chinese overtones into the US-Soviet Summit.

18. Even if Summit II does not produce important and concrete results on many specific issues, Brezhnev is likely to go away pleased. He will be persuaded that the occasion itself has added to his stature as a world statesman and increased his authority at home. Although, as noted above, the present course of Soviet policy is not irreversible, the forces working for a more restrained power competition will no doubt be further strengthened. Nothing will have changed Moscow’s view that the Soviet-American relationship retains at bottom an adversary character. But Brezhnev is likely to be confirmed in his belief that the present course of Soviet policy, especially the aspect of dealing with the US at the Summit in an atmosphere of relative normalization, is the correct one.

120. Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev


Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have read with great interest the account you so kindly sent me of your visit to the Federal Republic and the conversations you held with Chancellor Brandt. It is evident that the visit was a fruitful one and produced very favorable results. Both you and the Chancellor are to be congratulated.

We are now in the final stages of preparing for your historic visit to this country. All the signs point to an outcome that will further

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2 The letter describing Brezhnev’s May 28 visit with Brandt, is ibid.
strengthen the beneficial relations between our two countries and the prospects for lasting peace in the world.

I should like in this letter to review certain of the major items on our agenda.

First of all, as you noted in your letter of May 15, we have now completed the work of drafting an agreement on the question of the prevention of nuclear war. The agreement that we will sign will be of truly historical importance. Building as it does on the basic principles we signed last year, this agreement will undoubtedly be a most important aspect of our meetings. I profoundly hope, as I know you do, Mr. General Secretary, that in signing it, we will be taking a significant step not only toward reducing the danger of a devastating nuclear war, but also toward creating the conditions in the world where wars of any kind and the use of force will no longer afflict mankind. That we have taken this step while fully recognizing and respecting the rights and interests of other countries, is a mark of statesmanship. I am convinced that as our relations improve and worldwide peace is strengthened, additional important steps toward the ultimate exclusion of wars will become possible.

The negotiations that have produced this agreement have lasted for more than a year during which we have had many frank exchanges on the complex and delicate issues involved. Both of us will of course be expected to assess and interpret the meaning and significance of our agreement.

To avoid any possible misunderstanding, let me therefore tell you briefly the view that I shall express. It would be my hope that we could both express ourselves in similar terms since any significant differences would detract from what we have been able to accomplish.

My view is that we have set forth an objective and certain modes of conduct applicable to the policies of each of our countries in the years ahead. In doing this, we have not agreed to ban the use of any particular weapons but have taken a major step toward the creation of conditions in which the danger of war, and especially of nuclear war, between our two countries or between one of our countries and others, will be removed. In short, the obligations we have accepted toward each other we have also accepted as applicable to the policies which each of us conducts toward other countries. In subscribing to the agreement and, in particular, in agreeing to consult with each other in certain circumstances, we have made commitments to each other but have in no sense agreed to impose any particular obligation or solution upon other countries. At the same time, we have left the rights of each of our

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3 Document 117. The May 13 letter was given to Kissinger on May 15.
two countries, and obligations undertaken by each of them unimpaired.

Thus, while the agreement contains a number of limiting clauses, it is nevertheless a major achievement in the development of peaceful relations between our two countries and a very significant step toward the creation of a stable peace in the world as a whole. We have demonstrated that the basic principles on which we agreed last year as well as all the other agreements that were concluded at that time and since did indeed mark a turning point in our relations. We can take satisfaction that with this new agreement we have given further substance to our developing relations and that the course upon which we are embarked has become even more firmly set toward a future of progress and peace.

The effect of our prospective agreement would undoubtedly be further enhanced by our ability to record, during your visit, additional progress toward the limitation of strategic armaments. I had hoped that we might be able to agree on some specific measures, but the joint statement which we have been discussing should give our negotiators a new impetus so that the talks can be accelerated, just as was the case when we agreed on a joint statement in May 1971.\(^4\) I look forward to reviewing the status of the strategic arms limitation talks in detail with you so that we might be able to give fresh instructions to our representatives looking to concrete progress this year.

On European affairs there have been many favorable developments and we will have the opportunity to review the two important current projects—the conference on security and cooperation and the negotiations on mutual reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe.

We will also want to review the situation in Indochina as well as in the Middle East. I share your concern that the situation in the Middle East is potentially explosive, and I appreciate that we are both working toward the same objective of a solution that is just for all the parties and at the same time a durable one. I will be prepared to go into this matter in more detail during our discussions, and Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin can pursue their consultations on it in the period before our meeting.

As regards our bilateral cooperation, it now is clear that there will be several new areas in which agreements can be concluded during your visit. On some matters we could also provide guidance for further negotiation to be conducted after our meeting.

We will of course want to go into the question of expanding our economic ties. I have reviewed your discussion with Dr. Kissinger on the long term relationship that might develop between our two countries. I agree substantially with the directions you indicated. These are highly complex matters, requiring much detailed and technical work. But in this area we should signal a positive direction, as well as develop some of the specific ideas to be taken up by the Commission we set up last October.

Altogether, the agreements which will be concluded during your visit due to the serious and constructive preparatory work that has been done under direction by our representatives, will add new momentum to our relations. They will ensure that your visit will have both symbolic importance and real substantive significance.

I believe the practical arrangements for your visit are progressing well. It will be a pleasure to conduct our discussions here in Washington as well as in Camp David, and then to continue our talks in San Clemente in a more informal and relaxed atmosphere. If there are any wishes that you have in regard to the schedule or itinerary, do not hesitate to raise them in our channel.

We all look forward to repaying the splendid hospitality shown to us in the Soviet Union last year.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

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5 See Document 111.

6 Presumably a reference to the U.S.–USSR Joint Commercial Commission who first met July 20–August 1, 1972, in Moscow; see Documents 19–22. The second session was held October 12–18, 1972, in Washington, at the end of which the Trade Agreement and the Lend-Lease Agreement were signed; see Document 65.
121. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War

I. The Background

Brezhnev first broached this idea in April 1972 before the last summit and gave you an initial draft. His original concept was a pure bilateral nuclear non-aggression treaty, and the first few Soviet drafts made this clear. He also had in mind that we would act jointly against any third country that threatened nuclear war. Finally, he foresaw that on the basis of this agreement, even if a war started in Europe, the territories of the US and USSR would be excluded.

Thus, the original Soviet proposal, in the form of a treaty, contained the following key points:

"Article I

“The Soviet Union and the United States undertake the obligation not to use nuclear weapons against each other.

“Article II

“The Soviet Union and the United States shall prevent such a situation when, as a result of actions by third States, they would find themselves involved in a collision with the use of nuclear weapons.

“Article III

“Both parties, in case of military conflict between other States, shall apply all efforts to prevent a nuclear war from being unleashed."

You rejected this approach out of hand. Over the next several months our strategy was to use the idea of doing something in this field as a means to regulate Soviet conduct, especially with regard to Vietnam.

By last fall, however, it was apparent to Brezhnev that his crude approach stood no chance of an agreement. In my conversations in

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files—Europe—USSR, [Discussions with Brezhnev]. Secret; Sensitive.

Moscow in September, I emphasized your point that he was asking for a revolutionary change in post-war military relationships, and that in this light the reaction of third countries would be of utmost importance. If we did not respect their rights, we risked bringing about a world crisis.

_These were the points I made to the Soviets as your position:_

"—We believe it important to avoid any formulation that carried an implication of a condominium by our two countries;

"—We believe it important that an agreement between our two countries should not carry any implication that we were ruling out nuclear war between ourselves but were leaving open the option of nuclear war against third countries;

"—We think it important that in concentrating on the prevention of nuclear war we should not at the same time appear to be legitimizing the initiation of war by conventional means;

"—We think it important that past agreements, whether alliances or other types of obligations, designed to safeguard peace and security should be enhanced by any additional agreement between ourselves relating specifically to the prevention of nuclear warfare.  

"—Within this framework the President is prepared to continue the exchanges in the confidential channel with the objective of developing a mutually satisfactory text. Negotiations in this channel are always conducted with a view to reaching some agreement."

I believe that after this presentation, Brezhnev began to realize that if he wanted an agreement, he would have to take our major points seriously, and that the summit would depend on his moving toward our position.

_Rest Developments_

Subsequently, the Soviets presented new drafts that began to take into account our position. At that time, we also involved the UK in our drafting, and used some of their points to good advantage.

The major points at issue in the period before the Zavidovo meeting were:

—The Soviets still wanted to state categorically that we would not use nuclear weapons _against each other_. The Soviets wanted to be free to use nuclear war against China and we obviously could not permit this. We wanted to formulate a general objective, applying to all countries, of preventing nuclear war. (Article I)

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3 See Document 42.
4 Nixon underlined most of the preceding four points.
5 See footnote 3, Document 25; Document 85; and footnote 4, Document 95.
—Second, the Soviets wanted to decouple the nuclear aspects from refraining from the threat of force (Article II), while for us it was essential to weave a tight connection between excluding the danger of nuclear war, and refraining from all use of force as a prerequisite. This was particularly important in regard to NATO where our defense posture rests on our potential use of nuclear weapons in case of overwhelming Soviet conventional attack.

—Third, the Soviets wanted to consult in case of a conflict between two third countries that raised the threat of nuclear war; this could only apply to China, France or the UK (The Chinese were very sensitive on this point). We took the position that there could be no right of intervention by either the US or USSR in such a case (Article IV).

—Finally, the Soviets wanted to limit the obligations that remained unaffected to formal agreements and treaties while we had to cover other US obligations that might come from Presidential directives, moral commitments or doctrines (Article VI).

In each of these issues, we prevailed in Zavidovo after I read out to Brezhnev your instructions.6

II. The Agreement

The heart of the Agreement is in the first three Articles:

ARTICLE I

The United States and the Soviet Union agree that an objective of their policies is to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons.

Accordingly, the Parties agree that they will act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military confrontations, and as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them and between either of the Parties and other countries.

ARTICLE II

The Parties agree, in accordance with Article I and to realize the objective stated in that Article, to proceed from the premise that each Party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the other Party, against the allies of the other Party and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security. The Parties agree that they will be guided by these considerations in the for-

6 Documents 104, 105, 107, 108, and 109 are the records of Kissinger’s discussions about the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war with Brezhnev and Gromyko in Zavidovo, May 5–8. For Nixon’s instructions, see Document 107.
mulation of their foreign policies and in their actions in the field of international relations.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to develop their relations with each other and with other countries in a way consistent with the purposes of this Agreement.

*In these three provisions we have accomplished our major objectives.*

The text—clearly requires violation of the Agreement if the USSR wants to use nuclear blackmail against us, our Allies or third countries;
—fully protects all other countries;
—restrains the Soviets from threatening *any* use of force without destroying this agreement;
—fully preserves our right of self-defense and all our commitments, with special, though not exclusive, emphasis on those to our Allies.

*In sum, this agreement places a major constraint on the Soviet Union; no piece of paper guarantees Soviet behavior, of course, but it is of significance that Brezhnev is prepared to sign this version, which is light years away from his original project.*

III. The Interpretation of the Agreement

Soviet

In discussing the significance of this agreement *Brezhnev will lean toward an interpretation that comes close to his original objectives and that*

(a) stresses the renunciation of all use of nuclear weapons between us;

(b) implies that as the two Superpowers we are obligated to act as a sort of nuclear policeman, consulting and acting together in all crisis situations;

(c) presses for some action to follow this up, probably by joining with the USSR to sponsor a UN resolution calling on all states to accept the provisions of our agreement.

*All of this would be contrary to our interests.*

U.S.

In essence, *your interpretation* in private, with the Soviets, with the Allies and the Chinese as well as in public *must meet the following points:*
—this is no condominium;
—this is not a simple bilateral non-aggression pact but an agreement predicated on non-use of force by either one of us against each other and against any third country; while the agreement is bilateral, the obligations are multilateral;7

—this is not a simple agreement to ban use of nuclear weapons (as the Soviets have unsuccessfully sought for 27 years) but a statement of an objective and of the kind of conduct required of both of us eventually to reach the objective. The objective is to preclude war of any kind including, of course, the most disastrous kind, nuclear war;8

—our alliance relationships, including our strategy of flexible response in NATO, is fully protected. That is, the Soviets have acquired no free hand to launch conventional aggression without running the risk that we will use nuclear weapons in response;

—any other country that relies on us can continue to do so;

—The Soviets cannot attack China, regardless of pretext, without violating this agreement;9

—we have a right to demand consultations if we think the Soviets are threatening or planning to use force against any third country.10

WHILE YOU CANNOT MAKE THE ABOVE POINTS ABSOLUTELY AS PRESENTED ABOVE, YOU SHOULD KEEP THEM IN MIND AS YOU TALK TO BREZHNEV. YOUR TALKING POINTS, WHICH FOLLOW, ARE WRITTEN ON THIS BASIS.

NOTE: In your comments you should not

—make direct reference to the protection we have obtained for China;

—refer explicitly to our continued right to use nuclear responses to conventional aggression against NATO;

—the fact that we have had extensive consultations with China, the UK or any one else.

Your Talking Points11

In your most recent letter to Brezhnev you carefully spelled out our view,12 and you may wish to reiterate the major points.

—It is important that both sides adhere to similar interpretations so as not to put any cloud over our accomplishments.

7 Nixon underlined all of the preceding two points.
8 Nixon underlined the last sentence of this point.
9 This point was crossed out, then reinstated with the marginal note “stet.”
10 Nixon underlined this point.
11 Nixon underlined most of these talking points.
12 Document 120.
—Thus, you should stress that for our future relations, it is important that the interpretations of this agreement do not diverge.

—The main significance of this agreement is that we have taken a step toward not only reducing the danger of a devastating nuclear war, but also toward creating the conditions in the world where wars of any kind and the use of force will no longer afflict mankind.

—This was possible only because we have agreed to respect fully the rights and interests of other countries; this is a mark of statesmanship; and the General Secretary deserves credit for his vision.

—It is important that you and he understand how we see this historic achievement.

—We have not agreed to ban nuclear weapons but have taken a step toward the conditions in which the danger of war, especially nuclear war is reduced, not only between our two countries, but between either of us and other countries. We have thus set ourselves an historic set of objectives.

—We have made clear, both in the second paragraph of Article I and in all of Article II, that the ultimate objective of excluding nuclear war can only be attained if both of us refrain from all kinds of threats or use of force against each other, against each other’s allies, and against any third country.

—Thus, we have not established a condominium but have reassured the world that we will act responsibly.

—In accepting the obligations to consult with each other, in certain circumstances we have agreed not to impose our will on other countries or force solutions on them.

Thus, the agreement is of major historic importance, and the General Secretary will be remembered by his own people and ours for the courage in taking this step.

—It demonstrates that the Basic Principles of last year did in fact mark a turning point in our relations.

—We can take with great satisfaction that we have given these principles substance.

The impact of this agreement will be further enhanced, however, if we can demonstrate to the world and to our own peoples that we can go further in the limitation on strategic arms.

—We have entered into this agreement on the assumption that permanent limitations on SALT will be achieved.

The text of the final Agreement is at Tab A.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{13} Printed as Document 122.
ARTICLE I

The United States and the Soviet Union agree that an objective of their policies is to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons.

Accordingly, the Parties agree that they will act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military confronta-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files—Europe—USSR, [Discussions with Brezhnev]. The agreement was signed in Washington on June 22. The final text (24 UST 1478; TIAS 7654), nearly identical to this draft, is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, July 23, 1973, pp. 160–161.
tions, and as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them and between either of the Parties and other countries.

ARTICLE II

The Parties agree, in accordance with Article I and to realize the objective stated in that Article, to proceed from the premise that each Party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the other Party, against the allies of the other Party and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security. The Parties agree that they will be guided by these considerations in the formulation of their foreign policies and in their actions in the field of international relations.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to develop their relations with each other and with other countries in a way consistent with the purposes of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

If at any time relations between the Parties or between either Party and other countries appear to involve the risk of a nuclear conflict, or if relations between countries not parties to this Agreement appear to involve the risk of nuclear war between the USA and the USSR or between either Party and other countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, acting in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, shall immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to avert this risk.

ARTICLE V

Each Party shall be free to inform the Security Council of the United Nations, the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Governments of allied or other countries of the progress and outcome of consultations initiated in accordance with Article IV of this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI

Nothing in this Agreement shall affect or impair:

(a) the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as envisaged by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,

(b) the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, including those relating to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, and

(c) the obligations undertaken by either Party towards its allies or third countries in treaties, agreements, and other appropriate documents.
ARTICLE VII

This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.

ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

Done at the City of Washington, D. C. on June ___, 1973, in two copies, each in the English and in the Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:

President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

123. Conversation Between President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev

Washington, June 18, 1973, 11:31 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

[Omitted here is discussion with the members of the press and introductory comments. Ronald L. Ziegler and members of the press exited the Oval Office at 11:37 a.m., leaving Leonid I. Brezhnev and interpreter Viktor Sukhodrev alone with President Nixon.]

Brezhnev: But we have an omen in Russia that when it rains as you are leaving on a trip it’s a good sign. And it was raining by chance at the airport. It happened. But that, too—but that, too, is according to the Russian folk tradition a good omen. And especially since it was raining both in Moscow and in Washington, that makes it a double, extra good omen.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 943–8. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. Brezhnev spoke in Russian, and Viktor Sukhodrev translated for both Brezhnev and Nixon. Paragraph breaks denote pauses for translation. No written record of this conversation was found. Kissinger wrote in his memoirs that the President did not tell him what transpired at this meeting. (Years of Upheaval, p. 291)
Nixon: Um-hmm.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, because of the ceremonies and all the protocol, I didn’t get a chance to say, and I want to do this right from the start, to extend to you the very good, the best wishes, greetings, and good feelings of all my comrades, all my associates who saw me off at Moscow airport.

It’s ok if I may talk?

Nixon: Oh, absolutely.

Sukhodrev: [unclear] Is that ok? I’ll try it.

Nixon: Try it. Ok.

Sukhodrev: Good.

Brezhnev: You see, I have a cigarette box there. It has a special timing mechanism and I can’t—I won’t be able to open it for an hour.

Nixon: Oh, how’s it open?

Brezhnev: See, the mechanism, the timing mechanism is now working and I won’t be able to open that for another hour. In one hour it will unlock itself.

Nixon: [laughs] That’s a way to discipline yourself.

Brezhnev: That’s right. Mr. President, on a personal level [unclear] I need to just say that as I was being seen off at the airport in Moscow, and all my colleagues and my comrades were there, and I had a few words with them, and, well, I just said, “I thank you all for your trust that you vested in me for this visit with President Nixon, and I only hope that you will support me in all that we do together with the President of the United States.” And all of my colleagues who were there at the airport said they were absolutely confident that these new talks, at summit-level, between the Soviet Union and the United States, would yield new and truly historic results. And with those words, with that send-off, I climbed the steps up to the plane and flew off to Washington.

That was really a word-for-word—that was a word-for-word description of what went on at the airport, and how the world may be changed.

And, also, last Thursday, when we had our regular meeting of our leadership, the Politburo of the Party, where we had a free discussion, a long discussion about Soviet-American relations, about all that has been achieved already, and all that we want to achieve in the future, and the prospects that we are aiming at, there was complete unanimity of views as regards the basic principles of the development of our relations and of the main questions on which we have achieved already a preliminary agreement and on those that we still have to discuss. Of course, there are certain matters that I have not raised in that forum before having had a chance to ask for your advice, consult with you on.
With all this hope, purely, personally, and at this meeting permit me to say that I have certainly come to this country with very good feelings, with good intentions, and with high hopes for these forthcoming negotiations.

Although doubtless certain problems are complex, and they may be difficult of solution for both yourself and myself, but I always believe that there are no—there are no situations out of which a way cannot be found, and there are no problems for which a solution cannot be found.

And if I might just make two personal points before we go over to official discussions—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Brezhnev: When you called it—the first thought I had [unclear] certain doubts about the San Clemente visit—

Nixon: Sure.

Brezhnev: —and that’s why I came to you, to contact you through the Ambassador, but then when I learned that, Mr. Nixon, that you were very anxious for me to be there and go there. I am now—

And I immediately responded. And I am—let me say that I am now really happy that I have revised my initial decision and I—and it was a personal decision on my part, and I do believe now, especially when I know that you—the symbolic—the symbolism that you put into the name of that house in San Clemente—

Nixon: House of Peace.

Brezhnev: House of Peace [unclear]. Exactly, and I do believe—I’m, as I say, I’m happy that I am going there, and I do believe that that symbolism will turn into reality. And that is something that I [unclear]—

Nixon: [unclear]

Brezhnev: And the second point is a family—is a family one. Everything seemed to be going very well and I had hoped to come here with some of the members of my family, but, well, you see, my wife was not well anyway. She got a little worse and she was put to bed. And for a short time I hoped, but, anyway, that’s the way it happened. And then, I also wanted to bring my son along, but then he has his own kid. Now, the trouble is that his—my grandson, his son that is, is finishing his high school this year.

Nixon: Uh-huh.

Brezhnev: And so he’s got his examinations, his graduation examination, and then his entrance examination to Moscow University. And so you know how parents are. I mean in our country, especially, they insist on going, [unclear] to the school [unclear] or to the university, and they insist on pacing the corridors, waiting for the results of the ex-
aminations. I keep saying that you can’t help them, anyway, but that’s what they do. So, well, those are the circumstances that prevented me from bringing any of the members of my family along.

Nixon: That’s ok.

Brezhnev: So, there was really nothing I could do about it. But I—but I will say that Tricia [unclear] and made a very big impression on my children, and they still remember every minute of their meeting and the way they went along together.

Well, I assured them that I will let them come to Washington to be able to spend some time with Tricia, the other of your—younger—and your other children. I will come. My son, my daughter, and my daughter-in-law wrote a collective letter and asked that it be given to Tricia, so I don’t want to give it to anybody else. I want you, as a father, to give it to Tricia.

Nixon: Well, I would like, Mr. Brezhnev, to extend from me, and from Tricia and Julie, an invitation for the members of his family to come here as our special guests. [That] we would like, and we appreciate the very warm welcome that was given to Tricia and her husband when she was in Moscow. We look forward to having them here as our personal guests.

Thank you. And at any time. Any time.

Brezhnev: Thank you. Maybe some time in the fall.

Nixon: Sure.

Brezhnev: It is advised—

Nixon: Tell him the weather is good. It’s good anytime.

Brezhnev: They’ll be happy to hear that.

Nixon: Right. Also, I want to say before the others come in is that I very much appreciated the personal remarks that Mr. Brezhnev has made.²

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: We, we both—we must recognize, the two of us, that I for 3½ more years in this office and the General Secretary, I hope, for that long or longer, we head the two most powerful nations and, while we will naturally in negotiations have some differences, it is essential that those two nations, where possible, work together. And the key really is in the relationship between Mr. Brezhnev and myself. If we decide to work together, we can change the world. That’s what—that’s my attitude as we enter these talks.

² Both President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev spoke at the welcoming ceremony at the White House just before this conversation. The ceremony was broadcast live on TV and radio in the United States and the USSR. For the text of Nixon’s remarks and a translation of Brezhnev’s remarks, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 594–595.
Thank you.

Brezhnev: Well, thank you very much. And, in fact, I did indeed have two opportunities fairly recently to speak of you, Mr. President. Once was during my meeting with a group of American Senators, and I was speaking really from my heart—

And, incidentally, let me proceed here to say that when I did meet the Senators, I was struck by the fact that they all, all of them regardless of party affiliation, evinced sincere—what I felt to be a sincere respect for you, Mr. President. And there was no attempt in any way to kind of, to sort of needle you through—in their—in the way they talked about you or in their general attitude.

And in fact, after the—After the meeting, Senator Hartke, who led the delegation, he came up to me separately, and he said that he had never had, just at the beginning of that conversation, and he had never before had such hopes for a better atmosphere in relations between our two countries as he now has after the foundation made jointly by the President and by myself. Now, he spoke really so highly, I was moved, I was deeply touched. Say, is he a Republican or a Democrat?


Brezhnev: But, you know, Mr. President, if he spoke that highly of you always, well I’d live for nothing better. [unclear]

And I was just recalling that I was asked once, during my meeting with President Pompidou at Zaslavl, one of the correspondents there, and I met some of them at the airport, they were asking me about my forthcoming trip to the United States and whether that was still on. I said—at that time I said, “Of course it is, certainly.” And then in Bonn, out walking with Chancellor Brandt, there was also—we came across a group of correspondents and one of them asked me, “Is your trip to the United States still on?” I said, “Well,” I said, “what are you expecting? A great big earthquake in the United States that will prevent me from going and meet with the President?” [unclear] And of course I would go, and, well, that made a big hit with them.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Brezhnev: So, and—well, for the first time, as I say, that I spoke to a group of Americans about my paying my respect for you was with this group of Senators, and I really spoke from my heart. And the second time was during my interview with the biggest group of American correspondents that I’ve ever received. There were eleven of them.

3 See footnote 4, Document 111.
4 Vance Hartke, Democratic Senator from Indiana.
Nixon: Um-hmm.

Brezhnev: And I—in fact, I can—I spent a lot of time with them. I can send you a full transcript of my discussion and my interview with them.\(^5\) And in that conversation I—twice in different sorts of settings and different circumstances I mentioned and emphasized what I see as the role and the significance of President Nixon and his policies in the—in changing relationships and improving relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States. But you know, come to think of it, 12 or so years ago one former very—formerly very prominent Soviet diplomat and statesman told me that, “Now you”—and I was then—“you are just a sort of a newly-initiated statesman. You’re an up-and-coming statesman,” he said to me—

Nixon: Yes.

Brezhnev: —at that time, and—

Nixon: Absolutely.

Brezhnev: —and he said, “Now, and I want to give you some advice.” He told me, “Now, you’re new in politics but believe me that personal, good relationships, even in grand politics, are at times the most important thing for progress at any time.” And, you know, I remember those words and I, personally, I agree with them. And I do believe that personal confidence and loyalty to even a gentleman’s agreement without setting down anything on paper are the best thing for any relationships at any time. And it’s with that hope that I come here, and in that spirit I want to shake you hand.

Nixon: Uh-huh.

Brezhnev: Now, I believe that our personal relationships and the respect which I certainly harbor, very sincerest regard for you and I know it’s reciprocal, can be confirmed by two events and that is: your arrival to Moscow last year, and mine in Washington this year.

This is not in any way to remember the bad past or to emphasize anything out of the present, but, simply, I’m giving an answer in substance and what is, I think, is realistic.

Yesterday, I had a very pleasant conversation with Dr. Kissinger and I guess he must have told you at least about it in general terms, but I want to say now—I said this to him yesterday, and I do want to say it now—that it is certainly my very earnest desire that you should pay another visit to the Soviet Union some time next year, in 1974. I think that would be very good—

Nixon: For the election?

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Sukhodrev: Yeah, pretty much.
Brezhnev: [unclear]
Nixon: You’ll come back in ’75 here.
Sukhodrev: That’s what he’s talking about now—
Nixon: Oh, go ahead. Please go on—
Brezhnev: Let me say here that this is not something I just say in a personal—only in a personal capacity. At the last meeting of the Politburo, I suggested—made the suggestion that I should make an official visit to—I should extend an official invitation to you to come to the Soviet Union in 1974. That suggestion received unanimous support by the entire Politburo, so it’s both a personal and a unanimously-supported decision, and a considered decision by our leadership. And then, you see, I think that new meeting between us would give new impulse to what has already been done and it would be fully in accord with the arrangement—the agreement, actually, that we entered into last year that these meetings should be a regular, annual event. So, today, I’m here with you in the United States, and I shall be hoping that you will accept our invitation to visit us in 1974, and then, if we get an invitation, we can come back to the United States in ’75.
Nixon: Thank you. That’s right.
Brezhnev: And then, in 1976, you come and pay us another visit. And that will, I’m sure, that this series of meetings of this sort will give continued—will give new and continuous impulses to the development of a real, lasting relationship between our two countries.

Now, of course, I don’t have with me any brief or any official or formal proposals as to the problems we could take up for discussion next year or the agreements that we could sign next year, but this is something that we could some day at a point have a general discussion about, exchange views, consult one another, but I believe that our experience, the experience of preparing for last year’s meeting, and of preparing for this one, shows that we can do some very fruitful work, preparatory work together, and then, if we do that prior to the visit, there is—there can be more, time can be spent on seeing, traveling more through the country. You could go down south, see something in the Caucasus, for instance, some other part of the country. And, in short, we can prepare all of the business part of the trip so well, in advance, as to leave the minimal time for formal discussions and the settlement of various problems. So—but we certainly seek to insure that the next visit is at least as important as—each next visit is at least as important as each preceding one. But we can talk about that a little later.
Nixon: Well, I want to say before the others come in that I have the same feeling of respect for and a very personal basis, for the General Secretary, and of friendship on a personal basis. He’s a very—as I have
told people in this office, I’ve indicated this: he is a strong man, and he represents a very strong country. And my greatest desire is to have this personal relationship, so that our two very strong countries can be a force that’s working together, rather than like that. If they work together, then the whole world benefits. If they work like that, the whole world is greatly endangered. And Mr. Brezhnev and I have the key, and I think that our personal relationship will unlock the door for the continuing relationship between our two countries, which will contribute to peace in the world.

Brezhnev: Oh, thank you. And I should like in that connection to say that I, for one, take pride in the fact that my country is a very big and powerful one, that it’s got, has many millions—250 million-strong population. It’s got the vast mineral resources, and agricultural and industrial potential. And all this is something that heartens us. It cannot fail to do so. But, on the other hand, I have never said that I regret the fact that the United States is also a big, important, a very powerful and a very strong, economically strong, country. And as, in fact, I told the last plenary meeting of our Central Committee, the ruling body of the—for our party and of the country, that the United States is worthy of the greatest respect as a major, as a big world power. And I spoke of the role that our two countries can play in strengthening world peace and in working together on a basis of cooperation. Now, there are some people who keep throwing in this idea of there being two superpowers in the world who are out to dictate their, as they say, dictate their will, to foist their will upon others, and so forth. Now, but, are we to blame for being big? Are we to blame for being strong? What can we do about it? That is the way it is. I mean, what do these people want us to do, become countries—?

I am praising those who have made their nations strong. What are we to be? What are we to do? To turn ourselves into some kind of Guinea, or a country like that? And, surely, the main thing is the fact that we have—we are strong, but we don’t intend to use that strength against either one another or against any other third parties. Now—and there are—and people—except there are some people who keep reproaching us that we—that that is exactly what we allegedly want to do. But those—I think that is a deliberate attempt to spoil relations thrown in by certain people on the side. Now—but, and doubtless, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can turn themselves into a Luxembourg where the entire army is made up of 78 policemen.

Well, so far I’m taking a kind of tolerant, patient attitude towards those who propagate that theory, the superpower theory, but I think that some time later I will make a big, serious speech and deal with that theory, I mean the so-called superpower theory, and really strike out
against it, so as to crush that theory. And in that speech I’d certainly emphasize the constructive role that our two countries can make.

And, finally, that we should take up for discussion and endeavor to solve not only various current problems, but, also, we should endeavor to look far ahead, because if we can look ahead we can really create a basis of stable relationships and peace. And, as they say, if you don’t look ahead, you will inevitably lag behind and fall back, and I want us both to look forward together to a peaceful—a more peaceful, and a stronger future.

[unclear exchange]

Nixon: Well, I think the key is personal friendship plus respect for each other’s peoples. Those two added together mean a constructive and positive relationship. And we have that.

Brezhnev: Now, as regards the schedule and the general protocol of our meetings, I’m happy to go along with any suggestions that you might make, with all those that you have made already, and any that you might make—wish to make in the future with regard to any minor changes or adaptations, or alterations, or anything—

Nixon: I realize that—

Brezhnev: Anything you suggest, I’m happy to go along with.

I like the gaiety of Camp David.

Nixon: We’ll have a good meeting up there.

Brezhnev: It’s quiet, peaceful.

Nixon: And he’ll like San Clemente, too. That’s very quiet. All you hear there is the ocean waves. You’ll like that.

Brezhnev: The same goes for me. I like them—I like hearing the sound of the sea.

Nixon: Well, should we invite—would you like to invite Gromyko? [unclear]

Brezhnev: As—as you wish, Mr. President—

Nixon: Yeah?

Brezhnev: —as protocol dictates [unclear] protocol [unclear].

Nixon: Right. I think the—I think that we should have Gromyko, Rogers and Kissinger, and [unclear] Soviet Union, sort of—we can have a sort of, as we did in Moscow, a plenary session.

Brezhnev: Well, yeah, for this sort of plenary meeting I’d like to have Gromyko in, certainly, and it’s natural if our two other Ministers, Patolichev and Bugayev, just for the first one.

Nixon: Would you like them, too, today?

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6 Boris Pavlovich Bugayev, Soviet Minister of Civil Aviation.
We were going to have—I thought that tomorrow we’d have an economic meeting.

[unclear] today—
Brezhnev: And then—I fully agree—and then, the—our—we have most of our other meeting times, I guess, could be held in [unclear].
Nixon: That’s right. That’s right.
Brezhnev: If you will take Gromyko on our side, and—
Nixon: Yeah.
Brezhnev: —or—and some of them might be just personal.
Nixon: Yeah, that’s right. I’d like to have that, too. We can talk on the plane, we can talk at Camp David.
That’s all right.
Brezhnev: Now, I wanted to consult you on this—
Nixon: Sure.
Brezhnev: On the question of the prevention of nuclear war, this plenary session we say that, “well, so”—we call it the first question, so we have—we say something like, “Well, we have reached an understanding on this first question of ours,” and then [unclear]. Things like that now.
Nixon: Going into it?
Brezhnev: So as to prevent any leaks to the press in advance. [unclear] Right from the start.
Nixon: We don’t want anything said about that, no.
Brezhnev: And—well, Mr. President, what’s your—do you have any ideas as to how we should conduct this first—
Nixon: I think we—
[unclear exchange]
Brezhnev: —[unclear] session, how do we start out—?
Nixon: What I would suggest is that I will ask—that Mr. Brezhnev being the guest—I will ask him to talk first, and he can talk generally about our relations.
[unclear] And I will respond.
By that time it’ll probably be about—we’ll run a little over, but [unclear]—
Brezhnev: That’ll be fine. I’ll use the lunch break to have a little nap—
Nixon: Good.
Brezhnev: —because I’m still a little weak.
Nixon: That’s good that [unclear].
Brezhnev: [unclear] our time difference.
Nixon: That’s very important.
Brezhnev: Because if we take Moscow time, tonight’s dinner will end at something like 5 a.m. [laughs]
Nixon: Well, we’ll break him of that. I would suggest—
Brezhnev: I’m now happy to go on with any of you—
Nixon: —we meet now for maybe 45 minutes.

[Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State William Rogers, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin entered the Oval Office at 12:32 p.m. Omitted here is the larger group conversation; see Document 124.]

124. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 18, 1973, 12:35–3:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

SUBJECTS

Agenda; U.S.-Soviet Relations

The private meeting between the President and the General Secretary ended at 12:30 p.m. at which time the other participants entered the Oval Office. As the photographers were brought in Gromyko remarked that the President and Brezhnev must have settled everything in the previous hour.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Brezhnev Visit Memcons, June 18–25, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. Brackets are in the original.

2 See Document 123.
President: I was going to suggest that we talk about the agenda. The General Secretary should make an opening statement and then I will follow with an opening statement. Tomorrow we will have a signing ceremony. Then we will have a plenary meeting on economic matters in the Cabinet Room. You can bring whomever you wish. One other point that may be helpful in making the schedule: the Communiqué language on the Middle East is not yet agreed; if the General Secretary agrees, Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko could settle this point and also the one on CSCE and maybe any others.\(^3\) Perhaps they can do this at Camp David while we talk about other things. I hadn’t mentioned this yet to the General Secretary and I just want to make sure he agrees.

Brezhnev: We should instruct both of them that they have to come to an agreement. Otherwise it will be said that they tried and tried and tried, and couldn’t get their work done.

The two points you mentioned are certainly important. Without going into details now, I am not too familiar with the exact differences between us but we can discuss them as we go along.

President: All right. You have the floor.

Brezhnev: It would not be expedient for us to return to the ancient history of our relations or to things we already covered in Moscow last year. This is not because it would not be worth having such a discussion but because we should reduce the time devoted to the past and

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\(^3\) The communiqué was agreed on June 23 and released on June 25. See Document 130.
concentrate on the future. So I’ll keep the general review as brief as possible and also try to be as accurate as possible as far as substance is concerned.

I must just say two words on past history and then I’ll switch to the present and the future. In the past, relations between us developed very unevenly. There was much that was good, especially in our joint struggle against fascism. But then much happened that was uneven. All that was done in Moscow and that we have to do here therefore acquires unusual significance and importance. As you know, we Russians have an adage—life is always the best teacher. I believe that the life of our two great peoples and of our leaders had led us to the conclusion that we must build a new relationship between us now and in the future. Therefore, I am deeply gratified to emphasize that human reason led us both at the same time to recognize this and that is what led us to the successful meeting last year in Moscow. I very firmly believe, and will go on believing, that what was done in Moscow took place in the profound awareness of the importance of our joint ventures for the future and for peace. We met in Moscow last year not to compare our strength or to compete but to adopt important decisions. And I know that they won the unanimous support of our people and of yours.

I know our people and those of the U.S., and in fact of most of the countries, refer to last year’s meeting as historic and that underlines the fact that indeed it was historic. Our people are very satisfied. That is the assessment made by people who live today. But for historians of the future the meeting will be a subject for study and I am sure it will be highly judged. This is not a matter of vanity because peace is not just between the two of us but with many others and that is what gives such great significance to last year’s meeting and to this year’s meeting as well. And this will lay the basis for the forthcoming visit of the President to the Soviet Union next year.

Let me just tell the others here that I already invited you and that the President already accepted. We will find a way to make the invitation official.

It is indeed important that not only the people of our two countries but others should welcome our meeting. We can say that the vast majority of people did welcome it and also the achievements since then. Maybe there were some exceptions, but that is not an overriding factor because the majority of people do.

In relations between any two nations confidence is a factor of no small importance. In that context, I must say that a major factor in relations between our two countries is the confidence factor. This can be manifested in various ways. But the important thing is that we have the trust of those we represent, whether it is the party or the whole people.
A year has passed since Moscow. It is very important that people in all walks of life have written to the Central Committee and to me personally to say how they view the summit. I do not recall the exact number but it would not be far wrong to say that I received over a hundred thousand letters wholeheartedly supporting the aims of the summit. I consider this most important because in this way I can be sure of the peoples' support. Some have even written their letters as poems. I'll show it to you at your house. One person had not even ever written poetry before. Anyway no poet could ever do it, or he would ask for six months vacation to write it. It really was a very curious letter. I was really amazed when I got it. In a brief letter he said lucidly and succinctly what it sometimes takes us to say in months.

We have now put an end to old history. And we have made a start to new history. That is why this meeting is so important. Maybe people will even call it epoch making. As I said alone to you, if we really can lead nations from war it will be seen as epoch making. We have all studied history. All it was was a history of war—this or that prince or king or queen; the Roman Empire, Austria-Hungary ... all there was was war. But today we want peace. And future historians will see it that way. My support rests on 15 millions of members of the party and the Komsomols\(^4\) and on the whole people. So, when I sign documents with the United States I am not doing it alone but on behalf of all my people. During this visit we will be signing several agreements. Twelve years hence it will be regarded as truly epoch making.

We will be discussing such questions as European security, etc. But right now we are talking just about our two countries. As you said, we are very strong, economically, scientifically, technologically, militarily. And big and strong as we are we can’t, as you said, help but influence the rest of the world. We can also see that last year’s meeting was supported by European states—France, Germany, and so on.

[Brezhnev looked at his watch: I have two watches, one on Moscow time and one on Washington time. President: It is the only way you can tell when to go to the bathroom. Brezhnev: When I arrived I was trying to adjust. I was told the difference was 7 hours but my watch showed 6 hours. It turned out that I had turned the hands the wrong way.]

There are also many countries in Western Europe and all the socialist parties and labor parties and certainly the communist parties—they all supported the Moscow summit. I am sure you agree that all

\(^4\) An acronym for the Russian name for the “Communist Union of Youth,” the CPSU’s official youth movement.
countries want to see a tranquil life in peace. So the Moscow meeting last year represented a new phase. But we did not stop at the documents that were signed then. We went forward to prepare for this meeting. We have travelled a great and important road. So this visit will be followed by the people of all the world, as you said in your welcoming speech.

Every epoch leaves an imprint on the nature of relations between nations. But you and I live in an epoch where questions of politics have special importance; but they cannot be divorced from economic and cultural questions, in short, from all the other aspects of life. And this is only natural because the world has achieved so much in the last century in those fields. This is true especially of the U.S., the Soviet Union and such countries as France and West Europe. And then there was the special imprint left by the last war, when the threat of fascism loomed over the world. The progress that has been made could not fail to have an effect on the settlements of the peoples concerning how relations should develop. All nations want to thrive on progressive ideas, not retrogressive ones. If that is taken into account, I want to emphasize once again that the meeting last year and the one this year will be judged by people of all professions as events of peace. The only exception are those who make a profession of war. But I am speaking of the hundreds of millions who support us. We have moved a long way forward politically, and economically too. Perhaps not everything has been accomplished yet and we can talk about that later. But we can say that we have moved substantially forward.

I will not speak of the basic principles of our policy. We talked about them last year and I also spoke of this subject earlier. But I felt recently that it was desirable to tell our people again of our general policy line. And so we had a Central Committee plenum where I delivered a detailed report on developments since last year. We changed the rules for the first half by not just having a brief statement of approval but putting out a statement, which for us was a long one, setting forth our policy since last May and the line we intend to follow. We have full grounds for saying that your line last year and since and our line are indeed correct. And this fully accords with your welcoming words today. I too feel that the present visit will enable us to take new steps in our relations and I agree that if the two great powers do this and pursue an agreed peaceful policy hardly anyone will dare to breach the peace of the world. We can talk in more detail later. We joked before about superpowers. True, there is Luxembourg with 85 policemen.

[Brezhnev interrupts interpretation and says to Secretary Rogers: Are you looking at your watch? Rogers: No, I was fascinated by your remarks. Brezhnev: Well then, Kissinger was looking at his watch. Kissinger: I was just sitting here minding my own business.]
Brezhnev: But what can we do about it if we are big powers? We should take pride in it and not reproach each other. Lenin understood this even though it was then a very difficult time in our history.

Before the others came in we talked about the importance and need for confidence. Confidence is a most important factor. The last war and the subsequent events generated distrust. We know all about that but shouldn’t go into it. It is a matter of confidence not only between our two leaders but between all others too. What we did last year and will do this year will promote greater trust. If it is possible for these two powerful great nations to live in peace and cooperate, that will strengthen confidence all over the world and contribute to peace.

Recently I was in Bonn. You know I fought in World War II from the beginning to the end and West Germany is a country where many people who fought in the war are still alive. Yet I got a very good reception. This was how much confidence there is already. And that is the underlying spirit of all the documents we will sign. We can say that President Richard Nixon and Comrade Brezhnev and all the people and all the children will live a tranquil life. But that is not enough. We have to make sure that future generations also live a tranquil life.

We talked about the forthcoming visit of the President to the USSR. Perhaps we can prepare some new agreements, perhaps fewer in number, perhaps more, I can’t say. But if we do the preparatory work we will save time at the meeting and that will permit a more extensive tour of the country. So we will have visits in ’72/’73 and ’74/’75. And then ’76 will again be the turn of the President to visit the Soviet Union. That is the way to make progress.

[To the President: I am not tiring you too much? President: No. Rogers: We have only one watch.]

Brezhnev: May I thank you for all the work I know you have been doing on the agreements we reached in Moscow in principle and to get more favored nation treatment. Of course economic relations are very important. I am not raising new points because I am sure this will be settled as we agreed earlier. In fact, many economic arrangements are already in effect, such as the U.S. Trade Center in Moscow.

In connection with the recent Central Committee meeting I changed the rules. We did not used to publish reports on such meetings. But I had the report read out to regional and even district party organizations. And after that was done I got further support for our line toward the U.S. I say this to you so that you should not have any doubt that we are pursuing a steadfast policy, not just a temporary one. After this has been done; outside the whole of the party, the young and the working people are fully familiar with the main lines of our policy and I come with their support for what we are doing for peace, especially with the United States. I am very pleased that there are now
more frequent and concrete contacts between the economic agencies of our two countries.

I agree we cannot and should not set the goal of transforming the entirety of international politics in just one year. I am reminded of the story of how Newton formed the law of gravity by looking at an apple on a tree and seeing it fall and concluded it must be gravity. We also are formulating a new law of gravity when we formulate a policy of peace and friendship. It will make others gravitate toward peace. That factor will be as important for the whole world as Newton’s law was in its time.

Hardly anyone could come out against our joint line. Is there still anyone who would not want the two of us to be an example for peace? In my country I enjoy the trust of the people. I could not agree to make any concessions to those who oppose peace, détente, and cooperation because in the struggle against those kinds of people I will never make concessions because that would be weakness. Why should one be weak in the struggle for peace? Strength for peace—yes; strength for cooperation—yes; strength for economic relations—yes; strength for science—yes. That is how one should act, without concessions.

[Brezhnev asks Gromyko whether the interpreter had translated these remarks too strongly. Gromyko said the translation had been fine.]

[Brezhnev interrupting interpretation: You, Mr. President, and I are going to do the most difficult job and leave to others easy jobs like the Middle East. We’ll do the Communiqué and find you—Gromyko, Kissinger, Rogers, Dobrynin—something else to do when you have finished your first task.]

There are several matters that should be in the final communiqué including the Middle East and CSCE and maybe others. We hope we can find common language.

Ending this general review, I am very pleased with all our cooperation and with the finalizing of all the documents that are to be signed. With that done, this should be a good visit. I want to extend thanks to all of those who last year and this year prepared everything and all the documents—Dr. Kissinger, Secretary Rogers, Sonnenfeldt, and all my own colleagues here. Incidentally, I do agree that perhaps more can be done on the two points you mentioned, Mr. President. But this is what I wanted to say by way of introduction.

Now just a word about our country. The situation in our country is pretty good after a bad situation last year. We have planted a lot of grains and other crops. Industry is now making progress. The main problem as always is the correct allocation of capital investments. This year it will be 501 billion rubles. But it is always a problem.
Our Minister for Land Amelioration, Alekseyev,\(^5\) gave us a good report of his visit to your country. I read it and he had a very good impression. I want to thank all of you for making his visit possible. I mention this because agriculture in our country is a very complex problem because of the different climatic zones. I was sorry to hear about certain technical difficulties in the agricultural shipments we are receiving from you but I am glad that all has been taken care of. So the general picture is good. There are many negotiations going on natural gas, oil, and so on. If we give instructions and you give instructions and blessings all will go well. After all, I am a mechanical engineer so why should I care about oil? I just give the blessing. So this completes the introductory remarks I wanted to make. Incidentally, Alekseyev was not the only minister who visited you. Our food minister also came.\(^6\)

President: Yes, I saw him in San Clemente. He is a big man.

Brezhnev: Yes, an Estonian. He signed the deal with Pepsi Cola. There are quite a few examples of such deals. For example, the one with Hammer and Occidental and others.\(^7\) Trade has really grown, although it is a bit one-sided. But I will talk about this later. Also, we are using U.S. credits—I think about 300 billion rubles so far. These are graphic results of our meeting last year and of the policy we have been pursuing.

In my report to the Central Committee Plenum I made direct and forthright statements about the need for long term trade so that we don’t just trade watches and ties, just peanuts. What we need is large scale and long term trade. I spoke to your Senators. I told them about our reserves of over 3 trillion tons of natural gas and asked them why not have a long term deal.

I just want to pay tribute to all of those on your side and our side who made this visit possible. On our side in the first place it is Gromyko and also Dobrynin, both of whom I mentioned in my report to the Central Committee. They merit appreciation.

Do you have any questions, Mr. President?

President: All on our side appreciate your candid and warm statements on the new relationship that has developed. I approach the

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\(^5\) Yevgeniy Yevgenyevich Alekseyevskyi.

\(^6\) Voldemar Petrovich Lein.

\(^7\) Telegram 111312 to Moscow and Tokyo, June 8, requested information about the reported signature by Occidental Petroleum Chairman Armand Hammer and El Paso Natural Gas Company Chairman Howard Boyd with the Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry of a letter of intent to import into the United States more than $10 billion worth of natural gas from the USSR via Vladivostok over a 25-year period. Hammer indicated that Japanese firms, which had been negotiating with the Soviets, expressed interest in taking a portion of the gas. Telegram 6770 from Moscow, June 9, confirmed the report. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
meeting with the same spirit Mr. Brezhnev described. You put this in historic perspective. I was thinking that it had been just 13 years ago when a President of the United States—Eisenhower—met with a Soviet leader in this room and as we consider present problems we should keep them in perspective by recognizing how far we have come from the mood that existed at that time, and the tensions. There is also an historic point to be made. Then the U.S. had a significant advantage in nuclear weapons over the Soviet Union; today we are equal. I do not believe that this is bad because relations between the most powerful nations in the world can best be built on the basis of mutual respect and equal strength. There are, of course, delicate problems which we have to bear in mind. There is concern, even in France, where the General Secretary will be visiting, by those who do not want to see some kind of U.S.-Soviet condominium dictating to them. While we as practical men know what our strength is, we also, as strong nations, can afford and should follow a policy of respect for the rights of other nations. That is how we can best serve the cause of peace. I think the General Secretary has made a very significant contribution to this concept with the agreement that we will be signing Friday which recognizes the rights of all countries and at the same time the responsibility of the two of us to develop methods that will avoid nuclear and other confrontations between us. I remember very well when Mr. Brezhnev first broached this by letter in April of 1972 and then we talked about it in Moscow. And now it will be consummated here in Washington. It will be a great tribute to your wise leadership.

Brezhnev: Thank you.

President: We will talk later about Europe, about CSCE and MBFR. And also about the Middle East, where frankly, none of us have any easy solutions but where we hope our meetings will help to move the negotiations off dead center.

Brezhnev: I fully agree that all these questions exist and that we cannot bypass them.

President: We must address all those problem areas in the world that might draw us into confrontation. When we think of problems, Mr. General Secretary, remember that just a year ago you and your colleagues had a very vigorous discussion with me about Vietnam. We have moved very far since then.

Brezhnev: I hear “Vietnam.” I didn’t raise it. But if you want we can have a discussion later. I remember we talked about it at the Dacha. [Laughs]

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8 See Document 121 and footnote 2 thereto.
President: Yes, it was a late dinner.

Brezhnev: We had a very good time. Mr. President, indeed all the world reacted very positively to the Paris accords and the need now is to get them strictly implemented but we can talk about all this later.

President: We will use our influence to see that the most recent communiqué is adhered to. The most serious problem now is Cambodia. To the extent that North Vietnam shows restraint the chance for permanent peace is greatly increased. We can talk about it later.

Brezhnev: That is one of the questions.

President: I mention these three areas because it shows that our two nations have enormous influence not only on whether there is conflict between us, which I am confident we can avoid, but whether there is conflict between others.

I would say finally that tomorrow at the economic meeting I will express some views. But I will say now that the growing economic relationship is good for you and good for both of us. I fully support it, including MFN. It is necessary to get state and free enterprise economies to cooperate. My goal is just as Mr. Brezhnev indicated. I fully support it.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, I already thanked you for all your efforts. What you just said again evoked heartfelt thanks. It fully corresponds to our attitude. It would be strange for two such great powers to confine their trade to ties and buttons as I like to say. In this field it is also a matter of inertia and of adapting the systems to each other. I know we gave our approval for negotiations with Boeing on aircraft. We should think in a solid way on matters dealing with economic cooperation and both will gain. It is for experts to figure out the pluses and minuses.

[There was then more talk about the time difference between Moscow and Washington. Brezhnev said he still did not know whether his second watch was ahead or behind. Dobrynin and Gromyko explained that it was 7 hours ahead. Brezhnev then shows the President his cigarette case with its timer.]

Brezhnev: I hope there will also be further cooperation on commercial air relations. I am disappointed to hear that there are some difficulties. I merely mention it. I am not raising the issue.

Kissinger: It is being settled.

President: Let me close with two brief points. One is the very historic agreement that we will sign on Friday.\(^\text{10}\) It will be seen as more words than substance unless we can move along on SALT. I hope we can talk about moving SALT along. The other point is that the General

\(^{10}\) June 22. A reference to the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. See Document 129.
Secretary several times mentioned support for better Soviet-American relations in this country. I want to assure him that even though some in our somewhat undisciplined country oppose the trend, the vast majority of Congress and of the people support it, like the people you saw out there this morning. I would not be here without that support. Pay no attention to the few who are in opposition, like Senator Jackson. They don’t want it, but the vast majority does.

Brezhnev: [laughing] Don’t even remind me of that man—Jackson. Mr. President, Jackson is a name I used 30 times, as Dr. Kissinger knows, in Zavidovo.

Take the idea of nationalism. In the good sense of the term, a nationalist is solicitous of his own people. But if you add qualities that have no bearing to that then it is different. I don’t want to be insulting but I really don’t think that a man like Jackson reflects the aspirations of the American people. If the policies you and I want to pursue are in the direction we charted last year—the direction of peace, friendship, and cooperation—it transcends national limits. Ninety-nine percent of the people cherish it. Therein lies the difference between you and me and Jackson. All his words regarding MFN are like using a fan on a tightrope to keep himself from falling. Pardon me for being so direct. It is my Russian nature.

President: It is 10:00 in Moscow and it is time to go to bed. You still have to come to dinner later.

Brezhnev: I tried to find my schedule yesterday to prepare for the work and to adapt myself to the time difference. Then I had a very pleasant talk with Kissinger and then I talked to the Ambassador and I told him that when we make our speeches tonight at the dinner it will be 5:00 a.m. in Moscow.11

[The President escorted Brezhnev and the Soviet group to the car.]

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11 Nixon’s and Brezhnev’s dinner toasts are printed in Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 595–598.
125. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 19, 1973, 4:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev
Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko
Foreign Trade Minister Nikolay S. Patolichev
Civil Air Minister Boris P. Bugayev
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Mr. A. M. Alexandrov
Mr. G. M. Tsukanov
The President
Secretary of State William Rogers
Secretary of Treasury George Shultz
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. Peter M. Flanigan
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

SUBJECT

Economic Relations

Brezhnev: Mr. President, I had a very pleasant meeting with some very influential Americans—Senator Fulbright and others, members of the Foreign Relations Committee.\(^2\) I am very well aware of the great importance of these bodies of the Congress and of the Congress itself. I myself was the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and I am still a member. So I am deeply aware of the importance of such bodies. And this is especially true when we are trying to resolve major problems. I expressed to them my appreciation for all your contributions and I thanked Senator Fulbright for bringing the group together. I referred to our relations in a broad way. I stressed the importance of last year’s meeting and the responsibility that rests on us. I stressed that our line enjoys the support of our people and that most Senators seemed to be supporting the President as do a majority of the American people who voted him a second term.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Brezhnev Visit Memcons, June 18–25, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. According to the President’s Daily Diary, it lasted until 6:26 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) Brackets are in the original.

\(^2\) Brezhnev hosted a luncheon for 25 Senators and Representatives on June 19. No record of the meeting was found, but for a summary of the discussion, see “Some Senators Not Convinced by Brezhnev on Jews,” The New York Times, June 20, 1973, p. 20.
I talked about trade and, at the initiative of the Senators, about the so-called question of a departure of people from the Soviet Union and I read out some statistics on this. The meeting was very satisfactory and they thanked me for the frank discussion. But I must say it was tiring and quite hot in the room. I spent three and one-half hours with them.

Our start yesterday was very important and I told the Senators that there would be more meetings and some very important decisions to come. I must say they left me with a very pleasant impression.

One of them asked me about my attitude toward the Jackson Amendment.3 He asked a question to the effect whether that amendment could be beneficial to the development of our relations. I told one of them any amendment can have a counter amendment. And one of them said maybe so: I will introduce an amendment to the amendment. But I am sure you will get a fuller report. The meeting was very useful.

President: I greatly appreciate the time you spent and it will be helpful with the legislation, with getting MFN and stopping the Jackson Amendment. I am sorry that it took so long and hope that you will get to bed early tonight at Camp David.

Brezhnev: Thank you. Tiredness always accompanies a visit such as this. It could not have been easy for you last year to adapt to the time difference and so on.

President: Well, welcome to the Cabinet Table. The only such time that I can recall was with Prime Minister Wilson in the first term.

The subject we agreed to discuss is one in which there is total agreement regarding goals. The only question is how to achieve those goals. The General Secretary has often said—last year and this—that our economic systems are complementary. And that we should think big, not small with regard to economic relations, and long term, not short term.

Brezhnev: I certainly reaffirm that and I put it that way to the Senators.

President: I know that Secretary Schultz and Minister Patolichev have been discussing this subject. The problem is how we can take an economy like ours with many private firms and get it to dovetail with yours which is basically government controlled. I have asked Governor Connally to participate for two reasons. One, he is a former member of the Cabinet, and two, he is now in the private sector and very familiar with the problems of arrangements for private investment, etc.

I think we can look back over the last year and be pleased with the increase in trade and we can also say that in the future the increases can

3 See Document 76.
be much greater than what we have achieved so far. The problem we have however, is to find ways so that many American companies can invest in trade with the Soviet Union. It is here where Secretary Shultz has been working with some success with Minister Patolichev and we can do more in the future. As I told the General Secretary yesterday, the attitude on the government side will be positive as issues come up. Yet as practical men we know that there are many practical problems to be worked out.

Brezhnev: That is true. I believe we have things to sell each other and areas for mutually advantageous cooperation. The problem is to find adequate forms of cooperation. We have a broad and positive program fully approved by the last Central Committee Plenum. Some of the members are here—Gromyko, Patolichev, Dobrynin; they and others can all confirm it and also that we have given instructions to our various bodies to depart from old traditions and to work on a broad and long term basis.

In my meeting with U.S. Senators in Moscow, the question of gas was raised. But we are not insisting on it. But gas works wonders and one can do amazing things with it that no one dreamt of 20 years ago. I said then that we could offer one trillion cubic meters of gas to the U.S. It is not for me but for the business men of the U.S. to calculate and see how best to solve the problems. If the U.S. wanted 20 to 25 billion cubic meters a year it would last 40 years. But this is all for Secretary Shultz and Mr. Connally to discuss with Patolichev.

There are also other areas for useful agreement. And there is also the question of consumer goods, but this would be smaller in volume than the long term projects. It might help if we speeded it up in the trade center in Moscow and get U.S. business men over for discussions. We will do what we can.

We could set up working groups on power, on mineral resources and on joint projects in technological cooperation for many years. We could make arrangements for repaying credits over a 10, 20 or some other number of years, as our representatives might agree. It is not for me to list specific projects now, but I fully agree with your approach. If Mr. Shultz and Mr. Connally could work out something concrete with Patolichev, our leadership and people would welcome it.

If we are at one on goals, the question remains how we implement these goals. It was not an easy thing to reach agreement on your first visit; yet we managed and now we have experienced it. We agreed on the basis for an economic agreement. I agree that we have already made progress. Trade has grown from 200 to 600 million rubles and we

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4 See footnote 4, Document 111.
have used 70 to 80% of the credit extended. And we will repay it with interest and it will be profitable for you. We have agreed with Boeing on the YAK–40, with the interior to be provided by the U.S. side. There is also progress on the construction of plants for artificial fertilizer and we will sell you ammonia. Some products we cannot sell you, for example, automobiles, because you are more developed than we. But we could find dozens of areas for trade.

Perhaps Patolichev should add something to what I have said, if that meets your approval. Let me just add that the solution of all these problems will require support with credits which we will repay with interest. We have been working vigorously on deals for the development of Yakutsk oil for use in Japan. We agreed. Then there was the suggestion for the U.S. to cooperate with Japan and we agreed. Then the Kopf Company of the FRG proposed a new metallurgical plant that by-passes the blast furnace stage of making steel. We agreed on the basis of the Kursk metal deposits and we will work out repayments with the FRG company. I also heard recently of a U.S. company that is interested in a similar project. These are just examples of how many firms think in these terms. So we can find new forms of cooperation. Of course the development of that type of cooperation can be achieved on a more durable basis if it gets the support of the President on your side and of us here.

Patolichev: With your permission—as you know, we have a Joint Commission. It has met twice but focused its attention entirely on negotiating the agreement on other legal matters. The agreements involved were signed, that is, the Trade Agreement and the Lend Leasing Agreement, etc. Tomorrow we will sign the Tax Convention. In short, we have been finalizing all these matters. We discussed with Secretary Shultz today the usefulness of announcing that we will open a trade office here and you will open such an office in Moscow.

President: When?

Patolichev: Perhaps while the General Secretary is here. We gave Secretary Shultz a possible protocol and we think it would have a good effect. We also suggested announcing a Joint Chamber of Commerce. That too would have a good effect. We could set up organizing committees on both sides and make the announcement. They could get together and establish the statutes; then they could have a founding meeting and the Joint Chamber would come into being. It is important for us to establish contacts between our organizations and U.S. firms. U.S. companies and firms have been applying for commissions to set

5 See footnote 6, Document 120.
6 See Document 129.
up offices in the Soviet Union and we have given this permission in some cases. It will be easier when the Trade Center is established.

Mr. Shultz and I agreed that once these matters are cleared away our Joint Commission could get together to discuss actual trade. We agreed to have the third session of the Joint Commission in October in Moscow. But if the President and the General Secretary can meet once a year, why should not the trade ministers meet twice a year. We could do important work. In 1971, trade was 200 million, in 1972, 600 million and in 1973 it will be 1.3 billion. But this is not enough for us. We can set up joint working groups for gas and power consuming industries, etc. These are very important matters. We have received offers from many U.S. companies for joint projects on a compensatory basis, that is where investment is to be repaid by finished products. The figures I cited concerning the increase in trade relate basically to increases in imports. The agreement on the automobile plan is being implemented and we have received some agreement with Caterpillar and others and there is a grain deal. The increase for the coming year is also basically in imports. The first large scale agreement with Occidental7 requires very intensive work. There are many other contracts with U.S. firms. On the Yakutsk gas deal we are negotiating with El Paso. On Tyumen there are three companies, Tenneco and two others. So in the course of the year we can do important work on gas. We have also started negotiations with Boeing. These are just a few examples. So I believe we can set up working groups which report to the full committee. Of course, they will come up with problems, for example, on credits, and I discussed this with Secretary Shultz. You have a law dating back to the 1880s long before the Soviet Union came into existence. Under that law a private bank can extend credit to one recipient only to the amount of 10% of its reserves. On our side, of course, the bank is the Foreign Trade Bank. But I think we have managed to find common language and can reach some decisions. The basic point will be that our various trade organizations will act as creditors. But this will require further discussion. So I see a future with a good deal of work and we will require some support to insure greater increases than have occurred so far.

President: I remember my meeting with Mr. Patolichev last year.8 He is a good salesman. Now, let’s hear from our salesman.

Secretary Shultz: First, we met for only 40 minutes and you can see how much we covered. This gives reason to hope that a Joint Commission will continue to be productive.

Brezhnev: Don’t work too long—just give us results.

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7 See footnote 7, Document 124.
8 See Document 65.
Secretary Shultz: I will come to that. The idea of a Commission that meets perhaps twice a year with some rhythm and uses the Trade Agreement as an umbrella and then solves specific problems as they come along is a very good idea.

Brezhnev: There would be various groups on various problems?

Secretary Shultz: Well, we would adapt and see what makes sense as we go along. Mr. Patolichev has shown that there are a variety of problems. You cited the 1880 law and we can clear that up. It illustrates how we can work together also at the staff level on these problems successfully.

Then you mentioned the problem of facilities. We are very gratified to hear what you had to say, but it illustrates one problem—price. Things are very expensive in the Soviet Union and we don’t see why we should pay ten times what the British pay. This is not for you—the President and Brezhnev—to argue about. We will work it out. It is not a question of principle just of money.

President: That’s principle.

Brezhnev: Could you clarify this?

Secretary Shultz: Well, we estimate that if you take a measure like square feet and compare what the British pay we have to pay more. But I don’t mean to argue. It is just a problem. This refers to our office in Moscow.

Brezhnev: I think I can help you.

Secretary Shultz: Well I can use all the help I can get.

Brezhnev: You can rely on me.

Secretary Shultz: There are other illustrations. You mentioned grain. This would be an example of mutual assistance if we can get as much advanced information as possible to avoid disruptions. We discussed this when I was in Moscow. We should exchange as much information as possible in our Commission.

Brezhnev: This is a very important problem and I hope you won’t object if the President and I take part in the discussion.

President: This debate is more difficult than the one on missiles.

Brezhnev: I can see that we don’t seem to be able to come to actual trade until we build the Center. But we should do it all together, build the house and trade at the same time. If we succeed in getting mutual information on missiles, surely we can agree on grain. But seriously, the President and I can talk about it and help.

President: As a matter of fact, the General Secretary yesterday told me about the crop situation and it was very interesting.
Brezhnev: That’s true. We can also agree to exchange information on a long term basis because one year is not enough. I am happy the President wants to discuss it. I am not trying to contradict what you [Sec. Shultz] said.

Secretary Shultz: Then there is gas and oil. We should do what we can to get all the facts to determine whether some project or other is mutually satisfactory. I gather the people involved are going to move shortly.

President: Secretary Shultz suggested that Governor Connally, who is familiar with these problems should say a few words.

Gov. Connally: North Star project\textsuperscript{10} is further along than the other. The Yakutsk reserves are not large enough to justify contracts, yet North Star has not signed a protocol like the one El Paso signed. So, if there is some kind of a problem, let us know because really North Star is much further along, three years actually.

President: Let us make clear that we are not picking among private companies.

Gov. Connally: There is one other thing we might consider. If you count up oil and gas, even without all the other projects, you are talking 8 to 10 billion dollars. I am not in a position to say what the Government will do. But we have to think of new institutions. I doubt if we can do it through the Exim Bank. At least this is a serious question.

President: For us?

Gov. Connally: Us and them.

President: Is the Commission the proper place to consider this?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. President, there is a gas sub-group of the Commission.

Gov. Connally: George can handle it directly unless the Commission becomes more active. Twice a year is not enough.

Brezhnev: Maybe Shultz and Connally can talk it over and report to us. Our deposits of gas are enormous. When I mentioned the size of deposits of gas I mentioned the minimum. The size will probably double. In regard to credits they will have to be guaranteed by the State. I don’t know about the level. Anyway, it should be in the mutual advantage and the experts should calculate carefully what the advantages are. The technical experts should take up all of this but in principle we support this and we think it should last 25 to 30 years.

I don’t know about the holdup that Mr. Connally referred to but Patolichev says that representatives of the companies are coming to Moscow and progress will be made.

\textsuperscript{10} See Document 69.
President: We have to have individual deals but with a push from the higher level. We must set up the institutions, some of which the minister referred to, to find a way to get a greater complex of U.S. companies into contact with Soviet authorities. That is the problem. When the General Secretary met with business leaders—as I myself have in this room—he will find that they won’t know where to go.

I was going to say that the General Secretary has been kept too long by the Senate and by us here, but I do hope the two ministers will meet tomorrow not only to sign the Tax Treaty, but to discuss other issues.

Brezhnev: No objection.

President: While the General Secretary and I settle easy problems like the Middle East and SALT, they can solve the difficult ones.

Brezhnev: Right.

May I express my satisfaction about this meeting on such an important subject. It convinces me we can and want to cooperate in this important field. It is a good sign.

I listened very attentively to what was said by Secretary Shultz and Gov. Connally and by Patolichev. I see there are certain issues to discuss. But speaking broadly, our systems are not an obstacle. You have companies and we have all our ministries, though they do represent the United States. So the difference in systems should not be an obstacle. But the details should be discussed by experts. Let them make mutually beneficial decisions so progress will get ever faster.

President: In summary, we have learned to walk, now we should learn to run.

[The President and the General Secretary and several others then proceeded to the cars to go for a boat ride at approximately 6:30 p.m.]
126. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, June 20, 1973.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Secretary of State William P. Rogers
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt

General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev
Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Mr. A. M. Alexandrov
Mr. G. M. Tsukanov
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Brezhnev: Mr. President, my colleagues are very industrious, they got up at six in the morning and had breakfast. I only found out today they have these qualities. Gromyko as Foreign Minister is really entitled to a second breakfast, but when he was in our country, Dr. Kissinger kept resisting the food we had for him, the little pies.

Kissinger: I resisted only for two minutes.

Brezhnev: But you did resist.

Kissinger: I have a passion for the little pies they serve.

Brezhnev: I have been told by my people who watched television of the excellent coverage of all the events since our arrival.

President: Yes, and also of the boat ride last night.

Brezhnev: I saw the photograph in today’s press where I was trying to hide from the photographers.

President: Since the SALT principles are scheduled for tomorrow, we have one item to complete—the date we select as our goal for a permanent agreement. This is very important, as I indicated on the first day in view of what we will do on Friday, so that the SALT principles will have real meaning and we give impetus to negotiations which are now pretty well at a standstill. For that reason, if we could select 1974 as

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Brezhnev Visit Memcons, June 18–25, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Brackets are in the original. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met with Brezhnev from 1:08 to 3:07 p.m. The U.S. and Soviet parties left Washington the evening of June 19 and traveled by helicopter to Camp David. They returned to Washington the afternoon of June 21. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

2 June 22. The two leaders signed the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. See Document 129.
a goal rather than making a vague statement about 1974–1975, it would be very important for our negotiators. If we set a deadline in 1974, this would be something we might achieve when I go to Moscow next year.

Brezhnev: That is indeed a very important matter and it is a point that has been left open. I can see that Dr. Kissinger and Dobrynin left it to be decided at the summit. As always, they leave the easiest things for us. Now I should ask: Is this the only point?

President: Yes, as regards SALT.

Brezhnev: I just wanted to check on them. I have great respect for Kissinger and Dobrynin, but we should check them occasionally. Checking and verification are not incompatible with respect.

Kissinger: As long as it is by national means.

Brezhnev: What other kind is there? We have a small understanding with the President that we will set up a small machine of one and one-half million people. You do the same thing. They go around and look and then we are secure. But I recall that there was a lot of talk in the recent past whether it is possible to use national means to verify these things. Now it is clear that it is possible. Both sides can pay tribute to man’s geniuses. In the very recent past you and I could not have conceived of such things, but now the scientists have done it.

Mr. President, I agree we should discuss that matter. [The date]. It is a very important one. Perhaps you can raise all the outstanding questions as a whole, so we can settle them.

President: All together?

Brezhnev: Well, yes. There are not too many left. If we could identify all the issues and then have a personal talk our colleagues can work them out and then we can meet with them again. We should agree to settle it all today.

President: We should work out the other areas. Perhaps the Middle East should be worked on by others, the Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin. It involves complicated language. We should not have to work it out but they should try this afternoon.

The other point at issue is with regard to CSCE and the starting date of MBFR. The positions vary in that your side definitely wants a summit committed for CSCE but the allies do not want it. We are in a tough spot there. Regarding MBFR, we consider it important to state the date for starting—October 30th. You have indicated you want to leave it open; it is very important to us because of the allies and because Congress wants progress. If you could come with us on the October 30th date we could take language “considering” a summit. It would cause some problems for us with the allies but we would be prepared to do it. Those, Mr. General Secretary, are the only issues left. If we could
reach agreement we would have the communiqué all set and of course the SALT agreement tomorrow would then be in order.

Brezhnev: Has your position on MBFR since the meeting in Moscow undergone any changes?

President: We consulted with our allies, though I don’t think we can say now what the details are. But we can have constructive and very concrete negotiations. There is no change in principle from last year.

[At this point photographers entered the room to take pictures.]

Brezhnev: You remember Mr. President, when the idea was first advanced to have the CSCE in Paris. We discussed it in Moscow and also in Oreanda with Brandt and we were proposing 1972. But then there were many consultations and discussions. We can now note with gratification that all parties favor the conference and that July 3rd has been chosen for starting at the Foreign Minister’s level. Then there will be commissions. And then the third stage. What do you say to this? It should end this year so that it does not drag on and people will lose interest. So we should agree to 1973 for the ending. If we can agree on this, the other problems will be easier.

President: It is difficult to set the end before the conference begins. There are a great number of nations involved and it would not be realistic. We, ourselves, have no objection but we cannot speak for our allies and you would have similar problems with yours. All I can say is that we can press forward to get a conclusion as soon as possible. You and I can agree to that as a goal.

Brezhnev: I did not mean that I wanted to select a definite date, a month or a day for the end. I merely was talking about the end of 1973. It could be anytime in December, say. It would have a great significance in Europe and the world. The matter was first raised during 1972. Pompidou first took the initiative when I was in Paris and he supported it. It was set out in the communiqué at the time. Several others felt the conference would be held in 1972, certainly France did. Then it transpired that it was not held. Now it seems that even 1973 will pass without result. We should try to do something definite. The word allies has a relative sense. After all the two of us are allies in working out things. Any way our allies support the end of 1973. We favor saying that we should end all stages, including the last one at the summit by the end of 1973. If we could do that, then we can set the start of mutual force reduction negotiations, since you say you have a problem with your allies on this.

It seemed to me that from the previous discussions with Brandt, Pompidou and you we could say in a gentlemanly fashion that this has been solved. Sometime ago I met Pompidou at Zaslavl. I met him half way by saying that the commissions should meet one and one-half months after the Foreign Ministers. Pompidou did not raise any ques-
tions about ending the conference in 1973. So the French don’t oppose it and in Bonn we also discussed this with Brandt—and I informed you in detail—and he also did not object. I don’t see anyone who opposes this except perhaps the British. Certainly the others don’t. I don’t see any significant objection. Anyway, our joint voice is generally heeded in the world. If we don’t speak out it won’t be taken seriously. So if we could agree, then we could agree on the points you raised.

So, I believe if we could get full understanding on all these questions we would just have one. I agree that it is very knotty. The Middle East. Our colleagues could talk about it today. But we should settle all other matters today. While our colleagues talk we could also talk on the Middle East, the two of us.

President: Keep in mind that in regard to the SALT principles, if they are to be signed tomorrow, it is very important to set the 1974 date. Because Friday’s agreement has to be coupled with specific things on strategic arms. So the date, not just the vague 1974–1975, is very important. The same applies to the starting date for MBFR in relation to Friday. We have to put meat on the bones. It is very important.

CSCE is a different problem. The starting date has been set for July 3. We both are not dragging our feet. But from contacts with the allies, we know they don’t want a commitment to a concluding date. When you say that Pompidou and Brandt don’t oppose, it is quite different from what you are saying, which is to settle between us a precise date. Perhaps we could try to give this to our colleagues for drafting: “And therefore they are of the view that it should proceed as expeditiously as possible.” That is on page 9 [of the draft communiqué]. That way we would not be committing our allies. This would come in the sentence: “The USA and the USSR proceed from the assumption . . .”

Brezhnev: If we take that form of words it might seem that we are creating haste and are afraid of something. We should get an acceptable form of words but not a specific date, just this year. This would give the allies greater assurance. This would not be diktat, it would just be that we favor it and it would mean that we still have six months to complete the work. If this were done, I could then think over the date for the start of the mutual troop reductions.

President: Let me suggest a procedure. This item, MBFR and the Middle East will not be decided today because they are in the communiqué. If we could make progress it would be fine but it could be finished later. On the other hand, the SALT principles have to be decided today. The note that was just handed to Dr. Kissinger was whether the

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3 See footnote 8, Document 130.
4 Not found; not further identified.
two press secretaries can announce today that we can have a SALT Agreement. I feel very strongly that the SALT principles will be a shattering disappointment if we fail to put in 1974. Also it would be consistent with our meeting in Moscow in 1974. For example, we would never have had an agreement in Moscow last year if we had not set a goal for ourselves. I would suggest that if we could get that item settled, which is separate from CSCE, then the experts could work on CSCE and MBFR.

Brezhnev: I certainly cannot object that these two are interrelated and of great importance to us and the world but I would like you to agree that settling a time limit for CSCE is also very important. I would like a private talk before we reach final decisions on all these questions. I have a feeling, a sixth sense, that a little discussion between us could lead to a settlement including all those questions in the communiqué. Certainly I am guided by an earnest desire to reach mutually satisfactory solutions on all these questions. I suggest we adjourn and have a discussion while our colleagues have a discussion on other matters. I am sure we can agree today and then have an easier day tomorrow.

President: We have to remember that SALT has to be agreed.

Brezhnev: That is the point of my suggestion. It is with a view to reaching agreement. They keep talking about a summit. The only thing higher than us is the ceiling. So we have to be the ones to do it.

[The meeting ended at 3:10 p.m.]
127. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)  


SUBJECT

Meeting with General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, Morning, Thursday, June 21, 1973, at Camp David, 11:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
General Secretary Brezhnev
Dr. Henry Kissinger
Victor Sukhodrev, interpreter

The President and General Secretary Brezhnev discussed the nuclear agreement to be signed the following day.

The President described the agreement as designed to prevent nuclear war. He then summarized the agreement article by article, making particular reference to Article VI on the right of self-defense and obligations to allies and third countries. When this agreement is presented to our leaders and the press it can be a great step forward in preventing nuclear war, the President continued. If different interpretations occur it would be very unfortunate. “You and I understand,” he said to the General Secretary.

Dr. Kissinger then mentioned that he would be briefing the press before the signing ceremony on Friday, and he wanted to review in advance the briefing he would give. He would discuss the agreement along the following lines.

[Dr. Kissinger then read from the talking points at Tab A.]  

General Secretary Brezhnev agreed with this presentation, as long as we don’t go beyond the provisions of Article VI. “We will be signing as representatives of our people,” he said to the President. “We will interpret it the same way.” There will be no harm to obligations toward allies, the General Secretary continued. It is an agreement leading to the avoidance and prevention of war. It would have been better if we had been able to have an obligation to ban war completely.

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2 See Documents 121 and 122.

Dr. Kissinger stated that we would not go beyond what we have said here. And what was written in the letter, the President added [referring to the President’s letter to Brezhnev of June 7th stating the U.S. interpretation of the agreement]. General Secretary Brezhnev said he recalled the letter very well. If we give different interpretations, he added, politically the agreement would be reduced to nothing. Therefore the General Secretary agreed to Dr. Kissinger’s briefing.

The General Secretary said he thought the President’s letter stressed balance of strength as the basis of the US-Soviet relationship, but he thought the agreement would be given added impetus by the SALT principles. He didn’t think we should link all this to the European Security Conference, MBFR and SALT. He indicated that the Soviets would have an MBFR suggestion to make which would suit us very much.

The belief of our people in progress would be undermined by stress on positions of strength. The comments in the press would be very favorable. The Soviets have no selfish purposes in all this matter, he assured the President. He had received a report from Suslov, who was presiding in Moscow in Brezhnev’s absence. The Politburo all sent their warm support, and also their warm greetings to the President.

The President suggested that we should let Dr. Kissinger stress what the agreement does not cover. General Secretary Brezhnev replied that if we gave in to that pressure, Dr. Kissinger would spend all his time on negative things. “Why should we do anything to belittle the agreement?” the General Secretary asked. “So let us comment in a positive way.” Senator Fulbright had said he would positively support the Administration’s policies.

The General Secretary cited the agricultural agreement as an example of the positive approach. The two sides had just signed it the other day. The General Secretary now proposed an exchange of letters saying that the Soviet Union will buy an average of five million tons every year for five years, beginning July 1, 1974. This would be announced after the Summit.

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4 Document 120.
5 The Agreement on Cooperation in Agriculture was signed on June 19 by Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz and Andrei Gromyko. See Document 129.
128. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the 
Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for 
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Brezhnev’s Figures on Soviet Jewish Emigration

The figures on Soviet Jewish emigration Brezhnev gave to Congressional leaders on June 19\(^2\) appear in various parts accurate, unintentionally erroneous, and perhaps deliberately misleading.

Brezhnev said there were 2.1 million Jews in the USSR, which is the figure used in the 1970 Soviet census, but which is significantly lower than the three million figure Kosygin used in Stockholm in April 1973 and generally accepted by Western scholars.

Brezhnev said that 68,000 Soviet Jews were able to leave before January 1973. He gave no beginning date for the period. According to our figures (from the Dutch, the Israelis, and voluntary agencies) from 1960 until January 1973, 55,500 Soviet Jews emigrated for Israel. This is 12,500 below Brezhnev’s figure. We have no data for the period before 1960 nor comprehensive totals on Soviet Jewish emigration for countries other than Israel.

In the first five months of 1973 Soviet emigration to Israel was approximately 12,500. Therefore, the combined total from 1960 through mid-June 1973 is just over 69,000—close to Brezhnev’s 68,000 figure, which he, however, claimed as the total by January 1, 1973. He may have confused relevant time periods.

Brezhnev referred to 61,000 applications and to 60,200 approvals in 1972. We have no firm data on applications last year, although the Israelis believe that some 100,000 applications are pending. However, the reference to 60,200 approvals seems far wide of the mark since about 31,500 Soviet Jews actually emigrated. If Brezhnev misread and the “6” was actually “3” the number of applications he claimed was approved would correspond fairly closely to the number which actually left. (The figures on annual totals vary by several hundred depending on where the count was made—Moscow, Vienna, Israel—because of the numbers in pipeline.)

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\(^2\) See Document 125 and footnote 2 thereto.
Brezhnev’s reported assertion that 95 per cent of the Soviet Jews are free to leave appears to be a brash effort to dissimulate. The claim was first made formally by Soviet Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs Shumilin in December 1972 when he asserted that 95.5 per cent of all applications are approved. In his remarks to Congressmen, Brezhnev gave some corroborative evidence on what had been suspected about how the 95 per cent figure was reached.

In referring to the list of “742” names of Jews denied permission to emigrate, Brezhnev reportedly said that “177 have not applied for exit visas for security reasons, but these cases are being reviewed.” It seems clear from this remark that the Soviets did not count these de facto refusals of applications in their tabulations. The “95 per cent” claim, therefore, almost certainly refers only to applications which have been accepted for action, either to be approved or refused. The number of applications which the authorities refuse to accept, and are not included in the Soviet tabulations, is unknown, except for the “177” (probably 177 families) to which Brezhnev referred.

Brezhnev’s statement that 300 Jewish emigrants have asked to return to the Soviet Union appears credible. We have no way of assessing his remark that 1,300 did not pick up their exit visas. Both figures are relatively small given the numbers involved.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. 3

3 Dudley W. Miller signed for Eliot above this typed signature.

129. Editorial Note

The Soviet Union and the United States signed 11 agreements during the Washington Summit between June 19 and June 23, 1973. On June 19, the Agreement on Cooperation in Agriculture was signed by Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. It specified certain cooperative projects in research and technology designed to raise agricultural production, especially food. Projects were to be overseen by the U.S.–USSR Joint Committee on Agricultural Cooperation. For the full text of the agreement, see Department of State Bulletin, July 23, 1973, pages 161–162. The Agreement on Cooperation in Studies of the World Ocean, the Agreement on Cooperation in Transportation, and the General Agreement on Contacts, Ex-
changes and Cooperation were also signed on June 19. For the full texts of those agreements, see ibid., pages 163–169.

On June 20, the Convention on Matters of Taxation was signed by Secretary of the Treasury George P. Shultz and Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolay Semenovich Patolichev. The agreement was intended to avoid double taxation on income and to prevent, where possible, citizens of one country being taxed by the other. For the full text of the agreement (27 UST 1; TIAS 8225), see ibid., pages 169–173.

On June 21, the Basic Principles of Negotiation on Strategic Arms Limitation were signed by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev. The Basic Principles reiterated the arms reductions that both countries committed themselves to in the May 1972 agreements and asserted that active negotiations toward a permanent agreement would continue, with the hope of concluding such an agreement in 1974. For the full text of the Basic Principles (24 UST 1472; TIAS 7653), see ibid., page 158. The Agreement on Scientific Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was also signed on June 21. For the full text, see ibid., pages 159–160.

On June 22, the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (see Document 122) was signed by Nixon and Brezhnev. On that same day, the Protocol on the U.S.–U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce (24 UST 1498; TIAS 7656) and the Protocol on Commercial Facilities (24 UST 1501; TIAS 7657) were also signed. On June 23, the Protocol on Expansion of Air Services was signed. For the full texts, see Department of State Bulletin, July 23, 1973, pages 173–175. The New York Times also printed the texts of some of the agreements in its editions of June 20–24, 1973.
130. Memorandum of Conversation

San Clemente, June 23, 1973, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister of the USSR
Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
Mr. Makarov, Counselor to the Foreign Minister
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff

The discussion fell into four sections: (1) brief discussion of the press reaction to the signing on June 22 of the agreement on avoiding nuclear war; (2) brief discussion of some details of the US–USSR communiqué to be issued at the end of the Brezhnev visit; (3) discussion of the Middle East paragraphs of the communiqué; (4) discussion of the “general working principles” paper.

Reaction to Agreement on Avoiding Nuclear War

Dr. Kissinger began by saying that the reaction to the agreement signed in Washington the previous day on avoiding nuclear war had been “superb.”

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that he would agree as far as he could tell from the West Coast papers that he had seen.

Dr. Kissinger said he would show the Foreign Minister our news summary. In response to the Foreign Minister’s question, Dr. Kissinger said that the general sense of the reaction was “very good.” Dr. Kissinger went and got from his desk a copy of the news summary and noted the comments on TV of Messrs. Brinkley, Valeriani, as well as the Associated Press lead. He concluded his comment by saying that overall it was “very, very positive.” [Copy of relevant pages of news summary attached at Tab C.]

Foreign Minister Gromyko asked how the reaction from US allies had been.

Dr. Kissinger replied that it had been mixed but generally positive. He said with a smile that the USSR would not be heartbroken if the

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2 David Brinkley anchored NBC Nightly News in the 1970s and Richard Valeriani also worked for NBC News.

3 Attached but not printed.
The agreement were not wholly popular in Europe. He said that we had averted the worst dangers so that if the Soviets were moderate in their statements, the US could live with the situation.

The Foreign Minister asked whether there had been any reaction from the Far East.

Dr. Kissinger replied that there had been virtually none, although what had come from Japan had been favorable. Alluding to China, he said that he was confident that the reaction from there would not be positive.

Foreign Minister Gromyko, taking the posture of the statue “The Thinker” by Rodin, said that the Chinese were probably sitting there contemplating their next move.

Dr. Kissinger said his estimate is that the Chinese will be “very critical.” In response to a question from the Foreign Minister on what points he thought the Chinese would particularly object to, he said that they would not like the fact of an agreement and particularly they would not like Article 4. He felt they would be “extremely negative.” They do not want the impression of an extremely close relationship between the US and USSR.4

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that the Chinese would assume that what is good for the USSR is bad for them. He said that is not necessarily the case, but that is how they will see it.

Minor Communiqué Items

Dr. Kissinger said he would like to settle two minor issues in the communiqué:

—Dr. Kissinger proposed that the date on which the President was invited to come again to Moscow be inserted since it had been mentioned publicly. To make this point, he would add the words “to visit the USSR in 1974” and drop the words in the present draft, “at a time convenient to both sides.” He commented that “your ally” [referring to the Chinese] will not like the prospect of another summit.

—On page 9 of the present draft he felt that the words “the US and the USSR proceed from the assumption” should be changed to “the US and the USSR hold the view that.” He said this was a purely editorial change since on page 10 practically the same words are used. Foreign Minister Gromyko assented, saying that the two phrases mean about the same in Russian.

Dr. Kissinger went on to say that the US needed a list of people to be included on the first page of the communiqué, and Ambassador Do—

brynin said he would give that to the US side in the afternoon. Finally, Dr. Kissinger gave to the Foreign Minister a copy of the paragraphs proposed to cover the Civil Aviation agreement. He handed Ambassador Dobrynin an English text of the agreement.

The Middle East in the Communiqué

Dr. Kissinger continued, saying that the only issue left is the Middle East.

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that, as the Soviet side sees the situation, it is difficult to agree on any “substantial” text for the communiqué. It could be stated that both parties expressed their positions and added that they would continue to exercise efforts to promote a just settlement of the problem which is in accord with the interests of independence and sovereignty of all the states in the area.

Dr. Kissinger said that such a statement would be “less than last year’s.”

Foreign Minister Gromyko said, “in one sense less; in another sense more.” It would not mention Resolution 242. Last year, he said, the two sides had hidden the differences between them and accentuated the matters on which there was agreement. But since the areas of agreement were thin and the Arabs did not particularly like last year’s communiqué, he felt that the two sides should simply indicate that they had expressed their views. He indicated that the Soviet side would be willing to mention Resolution 242 if the US were prepared to mention the Jarring memorandum of 1971.5

Dr. Kissinger replied that the US could not do that. In any case, the two documents were of a quite different character.

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that they could be mentioned together, and Dr. Kissinger replied that we had never mentioned the Jarring memorandum. The Foreign Minister noted that the US had initially expressed a positive view. Dr. Kissinger replied that this had been purely a unilateral expression of view.

Dr. Kissinger said that he did not see how “we” could separate ourselves from Resolution 242. He felt it would be a pity after a week of substantial harmony if the press were to report disagreement on the issue of the Middle East.

Foreign Minister Gromyko acknowledged that the press might report such disagreement, but the reality is that there is disagreement on

fundamental points. The US side in Moscow in 1972 had said it would show flexibility on the issue of withdrawal of Israeli troops, but that flexibility has not materialized. The crucial point is withdrawal. Nothing has happened in the past year.

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that he had talked with Secretary Rogers on the plane the previous afternoon. They had not discussed a text, but on the basis of the talks they did have, the Foreign Minister proposed the following:

“The parties expressed their deep concern with the situation in the Middle East and exchanged opinions regarding ways of reaching a Middle East settlement.

“Each of the parties set forth its position on this problem.

“Both parties agreed to continue to exert their efforts in the direction of the quickest possible settlement in the Middle East. This settlement should be in accordance with the interests of all states and peoples in the area and with the interests of their independence and sovereignty.”

Dr. Kissinger asked the Foreign Minister what the phrase “and peoples” was intended to reflect. He said he did not understand how the two were different in a context like this or how we could distinguish “peoples” in the context of a situation like this. He asked the Minister what he intended to convey. He indicated that the US would prefer to drop that phrase.

When Foreign Minister Gromyko said he felt there was no important distinction, Dr. Kissinger countered that, to be frank, the problem was that this raised the whole question of the Palestinians. He noted that in his conversations with Egyptian National Security Adviser Hafiz Ismail, Ismail had talked in terms of getting Israel back to its borders simply in order to gain an end of the state of belligerency—nothing more than a virtual continuation of the cease-fire. Thus, the Egyptians seem to be putting themselves in a position to make the establishment of peace between Egypt and Israel contingent on a later solution to the problem of the Palestinians.

Ambassador Dobrynin recalled that this issue had been discussed at length between him and Assistant Secretary of State Sisco in 1969 and that the USSR had substantially met that objection by the US. He said he did not feel that was an issue any more.

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6 For the May 26, 1972, memorandum of conversation in which the Middle East was discussed, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 284.

7 For a summary of the 1969 discussions between Sisco and Dobrynin, see ibid., volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 38.
Dr. Kissinger recalled that he had not been a party to those discussions. In any case, we preferred not to see the word “peoples” introduced in this context.

Foreign Minister Gromyko then said that he would drop the phrase “and peoples” provided the following sentence could be added at the end: “Both parties stand for the fulfillment of decisions of the United Nations on this question.”

Dr. Kissinger said that this is too open-ended for the US side. There are UN decisions which the US has not voted for.

Foreign Minister Gromyko suggested inserting the word “appropriate” before “decisions.” Dr. Kissinger repeated the point he had made earlier that the US did not want to indicate unqualified support for decisions which reach back over a number of years. He said that he would have to go back and look at them all to agree to this point. He would prefer not to have a sentence of this kind.

Foreign Minister Gromyko then went back to saying that the USSR would want either this sentence or the words “and peoples” in the previous sentence.

Dr. Kissinger indicated that perhaps if the word “appropriate” were inserted, that the US could consider the sentence.

At this point, Dr. Kissinger read through the text as it had been developed in the conversation, editing as he went through and reaching the following version:

“The parties expressed their deep concern with the situation in the Middle East and exchanged opinions regarding ways of reaching a Middle East settlement.

“Each of the parties set forth its position on this problem.

“Both parties agreed to continue to exert their efforts to promote the quickest possible settlement in the Middle East. This settlement should be in accordance with the interests of all states in the area and consistent with their independence and sovereignty.

“Both parties stand for the fulfillment of appropriate decisions of the UN on this question.”

Dr. Kissinger and the Foreign Minister agreed that they would discuss this with their principals, and Dr. Kissinger indicated that he would tell Secretary Rogers that the Foreign Minister had presented this proposal following his conversation with the Secretary on the plane the day before.8

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Foreign Minister Gromyko indicated that General Secretary Brezhnev was “generally very satisfied” with the visit.

Working Principles on the Arab-Israel Issue

Foreign Minister Gromyko asked, “What about the principles?” He asked whether there is anything new worth talking about. He felt that there is no point in spending time on the project unless it is possible to make some progress.

Dr. Kissinger said he had talked with the Israelis generally and had studied again the paper presented in Moscow this May. He indicated that he had worked out a new version which he then handed to Gromyko [copy attached at Tab A].

Foreign Minister Gromyko read through the principles and made the points indicated below:

On paragraph 1, he felt that the paragraph as now drafted reflected a different approach from the one in the principles discussed in Moscow in 1972 [copy attached at Tab B]. He said that the paragraph as now drafted loses the idea of a comprehensive settlement in which all parts of the settlement are inter-related. Introducing the idea of “separate agreements” suggests that it would be possible to have something like an interim Canal agreement outside the scope of the general system of overall agreements.

On paragraph 2, he said that “this is not the answer.” He said that there are different interpretations of Security Council Resolution 242 and that this paragraph did not say what is necessary.

On paragraph 3, he said that this point would refer only to Jordan. He said that this had been made clear in the discussions in Moscow in 1972.

Dr. Kissinger said that he wanted to get the history of this point clear. When it had been discussed in Moscow, it was not limited to Jordan. The following day in Kiev, Ambassador Dobrynin on the Foreign Minister’s behalf had come to Dr. Kissinger and said that the Soviet side regarded this as applying only to Jordan. But when it was drafted, Jordan had not been discussed. The Foreign Minister said that he felt Jordan was mentioned several times.

Dr. Kissinger said he would have a great deal of difficulty identifying Jordan in this paragraph. He stepped back to describe his overall philosophy about a set of principles like this. He felt that if the US and

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9 See Document 112 and footnote 3 thereto.
11 Attached but not printed.
USSR could agree on a set of general principles that succeeded in starting negotiations, then each side could give its own particular interpretation of what any of these principles meant. The USSR could say that the principle applied only to Jordan. The US would simply say, “Let’s see what emerges from the negotiations.” The issue is whether the two sides could find a set of propositions general enough to get talks started.

Foreign Minister Gromyko then turned to paragraph 4. He objected to the words “including participation of the signatory nations.” He said that if that meant that Israel could participate, this could not be accepted.

He then indicated that paragraphs 5 and 6 were all right. On paragraph 7, he indicated that it would be necessary to make reference to the appropriate UN decisions.

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that he could not give a final answer at this meeting. He had simply given a quick judgment on what changes would be required if the principles were to become more acceptable to the Soviet side.

Dr. Kissinger said he would like to recapitulate the Foreign Minister’s comments and to make some comments of his own.

On paragraph 1, he said that the US could accept a formulation which indicated the comprehensive nature of the settlement. As far as “separate agreements” are concerned, a way could be found to indicate that they would be part of a general settlement. It would also be possible, as Ambassador Dobrynin had suggested, to use the phrase “appropriate forms of negotiation” rather than “negotiations between the signatories.” The Foreign Minister interjected that this was important because the phrase “negotiation between the signatories” would be like a red flag to a bull because it connoted direct negotiations.

Continuing, Dr. Kissinger said that the US would have to have some reference to Security Council Resolution 242. Foreign Minister Gromyko said, “Impossible.” There was a moment of silence, and Dr. Kissinger continued.

On paragraph 3, if the Soviet side wanted to say explicitly that border changes would take place only on the Jordanian front, that would be impossible. The US could note the Soviet view. The Foreign Minister said that would do no good because it would not bring the two views together. He suggested that the US might at least confidentially indicate that this point applied only to the Jordanian sector. Otherwise, there would be major problems if the Egyptians and the Syrians thought there were to be changes in their borders.

Dr. Kissinger suggested that it might be possible to agree confidentially that we would both exercise our influence for a return to 1967
borders. But this would have to be agreed confidentially. He noted that
doing things like this confidentially in the Arab world was often an impossibility.

On paragraph 4, he felt that the US could meet the objection to including Israel explicitly in the composition of the international forces. The words “participation of the signatory nations” would not be necessary.

Foreign Minister Gromyko said the problem with including it is that it reflects Israeli aspirations to keep its forces in the Sinai.

Dr. Kissinger said that he understood. He would not insist on this point. In the framework of what we are trying to achieve with these principles, it would be all right to drop that point. He felt that the only way to get the talks started was to be sufficiently vague. He agreed that we could eliminate the phrase.

Dr. Kissinger noted that paragraphs 5 and 6 were agreed. At this point, he called attention to the fact that a paragraph from the May 1972 principles had been dropped. It was the one which read, “The agreements should lead to an end of a state of belligerency and to the establishment of peace.” He explained that we had dropped it because there was reference to “final peace” in the new paragraph 1. We felt that it was not needed.

Foreign Minister Gromyko said he would like to keep that paragraph. It was more favorable to Israel. It might facilitate negotiation. The Foreign Minister asked whether he was being “too pro-Israel.”

Dr. Kissinger joked that this was because of the large Jewish population in the Soviet Union. The Foreign Minister acknowledged the quip.

Foreign Minister Gromyko said he wanted to go back to the first paragraph. He had not looked at it carefully. He said that the USSR could not say anything that looked like direct negotiations. Therefore he wanted to insert the idea of “appropriate forms of negotiation which would be agreeable to all the parties concerned.” Dr. Kissinger indicated that we could probably work something out along these lines.

On paragraph 7, Foreign Minister Gromyko said that it would be necessary to include some reference to the UN decisions. Perhaps the same language could be used as had been proposed for the draft communiqué—“appropriate decisions of the UN on this question.”

Dr. Kissinger summed up saying that we had simply maintained some of the principles from the May 1972 draft. He felt that paragraph 4 is manageable. He felt that on paragraph 1, the US side would have no objection in principle to a comprehensive settlement as long as it could take place in stages.
Dr. Kissinger indicated that he would try to produce another draft before the 2:00 p.m. meeting that would represent a US revision taking into account the informal comments made by the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador.

Ambassador Dobrynin suggested that perhaps brackets could be used to show any point that had not been resolved in the discussion.

Foreign Minister Gromyko said he would prefer not to show the draft as Dr. Kissinger had handed it to him to General Secretary Brezhnev. He would, however, like to be able to report to the General Secretary and suggested that Dr. Kissinger reshape his proposal along the lines of the comments he had made. If a new US version could be handed to him in the afternoon, he would talk to the General Secretary about it. Then Ambassador Dobrynin could continue talks with Dr. Kissinger after his return to Washington.

Foreign Minister Gromyko reflected that there is one new element in the principles—namely, the element of negotiation. He said that he would not exclude some form of negotiation along the lines of the Rhodes talks. A long time ago, he recalled, Foreign Minister Riad of Egypt had told him that the Arabs would not exclude talks along the lines of the Rhodes formula. [Note: The “Rhodes Formula” refers to the negotiating procedures used at Rhodes during negotiation of the Arab-Israeli armistice agreements in 1949.] He said the Arabs had changed their position on Rhodes-type talks in 1969 only after the Israelis had made certain public comments. He repeated that he did not exclude the possibility that the Arabs might agree to the Rhodes formula. He noted that the talks might not necessarily take place at Rhodes; they might just as well take place at the UN in New York. He felt this problem would be taken care of in the draft if we could say that “appropriate forms of negotiation should be used acceptable to the parties concerned.” If anything is said that the Arabs interpret as “direct negotiations,” then any progress we made on the other points would be spoiled by the negative reaction the Arabs would have to this one.

The meeting concluded with the understanding that Dr. Kissinger would revise the principles and bring a copy to the afternoon meeting.

Harold H. Saunders

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12 Saunders initialed above this typed signature.
131. Memorandum by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) for the President’s File


SUBJECT
Meeting with Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU, on Saturday, June 23, 1973 at 12:22 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

[The principal topics of this meeting were China and Indochina.]

General Secretary Brezhnev: [Showing the President a copy of the Soviet-proposed non-aggression treaty with China.] I am doing this as a rebuff to the slander of the Chinese. They claim we are amassing an army to threaten them. If the Chinese do not accept it, we will publish the text of this with appropriate commentary.

I will tell you of my study of Chinese history. The Chinese have implemented agreements with others only rarely. Even when they implement them, they interpret them in ways that deprive them of meaning. I would like to quote one example of the peculiar nature of the Chinese. Often the Chinese hide things from the rest of the world. They managed to hide the death of an Emperor for a whole year. There was a Russian cartographer, Semomas by name, who wrote a treatise on the Chinese. He said they are treacherous and spiteful, capable of destroying a whole people.

They are not honorable. We at one time had good relations with China. We did a lot to aid the Chinese. It was vast. We built up their metallurgical industry and their building industry. What we received in return is well known. Once they asked us to build a metallurgical plant in Mao’s home town. As we did at that time, we provided experts to implement the request. And it so happened that the right man for this job was my brother. He was requested to go to China. He was summoned to Moscow from Dniepropetrovsk. So my brother asked me to

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Brezhnev Visit Memcons, June 18–25, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Brackets are in the original. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting ended at 12:26 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) In his memoirs, Kissinger noted that this meeting was unscheduled and “descended upon us without warning.” (Years of Upheaval, p. 264)
help him to stay home because he didn’t want to leave his daughter. I urged him to go, in the name of higher authority. So he went and built their metallurgical plant. Mao you know is a strange man; he is afraid to speak to his people. My brother was one of thousands of experts in China. Suddenly they started a big-power chauvinist campaign against us. Mao has a treacherous character.

I speak frankly because you are my friend.

You know, during the war we gave aid to the Vietnamese side knowing they could not impose their will on you. After the 23rd Party Congress, I spoke to Le Duan and Pham Van Dong. I told these people: Dear friends, to fight is your business. But you must soon negotiate with the U.S. In all our talks with the Vietnamese we urged negotiations, although I knew the Vietnamese were very dependent on the Chinese. I would like to express my satisfaction at the outcome of the negotiations. But the credit goes also to you and other countries. Let us not forget the sort of policy the Chinese were trying to teach other countries, especially to Vietnam. You may remember how strongly I spoke to you in Moscow, and I ask you to forgive what I said. Due to my influence, you started peace talks again. You will remember how we handled the negotiations in Paris. But we know also that the Chinese are an exceptionally sly and perfidious people.

We will wait with publishing the document, partly because we don’t want to distract from this visit.

The feelings of distrust and disrespect I feel for the current Chinese leadership were reinforced by the Cultural Revolution and their reaction to U.S.-Soviet détente. What sort of leaders are they who so oppress their people while making propaganda all around the world? In our modern time, gigantic trials were held in public squares and thousands watched public beheadings. What ideas roam in the heads of such leaders? These are people who can craftily conceal their real aims. I am not proposing anything, but any student of China feels the same way. Kuznetsov and Chuikov feel the same way.\(^2\) We have doctors who worked with Mao and wrote a special report on his health. All agree on the Chinese danger.

I tell you this because, while we each have a right to our individual view on China, we must understand each other. We have normal state relations with China, but the reality is different. Soon you will have state relations with China. This is your business. I would like to ask you if after some time we could exchange views about Chinese reaction to

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\(^2\) Presumably Vasily Vasilyevich Kuznetsov and Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov. Kuznetsov was Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister. Chuikov became Marshal of the Soviet Union in March 1955 and served as Chief of Civil Defense from 1961 to 1972.
our rapprochement and to the treaty on the prevention of nuclear war. This comparing of notes, this exchange of views, can only do us good.

The President: Dr. Kissinger will talk to Dobrynin.

Brezhnev: I will write you my views directly. Do I understand that your reply is positive?

The President: We should always be in touch through the private channel on any subject and any nation, especially an important nation like China which can affect our relations. This must be in total confidence.

Brezhnev: We accept no other way.

The President: We shall continue our present policy of communication with China. But you can be sure that the United States will never do anything with China or Japan against the interests of the Soviet Union or inconsistent with the spirit of the agreement we signed yesterday.\(^3\)

Brezhnev: This is important. Thank you. Of course, very good relations will continue between our countries. I am sure, however, of one thing; China will never stop the development of its nuclear arsenal no matter what you say. We should continue to exchange on this subject, especially when you come to the USSR. We cannot limit our arms while they build up.

The President: How long until China becomes a major nuclear country?

Brezhnev: In answer to your question, we must take into account various analyses. I believe that in the course of the next 15 years they will not reach a stage we will have then; but in ten years they will have weapons equal to what we have now. We have tactical weapons sufficient to deal with them now. But we must bring home to them that this cannot go on. We will adhere strictly to our agreements. But the Chinese will act in their fashion. In 1963, during our Party Congress, I remember how Mao said: “Let 400 million Chinese die, 300 million will be left.” Such is the psychology of this man. Afterwards, the people of the world became afraid, and a new phase started of the arms race. Then when Mao saw that his idea was not gaining support, he made a somersault, asking us to sign the principles of coexistence with him. Now Chinese people are saying they will never use nuclear weapons. I don’t believe them. They won’t sign any agreements. These people are ruthless.

The things I have been saying are my personal thought.

The President: The subject is of critical importance for the future of our children and grandchildren. I will be in personal touch with you. I

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\(^3\) A reference to the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War.
will ask Dr. Kissinger to analyze it and be in confidential touch with you through Dobrynin.

Looking at that part of the world, the subject that concerns me is the continued military action of the DRV in Cambodia in violation of the Paris Agreement. If that continues, the reaction of many people in this country will be that Soviet arms made it possible. The U.S. and the Soviet Union must show restraint also towards allies, in relation to our agreement. This would involve a contentious situation.

Brezhnev: I agree one hundred percent. Let me tell you something in strictest confidence. When the Paris Agreements were signed we had an exchange of letters. You accused us of supplying tanks and arms to the North Vietnamese. After the Paris Agreements we in fact suspended sending arms. The Vietnamese wanted to send Giap to Moscow. The visit was postponed. There is nothing dangerous in these agreements. On 9 July Pham Van Dong and Le Duan will come to Moscow. I don’t know what they will propose, but it will certainly involve a return visit. I have no intention of going. I see no necessity of sending new equipment. We have no agreement with Cambodia and Laos regarding supplies. Do not worry about our supplies. There may be rifles but nothing of considerable significance. We will speak in strong terms to them. We will urge them to adhere to the Paris Agreements. We will talk to you afterwards. Many of these stories of arms shipments come from the Chinese. These reports say they are Soviet; we think they are Chinese. We are one hundred percent for a speedy termination of the war in Cambodia and Laos. We have no presence in Cambodia and Laos. Gromyko and Dr. Kissinger should give additional thought to this question. I would like to think the matter over. I intend to speak to the North Vietnamese on July 9th to urge that the war tendency not be strengthened.

One additional thought on China. Of course I do not have the right to interfere in the affairs of your country. I appreciate that you can make agreements with any state. My idea is that if in the course of this year the U.S. and China will conclude a military arrangement, people’s trust will go down. Next year or so is impossible.

The President: We will keep in touch on that subject, and our efforts will always be used to promote the purposes of the agreement of yesterday.

Brezhnev: The peoples of the world will lose trust in us if an agreement of a military nature is concluded with China. I would like you to understand me.

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4 See Document 74.
5 Vo Nguyen Giap was a Deputy Premier and the Minister of National Defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
Dr. Kissinger: We have never had military discussions with China.

Brezhnev: Of course I believe you. But we are worried about the future, or it will undermine our relationship. In 1972 we did not raise the issue. But I am worried about the future. There is no need to undermine the agreement we have concluded. We do not intend to attack China but it will be different if China has a military agreement with the United States. That would confuse the issue.

132. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT

President’s meeting with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev on Saturday, June 23, 1973 at 10:30 p.m. at the Western White House, San Clemente, California

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[The principal subject of the meeting was the Middle East. At the close, there was a brief discussion of the exchange of letters on Soviet grain purchases, and of Brezhnev’s forthcoming meeting with President Pompidou in Paris.]

[Pleasantries were exchanged at the beginning of the meeting regarding Brezhnev’s visit to the West Coast of the United States.]

General Secretary Brezhnev: I would be glad to hear your views on the Middle East problem.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Brezhnev Visit Memcons, June 18–25, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Brackets are in the original. Kissinger wrote in his memoirs, “At ten o’clock my phone rang. It was the Secret Service informing me that Brezhnev was up and demanding an immediate meeting with the President, who was asleep. It was a gross breach of protocol. For a foreign guest late at night to ask for an unscheduled meeting with the President on an unspecified subject on the last evening of a State visit was then, and has remained, unparalleled. It was also a transparent ploy to catch Nixon off guard and with luck to separate him from his advisers.” (Years of Upheaval, p. 297)
The President: The main problem in our view is to get talks started. Once we get them started, we would use our influence with the Israelis and you with the Arabs. But if we just talk about principles, we’ll never get them. Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Gromyko seem to have agreed on five principles and disagreed on three.\(^2\) We can do nothing about it in the abstract; we need a concrete negotiation. Then we can be effective. I understand that Dr. Kissinger is redrafting the document.

Dr. Kissinger: Right. And we will send it to Camp David.

General Secretary Brezhnev: The substance of the principles is essential, at least in confidential form. I fully understand that we cannot write into the communique all the details. But we must put this warlike situation to an end. The Arabs cannot hold direct talks with Israel without knowing the principles on which to proceed. We must have a discussion on these principles. If there is no clarity about the principles we will have difficulty keeping the military situation from flaring up. Everything depends on troop withdrawals and adequate guarantees. I can assure you that nothing will go beyond this room. But if we agree on Israeli withdrawals, then everything will fall into place.

The President: On a subject as difficult as this, we cannot say anything definitive. We will look at all your suggestions and incorporate them into the paper. Right, Henry?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. We will send them to you in Camp David tomorrow.\(^3\)

The President: I am not trying to put you off. It is easy to put down principles in such a way that parties will not agree to talk. If we do it this way, then we can use our influence and you can use yours, to get a resolution of the differences. I can assure you I want a settlement—but we don’t get it just by talking principles.

General Secretary Brezhnev: [launching into a long speech] Proceeding from the logic of things, without an agreement on general principles we don’t see how we can act. Last year we couldn’t agree on a set of principles. We should find some form of words we can agree on. What are the principles? (1) Guarantees for Israel and the other states. This can be done in strict confidence. (2) We can ensure by the guarantees that there is no confrontation from the occupied territories. (3) Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories. (4) There will be unobstructed passage for all through the straits. And if we can get agreement on these principles we can then discuss how to use any influence on the

\(^2\) See Document 130.

\(^3\) The paper, prepared by the NSC Staff, was delivered to Dobrynin at Camp David on June 24. Attached to it is a draft of the General Principles on the Middle East. For the text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 74.
contending parties. We should use our confidential channel with Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin. If we don’t do that, we have no basis for using our influence. I agree with everyone present here that we can’t say it in the communiqué. But we should know in what direction to act.

We are reaching results as a result of our confidential exchanges. This is not a demand. But it is something we should do. It is necessary not only for the Arabs but for others too. As soon as there is a lasting peace, our diplomatic relations will be restored with Israel. We could agree on Vietnam. Why can’t we do it here? Once the principles are agreed, we can go on. That is why I would like to know that we have reached agreement on principles. If we agree, the result will be a stronger peace in the area. But if the state of vagueness continues, the situation will deteriorate. Of course we are great powers and we can bring to bear our influence. But the principles are a minimum. If we can’t reach agreement, it will undermine confidence in us. Peace must be worldwide. Our actions should be aimed at an enduring and lasting peace. I am trying to see things realistically. But to influence things we must know the principles on the basis of which we can do good work together.

The President: We can’t settle this tonight. I want you to know I consider the Arab-Israeli dispute a matter of highest urgency. I will look over Dr. Kissinger’s notes and we will send you our best thinking. Henry, do you have anything to add?

Dr. Kissinger: Only that all the headings mentioned by General Secretary will be covered. The big issue is the degree of precision to be achieved and how much should be left to the parties.

The President: A year ago when we met I had primary concern with Vietnam. I still have concern. I will say to General Secretary I agree with him and the Foreign Minister as to the urgency of this; we disagree only on tactics. We will try to find a formula that can work. We must avoid the issue—we must find words with subtlety that will bring both sides together. We have got to find a solution. I will devote my best efforts to bring it about.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We need not define all the principles and forms on which they can be carried out. We can’t write down everything. But I would like to attach to the communiqué some principles. These would be: withdrawal of Israeli troops, recognition of boundaries, free passage of ships, and guarantees. Without some measures of confidential agreement, we don’t know where we are going.

[Editorial comment by Dr. Kissinger: Typical of Soviets to spring on us at last moment without any preparation.]

The President: We are not prepared to go any further. We can’t abstractly beat the issue to death. We don’t owe anything to the Israelis.
That means I am interested in a settlement. We will work on it. We can make some progress in moving this problem off dead center. We can’t take intransigent position. I am prepared to move towards a settlement.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We have indeed talked about it extensively last year and even before our meeting. I have no doubt about our agreement in principle. But we must come to an understanding on this issue. We will study your messages carefully. I do not ask that we agree on all the tactics now. We will never leak any of our discussions. We can’t reach agreed positions if we start taking sides. We can make a gentleman’s agreement. We will be loyal to this promise. Then the channel—Kissinger/Dobrynin—can be used to elaborate the tactics.

I am categorically opposed to a resumption of the war. But without agreed principles that will ultimately help situation in area, we cannot do this. If there is a settlement, we can renew relations with Israel. Without such agreement our further cooperation will be weakened. We shall continue contacts but we will have problems. I know we have found common language regarding aims.

Perhaps I am tiring you out. But we must reach an understanding. We must be careful that is the case. We must act in order to achieve the desired results. The Arab states are not ours: Israel is not yours—we helped form the State of Israel. I am for full respect for the sovereignty of all the states of the area.

I will think over our conversation. You know the role I play in my country, just as I know yours. I will always act in concert with you. You trust Dr. Kissinger; I trust Dobrynin. We will have confidential consultations. If we can now agree on a gentleman’s basis on two or three principles, then Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin can implement them. We will keep this here in this room; the people in this room won’t disclose what has been said. What goes through this channel goes only to me. All that I say should be seen as the subject of an oral understanding not communicated to anyone.

The President: As for an oral agreement, I can go no further than to look over the Gromyko discussions. I’ll be in communication with him. I am trying to find a solution.

General Secretary Brezhnev: It is not necessary for the principles to be in written form. Very well. I agree that we should work on one principle—withdrawal of forces—alone.

Recall how hard it was for us to meet last year. Some people preached to me the impossibility of a meeting. Bear in mind this difficulty. Do not let me leave without this assurance.

The President: This is of course the key question. I will look at this question in the morning. It is not as simple as all that. That could be a goal. But it wouldn’t lead to a settlement. We have to face the problem in a pragmatic way.
General Secretary Brezhnev: Without the principle there is nothing I can do. Without a gentleman’s agreement we can’t use the channel. We need a friendly agreement. Or I will leave empty-handed. We should have an agreement without divulging the agreement to the Arabs.

The President: I will take it into account tomorrow. We won’t say anything in terms of a gentleman’s agreement. I hope you won’t go back empty handed. But we have to break up now.

It would be very easy for me to say that Israel should withdraw from all the occupied territories and call it an agreed principle. But that’s what the argument is about: I will agree to principles which will bring a settlement. That will be our project this year. The Middle East is most urgent place.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I want to mention the agricultural problem. There is the question of grain. I want to give you a draft of a letter in which we can have an exchange of letters on the subject of buying 5 million tons of grain for the years 1973–1980. I will get you the text.\footnote{Not found.} It will be consumed in USSR.

As you know, I will see Pompidou. My main objective is to have a conversation with him. I see three main areas for my views. He will ask me what we discussed. I will touch on MBFR. I want to ask your advice on the extent on which to inform him of our discussions. He will ask about SALT and other matters. Then I will do my consultations.
133. Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev

Washington, undated.

Dear Mr. General Secretary,

I have the honor to confirm that as a result of the talks held in the USA from 18 to 24 June 1973, the following understanding has been reached between the American and Soviet sides.

1. Soviet foreign trade organizations will purchase in the United States of America in 1973–1980 approximately 5 million tons annually of grain (wheat, corn, barley, soy beans and other grain products).

2. Commercial deals between appropriate Soviet foreign trade organizations on one side and American physical or juridical persons on the other will be implemented in accordance with each country’s existing legislation.

Simultaneously both sides will facilitate in every way the conclusion of such commercial deals.

3. Both sides proceed from the assumption that contracts for the purchase of the said goods may be concluded subject to reaching agreement on grain quality, prices, delivery dates, conditions and forms of payment, conditions of transportation and other conditions.

4. Both sides will favorably consider questions involving the possibility of concluding commercial deals beyond the quantities specified. Notification will be given as early as practicable of intention to purchase beyond the quantity specified.

5. Goods that may be purchased in accordance with this letter will be utilized mostly in the USSR. However, Soviet foreign trade organizations will have the right to channel a certain part of those goods to the countries-members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance.

6. All payments involved in such commercial deals will be made in US dollars or any other freely convertible currency by mutual arrangement between the participants in such deals.

Sincerely,


2 Printed from an unsigned copy.
The October Arab-Israeli War and Kissinger’s Trip to Moscow, July 1973–January 1974

134. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

Anatoli F. Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The mood of the meeting was slightly different from the pre-Summit atmosphere. There was some slightly less respect, slightly less deference. It was personally extremely cordial but there was a barely perceptible note of superciliousness.

Brezhnev Visit

I began the meeting by asking Dobrynin what his reaction was to the Brezhnev visit. He said all the Soviets had been extremely pleased by the Brezhnev visit. Everything had gone as exactly as planned. The only disappointment was the aftermath. Where in the Soviet Union all organs of public opinion hailed the new departure in Soviet-American relations, in the United States the Summit had disappeared without a trace. Indeed the leading papers were now making snide comments about the visit, and even about the person of Brezhnev. From that point of view, the Soviet leaders were disappointed with the result of the visit. As for the meetings with the President, they had been very satisfactory, but he was afraid that Soviet-American relations had not received the impetus that they would otherwise have had.

I told Dobrynin that this was due to a complex domestic situation but the long-term effect would still be essentially what had been expected. He glumly agreed that this might be so. Turning to Watergate, he then said that he had never seen such a mess. There was no other country which would permit itself this luxury of tearing itself to pieces

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 68, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 18, June 8–July 10, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy over lunch. All brackets except those that indicate a correction are in the original. A note on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” Sent under a covering memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon on July 16. (Ibid.)

2 Joseph Kraft, for example, wrote an article entitled “Watergate and the Summit” characterizing Brezhnev as being “hungry for agreement” during his visit. (The Washington Post, Times Herald, June 24, 1973, p. C7)
so publicly. For a long time he had thought that it would not do any lasting damage, but he had now revised his opinion. He thought the Democrats were certain to win in 1976, and this was bound to affect Soviet calculations. I said it did not seem such a fore-ordained conclusion to me. But Dobrynin said he saw now no possibility that this could be avoided. He also said that among the Republicans it seemed to him at this moment to be a race between Rockefeller, Agnew, and Reagan, with Connally’s chances dependent entirely on a deadlock between the other three. I said that I did not know of a single case of a deadlocked convention since World War II. Dobrynin agreed but said that this was a very unusual year.

China

We then went in to lunch. I showed him the document on the nuclear treaty that the Chinese had sent us [Tab A]. Dobrynin asked whether this wasn’t unusually primitive for the Chinese. Did Chou En-lai really believe that the United States and the Soviet Union were aiming for hegemony? I said I didn’t know what Chou En-lai believed but I did think they were genuinely worried about Soviet intentions. He asked what my impression was of Chinese leaders. I said that they struck me as very subtle. He said he too saw Chou En-lai as a clever fellow but paranoid about the Soviet Union.

Dobrynin then asked about my forthcoming trip to China. Did I plan to make a major agreement? I said no such plan was now envisaged. He asked, were we going to sign the same agreement with the Chinese that we had signed with the Soviet Union? If so, it would be taken as an unnecessary affront. I told him there was no such intention. He asked whether the Chinese had made any specific proposal for an agreement. I said the Chinese procedure was usually to wait for us to make a proposal, but I did not exclude that they might make one, in which case we would have to consider. But we would certainly keep in mind Soviet sensibilities. Dobrynin said that of course we were playing off the Chinese against the Soviet Union and doing it very skillfully, but he had always admired my abilities to keep it within limits. I said that he knew that in Moscow I had always been very circumspect about the Chinese, and he could be sure that in Peking I would be equally circumspect about the Soviet Union. We were trying to develop our relations with both countries without playing them off against each other.

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3 Attached but not printed at Tab A is the Chinese understanding of the U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War.

4 Kissinger’s sixth trip to China took place November 10–14.
Cambodia

We then turned to Cambodia. Dobrynin said that as far as he understood, we wanted an outcome in which we did not have to abandon the Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh, because of the principle that we did not give up our allies. On the other hand, he did not see what negotiating leverage we had with the bombing cutoff imposed on us by the Congress. I said that we would do what we could. Dobrynin said that this would require extraordinary diplomatic skill, and the only possibility was that I pull another rabbit out of the hat. Otherwise he would say we had no chance at all. He said, “Particularly what are you going to do if China and Hanoi are going to agree with each other on a possible government constituted without the Lon Nol group? What can you do about it? I don’t think your economic card is strong enough.” I said there should be no illusion that we would forget who had put us into this uncomfortable position. Dobrynin replied, “In that case you should go after Senator Fulbright, not after us.”

He asked again whether we thought it was possible to have a transitional government without participation of the Phnom Penh group. I told him that in that case we would not make an agreement and we would let nature take its course. He seemed to be worried that we might make a deal with Sihanouk and the Chinese. I told him that we were particularly interested in Sihanouk and we were pursuing our own policy, but that we would do what was necessary to have an honorable ending.

In the Cambodian discussion particularly, Dobrynin’s view was close to being supercilious.

SALT

On SALT, Dobrynin said that he would not object to an overture by Johnson about resumption, and he thought that the Soviets might be prepared to resume in early August since Semenov had already been on leave. He waited on a suggestion on whether we should get bilateral talks started. I gave him a note [Tab B] requesting verifiable evidence that the new construction we had detected at Soviet ICBM launch sites was not for additional launchers.

MBFR

On MBFR, Dobrynin said that Brezhnev thought he had made a suggestion to the President in the helicopter going to El Toro Air Base—the suggestion being that we should begin with modest cuts

5 Attached but not printed.
6 No record of this conversation was found. When traveling to San Clemente, Nixon would typically land at the El Toro Air Base and would take a helicopter from there to the Western White House.
and then stop for a couple of years. He wondered what our reaction to this was. I said that we had not understood that it was such a specific proposal but I would give him my reaction next week. Dobrynin said that he didn’t ask for a formal agreement, just some understanding that we would work in parallel towards that objective.

Berlin

We then talked about the problem of exfiltration from Berlin and I read him the attached memorandum [Tab C].7 Dobrynin took notes and said he appreciated the discussion.

Middle East

At the end of the meeting Dobrynin said that Gromyko did not particularly like what I had sent to Camp David8 because he thought that I had previously accepted the May 1972 [1973] document. This represented a retrogression. But they would let us know about their discussions with Ismail in Moscow.

MFN: Soviet Jews

Dobrynin handed me a note [Tab D] giving an initial accounting of the status of some 700 Soviet Jews seeking to emigrate, who were on a list I gave him at Zavidovo.9

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7 Scowcroft’s July 9 memorandum on the subject is attached but not printed.
8 See footnote 3, Document 132.
135. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Max Fisher
Mr. Jacob Stein, Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Trust Organizations
Mr. Richard Maass, Chairman of National Conference on Soviet Jewry
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Len Garment, Counsel to the President
Miss Kathleen A. Ryan, NSC Staff, Notetaker

Kissinger: Well, I am sorry I couldn’t see you on the West Coast. I understand you are seeing Dobrynin.
Stein: Yes, next week.
Kissinger: He tells me he does recognize your organization.
Maass: It is our understanding that a meeting without us would start great problems.
Kissinger: None of this ever leaves the White House [referring to Miss Ryan taking notes]. My problem is that if I have to refresh my memory I will have something with which to do so.
Fisher: How do we stand?
Kissinger: At the time of Zavidovo you gave me a list of about 700 names to get some ticklers on. The Soviets have about two weeks ago given an answer to that list, which is here. [Tab A] And all of this was done since that list was given to him. [Dobrynin].
Maass: The 258 figure was the figure he mentioned when he was here, with the total 750. To our knowledge there have been 58 who have come out.
Kissinger: They add and get 738 names. Dobrynin said there are 80 more that are in the process of being cleared now, which would bring it up to whatever he said.
Fisher: How recent is this?
Stein: 258 is what Brezhnev referred to when arriving.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcons—HAK & Presidential, April–November 1973, [4 of 5]. Confidential. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office in the White House. Brackets are in the original.
2 Presumably the list Kissinger gave to Gromyko on May 6; see Document 107.
3 Attached but not printed. See footnote 9, Document 134.
Kissinger: The sequence of events is as follows: He gave me some figures. Then I asked for figures in order to talk to Len during the week [of Brezhnev’s visit]. There was a lot of confusion and we never got the list during the week. Then I made a formal request. I then pointed out that it didn’t add up to 738 and Dobrynin answered that 80 are in the process.

Maass: It is interesting, Dr. Kissinger, that one month has elapsed since the 258 have been granted permission to leave and they have not been able to leave. There may be many reasons for this. The tourist season, there may be pipeline trouble, etc. As of yesterday there has been no indication of their being able to leave.

Kissinger: These months, I can’t believe they would trick us. That would be absurd.

Max Fisher: I agree.

Stein: There are 80 in the process?

Kissinger: Yes, there are 80 in the process. I assume that it isn’t inevitable that they will get out.

Stein: It is a question of time.

Maass: The class of the 149 that have been denied exit permission for security reasons, there may be a whole variety of reasons. When someone applies he doesn’t know if he will be a security risk.

Kissinger: I have mentioned before the process in which I raise these matters. I have always done it when I was engaged in some unofficial meeting with Brezhnev, such as during a walk with him in Zavidovo. I tell him that this is not official business of the United States, but here is a list and that I have the impression if something is done it would be very beneficial for the Soviet Union. He then takes it.

The same goes for the two points I raised last time. This procedure worked for the exit tax. This is really all that has happened.

Maass: Did you get any feeling from the Helsinki Conference? I am speaking of the reformulation of the Soviet citizenship procedures?

Kissinger: You mean on movements of people. In the Conference we will make some progress on these items. Because Western Europe and we pay so much attention to them. I can only tell you what I said last time. We have made more progress with the Soviets with both the exit tax and this than one would believe possible. It would help if you could do something that shows it leads somewhere. Then I can go back to them with another set of proposals.

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4 Garment.
5 A reference to the CSCE, which initially met in Helsinki July 3–7.
Stein: The problem from public visibility is that nothing has occurred. We have the list, but to our knowledge only 58 on the list of 700 or so have been allowed to leave. Certainly if 200 arrived, there would be a favorable reaction. We are looking for a handle to move.

Kissinger: I cannot believe that Brezhnev would communicate a list that would be false. I am not saying that the Russians are not capable of lying. But this I can't believe.

Stein: I agree.

Fisher: According to the list, 177 have not applied.

Maass: These 177 were included in the list but some may be hardship cases.

Stein: Here they say they haven't applied.

Maass: Maybe they haven't reapplied.

Fisher: We have to find out where the people are coming out. I have the emigration figures. We should check the list against the people coming out. I think it is a substantive gain.

Kissinger: I will try to get Dobrynin to move out those on the lists.

Fisher: Fast.

Stein: I think it would be a very substantial achievement if 250 were granted permission, and with the 80 more reviewed. You are dealing with a great number.

Maass: Accompanied by something else. What is the balance of those who want to get out? We would like to know in advance for those who will apply, what their chances are. If they are a new security risk, they should not apply. A security risk, say a recently released man from the army, should know he will have to remain for a certain number of years, before he should apply. Or someone from a space agency in the USSR who has information that has been classified, if he knew the requirement, at least he would not put himself in a position of applying and losing his job.

Garment: I share Henry's view that this achievement is very considerable. This is a situation that is inherently difficult to codify. The more one tries to do it, it will move in the wrong direction.

Kissinger: They have a domestic problem that the only group that can get out is the Jews.

Garment: You have achieved progress that is not easy to put on a billboard.

Stein: Has there been any response to the 242?

Kissinger: No, I gave them both.

Maass: There has been some progress, they have reduced the sentence of one individual from 10 years to 7.
Fisher: I think the point is that if we can get some visible results. If you could get Dobrynin to move 258, that would be 50%.

Kissinger: And in a three-month period.

Fisher: Do you have any feeling about the number that is going to be leaving?

Kissinger: That the number will be the number you received, yes.

Stein: 30,000–32,000.

Kissinger: I don’t know where the number 36,000 comes from, but it comes to my mind.

Stein: That is close to last year’s figures.

Maass: 32,000–33,000 last year.

Fisher: And the 200?

Garment: The parole authority.

Kissinger: We will get that done. We will do it in with a formal request from the State Department.

Maass: At no time have we felt that the numbers have been insufficient and false. They have been consistent. We don’t pay much attention to monthly figures. One month they are down and another they are up. They fluctuate. Because a six-month figure is down, that has not been a problem. They have been fairly consistent in the flow.

Today there was an article in The New York Times on the distinction of the nature of emigration from Georgia and the problems of Israel. There is a trickle from major population centers. They represent the higher education Jews.

Stein: They make up the bulk of the list.

Kissinger: I don’t mind telling Dobrynin for a big break and not to trickle out slowly.

Our problem is the MFN problem. I understand your position; you don’t want to give up the pressure prematurely. I have talked to Jackson, who is a friend of mine. He can yell, but at the last minute I hope he will agree to a compromise. He might be willing to do this. That is what we have to have in the light of where we are all going.

Stein: We were thinking of a reformulation that Mills, Jackson and you can take. This frees the Jewish community not to be caught between the White House and Congress.

Kissinger: We will have to be cautious.

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Maass: Mr. Stein uses the word “reformulation.” I am not talking semantics when I use the word reformulation. I think this word is better than compromise.

Kissinger: I agree. We have not to give intransigence a push.

Stein: I think a considerable restraint was given during Brezhnev’s visit. We were acting according to possibilities and to realities.

Kissinger: I agree and we are thankful.

Fisher: I talked to people in Rome [who had recently emigrated from the USSR] and I asked if it is easier now.

Kissinger: Is it?

Fisher: Yes. If this works—reformulation is the word—it is going to be necessary that we have the understanding, cooperation and drive of the President and yourself. You know the Russians, as you have said yourself.

Kissinger: That is why we don’t mind having something that can be undone in the MFN if they backslide. We don’t mind having it. In turn the Jewish community has to understand why we take our position.

Maass: You once submitted, as I understand, “you have to go down your road, and I mine, and we will meet in the fall.” It is up to the point of final decision of the Jewish community.

Kissinger: Just as long as Mills and Jackson agree to the reform.

Stein: The ones that will be castigated will be Richard and I.

Fisher: People gave up a few credit cards to keep this under control. If we can push out some numbers.

Kissinger: I will talk to him on this.

Maass: The applecart could be upset if any new trials are scheduled. There are three trials for which the KGB has already prepared information, to my knowledge. They will have lost credibility if these go through.

Kissinger: Nobody believes they are pro-Jewish. [Laughter] The KGB seems to be a world in themselves and very powerful. [Mr. Kissinger proceeds to discuss an incident at the reciprocal dinner given by Brezhnev at the Soviet Embassy where he wanted to be seated next to Liv Ullmann.7 He went to the head of protocol who said it couldn’t be done. He then talked to General Antonov of the KGB who immediately arranged it.

Mr. Stein then recalled a luncheon where he described to Antonov all the Kosher laws.]

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7 A Norwegian actress.
Stein: I would suggest that as we are now closer to the critical dates that a larger group have an opportunity to meet with you or the President, to make the task a little bit easier.

Kissinger: My understanding is that the bill\(^8\) won’t be close.

Stein: What is the date?

Kissinger: I think the House will vote on it in October. And the Senate in January or February—the beginning of February.

Stein: We were thinking earlier.

Fisher: I think that as far as we are concerned, we can announce certain results. We have to have a better feel at the time of the meeting. One of the things I found among the people I questioned was that most of the Jews were scientists.

Stein: They are of top nature—biologists, chemists, doctors. By the way this will be helpful, if I can tell the folks at the right time. This has just come to Henry.

Kissinger: If this is in the White House’s discretion. Is it?

Garment: Yes.

Kissinger: [To Stein:] When are you going to Europe?

Stein: Not until mid-August. I see ten names listed [on Dobrynin’s note at Tab A]. Do you think we can get the list? [from Dobrynin]

Kissinger: I would ask him. You can ask him more questions than I can. I think it would be better for you to ask him. [The meeting then ended. Mr. Fisher stayed to talk to Mr. Kissinger alone.]

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136. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Jewish Emigration from USSR to Israel Increased in August

You should read the attached Moscow Embassy telegram (Tab A).\(^2\) The decline in the emigration rate, apparently associated with Soviet concerns about appearing soft in connection with the US summit, may now have ended. The August figure was 3024, compared to an average of about 2300 in the preceding three months. The eight month figure for 1973 is running slightly ahead of 1972 now, but to reach or surpass the 1972 total of some 31,000 there will again have to be substantial surge in the final months of the year. This could well happen, together with additional action on the hardship lists which are of special concern in the US. (The US Embassy has not yet registered improvement on the latter score, but it is not fully informed.)

There apparently has also been some decline in harassment of would-be emigrants, beyond the removal of the most specific form of persecution, the educational exit tax.

At the same time, the earlier trend of increasing anti-semitism of a general character continues. In my view, supported by the Embassy’s telegram and other sources, this results from the feeding of endemic Russian and Ukrainian anti-semitism by (1) the better economic status of many Jews, (2) the support Jews enjoy abroad and (3), the ultimate paradox, resentment that Jews are able to leave the USSR by the thousands.

If you should get drawn into further colloquies on this issue in your hearing,\(^3\) you must not in any way compromise our [less than 1 line not declassified] sources on numbers.


\(^2\) At Tab A is telegram 10726 from Moscow, September 7.

\(^3\) A reference to Kissinger’s confirmation hearing as Secretary of State. On August 22, following Rogers’ resignation, Nixon appointed Kissinger as Secretary of State. He was confirmed on September 22. Kissinger described the process and his first days at the Department of State in Years of Upheaval, pp. 3–5, 423–432.
137. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 28, 1973, 10 a.m.–12:05 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

After pictures were taken, the conversation began at 10:07 a.m.

The President: It seems our meetings have become annual events. And our summits have also become annual events. I think this is a constructive development. Since on this occasion I am the host, why don’t you lead off.

Gromyko: [In English] Thank you very much Mr. President for receiving me again. [Translated from the Russian] I would like, if it is acceptable, to talk through Viktor. It is easier that way and I will go sentence by sentence. If I forget myself and go too fast, stop me.

First, I wish to convey very warm greetings from L. I. Brezhnev to you, personally, and also from Chairman Podgorny and Chairman Kosygin, who asked that I extend very good wishes to you.

Several months have passed since the General Secretary’s visit and there has been time to appraise it. This is even truer of the earlier summit, that is, your visit to the Soviet Union. Looking back we can say, and indeed this is our feeling, that the turn in Soviet-American relations has been of immense significance. We say this outright. Brezhnev said it to the people and to our Party and it is, in fact, the general assessment in the world of the two meetings.

In our leadership and in our country as a whole immense significance is ascribed to the forthcoming meeting on which you and L. I. Brezhnev reached agreement.

[At this point, coffee and tea was served.]

On the eve of my departure from Moscow, I talked to L. I. Brezhnev—I had of course talked to him earlier also—and he asked me to emphasize the truly great significance that he ascribes to the forthcoming meeting. He asked me to mention some ideas regarding timing.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 68, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 19, July 12–October 11, 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. Brackets are in the original.
Specifically, he thought that if it were acceptable to you, the next visit
and summit meeting could occur somewhere near the end of May or
the first half of June of 1974.

[The President commented to Dr. Kissinger that we could aim for
that. Dr. Kissinger noted the relationship to a SALT agreement.]

Let me explain why these times are most convenient for us. The
fact is that later on domestic affairs, economic affairs, agriculture and
the like, will require the undivided attention of the leadership as a
whole, and of L. I. Brezhnev. That is why we thought the dates I men-
tioned most appropriate.

Now let me return once again to the outcome of the meetings that
have already been held.

The most discernible and palpable turn has been in the field of po-
litical relations, and this is quite understandable. Here the very special
role of the relevant agreements has to be emphasized. If we take the
agreements signed this year, special emphasis should be placed on the
agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. The forecast you made
and the General Secretary made, regarding the consequences and influ-
ence on our relations and on international relations generally of this
agreement—this forecast has been completely justified.

While pointing out the enormous changes for the better in the po-
litical field, we also have to note that insofar as economic and commer-
cial relations are concerned, there have been no steps forward. To use a
term from our own language, this is the area of Virgin Land. In this con-
nection, I would like to emphasize first of all that the agreement to
place relations on a stable basis has not yet been implemented. You will
realize, Mr. President, that this is something for which we are by no
means to blame. It is not due to us. We are surprised by the slowness in
your country in considering the relevant matters and by the problems
that have arisen in the development of trade and in bringing the rele-
vant legislation to completion for this purpose. This is bound to make
us wary and put us on our guard. As I said to Dr. Kissinger in New
York, we feel that the US side has not so far fulfilled the relevant
promises and obligations it undertook. You will agree that it is one
thing to see relations develop in the political field but quite another
when those relations are buttressed by commercial relations.

We condemn most vigorously actions by people like Jackson to ob-
struct things so farsightedly agreed to by you, L. I. Brezhnev and our
leadership.

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2 The record of the dinner conversation in New York between Kissinger and Gro-
myko, September 24, is ibid., Box 71, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Gromyko 1973.
Now I should like to adduce several arguments to show the unfoundedness and the absurdity of the allegations by those who want to obstruct our relations. I am doing this so you might have additional arguments that you can use both in and out of the Congress.

First, there is the argument that the Soviet Union stands in such need of aid, of assistance and technology, etc., that it will give any concession to get this aid. But this is utterly ridiculous, and our entire history speaks against this argument and those who make it.

Now and again the so-called Jewish emigration problem is activated. The General Secretary gave exhaustive replies while he was in the United States and before his visit we transmitted certain information for you. The fact is that we do not require any tax; we ended it. But the people who make themselves shouters say true enough, but the law has not been repealed. Now of course if we took a mercantile approach, we could rescind the law and then restore it again when circumstances changed. But what we did was much stronger. We gave you an assurance, almost a solemn assurance, as information regarding our intentions, that our law permits us not to charge the tax and we had no intention to charge it. So it would seem that this should satisfy honest people. But still there are the shouters who want to activate this so-called problem.

You will have noted that these shouters frequently refer to two or three individuals and say that they want the Soviet Union to change its attitude toward them and to change its laws. But if they are actually so concerned, they should be applauding what we do, because these people freely air their views, and receive and make telephone calls from and to abroad. The shouters should be saying that these individuals are just as free as here. But what they really want is for us to do certain things and this all relates to domestic affairs. We will never make changes and all of this shows that these people have no elementary decency.

In all of these matters we are not begging with hands outstretched for assistance. We believe all these things, like MFN, accord with our mutual interests and secure the further development of our relations. In short, it is a reciprocal matter and should be so regarded.

In connection with the consideration of these matters in the Congress, we cannot take part in various combinations and drafts and projects. All these reservations that are being talked about, if I correctly understand them, we cannot accept. We can only accept a pure and clear decision. But if a decision is taken that has political overtones and says that it is provisional and will be looked at again in two years or so, this approach would be wholly unworthy of the noble goals for which you and the General Secretary have been working.
If you wish, Mr. President, you are at liberty to refer to our discussion here in your dealings with Congress. We, and this includes the General Secretary, highly appreciate your efforts in securing fulfillment of obligations in the solution of all problems relating to economic ties. Whether everything has been done by the US Administration is hard for us to judge. You would know better.

I dwelt in some detail on these matters to adduce the arguments that might help you to better understand our position.

Now, with your permission, may I briefly turn to other matters, having in view the forthcoming summit. We would like very much to have the arrangements and understandings reached on European affairs to be carried into effect as they were talked about at the summit. We appreciate your efforts toward securing positive results for the CSCE. We believe there exists every opportunity for the Conference to achieve good and positive results. It all boils down to the policy of the countries concerned. They could, of course, just sit endlessly and talk. It follows from your discussions with the General Secretary that we have no intentions to prejudice your position in Europe and we feel it will be in both countries’ interests to have a positive outcome in the Conference. We should not pay too much attention to talk about US-Soviet deals. We must be above that and we should not be distracted from our policies, because the outcome will be in the interests of all countries regardless of what the shouters may say. After you took office, you yourself pointed to the importance of relations between our two countries.

Another European question is the agreement to reduce armed forces and armaments. We would like to see a positive outcome. There was a general discussion during the General Secretary’s visit and he advanced certain views. I have nothing in particular to add now, but it would be in the best interests of all concerned to make progress on this and the prospects are favorable.

I want to emphasize our appreciation that you kept your word regarding the admission of the two German states into the United Nations. This promotes better relations between them and increases détente, and indirectly helps our relations also.

Now, about SALT and the agreements already achieved. There is no need to talk about their significance. All of this is very obvious and we must now look to the future. We want to find ways to convert the provisional to a permanent agreement, and reach understandings on additional matters of interest. I am familiar in a general way with the views given at your instruction to Dobrynin by Dr. Kissinger. I should add that this is a subject we are studying with the greatest attention, and in all of its aspects. We want to find points of contact and a basis for agreement. So far we have not completed our studies on a number of possible variants, but we will do so soon. The General Secretary and I
are only just back from our vacation—although for him it was not much of a vacation. But he has not yet studied it from the point of view of the next stage, but he is now doing so and giving it all the attention the subject merits. As regards the ideas put forward by Dr. Kissinger, we are studying them with all due attention, as they should be studied, in the context referred to above.

I should add one point, one we feel you also have in mind, as we understood from Dr. Kissinger. We have to take into account certain special features in our own situation, which for the time being are not as important for you as they are for us. I am referring to the Far Eastern factor. There are certain other factors relevant to the specific nature of our own situation, but I want to emphasize that particular factor and ask you to keep it in mind in formulating an agreement with us. What I have said on this score fully conforms to the principle of not inflicting any harm on the security interests of either contracting party.

Now just a few words on the Middle East. Your assessment and ours do not fully coincide, even if at first sight it seems that we do since both sides feel the situation is complicated and dangerous. But we have a different assessment of the danger because we feel the possibility could not be excluded that we could all wake up one day and find there is a real conflagration in that area. That has to be kept in mind. Is it worth the risk? A serious effort has to be made for a solution because a solution will not just fall down from the sky. I recall the conversations you had with General Secretary Brezhnev here and then in San Clemente on this and your words that you considered the problem of the Middle East most important, and that you would take it up. I certainly would be interested in what you might say.

Now, very briefly, on the Far East. Our relations with China are familiar to you. The General Secretary told you a lot about this. Since then, nothing noteworthy has happened. The situation is tense, but there have been no border clashes and we trust the Chinese leaders will not resort to such incidents. As regards the future—and we believe and feel you raise questions about this also in your mind—can one continue to rely on the common sense of the Chinese leadership? It is hard to forecast the makeup of the future leadership. But this is something we have to think of in both our interests. As we see it, our assessments do not diverge too much. But I am interested in your assessment and in the bearing of that factor on the relations between us. You have advanced the idea in confidence that you gave priority to US-Soviet relations and we cannot point a finger at anything that you have done that runs counter to what you said. But it is a factor that cannot help but have a certain influence on our relations.

The General Secretary asked me to tell you specifically that we do not intend to depart one inch from our policy regarding relations with
the United States, provided of course that you do not do so either. For us these relations are the question of questions, the question of war and peace in the world.

In conclusion, let me say the following. We feel, as we think you do too, that we should so conduct ourselves that the entire structure of relations will be built on a basis that no one can throw it back in the future, that is to say that our relations assume an irreversible character. I am now referring to the entire complex of relations, not just to the one aspect of the Far East.

There is one organizational question which is of significance for the forthcoming summit. We believe that for the preparatory work, Dr. Kissinger could visit the Soviet Union once or twice, perhaps the first time before the end of this year.

And, now, just a piece of geography. Perhaps during the next visit [of the President] to the Soviet Union, some time can be spent outside of Moscow. The Black Sea has a very long coastline. You will recall that the General Secretary flew 3000 miles across the United States, so maybe there should be the same thing for us.

Mr. President, thank you very much for your patience.

The President: First, Mr. Foreign Minister, please extend to the General Secretary and all his colleagues my good wishes. Second, with regard to my visit to the Soviet Union—as far as my own view is concerned, the timing could be the latter part of May or early June, but we should recognize that we want a major accomplishment and that is why SALT has such a high priority. I think that is what the General Secretary and I agreed to. So we should be sure that a permanent agreement will be on the way, plus anything else that your fertile minds can come up with. It should not just be symbolic.

Now I feel that the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war has not received enough attention in the United States. Henry, at the State Department, make sure in your speeches that it does.

Regarding travel, I will be completely in the hands of the hosts. I would like to go not just three but six thousand miles and I have never seen the Black Sea coast. It is good to change places for the talks, as we did here. Here we were in Washington and Camp David and San Clemente. It helps to change the place. But it is up to General Secretary Brezhnev and I appoint Secretary Kissinger to work this all out.

Regarding Secretary Kissinger’s trip, I have not discussed this with him. I would say he has considerable problems reorganizing the State Department—something the Foreign Minister does not have. He also has great problems in the Congress where Secretary Kissinger is indispensable. But as soon as progress in the private channel merits, and the Congressional problems are exhausted, I would like the Secretary of
State to make his first visit to the USSR in that position. We can work it out later.

Regarding SALT, the Kissinger–Dobrynin discussions were very helpful for the first two times. We should proceed the same way but we have a problem because we have to bring the bureaucracy into line, especially the military.

On MBFR, I am pleased to say we are not too far apart.

On CSCE, as I told the General Secretary, we would be pleased to finish by the end of the year and, if others agree, to have a summit for the conclusion, but it is not easy to get a conglomerate of nations together to agree. I happened to be reading a biography of Wellington last night. There were only four countries at the Congress of Vienna, Russia, Prussia, Austria and Britain, and four at the Congress of Paris after the defeat at Waterloo. But it was very difficult. On CSCE, there are very many views but you and we have no particular problems.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, we now have to get down to concrete issues on this.

The President: We must agree where we want to come out—I don’t mean condominium—otherwise it will be a shambles. I will leave it to the Secretary of State to work out. I made that commitment.

Regarding the Middle East, it is a very important priority as I said in my press conference.3 You say we must realize the danger of waking up one morning and finding a war. But there is also the energy problem. The Secretary has it as a direct assignment from me and we will push it, whatever the surface appearances may be. While we may have differences on how it comes out, we want progress on an interim basis certainly, or perhaps on principles.

Now on MFN, I listened to you with interest. Yesterday, Dr. Kissinger and I met with the leaders and gave them hell.4 He and I said just what you said. We made a commitment and a bargain. And you have delivered on it. For example, on lend-lease. We have an unholy alliance at the moment. First the classical anti-Soviet people—that I was supposed to be; second, labor, though not all of them. But George Meany and one advisor, Lovestone, are strongly opposed.5

Secretary Kissinger: Lovestone is a former communist.

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4 For the memorandum of conversation of the President’s September 27 meeting with the Republican Congressional leadership, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Document 187.

5 See Document 100.
The President: Third, there are as you say the shouters who shed crocodile tears, and ten years ago said hands off, let us have nothing to do with the Soviet Union. Now they have switched.

Any future progress depends on agreement that neither side will interfere in the internal affairs of the other. That is why we came as far as we did. The State Department is going to go right down the line. There will be no rebellion.

Secretary Kissinger: The age of rebellion is over.

The President: We believe the block to MFN should be removed, but it is a very difficult legislative situation. You must trust us. We will wrangle with different amendments and so on, but the goal is to carry out our commitment. But I won’t promise what Congress will do. We will work in private and public. We will get it in the end, but the question is when. At least, when they passed the amendment, they knocked out the provision that would have stopped credit. You may have noticed that after Don Kendall talked to The New York Times they did a pretty good editorial. You can see what an influential man he is. But then on the same day The New York Times reported that an award to Kendall from a Jewish group had been withdrawn.6

You should assure the General Secretary that I made a commitment and will keep it. But we have a difficult situation and can’t control things. There is a lot of shouting. Meanwhile, we should proceed with other matters.

Now, finally, China. The General Secretary spoke very candidly here and again at San Clemente. Our relations with the Soviet Union are on quite a different basis than with the PRC. We have diplomatic relations and trade agreements and arms reduction. So we are talking about a different relationship than with the PRC and it has a high priority because our objective is for a peaceful world. On the other hand, it is important for the peace of the world to maintain relations with the PRC. You actually have an Ambassador, we have Bruce.7 The important thing to bear in mind is that we in our relations with anyone—PRC, Europe, anyone—will do nothing that will impair relations with the Soviet Union. I don’t want to leave a false impression that we will cool it with the PRC because of you. We will continue discussions.

6 The New York Times reported on September 20 that Kendall’s award for civic leadership from the American Jewish Committee had been retracted because of his efforts to increase trade with the USSR. Many Jewish organizations were calling for trade restrictions with the USSR until Jews were allowed to emigrate freely. See “Honor Retracted to Head of PepsiCo,” The New York Times, September 20, 1973, p. 93. The reference to an editorial may be to a news analysis by Bernard Gwertzman in the same edition of The New York Times entitled “Links With Soviet: Criticism Stings Administration.”

7 David K.E. Bruce, chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing.
It is very important that in Asia we don’t have a force to which we are not talking. Henry, do you want to add anything?

Secretary Kissinger: In the spirit of what you said, we will conduct no policy directed against the Soviet Union.

The President: Right. That is what I told the General Secretary.

Secretary Kissinger: We have not taken any position on the border dispute or on any bilateral issues. We won’t.

The President: You have a border, we do too in a sense because we are in the same ocean. We will be candid with you if you are with us.

Secretary Kissinger: We will keep up the information exchange.

The President: That doesn’t mean we will go to China with this conversation.

Somebody will say that the meeting the President had with the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union today was more important than the meeting with the Prime Minister of New Zealand yesterday, and it is true because with our strength, our power, our science we two are the most important nations in the world, although maybe not forever. But that is why when the General Secretary comes we spend a week and when the British come we spend one and one-half days. I am not trying to play them down and we have to have in mind the sensitivity of others. But we need not apologize for our strength. We will respect the rights of others and the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war says just that. That is the way to a peaceful world.

Gromyko: Thank you Mr. President for putting forward your considerations on all these matters. Regarding the Middle East, when would you be ready to set forth specific ideas or plans to get down to specific arrangements for the area, having in mind of course the role of the parties?

The President: I have in mind that when Dr. Kissinger makes his trip to the Soviet Union this could be done. It seems far off but it really isn’t. The trip should have results. We would like it sooner but the Secretary has lots to do so this is the soonest we can do it; within 60 to 90 days.

Secretary Kissinger: I will stay in touch with Dobrynin.

Gromyko: I asked the question because experience has shown that you were not fully prepared on the questions I asked the last time. There was no desire on your side to talk.

In summarizing, you have confirmed in very definite terms the line you have taken in Soviet-American relations and will continue. If that is so, or since that is so, we intend to pursue the same line we have chosen.

The President: Let us think about the trip around the first of the year if you can prepare it. We are not talking of as late as February.
Gromyko: Once again, thank you for the meeting.

The President: In developing the new relationship, the Foreign Minister has played an indispensable role. When we think of the great differences in our first meeting here, we can look back with some pride. We laid the groundwork for two summits.

Gromyko: Let us build the tunnel from both sides. The process is easier now because the tunnel is lit better.

The President: I will send Dr. Kissinger to Camp David with Dobrynin so they don’t just meet in the map room. I know the General Secretary likes Camp David. It will be very useful. They can spend some days and I will tell them not to come back until they get their work done.

Gromyko: As long as you had kind words about my part, let me emphasize the very important work done by Dr. Kissinger as Assistant to the President and now as Secretary of State with force and brilliance.

The President: Let me say in conclusion that the Foreign Minister referred to the fact that on trade we only have virgin land. Once Kissinger gets settled at State, there won’t be any virgins left there.

Secretary Kissinger: That is quite a challenge, Mr. President.

138. Message From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger

Moscow, October 6, 1973.

The Soviet leadership got the information about the beginning of military actions in the Middle East at the same time as you got it. We take all possible measures to clarify real state of affairs in that region, since the information from there is of a contradictory nature. We fully share your concern about the conflagration of the situation in the

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2 On October 6, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel by crossing the cease-fire lines into the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, areas which had been held by Israel since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Documents 97–114. Kissinger, who was in New York but returned to Washington that morning, and Dobrynin had begun discussing the situation by telephone at 6:40 a.m.
Middle East. We repeatedly pointed in the past to the dangerous situation in that area.

We are considering now as well as you do, possible steps to be taken. We hope soon to contact you again for possible coordination of positions.\(^3\)

\(^3\) Both Kissinger and Scowcroft continued to be in contact with Dobrynin by telephone concerning possible actions the United States and the Soviet Union could take. See ibid., Documents 108 and 109.

139. **Oral Message From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon**\(^1\)

Moscow, October 8, 1973.

We have contacted the leaders of the Arab states on the question of ceasefire. We hope to get a reply shortly. We feel that we should act in cooperation with you, being guided by the broad interests of maintaining peace and developing the Soviet-American relations. We hope that President Nixon will act likewise.


140. **Message From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon**\(^1\)

Moscow, undated.

The Soviet leaders consider it necessary to draw in the most urgent way the attention of the President to the defiant, to put it straight,

gangster-type actions of Israel, which, if they are not stopped from the very beginning, can still more complicate the situation in the Middle East and around it, which is dangerous even without such actions.

The matter is, first of all, about the barbaric bombings by the Israeli aviation of peaceful population centers in Syria and Egypt, Damascus including, as a result of which there are numerous casualties among civilian population.

There are also Soviet citizens among those killed and wounded. The damage was also caused to the Soviet office buildings.

We have the information, and we want the President also to know it, that the other side has a capability to deliver retaliatory strikes against Israeli cities, the action from which it has refrained up till now, if the bombings of the Arab cities by Israel are not immediately stopped.

Further. During the night from the 11th to the 12th of October in the Syrian port of Tartus torpedo boats attacked a Soviet merchant ship “Ilya Mechnikov” which delivered a peaceful cargo there. The ship caught fire and sank.

There is hardly a need to explain what can be the consequences of such provocative actions against the Soviet ships on their way to the ports of Arab countries. Tel-Aviv in this case also should realize absolutely clearly that it cannot expect that everything will go off all right for it. The Soviet Union will of course take measures which it will deem necessary to defend its ships and other means of transportation.

However we believe that such developments do not correspond to the interests of implementing our understanding with you to direct the events towards a cease-fire in the Middle East and towards activization of efforts on reaching a political settlement there. We expect therefore that the United States will exert an appropriate sobering influence on the Israeli leadership.
SUBJECT

Aspects of the Middle East War

In several important ways the Soviets have been more irresponsible in this war than in 1967: their behavior this time must be measured against the standards established at our summits in 1972/73 which did not exist in 1967. The only two elements that are not evident in their conduct this time are (1) that they did not actually trigger the crisis as their false alarm did in 1967, and (2) that they are not openly anti-American in their public position, because they want to preserve the fruits of détente. But their failure to act on clear foreknowledge (at least by October 3, but probably in late September), their subsequent incitement of other Arab states to join the fighting and broaden the war, their initiation of resupply while the Arabs were still on the offensive against the background of six years of massive infusions of matériel and technology, their assurances to the Arabs that the U.S. would not intervene and that U.S. actions could be discounted—all these are steps that go beyond the mere protection of their interests.

Sometime around October 10/11, as I noted in my memo to you of October 12, the Soviets evidently decided it was time to maneuver toward a ceasefire that maximized Egyptian gains and minimized Syrian losses.

Within certain limits that ought to be the basis on which we should also proceed, largely because any prolongation of the war carries serious risks to our interests. Without going into detail, we suffer from vulnerabilities this time that did not exist in 1967, at least not to the same extent. These result, whether objectively justified or not, from the oil situation and the far-reaching changes in European attitudes which could easily lead to major turbulence in U.S.-European relations. Moreover, we do not have the diplomatic asset of rapid Israeli military success. On the contrary, we face this time real Israeli weaknesses and

2 A reference to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
4 Not found.
urgent requirements which only we can meet and then only in an environment notably more adverse than six years ago.

Our task is to increase the Soviet stake in a cease-fire and to build on whatever tendencies toward a cease-fire that have already been discernible in Soviet policy. As usual, this requires both incentives and sanctions.

Leaving aside the drastic sanction of possible direct U.S.-Soviet confrontations (for which we are not particularly well prepared), our basic area for maneuver is in the various aspects of détente in which the Soviets have stood to gain more than we in the short run. Brezhnev’s own stake in his relations with us presents us with a certain leverage inside the Kremlin but it must be used with the greatest care since Brezhnev will go only so far to protect his U.S. policy. We should also bear in mind that extravagant Israeli gains in Syria will make a cease-fire in place politically unacceptable for the Soviets even though the Egyptians hold territory in the Sinai. On this score, therefore, the Israelis must be firmly restrained, especially once our replenishment operations are underway, from going a reasonable distance beyond the Golan Heights. Hard as it may be, Israel must also accept the Egyptian bridgeheads in Sinai.

Before we actively use pressures against the Soviets, we must continue our diplomatic efforts to enlist their cooperation in seeking a cease-fire. We should not assume that the Security Council is the only forum for this purpose. Indeed, the probability of a Chinese veto makes it almost essential that the Arabs and Israelis are brought to signal their readiness to stop shooting before any formal arrangement is attempted in the Security Council. Moreover, it is probably illusory to tie the terms of a cease-fire explicitly to the terms of an eventual settlement since any effort to do so will merely land us in the same deadlock that has prevented progress toward a settlement in the first place. No matter how much in pain, the Israelis will probably use an atomic bomb before they concede the 1967 borders—not to mention what Senator Jackson will use here at home if we attempt to extract such a concession at this time. On the other hand, the Arabs will never yield on the 1967 borders, or the Palestinians.

So, to repeat, we must seek a simple cease-fire in place, without ifs and buts and regardless of what we may have in our minds as to where it might later lead. (We might consider a Joint Resolution in Congress to buttress the President’s position).

If we have not done so, we must seek explicit Israeli agreement to a cease-fire and, if necessary, tie our supply operations to it. By the same token, we must explicitly get the Soviets to work toward the same end with the Arabs. They must understand that an end to the shooting is the pre-condition for any possible negotiation later. (Incidentally, I
think the search for a “settlement” is illusory and we must think in terms of a demilitarized Sinai with an international force including the U.S.)

Once our clear support for a cease-fire in place has been signaled, it should be made clear to Brezhnev that the President has already spent enormous capital here at home to obtain the implementation of last year’s economic agreements. This plainly cannot continue if the U.S. and the Soviet Union are waging proxy war in the Middle East. And this applies even more to the area of EXIM and CCC credits. Not until we can demonstrate that the 1972 Principles and the 1973 nuclear war agreement have real practical meaning in a real-life international crisis can we hope to fend off those who want to condition economic relations on changes in the Soviet domestic system. Our economic relations were always predicated on crisis-free political relations. If we do not want to convey this message directly, there should be little difficulty in getting Administration supporters in Congress to make these points.

We should also find a way to convey to the Soviets the point that if we are to suffer Arab economic sanctions, we will have to pass the costs on to the Soviets as long as they sustain Arab warmaking.

Similar connections to economic relations should be established with the Yugoslavs and Hungarians who have been instrumental in facilitating the Soviet airlift.

Although I assume we have had our own contacts with Arabs, at least with the Egyptians, we should do what we can not to let the Soviets have a monopoly of such contacts in the future. Our problems in this regard will undoubtedly become tougher as our supply operations to Israel pick up, but we should never let the Arabs forget that in the end only we, not the Russians, can influence the Israelis. The British and French should be enlisted for this also.

In sum, in the present phase we should:

—tie our resupply of the Israelis to restraints on their Syrian campaign, and their acceptance of a cease-fire in place;
—work on the Russians to get them to support a cease-fire in place;
—begin to make more explicit connections between the economic aspects of détente and Soviet support for a cease-fire and general restraint;
—put pressure on Hungary and Yugoslavia;
—maintain our own contacts with the Egyptians and get the British and French to work on them in regard to a cease-fire;
—take the position that a cease-fire should stand on its own rather than be tied to eventual terms of a settlement;
—make clear to the Russians that Arab oil sanctions against us will have adverse consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations.
You have a separate set of papers on the urgent need to get together with the Europeans in regard to possible oil supply problems.\textsuperscript{5} This is a matter of the utmost political urgency, since U.S-European relations could come under the most severe strain quite rapidly, thereby giving the Soviets added incentives to support a protracted war.


\section*{142. Memorandum of Conversation\textsuperscript{1}}

Moscow, October 20, 1973, 9:15–11:30 p.m.

\textbf{PARTICIPANTS}

- General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev
- Foreign Minister Andre Gromyko
- Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
- Mr. T. M. Kornienko
- Mr. A. M. Alexandrov-Agentor
- Mr. Victor Sukhodrev (Interpreter)
- Other Soviet Interpreter
- Notetakers
- Secretary of State Kissinger
- Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco
- Deputy Assistant Secretary Roy Atherton
- Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff
- Mr. Winston Lord, Director of Planning and Coordination of the State Department
- Mr. William Hyland, NSC Staff

(There was some cordial small talk before the formal meeting began. The General Secretary pointed to the pictures of Marx and Lenin on the wall. Secretary Kissinger brought President Nixon’s personal greetings to Mr. Brezhnev. Mr. Brezhnev mentioned that he had received a message from the President in which he had assured him that

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 76, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Kissinger Trip to Moscow, Tel Aviv, & London, October 20–22, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Brezhnev’s office in the Kremlin. Brezhnev requested that the President send Kissinger to Moscow “in an urgent manner” in a note to Nixon that Dobrynin read to Kissinger on the telephone on October 19. Nixon agreed later that day. See \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1969–1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Documents 209 and 210.
Secretary Kissinger had full power to negotiate. He then congratulated Secretary Kissinger on his appointment. Secretary Kissinger commented that in future summits it would not be necessary to set up separate meetings for the Foreign Ministers. There was then some discussion of the map of the Middle East on the wall and the fact that both the Arabs and Israeli sides were liars with regard to the military situation. The group then sat down at the conference table and the meeting began.

Brezhnev: Welcome, Dr. Kissinger, and gentlemen. I am profoundly satisfied to see you here, particularly taking account of the important and complex situation we have at hand. My decision to send a message to President Nixon requesting that he send you to Moscow for discussion was dictated by me late at night. The experience in the past in preparing for the summits of 1972 and 1973 has amply shown that meetings and discussions with you have contributed in a very big way to our common success. When I received a very prompt reply from the President, I equally promptly late last night sent a reply that I was gratified at his swift decision. Please know that my reply of gratitude reached the President before you left Washington.

It is, of course, a fact that previous meetings that we had were tremendously effective. And it is not only my thought, but yours as well, when we say we trust that the present visit reaches very good and favorable results.

The situation from our point of view as I see it will conform to your own views, namely that it has assumed a very acute nature. Guided by the principles that have already been laid down between us, the principles of joint cooperation in the interest of maintaining peace and the interest of the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and guided by the feelings of respect and confidence for one another, I believe we should conduct these discussions calmly and frankly, in a businesslike way, with both sides freely putting forth propositions, suggestions and various suppositions in a quest for a solution. If we depart from these principles, that can only lead to further complications and cannot be beneficial in the search for a solution to the present situation. And that would not extinguish the flames of conflict. Therefore, we will put forward concepts, thoughts, views and facts. Recent times have certainly given more than enough food for thought.

In making these preliminary remarks, I already have the view that, although military matters can be presented in some way, in these discussions neither you nor I hardly need to go into the details. We do not
have military staffs. We can take account of the information in the reports emanating from both sides on the understanding that they are not absolutely accurate. But that is not the most important thing, and that was not the most important thing in our discussions in Moscow and San Clemente on the question of the Middle East crisis.

Therefore, taking account of the state of affairs existing today, we should conduct frank and sincere discussions. This will better inform the President of the gist of our discussions so that he can better understand. I trust that Dr. Kissinger will agree to proceed in this way. If so, we can today lay the foundations for discussion of all these problems, trying at the same time to take a look into the foreseeable future.

I hope that both today and tomorrow that you and I will adhere to the principles that we adopted and that we want to continue to cooperate in the spirit of the agreements that have already been concluded and are now being further developed, notwithstanding any complicated situation that might arise. I feel we should not lose the feeling of equilibrium, of balance. We should act in a spirit of common sense so as to promote the finding of an acceptable solution. This does not mean in any way that we want to dictate our will to others. This is in spite of the slander leveled at both of us. So let us ignore these things. There have been attacks both by certain circles in your country and certain circles in Asia, but that is not important. What is important is governments and the decisions they take.

I hear you are preparing to stay here all day tomorrow and the day after. That is very positive. It is not because I see that the discussions will be acute, but I believe it is important that we see all the important propositions of both sides. I am not referring to allies. We do not have an alliance with the Arab countries. I don’t know—perhaps you have certain commitments to Israel. That is something I am not going into.

I am well experienced in my many meetings with you, and in your conversations with me you are a person who likes good jokes. I appreciate that very much. In the general course of my visit and conversations, I saw that the American people like jokes. They don’t get in the way of serious discussion.

You notice I have a very quiet voice today.

Kissinger: I noticed. I’m waiting.

Brezhnev: If it’s a very quiet voice, don’t think I am weak. I am just a little ill in the vocal cords. I just wanted you to understand.

Gromyko: That is not something that is detrimental to the gist of the talks.

Brezhnev: Let me add that I trust that, as agreed earlier with the President, we will conduct these discussions not from a position of strength but from a position of good will.
Gromyko: Both sides know the strength of each other well enough.

Brezhnev: That is one point I want you to bear in mind. I certainly will as I conduct the discussion. (Mr. Brezhnev then told the story of people traveling in an open car on a country road in which there is very much dust. When the winds are blowing in your face the dust remains behind and doesn’t cover you. If the wind is coming from the left and you turn right, you avoid the dust. But if the wind is from the left and you turn left, then you can find dust covering you. The only answer to this dilemma is to turn left as fast as you can so as to avoid the dust covering you.)

So we can be guided in these discussions by the need to evade turns which might cover us with dust. This is one example from life that can be translated into policy. These stories always give me an incentive when I see you across the table. Now, if we could get down to the subject of the present discussion.

Kissinger: Did the General Secretary want to continue?

Brezhnev: Yes. We are now confronted with the fact that guns are firing in that area and hostilities are beginning. And that is certainly something to give us cause for concern as a fact, as such. After all, we agreed on both sides to exert efforts in order to find an agreed position. And we agreed to act in a certain way so as to prevent guns from firing, and in such ways to preclude guns from firing in the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, that did not come true. I trust you are equally concerned at the turn that events have taken, and justly so.

And confidence is indicated by the immediate exchange of messages that ensued between us and President Nixon.4 Various reports have appeared in the press, but certainly the fact and the core of the matter lies in the direct exchanges between us and the President. At today’s meeting, I do not want to go into analyzing all the details of the exchange of views that have taken place up until yesterday. We might have to do that tomorrow or the day after in order to compare various positions and elements. But I don’t think we should do that today.

I would like to express the hope, Dr. Kissinger, that you understand me when I say that, in the exchange of messages recently, the most important message was the one I sent to President Nixon the day before yesterday.5 I would certainly welcome it if Dr. Kissinger could comment on my message and proposal in this context because we have not received an official reply. But, instead, we received something very

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4 See Documents 138, 139, and 140.
5 The October 18 message outlined three provisions that the Soviets wanted to include in a draft resolution of the Security Council. Additionally, the Soviets proposed that both the United States and USSR sponsor the resolution. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 202.
pleasant for us, that is the news that Dr. Kissinger was coming to Moscow. If Dr. Kissinger is in agreement with that, I would be most happy to hear whatever comments that President Nixon has on that score. When I say that I would like to hear that, it is because, on this score, the President has informed me that Dr. Kissinger is empowered to speak on his behalf.

Kissinger: I think, as the Foreign Minister would probably agree, that it is dangerous for a foreign minister in foreign countries to assume that they have full authority. If we come to some understandings, I will still want to check them with the President.

Brezhnev: When Foreign Minister Gromyko is in the United States, he meets you or the President, and he is in exactly the same situation as you. The only thing I can do is to sympathize with both of you.

Kissinger: We have negotiated very much, and I think we can communicate very rapidly. And I have a pretty good estimate of what is possible and what is not possible. So we will not play games with you, while we are here, of hiding behind instructions.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, these matters are so important and complicated that perhaps I am ahead of myself. I am not talking from a position of threats of military operations but from a much deeper position. After all, for the last year we have been talking against the background of comparative stillness. Now we are talking about one side having moved to another side and another side having to move to this side. If we proceed from those positions, we will never agree.

Kissinger: I agree. (Not translated.)

Brezhnev: Therefore, I believe that both sides must rise above any statements by Golda Meir or Dayan or Sadat or aside. Otherwise, we have nothing to talk about. We can just go away and draw lines according to the relative reports that each side makes. You and I are not Chiefs of Staff, and that is the important fact. Of course, events in the area have a certain significance. We must rise above these factors and take a broader view of the problem. It just so happens that on one side there are certain differences in relationships between the Arabs and us and you, on the one hand, and certain attitudes of Israel toward us and other states. So we should not go into that matter.

Kissinger: Well, Mr. Secretary General, over the last two years, President Nixon and you have established a unique relationship which we believe is essential to the peace of the world. I have said to your Ambassador on behalf of President Nixon that in many areas we exchange ideas and information more freely than any other nations, and, therefore, our relationship has really a unique character. It would be inconceivable, to speak personally, that President Nixon would permit me to leave in the middle of a crisis for any other reason except to talk to the General Secretary about world peace. That is why in the face of do-
mestic opposition by people opposed to the improvement of relations, the President and his associates have stood absolutely firm and will continue to stand firm for the relaxation of tension and improvement of the relations between the United States and the USSR and founding world peace on the basis of a good relationship. And, therefore, the President will be very glad to hear the comments by the Secretary General that he and his colleagues are dedicated to the principles for which we have both made such a great effort. Our intention is to develop even further these relationships in the remaining years of President Nixon’s terms in office.

Brezhnev: And I certainly reaffirm that once again, including the agreement reached in principle of a new visit by the President to this country in 1974 and then another visit by me in 1975, and then another return visit by the President in 1976.

Kissinger: These principles, of no unilateral advantage, no exacerbation of tensions, are central to the peace of the world, and essential to our relationship. Rarely in history have two countries had such a great opportunity for a cooperative relationship as we have already begun, and even greater in the future.

And, therefore, I agree very much with the General Secretary that, in the conditions of the Middle East, we should not look at the tactical situation and particular grievances. The problem of the Middle East is that the opposing parties have very strong convictions about the local rivalry, but they have no responsibility to the peace of the world. Our present responsibility is to the peace of the world and to apply a global perspective to what is going on in the local area. So it is in this spirit that we should conduct our discussions.

To get to the concrete situation. We have, as we have analyzed, two problems. First, to put an end to hostilities, because as long as the war goes on, there is always the possibility of some irrational act. In reality, each of us is giving to one side, and therefore there is a contest between the U.S. and the Soviet Union for objectives that do not concern our vital long-term national interests.

Secondly, in ending the war we should also make provisions to move energetically to remove the causes of war after the ceasefire has been achieved, and we are prepared to do that. Now our success in bringing about the first objective—the first objective being to bring an end to the war—can be extremely important for our relationship. As your Ambassador must have reported to you, there are many forces in the U.S. right now that are attempting to exploit the current crisis to destroy a policy they have always opposed, namely rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, if we should succeed in this trip to develop a joint agreement that would bring an
end to the war on reasonable terms, it will be the best counterargument to these people who have claimed that we can no longer cooperate.

Brezhnev: I would add that this would have great importance for public opinion all over the world and people everywhere would take an entirely different view of our relationships if we do achieve our objective. And I will add that it will bring to an end all allegations about the two super powers wanting to dictate their will to others. And those allegations relate equally to your side and ours. Some say the United States can’t be believed, and others say the same things about the Soviet Union. I’d say that, if we can bring an end to the gunfire, we can also bring an end to this slanderous allegation.

Kissinger: That’s exactly our attitude.

Brezhnev: That is of paramount importance. That objective would be a great help to us in pursuing a policy we have been pursuing of late.

Kissinger: That is exactly why the President sent me here.

Brezhnev: As I said, it is certainly something I value very highly.

Kissinger: Let me make one or two practical comments and then make a few observations about the message the General Secretary sent to the President on Thursday.

I will have to leave Monday afternoon at 2:00, or the latest 3:00, o’clock, either to return to the United States or to make one stop on the way depending on our conversations. If I make that stop, it will be in Israel. The reason, I will be very honest with you, Mr. General Secretary, is that we have not had an opportunity for full discussion with Israel as you have had, during the visit of your Prime Minister Kosygin, with the Arab countries.

Brezhnev: Well, Kosygin’s visit only enabled us to exchange views with President Sadat. He did not exchange views whatsoever with Syria or Iraq or the other countries.

Kissinger: In the spirit with which we talk to each other, the reason we have not been very explicit with Israel is because we didn’t want to unleash a propaganda campaign in the United States before we knew where we were going. And this we could not know until we talked to you. As your Ambassador may have told you, your friend Senator Jackson at the moment is engaged in a very active campaign against me and the President, accusing us of having been taken in by you, which is not impossible considering the General Secretary’s persuasive power.

(Mr. Brezhnev stands up at the mention of the words “Senator Jackson” and asks for water immediately. Laughter.)

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6 October 18. See footnote 5 above.
7 October 22.
8 Kosygin traveled to Cairo and met with Sadat on October 17 and 18.
Gromyko: This should not be repeated.

Brezhnev: I will lose my voice completely. I might not lose my voice, but I think it will bring the discussion to a close. (He stands again. Laughter.) Will you please make it easier for me, calling him “our friend” and “your friend”?

Kissinger: I agree. That is our first agreement.

Brezhnev: Good. We will handle this, but we will have to think of the tactics of implementation together with the special agreements reached.

Kissinger: Now, if I may suggest . . .

Brezhnev: And I think we can both agree if we say that the question before us is far from being an easy one.

Kissinger: For both of us.

Brezhnev: And we certainly should not labor under any illusions about the fact that the two sides of the conflict, the Arabs and Israelis, have totally different, opposing views on this entire matter. That should not deprive us of the opportunity in terms of finding a solution to ensure peace and tranquility in the area, with all the necessary guarantees of sovereignty—whatever they want, let them have it so long as there is tranquility in the area. Both sides, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, have an interest over anything else to achieve tranquility on both sides.

Kissinger: Now the central point is that we have an impossible problem when every few years war breaks out and threatens world peace for objectives which neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can determine.

Brezhnev: That is indeed very well said. It was not for nothing—and I did not mean to bear pressure on the President—when I indicated in my last message that the continuation of the present situation could expose the entire area of the Middle East and involve other matters, for example, oil for all leading to hostility toward the U.S., etc. I had in mind those circles in the United States who are inflaming matters, promoting hysteria, unmindful of all the implications of this for the prestige of the United States and the world, and oblivious as patriotic American citizens.

Therefore, I wrote from the bottom of my heart, and we can state as facts today. Dr. Kissinger, you and I have spent many hours and days together in very complicated discussions. I trust you are very familiar with my manner of speaking, and I am telling you this in frankness and sincerity. In all my discussions with you, Dr. Kissinger, and the President, in our replies we have always taken account the differences existing in our respective societies. In this country, we have complete unity of views and aspirations; we don’t have the difference of views
and shouting of the U.S. We have to be continually aware that the situation in the United States is different, very different from ours. It does not mean we cannot agree in principle. First and foremost, we must display goodwill toward one another. My attitude is also prompted by the lofty responsibility I have when conducting negotiations entrusted to me by our leadership.

Kissinger: For these reasons . . . I agree also that it is impermissible to let this or that tactical situation determine our discussions over the next few days. The first reason is that we can’t find out the truth. And, secondly, while, whose tanks move five kilometers forward on one side or the other is terribly important to one side or the other, it’s basically irrelevant to the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev: Of course, some factors do have some relevance to these relationships. That is only too natural because arms are being delivered to Israel; and we are fulfilling our agreement that we had gone into with Egypt and Syria, four years ahead, these existing longstanding agreements according to which we must send so many guns.

Kissinger: To us it looks like you are fulfilling the four-year agreement in two weeks. It is an impressive performance.

Brezhnev: I didn’t hear what you said. My only answer would be to turn the whole thing around.

Kissinger: Perhaps if we settle the other problems, this problem will settle itself. At some point, we should talk because both sides keep pouring arms into the area. And an explosive situation can arise because of our actions.

Brezhnev: And the situation will become even graver; in fact, things can reach a point today we can even foresee.

Kissinger: Let me make this suggestion. I’ll make some comments on the three points of your message of Thursday night. Then perhaps we can meet tomorrow and be concrete about where we go from here. I read in a book that I should not negotiate after an airplane trip. At any rate, I am at a disadvantage with the Secretary General, and I don’t wish to compound this by negotiating right off an airplane—not to speak of the Foreign Minister.

Brezhnev: I can’t conduct myself from a position of advantage—all the more so because Dr. Kissinger still has to fulfil his promise to give me a belt. He’s given me a holster, but no belt.

Kissinger: You’re right.

(Mr. Brezhnev stands up.)

(There was then some discussion of the two pistols and the belt that Secretary Kissinger promised Mr. Brezhnev as well as a reference to Mr. Gromyko’s wearing a hat saying “Nixon’s the One.” There was
further discussion about how much money it would take to get Mr. Gromyko to wear the hat and who would split the money.)

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I certainly appreciate the fact that you have had no chance to rest and that you are tired after your flight. I am perfectly willing to hear what you have to say about the three principles that I mentioned to the President. I am not offering tea or coffee because I will hope you will join me for a private supper. You must have some food.

Kissinger: I already had some at the Guest House, but I will be glad to join. Let me make a few comments.

As I understand it, the General Secretary’s message to the President had three principles for a ceasefire and then an associated understanding. Speaking very generally of the three principles, the first is, in general, acceptable. By the time Kornienko, Sonnenfeldt, and Sisco work on it, this will not be easy to recognize. But, in principle, it is acceptable. It is a drafting problem.

The third principle is also, in general, acceptable, although it presents a slightly more complex drafting problem, but I believe a solvable one. That is, we accept the idea represented here. It is a question how to express it in ways that take account all the complexities.

The second principle has some ideas which we can accept, such as reference to the Security Council Resolution 242.

Gromyko: Can or can’t?

Kissinger: Can. But I must say something. We can accept it in principle; the rest of it is expressed with perhaps unnecessary precision and refers to matters like “to the line of Security Council Resolution 242.” As you know, the resolution does not establish a line, but a general principle. It contains an idea, Mr. General Secretary, and if we work on it in a spirit that you and I have expressed, we should be able to find a formulation that is mutually acceptable.

Now on the understanding which you suggest, namely that you and we in some sense should provide auspices under which negotiations take place, we are quite sympathetic to that. (Ambassador Dobrynin translates further.) We are not rejecting the idea—on the contrary. I must point out to you, Mr. General Secretary, that it is my impression that Israel, at this moment, would reject a reference to Security Council Resolution 242. I must simply point this out for your information.

Brezhnev: Israel?

Kissinger: That is our impression. We have not had a chance for a full discussion, so we will have to weigh speed against the formulation at some point.
But to sum up, our belief is that in the proposal you transmitted to us we can incorporate much of the language without specific references as a possibility.

(Gromyko and Brezhnev confer.)

So to sum up our reaction, we believe what you transmitted to us was constructive. It has the basis for a solution and should be discussed in detail tomorrow. And we will be prepared to do that with specific language, point two being the one that is most difficult.

Brezhnev: That is a point I wanted to raise myself. The Foreign Minister is quite right in raising it. Apart from the various collections of the various principles and forums, whether or not you decide to accept the principles such as referring to the resolution and other matters, one very important fact is the question of guarantees, and the form the guarantees will assume in implementing the principles once they have been agreed upon by the two sides. It is a fact that the so-called Security Council guarantees have of late become less than reliable. The Arab world doesn’t believe in them; Israel doesn’t accept them. So I don’t think we can leave the matter tomorrow without drawing up guarantees. For if we just gave the Security Council a paper, that would be dooming the matter to failure. We feel we must give thought to a form of guarantee of a different kind, and we can agree on this tomorrow. In principle, it is hardly worthwhile to entrust the guarantee to those parties. For example, if we give the guarantee to a man like Waldheim, it would be just an empty gesture. No one believes he is capable of enough guarantee.

Kissinger: I think the General Secretary is wrong. Mr. Waldheim believes he could guarantee it.

Brezhnev: That is possible.

Kissinger: I wish you would invite him to Moscow because he calls me three times a day.

Brezhnev: I would do that, but there’s no empty space here for him. The same goes for the so-called Jarring Mission. He’s left the scene altogether. Realistically, if our two countries could come to a conclusion, then we would be believed by all parties. If the U.S. and the Soviet Union could find an acceptable form to provide the necessary guarantees, if that were done, it would be believed by the Arab world, the Israelis, and the entire world. I am convinced—because our guarantees are not taken lightly. I doubt in the future that there would be any doubt about the guarantees of our two countries. So we need to get together and reach an accord on guarantees.

9 See footnote 6, Document 130.
I certainly appreciate your joke about Waldheim. He has only a narrow capability to give effect to guarantees. I get the irony of that remark.

(Mr. Brezhnev then tells a story about a scientist who was considered a towering figure, but this was very ironic because he was a very weak person.)

I see that you have, in brief, touched upon the three principles. I appreciate the fact that you have had certain reservations about guarantees and don’t want to refer to them right now. But if you could say a few words on this, it would help our planning for tomorrow.

Kissinger: No, I’m prepared to do this, Mr. General Secretary. I’m like a professor.

Brezhnev: Good. Just let me add that, as we see it, these guarantees need not be in the form of a Security Council resolution, but in the form of a guarantee bilaterally.

Gromyko: Bilateral, in the sense of two powers?

Kissinger: There are two senses. One, a guarantee to speed up the process, and two, a guarantee to assure the results of the process are, in fact, carried out.

Gromyko: We were talking about the second, the guarantees that were related to the second point.

Kissinger: I had the impression that it was used in connection with both senses, that you propose that we assume responsibility for speeding up the consultations and afterwards to guarantee the results.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: In principle, we are prepared to move in that direction in both senses, keeping in mind it is a very delicate problem. I agree that the Secretary General can’t do it. I agree that in the Security Council, if the permanent members were to do it, they would fight among each other rather than settling local disputes. So we understand the problem. We would have to discuss how to give effect to a bilateral understanding, but in principle it is not rejected.

Some of my colleagues are of the impression that Alexandrov agrees with what I just said.

Brezhnev: I cannot see Alexandrov.

As I see it then, in principle, all the points in our last message are acceptable as a basis for discussion. What we have to do is to think over ways to correlate them in appropriate form.

Kissinger: Except there’s a paragraph which has a precision we don’t think is necessary.

Gromyko: We will talk with you tomorrow.

Brezhnev: In short, it’s a question of formulating a joint position.
Kissinger: And how we express the obligations of 242.

Brezhnev: Now we are agreed after that discussion on the basic principles.

Kissinger: Good, Mr. General Secretary.

Brezhnev: You have experienced a time difference. I would suggest we start tomorrow at 11:00 o’clock and meet without any time limit.

Kissinger: I agree. That gives the Ambassador a chance to go to a Mass in the morning.

Brezhnev: That is his innermost desire. Good.

Kissinger: Thank you.10

10 For Kissinger’s report to Nixon on this meeting, see Scowcroft’s October 21 memorandum for the President’s file, printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 219.
143. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, October 21, 1973, noon–4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

USSR
General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev
Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko
Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov
Mr. G. M. Kornienko, Chief, USA Division
Ambassador A. Dobrynin
Mr. A. M. Alexandrov-Agentov, Aide to CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev
Mr. V. M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

US
Secretary Kissinger
Assistant Secretary Joseph J. Sisco
Deputy Assistant Secretary Alfred L. Atherton
Director of Planning and Coordination Winston Lord
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff
Mr. William Hyland, NSC Staff

B: My voice situation is that my doctors keep treating me and I keep . . .
K: That’s good for my nerves.
B: In that case I shall do my best to cure my voice. I have been thinking about how we should proceed today, and I have the following suggestions to make. Yesterday in general terms you expressed your attitude in principle to points raised in our latest document. Now to speak in the same general terms to you as yesterday, let me say I and my colleagues have formed the impression that you regard that document as a good and constructive basis for our work and for possible agreement between us.

As I understand it, in the latest letter I have received from the President, he feels that if we act in the spirit of accord, in the spirit of ac-
tempting to find an acceptable solution, and in the spirit of seeking to take concerted actions after the cease fire, we can find a good way out of the present situation. I want to be sure I understood the President’s message correctly. Therefore, if you have no doubts as to my having correctly understood the theme of the President’s message, I would suggest—I’m sure this goes for diplomats as for ordinary people—less words and more deeds.

I therefore suggest we begin the process of practically ironing out acceptable formulas, that is, we should immediately proceed point by point to what was stated in the document. Take point one, for instance, reach agreement on that; then we could inform President Nixon we reached agreement on that, and subsequent points under discussion are in the process of being concerted. In general, I should like to keep President Nixon informed on all steps we take here; inform him quickly as possible. I feel he would like that. I want this to be so because the President himself has reacted very promptly to all of my messages and I should like to respond in kind. If you agree, we could take up point one and endeavor to reach agreement on it. We feel this would bring us closer to adoption of a constructive decision and if such a decision is arrived at, Dr. Kissinger could take two days off and go to Leningrad before going home.

Seriously, we should proceed from the assumption that we have spent quite enough time discussing the general proposals of our talks and that, as I see it, we have reached a measure of accord on that score. Therefore, we should now turn to concrete work, and I believe we should take up the three points rather than relegating them to some kind of commission. It is better for us to bear the responsibility for decisions of such vital importance rather than to relegate the decisions to someone else. If we did that, there would be no need to meet face to face, relegating it to a committee, instead of meeting face to face across the table, and in a very good atmosphere.

And, also, I proceed from the assumption that we certainly understand and realize you have certain difficulties as regards bringing your allies and friends to accept this or that decision. I trust you will realize we too have difficulties of the same sort, and particularly since we have more states to deal with than you. You have just Israel. We have the entire Arab world. We feel we are such major states we can, as President Nixon says, we can have decisive influence on decisions and a joint decision taken by us could prevail. What President Nixon said, I certainly agree with. Getting down to specific points, perhaps we can reach agreement quite quickly for something constructive to suggest to President Nixon and to finding an end to the conflict.
And, I also proceed from another assumption. That is, that I have noticed in my three years of experience conducting discussions with Dr. Kissinger that I turn out to be the man who makes all the concessions. You know that is true, that is why you are smiling. What about my position? I have to do all the crying.

I would then suggest that perhaps, Dr. Kissinger, if you agree, that you might give me the benefit of your comments on all three points of the resolution, of the document. We could then get down to concrete discussion and do away with abstractions.

K: If we do away with abstractions, we will have nothing left to say.

B: But I do think we ought . . .

K: Mr. General Secretary, you have correctly understood the letter of President Nixon, and I agree we should proceed with the attitude you described.

B: That is the only way we can act in order to get down to business.

K: I also agree we should go point by point. Could I ask one procedural question, because it is not clear from our discussion what we are attempting to do. Is it our intention to do something that, with the concurrence of the parties, we submit to the Security Council, or something simply we submit to the parties? I wasn’t fully clear yesterday what you had in mind. We are open minded.

B: While we have no pride in this respect, as I understood it yesterday, we seemed to reach an accord on a general approach. We could reach agreement on a certain proposal which we could, with the concurrence of the sides, present to the Security Council, and that would be acceptable to both sides—this is one possible method of action. If we feel it would be more expedient for our two states to bring influence to bear on the Arabs on the one hand, and Israel on the other, and induce them to move forward to a peaceful settlement, that is another possibility I would agree with equally. In that event, too, we should start now by discussing the specific points, point by point. So if you have a certain preference, I would be glad if you told me.

If we proceed from the premise that we cannot do anything at all, you cannot influence the Israelis and we cannot influence the Arabs, or proceed from the premise that we can do nothing through the Security Council in the sense of bringing about a resolution aimed at a settlement, first a cease fire and then a settlement, then the question arises why is our meeting necessary at all. Certainly I agreed to it in the sincere hope this meeting would proceed from the point towards a final acceptable solution that would serve the cause of reaching a peaceful settlement. How can we do that? By discussing the proposals. I’m not claiming the proposals are ideal or can be accepted as they stand right
now. Certainly various amendments can be made to the proposals, but let us right now begin a calm and friendly discussion of those proposals, just as we did at San Clemente in a truly friendly spirit.

Now our conversation may present a few ideas. Some of the world’s greatest discoveries and inventions were made by the greatest scientists sort of off the cuff. Therefore, I believe in this case it is another thing we must take into account. The Security Council was convened at the initiative of the United States, and is still in session. As I now see it, if we start trying to work out a set of proposals bypassing the Security Council, that would not be the best way of acting. So I think we should endeavor not to violate the UN Charter, those provisions of the Security Council should be maintained.

We should give preference to the following method. Make an effort to elaborate proposals which could in a form that had been agreed by us be submitted to the Security Council in the hope that the Security Council will vote in favor of those proposals. I believe if we do succeed in elaborating such proposals, any point we agreed on should be mutually acceptable. Give no one a unilateral advantage, the Arabs, Israelis, the Soviet Union or the United States. They should be couched in such terms as to promote the good relations established between our countries, in such terms as would enable us to go further forward along the path we have chosen for development of our relations and the good will existing between us. And that also would be absolutely correct from our point of view for in international practice our two sides will have to take a constructive decision on these matters. If we just acted alone, we might have to face questions from various quarters and they might be so numerous that a full year would not be enough to cope with them.

K: I think we should follow the plan outlined by the General Secretary. I think we should attempt to come to some understanding here, then discuss it with the parties, and if we agree, have the possibility to exercise great influence on the parties, and then submit it to the Security Council. And, then after the cease fire, our two sides can continue exchanges on how to move towards peace, towards the final solution.

B: I have one substantial comment to make regarding this. I will be quite frank. I will not conceal. Let us endeavor to reach a constructive solution. You know as well as we do how contradictory the views and attitudes of the two sides are regarding the present situation, especially today, when there is a war on in the area. If we reach agreement here between us, and I am sure we can do that, and if we then start talking, we with the Arab world and you with the Israelis, the Israelis will confront you with so many questions as the Arabs will with us, our agreement will be worth nothing. We will not be able to act jointly in the Security Council. It will mean all we have talked about, about being able
to influence the sides, agreeing to reach solutions, all that will hang suspended. We will lose our prestige, and they will say we were only pretending we can influence the parties, and in fact we cannot. As soon as we reach agreement, let us submit it to the Security Council. Then another matter arises, informing the sides. We can say this is what we have agreed to and are submitting to the Security Council. That is what we are going to do and you can do whatever you like. It is the only way to proceed.

K: Mr. General Secretary, I propose we try to reach agreement. We can then decide on tactics. In principle, if we reach agreement, then we should submit it soon after to the Security Council to bring about an end to the hostilities.

B: Let us indeed take that method. Let us then proceed to a point by point discussion. Let us take up all these things. We are prepared to hear you.

K: How do we do it? Let me read yours and then give you our suggestions. Would that be acceptable? First point, as I have it from your Ambassador was, “A call to the sides to immediately cease fire and all military action on the positions where the troops actually are.”

B: That’s correct.

K: Let me read the redraft I have. It is very similar to yours, only a little more precise.

B: Please. I am sharpening my knives for peaceful purposes. (Picking up a knife to eat an apple.)

K: “Calls upon all parties to the present fighting, including those who are not directly involved but have sent military units to the area of combat, to cease all fighting and terminate all military activity immediately in the positions they now occupy.” It is really only a little more precise.

B: Is that all of point one?

K: The only difference is that we just want an equal commitment from other Arab countries, that’s the only difference. Should I go on?

B: Please.

K: I’ll read your point, then our point. “Call upon parties to start immediately after the ceasefire a phased withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories to the line in accordance with Resolution 242 of the Security Council, with completion of this withdrawal in the shortest period of time.”

B: Yes, I have it before me.

K: Ours is much shorter. “Calls upon parties concerned to start immediately after the ceasefire . . .

B: Would you write it?
K: It’s very short, yes, we will give it to you in writing. “Calls upon parties concerned to start immediately after ceasefire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts.” I must say this—just for your information—it has not been at all discussed with Israel. In fact, they have told us that they do not accept any linkage with 242. I just wanted to tell you. We are submitting this as an indication of our willingness to proceed in the spirit the General Secretary outlined.

B: We will get a translation. I will then look into it in greater detail. It is very difficult to get all the details by ear. I trust you will give it in writing.

K: Point three. I will read yours, just as a check, then I will read our point three. “A decision to start immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire appropriate consultations aimed at establishing a just and honorable peace in the Middle East.” Just for checking.

B: Durable peace.

K: I was wondering, I have never seen the word “honorable” before . . .

B: It is durable.

K: I didn’t hear it correctly on the phone.

B: It is wrongly translated in this paper.

K: We have for point three. “Call upon parties concerned to start immediately and concurrently with a ceasefire appropriate negotiations under appropriate auspices aimed at achieving paragraph two above and aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.”

Sisco: “appropriate auspices to establish . . .”

K: “Aimed at establishing . . . aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.” And if you wanted—we don’t insist on it—what we mean by just and durable peace—“in conditions of mutual security and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area within secure and recognized borders.” We will write it out and give you a text.

B: What a hard time I have with you.

K: It is basically the words of your proposal.

B: After this discussion I am going to file an application. We have a higher diplomatic school. I’m going to take that course. It may be easier to talk to you.

K: We have never failed yet, Mr. General Secretary, in our negotiations and we won’t fail in this one.

B: That seems to be a promising prospect. I have a feeling we are going to have a nice dinner together tonight, starting off much earlier than we did yesterday, which will be a prize for us.
K: I wouldn’t bet on it.

B: While we are waiting for the texts, why don’t we have some tea. It will be on a reciprocal basis. We are going to foot the bill. The Ambassador mentioned you didn’t have any money. You know when Shultz was here he gave me a dollar and countersigned it. He said it was guaranteed. I have it.

K: I need protocol money for some Colts I am getting from the General Secretary.

B: But I can lend you some money for that.

K: You have the only hard currency in this room.

B: I have such a good relationship with you I can give you money on credit. Our currency is indeed very stable. You are right about that.

K: When I came to Washington in 1969 they had a financial problem, and I attended a meeting at Treasury. I said why don’t you devalue the currency and they said it was technically impossible and morally unjust to devalue. Since then we have gone through a second and third devaluation.

B: I have one ruble, 3 rubles and 5 rubles ... I will sign it, give you a guarantee.

Dobrynin: You know in his country 3 rubles is not so good ... 3 dollar bill.

B: It will be a good souvenir.

K: Oh, it’s a wonderful souvenir.

B: Do you like the car you are riding in?

K: Very good.

B: It is a very sturdy car, drives easy, reminds me of your former Packard. Kind of a Russian version of your old American Packard. At the time when the Packard was new, in those days, our leaders, Stalin, Molotov, others, always drove in Packards.

That’s in addition to the 5 rubles, to help him out.

K: The Packard looks like our limousine?

B: There is a difference. It had a narrower front. This is wider. The track is wider, achieves greater stability, center of gravity ... very smoothly. It is a strongly run car, takes a bad road well.

K: Is it easy to drive?

B: Much better than the other car we use ... but at 120 it starts vibrating.

K: Coming to the Kremlin this morning my car started vibrating at 250.

B: A few days ago I arrived here on time and we drove 140 kilometers an hour, and I was sitting in the car as if sitting at my desk.
K: I made it from the guest house this morning in 3 and a half minutes. A new world record.

B: Years ago I had to travel from where you are staying now. I had 5 minutes for an important meeting. From my porch it took me exactly 5 minutes, to drive to the Kremlin—and without prior notice—no advance notice.

K: The Secret Service won’t let me drive. I had a Mercedes.

I told the President it was unkind to make me deal with Viet Nam and Israel in one year.

B: It certainly is a very harsh treatment of one’s assistant. But he is easier on you than I am on my assistants. You remember I even broke my principal assistant’s arm. Remember, he was working so hard, he looked like a victim of World War II. But he is much better since. Let’s take a little break so we can consult.

(There was then a half-hour break during which both sides consulted and there was also some small talk about the White House Situation Room, the Dobrynin–Kissinger relationship, the presence at the meeting of Kuznetsov, Senator Fulbright and other matters.)

B: So, I would like to submit the following version for point one. “The Security Council calls upon all parties to the present fighting” and then deleting the words “including those who are not directly involved in the area of combat.” The rest stays as it is, “terminate all activity in the positions now occupied.” If we start making reference to others we would have to mention volunteers fighting in Israel. We are talking about states, not all parties to the fighting, not whatever anybody else does really to assist those fighting. In Viet Nam, when other parties were fighting, Australia for instance, we didn’t make any reference to them. A situation could arise where American volunteers were fighting on the side of Israel . . . we are not interested in referring to them. We have the Security Council calling on states, which can be understood by anybody, the Russians or the United States. Quite frankly, we don’t think what we are suggesting would be harmful to what we want to achieve, ceasing all hostilities. Surely countries like Algeria and Libya can do nothing if the warring parties bring about a cease fire. I don’t see it detrimental if we leave the text as it is and call upon all parties to cease all fighting and terminate hostilities.

K: Mr. General Secretary, I understand what you are saying. The phrase you have now now added would, in your judgment, include all countries which have units, even though not specifically mentioned.

B: Undoubtedly.

K: So we could have an understanding between us on how to interpret it.

B: We are duty bound to say this to everybody concerned.
K: In that case, we accept.

B: On point two, there is in fact a matter of Russian translation. What we are suggesting actually is calling upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease fire to “practical” implementation of the Security Council Resolution. The English word is “implementation” only. The Russian includes “practical.” We couldn’t change the English. In Russian it would be “(Russian word).”

K: Is this one of your Kornienko specials? Mr. General Secretary, in English . . .

G: It is no problem. In Russian it is the same.

B: Since we make no mention in specific terms of troop withdrawals and this can call attention to itself, this fact, and since we refer to implementation and since the resolution speaks of withdrawals, therefore, it means withdrawal when we say “in all of its parts.”

K: If you want to say practical fulfillment, no problem. We accept this. I have to check back in Washington, but I think it will be all right.

G: It is a question of precision of translation. Your text is not affected.

K: No problem. Your text stands as it is.

B: Then we can consider that to have been agreed.

K: Yes.

B: Point three. We have a suggestion to make. Since we have point one which begins “The Security Council call upon” and point two which begins “calls upon,” we suggest point three begins “decides to . . .,” “decides to start immediately and concurrently.”

D: Henry, to start, “decides to start immediately and concurrently.” It goes on to say, including the optional part, until the words “every state in the area.” One word is out, where it says “appropriate negotiations” the word “appropriate” is deleted.

B: I will read now, point three. “Decides to start immediately and concurrently with the cease fire, negotiations under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East in conditions of mutual security and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area.” The last words are covered by the resolution.

K: Anatoliy, when you get through with me, I won’t know whether we are talking about European security or what. I understand Mr. General Secretary. One point of verification, and I would like to take a 5-minute break, because practically we are approaching each other very closely. I think even I cannot prevent agreement any more.

B: Why don’t we try to help one another for a change. That’s what I want to do.
K: That’s what I want to do, too. When you say “decides to start negotiations,” who’s going to conduct negotiations?

B: Let me elucidate. What we want here “to start meeting concurrently with the cease fire under appropriate auspices,” is calling on those who have to cease firing, because I don’t think we should write, in addressing the Security Council, that these negotiations should be under your and our auspices. But you and I here will agree that negotiations will be conducted under our joint auspices, and prior to adoption of this resolution you will in confidence tell the Israelis and we the Arabs that negotiations will be conducted under our auspices, and we will naturally be loyal to the word each of us gives the other. If you could agree to that, we will proceed although this would not be an easy thing to achieve.

K: Not easy for us to achieve. It is difficult for both of us.

B: But we will achieve security for all parties concerned, including Israel. We certainly favor that, bringing about security for other parties concerned and letting them live there in peace. And, our auspices will be there. Whenever details required something, they could be subject to future discussions between us.

K: Let me consult my colleagues.

B: This is something that we could initial and inform the President, President Nixon accordingly so that this could be submitted immediately to the Security Council.

K: Let us agree on the text and then agree to procedures.

B: This could then be submitted today to the Security Council.

K: Let us talk about it for a few minutes and then discuss choices. We want something that will lead to an efficacious solution. I will tell you my frank opinion after . . . You are suggesting a US-Soviet joint resolution.

B: Yes.

(There was a 15 minute break for consultations.)

G: In the statement we should state such and such a time for the cease fire.

K: That will complicate it even more. Let us give suggestions for point three. We suggest to say this: where it says “decides immediately and concurrently with the cease fire, negotiations under appropriate auspices,” we want to say negotiations “between the parties” under appropriate auspices. And with respect to the conclusion, there is one of two possibilities which are up to you. Either we say “within secure and recognized borders” and add “free from threats or acts of force” which is the actual 242 language, or stop the whole thing after the words “Middle East.” Those are two suggestions we have. Then if we can come to agreement, we will have to make some decisions on proce-
dures so we can actually bring about what we decide. This is a quote from the Resolution.

G: There is no need to repeat it.

K: Well, then the resolution will stop at “Middle East.”

B: If we add the words “negotiations between the parties,” let’s look at it from the point of view of realism. The Arabs and Israelis will not be in agreement beginning negotiations between themselves. That is one side of the problem. The second is when we say “under appropriate auspices,” you and we agree that these will be our auspices and I believe both the Israelis and Arabs will be pleased that we the great powers will be acting to promote a settlement.

K: Not Israel. Not Israel, believe me. In fact, I wonder whether we should do what the General Secretary said about saying ahead of time how we interpret “auspices.” We have no difficulty agreeing between ourselves. But if we want a resolution tonight, it will create additional difficulty.

B: Then we agree not to say anything beforehand.

K: I think it is better.

B: I agree. Say nothing before the resolution, I agree to say nothing before the resolution is adopted. We then have a private agreement that as soon as an agreement is adopted, we announce it to our respective friends.

K: Let us agree when we tell it to them. I frankly think we should let a few days go by until we get things calmed down.

B: We agree. OK. Let it be three or four days after the resolution is adopted.

K: No problem.

B: Then, there’s another matter we should foresee and discuss. Let’s say the Security Council is in session, and this resolution is submitted, and the resolution refers to negotiations “under appropriate auspices,” and since the Security Council is not just we and you but other members, permanent and non-permanent, the question might arise immediately what are those auspices? What do our representatives reply to questions like that?

K: We will decide that afterwards. But first, to be quite honest, Mr. General Secretary, the question is how much time do we want to spend on this. If you want to mention 242 in paragraph 2 which the Israelis violently object to, we have to mention “between the parties” or something like it. Maybe Kornienko can come up with a better phrase, something that can be pointed to as a process of negotiation.

Dobrynin to Brezhnev: “parties concerned,” he is trying to make it more explicit.
B: Since point one and two are calling upon the parties concerned, the parties actually fighting in the area, when we turn to point three and say immediately and concurrently, the cease fire relates directly to the Arabs and Israeli . . .

K: Point two is clear . . . by implication since we refer to cease fire earlier in our reference to those combatants. It stands to reason that the negotiations are to be conducted also by them. If we pinpoint it, to say that there are to be negotiations between the parties, that might cause a lot of queries in the Security Council. By implication it is clear. We also refer to “appropriate auspices,” and this is to be we and you; with our auspices therefore, they get together and talk.

(There was a brief break while Brezhnev and Gromyko conferred.)

B: One other point we would like to suggest which may even have been overlooked or perhaps even objected to at the outset. Let me suggest “Decides to start immediately and concurrently with the cease fire negotiations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices” and all the way down to the words “in the Middle East.”

K: Let me take two minutes with my colleagues. Really, it will take only five minutes.

(There was another brief break.)

K: We agree. We just want to change the English, but the translation won’t take us 30 seconds.

G: Same situation here.

K: I knew Dobrynin would take over today. He’s already running our government.

B: I am all ears.

K: Mr. General Secretary, we agree to this, and we just suggest a change in English which does not affect the Russian; “decides that immediately and concurrently to the cease fire negotiations start between the parties concerned.”

D: It doesn’t change it.

K: It doesn’t change the Russian. Otherwise the English sounds wrong.

B: Can we shake hands?

K: Yes, but we have another practical thing we have to discuss. (They shake hands.)

B: I think we have done a very good thing today, and I think you and I have been true to the hopes vested in us by the President. I need about 20 minutes to talk with my colleagues. I am sure they will agree. I don’t know what the Arabs will do to us about this. Possibly they will declare war on us.
One request we make of the President and yourselves, and that is to submit this resolution today, and to do our utmost to insure its adoption today. That is one. And two, we must agree on some kind of timing for implementation of the cease fire. It should be mentioned in the resolution—5 hours, or 3 hours, or immediately. We must agree on some kind of timing. The best thing we feel would be to name a certain hour, so that we avoid any differences in this [Omission in the original].

K: How about 24 hours after adoption of the resolution?

B: That’s a whole day.

K: In the Viet Nam case we gave 72 hours. It takes that long to get orders out.

B: But the situation here is different, and otherwise they will continue fighting throughout the day and night, and kill thousands more of their people. I am not making any comparisons of losses on either side, losses on the Israeli and on the Arab side. Going on fighting for another day or night could kill thousands more.

K: I am just wondering about a practical matter Mr. General Secretary. If it is voted tonight, then as a practical matter it has to be communicated to the nations concerned and they have to take decisions. If you say “immediately,” then they are already in violation of the resolution the minute it is passed. If it is 24 hours this would give them a realistic deadline.

B: OK, let’s give them 12 hours after the adoption of the resolution. There shouldn’t be any communication problem.

K: We have right now a practical problem. The Israelis I know will demand a release of prisoners as a condition of the cease fire. They have already said so publicly.

B: But there are prisoners of war on both sides. There should be an exchange. We are certainly in favor of both sides releasing every prisoner on both sides, right down to the line. We will certainly bring all our influence to bear to bring that about.

K: This will be a very big help.

B: I will back this with the entire prestige of our country, government and all. On a reciprocal basis, of course, and we could not make it part of the resolution.

K: No, no, we can’t. Another practical matter. Let us aim for a Security Council meeting at 10:00 tonight New York time.

G: In Moscow would be 5:00.

K: I must get back to the Guest House. I have to communicate to the President. I have to inform the governments, draft instructions for Scali. I wanted to ask permission—if we want to move fast, we would
like to talk to the British, French and Australian ambassadors here. This will guarantee it will go fast through the Security Council. 4

B: We surely appreciate the need for you to get in touch with the President. But I am in general guided by what the President said in his letter. Whatever we agree will be . . .

K: Mr. General Secretary, he will agree. I won’t play games with you. The President will accept it, but he has to know it and understand it, and it will take me an hour to write a memo to the President. I have to write also instructions to Scali and to our bureaucracy. I will be busy for two hours, and it will take about 2 hours to transmit all of this to Washington and get it into the President’s hands. 12 hours—we will never make it. Even with this, it is now 3:30. We will be back at the Guest House at 4:00. 5:00 a.m. Moscow time is in 13 hours. If the British and French and Australians don’t know what’s happening, it’s going to waste more time. I have to write a message. We need two hours to get the message out. Another two hours. Then they have to get their instructions in New York. We can say 9:00 New York time, 4:00 a.m. Moscow time.

B: The President of the Security Council can always delay a little bit.

K: When we ask for a Security Council meeting we have to agree among ourselves.

B: The request we feel should be handed in to the Security Council immediately.

K: No. Excuse me Mr. General Secretary, my suggestion is to do it at 4:00 p.m. New York time, which is going to be tight. And, to ask for a 9:00 meeting.

K: At 1:00 a.m. Moscow time, 6:00 p.m. New York time. Malik and Scali jointly ask for a Security Council meeting. They could say they want it immediately with the understanding it take place in three hours. (There was further discussion about the time.)

G: I myself have had the experience of calling a meeting of the Security Council, and what it takes is really 30 minutes to get it together.

K: Mr. Foreign Minister . . .

G: Once a proposal has been made it takes no more than one hour.

K: Let me explain. We will not be ready, practically to have everybody ready and informed. Based on our bureaucracy, what has to be

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4 At 6:30 p.m., Kissinger met with the British, French, and Australian Ambassadors to the Soviet Union and informed them that the United States and the USSR had agreed on the text of a resolution that would be introduced in the Security Council at 9 p.m., New York time. (Memorandum of conversation, October 21; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 76, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Kissinger Trip to Moscow, Tel Aviv & London, October 20–22, 1973)
done in Washington, it is Sunday. There is a danger of moving too fast. A lot of governments are going to start the wheels rolling . . . we don’t want them to go into the Security Council with opinions already formed.

G: Three hours between application and the meeting?
B: Good, at 4:00 a.m. Moscow time.
K: If you want my basic opinion . . . not worried about it, 9–10, we ask for the meeting.
B: We agree. The meetings start at 4:00 a.m. Moscow time. But the basic resolution, what amount of time do we give for implementation of the resolution?
K: Should we put this in the text? May I make another suggestion, just to speed things up? I think the most important thing I can now do is to communicate with the President, but I think later this afternoon, if you agree, I should meet with the Foreign Minister or Vice Foreign Minister so that we can work out parallel instructions for Malik and Scali so that they know how to cooperate. One other thing. When asked about under whose auspices, we should say the US and Soviet Union are prepared to offer good offices to these parties.
B: Where would that be done?
K: Malik and Scali can say that at the Security Council.
B: I agree, but I suggest here between us that we reach specific wording. When we say “auspices” it means the Soviet Union and the United States will act.
K: Yes, and the President already said this in this letter to you, more or less.
B: When will we say this to the combatants?
K: Afterwards. We have to understand what we mean by “auspices.” No one can stop two great powers from discussions. So this is what we are free to do.
B: If we say “auspices,” it means we should be parties in the negotiations, not just postmen. If we say “auspices” it means that a representative from your side and from our side takes part in whatever negotiations are held.
K: When it was first proposed to us we were told it meant that if the parties agreed. Now let me say on behalf of the President, he has decided to play an active role in cooperation with you in bringing about that settlement. But whether that means we sit actually in the conference rooms, or influence it from the outside, if we try to settle that tonight, there will be unnecessary delay. But as a practical matter, we are prepared to make a very major effort.
B: I think perhaps we are reducing to zero all we have agreed. There can be no talks between the sides without auspices.
K: We are prepared to do it.

B: Otherwise Qadaffi\(^5\) or somebody might start something, then where would we be. At this point, especially at the beginning of negotiations, there must be the presence of representatives of our two sides.

K: We are prepared to do it and prepared to recommend it. The only question is that tonight I don’t think we could get it accepted.

B: I would say suggest that, although there can be no 100% certainty. I would be prepared to assume responsibility for this to be carried out in the way we see it. We should take part in at least the early parts of whatever negotiations are held. We will not sit there throughout. We will be there and consult with one another.

K: We will strongly impress on Israel that we want to take part in the key moments of negotiations. We do not think we should try to obtain that particular agreement tonight.

B: It is not a matter of obtaining agreement tonight. What we have to do first and foremost is to obtain Security Council resolution today. We must have an understanding what we mean by “auspices” not merely consultations among ourselves. It means we are assuming obligation, the burden if you like, of telling the Israelis and Arabs our understanding of the word “auspices.”

K: Let me sum up so we are very sure. Our understanding of “auspices” is that at the opening of negotiations and at some critical moments the U.S. and Soviet Union will be participants in the process of negotiations.

B: We will participate.

K: Right, not at every session, but at key points. This is our understanding. The actual implementation we will have to work out afterwards, because we cannot get it accepted tonight.

B: In short, the US and the Soviet Union are active participants in the negotiations.

K: Not in every detail, but in the opening phase and at critical points throughout.

B: Perhaps we could formulate it in this way. The Soviet Union and the United States are active participants in the negotiations which shall be conducted under their auspices. Details of what particular moments will be worked out in the process of the actual negotiations, but also with a view to not letting the process of negotiations slip out of our hands.

K: I must tell you honestly the Israelis will violently object to Soviet participation.

\(^5\) Colonel Mu’ammar Qadhafi, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Libya.
B: Then, other side might object to American participation.

K: Therefore, for us to guarantee 100% would be unrealistic, but we will use our maximum influence. That I can honestly promise. We have no interest in a relationship with you, Mr. General Secretary, in which we break an understanding with you.

B: But that is something which I would like to have laid down as an understanding jointly reached, on our interpretation of the meaning of the word “auspices.”

K: What I have written out is that the negotiations will be conducted under our auspices and we will participate in them at crucial moments.

B: In other words in the solution of all the key issues.

K: Yes.

B: In the interests of achieving a durable and reliable peace in the area.

K: Right. But it must be brought about after the cease fire. We cannot do that tonight.

B: I agree. First implement the first part, i.e., the draft resolution to be submitted to the Security Council.

K: Our understanding is what we have given to you. I will write it out to make sure we understand exactly what is given to you. I don’t want to be impolite, but the most useful thing I can do in the time frame we have is to get in touch with the President. The understanding is exactly what I have given you.

B: Right. Then you can get with Gromyko.

K: If we can meet three or four hours after we have sent out our messages. One other technical thing. Could our people set up open telephone lines between me and Scali?

B: Yes.

K: During the Security Council meeting tonight, we will get our people to work together.

B: I will give instructions right away. (He gets up and makes a phone call.)

K: After we have made the announcement, Malik and Scali have to work together. You and I, Mr. Foreign Minister, should draft their instructions.

B: Do you want the telephone from your residence?

K: Right.

B: By the time you get back to the residence, I promise to have something ready for you.

K: We should also have agreement that neither Malik nor Scali will accept amendments except by mutual agreement.
B: Absolutely, and we consider that we have reached agreement.
K: I technically have to ask the President’s approval.
B: I am very sincere. I am not saying goodbye.
K: The President could overrule me. It could happen, but I tell you
as a friend, it won’t happen.

(There was a brief discussion of a possible preamble. Gromyko
pointed out this would take time and suggested simply leading in with
“The Security Council.” The Secretary agreed.)

6 The resolution was introduced in the Security Council and adopted in the early
morning hours of October 22 as Resolution 338. For a summary of the proceedings in the
lution is ibid., p. 213. Kissinger’s report to the President on this meeting was transmitted
in message Hakto 9 to Scowcroft, October 21, 1530Z. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976,

144. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, October 22, 1973, 8:45–9:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

USSR
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Vasili V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Member of Collegium of Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

USA
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for NEA
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff
Ambassador Robert McCloskey
William Hyland, NSC Senior Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister began by initialing the
agreed US-Soviet understanding on the meaning of the phrase “under

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
office Files, Box 76, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Kissinger Trip to Moscow, Tel Aviv &
London, October 20–22, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting
was held in the U.S. Delegation’s Guest House in Lenin Hills. Brackets are in the original.
appropriate auspices” in paragraph 3 of Security Council Resolution 338. The text [at Tab A] was initialed in English and Russian copies.

The Secretary offered a second written understanding [Tab B] to confirm the agreement to use maximum influence with the parties to ensure an exchange of prisoners of war within 72 hours of the ceasefire. “This will help me in Israel,” the Secretary said. After a brief private conversation, it was agreed that a formal written understanding was not necessary. The Foreign Minister assured the Secretary that we had the personal commitment of Brezhnev. “I’ll take the word of the General Secretary,” Dr. Kissinger stated. “There is no need to sign.”

The group was then seated at the table, and breakfast was served.

Gromyko: At this breakfast you are the host.

Kissinger: I told you I once gave Brandt a lunch in his own house.

Gromyko: The next lunch I will give for you.

Kissinger: Good.

Gromyko: Another agreement reached!

Sisco: Did you hear about Scali’s phone call about “practical fulfillment?” I had to explain it to him in the middle of the night. He said, “Did you discuss it?” I said, “We discussed it fully.”

Kissinger: One other question: Can I tell newsmen at the airport that I’m going [to Israel]? Would it be embarrassing?

Gromyko: Psychologically . . . It would be preferable if you not tell your destination from Moscow [laughing].

Kissinger: Then we do it from Washington.

Gromyko: I think it’s rather [better] psychologically.

Kissinger: Good.

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: Then I won’t say anything at the airport. Otherwise I’d be lying.

Gromyko: You should be enigmatic. [Laughing]

Dobrynin: Like a sphinx.

Kissinger: They will ask me, “Where are you going?” I’ll say, “It remains to be decided!”

The Chinese, when they were informed of this resolution by the President of the Security Council, McIntyre, were very angry. He [Huang Hua] pounded the table, I heard.

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2 See Document 143 and footnote 6 thereto.
3 Tab A and Tab B attached but not printed.
4 Sir Laurence McIntyre, Australian Ambassador to the UN. Huang Hua was the Chinese Ambassador to the UN.
Gromyko: [rises] I offer a toast to what we accomplished yesterday and the day before and to all who accompanied you. [drinks toast]

Kissinger: [rises] Mr. Foreign Minister, we’ve negotiated many agreements. But even more than agreements, we’ve negotiated a relationship between our countries which is fundamental to peace in the world. What we’ve done in the last two days is important not only to the Middle East but to US-Soviet relations and our whole foreign policy. I therefore offer a toast to the Foreign Minister and all he has done for the friendship between our two countries and the peace of the world.

I also want to offer a toast of a personal nature. What we’ve accomplished couldn’t have been done without the contribution of your Ambassador in Washington, who—if it doesn’t ruin his position here—I must say is not only a distinguished Ambassador but a great personal friend.

Gromyko: We call him the Russian American. [Laughter] [toast]

Twenty years ago there was an interpreter at the UN named Sherry, who repeated every gesture of the speaker. If the speaker stretched his hand out like this [shakes his fist] he did it too. [Laughter]

Dobrynin: Once during a UN debate on the Congo . . .

Kuznetsov: It must be ten years ago.

Dobrynin: A speaker gave a quote from Hamlet, “Everything is rotten in Denmark.” And the representative from Denmark got up and said, “He may know something about the Congo but he knows nothing about Denmark.” [Laughter]

Gromyko: I offer a toast to the President. [toast]

Kissinger: This isn’t strictly protocol, but I offer a toast to the General Secretary, who has done so much for US-Soviet relations.

Gromyko: Sometimes protocol must be subordinated to something substantial.

Kuznetsov: To something substantive.

Kissinger: To affection.

Gromyko: In Russia we keep the main toast to the last.

Kuznetsov: There is a difference between drinking and a toast. [Laughter]

Gromyko: When do you get back to Washington?

Kissinger: Midnight Washington time.

It [the visit to Israel] will be very important for the guarantee question. If we did it in Washington, there would be many exchanges. When it’s done I will let your Ambassador know in Washington.

Kuznetsov: It’s very important.
Kissinger: It’s also our preferred way of doing it.

[Phone call comes in for Sisco from Scali, Sisco goes out to receive it.]

The meeting [of the UN Security Council] started one hour late, but it finished in exactly three hours as we had planned. It was excellent example of cooperation.

Gromyko: The French and Chinese were absent.

Kissinger: No, just China. The French voted for it.


Kissinger: A number of countries offered their interpretation that it meant that.

Sisco: [comes back] Malik and Scali have agreed that the UN Secretariat will send the resolution to Israel, Syria, and Egypt and as note verbale to others related to 242, such as Iraq, Syria, etc. as a matter of information. I think it’s a good idea. Doesn’t make any difference.

Gromyko: Right.

Kissinger: You should know that when we agreed to go to Israel, there were two conditions—they had to accept the resolution and there had to be substantial compliance with the resolution.

Gromyko: And they accepted.

Kissinger: They accepted. Because I didn’t want to be there if there was a violation going on.

Gromyko: Did any Arab representatives speak?

Kissinger: Zayyat spoke. We understand that Huang Hua was very angry until Zayyat told him that the non-committed wanted it adopted. He had been very angry.

You must have been in very active touch with your Arab friends yesterday.

Gromyko: We were in touch. We were in touch with some of them. With several of them.

Kissinger: Knowing how the Foreign Minister operates, I didn’t think he was entirely ignorant of their probable reaction. And so were we, but not with so many. Australia, Britain, France.

Gromyko: And you were in touch with the nonaligned bloc countries.

Dobrynin: The nonaligned bloc!

Kissinger: We told the Yugoslavs we would rather deal with hostile countries, who were less critical than the nonaligned. [Laughter]

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5 Mohammed el-Zayyat, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
We should form a bloc of our own. [Laughter] Has there ever been a joint US-Soviet resolution at the Security Council before?

Sisco: I think there was on the non-proliferation treaty.

Sonnenfeldt: And General Assembly resolution Number 1 in 1946.

Kissinger: But it must be the first time that during a crisis the US and the Soviet Union joined in a resolution.

Gromyko: You are right.

Dobrynin: The United Nations was puzzled yesterday. They couldn’t find a way to oppose it!

Kissinger: I don’t know what the American press will say. When we were meeting, they were writing about détente being ruined.

Gromyko: Are they good boys or bad boys?

Sisco: Today they’re good. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Tomorrow I’ll have a press conference and I have a certain ability to handle them.\(^6\)

Gromyko: We will have time to negotiate one more resolution.

Kissinger: I’m getting worried about Kornienko. We got through this without any objection from Kornienko. [to Kornienko:] Do you feel all right?

Kornienko: Yes. Today. [Laughter]

Kuznetsov: The American team also has some people. [referring to Sonnenfeldt]

Kissinger: They’re sitting next to each other.

Kuznetsov: They even look alike.

Dobrynin: I wouldn’t go that far.

Gromyko: When you went hunting, Sonnenfeldt didn’t want to kill anything?

Kissinger: No, it was a massacre!

Gromyko: It was defensive.

Rodman: Collective self-defense.

Sonnenfeldt: Article 51.\(^7\)

Kissinger: I don’t know if the invitation for January is still . . . oh yes, the General Secretary mentioned it yesterday.

Gromyko: We promised you warm clothes. Hunting is more interesting in winter because the boar are more careful, very careful. And you can hear their steps in the snow.


\(^7\) A reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter.
I wouldn’t call me a great hunter. But I have patience. 
Sukhodrev: He is a passionate hunter. 
Gromyko: I’m not modest enough to deny it. 
Kissinger: In New York the UN Secretary General gave a dinner for all the delegations, and everyone made passionate speeches about how wonderful international relations were. The Foreign Minister got up, and he’s very precise. He said, “Relations are essentially constructive.” [Laughter] I laughed so hard that the Chinese wouldn’t speak to me. 
Gromyko: The Secretary General used several superlatives. [Laughter] Did you agree with my remarks? 
Kissinger: Yes, and they were, if I may say, quintessentially Gromyko. The Chinese thought there was some diabolical collusion going on because I was laughing. 
Gromyko: In Geneva our representatives at SALT seem to be doing an honest job. 
Kissinger: It is completely stalemated. 
Gromyko: But in some time we should review where we are. 
Kissinger: In the US we’re having a debate about whether to make proposals that are as outrageous as yours, or stick with ours. As extreme as yours. I assume we will have some considerations. And you’ve not yet completed your studies. 
Gromyko: About half way. 
Kissinger: We’ll stick with ours. There is no need to introduce any new ones. We’ll wait until you have something to say. 
Gromyko: It doesn’t mean you should stop thinking. 
Kissinger: No. It’s a very tough problem, as you must have discovered in your deliberations. The ideas I’ve discussed thinking out loud with your Ambassador we could consider. 
And the Security Conference is going along normally. 
Gromyko: We would like to see more effect. 
Kuznetsov: More speed. 
Gromyko: It’s going too slow, too slow. Thirty-five people, thirty-four, thirty-five. 
Kuznetsov: Monaco was added. 
Kissinger: If Princess Grace is there, this gives me high incentive for a summit. 
Gromyko: The Americans acted very wisely. They infiltrated this American Grace into the European Conference. 
Kuznetsov: This gracious Grace.
Sonnenfeldt: And Sikkim, too.

Kissinger: Hope Cooke, another American girl. 8

Dobrynin: In Washington one of your colleagues told me that it’s hard to get people to learn foreign languages, therefore they need to provide incentives. He told me a joke about a cat and a mouse. The mouse is in his hole and the cat is trying to get him to come out. He goes, “Meow, meow.” But the mouse is too smart; he doesn’t come out. Then the cat goes, “Rowr, rowr.” The mouse thinks, “The dog has appeared. The cat has disappeared. And I know that the dog doesn’t bite the mouse. So it is safe.” So the mouse goes out, and the cat gets him. The moral of the story is, this is the advantage of knowing foreign languages. [Laughter]

Gromyko: There is another story. The mouse jumped into a bowl of milk, and the cat fled in fright. The cat’s wife then asked him, why are you so frightened? The cat tells her the story. The wife says, “What kind of man are you?” The cat says, “I never tangle with a drunken woman!”

The breakfast meeting then ended. As they went to the door, Secretary Kissinger repeated that the accomplishment of the last two days was an example of what US-Soviet cooperation could mean.

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8 An American socialite, who in 1963 married Palden Thandup Namgyal, the Crown Prince of Sikkim.

145. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon

Esteemed Mr. President:

Israel has flagrantly violated the Security Council decision on the cease fire in the Middle East. 2 We in Moscow are shocked that the understanding which was reached only two days ago has in fact been rup-

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2 A reference to UN Security Council Resolution 338. See footnote 6, Document 143.
tured by this action by the Israeli leaders. Why this treachery was allowed by Israel is more obvious to you.

We see one possibility for correcting the situation and fulfilling the understanding ... in forcing Israel to immediately obey the Security Council decision. We vouch for the Arabs, since the leaders of Egypt and Syria have stated that they will implicitly fulfill the Security Council decision.

We pledged with you, jointly as guarantor-countries, to ensure the fulfillment of the Security Council resolution. In this connection, we propose that the most decisive measures be taken without delay by the Soviet Union and the United States of America to stop the violations of the understanding reached and of the Security Council resolution based on [this understanding]. We would like to believe that on your part, on the part of the United States Government, everything will be done in order that the Security Council decision and our understanding with you will be implemented. Too much is at stake, not only as concerns the situation in the Middle East, but in our relations as well.

We will be grateful for a speedy response.

Respectfully,

L. Brezhnev

3 Brackets in the original, presumably added during translation of the message.
4 Nixon replied at 1:10 p.m. that he understood that the Egyptians had violated the cease-fire. He assured Brezhnev that the United States would insist that Israel respect the cease-fire, and he hoped the Soviets would likewise speak with the Egyptians. Nixon reiterated the importance of achieving a cease-fire. For the text of Nixon’s reply, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 246, footnote 3.
5 Printed from a copy with this typed signature.
146. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon

Moscow, undated.

Mr. President:

I have received your letter in which you inform me that Israel ceased fighting. The facts, however, testify that Israel continues drastically to ignore the ceasefire decision of the Security Council. Thus, it is brazenly challenging both the Soviet Union and the United States since it is our agreement with you which constitutes the basis of the Security Council decision. In short, Israel simply embarked on the road to defeat.

It continues to seize new and new territory. As you know, the Israeli forces have already fought their way into Suez. It is impossible to allow such to continue. Let us together, the Soviet Union and the United States urgently dispatch to Egypt Soviet and American military contingents, with their mission the implementation of the decision of the Security Council of August [October] 22 and 23 concerning the cessation of fire and of all military activities and also of the understanding with you on the guarantee of the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council.

It is necessary to adhere without delay. I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel.

We have an understanding with you which we value highly—that is to act jointly. Let us implement this understanding on a concrete case in this complex situation. It will be a good example of our agreed actions in the interest of peace. We have no doubt that all those who are in favor of détente, of peace, of good relations between the Soviet Union

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 20. No classification marking. A note on the letter indicates that it was received at 10 p.m. on October 24.

2 Nixon’s October 24 letter to Brezhnev is ibid.

3 A reference to Resolution 339, introduced in the Security Council by the United States and the Soviet Union, and adopted on October 23. The resolution referred to Resolution 338, confirmed an immediate cease-fire, and requested that UN observers be dispatched to the Middle East to supervise the cease-fire. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1973, p. 213.
and the United States will only welcome such joint action of ours. I will appreciate immediate and clear reply from you.4

Respectfully,

L. Brezhnev5

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4 Kissinger wrote in his memoirs that, although the Soviet proposal had to be rejected, the Soviet threat of unilateral action had to be taken seriously. As a result, an NSC–JCS meeting convened late that evening and the President subsequently ordered the U.S. military to go to DefCon III, the highest stage of preparedness when attack is not imminent. For Kissinger’s description of the events, see Years of Upheaval, pp. 584, 588. For Moorer’s memorandum for the record of the late night meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 269.

5 Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

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147. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin1

Washington, October 24, 1973, 10:15 p.m.

K. We are assembling our people to consider your letter.2 I just wanted you to know if any unilateral action is taken before we have had a chance to reply that will be very serious.

D. Yes, all right.

K. This is a matter of great concern. Don’t you pressure us. I want to repeat again, don’t pressure us!

D. All right.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 28, Chronological File. No classification marking.

2 See Document 146 and footnote 4 thereto.
148. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, October 27, 1973, 11:24 a.m.

D. Thank you. Scowcroft sent me a copy of what you sent. I received what we sent to you just after your talk with me. By the way, in your letter which you sent to Brezhnev in answer you quoted sentences in his letter of... you remember.

K. Yes.

D. Perhaps when I dictated to you it was my sound but a little bit different. I don’t think it makes that big of difference. It was not adhere. I said act here without delay.

K. That makes a big difference.

D. I don’t think so.

K. Adhere means we have to agree with what you said. While to act here leaves it open to joint action.

D. You will say that you acted pro... This adhere speaks about a Security Council resolution. So, in any case...

K. We had the impression that you were planning a military move. We did not invent this. Someday soon we have to discuss this. We had no reason to meet until 4:00 in the morning.

D. This is the point. On this, I think, one thing was really a big blunder on your side, maybe it was deliberate. For six hours you are just telling us every hour to wait, there will be a reply. I am sure if you had just mentioned to me that the President feels it was necessary to make an alert... blow up our relations. We don’t want to do it, please send an urgent message to the Chairman. We will be forced to do it if we must. I am sure it would have received a reply that nothing...

K. That was a blunder.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 28, Chronological File. No classification marking. Blank underscores indicate omissions in the original.


3 According to Kissinger’s memoirs, Dobrynin called him at 9:35 a.m. (Years of Upheaval, p. 583) No record of the conversation was found.


5 See footnote 4, Document 146.
D. Seven hours you were telling us and then we receive a letter that didn’t say a word about the alert.\textsuperscript{6} It was widely publicized.

K. Whether you ever believe it or not it is not important now. I am telling you it was not ... we were convinced you were planning something unilateral. We were as outraged. We thought the tone in that letter ... 

D. You were pretty sure we would do it. If you were so sure, you could have waited one hour to get some additional information from Brezhnev. But you didn’t want to have it.

K. That isn’t true. I was very tough. Don’t pressure us. I sent you two or three messages to please don’t do anything unilateral.

D. Exactly.

K. You could have said what makes you think we will do anything unilateral. We have no intention of taking action.

D. What you said was to wait for a reply. I sent four telegrams to Moscow——this was a unique situation——to wait for a reply from the President. What did they receive? This is not ... Someday in Moscow ... much more easy to discuss.

K. We very truly thought you were threatening us out of the ... 

D. Exactly, you have it with us. Wait for the reply. By the way nothing was said. Then you are trying to make it look like it was a Cuban or Hanoi crisis.

K. Don’t remind me of that. It was not well done.

D. It was done badly. It was unbelievable. He won’t believe he compared it ... More things are involved for both sides. There is no need to discuss this. What was done was done. We will now have to look forward. This message is oral to the President and to you in connection with Soviet/American observers. I was instructed to tell you in a written message ... that the Secretary General would like to say that we ... substance of yesterday’s message from ... about Soviet/American observers.\textsuperscript{7}

K. I know of one. You sent me on discussions.

\textsuperscript{6} Nixon’s October 25 message; see \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1969–1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 274. Nixon informed Brezhnev that joint action was not appropriate at that time, and that Nixon had no information regarding the violation of the ceasefire. Nixon emphasized that Soviet suggestions of unilateral action caused great concern and would be a violation of both the Basic Principles and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. However, he was willing to support a joint Truce Supervisory Organization report.

\textsuperscript{7} The text of the message, read during the October 25 telephone conversation at 2:40 p.m. between Kissinger and Dobrynin, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 23, Chronological File. It is printed in Kissinger, \textit{Crisis}, pp. 360–361.
D. We also . . . from the promise that the Soviet and American observers . . . will ask as a contingent of the observer force of the UN. We want to stress that we consider it very important that the American observers will start the dispatch of their forces, having in mind that it should give the USSR and US the possibility of getting authentic information.

We expect that the US on its part will also take necessary steps before the UN . . . The American said that . . . to Egypt front about of . . . and the President Nixon in his letter8 . . . that a number of the American officers should be there to oversee the ceasefire. On the same day we informed the President of the dispatch of 70 Soviet observers to . . . and sent them immediately to the line.9 It would mean that this understanding reached with us would be broken. We would hope that . . .

K. Don’t you think the President answered it yesterday. We are prepared to send observers as soon as the Secretary General requests them and we have told him he should request them.

D. You should mention it to him again. He said that Scali . . .

K. I will get in touch with Scali immediately.

D. Waldheim is under the impression . . .

K. I thought they were talking about some number yesterday. Let me call Scali.

D. Send out U.S. observers and I will . . .

K. I will call you back within an hour. Why don’t we get together on Monday10 and review just what went wrong.

D. What time would you like?

K. How about lunch.

D. I will try. Fulbright would like to have me for lunch. Maybe I could switch it on Tuesday.

K. I also have a lunch. It was either a deliberate . . . of thinking by you and of thinking by us or it was a horrible misunderstanding. I can assure you from our side it was not deliberate . . .

D. I will ask Fulbright to postpone Monday.

K. Too much is at stake for us to be angry with each other. Let’s not have it fester. As a friend . . .

D. For two days I was mad. I know that anger in Moscow is still very high.

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8 Probably a reference to Nixon’s October 25 letter.
9 This was in the message Dobrynin read to Kissinger at 2:40 p.m. on October 25.
10 October 29.
K. As a friend, one thing about yesterday evening that can only be explained in terms of emotional stress over a domestic situation.\footnote{Presumably a reference to the growing Watergate investigation.}

D. I understand.

K. This was not well chosen and not deliberate. General Haig called you immediately.

D. I know.

K. We are in a difficult period between the two of us now. If you had no intention of acting unilaterally our letter was a mistake. I should have warned you but I was outraged.

D. . . . I simply asked you if you could tell me 15 hours. That is all right with me. You really think that I was pressing you to get an answer. I simply asked you the usual question—when I could expect an answer, sometime today, sometime tomorrow. You immediately qualified that as a pressure. That I usually do, did before, and will again.

K. OK. Lunch at Monday at 1:00.\footnote{No record of this meeting was found, but Dobrynin gave Kissinger Brezhnev’s letter, Document 149.}

D. At State?

K. Yes, better food here.

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**149. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon**


Dear Mr. President,

In my yesterday’s message to you\footnote{Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 20, October 12–November 21, 1973. No classification marking. A handwritten note at the top of the page reads, “Handed to HAK by D 1:00 pm 10/29/73.”} in connection with President Sadat’s request—which he, as I know now, made simultaneously to you and to us—to permit a convoy of non-military supply for the Egyptian 3rd Army, I did fulfill the request of President Sadat. On my own
part I asked you to take decisive (moreover, at that time I thought—final) measures to influence Israel not only with the aim of giving mercy in the form of permitting necessary food, medicine, blood for wounded and dying people, but to take measures in order to put an end to all kind of adventurist actions on the lines which were at the time of adoption of the well-known Security Council decisions.³

I would not have addressed to-day myself to you with this message, since to my yesterday's communication I received a prompt reply⁴ from you which said in particular that you were happy to inform us that you were able during the night to arrange for talks between Israel and Egypt regarding the implementation of the Security Council Resolutions and that Major General E. Siilasvuo⁵ at the moment of your communication was arranging these talks and that Israel had also agreed to permit a convoy of non-military supply to reach the Egyptian 3rd Army.

You expressed in your letter a hope to continue to work closely and cooperatively with us in resolving the Middle East crisis. You stressed that we were now well on the road to the achievement of a true cease-fire which will make it possible for the parties, with our help, to arrive at a just settlement and a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Such a reply on your part was received by me with satisfaction. However one and a half days later I again received a communication from Cairo (as I understood, a similar communication had been sent by the Egyptian side also to you, Mr. President) that up till now Israeli military, who are now on the seized by them territory, put roadblocks stopping the convoy, and that part of this convoy of supply was shot at crossing at the canal.

Informing you about this I must—however reluctantly—tell you frankly and straightforwardly, as I always did, the following.

I personally and my colleagues have reached a point of crisis of confidence that the whole exchange of messages during a week time and all assurances both to us and to the Egyptian side that all measures are being taken for cessation of firing and for fulfilment of the Security

³ UN Security Council Resolutions 338, 339, and 340. For Resolution 338, see footnote 6, Document 143. For Resolution 339, see footnote 3, Document 146. Resolution 340 was proposed by eight powers and adopted on October 25. It recalled the earlier resolutions, regretted the alleged cease-fire violations, demanded an immediate and complete cease-fire, requested the increase of UN observers, established a UN Emergency Force, and requested the cooperation of member states. For the full text of the resolution, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1973, p. 213.


⁵ Major General Ensio Siilasvuo from Finland was Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force, which was dispatched to Cairo to observe and enforce the cease-fire.
Council Resolutions, especially under our with you auspices about which we were given a written confirmation on behalf of the President, is in fact a support for Israeli military clique who continue to act provocatively with an obvious, I would say—naked aim which is now absolutely clear to the wide world public opinion.

I can assume that all this happens as a result of a false information to you and even a deceit aimed at, on the one hand, encouraging the aggression and worsening as far as possible the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and, on the other hand, at undermining personal mutual confidence between us.

I am deeply convinced that we should not allow such kind of actions, including elements of confrontation, to happen, because it does not correspond to the interests of our peoples and states, as well as to the interests of the cause of peace.

Such wishes can be implemented, of course, only with mutual agreement in which I do believe.

Addressing these words to you and also taking into account communications to you from the Egyptian leadership, and looking—as I said it above—at the whole picture of events which happened during the past week both at the front and in various exchanges of messages, I am asking you to inform me in the nearest hours of your firm decision which you will take with the aim of real cease-fire and implementation by Israelis of all adopted Security Council Resolutions and of our understanding with Kissinger in Moscow, which as you communicated to me is an understanding with you personally, so that we in the Soviet Union can determine our decisions on this matter.

Respectfully,

L. Brezhnev

6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
150. Memorandum for the President’s File by Secretary of State Kissinger

Camp David, October 30, 1973, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin on Tuesday, October 30, 1973, at 6:00 p.m., at Camp David

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Ambassador Dobrynin
Secretary of State Kissinger
General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Ambassador Dobrynin thanked the President for receiving him. This week, and today’s meeting, the Ambassador said, were very important events in the U.S.-Soviet relations. The Soviet leaders valued the personal relationship with the President.

The Ambassador then read from General-Secretary Brezhnev’s letter to the President of October 28, [Tab A] which spoke of a “crisis of confidence” in U.S.-Soviet relations produced by Israeli deceit. We should not have a confrontation, the Ambassador declared. It was with a certain amount of sadness that he had to note that relations had reached this point. It took a very difficult decision on the part of Brezhnev to preserve our good relations with each other. We now had a good chance to find the conditions for final resolution of the problem.

The President asked if the Soviets had leaked to John Scali. Ambassador Dobrynin went through the history of the Security Council deliberations which produced the ceasefire resolutions, and then retraced the history of the ceasefire itself. He complained about the press stories about alleged Soviet misbehavior. What kind of a relationship is this, he asked, if one letter produces an alert?

Ambassador Dobrynin then discussed what was to be done. One of the first things to be done was to carry out the joint resolutions worked out between us. Then we should each send a senior repre-
sentative to Cairo to supervise the progress of implementation. Then there should be an end to airlift of military supply, and then a start of political negotiations.

The President replied that he still looked for a better future in U.S.-Soviet relations. He hoped détente would soon be put back on track. He appreciated Ambassador Dobrynin’s discussion. Events had not changed the President’s view as to the vital role of détente in the world. He cited the indispensable role that our two countries would play in getting a settlement in the Middle East. The key was how we could get both of our recalcitrant friends lined up. Despite the difficulties of the past two weeks, these events gave us the best chance in a long time to settle the problem. We had resisted enormous heat in this country, during five days of a substantial Soviet airlift into Syria and Egypt. Only when we could not get Soviet cooperation to stop it did we start our own airlift.

We must avoid situations where we confront each other, the President pointed out. General Secretary Brezhnev and he must have an overriding concern with avoiding confrontation.

We want to work with the Soviet Union all along the line, the President continued. The principle of détente will not be destroyed. We should hammer out areas where we can work together and demonstrate how it can work concretely. Our new relationship had helped enormously in the present crisis. What we need now is a demonstration that our relationship is durable and we can accomplish positive things together.

151. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, October 31, 1973, 6:02 p.m.

K. Anatoly.
D. Henry, I have a request.
K. Which is what?
D. Could you give me part of your presentation today on Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{2} The Chairman, Fulbright, was talking about your brilliant representation and about the détente.

K. I made a very impassioned defense of détente.

D. He said you particularly mentioned about détente.

K. It was a closed session, but I will get you the extract.

D. No, no, I am joking. He mentioned he was very much impressed on your presentation on the détente issue.

K. I made very strong defense of détente.

D. He mentioned it. He is a fellow who is a rare one to say somebody brilliantly represented so I was impressed on the détente question.

K. Very good.

D. What about the . . . are you . . .

K. Before I get to the main subject let me say another thing. I saw in a Los Angeles paper today an article from Moscow.\textsuperscript{3}

D. It was by an American?

K. Yes, it was an American and was very close to what you said yesterday.\textsuperscript{4} It said the Soviet leadership was very angry with me.

D. Who was the author?

K. Seeger, and it said from now on Brezhnev would insist on protocol when he sees me.

D. I think it is invention.

K. My suggestion is if this is inspired it is not all that helpful.

D. Henry, I can tell you this is not the way we are doing that kind of inspiration . . . You could easily check an American correspondent. It is very easy to be checked. He will immediately tell you and your embassy who mentioned it from our side. I doubt very much that they would tell an American correspondent about their grievances. He would make his own deductions. First there was an agreement and afterwards a confrontation. It doesn’t take a very wise man to figure that out.

K. It had a lot of detail. You know, it sounded—I normally don’t pay any attention but it sounded very plausible.

\textsuperscript{2} Kissinger met that day with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in executive session. The text of his presentation was not found.

\textsuperscript{3} A reference to “Russian-U.S. Détente: Realism Moves In as Euphoria Fades” by Murray Seeger in the Los Angeles Times, p. A1. Seeger cited Soviet sources who maintained that, because of the Arab-Israeli crisis, Kissinger “has lost his high status in Soviet eyes and will have trouble regaining the standing that enabled him to negotiate directly with Communist Party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev instead of lesser lights.”

\textsuperscript{4} See Document 150.
D. I don’t believe . . . if they wanted some fellow not from America . . . Maybe some of the fellow said something, even I doubt this one quite frankly.

K. Well it sounded very plausible. It repeated many things that you said.

D. From . . . it is not only my point of view. I told you they feel the same, that is very clear Henry. I am telling you . . .

K. Look, I am not asking to be loved. I am saying we are in a very difficult situation. The two people who helped put the détente together is the President and me and there is no sense in attacking the two of us while we are trying to do this. Whatever mistakes were made last week were not unilateral. Mistakes were made on both sides. Although I can tell you, having to deal with Egyptians is enough to test anyone’s nerves.

D. I’m not arguing about that. I think it is not worthwhile to argue. If you look in perspective at the big things we have done and have to do in the future, all of these things were very small but got out of proportion in sense of word which Brezhnev had given to them.

K. We now have the art of statesmanship. Now is for us to keep this thing together and to go back to the big things we did together rather than let it be split [spoilt?] completely. We did important things for three years and shouldn’t let three days get in the way. On behalf of the President pass on his message to your leadership that he feels, that he attaches the greatest importance to continuation of what has been known as the détente policy and the greatest importance to the confidence established between him and the General Secretary.

D. Yes, he said that he is going to write a letter.

K. He asked me to reiterate.

D. Will he write a letter?

K. Yes, he will write a letter but we haven’t had a chance. It may be Friday. We have been preparing for the Egyptian and Israeli visits. It will be a very positive letter.

D. I understand, you need some time . . . I understand.

K. On your specific proposal, we are prepared to designate somebody to meet with somebody you designate to discuss how to implement Article 3 of Security Council Resolution 338.

D. Where?

K. They can meet in Geneva, or here, whatever you decide.

D. You are here.

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K. Let them meet wherever. Should he go to Moscow? Eventually they can take a trip to the Middle East.

D. Why don’t they begin with the Middle East?

K. We have another idea that hasn’t been fully decided yet. We may upgrade the head of the Interest Section in Cairo and send a more senior person there with the agreement of Egypt and he could get together with whoever you have.

D. Just trying to develop ideas you mentioned . . .

K. We don’t exclude a trip to the Middle East.

D. Just to give them something. I know for instance, Gromyko will hardly like the idea. When he is in charge, you are in charge . . . people in Cairo, just to put Atherton.6 I don’t know, maybe I am wrong. That is my impression. Do something we ask you . . .

K. Then let me raise this tomorrow with the Israelis.

D. I think it would be better. I mentioned to Gromyko and Brezhnev your discussions with . . . but thinking aloud, they are waiting for their reaction.

K. Let me raise it with the Israelis tomorrow.

D. Yesterday it was one thing, today another.

K. Let me see what the Israelis reaction will be.

D. They didn’t react negatively, but they are waiting further because you said you haven’t discussed anything . . .

K. I will give you a definitive answer tomorrow.

D. I will send to Brezhnev the message from the President, but on this particular issue I won’t say anything until I hear from you.

K. We have given strict instructions to this department to keep their mouths shut. Now it turns out you have over a hundred ships in the Mediterranean. If that keeps up we will be driven into—

D. How many have you?

K. Less than 50. Look, you used to have the same number of ships as we had and then it increased.

D. Is this a number game or a word game?

K. In the past your number was about a third of what you have now.

D. Are they military or commercial?

K. No, military. We don’t object to commercial. These are submarines and others. You have double the submarines you normally have and nearly three times as many surface ships.

6 Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.
D. I will . . . just thinking aloud.
K. That is right. It would certainly be noticed if there was some re-
duction and would be reciprocated. You can tell them that.
D. I will tell them. What really they want up to now we didn’t . . .
What about the second proposal?
K. What second proposal?
D. Using UN helicopters.
K. Let me discuss that with the Israelis. I understand.
D. All right. UN business not ours . . . I have a small matter that be-
came apparent. We discussed with you about 36, or 32.7 Malik went
there and the Swedish officials say they have 37. Could we finish this.
Malik asked me today if we could settle on the 36 and forget about it.
K. Yes, we will settle on 36.
D. Could you get Scali these instructions.
K. Yes, I shall, You can tell Gromyko but don’t tell Malik until I
have told Scali which will be another hour.
D. I will wait two hours more. Our information is nothing, nothing
really new . . . mentioned staying until Golda Meir is out.
K. There aren’t going to be any spectacular results. I will see him
again tomorrow.
D. How are things with Golda Meir? I hope you will tell . . .
K. We will tell you about it tomorrow, or Friday. She will be here
today.
D. All right, Henry, the President said he is going to tell us.
K. We will tell you tomorrow.
D. OK. Nothing else I guess, Henry.
K. That is all.

7 Presumably a reference to UN observers. See Document 148.
152. Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev

Washington, undated.

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

We have been in close and frequent contact in recent weeks in regard to the Middle East crisis. Much remains to be done to ensure implementation of the cease-fire and to commence the process that will bring about an acceptable and lasting settlement. We are working hard on bringing about a full implementation of the cease-fire. With respect to a permanent settlement, it is my policy to work closely with you within the framework of the understanding initialled by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Kissinger in Moscow.2

Today I would like to share with you some thoughts concerning the prospects for our relations as a whole.

Without reviewing in detail the many messages we have exchanged since early October or attempting now to characterize the course of events, I think it can be said that it has never been made clearer how much the peace of the world depends on the actions and policies of our two countries. This is true both in a negative and a positive sense. For we have seen that when we cooperate the prospects for peace can be advanced whereas the failure to do so can easily produce situations fraught with the gravest danger. Both of us recognized this truth when we met in Moscow and in this country and the agreements we signed on those occasions were a formal expression of it. Yet, as so often in history, it has taken concrete events, in real life, to give substance to what was set forth in documents.

The current crisis has led me to reflect again on the wisdom of the Principles to which we agreed in Moscow as the basis for our relations and on the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war which represented a further elaboration of those Principles. I want to assure you of the importance I attach to the course you and I have jointly charted.

I should like to stress that throughout the difficult days of the Arab-Israeli conflict we have kept carefully in mind the second of the Basic Principles in which “both sides recognized that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly,

2 A reference to the U.S.-Soviet draft that became UN Security Council Resolution 338. See Document 144.
are inconsistent” with the fundamental objectives of peaceful relations and the avoidance of confrontations. Likewise, we have sought meticulously to live up to the final sentence of the Second Principle in which we agreed that the “prerequisites for maintaining and strengthening peaceful relations between the USA and USSR are the recognition of the security interests of the Parties based on the principle of equality and the renunciation of the use or threat of force.” I remain totally convinced that these prescriptions for our mutual conduct must be our constant guide, and I am confident that on the basis of all the agreements we have concluded we will not only surmount the present crisis but make further progress in cementing our relationship.

Our two countries are at the moment engaged in several important conferences and negotiations. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is continuing its work in Geneva and I am hopeful that it will produce beneficial results before too much time elapses. We remain guided by the approach we agreed to at our last summit meeting. The second phase of the effort to negotiate mutual force reductions in central Europe has also just begun.3 I believe that if our two countries work toward the goal of safeguarding the security of all concerned, a goal I know we share, these important negotiations can be crowned with success in the shortest possible time.

The negotiations for the limitation of strategic arms have not progressed as rapidly as I had hoped following our agreement on basic principles in Washington last June.4 Secretary Kissinger has told me of Foreign Minister Gromyko’s comments to him on this subject during your most recent meeting with him in Moscow.5 I will of course look forward with keen anticipation to the results of your own review of the difficult issues involved but I want to assure you that for our part we are not standing still. We are seeking to establish the elements that would make up a meaningful and equitable agreement which would place permanent limitations on the strategic offensive arms of both sides and which would place the strategic relationship of our two countries on a basis of enduring stability. I recognize, as I know you do, that the complexities involved are great because the technology of strategic weaponry is difficult to bring under control and because there are many differences in the military requirements of our two countries which any agreement must take into account. Because of these complexities it is important that we continue our frank and informal exchanges and Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary Kissinger keep in close touch, so that neither sides “freezes” itself into rigid negotiating

3 MBFR negotiations began in Vienna October 30.
4 See Document 129.
5 Not further identified.
positions. I would like you to know, incidentally, that it is precisely for this reason that our side has not tabled a new proposal in Geneva following the submission of your most recent proposal.

Mr. General Secretary, I have been encouraged to note that despite recent tensions, our bilateral relations have progressed satisfactorily, based on the numerous agreements signed by our two governments during the past two years. This demonstrates that our relationship has already achieved considerable stability and is able to withstand, at least to a degree, the kind of turbulence which has recently taken place. I make this observation not from a sense of complacency but because I believe we have here a new phenomenon in international relations.

As you know, it has not yet been possible to obtain the legislation required to complete the commercial agreements we concluded last year.\(^6\) The situation in our Congress remains complicated in this regard and, as I am sure you will understand, has not been made easier by recent events. Nevertheless, my commitment to the growth of mutually advantageous economic relations between us remains firm. I want to assure you again that whatever moves the Administration may make with respect to our trade legislation are designed solely to prevent the adoption of harmful measures by the Congress and to provide a basis for subsequently obtaining the legislative authority I need in order to implement our agreements. Let me say in this connection that I have vigorously resisted all efforts to tie matters that are your domestic concern to this issue. I will continue to do so, bearing in mind, at the same time, the very helpful steps you have unilaterally taken.

Mr. General Secretary, I thought it was desirable to step back some paces from the urgent and immediate events that continue to preoccupy us to give you a sense of my assessment of our current relations. My conclusion is that we are on the right course and that we must use recent events to strengthen our resolve to persevere.

Sincerely,

Richard M. Nixon\(^7\)

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\(^6\) Presumably a reference to the Long-Term Economic Agreement and the Lend-Lease Agreement.

\(^7\) Printed from a copy that bears Nixon’s typed signature.
153. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon

Moscow, undated.

Dear Mr. President,

I have received and carefully studied your letter of November 3. As well as you, we want to be sure that on the basis of fundamental agreements and understandings that we have previously achieved we shall not only overcome the present Middle East crisis but we shall also move even further ahead in strengthening relations between our countries. We, on our part, from the very beginning of events in the Middle East, proceeded from this very perspective and correspondingly built our line of actions in accordance with them.

At the same time it is obvious to us that in order to proceed further along this path it is very important not simply to damp down temporarily the acuteness of the Middle East crisis but to do away with its roots. To do otherwise would mean to act contrary to the lesson that latest events in the Middle East taught us.

Certainly, to find cardinal solutions for the Middle East is not an easy task. In this case one needs selfcontrol and tact but not less also energy and principled approach. Without this nobody and nothing can guarantee us from a new explosion in the Middle East with possible even greater complications. We now believe in this as firmly as when we warned you before about unexpectedness and dangers lying in wait for us in the Middle East.

I shall not now touch upon the details of the Middle East problem, we have done this more than once, and soon they will be a subject of negotiations between sides concerned with active participation of the USSR and the US, what we have agreed between ourselves. I shall emphasize only one thing: the key element of the Middle East settlement was and still is the question of withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories occupied by them in 1967 with simultaneous provision for guaranteed security—with the participation of the USSR and the US—of all states of that area, including Israel.

To make the progress in the Soviet-American relations more stable and less painful it is very important also, in our view, to draw correct

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 20, October 12–November 21, 1973. No classification marking. A handwritten note at the top of the page reads, “Hand delivered to Gen. Scowcroft by Yuri Babenko 4:30 p.m. 11/10/73.” Babenko was a Third Secretary in the Soviet Embassy.

2 Document 152.
conclusions from the latest developments, both taking place in the Middle East and accompanying them.

You write, Mr. President, that throughout the difficult days of the Arab-Israeli conflict you have kept carefully in mind the second of the Basic Principles of relations between the USSR and the US, and you quote in your letter certain parts of that Principle. Neither did and do we forget even for a minute both the quoted by you and other provisions of the Basic Principles, including those related to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of the relations between the USSR and the US or situations capable of increasing international tensions. We also remember and strictly follow the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, including its Article IV, providing for urgent consultations between the USSR and the US when certain situations emerge.

Since you yourself touched upon the importance for the sides of living up to the provisions of the above basic documents and in order to make that question completely clear for the future, I should frankly tell you, that some steps taken by the US in this period of time cannot be considered by us as fully corresponding to the letter and spirit of those documents. I have already informed you about my opinion regarding that matter, and I do not think it is necessary now to touch upon the issue again.3

I believe it extremely important that we and you have common understanding of what has happened and that both sides make equally correct conclusions from that.

I agree with you that the fundamental documents signed at the two Soviet-American summit meetings have passed the test in the concrete situation and that now it is in real life that their deep substance has already been reconfirmed. The fact was also proved that the peace of the world greatly depends on the actions and policies of our two countries. That once again emphasizes the responsibility resting upon their leadership and necessity of exerting all efforts to remove dangerous hotbeds of conflicts. Everybody will benefit from that and none will lose with the exception of those who would seek profit for themselves from the opposite development of events. And such forces, as you know, do exist.

It is with satisfaction that we note your reaffirmation of our agreement of bringing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to successful conclusion in the near future. I am convinced that through joint efforts of our countries the success of that Conference will

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3 See Document 149.
be ensured inspite of the artificial obstacles which are sometime being created on its path.

We consider it important in this respect to have between us an understanding regarding the necessity to strictly adhere to the principle of noninterference into internal affairs of states. I recall that you had fully agreed with the necessity to adhere to this principle strictly. Secretary of State Kissinger spoke about it in his recent talks with A. A. Gromyko in Washington.\footnote{See Document 137.}

We also believe in the success of the negotiations which started recently in Vienna on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. As we have already told you it would be probably unrealistic to put before us the goal of achieving at once major reductions. It is important, however, to commence the process of reducing armed forces and armaments in that area and, as I have recently stated in public, the Soviet Union would be prepared to such reductions already in 1975. Evidently, we will have additionally to exchange views on this matter in a more specific way. The most important thing here is not to try to change the existing situation to the detriment of the interests of security of any of the parties.

As for the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms going on in Geneva, indeed, no special progress has been shown as yet there. Attaching great importance to that question, we are considering all its aspects now. We shall be also prepared to review carefully those concrete thoughts which some time ago Dr. Kissinger promised to send us by the end of October but which we have not yet received. In this question as well, the main thing now as it was in the past is that, while taking any steps on the limitation of strategic arms, the interests of neither side are infringed upon and equal security for them is provided, taking into account as well the unequal strategic position of both sides. Proceeding from that main premise, we would like to find real points in common between our respective positions and to work out a joint good basis for agreement. Of course, we agree that a confidential exchange of views on that question should continue between Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary of State Kissinger.

We share the satisfaction, expressed by you, Mr. President, concerning the fact that the bilateral relations between our countries continue to develop and that numerous agreements, signed during the past two years, are being in general successfully carried out.

This cannot be said, however, about one sphere of our relations.

I have in mind the issues of trade and economic relation which presently happen to be to a large extent in a suspended condition be-
cause the question of granting the Soviet Union the most-favored-nation treatment in trade with the US remains unsolved.\(^5\) To-day the respective understanding reached at Moscow meeting and confirmed during my visit to the United States still remains unrealized.

It is, of course, up to the American side to define how and at what moment to better solve this problem. We cannot, however, remain unconcerned when attempts are being made to somehow tie up the problem of granting the most-favored-nation treatment for the Soviet Union with other completely unrelated questions, when the solution of this problem is in essence being conditioned by the USSR position at the Middle East negotiations.

If some people in the United States continue to consider that the Soviet Union allegedly is interested in development of economic ties with the US more that Americans themselves, and therefore, they say, attempts should be made to get from the USSR “an additional price” for it at the expense of some principal concessions to the detriment of our social and state system, then I would like once more to stress the following.

We stand for the development of large scale and long-term trade, economic, scientific and technological ties between our countries. We are convinced that such their development would be mutually beneficial to the USSR and the US on purely practical grounds as well, and at the same time that would make our political relations more stable. But there is only one possible basis for the development of Soviet-American relations including the economic sphere: full equality of the sides and complete non-interference into each other’s internal affairs.

Speaking about all this and my colleagues would like to tell you that we view with understanding the complexities you have to face in undertaking certain steps aimed at the deepening of the cooperation between our countries in accordance with the letter and spirit of the agreements concluded between us.

Without claiming for ourselves the right to go deeper into the question of the source of these difficulties since one can easily slip into analyzing some aspects of purely internal situation in the US, we would like to emphasize that we do value very much your efforts directed at the implementation of those agreements between us which have not been carried out yet. We have not also passed by your repeated statements to the effect that the commitment taken by the Amer-

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\(^5\) A reference to the administration’s attempts to either delete Title IV of the 1973 Trade Bill, which included the Jackson–Vanik Amendment, or delay Congressional consideration of the bill. For documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Documents 188–199.
ican side in the field of strengthening economic ties between the Soviet Union and the US will be fulfilled.

We would like to think that you and your closest assistants and aides see better what has to be done on the American part to bring this whole matter to the successful end.

We would like, so to say, to wish you in a personal human way energy and success in overcoming all sorts of complexities, the causes of which are not so easy to understand at a distance.

For the understandable reasons our wishes of success relate first of all to the field of developing Soviet-American relations, the great significance of which for easing further international tensions in the world has been already properly appreciated by the peoples including peoples of our countries.

In conclusion, I would like to tell you, Mr. President, once again with full certainty that our determination to proceed further along the path of decisive improvement in the Soviet-American relations has not diminished as a result of the events in the Middle East. And we note with satisfaction that you are also resolved, as your letter says, to persevere on the chosen course.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

6 Printed from a copy that bears Brezhnev’s typed signature.

154. Backchannel Message From Secretary of State Kissinger to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)

Cairo, December 14, 1973, 0045Z.

Deliver to Gen. Scowcroft no matter where he is.

Hakto 27. You are to pass the following message from me to General Haig immediately, no matter where he is, for immediate reply.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 42, HAK Trip, Europe & Mid East, December 8–22, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Flash; Exclusively Eyes Only.
I have just learned that the President has recently seen Dobrynin alone to talk about the Middle East.\(^2\) This report concerns me deeply for three compelling reasons.

First, I cannot overemphasize the extremely tenuous nature of the current situation here. It is now a very close run thing whether we will ever get the parties together in Geneva—much less next week. At the present moment I cannot predict with any confidence that we will have our conference, and the slightest miscalculation—the least slip—and we will be embroiled in a major foreign policy failure of the gravest sort. Every move must be planned and carried out with the greatest care.

Second, the major spoiling role the Soviets are trying to play—the mischief they are about—has become glaringly obvious since my arrival in Cairo today. Sadat, from whom I have just come, spent well over 30 minutes pleading with me to help him stand up against Soviet pressures—which he says are getting more intense by the day. During the course of the conversation Sadat quoted several messages, purportedly from Dobrynin. I recognized the occasions, but the reports themselves were such misrepresentations of fact as to be totally misleading. One can only imagine the turmoil and mischief that such a miscast description of a conversation with the President could cause.

Third, I will be seeing Gromyko in Geneva next week if the conference convenes. I will be in an intolerable position if he knows, or even suspects, that he is privy to information on the President’s thinking that I do not have. The challenge to my credibility could be disastrous.

Thus, I must insist that I be given a full report of the Dobrynin conversation with the President. I am flying blind without it, which at this point could have disastrous consequences for all we are trying to do here and at home to build a peace and restore foreign and domestic confidence in this administration.

As to the Pilgrims speech,\(^3\) I have said all I intend to on the subject. It was given in good faith, cleared within the bureaucracy, and directed

\(^2\) Nixon met with Dobrynin on December 13 from 12:41 to 1:33 pm. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the meeting was found.

\(^3\) Kissinger spoke to the Society of Pilgrims in London on December 12, focusing on the “Year of Europe” and proposing an international consumers group to regulate world demand. “At the same time, we must bear in mind the deeper causes of the energy crisis: It is not simply a product of the Arab-Israeli war; it is the inevitable consequence of the explosive growth of worldwide demand outrunning the incentives for supply. The Middle East war made a chronic crisis acute, but a crisis was coming in any event. Even when prewar production levels are resumed, the problem of matching the level of oil that the world produces to the level which it consumes will remain. The only long-term solution is a massive effort to provide producers an incentive to increase their supply, to encourage consumers to use existing supplies more rationally, and to develop alternative energy sources.” The address was printed in full in The New York Times, December 13, 1973.
at strengthening the President’s hand in the tough months of slugging that face us in bringing Europe to its senses. It is not I but the country that is being punished by this act of pique.

I shall be seeing Sadat again tomorrow at 11:00 a.m. Cairo time for a heavy negotiating session. I must insist that I be given a full report of the conversation before that time, although I must tell you that there is almost no scenario of that conversation that I can imagine that will not be damaging—the question is only the degree of damage perpetrated.

I ask for your help, for the sake of the country, in two ways:

1) To get me the information quickly and,  
2) To assure that this sort of thing does not happen again.

Finally, I must emphasize how gravely I view this development. I urge you not to underestimate the seriousness of this cable.

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4 In message Tohak 79/37588, December 14, Haig replied to Kissinger, noting that he had just left Nixon and had made a formal request for more details on the President’s meeting with Dobrynin. He reported that the President said that, on the Middle East, he had merely urged continued U.S.-Soviet cooperation in achieving a settlement and had asked the Ambassador to use Soviet influence on Syria regarding the POW issue. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 42, HAK Trip, Europe & Mid East, December 8–22, 1973)
155. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS
Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister
Viktor Sukhodrev, Soviet Foreign Ministry (Interpreter)
Secretary Henry A. Kissinger
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
Middle East; US–GDR relations; Summit preparations; SALT; CSCE; MBFR;
Trade; Brezhnev visit to Cuba; Pompidou and Brandt visits to USSR

[After a brief photo opportunity, the conversation began informally in the anteroom.]

Secretary Kissinger: I think we came out all right.

Minister Gromyko: When I talked with the General Secretary just before I left, he said it is all arranged on Zavidovo.

Secretary Kissinger: Good. It is a great place.

When I looked at the auspices question yesterday, I realized that you preferred what we would have preferred. I think we let the Egyptians maneuver between us. We had no interest in having UN auspices and we had a lot of trouble with the Israelis on this. We were lukewarm, and you were too, but neither of us wanted to take the responsibility for it.

I think the British and French were pushing it.

Minister Gromyko: Especially the French.

Secretary Kissinger: This is just for you: I've complained officially to the French for their behavior on the Middle East.

Minister Gromyko: Jobert never misses any forum to throw his arrows at us.

Secretary Kissinger: That is true.

Minister Gromyko: I asked him how many arrows he has sharpened for us!

[Vodka was served. Gromyko recommended a Belorussian vodka named for “bison herbs,” which prompted a discussion of bison, boar, and hunting.]

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 71, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Gromyko, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission. Brackets are in the original. Kissinger and Gromyko were attending the Middle East Peace Conference.
Secretary Kissinger: Can you go hunting in Zavidovo in the winter?

Minister Gromyko: Yes. I went just before I left Moscow for Geneva.

Secretary Kissinger: We’ll get the Israeli military delegation here by Tuesday, just to talk.

Bunker will be back on Thursday. I’ve talked to Eban; he’ll have an Ambassador here.

You were right. It’ll be better that way.

[The group then moved to the dining room for the luncheon. The main topics of the conversation over lunch were eating, drinking and hunting.]

Secretary Kissinger: Ambassador Dobrynin has a good cook. We know sooner or later we will lose him [Dobrynin].

Minister Gromyko: You’d prefer later rather than sooner.

Secretary Kissinger: From our point of view. He is intelligent, reliable, a good friend of the United States.

Minister Gromyko: He played a role in the development of US-Soviet relations.

Secretary Kissinger: The Arab world is very new to me, Mr. Foreign Minister. I’ve no experience with it.

Minister Gromyko: You never dealt with them before?

Secretary Kissinger: I have never been in an Arab country and never had much dealings with them. I frankly thought I could get through my term of office and let someone else do it. To be honest. Now that I have started, I will finish it and with enthusiasm.

Minister Gromyko: It is an extremely complicated world.

Secretary Kissinger: Extremely. And you can’t count on every word they say. [Laughter]

Minister Gromyko: Should I comment or not?

Secretary Kissinger: [Laughter] No. That is why we should communicate; otherwise the confusion will be total.

Secretary Kissinger: Have you been in Africa? You might enjoy hunting there.

Minister Gromyko: I have been in Arab Africa, not black Africa.

Secretary Kissinger: In Algiers?

Minister Gromyko: In passing. I passed through there to attend the Crimean Conference [in 1945].

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2 December 25.

3 Abba Eban, Israeli Foreign Minister.
Secretary Kissinger: I’ve always had respect for Stalin’s foreign policy. He had a long-range vision.
Minister Gromyko: I agree.
Secretary Kissinger: [Offers toast] To our cooperation.
Minister Gromyko: To our cooperation.
Secretary Kissinger: In 1938, 1939, were you in the Foreign Ministry?
Minister Gromyko: Just in 1939, I entered the Foreign Ministry. I was in the Academy of Sciences.
Secretary Kissinger: You had to make big decisions then. I think you were essentially right on the pact with Ribbentrop.4
Minister Gromyko: We didn’t have any reasonable choice. It was a pact for peace, for non-attack—not a pact to cooperate with someone else for attack. And we did it after all our attempts failed with the British and French.
Secretary Kissinger: One could say the pact made the war inevitable, but you had no reasonable choice.
There was very stupid leadership in Western Europe.
Minister Gromyko: Very shortsighted.
Secretary Kissinger: You needed some assurance. They had to decide whether to go to war with Hitler or not—but not to go to war half-heartedly and bargain with you over whether you could put your troops in Romania, etc.
If they had let him take Poland he would have attacked you next.
Minister Gromyko: Yes.
Secretary Kissinger: Also, at the end of the war he showed great courage, when we had the atomic bomb.
He must have been difficult to deal with personally. People always said they were amazed how short he was when they met him.
Minister Gromyko: He was not really so short. He was about Viktor’s height—average. About 170–175 centimeters.
Secretary Kissinger: Oh really? I had the impression he was much smaller.
Minister Gromyko: But he was striking. So the first impression may be that he’s not tall. But maybe psychologically people expected him to be higher because of his power.
Secretary Kissinger: That must be true.

4 A reference to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, also known as the Treaty of Non-Aggression Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Minister Gromyko: At closed meetings, Politburo meetings, it was his custom not to sit. He was always walking, slowly, slowly, speaking, slowly, slowly.

Secretary Kissinger: Did he encourage discussion?
Minister Gromyko: Certainly, certainly. And he listened patiently.
Secretary Kissinger: And he was intellectually in good condition until the end?
Minister Gromyko: Perfect.
Secretary Kissinger: He didn’t realize he was getting older?
Minister Gromyko: No. It was very sudden.
Secretary Kissinger: I only studied his foreign policy, not the details of his domestic policy.
Minister Gromyko: He was very sympathetic to President Roosevelt, from a human aspect.
Secretary Kissinger: After the war, where were you?
Minister Gromyko: I was First Deputy Foreign Minister.
Secretary Kissinger: Like Kuznetsov.
Minister Gromyko: Yes. Then I was Ambassador to Britain for a year.
Secretary Kissinger: You must have the longest tenure as Foreign Minister.
Minister Gromyko: No, I was just 49, in 1959. Just 15 years.
Secretary Kissinger: You are 64 already? You look younger.
Minister Gromyko: [Toasts] To youth!
Secretary Kissinger: To youth!

What is your idea about the time for the Summit next year?
Minister Gromyko: In the next room I will tell you. I swore to keep it a secret at this table.
Secretary Kissinger: Just not between June 13 and 27, because I will be in Germany, no matter what you do. That is the time of the World Cup football championship.
Minister Gromyko: To success of next year’s Summit meeting.
[They toast]
Secretary Kissinger: To the success of the next Summit meeting.

Before I took this job, I had no feel for how Soviet leaders made decisions. It was just theoretical.
Minister Gromyko: Just in books.
Secretary Kissinger: What is important in your domestic situation, I think, is that when we tell you something, you write it down and you tell the whole Politburo. So it mustn’t be changed very easily, because it affects many people.
Minister Gromyko: I’ve been concerned with American affairs for 30 years.

Secretary Kissinger: But you couldn’t have predicted what is happening in America this last year!

Minister Gromyko: No.

Secretary Kissinger: It’s unbelievable.

Minister Gromyko: Tomorrow I have to repay my courtesies to the Egyptian Foreign Minister and I invited him to come over in the afternoon to discuss some matters connected with the Middle East conference. So I leave the day after tomorrow,5 in the morning.

Secretary Kissinger: Ambassador Bunker will be here. He has lunch with Vinogradov.6 He leaves and will return on Monday. He’ll have a younger deputy, Sterner,7 for the time being, then someone else.

Minister Gromyko: When is your Ambassador going to Moscow?

Secretary Kissinger: In the end of January.

Minister Gromyko: Is he pleased?

Secretary Kissinger: Oh yes. I had an idea of sending Senator Cooper,8 as Ambassador Dobrynin may have told you. But he is practically deaf. So I thought it would be better to send a good professional. Stoessel is very good. I’ve known him a long time.

Minister Gromyko: He’s been there before?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Minister Gromyko: I knew him when he was there as Consul.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We’ll have an Ambassador in East Germany, too, if they let us have some property. There is some problem. If they attach importance to having the United States there, we’ll send an Ambassador immediately. The only problem is the property. We recognize they have difficulties; they have been very polite. But so far the property they have offered is inadequate.

Minister Gromyko: You will give them property in Washington?

Secretary Kissinger: The problem in Washington is different. They’ll have to buy it—but if they need assistance we will give it.

Minister Gromyko: Any problem with building the new structures in Washington and Moscow?

Secretary Kissinger: I have the impression it is no problem. Both yours and ours are too small now.

5 December 24.
6 Vladimir Vinogradov, Soviet Ambassador to Egypt.
7 Michael Sterner, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.
8 John Sherman Cooper, Republican Senator from Kentucky until 1972; appointed Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic on September 19, 1974.
Minister Gromyko: Before the Revolution, your building in Moscow was the personal chancery of a Russian Ambassador.

Secretary Kissinger: It is about the right size for that, but not for a whole Embassy.

Minister Gromyko: When I was in Washington once for a reception, they had to open up all private apartments on the third floor.

Secretary Kissinger: I've moved modern art in. If Rockefeller becomes President, you'll see at Summit things you never saw before. I think the next time you come, you and I should spend a night at his estate.

Minister Gromyko: I knew him in wartime. He was Coordinator for Latin American affairs.

Secretary Kissinger: He has a good chance. He's too old—usually—to run for President. But in 1976 the American people will want calm and experience. Kennedy will make them nervous.

Jackson has a good chance.

Minister Gromyko: [Puts hands over his ears]. I didn't hear what you said.

Secretary Kissinger: Unfortunately he has a good chance. I'm violently opposed to him.

Minister Gromyko: Kennedy?

Secretary Kissinger: Kennedy will be a candidate but he will be defeated.

[At about 2:40 p.m., the luncheon ended and the group adjourned again to the anteroom].

Minister Gromyko: All right, let us take up some matters.

Secretary Kissinger: Good.

Minister Gromyko: First of all, I would like to emphasize one point in addition to all that I have already said. I had a long talk with General Secretary Brezhnev before I left for Geneva. Rest assured that the Soviet leadership and personally General Secretary Brezhnev, will strictly follow the line we’ve taken with the United States, the line first expressed in the Summit meetings in Moscow and the United States and in appropriate agreements and treaties. And to give you greater clarity on this point—and this gives you an insight into his character—General Secretary Brezhnev is a man who strictly keeps his word, and he has strong conviction on that score. I wanted to add that to everything else I’ve told you in Geneva.

Secretary Kissinger: I have talked to the President, as you did to your General Secretary, before I left, and he tells me to tell you that his policy is fixed, and that his greatest ambition is to make it irreversible
during his term of office. And he is determined to continue it and even speed it up—and I may say, in spite of increasing domestic opposition.

Minister Gromyko: I’m extremely glad to hear that.

We certainly believe that both sides should conduct themselves with assurance, calmly, and without nervousness. There may be in the future, as in the past, forces in the United States and outside your country—and I am sure you know their addresses—to whom the further deepening of our relations will not be to their liking. We must certainly rise above the outlook of those forces and not be limited to the horizons visible to them. We have the ability to do that.

I want to add one other thing. We certainly understand and realize that the domestic situation in the United States is a fairly complex one, although we don’t lay any claim to being familiar to it in every detail. But we do regret that fact because we value very highly all we have achieved in our relations. We regret all these problems the President has on his hands and hope they’ll soon be a thing of the past. We hope he and those who help him—particularly you—will carry through.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me say that our domestic complexities, except [on] those [matters] requiring legislation, do not affect the day-to-day conduct of our foreign policy. Paradoxically it gives us greater freedom of action, because our opponents are afraid to attack everything. So let me assure you on behalf of the President that we will continue on our course.

Minister Gromyko: I am certainly very gratified to hear those remarks, and they serve to buttress the prospects ahead of us.

Now about the next Summit meeting, despite all the complexities that exist, including those you referred to, we—and particularly General Secretary Brezhnev—firmly stand by our line of bringing about this next Summit meeting. Our two powers have such profound and diversified interests, and we are both faced with such serious tasks in the development of bilateral relations between our two countries—and in the international field—that on no account must anything be done to prevent that meeting from being held. We are firmly in favor of holding the meeting with President Nixon in the Soviet Union, and we will do all in our power to hold that meeting and make it a success.

Secretary Kissinger: That is exactly our attitude.

Minister Gromyko: Very good. As regards timing, we believe the most appropriate time could be either the very end of May or the month of June. Actually, from our point of view June is the best, and I will try to explain why. Before that period, we would have certain events, including domestic events, which could divert attention from the meeting to a certain degree and in a way impede the preparations and the holding. It is a matter of convenience. Later, July, would also
create complexities. It is a period of very intense activity in agriculture and in the economy generally, all of which would require the attention of all our leaders and personally of General Secretary Brezhnev. Economic activity all around the country, especially because of the diversity of our country. So June would be the optimal time, the most convenient time.

Secretary Kissinger: How about September?

Minister Gromyko: September would be less convenient precisely from that point of view.

Secretary Kissinger: We had not studied it. In principle, June will be possible. I will check with the President and then tell Dobrynin. The only concern I have is whether we’ll have enough of our work done in time for that meeting.

Minister Gromyko: That question can arise regardless of timing. If we can prepare adequately by September, we can do it by June also. In the Soviet Union, given the climatic conditions, the fall is a period of most intensive activity. Those are our views, but the President can think it over.

Secretary Kissinger: I will discuss it with the President, but in principle I think June or late May will be acceptable, particularly if we have the determination to do what has to be done.

Minister Gromyko: I certainly take note of what you say and will act accordingly.

Now, about the actual work in preparation for the meeting. We believe in that context we should give effect to the understanding reached on your visit to the Soviet Union. We attach great importance to your visit. And General Secretary Brezhnev said this to me specifically before I came to Geneva, having in mind my talks with you.

Secretary Kissinger: I appreciate this very much and I would be prepared to come at a time we can work out.

Minister Gromyko: That’s good. As for timing, we believe we can agree to set approximate dates towards the end of January or the first ten days or first half of February. The best possibility for us would be the first ten days in February.

Secretary Kissinger: That would be the best time for me too. Say between the 5th and the 10th. And I will make a concrete proposal to Dobrynin when I come back. But in that timeframe.

Minister Gromyko: Very well. Let’s proceed from that general understanding then, and abide by it.

Secretary Kissinger: Good.

Minister Gromyko: As regards the place of your meetings with the General Secretary, we suggest Zavidovo. It is a place that has already won some prestige in international affairs, and you have been there.
With your agreement, I’ll inform the General Secretary. As regards the necessary communications with Washington, you are familiar with the communications last time.

Secretary Kissinger: We like the arrangement in Zavidovo very much, and if you can arrange the communications, that is fine. There is a small problem with the press because I am Secretary of State—but we can leave them in Moscow and just give them reports.

Minister Gromyko: As regards correspondents, we can leave that. It’s not important.

Now, as regards the problem of the agenda for the next Summit—and the agenda for the discussions with you, as your meeting will be in the context of preparations for the Summit—I would like to add a few words in addition to what we discussed at the UN General Assembly and when I was in Washington and met with the President.9

[Both drank glasses of cognac].

Secretary Kissinger: I am amazed [at his drinking]! Training!

Minister Gromyko: What comes to mind in this respect—and this is something I talked about in great detail with General Secretary Brezhnev—we’ll be at that time at a certain point as far as the Middle East is concerned. So certainly this has to be on the agenda as a major item.

Secretary Kissinger: No question. And in much better conditions than last time. Because if there is progress, so much the better, and if there is no progress, it will be all the more important for our two leaders to break the deadlock.

Minister Gromyko: We should put out of our head talk of no progress.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. There will be progress, and we will be able to envisage the final outcome by then. There will be progress by the Spring.

Minister Gromyko: That is something that must be achieved.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. It will be a much better discussion than last time.

Minister Gromyko: Then, of course, the question will surely arise of strategic arms and a possible new agreement on that score, the question of conversion of the provisional agreement into a permanent one. I recall great conviction and forcefulness with which the President spoke on this, in the summer with General Secretary Brezhnev and in the fall with me. We are certainly in favor of such new agreements and ar-

9 See Document 137.
rangement. In fact, General Secretary Brezhnev was emphatic on this with me, and stressed the need to achieve this.

Secretary Kissinger: But how do we proceed? Because we’re not even in the same framework yet.

Minister Gromyko: We are certainly engaged in a very intensive study of this issue and we have made substantial progress in the formation of our positions in terms of the forthcoming Summit. You know as well as we know that our delegations in Geneva have made no substantive progress, and if you have any thoughts on this . . .

Secretary Kissinger: We lack a theory of what we’re trying to do. In the first SALT, we had a rough outline in terms of numbers and could work out the details. Now we don’t even have a rough idea of what we want to do.

Minister Gromyko: I would suggest the crux of the matter is not that we lack a theory to guide us in finding practical solutions. I think we have common premises, but we lack practical concepts to convert theory to practice. You said we shouldn’t allow ourselves to be thrown back. We both agree. We proceed from the assumption that we have traversed a very important path in the past by achieving the agreements already signed. For example, we are both in agreement that we are faced with the task of converting the provisional agreement into a permanent one, or else the task of elaborating or covering the provisional one in a new agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: Or extending it, for say ten years.

Minister Gromyko: At least there is no great theoretical difference. The task is to elaborate it to the point of figures.

Secretary Kissinger: And criteria. Have you any ideas?

Minister Gromyko: When you mentioned figures at one time to our Ambassador, you said that you might add something to the considerations you gave. Then you said it was not precisely a promise to give new considerations. Do you have or don’t you have something new, just so we know?

Secretary Kissinger: What figures do you mean?

Minister Gromyko: You mentioned certain figures concerning the Far East, China. You said you might add something—and you even had certain figures—to take into account the Far East. Do you have any precise considerations on this?

Secretary Kissinger: [Picks up briefing papers\(^\text{10}\) and reads them to himself]. I just wanted to review some figures. [Reads]. In the context of some limitation on MIRV, for example, if we said that each side had

\(^{10}\) Not found.
equal throwweight of MIRVs, we might be able to consider some inequality in numbers—not in a permanent but in an extended provisional agreement. For example, if we said you could put MIRVs on . . . The difficulty is that your missiles have more MIRVs—you have four and we have three. Sometimes you have even more than four. Suppose we said the throwweight of MIRVs should be about equal, then you could MIRV somewhat fewer missiles but we could live with some inequality in numbers—including the ones with single warheads. If you MIRV 300 and we MIRV 500, because of the inequality of the number of warheads, then we would not insist on your reducing the overall number of your missiles. You could keep your 1400 and we could keep our 1100—but you would MIRV 300 and we would MIRV 500. We would not ask you to reduce your number.

Minister Gromyko: When you say “extended provisional agreement,” you mean a “reviewed” provisional agreement, or in terms of time?

Secretary Kissinger: In terms of time. But with these new figures.

Minister Gromyko: With these new figures. [Viktor translates Kissinger’s presentation into Russian]. And how about compensation for the Chinese factor?

Secretary Kissinger: We cannot compensate for that in words—but you would have 1400 missiles and we would have 1100, so you would have 300 more than we.

Minister Gromyko: Yes, but then you say you will MIRV 500 of yours while we MIRV 300. That makes the total throwweight equal. Therefore the question of compensation for our geographic factor doesn’t come into the picture. And there is no mention of your forward-based missiles. The geographic factor is in your favor.

Secretary Kissinger: With regard to the first point, the total throwweight of the MIRV’d missiles will be equal. The total throwweight of all missiles will be strongly in your favor.

Minister Gromyko: What I am asking is, does that mean you are ignoring the forward-based strategic arms altogether, or simply haven’t reached that question?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me distinguish two things. The Chinese factor is included—we have to be more precise with the figures in a negotiation—because the MIRV’d missiles are equal but on top of that you have 900 more and we have 600. Those 300 should certainly compensate for the Chinese factor.

Minister Gromyko: You are approaching that question from an end angle, as it were. The Chinese factor is taken care of in that calculation. It’s built into this calculation.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. You’ll see when you study these figures. It gives you an overall advantage in throwweight and an overall advantage in numbers. It gives a certain equality in MIRVs.

Minister Gromyko: I understand you sort of built that factor into that calculation so it doesn’t poke out of the sack to be visible. But you have elsewhere your forward-based missiles—your heavy bombers, submarines, intermediate-range rockets, and other types of weapons. Is it right that you’ve eased them out of the picture? We shouldn’t leave that out, especially after blini.

Secretary Kissinger: I haven’t fully studied it. But you have certain weapons that can reach these countries. I haven’t studied it fully.

Minister Gromyko: I ask all these questions because we do want to find a common language on this issue. You mentioned figures to our Ambassador some time ago—figures that were supposed to serve as compensation for Chinese factor. I was prepared to say we do not exclude reaching agreement on that basis.

Secretary Kissinger: What figures do you have in mind?

Minister Gromyko: You mentioned 200 additional. The principle itself which you mentioned at that time—but the figures weren’t enough—but I was prepared to say that.

Secretary Kissinger: The principle is still acceptable.

Minister Gromyko: But not the figures.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand.

Minister Gromyko: But now, when you formulated your remarks, your ideas suggest you want to place us in an equal position in one area but you fail to mention other areas.

Secretary Kissinger: Only MIRV. Beyond MIRV you have the advantage.

Minister Gromyko: But you leave out an entire area. Perhaps you can give this further thought and convey your views to our Ambassador. Preferably before your visit.

Secretary Kissinger: Definitely.

Minister Gromyko: Because this is a field in which one has to be objective because it is so important.

Secretary Kissinger: Definitely before the end of January. If you have any new ideas, let me know through Dobrynin, so we can study it.

Minister Gromyko: Yes, but we will await your ideas.

Now on European problems.

Your representatives and ours at CSCE are in contact with each other, but we believe your representatives, even if they take a position favorable to success, should be nevertheless a little more active in
bringing that success about. Particularly in view of the Summit. Because we should approach this Summit with more progress in this area.

Secretary Kissinger: I will call our representative back and talk to him personally.

Minister Gromyko: We would appreciate it. We should do our very best, both sides, to bring this to a conclusion before March. Even the pessimists thought it could not end before March.

Secretary Kissinger: We are not the problem. The Europeans are crazy on the subject of human contact. I’ve told you I believe you are serious people and won’t be undermined by the introduction of newspapers in the Soviet Union. I’ll speak to our representative personally. He’s not in Washington now, but I’ll bring him back and speak with him. There should not be slow progress.

Minister Gromyko: Just in brief on the subject of the negotiations on the reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe, we can in a sense understand why some pose the question in this way: “Let’s just set a ceiling and both go down to that ceiling and just cut off everything above that.” We’re convinced that kind of approach will yield no positive results; we need a more realistic approach. We need to keep the present alignment—preserving that correlation of forces, and non-harming each other, we can find some success.

You have said it will be a long journey; we agree it will be long. We for our part have patience.

Secretary Kissinger: If the correlation is the same but at a lower level, this gives a certain advantage for the offensive side. One approach is agreement in principle on a common ceiling and in the first step have a symmetrical cut, say 10–15 percent each.

Minister Gromyko: I should want to ask you to take another look at that entire area and at the positions made known by countries in Vienna. We were surprised by the oversimplicity of some Western nations in the talks. Perhaps you are not familiar with all the details.

Secretary Kissinger: Did I make that obvious?

Minister Gromyko: I said “perhaps.”

So probably some of the countries are proceeding from the fact that this road will be a long one. If so, neither of us should regard that as a tragedy, even if it is long.

Secretary Kissinger: I’ve scheduled a review meeting when I get back. Then I’ll have a more considered view.

Minister Gromyko: I appreciate it. A few words on trade and economic relations.

We certainly regret the situation that has developed in the U.S. Congress and the impediments erected in the way of resolving this question in Congress. It is a sad thing that the understandings made by
the President have not had effect. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union—and the General Secretary made this emphatic to me before I left—we appreciate very highly, very highly, the effort made by the President and Secretary Kissinger. The General Secretary made this point specifically to me. We note the statement of President Nixon that this problem—extension of MFN—will be resolved next Spring and the barriers to trade will be eliminated.

This is a reciprocal question, a two-way question—we’re not standing with outstretched hands. It is to our mutual benefit.

Secretary Kissinger: We are in complete agreement. We have a common enemy—Senator Jackson. I speak frankly with you. We have no disagreement in principle or in practice. I have talked to Senator Fulbright and in January we’ll start a publicity campaign by starting open hearings.

You are entirely right. We promised it to you. We owe it to you. And you are right that it is a reciprocal question. It is natural for two great powers, and especially for two great cooperative powers.

The President will certainly not sign the restrictive provisions now in it. He has said this publicly.

Minister Gromyko: To become law he must sign it?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes.
Minister Gromyko: We’ll have to wait and see how events go, hoping for a favorable outcome in the meantime.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly.

Minister Gromyko: Before we end, I would like to give you a piece of information on some matters. This is also something General Secretary Brezhnev asked me to convey to President Nixon through you.

You know many Soviet leaders have visited Cuba. But there has never been a visit by the General Secretary of the Central Committee. The General Secretary intends to visit Cuba sometime in January. No agreements, political or economic, will be signed. It will be of a general political nature, and will not in the slightest way have any anti-American character. On the contrary, it will promote, as we see it, a better climate for relations between Cuba and the United States.

Secretary Kissinger: I appreciate that very much. The General Secretary was kind enough to hint at that during his visit.

Minister Gromyko: Yes, but not the timing.

Secretary Kissinger: May I say a personal word? This is personal, not official. Our President is usually calm and detached on all other issues, but on Cuba he is very emotional. This doesn’t affect the fact of the visit—but the public manifestations. This is a personal word.

Minister Gromyko: The second point of information for the President is that there is a possibility, I repeat, a possibility, of a working
visit by President Pompidou of France to the Soviet Union, sometime in February. A brief working visit. There is no specific agenda for the meeting; it is just a general political meeting.

Secretary Kissinger: I appreciate that. As long as he’s not in Zavidovo when I am there. [Laughter].

Minister Gromyko: A third point of information is there is a possibility of a short working visit to the Soviet Union sometime in the Spring by Chancellor Brandt. There is a possibility of another, or instead, a visit in the second half of the year.

Those are three items I wanted to convey, of course in strict confidence.

Secretary Kissinger: Of course. I want to thank you for not only the fact of this information but the spirit. Especially on the Middle East. It is more reliable if we talk to each other instead of learning from the Egyptians.

Minister Gromyko: I appreciate the spirit in which you receive it.

In conclusion, you think the French, in particular Mr. Jobert, have many arrows for us—not only our auspices but our relations generally. Because I note your relations are a little softer.

Secretary Kissinger: Cooler. In practice, though in form, friendly. But what they don’t know they can’t use against us.

Minister Gromyko: We certainly regret that they take such a pained attitude toward our relations, because they certainly cause France no harm.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree.

Minister Gromyko: We will see you in February. Please convey warm regards from me to President Nixon. From the General Secretary I have already conveyed warm regards.

Secretary Kissinger: And from the President to you and to the General Secretary.

[The meeting thereupon ended and Foreign Minister Gromyko escorted Secretary Kissinger downstairs and to his car].
156. Memorandum by Secretary of State Kissinger for the President’s File


SUBJECT
Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, in the Oval Office, Wednesday, December 26, 1973, 10:35–11:29 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin
Secretary of State Kissinger

The President greeted Ambassador Dobrynin during a photo opportunity.

The President began the conversation by remarking on the vote in the Congress on the Trade Bill which prohibited MFN for the Soviet Union on grounds of restricted emigration. It was a “miserable vote.” The opponents of MFN were American Jewish groups and others who were hawks in the Middle East but doves in Viet Nam. The opponents thought better relations between the Soviet Union and the United States served parochial interests. The Europeans, too, were now attacking détente. But the United States and the Soviet Union were the two nations that mattered in the world today. It may not last, the President suggested. But we must take the responsibility. Ambassador Dobrynin asked, Why be so pessimistic?

The point of the matter, the President continued, was that we had to understand that the shape of the world would be determined by our two countries. Such matters as arms control in Europe were very much determined by us. The United States and the Soviet Union must come out working together in a world where the two superpowers can organize the world.

The newspapers did not reflect his views, the President continued. The course on which we were now embarked was irreversible.

Our decisions were so important, because of the danger of miscalculation. “Maybe we made a mistake in October,” the President said, “maybe you did.” But it was an interesting thing, with Jackson and with the liberals all moving to the right.


2 The House of Representatives passed the Trade Bill on December 11. The House version of the bill included the Jackson–Vanik Amendment.
The main thing was the shape of the world, the peace of the world. General Secretary Brezhnev must have his own problems. The American press was creating the impression that we could not succeed. Communication between our two sides could help the peace of the world. There were different kinds of opportunities for different countries. For our part, “we will continue to work together.”

Ambassador Dobrynin thanked the President for his remarks. The President had just covered the whole gamut. The Ambassador wanted to mention his analysis of the situation including our domestic situation. It was important to keep our relationship on a frank and good basis. He wanted to keep it on a personal basis.

On the Middle East, the Ambassador said that we agreed on the main points and he did not want to go into detail. A crisis should not occur. Both governments should work together in close cooperation and should not let the opposing sides in the conflict pit us against each other. The Soviet side was going to see to it very carefully that foreign policy would not pit us against each other. General Secretary Brezhnev gave instructions to Gromyko that he should work closely together with the United States, and there was very good cooperation at the Geneva Peace Conference.

The President emphasized one point he wanted to make to the Ambassador—that we must not be in conflict and we must not have one side try to drive the other out. That was a short-sighted view. The Ambassador agreed. It went without saying that that approach must not be used by either side. He looked forward to close cooperation as the negotiations proceeded. He wanted to mention once again that as the Soviet side evaluated the situation, the task was to make progress on implementing Security Council Resolution 339. Ambassador Dobrynin complimented Secretary Kissinger for bringing the parties together.

“I will deliver the Israelis,” the President declared. “It will be done.”

Ambassador Dobrynin then raised other matters of Soviet-American relations. On MFN, he expressed appreciation for the hard work the President and Dr. Kissinger had done on this. Of course the Soviet Union hoped the issue would be resolved. The President remarked that the idea that one nation could force the other nation to change its domestic system was clearly foolish.

Ambassador Dobrynin reiterated that General Secretary Brezhnev wanted the President to know that the Soviet Union stood firmly on the course of Soviet-American relations that was shaped at the two Summit meetings. Mr. Brezhnev was going to stand very firm on this, and he was firmly looking forward to the next meeting. Mr. Brezhnev gave instructions to prepare for a Summit meeting in mid-June. Secretary Kissi-
Kissinger should come to Moscow in February to prepare the work of the Summit.

The President agreed that that would be a good idea, either at the beginning of February or in March.

Ambassador Dobrynin pointed out that General Secretary Brezhnev shared the President’s view that many nations wanted to undermine the progress in US-Soviet relations. Hundreds of times Mr. Brezhnev had explained to his allies that the US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War was not to be misunderstood.

Ambassador Dobrynin emphasized the Soviet view that our relations were not directed at the Chinese. The President interjected with a question: What was the Soviet intelligence on how long it would take the Chinese to catch up with the United States and the Soviet Union? We thought it was twenty years. Why did the Soviets think it was 10–15 years? Ambassador Dobrynin asked the President what the question was. Did he still think it would take twenty years? The President turned to Dr. Kissinger, who said that it was not a question of a Chinese capability comparable to that of the United States or Soviet Union, but a Chinese capability to do extreme damage. Ambassador Dobrynin emphasized the extreme demands of the Chinese in their border dispute.

The President noted that some like Senator Mondale\(^3\) might go as far as military assistance to China. But the President’s view was that we must not let anything in the world interfere with or poison our relations. What had always sunk great powers were the conflicts of smaller powers. He asked the Ambassador to remember the statement at Camp David that we must restore the spirit of Yalta.\(^4\) What made Yalta work was that the great powers didn’t permit small nations to interfere. We should not let matters like Cienfuegos or Hungary,\(^5\) etc., do us in, he concluded.

The meeting thereafter ended.

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\(^3\) Walter F. Mondale, Democratic Senator from Minnesota.

\(^4\) A reference to the Yalta Conference, February 4–11, 1945.

\(^5\) A reference to the Soviet military buildup in Cienfuegos, Cuba and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.
Gromyko’s Trip to Washington and Kissinger’s Pre-Summit Trip to Moscow, February–March 1974

157. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 1, 1974, 8:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger

The conversation started in a mellow mood, with Dobrynin reflecting on some of his experiences.

He said that it was his view that Khrushchev had a great sense of publicity and was tactically quite good but had no sense of strategy whatsoever. He said that Gromyko and he had all urged Khrushchev first to return to the summit conference in Paris in 1960, after he had made his scene, and secondly, to go into concrete negotiations with Kennedy in September 1961. Both Gromyko and Dobrynin were convinced that they could get major concessions, first from Eisenhower and then from Kennedy—a judgment with which I tend to agree. However, Khrushchev was convinced that he could obtain a stationing of Soviet forces in West Berlin and therefore was not prepared to negotiate. As a result, the Soviet Union obtained nothing. The Soviet judgment of Kennedy was that he was a very weak but very vain man on whose weaknesses one could play.

Dobrynin also told me that prior to the Vienna summit, when Khrushchev explained to the Politburo how he planned to proceed, the only man who stood up to him was Mikoyan, who said in effect that it would be easier to deal with Kennedy with sugar than with vinegar.

Gromyko Visit

The meeting was supposed to go over the Gromyko visit [Monday, February 4]. There was some discussion of Gromyko’s arrival, and Do-

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 22, January–April 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The dinner meeting was held at the Department of State. Brackets are in the original.

2 The June 1961 Vienna Summit between Kennedy and Khrushchev.

3 Anastas Mikoyan served as First Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union from 1956 to 1964 and then as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet from 1964 to 1965.
brynin suggested that, since Gromyko had met me at the airport in Moscow several times, it would be a nice gesture if I reciprocated this. I said American protocol does not call for the Secretary of State to go to the airport. Dobrynin pointed out that this was not the issue, but that in the present state of U.S.-Soviet relations some solidarity was useful.

We then discussed the order of the meetings and the participants. We agreed that I would have lunch at the Soviet Embassy and would give a dinner at Blair House Monday evening.

Middle East

We then turned to the Middle East.

Dobrynin said that a bitter debate had been taking place within the Soviet Union. Many had argued that the Soviet Union had suffered a setback without any commensurate benefit. To be sure, in the long term nobody was going to gain anything by solo performance in the Middle East, but the long term was not all that mattered. When I pointed out that gratitude was not the outstanding attribute of the Mid-East nations, Dobrynin agreed, but he said that nevertheless an interval of bad feelings could do serious harm to our relationship. I agreed, and told him we would be very circumspect.

Dobrynin added that a policy decision had been made in the Soviet Union to move very constructively and cooperatively with the United States in the Middle East. The explicit decision was that the Soviet Union had nothing to gain from a continuation of conflict and that it would use its influence to help end the rivalry and move towards peace. I told him that in that case the Soviet Union would have to change some of its tactics. The tendency to come up with global solutions was simply not possible. Each issue had to be dealt with individually and one at a time. Dobrynin said that this was true, but that there was a good chance that Sadat would get himself completely isolated and into more difficulty than he ever bargained for. I said this is why it was important to make some progress on Syria.

I asked Dobrynin how we could give effect to this determination and move constructively. He said, one, Gromyko was planning a trip to the Middle East in March and we should do nothing to interfere with that. I assured him he could count on it. Secondly, he said that if we had periodic meetings of the Co-Chairmen, it would symbolize our common commitment. I agreed to that as well.

Nuclear Test Limitation; MBFR

We then turned to other matters. Dobrynin asked about the forthcoming summit visit to the Soviet Union. Would it be possible to agree,
if not to an end of underground testing, to a limit on the number of
tests? I told him I would look into it.

Dobrynin then asked whether it might be possible at the summit to
agree to a percentage cut of Soviet and U.S. forces in MBFR. I said that I
remembered that Brezhnev in June 1973 had recommended only five
percent; we thought ten percent would be the minimum. Dobrynin
said, “Well, maybe we’ll compromise on eight percent.” I told him it
seemed to us that ten percent was the genuine minimum, but in any
event the problem was how to relate it to the position of our Allies. Do-
brynin said we should both think further about that. I said it would
help to do this if we could get a basic plan accepted in the MBFR negoti-
ations as a goal, within which this first stage could be negotiated.

SALT

We then turned to SALT.

Dobrynin said that the equal throw-weight proposal was creating
major problems in Moscow. The Soviet military were pointing out that
this would mean, first, that they would have much fewer MIRVed mis-
siles, and second, that their large missiles could have no MIRVs at all. I
said no, their large missiles could have MIRVs. He said yes, but in that
case they could only have 50 to 60 MIRVed missiles.

I told him one way of handling this problem would be to reduce
some of the non-MIRVed missiles. Dobrynin seemed surprised and
asked whether we would really be prepared to dismantle some of our
missiles. I said in principle, yes. Dobrynin asked whether we would be
willing to dismantle some submarines too. I said in principle it was
more difficult for us, but we would be prepared to discuss reductions
in all categories, including airplanes.

Dobrynin said in his judgment this was not a matter in which we
could make any progress with Gromyko. It had to be settled with
Brezhnev when I got there in March.

Summit

Dobrynin asked whether we were still thinking of June for the
President’s summit visit. I said yes.

Economic Relations

Dobrynin raised questions about the economic relationship and
said that MFN had now become a highly symbolic issue which could
profoundly affect our relationship, but that credits were absolutely im-
perative. Were we prepared still to go ahead on the long-term econom-
ic agreement? I told him we were, but urged that it be deferred until af-
ter the Trade Bill’s fate had been decided.

The meeting then ended.
158. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

Soviet:
Andrey Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to US
Yuly Vorontsov, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Georgiy M. Kornienko, Chief, USA Division, Soviet Foreign Ministry
Viktar M. Sukhodrev, Soviet interpreter
Vasiliy G. Makarov, Senior Assistant to Mr. Gromyko

State:
The Secretary
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Ambassador Walter Stoessl, American Ambassador-designate to the USSR

(There was an exchange of greetings, a discussion of art in the Secretary’s office and an exchange on how the Secretary was feeling.)

The Secretary: We are very pleased to have you here and to have a general discussion of some of the issues we face. After our general discussion, I would like to meet with you alone.

Mr. Gromyko: I wish to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your kind invitation. You must have noticed that I replied at once.

The Secretary: Yes and I thank you for that. This is a good time for us to meet.

Mr. Gromyko: What sort of matters do you want to discuss?

The Secretary: I think we should touch on our general bilateral relations, SALT, force reductions in Europe, and European security. We can cover the rest in private.

Mr. Gromyko: Do you want to begin or should I?

The Secretary: You’re more disciplined than I am. Why don’t you start?

Mr. Gromyko: I am not sure what that means in this case but since you have mentioned European security, I would like to make some observations. First, let me emphasize our appreciation of the extensive work that was done in the first phase and at Helsinki. There was in fact


no small amount of work undertaken in the second stage, but I must say that we are not pleased by the current state of the conference.

The Secretary: I agree with you.

Mr. Gromyko: I would like to discuss several specific issues but also I would like to talk about the broader question which has an impact on our relations in the future.

The Secretary (As cookies were passed): I had always been told that there were cookie-pushers in the Department but I never saw the cookies before today that they are supposed to push.

Mr. Gromyko: The reason that we are not pleased by the progress in the All European Conference—and I will not express myself in diplomatic terms—is that I feel that all these representatives are beating the air without achieving any concrete advancement toward the aim of resolving the real issues. They are going around in circles. This could go on endlessly. It seems to me that issues are being invented out of virtually nothing. This is the impression I have. It seems to me that there are a series of artificial measures which are being put forward with the intent of preventing a solution.

The Secretary: Not by us.

Mr. Gromyko: I would not like to try to gauge how to share the blame among each of the Western Powers but the raising of these artificial issues is enough indication of the fact that some are misbehaving. It is a fact that these actions contradict the often-stated solemn, high-level declarations that we have agreed with most of these States on the necessity of achieving détente and peace. I question whether some of the political forces have forgotten or want to ignore what happened in World War II.

I ask myself is this a negligent attitude? All of us agreed after the conclusion of World War II that we must avoid the possibility of war. We had fought together as allies against a common enemy and we agreed that we must weed out the possibility of war. Can it have been forgotten?

I don't want to specifically accuse the US of taking this position. As we see and assess the situation, however, we note that the US Representative displays a knowledge of our position and an understanding of our general agreements. Our representatives have numerous contacts and, I must say, that these are highly appreciated. What also strikes the eye, however, is the passivity with which you approach this conference. We appreciate the words but where is the US voice for all to hear? This is not being done. Perhaps this is strategy or tactics. What we can do is voice our own desires and to recall that our common agreements were made at the highest level during the visit of Mr. Brezhnev last year and the visit of the President to the Soviet Union. We hope that
the US will accord greater weight and interest in more firmly setting out the position which has the aim of carrying out our agreements. It should not be beyond the means of the US to express its strong views. When the US wants to act it does so and in a loud voice. We hope that your view will come out in the open in the most appropriate way.

The Secretary: Mr. Foreign Minister, first of all, let me make a general remark and then address the details. We attach enormous importance to maintaining the peace of the world. We do this because it is in the interest of the well-being of all peoples. Since it makes sense for us to do that, it underlies all of our actions.

In Europe, there seems to be a desire to treat most issues in a totally frivolous fashion. People who have maintained their power in a country such as the Soviet Union for fifty years are not going to be unseated by a declaration. Therefore, I want you to know that I don’t attach much importance to the question of declarations as a solution to these problems. Leave aside any ulterior motives. There is just no way that one can proceed to undermine what exists in the Soviet Union.

On the question of the inviolability of frontiers, that is a question of German domestic politics. On human contacts—and I refer specifically to the letter to the President—we favor a maximum increase in these contacts consistent with the domestic laws of the parties. The Allies go farther. They don’t like the reference, not only to “domestic laws,” but also to “customs.” This is a question of domestic politics among our Allies. I don’t want to say whether it is right or wrong. What we have to decide now is what price to pay to get the Allies to change their minds. I think that you overestimate our influence with the Allies. In our negotiations of the bilateral declarations we are faced with a series of idiotic, juridical positions. In other words, they don’t reserve their tactics for you. For one year, we have been engaged in trying to find a formula to describe our relations. It is not easy for us to get them to agree.

We would like to conclude the Conference. We recognize it will not have a world-shaking result. We will not support measures which go beyond our common understandings (at this point the Secretary said he wished to be sure that he sees Ambassador Sherer before he departs). What do you think Art? Is it possible to make some progress?

Mr. Hartman: We have already tried out several formulae for dealing with the question of encouraging human contact and yet making reference to the non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States party to the Agreement. We have not yet had success in convincing the Allies that there is a means to handle this point.

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3 See ibid., Document 182.

4 Albert W. Sherer, Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, was the Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the CSCE from February 1974.
The Secretary: I have stated and I will state again that we are in favor of an improved situation with respect to human contacts. But I will also say, as I have with many Congressional Committees, that we have trouble enough agreeing on our foreign policy problems without getting ourselves involved in each other’s domestic affairs. We have not after all demonstrated we can handle our own affairs much less those of others. This is our view.

Mr. Gromyko: I would now like to try to turn to the specific issues.

The Secretary: But before you do, let me just say that our representatives should remain in very close contact.

Mr. Gromyko: I certainly share fully and associate myself with the desire for close contact. Now, very briefly on the specific issues, with due regard to the general principles. The first issue has to do with the inviolability of frontiers. There has never been any doubt in our mind that the US position is consistent with our views. We feel, however, that the US should use its influence to prevent certain other countries from burdening this conference with issues and propositions which are unacceptable and, indeed, absurd. Second, we see that the same countries are attempting to raise unacceptable questions with respect to maneuvers, large-scale troop movements, and the exchange of observers. We have the question of what is large and what is small. As to observers, we ought to be able to find some mutual way to solve this problem by invitation. You have discussed this problem with Dobrynin. You have made certain statements with respect to maneuvers and large-scale movements. I understand those statements. But what we can see is that the appetites of the Europeans are growing. I can qualify some of their proposals as nothing short of ridiculous. I won’t even discuss these matters. For example, that all of the Soviet Union should be taken into account with respect to maneuvers taking place. We can’t agree. We can’t accept.

The Secretary: Who proposed this?

Mr. Gromyko: It was submitted by the FRG Delegation in the name of the Nine.

The Secretary: That is becoming my favorite group of nations. However, I should say that we won’t reject that idea if you want to agree to it.

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5 Kissinger and Dobrynin met on January 17. No record of the meeting was found, but the paper that Kissinger gave Dobrynin is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 123.

6 A reference to the European Community, whose members were Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Ireland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom.
Mr. Gromyko: We recall that at the outset there was no mention of this question. When the matter was raised by you, we agreed to consider it. We then made some agreements on how to handle maneuvers and observers. All those things have now been put aside and people are suggesting unacceptable solutions but I can tell you that, if anyone thinks that they can attempt to talk us into this position, they should know that it will fail. I hope for more realism. I hope you will try to persuade the others that it is groundless for them to pursue these unrealistic proposals. I have no doubt that your people are familiar with this problem in Geneva. Now my third point.

The Secretary: Let me say on troop movements that you have received a correct report of my conversation with Dobrynin. Your response was forthcoming but the proposals that were made in Geneva were not made at our instigation. They go well beyond our own intention. We will talk internally about how to approach this problem. The trouble is that you have a bunch of bureaucrats in Geneva who are trying to impress each other with their toughness. No one wants to admit that he is any less strong than the next fellow. On the other hand, I don’t want to discourage you from accepting it but you are right that the Ambassador reported our conversation correctly. We must find a way to end this sterile debate.

Mr. Gromyko: The third point for us is the very crux of the problem. How to reach agreement on the rule or principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of others.

If that principle can be met, we can inscribe in the declaration that all States favor maximum ties of cultural, scientific and other kinds. We will do our utmost to promote human contact. We are not afraid of this. Physically we cannot receive as many tourists as you can in the West. What with the war and the subsequent housing problem, we cannot give priority to hotels over housing.

The main point is that we must rule out entirely outside interference in domestic affairs. We have enough to do in the international area without meddling in each other’s domestic affairs. This is a watershed that we must overcome. The crux of the problem is what solution can be found to deal with the third basket.\(^7\) I hope that the obstacles will be overcome and a common agreement found. We sometimes think that some circles underestimate the strength of our position. No one can hope that we will retreat from this principle and fling it to the floor so that others may meddle in our affairs.

\(^7\) Basket III of CSCE dealt with aspects of humanitarian cooperation between the nations, including cultural and educational exchanges, freer movement of people, freedom of information, and family reunification.
The Secretary: The least dangerous people in the West are the intellectuals.

Mr. Gromyko: You have expressed your sober thoughts in the past. I recognize that you have no interest in attempting to interfere in our domestic affairs. I would say this that if anyone tries, while they might not be medically certifiable, they are politically not normal. These people are divorced from reality. Perhaps you are right that bureaucrats are competing to see who is toughest but they should remember the strength of the diamond because that is how tough we feel on this issue. In short, we must get rid of these artificial problems and get on with the conference.

The Secretary: First, there is merit in this position. The US is in favor of maximum contacts but without the ability to interfere. We recognize that your system will not be transformed by negotiation but that is the limit of the progress we would like to see. Second, how do we move ahead from here. Everyone agrees that there should be contact. There is a question about the use of the phrase “not inconsistent with the laws and customs.” It is much harder to deal with this because it is a domestic political issue in each of our countries. I assume that the Soviets can prevent any contacts they don’t want regardless of what a declaration might say.

Mr. Gromyko: But we don’t want to be in violation of an agreement we have made.

The Secretary: I wonder if it is possible to find some phraseology.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The difficulty is that it is not in the mandate.

Mr. Gromyko: We must find a formula.

The Secretary: Art, can you get this thing going? What are the chances?

Mr. Hartman: We have already suggested several formulations to our Allies but they have been rejected. We have talked in terms of a preamble to Basket Three which would refer back to the principles in Basket One.\(^8\) Perhaps we could beef this one up.

The Secretary: This is all about words.

Mr. Gromyko: There is a principle behind the words (at this point the Secretary referred to Sonnenfeldt and Sisco—saying that if they ever got together he, the Secretary, would be evicted from his office.)

Mr. Gromyko: It all boils down to whether there will be an opening of the door or whether the principle of non-interference will be left intact. This is after all the basis of all our post-war agreements, including

\(^8\) Basket I dealt with European security, territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, inviolability of frontiers, and freedom from the use of force.
the charter of the United Nations. That is the basic issue. All the rest are words. To sum up, we have the question of frontiers, of maneuvers and what is meant by non-interference.

The Secretary: Can we build on the principle of non-interference as agreed at Helsinki and drop the reference to laws and customs? Then we might have something concrete. Which of the countries have guts enough to push us on this?

Mr. Gromyko: Let us try jointly in the next few days to work out an agreed formula. Then it can be brought to the conference. I think it would be better if you introduced it at the conference or are you overawed by the Nine?

The Secretary: You certainly know how to raise my ire on one of my favorite subjects. We should try to work out a formula but I think tactically it might be wiser if you introduced it. Otherwise, we will be accused of collusion.

Mr. Gromyko: But we ought to agree between us.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It might be better for you to introduce it. It would help psychologically.

The Secretary: I am not so sure. I would like to think about who introduces it. The Ambassador has the best idea. We will introduce it and the Soviets will oppose it and then everyone will agree. Why don’t Vorontsov, Art and Walt work on the problem this week and see if we can’t get a formula on non-interference.

Mr. Gromyko: I would now like to exchange views on Berlin. We feel that this question of Berlin is an alarming symptom that the agreements on West Berlin and the Quadripartite Agreement are not being adhered to. There was unanimous agreement that these accords were constructive and a very important step forward. Certain acts, however, by the signatories—the UK, France and the US—I don’t know who takes the initiative—have questioned in my mind where we are going. I don’t know how to distribute the responsibility. Perhaps it is 33 1/3 percent for each but I want you to know that we consider recent actions by the Federal Republic to be in flagrant contradiction to the Quadripartite Agreement and that they are undermining this agreement. We cannot understand that you could sanction the creation in West Berlin by the FRG of a Federal agency dealing with environment. We believe that this is in direct contradiction to the relevant clauses of the Quadripartite Agreement which prohibited the establishment of Federal bodies in Berlin.

At first we thought that these actions were caused by the influence in the FRG of political forces opposed to the Quadripartite Agreement.

9 See footnote 11, Document 55.
We thought that these forces had raised the issue but we want you to know that, even if that is the case and even if promises have been made (that you will protect them), there can be no justification for this act. We thought that the three Western Powers would say no to this proposal. We were amazed when the West on two occasions gave their stamp of approval and attempted to justify this action. We cannot understand what is behind this—on the one hand, the agreements are signed, and then, on the other, they do not appear to have been signed in earnest. We cannot accept that sentiments or expediency justify this action. We reject any references by the FRG to these sentiments or to the fact that the three Western Powers then had to support the FRG action on the basis of these sentiments. I wish to raise this issue as an action which runs counter to the Quadripartite Agreement and leads to its being undermined to a certain degree in the relations among the big powers. It runs counter to our agreed line on Berlin. How can we remedy this situation?

The Secretary: Let me review our legal interpretation. The Quadripartite Agreements provide for new ties between the Federal Republic and Berlin but they prohibit actions which would make the FRG the Government of West Berlin. In the case of the environmental office, it does not operate in Berlin but rather in the Federal Republic even though it is located in Berlin. What should we do?

We are prepared to work out criteria of what is permissible. We would then undertake to veto actions which are contrary to these criteria but we cannot undo this action.

Mr. Gromyko: Whether we can agree on criteria is another matter. It would never be possible for us to agree on criteria when our agreement states flatly that West Berlin cannot be administered by the FRG. How can we deal with this problem?

The Secretary: The agreement doesn't say that West Germany cannot be governed from West Berlin.

Mr. Gromyko: We have a system for calling special meetings to discuss the Quadripartite Agreements. There we can take steps to ensure full implementation. Steps such as this taken by the FRG will certainly produce a reaction in the GDR. They cannot act as a bystander. I hope that the US will take this problem seriously and give it its full attention in order to find a remedy.

The Secretary: I will look into the situation but I must express my regret about any harassment continuing on the autobahn. I would urge you to urge the GDR not to continue this harassment.

Mr. Gromyko: I certainly cannot visualize a situation where the GDR would stand still as a casual bystander. They cannot be indifferent bystanders.
The Secretary: We can talk further about this at dinner. (At the very end the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko met privately for three quarters of an hour.)

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10 No record of either the discussion at dinner or the private meeting has been found.

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159. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 4, 1974, 4:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrey Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs, USSR
Anatoly Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador
Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter
The President
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Walter J. Stoessel, Ambassador to the USSR

During photographs, there was discussion between the President and Mr. Gromyko about the battle of Borodino and the question of who really won the battle. The President concluded that the battle had been a draw. The Secretary remarked that when Napoleon had gone into Russia, he thought the Czar would surrender after the first battle. This had been the pattern at Austerlitz. However, the Russians had not acted in this way.

Mr. Gromyko: Fulfilling my duty, I wish to convey to you, Mr. President, the best greetings from Secretary General Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership. I might say that I think there is some personal feeling in Mr. Brezhnev’s greetings.

How should we conduct our talks today? I have certain things to say on behalf of the Soviet Government and I, of course, would welcome your views.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 71, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Gromyko 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. Brackets are in the original.

2 Borodino and Austerlitz were battles in the Napoleonic Wars, fought on September 7, 1812, and December 2, 1805, respectively.
The President: I think the subjects for discussion are clear for both sides. I would like to hear your Government’s views on bilateral matters, European matters, the Middle East, and on any other matters you may wish to raise. The Foreign Minister, who has already had a chance to talk to the Secretary of State, might raise any of these matters, and I will then add whatever is necessary.

Mr. Gromyko: Good. The best would be if I take up one matter at a time and then hear your remarks on the subject. I will be as brief as possible.

First, I wish to underline that the entire Soviet leadership, the people of the Soviet Union, and General Secretary Brezhnev—whom I saw just yesterday—stand firmly on the positions which were stated in Moscow at the time of your visit in 1972 and here in this country when General Secretary Brezhnev visited in 1973. These positions are reflected in the appropriate treaties and agreements entered into by our two countries. We support both the spirit and the letter of these agreements. In this context and proceeding on this basis, I would like to set forth views on behalf of the Soviet Union. I would appreciate any views you might have as to these general observations.

The President: As I said recently to Ambassador Dobrynin, we on our part are just as thoroughly committed to the spirit and the letter of the agreements reached at the summit. In some areas, there has not been as much progress as we would have liked, but so far as our policy is concerned and the views of our Government, we want to continue to work for the implementation of all the agreements which we made at San Clemente, Camp David and here in Washington.

I am grateful for the good wishes of Secretary Brezhnev and I send my own greetings to him and to his colleagues. I look forward to seeing them at the beginning of the summer.

Mr. Gromyko: We certainly proceed on the assumption that the agreement about the next summit meeting remains valid: that it will be in Moscow, this year, and I can confirm that the month of June would be the most convenient time. We also think that considerable preparatory work is needed for this meeting. For this, we think it would be very useful for the Secretary of State to visit Moscow. I also believe that my own visit at this time to Washington has a direct bearing on the preparations. Both sides must work to prepare very carefully for the meeting in order to guarantee positive results at the summit. These results should at the least be no less positive and meaningful than the re-

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3 See Document 158.
4 See Document 156.
results from your visit to Moscow and Secretary Brezhnev’s visit to the United States.

Secretary Kissinger earlier had thought of coming during the first part of March, but today he suggested coming toward the middle of March. I have asked Mr. Brezhnev’s views about this, since it will have a bearing on his schedule, and I will inform Dr. Kissinger about what he says. I believe there should be no problem. If the reply comes after I leave, then our Chargé will inform Dr. Kissinger.

In talking about the summit, we have some ideas regarding items for the agenda. I made some observations on this subject when I was last in Washington on October 1 of last year [sic], and I also discussed this matter with Secretary Kissinger in Geneva.\(^5\)

We have no specific and polished formulations to present, but the following represents our general ideas about topics:

1. Exchange of views on the main lines of further development of Soviet-American relations in general.
2. Further measures to limit strategic arms and the signature of an agreement or agreements on this subject, if they are ready.
   (Dr. Kissinger interjected that first we will have to make an agreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)
3. Agreement on the cessation of underground nuclear tests.
4. The prohibition of measures hostile to the environment, climate and human health.
5. The Middle East.
6. The question of European security and cooperation.
7. Reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe.
8. The situation in Indo-China (with due regard to the situation as it may exist at the time) assuming discussion is justified.
9. The status and further prospects of trade relations between the US and the Soviet Union. Under this heading would be included the participation of US firms in large-scale projects in the Soviet Union on a compensatory basis. This concerns matters we agreed on but which have not yet been settled. Again, this discussion would be with due regard to the situation as it then exists.
10. The possibility of new arrangements in the field of scientific and technical cooperation.

We don’t consider this list exhaustive and perhaps the questions could be expressed differently. Maybe there are other questions mer-

\(^5\) For the records of Gromyko’s September 28 and December 22, 1973, meetings with Kissinger, see Documents 137 and 155.
iting discussion. Each side of course would be free to add what he
would wish to discuss during the summit.

The President: All of the ideas on this general list are agreeable to
me. We might wish to add subjects later. I hope we will have made
progress on some of the items by then, but, at present, all of them de-
serve consideration.

Mr. Gromyko: I am pleased to hear your remarks. I therefore as-
sume that in this list we have a basis on which we can work, a skeleton
around which we can continue discussions with the view to signing
agreements.

The President: I might add one thing. As you know, there have
been bilateral discussions about energy. This is a very urgent question
for us and for all advanced countries in varying degrees.

I think it would be appropriate, if we agree, to consider how we
might cooperate concerning energy. After all, we are the two most ad-
vanced industrial countries and we have great needs.

Although the Soviet Union will not be at the meeting of the con-
sumer countries here in Washington on February 11, I do not want to
leave any impression that our two countries should not work together
on energy. And here, of course, I do not mean just in the field of de-
velopment of natural gas. We want to consider such things as peaceful
uses of nuclear power and the conversion of coal to gas. Your scientists
are working on these things and I think it would be a good signal to
others if we studied these matters together. So I suggest adding this to
your list of ten.

Mr. Gromyko: Your statement will be considered with the closest
attention by the Soviet leadership. Personally, I feel your suggestion is
very useful. Certainly it is a subject which merits exchanging views at
the next summit. Thereafter, we could have further exchanges about it.

The President: To conclude on this, I don’t want the Soviet leader-
ship to be under any impression that the United States, Western Europe
and Japan will solve these problems themselves. After our conference
in February, as we move toward the summit, we are prepared to move
with the Soviets on the same basis and will not leave the Soviet Union
outside. We will do this if you can agree to move in this direction, and
we will proceed that way at the summit.

Mr. Gromyko: Regardless of various views about the direct
reasons behind the energy crisis, the situation which now exists is of in-
terest to all countries and certainly to the Soviet Union. We understand
its importance.

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6 A reference to the Washington Energy Conference held February 10–13. See For-
I would now like to go to the subject of arms limitation and the possibility of reaching agreement on this subject during the next summit. We are firmly in favor of an agreement being signed next summer. Our interest in a new agreement by no means has diminished—rather the contrary. We feel that both sides are in need of a new agreement.

[The President mentioned the Russian words for “tea” and “please,” saying “I know more Russian than you think.” Gromyko said: “I always suspected it.” Coffee and tea were served.]

General Secretary Brezhnev asked me to emphasize that we are now working energetically on this problem in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on political aspects, and in the military area. We are weighing various alternatives and possibilities. I know you are doing the same. You have already given us a few different ideas, and I also gave some to Secretary Kissinger in Geneva. All of this is very complicated but also very important. We must approach the stage where we can get together on a joint agreement and sign it.

I don’t feel I need to set out in detail our preliminary concepts. We don’t have as yet a final version of our approach, but we will move ahead and are close to completion.

Also, Secretary Brezhnev wanted me to tell you that recently he has not been able to get into the details of these problems since he was sick and had a little flu before he went to Cuba. Now, when he gets back to Moscow, he will get into the details.

The President: Dr. Kissinger also has not been feeling too well. That’s why I wanted him to delay his trip to Moscow.

We have been working hard on this question ourselves and it has been considered at the highest level here. We will have another meeting about it in the next two weeks. This is the most difficult subject of all since it goes to the heart of the security of both nations in limiting offensive weapons.

In the Congress, our Vietnam doves have become nuclear hawks about the Soviet Union. This is purely political, of course. We will handle this, just as we will handle our own military. I know that you, too, have a problem with the military, as Mr. Brezhnev said.

This is a matter of the highest priority and I will give it my personal attention.

Secretary Kissinger: It is important that we synchronize what is said in various forums. We will advance general ideas in Geneva, but these will not necessarily be our last word. We will pursue this through our usual channels or in Moscow when I come.

Mr. Gromyko: We will proceed from the assumption that the more delicate aspects of the problem will be handled as they were in the past, and of course this has been justified by practice.
In short, you would be correct if you concluded that the Soviet Union is anxious to reach an agreement in this area and to sign it at the summit. This would be of importance on the international scale as well.

Only one condition needs to be met in our view, as it was met in the earlier agreement, and that is that neither side’s security interests should be harmed. Neither side should take a unilateral advantage at the expense of the other.

Now I would like to refer to another matter which is in a way linked to this question although it is mentioned separately in our list. That is the problem of ending underground atomic testing. As you know, we already have a treaty, but we have not considered this question for a long time. Let us look at it again. Obviously, it should be possible to reach a mutually acceptable agreement on this problem. If this could be done at the summit it would have great significance and positive repercussions throughout the world. It would confirm the line of policy which both countries have taken in our relations.

Of course, we are aware that some other nuclear countries continue nuclear testing and may not want to agree to such an accord between us. We also know that a series of questions would arise, including the possible duration of such an agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: As I understand from Ambassador Dobrynin the other evening, you might consider limiting the number of tests, not just stopping tests altogether.

Mr. Gromyko: We are open-minded.

Secretary Kissinger: This would help our preparations.

The President: We haven’t considered it yet, but it would give us some bargaining room.

Mr. Gromyko: On European affairs, I would like to recall the understanding reached in the relevant US-Soviet documents, and also in talks between you and Mr. Brezhnev on the theme of Europe and the CSCE.

I went into more detail about this with the Secretary this morning, but, briefly, I would like to say that we are not completely satisfied with the progress in Geneva. We feel that some countries are artificially dragging their heels. We don’t know the reason for this. Perhaps some countries want to find ways to interfere with the internal affairs of the Soviet Union—or perhaps it would be better to say of the Socialist countries in general and the Soviet Union especially. I don’t know how to explain this. Perhaps there are some naive people who think they could divert the Soviet Union from its course, or perhaps there are other reasons.

7 See Document 157.
I would like to underline that we feel that there are unjustified delays in the conference and we are not happy about it. We hope that the US can find ways of exerting its influence in Geneva on those who are dragging things out. We think you are able to do this, so as to achieve a positive outcome. We think this would be in the best interests of everyone and it would benefit US-Soviet relations. There is no need to go into detail.

Lastly, I would say that we hope that the possibility mentioned by you and Mr. Brezhnev regarding the holding of the final stage of the conference at the highest level could be realized. This would have enormous international significance. Secretary Brezhnev wanted me to underline this especially. We believe it would be a good thing to complete the agreements of the Conference at the highest level. This would be of historical importance for the world at large and especially for the US and the Soviet Union. I would appreciate your comment on SALT and the conference.

The President: I have already commented on SALT. As I said, our intentions are to reach agreement at the summit and this will have my personal attention.

About dragging feet at Geneva, this does not apply to the US. We are not doing this. I remember when Mr. Brezhnev pressed me at Camp David to agree to conclude the conference by the end of the year and I said this could be our goal but we can’t commit others. That is still true.

As at Camp David, I would say that we want agreement at the Conference and, if they merit it, they could be signed at the highest level. We remain committed to that.

Dr. Kissinger will look into the question of who is dragging feet at Geneva, and see what can be done.

I know there are language problems at Geneva. If you could be flexible, we would have a better chance of influencing our allies. However, our two countries are together in their approach at Geneva; the problem lies with some of the allies.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly. As I explained, some of the allies want to use the Conference to reform the domestic system of the Soviet Union, which is unrealistic since they failed to do so in several wars.

We agreed this morning on a procedure and we will try to work out some language. Then it will be a question of tactics as to how this should be presented at Geneva. Stoessel, Sonnenfeldt and Hartman will work with Vorontsov and someone else from the Soviet Embassy. They should find a formula this week.

The President: We are not dragging our feet. You want us not to drag our feet but rather to kick someone else in the tail.

Mr. Gromyko: We just want you to nudge them.
The President: When I think of the language worked out by Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt on world problems, it should be possible for us to get together on this matter.

Of course, we have our own ideas about your system and you have your ideas about ours, but we are not trying to change yours.

It is a question of how honest a person like Jackson is who seems to want to change the Soviet system—and here I speak as an old cold warrior myself.

Mr. Gromyko: If there are such people—and there must be, judging by the obstructions in Geneva—either they have lost all feeling of realism and are unable to see what is possible and what is not possible, or they are real opponents of détente. I was asking Secretary Kissinger can there really exist people who are oblivious to the results of WW II?

I agree with most of what you have said and I see you are against procrastinating. We need a little more coordination and we will work with Dr. Kissinger to see what can be done to speed things up.

Now, about the Middle East. Here I probably will say some things which are not too pleasant for you.

The President: The Middle East is not pleasant for anyone.

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to make a deal with our Soviet friends to turn over the Israelis to them.

Mr. Gromyko: In what form would you turn them over?

On the positive side, we can say there is no war in the Middle East at present. This is largely the result of our joint actions. However, many problems remain unsolved. The occupation of Arab lands by Israel still continues.

I would like to say the following: we reached agreement to have the Geneva conference and we felt everyone could heave a sigh of relief that a forum had been found by which the achievement of a solution became possible. But what happened: After the Ministers left the conference became paralyzed. And when the question arose about the separation of forces the US decided to act without the Soviet Union.

This is something which caused us great surprise. What happened to our agreement that the conference would be under the auspices of the US and the Soviet Union? In fact, it mattered not a bit; it turned out that this was an empty and meaningless gesture.

This throws a shadow on our agreement and on the prospects for the future. If this important agreement could be violated, there is no guarantee that this could not happen again on another subject.

We in the Soviet leadership ask why this step was taken. It was contrary to repeated assurances that we needed to work in a coordinated way in the Middle East in the interests of peace and guided by
the long-term interests in peace of both our countries, and by the principle not to inflict harm to the other side’s interests and security. All this has been thrown aside and the US decided to take matters into its own hands and to act in circumvention of the agreement. This was breached and the US acted unilaterally.

If we had wanted to act in the same way to trip the US up on some Middle East matters, we could have done so. We could have found Arab leaders to work with us. But we did not take this course. This is plain speaking. It is for you to judge who gained and who lost. We feel that you lost.

If we acted together, the progress would have been better. It would have been better for you, for us, for Israel, Egypt, Syria, and for everyone.

We don’t understand why the US, for interim gains, decided to act in this way, why you sacrificed the long term for the short term.

We favor joint action with the US to ensure that all questions relating to the Middle East could be taken up jointly. This would include Syria. As to the forms, level, timing of action, these details could be agreed between us.

In short, the US action was a surprise. The situation can only be rectified by joint efforts by both sides.

Now, I would like to hear your views.

The President: First, a general comment. War in the Middle East is detrimental to the interests of both the US and the Soviet Union. Permanent peace is possible in the Middle East only if it is supported by the Soviet Union and the US.

This is a general observation. The Foreign Minister indicates that more progress could have been made if there had been more coordination between the Soviet Union and the US in the difficult negotiations for disengagement. Maybe so. But, we have disengagement now, which is the first time Israel has withdrawn from anything. This is important.

But there should be no impression we are trying for a big settlement in the Middle East with the Soviet Union on the outside looking in. I would go back to my earlier remarks—a permanent peace can only be obtained with the Soviet Union and the US. As you say, you could have blocked things.

I told the Ambassador previously that we had testing times in the Middle East. We should do better in the future. I talked with Dr. Kissinger this morning about this. We should have closer coordination on the talks in Geneva and in other ways.

The Soviets can play a role in other ways in addition to what they can do with the Syrians. We have one interest, and that is to bring about permanent peace.
We don’t intend to have American domination in the Middle East. We believe both the US and the Soviet Union have interests in the Middle East and we do not need to be in conflict. Both should play a role.

I accept your criticism. There was an impression given in our press that the US was trying to make this a one-man show and cut the Soviets out.

My intent at least was to get the thing done. To achieve disengagement, the best way was to proceed as we did.

However, looking to the future, we don’t want to jeopardize our relations with the Soviet Union on other things by any failure on our part to consult about the Middle East.

Secretary Kissinger: We had a brief discussion this morning. I will see the Foreign Minister again tomorrow and we will discuss this. The problem is how to relate strategy to tactics.

In Israel, where the Soviets have no representation, we can work more easily than the Soviets can. We should look concretely at who can do what in each case. We have no interest in proceeding unilaterally.

The President: The main thing is to get it done so that we both are not dragged by small and sometimes irresponsible powers into unnecessary conflict.

I know that the Soviets have a certain position about the Palestinians. This is a problem and in our opinion it would be like a loose cannon on the deck. It could blow up the possibilities which now exist.

In any case, I heard the Foreign Minister’s plain talk clearly and I will talk the same way. Our goal—unequivocally—is, first, to achieve a settlement. Second, we recognize that the Soviet Union’s cooperation in this and other areas is vital. It is essential if it is to last. But, as Dr. Kissinger says, we must discuss tactics. Some areas we can get into where you can’t. Some you can get into where we can’t. We must consider this.

Mr. Gromyko: Mr. President, you emphasize that the main objective is to achieve a lasting settlement and not simply a partial one like disengagement.

Now, we agreed on convening the Geneva conference on the Middle East and if we act correctly all questions could be discussed and solved there. On some things, if we agree in advance, one side could talk with one of the parties. You could do this with Israel and we could do this with Egypt or Syria. But joint efforts are required by us both. Let us try to put this into effect.

Secretary Kissinger: I will follow up on this.

Mr. Gromyko: There are two other matters I would like to raise.
First, I would like to know your views about economic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. I am familiar in general with the factual situation. We talked about this with Dr. Kissinger in Geneva. We appreciate your personal efforts, Mr. President, especially about MFN. But I would be interested in your assessment.

Secondly—and this goes beyond the framework of bilateral matters—I would say that there is nothing new in our relations with China in any sense of improvement. You know about our statements of readiness to improve relations with China. They have been published. We received no positive response to them. So, our relations are in bad shape. But you mustn’t applaud this. Many US visitors go to China these days, and I am sure you are familiar with Chinese views. I would be interested in anything you might say on this subject as a continuation of your talk with Secretary Brezhnev about it.

(Secretary Kissinger left the room at this point.)

The President: Concerning MFN, I would be less than candid if I said there is no problem. We are continuing to work at it. I will indicate my support in a symbolic way by giving a dinner for Patolichev and Kendall when they are here in Washington.8

We are working on this, but without immediate hope for success in Congress. We are trying to keep the credits alive.

I know your interest in a long-term economic agreement and we are looking at this.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Yes, Secretary Shultz will be prepared to move ahead on this with Patolichev.

The President: We want to do something that means something at the summit.

I am committed to MFN, but it is a sticky problem and we must continue to work at it until it is resolved.

About China, there is nothing much new to say. The idea that someone should applaud differences between the Soviet Union and China is really rather foolish. If one wanted differences, the most stupid way would be to applaud. About our own very young relationship with the PRC, it is primarily in the fields of trade and exchanges. We will continue this in the future. We can’t leave out a billion people, just as you can’t. I know that Mr. Brezhnev understands this.

I have given you assurances on all of this previously.

We won’t be so foolish when two superpowers are engaged in a constructive dialogue—and we have problems and lots of fish to fry—to let any other country jeopardize this dialogue. Just as you wouldn’t.

The Soviet Union itself is a Pacific power and you understand why we should develop communication with the PRC. This is not done with any idea that it is at the expense of the Soviet Union. We recognize at this time in history that what the Soviet Union and the United States are able to do will determine the future. This is our first priority.

Mr. Gromyko: Thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to talk with you and the time you have given and what you have said.

In accordance with your comment, Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to take up in more detail some of these questions with us. I will join him in such an exchange of views with pleasure.

May I ask if you have any message for Secretary Brezhnev? What should I tell him about things here when I enter his office?

The President: You can say that we remember his visit with pleasure and everywhere he traveled people remember it with great pleasure. Despite the fact that some people for political reasons, as in Western Europe, are trying to discount Soviet-US relations, I know what our best interests are just as Mr. Brezhnev does for the Soviet Union.

Our relations are strong now and they must be strengthened. This is vital for the peace of the world, despite what politicians and the press say.

Personally, I would tell the General Secretary he should not drive too fast. I remember at Camp David when he drove his new car with me in it down the one lane road. I was frightened to death we would meet a Marine in a jeep coming the other way and there would be an international incident. But I know that he is a very good driver.

I hope that when we meet again that we will have an opportunity not only for serious talk but also for easy talk. We like each other personally, but what really counts is the progress we can make on tough issues.

Mr. Gromyko: I agree. I will convey your words to the General Secretary. I would like to say that we appreciate the fact that you have appointed an Ambassador to the Soviet Union who knows our country so well. He will be welcome there.

The President: Yes, he is a good man, and he also has a very attractive wife.

The President accompanied Mr. Gromyko and his party to his car outside the West Lobby and wished him well. The Foreign Minister departed the White House at 6:35 p.m.
160. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 5, 1974, noon–1:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
The Middle East; Berlin; Europe; Viet-Nam; Kissinger Trip

[The Secretary arrived at 12:00 and was ushered upstairs to meet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin. The Ambassador then left. There was a brief photo opportunity. Then brandy was served.]

Gromyko: [to Viktor]: Armenian brandy?
Sukhodrev: Yes.
Gromyko: Just a short time ago I visited the Armenian Republic.
Kissinger: It is very good. It is one of the places I would most like to visit.
Gromyko: Leningrad too.
Kissinger: I will never see Leningrad!
Gromyko: It is, as they say in diplomatic words, a guarantee.
Kissinger: I will never see it! Although it is better to see it in the summer. Once when I went as a tourist, I saw it in February. It was colder. It was impressive—and very sinister.
Gromyko: Very impressive.
Kissinger: And also very sinister.
Gromyko: It was described by Dostoevsky. What is called the White Nights.2

The Middle East
Kissinger: Let us talk about the Middle East.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 71, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Gromyko 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. Brackets are in the original.

2 A reference to the time during the summer in the high northern latitudes when darkness is not complete, as described in Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky’s 1848 short story “White Nights.”
Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: We are in principle prepared for coordinated action. What we would like to do is also ask the opinion—which I am sure will be favorable—of the Syrians, and the Israelis—they won’t be favorable—and the Egyptians. In fairness we should ask their view. But we will tell them we are prepared in principle for coordinated action.

Gromyko: What do you mean by “agreed in principle?”

Kissinger: That we inform each other, and act in coordination, and when appropriate, that we act jointly.

Gromyko: “When appropriate?”

Kissinger: In Jerusalem, it would not be. For example, if—or when—you go to the Middle East, I will not come along.

Gromyko: The crux of the matter is not in who can or cannot go to a certain place or city, because I have had a repeated invitation to visit Egypt, Syria, Algeria. That is not a matter of principle.

Kissinger: No.

Gromyko: The crux of the matter is not in who can or cannot go to a certain place or city, because I have had a repeated invitation to visit Egypt, Syria, Algeria. That is not a matter of principle.

Kissinger: No.

Gromyko: But if I go I will say that all matters pertaining to the Middle East must be discussed by Egypt, Syria, the Soviet Union, the United States, Jordan. What you will say, I don’t know. But that is the issue—that is the line.

Kissinger: I am prepared to say that. The only qualification—I have no reason to think it will arise—is if Syria or Israel say they don’t want these discussions. Israel you have no diplomatic relations with.

Gromyko: In theory that is a possibility, but I doubt it will happen. Kissinger: I do too.

Gromyko: But you should set out your own opinion, which is that all these questions should be discussed by all parties. Let the parties say that all these questions should be discussed. We [the Soviet Union] always say that we will discuss on a bilateral basis between us. Always we stress this—the U.S., Egypt, Syria, Jordan.

May I say this when I go to Moscow?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: It is a question of confidence.

Kissinger: Yes. We will do it in consultation with the Soviet Union. I am telling you this.

Gromyko: Consultation, and as far as the settlement of the question, a joint understanding?

Kissinger: Yes.

It means that both sides have to show understanding. Taking rigid positions will complicate the situation. I told you this.

What we don’t want is for you to wind up as the lawyer of the Arabs and we wind up as the lawyer of Israel. We should act in a
common interest. If you keep telling the Arabs “We are more for you than the Americans,” then we have to protect our interests. But if we both show a general understanding, it will not arise.

Gromyko: This by no means implies that I will say, for example tomorrow, that we agree fifty percent with the Arabs and fifty percent with Israel.

Kissinger: No, no.

Gromyko: Obviously there will be cases on which we have greater sympathy with one side, and occasions when we have sympathy with the other side. And that goes for you, too. But we should strive for a mutual understanding; that is what the Geneva Conference is all about.

Kissinger: What about your relations with Israel?

Gromyko: Do you seriously believe that a normalization of our relations, or the achievement of more normal relations, will be helpful?

Kissinger: Yes, I do.

Gromyko: From the point of view of our purely domestic situation, up to now our public opinion is certainly unprepared for anything of that kind, for the material implementation of that idea. Lately the situation, the unilateral actions of the U.S., has not created conditions conducive to that idea. So I cannot now say anything definite on the situation in that regard. If we did, the Arabs might—may—be certainly very critical of us, and that would complicate the situation for both of us.

As regards your advice, we will certainly take it into account and I will talk to the General Secretary about this. I will tell him your opinion. But there certainly should be some substantial advance in the Middle East situation. So it is hard indeed to give a positive response now to that question. I am sure you understand our position.

Kissinger: But it would help joint action. Because up to now only we can act in Israel.

Gromyko: Up to now nothing was done with joint action.

Kissinger: Let’s take the case of Syria, which is the acute issue now. The Syrians have made a proposal. Like every first Arab proposal, it did not extend itself in the direction of taking account of the Israeli point of view. It won’t be acceptable. I think they know that. But let’s not worry about that. The Israelis will not negotiate without the lists of prisoners and Red Cross visits. They don’t want their release, just the lists and visits. It is hard to say it is an unreasonable requirement.

Gromyko: What is the reaction of the Syrians?

Kissinger: Up to now they have refused.

I have told the Israelis that maybe the Syrians are afraid that after they give the lists there would be no plan from the Israelis. But I can assure you they will give me a plan. I have not seen it; I do not have it. But after they get the lists they will give me a plan.
Gromyko: If we agree on joint action, we should discuss it.
Kissinger: That is no problem. When I have something we will
discuss it.
Gromyko: You can discuss it with our Ambassador here. He will
be going away but you can discuss it with the Chargé [Vorontsov].
Kissinger: Is he informed?
Gromyko: He is. He will be, in the course of the negotiations.
Kissinger: That is the only solution. Our Ambassador [Stoessel]
will not be there until the 17th. But we have confidence in him. That is
why he was selected.
Gromyko: With regard to Syria, everything should be taken up
and discussed through the application of this method, and everything
that arises should be considered in the framework of the Geneva Con-
ference. If something is discussed on a bilateral basis, even this should
be considered as in the framework of the Geneva Conference. If some-
thing should come up on a higher level, we should not exclude that you
and I could come to Geneva and look it over.
Kissinger: We don’t exclude that.
What we will resist—so there is no misunderstanding—is if we
think you are trying to drive us in the direction of the Arabs. You have
not done this.
Gromyko: We have not.
Kissinger: No.
Gromyko: And vice versa. We should not try to trip each other up.
Kissinger: Yes.
When the talks themselves take place, the Syrians want us to do it
all. It cannot be done. The Syrians have to talk to the Israelis. They can
do it as a part of the Egyptian delegation. But we cannot do the whole
negotiation.
And when the Syrians and Israelis talk, we think for the sake of the
Israelis it is better that a UN man be present but our two ambassadors
should be in the closest contact. I will send Bunker there and he will be
in touch with Vinogradov.
Gromyko: I don’t understand this. We just agree on something and
now you say Israel and Syria will talk and our ambassadors just talk.
Kissinger: They will exchange ideas.
Gromyko: It is not the same.
Kissinger: Because of their [the Israelis’] mistrust of you.
Gromyko: Are they worried about security? How many nuclear
weapons do they have?
Kissinger: After diplomatic relations.
Gromyko: How can we do it with such an attitude of theirs?
We cannot understand. Such an approach is contrary to the readiness to have a normalization of relations. Without something positive, our public and our leadership could not accept. And to discuss within the framework of the Conference we agreed on, this cannot be.

Kissinger: I have to discuss it with them.

Gromyko: Then discuss it with them. If you inform us, we would appreciate it.

Kissinger: I will inform you in a couple of days.

Gromyko: I was a neighbor of the Israelis at Geneva. But not to have meetings—what secrets do they have?

Kissinger: It is not a question of secrets, because presumably the Syrians would tell you everything that was discussed.

Gromyko: It is a question of confidence. Certainly some degree of confidence should exist between the participants, even Israel and the Soviet Union. We are pleased knowing about the reaction in Israel to our statement at the Geneva Conference. They interpreted it correctly.

Kissinger: It was a favorable reaction. Under what conditions would diplomatic relations be reestablished?

Gromyko: When there is substantive advance toward a settlement of the substance of the problem.

Kissinger: Would you consider a Syrian disengagement agreement a substantive advance?

Gromyko: It must be a living process, not a dead process. They say: “We don’t even want to be present with Soviet representatives.” This I will tell my colleagues.

Kissinger: You can tell your colleagues that if there is a reestablishment of diplomatic relations, then they will be present.

Gromyko: I will not repeat the old story about the horse and cart. Israel doesn’t want to discuss the problem in the framework of the Geneva Conference in the presence of the Soviet Union. My colleagues would regard it as an insult; I personally would regard it as an insult.

Kissinger: We will discuss it with them.

Gromyko: All matters daily we should be in constant consultation.

Kissinger: All right.

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3 In his statement on December 22, Gromyko pledged the Soviet Union to assist in eliminating the tension in the Middle East. He insisted that Israeli troop withdrawal from the occupied territories was key to peace and cooperation in the region.
Berlin

Gromyko: On West Berlin, I think you underestimate the consequences of certain actions of the Federal Republic. We have relations with them; we do not want a worsening of relations. But we now are witnessing certain forces in West Germany which are pressing the Government and the Government does not have the stamina to resist. They take steps contrary to the Four-Power Agreement. And as to the Three Powers, we regret they did not show a minimum of respect and loyalty to the Four-Power Agreement and the Soviet Union. Only because the Federal Republic took this step, they say “We agree.” Now the representatives of West Germany say: “If you take certain steps in regard to communications you will be responsible for the consequences.” I do not want to use harsh words, but it is strange statements by West Germany. It is not only to the Democratic Republic but to the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: We were told by the West Germans that you are responsible.

Gromyko: It touches not only the Democratic Republic but the Soviet Union. So I would like to ask you to look into the situation. Maybe you have not had time.

Kissinger: I have looked into it. The original decision was made before I became Secretary of State, in August or September. The legal decision of the Federal Republic was that it is not a constitutional body. It does not make laws, only studies. I am just telling you the [their] legal position. The agreement only prohibits governmental functions.

That is the legal position; let us look at the real position.

I believe we should be more careful about these bodies in the future. We should look at their functions. And we should look at the governmental bodies. But we can’t retroactively withdraw our approval. This would create an enormous crisis in our relations with the Federal Republic.

Gromyko: It would not be enough. Because the representatives of the Federal Republic will always say: “This is the law, this is the precedent.” The immediate task is not to materialize it [sic], not just to worry about the future. Otherwise there is a violation of the Four-Power Agreement. No matter what its body and functions, it represents the power, the power of the Federal Republic and the state, the state. They represent this attitude.

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Kissinger: I have to examine it in light of what you have said. I don’t think it can be reversed from our side, but we can prevent similar occurrences.

Gromyko: For us it is a serious matter, and it is only to defend the agreement. There is no other way.

Kissinger: You will show restraint in what you do.

Gromyko: What is restraint? Up to now we have been hoping something would be done on the other side to remedy the situation. Even the Democratic Republic was going to take action but did not. So we are doing this. But for us there is no other way but to make certain conclusions.

I do not touch the broader aspects of this matter, because it, too, is just a question of confidence. One year and a half, and the agreement has been violated.

In West Germany there are two political parties, but for us it is a state. If the Government reflects the quality of West Germany as a sovereign state, then it has expressed its will in the agreement, no matter whether the other political party demands modification.

I have tried to put forward arguments in favor of our estimation of the situation. I discussed with the General Secretary our position as well. He asked me, told me, to stress this very candidly, hoping that you personally would pay attention to this.

If you have something on this, we would appreciate it as soon as possible.

Kissinger: I will be in touch with the German Foreign Minister next week, when he comes here [for the Energy Conference].

Europe

Gromyko: I may visit in mid-February Paris and Rome. I tell you preliminarily I may go. I was invited long ago, but my schedule was crowded. Not to go specially, but just to consult, and probably I will work for both of us.

If you have any wishes for me in connection with my forthcoming conversation with Jobert . . .

Kissinger: No. We will ignore him. He wants a confrontation with me, to get him publicity in Paris.

Gromyko: Don’t think it is different with me.

Kissinger: No, he has the same attitude towards you. He does not discriminate against us. What can we do?

You will be aware of the fact that whatever you say to Jobert he will go to the Middle East with, for his own benefit.

Gromyko: You may be sure that whatever we talk with you will be considered confidential between us; it is essential. He, and if I see Pom-
pidou, will express one or another form of dissatisfaction. Not only with your actions, but the different aspects. It is not the first time. They don’t like it when we do something together.

Did Sadat say anything about the French connection?

Kissinger: No. At first he tried to involve them in the Geneva Conference. But not lately.

**Middle East**

Gromyko: By the way, you and we did not recall the one question we discussed when you were in Moscow: the question of guarantees. Then we reached an understanding in principle about the role.

Kissinger: We said we were prepared to give guarantees. We don’t insist on it. It depends on what the parties want.

Gromyko: Did you discuss it?

Kissinger: I don’t know what the Arabs want. The Israelis are not enthusiastic.

Gromyko: They rely on their own arms!

Kissinger: They are prepared to discuss it when there is a final settlement. They are afraid the guarantees will be used as a substitute for . . .

Gromyko: We are talking about fulfillment. Something must be guaranteed. What will be guaranteed? Fulfillment of the agreement.

Kissinger: We have never discussed it with the Arabs. Our discussions with the Arabs are much less intimate than you could judge from the time we spent on them. Most of the time was spent on the details of disengagement.

Gromyko: What is your attitude toward guarantees if the parties agree?

Kissinger: We are prepared.

Gromyko: Guarantees of the fulfillment of the agreement.

Kissinger: That the agreement will not be broken.

Gromyko: I feel you are slow in your reaction.

Kissinger: No, I am trying to figure out what you have in mind. That without the parties having agreed, the two parties can intervene . . . Can you give me an example?

Gromyko: That certain articles out of the X articles of the agreement are not fulfilled, and country A is not doing it. Then we say: “You’re an honorable country; you are doing something wrong.”

Kissinger: Then you have a violation of the agreement. What we don’t want is intervention of outside powers without the request of the parties.

Give me another example; then I can react more.
Gromyko: Suppose something is wrong on the understanding on Jerusalem; one of the parties doesn’t fulfill it adequately. We should take heed of it, should draw attention to it.

Kissinger: We should draw attention, yes.

We do not exclude participation in guarantees if the parties concerned request it, and then we have to work out the text of the guarantees.

Gromyko: First you say if they agree; then if they request.

Kissinger: It amounts to the same thing.

Gromyko: It should say “unless they disagree.”

Kissinger: Well, we won’t impose guarantees on parties against their will.

Gromyko: I detect a lack of enthusiasm.

Kissinger: No, it is a lack of imagination. I don’t know what you have in mind. If they request it, we can give it. If they say nothing, we can offer it. But not if they don’t want it.

Gromyko: That is too theoretical. Maybe even more for you than for me, guarantees can be something useful. The same for us—Egypt and Syria. You say: “If you ask strongly, maybe we agree.” But we can say, “Look, gentlemen”—and in one case, Madame—“we think it is useful.”

Kissinger: I think it is premature to go into details about it.

Gromyko: Detail? It is not detail.

Kissinger: See, you have a big plan for the Middle East. I am not a big planner; I have to let the situation develop. [Gromyko smiles]

Gromyko: When will we review the Middle East situation again? When you come?

Kissinger: Definitely.

Gromyko: But not before.

Kissinger: We are now working on the Syria matter. When I get a response, I will let Vorontsov know.

Gromyko: Good. On Syria we will work . . .

Kissinger: . . . together. Will you let us know what their response is?

Europe

Gromyko: Yes. Are there any other Western European developments?

Kissinger: Did I tell you about my conversation with Asad? How at the end of a long discussion he finally said there was one sentence in the letter [to Waldheim] that he objected to—the one that said Syria agreed to come?
Gromyko: You told me.
Kissinger: Any Western European developments? No. Are you thinking of anything in particular that should refresh my memory?
Gromyko: What is the goal of the Nine? To establish a superstate in Europe?
Kissinger: Yes.
Gromyko: Or just a collection of sovereign states?
Kissinger: They want a united foreign and defense policy.
Gromyko: Do the French agree?
Kissinger: The French are pushing it. We are not supporting it. We are not yet opposing it but we are not supporting it.
Gromyko: When is it scheduled?
Kissinger: Five years.
Gromyko: The French are always sensitive to this nuclear problem. West Germany.
Kissinger: First they will combine with Britain.
Gromyko: They will participate?
Kissinger: That is the logic of events. A combined foreign policy, economic policy, and defense policy.
Gromyko: What is behind it? What is the main factor that guides the French?
Kissinger: Political assertiveness. Self-assertion.
Gromyko: Self-assertion. To be stronger against you.
Kissinger: And you. It is directed at us both. It is not very well thought through. They want our protection so they can carry out an anti-American foreign policy.
Gromyko: Double security.
Kissinger: It is good if they can get it.
Gromyko: And they think they are angels.
Kissinger: They think you are the devil but that we will run the risks.
Gromyko: They see you as an angel.
Kissinger: We are considered children; they think they can play with us.
Gromyko: Jobert . . .
Kissinger: He thinks he is smarter than we.
Gromyko: Jobert, whenever you talk with him, it is in so complicated a way.
Kissinger: And nothing ever happens after you talk with him. This is what I’ve found.
Gromyko: He doesn’t like any kind of joint action between us even for peace.
Kissinger: But he has no alternative.
Gromyko: No constructive alternative.
Kissinger: But he’s in the great tradition of French diplomacy. Since Napoleon, other than de Gaulle...
Gromyko: Napoleon III?
Kissinger: Napoleon III united Germany and Italy and made France a second-rate power. It may have been inevitable, but the French didn’t have to do it.

After World War I, the Rhineland was the key. They had to keep Germany in the east; all it took was to move into the Rhineland.
Gromyko: When will they conclude the treaty, China and Japan?
Kissinger: My impression, when I was in China, is that their relations go very slowly.

What is your impression of what goes on in China?
Gromyko: It is something like the Cultural Revolution, with Mao behind it.
Kissinger: I must tell you, when I was at a dinner, I started discussing Confucius and all the Chinese at my table started shaking and getting nervous. I couldn’t understand why my general discussion of an old philosopher had this effect. I was just making conversation.
Gromyko: Maybe they draw a parallel between Confucious and somebody living.

Then we pay attention to a statement by Teng Hsiao-ping. Now he is, I think, a deputy of Chou En-lai. He said: “I received a Japanese delegation because Chou is not a young man and it’s difficult for him.” And he made remarks hostile to the Soviet Union. We don’t know what it means, this rearranging of the military. This process going on—there is no stability.
Kissinger: No stability.
But nothing has changed in our relationship and there are no military discussions of any kind. Dobrynin asked about helicopters. There are discussions going on; they wanted some, but it was very few.
Gromyko: It is not an easy situation there for contacts.
Kissinger: Very difficult. They’re very open in a very restricted group with me. But no contact with the people. Maybe we can discuss it further in Moscow.

5 Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Republic from January 1959 to April 1969.
6 Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping), Vice Premier of the PRC State Council.
Viet-Nam

Gromyko: Any news from Viet-Nam?
Kissinger: No.
Gromyko: Comparative quiet.
Kissinger: Comparatively quiet. If there is a major offensive, we will have to do something. But if it stays as it is, we won’t do anything.

[They get up and walk downstairs.]

Gromyko: Our interest is in quiet and in fulfillment of the Agreement.
Kissinger: And any influence you can use . . .
Gromyko: And this is a constant.

Kissinger Trip

[Dobrynin comes out to say goodbye.]
Kissinger: Shall I plan to arrive on the evening of the 17th?
Gromyko: Certainly.
Kissinger: It will be about three days?
Gromyko: The General Secretary said as much time as is necessary. Four to five days if needed.

Kissinger: You think we will have serious talks on SALT? There almost have to be.
Gromyko: Yes.
Kissinger: Because if there are . . .
I am looking very seriously at this. Anatoliy will confirm. Jackson and our military are now a united front. I will bring something concrete.

If we do this, it will probably be four days.
What dates did you suggest?
Dobrynin: The 18th or 19th.
Kissinger: Then I will come the evening of the 18th.
Gromyko: Probably Zavidovo.
Kissinger: Good.
161. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
Washington Post Luncheon

PARTICIPANTS
Department of State
The Secretary
George S. Vest, Special Assistant for Press Relations
Washington Post
Benjamin Bradlee—Executive Director
Howard Simons—Managing Editor
Philip Geyelin—Editorial Page Editor
Meg Greenfield—Editorial Page Duty Editor
Steve Rosenfeld—Editorial Page
Richard Harwood—Assistant Managing Editor For National Affairs
Philip Foisie—Assistant Managing Editor For Foreign Affairs
Lee Lescaze—Assistant Foreign Editor
Ronald Koven—Correspondent
Murray Marder—Correspondent
Marilyn Berger—Correspondent
Dan Morgan—Correspondent

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

Question: What’s happening to détente and what are the Soviets up to?

The Secretary: There has been much argument over who has gained what in the process of détente. You should keep in mind that the Soviets could ask themselves rather searching questions about whether they have gained enough in the process. Grain, yes, they did gain. It was not discussed at the Summit between the President and Brezhnev. But they did put one over on us because of a bumbling bureaucracy. But except for the wheat deal what have they gotten out of détente?

In this country some liberal groups seem unwilling to accept any monument to an achievement by this administration.

I think we have to assess in which direction Soviet attitudes are moving. I think I can detect a certain chill in Soviet attitudes. They are faced with a lot of problems when they look at the course of affairs inside the U.S. and even a compromise with Jackson on MFN may not

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1028, Presidential/HAK MemCons, MemCons—HAK & Presidential, March 1–May 8, 1974 [3 of 4]. Limited Official Use. This meeting, held at the Washington Post building, was conducted on a deep background basis.
save détente; without a compromise it is hard to foresee what might happen to détente. As for the form of a compromise, I can’t say now, that is really up to Jackson and Ribicoff.

On SALT, I agree with your editorial. Jackson’s pressure was a major factor in increased Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, but beyond a certain point it is not helpful. On SALT, I don’t negotiate with Jackson. We will pay no price in that area in order to get MFN. SALT affects the future of this country for the next fifteen years and we just will not play with it.

I have no difference with Schlesinger—although people try to impute problems to us. He has a different constituency from mine. I have no evidence that he does not see the basic problems of SALT in the same way I do. We have breakfast together every week, plus other frequent meetings together with Colby and Moorer. And there are verification panel meetings which are used to bring out all technical viewpoints. I consider him an ally.

As for a chill with the Soviets, I should emphasize that there are no Soviet actions yet that you can really judge by, it is just a gut feeling, the way communications are addressed, the number of them and this rather lengthy absence of Dobrynin. What could happen next? It could take some form of stiff opposition from the Soviets in all international forums, but most immediately in the Middle East making it difficult to proceed as we do, a push for reactivation of the Geneva Conference, increased détente efforts with the Europeans and an effort to create differences between us and the Europeans. I repeat, it has not showed up as yet. Maybe they’re only waiting for me to get there. Gromyko’s pattern on the Middle East was frantic and a little undignified: in each capital he arrived after me, after the decisions had been made. The Soviet media commentary on the oil embargo which backed a hard line, is it a sign? Maybe. Certainly progress in SALT would be a litmus test—absence of progress on SALT would not be. It depends on how big a bite we want. But we can have a SALT further agreement in time for the Presidential visit to Moscow.

In SALT there would normally be three phases. First, technical discussions, second a conceptual break-through, and the time need not be too long between the second and third phase, final negotiations. However, we have not yet made the conceptual break-through.

You ask if the détente has not loosened the alliance. Well in CSCE, the Europeans have been almost as obnoxious to the Soviets as any one

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2 Not further identified.
else. The truth of the matter is that détente with its illusion of peace, or perhaps the reality of peace, leaves the nations free to be tougher with the Soviets.

The reaction to the alert during the Middle East war must raise questions in the Soviet minds about how long the U.S. can sustain stiff positions. This is a factor we have to bear in mind. On balance, I expect the Soviets to continue to opt for détente.

You asked what are the benefits for the U.S. in détente? It has enabled us to end the Viet-Nam war, temporarily to calm down the Middle East war, to stabilize the situation in Europe, and to start on the path toward controlling the arms race. The two super-powers have begun to regulate their relationship and to make a beginning of working on problems without pushing to extremes.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

As for the Soviets and the Middle East, I don’t think the Soviets have made up their minds what they want in the Middle East, or what they are prepared to pay in that area. They are in the process of reassessing their policy. They have three choices. One, they can force the issue and drive us to another air lift for Israel, which would be difficult to sustain. Two, they can wait for us to fall on our face. The further down the road we go, the more difficult the tasks become. We have scrupulously avoided saying we support the ’67 frontiers. Three, they could go ahead and accept peace in the area, which is incidentally, quite unlikely. A settlement between Israel and Syria will take a miracle. Israel now has placed settlements on the edge of the Golan Heights. Syria operates on the theory that all of Israel historically belongs to Syria. The chances are slightly better than 50–50 that I can succeed in obtaining a disengagement there.

My timetable for the immediate future is, first, a visit to Moscow later this month with a stop in London on the way back. I do not plan to add a visit to the Middle East on the way back from Moscow. That would be too much of an indignity for the Soviets. I expect to come back from Moscow, deal with a Syrian emissary, and then hope for vacation.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

Back to the Soviet Union, I do not believe the Soviet Union exercised the restraint it could have in the Middle East. On the other hand, if the Soviets perceived that the Arabs would lose the war and didn’t want to further diminish their influence, it could be understood why the Soviets played out their hand as they did. The U.S.-Soviet relationship is delicate, partly antagonistic, partly collaborative, and where the balance is, I cannot judge. I do not think the Soviets provoked the Middle East war. Arab leaders assured me of this. But the Soviets did provide the objective conditions in which the war could happen. I
would not be surprised as a result of Gromyko’s visit to Egypt to see more Soviet arms sent to Egypt. I make this comment based on no intelligence sources whatsoever.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

162. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, March 18, 1974, 1651Z.

3814. For the Secretary. Subj: Current Assessment of the Soviet Scene.

1. Summary. On the eve of your talks here, Brezhnev’s position within the leadership seems by outward evidence to be stronger than ever. He remains fully committed publicly to détente with the U.S., but is now turning some of his attention to other issues—particularly agriculture. He is counting on a summer summit and apparently wants not only atmospherics but also something concrete in SALT. He may complain to you about U.S. defense statements. Soviet desiderata at CSCE are clear and they may hope to nail down a few during your visit. In exploring both CSCE and MBFR with you they will have in mind our current difficulties with Europe. In the Middle East, the Soviets still seem interested in Syrian-Israeli disengagement, but they may be inclined to influence the Syrians to stiffen their position. While the Soviets may feel they have some advantage from U.S.-European differences, I think they view the President’s political difficulties at home not as an opportunity for leverage but as a cause for concern. On the other side of the ledger, I think China continues to gnaw at their self-confidence despite their occasional attempts at nonchalance, and

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2 Possibly a reference to the Department of Defense annual report to Congress on the U.S. military posture, released by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger on March 3. Schlesinger expressed his concern that the Soviet Union was trying to exploit the numerical advantage in missiles it was granted in the Interim Agreement to gain diplomatic leverage over the United States. He believed the Soviets were striving to achieve equality in the number of MIRVed missiles and he urged the United States to begin development of new weapons. See “Schlesinger Defends Pentagon Budget,” Washington Post, March 4, 1974, p. A2.
they may be tempted to meddle in China’s internal problems if an appropriate opportunity arises. End summary.

2. Leonid Ilich, Head of Politburo. I have been struck by the extent to which Brezhnev’s Politburo peers in public speeches have taken to referring to him as “Leonid Ilich” (just as they refer to Lenin as “Vladimir Ilich”) and have begun applying to him the ritual (and extra-legal) title “Head of Politburo.” He may be taking on the aura of the untouchable national leader. If his colleagues permit this to happen, they must accept that it means a narrowing of their own options as a collective and improves his ability to override them in the event of a future policy crunch. I see no major signs that they are upset. Kosygin seems to be sliding relative to Brezhnev; Podgorny seems robust and active; and some of the younger luminaries have jumped on the Brezhnev bandwagon, at least in their speeches.

3. Agriculture. It is worth noting that this trend has been accompanied by a broadening of Brezhnev’s image: he is being presented not only as the architect of the peace program, but with his current initiative he has resumed his role as the leading figure in agricultural policy. The thrust of his policy—bringing the advantages of capital formation and management inherent in large-scale industry to bear on certain agricultural and food sectors—is hardly revolutionary. If it is accompanied by the shift of resources necessary to put Soviet agriculture on its feet for the longer term, however, the consequences would be important—for world trade in food; for other Soviet claimants of resources, including the military; and for Brezhnev’s political position. Obviously this trend deserves careful study.

4. Internal security and defense issues. From Moscow it appears that the regime is over the hump as far as foreign reaction to Solzhenitsyn is concerned. Internally the noise has also tapered off, but outspokenness on the part of well-known fringe establishment figures such as Yevtushenko may continue to provide ammunition against détente for doomsayers in the KGB. There is also a temptation to read Defense Minister Grechko’s tough public statements as a reflection of opposition to détente, but I think that would be an exaggeration. While the military surely counsels caution on SALT and MBFR, and lobbies for its share of the resource pie (as Brezhnev intimated to me), I view Grechko’s public statements also as a reaction to U.S. public discussion of de-

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3 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, a Russian novelist, was deported from the USSR in February 1974 and eventually found asylum in the United States.

4 Yevgeny Yevtushenko, a Russian poet.

defense issues and as a rather subdued rattling of bargaining chips. Brezhnev told Pompidou he would take up with you recent remarks on defense by U.S. public figures. In addition to any response dealing with the substance of Soviet concerns about the U.S. attitude on parity, it might also be useful for you to point out the negative impact in the U.S. of Soviet remarks about the changing correlation of forces in favor of socialism.

5. **Toward the summit.** I have little doubt that the Soviet leadership—and Brezhnev in particular—is anxious for the summit meeting with the President to take place this summer. (Podgorny spoke of late June or early July.) Brezhnev continues to see the U.S.-Soviet summits as important stars in his détente crown. Some concern is evident here about the effect of Watergate on détente. Among the Soviet leaders it seems mainly to take the form of concern about the fate of the President. The importance Brezhnev attaches to his personal relationship with the President came through strongly during my first meeting with him here. It would not be surprising if he probed discreetly for some indication from you about the current domestic situation.

6. **Summit substance.** Exactly what the Soviet leaders want from the summit is a more complex question. I suspect their basic interest is to demonstrate that détente continues to have positive momentum. In this connection atmospherics play a larger role for them than they do for us. But the recent rough spots in our bilateral relations are probably making it more difficult for them to persuade their various constituencies that atmospherics are enough.

7. **SALT.** Therefore, there is pressure on the Soviet leadership to come out of the summit with something concrete. The interest expressed to me by both Brezhnev and Podgorny in progress in SALT probably reflects that pressure. I expect you will find the leadership prepared to discuss with you possible political decisions which could accelerate the pace at Geneva. The pressures for summit results merely create the incentive for a full exploration of the possibilities; they are not, of course, of a magnitude to encourage Moscow into a partial or full agreement on offensive systems which cannot be justified on its own merits.

8. **Trade.** While the Brezhnev leadership seems to realize the strength of the pro-Jackson–Vanik Amendment forces, and long ago hedged its internal position by playing down somewhat the immediate importance of MFN, they probably nevertheless hope you will succeed against the odds and produce a viable compromise in Congress. Your interlocutors will be anxious to hear from you on this, particularly

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6 Stoessel described his first meeting with Brezhnev on March 5 in telegram 3252 from Moscow, March 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
about the outlook on credits. On this question, the Soviets I have seen so far have demonstrated substantial concern, but there is no feel of panic on their part.

9. Emigration. The current downswing in the Jewish emigration figure is worrisome; perhaps the Soviets will provide some clue whether it is a deliberate tactic or a temporary technical fluctuation.\(^7\)

10. Agreements. The Soviet side may push for agreement on cooperation in energy and natural resources development, either in the context of a long-term economic cooperation agreement or separately.

11. CSCE. The Soviets will air their concerns about CSCE to you and are likely to press hard for a third stage summit. This was their main pitch to Pompidou. The overriding Soviet concern is still to have CSCE end in a way that will allow them to play it as another major success for their détente policy. They may be prepared by the time of your visit to acknowledge the shape of the compromise that is emerging at Geneva between the contents of Baskets One and Three and on a general preamble for Basket Three.

12. Middle East. It is still our impression that the Soviets are interested in a Syrian-Israeli disengagement—largely because it would take the play back to Geneva where they can become more active and would avoid the danger of new hostilities. On the other hand, the Soviets may be inclined to view Syrian-Israeli disengagement as a testing ground for their Middle East role. To demonstrate their import to the Arabs, to curb the momentum of U.S. diplomacy, and to rebuke Cairo (with which Moscow’s relations have worsened), they may be tempted to insist on better terms for Syria than Egypt got via U.S. mediation. Soviet helpfulness on Golan is likely to depend on their assessment of whether the ultimate agreement will enhance their position with the Arabs.

13. China. The Soviet leaders, including Brezhnev, have China on their minds these days, perhaps even more than usual. The Chinese internal situation lends itself to speculation about a power struggle, which in turn arouses both concern and possibly some wishful thinking here. In a very fleeting reference to China in our March 5 meeting,

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\(^7\) Vorontsov provided the following figures in a March 5 note to Scowcroft: “In 1973—33,5 thousand Jews left the Soviet Union for Israel and 645 for the U.S.—95% out of the total number of people, who applied, received permission to leave the U.S.S.R. for Israel and the U.S.” Vorontsov’s note continued: “In connection with the recent events in the Middle East, in October–December 1973 a number of applicants to leave for Israel has decreased by 28% in comparison with the same period in 1972. The Soviet authorities have received more than one thousand appeals from former Soviet citizens who left the U.S.S.R. for Israel, asking for permission to come back.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 22, January–April 1974)
Brezhnev admitted that he didn’t understand China, but he was keenly aware of reports of military clashes within the country. I do not have a current reading on the military readiness situation on the Sino-Soviet border. While it would be natural for the Soviets to take some contingency steps in the present uncertain situation, such moves could in their own right lead to a higher level of Sino-Soviet tension. Moreover, there is always the risk that a sudden fluid situation, such as might be brought on by the death of Mao, could tempt the Soviets to lend a hand to elements in China which they deem sympathetic to their Moscow brand of Marxism-Leninism. For these reasons, it might be useful, when the subject arises, for you to remind Brezhnev that China’s internal problems must be kept internal.

14. Berlin. The Soviet leaders might raise the Federal Environment Agency. They did not do so with me (nor, apparently, with Pompidou last week), which may mean they are backing off somewhat from the more bellicose statements we were getting at the working level a few weeks ago. We continue to believe that the Soviet failure to get some sort of three-power assurance that the FEA will not be followed by more such initiatives could lead to trouble on the access routes. Nevertheless, in view of the quieter current situation, it would seem to be best for us not to take the initiative in raising the issue here, even though the Germans would probably like you to do so.

Stoessel

163. Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev


Dear Mr. General Secretary:

In anticipation of Secretary Kissinger’s discussions in Moscow next week, I want to share with you my assessment of US–USSR relations and the prospects for further progress in their improvement.

As we prepare for another meeting at the highest level, both sides can take satisfaction in the durability of the achievements of our pre-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 22, January–April 1974. No classification marking. Kissinger forwarded the letter to Nixon under a covering March 18 memorandum with the recommendation that he sign it.
vious meetings. They have stood the test of time and events. To be sure, we have both encountered criticism of the value of improved US-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, I believe that history will show that we are on the right course. That we can and should make a relaxation of tensions irreversible, as you have so aptly described it, remains a goal to which I am personally committed.

Even though meetings at the highest level have become a regular feature of US-Soviet relations, adequate preparations prior to our discussions are still the best guarantee of successful results. In examining our various negotiations and projects, there are several that we might consider for decisions at the summit.

As in 1972 and 1973, I look forward this year to a general review of the international situation. I believe that questions of strategic arms limitations and issues related to European security will command a major share of our attention.

We have been conducting a most thorough review of the problems connected with the further limitation of strategic arms. I understand that the Soviet side has been similarly engaged. Against this background, I believe that we have reached a point where discussions at a higher level can provide an impetus to the Geneva negotiations.

In our review we have proceeded from the basic principles that you and I signed last year, which are the foundation for the agreements which we are committed to develop during 1974. As I see it, one of the most important tasks is to address qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, in particular the question of limiting multiple warheads. I recognize that this is a highly complicated technical issue; but in addition to an equitable solution of the technical problem, a political decision will be required if we are to place a ceiling on the unlimited proliferation of these weapons.

Secretary Kissinger will be prepared to elaborate on our ideas, following through on the general concept we have suggested in our confidential channel, and he will, of course, be authorized to consider proposals from the Soviet side.

The current situation is in some respects similar to May 1971, when we decided to proceed simultaneously along two paths: toward the ABM agreement and toward the interim agreement on offensive weapons. We might consider whether a similar decision should be taken at this stage: an agreement to work out the provisions of limitations on multiple warheads, plus an agreement to intensify negotiations to complete at least the main provisions of a permanent agreement dealing with all aspects of limitations of strategic offensive weapons including their subsequent reduction. Such a breakthrough, announced at the summit, would then allow our negotiators to accelerate their efforts to reach agreement this year.
I know that we both agree on the continuing importance of strategic arms limitations for all aspects of US-USSR relations. Our ability to maintain and develop progress in this area cannot fail to have the most beneficial effect on both our peoples and on world opinion. The prospects for progress on other important issues would undoubtedly be improved if we could demonstrate our determination to limit our strategic offensive arsenals.

The relaxation of military tensions in Central Europe, for example, is one area that would be favorably influenced by further progress in limiting strategic armaments. Though the negotiations are separate, some of the issues are related in that a stable balance of strategic weapons will encourage reductions of conventional armaments.

The vital interests of many nations are involved in the Vienna talks, but I am convinced that the US and the USSR have a special political responsibility to take the lead in demonstrating our mutual willingness to reduce our forces in Central Europe. You have suggested that the first reductions might come in 1975, and I agree that this should be our goal. It should be possible for the US and USSR to agree to reduce our own forces in 1975, and simultaneously establish the political framework for subsequent reductions of forces of the other participants in the talks.

Mr. General Secretary, agreements in this area, coupled with SALT agreements, would be ample proof that the relaxation of tension between the two strongest nuclear powers is not a passing episode but a continuing process leading to a fundamental change in the character of our relations.

As for the other aspects of European security, I agree with you that the conversations concerning the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have proceeded at a slow pace. You are aware that the US has been prepared to move more rapidly, and there are no disagreements of principle between our two sides. Yet, for this Conference to be successful, it is necessary that we take fully into account the interests of all the participants, so that the final result will be a truly significant contribution to international peace and security.

We have in fact made some progress since Minister Gromyko’s visit to Washington, and during your discussion with Secretary Kissinger we can make additional progress. As you know, the US will not stand in the way of concluding this Conference by a meeting at the highest level, but this decision will depend on the views of others.

Finally, I want to elaborate on the questions of securing a viable peace in the Middle East. Events in this area have taken some unex-

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2 A reference to the MBFR negotiations taking place in Vienna.
3 See Documents 158, 159, and 160.
pected and complicated turns. One thing remains paramount. I am determined to make every effort to create the conditions that will lead to a permanent settlement. The sides involved have insisted on proceeding step-by-step, and we have tried to ensure that this process moves ahead. In this way some degree of mutual confidence will evolve. While the diplomatic forms and procedures may vary, the success of the current disengagement process will make it possible to address more basic questions of a lasting peace.

We do not lose sight of the fact that the situation is enormously complicated, that tensions still are quite high, and that if political momentum is lost, then an exceedingly dangerous situation would be created. This is why the United States has accepted, with some reluctance, the role of bringing the sides together in whatever form has been necessary to ensure progress. In this role we are counting heavily on the support and influence of the Soviet Union, because Mr. General Secretary, there is no doubt in my mind that you and I share the concern of all our peoples that peace is indivisible.

Our meetings in Moscow will also be a new opportunity to broaden the scale of bilateral cooperation. There are two areas of particular importance—a long term economic agreement and an agreement in the field of energy—that I have asked Secretary Kissinger to explain to you next week. He will also be prepared to discuss confidentially with you the status of the legislation before our Congress as it affects our economic agreements of October 1972 and the tactics we will pursue in fulfilling our commitments under those agreements.

We have reviewed the other questions of bilateral cooperation suggested by Minister Gromyko, and Secretary Kissinger will discuss a plan to bring several of these forward so that they can be concluded at our meeting in Moscow.

Mr. General Secretary, I have been reflecting on the course of US-Soviet relations during these past five years. In our first meeting, it was significant that we agreed that there was no alternative to peaceful coexistence. In our second meeting, we were able to go beyond this principle and agree on concrete measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war and to broaden the base of our cooperative efforts. In this coming meeting, we have opportunities of no lesser importance, in that we can demonstrate that a mutually beneficial and cooperative relationship between our two peoples is, in fact, becoming a permanent factor for worldwide peace—the goal we set last year in San Clemente.4

4 Printed from an unsigned copy. Nixon added the following handwritten note: “I met your Cosmonauts in Houston yesterday. They are splendid men. I am proud that one of the results of our first summit in Moscow is that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are now going to go into space together in 1975. Let this be our goal in other areas as well. My best personal regards. RN”
Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your message of March 21, 1974, which I have read with great interest.

First of all I would like to tell you, Mr. President, that I highly appreciate and fully share your evaluation of the historic importance of what we already managed to do in the last years in improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. I agree with you also in that our forthcoming meeting can, and I would say—should demonstrate that the relations of mutually beneficial cooperation between our two peoples are really becoming a permanent factor of the general peace. This is a goal worthy to work for.

The concrete questions listed in your letter undoubtedly merit thorough consideration and I am confident that there exists ample opportunity—provided both sides demonstrate necessary determination, realistic and constructive approach—to come to mutually acceptable agreements which would give appropriate importance to our new meeting.

We will thoroughly discuss in this spirit all these questions with Secretary Kissinger, proceeding from the understanding that he will have as before all necessary powers from you for reaching concrete agreements.

Please accept, Mr. President, my best wishes,

L. Brezhnev

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 22, January–April 1974. No classification marking. Vorontsov’s March 23 covering memorandum to Scowcroft noted that Dobrynin had read the letter to Kissinger over the telephone that day. The transcript of that telephone conversation is ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 28, Chronological File.
2 Document 163.
3 Printed from a copy that bears Brezhnev’s typed signature.
165. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, March 25, 1974, 11:05 a.m.–1:57 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the MFA; Chief of USA Department
Victor M. Sukhodrev, USA Department, MFA (Interpreter)
Andrei Vavilov, USA Department
Oleg Sokolov, USA Department
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director–INR
Jan M. Lodal, NSC Senior Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
US-Soviet Relations; SALT; Other Arms Control

[The Secretary’s party arrived at 11:00 a.m. and was greeted by the General Secretary in his office. Press and photographers were present. There was a brief period of picture-taking and pleasantries.]

US-Soviet Relations

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I expect we should devote as little time as possible to protocol matters and get down to concrete things right away. But I can’t deprive myself of the pleasure of expressing my profound satisfaction at this new visit of yours to the Soviet Union, and I know it will be useful. Your previous ones have, and this will I’m sure be of good service to our peoples and states.

But I guess our situation is made easier by the fact that this is not our first meeting. We have accumulated some experience in negotiating, and it is not the first stage—it is the development of negotiations that have been taking place since 1972 and 1973.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 76, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Secretary Kissinger’s Pre-Summit Trip to Moscow, March 24–28, 1974, Memcons & Reports. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in Brezhnev’s office in the Council of Ministers Building at the Kremlin. Brackets are in the original.
But previously I talked to a Dr. Kissinger who had one title; now he has two titles, while I am stuck with my one. Isn’t that true?

Gromyko: Just one! [Laughter]

Kissinger: We will make special allowance for that.

Brezhnev: Let me say a couple of words about the development of our relations in the recent past.

Kissinger: Certainly. I would like to express appreciation for myself and my colleagues for your courtesy—especially that you let me bring my children.2 We feel that having worked together these many years we have a good foundation for the future.

Brezhnev: That is certainly true. We have laid a good foundation. And I will not now speak about those who want to shake or destroy that foundation. And I believe when those people become more mature they will apologize to their own people for the harm they are trying to do.

We have always been and always are according hospitality to our guests, but I would like to call attention to another aspect of our meetings: I hope this round will be useful in preparing for the forthcoming visit by President Nixon to Moscow. We are preparing not in a purely formal way, but we will sign agreements that will break new ground.

We should speak less on minor points and more on the really important policy issues.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: And if from that point of view we consider the state of our relationships in the past several years, if we look at them in a big way, casting aside the minor points—and I know there are important internal problems—in general, we can say they are developing in a positive way. [Kissinger nods yes.] It wouldn’t be in our best interests not to admit we have had to go through quite a few difficulties and complexities in the past, but what we have achieved in our relationships has withstood the test of time, and in a complex situation.

And therefore I wish to reemphasize that at this point we still have more grounds than before to stress the exclusive importance of our meetings with President Nixon and the importance of the agreements and understandings they produced. I should like to heavily emphasize, and I repeat emphasize, that the entire Soviet leadership stands today as hitherto on the principles expounded to President Nixon in the documents and in our previous meetings.

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2 Kissinger’s children, David and Elizabeth, accompanied their father on his trip to Moscow.
Without going into the various details of what is taking place in the United States—and we hear and read a lot about it—we see that President Nixon is displaying firmness and resolve to move ahead on the course we have charted, to move ahead toward further deepening of relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States. But having said that, I cannot fail to say that in order to move further ahead we have to overcome a few difficulties and obstacles which are integrally linked to improving relations with us and improving the atmosphere in the world. And that fact may well come to be one of the difficulties we face. But I feel sure the experience of the past will help us find correct solutions without violating the principles we have agreed upon.

[Brezhnev plays with a dome-shaped brass object on his desk. He lifts off the top. It reveals six brass cartridge-like objects pointed upward. He removes the cover from one of those and it reveals six cigarettes.]

Kissinger: Is that a MIRV? [Laughter]
Brezhnev: No, it’s for cigarettes. It’s more peaceful than it looks.
Kissinger: One of our intelligence experts will now say we know there are six MIRV’s on the Soviet missiles.
Gromyko: That’s what we do from friendship.
Kissinger: It’s better than much of our intelligence.
Brezhnev: We have no secrets from each other.

Let me say I am very grateful to President Nixon for his recent message [President’s letter of March 21, Tab A]. It was one I read with great interest, and I replied right away [Tab B]. I am glad Ambassador Dobrynin was able to discuss it.

Kissinger: The President was very glad to receive it, and sends his warm personal regards.

Brezhnev: Thank you. Since I knew you would be empowered to conduct these negotiations with me [Kissinger smiles to Sonnenfeldt] I didn’t go into any of the details of the subjects. I frequently recall the conversation we had, especially at San Clemente, when the President emphasized the very good and very friendly relations that had been coming into being between us. That we very much retain, and in my reply I wanted to tell him we maintain that spirit.

I would like to say a few words on the substance of the matter at hand.

Kissinger: Please.
Brezhnev: The basic substance is that, in order not to spoil the past, and in order to secure further advance in the future, we must ensure that the forthcoming visit of President Nixon to this country be of no lesser significance in its content than our two previous meetings. On the contrary, we must show our two peoples that all we have done in the past has built a secure foundation. If we slipped back, that would be a bad sign for our two peoples. And these words I link with the grand strategy of our state and our party. We have always said, particularly after the 23rd and 24th Party Congresses, that our policy is not built on momentary considerations. And this relates not merely to the question of, say, economic ties, but first and foremost to the basic policies of peace and the necessity to save mankind from the scourge of thermo-nuclear war, and that must be the focal point of all our discussions.

I believe that in the course of our discussions there will be quite a few questions we will want to raise. [Kissinger nods yes.] I would like to ask you, Dr. Kissinger, what you would prefer to start out with.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we agree with everything you have said. When we first met, almost two years ago, to prepare for the summit between you and President Nixon, we were at the very beginning of a totally new relationship. You and President Nixon recognized that whatever differences exist, our two countries have a very special responsibility to bring about peace between ourselves and peace in the world. This conviction has been strengthened by the events of the past two years and it is the fundamental guiding principle of our relations, which we are determined to follow in all our dealings with the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev: I am very pleased to hear that.

Kissinger: In addition, there has grown up a degree of personal confidence between President Nixon and the General Secretary which is unusual among leaders of great powers and which we are sure will be a further guarantee of our relations. So the most important thing is to reaffirm that the President and the Administration are determined to pursue the course even when occasionally there are disappointments, and against all opposition in the United States. Our basic objective is to make the pattern of our relations as they have developed in the past two years irreversible, no matter what happens.

Brezhnev: [Interrupts Sukhodrev’s translation] We should cross out the word “disappointments.” “Complications” is better.

Kissinger: It is a better word.

Brezhnev: Because I have never seen President Nixon disappointed with what we have done. Only Jackson.

Kissinger: Right.

Brezhnev: And he is not America.
Kissinger: And that will be proved in the next two years.

[Sukhodrev finishes his translation of the Secretary’s remarks above.]

Brezhnev: That is a word I certainly like—“irreversible.” And I say so not only on my behalf but for my entire Party and people. I could fit you out with an artificial mustache and beard and you could go in any part of the country, and anybody you ask would come up with those words. And I say that to truly emphasize that this policy of détente, of improving relationships with the United States, is one approved by the Soviet people. You know why this is so. It requires no complex explanation.

Kissinger: So it is in the United States. There are groups and individuals in the United States who have always opposed these policies. And there are other groups who have taken our successes for granted, so they think they can have both peace and an anti-Soviet policy. But we will not be deflected from the course that you and the President agreed to at the two summit meetings. We will reinforce it at the next summit meeting. And we agree with the General Secretary that the next summit meeting must be worthy of its predecessors, with their agreements on strategic arms limitation, the agreement on prevention of nuclear war, and other agreements.

I want specifically to emphasize that we will observe and carry out to the best of our ability every understanding we have made, whether on trade or on specific geographic areas.

The General Secretary asked me what we should discuss here. We believe . . .

Brezhnev: That is, what we should start out with.

Kissinger: Well, the Foreign Minister mentioned this morning, and I agreed, that we might discuss this morning strategic arms, and this afternoon the Middle East. If that is still your wish, we agree with your proposal. On other topics, we are prepared to discuss anything in our relations, but we think the problem of force reductions in Central Europe is ripe for progress, and on the European Security Conference we are prepared to discuss how it can be brought to a rapid conclusion at the appropriate level. We are prepared to discuss a long-term trade agreement, as well as other issues in our bilateral relations that are appropriate to cover.

Brezhnev: I certainly believe that during so pleasant a meeting as this, neither side should restrict the range of questions to discuss, and both should feel free to raise any matter that seems useful to discuss. Both sides should proceed this way.

Kissinger: I agree.
Brezhnev: We are indeed prepared to begin by discussing any question, and it is my view that the question of strategic arms is the most complex and most appropriate. It would be better still if Dr. Kissinger could arrange to work out and even sign a whole series of important agreements and bring them back to President Nixon. [Gromyko makes comment to Brezhnev.] But the Foreign Minister says not sign it, only initial. He wants to initial them himself.

Gromyko: No, I want to leave something for the summit.

Kissinger: If we make progress here, whatever we agree to here we will certainly maintain.

Brezhnev: I certainly agree. If we reach agreement on certain issues, we should maintain them. Otherwise we are not honest partners.

Kissinger: If we are to discuss strategic arms, I have one associate waiting outside who is a technical expert, and I would like to bring him in.

Brezhnev: Certainly.
[Hyland goes out to fetch Lodal. Hyland returns alone; Lodal can’t be found. Hyland goes out again. Hartman goes out to retrieve Hyland. Hyland returns, goes out again.]

Kissinger: We have no simple problems.

Gromyko: We can assure you we have not gone in for a kidnapping exercise.

Kissinger: One Foreign Service officer was just kidnapped in Mexico, and they’re demanding $500,000. But I don’t know one that’s worth $500,000, so we’re refusing to pay.

We’re prepared to proceed without him.
[Lodal arrives. The Soviets had kept him in a waiting room at the other end of the corridor. Dr. Kissinger introduces him.]

Brezhnev: [to Lodal] Dr. Kissinger didn’t want you to be present, but I insisted on your being present.

Lodal: Thank you.

Kissinger: Provocateur! I have trouble enough with discipline on my staff.

Brezhnev: I told you I had difficulties—I used to talk with you when you were only Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Now you are Secretary of State, too. And you have other titles too.

Kissinger: What other titles? I don’t mean what they call me in the newspapers.

Brezhnev: Let’s have some of those snacks first. [Snacks are served.]
Kissinger: I had lost 2 kilos before I came.
Brezhnev: You look well, honestly.
We can start our discussions.
Kissinger: Please.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Brezhnev: We start with strategic arms.
Kissinger: Please.

I gave to your Ambassador, Mr. General Secretary, some ideas which we developed to advance the discussion [Tab C, US note of March 21]. I don’t know if we should use those as a starting point.

Brezhnev: I think we should basically proceed from the fact that our delegations discussing the matter find themselves deadlocked. They have engaged in discussions but have not moved very far. Past experience has shown that this is the time for decisions to be taken at a higher level.

Kissinger: That is our view.

Brezhnev: I would just like to make an observation here: If we let our purely military men into this sphere we’ll end up with an unprecedented arms race; I say that in a full sense of responsibility. Your military men and ours are the same. You can’t really blame them. What they say is, we don’t care about all these policies, and there is the Secretary of Defense saying the United States has to be militarily stronger. And there are others in the United States echoing these views and saying “We have to talk to the Soviet Union from a position of military strength.”

Surely, Dr. Kissinger, if we let ourselves be carried away by that kind of talk, all our discussions will come to nothing. What we have based ourselves on in the past, and the greatness of what we have achieved, is that we first of all achieved a freeze of existing arms and agreed on reductions, but without changing the balance. Only on that basis can we maintain coexistence.

So let us endeavor to decide something at this level without giving new instructions at Geneva. If we achieve something, our delegates will talk a different language.

Kissinger: I agree, this is the best way to proceed.

Brezhnev: But I really would like you to pay attention to this fact, all those statements about the United States needing to be strong.

Aleksandrov: [Correcting Sukhodrev’s translation] Stronger.

5 Attached but not printed.
6 See footnote 2, Document 162.
Brezhnev: Unless we put a stop to this kind of talk in the United States, people will become accustomed to this need, that is, the need to talk to the Soviet Union from a position of strength. And not for the record, perhaps, but let me say that living generations of Americans have never experienced war on their own territory and never experienced a fascist advance as far as Stalingrad—so they are prone to this kind of talk. Americans have not had 20 million deaths from war.

Gromyko: Think of how many widows and orphans there are.

Brezhnev: In Belorussia, every fourth person died in the war. That is why we in this country—I can’t speak for the United States—are very sensitive to these issues. I have emphasized this to everyone—to Chancellor Brandt, for instance. Even if the Senate didn’t appropriate additional sums of money to the Pentagon, and if the Pentagon didn’t always shout about it, it would still be a very sensitive subject for us. But the sensitivity is heightened by these statements. We can’t help it.

I would like to emphasize, Dr. Kissinger, you and I don’t have an easy task before us, but we are duty bound—I repeat, duty bound—to find an acceptable solution, a solution which will give no advantage to either side. That is the principle we agreed on with President Nixon, and I would like to see it observed.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, the entire policy of the Administration is based on the presupposition that neither side can achieve military superiority over the other and should not attempt to achieve military superiority over the other. If either tries to talk to the other from a position of strength, it will be a disaster for our two peoples and for all mankind. I have made this point in every public statement, and so has the President. Since we speak here as friends, I can tell you certain circles in the United States have taken advantage of certain domestic developments to say things that would be difficult to permit otherwise. But the basic direction of our foreign policy is fixed. And of course our people are also watching Soviet developments, and as the Soviet Union develops new weapons, they are used as a justification for our new weapons.

Brezhnev: I don’t quite agree on that, and here is why:

By the time the SALT agreement was signed, the United States already had its multiple reentry vehicles and we were behind the United States in that field. But nonetheless we did agree to sign the agreement on that score, proceeding from the most humane goal, which is embodied in the preamble of that [agreement]. And we undertook not to introduce any new missile systems and we accepted certain conditions for those, and those are being scrupulously observed.

Kissinger: We don’t question that.

Brezhnev: By the beginning of next year, perhaps I or perhaps someone else will be entrusted with making the relevant report, but we
will accurately report what is taken out of commission and made into submarines. But we are not making any new weapons. It was agreed we both could engage in certain improvements but without any increase in diameter or any new systems. We have developed a MIRV but that is all that is taking place. So it is wrong to say we are devising something new. Even if something is being invented, we are not deploying anything in contravention of the agreement.

President Nixon said there are new submarines being developed in the United States, but while there are 42 . . .

Kissinger: 62.

Brezhnev: Yes, 62, we won’t develop any new ones.

Kissinger: If you want to make it 42, we won’t object.

Brezhnev: We scrupulously observe that. We know you are making MIRV’s on the submarines and replacing Poseidons with Minutemen.

Kissinger: No.

Brezhnev: You’re installing new missiles in place of older models.

Kissinger: That is true.

Brezhnev: Within the limits of the improvements allowed by the agreement. So it is wrong to conclude that we’re doing anything in contravention of the agreement. So as of this time, it is certainly a fact you are ahead of us in multiple warheads. As this is one aspect that can’t lend itself to control by national means of detection. Since you were ahead, we assume you have more. If we have to apologize for something we’re not doing . . . The numbers you have are in excess of what we have. I’m not complaining about that. We should both scrupulously observe the agreement. You are refusing to take into account forward-based systems. Who are these aimed at? Not against France, because France can’t declare war on the United States.

Kissinger: But this may change if things keep up!

Brezhnev: Or Holland or Belgium, or the GDR or the FRG. I can show you a map. You said the agreement should relate to American missiles that could reach the Soviet Union and Soviet missiles that could reach the United States. That is the significance of those forward-based missiles. [He shows a small map] They can reach Tashkent, or Baku.

Kissinger: The submarines?

Brezhnev: Yes. And air bases. More than one-half of the European part of the Soviet Union is within range of those.

Kissinger: We have to separate the problems.

First of all, if M. Jobert makes more of his speeches, we’ll need some of those missiles against France.
Brezhnev: You can’t blame me for that! No speech ever caused destruction; only weapons have.

Kissinger: This shows submarines?

Brezhnev: It shows all kinds of bases and ships.

Kissinger: So this line is the range of the submarines, and they’re being counted. They are part of the agreement. They are not forward-based systems. They are counted in the Interim Agreement.

Gromyko: But they are pointed at us—whether submarines or carrier-based aircraft. The first agreement left aside strategic aviation.

Kissinger: I agree with that. That’s a separate problem.

These are our fighter aircraft?

Brezhnev: It’s not a good picture, is it? Those are European-based aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. Then nothing else remains for us but to have our aircraft carrying nuclear weapons or missiles.

Kissinger: I have two separate problems, Mr. General Secretary. According to our estimate, you’re developing four new missiles. That’s not in violation of the agreement. In fact, one of them impresses our people very much, and if that’s only an improvement, I’d hate to see what a new system looked like. In fact, if I see Mr. Smirnov, I’ll congratulate him on this new system.

Brezhnev: I can reply in place of Mr. Smirnov, and I can say we’re not making a single new missile. We are improving our missiles.

Kissinger: It’s just a question of definition. It’s such a great improvement that to our people it looks like a new one. But I won’t debate it. But we’re not saying it’s in violation of the agreement.

Brezhnev: Let us not proceed from what people think but from official statements of governments, and from what lends itself to control.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: If we really get down to business, we should proceed from the assumption that in the time left before President Nixon’s visit, our delegations will hardly be able to proceed without us. We will hardly be able to work out a solution that can be a permanent agreement.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: Let me suggest, perhaps then we could undertake to enter into a new arrangement where the first operative paragraph—after the preamble—says that the two sides have agreed to prolong the provisional agreement in its full measure, let’s say, until the year 1980. That’s the first point. That is, both remain with the existing levels. But just that alone would not exactly satisfy certain circles in US.

Kissinger: Not in its exact details.
Quite candidly, this would be quite impossible in present conditions in the United States. It would strengthen Senator Jackson, quite frankly.

Brezhnev: So then, after this, we could have a second paragraph couched in the most categorical terms, which would say roughly that the two sides undertake that their delegations will continue their work to convert the provisional agreement into a permanent one. But even that would not be enough, I gather. Since these multi-warheads are constantly in the news, let’s decide on a certain number of warheads on a certain number of missiles.

Korniyenko: The number of missiles to be equipped with multiple warheads.

Gromyko: That will be MIRVed.

Brezhnev: They could be listed in quantities or in percentages. For example, the United States will be entitled to MIRV 1,000 missiles and we will be entitled to MIRV 1,000 ICBM’s.

Kissinger: ICBMs or missiles?

Brezhnev: It is only about land-based ICBM’s.

Gromyko: Both land-based and sea-based.

Brezhnev: One total percentage, and it is for the side itself to decide whether it wants them on land or sea. Therefore if we decide to install more on submarines, then we can do less on land. And that will be done at the discretion of each side. And that certainly will be a substantial element.

Kissinger: Is that a firm figure, or just a suggestion? The 1,000.

Brezhnev: I put it forward as a proposal for discussion.

Kissinger: To 1980, or now?


Brezhnev: Since, as we suggested, paragraph one would state that the provisional agreement is prolonged until year 1980, this third point, regarding MIRVed missiles, would also apply until the year 1980. Here, one point is the fact that you have more missiles on submarines than we do.

Kissinger: But not by 1980.

Brezhnev: Yes, but the agreement in substance gives us seven submarines but to compensate from that, we have to withdraw some of the land-based ICBMs.

Kissinger: What seven?

Brezhnev: Under the agreement we withdraw some of our missiles of land-based type and replace them with missiles on submarines. We
had an additional seven submarines to compensate for the geographical factor. For the rest, we have to withdraw the land-based.

Kissinger: They are dying of old age.

Brezhnev: They’re not all that bad. They can still carry atomic weapons.

Kissinger: That’s a correct statement. I won’t argue.

Brezhnev: [draws a silo diagram on a piece of paper] Say we had a silo launcher and our designer invents a narrower one; it’s not a new missile. So we’re free either to reconstruct this or install it on a submarine.

Kissinger: Now I understand the difference between a new missile and an improvement. I have to compliment your designers; they’ve used the existing space with great skill.

Brezhnev: I can just say you have some very wonderful designers too. They’ve put Minuteman III in the same hole, though it is a new rocket.

Kissinger: [Laughs] All I can say is, I hope you never come up with a new missile.

Brezhnev: Yours too.

Kissinger: But basically we both have the same problem. Could I take a two-minute break?

Brezhnev: Certainly.

[There is a break in the meeting from 12:58–1:02 p.m. At a table near the wall, they look at a blow-up of a picture taken of Major General Brezhnev in Red Square at the Victory parade on June 24, 1945. The meeting then resumes.]

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, you said the situation would change by 1980. That is true; the situation can change. But if so, we will revise the terms. But another thing that can happen is that we can prolong the agreement until 1980, add a couple of paragraphs to it, then let’s say by 1975, by the time I pay another visit to the United States, our delegations could reach an agreement, and if so, we could sign a new agreement without waiting until 1980. That is another possibility. But until that happens, and considering that the delegations up to now have been unable to find common language, we could sign an agreement with a good preamble, and with a paragraph one saying the agreement is prolonged, and another paragraph saying the delegations are charged with making every effort to convert it into a permanent agreement, and then a paragraph on multiple warheads, saying that each side is limited to 1,000 MIRVed missiles, and it is up to each side to decide whether to MIRV land-based or sea-based missiles.

Also, and concurrently, we could also reach a new understanding on ABM systems. Under our agreement, you remember we both agreed
the United States was building one ABM area and the Soviet Union was building one, and both were entitled to build another. So we could refrain from building the additional ABM area and agree we both stay with the one we have.

Further, you’ve been working on the B–1 bomber, and we are building our plane, the 160. We could agree to cease work on the 160 on our side if you agree to cease on the B–1.

If we want to proceed towards détente, all those would be elements of détente.

That could of course be part of a separate understanding, but I am just mentioning them in one package.

Let us reach an agreement to end underground nuclear testing. Let us agree, say as of an agreed date, say 1975, 1976, or 1977, we shall both cease underground nuclear tests and call upon all others to do so. Say by January 1, 1976. And we would add a paragraph that if other nations do not discontinue testing, then each of us will be free to act at our own discretion.

Also, we could enter into an agreement that United States and Soviet Union could agree to withdraw all nuclear systems from the Mediterranean.

Kissinger: Ban them?

Brezhnev: Withdraw them. We’d withdraw all nuclear weapons carriers, and you too. Both surface vessels and submarines.

Kissinger: Missiles, or anything?

Gromyko: Carriers of any type of nuclear weapons.

Brezhnev: Of course, conventional naval vessels would be permitted to remain in the Mediterranean.

There, Dr. Kissinger, you have before you a program for strengthening security, and equal security for both sides.

[Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt confer.]

One more suggestion. Our provisional agreement is due to last until 1977. At that time President Nixon said the United States would engage in a new type of submarine, the Trident, but that the United States would not manufacture those submarines until 1977.

Kissinger: Right.

Brezhnev: We accepted that. But I guess there are certain pressures in the United States to build them.

Kissinger: Not to complete them until 1977.


Kissinger: That is correct.

Brezhnev: But I have to be very frank, that if you commission Trident, we will have to build new submarines too. So let us agree that nei-
ther of us commissions them—or if either of us does, we do so in equal measure. But that would continue the arms race.

Kissinger: By 1980.

Gromyko: Yes, if we prolong the agreement.

Brezhnev: Those are the suggestions I wanted to make. And I suppose they all presuppose equality of strength.

Kissinger: May I make some comments, Mr. General Secretary?

Brezhnev: Certainly. Please.

Kissinger: As you know, Mr. General Secretary, we have come under strong attack in the United States for the existing agreement, so extending it is not an easy matter. But let me leave this problem aside for the time being.

Of your additional suggestions, first, elimination of the additional ABM, we will probably be able to accept.

Brezhnev: I’d suggest that that would be a necessary step and would not create any problems.

Kissinger: On the B–1, I don’t know what your 160 is—we are not familiar with that. We can only hope your airplane designers are not as good as your missile designers. But we don’t know it.

Brezhnev: They’re both lethal weapons. Whether the plane is better, or the missile, both are the same.

Kissinger: It hasn’t flown yet?

Brezhnev: They haven’t told me yet.

Kissinger: [Laughs] They do that to us too. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force reports to the President that he’s just flown a new airplane.

Brezhnev: I saw one of your aircraft journals 10 years ago. There was a picture of what purported to be an atomic-powered aircraft flying over Moscow. But no one has built one.

Kissinger: If so, it is flying over Moscow, because we don’t have it in America.

Brezhnev: The staffs tell you anything.

Kissinger: On the B–1 airplane, we can agree it would not enter our force during the extension of this agreement.

Brezhnev: What would you mean by that, Dr. Kissinger? It was built but not introduced into the Air Force? It would just stay on the ground? What we are suggesting is that you don’t build it, just as we wouldn’t build our 160. We take a serious view of our agreement.

Kissinger: I think not building it is going to be difficult. The rate of deploying it is something else. But I am afraid it would raise major problems of what is operational.

Brezhnev: It means aircraft tested and introduced into service.
Kissinger: I think we could find it, but as you know, an aircraft is tested for many years before it becomes operational.

Brezhnev: That is quite true. But every new test brings closer the time when it is part of the armament.

Kissinger: That is true.

Brezhnev: It usually takes five–six years, but the end result is that a new plane is born.

Kissinger: That is true.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, all that from a purely human standpoint is aimed at lessening the temptation to increase nuclear weapons on both sides.

[Gromyko gives Brezhnev a paper]

It turns out, on the one hand, that we write and sign very good papers and proclaim very good objectives, and on the other hand we listen to our staffs and you build the Trident and B–1 long-range bombers, and we on our side build the 160 bomber with long-range nuclear missiles. When the people get to the bottom of what is happening, they will start criticizing us.

Kissinger: Let me turn to the 1000 missiles that the General Secretary mentioned. There are a number of problems in connection with this.

One, the fact that you have more warheads on each of your missiles than we do. Or will have. And each of the warheads is of greater weight.

Secondly, you do not yet have multiple warheads for submarines. So if you put all your permitted warheads on land-based missiles, then by the end of this period, you will be free to put multiple warheads on all your submarines. And since there is only a certain amount you can do anyway, this only means that we are only endorsing your existing program. The end result would be that on land-based missiles you would have many more warheads than we do.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I listen to you and I hear the exact words of our general staff when they report to me. But vice versa. Our people say the Americans have more than we do.

Kissinger: True.

Brezhnev: And you have 12 on a rocket.

Kissinger: What 12?

Brezhnev: They say the Americans are putting multiple warheads on their older missiles. So in your place I keep seeing our chief of the general staff reporting on developments in the United States. What is a warhead? One block with a capacity of a million tons. When you divide
it into six warheads, the capacity will no longer be a million tons. The whole thing becomes weaker by half.

Then there are those in the military who believe it is better to have one warhead but a bigger one, and there is another school of thought who think the more the better. But what is the difference between one kiloton and 50 kilotons? Both mean death and destruction. In World War II, you dropped two and wiped out populations.

I read the American press quite attentively and I don’t think anybody in the United States is so critical of the agreement. What they are proposing has nothing to do with the agreement.

Kissinger: No, there is increasing criticism—but we should not debate it. Most of it is by dishonest people, I must say.

Brezhnev: Undoubtedly.

Kissinger: But that is an American domestic complexity.

Brezhnev: What do you suggest in place of it?

Kissinger: We gave you our ideas in the note to your Ambassador on Thursday. [The note is at Tab C]

We don’t exclude a limit on the number of missiles that can be MIRVed, and we would have to make some calculations to see whether 1000 or 900—that clearly is not unacceptable. And you would certainly listen to a counter proposal on this.

Brezhnev: I am waiting for it.

Kissinger: I have just heard your idea for the first time. Let me think about the number for a while. Our basic problem is that it would have to be based on an agreement on how many would have to be land-based.

Brezhnev: This is not something—MIRVing—that can be done in just one year, so it is hard to predetermine at once the number of land-based missiles.

Kissinger: Since we may have completed 80% of our MIRVing, while you haven’t even started, the practical result is that we would have to stop for five years while you were given time to catch up. That is how it would be seen in America.

Gromyko: But you will have advantages in that situation. You have got it in your pocket already.

Kissinger: Yes, but then why is it in our interest to tie ourselves to figures we have already?

Gromyko: Otherwise, the whole question of limitations will simply soar. It will be an unlimited race.

Kissinger: If the Soviet side could accept some of the principles in the paper we gave to the Ambassador, then we could consider an upper ceiling. Then we could consider numbers.
Brezhnev: Although within the limits of the agreement you have already in fact violated the balance of forces.

Kissinger: How?

Gromyko: Of this proposed agreement. Now we have agreed not to build any new missiles until 1977. But improvement is permitted, and you want to deprive us of any chance to improve it.

Kissinger: I think, Mr. General Secretary, we are arguing semantically about new missiles and improvements. My briefers tell me about your new systems. We do not have any change of that same magnitude. We are not saying it is a violation of the agreement, Mr. Brezhnev. I can only answer in the same vein.

Brezhnev: You have built an entirely new type of missile. Instead of one warhead, now each carries five.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, your information is wrong. We don’t have a missile with five or with 12. That is not the basic point. Mr. Gromyko thinks it is three. That is because he takes trips. Whenever I think he is at Las Vegas he is at missile bases.

Gromyko: I haven’t yet been allowed into a single missile base.

Kissinger: I’ll take you there once.

Our Ambassador asked for so many appointments, I am surprised he hasn’t asked to see a missile base.

So that—since your Foreign Minister is as usual correct—we have three on our land-based and you have six on yours, we think the equivalence ought to be established on the basis of warheads.

On submarines, we have more warheads.

Another way of doing it is to set an upper limit on MIRV’d missiles, with a sublimit for ICBM’s for each side, and the sublimit could generally be established on a differential basis.

Gromyko: You mean a sublimit for submarine-based missiles and another sublimit for land-based missiles?

Kissinger: Yes. Automatically.

[Both sides confer]

Dobrynin: We will have to consider 1000.

Kissinger: We have to consider 1000, 1100, 900. 1100 would be easier for us. We could accept 1100 now.

My various colleagues are having heart attacks along the table because I am accepting things so quickly. [Both sides confer].

Dobrynin: Do we want to take a lunch break?

Kissinger: We could certainly—without going back to Washington—we could accept 1100 if there was a subceiling below that.

Dobrynin: What is the number?
Kissinger: That we would have to discuss. I agree to an interval, because I have a slight insurrection on my staff.

Gromyko: We will issue a communiqué to the press about our meetings at the end of the day.

Kissinger: Good. We won’t report back to Washington yet.

Gromyko: I have a list of subjects

Kissinger: When we come back, what will we talk about? Because I have to know whom to bring.

Brezhnev: We should continue with this, then we have to talk about the Middle East.

Kissinger: I will bring these people, then the Middle East people will be told to stand by.

[The meeting then ended.]
166. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Moscow, March 25, 1974, 5:45–10:32 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief, USA Department
Mikhail D. Sytenko, Member of the Collegium of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief, Near East Department
Andrei Vavilov, USA Department
Oleg Sokolov, USA Department
Viktor Sukhodrev, USA Department (Interpreter)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Carlyle E. Maw, Legal Advisor, State Department
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary-Designate for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department
Jan M. Lodal, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

SALT; Other Arms Control; CSCE

General Secretary Brezhnev: I received a group of Japanese economists and businessmen here today.

How are your children?\(^2\)

Secretary Kissinger: They are getting on beautifully. And we appreciate very much the arrangements you have made.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I interviewed them today. Before they go I will tell them who you really are.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 76, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Secretary Kissinger’s Pre-Summit Trip to Moscow, Memcons & Reports, March 24–28, 1974. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Brezhnev’s office in the Council of Ministers building at the Kremlin. Brackets are in the original.

\(^2\) See footnote 2, Document 165.
Secretary Kissinger: The arrangements were not only technically very correct but humanly too.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I had a say in that, I will tell you. The journalists, too, have a program.

Secretary Kissinger: I saw their reports this morning; they were really quite good. It was a good idea [for you] to see them for a few minutes. Their reports were very favorable.

General Secretary Brezhnev: The world press has been writing about these meetings. They are all warning me to be careful.

Secretary Kissinger: Warning you? They are accusing me of wanting relations with you so much I will give away anything. It is mostly from members of the peace movement on the Vietnam war who have now switched sides. In America.

SALT

General Secretary Brezhnev: I trust you have solved everything during lunch?

Secretary Kissinger: No. Let me explain our difficulties, and let me explain how it will present itself in the United States. You will remember from my public testimony when Senator Jackson attacked the first agreement, we defended it on the grounds that MIRV made up for the imbalance in numbers in the first phase. If we now extend that agreement, and add to it a provision of 1,000 MIRVed missiles, there will be two criticisms made, at least: One, that the numerical advantage now will become effective because of the number of warheads. Second, because the Soviet Union has more MIRVs on each launcher than we do, you will have a numerical advantage not only in the number of missiles but in the number of warheads. Thirdly, because the Soviet warheads are heavier than ours, it means the land-based force of the Soviet Union will be able to acquire a first-strike capability against ours. And therefore if there is not some ceiling on land-based missiles that takes account of the different numbers of warheads on each of these missiles, the position will become very complicated. In addition, we have the problem that at the level of 1,000, we would have to stop deploying MIRVs soon, while you would be starting yours. We would have no way of knowing if you are stopping. You will reach 1,000 at the very end of this process. So if you put, say, 500–800 on your land-based missiles—I give you the arguments quite honestly as they will be put to us—and if our calculation is correct that you have six on each, you would have 3,000–5,000 warheads, and you would be able to destroy our Minuteman.

I don’t want to give you ideas, but these are the arguments that will be made. I just wanted to give you the reasoning of our people.
General Secretary Brezhnev: I want to be absolutely clear in my mind where we stand. In connection with the figure you mentioned, 1,100, how many land-based missiles would we be entitled to MIRV, and how many on submarines?

Secretary Kissinger: We would propose, on that calculation, a ratio of about 5:3 land-based missiles, and we would therefore propose 500 land-based missiles for ourselves. This would give you slightly more warheads than we.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Eight hundred for submarines. [Kissinger nods yes.]

Foreign Minister Gromyko: And you 600.

Ambassador Dobrynin: You are more generous for us!

Secretary Kissinger: It would give equality in warheads. You about 1,800 to our 1,500 warheads on land-based missiles.

[They confer.]

When I first met your Ambassador, he didn’t know what a missile was. Now he participates very actively. [Laughter]

General Secretary Brezhnev: If I agree to this, this will be my last meeting with Dr. Kissinger, because I will be destroyed.

Secretary Kissinger: My problem is that exactly the opposite is true if I agree to this [points to Soviet proposal].

[Both sides confer. Brezhnev winds his mariner’s clock, and it chimes for 6 o’clock. It is 6:03.]

General Secretary Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, this is an interesting watch. [He shows a French-made watch which shows the whole mechanism. He points again to the cigarette-holder with the six cartridge-like holders.]

It is like the American MIRV. Looks like six but you say three.

On your submarines, you have 12.

Secretary Kissinger: Ten.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Twelve! I will prove you have 12.

You say we have six whereas in actual fact we don’t. So if we look at this officially, we are entitled to ask you for an advance. I didn’t want to introduce this element into this, so we should count in good faith.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I will tell you our numbers. So Dobrynin’s generals won’t have so much work to do—so they can concentrate on Congress and help us with the Trade Bill. We had one test with 12 for submarines, but the warheads were so small we couldn’t see them. So we are deploying them with ten. It doesn’t make any difference. But on what is deployed, we have ten.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We have not even started even the work to deploy ten or 12. That is the crux of the matter. I for one want to
say this to you in a sense of responsibility. If we were talking about destroying these weapons on one side or the other, it would be a different matter. But that is impossible because you have done so much work to launch these, including submarine-launched missiles. So we should look for a more acceptable solution. So in order to remove the arguments of Jackson, if he represents the American public opinion, to eliminate their arguments we could try to find some other common ground, but not on this basis.

I mean, our last agreement was not a fortuitous agreement. We had precise figures; you and President Nixon had accurate data. No attempt was made to conceal the fact that you were ahead of us in MIRVs. Then suddenly we see this complete turnabout, which puts us in such a position of unequality. I wouldn’t like to use inaccurate figures.

Secretary Kissinger: Which figures are inaccurate, Mr. General Secretary?

General Secretary Brezhnev: You don’t have three.

Secretary Kissinger: Three on Minuteman.

General Secretary Brezhnev: And 12.

Secretary Kissinger: Ten.

General Secretary Brezhnev: But we don’t have any. We still have so much thinking to do on them, and you will know when we have ten. We will have to admit it ourselves. But that is nothing but pie in the sky. Let’s try to speak in more realistic terms. Maybe we should try to find another figure for a ceiling. But for us to have only 300 while you have 500 is something else. If you have ten MIRVs on one type, you can have the same number of other types as well. And you have already mastered the technology and we have not.

Secretary Kissinger: But you would have 1,100 single warheads.

General Secretary Brezhnev: MIRVs are something else again.

Secretary Kissinger: But if you add them up, you would have 1,100 and we would have 500.

Let me establish one principle. If we have any agreement on MIRV, there has to be a ceiling on land-based missiles. We don’t have to agree now what the ceiling is.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: MIRVed.

Secretary Kissinger: MIRVed. I am not now talking about what the number is.

[They confer.]

I will tell you why. Because if you don’t have a ceiling, we won’t really have a meaningful agreement. Let me explain our reasoning. There is no way you can inspect the MIRVs on a submarine. So after
you test your submarine MIRV, for our calculation we have to take all the submarines that can take that missile as having MIRV. The same is true for us.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: But that requirement is adequately met by establishing a total ceiling. Only a total.

Secretary Kissinger: No, because for the first few years you could build an increasing number.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: But it would be a total ceiling, with the ratio between land-based and sea-based determined by the countries themselves. The only problem will be to find the number.

Secretary Kissinger: You will probably be deploying within a year. That is our estimate.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It is certainly to your advantage we can’t deploy it all at once.

Secretary Kissinger: Our problem is, if you deploy 1,000, you can keep going during the period of the agreement, and then put everything in sea-based.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: That would be completed during the period of the agreement. You have already deployed.

Secretary Kissinger: But what will we do without an agreement?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Without an agreement there is no ceiling, and you can do an unlimited number.

Secretary Kissinger: That is exactly the point. Without an agreement you could put everything into land-based missiles, and we would never know.

We can build 1,000 Minuteman, MIRVed, if we want. There are 500 Minutemen which, under our agreement, we are prepared to MIRV.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: How can you say we want unlimited numbers when we have a ceiling? When you say we can’t deploy in the first year, it is in your advantage.

Secretary Kissinger: Never in the past have you deployed more than 250 missiles in a year. So during the period of this agreement, you could deploy 1,000 MIRVed missiles, each very much larger than ours. During that same period we would deploy very few under the agreement, because we have already deployed close to 1,000. So for the five-year period, it is, practically, a means for you to catch up. I am just telling you the arguments we will be faced with. And each of your warheads is larger than ours.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: But surely there is a contradiction. You say you are nearing the end of your deployment, and that we are only trying to catch up and we will catch up by the end. But the situation will change and we will have to revise the agreement anyway.
Secretary Kissinger: By the end of the period you will have the possibility to destroy our Minuteman.

General Secretary Brezhnev: In short, then it appears there are versions that are good for you, but as soon as we fall behind you want us to stay behind. We won’t endorse unequal security conditions.

Secretary Kissinger: Our military says we accepted unequal conditions in the first SALT agreement.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: As the General Secretary said, not only you but we have military men.

Secretary Kissinger: But you have 1,400 and we have 1,000 ICBMs, and we have 48 and you have 62 submarines.

I am not contesting that agreement.

We are now debating whether we want a rate of deploying MIRV missiles . . . By any theory, you will deploy more MIRVed missiles than we did.

We will face the present difficulty.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: But we never accepted the view of Jackson, that the previous agreement was unequal.

Secretary Kissinger: There is no way you could possibly deploy more than 1,000 in five years.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: But you can’t say there is no limit; the limit is set by the total ceiling.

Secretary Kissinger: Suppose you dig 500 holes in the first year.

Ambassador Dobrynin: We can’t do that under the agreement.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: If you say it might take three years to get an agreement; Dobrynin can know what goes on. He gets what he needs.

Secretary Kissinger: But we don’t meet as many of our Congressmen as he does.

Let me do some calculations. First, there must be some ceiling on land-based missiles. Leave aside the figure. But within that, what is your idea of the relationship of the various missiles? Do you have an unlimited right to put MIRVs on land-based missiles?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Each side would be able to choose the types of missiles it wants to save.

Secretary Kissinger: We don’t have a heavy rocket.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: But you use the advantages you have—factual advantages—and your program is almost complete.

[Both sides confer.]

General Secretary Brezhnev: Should we perhaps pass over to something else?
Secretary Kissinger: All right. Let me—how should we therefore leave this? Just for our consideration. Should we talk about it again here, or should we leave it until the Foreign Minister comes to Washington?

General Secretary Brezhnev: I think we could take it up again while you are here.

Secretary Kissinger: All right. Our concern is to have some ceiling on land-based missiles and some ceiling on the heaviest missiles.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: MIRVed.

Secretary Kissinger: MIRVed. We are talking about MIRVed, yes.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Whenever a question is too challenging or difficult, the best thing is to put it in your briefcase and sleep on it. Then you will ask yourself what the fuss was about.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

General Secretary Brezhnev: So maybe we should discuss another question relating to this military sphere.

Secretary Kissinger: We could discuss MBFR—or did you mean the things the General Secretary mentioned this morning?

General Secretary Brezhnev: This morning: Tridents, B–1, withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean, the ban on underground testing—all of these are important issues.

Secretary Kissinger: Of these issues, I am quite confident we can agree on the ABM proposal. No second ABM. I am quite sure we can agree to that.

General Secretary Brezhnev: It is quite useless work anyway.

Secretary Kissinger: On B–1, I don’t think we could stop work on it. But we could agree not to deploy it to operational units during the period of this agreement. And freeze the number of heavy bombers during the period of the agreement.

General Secretary Brezhnev: What about Trident submarines?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to Trident submarines, I believe we would have to do it in terms of what the General Secretary said—that is, if the agreement is extended, we would have to deploy three of those submarines.

General Secretary Brezhnev: During the period of the agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: In the last year of the agreement.

General Secretary Brezhnev: In 1980.

Secretary Kissinger: In 1978. One in 1978, and the others in 1979. That is a delay; that is lower than otherwise . . .

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3 See Document 165.
General Secretary Brezhnev: So that would mean approximately an additional 75 MIRVed missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: Seventy-two.

Mr. Korniyenko: But instead of other submarines. Because if the agreement is prolonged, the figures will be kept.

Secretary Kissinger: But—we can discuss it—the agreement is basically for 44 submarines. We have an understanding that we will build only 41 during the period of the agreement, which is in a letter from the President.

General Secretary Brezhnev: True. But then we should be entitled to build new ones too.

Secretary Kissinger: New types or numbers?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Because Trident is a new type.

Secretary Kissinger: Within the 62 you can build new types.

General Secretary Brezhnev: But that surely is a departure from the agreement already entered into, and that again would mean prejudicing the basic principle of balance. Merely because of what somebody from the Pentagon tells you. We are being told things too.

Basically, we are building types of submarines you are familiar with, not building anything new. You are talking about having Trident, a product in hand, but wouldn’t build them in the period of the agreement. But you would afterward.

Secretary Kissinger: No, we said we wouldn’t have any of them operational or on sea trials during the period of the agreement.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Will not be commissioned.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct. That is no disagreement. Our definition of “commissioned,” which we all agreed to, with respect to when weapons have to be destroyed, is when a boat is put into the ocean. And we won’t have any Tridents during the life of the Interim Agreement.

Ambassador Stoessel: They will be ready.

Secretary Kissinger: They will be ready, but they won’t be tested during the life of the agreement. And then it takes six months of trials. Jan?

Mr. Lodal: More like a year. Thirteen months. They are launched, then after four months, there are 13 months for sea trials.

Secretary Kissinger: So 17 months?

Mr. Lodal: More like 16 or 17 months.

Secretary Kissinger: That is our program; it could be speeded up, I suppose.

[Secretary Kissinger looks over the schedule of Trident deployments and confers with Sonnenfeldt and Lodal.]
No, it is thirteen months. This is the schedule of Trident. They are criticizing me for giving away too much.

General Secretary Brezhnev: There are no secrets.

Secretary Kissinger: Our only protection is, so much is known that no one can tell the difference between what is true and what isn’t.

General Secretary Brezhnev: On ABM, as I see it, we can reach agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

General Secretary Brezhnev: What about the ending of underground nuclear tests, by way of a joint statement or agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: As I told your Ambassador, it is very difficult for us. But your idea today—that the end be put in some future period—is something new, which I hadn’t heard.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: January 1, 1976.

Secretary Kissinger: So we would like to consider this a little further.

General Secretary Brezhnev: You are welcome.

There is another question, which I omitted to mention this morning, that is, an agreement banning activity modifying the environment for military purposes, detrimental to the well-being and health. That seems to us a very humane field of endeavor, which would benefit mankind.

Secretary Kissinger: I told your Ambassador we actually have a study on this, which it will take some weeks to complete. Maybe we will get some ideas while I am here.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, we could try and set out our views on this matter.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

General Secretary Brezhnev: There is also the question I did mention this morning, the withdrawal of American and Soviet atomic submarines carrying nuclear missiles and aircraft carriers carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean—in short, all nuclear weapons.

Secretary Kissinger: That I believe would be more difficult.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Why?

Secretary Kissinger: Because our aircraft carriers are there not only in connection with our relationship but also in connection with our relationships in the Mediterranean.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Since we both agreed to be very frank in our dealings with each other, let me say I don’t find that argument at

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4 See footnote 9, Document 174.
all convincing. I mean, for instance, what would you say if we introduced atomic weapons into all socialist countries and said it had nothing to do with our relations but came from our relationships with socialist countries and that is that?

Secretary Kissinger: But our impression is you do have nuclear weapons in socialist countries.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We have no atomic weapons anywhere and don’t give atomic weapons to anyone.

Secretary Kissinger: We don’t give them to anyone but these aircraft carriers are related to the situation in the Middle East.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That would be tantamount to our giving surface-to-surface missiles to Egypt and Syria and saying . . .

Secretary Kissinger: That is different, Mr. General Secretary. Aircraft carriers are under American control.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Egypt and Syria would be only too happy to have surface-to-surface missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: The Egyptians told us you gave them surface-to-surface missiles. And Arabs never tell an untruth.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Sadat was offended at us for not allowing him to fire surface-to-surface missiles even without nuclear warheads.

Secretary Kissinger: One [was fired] on the last day of the war.

General Secretary Brezhnev: They were under our control the whole time.

Secretary Kissinger: We thought it was a very constructive move. But we haven’t given surface-to-surface missiles to the Israelis.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That may be true, but I am talking about the situation as it stands. Incidentally, Egypt tells you one thing and us another.

Secretary Kissinger: I find it hard to believe Arabs wouldn’t tell you the exact truth. [Brezhnev and Gromyko smile; Kissinger laughs.]

General Secretary Brezhnev: I think my smile says enough.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I am sure some countries in the Middle East are telling you one thing and us another, and would like nothing better than to have us quarrel because of them. Relationships in that area are even more temporary than elsewhere. So we have no illusions.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We have some information that Libya is about to unite with America. Or Libya wants America to join it, under the aegis of Qaddafi.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: But you can’t have two Presidents!
Secretary Kissinger: That is why I thought they would unite with Saudi Arabia. But it is an interesting idea. Soon they will have more dollars than we do.

Ambassador Dobrynin: It is true.

General Secretary Brezhnev: It would certainly look good if you and we could agree to withdraw nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean. Surely that would be welcomed throughout the world. We would thereby certainly show the world’s public that we are earnest and serious partners. For after all, what reason is there for us or you to swim in that basin? And surely all of the countries of that region would welcome that agreement.

Well, I don’t want to believe that question is over and done with, because I know Dr. Kissinger so well that I am sure he will think it over and come up with something tomorrow.

Secretary Kissinger: Maybe not tomorrow.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Maybe after lunch. Taking account of an eight-hour difference in time, it will be the day after tomorrow.

One other question I didn’t list: a possible agreement to ban chemical weapons.

Secretary Kissinger: To ban the use of chemical weapons, or production?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Both production and use. Now you see the kind of important documents we can sign by the time of the meeting.

Secretary Kissinger: Ban the use—that we can almost certainly do. I want to be specific. Banning the use will be no problem; I mean it can be done. On banning production, the argument will be made that there is no way to inspect it. Our production is not very great.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Some chemical weapons are lethal.

Secretary Kissinger: You propose the end of production of lethal ones?

Ambassador Dobrynin: Yes.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Up to now, you and the British and the French have been in favor only of a partial ban on the use, not on production. So no forward progress has been made. What we are suggesting is that you and we enter into an arrangement that can be the basis of an international arrangement. Because it can be solved only on an international basis.

Secretary Kissinger: What is the exact attribute?

Ambassador Dobrynin: The most lethal.

Secretary Kissinger: Less lethal are okay?
Ambassador Dobrynin: All chemical lethal. Others would be continued to discuss [sic].

Secretary Kissinger: All chemical lethal, a ban on use and production.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Any chemical if used in sufficient quantities can be lethal. Because we have one chemical that prevents you from counting down. You can only count up. So no rocket ever gets fired.

We will study your proposal very seriously.

General Secretary Brezhnev: You remember this question was mentioned in the communiqué.\(^5\)

Secretary Kissinger: Very well.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Of both the Moscow and Washington visits,\(^6\) and both sides said they would do their utmost to bring about an international agreement banning the use of chemical warfare. We inscribed it in two joint documents but they are not going anywhere. The time has come to give the whole matter new impetus. Surely a solution to this question, or a joint statement on our part, would give impetus to détente, and would remove a danger.

Secretary Kissinger: We will examine it with the attitude of coming to agreement.

General Secretary Brezhnev: As a minimum, we could probably at least agree to a phased banning of that weapon.

Secretary Kissinger: What do you have in mind specifically?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Phase it out in terms of time, saying that by such and such a year it will be prohibited and removed from the arsenals of states.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: At Geneva your representatives were in favor of leaving in the hands of states some types, because they said you needed some, like tear gas.\(^7\)

Secretary Kissinger: But that doesn’t apply here, because we are talking about lethal.

Ambassador Dobrynin: As the first stage.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It would be the first step.

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\(^6\) The communiqué issued at the conclusion of the May 1972 Moscow Summit is ibid., 1972, pp. 635–642.

\(^7\) A reference to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which met in Geneva in 1972 and again February–April 1973 to discuss, among other things, a treaty on chemical weapons limitations.
Secretary Kissinger: You mean first lethal, then non-lethal—not that in five years lethal would be phased out.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Something in the communiqué could be said along these lines.\textsuperscript{8} [To Sukhodrev:] Read it.

Mr. Sukhodrev [reads]: “Attaching great importance to the achievement in cooperation with other countries of an agreement, excluding from the arsenals of States such dangerous weapons of mass annihilation as chemical weapons, the USSR and the USA have agreed to come out with a joint initiative on this issue. Accordingly, they intend to table in the Committee on Disarmament a draft of an international convention which would prohibit the development and production of the most dangerous, lethal types of chemical weapons of warfare on the understanding that discussions on the question of prohibiting the remaining types of chemical weapons will be continued.”

General Secretary Brezhnev: Something along those lines.

Secretary Kissinger: We have to study it, but we will do so with a positive attitude. And we will give a reply very soon.

General Secretary Brezhnev: You really don’t want to get out of the Mediterranean?

Secretary Kissinger: [Laughs] Not this week.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Alright, then you stay here another week.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Alright, it is a very important question, so you will stay here another couple of weeks and travel around, and maybe then . . .

Mr. Aleksandrov: Leningrad.

Secretary Kissinger: Leningrad doesn’t exist! It is a rumor but it is unfounded.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: A legend.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I had two Japanese calling on me. One is 83, the other is 78, and they just got back from Leningrad at 8:30 this morning.

Secretary Kissinger: Our experience is you can’t always believe what the Japanese tell you!

Foreign Minister Gromyko: You know them better.

\textsuperscript{8} The communiqué issued in Moscow on March 28 did not mention chemical weapons. See footnote 9, Document 170.
General Secretary Brezhnev: I haven’t met Japanese all that often, although I get quite a few messages from them recently. I just got two from Mr. Tanaka.9

Secretary Kissinger: One for each island?

[Snacks were brought in.]

General Secretary Brezhnev: New cookies?

Secretary Kissinger: Now I know it is a serious proposal.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That is why I offer them to you. First we had those dry rusks, now we have real cookies. That is all for you; nothing for Sonnenfeldt.

Secretary Kissinger: I am thinking of leaving Sonnenfeldt here.

General Secretary Brezhnev: You can’t imagine the hard time I would have if he stayed.

Secretary Kissinger: I can, because I have had it. You can’t imagine it.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I am beginning to understand.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: On one hand he sits there, looking like he agrees with everything.

Secretary Kissinger: With Sonnenfeldt it is a close race between the difficulties he causes and his indispensability.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I guess since he is here, he must be of some use to you.

Secretary Kissinger: He is unfortunately of some use, or I would have fired him a long time ago.

General Secretary Brezhnev: He is an interesting man. Here we are, criticizing him, and he sits there silently.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I take it as praise.

Secretary Kissinger: I must warn you, Mr. General Secretary, Sonnenfeldt can read upside down.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Anything written there I can just hand over to you.

So we agree we withdraw nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean [laughter], which is a very important achievement.

Secretary Kissinger: Why don’t we start with the Black Sea and work our way south from there?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Let’s do it simultaneously.

President Nixon is sure to be pleased if we solve at least one problem in a whole day.

9 Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka.
Secretary Kissinger: I think that one we will have to study much further.

General Secretary Brezhnev: As soon as I raise a businesslike question, you say you have to study it. I can’t imagine I caught you unawares.

Secretary Kissinger: Our Chief of Naval Operations, who is already very melancholy, would fall into a deep depression.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Why don’t you find a more cheerful man for that job?

Secretary Kissinger: We’re changing him in June.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Why not earlier?

That would really be a question that would cause a world-wide resonance. It’s really a question that requires a solution. Maybe you do need to study it; maybe you will organize a couple of scientific research institutes. It’s a really important question. What are we doing swimming around there, with our submarines chasing each other?

Secretary Kissinger: We could discuss restrictions on deployment in the Mediterranean.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Perhaps we should discuss increasing our deployment.

Secretary Kissinger: There was one period, the end of October, when there wasn’t enough room, there were so many ships there.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Really it’s not a very pleasant subject, the idea of our two navies, our submarines coming to the surface and waving to each other, saying okay a few times. Our people certainly take a dim view of it; it looks like the Americans just want to be everywhere. We are not suggesting you withdraw and we remain. Of course, conventional ships and merchant ships can stay, if they are required. But if rocket-armed warships are there, that changes the picture. It suggests your military men have a certain concept in mind, and ours get to thinking. And there you are, faced with contradictions, signing documents on limitation of strategic arms and poking around the world.

I have had occasion to say, and I will repeat, the best outcome would be to burn all the others and sign one—that the U. S. and USSR undertake never to attack each other, and if another attacks one of them they come to each other’s help. We would be willing to submit it to Parliament, and you to the Congress, and everyone would support it. Otherwise we keep talking about it. Some call it condominium or call us superpowers. Instead of its proving our good intentions, various ill intentions are being ascribed to us.

I fully realize, Dr. Kissinger, that certain things are being presented by you under the influence of the domestic situation as it is taking shape in the United States. But when years will have passed, and
second- and third-rate things have fallen past, President Nixon will be proven right.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Years will pass, and a new President will be in office. But it is one thing to get nominated for President, another to get down to basic issues.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree with you, Mr. General Secretary, I have said in every public statement that the establishment of peace between the United States and the USSR is the paramount issue of our time.

General Secretary Brezhnev: And it is you and we and President Nixon who must continue to give impetus to the process.

Secretary Kissinger: And you can count on us. We will fight our domestic opposition on this issue.

I will consider seriously what you have said on strategic arms limitation. But you should take into account also our problems. Because if we can achieve something this year, even if it is not perfect for both sides, it will be a tremendous achievement for the peace-loving element on both sides. If we can overcome the intrinsic difficulties of the proposal, we will fight our opposition on that issue.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I am certainly pleased to hear that. But the trouble is, when we get to the details, it seems hard to find a common language.

Secretary Kissinger: We should both study what has been said today. I will certainly study yours.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Believe me, I have done a lot of work on this, first and foremost as Chairman of the Committee on National Defense—and who should be insisting on a national advantage, but I’m not. I am both General Secretary of the Party and Chairman of the National Defense Council. So it is my responsibility to preside over the defense of the country. But I wouldn’t proceed from the same attitude as the Chief of the General Staff. You see that my proposals, one after the other, are aimed at lessening the danger of war. Instead, I get the reply that this requires further study; this has to be weighed, etc. But with military technology being what it is, and the exchange of information being what it is, each side knows nine-tenths of what the other is doing.

Let me just say, I would be willing, before your very eyes, to destroy 100 launching sites. Would that change anything? Nothing. President Nixon was right in saying in our first meeting that the Soviet Union could destroy the United States seven times over, and the United States could destroy the Soviet Union seven times over. That is probably correct. So what do we do, destroy each other? Here we are, bickering over throw-weights and warheads, etc. When you get home, you could put it into computers and you’ll see we get no advantage from
our proposals. Although it’s a difficult problem in our minds, forward-based systems. You treat that as incidental. But our military people and I have to take that seriously. Don’t think that’s something out of a pack of cards—it’s nuclear weapons.

Secretary Kissinger: No, it is essentially correct.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I am not saying this to pick a quarrel. It has to be taken into account. In the military field alone I have listed so many proposals; what kind of opposition could there be?

Secretary Kissinger: Take chemical weapons, to be specific. Our problem is we have no way to know whether you’re producing them or not. If that could be solved, we would have no problem with banning production.

We have no intention of using them.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Let’s find a way to solve that.

Secretary Kissinger: I can tell you now: If that can be solved, we will agree to stop production. That is the only obstacle.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, when we were signing the agreement on limitation of strategic arms, I honestly didn’t know you would have 12 warheads on your missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: Ten.

General Secretary Brezhnev: All right, ten. I knew we didn’t. Doesn’t that affect the factor of confidence? Because I knew the President Nixon I was facing was not the Nixon of the Kitchen Debate. Because I saw this was a President Nixon who had come to recognize the realities of life, to establish peace or else to go back to the worst periods of the Cold War. I saw he was guided by a noble intention and I valued that highly.

Secretary Kissinger: This reality has not changed.

General Secretary Brezhnev: And all these attacks on him really have no bearing on the major issues we face. They are just trying to get him down.

Secretary Kissinger: You should not think the position we have advanced here is the result of domestic difficulties. In foreign policy we do not have these difficulties. Our problem with your proposal is this: You say 1,000 missiles can be MIRVed. This is the maximum you can MIRV in this period, so we don’t see what restriction you are accepting. Secondly, as we have always told you, if there is no restriction on

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10 The “Kitchen Debate” between Nixon, then Vice President, and Soviet Secretary General Khrushchev, took place at the American National Exhibition in Moscow on July 24, 1959. Sitting in a reconstructed American kitchen, which U.S. exhibitors claimed the average American could afford, Nixon and Khrushchev debated the merits of capitalism and Communism.
land-based forces, it produces an inherent inequality. I put aside now the numbers; I'm talking about theory. This is not compensated for by the inequality in sea-based forces, because, first of all, sea-based forces do not threaten each other. We can't destroy your submarine missiles with our submarine missiles. But you can destroy our land-based missiles with yours if you have a sufficient number of MIRVs. So in order to prevent that danger, we want to bring about an approximately equal number of MIRVs. This has nothing to do with our domestic situation.

So this is the theory under which we are operating. And I can assure you we will be attacked for that. I can assure you my present position with Congress is sufficient. So we can carry any reasonable agreement that we can defend. But there has to be some limitation on land-based missiles. With a complete freedom to mix, we don't have an adequate basis for what you call equal security.

On some of your other proposals: I told you our difficulties. That was the case before our domestic difficulties, and is the case afterwards. That has always been our position.

On the ABM site, we have agreed.

On the test ban, quite frankly, it looks to us in one of its aspects as directed at third countries, and we have always been reluctant to make such agreements.

On the other hand, we are determined to do our utmost to make major progress this year and we won't be deterred by political difficulties. I think your Ambassador can confirm that the President and I can get sufficient Congressional support for any reasonable agreement. And it's terribly important, because if we can defeat now the opponents of relations between the Soviet Union and the USA, then we have achieved an almost permanent victory. The reason they are so determined is they know soon it can't be reversed.

So frankly, our difficulty with your proposal on SALT is its intrinsic nature, not our domestic difficulties.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I'm not linking it with the domestic situation, but let us recall in 1972 the U.S. and USSR signed a convention on banning the production of biological weapons. The question of control didn't arise.

Secretary Kissinger: You know why? Because we said [to our military:] "If they used biological weapons, we could use chemical weapons."

Ambassador Dobrynin: But you could use atomics.

11 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, signed April 10, 1972. (26 UST 583; TIAS 8062)
Secretary Kissinger: That we could use atomic—it’s a particular threshold.

General Secretary Brezhnev: In the field of underground nuclear testing, we are proposing that our two nations declare we won’t, but if other nations don’t, we’ll feel free . . . How is that directed against third countries?

Secretary Kissinger: Because since we both know that allies of the two sides won’t stop, we are not reaching an agreement.

[They confer.]

[To Dobrynin:] I see Vinogradov\(^{12}\) is back. You are not taking the Geneva Conference seriously.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Bunker will be back?

Secretary Kissinger: I’m sending him back.

Ambassador Dobrynin: For one day; then he will disappear.

Secretary Kissinger: For a week.

Can I take a 5-minute break?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Certainly.

[There was a break from 8:18 to 8:47 p.m.]

[Maw and Atherton were invited in and introduced. Sytenko joins the Soviet side.]

Secretary Kissinger [referring to Dobrynin]: I caught him in Las Vegas once.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: And he didn’t report to the Ministry! He told me about it later, much later.

General Secretary Brezhnev: How much time do we have? Can we have a serious discussion on the Mideast?

Secretary Kissinger: My impression was that you preferred not to discuss the Mideast, perhaps because there is not enough time.

General Secretary Brezhnev: It is indeed a serious question. If we went into it, it would take at least two hours.

Secretary Kissinger: Should we leave it until tomorrow morning?

General Secretary Brezhnev: I agree, first thing in the morning—10:00, 10:30.

Secretary Kissinger: Whichever you wish.

General Secretary Brezhnev: 10:30.

Secretary Kissinger: Here?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Yes.

\(^{12}\) In early 1974, Vinogradov was appointed a special envoy to deal with Middle East issues, including the Middle East Peace Conference in Geneva.
Secretary Kissinger: Good.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Is it comfortable for you here?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, except for the cakes, which are too fattening.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We are having more sent in—a special kind, nonfattening.

Secretary Kissinger: Not entirely!

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Anyway, they’re not MIRVed.

Secretary Kissinger: There was a time when your Foreign Minister never spoke on military matters.

CSCE

General Secretary Brezhnev: Perhaps we could have a brief survey of the European Conference.

Secretary Kissinger: Good idea.

General Secretary Brezhnev: If we delve a little into the past, we both recall in our meetings we agreed to consult with each other and coordinate actions regarding the basic objective of both of us, that is, to assure the success of the All-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This was the policy principle we agreed upon and set in communiqués in Washington and Moscow. It would be correct if in this present meeting we carried out a brief survey, with a view to bringing the Conference to a successful conclusion in the nearest future. I would go even further and say that if we can bring about the completion of the European Conference before President Nixon’s visit to the Soviet Union, this fact would give still greater significance and weight to the President’s visit, and would be a greater political asset. It would lessen tensions and be in the interests of the United States and its allies and ourselves and our friends in the socialist countries. It would resound very well around the world. We have had occasion to speak of the significance of Europe and the importance of cooperation and peace in Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: We have spoken a lot of Europe unilaterally lately.

General Secretary Brezhnev: But, you will also recall, there was a time when we did our best to secure a successful end to the Conference by 1972. Then we decided to end it by 1973. Now we’re in 1974 and the Conference has not yet ended. And a situation has developed where some people have tried to inject into the Conference elements which are alien to the principles the Conference is trying to establish—principles of cooperation and good-neighbor relations. I won’t recall who they are; they are either opponents of the Conference, or people who want it
to drag its heels, or who don’t want anything to result. Surely that was
counter to what our two countries have agreed upon.

Lately there are rumors that the United States and the Soviet
Union lost interest in the Conference. I can’t speak for the United States,
but it’s not the case for the Soviet Union. We are making every effort to
conclude the Conference successfully and making preparations for its
conclusion at the highest level.

Several days ago I met President Pompidou of France, and I criti-
cized those who are submitting proposals at the Conference that can
only impede the work of the Conference. As a matter of fact, I read to
him a proposal submitted by his own delegation—it suggested the
right to open a company or a theatre in the Soviet Union, not subject to
control of the Soviet Union. Surely that was counter to the first prin-
ciple, that is, noninterference in the affairs of other countries. He was
surprised at this and didn’t know it had been submitted.

If it is allowed to drag on for years and years, people will lose in-
terest, and people will speak of it like the old League of Nations, where
so many words were spoken. President Pompidou listened to my
words; he agreed on the need to sweep aside all obstacles to its rapid
success. In my earlier meetings with Pompidou, he was reluctant to
agree to a meeting of heads of state. This time he agreed that the leaders
could sign the document provided the document was good enough. To
this I replied, if the document were not good, I wouldn’t allow the For-
gign Minister to sign it either. [Laughter]

Regarding the United States delegation, it’s not impeding the work
of the Conference, but neither is it showing any great activity in the
work of the Conference. That is something we could perhaps talk
about.

Another thing I talked about with Pompidou: In the past, in in-
creasing confidence in Europe, I suggested the possibility of foreign
delegations being invited to observe various maneuvers of troops. But
no sooner did we come out with that than we were presented with de-
mands to give out information about all, even insignificant, troop
movements, even in the Soviet Union, down to the regimental level.
But that would require a Pentagon-like apparatus to observe.

Another matter: What if the states in Europe wish to bring about a
change in frontiers? How do we reconcile this with the principle of in-
violability of frontiers? Surely France has no intention to give up terri-
tory, or Belgium. We’ve heard rumors the United States is eager to give
up Florida or California.

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13 Pompidou was in the Soviet Union March 11–13. He met with Brezhnev at
Pitsunda.
Foreign Minister Gromyko: Florida is gone already!
Secretary Kissinger: To Cuba. [Laughter]

General Secretary Brezhnev: Who will support that reference to change in frontiers? The only country interested in that is the FRG, because they are nervous about the GDR. But that question is already resolved, because there is a treaty between the FRG and the USSR, and Poland and the FRG, and the GDR and the FRG—both of which are now members of the UN.

What we could do is agree on something like voluntary change in frontiers by the consent of the states concerned. But reference to that should not be in the part of the final document regarding inviolability of frontiers, but in some other part of the final document, so there will be no intimation of one state imposing its will on others. So that’s how we see the solution to this question.

If Bonn and France act as has been promised, and if the United States acts in the same spirit, we think it would be a good thing to bring the European Conference to a close before President Nixon’s visit to the Soviet Union. This would be a good and significant thing, because it is a fact that the United States is present in Europe. That is a fact.

We feel the All-Europe Conference has at present reached a stage where it is possible, given the mutual consent of all the parties, to end its work as quickly as possible, and then the Conference would yield its result as a contribution to the lessening of tension. That’s my first point.

The second point is the United States has been pursuing a consistent line. The task is to find a way to prepare the final document. We are adding no controversial issues and we are adding no new legal considerations to the guarantees of existing frontiers in Europe. That is a very important fact.

On the basis of consultations between us, we agreed to introduce this element of confidence, that is, that of military observations. But that has now been turned into God knows what. We should eliminate those accretions and retain what is really useful. That is the task we now face. And I trust you realize the need today is to remove all these unnecessary and trumped-up elements and leave in only those elements which are truly necessary and useful.

Finally, there are the questions regarding Item III, regarding culture, information, human contacts, and so forth. I have already had occasion to speak publicly on this subject, but I want to repeat here in our official conversation. I want to emphasize we are in favor of human contact and increase of tourism, etc., but on condition of basic respect for the traditions and customs of every country and respect for whatever social order exists in that individual country. And if anyone is counting on being able to interfere in our internal affairs through the
Conference, those hopes are to no avail, I can assure them. I will not conceal my satisfaction that after Comrade Gromyko’s last visit to Washington, an understanding was achieved to act in that spirit, and in accord. That would indeed display yet again the desire of both governments to strive for true understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union, in a matter of political importance.

I could speak at greater length on this, but I trust this exposition would be sufficient—unless Comrade Gromyko has anything to add.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I would say Comrade Brezhnev has been very exact on this.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we agree with much of what you have said. Above all, we agree a major effort should be made to bring the Conference to a conclusion this year, and within this year as soon as possible. We also share your evaluation that the objective conditions exist for bringing it to a conclusion. Finally, we also agree our two representatives in Geneva, working together tactfully, can speed up the work of the Conference.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That is exactly what I am calling for.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me talk first about various items you mentioned, Mr. General Secretary, and then we can talk about the level at which the Conference can be concluded.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Please.

Secretary Kissinger: Incidentally, I think the consultations between our representatives in Geneva should be handled with the same care we used at the time of the Berlin agreement. But I will work that out with your Foreign Minister and your Ambassador. And, of course, Ambassador Stoessel and Korniyenko have also been in active contact to work out the basic approach. [Korniyenko beams.]

Korniyenko is pleased I can say something positive about him. They’ve had useful talks.

On the individual items: On so-called confidence-building measures. You’re quite right; they were introduced after an initial exchange between our two governments. We share your evaluation that too many items have been introduced that aren’t really central to the main subject. So we believe we should concentrate on the question of maneuvers on which we started—maneuvers of a substantial size, for example, of units of 15–20,000 men. We think a practical means of achieving it would be by means of the British proposal at Geneva, which would be appropriately amended. Not the exact proposal, but . . .

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14 See Documents 158, 159, and 160.
Ambassador Dobrynin: Division or strengthened division.

Secretary Kissinger: Sixty days’ notice. We would be prepared to amend it.

We’ve not, incidentally, discussed any of this with our allies. This is what we are prepared to do on our own.

On the issue of inviolability of frontiers, we find that idea of the General Secretary has considerable merit. That is, we could put the phrase about peaceful change in, for example, the section on sovereignty, or some other section than the frontier section. And I think the proposal . . .

[Brezhnev reads an article in Izvestiya about Secretary Kissinger.]

Secretary Kissinger: Is it friendly?

General Secretary Brezhnev: No. We knew you would reject all our proposals. This is Izvestiya, our evening paper.

Secretary Kissinger: It is a good picture. It makes me look thinner. That was before I came here this afternoon.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It can be corrected.

Secretary Kissinger: The article, or the picture?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: The picture.

Secretary Kissinger: So tactically—I don’t know whether it is worth talking about—I like the proposal of your delegate in Geneva, to write that sentence on a separate piece of paper, with the understanding that it will not be in that paragraph on frontiers. And we could cooperate in that effort.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Let me say we feel the most convenient thing would be to write it in that section on sovereignty.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Where sovereignty is mentioned. Sovereignty extends to frontiers.

Secretary Kissinger: The United States and Libya. Your intelligence is too good. You found it out. We wanted to make it a surprise.

I have not studied the exact formulation. We agree that the concept of peaceful change should not—need not—be in the section on frontiers. We agree it could be in the section on sovereignty. And it has to have some specific reference to peaceful change and not simply be related to the concept of sovereignty. But it is not primarily an American problem, let me say. Anything the Germans accept, we will accept.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Why must one country hold the key to the problem?

Secretary Kissinger: We will use our influence to move that sentence. This we promise you. What that sentence is, we will discuss. I think we will find a reasonable solution.
General Secretary Brezhnev: What’s your view on ending the Conference before President Nixon’s visit?

Secretary Kissinger: It will be difficult, for technical reasons. But we won’t exclude doing it shortly afterward. For example, at the end of July. I am talking about the signature.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I take it you are agreeable to signing the document at the highest level?

Secretary Kissinger: This raises the following problem, about which I will be quite candid.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Please.

Secretary Kissinger: We don’t want to be accused of giving up the position of our allies. So let me separate our formal position from what you can expect—if you do not use it with other countries . . .

General Secretary Brezhnev: That goes without saying. Unless we stand on that assumption, then there is no possibility of confidential communications between us.

Secretary Kissinger: Our formal position is, like President Pompidou’s, that the formal document could be signed at the Summit if it is an adequate document. Let me say that if the document, which we are now working on, is finished in the sense we are now discussing, we will consider it a satisfactory document. This is to explain, on a private basis, the thinking of President Nixon to the General Secretary. And we would work in that direction.

That gets us to the part on cultural exchange. I have said on many occasions to your Foreign Minister that a social system that was established with so many hardships and that has overcome so many obstacles is not going to be changed through cultural exchange.

So for us it is the problem of how to bring it to a conclusion. We think the best solution is the one discussed between Ambassador Stoessel and Mr. Korniienko. I mean the solution proposed by Ambassador Stoessel, not the one proposed by Mr. Korniienko! That is, to have the reference to national laws in the basic principles, and then refer back to it at the beginning of Basket III. And we would urge our allies to accept such an approach. We would still have to give some content to the whole basket, but we don’t think that is an insoluble problem.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Let me just say, the solution as you explained is a possible one, that is, in the principles to make reference to national legislation and then to have a reference back to those principles, including the principle on domestic legislation, in the section on so-called human contacts. But since we are not dealing with a work of fiction, the link should have meaning. Namely, in the section dealing
with cultural exchange, etc. there should be reference to the fact that these ties proceed on the basis of the principles set out at the beginning.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We had no doubt of your understanding. But we were more than surprised that the representative of Holland came up with a proposal that included reference to the principles but the two are separated and there is a link between the two. And we were even more surprised when the other delegations—and yours was no exception—came out in support of that of Holland. What you just said is in accord with our thinking.

Another observation on another matter, that is to add to what Comrade Brezhnev has correctly pointed out, that other delegations have brought out of all proportion the so-called “confidence military measures.” You mentioned the British proposal. The first aspect is volume, that is the figures, the question of the size or figures starting from which information would start. We are told it starts from a division, or a reinforced division, though no one seems to know what a reinforced division means. If we take that approach, as Comrade Brezhnev said, we would have to have an enormous bookkeeping apparatus. The second aspect is geographic—the regions where this would operate. It is one thing to refer to a strip of land adjacent to borders; it is another thing if it includes the whole of European Russia. That is nonsense.

Secretary Kissinger: Certainly everything west of Vladivostok.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Some even include Vladivostok! Fortunately, the Urals are the limit of Europe.

You seem to take a realistic approach.

Secretary Kissinger: We want to be constructive, in the spirit of the agreement reached between the President and the General Secretary. Our preliminary view is that some distance from the frontier is more realistic than the whole of European Russia.

General Secretary Brezhnev: When I discussed this with the President, we talked only about foreign observers coming to maneuvers on a voluntary basis. But what is discussed now has a different aspect. In form, what Dr. Kissinger says makes sense, in the spirit of what was agreed upon. But in substance, Dr. Kissinger introduced a certain element of vagueness.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I’m trying to be constructive. I’m saying that what the Foreign Minister says, about a certain distance from frontiers, is what we will support as opposed to all of European Russia. I think the Foreign Minister will recognize it is an attempt to take into account the Soviet point of view, and it is not identical with the view of other delegations. And I believe on that basis a solution can be found.
General Secretary Brezhnev: I spoke about the basis for agreement; the question now is to find a concrete formula. And I certainly don’t want Holland to dictate its terms to the Soviet Union. I will never accept that. Holland should be grateful for our attitude toward it.

Secretary Kissinger: I was not familiar with this particular action of Holland. I think a solution is possible.

If I may make a concrete suggestion, Mr. General Secretary . . .

General Secretary Brezhnev: I think my meeting with President Pompidou at Pitsunda showed that Pompidou himself recognizes the absurdity of some of these ideas. And President Pompidou himself said: “Of course I realize the proposal now is that information be given about all of the European part of the Soviet Union, but I realize the territory of the USSR is not limited to Europe but extends to Vladivostok.”

Secretary Kissinger: That is an ambiguous statement.

General Secretary Brezhnev: He said it in a concrete context.

Secretary Kissinger: May I suggest—if Ambassador Stoessel and Korniyenko can work out concrete formulas on these questions and agree on the tactics. Otherwise all Europe will act as Holland did. But if we can agree, we can manage it like the Berlin negotiations.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I agree completely.

Secretary Kissinger: We may need a little time to convince our allies, but if Stoessel and Korniyenko agree, we have a very good chance. In fact, if Korniyenko agrees to anything, it will be a historic event.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Korniyenko always agrees with correct positions.

Secretary Kissinger: He is a very good man. We admire his work very much.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Stoessel too.

Secretary Kissinger: It is not your fault that Korniyenko always gets the better of Sonnenfeldt.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I’ve never seen an instance of that.

Secretary Kissinger: We think we can meet that Dutch problem in the framework we described.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: You hope.

Secretary Kissinger: We think.

General Secretary Brezhnev: What kind of proposal is it if they want to arrogate to themselves the right to open theaters in the Soviet Union without any control by the Soviet administration? It is not a matter of our being budged from our positions; there is no danger of that. It’s just wrong to have ideas like that.
Secretary Kissinger: As we discussed, it can be solved with a reference to national laws in the basic principles and then refer back to it in Basket III.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Good. I certainly agree. Let Stoessel and Korniyenko talk about it.

Secretary Kissinger: I think we can find a solution.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I think so too.

Secretary Kissinger: Then the problem of the level will also be satisfactorily solved.

General Secretary Brezhnev: The question of the level is, to a certain extent, also an important problem. If the document is signed by the Foreign Ministers, that is one thing. On no account do I want to belittle the importance of our Foreign Ministers; they are empowered to sign anything. But for the nations of Europe, Canada, United States, I believe signatures of the leaders will be of more significance.

Secretary Kissinger: We have understood your view, and if the document is finished as we discussed, it can be solved in that spirit and at that level.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We certainly wouldn’t empower Gromyko to sign a bad document.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we all know what the document looks like.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We can’t have two policies in this country, one that is the Foreign Minister’s policy and the other that is official policy.

Secretary Kissinger: We have had that on occasion. We have recently united them!

We will consider it a satisfactory document.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That is the way I look at it.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t think you and President Nixon will disagree.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I don’t think so.

I think we have had a useful exchange of views today. It has been useful because what Dr. Kissinger has been doing is to advance proposals that are to the advantage of the United States and to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union. But it is not difficult because we now know you better. It is now our sixth meeting.

Secretary Kissinger: I didn’t have the impression that the proposals of the General Secretary threatened the security of the Soviet Union.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Whatever I put forward, I had one underlying motive, that is, strengthening peace.
Secretary Kissinger: That is in both of our interests. We will think over our discussions in that spirit.

General Secretary Brezhnev: So tomorrow morning, perhaps we might discuss on the Middle East. And any of our associates who have work to do can get on with it.

At 10:30 tomorrow.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, exactly 12 hours from now. And thank you for your now-traditional hospitality.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That is the way it has always been. I trust it will stay that way.

At times our conversations have been acute but we have done quite good business together.

Secretary Kissinger: If we do as we both wish, that is the best service we can do for my children—and for your grandchildren.

General Secretary Brezhnev: And great-grandchildren.

[The meeting then ended.]15

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15 Kissinger’s report to Nixon on the meeting with Brezhnev, March 25, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 76, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Secretary Kissinger’s Pre-Summit Trip to Moscow, Memcons & Reports, March 24–28, 1974.
167. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, March 26, 1974, 10:35 a.m.–1:53 p.m.

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Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the MFA; Chief of USA Dept.
Mikhail D. Sytenko, Member of the Collegium of the MFA; Chief of the Near East Dept.
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, USA Dept. (Interpreter)
Andrei Vavilov, USA Dept.
Oleg Sokolov, USA Dept.
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Dept.
Carlyle E. Maw, Legal Adviser
Alfred L. Atherton, Assistant Secretary-designate for Near Eastern & S. Asian Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

CSCE; Middle East

Conference on Security & Cooperation in Europe

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I got home late last night. I certainly can’t say I was satisfied in the way things went [on SALT]. We spent all day talking yesterday but we decided on nothing.²

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t think that is correct. I think we decided on the European Security Conference very successfully.

Brezhnev: That may be true, but nonetheless I still have many reservations on that, and I like precision. When I say I was displeased, that’s of course a unilateral statement. There are two sides.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Files, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 76, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Secretary Kissinger’s Pre-Summit Trip to Moscow, Memcons & Reports, March 24–28, 1974. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Brezhnev’s office in the Council of Ministers Building at the Kremlin. Brackets are in the original.
² See Document 165 and 166.
Dr. Kissinger: My assessment is, on the European Security Conference, we’ll be able to bring it to an early conclusion along the lines and at the level we discussed yesterday.

Brezhnev: If we really wanted to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion, we could have done it long ago. As it is, we’ve had communiqué after communiqué. It was always said, “There is a possibility of doing it in 1972, and in 1973.” Now it’s 1974 and we’re saying, “There is a possibility.” What kind of a way is this to do business? Holland and Belgium are playing around. But who are we? [angrily:] We are nations too and we have our views on this. Also there is the GDR, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria—they’re playing in the Conference and not being capricious—but others are saying they want to establish theaters in the USSR and another wants to know everything that’s going on in the USSR as far as the Urals. If they don’t want any positive results to come out of the European Conference, why don’t they say so? Then there will be, instead of security, insecurity.

Here we are, the second year passing, and no results. The United States in this time managed to fit out all its missiles with MIRV’s and we still haven’t managed to sign even a piece of paper. We’ve offered a straightforward proposal, and someone asks for a kind of freedom in someone else’s country! What kind of freedom is this? We’re not interested in other people’s affairs, in Belgium and Holland.

That is just in addition, Dr. Kissinger, to what we agreed upon yesterday. We and you can sign it.

Dr. Kissinger: As you know, we haven’t had success in achieving unanimity from our allies. And Senator Jackson yesterday made a speech accusing me of treating the Soviet Union better than our European allies.3 I know how pleased the General Secretary is to receive reports from Senator Jackson.

Brezhnev: Very happy indeed.

Dr. Kissinger: So as a practical matter, Mr. General Secretary, we are faced with the reality of a Conference of 35 nations. You yourself said we’ve put no obstacles to progress.

Brezhnev: That’s true.

Dr. Kissinger: I think what we agreed on yesterday will bring results in the next few months.

Brezhnev: I didn’t mean you to take my irritability to mean that all I said applied to the United States. I was simply saying I don’t understand why they’re taking all that time. They gathered in Helsinki, and

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3 On March 26, the Los Angeles Times ran a story that stated that Jackson accused Nixon and Kissinger of “treating Western European allies as adversaries while pursuing the Soviet Union as a friend.” See “Jackson Hits Nixon Stance on Alliances,” p. 14.
the Ministers were charged with drawing up documents, and now they are sitting there drawing their per diems and doing sweet nothing.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we now have a procedure which should speed up the process.

Brezhnev: Then I’ll proceed from the assumption our two sides will act more vigorously. After all, we’re not the last fiddles in the Conference. But if delegations from Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg put forward proposals, we’ll never get anywhere. I admire those people, but if they put forward proposals in a businesslike way, not if they make absurd proposals.

I’m not trying artificially to hasten the work of the Conference. But they’ve been dragging their feet three years now. I would like the Conference to end before President Nixon’s visit, because it would be a solid foundation for the visit. We would then truly demonstrate to the whole world that our two major powers have shown the world an example of cooperation in bringing the Conference to an end. That is my main design.

Dr. Kissinger: I propose Ambassador Stoessel and Mr. Korniyenko work together as we discussed yesterday, both as to tactics and as to substance, as we agreed. And I think we can operate jointly as we did during the Berlin negotiations.

Brezhnev: Yes indeed, but trouble is some delegations there are putting forward things that have no bearing on the substance whatever. France says: “We hold no military maneuvers whatever. What are we supposed to do? Stop all our soldiers? Put them in their barracks?” We always carry out maneuvers—now as 20 years before. It’s a war game of sorts, playing it out. Now they start addressing humiliating demands—giving notice three months in advance, and so on.

Dr. Kissinger: I said yesterday that the unit to be controlled should be of substantial size; second, that the territory should not include the whole of European Russia, and third, that notice should be reduced from that British proposal. And we’d be prepared to work with you in that sense.

Gromyko: One of the problems is the term “substantial size,” because a country like Holland says a division is already a unit of substantial size and we have to inform them. For Belgium or Luxembourg, the movement of one division is a momentous development, but for us it’s nothing.

Brezhnev: Look at it this way: in the final document of the Conference that we will sign, we are reaffirming such all-important principles as inviolability of frontiers, respect for sovereignty, non-use of force. Now someone comes up with a demand that we inform them of every military movement. Does it mean people don’t believe us? We’re
signing it in seriousness. And can't individual movements be detected 
with earth satellites?

I discussed this subject with President Pompidou and I said we 
would be prepared to invite foreign observers to observe them. Say, 
around Kiev, we have one, two, or three divisions playing out ma-
neuvers, and we can give a few months' notice. It was something I pro-
posed. But now they're putting forward impossible demands. It's not 
that we're not willing. Let them come watch them. I'm sure soldiers in 
Belgium go on maneuvers; I'm sure they don't just sit around in their 
barracks.

As to free movement, just by way of a joke, in addition to Solzhen-
itsyn, we can give you a few more Solzhenitsyns. That's free move-
ment! [Gromyko and Brezhnev laugh]

Dr. Kissinger: If Solzhenitsyn gives a few more interviews, The 
New York Times will withdraw its recognition of him.

Brezhnev: Well, Dr. Kissinger, I accept what you say regarding this 
matter. I hope we'll be able to bring our useful influence to bear on the 
outcome of the Conference. If so, it will do credit to us, and everyone 
will be grateful. The true importance and significance of a major effort 
and major achievement can usually be discerned the further you are re-
moved from the time. If Jackson accuses you of something, it doesn't 
mean the American people do.

Dr. Kissinger: I think improvement of relations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union has the support of the American 
people, and it is the fixed and determined course of this Administra-
tion. And it is our intention to fix it so firmly that it is an irreversible 
course.

Brezhnev: As I've said, our people and our party and its leadership 
value that very highly if that is the case.

Shall we now turn to the Middle East?

Middle East

Dr. Kissinger: [smiles at Gromyko] It will deprive me of my sanity 
eventually—not this discussion, but the Middle East.

Gromyko: That will be very bad. Sanity must be present—espe-
cially in the Middle East!

Brezhnev: Of course, the question is indeed a very complicated 
one, and we discerned its complexity long ago.

I don't want to make any reproaches but simply to state the facts as 
they developed. You will recall the night we spent at San Clemente4—

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4 For the record of Brezhnev's meeting with Nixon, June 23, 1973, see Document 132.
the best part of the night discussing this complex problem. I under-
stand it wasn’t easy for President Nixon and you to discuss it, but we
did, and I did my best to warn you of the dangers inherent in this ex-
plosive region. As I recall, President Nixon and you promised to think
it over. But you probably thought it over all the way until October
when war broke out.

I have not counted who lost more, but human blood was spilled.
But you and I undertook to make an effort to bring peace to the region
and guarantee security there. This was a noble task, but we set out to
fulfill it. We did succeed in reaching an understanding, and even
prompting the Security Council to pass an appropriate resolution
about holding an international conference under the auspices of the
United States and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{5} You recall the UK and France
wanted to take part, but in the end they didn’t veto that resolution. It
took place, and we remained in the Conference along with the partici-
pants. It seemed that a favorable moment had arrived: there was a
ceasefire, and negotiations were about to begin—negotiations that the
participants had been balking at for some time because they didn’t
want to talk. But they came and talked about the problems, and it
seemed an opportunity to finally resolve the problem.

So the International Conference on the Middle East began its work
at Geneva; it set up working groups—but then things began to develop
differently.

I will leave whatever reproaches I have regarding the methods em-
ployed in bringing about mutual withdrawal and separation of forces.
But I want to say at this point that it would be a very bad mistake and
delusion if we felt at this moment that the Middle East problem has lost
its acute nature or its urgency. To believe that would mean making as
severe a mistake as in the past, a mistake which was proved when war
broke out in October. It is a fact that the chief source of tensions in the
Middle East remains. The prime source of tension was not from troops
facing each other but that the entire problem remains as it was. So I
cannot fail to utter a warning that the situation remains explosive be-
cause the issue remains as it was.

Of course, withdrawal of Israeli forces from part of Egyptian terri-
tory in the framework of troop separation is of a certain significance in
terms of lessening the possibility of swift and sudden military collision.
But, in fact, this is nothing more than a palliative—it cannot replace the
prime need, that is, the need for a complete and reliable settlement of
the Middle East conflict, a settlement on the basis we agreed upon in
voting for UN Security Council Resolution 242 and for its implementa-

\textsuperscript{5} Security Council Resolution 338. See Document 143.
tion in all its parts. But we have by no means approached implementation of that resolution in all its parts. Perhaps President Nixon promised to give the whole Sinai to the Israelis—but the Arabs wouldn’t agree to that. If there is anything covert, we would appreciate knowing it. Sadat knows nothing about that, and he certainly believes that troop separation will be followed by the normal process of settlement. As for Syria, you know what demands that country wants met.

Here I would like to say we cannot but express our surprise at the methods resorted to by the United States, in fact by separate maneuvers engaged in by the United States in circumvention of our understanding that there would be joint action and joint Soviet-American auspices in efforts to bring about a settlement.

When Comrade Gromyko was in Washington, I asked him to state our view frankly to the American side. I certainly reacted with a feeling of trust and confidence to the American assurances that the United States would not copy the methods used in the Egyptian-Israeli separation of forces. Then we were faced with new facts, of the same methods in the suggestions of Dr. Kissinger for separation of forces on the Syrian side and not in joint auspices. This couldn’t fail to cause surprise.

I would like one thing to be clear: The Middle East settlement as we discussed and agreed upon means not only protection of the Arabs but also for Israel, and guarantees for the Arabs and for Israel. Of course, complex questions like Palestine will require a good deal of brainwracking, but on questions that are clear, we should work together.

Gromyko: The question of Palestine means the question of the Palestinians.

Kissinger: That means that on the question of the Palestinians we can bypass each other?

Sukhodrev: His thought was that that question would require a good deal of brainwracking.

Brezhnev: The question then arises of what is required to pass over to the solution of key aspects of the Middle East problem. We have weighed this complex situation and we believe it is necessary without delay to activate the mechanism of the Geneva Conference. It is necessary that the military working group with the participation of the Soviet Union and the United States urgently address itself to solving the question of bringing the separation of Israeli and Syrian forces. And this in itself at the same time will solve the question of the prompt involvement of Syria in the Geneva Conference. It is also necessary to solve the question of the participation in that Conference of representatives of the Arab people of Palestine.

What we have in mind is that the Conference should pass to efforts to resolve the questions in the settlement on the basis of the agreed
principled positions of the Soviet Union and the United States. I am not introducing anything new; I am merely repeating what we agreed upon when we acted together to bring about Security Council adoption of the resolution creating the Conference. We can bring appropriate influence to bear on the parties to achieve a speedy, acceptable solution. The only other alternative is a new explosion in the Middle East like those that occurred in the past.

We are certainly very much in favor of Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Kissinger meeting regularly to consult with each other, whether in Geneva or elsewhere, to reach a solution to the entire complex of Middle East problems.

If the United States continues to act separately—and you can convey this to President Nixon—I am sure nothing good will be produced and there will be no final settlement. And such an approach would not improve relations between our two countries either. Suppose the Soviet Union began to act separately in circumvention of the United States? We certainly have the capacity to do that, but what good would it accomplish? We could have blocked any U.S. plan in the Middle East, but this would violate our understanding. I am saying nothing new, but just what we agreed upon in substance. I am sure in the future we will act together, act jointly.

I would end on that, for the time being.

Dr. Kissinger: Can I take a one-minute break before I reply? Objective necessity.

Brezhnev: Please.

[There was a break from 11:45–11:55 a.m. When Dr. Kissinger returned, Brezhnev showed him a photo of Jobert and Aleksandrov at Pitsunda.]

Dr. Kissinger: Should we both sign it? Should we write “condominium” on it and send it to him? [Laughter]

Brezhnev: Pompidou told me at Pitsunda we shouldn’t use the word “superpowers.”

Dr. Kissinger: Was Jobert with him?

Gromyko: Jobert told me how much he loves you.

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe that is the problem.

Gromyko: Admires you.

Dr. Kissinger: Jobert found out that every time he attacks me he goes up three points in the popularity poll in France. So he becomes famous. Then he tells me privately he agrees with me.

We appreciated, Mr. General Secretary, your note on your conversation with President Pompidou. It was in the spirit of frankness and cooperation that was characteristic of our relationship.
Brezhnev: I was quite honest in sending you that information—all the more so since I expected President Pompidou would be informing you, and then the Nine. It would be good to tell the truth.

Dr. Kissinger: You are correct. We also received some information.

Brezhnev: That’s no secret.

Dr. Kissinger: To turn to the Middle East. First, Mr. General Secretary, we owe it to you to say that your analysis of the situation in San Clemente unfortunately turned out to be correct.

Brezhnev: Nothing else was to have been expected. The situation was like a boil; it just had to come to the bursting point.

Dr. Kissinger: I confess we underestimated it.

Brezhnev: One didn’t have to be a genius to foresee it.

[Sonnenfeldt whispers something to Kissinger.]

Kissinger: Sonnenfeldt says, since we didn’t foresee it, what does that make us? [Laughter]

Brezhnev: Nonaligned!

Dr. Kissinger: I must tell you, on the morning of October 6, one of my associates said to me, “There is a minor difficulty between the Egyptians and Israelis and if you act very quickly you can settle it in two hours.”

You had somewhat more information. But we recognize the conflict started for spontaneous reasons.

In dealing with the situation as it then developed: When we met here in October⁶ we thought the primary goal should be to bring the Arabs and Israelis together into direct negotiations, and we thought it was not attainable unless our two countries provided the auspices. We didn’t think we should forbid them to talk if they wanted to talk without our auspices.

Gromyko: You say, “We felt our primary aim should be to bring the Arabs and Israelis together in direct talks”—this was the U.S. side? Because that was not our position.

Dr. Kissinger: The United States side.

But I will not insist on this but rather talk about some rather more general things.

First, there are no secret deals between us and any of the Arab countries. And, of course, the idea of a secret deal with an Arab country is a contradiction in terms. [Brezhnev doesn’t smile.]

We have not discussed any final solution with any Arab country, reserving that for the Geneva Conference.

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⁶ See Documents 142, 143, and 144.
Now, in response to some of the specific points made by the General Secretary:

Every move the United States has made in this area has been at the request of the parties. None has been initiated by the United States. For example, my last trip resulted from a visit of two Arab Foreign Ministers, whom we had not invited and whom in fact we had attempted to discourage. I then wrote a letter to your Foreign Minister and proposed a way of keeping you informed. We would have been open to counter-proposals—but we never received a reply.

What is it that the United States wants in this area? First, we are realists. We recognize that gratitude is an unreliable basis for the conduct of foreign policy, and we have seen enough, especially in the Middle East, to know that whatever has been done in the past it is no basis for the future, and I’m sure the Soviet Union can confirm this. We recognize the Soviet Union has major interests in the Middle East and we have no intention of achieving a unilateral advantage. And we recognize also that no major decisions can be taken in the Middle East to the detriment of the other without serious consequences for the stability of the area.

It is also a fact that the importance of the countries in the area increases to the extent they can play us off against each other. We occasionally receive messages that have that intention, and I’ve no doubt that you occasionally receive messages that have that intention. But I’m sure your many reports from the area will not be able to cite any instance when the United States has said one word against the Soviet Union or against Soviet interests. On the contrary.

But I agree that perhaps appearances have been deceptive, and we agree that great care must be taken not to encourage other countries to take advantage of the situation.

Now, what is it we have attempted to do? I am very conscious of the efforts of several of my predecessors who engaged in very formal diplomacy without result in the Middle East.

We also, as you know, have an extremely complicated domestic situation, complicated by events of the past year and complicated because of the influence of certain pressure groups. That imposes on us necessities of complicated tactics that are in no sense directed at the Soviet Union.

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7 Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy and Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Omar Saqqaf met with Kissinger on February 16. No record of the meeting was found. Fahmy and Saqqaf also met with President Nixon. The memorandum of conversation of that February 19 meeting is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, Document 327.

8 Attached but not printed at Tab A is Kissinger’s February 19 letter to Gromyko.
What we have attempted to do is to promote for the first time since the beginning of the Israeli State, or certainly for the first time since 1967, a process of systematic withdrawal of Israeli forces. In our judgment this could only be achieved step by step, without prejudice to the ultimate settlement. To be too formalistic jeopardizes the process we are attempting to start, and to criticize what has been achieved can only make it more difficult to achieve a permanent and just settlement, to which we have committed ourselves.

Therefore we have attached importance to the initial process of disengagement. We have been disproportionately active in this phase because we have been the only country with the influence to move Israel to take the steps that were needed. So this explains our actions in this phase. We do not believe it would help disengagement to convene the Geneva Conference at this point, but we are prepared to convene it after the Syrian disengagement is accomplished. But we recognize your concerns, and as the President has written to you, we are prepared to proceed even in this phase in cooperation with the Soviet Union.9

I am therefore prepared to accept the proposal of the General Secretary that the Foreign Minister and I meet regularly in Geneva to keep each other informed, to exchange ideas, and to proceed cooperatively. And in all we do we will proceed on the basis that there are no unilateral gains to be made and that the common objective should be a just and lasting peace.

That is all I want to say.

Brezhnev: Of course, meetings between Kissinger and Gromyko and exchanges of views between them are not all there is to the Geneva Conference.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: And you can meet virtually every day, or Ambassador Stoessel can meet with our representatives here as frequently as the situation warrants. But we for our part have no intention of burying the Geneva Conference.

Dr. Kissinger, you say the past should not be criticized. But that is exactly what I am doing. And I am criticizing that past from a position of principle, because it was done in circumvention of our understanding with you. Whether you like it or not, it is something that has caused bewilderment and doubts on our part. Which is exactly why I’m saying all this to you with such frankness. Especially since we have been very frank talking about more serious things.

Dr. Kissinger: I cannot accept the phrase, “in circumvention of our understandings.” That is a phrase I cannot accept.

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9 See Document 163.
Gromyko: How then can your actions be qualified?

Brezhnev: I fully realize I must react with necessary confidence and trust to your statement that there are no secret deals whatever. And I recall in this connection the words uttered by the late President Nasser who said, “We have the press and radio, but if you want to know the secrets, go to the market place.” That’s what they call the “secret code.” President Nasser told me that. It exists to this day.

Dr. Kissinger: So in that case you know there are no secret deals.

Gromyko: In that sense, yes!

Dr. Kissinger: I’ve told you there are no secret deals. I won’t debate it.

Brezhnev: That we accept.

Dr. Kissinger: What secret deals would we want?

Brezhnev: I can only repeat I accept your statement as a true one.

Dr. Kissinger: I repeat, we have made no secret deals. I can say we have confined our efforts to what has been made public.

Brezhnev: Let’s look into the substance of this matter. I’ve already said that disengagement of forces is in some ways a positive measure. But what happens now? Has the explosiveness of the situation disappeared? The Arabs see it this way: the non-use of force relates merely to the present disengagement, but they see their hands as free if Israel refuses to accept a complete settlement in the future. Syria refused to accept that principle altogether; Iraq rejects it out of hand. And the Arab world generally sees it that way. And it is not hard to see that all of this has not really resulted in any increased tranquility, but the situation remains more acute.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t agree that the general relationships remain more acute. But I do agree that this phase is an initial phase and is not a final one. We thought that what we have done is in everybody’s interest because it unfreezes the situation. It is easy to make doctrinaire statements; it is difficult to move things forward. As you know, we have no contact with Iraq and we have no information about your activities in Iraq. So I can’t judge what the attitude of Iraq is. Our attitude is that the disengagement phase is the beginning of a process and not the final stage.

Brezhnev: I’ll certainly make no secret of the fact that we have a good relationship with Iraq.

Dr. Kissinger: We certainly don’t object to that.

Brezhnev: We’ve no secret treaties aimed against a Middle East settlement.

I recently received Hussein.

Dr. Kissinger: Hussein?
Gromyko: Sadam Hussein, deputy to Bakr. 10

Dr. Kissinger: I thought you meant the King. 11

Brezhnev: But we did not touch on the problem of troop disengagement. He displayed no initiative on that, and, as you know, they take a negative view on it. So I didn’t raise it. Especially because I knew they were objecting. So if you saw the record of that meeting, you wouldn’t find a single word about it. I remained silent about it; he did too. I didn’t want to put him in a position of having to reject it.

Where do we go from here? I have set out some of our thinking.

Dr. Kissinger: Our thinking is that after the disengagement phase is completed, the Geneva Conference can be reassembled, and that while the disengagement phase is going on, the Foreign Minister and I meet regularly, so the actions of our diplomats can be concerted.

Brezhnev: We can set aside as much time as you and he need—in a neutral zone, in the Lenin Hills here.

Dr. Kissinger: No, in Geneva.

Brezhnev: We have beautiful parks here—Ismailova Park, for example. A very beautiful park.

Dr. Kissinger: If we meet in parks, we will offer one in Washington also. I don’t think we should put the whole responsibility on you.

Brezhnev: You went to Syria and you gave them some of your suggestions, and as we know, they gave counter-suggestions, and you then suggested they send someone to Washington.

Gromyko: Just to receive a new proposal, but there is no such proposal.

Dr. Kissinger: We hope to receive one when Dayan comes to Washington.

Brezhnev: You know Asad is coming to the Soviet Union. He has long since been requesting such a meeting, but due to other engagements it wasn’t possible. But he’s coming in the first half of April, and he will tell us what you are proposing and what he is proposing.

Dr. Kissinger: We have no objection to his informing you.

Brezhnev: We haven’t set up any formal agenda but he will probably ask us to protect their rights; he’ll probably ask us for some military aid.

Kissinger: That last is certain. He’s even asked us for military aid.

Brezhnev: You know in this period we have suspended sending even those supplies we were supposed to send under long-term agree-

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10 Sadam Hussein was the Iraqi Vice President. Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr was the Iraqi President.

11 A reference to King Hussein of Jordan.
ments. Sadat even accused us of not sending those supplies even during the events, and he gave it as one of the reasons he wasn’t able to destroy Israeli forces.

Dr. Kissinger: [Laughs] There were a few other reasons. It’s hard to destroy forces when you are not moving forward.

Brezhnev: Why didn’t you give Asad arms?

Dr. Kissinger: Because we didn’t want to fuel an arms race in the Middle East.

Brezhnev: But you sent sufficient arms to Israel. Isn’t that fueling the arms race—pouring petrol over it? In fact, the Arabs continually refer to the arms shipments from the U.S. to Israel and blame us for not sending more. You know how severe their criticism is.

Dr. Kissinger: No, and I think they tell each of us what we want to hear.

Brezhnev: I don’t know what they tell you; I do know what they tell us. But it is quite clear to me we should make every effort to get Syria to join the Geneva Conference. At any rate, if we get the Geneva Conference going, with Syria and the participation of our two countries, and Israel, Egypt and Jordan, and the Arab people of Palestine should take part, there will be arguments but they will be talking.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not opposed to getting the Geneva Conference together. We think the best time is after Syrian disengagement.

Gromyko: You say the best time to reassemble the Geneva Conference would be after disengagement between Syria and Israel. But why do you pose the question in that way? Why don’t you say the Geneva Conference could promote disengagement between Israel and Syria, through a joint military group with Israel, Syria, United States and the Soviet Union, and Egypt? Don’t you think that would be the best method of bringing Syria into the Geneva Conference? When we discussed the Conference at the beginning, we agreed it was a joint task. Maybe you say it is not to the liking of all sides. But as we know, Syria accepts that. But you would prefer to discuss that between Syria, Israel, and the United States. You don’t want to qualify it as not a separate action by the United States, but how else can one qualify it? That’s not how you said in Washington—and I am quoting your words—when you said you wouldn’t copy the methods of the Egyptian disengagement. As Comrade Brezhnev said, if is all very well to consult one another, and the venue isn’t important. If I go to the United Nations General Assembly, it would be appropriate if we met in New York or Washington.

Why don’t we convene the Conference? We certainly want to establish peace. If Israel is indeed in favor of ensuring its security, it won’t find a state more interested in that than the Soviet Union. When we
stated as much at Geneva, you will recall what you said. Minister Eban told me that our statement about our desire to guarantee Israel’s boundaries as a state would be welcomed wholeheartedly by Israel.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t think it is possible to bring about a disengagement by the procedure the Foreign Minister has described. And I do not think the issue should depend on procedural matters. I believe we can exchange information and act cooperatively, since in any event you will be informed by the Syrians.

Gromyko: You favor that role for the Soviet Union—just to be a receiver of information?

Dr. Kissinger: No, I said cooperative action. Neither of us should take the position that we should prevent things from happening just because we don’t participate. I can see situations where the Soviet Union is in a position to make things happen, and we won’t object to that.

Gromyko: But in what, then, should that cooperation take place? Since you have no objection to the Soviet Union receiving information.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I haven’t heard any [clearer] case of direct ignoring of the Soviet Union’s role than the one you just described.

Dr. Kissinger: How is the Soviet Union ignored?

Brezhnev: You have gone back on the understanding reached between us once on Egypt; now you want to do it on Syria. What other violations will there be?

Dr. Kissinger: If the two parties come to an agreement, one of whom is a close ally of yours, we don’t see how this prejudices the Soviet Union, since the United States gets no benefit from this except progress towards peace.

Gromyko: The first point is, there is no agreement between Syria and Israel as yet.

Dr. Kissinger: Right.

Gromyko: There is only the possibility of such an agreement, and Syria has publicly stated their agreement to the Soviet Union participating. But you say no.

Dr. Kissinger: As far as we are concerned, the Syrians can engage the Soviet Union in whatever manner they think appropriate. We have never said we opposed it.

Gromyko: That remark strikes wide of the mark, because the Syrians said they are in favor of the Soviet Union participating and you say no. You don’t want to get around one table the Soviet Union, Egypt, Syria, and the United States. Why not?

Dr. Kissinger: Our understanding is this is not the preferred position of some Arab states, and we believe Israel also disagrees in the disengagement phase.
Gromyko: One can’t in this context speak of “certain Arabs,” but one must speak concretely of Syria—and Syria does agree. As regards the consent and non-consent of somebody, we are talking about the United States and an understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Dr. Kissinger: The important thing is not to rely on formalism, but to get a settlement. When we met in October, there was no reading of this which implies the parties have no right to settle anything without the participation of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Gromyko: It appears that as soon as the question is broached of the Soviet Union participating, you call it formalism and doctrinaire. What happened with the understanding reached?

Dr. Kissinger: No, I think we should remember what we are trying to achieve. Neither the participation of the Soviet Union nor the participation of the United States is an end in itself. I have said that after disengagement, the Geneva Conference should be reassembled. I have also agreed to meet with the Foreign Minister before further decisions are made. If there were more effective means to get a disengagement, we would accept them.

Gromyko: Which is exactly what we are proposing. And Syria said so publicly.

Dr. Kissinger: Not to us.

Gromyko: But they have publicly stated on their own behalf that they are in favor of resolving this problem with the participation of the Soviet Union. But then the United States, with whom we have an understanding on the subject, objects.

Dr. Kissinger: That is absolutely not correct. We have no understanding with them on that.

Gromyko: You have not met with them?

Dr. Kissinger: But we are not without communication with them.

Gromyko: You can ask them any time you want to.

Kissinger: It is our judgment this procedure will make an agreement impossible or will at least lead to a protracted stalemate.

Gromyko: But what you are proposing—these joint contacts in Washington, Moscow, or elsewhere—is just the semblance of the Soviet Union’s participation and cooperation. Whereas in substance you are in favor of acting separately.

Dr. Kissinger: It depends on your definition of acting separately.

Gromyko: From whatever aspect.

Dr. Kissinger: I have difficulty understanding the proposition that the parties have no right to settle anything without the participation of everybody.
Gromyko: Which parties? Here there are two, Syria and Israel. It is one thing if you said the United States is not participating, but you favor the participation of the United States.

Dr. Kissinger: Everything we have done is at the request of the parties.

Gromyko: Surely that argument works both ways, especially when we tell you that one of the parties, Syria, is in favor of Soviet participation. But it leaves no impression.

Dr. Kissinger: I hadn’t heard that.

Gromyko: The public statement said it.

Dr. Kissinger: In very ambiguous terms.

Gromyko: And in no uncertain terms, and if you need any elucidation, I can tell you that that composition is accepted by Syria.

Dr. Kissinger: If we receive a formal request by Syria, we will discuss it with Israel and see where we are.

Gromyko: We know full well that Israel will act as the United States wants it to act.

Dr. Kissinger: That is certainly not the impression of any of us who have gone through the anguish of negotiating with Israel.

Gromyko: We can only react with disappointment to your words. What will happen when and if we meet in Washington? You will just confirm what you said today? I see no possibility of cooperation. There will be meetings in Geneva, in Washington, but no content.

Dr. Kissinger: That depends on us. If we agree to act cooperatively, it depends on actions needed.

Gromyko: That is just the question. The question is, are we just to have consultations in the form of an outer shell, or filling in that shell with real content?

Dr. Kissinger: We are prepared for serious discussions.

Gromyko: What should those consultations consist of, if no substance?

Dr. Kissinger: We are prepared to discuss substance.

Gromyko: Where is that substance if you are even against our participation in the discussions?

Dr. Kissinger: Because participation in the discussions between the parties doesn’t mean we can’t form a common view of a possible outcome.

Gromyko: We are trying to promote achievement of a common opinion, and one that will promote an agreement. You will recall that
the last time we were in Moscow we initialed a text which said that the two parties would act jointly. Why not do it?

Dr. Kissinger: I said we are prepared to discuss it jointly. I don’t know why being in a room with the two parties has to constitute the nature of our cooperation.

Gromyko: Well, how else? Through correspondence? You don’t restrict yourself to correspondence—you travel and talk.

Dr. Kissinger: So does the Foreign Minister.

Gromyko: But that is not cooperation if you and we travel and talk separately.

Dr. Kissinger: It’s a question of efficiency.

Gromyko: Then nothing remains of the framework except splinters. We received your letter about the framework—but what it meant was that the Soviet Union remains an outside observer. The purpose of the letter was that you were traveling to the Middle East. [Referring to the Secretary’s letter to Gromyko of February 19, 1974, attached at Tab A].

Dr. Kissinger: No. First, we didn’t ever receive a letter about the Foreign Minister’s visit to the Middle East.

Gromyko: I told you in Washington.

Dr. Kissinger: Second, my trip was related to a request of four heads of state who sent two Foreign Ministers, and it was related to the lifting of the oil embargo. I sent you a letter about being willing to meet your Ambassadors—but I would have listened to counter proposals. I was on a long weekend when those two Foreign Ministers came. We even tried to stop them.

Gromyko: They dropped in contrary to your wishes?

Dr. Kissinger: Unbelievable as it may sound, yes. They simply sent a telegram saying they were coming.

Gromyko: It doesn’t boil down to a visit of two Foreign Ministers. The question is cooperation between us.

Dr. Kissinger: I am just telling you what happened. The Four Arabs met in Algeria; then, two Foreign Ministers came. One of the conditions for lifting the embargo was that I come to the Middle East. You can confirm this with President Asad, I am sure. We didn’t know they were coming or what they were going to ask for. Then we sent a letter saying we could meet with your Ambassadors.

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12 Attached but not printed at Tab B is the understanding initialed by Kissinger and Gromyko on October 22, 1973. See Document 144.

Gromyko: To be informed.

Dr. Kissinger: For consultation. To be available for consultation.

Gromyko: But what bearing does all this have on the question of Syria? No one but Syria can speak for Syria. The Syrians tell us they are in favor of the Soviet Union’s participation and the specific group.

Dr. Kissinger: [Reading from the letter to Gromyko at Tab A] First, “I wanted to inform you of these developments in the spirit of the understanding between our Governments. . . . In that same spirit, I would like to suggest that your Ambassadors in Damascus, and perhaps Algeria and Cairo, be available for consultations. . . .”

Gromyko: They all received their instructions. Did any of our diplomats refuse such a meeting?

Dr. Kissinger: But you were coming to the Middle East. That created a new situation.

Gromyko: Your trip to the Middle East didn’t create a new situation?

Dr. Kissinger: I have no objection to the Foreign Minister visiting the Middle East.

Gromyko: I fly towards Cairo and find Dr. Kissinger has already taken off. So obviously you were against a docking operation!

Dr. Kissinger: A docking operation would have been a little difficult with planes.

Gromyko: Not planes, but humans!

Dr. Kissinger: We never received a reply to this letter. It didn’t seem to me proper to call an Embassy when I hadn’t received an answer from the Foreign Minister.

Gromyko: It appears that you find it inconvenient to call us on substance—in Washington, in Cairo, in Damascus.

Dr. Kissinger: It was up to your side either to make a counterproposal or accept my proposal for consultations. It is unfair to accuse us of finding it inconvenient when we never received a reply to this letter.

Gromyko: That in that letter you mainly repeated what you told me orally when I met you. You merely informed me you were leaving; you didn’t offer consultations with me in Geneva or elsewhere.

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe it was unfortunately phrased. I have told your Ambassador I was willing to meet with you in Geneva but I wasn’t going to order the Soviet Foreign Minister to come to Geneva. I had not thought of Damascus; I didn’t think it appropriate to arrange it in the capital of a country with whom we had no formal diplomatic relations.

Dobrynin: But only after the trip you mentioned it.
Dr. Kissinger: My thought was, if the Foreign Minister had replied and said, “Consultations with our Ambassadors are not at the right level,” I would have proposed Geneva.

Dobrynin: You mentioned it only after the trip.

Dr. Kissinger: We were debating internally whether to propose it in the second or the first communication. We were handicapped by the fact we had no really good communication in Washington.

Gromyko: That relates to the past. We should now give thought to the future, how to ensure cooperation in the future, even exchange information.

Dr. Kissinger: We agree on convening the Geneva Conference, so it is only one step between us. But we are prepared before that for the most precise exchange of information, and concerted action. And our reason is that we believe that to obtain what is necessary—some withdrawal beyond the October 6th line—is a very difficult operation. So it is not to get any benefit for the United States.

Gromyko: We know that withdrawal to the lines of October 6th is quite unacceptable to the Syrians. They told us themselves.

Dr. Kissinger: I know. That is the problem of the present negotiations. It is no secret. We have no desire to hide the positions.

Brezhnev: I have been silent but I was listening attentively. And I must say that all that has passed between you [Kissinger and Gromyko] points up the correctness of what I said before: I never before heard such an open statement of U.S. intentions to exclude the Soviet Union’s participation. It remains but to note that the two sides stated their views on this question and it leaves hands free to act at one’s own discretion.

Dr. Kissinger: That would be very unfortunate. I want to state that formally.

Brezhnev: What else can I do? I have here the statement initialed by Dr. Kissinger and the Foreign Minister [the October 22 understanding on auspices, Tab B].

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. [Reads] “The Soviet Union and the United States will . . . maintain the closest contact with each other and the negotiating parties.”

Korniyenko: Before that.

Dr. Kissinger: “The active participation of the United States and the Soviet Union.” At that time you knew very well the issue was how to promote contact between the parties.

In any case I want to state formally, so the record is clear: The United States has no intention to exclude the Soviet Union from the negotiation.
Brezhnev: Neither do we have such intentions, nor did we even contemplate it. And we certainly had no inkling the United States would ever deem it possible to act in such a way. I just re-read the message of President Nixon. I see your hand in it. The letter makes reference to various forms. I don’t want to speak about forms; I want to speak about substance, and the substance is we have UN sanction to act under our auspices. Because at that time, the British, French were all slightly offended at us but they finally agreed we could act jointly. In matters such as this we need good faith, not playing games.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree, but also act in a manner that will promote progress.

Brezhnev: Could our participation be opposed to that? Do you have any evidence?

Dr. Kissinger: We are not opposed to Soviet participation. We think at the present stage, when the two sides are not even in contact, we should be flexible as to method. And we agree the Geneva Conference should be reconvened as soon as the Syrian disengagement is achieved.

Brezhnev: But we don’t have any understanding about that; it is something quite artificial. You say those two Foreign Ministers arrived in Washington almost unannounced. What is my reaction to the telegram from the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ismail Fahmi, saying he is coming to Washington? And he raises forty questions to me. But I didn’t act unilaterally. The Syrians didn’t want to go to Geneva; I wrote them a letter. This was in the framework of our understanding with you.

So we never even took half a step in contravention of the understanding we reached. Whereas you, having taken steps in contravention, want us to approve further steps in contravention. All I said to Fahmi when he arrived was that everything should be taken in the framework of the Geneva Conference as agreed. The only question I put to him was how to understand the statement that no further military or semi-military measures would be taken. I took no step to resume military shipments, though he asked.

Dr. Kissinger: What did you mean by . . .

Brezhnev: One of his requests was to deliver supplies under the agreement. To this day, we have not sent him two cartridges. That is an honest statement of keeping an understanding. Whereas in fact I could have said that in my view the most flexible way to influence the U.S. was to send military supplies. I could have sent 300 planes and 1,500 tanks. But I didn’t. So I gave my word and was true to it.

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Dr. Kissinger, maybe we should give additional thought to this. I want to raise one other point. This is the second day of our discussions here. Do you think it is at all possible if you could prolong your stay here for another day or two? Because we think it very important to find agreement on the questions before the visit of President Nixon.

Maybe it would be worthwhile to make a recess now for lunch, and reconvene at 5:00 to continue our discussions.

Dr. Kissinger: All right.

Brezhnev: For another five hours of work!

Dr. Kissinger: I am prepared. I agree to meet at 5:00. On extending my stay: As you know, we are expecting a visitor in Washington on Friday [General Dayan]. And I was going to leave Washington on Saturday on a trip I had postponed on many previous occasions. And also I have a schedule in London on Thursday. Let me consider it this afternoon.

Brezhnev: Please.

Gromyko: For three hours, disengagement. [laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: But let me say one thing, Mr. General Secretary—which is more important... Five kilometers one way or the other on the Golan Heights is less important than U.S.-Soviet relations. We have no intention of excluding the Soviet Union from active full participation. And this is our basic attitude.

Brezhnev: Of course, I can liken no relationships, economic or political, between anyone, to our relationship. This concerns two such powers as the United States and the Soviet Union. And we certainly want to remain dedicated to those principles established in 1972 and 1973. Today I re-read for the third time President Nixon’s letter to me. It is the paragraph where he speaks about the need to go on moving forward, which prompted me to send an immediate reply.

Dr. Kissinger: The one delivered on Saturday,¹⁵ which was very well received.

Brezhnev: I was reacting to what was to me the main content of the letter, that we should continue on that course. And that prompted me to reply. Of course, as President Nixon knows, all these questions—strategic arms, the Middle East, Europe—are linked. And we should continue on that road. I surely trust you could not have noticed either yesterday or today any desire on our part to gain unilateral advantage.

Dr. Kissinger: No, the spirit of discussions has been very constructive.

Brezhnev: Well, bon appetit!

¹⁵ March 23; Document 164.
Dr. Kissinger: What have we been doing?!
Brezhnev: At your house you will have a full lunch. This is just a
diplomatic snack.
[The meeting then ended]

168. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, March 26, 1974, 5:09–9:43 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee,
and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the US
Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Georgi M. Korniienko, Member of the Collegium of Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
and Chief, USA Department
Mikhail D. Sytenko, Member of the Collegium of Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Chief, Near East Department
Viktor Sukhodrev, USA Department (Interpreter)
Oleg Sokolov, USA Department
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., US Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the State Department
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Carlyle E. Maw, Legal Advisor, State Department
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State
Department
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary-designate for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs
Jan M. Lodal, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
Other Arms Control; CSCE; MBFR; Economic Relations

Brezhnev: I just got a code message from President Nixon. He is
displeased very much with you.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Files, NSC Files, Kissinger Office
Files, Box 76, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Secretary Kissinger’s Pre-Summit Trip to
Moscow, Memcons & Reports, March 24–28, 1974. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in
Brezhnev’s office in the Council of Ministers Building at the Kremlin. Brackets are in the
original.
Kissinger: It happens every Tuesday afternoon.
Brezhnev: So it is nothing out of the ordinary? I was so pleased. I thought it was something new.
Kissinger: Did you go behind my back and complain to him?
Brezhnev: No, I didn’t complain. It must be something you told him. He must have taken an objective view of the situation.
What do we do? Should we turn to something new? Or return to the Middle East?
Kissinger: I leave it to the General Secretary.
Brezhnev: All right.

Other Arms Control

On ending underground nuclear tests—could we do something?
Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, there are two separate problems. One question is whether you and we want to agree to end the tests at some future time. For example, January 1, 1976, as you proposed. The second problem is whether we should make it in the form of an appeal to other nations and feel free to resume if they test. Since we know that other countries will test after January 1, [1976], that second proposition just means we will find another reason to test after January 1, and it has the objective consequence of embarrassing those other countries.

We could study the question—we have never examined it—of some date in the future, say 2–3 years from now, at which there would be a moratorium. That we could study. The other is difficult.
Gromyko: What is the second proposal you mean?
Kissinger: You have one proposal, but it has the objective consequence of leaving both free to test but with a new excuse.
Gromyko: But the substance of our proposal is that we two agree to stop underground testing as of January 1, [1976]. At the same time we appeal to others to stop.
Kissinger: But if they don’t, we are free to resume. Since we know . . .
Gromyko: But we would not resume testing immediately. We would wait for a couple of years after we would agree to stop. Our own agreement would be effective January 1. For a certain period we could wait and see what other countries do, and then the agreement itself could contain a clause saying the two would observe the situation for say 1 or 2 years and then consult together to see what to do next, to see what others do.
Brezhnev: Neither you nor we stand to lose anything from that. But we would therefore show the desire of our two countries to proceed along the path of détente and that our line is aimed at furthering détente. So it contains no danger to our two countries.
Kissinger: No, I understand the proposal. As I said, it has two difficulties. One is the problem of verification, because below a certain threshold we don’t know whether tests are being carried on. That, for a limited period, one could consider.

Brezhnev: I think we could give some thought to giving a certain threshold on tests and discontinue the rest.

Kissinger: That would be something we could study. The second difficulty we have is to make it in the form of an appeal to third countries.

Brezhnev: But that is what we contemplate.

Kissinger: Because this will provoke major disputes with our allies to the East and your allies to the East. Our allies to our East and yours to your East—they’re not the same countries.

Brezhnev: God be with them. We would be entering into an agreement with you. I don’t see anything wrong.

Kissinger: We can have a serious discussion about a test ban with a threshold. Whether to couple it with an appeal to others would be more difficult. And of course, there are detailed issues to be considered, such as peaceful nuclear explosions and how to deal with them. But those are not issues of principle.

Brezhnev: That would be the subject of a special study.

Kissinger: That we could solve.

I think we could find a solution on the basis of a threshold test ban.

Brezhnev: Very well.

Kissinger: And we could start discussions to that effect. I don’t think we should discuss here how to establish a threshold, or peaceful nuclear explosions.

Brezhnev: Very well. I take it then we have reached an understanding in principle.

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: Good.

What about the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of nuclear submarines and other nuclear-bearing craft. Did we reach an agreement?

Kissinger: Not completely.

Gromyko: We had the impression we agreed on everything.

Kissinger: I know. When I use professorial language, it is very complicated.

Gromyko: That is a tragedy.

Kissinger: I thought we were talking about the Black Sea and Baltic.
Gromyko: It is a peaceful lake.
Kissinger: I think that will create great difficulties for us. Especially as it applies to aircraft carriers.
Brezhnev: I really don’t see any difference of principle between submarines and aircraft carriers. Both are capable of shooting at each other. Why should we be there?
Kissinger: Because, as I explained yesterday, carriers have many uses. [They smile.]
Brezhnev: You mean many political uses or many technical uses?
Kissinger: Both. But especially technical uses.
Brezhnev: Then I guess we will have to add some of our missile-carrying warships to effect a balance.
Kissinger: Our Chief of Naval Operations thinks there is already more than a balance.
Brezhnev: That is what our naval chiefs say but the other way around.
Kissinger: That is the tragedy.
Brezhnev: Yes, but surely you and I know how many submarines we have. You know how many we do, and we know how many you do. Because they roam about in a friendly manner, not far from each other.
Kissinger: That is in the spirit of cooperation.
Gromyko: The whole secret is they both watch each other openly.
Kissinger: As I said, missile-carrying submarines are somewhat easier to deal with than carriers.
Brezhnev: And when do you think that question could lend itself to a solution?
Kissinger: Missile-carrying submarines?
Brezhnev: Yes, in the Mediterranean.
Kissinger: First, it would depend on what framework. I’ve never examined that question, to be quite candid.
Brezhnev: I can present a full report on the general picture.
Kissinger: Do you know whether we have missile-carrying submarines in the Mediterranean?
Brezhnev: Certainly. I know the full picture.
Gromyko: Should we give the United States some information on that score? Confidential!
Kissinger: We should exchange information about each other’s submarines.
Gromyko: We can give you information about yours.
Kissinger: And we about yours.
Gromyko: Probably so.
Brezhnev: Nowadays these types of submarines circle the globe.

Kissinger: I must tell you honestly I have never studied the question about Polaris submarines. I am prepared to study it and give our views to your Ambassador.

Brezhnev: Okay, then we will postpone it until tomorrow.

Kissinger: Tomorrow I can give it to you; I don’t have to give it to your Ambassador. But I don’t think I’ll have any conclusive answer tomorrow.

Brezhnev: Well, at least an approximate answer.

If we go further on, can I re-refer to the banning of chemical weapons?

Kissinger: We can agree to banning the use of chemical weapons.

[The Soviet side confers.]

Brezhnev: Yesterday we read out to you our piece of paper on banning chemical weapons.

Kissinger: Do you want to read it out to me again?

Sukhodrev [reads]: “Attaching great importance to the achievement in cooperation with other countries of an agreement, excluding from the arsenals of States such dangerous weapons of mass annihilation as chemical weapons, the USSR and the USA have agreed to come out with a joint initiative on this issue. Accordingly, they intend to table in the Committee on Disarmament a draft of an international convention which would prohibit the development and production of the most dangerous, lethal types of chemical weapons of warfare on the understanding that discussions on the question of prohibiting the remaining types of chemical weapons will be continued.”

Kissinger: As I have pointed out in the past, we’ve found no solution to how to assure each other of the ban on production. If we can find a solution to that, we would be prepared to consider it. But we are prepared . . .

Brezhnev: Yes, but if you pose the matter in such a way, you could erect difficult obstacles in the way of other treaties. If you enter into a treaty, you enter into it in a spirit of confidence.

Kissinger: No in the case of lethal weapons. If you have them, it means you don’t have total confidence. But I repeat, we are prepared to ban the use of chemical weapons.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Brezhnev: On the European Security Conference, we seem to have reached an understanding on our joint mode of action.

Kissinger: My impression is, on the European Security Conference we have reached an understanding both on substance and on procedure. That is my impression.
Gromyko: The important thing, however, is to implement that understanding in practice.
Kissinger: Of course. But we have implemented understandings in the past; it is not the first time we have carried out an understanding.
Brezhnev: But the Conference has been dragging out three years. There is no end to the Conference.
Kissinger: Up to now the issues have not been reduced to such a small number, with such a precise understanding.
Gromyko: You mentioned the possibility of the Conference ending some time in July. Do you see any way we can have it end before President Nixon’s visit?
Kissinger: I think it would be very difficult.
Gromyko: What if we tried to prepare all the documents and have them initialed, and leave until afterwards only the signing? That is, have the documents prepared in substance?
Kissinger: I knew the Foreign Minister for years before I discovered his passion for initialing.
Gromyko: It is a very good thing.
Kissinger: That is more nearly conceivable. That I do not exclude.
Gromyko: Because of the substance of our opinion, and the General Secretary’s opinion too, if President Nixon’s visit is on and the substance of the Conference is still in mid-air, our public opinion won’t understand that.
Kissinger: Of course, the visit of President Nixon has to be seen as in the mutual interest, and we can’t accept it as being conditional on anything.
Gromyko: Yes, but it is a matter of atmosphere.
I have fresh information. During the lunch interval, I heard from our delegation at Geneva on the first item, inviolability of frontiers. This refers to the study they are undertaking, that we mentioned, on peaceful change of frontiers. You and we reached a fundamental understanding that the mention of this should not be in the context of the clause on inviolability of frontiers.
Kissinger: That is right.
Gromyko: What they are discussing now is a bare reference.
Kissinger: Right.
Gromyko: The question of where to put it is not yet decided. If you could give your delegation instructions in line with what we agreed. You know best how to work with your allies.
Kissinger: I’ve not exactly proven I know best how to work with our allies! Nevertheless, you correctly understood our discussion yesterday, and we will work in that sense. We already had a preliminary
discussion with the Germans in that sense before I came here, and we will work with others after I leave. You can count on that.

Gromyko: Good. Incidentally, the French are better in Geneva yesterday than today. It seems our discussion with Pompidou had an effect.

Kissinger: I was going to claim credit for it. It was the result of our discussions last night. We immediately used all our influence with Jobert.

Gromyko: This gives you a chance to show your abilities.

Kissinger: One country at a time. Last night it was France.

In seriousness, we have agreed on this question, and we will proceed along the lines of our understanding.

Gromyko: Good. And during the interval I again looked into the situation regarding so-called “military détente.” The situation is confused to the utmost, and it has been confused deliberately.

When it came to light that some of the Western countries were putting forward impossible proposals, suddenly they put forward new ones putting the whole of the European USSR under control. This proposal is not yet withdrawn. Belgium, Holland, are putting out these ideas.

Kissinger: I have told you we will not support that proposal.

Gromyko: We appreciate that, but could we have an understanding to act more vigorously to eliminate all these?

Kissinger: Yes; this issue will take a little more time, but you have our assurance. I will discuss it in London on my way through.2


Kissinger: This may be a good way of proceeding.

Gromyko: Because it is the British who are acting as the motive force behind all this.

Kissinger: That is why I suggest it.

Gromyko: We thought the new Labour Government would see it differently, but the law of inertia was applying.

Generally speaking we like your attitude to this question of military détente and these measures. As you know, the matter has three elements: One is the exchange of observers—that is no problem. Second is presentation of information about maneuvers. The third is the presentation of information about troop movements. We share your view of the third, that is, to send it back for further study.

2 Kissinger stopped in London on March 28 en route to Washington.
Kissinger: That is correct. We can weaken these proposals substantially. Basically we should talk about large units or substantial units on maneuvers, not about movement of all military units.

Gromyko: That would certainly facilitate the situation, because one of the complicated elements would be eliminated.

Kissinger: We will talk about this in London in that spirit and see if we can reach a common position. But it will be better if your Ambassador does not go there tomorrow and support the position we were taking on Thursday!

Gromyko: It will be impossible because he is not in London.

Kissinger: But you should not be active in London until we tell you how it came out.

Gromyko: We will do nothing. We can let one secret out: We believe perhaps the Labour leaders could take a more realistic stance; at least that is what our intuition prompts.

Kissinger: That is my impression. The Conservatives were more difficult for you and for us.

Gromyko: That is a page in British history that has been turned over.

On Basket III, I don't know whether you have seen the pile of documents they have piled on. If you take this pile here [shows stack of documents] you can multiply it by 10, most of it wastepaper.

Kissinger: I've never examined those papers. Because I don't think the Soviet system will be changed by the opening of a Dutch cabaret in Moscow. [Laughter]

Gromyko: Cabaret! I made myself go through the whole basket. If you clear away the rubbish, the real sense boils down to three items: borders; respect for sovereignty, noninterference; and the third is what we just discussed—matters of military détente. In fact, the third one, until recently, wasn't there at all. At Helsinki, it was decided merely to give some thought to it. I think it would be a good thing if you could look into this, because you will see a lot of those matters don't relate at all to the problem of security.

Kissinger: I understand your point about Basket III. It has two aspects: One is to relate it to the principles, and the second is to give it some content. Some of the Europeans think that for domestic reasons they have to give some content to Basket III. You and I discussed once that if we can establish a relationship to domestic legislation, you could consider some content for Basket III. I think that with goodwill on both sides, this is a soluble problem. The United States will use its influence not to embarrass the Soviet Union or raise provocative issues.

I have not seen any of the papers. I must be frank. I have not studied them. The United States has not put forward one concrete idea.
I will put forward one—compulsory visits by the United States Secretary of State to Leningrad.

Gromyko: We will be agreeable, if not in the document, but at least in a footnote. It should be bilateral, because I don’t think the French would sign it.

Kissinger: We should initial it. But we should be able to solve it and you will have no difficulty with the United States.

Gromyko: The others have, though you haven’t. But we agree the crux of the matter is something about domestic legislation. But as for what you say about us being prepared to insert substance into Basket III, it has been said on many occasions, as in the statement by Comrade Brezhnev, that we are in favor of a broad expansion of cultural ties provided they are consistent with domestic legislation. We are in favor of a wide range of humane questions provided they are consistent with respect for domestic legislation.

Kissinger: We are prepared for substance. But I haven’t studied any of the papers on substance. Because I have assumed we would work it out in practice.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I have derived great pleasure hearing the two Foreign Ministers talk at length with each other, and I keep thinking “How are they able to do this?” My conclusion is that I can never be a Foreign Minister. I would have to set aside a couple of years to study the most complicated words from every encyclopedia in the world and insert them one after the other in each phrase. I will set aside a couple of years and maybe then I will be up to it.

My second conclusion is that Foreign Ministers speak in such an interesting way but resolve nothing.

Kissinger: That gives them job security.

Brezhnev: I am really thinking of volunteering for one of these commissions in Vienna. It will be a school of practical study.

Gromyko: But not on Basket III.

Brezhnev: The other day I phoned Comrade Gromyko and I said “My deeply respected Andrey Andreyevich—”

Kissinger: The President never says that to me—but then I am not in office as long as he.

Brezhnev: And I said, “I was quite convinced that as soon as I telephoned, you would raise your phone and reciprocate. And I was so impressed I ventured never to forget that. I was impressed by your gesture for me, and you can be assured of my feelings for you for many years. And availing myself of this opportunity, I would like to know how you feel and at the same time inquire about the health of Lydia Dmitrievna, your spouse, and please pass on to her my best wishes, and please let me express my hope that the forthcoming telephone con-
conversation will give you the greatest pleasure and bring forth no problems. Because my many years of experience give me every confidence you are directing every effort toward these goals that I and my colleagues are seeking, and I am sure our conversation will be a success. Now I will say a few words—but I forget one thing.” But he then broke into conversation saying, “I entirely reciprocate your feelings.” And I said, “Andrey Andreyevich, if I were not assured of your feelings I would not have called.”

Kissinger: He would say to me, “I essentially reciprocate your feelings.”

Brezhnev: My call was to find out when your plane was coming. [Laughter] He said, “It is coming one hour late.” We talked twenty-two minutes. But I wanted to hear the two Foreign Ministers talk to each other.

Kissinger: But I am a new Foreign Minister . . .

Brezhnev: I have one shortcoming: I like a precise discussion. But we talked for twenty minutes about our mutual respect and admiration, and we concentrate on the last word. So I listened to you most attentively. You agreed to inform each other. I will inform President Nixon, Korniyenko, Sonnenfeld.

Kissinger: I knew Sonnenfeldt was communicating with somebody, because he is not communicating with me.

Brezhnev: I haven’t ever been able to suspect Sonnenfeldt of ever engaging in clandestine activity. The only thing I can guess is that he writes you notes and tells you “Don’t agree to anything they say.”

Kissinger: What really happens is, I move my lips and he speaks. When I speak to your Foreign Minister, he never says, “I entirely agree.” The most I get is, “I essentially agree with you.”

Brezhnev: As I see it, that is again a case of his reciprocating your words.

“Thank you, Mr. Kissinger, for thanking me for my gratitude. I am deeply indebted to you. Thank you for my hearing of these words so pleasant to my soul.”

That is what is called a respite or disengagement.

Kissinger: I don’t think I would achieve this felicity of phrase . . .

Brezhnev: [referring to Rodman] What is he writing this for?

Kissinger: We need this for our diplomatic language training.

Gromyko: I don’t know what he is writing.

Kissinger: We will initial it. We will introduce it into our Foreign Service charm course.

Brezhnev: I’m quite sure you and all your assistants, and President Nixon, understand full well the significance and meaning of the
All-European Conference and are familiar with all the details to date. I know your so-called allies regularly inform you of all the details of what they are going to do. We don’t refer to our East European colleagues as allies but we get reports from them.

We would now like to hear precise firm words, not on details but on the principle. We want to know whether we can bring the Conference to an end in the next one or two months or whether it goes on and on. It is left a bit vague. I am a practical man and I wanted to know the facts. I have to report back to the members of the Politburo on what is going to happen. We hear about “efforts will be made with allies.”

The situation is like this: Countries like Belgium want to set up a theatre here under their own control without the Soviet administration. You say your allies have put forward this or that proposal; that is just to let it go on endlessly. We can speak our mind. We can say the subject matter is European security, not a matter of organizing restaurants in each other’s country. If the United States isn’t interested in that, then I will take that into account, and that is another question.

When there is a question of who should participate, whether it is just the nuclear powers or others, I said, “No, it should be all European countries.” This was the correct view. Luxemburg, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, should all participate.

This is why we are against all attempts to give evasive answers, which only creates unpleasantness in our minds.

We are not putting forward the question of the withdrawal of United States forces from Europe. That is a separate question altogether. Nor do we link it with your “allied commitments.” But in spite of our straightforward approach, others are putting obstacles in the way and trying to gain certain advantages over the Soviet Union.

You know the United States publishes a magazine, “America,” in this country, and we reciprocally publish, “Soviet Union” in the United States. [Brezhnev gets up and fetches a copy of “Soviet Union” and shows it to Dr. Kissinger.] I personally read “America” in my house, and my wife reads it too. So there is no problem about that publication in this country. But now there is a new demand, to set up a printing house in the USSR. Surely that would contradict the principle of noninterference in other countries’ affairs and respect for sovereignty.

So all references to alliances are nothing but attempts to evade the question. What alliance can there be with a country like Holland on setting up restaurants in the USSR? Tell them straight out that it runs counter to the spirit of the Conference. You keep saying you have to consult with your allies.

But I want to be completely objective, Dr. Kissinger, and I appreciate the fact that you’ve made two serious statements. One is that you
have the intention to make a serious effort to complete the documents and effect the signing as soon as possible, and second, that you will do everything in your power to ensure the signing of those documents at the highest level. If that is your intention, I certainly welcome it and we can end the conversation on that note.

What is your view on those last words?

Kissinger: My opinion is, we have agreed to use our efforts to bring about an acceptable document, and that in that case conditions will be considered right for signing it on the highest level, as far as the United States is concerned.

Brezhnev: I agree. And I trust you agree in principle that if it were at all possible to achieve it before President Nixon’s visit, that would be very good. Politically it would confirm the ideas President Nixon set out in his last letter to me. You will naturally recall the words in that letter—“that we have gone through difficulties but we remain true to the policy we have set, and that there is indeed no alternative to coexistence.” Surely the final document of the European Security Conference would be very important in that respect.

Kissinger: I have said we will act in that direction and I am sure we will achieve it. But I have pointed out that I don’t believe it will be completed before the President’s trip. But we have no fixed view on that subject; it is my estimate. But we can certainly finish it, if not before, then shortly afterward. But you have our assurance we will act in the sense that I have described.

Brezhnev: Good. When we were preparing for our discussions with you, we listed 15 questions we thought were important and of benefit to our two countries. Of those 15 questions, I felt the most important ones, on which results would be the most significant, were the following:

1. Soviet-American relations.
2. Further steps in the field of strategic arms limitation.
3. Middle East.
4. Trade, economic and scientific and technical cooperation between our two countries.

As I say, there are other matters, but these would seem to be the main ones, and they are fully in line with the President’s thinking and with the goals we set for the President’s visit.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: Then we can consider our general assessment of Soviet-American relations is a favorable one and we have not come up against any differing view.

3 Document 163.
Kissinger: That is correct.
Brezhnev: And we feel that gradually—not as fast as we wish but nevertheless—we are moving in that direction.
Kissinger: On Soviet-American relations?
Brezhnev: Yes.
Kissinger: That is correct.
Brezhnev: We are not in a position of confrontation. On the contrary, we are here exchanging views.
Kissinger: That is the meaning of détente.
Brezhnev: We make no attempt to interfere or inject our presence in the domestic affairs of the United States. That is entirely the concern of President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger. So whatever adverse processes are felt in the United States, there are no adverse processes between us.

In the past period, there have been increasing contacts between business circles and our people, and I have had occasions to receive them.

Kissinger: We strongly support that.
Brezhnev: And at various suggestions made by American companies, people from here have been going over to study the possibility of new deals. And so on this issue we can both state that our assessment is a positive one.
Kissinger: That is correct.
Brezhnev: As I say, I list these matters first because I think this is in line with President Nixon's thinking, and not to give any impression we want to dodge any of the issues involved.

Then there is the question of the Middle East. Regardless of what number you give it, that is a very complex one. We have had a long conversation, and you and Foreign Minister Gromyko have on this subject. And I would not like to resume the conversation on this tonight. Perhaps we might find occasion to talk some more, or you could with Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Kissinger: As you wish. I am prepared.
Brezhnev: On strategic arms limitation, incidentally, just today we received a report—and I can probably show you tomorrow—that you carried out a test of a new missile, it seems successfully, on one of your islands, and the missile was equipped with five warheads, not three.

Kissinger: If it is Minuteman, that is impossible. If it is the Poseidon, it could be anything up to ten. But if it is the Minuteman, it cannot be anything but three.
Brezhnev: Let me be more specific tomorrow, because I was informed of this at the very last minute.
Other Arms Control

On ABM, it is my impression we have reached an understanding.
Kissinger: Yes.
Brezhnev: On the basis of leaving each side one area and ending all work on other areas.
Kissinger: That is correct.
Brezhnev: On ending underground tests, the question remains about the threshold.
Kissinger: We should begin technical discussions on that subject.
Brezhnev: That is, there is an understanding of the question.
Kissinger: That is correct.
Brezhnev: The understanding being that we can continue testing until January 1, 1976 and then call upon others to follow suit.
Kissinger: No, first of all, discontinuation applies to a threshold.
Gromyko: We said that.
Kissinger: Calling upon others, in our view, is not an essential element of this.
Gromyko: We understand you emphasized the need for that question to be resolved.
Kissinger: I think I expressed myself in the manner caricatured by the General Secretary. I consider it an obstacle to agreement. Also we must have technical discussions about the threshold before we can give an absolutely final answer.

[They confer.]
Brezhnev: I think, Dr. Kissinger, we could reach an agreement on that on a bilateral basis, that is, we could agree that we would discontinue testing, say two years, and at the end of that period, review the situation to see where we stand.
Gromyko: Without including a formal proposal in the agreement.
Kissinger: That is a possibility. But we should have technical discussions about the threshold. We are prepared to have them either in Washington or Moscow.
Brezhnev: We agree.
Kissinger: Then we should form an opinion, but in principle.
Brezhnev: Good.
Now, what about the question then of reduction of forces in Central Europe?
Kissinger: I think we should discuss that.
Can we take a 10-minute break? And bring our technical expert in?
Brezhnev: Certainly.
Kissinger: We are prepared.

[there was a break from 7:05 to 7:30. Mr. Lodal came in. Brezhnev roughed up Lodal’s hair and commented that he needed a haircut; Kissinger agreed. Dobrynin pointed out that Lodal’s hair was not long by American standards. On his way back to his seat, Brezhnev picked up Mr. Rodman’s case containing Dr. Kissinger’s briefing books and walked off into the next room. Mr. Rodman followed him. Brezhnev turned around and came back. Mr. Rodman retrieved the case. Mr. Gromyko affirmed that it was a joke. The meeting then resumed.]

MBFR

Brezhnev: I would like to say a couple of words on this question.
Kissinger: Please.

Brezhnev: On the question of reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe.

We were gratified at the start of the negotiations in Vienna on the substance of this important problem. And we discerned in them the joint desire of our countries, together with the other European states concerned, to continue the process of strengthening European security and to complement political détente in that continent with measures of military détente. It is only too natural that negotiations should be conducted not for the sake of the negotiations themselves, but to achieve concrete practical results. We have to note, however, that so far there have been no such results. And in fact, people now are speaking of the deadlock that has taken form at the Vienna talks.

And it is becoming obvious that our Western partners have come to Vienna with clearly exaggerated demands. The approach they are suggesting means nothing short of a desire to alter or amend in their favor the correlation of forces in Central Europe that has taken shape over many years. They start talking about some kind of ceiling or of reduction only of the Soviet and American forces, and also they are calling for a reduction of Soviet forces in a proportion of two-to-one, or even more, compared to American forces. They speak only about the reduction of infantry forces without talking of other types of forces and armaments.

You will realize that if that approach is taken, the talks are bound to end in deadlock. And it is quite obvious that no reasonable or acceptable solution can result from such an approach.

So, therefore, if there is a genuine desire to reach agreement on this problem, it is necessary to take a more realistic view of the situation. I don’t believe you and I can here and now finally resolve this problem, and I have merely described in principle what is happening, emphasizing those things that cannot lead to real results, and I would be happy to hear from you some observations on this score. And then, de-
pending on how you see things, we could decide either to issue our delegations with new instructions or to discuss the matter at a higher level, or take other appropriate steps.

Kissinger: The negotiations on MBFR have, as you pointed out, Mr. General Secretary, many complexities. One is the geographic disparity of the location of the United States as opposed to the Soviet Union. Any Soviet forces would withdraw a few hundred miles, while American forces would withdraw a few thousand miles. Secondly, we start from a base which is disparate: According to our estimates, the forces of the Warsaw Pact are larger than those of NATO, and the forces of the Soviet Union are larger than those of the United States. And there are some disparities also in individual equipment.

On the other hand, we understand the Soviet concern that as a result of this effort there not just be a substitution of other forces for those of the United States—in other words, that if we withdraw a certain percentage of our forces, the other allies not just increase theirs by the same percentage. And we also understand there should not be a change in the relative weight of the various allies as a result of these negotiations.

So we understand the Soviet desire to have some clarity about the process that would be started.

[Food is brought in.]

Kissinger: It’s about time. I was getting hungry.

Brezhnev: When I got home last night, my wife showed me a picture in Izvestia. She said, Dr. Kissinger has lost weight. I said no, it is something in the photograph.

Kissinger: Your wife is a great diplomat.

Brezhnev: She usually takes no interest in the talks.

Gromyko: Did you tell her Dr. Kissinger was bringing great pressure to bear? [Laughter]

Kissinger: So, we understand that the discussions that have taken place in Vienna may have had some of the attributes that the General Secretary pointed out.

We wonder, therefore, what the General Secretary thinks now of the idea he discussed with President Nixon—of, for example, a cut of 5% of U.S. and Soviet forces, without equipment. In other words, this is a change in our position. With a ceiling to be put on allied forces so they cannot be increased to compensate for this. And with an agreement to move within a specified period to further discussions which would involve also forces of other countries, of all of the participants of the Conference.

Brezhnev: I did talk about this with President Nixon, and I spoke of it to Chancellor Brandt and to President Pompidou. I did indeed suggest that we agree on certain reductions in size of forces, perhaps in the
initial stage symbolic reductions, and then let us wait and see several
years, with talks continuing in the meantime, and then everybody con-
cerned—the United States, the peoples of Europe, everybody—will see
it is possible to live in Europe with a smaller number of armed forces.
That would be just one first step.

But some time has elapsed since then, and here I have to use the
language of diplomats. First Brandt told me he favored reduction of
both national and foreign forces. Now I see there is a certain hesitation
in this regard. Pompidou tells me he takes no part in these talks, and he
says France is not going to cry over reductions of Soviet and American
forces. That is what he told me in the last meetings. That prompts us to
think about it.

Kissinger: I think the French army has a long way to go before it
strikes terror in the Soviet Army. You can withdraw many forces before
that point is reached.

Brezhnev: But I feel at this time we can limit ourselves to just an ex-
change of views.

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: Without, however, losing interest in this activity.

Gromyko: And let the talks in Vienna continue.

Brezhnev: And perhaps after we both thought things over, we
could agree to both give our delegations new directives. I’ve been
hearing it said that the EEC, which is of course not only a commercial
but also a political union, feels one could contemplate a Western Eu-
rope without boundaries. This was said to me by certain politicians. I
said to Pompidou I didn’t agree it would happen, but if it did, every
one of them would have to learn German.

Kissinger: That might be one result of the current tendencies.

Brezhnev: You are proposing an Atlantic Charter, which again
makes us think. Some kind of Atlantic Charter instead of NATO. Then
there is this Europe of Nine, a kind of union within an alliance. The nor-
mal number of teeth is 32; now people are trying to fit 33 into their
mouth. Not being a dentist, I have to give some serious thought to what
it means.

I know the Atlantic Charter is one of Kissinger’s ideas, and the
Nine is one of France’s ideas. Which is why you and Jobert like each
other.

Kissinger: It is not clear why Jobert should support something that
will lead to the domination of Scheel.

Brezhnev: That is a question that does arise. And in general,
various events are occurring in France which certainly give food for
thought. I am sure you are familiar with the situation in France. I per-
sonally have nothing against Mr. Pompidou—we were the first to sign
principles, the agreement on consultations. These were not simple documents. Our trade turnover has increased. This time, at Pitsunda, we spoke least of all on economic issues, on the specifics involved. Generally, France indicated her desire to increase trade and economic cooperation. We took a positive view of this. We could see Pompidou was deliberately avoiding reference to specifics, and, as it were, referring those matters to the relevant departments.

As I saw it, this was one of the effects of the terms imposed by the Nine. I didn’t want to importune him.

That is basically what I want to say. Unless Gromyko wants to say something.

Gromyko: The substance has been set out.

Brezhnev: I don’t know to what extent Pompidou informs you, but what I say is the truth. On several occasions, he repeated that France needs to retain a free hand, to be independent—he said that on several occasions. But since I had heard those words on countless other occasions, I didn’t try elucidating what he meant by a free hand. He did say at one point he thought Kissinger was going to attack France and he was going to defend himself. I say this merely to raise your spirits.

Kissinger: Most of the disputes between the United States and France depend entirely on French rationalistic education, only theory; there is no real basis. It reminds me of what Pétain4 said of those who came from the Ecole Normale—“They know everything; in fact they know nothing else.” There is no concrete basis; the independence dispute is only a theory. We make no attempt to interfere with independent policies, and the ultimate independence and freedom of action of a country depend on its specific weight, not its declarations. You have experience with that with friends on your side of the line.

So we have always treated such phenomena as on a tactical level, so I wouldn’t attach too much importance to them when they apply to France and the United States. We have no intention of attacking France, and I don’t know how Mr. Pompidou wants to defend himself. If in the spirit of cooperation you wanted to inform him he is wasting his energy . . . As for the Nine, it is our understanding they are thinking of forming a defense community, and a political union.

Brezhnev: That is my information too.

Dr. Kissinger, I was reminded here. This is one part of the [Pitsunda] talks I want to read to you. It relates to the U.S.-Soviet talks on SALT. “Pompidou said that France welcomed these talks and would be happy if they led to a halt in the arms race between the two powers, because it is dangerous. At the same time, France was happy not to be a

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4 Henri Philippe Pétain, Chief of State of Vichy France from 1940 to 1944.
participant in these talks because she didn’t want their consequences in any way to touch upon France.”

Another of his suggestions was that the next working meeting like Pitsunda be held in Paris. We didn’t discuss any dates. I invited him to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union, but again, we didn’t discuss dates. I informed you.

Kissinger: We appreciate this. We are not concerned with France’s policy, and these were all consistent with our expectations. But we appreciated the exchanges we have had on the subject and your informing us.

Brezhnev: So perhaps, returning to the subject of troop reductions in Central Europe, we could then agree the conference itself should continue to work. And in the meantime, say at the Ministerial level or other level, we could think of ways to give new impetus to the work and bring rapid results.

Kissinger: So as I understand it, the ideas you discussed with President Nixon last year are in abeyance?

Brezhnev: No, why? But for the time being, no practical solution has been found to that problem.

Kissinger: Including that idea advanced by the General Secretary?

Brezhnev: Yes. Because the suggestion is that only a certain percentage of land forces be withdrawn, which would violate the balance, a balance which has been in existence for 30 years. So obviously there is a need to dig a little deeper into this whole matter.

Gromyko: When Douglas-Home, the Conservative Foreign Secretary, was in Moscow discussing this subject, he said it was best to reduce land forces first, especially the number of tanks. When we asked why, he said, “Because the Warsaw Pact has more tanks.” That is not a good reason.

Kissinger: I have never heard a NATO Minister who disagreed. That is very convincing to NATO people!

The question is how serious we are in promoting these negotiations. If each side wants to freeze the superiority it has, there will never be an agreement.

Gromyko: Then let the other participants take a more objective view instead of saying, “Reduce tanks because the other side has more tanks.” Because all forces and armaments should be reduced. It should be a cross-section of all forces in Europe, including nuclear forces. So it is certainly expedient to give further study, but it is also necessary for the Western powers to take an objective view.

Kissinger: So you think at the Summit no understanding can be reached.
Gromyko: Perhaps as a result of further thought, something could be agreed. Let us agree to think this over. You may want to exchange views with your allies. This is certainly one of the topics we list as for the Summit.

Kissinger: But our experience is that unless there is a preliminary agreement before the Summit, it is very hard to reach an agreement at the Summit.

Gromyko: True, but surely there can be an additional exchange of views between now and the Summit.

Kissinger: I just told Sonnenfeldt I don’t have the impression we will achieve a breakthrough on this subject tonight. But I don’t want to be hasty; that is why I asked Sonnenfeldt.

Gromyko: A breakthrough today, maybe not. But between now and the Summit . . .

Kissinger: Because I would have offered to split the difference, if I knew what your position is.

Gromyko: Could you tell your position?

Kissinger: I already told you. A cut of 5% in U.S. and Soviet forces, to be followed by further reductions of other forces.

Gromyko: Yes, but we said that involved additional forces. What about air forces and other arms? We can’t do as Home said.

Kissinger: But in that stage tanks would not be included, only personnel.

Gromyko: But that is not our proposal. When Comrade Brezhnev put his proposal, he said armed forces, not just personnel. Otherwise it is just counting heads.

Kissinger: By air forces, do you mean personnel, or aircraft too?

Gromyko: Those too.

Brezhnev: Because air forces include arms and not just personnel.

Gromyko: The question now in the discussion in Vienna is the question of reductions of armed forces and armaments.

Brezhnev: I am sure Dr. Kissinger is aware that that kind of approach is groundless.

Kissinger: Can I also, just for my education, Mr. Foreign Minister, ask about the content of your 20,000 symbolic cut put forward at Vienna? Is that personnel or equipment?

Gromyko: We named that as an example but we have never divorced the question of personnel from that of arms, and we have always said cuts should include air forces and nuclear weapons.

Brezhnev: That is what we wrote.

Kissinger: My quick impression is reinforced; I don’t think we will find a solution this evening.
Brezhnev: I agree with you. But we should give thought to today’s discussion. [Kissinger nods yes.] So let the Conference go on working, and we should give whatever help we can. [Kissinger nods yes.]

Gromyko: [Picks up a briefing paper] This is our proposal: “The Soviet Union and other participants in the talks suggest a reduction of 20,000 with appropriate matériel and equipment.” That is in paragraph 2. This is something that applies to both of us.

And in fact, in the past, Western countries themselves never attempted to disunite personnel and arms. Only very recently this question cropped up. It seems they switch positions whenever it is to their advantage.

Kissinger: We are prepared to discuss cuts that move in the direction of equality. But we should consider the consequences if we fail to make progress in any of the fields of limitation of armaments. If armaments on both sides continue to grow while we declare we are in a period of détente . . . So this is not a question to be settled tonight, but it will have a serious influence.

Gromyko: We are in favor of continuing to give thought to this. Certainly it is quite possible we will have opportunities to make progress.

[Kissinger and Stoessel discuss the Soviet-proposed text of the daily press announcement.]

Kissinger: [to Gromyko] We suggest that if we omit the phrase we had yesterday about the talks being constructive and businesslike, it would have a political significance. Add whatever we had yesterday.

Gromyko: We will include it.

[Kromyko confers with Brezhnev.]

Brezhnev: Good.

Gromyko: Accepted.

Kissinger: [referring to Dobrynin] Is he going to be like his Chinese colleague in Washington, whom we haven’t seen in four months?

Dobrynin: Good. It is quiet.

Economic Relations

Brezhnev: Could we now go over to trade and economic matters?

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: If we sum up what we have achieved in the last two years, we can see the significant advance in economic ties between the United States and the Soviet Union. As comparing 1972 and 1973, trade between the two has doubled and reached $1.5 billion. There have been several agreements concluded between Soviet organizations and American companies, including with an American bank. A representative organization has been set up to promote economic ties.
But at the same time, we have to note that not everything agreed upon has been carried out, and in the first instance, one has to mention here that the cardinal and fundamental issue of eliminating discrimination against the Soviet Union in trade has not been resolved, and also the question of granting the Soviet Union most-favored-nation treatment. From what we know and what you have told us, we are familiar with your domestic difficulties in this regard. Only too naturally we hope a solution will be achieved as soon as possible. I hardly need to say a lack of solution to this question gives rise to quite a few difficulties. And lack of such a solution, for one thing, prevents me and President Nixon from discussing larger-scale arrangements that are possible in the field of economic ties. This applies to the question of credits.

Although I was gratified to hear that the temporary restrictions imposed on the Export-Import Bank were lifted. A few days ago, I was pleased to read your statement where you very convincingly and reasonably argued the case for granting most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union. It has now become possible to proceed further in the question of building a United States trade center in Moscow. But all of this process of first freezing, then unfreezing, impedes this process of developing economic ties.

One significant step along this road could be the signing of a long-term agreement on economic, industrial and technological cooperation. I think last October we handed to you a draft of an appropriate economic agreement.6

Kissinger: We have given you a draft.7

Brezhnev: We handed it to Secretary Shultz in Moscow.

Kissinger: But we gave you a draft.

Brezhnev: Yes. So it would therefore seem that preparation of such an agreement has assumed a practical shape. My colleagues and I be-

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5 Possibly a reference to Kissinger’s March 7 statement to the Senate Finance Committee, in which he said that he would recommend that the President veto the Trade Bill if it did not include most-favored-nation status for the Soviet Union because of Soviet restrictions on Jewish emigration. See “Kissinger Fights Trade Bill Curbs,” The New York Times, March 8, 1974. Documentation on the Nixon administration’s attempts to modify the Senate version of the Trade Bill is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976.

6 The Soviet draft was given to Shultz when he was in Moscow to attend a meeting of the U.S.–USSR Joint Commercial Commission October 1–3, 1973. The joint statement issued at the end of the meeting is in telegram 12137 from Moscow, October 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

7 The U.S. draft was given to Patolichev during the first meeting of the U.S.–USSR Trade and Economic Council held in Washington February 25–26. Patolichev briefed the press after the meeting; see “Soviet Stresses Trade Conditions,” The New York Times, February 27, 1974, p. 49.
lieve the signing of such an agreement could be an important element in the long-term economic relationship outlined by President Nixon in his conversation with Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev. And I believe this question could be one of the important matters taken up at the Summit meeting.

Frankly speaking, I personally have not had much chance to look into the details of the draft you have given us. However, our people reported to me there was a great difference between your draft and ours. Your draft emphasizes not the main question of developing ties between our two countries, but questions which, though requiring solutions, are in effect of secondary significance—for example, exchanging information in the field of trade, improving conditions for the work of trade companies and organizations. So it remains for us but to voice our hope and desire that we can get down to business-like effort to agree on the text of an agreement. And that your representatives and ours receive appropriate instructions without delay, so they can get down to business promptly.

There are quite a few negotiations presently under way, for example, on Yakutsk gas and other primary products. All these talks can run their course. If the United States is interested in principle in such long-term agreements, the experts will undoubtedly be able to calculate the economic benefits for both sides. So we have to elaborate the common, mutually acceptable and optimum treaty agreements.

Let me say, by way of illustration, that it seemed at first that the United States was interested in receiving energy from the Soviet Union, in the form of oil and gas. On the other hand, we felt that some representatives of American business circles took President Nixon’s statement about U.S. independence in the field of energy as signifying a loss of interest in Soviet oil and gas deposits. So there is one specific issue on which it is necessary to have some clarity. Then the specific issue will be seen in its true light. It is also a fact that not only American companies but also European and Japanese companies are approaching us with inquiries about our deposits of oil and gas. Yesterday I met with two prominent Japanese economists and businessmen. They both expressed their great interest in cooperation in these fields, as they had in conversations with Comrade Kosygin. They were very appreciative when I told of our willingness to supply them with a part of our national wealth. Chancellor Brandt, President Pom-

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8 In a speech to the nation on November 7, 1973, President Nixon introduced Project Independence in response to the energy crisis brought on by the Arab oil embargo imposed after the October war in the Middle East. See Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 916–922.
pidou, and Italy are all equally interested in these projects; not to mention the Eastern European socialist countries.

Or, to take another example, the talks going on now between our Aviation Ministry and the American companies Lockheed, Boeing, and Douglas, for technical cooperation. But those American companies say that so far they have not had a sign of the favorable attitude of the American Administration to this kind of cooperation.

On the other hand, we couldn’t fail to take note of the very fine statement by President Nixon to the American Trade and Economic Council when he said that economic relations should cement very friendly relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.9 So we see friendly statements not reinforced by appropriate actions.

We entered into fairly large-scale deals with Japan, for example, on timber, and at present we are on the threshold of a new agreement with the Japanese on timber resources. And the Japanese I met yesterday told me they were interested in continued Japanese-Soviet cooperation in various projects, including projects on the basis of compensation. And we confirmed our agreement to supply them with 25 million tons of oil.

[Brezhnev looks for a map in his folder of maps, and can’t find it.]
Do you know of the speech I made recently at Alma-Ata?10
Kissinger: Yes.
Brezhnev: In that speech, I made public what has already been decided on by us—adopted by the Central Committee and now included in the Plan.

[He finds the map he wants and puts it before the Secretary. They both get up to inspect it closely.]
That is Lake Baikal, and you see the existing railroad [the Trans-Siberian]. It is one hundred years old. The country has grown immensely in the meantime. It is very hard to ship materials to Vladivostok by railroad. The whole trans-Baikal area is a virgin area, which holds enormous reserves of gold, tin, and so on. So we have decided to build a new railroad. Part is already built, from Tayshet to Ust-Kut. That is what the Japanese are interested in. And we will build a new railroad. We won’t ask any credits for that; we will build it by ourselves. This will mean that an enormous new industrial area will be added to the country’s industrial centers. There will be two special en-

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9 Possibly during the February 26 dinner that Nixon hosted for the Directors of the U.S.–USSR Trade and Economic Council.
10 In his March 15 speech at Alma Ata, Brezhnev introduced a new agricultural program and announced the decision to build a railroad line across eastern Siberia and the Soviet Far East. (Telegram 3771 from Moscow, March 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
engineers; the Komsomol will send 20,000–30,000 young people
to work on the railroad. And we will build east and west from there
[points to a spot in the center]. Then in 5–6 years we will be talking an
entirely different language. The Japanese were very happy about this—
to build major towns and cities in the area, and plants.

[Both sit down.]

I merely say this to show the error of old views about the Soviet
Union, that we are backward or poorly developed. Maybe we lag be-
hind the United States in some areas, but we are not backward. One
year is just nothing. In the overall balance one year can be in favor of
one country; the next year in favor of another. So we have to define the
major issue, Dr. Kissinger, to define clearly the U.S. attitude and the at-
titude of President Nixon to this entire question. If that is clearly de-
finied as positive, then we can indeed say, as the President did, that eco-
nomic cooperation can cement our friendship. Because it is not a
flexible policy to say that today we freeze something and tomorrow we
unfreeze it.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we have had many talks on eco-
nomic matters.

Brezhnev: We should do our best to remove all obstacles placed in
the way of this by ill-wishers. It is one thing to criticize; it is another to
look at how someone comes to power and acts. It is one thing to criti-
cize, and another to plan and organize things.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we have talked about this
problem in this room many times. You ask our attitude. Our attitude
has been described by President Nixon at the dinner for your Minister
[Patolichev, Feb. 26]. It has been stated publicly by President Nixon and
stated publicly by me, and has been stated to the Senate Finance Com-
mittee. We believe very strongly in the general improvement in our po-
itical relations, and we believe a general improvement in economic re-
lations is an essential component of that relationship. We are
encouraging both public and private investment in the Soviet Union.
We have always considered your long-range economic plans and plans
for long-range economic ties between the United States and the Soviet
Union an example of far-sighted statesmanship on the General Secre-
tary’s part. We are prepared to cooperate with this.

We have, as you know, encountered a number of domestic ob-
stacles, some of a highly irresponsible nature. You must be aware of
the fact that the President and I have worked unceasingly to overcome
them. And we will continue to do this.

I have made a few suggestions to your Ambassador which are
frankly inappropriate but happen to be connected with our domestic
situation.
As to the specific items you mentioned, Mr. General Secretary, I repeat, we will cease no effort to implement the trade legislation and overcome the additional restrictions that opponents are attempting to impose on us.

On the Export-Import Bank, the temporary interruption that occurred was not the work of the Administration but came totally unexpectedly. Since it has been ended, we already approved $40 million worth of loans. And we are continuing to examine the fertilizer plant and the Yakutsk plant. We have to evaluate this in terms of the domestic situation at this point, because we don’t want to hurt the possibility of achieving a positive solution to the MFN question. But we have every intention of bringing about a favorable consideration.

Regarding the long-term trade agreement, this has the strong support of our Administration. It is my understanding that Mr. Bennett, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, is coming with Secretary Dent. In any event, our negotiators will be instructed to achieve a solution by the time of the Summit.

We will look through the draft with this in mind.

Regarding the long-term projects you mentioned, we continue to maintain our interest in the projects we have discussed with you and we do not believe it is inconsistent with our energy policy. In this connection I would like to reaffirm we are prepared to continue discussion between Mr. Simon or Mr. Donaldson and appropriate officials on your side.

Regarding aircraft design, the sale of aircraft by the United States would be facilitated in every respect. We would also be prepared to license the export of some equipment of aircraft components. The only thing we don’t want to do is contribute to the 160 airplane.

Brezhnev: We will have to work on that ourselves.

Kissinger: But on the principle of cooperation on aircraft design, we can cooperate.

In short, we agree with the perspectives that have been described by the General Secretary.

Brezhnev: I never heard you ask for our help in building the B–1.

Kissinger: Perhaps at the Summit in 1975 we can agree on the B–2. Then both sides will have the same airplane, and that will simplify many things.

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12 The text of the Soviet draft of a long-term economic agreement, given to Secretary of Commerce Dent during the meeting in Moscow, is in telegram 5244 from Moscow, April 10. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files) See also Document 172.

13 These discussions have not been identified. William E. Simon was the Administrator of the Federal Energy Office. William H. Donaldson was Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance.
Brezhnev: It is an excellent idea, and we will suggest cooperating on the 162. [Laughter]

Kissinger: But our most immediate objective is to get the trade legislation passed, which we hope to achieve in June or July. We believe that long-term trade between the United States and the Soviet Union is of mutual benefit and we will do our utmost to encourage it. It is not a unilateral thing we do for the Soviet Union, and we have never looked at it that way.

Brezhnev: What are the real prospects? Do you have a strong conviction that something can be done by June?

Kissinger: Speaking frankly, I believe if our political relations remain good—as I believe they will—and if we can do something on the problems I discussed with Ambassador Dobrynin, that we now have the possibility in the Senate to bring about a compromise that will lead to the granting of MFN. Many Senators told me before I left for the Soviet Union that they were eager to work for a compromise—Senators that have supported Senator Jackson. So this is the immediate problem I shall have when I return.

Brezhnev: I recently was told there was one Senator who deep down is against Jackson—and there are many Senators of that kind—but for the time being they are apprehensive about saying so.

Kissinger: They must be given some excuse for doing it, but they are ready to do it. And we now have support from some groups who were behind this program. I had a meeting with Senator Ribicoff and Senator Jackson, and later with Senator Javits. And I believe it will be possible to bring about a solution. Not so much with Jackson but with the others.

Brezhnev: As you know, Jackson is linking this matter with something that bears no relation to this entire matter.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: Relating it to such questions of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. Later I will give you an official communication on

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that score.\textsuperscript{16} I give you this not by way of accounting to anyone, but as gentlemen. I gave President Nixon assurances and I will give him official information.

Kissinger: We don’t consider this a proper subject of inquiry by the United States Government.

Brezhnev: We talked about that; it would indeed be tantamount to interference in our internal affairs. You remember I saw the Senators and read out official data.\textsuperscript{17} These were true figures that have been given. And I can now give you official figures relating to the true situation as of March 1 of this year.

Our Patolichev has been a little unwell recently. But I trust our others—Alkhimov, Semichastny\textsuperscript{18}—will do the work.

I can tell you—[to Rodman:] this is not necessary for the record—at a recent meeting, my colleagues asked, “Are we interested in any change in our line toward the United States, economically or politically?” And the trade experts were there. And the unanimous judgment was no. I am charged with these negotiations and I can tell you we stand firmly by the line we have stated.

Kissinger: I can tell you President Nixon has no higher goal than to establish firmly the course we have taken, including especially in the economic sphere.

Brezhnev: I feel he is certainly quite right. So I trust by 1975 I will be in Washington again, unless you change policies.

Kissinger: We won’t change policies.

Brezhnev: Then we should give earnest thought not only to this Summit but also to 1975. Because, I like to repeat, to govern means to foresee.

Kissinger: In fact, when the General Secretary comes next time, we hope he will travel around the United States.

Brezhnev: With pleasure.

\textsuperscript{16} A note was handed to Kissinger in Moscow on March 28 stating, “Since the emigration began in 1945 through March 1, 1974, 94 thousand persons (with children up to 16 years of age) left the USSR for permanent residence in Israel.” The note explained the decrease in emigration numbers: “Following October 1973 (the period of military activities), the number of requests to emigrate to Israel dropped more than two-fold.” “During 1973,” the note continued, “the Soviet authorities received more than a thousand requests from former Soviet citizens who had departed for Israel for permission to return to the USSR. The decline in emigration and the rise in remigration has been influenced in the first instance by the irrational and aggressive policies of the Israeli Government, as well as social difficulties in that country.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot 81 D 286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, 1955–1977, Box 8, Soviet Union—Secretary’s Trip, March 1974) See also footnote 6, Document 162.

\textsuperscript{17} See footnote 2, Document 125.

\textsuperscript{18} Not further identified.
Perhaps we can finish for today.
Kissinger: All right.
Brezhnev: I feel we are setting aside quite some time for discussions every day.
Kissinger: Yes.
Brezhnev: Our Defense Minister Grechko just returned from a trip. In the two days I have been discussing with you, I haven’t met any of my own colleagues, even though I am home. So I would like to set aside a half hour, an hour, tomorrow morning to meet with them. I have to tell them about the critical remarks I have addressed to you.
Kissinger: Maybe they will disagree with the critical remarks.
Brezhnev: So, 11:00.
Kissinger: At 11:00? It is up to you.
Brezhnev: If by any chance there are any changes, I’ll inform you.
Kissinger: And we will discuss primarily strategic questions? Or what else?
Brezhnev: According to my list: energy, the Four-Power agreement in West Berlin, which is not a big question.
Kissinger: Yes, I agree we should discuss it.
Brezhnev: And scientific and technical cooperation.
Kissinger: Yes.
Brezhnev: And perhaps we might have to return to some of the questions we have already discussed but agreed to think over. Maybe the Middle East, strategic arms; those are two items to which we might return.
Kissinger: If we want to conclude an agreement on strategic arms at the Summit, we have to reach a decision fairly soon.
Brezhnev: Of course. As I see it, it is indeed a fundamental issue. President Nixon singles it out for special attention in his message.19
Kissinger: Yes.
Brezhnev: And it is certainly in the focus of public attention.
And congratulations to your daughter tomorrow [on her 15th birthday]. Where are they?
Kissinger: At the ballet.
Brezhnev: Well, have a good rest.
Kissinger: Thank you.
[The meeting thereupon concluded.]

19 Document 163.
169. **Message From Secretary of State Kissinger to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)**

Moscow, March 26, 1974, 2010Z.

Hakto 9. Please pass the following to the President:

I had a largely inconclusive seven hours with Brezhnev today. During morning session, Brezhnev and Gromyko bitterly and at length, though calmly, gave vent to their resentment at Soviet exclusion from Middle East diplomacy. Discussion was one of most acid I have had with Brezhnev. It reflected I think not only resentment at US but at the Arabs and a certain recognition that despite their power Soviets have not been wanted as active participants in Middle East negotiations to date. I stressed the need to keep focus on the goal of a settlement rather than on formalities of negotiations to date. I agreed to meet with Gromyko periodically. Soviets dropped subject after some 3 hours along the lines of our meeting at the dacha, and they indicated they might come back to it.

During rest of day there was some agreement that we would continue joint efforts to bring European Security Conference to conclusion but I withheld agreement to repeated Soviet urging that CSCE conclusion at summit occur before your Soviet visit. I think such timing would be undesirable from your standpoint and would also deny you leverage during Soviet visit. There was also agreement that US and Soviet technicians get together to examine a ban on underground tests above a certain threshold beginning January 1976. I made no final commitment and rejected an obviously anti-Chinese proviso that US and USSR appeal to others to join such a ban. On other topics, Soviets showed no inclination to negotiate on MBFR. They also, not unexpectedly, voiced disappointment at trade situation though I assured them that your position remained as you stated it most recently to Patolichev.

In sum, major issues, i.e., SALT, Middle East and MBFR, have so far been inconclusive and there has been somewhat desultory quality to rest of Soviet performance. At the same time, Brezhnev has said that the leadership recently decided to continue on course with US. Also,

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2 See Documents 167 and 168.

3 Presumably Kissinger was referring to his meeting with Gromyko at Zavidovo on May 8, 1973; see Document 112.

4 See footnote 8, Document 168.
there is Politburo meeting scheduled Wednesday morning with Grechko, who has just returned from Iraq; this may produce some adjustment in Soviet SALT position. In any event, Brezhnev asked me to delay departure by one day. Because of my other commitments I agreed to delay by about 5 or 6 hours, permitting additional session Thursday.

Warm regards.

170. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, March 27, 1974, 5:50–9:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Chief, USA Department
Mikhail D. Sytenko, Member of the Collegium of Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Chief, Near East Department
Oleg Sokolov, USA Department
Viktor Sukhodrev, USA Department (Interpreter)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department
Jan M. Lodal, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
President’s Visit; SALT; Middle East; Other Arms Control; Vietnam; Economic Relations and Energy; Scientific and Technical Cooperation

Brezhnev: I keep trying to learn this diplomatic language: I am having a hard time. I am an engineer by profession. It is an arduous but
honorable one. In another ten meetings, I will be able to speak diplomatic language even in English.

How are your children?
Kissinger: Marvelous. My daughter loved the gift you sent her.
Brezhnev: What did they like best?
Kissinger: My daughter liked the Kremlin best; my son liked the Pioneer Club best.
Gromyko: Did they like the tower [the Ostankino Radio Tower]?
Kissinger: Very much, but it was cloudy.
Brezhnev: The weather was bad. So we couldn’t go to Zavidovo. The fog came in.
Kissinger: I understand. We would have liked to go, but I understand.
Brezhnev: I was hoping we could go by helicopter. It is two to two and a half hours by car.
Kissinger: That would be too much.
Brezhnev: Everything was ready at Zavidovo. But it wouldn’t have been pleasant in the forest, with the rain and fog there. The bad weather that was there today came down to Moscow in the evening.
Kissinger: I appreciate the thought.
I am sure the boar are grateful.
Brezhnev: I wasn’t able in this brief period to get a full report on all you talked about today. So perhaps in this conversation we could revert to some of the most important questions we have discussed. Not all, but the more important ones.
Kissinger: I agree.
Brezhnev: And Dr. Kissinger and your friends, I do this from President Nixon’s message, where he lays particular emphasis on the questions he feels to be the most important.
There are certain other matters—like the artificial heart—but those are scientific matters, and the scientists will understand each other better than we can. I did inquire from our people about progress in cancer control, and I was told there is broad cooperation already.
Kissinger: Yes.
Brezhnev: I know ceilings are a subject Dr. Kissinger specializes in.

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3 Document 163.
Kissinger: I specialize really in subceilings.

Brezhnev: Now I know. Can they be low ceilings, like 2.20 meters?

Kissinger: Architecturally, I like high ceilings; for MIRVs I like low ceilings.

Brezhnev: My view is exactly the opposite. [Laughter]

The Secretary of the Party Committee in my town, his name was Svirsky. We were doing our best to strengthen the Party organization in the countryside, so we sent urban party men out to the villages. They would think up any excuse not to go. Some said their wife was sick, some said they had piles, etc. Svirsky said: “That is fine. Now we have exchanged views on this subject. You have given me the benefit of yours. So it is all arranged. You go.” [Laughter]

That is a good principle.

Now if we turn to what we feel are the most important questions, I think we agree the first is limitation of strategic arms. Then the Middle East. Then economic cooperation. And then the European Conference. So perhaps we should talk about some of those.

The President’s Visit

One question which we have not discussed, and I leave it to your discretion whether to discuss it, is the question of concrete dates for the President’s visit.

On June 16, we have nationwide elections to the Supreme Soviet. All of us, the leaders of this country, will be nominated to the Supreme Soviet. I will be speaking on the eve of the election. My other colleagues are elected from other districts, so we all will be traveling around the country the first half of June. It will be a busy time. It all takes time. Therefore, personally I feel that during that time we could not accord President Nixon all the attention he merits by rights. Also, during our election speeches, we could have something good to say about the development of U.S.-Soviet relations, and that could be a way of preparing public opinion for the visit—and the meetings would go better in that background. That is by no means a precondition; it is just our desire to have the best atmosphere.

You could pass it on to President Nixon.

Kissinger: We in fact prefer the second half of June.

Brezhnev: It will give us more time, really, to discuss things and reach agreement.

Kissinger: We would prefer the end of June. Or July. Which do you prefer?

Brezhnev: We would be entirely agreeable and we could agree at some later date about when we make a public announcement in the
press. That we leave to President Nixon’s hands entirely. And the text can be left to the channel.

What we are talking about is the exact dates—because we have already announced June.

Kissinger: [to Stoessel] Do you have a calendar? [Stoessel gives him a pocket calendar. Kissinger studies it.] Then can we say June 24th. Monday.

Gromyko: The date of arrival?
Kissinger: Yes.
Brezhnev: As the President prefers. Monday would be a good date of arrival.

Kissinger: That is when he came last time. On a Monday.
Brezhnev: Naturally, as we agreed on, it will be an official visit. And we would be happy to meet any wishes he has regarding travel in the Soviet Union. It will present no problem whatever. He has a residence in Moscow; he knows it. [Laughter]
Kissinger: It was adequate. Essentially adequate.
Brezhnev: We have other residences.
Kissinger: No, that was excellent. The 24th.
Brezhnev: Right.
Kissinger: And we were thinking of what length?
Brezhnev: That date seems to be acceptable. As to length, I would like to leave that to the President’s hands.
Gromyko: As long as he can stay.
Brezhnev: About six weeks, I would say.
Kissinger: That has many possibilities!
Brezhnev: Congress can take a rest then.
Kissinger: I was going to say that.
Brezhnev: They are all tired anyway.
Kissinger: He would probably leave on Sunday.
Brezhnev: Three days is too little; four days is still too little. Something like seven or eight days would be more or less adequate. Because maybe he would like to spend two to three days traveling around the country. It is a very nice time of year. I could take him down to the Crimea.
Kissinger: He would appreciate that. If your Ambassador ever comes to Washington, we can discuss it.
Brezhnev: I invite President Nixon now to come there, on my behalf. Sonnenfeldt has been there.
Kissinger: I am sure he will like it very much.
Brezhnev: He can really breathe there.
Kissinger: I think it is a very good idea.

Brezhnev: It would be a nice gesture both from the point of view of our hospitality, but also from the political viewpoint. He could visit the Yalta Palace where Roosevelt stayed. It would be next to where he is staying.

Dr. Kissinger will no doubt want to inform the President about this and he can tell Ambassador Dobrynin.

Another interesting place—and he spoke about it—is Lake Baikal. It is a very beautiful place.

I for my part suggest the Crimea, and I want the President to feel free to go to any other place he chooses.

Kissinger: I will be in touch with your Ambassador, and anyway we set it for June 24th.

Brezhnev: Agreed.

Kissinger: And we will propose a date for the announcement.

Brezhnev: Agreed.

Now for the most complicated question of all—it is time for tea and cookies.

[A waiter comes in. The Soviets ask for a “MIRV’d” plate of snacks.]

There was a time everyone was scared about flying saucers.

Kissinger: One family in the United States thought one landed in their backyard.

Brezhnev: It was probably something the neighbors threw over. I threw a saucer once in the air and tried to get it to fly. It broke and my wife complained. [Laughter]

SALT

As I recall, on the subject of MIRVs, yesterday you suggested we should have 1,000 and we 600. I felt that was quite unjust. So I made a counterproposal that you should have 1,000 and we have 1,000 too.

Kissinger: That is characteristic of our negotiations—that we don’t accept proposals unfavorable to the other side.

Brezhnev: Of course we only put forward constructive proposals. We agreed we would think it over overnight. I hope you had pleasant dreams.

On this I rely on the reports in your press, which say our talks have been friendly and in a constructive spirit.

Kissinger: And businesslike.

Brezhnev: Why spoil this very friendly atmosphere? It is not in the interests of either side.

[Tea is brought in. Brezhnev counts the slices of lemon.]
How many warheads here? One-two-three . . . six! You tested one like this.
Kissinger: No, it was five yesterday.
Brezhnev: You have one with twelve.
Kissinger: No, ten.
Brezhnev: Twelve.
Kissinger: Ten. When you come to the U.S. in 1975 we will show you.
Brezhnev: We will show you ours too. The maximum we have is three.
Kissinger: That is on a good day.
Gromyko: Two and a half.
Kissinger: That is why I say, on a good day it is three.
Brezhnev: But truly this question is a very serious one and it warrants very serious discussion.

So we agreed by way of general principle that we will endeavor to sign an agreement prolonging the previous agreement limiting strategic arms. And I understand you to be in favor of that.

Kissinger: Only in connection with an agreement on MIRVs.
Brezhnev: Okay.
Kissinger: Either that or we have to change the numbers.
Brezhnev: Okay. We accept the principle it would be insufficient merely to state that the existing agreement is simply prolonged. So we accept that something should be added to that.

We could have the first paragraph saying the agreement is prolonged. And the second paragraph saying, in rough words, that the President and the Soviet leaders instruct their delegations to continue work to secure the provision [sic] of the Interim Agreement into a permanent one, by 1980 or so. That would be absolutely essential to it. We are both substantially in agreement on that.

Now to that, as I gather from our two days of talks, something else should be added on top of that.
Kissinger: Exactly.
Brezhnev: Something should be added, in the first place, to preserve the balance so neither side acquires any advantage. Now let’s think about that. I honestly tell you I don’t think your proposal is an appropriate one, for it does not meet that objective. Let me explain my thinking on that score.
Kissinger: Can I bring in my expert? [They nod agreement. Lodal is brought in.]
Brezhnev: [to Lodal] Okay.
So, as I say, I will try to explain my thinking.

It is no secret, and you didn’t conceal it, that the missiles installed on your submarines have 12 warheads.

Kissinger: Ten.

Brezhnev: Okay, let it be ten. History will prove who is right. Whether it is ten or twelve, you are equally aware we have not done this.

Kissinger: Done what?

Brezhnev: Put MIRVs on submarines.

Kissinger: Not yet.

Brezhnev: Not yet.

Kissinger: But soon.

Brezhnev: That is another question. But in terms of MIRVs, you have an advantage of over 2,000. Let’s place our cards on the table.

Kissinger: In the number of warheads. I don’t have the exact figure, but we certainly have an advantage.

Brezhnev: Certainly a big one.

Kissinger: Today.

Brezhnev: You also know how long it takes and what effort it is to develop and deploy MIRVs on submarine-launched missiles. You say we have an advantage in land-based missiles. But let us recall one fact of no small importance—that we have to destroy 100 rockets to fit out the 62 submarines we are entitled to under the agreement. So even if we proceed from the assumption we will have five MIRVs on each missile—and I doubt that—it means we lose about 500 warheads. Otherwise we are not entitled to build the 62 submarines under the agreement. Because we gained that right to build submarines only if we tear down that number of missiles. So even if we proceed from your calculation of number of warheads, we stand to lose 500.

[Kissinger laughs]

This requires fairly precise arithmetic.

Kissinger: Yes, Mr. General Secretary, but the missiles you have to destroy are a type on which you cannot put multiple warheads.

Gromyko: But we would be entitled to replace them with a more modern type.

As I said yesterday, your military may have their doctrine and ours have their own. But neither has anything to do with political negotiations.

Kissinger: The problem, Mr. General Secretary, is that even the missiles you are permitted are about 1,400, or maybe a little more. Of the characteristics most suitable for MIRVs, on those you can put either five or six warheads now and God knows how many later.
Brezhnev: The same God doesn’t know how many you can install. You have missiles carrying ten already. We don’t have any yet. So even today, each one of yours equals two of ours. That is the honest method of approaching this.

Kissinger: First, unless we are only making debating points, the missiles that are comparable are the land-based. You can install warheads on more of yours and each of your warheads is more powerful than ours.

Brezhnev: But Dr. Kissinger, I can equally say your scientists are capable of installing bigger warheads.

Kissinger: Only if we build bigger missiles, which, if the agreement lapses, we will certainly do.

Brezhnev: You think it is so easy [for us] to close the gap? It will be years before it evens up. The gap today is that wide. [He gestures.] It will be wider. It is like comparing the salary you get or the salary I get with the salary of a docker. We will be able to pay the docker such a salary when in America a docker’s pay rises to yours. Maybe after five more Brezhnevs. So let us proceed from the factual state of affairs.

Kissinger: The factual state of affairs is . . .

Brezhnev: Then you recall I suggested we both withdraw nuclear-carrying vessels from the Mediterranean. You said it was not appropriate. But you remember I showed you a map which showed you the facts. You didn’t want to take that into account.

When you and we were signing the original agreement, we didn’t take into account all your bases and weapons in the Mediterranean. But the weapons are yours and they are there. So from a legal and military point of view, we are certainly entitled to say that is also a fact to be taken into account. But I am not raising that now.

On the Mediterranean you say it is very difficult to do, and you make reference to allies, and so on.

So even if we prolong the provisional agreement by 1980, we will even by then have fewer MIRVs than you do, and you know that very well.

From a realistic point of view now—I can give you my last word on this—we agree to prolong the agreement to 1980 and you are allowed to have 1,100 and we are allowed to have 1,000. So we will lose 100 land-based missiles under the old agreement, so as to fit out the 62 submarines. So we scrap 100 launchers and report to you about that. And in addition, by way of an advance, or to make it more understandable for public opinion, we allow you to MIRV 1,100 launchers and we are allowed to MIRV 1,000. Now that would be a clear endeavor on our part to meet your position.

[Korniyenko gets up and whispers something to Brezhnev.]
Correction, correction. We are supposed to scrap 210 land-based missiles.

Kissinger: That is correct.

Brezhnev: Plus you get an additional 100, so you get 310 MIRV’d missiles more. And we get only 1,000, and at a time when you already have a vast superiority in MIRVs. I am sure you know—and I say so in full honesty—that so far we have not a single submarine fitted out with MIRV’d missiles.

Kissinger: No, we believe this.


Brezhnev: Then by 1980, provided we fulfill the terms of the original agreement, we can think over what further steps we can take. And seriously, what I am saying is that I still have to do a lot of discussing with our military men, and with our scientists, to see if they can develop this for us.

And what do we get from this? Politically, to show that the line on limiting strategic arms is continuing. And secondly, in an area where you have a vast superiority, in MIRVs, it allows you by 1980 to virtually complete your full program. So I don’t know what else you want. What else can you ask for the Soviet Union to do? How can you ask for more when you already have a clear superiority?

So I would appreciate it if you discussed this with President Nixon. We couldn’t really go into greater detail.

Because under those terms we would have only the right to do what we are entitled to, but I have no idea whether we could technically achieve it. In fact, our military may say they don’t want to have the full 1,000. Just like some of your military say there is no use firing at certain regions of the Soviet Union but [you] should fire at military targets, while other military people say no, that the most essential thing is to destroy all the launching pads. So it is really not a political question but a question of military doctrine.

So I have really set out our final position, a position based on our desire to observe the principle of non-use of force against one another and the prevention of nuclear war. In fact we are prepared to go this far considering the political opposition and certain political difficulties you are experiencing inside your country.

I would request that you transmit the substance of my remarks to President Nixon. I think he will think it over and appreciate the significance of our position.

Kissinger: Let me sum up, so I understand.

Brezhnev: Certainly.

Kissinger: In this total figure, it is not specified in each category how many in that category can be MIRVed—how many ICBMs of what type or how many submarines of what type.
Brezhnev: That would depend on the desires of each side.

Kissinger: But they don’t even notify each other about their intentions.

Brezhnev: I don’t know. We should think that over. We will, of course, report to you when we scrap some land-based missiles.

Kissinger: That is a different matter.

Brezhnev: But it is very important.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, there is the problem of verification, which arises this way. To be specific. After you have completed testing your submarine MIRVs—whenever it is; I personally think it will be before 1976—

Brezhnev: It won’t.

Kissinger: I believe yes, but we will see. We will then have to assume that every submarine capable of carrying that missile is MIRVed. Because we can’t know, looking at a submarine, whether you have already installed MIRVs or not. Just as you have to assume, when we count our 1,100, you would have to consider every submarine carrying the Poseidon missile as carrying MIRV, and count it. Because if we told you that some Poseidon boats don’t have MIRVs, you would laugh at us, and you would be right. Therefore, de facto, when you count our 1,100 you would have to consider every Poseidon boat as having MIRVs and subtract it. Or else each side simply doesn’t limit submarine missiles. That is the problem.

Brezhnev: Not necessarily. We may consider all your Poseidon submarines to be MIRVed, maybe not. I am not certain we will MIRV all our 62 submarines, even when we invent them.

Kissinger: But, Mr. General Secretary, we would have to consider every boat you have capable of accepting that missile as carrying MIRV. Therefore, assuming you have—I don’t know the number—400 that can accept your new missile for MIRV for submarines—that would have to be deducted from the 1,000.

Brezhnev: You said yesterday that if, for example, one of our launchers was capable of carrying MIRV, you would regard all of them as carrying MIRV.

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: Our military could take a different view. They could decide to MIRV only 60 percent of them and leave the others with a single warhead.

Kissinger: Yes, but our problem is we couldn’t know this and we couldn’t take their word for it.

Brezhnev: I can’t fully determine the degree of mutual exchange of information, but in the framework of our agreement we would cer-
tainly inform you. After 1980, when we will be devising a new agreement, we might have a special clause about exchange of information. Because meanwhile we know you have a vast superiority over us in MIRVs. But we proceed from the fact that we have an agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War, and we know we won’t have a nuclear war between us. It is only guided by such a lofty spirit of confidence between us that we can make such a proposal.

Let us have a ten-minute break.

Kissinger: Good.

[There was a break from 7:07 to 7:26]

Kissinger: I was explaining our military proposals to my colleagues who have never heard it.

You know what I think, Mr. General Secretary? Quite honestly, both our military people have painted a picture of the situation that is rather one-sided. Your people emphasize the number of warheads; our people emphasize the weight of your warheads.

Brezhnev: I don’t know how well you are familiar with the concept of the weight of warheads and with what percentage of the weight is lost when you MIRV that warhead. But I do.

Kissinger: I know.

Brezhnev: I have made a little calculation. Our proposal actually means if we agree you are allowed the total number of missiles you have, plus an additional 100 you get, plus the figure we have to scrap for our submarines, it means the United States will have—and this is an exact figure—the United States will be entitled to MIRV 64 percent of all the missiles it is allowed to have, whereas the Soviet Union will be entitled to MIRV only 42 percent of the missiles we are allowed. If you ask your military experts, they will give the same figures.

Kissinger: Yes, but if I ask my military men, they will probably say it proves that in our last agreement you took advantage of us because it allowed you a greater number of missiles that you are allowed to MIRV.

Brezhnev: Yes, well, people can invent anything to say but you can say you have discussed this with the Russians and this is the agreement you have come to.

Kissinger: In this forum I don’t believe we can make progress with these figures. We don’t want to get an advantage in ICBM warheads. Because, for example, if we had an equal number of MIRV’d ICBMs, you would have roughly twice the number of warheads. But this could then be compensated for by submarine missiles. So our concern isn’t that. Our concern is to get some figures that are a realistic limit and are not simply the maximum program of both sides. Because the General Secretary himself said he wasn’t sure he could MIRV as many.
I am just being analytical, Mr. General Secretary.

But without an agreement, we could MIRV 500 more Minutemen easily, and after 1977 we could deploy Trident missiles on land. So we would accept a limit on our number of both; by extending the Interim Agreement we would accept a limit on numbers and a disadvantage in numbers which gives you the possibility of more over a period of time.

Brezhnev: That is a logic I don’t understand, because it doesn’t meet the figures. I would ask you to report back to the President.

Kissinger: I will report this to the President. Maybe we can develop some counterproposal, and then we will see where we are.

Brezhnev: One other matter. You asked about information about our intentions as to how many submarines we intend to fit out with these missiles. I am not denying the validity of that suggestion. Let me think it over. It may turn out to be acceptable.

Kissinger: Let me say Mr. General Secretary, if that is acceptable, then I think we will be approaching an agreement. At least, this thing will look different.

Brezhnev: I can say we would not be concerned about whatever figure you mentioned—whether 2,000, 3,000 missiles—because we proceed from our agreement in good faith not to use nuclear weapons. So I would never have raised it. But then I hear first one speech by an official in the United States that “we must be stronger,” then another speech, and then Congress is increasing military appropriations. That I feel is in violation of our understandings.

Kissinger: I understand this, Mr. General Secretary, but we are attempting to prevent a runaway arms race in the United States.

Brezhnev: You say so, but on the other hand your military appropriations are growing, and you are mobilizing public opinion behind the idea the United States must be stronger. Which leads Americans to believe the United States is militarily weak and the United States stands on feet of clay.

Kissinger: [laughs] There is certainly merit in what the General Secretary is saying. I am not arguing every point the General Secretary makes.

Brezhnev: I recently spoke in Alma-Ata, and I will be making my election speech. What if I get up and make a speech [He gets up and gesticulates]: “Comrades, we must make every effort; we must be stronger than America.” Then the military men will say, “Give us the money.”

Kissinger: [laughs] If you said that, Senator Jackson would give you wide publicity in America.

Brezhnev: Senator Jackson again!
Kissinger: Of our military budget, of course, the greater part of the increase is due to inflation and most of it goes to personnel. The President never said more than that we will never be number two, never that we must be stronger than the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev: Perhaps we could end the discussion of that subject on that. We feel that could provide a good basis for our meeting.

Kissinger: If you could think over the submarine issue, and we will think over the numbers issue. [They query.] Assuming we accepted your figure for MIRV, and if you could then consider giving us information of how many will be on submarines, then we could think the matter over very seriously.

Brezhnev: I told you I couldn’t rule out the possibility of our informing you whenever we install the first MIRV on submarines. Maybe there is something reasonable in this.

So I take it, if we quite honestly inform you on the subject, this wouldn’t mean imposing any limits on us.

Gromyko: Within the limits.

Brezhnev: Let’s say, within the 62 submarines allowed, we will tell you whether one or five are being MIRV’d.

Dobrynin: Just inform you. No limits.

Kissinger: No, you will have the right to determine the limits in each category.

Gromyko: You are trying to introduce the notion of a ceiling through the back door.

Kissinger: [Laughs] I have tried to explain to you the problem of a ceiling introduces itself the minute you have started testing a submarine missile.

Let me explain how we view the subject—not to debate it, Mr. General Secretary. Let me explain our reasoning, just so you understand us.

First, we do not believe you can put MIRV’d warheads on any of your existing missiles. We may be wrong, but that is what we believe.

Gromyko: Please repeat.

Kissinger: We do not believe you can put MIRVs on any of your existing missiles.

Therefore we have observed you have conducted your MIRV tests with missiles that we consider new and you consider improved, but are in any case distinguishable.

I just want you to see we are not being capricious and trying to take advantage of you.

Brezhnev: It is the same type of rocket. But fitted with MIRV-type warheads, in the same silo. For a new type missile, you need a new silo, that is natural. And you know that.
Kissinger: You think they go in the same silo?

Brezhnev: Only in existing silos, otherwise it would be a violation.

Kissinger: We thought you would make them deeper, which is not a violation.

Brezhnev: If we had widened the silos, you would have complained.

Kissinger: So, should I continue with our reasoning?

Brezhnev: I think the main thing is, you should inform President Nixon that that is our proposal. That is as far as we can go. And we proceed from the assumption that neither of us will attack each other. If you need them, it is because maybe you think China will attack you. For us, the greatest guarantee is our intention of never attacking you.

In fact, Dr. Kissinger, I can tell you our military men have certain fears about a violation of the agreement, as far as widening of silos is concerned, to house new-type rockets. You know what those fears are based on? The fact that in the United States about 500 land-based launchers have been covered up. And we made two representations about that.

Kissinger: But we have stopped that.

Brezhnev: That is still going on.

Kissinger: That is impossible.

Brezhnev: That introduces certain questions. It is not something I really wanted to mention but it is a fact. Let us act in good faith.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I have to check this, but we ordered it stopped, and if it is not stopped, it violates orders. But I wasn’t accusing you of violating the agreement. That wasn’t our point. The only point I was going to make was that for the purposes of the agreement, for the purposes of verification, once you test a missile with MIRV, we have to assume it is MIRV’d because we have no way of verifying whether it is or is not.

Brezhnev: I have replied that it is a matter of military doctrine. We ourselves may decide to MIRV only half of them. We will be proceeding not from anything to do with the United States but from something to do with our other potential opponent. So what we are talking about is what each side is entitled to.

Kissinger: Okay, so how do we know you have deployed only half of your MIRVs?

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I am not rejecting your proposal about mutual information. It may turn out to be acceptable. I am not rejecting it. Let’s think it over.

Kissinger: All right. We will both think it over.
Brezhnev: After all, we have undertaken to inform you we are scrapping a certain number of land-based missiles to build submarines. Maybe we can go on to a broader agreement on exchange of information. But I am not in the position now to give you the exact answer.

Kissinger: No, I understand. Let’s leave it at that point.

Middle East

Brezhnev: Now, Dr. Kissinger could we finish the discussion on the question of the Middle East, by agreeing that we will cooperate with one another completely as was initially agreed upon by our two sides? And I stress the word “cooperate,” and by that I mean not simply inform each other. That should characterize our relationship in the Middle East.

Kissinger: I had a brief talk with your Foreign Minister today, and we agreed we would have a full exchange on the occasion of his visit to Washington. On the Middle East. And we are prepared to cooperate, to answer your question, and not to seek to achieve a unilateral advantage.

Brezhnev: We certainly have no aim to achieve any unilateral advantage. Unless you consider the assurance of the security of Israel and all Arab states a unilateral advantage.

Kissinger: I consider our objectives in this area compatible.

Brezhnev: That is what I think. But we should act accordingly.

Brezhnev: I agree we should coordinate our moves.

Other Arms Control

Brezhnev: Now, on underground testing, it would be desirable if, after your consultations with the military experts about which you spoke, you could give us your proposals about the threshold.

Kissinger: All right.

Brezhnev: So we can get down to concrete discussions.

Kissinger: We will make a proposal on the threshold, and I suggest technical experts on the two sides get together to discuss it concretely.

Gromyko: So the experts can also come up with a concrete text.

Kissinger: That, as the Foreign Minister would say, is not excluded. It can be done.

Brezhnev: I agree.

I would like to touch on the limitation on climatic-modification activity for military purposes detrimental to health.

Kissinger: As I told your Ambassador, this is a matter we should be able to form a conclusion about by the time the Foreign Minister comes to Washington. We quite frankly haven’t completed our studies. By the 15th or 16th.
Brezhnev: I agree, the important thing for me is that you should not reject consideration of this thing.

Kissinger: No.

Gromyko: Agreement between us on this would have very great resonance in the world.

Kissinger: We haven’t completed our studies but we will press it by the 15th.

**Viet-Nam**

Brezhnev: One more question. I don’t want to go into details, but I would like officially to tell you that our Vietnamese comrades at all levels, both at the party level and at the state level, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam have made repeated statements to us—the most recent case was when Pham Van Dong was here—to the effect they want to observe most rigorously the Paris Accords. They keep complaining that the Saigon regime is constantly violating those accords. I repeat, I don’t want to go into details on this, but proceeding from our understanding with you, let us make every effort—and I am calling on you to make every effort—to prevent Saigon from doing anything to violate the accords. That is my sole request. I have no other demands. Try and analyze the situation. There are observers in Viet-Nam. Our one request is that the Paris Accords be observed. I have no other requests to make.

Kissinger: We will use all our influence to prevent violations by the South Vietnamese.

Brezhnev: I would like nothing better.

Kissinger: But if you can use your influence, Mr. General Secretary, with the North Vietnamese, who are constantly violating the agreement, particularly Article 7, which has to do with infiltration, that would also be a great help.

Brezhnev: Well, I can tell you I for my part will use our influence to prevent any violations.

Kissinger: Then this was a very constructive exchange.

**Economic Relations and Energy**

Brezhnev: Good. This has something to do with the range of our relations and the whole spirit of relations between the Soviet Union

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4 Article 7 of the Paris Accords reads, in part, “From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the formation of the government provided for in Articles 9(b) and 14 of this Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel including technical military personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material into South Vietnam.” For the full text of the agreement, see *The New York Times*, January 25, 1973, pp. 15–17.
and the United States, that is, trade and a long-term economic agreement, and the question of fulfillment of the promise made by the United States regarding MFN. And also I would like very briefly to hear whether the United States is interested at all in cooperating with us in energy. Because others are—Europe, Japan.

Kissinger: Let me deal with energy first.

Brezhnev: Please.

Kissinger: In principle, we are prepared to cooperate with the Soviet Union across the whole range of the energy problem. We maintain our interest in certain new projects we already discussed with you. And we are also prepared to discuss with you certain new issues that have come up in recent years. Specifically, we are willing to cooperate with you on developing alternative sources to oil. We are doing a lot of work on it already. On other research and development we are devoting over $23 billion over the next five years.

Brezhnev: Could you be more specific? What do you mean by alternative sources?

Kissinger: Liquifying of coal, for example. Utilization of other sources. Matters of this kind, which we are working on on a large scale. Oil shale, and how to make it more economical. Conservation of energy. Matters of this kind. But we have proposed that some of your experts get together with ours and at the Summit we could sign a long-term energy agreement. And we would be prepared to cooperate with the Soviet Union. And as I said, we are already engaged in a major effort quite on our own, but we would be prepared to undertake joint projects.

Brezhnev: Are you continuing or have you stopped your dialogue with the Japanese about developing Siberian sources of oil?

Kissinger: To my knowledge we are continuing it and we continue to support it.

Brezhnev: Good. In very general terms, Dr. Kissinger, is the question of deals on a compensating basis of interest to you?

Kissinger: Along the lines of our discussions last year?

Brezhnev: Exactly. Just for example—it is for the scientists and businessmen to go into the details—some U.S. company extends credit to us for building a pulp mill to turn out paper of the highest quality and we pay you back with supplies of the end product.

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: It will then depend on the exact terms agreed on, whether we pay you back in five years, ten years. If we agree on a five-year repayment, 80 percent of the product; if ten years, then 100 percent of the product.

Kissinger: I understand.
Brezhnev: Another example: The United States supplies us with certain material to be used in, say, smelting of nickel or tin, and we pay you back by the end product. It is a very energy-consuming process. This way we save your energy, which is money in your pocket.

Kissinger: As a concept we will support it. We will have to examine each case. We will strongly encourage our companies to cooperate in this. Where credits are required, we are in principle prepared to increase credits. The same group trying to stop MFN is also trying to stop the credits. So we can deal with both of these problems hopefully simultaneously, along the lines of our discussion yesterday.5

Brezhnev: You know we have this agreement with Armand Hammer. He supplies equipment and we pay him back with ammonia, which the United States is in need of. I would imagine his company has examined the situation and wouldn’t agree to anything that would lose.

There are many such projects. I was just asking for your general assessment.

Kissinger: Our assessment is positive, and we will use all our influence with the banks to encourage it.

Brezhnev: I lay such emphasis on this question not because we are just dying for lack of such deals, but because it is in our mutual interest.

Kissinger: It is in our interests because it links our two countries together and it is a concrete expression . . .

Brezhnev: I don’t want to elaborate on any other subjects.

Scientific and Technical Cooperation

Brezhnev: On scientific and technical cooperation, we have given you our drafts and you have ample food for thought when you get home.

I feel we have exchanged some very constructive views, and we should now make an effort not to waste time on questions of second-rate importance, and more attention to what we have spent the last two days on. Then President Nixon will be armed with documents which will be truly worthy of his visit.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, may I raise two questions? One is, the President will be prepared to agree to a second U.S.-Soviet space mission once the first one is completed.

Brezhnev: I can say in advance that is more than likely to evoke a favorable response.

Kissinger: So we will have Mr. Fletcher, head of our Space Agency, get in touch with the appropriate officials.

5 See Documents 167 and 168.
Brezhnev: Certainly.

Kissinger: Should we also have our people begin talking about an energy agreement? Or is that premature?

Brezhnev: I don’t think it would be premature.

Kissinger: So we should.

Brezhnev: In several days time, a big delegation from here, headed by Minister [K. I.] Galanshin,6 is going there at Kendall’s invitation, on the paper and pulp industry.

Kissinger: [To Dobrynin] If you keep us informed and you need governmental support, we will do whatever is necessary.

Gromyko: We will inform you of the exact dates.

Kissinger: You can count on the support of our government.

Other Matters

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, these last couple of days we have been issuing communiqués to the press about what we have been doing. Tomorrow you are leaving. We ought to issue some kind of communiqué. My colleagues say they have handed a draft to your people.

Kissinger: I have just gotten it this minute.

Brezhnev: The short press release about today’s meeting is already agreed on with your people.

Kissinger: As long as it says “constructive and businesslike.” [Laughter]

Dobrynin: It has “more constructive than yesterday.”

Kissinger: As long as it is in the same order as yesterday.

Gromyko: Constructive and businesslike.

Kissinger: That is not without merit.

[Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt edit the Soviet draft.]

Dobrynin: [To Dr. Kissinger] Do we have to meet today, or tomorrow?

Kissinger: Tomorrow. But it is not subject to negotiation. I gave you the categories. The numbers.

Brezhnev: A piece of paper with that factual material I promised you—my colleagues will give it to you tomorrow morning.

Kissinger: That is all right.

[There was a brief break from 8:43 to 8:46.]

Kissinger: We have studied the communiqué and have really no substantive questions. Only a few stylistic suggestions.

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6 Konstantin Ivanovich Galanshin, Soviet Minister of Pulp and Paper Industry.
Brezhnev: I really haven’t read it.

Kissinger: Does Korniyenko draft for both sides now? Did you know he is joining my staff for a year? On the basis of equal torture for both sides. We will trade Sonnenfeldt for Korniyenko if you will get an additional man who can read upside down.

[Brezhnev goes out for a few minutes, returns.]

Kissinger: [To Gromyko] I will talk to the British about that European Security Conference. I will send a message to you on Friday.⁷

Gromyko: Good.

Kissinger: I think it is still bureaucracy. I will talk to Callaghan⁸ tomorrow. They probably haven’t had time to study it.

Brezhnev: Really, Dr. Kissinger, I find the thought rather dull that you are leaving tomorrow.

Kissinger: I always enjoy our meetings.

One possibility that occurred to me, Mr. General Secretary. If we make some progress on SALT, I would be prepared to return for a couple of days in May.

Brezhnev: You know, I was thinking about that. But I decided not to mention it. But I really thought we might need one more meeting, to finalize or almost finalize some of the documents. I didn’t think it would be on SALT, because I thought we had already settled that.

Kissinger: What are 3,000 MIRVs among friends? [Laughter]

But still we have to write down the small print.

Brezhnev: I don’t think I will live to see the day when we have 300 MIRVs in our favor.

Gromyko: To make things fair, we should be given 1,100 and you 1,000.

Kissinger: You will end up with more warheads. We will write down our considerations, because I really think I haven’t had a chance to give them to you. Our analysis of the problem.

Gromyko: Whenever you give us something in writing it looks very negative. Conditioned reflexes.

Brezhnev: What we gave you was really our final position. It means we are really giving you the maximum. I really should be fired from the Council of National Defense and all my other posts. You just think it over, how far I have gone. I for one—you absolutely never expected me to say what I have done. We have completed our discussions in a friendly way; I am sure you didn’t expect me to go so far.

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⁷ March 29. No message was found.

⁸ James Callaghan, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from March 1974.
[Laughter] When you tell President Nixon, I am sure he will give you a third post, in addition to the two you have.

[Both sides confer. Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt study the draft communiqué.]

Kissinger: What time does this have to be released tomorrow? 10:00?

Gromyko: We could maybe give it to the radio and TV tomorrow night and publish it in Pravda the next day.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: There is an aspect to it. I am conducting these talks as leader of the Party, therefore the Party paper should publish it first.

Kissinger: Let’s just establish a time.

Gromyko: 7:00 Moscow time.

Kissinger: All right. We will give it to our press.

Dobrynin: Going to Washington?

Kissinger: No, to London. 5:00 London time, 7:00 local time [here], which is noon Washington time.

Brezhnev: Both radio and TV at 7:00. Then the day after tomorrow’s edition of Pravda.

Kissinger: It is good for us too, because it makes evening TV.

Gromyko: Agreed. Completely agreed. Essentially agreed!

[The final draft of the communiqué is attached at Tab A.]9

Brezhnev: This might disappoint you, but I have no intention of considering any new proposals on SALT.

Kissinger: We have to now . . .

Brezhnev: Maybe something will come out of the information problem.

Kissinger: Exactly. If we can do something with the information problem. This is the direction my mind is now working.

Brezhnev: I believe you. And I hope so.

Thank you Dr. Kissinger, and I thank all your colleagues for the spirit that reigned during these discussions. Please give my highest regards to President Nixon for all my Comrades. My best wishes to him and my hope that his visit will be a good one.

Kissinger: On behalf of my colleagues, and especially my children, I would like to thank you for the spirit of these talks and your hospitality to us.

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9 Attached but not printed. For the text of the communiqué, issued on March 28, see Department of State Bulletin. It was also published in The New York Times, March 29, 1974, p. 6.
Brezhnev: Since I remember meeting your children at San Clemente, please give them my best regards. I hope they like Moscow.

Kissinger: Very much.

Brezhnev: And please come again.

Kissinger: I am confident the visit will be a successful one and a great contribution to peace.

Brezhnev: We have emphasized and re-emphasized that we both feel we are on the right course, and the further ahead we go, the more the American public and world opinion will conclude we are doing a truly great job.

Kissinger: Thank you.

[Brezhnev and Kissinger confer alone briefly on the way out.]

Brezhnev: I won’t see you tomorrow.

Kissinger: In June, and perhaps in May.

Brezhnev: Let us do some more work so we can settle it. And work out documents so they can be signed.

Kissinger: Certainly.10

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10 Kissinger’s memorandum for the President summarizing his final meeting with Brezhnev is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 76, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Secretary Kissinger’s Pre-Summit Trip to Moscow, Memcons & Reports, March 24–28, 1974.
Summit Preparations, April–May 1974

171. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, April 7, 1974, 8:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Nikolay V. Podgorny, Chairman, Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet
Vsevolod Kizichenko, Minister-Counsellor, Soviet Embassy, Paris
Andrey M. Vavilov, Interpreter
The President
Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Assistant to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The President’s breakfast meeting with Podgorny lasted about one hour and three-quarters. A good part of it was composed of conversation about ballet (Kirov versus Bolshoi), opera, food, reminiscences of the Kremlin and Leningrad and where the President might go during the next trip. (Podgorny suggested perhaps Georgia, Uzbekistan and Bratsk, but was rather noncommittal.)

Podgorny began the substance of the meeting with a remark about press stories to the effect that Secretary Kissinger’s trip to Moscow was a failure. He said they were lies; while Kissinger did not find common basis on some subjects, there was progress. He said there were those in the United States (and fringe elements like Solzhenitzyn and Sakharov in the USSR) who were against improved relations, but we must resist them and press on. He knew that Secretary Kissinger and the President were trying and he hoped all Moscow agreements would be implemented—especially those involving trade and MFN. The President responded that we had very tough problems in Congress but that he had made a promise in Moscow and would do his utmost to fulfill it.

Podgorny then took the United States to task for statements that the United States had to be first in defense, noting that it resulted in some of their people doing the same. He could understand when the military and Secretary Schlesinger did it, but not “political leaders.”

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Country Files—Europe—USSR, US–USSR Presidential Exchanges, TS–Sensitive, 1974. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held at the residence of the U.S. Ambassador in Paris. Nixon was in Paris from April 5 to 7 to attend memorial services for former French President Pompidou.

2 Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov, a nuclear physicist and dissident, urged the Soviet Government to work with the United States to limit ABMs in order to prevent nuclear war.
Our relations must be based on equality. The President agreed, but said that did not mean equality in everything; for example, they had a bigger army and we a bigger navy, although they were building rapidly.

On the summit, Podgorny thought there could be no agreement on a test ban and on SALT. He said MIRVs pose a difficult question but that this could be worked out on a basis of equality—noting that the USSR was far behind and a freeze would not be equal. The President responded by saying he would be personally involved in U.S. SALT analysis. He noted that Soviet throw-weight was much greater so that their MIRVs were more destabilizing than ours. Podgorny said it could be worked out, whether it was 600, 1000, or 1,2000 MIRVed missiles.

The President asked Podgorny to look into the future. If we two limit arms and perhaps reduced them, what about the PRC. Podgorny said the Soviets are optimistic about US-Soviet ability to develop mutual confidence and control arms, but if the PRC continued to build up, it would be dangerous—for us as well as them. We need to find a way “to drag the PRC into the field of disarmament.” He said he understood our relations with PRC were “in a state of freeze.” He added that the PRC is trying to drive a wedge between us. We both would like better relations with the Chinese. The present leaders are not eternal.

The President mentioned that it was of importance not to have a runaway arms race in conventional arms. Podgorny acknowledged that was so.

On the Middle East, Podgorny expressed extreme disappointment with U.S. behavior. He insisted that negotiations for a settlement should take place within the framework of Geneva. The President responded that it was important as an urgent first step to defuse a very unstable military situation, but we are working hard for a permanent peace and wished to consult closely with the USSR. We should use all available measures to move the situation to a position of greater stability. The USSR should not underestimate the strength of Israeli concerns and should move in a manner which took account of their sensitivities. He concluded we would work closely with the Soviets and would talk further about it with Gromyko next week.

The President and Podgorny then concluded their conversation during a walk in the garden at Ambassador Irwin’s residence.
172. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


Secretary Dent has sent you the following report of his meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev:

“1. I had hour-long talk with Brezhnev April 9. Ambassador Stoessel, Jack Bennett of Treasury and Lewis Bowden of Commerce were with me.

“Throughout conversation Brezhnev was somber, obviously preoccupied with what he feels is slowing tempo of détente relationship. He blames this squarely on what he called ‘misguided statements’ by a few individuals in the Congress and perhaps elsewhere in U.S. which are taken as signal by American businessmen not to move forward. He complained that many U.S. businessmen take positions when they were talking to you but changed their minds when you leave, intimating that some are easily scared out of ‘cooperation’ with the USSR in economic field.

“2. Brezhnev cited two cases: Rockwell negotiations for possible purchase of YAK–40 aircraft and Hammer deal on fertilizers, both of which he maintained had ground to halt.

“3. I pointed out record was not really that bad since much progress had been made in past 20 months, proof of which was that our trade had reached $1.4 billion last year. As evidence of movement, I cited recent approval by Ex-Im Bank of $36 million loan for new trade center in Moscow. Moreover, I told him you were personally interested in seeing fertilizer deal get backing from Ex-Im Bank and we hoped that would take place soon. As far as YAK–40 was concerned, I told him its use in U.S. would depend on conclusion of an airworthiness agreement between us and we were prepared to negotiate one when they were.

“4. Senator Jackson is clearly Brezhnev’s bugbear these days. At one point, on being told by aide that U.S. would not give licenses for sale of some of machine tools on display at U.S. exhibition, he commented perhaps we should get permission from Jackson. I said Senator

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2 Attached but not printed is Dent’s report, transmitted in telegram 5235 from Moscow, April 9.
Long had indicated to me last week he was hopeful about being able to pass constructive legislation this year, but he did not react to this.

"5. I told Brezhnev you were interested in our continuing efforts to find mutually satisfactory subjects for inclusion in a long-term economic cooperation. We agreed our representatives would meet soon with view to working out new text by next meeting of Joint U.S.–USSR Commercial Commission on May 21.

"6. Brezhnev said he looks forward to your forthcoming trip here and asked me to tell you that he and his colleagues deeply appreciate your efforts to fulfill the responsibilities which you and he jointly assured toward each other in 1972 and 1973. He hopes there will be new agreements to sign, 'notwithstanding the difficulties,' in order to show we are moving toward good neighborly relations. I promised I would pass these sentiments on to you.

"7. To sum up, I sensed from conversation Brezhnev and company are disappointed and confused over seeming slowdown in our commercial relations. At the same time, he appears convinced that course you and he have embarked on will be judged by history to have been course of 'great realism.'"

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3 Russell B. Long, Democratic Senator from Louisiana, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee.
173. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 12, 1974, 11:05 a.m.–12:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
Viktor Sukhodrev, USA Department (Interpreter)

The President greeted the Foreign Minister in the Oval Office. As they were seated and waiting for photographers to enter, the President noted in jest that Gromyko had been called a right-wing deviationist. Gromyko said that he was a little bit to the right of center according to contemporary terminology. Pictures were then taken. Secretary Kissinger mentioned the current UN session and said that it would be the first time that he would give a longer speech than the Soviet Foreign Minister. Gromyko asked how much longer. Secretary Kissinger said “one page” but that the approach of the two speeches could be rather similar. The photographers then left the Oval Office.

Gromyko: Mr. President, thank you for receiving me again. Could we use the usual method in our talks and take up various questions one by one?

President: Yes. Good, good.

Gromyko: First, may I say that although in the last year or two we have on many occasions and at many levels had the opportunity to exchange views regarding the principles and basic lines of policy of the two sides, it would not be out of place to do so again. I will be brief about this but definitive. Leonid Brezhnev expressed the desire that I especially emphasize the fact that the Soviet Union is fully determined to observe completely the obligations assumed by us in the documents adopted at the two summit meetings. This thought also dominated our thinking—the General Secretary’s thinking—when he set out the Soviet position in the recent talks with Dr. Kissinger in Moscow. And the same

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, 1955–1977, Lot 81 D 286, Box 8, Soviet Union, January–April 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. Brackets are in the original. The original is incorrectly dated April 11. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger and Gromyko on April 12 from 11:02 a.m. to 12:50 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)
thoughts were also set out by Nikolay Podgorny on behalf of the Soviet leadership in his recent meeting with you in Paris.\(^2\)

We express our satisfaction at the fact that on every occasion on which you meet with representatives of the Soviet leadership, or when the Secretary of State does, you also stress the firm intentions of the US side in this respect and this gives, we feel, greater solidity to our policies and our relations. We sometimes read in the press, and especially in the US press, words to the effect that no one can say for sure whether the Soviet Union really favors détente or whether it is a tactical maneuver. Such guesswork is sheer nonsense because we do not base ourselves merely on considerations of the moment. Our line has been set out to you many times and is known to you and, therefore, such guesswork is nonsensical. We, of course, hope that the US line is the same.

President: Yes.

Gromyko: I am glad you understand correctly.

One can never get far with temporary considerations because one would get shipwrecked quickly. We have no desire for that and we think you don’t either. So on that point I could end what I had wanted to say. But, I do want to add that we in the Soviet leadership are most satisfied that you hold true to the line you have taken despite certain known difficulties—which I don’t want to go into—and we admire you for it on the human plane.

Now there are certain more specific issues which I would like to raise later but for now I will end on this question.

President: We are on the same course and neither of us must allow opponents of détente, in the press and in political circles, to deflect us from our course. You should know that I pay no attention to them and I just go on. We have problems like the European Security Conference and the Middle East and SALT and so on. Our intention, despite certain tactical differences that arise from time to time, is to work together. I have always kept my word on that to Mr. Brezhnev. We intend to go forward on the various agreements, the various bilateral agreements, and we will have a good summit of course, despite some difficulties on MFN and people like Jackson who are opposed to any SALT agreement and those who want us to be at each other’s throats.

Gromyko: Thank you Mr. President. The most valuable part of what you said is that you intend most firmly to follow the line in relations between our countries which we both agreed on. The development of relations between two major powers is like two ships at sea. If the captains determine on a course, say from north to south, they may have to circumnavigate certain islands or other obstacles, but they still

\(^2\) See Document 171.
end up on course. Let us hope that our ship does not get lost in a fog and that it will go forward in the right direction. Of course I am not calling our ship an aircraft carrier; let us call it a Corvette.

When Dr. Kissinger was in Moscow—and you discussed this briefly with Podgorny in Paris—we discussed in detail the possibility of a new SALT agreement. We also had an opportunity to discuss this matter when I was last in Washington about three months ago. As hitherto, we attach great importance to reaching agreement on this question. Our determination to search for agreement with you has not abated. At the conclusion of our discussions with Dr. Kissinger in Moscow we, that is Brezhnev, submitted a proposal and we are now awaiting the official reply to it. Toward the end of the discussions the General Secretary said that it is not all that easy for us to come to a formulation of a proposal. We had to weigh all factors very carefully before making the proposal and we hope that the US appreciates it. After all, there is considerable disparity in numbers of missiles to be allowed under the agreement—1000 to 1100, meaning an advantage of 100 for you—and considering that each missile, that is, each naval missile will have 10—at least 10—MIRVs, the US will have an advantage of 1000 warheads.

Kissinger: They don’t trust our information, Mr. President. We tested it once with 12 warheads but only used 10, but it doesn’t make any difference.

Gromyko: I would like to stress that if we reach agreement on this basis, it would mean in fact that the US would be ahead of the Soviet Union for the entire duration of the next agreement. Of course it is hard to say how the gap will progress, whether it will narrow or widen and how the “scissor” will move exactly; but the US will always be ahead. This really makes for a double inequality—formal and factual.

And I would like to mention one other point. Voices are sometimes heard in the US alleging that the US and the President should make every effort to “correct” the previous agreement and obtain a sizable advantage. Anyone can, of course, interpret an agreement as he wants. But we categorically reject that the Soviet Union was in a better position as a result of the last agreement. We categorically reject that. We should like to hope that you as Head of State and of the US Administration will take an objective approach to this question, proceeding from the assumption that the previous agreement places both sides in a position of equality. If there were any inequality, it would be the US who would be

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3 See Documents 173–175.
4 See Document 165. A reference to Brezhnev’s proposal that the SALT Interim Agreement be prolonged until 1980 and the United States would be allowed 1,100 MIRVd missiles, while the Soviets would have only 1,000.
at an advantage because of one factor, your forward based systems. I hope all this will be weighed carefully and you will give an appropriate answer to those shouters who want to place difficulties in the way of understanding. I don’t know if they base themselves more on domestic or on foreign considerations but in any case they should be disabused of their false views.

President: Let me comment briefly on the entire area of strategic weapons. We have some areas for reaching an understanding. First, defensive weapons. Each side agrees not to construct site number two. Second, this is more technical—the question of not testing nuclear weapons above a certain threshold. This is very technical but I have instructed Dr. Kissinger to work with your people and we should be able to agree at least in principle. Third, this is more difficult still. We had hoped to get a permanent agreement but this is not possible. So we are talking about MIRVs because they most affect the balance. Now you mention numbers but you have enormous advantages in throw weight. Consequently, in the discussions of MIRVs we have to consider throw weight as well as numbers. And also whether MIRVs apply both to land and sea-based missiles or only to one or the other. But this is a difficult problem for us internally. There are those critical of the Interim Agreement because of the great Soviet advantage in throw weight. But we want agreement in SALT III—Summit III—as we had in SALT I and SALT II. Now we have already suggested a threshold test ban. On the MIRV agreement, having in mind the numbers problem, we should negotiate and attempt to reach agreement with you having in mind that we have a problem and we having in mind that you have a problem. We cannot negotiate ourselves into an inferior position. Nor can you. It is possible to reach agreement in that area provided there is an intention on both sides. And that is certainly true of Mr. Brezhnev and of you, and of me and Dr. Kissinger and others. I think you would agree, Secretary Kissinger.

Kissinger: Yes, it is very difficult but we should do it. On the test ban, we should have technical talks soon. On SALT, we have the problem that the two forces were designed in different ways and that now makes it difficult to establish equivalence. We each designed our forces independently not with each other’s advice, although our critics are trying to blame the Soviets for decisions we made years ago. We have to relate numbers in some way: how many of each category to MIRV and over what period of time. I will talk to Mr. Gromyko at lunch on the technical aspects and won’t hold you up with that now, Mr. President. We are now studying very carefully the Soviet proposal and we will submit our position first to you, Mr. President, and then to you and the General Secretary within about ten days. But I must say our press has really been unfair on this whole subject.
President: We are determined that unless we come to some sort of impasse this is a problem that can be negotiated. Both sides have to approach it in this way: Mr. Brezhnev cannot make an agreement that gives us an advantage and I cannot make an agreement that gives you an advantage. That is the spirit we should conduct negotiations in.

Gromyko: Two things with respect to that. First, in all the combinations you talk about, the US will have an obvious advantage in the form of the forward based systems; nothing made out as a concession by the US can change that. It is hard to explain for us that there is not an advantage for the US and it cannot be eliminated by the Soviet Union’s merely having a few more missiles. This is a factor that has to be taken constantly into consideration. Our proposal does not place us in a position of equal security.

Second, Dr. Kissinger raised the question of an exchange of information in regard to fulfillment of an agreement so as to give a clearer picture regarding the intentions of the other side. We need not debate here the accuracy of such information. We do believe that some kind of information exchange would facilitate agreement and whatever arrangement is made regarding such an exchange, the assumption made would be that each side will give precise and accurate information. And that would facilitate agreement.

Now, I would like to take up the question of the underground test ban. I presume that on that question we do have an understanding in principle. That is, that an agreement should provide for a ceiling on the capacity of explosions. Experts could meet in Moscow or here for technical talks and prepare an appropriate draft for signature when you come to Moscow. Do you have any views on timing?

President: Oh, about two weeks at most. Perhaps one week.

Kissinger: About two weeks.

Gromyko: Where?

Kissinger: We have no preference.

Gromyko: Now if you permit me, I would like to go to the Middle East.

Kissinger: I thought you had forgotten about it.

Gromyko: That is what you hoped.

President: Let me just mention some other things. We are making progress on space, on heart disease, health, energy and a long-term economic agreement, which incidentally is very constructive potentially. On MFN—I have been working on it and so has Dr. Kissinger and Dent, all of us.

I really would like to be able to deliver it by the time I get to Moscow but I cannot promise it. I know that General Secretary
Brezhnev told Dent⁵ that there are some problems, one or two, and I am kicking some pants on them. I have approved all the various cooperative projects personally and we will move ahead on them. Now, the Middle East.

Gromyko: I am certainly gratified by those words of yours. As I understand, you are expressing the hope that this matter [MFN] will be brought to a successful conclusion. I would prefer “confidence” as a word.

President: I will add with “confidence” for all the agreements I have mentioned. But on MFN—we are making progress and coming along. But I just cannot promise to deliver Congress. My prestige is behind it and Dr. Kissinger is working with Congress and the Jewish community.

Kissinger: Yes, but we may not have a compromise before you go to Moscow Mr. President. We are working on lining up support before we go back to Jackson. He is the most difficult.

Gromyko: Now to the “easy question” of the Middle East.

President: Okay.

Gromyko: Maybe my words won’t sound pleasant. But it is a reality that we do see US actions in the Middle East are in contradiction with the agreements between us and with your own words. I can recall that you said right here in this room that the US is in favor of joint action in the Middle East. And you said that if the US and the Soviet Union agree there will be peace and if they don’t agree then there will not be peace. That is what I remember you said to me. And you said the same thing in substance in San Clemente.⁶ But where are the concrete results to illustrate those words have been carried into action? One can only call US actions “separatist.” Maybe the US is seeking an advantage for itself by taking these separatist actions. The US is leaving the Soviet Union completely aside in the Middle East settlement. This was mentioned to Dr. Kissinger in Moscow.⁷ You know, if we wanted to frustrate peace we could easily do it because it is within our capability. So it would be good if you could weigh the consequences of separatist action because we had an agreement to act in a coordinated way to resolve the issue. And this doesn’t just boil down to the fact that we do not have diplomatic relations with Israel. After all, we sat next to them at Geneva, at the Geneva Conference, the one you have now blocked. We don’t regard them as untouchables or something like that. I hope you will look at the problem again and correct the situation.

⁵ See Document 172.
⁶ See Document 132.
⁷ See Document 167.
We want to act on a coordinated basis and we do not want to see Israel gobbled up. We want to see it as an independent, sovereign state. We want a just settlement. One can buy the condescending attitude of this or that Arab leader, but not peace by separate action. I am speaking very frankly on behalf of Leonid Brezhnev. We can have peace by acting together, if we both want peace.

President: I discussed this with Mr. Podgorny and I have also carefully read the accounts of the talks between Kissinger and Brezhnev. I saw Brezhnev worked him over pretty good for three hours.

You suggested that if it wanted to, the Soviet Union could frustrate peace. I am totally aware that if either of our governments decides that there should not be peace, then there won’t be peace. I stress if “either.” I have said there could be no peace if the Soviet Union is against it and there can be no peace unless we are for it. Because we have to influence Israel. I have said it publicly and I say to you that it is not an intention of ours or our policy to follow what you call a separatist course. We do not want to push the Soviet Union out because you have interests and you have many ties. In fact, in many cases you have closer ties than we. So there must be a recognition that there is a part for each of us to play there.

We now have the difficult problem of Syrian-Israeli disengagement. We have had discussions with Israel and we have had to reject their proposal regarding the Golan Heights. Now the Syrians are coming. Whether agreement is possible will depend on very hard negotiations on our part.

Why not do it in the larger forum in Geneva? It would not work. We broke out the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement. That was good. Now we are trying to break out Syrian-Israeli disengagement. Once those two issues have been broken out, then the Geneva forum comes into play to work out the broad areas of a settlement. That is even more difficult than disengagement because it will be a permanent settlement. Let me assure you: there must not be another war in the Middle East. Whenever there is war in the Middle East it drags us into potential confrontation. We do not want the situation of last October where we were airlifting to Israel and you to Egypt and Syria. It is ridiculous. The Soviet Union and the US should not let the Middle East destroy the progress we have made in other areas—Europe, SALT, etc.—important as the Middle East is. There is no intention on our part to go separate and cut the Soviet Union out. There is no intention that the US will be the major power in the Middle East. You should be there; we should be there. We each have a part to play. The immediate problem is the peace agreement. We believe we had to take a bite—Egyptian-Israeli disengagement, Syrian-Israeli disengagement—as we did. Maybe we consulted inadequately. I have talked to Dr. Kissinger about that. It serves
no purpose to discuss who will be “Mr. Big.” We both have a role. If you could deliver the Israelis, we would be only too glad. I told Podgorny that. If you can deliver the Israelis, we will deliver the Syrians!

As I said to Mr. Podgorny and sometime ago to the Ambassador, Mr. Brezhnev would have had a legitimate beef if the US was trying to go alone. But that was not our intention. Our only purpose was to get an agreement which could then be negotiated on in Geneva.

It is good we had this talk. At the summit we will talk the same way. We do not have a policy of cutting you out, “separatist” policy as you called it. There can only be peace if both of us are for it. I said this to Mr. Brezhnev at San Clemente and to Mr. Podgorny and to everyone. That is my belief. It wouldn’t last otherwise. Now it is up to you and Kissinger to work out the consultative framework. There is no point giving the press an opportunity to talk of our two great powers eyeing each other suspiciously. We have no desire to derive advantage at the expense of Soviet participation. The US and Soviet Union must work together in the long run. Or it will not last. I hope you will tell Brezhnev not only what I said but how I said it.

Gromyko: I heard all you said and cannot but agree with much of it. It is correct that a peaceful settlement needs to be achieved. That is exactly what needs to be done.

[At this point Steve Bull came in to remind the President that Mr. Gromyko had a one o’clock luncheon engagement.] You spoke of the need for both powers to act together to reach the goal. But the practical activities of the US in the Middle East run counter to those fine words. All that the US has done of late in the Middle East has been done in circumvention of the Soviet Union by separate measures.

Consultation is not the crux. The two sides can exchange information as long as they wish but their actions may never come together. The crux is for both sides to act together and that has not happened. I do not know what Dr. Kissinger will say to me in pursuance of what you have said, but we will see. Perhaps this is all we can say now in view of the shortness of time.

President: I hope you and Dr. Kissinger can work out some understanding so we can proceed to our goal, the peace settlement which we both pursue. I leave it to both of you and Dobrynin can be the referee.

Kissinger: The Foreign Minister is, of course, so flexible.

Gromyko: I would like to say a few words on Europe, especially on the all European Security Conference. In this area, we are happy to see

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8 Stephen Bull was the President’s Special Assistant.
the US taking a more constructive position. We said so to Dr. Kissinger in Moscow and also to you previously. In Moscow, Dr. Kissinger had certain interesting ideas. We told him we hoped the US Delegation would play a more vigorous role in Geneva. We are pleased to see that in recent days this has happened. We hope you and Dr. Kissinger will do everything to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion and to conduct the third stage at the highest level. You see, I have something pleasant to say.

President: Yes, we have made great progress. If the conferees can agree to important matters, then we will come to the summit. It is the same with you—you don’t want to come if there is no agreement. Of course, there are also the Europeans and they also have ideas. So it is not all that easy to get agreement.

Kissinger: We have worked with the Allies and you will have seen that there has been progress.

President: I have talked with the Italians, with Wilson and Brandt and they are all on track. Also with the Dane. We are using our influence; I am.

Kissinger: We have to do a little more with the British in regard to one item—confidence-building measures in the spirit we discussed in Moscow. These are the military things, Mr. President.

Gromyko: Well, thank you very much. Thank you for this conversation. I certainly appreciate it. It has been a very frank exchange of views. I express the hope that all that relates to the closeness of our positions will be brought to fruition. On those matters on which I had to say things that are not so pleasant for you to hear, I hope they can be worked out too. I would like you to instruct your Secretary of State that when he addresses the General Assembly he should not fire too many arrows at us. Because in my own speech I had to do some “fighting,” you know against whom.9

President: I would like you to discuss one question that you didn’t make much progress on—MBFR.

Gromyko: What is the question?

Dobrynin: Reduction of forces in Central Europe.

Gromyko: Yes.

President: I would like you to discuss it with Henry at lunch. It is very important for certain reasons here.

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9 Both Kissinger and Gromyko addressed the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly, which met to discuss the needs of developing countries and the international cooperation necessary to address them. Gromyko’s April 12 speech and Kissinger’s April 15 speech were reported in *The New York Times*, April 12 and 16, 1974, respectively.
Gromyko: That is indeed a very important matter, as was said by General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow. But the Western position in Vienna is not objective. No agreement can be reached on that basis. And what is more, we think they think so too.

President: Well, we discussed with Mr. Brezhnev a five percent cut by both sides.

Gromyko: Well, thank you very much Mr. President.

President: We have had many meetings in this room. All of us should indicate that we are making positive progress on all items, we are preparing for the summit. The New York Times said Kissinger was gloomy in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. But before the other summits everyone was pessimistic.

Gromyko: We must surprise them again.

President: We must work hard and come out with results. We should say we are making good progress, although not everything is settled. We have to leave some things for Brezhnev and me to settle.

[As the President was escorting Gromyko to the door, Gromyko said “We trust you understand that we want you to come and have the meeting and that nothing should interfere with it.”]

[The President accompanied Mr. Gromyko to the West Lobby. They spoke about détente and the President said, in shaking Mr. Gromyko’s hand at the West Lobby door, “We will be cursed by future generations if we fail. We must succeed.”]

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174. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 12, 1974, 2:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Conversation with Foreign Minister Gromyko

PARTICIPANTS

Soviets:
H.E. Andrey Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs
H.E. Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
The Honorable Georgiy Markovich Korniyenko, Chief, USA Division, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Viktor Mikhaylovich Sukhodrev, Counselor and Interpreter, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs

U.S.:
The Secretary
Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secretary of State
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Gromyko: I see in this room as well as in the other room that Americans like concealed lighting. We don’t make a big secret of our lighting.

Secretary: There are a lot of changes around here. Since I went away, Secretary Rush has introduced a whole new cuisine.

Our press is going crazy over the question of whether or not we are making progress.

Sonnenfeldt: The ticker stories this afternoon are all based on your comments in the elevator.

Secretary: They are saying that we are not going to achieve a permanent SALT agreement but if we had told them we had no intention of doing that, they would then call that a failure.

Gromyko: I suppose you are having many visitors this week.

Secretary: Yes, I have seen the Algerian and today I saw the Egyptian and tomorrow I have breakfast with the Dutchman van der Stoel.²

Gromyko: Do you plan to see Fahmy again?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 22, January–April 1974. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s Dining Room.

² Kissinger met with Algerian President Houari Boumedienne, Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy, and Netherlands Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel.
Secretary: I have no plan to. He told me he would see you on Sunday.\(^3\) I gather you are leaving on Monday. Why don’t you get up and leave after I begin my speech and then the press can make a big story out of that—GROMYKO WALKS OUT.

Seriously, I plan to add several paragraphs to my speech about how détente contributes to our ability to cooperate with all countries. I am told that your speech was very moderate.\(^4\)

Gromyko: Yes, perhaps it was too moderate.

Dobrynin: It stressed the basis for cooperative efforts.

Secretary: That is not inconsistent with what I will say.

Dobrynin: You see, Henry, you are beginning to use double negatives too.

Gromyko: I know how to use triple negatives, Anatoliy.

Rush: You know that a double negative equals an affirmative.

Secretary: We are talking to the greatest double negative expert of them all. (At this point the Secretary toasted the Foreign Minister.)

Gromyko: With respect to the UN General Assembly, we set forth our viewpoints. We think that this session can give a general direction for work that should proceed but that there can be no document adopted before the next session of the General Assembly. We think that the Economic and Social Council of the UN should be told to draft recommendations for the next session. This session we cannot get into specifics or details.

Secretary: We aren’t prepared either to get into specifics at this time. We should stick to general objectives and not talk about specifics at this session. Maybe I will be able to let you see my draft speech in case you wish to comment on it.

Gromyko: And your Allies, what position will they take?

Secretary: We haven’t coordinated very well for this meeting. I don’t have any knowledge about specific proposals.

Sonnenfeldt: The only thing I can remember is that the French have proposed a UN monitoring system.

Hartman: There are several proposals for commissions and groups to study specific proposals such as commodity arrangements.

Secretary: I think that we were both attacked by the Chinese.

Gromyko: Your Chinese friend accused us both of superpowerism. Are you going to reply?

\(^3\) April 14.

\(^4\) See footnote 10, Document 173.
Secretary: No, I don’t intend to reply. If I comment at all it will be very general, saying something critical about people using slogans.

Gromyko: I didn’t directly reply either.

Secretary: I am having dinner Sunday night with the Chinese. I don’t know how to interpret what is going on in China. By the way, they took the initiative for my meeting.

Gromyko: Do you know Teng Hsiao-ping? I met him a long time ago but I don’t know him very well. We met in Moscow and Bucharest.

Secretary: I know Chiao Kwan-hua well.\(^5\) He has been at every meeting except the first.

Dobrynin: He is an older man. He must be over seventy.

Secretary: Yes.

Gromyko: I think so but by Chinese standards that is young.

Secretary: Do you know Wang Hung-wen?\(^6\)

Gromyko: I have never met him.

Secretary: I have never met him either.

Dobrynin: Didn’t you meet him in Shanghai?

Gromyko: You visited Shanghai, didn’t you?

Secretary: Yes, but I don’t recollect meeting Wang.

Gromyko: May I raise the question of Berlin if it won’t spoil your appetite? You will recall that we discussed this question in Washington and also when you were in Moscow. We said that the best solution to this problem is to suspend de facto the establishment of the Federal Environmental Office\(^7\)—only Allah knows why they took the decision to establish it in the first place. We have information that if the United States agreed the Federal Government is prepared to go along with suspending the establishment of this office. Thus the problem depends on you. You can dispose of this matter.

Secretary: That can’t be the right information but let me say that if the Federal Government asks our approval for their not proceeding, we will not stand in the way. If you are saying that we should order them not to proceed that is a different matter. If the German Government considers that they do not wish to go ahead, we will not stand in the way. If we have to take the initiative, however, that is a different matter.

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5 Qiao Guanhua (Chiao Kwan-hua) was PRC Deputy Foreign Minister and head of the Chinese Delegation at the UN General Assembly.

6 Wang Hongwen (Wang Hung-wen) was the Deputy Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party from 1973.

Gromyko: Let us say that there could be an understanding without any political/legal steps on your part and that you register this understanding to their agreement not to proceed. Your attitude could be made known to them. That would be the way out. If you are concerned about the Berlin situation that could solve the problem. You register your understanding on the basis of facts. Thus you would be making a gesture in favor of the Quadripartite Agreement.

Secretary: This reminds me of messages I receive from our Ambassador in New Delhi, who says that he has received “idiotic instructions.” That leaves me with the choice of either saying that I didn’t know about the instruction or that I am stupid.

Gromyko: Mr. Rush who has great responsibility for the Quadripartite Agreement should “jump for joy” if we can solve this matter. Of course, this would not absolutely satisfy us even then because the Federal Government has still taken a decision in principle to establish the office but at least the factual situation would be frozen.

Secretary: I am not absolutely sure I understand. If there was a German decision not to establish the office on its own, we would not object.

Gromyko: I have the information that this is the German view.

Secretary: That is news to us.

Gromyko: I may say I have more than an impression that this is the German position.

Secretary: They have not conveyed this to us. Let me do the following: I will ask the Germans what their intentions are. If they have no intention of implementing their decision, then we have a new situation. If your information is incorrect, I will inform you. Art, will you see that a message is sent off immediately?

Rush: I very much doubt that this is the German position.

Secretary: I just had a conversation yesterday with Scheel and he said nothing about this.

Gromyko: Did you discuss this question?

Secretary: Yes, we reviewed our conversation in Moscow and agreed that this was now a common Allied position. No new institution would be created in Berlin without full consultation and approval of the three Western Allies. The Germans accept that they will recognize our decisions when we refuse approval. The British and French also agree.

Dobrynin: They know then?

Secretary: Yes, but that does not include the Federal Environmental Office. Perhaps you have confused the idea of no new institutions without our approval but the new institutions does not cover the
Federal Environmental Office. In any case, I will ask the Germans if anything is new.

Gromyko: So the Federal Environmental Office you think is still going to be established? You should check that with the Germans.

Rush: They have never indicated that to us. In fact, politically this would be very difficult for Brandt to do. He has lost several recent elections. The CDU is now showing more than 50 percent in the polls for the first time. The SPD is in a very weak posture.

Gromyko: What province is this in?

Rush: This is an overall percentage for the whole country.

Secretary: It is hard to understand the decline of Brandt.

Rush: I think it is due in large part to the inflation. When I first went to Bonn, Schiller\(^8\) told me that the SPD would stay in power as long as the inflation was kept below 3 percent.

Secretary: They have three years to go before elections.

Sonnenfeldt: The law on the Federal Environmental Office is in the Bundestag now.

Rush: It would be too late for them to withdraw. Politically Brandt could not do it.

Gromyko: I will verify my information.

Secretary: Do you want me to proceed with the Germans?

Gromyko: No, you wait until my Ambassador communicates with you. I will verify the information. I am sure that it is from a reliable source. I received it while I was in New York. Our Ambassador will phone when he has the information or whether my information is correct.

Secretary: I do not believe it is correct.

Gromyko: I don’t want your hands tied. Therefore, I will verify the information.

Now I would like to turn to another kind of environment and I hope that you can be more forthcoming. What do you think of our proposal on making an agreement with respect to changes in the environment?

Secretary: We are going to have a meeting on it soon.

Sonnenfeldt: A report\(^9\) is overdue but we should have it in a few days.

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\(^8\) Karl Schiller was the West German Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance from May 1971 to July 1972.

\(^9\) The report was sent to Nixon by Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements under a May 1 covering memorandum. (Ford Library, NSC Institutional/Historical Records, Box 13, Senior Review Group Meeting—Environmental Warfare (2), August 28, 1974)
Secretary: I am not optimistic about the results.
Dobrynin: Why?
Secretary: Our people say that there is no way to verify what others will do with respect to weather modification.
Gromyko: I would like very much to pretend that I did not hear your reply that you were not optimistic. So let us both do what the fishermen in the story did. There were two fishermen who met on the road and they were both hard of hearing. The first said “Are you going fishing?” And the second replied “No, I am going fishing.” And the first answered again, “No, I am going fishing.” So you can see, I did not wish to hear you. Really, I am not at all encouraged. This is another area where we can get into competition and the consequences will follow. Years from now our successors will say “Why didn’t we take this matter up before?”
Secretary: Can we get a report and answer by the end of the month? I will have to have a meeting to hear what my genuises have to say.
Gromyko: This problem could consume billions of dollars with only doubtful results if we get into competition.
Secretary: What you want is a declaration not to use it?
Gromyko: I don’t care about the form. I have a completely open mind.
Secretary: Then Jobert and the Chinese can make speeches that we have agreed not to use it against each other but we are free to use it against others. Am I right that you want to renounce the use?
Gromyko: We will consider any effective form. A declaration might be a good way to proceed and contain the substantive matters. You should not underestimate the effects. This could be like the ABM but it could consume several times more money. We will look back and say why didn’t we stop this. This is the joint opinion of our political, scientific and military advisors, especially our political and scientific people.
Secretary: It might be possible to agree to prohibit the use or the first use or the production of agents or the belligerent use.
Gromyko: We want to be specific and concrete.
Dobrynin: Can’t we agree to enter into negotiations at the Summit?
Gromyko: We could agree in principle that this is the general direction we wish to move in.
Rush: What about peacetime peaceful uses?
Gromyko: Those are all right. If it is to save a great harvest, that is permissible.
Secretary: Let me look at this again. Perhaps we could announce at the Summit that we intend to enter into negotiations or to study this problem.

Gromyko: I hope that you can stretch your position and see that this is in our mutual interest.

Secretary: Your suggestions have been helpful. I think we might look into the question of whether we can agree to a joint examination of how to avoid the use of the environment for belligerent purposes.

Gromyko: With our geography we have a lot of room for experimentation.

Secretary: You also have a lot of bad weather to export. I understand what you are saying. I will think seriously about whether we can have a joint examination.

Gromyko: If we can move in this direction it would be useful.

Secretary: There might be some symbolic value in this agreement. I will look to our study and see what the problems are. Ever since Mr. Rush left the Pentagon they have been more bellicose but you have given me an idea.

Dobrynin: Maybe we can have more sunny days.

Secretary: I will study and see what can be considered. I am sympathetic. I will let you know by May 1.

Gromyko: Can you turn to the Middle East?

Secretary: Let us talk about SALT and then have a preliminary discussion of the Middle East so that we can consider it further tomorrow.

On SALT we are getting trapped in a public debate which is dangerous and absurd. On the one hand people are accusing us of total failure. If we say we made some progress then they say we have given something away. Seriously, I think we have to set some time limit about what could come out of the Summit and how realistic the possibilities are. There are several possibilities: 1) We could make an agreement along the lines of our discussion in Moscow as we discussed with the President today.\(^{10}\) 2) Without an agreement we could make a statement like we did in May of 1971 that we will work toward an agreement on a numerical ratio but have not worked out all the details. 3) Or we could have a combination of the two. We should decide in the next three weeks what we have in mind. Let me say what our difficulty is. You have three kinds of land-based missiles which you can MIRV plus the submarine problem. We have only one land-based missile type. Our problem is simpler and, of course, through no fault of yours, we

\(^{10}\) See Document 173.
have decided to go for a smaller land-based missile design. Now people are saying that you have a big missile and we are at a disadvantage.

Gromyko: How many times the Hiroshima-type bomb do you have in one part of your MIRV—that is, one-tenth?

Secretary: Several times Hiroshima in one-tenth. The problem is the distribution of each other’s land-based missiles. I came back from Moscow determined to take another look. We had always focused on the number of missiles not on the number of warheads. You can see here I carry around a piece of paper with all the numbers on it because I want to learn them. The problem is you say you want one thousand and how that number is composed is meaningless. You could have all your land-based missiles MIRV’d in the first four years and then shift to submarines in the fifth year. This would be no technical violation but it would affect the rate at which MIRV’s are installed.

Gromyko: General Secretary Brezhnev told you that this was a practical impossibility for us.

Secretary: You have talked about exchanging information and I think that this is a constructive idea. Would you do this at the beginning of the process?

Gromyko: This should be specified in the negotiations. Information could be exchanged several times, not just once. It could be exchanged initially, in an advanced stage and in the middle. What you want to know can be obtained through this process of exchanging information. This is the way you can find out about intentions.

Secretary: The problem is that if you say, for example, at the beginning that you are going to have 700 land-based missiles and 300 sea-based missiles, then we can compare this with the actual deployment. If you give us information at the beginning and it only covers the first year we cannot plan our reaction.

Gromyko: We can exchange information at the beginning and tell you what our intention is for the next year and when that time expires each side will say what it intends to do in the second year and so forth each year for the duration of the agreement. We could exchange this information simultaneously.

Secretary: But you will know our intentions because they are public.

Gromyko: How will we know?

Secretary: Your Ambassador meets with more Senators than I do.

Sonnenfeldt: It is all in our budget.

Secretary: This would not be equal. Our deployment is ahead of yours. We may be finished in 1976.

Gromyko: What do you prefer?
Secretary: Our preference would be for you to tell us that there will be X number of land-based missiles and X number of sea-based missiles. We would accept that. We would have so many land and so many sea-based missiles.

Gromyko: We cannot accept a condition to the exchange of information.

Secretary: But you would be free to change your mind.

Dobrynin: We would be free to give any information.

Gromyko: What we are talking about is an exchange of information not an agreement on figures. It would be an understanding by each side on a mutual basis.

Secretary: I could conceive—leaving aside the assumption of an understanding—that you tell us you plan so many land and so many sea-based missiles. We tell you the same thing and we tell each year what we plan to do each year. But doing this year by year is useless.

Sonnenfeldt: If we have an agreement for five years year by year doesn’t really help very much. Our main problem is that you have told us your silos can take MIRV’s without any change.

Secretary: We are talking about launchers and counting silos. There is a problem in exchanging information and I hope that the General Secretary did not misunderstand. I said that to MIRV a missile without modifying a silo was not a violation of the agreement. We think it is possible to install a different missile by digging the hole deeper and that is not a violation.

Gromyko: The General Secretary understood the point you made.

Secretary: The problem is that if you MIRV without modifying the silo we have an almost insoluble problem. We don’t know if the missile has been MIRV’d and, therefore, we must count it as MIRV’d if you tell us that the silo requires no modification. That is a factual problem. Do you intend to modify your silos to install MIRV’s? If so, then your proposal for exchanging information has merit because we can then tell him you have modified a silo to install a MIRV.

Gromyko: Is that a concrete question? Doesn’t exchanging information solve the problem in principle?

Secretary: We can examine if there are other criteria on modifications or the question of whether they can be put in submarines.

Gromyko: Is this a pre-condition of the understanding or in the beginning should we only consider an algebraic formula and the exchange of information?

Secretary: For us this is a tough intellectual problem. There is enormous difficulty which is fed by the opponents of an agreement. It is conceivable that we could accept an algebraic formula and have an understanding about exchanging information but to be convincing it
depends on what we can say about our ability to tell when missiles are MIRV’d. If we can say they have been MIRV’d when a silo cover is removed for a period of months, then we can say that we have counted the number of MIRV’d missiles. If we say that we have no way to judge and you can just pop a missile into the old hole, then we have to count the full number allowed under the agreement.

Dobrynin: How can we convince you?

Gromyko: There is no violation unless the holes are made wider.

Secretary: Strangely enough, if there is suspicious activity it is better and easier to reach an agreement. The problem is that you have very large missiles and if there are no MIRV’s on the largest missiles or if you accept a ceiling, then your figures become more manageable.

Gromyko: We cannot accept any division within the ceiling. There can be no exchange of information if that is the case.

Secretary: We are not ahead on numbers of launchers.

Dobrynin: No, you are ahead on warheads.

Secretary: But your missiles are heavier.

Gromyko: Count how many warheads you can have on your thousand missiles.

Secretary: It is not excluded that we could accept a thousand missiles of which the largest or 50 or so could be MIRV’d. Then we could exchange information each year.

Gromyko: This makes exchange of information useless. It is a condition to the agreement. What we should do is to facilitate understanding. What you are suggesting just means one more condition and you would have the advantage and I am not speaking yet of FBS. Gradually you are washing out the idea.

Secretary: I think you have made some constructive suggestions but your idea needs greater precision.

Gromyko: We could have an exchange of information each year or twice a year if you want.

Secretary: No, we have more interest in long-term developments.

Sonnenfeldt: If we can assume that silos must be modified, then we have some means to verify other than watching the testing program.

Secretary: The problem is how to reassure each other.

Gromyko: We believe that national means should be used. What other alternative is there?

Secretary: The present agreement is easy to deal with by national means because it talks only about numbers. The choice before us is that you can modify your missiles with no external change, then we have serious difficulties. If it requires external change our problems are easier to deal with. We will have to respond to your suggestions.
Gromyko: If you set an inner limit, then the agreement to exchange information falls and there can be no progress in the negotiations. Frankly, the agreement on exchanging information was not simple for us. I would say that this is not a usual step for the Soviet Union to take.

Secretary: I agree with that but, as you know, we publish everything. I can still remember Smirnoff’s face when I described the characteristics to him of your SS/9. But you managed to calm him down.

Gromyko: Then we will wait for your reply.

Secretary: Now let us turn to the Middle East. I don’t want to try to find a solution now but I would like you to sum up once again what it is you want. (Before we have the translation I must say that you are hard to please. At first you accused us of not doing enough over the last six years and now you tell us we are doing too much.)

Gromyko: Not quite.)

Gromyko: Let us proceed from the following basic understanding:

1. In all questions pertaining to the Middle East, the Soviet Union and the United States will act in a coordinated way. Both Powers will take part in the consideration and solution of these problems.

Secretary: I can imagine the rest.


Secretary: By those problems do you mean the overall peace settlement?

Gromyko: Yes in the broadest sense to include all matters.

2. Disengagement. With respect to the disengagement between Syria and Israel, the Soviet Union and the United States and, of course, Syria and Israel and Egypt, if it wishes to participate, should take part in the consideration of this question. But in practice this is only possible after the Syrians say that what the Israelis have proposed can serve as a basis for further discussion. If the Syrians say that there is no basis to proceed, then it is pointless to have a meeting.

3. If it is seen by the Syrians that there is a basis—cause for the group to meet, then such a meeting should take place within the framework of the Geneva forum. We have discussed this with the Syrians and they are prepared to do this and I can assure you that it was no simple matter to get them to agree.

4. It is important to secure a positive outcome to the disengagement process. The United States is in a position to influence Israel—I am convinced of that and your President intimated as much. Therefore, you should bring your influence to bear on Israel to get it to take a reasonable attitude (a) to secure a withdrawal which is not just symbolic but involves a substantial part of Syrian territory and (b) that that withdrawal should be an integral part of the total withdrawal and general
settlement. I trust that this presents no difficulty. Disengagement must be part of a general settlement.

5. Withdrawal is withdrawal. The overall settlement still lies ahead. We can continue our consultations every day. You and I can meet. Dobrynin can meet with you. But the Geneva Conference is the appropriate forum for the overall settlement and it has been paralyzed. Therefore, we should move in parallel with our bilateral conversations to reactivate the Geneva Conference. I emphasize that this should not impede our talks.

6. We could specifically reach understandings with regard to the way we should move ahead. We can meet together in Geneva—so that neither of us has to travel too long a distance. We could meet there bilaterally to exchange information and see where things stand. We could agree on how things could be moved forward or chart future steps. There would be no secret about these discussions. We could announce them. Perhaps we could meet in two or three weeks or a month from now.

7. (And like Beatrice in Dante, this may represent the Seventh Heaven), We—the United States and the Soviet Union—should agree to reaffirm our decision to act in agreed, concerted, coordinated, joint way or whatever word you wish to use. What better way to keep in touch and consult with all the appropriate relevant countries in the interests of world détente and peace in the Middle East. This procedure would assure the independence and sovereignty of all. And I would be willing to mention Israel too. I would say this out loud. I would not be shy about it. Perhaps our present meeting could put out a statement to this effect. Israel should not shrink or shudder about this very idea. They should have no cause to do so. We have no intention of pulling the rug out from under the existence of Israel. At the table there will be no name calling. You should convince them that this is so. What matters is that we begin the process.

There are other matters, of course, beside complete withdrawal such as Jerusalem, Gaza and the Palestinian question. But if we have a framework it will be easier to deal with these problems later. It is easier to influence the parties at the same table. By the way, we favor having the Palestinians in Geneva but we do not wish to make that decision now. We can discuss it later in our consultations.

Secretary: Tomorrow we can talk more about this. In the meantime I will study the seven points you have raised. You object to the United States acting separately but most of your concern is about form. Nothing has happened to embarrass the Soviet Union. We don’t want to enter a process where one side makes itself the lawyer for one or more of the parties and we don’t want a process which enables either side to achieve unilateral advantage. We have been greatly concerned
about the Syrian disengagement. We are attempting to get some withdrawal behind the October 6 line. We have not been successful yet. If that is what you call symbolic, and you think more can be done I want to tell you that that is the maximum we think is possible. We are afraid that meetings will lend themselves to great agitation. We know what can be achieved. We are not looking for symbolic moves. What we will do is try to get the maximum obtainable. Both of us want to have a constructive attitude of cooperation and neither of us wishes to take unilateral advantage. But we must have a separation in form as well as in substance.

Your idea of a meeting in Geneva strikes me as a good one. We can set the time in the next few days. On your other points I will study them. I am not sure I can remember them all. I am not opposed to convening the Geneva Conference after the Syrian disengagement. To clarify the problem you said on the one hand there should be joint negotiations on disengagement but the peace settlement should take place under the framework of the Geneva Agreement. The only issue is the Syrian disengagement. We agree to re-open the Geneva Conference after that. With respect to the disengagement we can’t move until Syria has an indication of an acceptable Israeli proposal. I can visualize a continuing process in which we try to elicit an Israeli proposal and then we agree to work out the modalities of disengagement in some military commission in Geneva.

Gromyko: That is correct.

Secretary: I would like to explore this more thoroughly. This is actually close to what I had thought of suggesting to you. Let me sum up. 1) We should meet in Geneva in two or three weeks. 2) After the Syrian disengagement we will re-open the Geneva Conference. 3) To proceed with Syrian disengagement we will seek a line from Israel that is acceptable to Syria in principle. The modalities will be worked out in a larger framework.

Gromyko: We can discuss it. If the Syrians accept the basis they don’t necessarily have to sit at the table. What we are looking for are practical arrangements for Syria and Israel to meet with both of us being fully informed. We do not wish to cause trouble by our presence. Israel is just making up this story. That is a primitive idea of the Israelis.

Secretary: 1) As I told you we are realistic on this matter. Neither of us should seek unilateral advantage over the other. 2) As realists we also know that all the parties in the area will try to take advantage by creating rivalry between us. It is a mistake for us to fall for this. People will change but our policy should not be to take unilateral advantage. 3) (Gromyko interrupts)

Gromyko: Not words but deeds.
Secretary: On both sides. We know that our diplomatic activity and coordination must be genuine.

3) On the Syrian problem we have a concern that Israel not produce an uproar and, therefore, that we do not introduce extraneous issues. Our biggest concern is to get a line that Syria can accept. Other details are not fundamental. Therefore, it is not a question of closing our eyes to the Soviet Union. In the back of the Israeli minds I am sure they think they can benefit by our rivalry. I don’t exclude that.

To sum up: 1) We should agree to act in a coordinated manner. 2) We should agree to meet in several weeks in Geneva. 3) We agree that the overall peace talks should take place in the Geneva framework. 4) On Syrian disengagement you have opened up the perspective of reaching agreement on a line and then working out the modalities.

Gromyko: Does Israel agree?

Secretary: We are using the same process with Israel as we did with Egypt, moving them along in a way that prevents a domestic explosion here. When we started out in Egypt and we were talking about Resolution 339 which talked about the October 22nd line, Mrs. Meir was so angry with me that she refused to talk to me all during dinner at the Israeli Embassy. You remember, Ken, you were there. Even though I was the guest of honor she conspicuously thanked all the Democrats present for their help. That was October 30. If we had talked on November first, I would have said that I had gotten nothing but, as you can see, we finally got them there. I think I can work this my way. No confrontation. No big plan. I hope I will succeed. If I fail, there will be some merry old times and an explosion. This is my view. I think if we can get a line and get the process moving that is what we need.

Gromyko: I will study what you have said. I have outlined our position in the clearest possible way.
175. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, April 28, 1974, 10–11:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo, Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium, Chief of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counselor, MFA (Interpreter)
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
William A. Hyland, Director, INR
Robert J. McCloskey, Ambassador-at-Large
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
CSCE; ABM Limitation; Threshold Test Ban; Environmental Warfare; Bilateral Agreements; Jackson Amendment

[Photographers were admitted briefly at the beginning of the meeting.]

Kissinger: I saw Senator Kennedy yesterday. He says he saw an opening: He feels he could persuade you to accept a complete test ban, with an escape clause for China. He saw an opening!

Seriously, I think it was a very useful visit. [Gromyko smiles.] Seriously, even for our common objectives. Though he will be an opponent in ’76, in the present debate he will be an ally against Jackson.

Gromyko: What shall I say? I will take notice of that. [Laughter] That is the most correct thing.

Judging by all the papers I see Dr. Kissinger and his aides have, I see you have a mass of things to raise. It seems a massive offensive on your part. [Laughter]

Kissinger: We thought it better to deal with all the issues except the Middle East and SALT tonight, and do those tomorrow.

Gromyko: I received your solemn message [to that effect]. [Laughter] I agree.

What do you suggest we take up first?
First, let me express my gratification for the opportunity to discuss these things, to discuss on a classical bilateral basis here in Geneva. There are, indeed, always questions to be discussed. You know what they are, as do I.

What should we start with?

Kissinger: I thought, if you agree, we could review where we stand on various items for the summit, then the European Security Conference, and other bilateral issues. Of course, test ban, and ABM site.

Gromyko: I completely agree with that. May I start by saying a few words on Europe?

_Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe_

Kissinger: Let’s talk about Europe.

Gromyko: Good. The fact that we are not fully satisfied with the way things are going at the All-European Conference is well known. I said so in my meetings with you and the President in Washington; General Secretary Brezhnev said so to you in Moscow. We think it is time to end the All-European Conference.

Kissinger: I have made an appointment tomorrow, after our discussions, with our Ambassador to the All-European Conference so I can talk to him personally about the direction we will go.

Gromyko: Good. That, I feel sure, would be useful. It is certainly high time to end it. The end of the second stage should be in the nearest possible future—to be more definite, in May. That depends only on the governments and peoples actually at the Conference.

Further, understanding should be reached on holding the third and final stage at the summit level and as soon as possible. It is best of all to hold it before the forthcoming Soviet-American summit meeting.

Kissinger: First, on the Conference. I agree the work now depends on the efforts governments are prepared to make. We could perhaps run over some of the topics while we are here.

As for the level, our position is the one we discussed in Moscow, and has not changed.

As for timing, as a practical matter, looking at the President’s calendar and my calendar, there is no possibility of doing it in June. But I said this to you in Moscow.

Gromyko: What about the first half of July?

Kissinger: As far as we are concerned . . . the President will be in the Soviet Union from the 24th of June to the 1st of July. I think he should return to the United States. So closer to the middle of July would be better. But it would depend on the course of events at the summit and on the decision, of course, of many other governments.
Gromyko: What is the general mood of your European friends on that? This is the first time we have gone into concrete dates.

Kissinger: My impression is, I wouldn’t be surprised if you told me Brandt has already told you he wants a summit.

Gromyko: With regard to Chancellor Brandt, even previously he spoke in general terms about holding it at the summit, though he always mentioned minor reservations.

Kissinger: I don’t say it as a criticism.

Gromyko: Very minor, minor [reservations]. He was sympathetic.

Kissinger: To tell you candidly our problem: We don’t want to be in the position of being accused of having forced our allies to go to the summit if they don’t want to go. If they want it, we won’t be the obstacle, to put it mildly.

Gromyko: You have now worsened your position—a little bit worse. Before, you spoke lucidly; now you say it is only if your allies agree. We think United States should have a say in this and not just follow, just follow.

Kissinger: “Just follow” is not my style.

Up to now, the West European governments have used the formula that they will go to the summit “if the results of the Conference warrant”—even while it is perfectly clear what the outcome will be. We believe the probable outcome is sufficiently clear so that we will next week take formal soundings of what their view is. Then we will inform you, when we know concretely what their attitude is.

Gromyko: Good.

Kissinger: Because I suspect we will see each other before too long.

Gromyko: Very good.

I recently had discussions with the representatives of a difficult country at the European Security Conference. Guess which.

Kissinger: Romania, or France. [Laughter]

Gromyko: No. The Netherlands.

Kissinger: Oh, the cabaret! [Laughter] Will you try to get a cabaret in Moscow?

Gromyko: He said to me: “I believe the complications which existed until now will be overcome in the very near future.” He spoke of there being certain forward movement at the Conference in the recent period. Regarding the level of the third and final stage, he didn’t express himself definitely.

Kissinger: We didn’t want to take a formal sounding until the results would be more clear. My impression is the Europeans are a little more negative. There is no sense speculating, because in a week we will know. We are not bound by them.
Incidentally, our impression is also that things are moving forward at the Conference.

Gromyko: Let’s agree then that if, for example, one, two, three small countries—maybe the Netherlands—decide not to send their Head of Government or Head of State to the third stage, all right; every country will be free to decide whom to send at the highest level. But if the major countries decide to send their highest officials, we are free to do so. Why be slaves to our procedural structures? The President I know is accustomed to think in terms of big categories.

Kissinger: It is true that one or two or three won’t be able to veto, especially if they are the smaller ones. I agree with this general observation.

Gromyko: We are sympathetic with that idea. Brandt is. And even France.

Kissinger: That would be hard to verify.

Sonnenfeldt: By national means.

Gromyko: Pompidou was, and whoever wins will not go backward. And thank God China is not represented. Thank any God.

Kissinger: As I said in Moscow, I would think the chances are very good. Actually we have not taken concrete steps with our allies, but it is time to proceed.

Gromyko: Good. Now I think the time is more appropriate than before for you to do that—to get in touch with others. And not simply to compare yours with theirs.

Kissinger: But let us do it before your people ask them.

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: My reaction is that West European judgments on the level will depend on their assessment of Basket III. Our view doesn’t depend on that to that degree. But I told you that in Moscow.

Gromyko: With the greatest of pleasure I would simply cut the bottom out of that third Basket, not because it is bad as such but because the questions in it have been inflated 100 times bigger than their real merits. The purpose of the Conference is to strengthen peace and security in Europe.

But I am sure there has been progress. In short, if all of these matters are tied in with the relevant principles and if it is indicated that the Basket doesn’t represent an attempt to interfere with the sovereignty, then the problem is solved. I think the main difficulty will be in the area of so-called military détente—as regards troop maneuvering, and so on.

Kissinger: On Basket III, on the issue of domestic legislation, we are making good progress and it seems to be reaching a solution. I men-
tioned it not because we won’t agree, but because for some West Europeans to go to the summit, the decision depends on what they can say is in Basket III. What are the issues? Art?

Hartman: We haven’t really started on the details yet.

Kissinger: But something short of the Dutch cabaret would help. But we will be constructive.

Gromyko: What we should do now is take up specific forms of words. We are not far from you on this. We have looked at your formula, the one you gave through Stoessel.2

Kissinger: That is the preamble. That I think we can bring to a close reasonably quickly. Then we should do the content. We should have Stoessel get together with Korniyenko.

Gromyko: It would be better not to waste time and to decide the matter between our two representatives here. Ours came with me and you say you are meeting with yours. We have our Deputy Prime Minister, and you have your man.

Kissinger: I agree. Art, why don’t you and Hal meet tomorrow morning with . . .

Sukhodrev: Kovalev.3

Kissinger: When we are talking about the Middle East tomorrow. I agree.

Gromyko: I would like to ask you to look into the question of military détente once again. I recall what you said previously; it seemed reasonable. But there are some states in the Conference who are putting forth unreasonable proposals. Why don’t they just say they are out to wreck the Conference?

Kissinger: Tomorrow, on the preamble, our people should resolve how it is to be introduced.

On military détente, I told you I would talk to the British about modifying their proposal.

Gromyko: What was their reaction?

Kissinger: Their reaction was not negative. They said at the time they needed time to study. We urged that they not insist on all of western Russia and not insist on the smallest types of units, but something like a division. And there is the issue of the number of days.

Sonnenfeldt and Hartman are going through London Tuesday morning, and if you think this is a positive step, they can do it.

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3 Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoli Kovalev was the head of the Soviet Delegation to the CSCE.
Gromyko: [referring to Sonnenfeldt] We shall certainly be expecting major results to come from his discussions with the British. All our eyes will be upon him.

Sonnenfeldt: You should talk to the neutrals, who are really the problem.

Kissinger: Who? Sweden?

Hartman: Yugoslavia.

Kissinger: What is Monaco’s position? If you can assure me that the Princess is coming . . .

Gromyko: Your influence on the ladies is more limited now.

Kissinger: More covert.

Are there any other issues in the Security Conference of any major consequence?

Gromyko: The main issues with respect to military détente are the zones and the definition of large-scale troop movements. Because the tendency now is to define as large scale something that is negligible. We cannot adopt the scale of Monaco or Luxembourg.

Kissinger: We agree that on the zones, the definition proposed by some is too sweeping, and on the scale, a battalion is too small.

Gromyko: All right. Look into the matter and see what you can do. We certainly believe you can do much.

Kissinger: We will keep in touch, and we believe we can move in the direction we have indicated.

Gromyko: It would certainly be good if this entire question of the European Security Conference would be something we could see behind us. You can tell this to the President. Our cooperation since the beginning of the Conference has been on a rising scale, and this fact, that we could complete the Conference in that spirit, would give even further reliability.

Kissinger: What length of time do you foresee for Stage Three?

Gromyko: It should be short. We are open-minded. Brezhnev discussed it but never in terms of days.

Kissinger: Could we keep it to two days?

Gromyko: Two to three days.

Kissinger: Does everyone have to speak?

Gromyko: Two to three days.

Kissinger: It is not important, but psychologically. That is procedurally manageable. We can exchange ideas on this but I wanted to get your impression.

Gromyko: So you know our way of thinking.

Kissinger: And we will be in close touch with you.
ABM Limitation

Gromyko: Perhaps we can now take up a question on which we have a great deal of understanding, the ABM question, where we have the cabalistic numbers of 2–2, 2–2. We would like to give you our draft of the relevant understanding we have on this question. [He hands over Soviet draft agreement, Tab A]4 Solemnly I hand it to you. You see we have been doing all your work; we have drawn up a draft.

Dobrynin: And in English, too.

Kissinger: You have had our suggestion, that something substantially like this would have no problem if it is made for ten years. If it is made part of a permanent agreement, we would like to allow altering the choice of site—though we would be still limited to one site.

Gromyko: We would prefer to do this on a more stable basis. We would hope you would think it over.

Kissinger: For a country to agree in principle not to defend its capital is frankly a different matter than a decision not to defend an ICBM site. This is frankly our problem.

Gromyko: You know our attitude, so can you look at it again?

Kissinger: This is something that will certainly have a solution before the summit. We will study this carefully and we will then respond to your Ambassador.

Gromyko: All right. So this matter would seem to be in a reliable state.

Kissinger: We agree there will be no second ABM site. That is settled. We have a problem either to limit the duration or have some flexibility on what that site is. We will have a concrete proposal to your Ambassador within two weeks.

Threshold Test Ban

Gromyko: Good. Now, on the subject of underground tests, we are prepared to have our experts begin discussions with you in mid-May and we are prepared to have your people come to Moscow on May 15th.

Kissinger: Could we delay it by one week, because of my return to Washington? It is a purely bureaucratic problem. We may be able to do it by 15th. No later than the 22nd, aiming at the 15th.

Gromyko: Let us then agree, possibly the 15th but at any rate not later than the 22nd.

Kissinger: Agreed.

Gromyko: When can you tell us?

4 Attached but not printed.
Kissinger: A week from tomorrow we will let you know. On the summit, we don’t think it possible, or a good idea, to try to solve all the problems of the test ban at the summit, or to make a final agreement to take effect 18 months later.

We think at the summit there should be an agreement to have a threshold test ban, with a threshold that will be agreed, and have our experts work it out. Our idea is that the decision of the summit will be to agree on the fact of the ban and on the seismic level at which it will be.

Gromyko: We would prefer, of course, that an actual agreement should be reached at the summit. That would be ideal. But if you object, we should do the next best. It should not be limited to authorizing experts to initiate talks; it should be to agree in principle.

Kissinger: The question would be resolved in principle, and the level of the threshold is decided, at least.

Why don’t we see how our technical experts proceed and agree that whatever they accomplish will be, so to speak, frozen at the summit?

Gromyko: That would be second best. Our position would be for an agreement to be signed. I won’t repeat what you already know, but our agreement could be signed to indicate the dates it will take effect.

Kissinger: Agreed. An agreement in principle and the seismic level, but maybe more things can be done. Agreed.

Gromyko: I do have one question on this, on its technical aspects. You named a specific figure.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: Are you wedded to this figure? We really think it is too high.

Kissinger: It is our strongly preferred level. We haven’t considered an alternative level, but will certainly take your view seriously into account.

Gromyko: We would certainly like you to take a more flexible position on this.

Kissinger: Have you a specific level in mind?

Gromyko: I don’t want to mention a specific figure, but yours was much too high, I emphasize much too high.

Kissinger: At any rate, [it should be] lower than our warheads. At any rate, the ones we have already are not the issue.

One problem is peaceful nuclear explosives, and how to handle them is an issue.

Gromyko: That is a separate problem, and let’s not link them or we will tie our own hands. We did have a preliminary understanding with
you—in the time of Johnson—when we agreed it should be discussed, but we never went beyond that. We should agree it should be pursued.

Kissinger: I don’t know what happened with Johnson; that was joint peaceful explosions, wasn’t it?

Hyland: There were also technical talks during the Nixon Administration.

Kissinger: The problem is not peaceful nuclear explosions below the threshold but how one makes exception for peaceful nuclear explosions above the threshold. That is not the problem discussed during the Johnson Administration.

Gromyko: What I said was, this entire problem should be addressed as a separate question, and the US Government and others were in general agreement. But so far it wasn’t taken up too actively.

Kissinger: I haven’t studied actually how many of these explosions would be above the threshold.

If they are not covered, they will be prohibited by the agreement. That is easy. It is a problem only if we want to make exceptions for them.

[Both sides confer]

Gromyko: There never was any agreement or understanding on peaceful explosions nor is there any agreement on peaceful explosions. Because in the past, as in the Johnson Administration, when we proposed it, you said, “Let’s discuss it, because you have projects, maybe in Siberia, and we have a project, maybe to build a second canal in Panama.”

Kissinger: That is right. There is such a plan. The point is, if nothing is said about peaceful explosions, everything above the threshold is banned and everything below the threshold is permitted. If that is the clear text, we don’t have to worry.

Gromyko: Yes, that’s exactly what I am saying. There is no agreement. That is a matter to be discussed in subsequent negotiations.

Kissinger: I agree. If we don’t discuss it, that is what happens. A country cannot just have a test above the threshold and say it was peaceful. That is what has to be discussed.

Gromyko: That should be regarded in the future, as today, as a separate issue.

Kissinger: Let us have our experts discuss it and see what they get. It is no issue at all unless an exception is sought.

Gromyko: So we propose this question be regarded for the time being as a separate question.

Kissinger: That is all right as long as we understand that a test ban without mention of it bans all peaceful nuclear explosions above the
threshold, and then we can have a separate negotiation about an exception.

Gromyko: Yes, but agreement will have to be reached on that question too.

Kissinger: We are prepared to have a separate negotiation on exceptions. We do not insist that it be treated in the same negotiation.

Gromyko: Of course, in practice, the question will boil down to explosions beyond the threshold. It should be discussed separately.

Kissinger: I agree with the Foreign Minister, as long as we understand what the implications will be.

Gromyko: Within these limits, of this threshold, yes. But the question may arise of other limits, and therefore should be discussed separately.

Kissinger: I think we probably agree with each other. It is not required that there be a separate agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions as a precondition of the test ban.

Gromyko: Yes, yes.

Kissinger: But until that separate arrangement exists, the test ban covers all explosions.

[Sonnenfeldt whispers.]

Kissinger: It is just like the limited test ban. No country can test in the atmosphere and say it is peaceful.

Gromyko: Yes, but even before, the question of peaceful nuclear explosions was set aside as a separate issue. The entire question of peaceful nuclear explosions was set aside, not just ones in the atmosphere.

For instance, if it is decided at some future date, as a joint venture, in the interests of mankind, to have a test in the Arctic, it need not be underground, but could be in the atmosphere.

Kissinger: A joint US-Soviet test?


Kissinger: Soviet-Chinese?

Gromyko: I wouldn’t go so far. [Laughter]

But that would be in the interests of mankind, and could be done even if there is fallout.

Kissinger: That would be the result of a separate negotiation. I think we agree. I am sure we agree.

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5 The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water was signed in Moscow by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom on August 5, 1963. (14 UST (Pt. 2) 1313)
Environmental Warfare

Gromyko: What about a possible agreement to prevent changes in the environment for military purpose?

Kissinger: I do not think we could finish an agreement by the time of the summit. Our studies still are not complete. We could announce at the summit that the two sides have opened negotiations on the subject. That is a possibility.

Gromyko: And to give some indication of the direction in which that negotiation should move?

Kissinger: That is possible, but we really haven’t fully crystallized our thinking. [He looks in his book and finds the Presidential directive.]⁶

It is an internal matter. They put the Secretary of Commerce on this study, just because the Weather Bureau is under him. If any of this gets to him, we might as well publish it in The New York Times.

Gromyko: Let’s keep working on it.

[Kissinger shows Gromyko his directive and crosses out the name of the Secretary of Commerce as an addressee.]

Bilateral Agreements

Gromyko: On long-term energy, our people arrived in the United States today.

Dobrynin: Our delegation will arrive about 5:00 p.m.

Kissinger: On the long-term economic agreement, it seems in good shape.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: Space flight, seems in good shape.

Gromyko: Continuing.

Sonnenfeldt: There is a problem about the time.

Gromyko: Artificial heart?

Kissinger: The draft agreement is ready. Secretary Weinberger⁷ has to approve it.

Gromyko: Did the Secretary of State look through it?

Kissinger: I control the pace at which he moves, not the substance.

Gromyko: On construction in cities?

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⁶ Kissinger wrote in an April 26 memorandum to the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee that the President directed that a study be made on the possible international restraints on environmental warfare. (Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional File, Box 13, Senior Review Group Meeting—Environmental Warfare (2), August 28, 1974)

⁷ Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
Sonnenfeldt: There is some problem with the legislation.
Kissinger: We will check and get the draft to you this week.
How about Korniyenko’s idea on electric transport? Are you still interested?
Korniyenko: Of course.
Kissinger: Pollution?
Korniyenko: As part of the existing agreement?
Kissinger: Your parliamentary delegation: I will receive them if I am back. They will get high-level State Department reception. It is all arranged.
Gromyko: Good.
Kissinger: What should we do now? Go to bed?
Gromyko: There is two hours’ time difference for us.
Kissinger: We have you at a disadvantage. We should discuss SALT. This late is the only time we get anything accomplished.
On our agenda, there is now only the Middle East and SALT. In which order?
Gromyko: Middle East in the morning. 10:30, 10:00.
Kissinger: 10:00. Can you stay for lunch?
Gromyko: We have an election—to find our Jackson!

*Jackson Amendment*

Kissinger: I told the Ambassador that I talked to Senators Jackson, Ribicoff and Javits. We should not discuss in this group, but I have the impression that we are at a strategic moment. Anything I can come back with will have an impact.

There are two issues: trade and credits. If we make a major effort to defeat Jackson, we have to do it in the next 4–6 weeks. It is not impossible. One Senator says he has already collected 33 signers of the Jackson Amendment who will break away. That means we have 53 votes, because 20 didn’t sign. And I had a meeting with Jewish leaders and I had the impression they will go along.

So if I can have something when I go back, it will be the best timing.

On fertilizer, we will hold up approval for the next three weeks.
Dobrynin: EX-IM authorization?

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8 No record of the meeting was found. The April 25 briefing memorandum for the meeting is in the National Archives, RG 59, Lot 81 D 286, Box 9, Records of the Office of the Counselor, 1955–1957, Trade Bill, March–May 1974. See also Years of Upheaval, pp. 994–995.
Kissinger: Yes—not to inflame the discussion. But that we will approve.

Gromyko: 10:00. On the Middle East.

Kissinger: 10:00 at the hotel.

[The meeting then ended and Secretary Kissinger and his party left the Soviet Mission for the hotel.]

176. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, April 29, 1974, 10:20 a.m.–12:37 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, & Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to USA
Sergei Vinogradov, Soviet Delegate to Geneva Peace Conference on Middle East
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium, Chief of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mikhail Sytenko, Member of the Collegium, Chief of the Near East Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vasili Makarov, Aide to Gromyko
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for Foreign Affairs
Joseph Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador at Large, US Chief Delegate to Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East
Alfred L. Atherton, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Senior Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECT
Jackson Amendment; Middle East

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I am delighted we can continue our discussions, and we left the two biggest topics for today, Middle
East and SALT. We agreed yesterday to start with the Middle East. If you agree, we could have a few private words after we finish.

Gromyko: Agreed. We always agree with all the US proposals that are correct. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I talked to the President on the phone and he chided me for not expressing his personal greetings, and he looks forward to the summit and to meeting with you.

Gromyko: I should do the same. I met with the General Secretary—we were having the Congress of Komsomol—and he asked me to convey his greetings to you and the President.

Kissinger: Should we turn to the Middle East?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: We have two positions in the United States Government—if it fails it is the Sisco position; if it succeeds it is the Kissinger position. [Laughter]

Gromyko: And the American position? [Laughter]

I find we are very comfortably arranged here and surely we can find solutions.

Kissinger: Or we like it so much we will create a deadlock so we can stay a week.

When your Ambassador is alone in Washington, he deals with the Congress behind my back. Every day three Senators call me, thinking they have a special channel with him, and ask me if they can do anything for me.

Jackson Amendment

Gromyko: A very complicated mechanism, your Congress.

Kissinger: During the Vietnam war, if you listened to congressional statements you would think we could not continue three days, but we always got the votes. On our relations, and SALT, you should not believe the impression you get from the newspapers.

Dobrynin: A silent majority.

Kissinger: I have already started a counteroffensive on SALT. You saw the Reston column.\(^2\) I think we’ll get it.

The credits we will get. It will be messy. I have consulted with many Senators who are for it, and we have decided to let it be voted with the EXIM extension rather than with the Trade Bill. So we can say it is settled when the Trade Bill comes up.

Some businesses in Jackson’s state have an interest in this. There may be some amendment, but it won’t be related to the Soviet Union or emigration. It may give the Congress 30 days to veto by resolution. In my experience Congress has never really exercised the right of negative veto.

So our strategy is to separate it. If we can’t defeat Jackson on the Trade Bill we may kill the whole bill, so it will have to start again in January with a new Congress.

Dobrynin: You are prepared to veto?

Kissinger: If the Jackson Amendment passes in its present form, we will veto the whole bill.

**Middle East**

Kissinger: Regarding the situation in the Middle East, we have two problems: (1) disengagement between Syria and Israel, and (2) continuation of the process leading to a just and lasting peace. Both of them will be fundamentally affected by the relations between the US and the Soviet Union. I want to state very formally: the United States is not pursuing a policy in the Middle East to negate Soviet influence or reduce Soviet influence, or that is in any way anti-Soviet. There are only those two objectives. It is in the interest of many countries in the Middle East to encourage and exploit divisions between us. We will do nothing to encourage that.

Of course it is a complex area, with volatile people, and it is not easy always to control it, as both of us know. But I wanted to state our general approach first.

Gromyko: We have set out our position on the problem of the Middle East on so many occasions that I am sure you and the U.S. Administration have nothing unclear in your minds on what it is. We are in favor of a lasting and durable peace in the Middle East, in the continuing existence of Israel as a sovereign state in the Middle East. We stood at the source of Israel as a state, introducing the resolution in the UN. We favor cooperation with the United States, provided the United States is prepared for such cooperation.

Up to now we have not seen a genuine readiness on part of the United States to join in a genuinely cooperative solution to the Middle East problem.

You just said you are not in favor of an anti-Soviet policy. Those are good words, but we hope for deeds too.

What do you mean by Soviet influence in the Middle East? Are you building military bases there? No. You have admitted that the Soviet Union more than once cooled passions there and created conditions
conducive to a settlement of the Middle East problem. This should be borne in mind.

Kissinger: Let me make one quick observation: First, I agree the influence we are talking about is political influence, and the natural concerns of the Soviet Union with the evolution of an area so close to its borders. I want to make clear this is understood, recognized and not contested by the United States.

Second, we have now the experience in the Middle East where the United States had assumed an exaggerated degree of day-to-day control over some countries in the Middle East; and there are still in the US some who accuse the Soviet Union of controlling events. We want you to know we know that some of your disagreements with some countries in the area are due to your exercise of a restraining influence. We may be in the same position. Some actions there you should not assume are approved, encouraged, or not discouraged by the United States.

Gromyko: You are right that there are forces in the Middle East who would like nothing better than to see us in dispute, collision, and we should not allow this.

Our entire leadership and Government, and personally General Secretary Brezhnev, with whom you have had personal negotiations, are strongly in favor of cooperating to settle the Middle East problem. But such cooperation should be manifested in words, not deeds.

That is what I wanted to say as an introduction. Now before us we have one concrete question, disengagement between Israel and Syria. We would like to see the United States take a broadminded approach to this, not to give support to groundless claims of Israel but to act so as to promote the interests of all states, in the interest of a peaceful settlement.

That is what I wanted to say as an introductory statement, even if you had not made your opening remarks.

Now on the immediate agenda we have the question of Syrian-Israeli disengagement. We shall probably pass on to detailed exchange of views on that, but first let me make some general remarks. We by no means belittle the significance of that, and we are in favor of its being resolved in a positive way. But even if we take both the Syrian and the Egyptian sector, the problem of the Middle East cannot be reduced to merely this disengagement. The problem remains of the cardinal problem of Israeli withdrawal; until that cardinal problem is resolved, the danger remains of an explosion. If that cardinal problem is resolved, it will put more a solid foundation under our relations as well.

Kissinger: I agree with you, Mr. Foreign Minister. Even disengagement on both fronts should not be the final result of our efforts. Indeed, it will be seen as an initial, maybe a small initial step in the Middle East.
We agree the objective should be a settlement between Israel and the Arab countries. We agree we should work with you for this peace. Disengagement is the beginning of the process; we’ve attached great importance to the beginning of a process because of the practical situation, because of the domestic aspects of the issues, and because of the Israeli context. The Egyptian disengagement I said had two aspects; its intrinsic aspect, and that it would start a psychological process in Israel. This is even more true with Syria. The current turmoil in Israel is not unrelated to the process that has started. We believe even if there are short-term difficulties, in the long term the emergence of a new generation, which was not born in Europe and to whom the territory does not have this significance, will be helpful. A new generation which does not have such a doctrinaire view of you. So it should be viewed in terms not of the territory which has been given up but of the thought processes it will start. The United States has gone about it precisely to trigger this long-term process, not to set dividing lines between steps. We have learned that artificial dividing lines are certain to produce another explosion.

Gromyko: I would take those last remarks of yours, regarding artificial dividing lines fraught with new dangers. What do you mean by artificial dividing lines? In our view any lines that don’t reach as far as the 1967 frontiers are artificial. And until the lines of troop separation reach those lines which in the long run coincide with the lines of the borders of 1967, seeds of conflict will remain in the area. So we shouldn’t delude ourselves by thinking it possible to establish a line without coinciding with the lines of the border to resolve the conflict effectively. Every line short of the border is artificial.

Kissinger: To quote a Foreign Minister, this is not excluded.

Gromyko: That is too cautious.

Even if an Arab leader accepted such a line—and I doubt it—the Arab people themselves will never accept that line. It is hard to object to what you say in that respect.

On your side, and voices are heard elsewhere, too much attention is devoted to analyzing moods or shades of moods of individual figures in Israel. Whether there are nuances, we don’t attach even that much importance [makes narrow gap between thumb and forefinger] to it, whether the Prime Minister, or the Defense Minister has such and such a view. Our press doesn’t devote any attention to it. We should rise higher than that.

Those who believe the problem should be resolved through withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territory, those forces in our view are for an effective solution. With guarantees for the existence of Israel, of course.
Let us endeavor to consider all these matters by thinking big, and using big categories of thinking, and not by analyzing shades of thinking of Israeli statesmen. I am not accusing you of harboring such views. We should pay no attention to the statements of statesman X or Y if both favor the annexation of Arab territory.

Let us examine this in terms of our relations too—not just for the duration of one administration, but as you say yourself, to build a relationship between our two countries for a long period of time. Let us look at our discussions on the Middle East in this context as well.

What ideas do you have at present on achieving disengagement on the Syria-Israeli sector? You say you are willing to cooperate on this matter; and we will reply to your ideas.

Kissinger: First, let me make an observation about the general observations that the Foreign Minister made. I agree we should not get bogged down in details or about the domestic situation in particular countries. On the other hand, it is important that we not devote so much attention to final solutions that we neglect the steps that can get us there. Second, regarding the Israeli domestic situation, as for the difference between Minister Sapir and Mrs. Meir, it is of the order the Foreign Minister mentioned, that is, a tactical difference within the same general tendency. Between Mrs. Meir and Rabin, there may be a qualitative difference—maybe not. I mean that the new generation may be able to look at their Arab neighbors—and the Soviet Union—with less prejudice than their predecessors. I say “may be able.”

The objective is to get a fundamental solution. The second objective is to bring about a turn in which a fundamental solution can be even considered. Before the war, no one in Israel thought of security except in terms of military preponderance. Since the war, and if I may say so, especially as a result of our efforts, they have had to consider seeking security through diplomacy.

The Foreign Minister correctly speaks of guarantees. We agree; they are an essential part of the settlement, they are an essential part of Israeli withdrawal. But until there is some confidence in those guarantees, we cannot get to those steps.

What are our ideas on the present phase? You have learned from your friends in Syria that we have not presented a detailed plan.

There are before us two versions: the Syrian version, which is too ambitious, and second, the Israeli version, which is not ambitious enough. The key question is whether Israel is prepared to withdraw beyond the October 6 line—whether the disengagement is to the west of the October 6 line.

[The Secretary confessed to some confusion about which direction was west and which was east. He and Foreign Minister Gromyko then...]
agreed that they could get by with saying the “right side” and the “wrong side.”]

So this is the fundamental issue. For Israel to withdraw any distance towards the ’67 lines, especially on Golan, is a traumatic experience for Israel, which, when it is done, will have important implications.

If you read the Israeli press, they are after me already. They have offered only short of the October 6 line, only part of the territory which they occupied in the last war. I tell you now—just to show you there is no identity of views—the United States does not accept that view, and this explains many of our domestic manifestations in the last weeks.

When I go to Israel I will see if I can break the sound barrier, so to speak, on this. I have no plan, because to establish principles is more important at this stage.

In all candor, this is the exact state of the negotiations now.

I would add: I believe the line cannot be on the “wrong” side of Kuneitra.

Gromyko: In principle, one cannot discuss the matter without reference to concrete figures and concrete lines.

You say you have no detailed plan. You are familiar with the Syrian position, I trust?

Kissinger: I am familiar with the Syrian position.

Gromyko: How do you see the Syrian position? You can say something on this, and I can tell you our view.

Kissinger: I believe it goes beyond what is attainable in a separation of forces agreement.

Gromyko: As we see the Syrian position, they want to have Israeli forces withdraw from about half of the territory occupied since 1967. This will, in short, in specific terms, include about 60% of the area of the Golan Heights. If that is carried out, they would not be opposed to having UN Observers posted in a strip two kilometers wide between Syrian and Israeli forces. You and Israel are familiar with that. Why can’t Israel accept it?

The Syrians would regard this naturally as nothing more than the first step towards achieving a fundamental solution and we certainly support them in that view: If anyone in Israel—Rabin or anyone else—thinks this line could be the final settlement, it would be a very crude mistake on the part of those who determine Israel’s policy, and with all the ensuing consequences. Why can’t we do this in the first step?

Kissinger: As I told you, we will work in the direction of Israeli withdrawal from the October 6 line. I don’t think it is helpful for you and us to engage in competition as to who can recommend the widest withdrawal, because that will lead to a situation in which there is no
withdrawal. We will seek the widest possible withdrawal. I don’t know Rabin’s views or anyone else’s; I haven’t talked with him. I was speaking of what is possible in a long period of time, not what is possible in one week.

Gromyko: What is your assessment of the position the new Israeli Government will take? Will it take a more soberminded position on the question of disengagement?

Kissinger: I am very sorry I have interfered with your Ambassador’s luncheon plans today, because I think you need some additional experience. [to Dobrynin] You interfered, actually, to change the location of our meeting.

First, I do not think Rabin can form a new government in any timeframe relevant to the negotiation. Three-to-six weeks is the normal time it takes. If he can make it at all. If he cannot, there will be elections. Elections will be no earlier than the middle of October, and probably in my judgment, the end of October because of the Jewish holidays. These are the facts.

Gromyko: And until then?

Kissinger: Until then, the existing government continues. And in Israel there is the anomaly that the stablest government is a caretaker government, because no one can resign. My judgment is the new government, on an overall settlement—on Jerusalem, on the lines—particularly if we move quickly, will be more creative. If there is movement on the north and the south, there can be considerable progress. This is our interest in bringing about this movement now. I repeat, when one talks in Israel now about Egypt, it is in a different frame of mind than regarding Syria—and it can be done with Syria too. On the other hand, if we see a reemergence of their Masada Complex, it will be with all the consequences as after 1967.

I don’t think Rabin now can be decisive. For them to move back from the October 6 line is an enormous decision—you think it is trivial but for them it is enormous. To confuse this with arguing about 5 kilometers here or there would totally confuse the debate.

Gromyko: As we see it, the difference between the positions of Syria and Israel is a very big one, and we see the situation at present as very complex. If Israel will continue to take such a position, it is hard to see any forward movement. Maybe you have information warranting optimism, but we have no information warranting such hopes. The key is the influence you can bring on Israel.

You will be in Israel May 3. How many capitals are you visiting?

Kissinger: Algiers tonight—at the request of President Boumedienne—and Cairo and Damascus. Those are the capitals I am visiting in connection with this. And Amman.
Dobrynin: You didn’t mention Israel!

Kissinger: I once offered that we trade our relative influence in Jerusalem and Damascus, Mr. Foreign Minister. A night with their Cabinet is an experience.

After the conclusion of an agreement, I may also visit Kuwait and Riyadh, but that has nothing to do with this negotiation.

Gromyko: Algiers, Cairo, Damascus, Amman, Jerusalem, Kuwait, Riyadh. Seven. You like this number.

Kissinger: Riyadh I like for the night life. [Laughter]

Gromyko: It is more than exotic. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I must say, Mr. Foreign Minister, when you visit Riyadh, in the course of the historical evolution, you will discover true facts that you had not known. The King of Saudi Arabia knows—even though you have kept it well hidden—not that the Soviet Union controls the policy of Israel, but that Israel controls the policy of Moscow. [Laughter]. This is the secret you have kept hidden, which is now penetrated by Saudi Arabian intelligence.

When I was in Riyadh, in the Royal Palace, I saw a picture on the far wall. I forgot that Moslems do not use pictures for decoration. I asked him if it was a picture of the Arabian Desert. The King said no, it was the Holy Oasis, and fell into a morose silence for the rest of the evening. [Laughter]

If you want to know why the oil embargo lasted two months longer than we thought, it was not your radio broadcasts but my conversation with the King. [Laughter]

Gromyko: After the October revolution, Saudi Arabia was one of the first to recognize the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: Really? Who was King then? Saud? Ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia from 1932 to 1953. I’ve seen the King three times, Mr. Foreign Minister. Four times, including in the United States. And I have heard the same speech about Jews and Communists each time.

Gromyko: I met him, by the way. It was at the first or second session of the General Assembly.

Kissinger: He was Foreign Minister then. He is actually very shrewd.

Gromyko: I almost said he appeared like a European-educated man. But he certainly gives the impression of being polished, cultured.

Kissinger: In the present phase, he exaggerates his Bedouin origins. He pretends he does not speak English.

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3 Ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia from 1932 to 1953.
May I ask, do you have any travel plans, Mr. Foreign Minister?

Gromyko: I do not completely exclude the possibility of my having to go to visit that part of the world. And I have notably the idea expressed to you in passing, but I have no definite plans regarding the dates yet. If I were to have told you I had no plans at all, that would give you grounds to say, “Here I am alone and doing all the work and you are not active enough in cooperating to get a solution.”

Kissinger: That is exactly what I would say. [Laughter]

Gromyko: So we believe there should be a joint action. I like your casual remark.

Kissinger: I think we are in any case reaching that point in our relationship where if we don’t see each other for two weeks, it creates a void at least in my life. But I do believe—seriously—that working together towards the same objective is important.

Gromyko: We feel that to work in close proximity and compare views and work in close contact is more effective than to try to settle whatever differences that exist at a distance. I am gratified that you see it the same way.

But you seem to cling to Dante’s figure of seven all the time. Although, of course, the figure seven is something that originated in the general area of Palestine, as a cabalistic figure.

Kissinger: The Foreign Minister seems concerned with Dante. This is the second successive meeting he has mentioned it. It is not the obvious choice of reading for a Soviet Foreign Minister.

We would be prepared, first of all, to keep you closely informed at all stages of our negotiation, and if we knew your plans, that would help us stay in touch.

As for the process, I would be prepared to consider another meeting before the process is concluded, so it is clear that it was not concluded by unilateral action. But I would like to reserve the location for later exchanges.

Gromyko: How in your view could the Geneva Peace Conference be reactivated? Are we necessarily supposed to wait for the elaboration and complete implementation of a Syrian disengagement agreement? Or can we do it to discuss other aspects of the Middle East while disengagement is going on?

Kissinger: We believe the most effective time for reactivation of Geneva is after the completion of Syrian disengagement, which we believe, with goodwill on all sides, could be done in the next month. We could exchange ideas in addition in the interim, but we believe the best time is after Syrian disengagement. Also, we would be prepared to have Ambassador Bunker meet here with Ambassador Vinogradov. Painful as it is, Ellsworth. If we can pry Bunker away from Panama. He
has an island there where he goes for weeks at a time and comes back rejuvenated.

Gromyko: I would like to know about that island. [Laughter]

I think the present situation is becoming a bit strange. We all know there are many unresolved issues, including the fundamental issues of the settlement, and our representatives are here but in substance they have no contact. We are meeting; why can’t they meet and discuss the same issues?

Kissinger: I agree. We can start in a week. Of course, Ambassador Bunker is with me now. I think they could have a more extensive series of meetings a week after I return to Washington. I will return to Washington on the 10th at the latest. So starting around the 15th.

Gromyko: Please don’t think we simply cannot live without these regular contacts with our American counterparts. If yours goes back to Washington all the time, we couldn’t help but draw the necessary conclusions.

Kissinger: I agree. I need Ellsworth on this trip. It will be helpful because he will then have a full foundation of knowledge. Then he will have a regular series of consultations here, as near as possible to the 15th as we can make it. Is this agreeable then? Around the 15th? We will propose a firm date within the next few days, as soon as we know what is ahead of us. Between those two, and between us. I would say by Saturday⁴ . . .

Gromyko: We would prefer that they meet immediately but we will take your view into consideration.

Kissinger: Between us, I will have a specific proposal by Saturday. By then I will have been in Damascus and Jerusalem. I will communicate with you by Saturday. Having in mind that it will not be purely pro forma. The most efficient way is through Washington.

Dobrynin: General Scowcroft?

Kissinger: General Scowcroft.

Gromyko: Do you have any schedule?

Kissinger: Genuinely I have no definite schedule. I will be in Amman Saturday because of the holiday in Israel—they can’t work.

Gromyko: You go from Damascus to Amman?

Kissinger: My tentative plan is to go to Amman from Damascus. The advantage is that I will have some idea then. I will communicate to you.

On the 4th, the Israeli Cabinet doesn’t work. Therefore, the earliest I can go back to Israel to do anything is late evening, the 4th. My

⁴ May 4.
present plan is to go on the 5th. This is assuming no stalemate in Israel, which is not excluded. Read the Israel press: Our vote in the UN is not unanimously approved in Israel.

Gromyko: You will take a second trip to Damascus?

Kissinger: It is not excluded, but really I have not made a plan. I can tell you precisely on the 4th. I assure you now we will do nothing to surprise you or present you a fait accompli. You will know almost as soon as we do.

Dobrynin: When do you expect a meeting?

Kissinger: Maybe the middle of next week. It will take many Cabinet meetings in Israel. The best time for us to meet is when Israeli thinking has crystallized but not settled. Then we have something concrete.

Dobrynin: The 10th?

Kissinger: Some time between the 8th and the 10th. I will communicate with you on the 4th without fail.

Could I take a five-minute break?

Gromyko: Surely.

[There was a short break, from 12:14–12:27 p.m.]

Kissinger: I propose we continue on the Middle East until lunch.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: Then we should discuss SALT after lunch. I have until 4:00, 4:30.

Gromyko: Good.

Where do you prefer to continue after lunch? Here? Or at our place?

Kissinger: Here, or we can go to your place.

Gromyko: Lunch is at what time?

Kissinger: About 1:00.

Dobrynin: To save time, we should continue here.

Kissinger: We would be delighted to have it here.

Can we speed it up?

[Mr. Sisco goes out to have the lunch arrangements speeded up.]

You know, Sisco was a bartender and he won’t let anyone else do the luncheon arrangements.

Atherton: He will not delegate!

Kissinger: We would do it at your place if it had some symbolic significance.

The ladies are meeting at your place, anyway. Maybe they will settle it.
Dobrynin: Something will be cooked up, literally!
Kissinger: Maybe with a great effort something will come out of our meetings. It will cost us 100 MIRVed missiles. [Laughter]
Maybe we should exchange observers—so you could attend our National Security Council meetings and we could attend your Politburo meetings. You would be amazed.
Gromyko: They urged you to accept it.
Kissinger: I am negotiating between your General Staff and our General Staff.
Vinogradov: Disengagement.
Gromyko: I heard a joke. An Army man wanted a job on the General Staff. A friend said, “You’re crazy.” He said, “Is that a necessary qualification to be on the General Staff?” [Laughter]
Kissinger: Our General Staff accuses you of betraying the country if you agree to ban things they didn’t plan to do anyway.
As I understand it, on Saturday I will inform you first on the state of discussions, and second, I will propose what the next step might be. Bearing in mind that proximity improves our cooperation. And we then decide what next steps we might take. This is my understanding of where we stand.
The Israeli press is already starting a campaign.
[The meeting then broke up. Secretary Kissinger, Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin went to the Secretary’s suite for a private discussion.]

5 Kissinger sent a report of his meeting to Nixon through Scowcroft on April 29. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 22 (January–April 1974))
177. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, April 29, 1974, 12:20–1:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

HAK–Gromyko Meeting in Mideast; Syrian-Israeli Disengagement; Palestinians; Jackson Amendment

HAK–Gromyko Meeting in Mideast

Gromyko: So you will travel up to the 7th-8th-9th?
Kissinger: My present thought is I will be back on the 10th.2 But I will stop in Europe.

Gromyko: You think we might join? I am not pressing.
Kissinger: I do not exclude that we might join. I will make a definite proposal on the 4th. Between the 7th and the 10th.

Gromyko: I may go to Syria maybe one day, maybe two, maybe four. We have not agreed on any date.

It does not interfere with you, as well as your trip does not interfere with mine. If you think it would be a good idea to meet, if you will let me know.

Kissinger: Do you exclude meeting, for example, in Cyprus?
Gromyko: In Cyprus? [Thinks] You like the vegetation in Cyprus?
Kissinger: I have never been there.

Gromyko: And you like ancient ruins? In a suitable mood.
Kissinger: It gets us into one of the few disputes we are not in.

Gromyko: Of course, my preference would be in the Middle East, in Syria. I have not discussed it with them.
Kissinger: Nor have we.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 71, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Gromyko, 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s suite in the Intercontinental Hotel. Brackets are in the original.

2 After Kissinger’s departure from Geneva, he traveled to Algeria on April 29 and 30; Egypt, April 30 and May 1; Israel, May 2 and 3; Syria, May 3; Israel, May 4; Jordan, May 5 and 6; Cyprus, May 7; Saudi Arabia, May 9; and Egypt, May 9 and 10.
Gromyko: I have not rejected Cyprus.
Kissinger: My idea is, we have so difficult a time in Jerusalem this week, that if you can avoid being in Damascus while I am there . . . So it will not inflame things.
Gromyko: You will be there when?
Kissinger: On the 2nd. It will be difficult.
Gromyko: Of course, it will not interfere with my holiday.
Kissinger: May 1st.
Gromyko: Now it is four days! We are a Socialist country. A capitalist country could not afford such a practice.
Kissinger: You will hear from me by noon Saturday,\(^3\) Washington time.
Dobrynin: Yes.
Gromyko: Do they have good airports in Cyprus?
Kissinger: Yes.
Gromyko: A hot climate?
Kissinger: Moderate climate.
Gromyko: It is of secondary importance. Let us not exclude this possibility.
Kissinger: I will conduct myself with an attitude of emphasizing coordinated activity. I will not encourage an attitude of Soviet exclusion. The reality cannot be this anyway.
Today there is a vicious Israeli press campaign against me. That I am here to sell them out.
Gromyko: The difference between your statements and ours is this: Your statement emphasizes cooperation. We say: “Of course we are ready to cooperate with the U.S. and in contact with the countries concerned.” You say, “Of course we do not exclude the possibility of cooperation with the Soviet Union.” Or, “Soviet Union did not do anything bad.” Always understatement, understatement, understatement.
Kissinger: I understand.
Gromyko: At your last press conference\(^4\) you said something positive, but it was so reserved. I may hold my right ear with my right hand but not my left ear.
Kissinger: In the American context, it was as far as I could go without inflaming the situation. Our press corps does not believe me. They believe Dinitz. Anatoli’s friend.

\(^3\) May 4. No record of that message has been found.
Seriously, we have strongly urged them to do it. They asked our opinion, and were reluctant. We strongly urged them. It is an excellent idea.

Dobrynin: I will have lunch with him.

Kissinger: I do not believe in losing battles.

**Syrian-Israeli Disengagement**

Gromyko: Disengagement.

Kissinger: I believe in seeking the maximum that is attainable in each stage.

Gromyko: Tell me frankly, will Israel go beyond the present proposal?

Kissinger: If they do not, it is very gloomy. I have not decided whether this press campaign is to justify not going beyond the present proposal, or whether it is to show how tough they are so they can.

We will try to make them go beyond the present proposal. It would be helpful if you could urge the Syrians to be restrained.

I will let you know what their proposal is when I get one. In general, my view is they have to go beyond the October 6 line.

Gromyko: We do not understand Israel’s idea. They are living not on earth, maybe in another galaxy.

Dobrynin: The Minister said 60 percent withdrawal. What do you think would be a reasonable compromise?

Kissinger: About 20–25 percent. It depends on whether you count the salient. The salient we think has to be given up completely.

Gromyko: When the Conference will start to work? And the Military Group? At once after the groups start, or after the conclusion of a formal agreement?

Kissinger: Once we have the conclusion of an agreement in principle, the formal agreement will be very quick. By mid-June, the Conference will start. With preliminary meetings of our two Ambassadors.

Gromyko: You are seeing Egyptian President Sadat—I was going to say your friend Sadat . . .

Kissinger: [Laughs] I remember when he was calling you brother, so . . . I am seeing him Tuesday night. My view is, a change in 180° in one direction can be followed by a change in 180° in the other direction, and we do not base U.S.-Soviet relations on the maneuvers of secondary powers. If you saw the records of our conversations, we have urged great restraint. None of these statements is encouraged by us, to put it mildly.

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5 April 30.
Gromyko: You see his statements: one, the Soviet Union always restrained Egypt.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: And second, the Soviet Union did not fulfill its pledges on arms.

Kissinger: We consider those things for which you are attacked to be positive things.

[Nancy⁶ comes in. There is social conversation from 1:00 to 1:05 p.m.]

The Palestinians

Gromyko: About the Palestinians, when we meet at the Conference, do we quarrel? Will we collide, or will we agree? Do the Palestinians speak for themselves, or with translators?

Kissinger: It depends on the stage at which it is introduced. We do not quarrel with the evolution. I do not quarrel with the statement you just made.

Gromyko: The Arab countries will take the logical position.

Kissinger: Probably. We will probably establish some contact with them.

Gromyko: You have?

Kissinger: We have received some information from them, but we will have contact after Syrian disengagement.

Jackson Amendment

You have to assess our domestic context and the Israeli context. In that context, you will have to admit we have followed a course in the interest of Soviet-American relations.

On Trade and the Export-Import Bank. So far, they have not linked emigration and Ex-Im. As soon as I return, I am working along two lines: Senator Cranston⁷ is organizing what will look like a movement of the rank and file, and I am working with the leadership, to get an agreed compromise.

The time frame is by the time I return—I am not suggesting you do something, but that is the correct time frame if you do something.

One issue that concerns them is numbers.

The General Secretary said to me and to Kennedy that everybody without a security clearance can go.

Gromyko: We told you.

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⁷ Alan Cranston, Democratic Senator from California.
Kissinger: Yes. If it were possible for me to . . .
Gromyko: You can say this.
Kissinger: If I could give an estimate—not confirmed by you—of what this means in numbers.
Gromyko: What would you say?
Kissinger: Last year it was 35,000.
Gromyko: Right.
Kissinger: If I could say 40–45,000.
Gromyko: For what period?
Kissinger: For a year.
Gromyko: What year?
Dobrynin: For the whole year.
Kissinger: As a yardstick.

Kissinger: He attacked me for détente with the Soviet Union. When I say the way to prevent nuclear war is better cooperation with the Soviet Union, he says I am encouraging the Soviet Union to threaten nuclear war, and I am yielding to Soviet totalitarian methods.

Dobrynin: On harassment, this fellow Levitch,8 who organized the group for Kennedy, was working in sensitive areas. He was let off; so he had two months vacation with pay, doing nothing. His job is the same.

Kissinger: Can I say this percentage given by the General Secretary means in the area of 40–45,000?
Dobrynin: Yes.
Kissinger: Second, can you tell me the answer on geographical areas, that it is not discrimination?
Dobrynin: Yes.
Kissinger: Third, whatever you want to tell me on what they call harassment.

With these assurances, I have a good chance to turn around the Jackson Amendment and almost a certain chance on credits.

On credits, they will be in the form of Congress having an opportunity to vote in 30 days. It almost never happens. You remember the debt rescheduling with India, which many Senators opposed; they never could organize.

With the Jackson Amendment, we will make a judgment either to defeat it and pass the bill, or kill the whole bill and start again in Jan-

8 Not further identified.
uary. If we pass the bill, it will mean credits have already been taken care of in the Ex-Im bill and Jackson will apply only to trade.

Cranston was prepared to introduce the whole thing in the Ex-Im bill, but it was too dangerous.

Nobody will introduce anything until I get back. Jackson or Stevenson may introduce a restrictive amendment on credits. Nothing will happen until I return.

Gromyko: When will you know?

Kissinger: On credits, by the summit. On trade, the trends will become quite clear by the summit.

Gromyko: What is the President’s situation?

Kissinger: As I told your Ambassador yesterday, the court verdict yesterday [Mitchell–Stans acquittal] will greatly strengthen the President. It will greatly affect the climate. Today the President is making a speech disclosing the evidence; he thinks it will be helpful.

There is a climate now that is composed of conservatives and intellectuals, particularly Jewish intellectuals, who think if they attack us, particularly me, on the Middle East, they can kill détente and our Middle East policy.

I did not fight for a couple of months because the time was not right. I have agreed with Kennedy to coordinate against Jackson. I have attacked Jackson twice last week—once by my statement, once by a State Department statement, and Reston wrote two articles.

Fulbright is organizing public hearings—nationally televised—on détente.

With all of this, plus disengagement in the Middle East, we will be in a strong position.

Gromyko: On this question of impeachment.

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9 The Export-Import Bank Bill, passed by the Senate on September 19, required advance notice to Congress if credits of more than $60 million were granted to any nation and limited new commitments to Soviet exports to $30 million. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 134–136)

10 Adlai Stevenson, Democratic Senator from Illinois.

11 John Mitchell, former Attorney General, and Maurice Stans, former Secretary of Commerce were found not guilty of interfering in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s investigation of Robert Vesco. (Martin Arnold, “Mitchell and Stans Are Acquitted on all Counts After 48-Day Trial,” The New York Times, April 29, 1974, p. 69)

12 On April 29, Nixon addressed the nation to announce his answer to a Congressional subpoena for additional tape recordings. For the full text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1974, pp. 389–397.

Kissinger: My judgment is it is impossible to get a two-thirds vote in the Senate. Impossible. I do not see how. And I do not think he may be impeached in the House.

Gromyko: The press tries to create that impression.

Kissinger: My estimate is 52 to 48 against impeachment. But it could happen.

Dobrynin: But it is close.

Kissinger: It is close. I have not seen what his evidence is.

Gromyko: This Michigan thing.

Kissinger: You can use it to prove anything. Before the President campaigned, he was ten percent behind; he ended up three percent behind.

If he is not impeached by the House, he can turn opinion around fairly easily. If he is impeached, it will be more difficult, but he will still do it.

Gromyko: On the next meeting.

Kissinger: There is no question on our side. You can count on its not being cancelled. And I suggest, when I come back we can announce the dates. Around the 13th, we can do it. The plan is to arrive on the 24th, and stay until the 20th or 1st. Six or seven days.

Gromyko: Can we issue a statement now?

Kissinger: If you want, or brief the press. We can say it was friendly and constructive and we made progress on a number of issues.

Gromyko: I told Korniyenko to do something. Maybe you could do something.

Kissinger: Sonnenfeldt.

[At 1:35 p.m., they get up to go to lunch. They pause in the doorway.]

Gromyko: This word “impeachment,” it was never known to us before.

Kissinger: I think it is like on Vietnam—the public does not really like it but they do not know what the truth is. I think it may turn. There was an article in The New York Times Magazine yesterday on Rodino,\textsuperscript{14} saying that when he goes around his district, people say he will be in trouble for what he is doing. If you read our press on Vietnam, you would think we did not have ten percent of the vote.

Dobrynin: We think, on détente, you are really not aggressive enough in promoting it.

\textsuperscript{14}See James M. Naughton, “The First Judgment,” The New York Times, April 28, 1974, p. 289. Peter Rodino, Democratic Representative from New Jersey, was Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.
Kissinger: But now we will start.
Dobrynin: Yes.
Gromyko: And foreign policy is your strongest point.
Kissinger: Absolutely.
[They then proceeded to join the luncheon group.]

178. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, April 29, 1974, 3–4:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo, Central Committee CPSU, and
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium, MFA, Chief of USA Division
(at end)
Vasili Makarov, Aide to Gromyko (at end)
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counselor, MFA (interpreter)
Secretary Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to President for
National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department (at end)
Robert McCloskey, Ambassador at Large
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, INR
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
SALT; Joint Statement

SALT

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Could I say a few words, first?
Secretary Kissinger: Of course.
Foreign Minister Gromyko: All of the discussions that have gone
on until now on this subject [SALT] were certainly necessary and useful
since, of course, it is necessary to clarify the positions of each side.
Without that, no agreement is possible. But I must say, frankly, that so

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Files, NSC Files, Box 1028, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcons—HAK & Presidential, 1 March 1974–2 May 1974 [1 of 4]. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s suite in the Intercontinental Hotel. Brackets are in the original.
far we do not see an agreement materializing. The latest considerations you gave to us [U.S. Note of April 23, Tab A],2 frankly, are not the basis for an agreement, because, frankly, they are one-sided.

Secretary Kissinger (laughs): May I say that the Joint Chiefs are completely in agreement with the Politburo on that.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I understand what you mean. I would like to make several observations to show why we think as we do.

Secretary Kissinger (interrupts the translation): You know how many submarine missiles the Joint Chiefs would like? 856.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: There are almost no figures, within the limits of what is realistic, that could compensate us for the one very big advantage which you have, which is forward-based weapons. And if you really want to know, within our own circle, a lot has been said that the agreement that has been achieved does not fully coincide with the interests of both sides. In your country many voices can be heard, but we have a different view on that score. Nonetheless, we deemed it possible, on the basis of the proposal which was made by General Secretary Brezhnev to you in Moscow,3 to reach agreement by the time of the forthcoming Summit on the continuation of the Interim Agreement with the addition of certain figures. These figures are known, so I needn't go into detail.

Secretary Kissinger: The figures General Secretary Brezhnev gave me on MIRV?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yes. 1000, 1100. Apart from that, there is the second factor, which we have mentioned on several occasions—though we could have mentioned it but once, we did so several times—that there are certain third countries, and we cannot but take that into account. You know their names and we needn't go into detail.

Secretary Kissinger: France.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: And you know about the so-called "eastern factor." If we didn't take account of this, we would be acting contrary to our own security interests, and that we cannot do.

And therefore we should certainly like to believe that you still have the possibility to give some additional thought on this matter and will find it in you to take a more realistic position. As for the possibility of an agreement, we both know its importance and needn't say more. We, for our part, want an agreement by the time of the forthcoming Soviet-American summit, which would serve the cause of peace.

Secretary Kissinger: What aspects of it did you see as one-sided? So we can understand.

2 Attached but not printed.
3 See Document 165.
Foreign Minister Gromyko: In your latest proposals you seek to revise the Interim Agreement and you alter the figures in such a way as to considerably improve your own situation and considerably worsen our own.

Secretary Kissinger: I can’t believe that 26 weapons considerably worsen the security of the Soviet Union.

We are now entitled to 710 missiles; we now propose 736. So in effect the total number permitted under the Interim Agreement is increased by 26. We don’t mind your increasing yours by 26.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: The Interim Agreement is the Interim Agreement. As I said, you have voices in the United States saying it’s slanted in favor of the Soviet Union. We don’t accept that. In fact, we maintain the opposite view, that you are in a better position. But the Agreement is there. Now you want to slant it in favor of the United States.

You will have 26 more plus an additional 250 MIRVs and then another 54 missiles in the letter—which I want to go into.

Secretary Kissinger: In the overall forces of the two sides we’ll get only 26. We can’t use the whole 30; only 26. To get those 26, we have to destroy 54 land-based. So the Foreign Minister is not correct that we get 26 plus 54. We get a net of 26. We are shifting the 54 from land to submarines.

Ambassador Dobrynin: What about the 44 submarines?

Secretary Kissinger: The agreement allows 44; there is a side agreement that we’ll stay with 41, or 756. We propose that the side agreement just lapses in 1977.

Ambassador Dobrynin: So this is the second change in your proposal.

Secretary Kissinger: We don’t get 54 extra; we get 26 extra. Concretely we want three submarines with 72 missiles. 72 minus 54 is 18. By 1980 we can do it with 728. By 1982 we can do it by 736. But at any rate we’re talking about either 18 or 26 net gain in missiles, not 54.

Ambassador Dobrynin: But there was the assumption that there were three out [on the basis of the letter].

Secretary Kissinger: If the agreement lapses, we’ll build many more.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We are probably talking in different languages. What we’re talking about is the letter—which I assume all the gentlemen here are familiar with . . .

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

4 A reference to the note at Tab A.
Foreign Minister Gromyko: So you have the right to 54 missiles but the letter says you won’t make use of that right. Then there is the Trident; now you say you want to go full steam ahead on implementing that program. We will draw the necessary conclusions. That means both sides will go ahead. What you say in effect is that you want unilaterally—or rather, in the interests of one side—to change in your favor the material content of the agreement. Of course we realize perhaps it may be good for you. But what we’re talking about is a mutually-acceptable agreement and it certainly couldn’t be acceptable to us.

[Secretary Kissinger goes out to take a phone call. In the meantime Mr. Hyland explains the numbers to Ambassador Dobrynin. Secretary Kissinger then returns.]

Foreign Minister Gromyko: The Pentagon was calling?

Secretary Kissinger: (laughs): Yes. If they only knew! We have a serious problem, Mr. Foreign Minister. Simply on numbers. The total number of missiles by which our forces would increase by 1980 is 18. These Tridents wouldn’t be in the force; they’d be only on sea trials.

The only reason we mentioned it is that under the definition of the agreement the old ones have to be destroyed once the new ones go on sea trials. On the assumption of three Trident submarines.

[Sonnenfeldt comes in]

The total force increases by 18, land and sea-based. The sea-based increase by 72; the land-based decrease by 54. Even those figures are not correct: The land-based would be destroyed before the others become operational. So the strategic effect is zero.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I can’t quite understand your line of reasoning. According to your latest proposal—1100 for you, 850 for us—what’s in it for us?

Secretary Kissinger: MIRVed?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yes. So then, according to the corrections you now want to introduce to the agreement itself, your combination with sea-based missiles, you want 30 more than us plus 54 according to the letter, whereby you turn the right into an actuality. Which means 250 plus 30 plus 54. All told, it means 334 more than us.

In reality, take the 250 [advantage] related to the MIRVs—and you do have the right to install them all on submarines—that means each would have 10. This means 250 times 10, which is 2500. Again, plus 30, plus 54 which are not MIRVed. This means 2800 more than us.

That is the arithmetic we reach from your figures. Tell us where we’re wrong.

Secretary Kissinger [laughs]: A masterful dialectic!

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Subject to correction.
Secretary Kissinger: Let’s separate the number of missiles from the number of MIRVed. You lumped them together.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: All right. Separate them.

Secretary Kissinger: In the agreement, there are 1054 ICBMs and 656 submarine missiles. You have the right to 1409 and 950, which is 2359.

This is incontrovertible. We are entitled to 1710. By our proposal, by 1980 we would have 1000 instead of 1054, and we would have 728 instead of 656. Making a total of 18 missiles gained. In terms of missiles.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: We’re not accumulating the 54; we’re destroying 54.

Ambassador Dobrynin: The only question he asks is, if it’s the agreement as it is now, and a prolongation, you’re saying we should just forget the letter. If you just held to 41, you wouldn’t have to ask us.

Secretary Kissinger: If we held to 41, we would still keep 54 Titans. We can still get Tridents under the Interim Agreement by giving up Polaris.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Right. But for two Tridents, not three. Then there is the separate case my Minister made about MIRVs.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s separate.

Ambassador Dobrynin: But you would have 2500 warheads, as he showed.

Secretary Kissinger: But your warheads are bigger.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yes, but if you believe the obligation regarding 54 will cease to operate after 1980, that’s wrong. Because if we prolong the agreement, we have to prolong it in its entirety. Otherwise, it’s like buying a horse and you find yourself holding the bridle and the horseshoes but the horse isn’t there.

Let’s try to understand each other in matters of substance. I see that here the matter lies not in the distribution of figures or how you read the figures but in the desire on your part to alter the material substance. It is a different approach in principle. We propose that the agreement be prolonged in its entirety, with an additional document.

Secretary Kissinger: We consider this change a very minor modification of the agreement; it does not go to the material substance of the agreement.

Ambassador Dobrynin: How can you treat it as additional correction? You just seem to want another Trident. If you wanted a correction just on MIRVs, that would be easier.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand. If we widen the gap on MIRVs, we could hold to the existing agreement.
I think both our General Staffs won’t allow a ban in an agreement on something they don’t want to do anyway! All hell breaks loose when this is even suggested.

On MIRVs, we’re making a very considerable concession. We could build more Tridents; and we could MIRV 500 more ICBMs. On the other hand, if the gap in MIRVs is larger, then we don’t have to play around with the Interim Agreement.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Well, I think we have understood each other very well. There is no misunderstanding here; it’s simply that there are different approaches.

Joint Statement

[Korniyenko comes in. Secretary Kissinger discusses the draft of the communique with Sonnenfeldt. Korniyenko confers with Gromyko. Sonnenfeldt goes over to the piano and rewrites the draft communique. In the meantime Dobrynin and Kissinger confer at length on the SALT figures; Korniyenko confers with Gromyko on the communique. The Soviet draft is then given to Secretary Kissinger.]

Foreign Minister Gromyko: There is one phrase in this document which we consider invaluable [about joint action in the Middle East]. We use this around the table but for some reason you don’t want to tell others about it.

Secretary Kissinger: It’s because of the great difficulties we’ll have this week, quite frankly.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Because we don’t see from what quarter difficulties will come. Syria and Egypt are in favor; Israel seems to accept Soviet participation. Who objects? Salvador? Panama?

Secretary Kissinger: No, Israel. What we’ve agreed to today amounts to this—Bunker and Vinogradov meeting in Geneva, convening the Geneva Conference—all this has the same objective consequence.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: That’s what we say in the small group, but not to others?

Secretary Kissinger: It would be suicidal.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Suicidal for whom?

Secretary Kissinger: Suicidal for what I’m trying to do.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Of course, if you object, I won’t put it in myself.

Secretary Kissinger: No. Let’s save it for another meeting. It is not objected to in principle.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Let’s say: “Both sides expressed themselves in favor of resuming the work of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East in the shortest possible time.” No dates would be
mentioned. We understand it would be actually difficult to resume it before disengagement, but we can say it.

Secretary Kissinger: “Within the shortest appropriate time.”?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Our formula is: “Both sides expressed themselves in favor of resuming the work of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East in the shortest possible time.”

Secretary Kissinger: Why don’t we say: “At an early date.”?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: “At an early date”?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: All right.

SALT

Foreign Minister Gromyko: As I see it, we understand each other well enough [on SALT], and there is no misunderstanding here. Nothing changes according to what end you start listing your figures from. You are altering the material content of the agreement, but what we’re talking about is prolonging it, and changing it only by an additional protocol or something.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand this. I explained to your Ambassador why for us to accept figures of 1100 or 1200 is a major concession for us. I won’t go into it now; he can write it down for the consideration of your colleagues. It is a concession not only regarding MIRVs but also regarding types of missiles. If we do it, it will be less like the ones we have now and more like the ones you’ve tested so successfully recently.

I understand your concerns on the Interim Agreement. We have to study whether by changing the replacement formulation [i.e., using the time when submarines become operational rather than the beginning of sea trials] we can accomplish the same result as we sought in the formulation we gave you. But we are sincerely attempting to limit the escalation that is sure to take place.

We will be in touch with you shortly after I return. Hal [Sonnenfeldt] and Bill [Hyland], you and Lodal will do the studies.

Joint Statement

[Sisco comes in and Kissinger confers with him and Sonnenfeldt on the Joint Statement.]

Secretary Kissinger: We can accept that sentence on the Geneva Conference. When should we release it?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: There is another phrase here, a correction I want to make on the European Conference. Put a full stop after “Europe,” and add: “Both sides confirmed their positions in favor of its successful completion as soon as possible.”

Secretary Kissinger: All right. On the basis of non-reciprocity!
Foreign Minister Gromyko: Also, somewhere in the beginning—we can polish it—we should say something like: “Both Ministers, on behalf of their countries,” or better, “Both sides expressed the determination to act along the course which was taken, especially which found expression in the results of the past meetings on the highest level, to develop their relations, which would be in accordance with the fundamental interests of their peoples as well as in accordance with the interests of world peace.”

Secretary Kissinger: I accept it. Sonnenfeldt can put it into even more elegant English. [Laughter] I said “even.” I accept the one on the [European] Conference too. But both need a little polishing. Let Sonnenfeldt do it. Both are accepted in substance.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Let Sonnenfeldt and Korniyenko do it. [They go off and redraft.]

SALT

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I have one final question regarding your last remarks on SALT. What version do you have in mind? Are you referring to 1100–1200, or to what you said to Ambassador Dobrynin on the increase of 84 missiles by 1983? You can get in touch with us.

Secretary Kissinger: In light of your considerations, we had better think in terms of 1980 rather than 1983. I can tell you your proposal of 1100–1000 can’t be accepted. It means a reduction of our program; there is no real equivalence.

Let me give you my impression of what you have said. Our impression from what you said is that we have suggested two categories of changes—one in the numbers we presented to the General Secretary and one in the numbers of the Interim Agreement.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: You find it difficult to discuss both changes simultaneously.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: [Laughter] They are difficult to be considered taken separately too!

Secretary Kissinger: I understand your point. Let us see whether we can—in terms of replacement, the categories in the Interim Agreement, and modifications of the MIRV numbers—come up with a scheme that we might be prepared to sign. I’ll let the Ambassador know within days of my return. Maybe if we meet again, I’ll have a preliminary view.

Now what time should we release this?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Any time.

Mr. McCloskey: Before we leave here would be better.

Secretary Kissinger: But who’ll explain it to the waiting press?
Foreign Minister Gromyko: I said “any time” but it would be better if it is in our morning papers tomorrow.

Secretary Kissinger: Then why not on the plane?

We could do it either way. But I’ll have to give a briefing.

[The text of the Joint Statement as agreed upon is at Tab B.\(^5\) It was released on the aircraft enroute to Algiers, and the Secretary briefed the press on its contents on the aircraft.\(^6\)]

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\(^5\) Attached but not printed. For the text of the joint statement issued on April 29, see Department of State Bulletin, June 24, 1974, p. 677.

\(^6\) Kissinger sent a report of his meetings to Nixon through Scowcroft. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 22, January–April 1974)

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179. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Nixon\(^1\)


Following is Secretary Kissinger’s report of his meeting with Gromyko.

“I spent three hours with Gromyko today (Tuesday) in Nicosia, almost exclusively dealing with the Middle East.\(^2\)

“Gromyko reiterated the standard Soviet position that disengagement will leave the area in a state of tension unless it is clearly linked to achievement of a final settlement. He stressed Soviet support for Syria’s demands. However, his presentation confirmed our own judgment that the principal issue for the Syrians is Kuneitra and that if they get it, the negotiation with Syria has a chance of succeeding. I made the point firmly to him several times that the US and USSR would inflame the situation if we tried to compete with each other in backing the maximum demands of the two sides. He assured me the Soviet Union did not want the area in a state of tension.

“In short, while I believe we probably cannot expect the Soviets to be particularly helpful on the Syrian negotiations, I do not see serious

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\(^2\) The May 7 memorandum of conversation is ibid.
signs that they are determined—or able—to disrupt the negotiations at this point. There was not a single complaint this time about US unilater-alism and exclusion of the Soviet Union. He seemed eager to try to find out from me the detailed specifics and he wants to assure the Soviets participate in the ‘finalization’ of the disengagement agreement at Ge-neva. My own assessment is that we will have a murderous time in Syria and that we may well fail.

“On other subjects, we reviewed the status of a number of bilateral US-Soviet agreements for the Summit—including arms control and technical cooperation matters. We agreed they were on course. On SALT, I would talk to Dobrynin once I got back from my trip. I reiterat-ed what our concerns were.

“We sketched out a rough scenario for moving ahead with the Eu-ropean Security Conference. The Soviets are willing to agree to some beefed-up language in the section of the final declaration regarding human contacts; this would go far to satisfying the West Europeans. Gromyko and I agreed that a third country (such as Finland) should be invited to submit some pre-agreed language to the Conference.”

180. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon

Moscow, May 15, 1974.

Dear Mr. President:

As your new visit to the Soviet Union is approaching, we shall have, probably, more often than once, to exchange ideas with you on the most important questions which will be the subject of discussions also at our personal meeting.

In this case I decided to dwell upon one of the issues of that very nature—the Middle East problem.

After the last October events I have already set forth to you in de-tail my thoughts regarding the Middle East affairs through our Ambas-sador in Washington, and also in the talks with Mr. Kissinger during

his visit to Moscow last March. Our appraisal of the state of affairs with the Middle East settlement was given also in Mr. A.A. Gromyko’s talks with you personally and with Mr. Kissinger, including those very recent ones when they met in Geneva and on the Cyprus. We regard positively those meetings in general, considering that they demonstrate the desire of the sides to search for mutually acceptable solutions of the questions under discussion.

Presently, I would like to somehow summarize the exchange of opinion that has taken place up to now on the Middle East problem and to express a couple of thoughts on possible further steps in the interests of speediest achievement of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

It seems, that not only you and we, but also the whole world is well aware of the fact that due, first of all, to the agreed actions of our two countries last October it was possible to provide for not simply the cease-fire in the Middle East, but also the convocation of the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East under the auspices of the USSR and the US which are the co-chairmen of that conference.

Unfortunately, after generally not a bad start of the Geneva Conference its further deliberations as well as the cause of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East turned out to be actually paralysed. It was not once said before why it had happened, and there is no need, apparently, to repeat it again.

By now, as a result of latest exchanges of opinion there exists, as we believe, an understanding between the Soviet and American sides on the following important points:

1. The US and the Soviet Union are ready to act on an agreed basis in solving all the questions of the Middle East settlement.

2. As soon as an acceptable to Syria basis for an agreement with Israel on troops disengagement appears, the negotiations aimed at finalizing the agreement on that matter should be transferred to the respective working committee of Geneva Conference with the participation of the representatives of the USSR and the USA in the work of that committee.

3. The full volume of work of the Geneva Conference on considering and resolving the key issues of the Middle East settlement should be resumed in the nearest future.

The existence of such an understanding on the further way of actions by the USSR and the USA in the Middle East naturally causes satisfaction, but with one reservation: if what we have agreed upon is going to be carried out in practice.

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2 See Document 167.

3 See Documents 174, 176, 177, and 178.
I paid attention to the fact that it turned out inconvenient for the US side to have even a short meeting of our Foreign Ministers in the capital of an Arab state—Damascus although President Assad of Syria and ourselves were prepared to do that. Frankly, we were somewhat surprised at that. If we are in agreement with you that our joint efforts should be directed at solving the Middle East problems, then it would appear even more useful for the representatives of the two powers to meet for an exchange of views in the very area, which is the subject of our common concern.

In our view, the most important thing now—and may be even more so than ever before—is for our two countries to bring about a real and sufficiently speedy progress in peaceful settlement in the Middle East, consistently adhering to the actually gained understanding, through joint efforts and, naturally, in contact with other appropriate countries.

I shall not, Mr. President, tell you again, how dangerous it would be, from our point of view, to continue the present situation in the area. I shall not do that only because quite enough has already been said about it, and not because our position on that matter has changed.

If I were to speak again about the substance of the Middle East problem, then inevitably the question would be of the heart of this problem, to which we not once returned in our talks and in our correspondence. This is the question of the vacating by Israel of all the Arab lands occupied in 1967 and later.

We are convinced, on our part, that given mutual desire of our two countries, and we have it, it is completely realistic to achieve substantial progress in the elimination of the most dangerous source of tension in the Middle East by the time of your visit to the the Soviet Union.

I would like to hope, Mr. President, that you are of the same opinion and that the US, on its part, will do everything possible so that at the meeting with you we could sum up what has been done on the Middle East settlement, and not speak again about the dangers of the situation in that area.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

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4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
NIAM 11–9–74

SOVIET DÉTENTE POLICY

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

Note

This National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum addresses the Soviet conception of détente, the factors which commend a détente approach to the Soviet leaders, the dangers they see in it for themselves, and its durability as a general framework for Soviet international behavior. It discusses the relationship between détente and the USSR’s major foreign policies, but does not attempt a detailed analysis of each of these individual policies.

Principal Conclusions

A. The USSR sees in détente the international atmosphere best suited to maximizing the power and security of the Soviet state and its influence abroad. Soviet leaders neither expect nor intend their “peace program” to end rivalry with the outside world, but rather to set prudent limits on that rivalry in the nuclear age and allow for greater Soviet policy maneuver.

B. For the Soviets, détente is at least as much a need as a choice. The major contributing factors include: the necessity to avoid nuclear war and, by extension, to manage local crises with great care; the problem of coping with Chinese hostility; a need for Western capital and technology; opportunities to have the USSR’s superpower status recognized and to consolidate its hegemony in Eastern Europe; and the chance to inhibit Western military programs without accepting corresponding limits on those of the USSR.

C. Pursuit of détente also raises problems for the Soviets at home and abroad: the problem of maintaining internal discipline in a more relaxed international atmosphere; possible erosion of Soviet control in

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A note on the original indicates the paper was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, and the National Security Agency and was concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board, except as noted in notes in the text.

2 The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Air Force, believe that this Memorandum, as a whole, does not stress sufficiently Soviet use of détente as a tool of external policy designed to expand Soviet power and influence in the world. [Footnote in the original.]
Eastern Europe; and complications in relations with client states and within the international communist movement. These problems do not appear critical at the moment.

D. Brezhnev and the détente approach seem well entrenched, but both must sustain a defensible record of accomplishment. Foreign policy setbacks of a magnitude to bring the overall détente approach into question would pose a challenge to Brezhnev’s position. He would probably be able to head off such a challenge by initiating some policy shifts. But if these setbacks were to coincide with serious domestic difficulties, he might not be able to carry off such a maneuver.

E. While Soviet leadership changes are likely over the next few years, successors will face much the same set of opportunities and imperatives. After some hiatus for domestic political consolidation, they will probably be predisposed by Soviet national interests to look favorably on a détente approach.

F. The most durable elements of the Soviet détente approach are the drive for expanded economic relations and the avoidance of threat and challenge in relations with the highly developed countries. Barring a radical change in Sino-Soviet relations, which we think unlikely, the rivalry with China will also serve to keep Moscow on this track. But some easing of this conflict, perhaps after Mao’s passing, could reduce Soviet incentives to pursue détente.

G. In the Middle East, the USSR is concerned to regain lost ground and hopes to do so at the more difficult later stages of Arab-Israeli negotiations. In any crisis within the next year or so, if Moscow were forced to make a clear choice between détente and its regional interests, the chances are better than even that, within the requirement of avoiding a confrontation with the US, the USSR would be willing to risk a setback to détente.

H. Soviet relations with the US are central to the future of détente, and arms control negotiations are central to those relations. While Soviet policy does not allow for a collapse of MBFR and SALT, Moscow still appears to be searching hard for advantage in these talks, and would like to believe that this behavior does not threaten other Soviet interests bound up in détente.

I. In the meantime, the USSR continues to pursue ambitious military programs. These extend beyond its vigorous ICBM development efforts to embrace many other weapon systems as well.

J. While the Soviet balance sheet on détente is becoming more complicated, the leaders will prefer to deal with various problems in pragmatic fashion, and to keep détente as a whole from coming into question. Even if only partial gains are realized, Moscow will not choose
deliberately to abandon détente unless forced to do so by critical repercussions at home or in Eastern Europe.

[Omitted here is the Discussion section.]

182. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 28, 1974, 12:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Richard Nixon
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Dobrynin: I just got a personal note from Brezhnev. [He reads:]
“The time of your visit is coming closer. We will exchange ideas. As it approaches, time may not permit much unless we begin preparations. Our meetings promise to be impressive. We will be able to reach agreement on ABM, a threshold test ban, long-term economic cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation, energy, construction and artificial heart. We continue to proceed from the possibility of progress on other problems where our discussions have not reached the point of drafting but we expect to reach agreement. In human terms, I want to express some thoughts I have. We attentively follow events in the United States. Much of what is happening is not understandable to us, but it is clear that the forces which are up in arms against the President are not friendly and also these are matters which affect not only internal politics but also foreign policy as well. Foreign policy is the toughest issue for opponents to attack for those who want to undermine the important things in the US-Soviet agreement and the other things you and I have agreed upon.”

“The best testimony that our joint course is correct is that détente is close to the hearts of the Soviet and American people. My colleagues and I do not identify the opponents with the majority of the American people. You, even with your domestic problems, are busy with foreign policy, including US-Soviet relations. That is the course for a statesman.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, Presidential/HAK Memcons, MemCons—HAK & President, May 8–31, 1974 [1 of 3]. Secret. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. Brackets are in the original.
Tenacity and firm spirit are needed, and these the President has. There are those who may think you may give way but we note with satisfaction that you will not give them such a pleasure."

"We are telling you this personally from the good relations enjoyed between us and believing in the success of our forthcoming meeting. Meanwhile we are looking forward to your visit and the visit of Dr. Kissinger."

President: I don’t want you to think that domestic politics will affect my trip or our relations. Mansfield agrees. Jackson is just playing 1976 politics. The important thing is not my problems—they will pass—but the legacy of peace that we will leave. Brezhnev and I came up the hard way. Both of us believe deeply in our own systems, and we bargain hard. But we see overriding our interests in peace. We must overcome our domestic problems. Tell Brezhnev not to worry about me and my health.

As you know, Kissinger’s visit has been delayed. I hope he settles it so we don’t have to talk about it—just the general area of the Middle East.

As I told your Parliamentarians,² the idea the U.S. is playing a role to force out the Soviet Union is baloney. As you know, right now we are the only ones who can handle the Israelis. As I told a group the other day, only the U.S. and the Soviet Union can resolve the big issues of peace in the world. We won’t always agree, but we must have close contact. As for the Kissinger trip, I hope we can meet with you first to iron things out to see if a trip is required.

Dobrynin: Kissinger and I are having lunch on Thursday.³

President: The main problem is MIRV. It’s tough for your and for our military.

Dobrynin: When Kissinger was with Brezhnev last time, Brezhnev was very outspoken on the situation.

President: As you know, I may visit the Middle East. It depends on the negotiation. The main point is we must announce the Soviet trip before my Middle East trip. Since I have to be here in July, I probably would have to go in June or postpone it to November. The Soviet trip comes first. A Middle East trip doesn’t take preparation.

Dobrynin: It will be good that the Soviet trip will be announced first.

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² Nixon met with a group of Politbure members on May 23. A record of the meeting is ibid.
³ May 30.
President: Yes, let’s try to do it Thursday or Friday.\(^4\) I understand Brezhnev will go to the Middle East. That is good. We both must play a role in the Middle East. We don’t want to push you out at all. The Middle East requires the participation of us both.

I told Boumediene the Soviet Union has a relationship there and so do we.\(^5\) We may compete at times, but we cannot try to push each other out. There are differences, yes, but in final analysis we must be able to get a common interest which overrides these differences. When you study Potsdam and Yalta,\(^6\) we made mistakes and you out-negotiated us. We won the war because we kept our eyes on winning the war. Now we must win the peace. We will have tough talks—but we must deal as equals and we don’t paint over our problems. That is a good part of the Nixon–Brezhnev relationship.

On the announcement, Friday would be good.

Dobrynin: What city would you like to visit in the Soviet Union? Brezhnev has asked me.

President: He knows the country. You and he figure it out.

\(^4\) An announcement was released in Washington and Moscow on May 31 that Nixon and Brezhnev would meet in Moscow for a week beginning June 27. See “Nixon to Go to Moscow June 27,” The New York Times, June 1, 1974, p. 1.

\(^5\) Boumediene and Nixon met on April 11.

\(^6\) A reference to the Potsdam and Yalta Conferences, July 17 to August 2, 1945, and February 4 to February 11, 1945, respectively.

183. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger\(^1\)


Mr. Secretary:

The thrust of this memo tallies closely with Embassy Moscow’s assessment that the Soviets are making considerable efforts to discourage emigration applications for Israel, including a press campaign highlighting bad living conditions there. As you recall, the Soviets in March gave us an “information sheet” stating that 95 percent of applications

for emigration are approved, and explaining that the decline in emigration since the October War is linked to unsettled conditions in the Middle East and to poor living conditions in Israel, and to a consequent decline in applications.

Sonnenfeldt

Attachment

Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hyland) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, undated.

Decline in Soviet Jewish Emigration

Soviet Jewish emigration declined 26 percent in the first four months of this year compared to last year. The table below compares emigration for the first four months of this year and last year:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>Percent Decline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,400</td>
<td>7,700</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Total</td>
<td>34,800</td>
<td>25,800 (projection)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It appears the Soviets are deliberately cutting back the flow of emigrants by a higher refusal rate and tougher application procedures:

—applicants must now obtain clearance from the local police before approaching the exit visa office.

—required employer’s references must date back at least six months, thereby discouraging Jews from quitting before applying to emigrate, since more than four months’ unemployment can lead to prosecution for “parasitism.”

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2 See footnote 7, Document 162.
3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
The Kremlin claims the decline in emigration is due to a drop in applications resulting from disillusionment with conditions in Israel, and is currently conducting a propaganda campaign highlighting difficulties of life there. But this is probably only a marginal factor at the moment. The Israeli Embassy in Washington says more than 4,500 invitations to emigrate are being mailed to Soviet Jews every month, and Jewish activists in Moscow say the desire to emigrate is as strong as ever.

The current decline may represent an attempt to pressure the US Congress on the Soviet-American trade issue by linking continued opposition to MFN and credits with a reduction in emigration. If so, the message would be that a Congressional compromise on the issue might bring the emigration back up again.

The Soviets have manipulated emigration rates before, boosting them in 1972 during the US elections and again in 1973 during House debate on Soviet-American trade and with the FRG prior to the last election. Moscow Jews are speculating that barriers to emigration may be lowered in connection with the Summit, but there is no hard evidence to this effect.
Moscow Summit and the Cyprus Crisis,
June–August 1974

184. Message From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon

Moscow, undated.

I would like to express to you, dear Mr. President, some considerations regarding the situation that is shaping up at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We shall certainly touch on this theme during our forthcoming talks in Moscow. However, in view of the urgency of this issue it is useful even now, in our opinion, to exchange views on it.

The completion of the Conference has been unjustifiedly delayed. The deliberations in Geneva have been going on extremely slow, sometimes the proceedings are being bogged down in trivia. It looks like the trivia overshadows the principal mission of the Conference, i.e. to consolidate the relaxation of tensions in Europe and beyond, to provide for peace and reliable security, which are the only conditions that can make a wide-range cooperation between the states in various fields possible. Sometimes we are confronted with proposals—I would like to note at once that they come not from the US—which are either plainly unacceptable or are not yet ripe for a decision, while the discussions on them result in unproductive waste of efforts and time. Some people start talking to the effect that the work of the Conference should be suspended for the summer or even for a longer period of time.

The Conference has been going on already for almost a year. Practically all the questions under discussion have been thoroughly reviewed, many of them several times over. On a number of aspects, including some major and important ones, agreement has been reached among all the participants with the balance of interests of the sides being found, and those interests are of course far from being homogeneous. We view that as an encouraging basis for the final success of the Conference.

As for the still unresolved questions, it appeared here with adequate certainty as well what was common in the positions of the partic-

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ipants and where they differ. Actually it is clear to everyone which pro-
posals can be accepted and which cannot.

If to remain on the realistic grounds, then it is possible to reach rel-
atively soon mutually acceptable decisions on the pending questions
related to all items on the agenda. In other words it is quite possible to
secure in a document agreements which would correspond to the de-
gree of the relaxation of tensions achieved at present in Europe and in
the world as a whole, to the level of mutual understanding, being estab-
lished between the states after a long period of tensions and mistrust.

In future, with the deepening of present positive processes in the
world, the results of the Conference, this first international forum in the
modern history of Europe, could be expanded and enriched along the
line of relaxation and confidence.

With such an approach the assets accumulated at the Conference
allow, so to say, to enter the final lap, to make the final thrust towards
the completion of the work of the Conference within the shortest period
of time, and mainly, with solid achievements which would reflect the
coincidence of interests of all the participants, above all in the cardinal
question of strengthening peace, security and cooperation in Europe.

I hope you will agree with me that to put the Conference in a top
gear a strong political impetus is needed, and first of all the one coming
from the top leaders of the countries, interested in its success. The
Soviet-American mutual understanding on the issues of the Confer-
ence has always been of prime importance for moving the Conference
ahead. It pertains also to the known understanding reached between
A.A. Gromyko and H. Kissinger which, we hope, will make it possible
to untangle the questions of item 3 of the Agenda discussed at this time
in Geneva.²

We would like to hope that now too at this turning phase of a sort
in the work of the Conference, both our countries will act in the spirit of
the established mutual understanding and will jointly facilitate the
speediest conclusion of this major international undertaking.

There is one more point to which I would like to draw your atten-
tion. We believe that one of the possibilities to make the work of the
Conference more active is for the countries, which of course would de-
sire to do so, to send to the conclusive part of the second stage of the
Conference in Geneva the representatives of a sufficiently high rank
who would be authorized to make appropriate decisions there.

We are convinced as before that the results of the Conference
would have historical importance for all the future course of events in

Europe in the direction of peace, relaxation of tensions and cooperation and they deserve to be sealed by the authority of the supreme leaders of the participating states. There are objective possibilities for bringing the Conference within a short period of time to a successful conclusion. We believe that they should be used to the fullest extent.3

3 In telegram 8625, from Moscow June 6, Stoessel wrote: “Some sort of turning point on CSCE will have been passed as of the time of the Summit. It now seems likely that the Soviets will very soon put in most of their chips in order to try to wrap up the second stage by the end of June or early July. Whether they will continue to push for a July CSCE summit is still not clear, but it seems more likely than not. Therefore I would expect a strong pitch from Brezhnev on this subject in June.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 950, VIP Visits, Presidential Trip (USSR & Europe), June 1974 [5 of 5])

185. Editorial Note

On June 25, 1974, President Richard Nixon left Washington for a two-day state visit to Belgium. In his memoirs he described the trip: “Our first stop was Brussels, where I attended ceremonies marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of NATO. I thought that it would be especially useful to dramatize the continuing viability of the Atlantic alliance before sitting down with Brezhnev. In my formal statement to the NATO Council, I said that the period of détente was one of great opportunity but also great danger. We had to face the fact that European politics had changed completely. We had to accept the fact that fear of communism was no longer a practical motivation for NATO; if NATO were to survive, it would need other binding motives to keep it together.” The text of President Nixon’s statement before the North Atlantic Council, delivered on June 26, is in telegram 4583 from Brussels, June 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Two days later, Nixon and his party left Belgium and continued on to Moscow for the summit. He described his arrival in his memoirs: “With our airport reception in Moscow on June 27, Summit III got off to a very auspicious start. Brezhnev himself was there, bounding across the tarmac to meet me. A fairly large crowd had been allowed to stand behind barriers and wave paper flags. Unlike 1972, there were also crowds along the streets to the Kremlin.” (The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, pages 1026–1027)
186. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, June 28, 1974, 10:45 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Nikolai V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of USA Division
Leonid M. Zamyatin, Director General of TASS
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Andrei Vavilov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
President Richard M. Nixon
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., USA (Ret.), Assistant to the President
Ronald L. Ziegler, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Major General Brent Scowcroft, USAF, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor to the Department of State
William G. Hyland, Director, State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Jan M. Lodal, NSC Senior Staff

SUBJECT
Tour d’horizon

General Secretary Brezhnev: Mr. President, American guests, it gives me and my colleagues great pleasure to welcome you once again to Moscow. In effect, we began this round of talks yesterday, but yesterday we devoted most of the time to protocol, and had no time to get into substance.

I would like to note, first of all, that this new meeting takes place under new circumstances: many important political events are taking place in the world. But, first, I would note that in meeting here with you once again, I cast my thoughts to the past, to the first meeting in 1972.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in St. Catherine’s Hall at the Grand Kremlin Palace. Brackets are in the original.
when we had very businesslike discussions and negotiation and signed the most important agreements, which laid the groundwork for very good relations between our two states and two peoples.

That first meeting is past history, and it is universally recognized that it belongs to a prominent place in history, so that meeting in world history and the contents of its agreements constituted a turning point in relations. Then we stood at the beginning of the road that we were to follow together.

I think that we both recall that at the time of the first meeting there was great pessimism on the part of many; many said the meeting itself was impossible, let alone the agreement we signed. And following that meeting it took a great effort to go further, and we all of us value very highly your persistent efforts, of the President and Secretary Kissinger, to make it possible in 1973 to continue what we began in 1972, and to sign some important documents.

There is no need to list all of the agreements. They are universally known—known to the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States, and indeed, they are agreements that have been duly appreciated by the peoples of the Soviet Union and the USA. While we would not want to belittle the others, the most important ones that we signed here and in the US are the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement, the Treaty on Limiting ABM and the Treaty on Limiting Strategic Arms, and, of course, the Basic Principles. All of these are documents of great historical importance. Figuratively speaking, all served to prepare conditions for building a broad avenue between our two countries, based on principles of mutual respect and confidence and development of political, economic and cultural ties. Of course, to be frank, we have to say that along with the highest assessments, we hear in the press and from others differing assessments of these documents. But what they all achieved are already a matter of history and reality, and history will judge what we have done correctly, and history will assess what we have achieved, the courage it took to do it, and the justice of what was achieved in a short time.

And it will also be realized that in the past period, how our relations have improved from a purely practical standpoint. For example, there are thousands of visitors to the Soviet Union—statesmen, businessmen and others. Many travel to the US—ministers, heads of departments and others. Thus, indirectly, Soviet-American relations are becoming a fact whether some are against it or whether anyone likes it or not.

And it is probably worthwhile noting the improvement of relations is playing a role of no small importance in world politics. In this period, we recall that improvement existing in Vietnam, there is no firing in the Middle East, and there is cooperation by the four powers in
Berlin, and, not without your support, we have important agreements in Europe between the USSR and FRG, and Poland, and between the two Germanys. Both are members of the UN. And there is agreement with Czechoslovakia—all of very great significance.

A considerable amount of work has been done in the economic field. We have several agreements, and contracts have been negotiated and signed, both short-term and very long. These cement the positive elements written into various documents that we signed.

In short, we positively evaluate the work done between the Soviet Union and the United States in the past years. We do not say this simply today in this meeting, but in several public statements. Regardless of extraneous or momentary conditions, even during the recent Soviet elections campaign all of my comrades here gave a high assessment of what we had achieved jointly. I would not like to omit the fact of more frequent group visits to the Soviet Union—various representatives of business and social organizations. We express our gratitude for hosting the Supreme Soviet visit recently. Of course there are quite a few other important events, some of which we will be mentioning later on.

Nonetheless, without belittling what has been achieved, we believe it is too early to put a full stop to this process. We have jointly begun the process of détente and improving relations in all spheres, but we have traversed only the initial stage, and we have to consolidate it. Ahead of us lies a great volume of work, issues that require intensive efforts and goodwill on both sides.

There are other reasons for not weakening our attention and concentration for progressive advance in Soviet-American relations. You and we would not be realists if we closed our eyes to certain circles who want to put a brake on our progressive advance in relations, and arrest the process of improvement.

In saying this I emphasize that the process of improvement of relations not be allowed to run its course, but requires an effort to overcome obstacles and negative accretions of the past. As our two states, we have occasion to confirm that we are building relations in terms of the perspective of peace, good neighborliness and friendship, and, as before, we are firmly in favor of joint efforts to make the process a continuous and stable one and irreversible. And this is a line of ours that we seek to extend to all spheres—political, economic, scientific and cultural, technical.

In short, that is what we are trying to do today with the third meeting. I would like to express the hope that as in the two previous meetings this one will end with very impressive results. Mr. President, we will discuss many issues, some more or less agreed before, and requiring less effort, but there are quite a few that will require a
strenuous exchange of views. The main purport and direction of the meeting, we see in showing to the world the clear, unflagging determination of the US and Soviet Union to go on following the line defined in the document and to take further steps to give practical effect to that line. I am sure that you know yourself, but I want to say, that we are fulfilling honestly in good faith all the agreements signed in the past two years. I believe that the main meaning of our meeting, not only in the documents signed but also in the communiqués that continue this line, is to show the world that there is a relaxation of tensions, a slow down in the arms race, including strategic arms, and the chance for general and complete disarmament. Also we believe it is only too natural for communiqués to include a provision that we are determined to remove and to prevent outbreaks of new hotbeds of tension and to consolidate and extend the process of the relaxation of tensions to new regions of the world. Also there is the question of principle in trade and commerce. The net result is that life itself is making the way—the business communities are interested in more contracts and we should register this important fact in the communiqué as well. I should like to comment on the important aspect of the machinery of Soviet-American meetings at the highest level. It is proven in practice that regular summits are a positively important sign to ensure the favorable development of relations. Indeed, precisely, the holding of meetings as nothing else creates the possibility for open discussion and solution of more complicated questions of principle, and as I feel—and I said this to my comrades after our brief meeting yesterday—the President is of a like mind, and has invited me to pay a new visit to the US. That is something we welcome, but we also feel that we could build on the existing practice and have additional, briefer meetings, to take up not the full range of relations but one or two issues.

In concluding this opening statement, we all value very highly your personal contribution to the process of improvement of relations between our two countries and we want to express in confidence our hope and belief that the present visit will serve the broadest interest of our two peoples and the interests of universal peace. At this opening stage, we have expressed our views on general problems, so that after we can turn to a specific review in whatever order the President prefers.

President Nixon: In response to the General Secretary's statement, we all share the spirit of his remarks and also the goals he sets out for eventual achievement. We feel, as does the General Secretary, that these highest level meetings serve useful purposes. When you have the two strongest nations, there is inevitably a positive impact, when we work together, and many bilateral matters can only be settled at the highest level. The value of summit meetings is that there is an incentive
to make progress on substantive issues. We cannot have a meeting and labor at the summit to produce a mouse. I think that we have found that the preparations for each meeting have laid the groundwork for agreement and negotiations and for signing documents at the summit. The work of our associates—Dr. Kissinger, Minister Gromyko, Ambassador Dobrynin and all our colleagues—are extremely constructive, making possible real results, rather than atmospherics at the highest level. For example, after this meeting, we have to think to next year, to think of projects we might have underway that we can negotiate. I agree with the General Secretary that where there is something specific to negotiate, which cannot be delayed to the annual meeting, that on our side there will be every support for a meeting whenever necessary to serve a useful purpose. We live in a fast moving world, and some events will not wait for a year.

I will address some of the subjects which the General Secretary raised.

First, we have significant progress already made, and a recognition of some disappointments that in other areas we have not made progress as fast as we would like.

We begin by recognizing that as the two strongest nuclear powers there will be inevitable areas of competitiveness and our interests will not be identical. We would add the fact that for many years we did not have the frank avenue of consultations that has now been established by the summit meetings. This does not mean that simply by meeting and knowing each other that this settles very complicated problems. But it is also true that differences cannot be settled at all if there is no direct consultation between the two parties concerned. So by establishing at various levels—at the highest and other levels, and in other sectors—these contacts set up the process for settling differences where we can and of avoiding disputes that might occur if there were no communication.

That brings us to those areas of agreement that are relatively easy, and from this we can move to the ones that are more difficult because of the mature relationship we have.

Bilaterally, the negotiation of an agreement on energy, for example, or medical exchange, the artificial heart—these are mutually beneficial, and they do not place us in opposition in any way. And though there is a tendency on the part of many foreign policy experts to downgrade the importance of these, the more we find areas to work together the more we make the relationship binding, and thereby irreversible. In other words, it takes small as well as large threads to make a fabric that binds.

Now we come to those areas, because of differences in substance, we have more difficulty in reaching agreement.
We are pleased that we are going to negotiate a long-term economic relationship at this meeting. We are not pleased that due to the policy of the Congress we have not gone forward on the MFN, on which I made a commitment in these meetings. But considering the fact that trade between the private and socialist economies is difficult—like oil and water—we have made significant progress, and I believe that we can safely say that we can make far more progress in the future.

Every private businessman that has visited the Soviet Union returns very excited about the prospects of more trade with the Soviet Union.

Another question is how to work out the problem of credits—a problem that the experts are quite familiar with. We shall continue to push forward and to work politically with the Congress on MFN and the credit side of this issue. Here we believe as more understanding develops between our two governments at the highest level we can make progress that influences prospects at the Congressional level on this issue.

In a third area, the two strongest nations can and must work to find ways to work together in what might be called crisis areas, in other parts of the world. Here we have the European Security Conference. We can discuss where problems are arising, which we are all familiar with. Related to this is the reduction of forces in Europe. On our part we desire to have very frank discussions because Europe is a critical area of the world, and our two great nations should reduce to a very minimum conflicts between themselves in this area.

We have a problem here which the General Secretary and his colleagues are very familiar with. It is more difficult for us to speak for our allies than for the General Secretary to speak for his. For example, I made a commitment to conclude the CSCE by the end of 1973. We have done as well as we can and we are continuing to try, and perhaps with the Finnish compromise, which the General Secretary is familiar with, and other working level compromises, we can break the logjam at the Conference. I emphasize here that just as with MFN, where we made a commitment, we will not drag our feet, but will show goodwill and make progress; though there are problems—(1) political problems in the US, with which the General Secretary is familiar, and (2) problems of political influence in the Atlantic Community.

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2 The Senate version of the Trade Bill was still in markup as of June 1974. The President met with Senators Long and Bennett on May 23 to discuss, among other things, progress on the bill. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 208.

3 On June 5 in Geneva, the Finns proposed two amendments to language in Basket III.
The Middle East is the other area where our interests are not identical. This does not mean that we both are not for peace, but because of our long association that each of us has in that area, we have had some differences. The point I particularly want to emphasize is that the US will play whatever role it is useful to play to bring about a more peaceful atmosphere in the Middle East. But there has not been, and will not be any effort to push the Soviet Union out of its traditional role, which it has because of historical tradition and geographical location.

There, as in Europe, there are times when each of us can best accomplish the objectives of a peaceful settlement which both of us have, by working bilaterally, and other times [working] collectively. But the rule is that at all times we consult and closely, so that we are never in a position of acting at the expense of the other party. What counts in the end is the result: if it is best achieved in a larger forum at one time, then it should be used; but, at other times, discussions in a smaller forum are more useful. I use the analogy of the UN. The UN generally is not suitable for settling differences on many important problems.

The most difficult, and it has always been the most difficult because it involves vital questions, but one in which we have made considerable progress and can take satisfaction to date, is strategic arms control. We have the ABM agreement in 1972 and the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons and the agreement on preventing nuclear war. There are others, but these are the most important. We have made a good beginning for this summit, but we must admit that we have only begun; I refer to the limitation of ABMs to one site. Our experts will have to work out the language satisfactorily. We have the threshold test ban. Here we have considerable differences between us. This is an area we believe can be explored to find an agreement in principle to lay foundation for final agreement later.

On SALT, this is the most difficult of all. I well recall our first meeting, when the General Secretary explained by drawing the changes in silos, that he was more expert than I. We have to have very frank discussion of whether we can reach agreement in particular, as far as MIRVs are concerned. We do not discount the importance of ABMs, of non-proliferation, or even the test ban. They are all important. But in terms of an overriding runaway nuclear arms race, agreement on offensive arms is crucial.

The problem that I present to the General Secretary and his colleagues is this: if we are unable to reach agreement or to make progress in reaching agreement in the future, inevitably the reaction will be, on our side, to go forward with our offensive nuclear weapons program; and, of course, the Soviet Union will do likewise; it is inevitable. So the question we have is whether to control the nuclear arms race before it controls us.
I wish I had the solution to offer at this point, but as the General Secretary implied in his own remarks, this subject requires extensive discussion to see if we can narrow our differences.

I will conclude by saying that the very fact of this meeting is important. When we have this close personal relationship that we enjoy, it means that where differences arise we have a better chance to resolve them, by contacts between ourselves. I can assure the General Secretary and his colleagues that I will use my influence in a way to find a solution fair to both sides, while always recognizing that we are negotiating as equals, and that there could be no settlement or agreement that either side could accept if it gave an unfair advantage. Not only are meetings important, but this great host of agreements that we have signed and will sign, apart from strategic arms, is very important. Because, as I indicated earlier, we must establish as many ties between our two nations as we can. Because in the end not only a single agreement, but even more important agreements in a number of areas, means that we are cooperating together, and will make détente irreversible. Above all, we establish ties that others in the future will find very difficult to reverse. We must say, finally, that we must not expect that at one meeting we will settle everything; we must not be discouraged, because we recognize, as I said at the outset, that because of our strength, and because we represent two powerful people, there will be competition and differences. But what we can achieve is that such differences and competition will not result in conflict. For that reason it is vital to make as much progress as we can in this third meeting so that forces will not be set in motion that will undo all our good work.

General Secretary Brezhnev [pointing to Secretary Kissinger]: Dr. Kissinger is not working, because he is not eating enough.

Secretary Kissinger: I am eating.

General Secretary Brezhnev [picking up a pirozhki]: I treat you equally; I am also eating.

Secretary Kissinger: I will gain weight and then surrender.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Mr. President, maybe we could have our minister state what we have.

President Nixon: Yes, we could round up from them our work.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Then I call on Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Minister Gromyko: We have three agreements, on energy, urban construction and artificial heart. These are fully agreed, fully prepared including from the technical preparations and as agreed, we can have a signing ceremony at 3:30. We have a new understanding as regards ABMs. This is agreed in principle but will not be signed today; that will be signed in the second round of signing. We have agreement on
long-term economic relations that is agreed by both sides. We also have two protocols: one to a previous agreement on strategic arms, and the other to the ABM treaty. These are agreed and are fully ready for signing.4

We have given before this meeting, a possible agreement on the non-use of environmental means for military purposes and we received a counterdraft which is markedly different in content. Without going into details, your counterdraft creates problems, but that can be taken up in other discussions. If an agreement on this subject is possible, it would result in a relevant document to be signed in the second round.

I have nothing to add to what the General Secretary said on underground tests. There is no document agreed, therefore we have differences of views.

On the communique, leaving aside further limit of strategic arms—because as Comrade Brezhnev mentioned to you these require further exchanges of view—we find that the communique is not finally agreed, partly because important issues that form part of our discussion are not agreed, and partly because formulations are in the process of being agreed. As regards other matters, work is continuing.

General Secretary Brezhnev: This shows a lot of work is ahead of us.

President Nixon: This leaves the easy work for us.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Yes, it appears so.

The President will sign the agreement on energy? Kissinger will be signing on artificial heart? Energy will be signed by Comrade Podgorny and housing by Prime Minister Kosygin and artificial heart by Foreign Minister Gromyko.

President Nixon: [What is left] for you?

General Secretary Brezhnev: You see how they have taken it all out of my hands. See, what my role is.

Minister Podgorny: We have left the most important for him.

President Nixon: I want to add that on MFN, we will get it.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That is good sign.

President Nixon: I knew that I did not have to remind you.

General Secretary Brezhnev: It was not in my opening remarks, but I had not forgotten.

Minister Podgorny: He put it very delicately.

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4 In all, seven agreements were signed at the end of the Summit, as well as the joint communique and a joint statement on environmental warfare. See Document 199.
General Secretary Brezhnev: Could we read the communiqué for this meeting?

Mr. Sukhodrev [reads aloud texts at Tab A].

“On June 28 the talks began between General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet N. V. Podgorny, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin, USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko and the President of the United States of America Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

“A broad range of questions of Soviet-American relations was discussed. Both sides noted that the agreements concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States of America are being implemented and that as a result of this, the relations between the two countries are increasingly assuming a character that meets the interests of peace. This in turn creates additional possibilities for their further development and deepening.

“It was also noted on both sides that the continued reshaping of the relations between the USSR and the USA not only meets the fundamental interests of the peoples of both countries but constitutes an important element in the general process of relaxation of international tension.”

[Sukhodrev then hands over texts at Tab A.]

President Nixon: Let us agree, unless Dr. Kissinger has anything to add.

Secretary Kissinger: Foreign Minister Gromyko has correctly summarized the status of our discussions, in terms of what documents are ready. We had prepared the ABM protocol for signature conceivably for tomorrow, but this is not yet decided. At the end of the summit we might have a protocol on environmental questions and the test ban. I am confident, while agreeing that points remain open, that we can have an important communiqué in time for signature.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That is a good statement. [He takes another sandwich.]

President Nixon: I suppose that we are not restating [in the communiqué for this meeting] that it is agreed to have another meeting in Washington next year. The suggestion that the General Secretary made is constructive: if there is a single subject that comes up that is worth our exchange of views at the highest level, we do not wait for a year. That is a fundamental point.
General Secretary Brezhnev: We could mention that in the final communiqué.

President Nixon: I agree, but we will not mention it in this communiqué today.

General Secretary Brezhnev and Minister Podgorny: Yes.

President Nixon: We have a good network of communication established: through Dobrynin, Gromyko and his colleagues, and Ambassador Stoessel, but maybe an occasion will arise, even growing out of this meeting, that we might have another summit.

General Secretary Brezhnev: The trouble is that Dr. Kissinger is not always disciplined. He was here last March and said that he would come in May.

President Nixon: He went to Leningrad instead.

General Secretary Brezhnev: You know that we will make it easier for him to go to Leningrad.

President Nixon: In Leningrad, Mr. Kosygin will be the host because he is a Leningrader.

Minister Kosygin: Of course, with pleasure.

President Nixon: I want to say that as two great powers, we are now speaking directly. Considering our differences in the recent period of the cold war, the establishment of a new relationship would not have occurred if there was only one meeting. It was a beginning, but it must be constantly renewed to give it new impetus.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That is precisely our goal, as time goes by there are new ideas.

President Nixon: The situation changes. Too often in world history, treaties are signed, and statesmen depart, and people say “peace, it’s wonderful.” But treaties are put in desk drawers and gather dust.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We are not that kind of country. If we give our word, we never break our word.

President Nixon: The difficulty is that our differences cannot be the subject of one meeting. What we achieve we must keep building.

General Secretary Brezhnev: True. We can so we have a solid foundation on which this meeting can build. As I see it, judging from agreed statements, our views coincide in wanting to strengthen the peace between our two countries but also in the world. This is the reason why our talks should be open and frank, and testify to the fact that the line jointly chosen has been progressing.

President Nixon: Each of us appreciates that the other is equal; each of us appreciates the other is honest.

General Secretary Brezhnev [interrupting]: That is exactly the principle we agreed in our first meeting.
President Nixon [continuing]: And, second, we recognize our differences and lay them on the table honestly. And, finally, each of us recognizes that over a period of time our negotiations reduce those differences. But only on the basis of where each recognizes that for an agreement to be lasting it must serve our mutual interests. I have to defend agreements with the Congress and our people, and the General Secretary has to defend the agreements with his colleagues and with his people.

General Secretary Brezhnev: The principles which you have just stated, that we are building good relations, that is espoused by the entire Politburo and our entire state. And as I promised to you yesterday, we will be completely frank, honest and open.

Well, I now wish that you have a good rest.
187. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, June 28, 1974, 4–5:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Nikolay V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
Aleksey N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.
Georgy M. Kornienko, Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Andrey M. Alexandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
President Nixon
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
General Alexander M. Haig, USA (ret.), Assistant to the President
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the State Department
William G. Hyland, Director, INR
Jan Lodal, NSC Senior Staff

SUBJECTS
ABM; Test Ban

Brezhnev: Mr. President, what is the first subject for discussion today?

President: I think ABM. We want to make sure that Kissinger and Gromyko don’t sign something that is not in our interest.

Brezhnev: Yes, that is very important. For my part, it is important and we are setting about a solution in the correct way. A certain time has passed and our scientists have concluded that we can spare this and I feel we should agree with their findings. Not only will we be saving money but we will also prove the direction we want to go is toward peace. It will be most expedient and significant in terms of increasing confidence between our two countries and, therefore, I feel sure that we will reach a unanimous decision in this field. And so we are prepared to sign an agreement tomorrow.

President: Good. Yes, we will then be limited to one ABM for each side but will have the right to exercise a change.

Brezhnev: Yes, at the option of that side. As far as the zone for ABM is concerned I only request that the area not be in the region where Dr. Kissinger lives.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in St. Catherine’s Hall at the Grand Kremlin Palace.
Kissinger: You see what understanding I have achieved in only two years.

Brezhnev: You see how solicitous we are of your health.

President: Considering our bureaucracy we could probably do without Washington easier than you could do without Moscow.

Brezhnev: The scientists show that ABM has little effect but let them have their one area and do what they want although we could get by without ABMs altogether. We feel people will take the correct view. They will regard it as another step to gain confidence. You always advance step by step and perhaps we can eliminate the one remaining site in the field.

Kosygin: The main thing to point out to the public is that we are removing and limiting ABMs not because we are technically unable to produce a new system but that we do not need it. There are two ways the public may react. There will be a feeling of concern that they are not adequately protected. But the other way will be the result of increased confidence on both sides.

Podgorny: In short, people will be more certain that neither side wants to attack the other.

Brezhnev: Good, shall we turn to the European Conference?

President: Either that or the threshold test ban. Since the threshold test ban relates to the same general subject we have been discussing maybe we should take it up and then go on to Europe.

Brezhnev: Good, let’s do it. That question is basically agreed as Dr. Kissinger said. Why do you want to conduct any underground nuclear tests when we have already had so many tests. When will they stop?


Brezhnev: That long? What we should do is build on what we have achieved. The previous agreements limit strategic arms. The agreement provides that we will not develop cardinally new types of weapons. And suddenly against this background we will tell the people that we want to go ahead with nuclear testing. So reasoning logically, they will be bewildered: we agree to limit strategic arms but want to go ahead on testing—therein lie certain contradictions. People will ask about that. On the one hand we limit and on the other we conduct explosions. And this against the background of the limited test ban treaty, and they will question why are we conducting underground testing. Therefore, if one looks at another aspect of this matter the present situation enables other nations that signed the NPT also to test. This is a politically adverse aspect of this question. So we believe we should discuss the entire range in a friendly manner. We agree to move gradually forward step by step. This question if it remains without a solution will draw the at-
tention of the people. That is why we must give earnest thought to the whole matter.

President: Regarding the argument the General Secretary raised with regard to the comprehensive test ban, we have heard this before, and also the points he made. While that might be an objective view, nevertheless, we consider it possible to go the step by step approach. That is why we suggested, as you know, a threshold of 100 kilotons. That gets around the problem and answers the verification problem. I think a step by step approach will have very great meaning. It is the testing of major weapons that causes the greatest concern. We believe we should take a step of this magnitude now to see how it works and it is possible we shall make further progress in the future. When I used the number 100 kilotons we are not totally tied to this but in that low magnitude. There are also other issues we have put on the table for discussion. In addition to the threshold magnitude of 100 kilotons you may have some other ideas on this. We feel from the point of view of promoting non proliferation of nuclear weapons our agreement can be a factor in encouraging others not to test and will show we are indeed fully determined to proceed along the path of détente and disarmament. Whichever way, whether favoring your or our point of view, there is disagreement. Therefore, logic speaks in favor of ending tests altogether and this will also have a great effect on others to refrain from testing because there is a gradual spread. In suggesting this we are not pursuing self-seeking goals. It is in the interests of both sides.

Kosygin: Mr. President, if we were to endorse publicly that we want to continue nuclear testing it will not convince anyone. We need to reach agreement as we did on the ABMs not to expand our effort. We are going to only one area and that is already disarmament limiting one type of weapon, that is disarmament. But we are continuing nuclear testing with the obvious aim of improving nuclear warheads. So what, in short, does a threshold test ban mean that we will be renouncing? We will not be taking the road of disarmament, but will be perfecting weapons. That will be the obvious tenor of the comments. I just heard today that 20 senators had come out in favor of ending tests.

(President: 37.)

Kosygin: So what do you think is easier? To justify the need for continuing or the need for stopping. We believe it is easier to justify the need to stop. We believe it is very hard to prove the need to continue nuclear testing. We can prove the value of ending tests to the Congress but the very fact that we don’t reach agreement on ending tests will re-

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2 In a June 25 letter to President Nixon, 37 Senators, including Mansfield and Fulbright, urged Nixon to negotiate an agreement that would lead to a total ban on nuclear testing. (The New York Times, June 26, 1974, p. 16)
duce the significance of questions we are also agreeing to. Speaking frankly, everyone will say we are making concessions to your Pentagon and to judge by the statements of your Secretary of Defense this may be seen as some kind of support of the line taken by the Pentagon. That is, to step up military preparations. Whatever way we decide to discuss, in fact, people will agree that it is a severe blow to our general cause. Also of late, there is on the part of the US a line of general thought—Israel and Egypt for example received reactors—and all big things start with such little things and therefore for us it is very important to find a solution to this issue and to solve it on a long term basis. If we reach a solution this will be welcomed by all people everywhere.

President: We discussed this issue in very great depth before I came. It is true some in our Senate favor a comprehensive test ban. At the other end of the spectrum there are equal numbers who favor no ban at all having in mind the problem of verification. We have tried to take a very significant step to restrain both sides by setting a low threshold. Having taken such a step we will get the support of the majority of our Congress. It is true as Premier Kosygin has said that we will not be going all the way. I will speak very candidly in terms of the limit to our negotiations. We cannot go to a total test ban and we think the threshold we are suggesting will be considered a very significant step. Obviously, we have a difference of opinion as I indicated in my opening remarks. I do not want to give the impression that I am not giving consideration to the remarks of the General Secretary and his colleagues. But I also do not want to leave any impression that I simply do what the Pentagon wants to do.

Kosygin: I don’t have that impression.

President: If so, I wouldn’t be here at all. In our system the decision is taken at my level. If there are differences in our system those in our bureaucracy will disagree publicly rather than as in a more responsible government limit their remarks to private meetings. We have surveyed this question very carefully, not only in our NSC but also with the Congress, and I have reached the conclusion that the proposition we have made to you for discussion is the step we can take but we cannot go further. We have prepared our own people for a threshold test ban. We are prepared to discuss the specifics and to negotiate but not for a comprehensive test ban at this time.

Kosygin: But then you will be coming out in favor of continuing nuclear testing.

President: No, the fact is that we are coming out in favor of limiting nuclear testing.

Kosygin: Yes, but those who oppose testing and come out in favor of a comprehensive test ban want to see more progress.

President: That may seem to be the case.
Kosygin: In fact, they will be right because then we will have to come out in favor or continuing testing. We cannot claim to interpret the internal aspects of the US; you are the best judge of that. But we feel the broader approach is more correct.

President: We recognize that there has been a lively debate over the years on this issue.

Kosygin: There is throughout the world.

President: But the point we have in mind is the one the General Secretary recognized. We have got to take these things on a step by step basis. For example, the most progressive point of view would be to ban all nuclear weapons and destroy all of them. Yet neither of us is in a position to go that far at this point. In this field we feel an obligation for our security and also to consider verification. Taking account of public opinion this will still be the biggest step we can have taken in that the threshold will be very low—in the neighborhood of 100 kilotons. That, of course, is a matter for negotiation.

Brezhnev: While discussing this the question arises: why do we need tests at all. This is the toughest question. It must be taken into account. Under the previous agreement you have tested all you can and we have tested all we can. We favor the non-proliferation treaty and so do you. And yet, nonetheless, we want to go on testing. Why do we leave this loophole? We can vouch for everybody here so let us understand what is the real reason. Who are we acting for? Who are we trying to please by continuing testing? I am perplexed; we are not pleased with continued testing. We are not pleasing the people, but maybe the top echelon of the Pentagon. So the question does arise why continue testing. I don’t know. Maybe because of a group of senators, maybe because of Jackson. But we care ourselves in the interests of our people. In terms of world opinion, if we continue, if our two countries cannot cease testing, this will become a decisive factor in terms of others who wish to continue testing. The step we want would have beneficial influence on the entire international situation. It would favorably affect the French public and opinion in China. Several of them would in this situation be in complete isolation. Otherwise, they say the US and USSR are still testing. Let’s join in and test with them. But this is not much in line with the expression of world opinion today.

Kosygin: Every correspondent will ask did we discuss limiting nuclear testing. What happens when we say we discussed continuing testing? What will you say? It will not be a pleasant burden. I would not wish to carry thus unpleasant task. We want to take another step more beneficial in strengthening the line of cooperation. Otherwise, when we are asked who wanted to continue testing and we have to say it was not the Soviet Union, and in our draft as we suggest it is specifically addressed to others. We merely call on them to accede. If this has no ef-
fect, if others do not accede, then in two years we will be free to resume. We would not want to but we must leave ourselves this option. On the other hand, under the arrangements already envisaged which will be extended, neither side will create cardinally new weapons so there will be no need for further testing. I say this not merely out of a desire to attack your position or to talk you into it, but to give you an understanding of our position and to gain an agreement that will improve mutual confidence. We fully accept what some will say about this but it is up to us to find agreements that our views frankly and openly. [sic]

We can discuss this at greater length but boldly.

Kissinger: We have had a period of exchanging views on this subject, and you are aware of our reasoning why we are not prepared to have a comprehensive test ban. Incidentally, the fact that you pointed out concerning SALT the agreements do not prohibit developing weapons that will require some testing. Thus, we had agreed that we could have a threshold test ban, the one which our experts have been working on for two weeks, which would not exclude a comprehensive test ban in the future if the whole situation with respect to strategic weapons were clarified. We want a threshold test ban at this summit, Mr. President, but there are a number of important issues that require resolution, at least in principle: (1) at what level the threshold should be set; (2) what to do about peaceful nuclear explosions; (3) what to do about exchanging enough data to convert a kiloton threshold into a seismic magnitude; and finally, what to do about Soviet proposals for a quota on the number of tests below the threshold. There are other points but they can be settled so that we could sign a protocol giving instructions to establish a threshold test ban within a reasonable period. And then the comprehensive test ban could be taken up within the general framework of stopping the arms race in strategic arms when that is achieved.

Brezhnev: None of the points you mentioned would exist if we banned all tests.

President: Except for the real problem which shall remain: until we get the nuclear arms race under control some testing is inevitably going to go forward. I realize that the General Secretary and Prime Minister Kosygin have lost none of their very effective advocacy ability and I appreciate their point of view. But we explained our position before we came and what we are trying to do is to negotiate something that is possible now. That is why we suggest a threshold test ban. I know the press will say this is half a loaf but nevertheless it is a step in the right direction, and we look down the road to stopping all tests, when those conditions that require testing are achieved. Incidentally, either one of you (Kosygin or Brezhnev) would make a very good Senator but I would want you on my side.
Kosygin: I will be on your side if you agree to end testing. No, I will always be on your side.

President: Speaking quite candidly, we have an ironic situation as 1976 approaches in the US with respect to détente. There are some who are quite critical of the hard line as opposed to the arms control. But others have now changed their minds. It gets down to this. Those who applauded our efforts toward détente successfully over the past two years now for reasons more of a pristine motive would like to see our efforts fail. I would not make any enemies if I were intractable. It is unlikely that I would be criticized too hard. On the other hand, if I take a reasonable position as I intend to do they will say that I am giving away the store. For example, should I agree to a threshold test ban that cannot be verified they will say that clever fellow Brezhnev, he took Nixon again. Even today Dr. Kissinger and I are used to tough negotiations but I heard our critics say in 1972 we made a deal with regard to SALT in which we gave away too much at the conference table. I do not raise these points to indicate that my position is based simply on these political figures. I will move in the direction of détente because for the US and USSR it is indispensable for the peace of the world and that is why we want every possible agreement we can make and implement. That is why I am so critical of the members of the Senate who did not produce MFN. For those who do not follow the American scene it may be quite illuminating to read my Naval Academy speech3 where I said neither of the great powers can think in terms of military power and threats or think that their economies can affect the internal policies of other nations. We are not going to change your system and you are not going to change ours. The point I want to make is this: I am in a unique position of being able to bring the American public along in support of détente. I can handle our so-called hawks but only one step at a time and I do not want this process to be interrupted, I want it to continue. What we would like to do is go from here to here but not too far in any one step or one meeting. I have considered it and understood the points you have made. I don’t want to be in a position of questioning Premier Kosygin’s eloquent comments on limiting the nuclear arms race. We have to get it under control. But we have to do it on an orderly, step-by-step basis. I consider that our position on this particular issue of the threshold test ban will be a very important step not only for America but for world opinion, though it will not satisfy those who always want to go all the way. But it is far better than the unlimited testing of big weapons. This would not give us an advantage or give you

3 Nixon spoke at the commencement ceremonies of the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, on June 5. For the text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1974, pp. 467–473.
an advantage although some military people might disagree on both sides. It is good to have this kind of open conversation. As we look to those golden doors (gesturing to doors at the entrance) we could say that we all want to reach them but we will not make it if we try to do it in one step. We will always find, Mr. General Secretary, various factors in the US and in other countries who for differing reasons want to see détente fail. And we on our part do not want to take a step that we have not prepared the support for. We do not seek to go in that direction because we will be looking for repudiation.

Brezhnev: In this position we approach all aspects for all sides. We have never engaged in politics. We have never tried to be clever no matter what Senator Jackson might think. We try to conduct ourselves in a forthright and honest manner in every important issue. This compels us to give serious thought to other aspects and to think about the problem from the standpoint of public opinion and the viewpoint of our allies, both yours and ours. There is no reason to speak further about this but I want to say merely that this step would have a strong impact in line with the goals we set in 1972 to achieve a measure of détente and an impact on the world. You have presented arguments in which you say elements must be heeded but you are steering the foreign policy of the US. We are acting on a long term basis and not on the basis of temporary considerations. This is the point: we will have to think it over and tomorrow return to further discussions. I will consult my Soviets and we will discuss it further and then we will continue discussions tomorrow. Otherwise if we do not take a step the question will arise why does the US want to have the right to test. All will say it is more in our interest. You are right in saying that if the US tests we will also do so. Science continues to confront us with new developments. Faced by the scientists we can go on testing. There are those in the Pentagon who would want to but we came to this table not to outwit you. We know we are dealing with a responsible statesman of a great country. In all these remarks I am merely thinking aloud. But logic prompts us to take a step and end testing.

Kosygin: We have to use our head. We have a head on our shoulders. Let us use our head.

President: I suggest we ask Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Gromyko to take into account our discussion and if they can come up tomorrow and submit something to us because it is a complicated issue. In view of the fact that we have not reached an agreement on the threshold test ban I think it would not be a good idea to sign the ABM agreement Tuesday because if we did everyone would speculate that

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\[4\] July 2.
we couldn’t agree on anything else. I suggest instead we sign the long-term economic agreement tomorrow which indicates movement and try to have something more than just ABM.

Kosygin: If any two men can settle this question I’m certain it is Kissinger and Gromyko.

Podgorny: We will give them a time limit.

Brezhnev: We will lock them up over night or give them both an artificial heart.

President: Then we will go to the Black Sea and take the boat ride.

Brezhnev: So our friends decided not to go to Star City and instead we will invite our spaceman to our final reception and have some photos. That will give us more time tomorrow for meetings in the morning and sign in the afternoon so we can get to the Crimea while it is still light. We could take a helicopter but there are air streams and if it is not light we would have to go by car.

President: We would see more of the country that way.

Brezhnev: We have to leave before dark. How long does it take. We should reach there not later than 5:00. In the South the night falls about then.

Podgorny: It takes an hour and 50 minutes to fly.

Kosygin: We should leave about 3:00.

President: So we will have the long term agreement. I consider it a well-written document, long-term and looking toward more combinations of our economies. The more our relations improve the more they become irreversible and they give our people a stake in progress. I believe this agreement will be well received by the American business community. They of course want to make deals but they also want to make a profit.

Brezhnev: You think we don’t?

President: Unless both sides profit it will be a bad deal.

President: We will have to use our influence to encourage business. The Secretaries of State, Agriculture and Commerce will be so instructed.

Brezhnev: I do not want to intervene in your internal affairs.

President: You want to overthrow us.

Brezhnev: No, we want to get you elected.

President: I’ll do it in the next 2 and ½ years.

Podgorny: Sometimes it is easier to make an effort when you have the power, the more strength you have the more people hear you. That is why we must use every meeting to reach agreements where we can. We cannot set impossible goals, but as we use the means possible then
the goals themselves become more possible and that is what we intend as a step in the test ban.

188. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, June 29, 1974, 9:30–10:10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Chief of USA Division
Oleg Krokholev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Walter J. StoesSEL, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William Hyland, Director, INR
Jan Lodal, NSC Senior Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECT

Test Ban

Gromyko: We have 30 minutes. Will this be enough?  
Kissinger: We can settle in 10 minutes. I pointed out yesterday what the issues are that we need to settle. I don't think it is possible to draft an agreement here.

Gromyko: Not possible?
Kissinger: Not possible. I think it is possible to draft a protocol that we will finish the agreement in 1974, and specifying a certain threshold, and something on peaceful nuclear explosions.

Gromyko: Specifying a certain threshold.
Kissinger: Yes. So there is some result. 150, for example.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in St. Catherine’s Hall at the Grand Kremlin Palace. Brackets are in the original.

2 See Document 187.
Gromyko: 150, the threshold.
Kissinger: Yes. 100–150.
Gromyko: How about an intermediate threshold?
Kissinger: We can’t accept it.
Gromyko: You can’t accept it? Yesterday it was said by the President, 100.
Kissinger: I overruled him. [Laughter]
Gromyko: This is real democracy.
Kissinger: He thought you would say 300.
Gromyko: How about the testing fields? The two questions I mentioned yesterday.
Kissinger: You have already agreed to specifying the testing fields.
Gromyko: That is too bureaucratic an approach. The foundation of the agreement should be the capability of each side to identify. On this supposition we are prepared.
Kissinger: If they can work out some conversion table. But then they are almost back to a seismic threshold. For example, if an explosion at a site is considered equivalent to a certain yield, then the reason for it is not so important. Whether it is granite or otherwise.
Gromyko: First, information about fields—you insist on it?
Kissinger: Yes.
Gromyko: This is one difficulty.
Kissinger: But we know where it is anyway.
Gromyko: The second one, about the ground.
Kissinger: The second we can handle in one of two ways. Whether we get the data on the ground is decisive only if we have to get the data ourselves. If you agree to a conversion table, we are in a different position.
Gromyko: If we are going to produce all kinds of tables and annexes to the agreement, these kind of bureaucratic things only make it more difficult. It is not necessary. What is important is that the parties will do everything possible to determine the nature of the tests. This applies to both the test sites and the kind of rock.
Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, on test sites, it is in Article 2 of your own draft. 3
Gromyko: Our position is not to identify and write into the agreement specific test sites.

3 The United States and the Soviet Union had been holding technical talks in Moscow since early June to draft a threshold test ban treaty. A draft treaty, showing U.S. and Soviet proposed wording, is in telegram 10157 from Moscow, June 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Kissinger: It doesn’t have to be written into the agreement, but we have to know where the test is taking place.

Gromyko: In other words, we are not in favor of agreeing on that matter or writing it down anywhere. We are in an equal position in this respect.

Kissinger: You can read The New York Times, and Dobrynin’s Congressional committees will tell him.

Gromyko: The New York Times is not a Bible.

Kissinger: But the Joint Atomic Energy Committee will tell Dobrynin.

Gromyko: It never writes down instructions for us.

Kissinger: Are you saying you don’t want to do it here at the summit? Or that you don’t want to do it at all? Are you withdrawing your own article? I always knew Korniyenko operated on his own.

[The Soviet side holds a brief conference.]

Gromyko: I have a question to ask. Does your delegation have any proposal on the specific amounts of information required on the rock? Because our delegation has the impression you are trying to request an unlimited amount of data. An enormous amount of data.

Kissinger: I don’t doubt that. I don’t doubt that every clever bureaucrat writes down what he thinks is desirable and they add them together. But let me sum up: I know what we have asked for. We could get by with your paragraph two which is less specific but has the essential elements. In other words, we withdraw our paragraph three and accept your paragraph two. On information.

[The Soviet side holds another conference.]

Gromyko: Is my understanding correct that you are going to omit your paragraph three and accept our paragraph two?

Kissinger: We accept your paragraph two.

Gromyko: You are going to omit your paragraph three?

Kissinger: We would have to look at your paragraph two and see if we don’t want to add a word or two.

Gromyko: And omit your paragraph three?

Kissinger: You are very precise. We substantially accept your paragraph two. You will have to give us an opportunity to discuss your paragraph two but it will be in that framework.

Gromyko: Is my understanding correct that you are talking about two things: First, the test site, that is, a rather big area which contains many areas where tests proceed?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: So you insist on both the general area and the specific area?
Kissinger: I am negotiating with my two neighbors here.
Gromyko: Cover your ears.
Kissinger: If I don’t understand it, how can you?
Gromyko: Don’t forget: [he points to the chandelier] Ivan the Terrible put in the devices. [Kissinger turns his paper over.]
Kissinger: We need a definition of the entire area, location. Then after the shot, under your own paragraph three, we should be told where the shot was. That’s with respect to location. With respect to geology, we would like general information as in your paragraph three of the protocol for the area. All we need is the geology of the place you are going to test. We don’t need the geology of the whole big area.
Gromyko: Yes. As to peaceful nuclear explosions, did you give us an answer yet?
Kissinger: What is the question?
We will give you the answer.
You mean the NPT?
Dobrynin: It was given to Vorontsov two days ago.
Korniyenko: To have separate talks on peaceful nuclear explosions.
Kissinger: In the framework of the NPT. Yes.
Korniyenko: In October in Moscow.
Kissinger: We agree in principle.
Gromyko: I think we should not postpone agreement on this subject—peaceful nuclear explosions—until we reach agreement on this. This matter should not be stopped.
Kissinger: That is all right with us. If we agree that there will be no peaceful nuclear explosions until we agree. Except below the threshold.
Gromyko: Why?
Kissinger: Because otherwise peaceful nuclear explosions can be used as an evasion of the threshold.
Gromyko: That can’t be.
Kissinger: Then we have no agreement.
Gromyko: You agree there will be a separate agreement?
Kissinger: I am prepared for an agreement if there are no tests above the threshold until there is an agreement.
Gromyko: Practically it will be the case.
Kissinger: Under those conditions, yes.
Gromyko: Let’s adjourn our meeting and discuss it later.
Kissinger: We have fully explored the topic. Businesslike and constructive.
Gromyko: The President and General Secretary meet at 11:00.
Kissinger: What is the subject?
Gromyko: Both sides are free.
Kissinger: What will you raise?
Gromyko: European matters, the Middle East.
Kissinger: Not on a Saturday.
Gromyko: We are not Moslems. Always when I am in the Middle East we don’t work on Friday.
Kissinger: The same with me. Except in Saudi Arabia. The King of Saudi Arabia knows Moscow is run from Tel Aviv.
Dobrynin: Faisal? He is a great expert.
Kissinger: Your intelligence should look into this. It is an interesting theory.
Gromyko: How did this happen? How did they subjugate us?
Kissinger: Because all their leaders were born in Russia.
Gromyko: Not any more.
Kissinger: We will find a new reason.
Gromyko: Ben-Gurion, yes. The Foreign Minister once, Shertok—Sharett—was from Odessa, or Nikolayev.
You think it hopeless to have an agreement as such?
Kissinger: We would have to let our experts look at it.
Gromyko: But there could be a protocol with details.
Kissinger: Oh, yes. Very detailed paragraphs like your drafts. With the threshold.
Gromyko: With the intention to formalize in a treaty before . . .
Kissinger: Before the end of the year.
Gromyko: How about the duration of the agreement?
Kissinger: Our proposal is to have it indefinite, with a five-year review.
Gromyko: You think a third country should not be mentioned?
Kissinger: I don’t think so.
Gromyko: Some sort of understanding.
Kissinger: Written or discussed?
Gromyko: Confidential.
Kissinger: Why should that make any difference if we can test under the threshold?
Gromyko: Or we can test until the second coming of Christ.
Kissinger: That would be very popular in Moslem countries. It would be taken care of in the review.
[The meeting then ended, to give time for preparation for the plenary meeting at 11:00.]

189. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, June 29, 1974, 11:12 a.m.–1:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Nikolai V. Podgornyi, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA
Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of USA Division
Leonid M. Zamyatin, Director General of TASS
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Andrei Vavilov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
President Nixon
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., USA (Ret.), Assistant to the President
Ronald L. Ziegler, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Major General Brent Scowcroft, USAF, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor to the Department of State
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Jan M. Lodal, NSC Senior Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

Test Ban; Mediterranean Nuclear Ban; CSCE

Test Ban

Brezhnev: What are we going to do today? Kissinger and Gromyko didn’t suggest anything.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974. Secret. The meeting was held in St. Catherine’s Hall at the Grand Kremlin Palace. Brackets are in the original.
Nixon: It might be helpful if we hit briefly on where we stand in terms of the test ban. Then go to Europe.

Brezhnev: I would do that.

Nixon: Then come back to the threshold [test ban] later.

Kissinger: Mr. President, the Foreign Minister and I and some associates met this morning\(^2\) to review where we stand on the threshold test ban. We pointed out it was probably impossible to complete an agreement while we are here, but it would be possible to sign a protocol which in a rather precise way could settle certain details.

With respect to the threshold, the United States side proposed 150 kilotons and only a single threshold.

With respect to exchange of geological information, the Soviet side pointed out to us that some of our proposals were perhaps excessive in detail, so we accepted the substance of draft paragraphs two and three of the Soviet draft—we would discuss the exact wording, but essentially those paragraphs.

With respect to peaceful nuclear explosions, we propose to keep peaceful nuclear explosions outside this threshold agreement, but we agreed there would be no peaceful nuclear explosions until there is a separate protocol on that subject.

With respect to the impact of events elsewhere on the agreement, we propose a five-year review clause. The Foreign Minister said this was a matter he has to discuss with his colleagues.

And if we reach an agreement on these issues, these could be a basis of a protocol. This is where the discussion was left.

Brezhnev: You see how easy their work has been, Mr. President. It is obvious that the United States does not accept the proposal for a complete ban on underground nuclear testing. Politically speaking, from the standpoint of public opinion, this means we are continuing the arms race. Again, politically speaking, this means we will be contradicting the statements we are making. But ways do have to be found to seek out mutually acceptable solutions. Of course the question does arise as to why we cannot reach an understanding on this issue. I fully agree with what the President said yesterday:\(^3\) Neither of us needs an agreement in which one side can be put in the drawer and eaten up by moths. We need documents that will be really effective and that people feel are really effective. So neither of us can ever be accused of saying one thing and acting in another way.

The very fact that Dr. Kissinger says it is not possible to reach an agreement does arouse certain doubts. Are we cutting ourselves off

\(^2\) See Document 188.

\(^3\) See Document 187.
from a solution of these questions forever? We could, of course, discuss
the questions of quotas or ceilings, but to be told there is no possibility
whatsoever of an agreement does cause certain doubts. Because the
two days of talks we had with the President instilled confidence in my
mind that we should work to an agreement.

Just before this meeting we had a brief exchange of views on the
substance of the exchanges between Dr. Kissinger and Comrade Gro-
myko. What we feel can be done in the interests of the present, and fu-
ture as well, is to conclude an agreement.

We are fully aware of the tasks you want to solve. In the interests
of preserving friendly relations and in the interest of further advances
toward limitation of strategic arms, we would be prepared to accept a
ceiling of 150 . . .

Gromyko: Kilotons.

Brezhnev: . . . kilotons, which does represent a big concession on
our part. And it means we are in fact meeting the U.S. proposal. The
lower threshold is immaterial. Do you agree with that?

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: Which, as I say, means we are fully meeting the U.S.
proposal. But what we must give thought to, Mr. President, Dr. Kissin-
ger, is how we present this agreement. And we should also be clear in
our minds how we want to continue to act to halt the arms race.

I would suggest we go about it this way: we cast aside all
second-rate matters, details about water and sand, but include a clause
in the agreement roughly that the two sides have undertaken to con-
tinue within a certain time limit to find a solution to the question of a
complete ban on nuclear tests. If we do that, everyone will understand
this interim agreement will continue for some time while we continue
efforts to find a comprehensive ban. Then people will understand.
They will understand it is not possible yet to achieve a comprehensive
ban but both will continue active efforts and this will continue in effect
until that.

Then I would suggest we do not include any specific quotas in the
agreement but inscribe a clause that within an agreed period of time the
two sides will conduct a minimum of tests. You will be free to conduct
150-kiloton testing but with a clause indicating a minimal number of
tests. We will be indicating the trend of the agreement. And a clause on
continuing efforts.

That will be the kind of agreement we need. It will show the public
we are continuing détente. I think an agreement of that kind can be
worked out quickly.

I have another question, Dr. Kissinger: Why should we not be per-
mitted to conduct peaceful nuclear tests? We agree they should be left
outside this agreement. What we are suggesting is, in the event of any peaceful explosions, we will agree to notify the American side and invite observers.

Gromyko: And vice-versa.

Brezhnev: So in the event, therefore, of any peaceful explosions, we would invite your observers to attend there.

Kissinger: I have a few candidates whom I would like to send to the test site. [Laughter]

Brezhnev: We wouldn’t place them right on top of the explosion! But if we do any such explosions, it would be to unite two rivers or shift water somewhere, something like that. We have areas, for example, where we have very substantial deposits of copper, and it could become profitable to do that with a nuclear explosion, and we would invite your observers.

Nixon: First, let me put the matter in context, the reason we proceeded to spend so much time to work out a test ban of this nature. When Dr. Kissinger returned from Moscow in March, he indicated that our friends on the other side had proposed this as an approach to a complete test ban. As far as the details are concerned, I see that the general principles the General Secretary has outlined are ones that we agree upon. The reservation I have here is with respect to the time limit. So we seem to have a meeting of the minds. I would like to have Dr. Kissinger indicate the points he sees we agree on and the points we would like to have the experts work on.

Kissinger: Mr. President, I think the General Secretary made a very constructive proposal. We agree on the threshold.

Nixon: Of 150.

Kissinger: Of 150 kilotons, and we can agree to this formulation, I believe, that both sides will conduct the minimum necessary.

Nixon: “each side agrees . . .”

Kissinger: We would have to formulate it but the principle is acceptable. I think also, Mr. President, that the approach of the General Secretary to peaceful nuclear explosions offers an approach to a solution, and is acceptable in principle, but we would have to be more precise in how it works out. We don’t have to do it in this room. I believe the principle of the General Secretary’s proposal is consistent with your instructions.

We can also accept stating the objective of working toward a comprehensive test ban.

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4 See Document 168.
Brezhnev: Something to the effect that the sides agreed to continue talks with a view to achieving a complete test ban.

Kissinger: That we can accept. What we cannot accept is saying that a comprehensive test ban must be accomplished in a certain time period.

Brezhnev: Let us at least say something about the time period for doing it: “To seek to achieve within four years, five years.” Let me suggest we write some words like: “The sides agreed to continue a discussion aimed at finding a solution.”

Kosygin: Without a time limit.

Brezhnev: I think that would be well received.

Nixon: That would be better than putting an unrealistic clause saying we will do it by a certain date. That means that between the two sides it has been discussed—which is true directly—and we will continue our best efforts to reach a comprehensive test ban. If you say, for example, a time of five years from now, it may indicate you may reach a test ban in that time but also means we would delay it until then. So saying we will make our best efforts is a better principle.

Brezhnev: So you see we can reach such an agreement, and that is the substance of an agreement.

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: And on exchange of information, we will use your two paragraphs.

Brezhnev: Are you prepared to reach such an agreement? Not a protocol, but an agreement?

Kosygin: If we have reached an agreement, we should decide it by an agreement.

Brezhnev: And we will be indicating the exact test sites. These will be in specified areas.

Kissinger: These will certainly be the substance of an agreement. The question is whether we can finish all the protocols in time for signature on Tuesday.\(^5\)

Brezhnev: What details do you mean?

Podgorny: Your experts who have been working on it are still here; ours are here. The main thing is to agree on the principles.

Kosygin: Mr. President, we would think it would be in your best interest and ours to have an agreement at this time. It would give you a very strong position in public opinion. So we should do it in two days.

\(^5\) July 2.
Nixon: We shouldn’t put an unrealistic deadline on drafting. But we could put diplomatic experts on doing the principles now.

Kissinger: What we could do, Mr. President, is: Ambassador Stoessel, who headed our delegation, could work with the Soviet experts this afternoon. If they can agree on all the protocols, we could sign the principles.

Kosygin: That could be worse, just signing principles. Because your experts have been working about a month together. If we hand these principles down to them, I feel sure they could work out the details very quickly. Then we could have a well-balanced document.

Kissinger: Mr. President, I think, if you agree, you could instruct your experts to meet with theirs. We don’t have to discuss it abstractly. They have two drafts; we could see how far they can get.

Kosygin: They should.

Kissinger: Then if there is a deadlock, it can be brought to you and the General Secretary. So we will keep the Ambassador here [instead of going to Oreanda], if you agree, Mr. President, and they can report to us tomorrow. And you can make a decision together with the General Secretary whether it is ready for the whole thing or just a general statement.

Brezhnev: Documents of this kind are always elaborated on the basis of decisions at the highest level, but experts always think up 200 problems. So they have to be instructed to stick strictly to the principles we agreed.

Nixon: I agree.

Podgorny: Let the experts draw up the agreement based on these principles.

Nixon: It is important that there be no misunderstanding.

Brezhnev: Agreed.

Mediterranean Nuclear Ban

Brezhnev: Now another subject, Mr. President. In March when we met with Dr. Kissinger, I mentioned the possibility of both our nations’ agreeing to remove from the Mediterranean submarines and other naval ships carrying atomic weapons. Dr. Kissinger told us he would think it over and give us a reaction later. But so far we have heard nothing from him. We believe an agreement on that subject would offer a good example to the people of other nations and show we are fully resolved to pursue détente. I mention this because we did have a talk.

Kissinger: I remember it.

6 See Document 168.
Nixon: We have considered that, the General Secretary’s proposal, but we are unable to take that step. There are some areas where, the General Secretary is aware, proposals are made and dependent on the good faith of either side. But we did discuss it; I want the General Secretary to know everything he discusses with Dr. Kissinger is brought to my attention. But after consideration, we believe we cannot take such a step. But there are other steps we can take.

Brezhnev: Could we at least, between ourselves, know the reasons why you feel unable to take that step?

Nixon: I think the General Secretary is aware of the nature of the reasons we can’t take this step. It isn’t for a purpose directed against the Soviet Union, but in the interests of peace in the Mediterranean. But in the context of our responsibilities and alliance in that area, this would be inconsistent with our responsibilities.

Brezhnev: All right. It would of course have been a very good step if taken jointly.

CSCE

Brezhnev: Well, could we then turn to the European Conference?

Nixon: All right.

Brezhnev: We have already had several consultations on this matter. Now, when we are sitting across the table, we should try and gain a clear idea as to our joint actions and aims in this matter.

Nixon: Before the General Secretary raises European matters, I want to reiterate what I said to the Foreign Minister. We made a commitment to try to get our European allies on track so there is sufficient substance to get a summit. That is our goal. We have had a problem, quite candidly, getting our European allies to agree on the substance. We could discuss among ourselves what can be done to get the substance straight. We can agree on certain things as on supporting the Finnish proposal, which has been a very constructive development.

The various items which are in question, I would like for Dr. Kissinger to run over briefly, and I will state positions as we go. Movements and maneuvers, for example, where our positions are more in tandem than with extreme positions, and so forth.

Kissinger: Well, Mr. President, we have been discussing with the Soviet Union how to move the European Security Conference forward. First, on specific issues and then on the level of Phase III. On specific issues, there are three major ones.

What is generally called confidence-building measures—maneuvers and so forth, and notification. On the so-called confidence-building measures, we have stated our view to the Soviet leaders, and as you correctly said, we have tried to move matters into a more rea-
sonable framework, that is, to limit the area in which notification is necessary, to increase the size of the unit about whose movement notification is required. We have worked primarily with the British on this, when we were in Brussels with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister.

The second issue is what is generally called Basket III. This has two aspects. How to relate the general principles of Basket III to specific clauses. [Gromyko and Brezhnev confer behind Podgorny’s back.] The Foreign Minister and we worked out a compromise solution, the so-called Finnish solution, that on the basis of close coordination was tabled. We are supporting the Finnish position. But we are having massive difficulties with our European allies. I think the only way to solve this deadlock is to agree on the content of Basket III and link it to the Finnish position.

The third issue is: Germans have raised the issue of peaceful change. They would like it in the same paragraph as inviolability of frontiers; or if it goes into another paragraph, on sovereignty, then they would like to change the sentence. We have taken the position with our allies, Mr. President, that if these changes can be achieved, then we would approve a high-level meeting for Phase III.

At the NATO meeting we agreed we should reach an agreement concretely on the content of Basket III.

This is where we stand on the issue of the European Security Conference.

Gromyko: Here I must say this area, CSCE, is really one where we should invent an artificial heart, because the pulse is really not there.

Nixon: And brain too.

Gromyko: The trouble is, each participant in the Conference thinks his brain is the best one too. But that can be handled.

I would like to explain our position. With respect to the so-called Basket III, which includes social, humanitarian, information, culture, etc., the situation briefly is as follows: Some of the participants in the conference are advancing dozens and I would even say hundreds of second-rate proposals. Literally piles of proposals: Reuniting families, cultural ties. Some go so far as to say we have the right to open a movie theatre, a club, in another country.

Kissinger: A cabaret.

Gromyko: Or the right to sell newspapers at newsstands whether they like it or not. Some of them have such an obsession with this that they have completely forgotten the objective of reducing the war danger in concentrating on these second-rate matters.

How do we react to these innumerable proposals? We say in response that we are in favor of development of scientific and cultural
and all other ties. We are in favor of solving all humanitarian issues; we are in favor, within reasonable limits, of lower fees for visas; we are in favor of Mr. Smith being allowed to marry Miss Jones.

We are not against measures. But we believe it is necessary in all this to respect national laws and regulations. This is the principle of the UN Charter. If this principle is embodied in a document, this will take care of the matter. Because whether a large country or a small country, its laws must be respected. [Brezhnev gets up and goes out.]

Therefore if this question is resolved, the question of respect for the laws of each country concerned, all the problems that relate to Basket III will be solved and no country that participates in the Conference will have anything to fear. This is the subject of many discussions with the United States, and we worked out a formula ensuring respect for laws and administrative regulations in each country. We found a third country to introduce a compromise: The Finns volunteered. I can’t say we were completely happy with what the Finns proposed, but it could provide some degree of understanding. [Brezhnev returns.]

There were some who reacted positively immediately. There were others who, as Dr. Kissinger correctly said, without directly rejecting the Finnish proposal, try to link it to other things not related to it. How? For example, the West Germans advanced a new idea with respect to a question that had been resolved. It had been resolved that the question of peaceful change of frontiers should be included in the document. Now the West Germans say “Let’s review the situation,” and they try to connect the formula on peaceful change with the formula on inviolability. The purpose obviously is to try to weaken the principle of inviolability.

We had the impression the United States would promptly take a firm line in this matter. Unfortunately this is not so. As I said, West Germany has taken a stand aimed at weakening the principle and trying to link it to the Third Basket with which it has no relation.

We think we should stand on the basis of our previous understanding. If we do that, we can achieve progress on Basket III. It is a question of the influence the United States can exert on its allies. Your possibilities are greater than the concrete manifestations. We would like you to work a little more actively. We believe it is a matter of honor for the United States and the Soviet Union and others who came out in favor of this formulation to stick with it in its undiluted form.

I have therefore covered two of the questions mentioned by Dr. Kissinger, Basket III and inviolability of frontiers, which has now been raised again although it had been agreed upon. The phrase on peaceful change we continue to think should be linked with sovereignty.

[Brezhnev gets up and confers with Dobrynin and Korniyenko; Hartman confers with Dr. Kissinger, while Gromyko talks.]
As regards the question of confidence-building measures, including such items as maneuvers, sizeable troop movements—although even there, some define it in a certain way—security zones, etc. This question has been inflated so much by some that unrealistic decisions are made.

How can you expect the Soviet Union to do nothing else but write out accounts of all its troop movements in the European part of its territory? I am sure you understand this, but there are many who believe it. The United States I know takes a skeptical view. But we would appreciate the United States to use more of its influence with its allies. We have made a technical approach in Geneva.

And the last question, with respect to the level of the third and final phase of the Conference: The West European countries through their representatives at Geneva said they are not opposed to a summit but it depends on the work of the second phase. From what the President has said today and several occasions previously, and statements repeatedly made by Dr. Kissinger, it will be obvious you are taking a more positive view of the work of the third stage. Nonetheless, certain reservations are evident in your voice.

If we base ourselves on the standard arguments marshalled by some participants, that is, that the highest level for the third stage is justified only if the second stage gives positive results, then any step can be seen as inadequate. Nobody has succeeded in giving actual criteria on whether it would be justified, no letter or agreement. Therefore any outcome of Stage Two can be used as a pretext against the summit level. So we would like the United States to come out more definitely on holding a summit.

Generally speaking, most European participants are in favor of holding a summit, but this general situation that I have outlined is standing in the way of it.

Finally, we believe the United States, Mr. President, could say its weighty word in favor of a time limit for ending the Conference. There are many time limits in the past that didn’t come off. This left a negative impression. If this one would stick, this would give the entire affair a more positive aspect.

Brezhnev: We have always understood that your need to see a successful outcome is a joint desire of both of us. And we continue to hope this is so. On the other hand, we cannot but agree with the remarks by Comrade Gromyko that our joint role at the Conference is very great. We could do more than we did before. Indeed, that Basket is really being inflated to such an extent.

Let me just cite one fact in this connection. In our last meeting at Pitsunda with Pompidou, he too spoke out in favor of proceeding with the European Security Conference as soon as possible and he had unfa-
favorable remarks about some of the tactics used to prolong it. It was a bit inconvenient, but I just had to show him one of the proposals that had been made just before by the French delegation. The proposal was that any country, France for example, should be entitled to open a movie theatre in the Soviet Union, governed by French administration, governed by French rules. He was very surprised and said he would immediately give instructions to have it removed.

All this is by way of confirming what Comrade Gromyko just said. Since you and I, Mr. President, are agreed to follow the line of détente, the line of developing good relations between our two peoples, we should agree to take more vigorous action at the European Security Conference and to register our stand along these lines in our final communiqué.

Nixon: I think no useful purpose is served by going into more detail on the enormous number of proposals which are in the Conference. Dr. Kissinger at NATO was alone, with the British and French on the other side, on the German proposal to link the principle of inviolability of frontiers with peaceful change. We are trying to bring our allies along but we can’t dictate to them. Now, I suggest, in addition to having some positive language in the communique, that we ask our people at the Foreign Office level, whoever is designated by you on your side and whoever is designated by Kissinger on our side, to see if they can sort out how we can get through the details.

Brezhnev: I agree.

Nixon: I would expect this, Mr. General Secretary . . .

Brezhnev: We have got to get this matter off dead center.

Nixon: I would respectfully suggest, Mr. General Secretary, that we should not haggle too much with dotting i’s and crossing the t’s. In other words, if we want a meeting at the highest level, we ought to be prepared, to the greatest extent possible, to adjust the language of various provisions in a way that will soothe the sensitivities of our allies. The language isn’t going to change the fact.

I recall, for example, 15 years ago, Premier Khrushchev and I had a rather extended discussion about a resolution that had just passed our Congress about “liberation of captive peoples.” The language there wasn’t operative; we were really talking about theory, not a fact.

The Lithuanians I saw dancing last night didn’t seem to be captives.

But to return to the point, I propose we get our experts working. Where there is possible “give” on language to see to the sensitivities of the Western allies, if it isn’t going to have any great significance . . . It would not be, in other words, to have the Conference fail to take place because of a quibble over language. That would be unfortunate.
All they insist on is that it be substantive enough to justify a meeting at the highest level.

Brezhnev: That is true, but there are some things that concern matters of principle and are not minor matters.

Nixon: I understand. That is why I suggest the experts get together. I know language can sometimes be enormously important.

Kissinger: Maybe Hartman and Sonnenfeldt on our side, and Korniyenko, could go over it, and your man in Geneva, and that way we could have an agreed content.

Brezhnev: We will agree to that.

Nixon: I agree.

Kissinger: I want to work with Stoessel on the test ban. [He gets up to leave with Stoessel. Kosygin gets up to talk with Kissinger.]

Brezhnev: I guess we shouldn’t discuss any more before the signing ceremony.7

Nixon: We meet at 2:30?

Brezhnev: No, 1:30.

Gromyko: In twenty minutes time.

Nixon: See you at 1:30.

[The meeting then ended, and the President and Secretary returned to the Residence.]

7 At 1:35 p.m., Nixon and Brezhnev held a ceremony to sign the long-term economic agreement between the United States and the USSR. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) See Document 199.
190. Memorandum of Conversation

Oreanda, June 30, 1974, 3:15–5:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary, Central Committee of the CPSU
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
Andrei M. Alexandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Georgi M. Kornienko, Member of the Collegium, Head of USA Department,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Generals Kozlov and Afonofsky, Soviet General Staff
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

President Richard Nixon
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Gen. Alexander M. Haig, USA (retd.), Assistant to the President
Maj. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, State Department
William G. Hyland, Director, INR

[Note: Conversation begins as other participants join the President
and General Secretary who have been meeting alone.]

Brezhnev: I was telling the President that we appreciate him
sending Dr. Kissinger to Moscow. He took a tough line with us in
March, and we candidly told him our view. We told him our limits. The
truth is there somewhere, so he should tell us where we should start to
reach agreement.

President: As far as the conversation the General Secretary and I
were having—we have left the issues for a larger group to discuss; if
there is to be any agreement, we have to discuss the specific problems
in this group.

Brezhnev: I confirm that.

President: I made the point only that the failure to reach any agree-
ment will inevitably lead us to step up US expenditures and programs

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
fice Files, Box 77, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June
27–July 3, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at
Brezhnev’s Beach House Grotto in Oreanda. On the afternoon of June 29, Nixon had trav-
eled with Brezhnev from Moscow to Oreanda, located near Yalta. (Ibid., White House
Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Brackets are in the original.

2 According to Kissinger’s memoirs, Nixon and Brezhnev met privately for 3 hours.
The discussion “in the grotto turned out to be on the subject of an unconditional treaty of
nonaggression between the United States and the Soviet Union.” (Years of Upheaval,
pp. 1172–1173)
in the November budget, with an inevitable Soviet response and this kind of increase in the arms race could jeopardize our relations in other areas as well. Consequently, it is important, in addition to agreements already reached, to see what agreements are possible in this area, and to see what are the points of view. In fact, we have a Wednesday\textsuperscript{3} deadline. If nothing can be agreed upon, we had better learn it now. I presented the themes, we both recognize our positions are far apart, that is where we stand.

Brezhnev: (To Dr. Kissinger) This is one occasion where the best possible answer is not to comment.

President: We agree we ought to agree, but Dr. Kissinger should tell us how.

Brezhnev: Suppose we take as the starting point the agreements already achieved, but we can’t start from the very beginning.

President: All right.

Brezhnev: Since we have already discussed with the President, through Dr. Kissinger that time he was here, we have set out our point of view. He promised to think it over and come back to us, but since then we have had nothing. Perhaps by now some new considerations have matured; some principles, because failure of this talk would be quite detrimental, but let’s proceed in an attitude of confidence and belief in our goal.

Kissinger: Mr. President, we made an informal suggestion to the Soviet side that represented our own best thinking. We said we would do our utmost to continue the Interim Agreement. Continuing this agreement, with its numerical advantage to the Soviet side, would be agreed along with limitations on MIRV that gave us a slight advantage. Thus we accept the basic principle that the General Secretary developed.

President: Only a slight US advantage?
Kissinger: Substantially a US advantage.

Brezhnev: Well, let me recall it: We suggest that the US be limited to 1100 MIRVs and 1000 for the Soviet side. This means 100 MIRV missiles more for the American side.

Kissinger: We pointed out that this was impossible for us. We will have to stop our MIRV programs next year, but the Soviets will continue for four more years at their maximum capacity. This will be represented in the US as our freezing while permitting the Soviets to catch up.

Brezhnev: Well, let’s talk about it.

\textsuperscript{3} July 3.
Kissinger: This agreement should be seen not only in terms of the numbers that are established but in terms of what each side could do without an agreement. Without an agreement, for example, we could put MIRVs on 500 more Minuteman missiles.

Gromyko: In this period?
Kissinger: Yes, in two years.

Dobrynin: After two years?

Kissinger: Let’s talk concretely: the numbers we propose are expressed as a percentage of the base, but amount to the equivalent of 1150 for the US and 750 for the USSR, and no large missiles with MIRVs. In this agreement, we will be accused of stopping the US while not stopping the USSR. We will be at the level of 1050 by next year which means that for the 4 years thereafter we would add only 100 MIRVs, so in terms of what we are refraining from doing this is a very major concession on our part.

In addition to this part of our proposal we agree to continue the Interim Agreement numbers which are favorable to the Soviet Union. So that is our basic proposal. What we can do in addition is to express this proposal in a manner so that the actual numbers do not appear. This is the paper I gave informally to your Ambassador.4

Gromyko: However you express it the results are the same.
Kissinger: No, you are getting more MIRVed missiles. Formally, the results are the same but the percentages are different.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger wants a vast supremacy which can’t be met by equality in percentages. I don’t see any basis for equality in this. If this is the final US position there is no sense wasting time. We negotiated an agreement in principle about not using nuclear weapons against each other. This was the principle. This was a great achievement. Without being unnecessarily modest we can say this agreement affected the entire world situation. In SALT we also have an agreement which registered a numerical level in terms of launchers. We did not publish those figures but you did. The agreement stated that we would have more submarines than you have and the Protocol indicated which levels we agreed on. And we also agreed that we could make the necessary improvements. Now you are a little ahead in perfecting some weapons. And you have found a way to use the same silo for a bigger Minuteman though with some violations. You have also tested 5 RVs and under our agreement you have this right.

Kissinger: Unfortunately, our missiles do not have 5 MIRVs.

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4 Not further identified.
Brezhnev: I think I am right in this. You do not have the right numbers.
Kissinger: On the Minuteman we have 3.
Brezhnev: You know I told you in March about this.⁵
Kissinger: (To the President) He is referring to a test of an ABM which exploded into several parts.
Brezhnev: I don’t know about this but if you say it exploded . . .
Kissinger: Let’s be specific. One basis for cooperation is the proposal we now suggest in which we refrain from improving our weapons whereas you suggest you would have MIRVs and eventually overtake us in warheads.
Brezhnev: You already have them on the Minuteman.
Kissinger: On one half of the forces only.
Brezhnev: So where do we go. To an increased arms race or to a freeze or to use the time for reductions. This is what we were talking about last time but now you say you will add 500 more Minuteman. That would be an arms race.
Kissinger: I am saying that in the absence of an agreement we can add 500 more.
Brezhnev: If that is to be the basis for our relations I can’t say how many more we would add. We don’t want to MIRV a single missile.
Kissinger: You don’t want MIRVs?
Brezhnev: But getting rid of them is another matter.
Kissinger: To return to our proposal, under our approach we would add only 100 MIRVed missiles while the USSR would build up to 750. In effect you are allowed to MIRV 650 more missiles than we would.
Brezhnev: But generally the point is on what basis do we have equal rights. Why do you want to restrict our rights to armaments under an agreement. We knew you had Poseidon with MIRV missiles at the time of the Interim Agreement, but we didn’t allow this to interfere with our calculations. But now you want to overrule our rights.
Kissinger: But in the Interim Agreement you had a larger number of launchers than we did.
Brezhnev: But you have other factors.
Gromyko: There are the forward base weapons in the Mediterranean and in Italy and Greece. We agreed not to take that into account. If we don’t count them so who is being generous. How will it look to our people if we do not talk about these bases.

⁵ See Document 166.
Brezhnev: We hope to achieve restrictions and not get into arguments whether we get advantages or not. Overall it was the same. I stand by what I pledged even though I could be accused of having given privileges and advantages.

Kissinger: We recognize that the Interim Agreement was fair to both sides. We are not saying that you got the better of the bargain. But, obviously, if we are now to create limits on MIRVed missiles our purpose must be to restrain each side below the buildup to their maximum. Even in our proposal, in the US many would say that we will be going at a much slower rate than the USSR. We are restraining our possibilities much more so than we are asking for your restraint. We would have enormous difficulties with this type of agreement domestically. You may have seen some of the columns in our press yesterday that reflect the views of a vocal minority.\(^6\)

Brezhnev: But we cannot let newspapers decide. We can publish our views in Pravda too.


Kissinger: It is not a question of The New York Times but the extent that it reflects views of many of our own people. If we look at the next five years in terms of disparities you could say that the proposal we are making is more favorable for you but we consider it fair. Some will say you can deploy more rapidly than we can.

Brezhnev: I agree that we can deploy rapidly. By tripling our efforts we could catch up but this is not what we want.

Kissinger: We consider our approach as fair in this regard.

Brezhnev: But how many MIRVs do you have and nuclear weapons overseas. If, as you say, you will complete your program within one year you will have several thousands of weapons and we wouldn’t have any MIRVs.

Kissinger: What we are saying is that if you go for your maximum capability and we do what we can do on our side then there will be a tendency to have very high warhead numbers on both sides.

Brezhnev: But you say you will complete your program in one year.

Kissinger: I am saying that within one year’s time we can complete our MIRV program up to the level of the proposal we are making. Within some years thereafter we can add another 500 Minuteman but which we would not do if you agree to the numbers we are talking about in our proposal. So you have a certain percentage of your num-

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bers in MIRVs and we have about ½ and we could do more but we would not do so. That is the agreement we are proposing to you.

Brezhnev: But this is an old proposal you made in March.

Kissinger: No, this is different. The figures are different. What we discussed in March in terms of throw weight for the Soviet side the figures would have translated into only about 300 MIRV missiles.

Brezhnev: It is important to preserve equality. You have the Minuteman and you are replacing it with an even more powerful weapon.

Kissinger: No, this is not true. We could do it but we are not doing it.

Brezhnev: But you are covering the silos.

Kissinger: But we are not covering the silos to put in a more powerful missile.

Brezhnev: We would not oppose if you did as long as you stayed within the limit that we agreed.

Kissinger: We do have the right to put in a more powerful missile and we could do it without violations.

Brezhnev: That is what you are doing.

Kissinger: No, the missile we have is essentially the same as the Minuteman II only it has MIRVs. Under the proposal we are making we limited what you had to say about SLBMs so we have proposed that you be limited at 750. Under this you may have more land based than sea based if you choose. We have made the assumption that you will not have MIRVs on SLBMs until the end of the period we are talking about so that in land based there will be near equality.

Brezhnev: But I didn’t give you any assurances about our SLBM MIRV.

Kissinger: No, only you spoke of your plans.

Brezhnev: I told you we would be building a new type but I gave you no assurances.

Kissinger: It does not make any difference under our proposal because our numbers combine sea based and land based. You choose as you see fit between the two.

Brezhnev: Right, that is how we agreed.

Kissinger: Right, we do not need an assurance on sea based.

Brezhnev: Well, it is very hard to talk on that basis of your proposal. We will have to think afresh but I think it violates an underlying principle of our relations.

Nixon: First, as far as accuracy is concerned, when we get into numbers of this magnitude it is almost beyond comprehension. It really doesn’t mean too much. The fundamental thing is to reach an agreement.
Brezhnev: I agree. It is important to reach an agreement but it should be one that restrains the race, slows it down. Under the proposal Dr. Kissinger is making the US does not do far less than they would do without an agreement.

Kissinger: No, the US would do far less than we could do without an agreement. The Soviet Union would do somewhat less than they could do otherwise. There would be actual restraint. The restraint would be greater on the US than on the Soviet Union. The other point is, and we do not put this as a threat, but we can MIRV an additional 500 more Minuteman and without an agreement there will be pressures to do so and the Soviet Union should think about that.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, let me say that if what Dr. Kissinger has outlined is the last word on this subject there is no basis for an agreement. I will tell you why. The US has in land based MIRVs now 1200 and with another 2530 on submarines. You already therefore have 4720. You are suggesting 1150 which means 8500 warheads. You are suggesting we have only 750 and with a great effort we can have 4500 warheads. Therefore, you will have 4,000 more than we do.

Dr. Kissinger: With all due respect, you have to add your other warheads. From the 2380 or so you have, 750 will have MIRVs and you will have 1630 single warhead missiles left and if you add that in you have 6100.

Brezhnev: But you are adding things that can’t be added. You know full well that if you add up all you have that you have 16,498 nuclear charges including the forward based systems and the strategic force. When I spoke of 1100 for MIRVs we were proceeding on the assumption that we are not going to war. That enabled you to have a certain quantity and you know that in that time we would have to make a very great effort to reach our goal.

Kissinger: Our military would make the argument quite differently.

Brezhnev: And you have a MIRV submarine.

Kissinger: Yes, and we are supposed to stop at our level and we are talking only of the next five years. If you are speaking only of equality we could say you are violating it under this principle.

Brezhnev: How come?

Nixon: If you want equality some in our country will argue that we are giving you the right to do more under the present agreement than we could do.

Brezhnev: But we have the right to do so under the agreement. We agreed on the numbers that were registered in the Protocol and we agreed to overlook your forward bases. I don’t see the logic of this argument. The figures I gave you are incontrovertible.
Kissinger: 16,000 is much too high.

Brezhnev: You only have to check this to verify it. I am always very meticulous about figures. I am never erroneous.

Kissinger: It depends on what you count. But we would have to count figures on your side that are comparable. Our first figures we gave you are correct.

Brezhnev: I know that you have certain information on the Soviet Union and I do not like to play word games. What you say leads to inequality. It leads to unilateral advantages and to the arms race.

Kissinger: The basic point is that we are prepared to move more slowly in MIRVs than the USSR.

Brezhnev: What kind of concession is that? You can afford to be tranquil because you are will ahead and don’t think we don’t know it.

Kissinger: In this proposal we are going far beyond the view in our government and this proposal would produce a great debate. It would not be construed as taking advantage of the Soviet Union. Quite the contrary.

Brezhnev: You can’t blame me for what Jackson’s interpretations are.

Kissinger: I am not talking about Jackson. He certainly would be one of them. But there are others. I am saying it would be very difficult to get approval and could not be done without a bitter struggle. And some would say we are giving you an advantage in land-based MIRVs. What we have tried to do is to construct a fair proposal that takes into account all factors.

Brezhnev: When we negotiated and signed the previous agreement we took into account all factors including geography. Nothing new has occurred to change this.

Kissinger: As long as we were talking of only single warhead then your level of throw weight was not so much, but with the advent of MIRVs this changes.

Brezhnev: But it is a fact you are using the same missile to increase from .2 to .4 megatons.

Kissinger: This is not yet a fact but it will be done if we cannot agree. This is a fact. Why do you say that the Minuteman is not the same.

Brezhnev: It is not.

Kissinger: No, but there will be changes.

Brezhnev: How could you complain about violations.

Kissinger: The fact is that your new FSS 19 is half again as large as the Minuteman. It has six warheads.
Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, why do you keep inventing things that do not exist. Why do you give me figures where we have six warheads.

Kissinger: You said you would have 4500 under our proposal which limits you to 750. If you divide 4500 by 750 this equals 6 warheads for each missile.

Brezhnev: You know when we have our tests and we know when you have yours. You have your observation ships and you know that we have 3 warheads, not six.

Kissinger: But the figures you gave equal six warheads.

Brezhnev: But this is only if we complete our program. It will be many years of work and you already have five times more than we.

Gromyko: We have heard your argument that if there is no agreement and that if the US goes ahead and that if the USSR goes ahead, that the gap will increase. Let us leave aside this argument. If we resort to this kind of agreement at our discussions we are talking about a broad proliferation of weapons, not disarmament. You say you will forge ahead but we are a big people and the disparity may increase but I hardly think such arguments will instill confidence in our minds about the need for an agreement. We are talking now about an important issue of disarmament and second, generally speaking, on the entire question of limiting MIRVs. On the proposal you raised with our Ambassador, if we accept the point that the agreement already achieved is based on fairness and is equal then why not extend it in its present form because the figures and content do in fact reflect equality and I fully agree with Comrade Brezhnev that all factors must be taken into account. And if we could ask an unbiased judge to weigh all the advantages to the US of forward based systems the advantages would clearly be on the US side. This is a factor of great importance. It takes no great strategist to realize who has the advantage, the US or the USSR. So what is being said by the American side about advantages is not sufficient to characterize the true impact of all the factors that give the US an advantage. It is very hard for us to justify the fairness of the existing agreement if you look at the map and see all your bases in Europe and Asia. The numbers in the existing agreement hardly compensate adequately. When we were negotiating we knew that you had MIRVs and you knew that we would have MIRVs so we agreed to change silos without increasing their dimensions. Now this is being taken out of context and isolated and so turned by you to make equality disappear.

Kissinger: That is not exactly my statement. We tend to repeat each other’s arguments about the agreement. We are not saying we will continue to increase the gap but the obvious reality is as follows: without an agreement for two years we would increase the gap. After that two years you will then close the gap under our proposal. After both sides have tens of thousands of warheads as the President said, it doesn’t
make much difference because there are no targets. We certainly have no targets for 16,000 weapons. Even if we did have 16,000 which we do not have, there would be no targets. What we are trying to do is put a limit on this situation and that is better in our view than no agreement.

Gromyko: To cite one thing to illustrate the problem of forward based systems, Secretary Laird stated that if the Soviet Union had a submarine base in Cuba this would be tantamount to a 30 percent increase in our weapons. Even if he exaggerated, you see what we mean.

Kissinger: This is one reason why the Soviet Union has more submarines in the Interim Agreement. But even with increased launchers for SLBMs this is no longer a correct analogy.

Gromyko: But geography has not changed.

Kissinger: But you have an advantage of 62 submarines to our 41.

Gromyko: But that is another matter, as we discussed in March. This involved quite a few other questions.

Brezhnev: Now Dr. Kissinger is bringing up new questions.

Nixon: I think the General Secretary had planned that we recess about now and perhaps go out on the water. This has been an important discussion and we will have to give it serious thought.

Brezhnev: I agree it is time to go out on the water.

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191. Memorandum of Conversation

Vnukovo Airport, July 1, 1974, 1:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Brezhnev–Kissinger Conversation at Vnukovo Airport, July 1

PARTICIPANTS

USSR
L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
D. F. Ustinov, Member, Politburo
A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
V. V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
A. M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to General Secretary Brezhnev
G. M. Korniienko, Director, USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Krokhalev, Interpreter

US
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State

As the group came in, Brezhnev shouted for tea to be brought and then pounded on the table to repeat the request. Kuznetsov told him the tea was coming, but Brezhnev, in a joking way, said: “All right, but it is necessary to show one’s power!”

Kissinger: (To Brezhnev, who was flanked by Sonnenfeldt and Scowcroft) If you take the advice of the people next to you, then everything will be OK.

Brezhnev: I thought before that Scowcroft would be big and fat like an ordinary General, but he turned out to be quite normal.

Kissinger: And he is a Mormon, also. He has many wives!

Brezhnev: That’s a good idea. (He hands the Secretary a box of chocolates for Mrs. Kissinger.)

Kissinger: Thank you very much. My wife is very unhappy not to be with me, but she was just released from the hospital.

Brezhnev: Well, you are known to be an exploiter.

Kissinger: Actually, I am glad I didn’t bring her. I don’t know what you would have given her.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Stoessel. The meeting was held in the VIP Lounge at the Vnukovo Airport outside of Moscow.
Brezhnev: Well, I would pay court to her. I saw how you looked at the girls on the beach!
Kissinger: You steered me in that direction!
Brezhnev: Now, Stoessel is a very modest man. I am sure he would look at the ocean and not the girls.
Kissinger: Stoessel worked all day in Moscow.
Brezhnev: Yesterday was a very hard day. We had some serious negotiations. How do you remember all of those figures?
Kissinger: I wanted to see what your figures would be to see if they were correct. I wondered how you arrived at the figure of 16,000. By counting every airplane we have and making unrealistic assumptions—which might theoretically be true—then it might be possible to arrive at this figure.
Brezhnev: Well, I wouldn’t want to count the toys of my granddaughter.
Kissinger: I repeat that it would be theoretically possible, but not realistic. You could count up to 12 or 13 thousand realistically.
Brezhnev: You know that not a single time during our May meetings (Note: He presumably meant March.) did I deceive you.
Kissinger: Right. I suppose that, if I were a Soviet military man, I would make the same calculation, but it shows the problem. Our military people count in the same way.
Brezhnev: President Nixon told me yesterday,2 and he repeated today, that even if you (Note: the Soviets) made concessions, ours would want even more. I speak seriously and with due respect for the difficulties.
Kissinger: I am serious, too. I repeat that the figures I gave you yesterday will produce an explosion in the United States. We probably could win the argument narrowly, but it wouldn’t mean very much.
Brezhnev: Well, if the United States blows up, then I’d be sorry. Why don’t we go to Zavidovo? We could shoot something there. It is a good place.
Kissinger: It’s a very peaceful place.
Brezhnev: We fixed up the house especially for you there. It has 6 missiles under it.
Kissinger: I knew you were doing something there. Do the missiles have 3 or 6 warheads?
Brezhnev: Twenty! They are for the wild boars.

2 See Document 190.
(To Gromyko) How should we plan for our meeting this afternoon?

Gromyko: Well, I need to go to the dentist.

Brezhnev: How about 4 o’clock?

Gromyko: I could do that.

Brezhnev: (To the Secretary) The Crimea is a very good place. I don’t understand why you go to Acapulco.

Gromyko: Yes, and there are no sharks in the Crimea.

Brezhnev then talked privately to Gromyko and said there should be a short meeting in the Ministry of Defense at 2:30. Kosygin, Podgorny, Grechko, Andropov, Ustinov and Gromyko should be there. Then at 3 o’clock there would be a Politburo meeting.

The group left the room at 1:45 p.m.

192. Notes on Talks Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko

July 1, 1974.

Note: The conversation was sporadic and in large part private.

1. It was agreed that the Minister and the Secretary would sign the protocols of the Standing Control Commission.

2. It was agreed that there would be a review, later that day, in Moscow of remaining issues in the underground test limitation agreement. Gromyko referred to removing “mistakes” in the text as it then stood.

3. Gromyko said that the agreement on limiting environmental modification techniques should be stronger than “restraint.”

4. PNEs

Kissinger: You will be able to continue as before for a year and a half, which will give us time to work out a protocol.

Gromyko: We must work out the date for stopping military explosions—March 1, 1976.


Gromyko: Then both sides agree to work out steps regarding peaceful explosions as soon as possible but we would not mention a date. This would not be a condition for the first agreement [on military underground tests].

Kissinger: Well, we cannot permit PNEs after the agreement goes into effect.

Gromyko: We should agree to put the agreement into effect even before the date [of an agreement on PNEs]. There should be no formal “string.” People would not understand that since we talk of peaceful uses all the time. But we should get an agreement on PNEs even before the effective date of the TTB—whether that is March 1 or July 1, 1976 is not material. There should be no problem. The US is also interested in it. And there would be no obstacle to having observers.

Kissinger: Perhaps we can express it more positively:

“Peaceful explosions can be conducted subject to the following conditions.”

Gromyko: Or “Both sides will make active efforts to reach agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions as soon as possible.”

Kissinger: But we cannot put the TTB into force without agreement on PNEs.

Gromyko: But it should be simple. In any case there is a supreme interest clause in the treaty.

Kissinger: That is not enough; we have to say something specific about PNEs.
193. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Moscow, July 1, 1974, 5:10–9:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Igor D. Morokhov, First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy
Roland M. Timerbayev, Deputy Chief of International Organizations
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Member of Collegium of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of USA Division
Vasili Makarov, Aide to Gromyko
Mr. Komplektov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Oleg Sokolov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Zaitsev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Mr. Bratchikov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Jan M. Lodal, Senior NSC Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
Test Ban; Environmental Warfare; SALT [Briefly]

Test Ban

Gromyko: Well, I think we can start. No introductory words are needed, apart from the fact that we have to start our work. Which question shall we start with? After this question, I make a suggestion: I suggest we discuss underground tests.

Kissinger: I agree.

Gromyko: If it is possible.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: Suppose we formulate one point in this way: It concerns peaceful tests. It is not a precise text but something like this: “The sides declare they will employ their efforts so as in the nearest possible time

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the “Tolstoi House” at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Brackets are in the original.
to reach agreement on the question of peaceful nuclear underground tests, explosions.” I think such an obligation, such a commitment, would be enough. It wouldn’t look like a formal condition. So as the real agreement comes into force on the other side, it would be strong enough so the two powers will turn this obligation into an agreement, especially taking into consideration the fact that the period is enough, even if you take the beginning of 1976. I cannot imagine we can’t get agreement in a year and a half. Naturally, there may be obstacles that may stand in the way. For the reasons I explained on the plane, I cannot be bold in that connection. I hope you understand us.2

Kissinger: I understand you, Mr. Foreign Minister. My difficulty is agreeing with you, not understanding you. As a practical matter, we cannot implement this agreement until the loophole of peaceful nuclear explosions is closed. We can’t be in a position where we have permitted you to conduct tests above the threshold in the guise of peaceful nuclear explosions.

Gromyko: Your argument is clear, but we consider there are no grounds for doubts, for fears. I want to give you two arguments. About one we already talked. We are ready to consider in a favorable direction the possibility of exchange of observers. We are ready. Now, second: suppose that in the opinion of one of the sides there are grounds for doubts about the actions of the other, we have a special article which guarantees the fundamental interests of the security of the state. A state can withdraw from the agreement. We don’t think any of the sides would put itself into the situation where it would give grounds to the suspicion of the other side. I have already explained this on the plane. I think it is sufficient.

Kissinger: I understand your point; I think we understand each other’s point. Why don’t we say something like: [reads] “The other provisions of this Treaty do not extend to underground explosions carried out by the parties for peaceful purposes. These shall be governed by an agreement to be negotiated and concluded by the parties before the date specified in Article I.”

Gromyko: All right, it is clear. But I put the question to you: If it happens by one or another reason that it is delayed with regard to peaceful tests, and if more than one side does it, say, the two sides will blame each other for the delay in the agreement, the Soviet Union is in a position where it is prohibited to use peaceful nuclear tests. And there will be these reproaches. Do you understand my point?

2 See Document 192.
Kissinger: I understand. When the Foreign Minister and I disagree, it is not because we don’t understand each other; it is because we understand each other only too well.

Let me ask: If there is no agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions, should we not implement this treaty?

Gromyko: We will observe the treaty. But taking into account other aspects would tie our hands with regard to peaceful nuclear explosions, if there is a delay in this agreement.

Kissinger: You are afraid we will stop your peaceful program by either delaying this agreement or dragging our feet on peaceful uses.

Gromyko: The absence of an agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions should not mean this agreement shouldn’t come into force. We fear your new formula means that if the provision on peaceful nuclear explosions isn’t implemented, there is a delay. You will think it is because of our position and we will think it is because of yours. But we will be left in a position where it will not be possible to carry out peaceful tests. This is the sense of your proposal. If not so, tell us.

Kissinger: One of two things will happen—you are quite right: Either this agreement won’t go into effect, or the peaceful program will have a moratorium until agreement is reached on peaceful nuclear explosions.

Gromyko: You mean, by the first case, that the treaty won’t come into effect?

Kissinger: We won’t, as a practical matter, be able to ratify unless there is some assurance on peaceful nuclear explosions.

Gromyko: If it is so, then we reject completely this proposal, and on two grounds. Not only the one I already gave, that it would leave us in a situation where we would be without the right to carry out peaceful explosions, but also because the first agreement on underground explosions will not come into force without reaching agreement on peaceful explosions. We couldn’t even agree on one of those grounds, and you give two.

[The U.S. side confers.]

Kissinger: My assistants think you don’t need such big explosives. They will be glad to tell you how to run your business.

Let me state the problem as I see it. There are two problems: One, is a peaceful nuclear explosion a weapons test? The second is, does it violate the threshold? When a peaceful nuclear explosion is below the threshold, we don’t care if it is a weapons test. When it is above the threshold we do care because it could be used for circumvention of the agreement.

Gromyko: Let’s not talk about below the threshold; we are talking about above the threshold. Below threshold, we are in agreement; it is free.
Kissinger: Wait a minute. I don’t want you to betray yourself with your usual impetuosity. Mr. Morokhov\(^3\) gave Mr. Stoessel something on below-the-threshold tests—when?—which is acceptable in principle.

Stoessel: This morning.

Kissinger: That is acceptable in principle. We would have to modify it but I think we could come to an understanding about this. He gave us two parts—one for above the threshold, and one for below.

Gromyko: As far as below the threshold is concerned, the question is out because the sides are free in that area.

Kissinger: Not completely, because for military purposes, tests below the threshold, the sites have to be specified. For peaceful purposes, the sites are specified from case to case. According to your own draft. So I consider the draft of Mr. Morokhov a positive contribution. I think it can solve the problem of peaceful testing below the threshold.

Gromyko: Just in the area of detection by the sides, but this is quite another matter.

Kissinger: No.

Gromyko: This is quite another matter. It has to do with verification. National means.

Kissinger: True, it is another aspect. I think it is useful because we won’t have the geological data and we will need additional data when tests aren’t taking place at the test site.

Gromyko: You mean national means for verification?

Kissinger: I believe essentially national means, with, however, the requirements contained in your own first paragraph, that is, that you inform us of the time and place and geological information about that place, and for observers as in paragraph three of your draft.

You don’t have “geological.” That is one refinement I would add.

Gromyko: Mr. Secretary of State, we shall return to this text. We don’t think this text will create problems. But we want a clearcut answer to two questions. First, tell us about the agreement we are negotiating right now: will it come into force, if before the indicated time of coming into force it turns out there is no agreement on peaceful explosions? Or will you interconnect these two? You precondition this on the agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions? That is the first question. The second question: assume there is a delay until January, March, July 1976 and by some reasons there is no agreement. Although we

\(^3\) I.D. Morokhov, Vice Chairman of the State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy of the USSR, was Stoessel’s interlocutor in the threshold test ban agreement technical talks. See footnote 3, Document 188.
think, on our part, we could come to an agreement before. But suppose we come across some difficulty; do you think in this case we have no right to carry out explosions for peaceful purposes? If you base your position on this, we categorically can’t accept this position. Take the Non-Proliferation Treaty, paragraph five. It says that nuclear powers not only by themselves can use it but can assist non-nuclear countries for using it for peaceful purposes. We would like to have an answer to those two questions.

When I looked at this text myself, I understood it this way: To the first question, yes, the first agreement enters into force whether there is agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions or not. As to the second question, it is not clear. We didn’t come to the conclusion that there is an answer in this text.

Kissinger: The two questions are clearly linked. The answer to the second question gives the answer to the first question. Let us say yes to the first question: the agreement goes into force regardless of whether there is agreement to the second. Then we would say a peaceful nuclear explosion below 150 kt can be conducted according to the Protocol, with the addition given by Mr. Morokhov. With respect to peaceful nuclear explosions above 150 kilotons, there would have to be, in my judgment, a moratorium until agreement was reached. Or there could be a special arrangement for each explosion. I am talking about the above-threshold now. There could be a special arrangement.

Gromyko: [Smiles] Well, Mr. Kissinger, let us not lose our time speaking about what happens below threshold. Because we agree.

Kissinger: No, there is a problem, Mr. Foreign Minister, because on peaceful explosions, we would not have information about tests off the test site, which would clearly be the case. But it is an easily soluble problem.

Gromyko: We do not understand your suggestion. Explosions for peaceful purposes are used not in a range but in the mountains, to connect rivers, to make water reservoirs. What do the sites have to do with this?

Kissinger: On the ranges we will exchange information on test sites, and I understand we are reaching agreement on calibration shots. We would be close to agreement. On other sites, there could be a variation in yield of a factor of two to three, and even below the threshold it could be used for evasion. So even below the threshold there is a problem. But with goodwill and exchange of information it can be settled. Above the threshold it becomes progressively more unmanageable.

There is 1 proposal I could make which you will not accept: that each side provides the device to the other that will be exploded. I am serious.
Gromyko: You know, below the threshold there is no problem.
Kissinger: No, there is a problem.
Gromyko: It is artificial. When you have to decide whether an explosion is above or below, there is a problem, but when you say there is a problem you unnecessarily delay it. On an explosion above, we could exchange a very very big volume of information, which would permit us to draw conclusions.

Kissinger: The information we exchange refers to test sites; it does not refer to the sites for peaceful explosions. I grant you this problem is more easily solved.

Gromyko: You have a certain amount of truth, that there are no testing sites for peaceful purposes. Then why do you not take into account what we have said: a corresponding conclusion should be negotiated, including an exchange of observers. I said this and you ignore it.

Kissinger: No, I know it. But when you say exchange of observers, we have to agree what they will observe.

Gromyko: [Laughing] Exactly. This is what should be negotiated—talks regarding explosions for peaceful purposes. I can’t take the terms of reference out of my pocket. Perhaps you do. If you do, lay it on the table.

Kissinger: No, I believe it is a soluble problem, with goodwill. But I would like it solved before the agreement goes into effect. Which is nearly two years from now.

Gromyko: Meaning the agreement on explosions for peaceful purposes.

Kissinger: As I said, there are two possibilities. We could have provisions for peaceful nuclear explosions below the threshold incorporated in this agreement in such a way that your second question would not arise. Because it wouldn’t take much drafting. Removing the question of peaceful explosions below the threshold from this agreement; I think this can be done.

Gromyko: You are putting conditions. Is it forbidden to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions if there is no agreement on explosions above the threshold?

Kissinger: Explosions above the threshold are excluded until there is an agreement.

Korniyenko: A moratorium.

Gromyko: You propose to exclude them.

Kissinger: From now until the treaty goes into effect, there are no restrictions at all. After the treaty goes into effect, there are restrictions on peaceful nuclear explosions until this is agreed.

Gromyko: It is unacceptable. Tell us on what grounds. Do you want to tie our hands in advance?
Kissinger: We are not trying to tie your hands. If you can have two peaceful nuclear explosions above the threshold, in effect free, how can we possibly explain to our people they are not weapons tests?

Gromyko: You accept that when we get agreement, we let your people come and you will let ours. We got agreement on that; then you just brush it aside. I don’t understand that.

Kissinger: Suppose we accept Mr. Morokhov’s suggestion; what is your idea of what would concretely happen with explosions above the threshold? You say observers. But you don’t say what they do there. I am just taking your second paragraph. If we haven’t come to agreement on the terms of reference for them, are you free?

Gromyko: Free. We are hopeful we shall find common language. We have the same tasks.

Kissinger: Assuming we accept unchanged your Article 3, and the terms of reference are unchanged, you feel free . . .

Gromyko: Free to go as we want.

Kissinger: You could, by refusing to agree to the terms of reference for representatives, use peaceful nuclear explosions for circumvention. How can we explain that?

Gromyko: You raise these possibilities of our intentions.

Kissinger: Our Congress will never ratify.

Gromyko: We should be positive and not listen to one or two opinions.

Kissinger: It takes two-thirds.

You know and we know we have no intention of circumventing the agreement, because the media will make it evident. In your country we won’t know whether it is for peaceful purposes.

Gromyko: We invite your representatives to be at the spot.

Kissinger: But until we know where the representatives can go, how close he can go, what he can inspect, we don’t know what it means.

Gromyko: Mr. Kissinger, why do you give us so hardly-thought up questions? As if you didn’t know their transport. We will give soap for them to wash their hands.

Sonnenfeldt: And sun glasses.

Kissinger: We have a year and a half to work it out.

Gromyko: You are against the text you presented, because we proceeded from your own text.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, if Ambassador Stoessel presented a text which created confusion in your mind, it shows he wasn’t as good a student of mine as I thought.

Gromyko: I won’t interfere in your internal affairs!
Kissinger: I see no alternative to either making it dependent on an agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions above the threshold, or have a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions until there is an agreement.

Korniyenko: Our Supreme Soviet also would not ratify an agreement of this kind if we delayed it ad infinitum. It would not ratify a document which let the American side drag it out indefinitely and delay our peaceful explosions because of artificial problems on terms of reference.

Gromyko: I have a proposal: Let’s have a ten-minute break.
Kissinger: Good. Without inspection. [Laughter]
Gromyko: You usually like inspection, but this time not.
Kissinger: No, we want to know what the terms of reference are. You might put our inspector in a dacha in the Crimea.

[The meeting adjourned from 6:15 to 6:40 p.m. and then reconvened.]

Gromyko: So, in which direction are we going? Further, where is the truth situated?
Kissinger: That is the question Pilate asked Christ: What is the truth?
Gromyko: Who will say Eureka?
Kissinger: I don’t think the Foreign Minister will spend twenty minutes on a problem without coming up with an answer.

Gromyko: There was a third-grade class in the U.S. and the teacher asked, “Who was the person who said Eureka?” One pupil said Archimedes. The teacher said, “Yes, but when did he say it?” The pupil answered, “While running from the bathroom, he was saying ‘I found it, I found it.’” The third question was, “What did he find?” The pupil said: “Soap.” [Laughter] Probably you elaborated or worked out some approximation to the truth.

Kissinger: No.
Gromyko: Further from the truth?
Kissinger: We were wondering what would happen when we reconvened. Stoessel said, probably Gromyko will accept Morokhov’s proposal.

If we made the two agreements conditional on each other, we wouldn’t be bringing pressure on you because if they didn’t go into effect, you could continue your peaceful nuclear explosions.

Gromyko: It gives little to us, such a kind of agreement. It is necessary to find a solution to meet your interest as well as ours . . .
Kissinger: I agree.
Gromyko: . . . that the first agreement should enter into force without being conditional on the other one. Similarly, the second one should be assured independently. This is the position.

Let’s delete the time period, the concrete condition, and say we will exert all efforts to the speediest conclusion of such an agreement.

Frankly speaking, in general, we think, if you don’t have another kind of instruction, the U.S. and USSR could agree on peaceful purposes before this date. Because we think you too have a desire on that score.

Kissinger: Then we have no problem.

Gromyko: Yes. So let’s not put it as a condition. Let’s say the sides will apply energetic efforts to agree on peaceful nuclear explosions in the nearest time.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I don’t question your good faith. But when I negotiated with your allies from Hanoi, whenever we wanted to write a provision where we knew nothing would happen, we put into the agreement “the parties will do their utmost.” Because we knew both sides would do nothing. So my Legal Adviser won’t let me use that phrase. It is possible to say: “Underground nuclear explosions shall be governed by an agreement to be negotiated and concluded by the Parties.” As long as you understand that, while it doesn’t have a conditional phrase in it, we wouldn’t ratify until the agreement is concluded.

Gromyko: You wouldn’t ratify what? The first agreement or the second?

Kissinger: We would tell our Congress we have made this agreement but we can’t in good conscience ratify it until we have the second one. But at least the agreement wouldn’t be written in conditional form.

Gromyko: We are agreeing on an acceptable agreement, but the first agreement won’t be ratified without the other. So what can I report tomorrow?

Kissinger: I share your confidence we will be able to come to an agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions. We have over the weekend queried all relevant agencies, and I have the impression that they would work on such an agreement with a positive attitude.

Gromyko: Your agencies?

Kissinger: Our agencies who would have to do the technical work.

Gromyko: Your President would look into it; in our country it is the Politburo. In the first instance it is me that is conducting negotiations with you.

Kissinger: That is right.

Gromyko: Suppose I go to the meeting tomorrow and tell my colleagues that Mr. Kissinger said he would use a more flexible formula
for joining them together without a hook, but he says the first one wouldn’t enter into force without the second. What kind of progress is that? So where is the truth?

Kissinger: There is no way around these two choices. We can come to an agreement for peaceful nuclear explosions below the threshold, and then the treaty can go into effect, with a moratorium on tests—peaceful nuclear explosions—above the threshold. Or we have to link the two together. There is no way around it. We can be extremely flexible in the way we formulate that linkage so it is not very apparent. You summed it up very effectively.

Gromyko: So it gives nothing. You are just blocking.

Kissinger: Not at all. We have a year and a half to come to an agreement on one category. That is the only loophole. That is the uncertain area.

Gromyko: You are putting forward an impossible condition, that we agree that you would be in the way of an agreement coming into force if the second is not concluded.

Let’s formulate it in another way. Let’s find a most imperative form but delete the variant of linkage of the first to the second and not turn the linkage into a precondition of entering into force of the first. Let’s try to find such a formula. I tried to put forward the formulations: “efforts,” “energetic efforts,” “express confidence that their efforts will be crowned with positive results.” But without formal linkage. You want to put it on steel hooks.

Kissinger: What is the imperative formulation?

Gromyko: A variant of yours, when you link it to the date. We can say the two sides will do their utmost so as to reach agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions and they express confidence their efforts will be crowned with positive results.

Kissinger: Look, we can put anything into the agreement, and such a formulation is not inconceivable, provided you understand the Senate will not ratify it unless we close the loophole.

Gromyko: Then the formulation makes no difference.

Kissinger: That is right.

Gromyko: Because Americans will delay our peaceful explosions.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, what I want to stress is, in any event you can have peaceful nuclear explosions below the threshold, and for the vast majority of peaceful projects 150 kilotons will be enough.

Gromyko: You put that in a very clear way. This question is clear, and practically it does not exist.

Kissinger: So we are talking about very few peaceful explosions above 150 kilotons. I would be amazed if you have done more than ten peaceful nuclear explosions in your whole program.
Gromyko: Right.

Kissinger: Small explosions for peaceful proposes we will solve. So we won’t interfere with your program.

Gromyko: You are stressing this; this question doesn’t need to be discussed.

Kissinger: No, it does, because if you suddenly did ten tests off the test site, even below the threshold, we would wonder why, because we would have much less data. But this is a soluble problem. So we are talking about the very few above the threshold. I don’t know how many you have done; I am checking it. Maybe you can tell me.

Gromyko: We are talking about ones above.

[Kissinger and Lodal confer about numbers of Soviet peaceful nuclear explosions.]

Kissinger: What we are discussing is trying to figure out from our data the number of peaceful nuclear explosions above this threshold in the last three years. Mr. Morokhov could tell us in thirty seconds. We think it is six in the last three years.

Gromyko: It is a question of a general educational character.

[Kissinger and Lodal confer about numbers of Soviet peaceful nuclear explosions.]

Kissinger: Our practical problem is: You know I have been before the Senate the day before I left, because of a loophole which you know, having been there, doesn’t exist. It had no reality; it was imaginary. Here we are talking about a loophole which anybody could find. So either we will impose this condition or the Senate will. So I understand we can eliminate the conditional phrasing. It will not change the reality but it will ease the formulation problem.

Gromyko: What is the course of the Administration? It would go to Congress, or more so that you yourself would come out in favor of shelving it?

Kissinger: I would come out in favor of accepting it but I would say we wouldn’t deposit ratification until we have the other.

Gromyko: So what is the use of the agreement?

Kissinger: We would have every confidence we could work out the other agreement. After all, it doesn’t make us look particularly good to have worked out an agreement that isn’t implemented. See, our estimation is—I don’t want to debate it—between 1964 and 1974 almost all your peaceful nuclear explosions were below the threshold, and only four were above the threshold in the last three years. So we are not talking about a problem that will arise every two weeks.

Gromyko: In this case we are talking about a question of principle. To us what is impossible is the principle itself. So what kind of alternative do you have, on the basis of which we could come to an understanding?

[Kissinger, Stoessel, and Sonnenfeldt concur.]

Kissinger: I have no trouble with an imperative formulation, with removing the conditional aspect to the text. And that will change the public impression of it. But it doesn’t change the reality.

Gromyko: An extreme imperative formulation gives nothing if you declare the agreement will not be approved.

Kissinger: You see, at this point we don’t have to go to the Senate because we don’t have to go to the Senate until three months before the Treaty goes into effect. So we don’t have to make any conditions. And I assure you our intention is to bring the negotiation on peaceful nuclear explosions to a conclusion, and we will certainly guide our bureaucracy to that effect.

Gromyko: It is not essential that today you notify Congress that you won’t send it. The main thing is that you wouldn’t approve and it wouldn’t go into force.

Kissinger: No, we would submit it to the Senate soon and explain. But we could tell them to take their time in ratifying it.

Gromyko: Then what will be the behavior of the Administration?

Kissinger: We would be in favor of the treaty.

Gromyko: You would strive for adoption?

Kissinger: We would strive for adoption. But I don’t want to mislead you: There will in fact be a linkage. But if you and we work at it, we can solve it. If you really want peaceful nuclear explosions, without cunning—which I really believe—then it shouldn’t be so difficult to work out the arrangement.

Gromyko: There is part of the truth in that. We know there is a situation in your country that a group of Congressmen and Senators can put up obstacles you can’t foresee.

Kissinger: You have some experience in this respect.

Gromyko: On most-favored-nation.

Kissinger: I know. But that condition will be imposed either by us or by Congress. It would be much better if we do it because that way we could control it.

Gromyko: Would the Administration fight for the agreement?

Kissinger: Of course. We would fight for it publicly. Seriously, what we would like in America is to have a debate on this and on SALT as quickly as possible so we can get an end to these stories that we have made agreements to the disadvantage of the United States. It is not in
our interest for us to make an agreement that the Senate defeats. It is against our domestic interest. It is also against our foreign policy interest for the Politburo to agree to a text that the Senate rejects. It will make it less likely that they will agree again.

Gromyko: You have another formulation without a specific date?
Kissinger: No, we haven’t. But it is not difficult to find.
Gromyko: There is no need for a strong formulation. Just say it will be done, if you make your condition.
Kissinger: We could say: “Underground nuclear explosions shall be governed by an agreement which is to be negotiated and concluded by the Parties at the earliest possible time.” And we say nothing about conditions. You probably have a much better one right in front of you.
Gromyko: We have your text.
Kissinger: We don’t need a stronger one. With the one condition, that we would want this loophole closed, we would fight hard for an agreement.
Gromyko: You talk so much about the fact that entering into force will be linked, then doubt emerges about how can we strive for agreement.
I would take the text for studying it.
Kissinger: All right.
[The U.S. side confers.]
Gromyko: What other questions can we come to next? The communiqué.5
Kissinger: Maybe the communiqué, but can we settle whatever remains in the Treaty? Aside from that one.
Gromyko: All right, the other provisions.
Kissinger: On duration, Article 5, I understand you had some question about our provision “including the yield provision specified in Article I.”
Gromyko: I haven’t yet seen it. I am reading it. [The Soviets confer]
Kissinger: Please. We are accepting your five-year proposal.
Gromyko: You know, at first glance it is acceptable, up to the words “including review of the yield provision indicated in Article I.”
Kissinger: I have never met your colleague Morokhov before but I don’t think he is a positive influence on this negotiation.
Gromyko: Let’s not go deeper into that. [Laughter]
Kissinger: Because he is the one behind peaceful nuclear explosions. You and I could settle it easily.

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5 See Document 199.
Gromyko: About eight years ago we were putting a proposal and I talked to some of your predecessors, and I take him out of those to blame. But before that . . .

Kissinger: In proposing that, we were trying to be constructive. Let me suggest “including possible downward revision of yield levels.” So it can only be downward.

Gromyko: We are in favor of deleting these words. I understand you want to go half way to meet us; don’t.

Kissinger: We were trying to offer a prospect. Why were you opposed? I just want to understand.

Gromyko: It shakes the agreement a little. There will be something cooking in three months, six months.

Kissinger: It will be only in five years.

Gromyko: We would prefer to delete.

Kissinger: We wanted to keep in mind your concern for a complete test ban and to be positive.

Gromyko: Our position is reducing, decreasing, and there was introduced a quota.

Kissinger: But that doesn’t affect the threshold.

Gromyko: It is a kind of mine planted under the agreement from the beginning. We would be talking, and then something comes up.

Kissinger: You are too suspicious.

Gromyko: Only moderately. We would prefer not to have such a privilege.

Kissinger: Can we then delete this phrase, but we can say when the five-year review comes up, either side is free to raise the matter of reducing the threshold?

Gromyko: Of course, either side is free.

Kissinger: This may have been drafted poorly. Can we say: “At the time of review”—not before—“the question of downward review can be considered.”

Gromyko: This question, other questions.

Kissinger: You would rather not say it, but it is understood.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: I know when I am defeated.

Gromyko: Either side has the right.

Kissinger: That is all we wanted to achieve. If you prefer not to have it in the agreement, it is not a matter of principle.

Gromyko: We prefer it.

Kissinger: I go along with you.

Kissinger: There is no Article 6.

Gromyko: Where did you lose it? On route here? From the Crimea? Yesterday we had a boat trip.

Kissinger: The only part of Article 6 we have left we made part of Article 5, but if you would like the third paragraph of Article 5 as Article 6, I will make that concession.

[The Soviet side confers.]
Oh, are you waiting for me?

Gromyko: Who will over-wait whom?

Kissinger: You are much more experienced; I always lose.

We don’t want an accession clause.

Gromyko: Why?

Kissinger: Your allies will be unhappy.

Gromyko: Ours will not be unhappy.

Kissinger: I can think of one that will be unhappy.

Gromyko: Are you ready to share that secret with us? The question is about states possessing nuclear weapons.

Kissinger: That is right. We don’t even have diplomatic relations with it.

Gromyko: It is quite a daring declaration—to say this ally would be unhappy. That is going too far.

Kissinger: That is true. But with this treaty, we would have to exchange information with every state that accedes to it. That would present problems.

Gromyko: About the other countries, do you have any questions?

Kissinger: No, we would prefer no accession clause.

Gromyko: All right, we will think over it.

Kissinger: The effective date.

Gromyko: I want to tell you from the very beginning we expressed the hope that you would accept in the final analysis the date of the first of January. The time period is long, and as we say, to think for half a year it doesn’t make great weather. Half a year is half a year. That makes two years. The question is so important from the humanitarian point of view, the time factor should be more taken into account. Therefore, we would like you to agree to the 1st of January.

Kissinger: The 1st of January I am afraid is too complicated for us.

Gromyko: Postponing the agreement to the 1st of July undermines too much the strength, the authority of the agreement.

Kissinger: My watch says it is June 31st.

Gromyko: Then in this case, you are not in Moscow, you are in Washington or the Middle East.
Kissinger: Probably the Middle East. Most likely Damascus.
Does your watch indicate the date when you get your salary?
Kissinger: I don’t get a salary.
Gromyko: You live under Communism already!
Kissinger: In our system they take from each according to his needs and give to each according to his ability. That is why I don’t get any.
Gromyko: Ambassador Dobrynin didn’t report this.
Kissinger: A silent revolution.
Gromyko: First in the list.
Kissinger: To each according to his ability. That is why I have an unpaid staff.
Gromyko: I would defend them.
Kissinger: Except the Ambassador.
Gromyko: I would defend them. I would defend them.
Kissinger: Why don’t we think about the date?
Gromyko: All right.
Kissinger: The only other question is a question of the calibration chart. Paragraph 1 (d).
Gromyko: Are you in favor of this formulation?
Kissinger: Yes.
Gromyko: Let’s come back to it tomorrow.
Kissinger: All right.
When is your idea when this should be signed?
Gromyko: Either tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.
Kissinger: Yes.
Gromyko: There is no other choice. [Laughter] The day after tomorrow we will release the communique.
Kissinger: So it would be better if we signed all the others tomorrow.
Gromyko: It would be good to sign it tomorrow. This one, and the two we talked about on the plane, and this is the fourth.
Kissinger: The four. The SCC one we shouldn’t sign publicly.
Gromyko: We can sign it.
Kissinger: But not publish it?
Korniyenko: No.
Kissinger: Stay out of it, Korniyenko. It is difficult to sign with television and not publish it.
Korniyenko: We didn’t publish the technical agreement on the Hot Line.

Kissinger: We can work it out. I will talk to our press man.

Environmental Warfare

Gromyko: Environmental warfare. I made an observation on your text.

Kissinger: I haven’t seen it.

Gromyko: Korniyenko and Dobrynin made it.

Kissinger: Orally.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: Yes, I understand; I am familiar with it.

Gromyko: That the way it is written now is more a permission than a prohibition.

Kissinger: And that is not an unreasonable comment. [He looks for the paper] Goddamn.

Gromyko: What is the problem?

Kissinger: I expressed an opinion about our legal adviser by damning a nonexistent entity in your philosophy. [Laughter]

Your problem is that “restraint” seems permissive. I am looking for a neutral word so you can say you are for banning it, and we don’t have to say anything.

Gromyko: We can do it together.

Kissinger: I have the impression that our views will not be different from yours over a period of time, but I need time to prepare our situation. Words like “measures for effective control.”

Gromyko: “Stand for” instead of “favor.”

Kissinger: That is provisionally all right.

Gromyko: Let’s not go further.

Kissinger: “Advocate,” “support,” “endorse.”

Gromyko: “Support” that somebody’s doing.

Kissinger: Let’s leave “stand for,” “control over the use for military purposes.”

Gromyko: Weather does not shoot, but can be used for military purposes.

Kissinger: “For military purposes,” that is: “stands for the broadest possible control over environmental modification techniques for military purposes.” This is not final; it is an idea.

Gromyko: Let’s break for ten minutes.
Kissinger: All right. [To Sonnenfeldt:] Why don’t you go off with Aldrich⁶ and write it out. Get Stoessel in too.

[The meeting adjourned from 7:58 to 8:10 p.m. and then reconvened.]

Kissinger: Should I read the appropriate paragraphs, Mr. Foreign Minister?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: After the preambular paragraph, “Advocate the broadest possible . . .”

Gromyko: “The widest possible measures not to permit,” or “with the purpose of prevention.” “With the purpose of not permitting.” This is the meaning.

Kissinger: I think this is about as much as we can do. “Over the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.”

Korniyenko: “The broadest possible measures for control.”

Gromyko: The whole purpose is not to permit.

Kissinger: Our ideas are not identical yet.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: Then let’s say “control over modification techniques for military purposes.”

Gromyko: Control may be control in favor of military application.

Kissinger: “Broadest possible limitation?”

Gromyko: This is the worst one could possibly think. How would there be limitation? Right now suppose we have X number of rockets, and we say in the future not more than X multiplied by ten. I think we are thinking in the same direction but let us express certain policy in this field.

Kissinger: I know. But the furthest we can go is something along the lines I indicated. “Control over techniques.” In America it would be seen as a big step forward.

Gromyko: But this could mean control in any direction. Control could be to multiply only by five and not by ten.

Kissinger: We had “restrain,” which means down.

Gromyko: “Restrain” means we will go in the direction of military purposes but only gradually, by doses, step by step.

Kissinger: “To curb”? To curb is to restrain, almost the same.

Kissinger: “Restrain” is more general; “curb” is more strict.

Korniyenko: It means “permit but . . .”

⁶ George H. Aldrich, Deputy Legal Adviser.
Kissinger: Maybe it isn’t ripe yet in our country.
Gromyko: It is with difficulty that I can think of the country, say country X, that is not ripe for prevention of modification of natural factors.
Kissinger: I have given you my best judgment.
Gromyko: Let us eat something.
Kissinger: All right. But remember, I am incorruptible.

[Dinner was served in the dining room from 8:20 to 9:10 p.m. Afterwards the group reconvened in the meeting room.]
Gromyko: Shall we resume our deliberations?
Kissinger: Yes.
Gromyko: Can Mr. Sonnenfeldt give us his ideas?
Sonnenfeldt: I give the word to the Secretary of State.
Kissinger: You see we have already had our review. “Advocate the broadest possible safeguards against harmful uses of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.”
Gromyko: There is harmful use for military purposes and not harmful uses? Since in a war there are always two countries at least, what is harmful to one is not harmful to the other. What is good for Carthage is not good for Rome.
Kissinger: I was just thinking of it the other way around. And history is written by the victor, so one doesn’t know what it looked like from the Carthaginian point of view.
I think the best we can do is a formulation that lets you interpret what you want but leaves vagueness. “Advocate the broadest possible measures to deal with the dangers of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.” But not to say “prevent,” “eliminate.”

[Both sides confer.]
Gromyko: “Both sides decided to enter into negotiations on measures to deal with the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.”
Korniyenko: “Both sides decided to enter into negotiations on measures to deal with the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.”
Gromyko: How do you translate “to deal with?”
Korniyenko: In this sense, to do away with.
Kissinger: In the sense of doing away with the dangers, not with the use.
Korniyenko: If you mean only “do something with,” it is not good.
Kissinger: I am trying to leave it more ambiguous.
Gromyko: What you are suggesting is promotion of the dangers.
Kissinger: I don’t think any English-speaker would understand that as meaning “promote.” It implies removing the danger or eliminating the danger. The problem is the danger of use. If we wanted to say “eliminate the use,” we would say “eliminate the use.”

I don’t know the Russian word for “to deal with.”

[Both sides confer.]

It may be an insoluble problem. We may have to defer for a few weeks or months.

Gromyko: We are very sorry. You say the country is not ripe; I don’t think the country is not ripe. It is a matter of statesmen.

Kissinger: We are prepared to start negotiations if the goal isn’t stated too precisely. “To eliminate the dangers in the use of.”

Gromyko: That is not good. That means the use is sanctioned.

Korniyenko: The dangers of using.

Gromyko: The dangers of use, that is another matter.

Kissinger: You want to interpret it to mean “to ban,” and we cannot yet do this, although the tendency of the negotiations will probably be in that direction.

Maybe I should talk to the President about that.

Gromyko: Please.

SALT

Gromyko: Maybe it would be advisable either here, or in another room, or with a more restrained circle, to discuss the other subject.

Kissinger: SALT?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: These are all the people who are working on it anyway for me.

Gromyko: All right. We can just continue.

We would like that you take a more realistic position on this question. As far as the figures are concerned, we talked about them.

Kissinger: The figures I gave yesterday.\footnote{See Document 190.}

Gromyko: Exactly. Maybe let us go to the adjoining room. Take one of your colleagues, and Comrade Korniyenko will come with the interpreter. Because if we go in this combination, many of your colleagues will come tomorrow with a shaky head. Take anyone you want, but we will come with only myself, Comrade Korniyenko, and the interpreter.

Kissinger: All right.
[Secretary Kissinger, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, and Stoessel conferred in the next room with Gromyko, Korniyenko, and Bratchikov from 9:30 to 10:20 a.m.]\(^8\)

\(^8\) See Document 194.

194. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Moscow, July 1, 1974, 9:30 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Restricted U.S.-Soviet Meeting, July 1: SALT

**PARTICIPANTS**

**USSR**
- A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- G. M. Korniyenko, Chief, USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Mr. Bratchikov, Interpreter

**US**
- Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
- Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
- Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador

Gromyko: The situation is very complicated. I noted you practically didn’t mention the B–1 and the Trident. These should be strictly limited.

Kissinger: If we extend the Agreement for five years, we could slow down the development of Trident relative to the present program. It is now planned to have two a year. This could be slowed down to one. Thus, there would be only two by the end of the interim period.

Korniyenko: There would be four or five by the end of 1979.

Kissinger: Two would be on sea trials. Only one would be commissioned by the end of 1979.

Gromyko: In March, you said there would be three. Have you reduced the number?

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Stoessel. The meeting was held in the Soviet Foreign Ministry Reception House.
Korniyenko: In March you were talking about 1980.
Kissinger: I think I spoke of the end of 1979. I will have to look this up. Maybe there would be none at all—certainly not more than one.
Gromyko: And not more than two on sea trials by the end of 1979?
Kissinger: Yes.
Gromyko: And the B–1?
Kissinger: I don’t think there will be very many by the end of 1979. I can check and let you know tomorrow.
Gromyko: I mention this because you didn’t cover this in detail. And what about the main figures?
Kissinger: This would be 750 for you and no large missiles. There would be 1150 for us. And the Interim Agreement would be extended until the end of 1979.
Gromyko: Those figures are so unrealistic.
Kissinger: Then we should send our Secretary of Defense to talk to you. He thinks you would accept 350.
We would have to explain why we let you build 750. We would build 150 more, and you would get 600 more to catch up. It would be presented this way in the U.S.
Our people say the maximum you can do is 900–1000 in that period. Maybe this is wrong.
Gromyko: We can’t accept your arguments as they relate to your own internal position. You know our own position. I must say we have a strange impression of your position; we’re surprised by it. It doesn’t seem realistic. I don’t see hope if you maintain your position.
I wonder if it is worth repeating again the argument about FBS which was presented by the General Secretary yesterday. You know our position on this. The distance between our positions does not narrow, but increases. There is no forward movement.
Kissinger: What are your concrete ideas?
Gromyko: You know them. We presented our figures. We’d like to hear your views. If you have something more realistic to say about the figures, this would be interesting.
Kissinger: I don’t have any different figures. I would point out that the figures we gave are not basically disadvantageous to you. They give you a greater rate than they give the U.S.
The General Secretary told me that you won’t have MIRVs on submarines until the end of that period. By that time, you will be in a posi-

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2 See Document 166.
3 See Document 190.
tion to add rapidly to your sea-based MIRVs, and you’ll still have more land-based missiles than we will.

Gromyko: We have quite different views about the figures. You had no arguments to make against the figures presented by the General Secretary. Your remarks about our heavy missiles as presented in Washington were really not arguments for serious discussion.

Kissinger: What remarks are you thinking of?

Gromyko: Those which you presented in Washington and which you are now talking about with regard to MIRVing our heavy missiles. These are not for serious discussion.

Kissinger: That may be, but it is a serious proposal.

Gromyko: Then this is all you have for the moment?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: That’s bad. The situation is gloomy. What should we put in the Communiqué on this?

Korniyenko: We have nothing at the moment.

Kissinger: This is quite a serious matter. It is very difficult for us to fight for an existing agreement with nothing.

Gromyko: We can’t accept any agreement which would violate the principle of equality as stated in the present agreement.

Kissinger: We could put language in the Communiqué saying that the parties seek energetically to limit MIRVs in relation to a possible broadening of the Interim Agreement without getting into figures.

Gromyko: And will continue negotiations for this purpose.

Kissinger: Something like that.

(Korniyenko then read off language which might be used in the Communiqué containing these thoughts.)

Gromyko: Tomorrow the President indicated that he would like to talk at the highest level about the Middle East and the Vienna talks. Sometime during the plenary perhaps you and I could work on the Communiqué. We should also discuss the threshold test ban.

Kissinger: I suggest the plenary be at 11. You and I could meet at 9:30.

Gromyko: This is not good for me. I have another meeting at 9:30.

Kissinger: We should meet on the test ban before the plenary. We could talk about the Communiqué after the plenary.

(There was further discussion about timing of the plenary, discussion of the test ban, and signing of agreements. The Secretary said that

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4 See Document 174.
he would look again at the language on environment—perhaps we could come up with a new idea.)

Gromyko: Well, let’s adjourn.

Kissinger: (Getting up.) Yes. I’m discouraged about SALT. (The Secretary and Gromyko then moved off to a corner of the room.) I don’t want to be forced into an admission of failure. If we can’t agree now, we should think of some way to keep up movement.

Gromyko: We have our delegations in Geneva. They could meet.

Kissinger: When do you propose they assemble?

Gromyko: (Answer inaudible.) A crucial point is the proportion of weapons. We need realism in the figures.

Kissinger: I am really a strong proponent of a solution. I am not bargaining.

We will have a violent discussion at home about all of this. We’ll look at it again, but it’s going to be very difficult.

Gromyko: Jackson has frightened everyone?

Kissinger: Jackson alone we could handle.

Gromyko: Your military is frightened, too?

Kissinger: No.

Gromyko: It is difficult for both sides. We’re constantly being asked what is the matter and why won’t the United States agree.

Kissinger: You can’t compare a Phantom fighter with a missile with a 20 megaton bomb.

Gromyko: All of this data is known to everyone. You shouldn’t have the view that we underrate the importance of an agreement. We want to find a solution.

Your figures seem to have changed.

Kissinger: If we let you put MIRVs on all your missiles, this would involve 1400 land-based missiles.

Gromyko: You will be ahead. Maybe for the sake of polemic, you could argue the other way. We’re not going to MIRV all of our missiles. We’re talking about this agreement. (Note: Presumably, Interim Agreement.) For the future, we will consider another agreement. This could represent something new.

Kissinger: We could see if we could find an entirely different basis for an agreement over a longer period with different figures. This could change the overall situation.

Gromyko: So after this agreement, a new, longer one could be agreed on, perhaps for 10 years.

Kissinger: Yes, for 10 years starting now. Maybe this could be on a new basis.
Gromyko: The present agreement expires in 1977. A new agreement would go to 1985?

Kissinger: We could see. This may be the only solution. It could affect the degree of optimism in the Communiqué. We could note the urgency of the problem and the desire of both sides to reach an agreement. Then we could discuss it later. We could say that the two parties agreed to consider a longer-term agreement upon the expiration of the present interim agreement.

Gromyko: Could you formulate a text?

Kissinger: Yes. This could be the best solution. At present, we may be too frozen with each side calculating movements.

Gromyko: This could be a good thing. It would give a sense of a new approach.

Kissinger: If we change the overall numbers, we could be more flexible about the number of MIRVs.

Gromyko: Then, if there is no agreement for the present, this could be superseded by a more general understanding. It is vague, but in a sense it is an intriguing formulation. It could touch the imagination.

Kissinger: And it could force us to use our imagination.

Gromyko: We should stress our serious intentions to reach an agreement.

Kissinger: I agree. Let’s talk about it tomorrow.

The meeting then adjourned at approximately 10:45 p.m.
Moscow, July 2, 1974, 12:45–3:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of USA Division
Oleg Sokolov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Zaitsev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interpreter)
Oleg Krokhalev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interpreter)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor to the Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Senior Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
Test Ban; Environmental Warfare; Communiqué

Test Ban
Gromyko: If there are no objections, let us go underground.
Kissinger: Fine. How is your toothache?
Gromyko: Thank you very much. I needed an hour and a half to put aside for that. But with all these documents to sign, I can’t. When we have finished, my war with the doctor will stop.

Let’s turn to a starting date. We thought first we would start on the 1st of January [1976].
Kissinger: Impossible.
Gromyko: Impossible.
Kissinger: How about May 27, my birthday?
Gromyko: Let’s try March 1 as a compromise.
Kissinger: Let us say April 15.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in St. Catherine’s Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace. Brackets are in the original.
Gromyko: That is a bad month.
Dobrynin: It is not a good time.
Kissinger: At the beginning of March you will find underground water is so deep that you can’t do it. I was trying to help Morokhov.
No, April 15 is the realistic figure we gave you.
Gromyko: I will give you one figure, and please don’t try to persuade me. March 31. Try the peanuts there and agree.
Kissinger: Now that you are trying to bribe me.
Gromyko: 31st of March.
Korniyenko: Without the peanuts.
Kissinger: April 15 with peanuts.
Gromyko: Let’s take this time our compromise solution.
Kissinger: All right.
Gromyko: The 31st of March. Let’s go to the third article. [Draft text is at Tab A.]
You have any reservations?
Kissinger: No.
Gromyko: Then we accept. “Underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes shall be governed by an agreement . . .”
Kissinger: I want the record to be absolutely clear on this, on what position we will take with our Congress. We will strongly defend this treaty but we will also point out that we cannot deposit ratification until this is settled.
Gromyko: Each side will be responsible for its own actions. This is the responsibility of the Administration, how it defends. All right. Article Five. In that form as we already agreed, excluding the words “including consideration of reducing the levels,” that we accept.
Kissinger: Within the context of what we discussed yesterday.³
Gromyko: Yes.
Kissinger: All right.
Gromyko: Now 3rd became 2nd. Is it recorded? The former 3rd becomes the 2nd paragraph.
Kissinger: The sixth article becomes paragraph three of the fifth article.
Gromyko: We are speaking about Article Five.
Kissinger: These texts have already been compared. It is accepted.

² A draft of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests is attached but not printed. See Document 199.
³ See Document 193.
Gromyko: Tell me. Have you become [more] realistic than yesterday about joining of other countries to the agreement?
Kissinger: No.
Gromyko: It is a pity.
Kissinger: I am a slow student. I don’t think you want to exchange geological data with the Chinese. So we are doing it out of friendship.
Gromyko: The Chinese scared you.
Kissinger: Scared me? They have Senator Jackson there; they are happy. I wish they would keep him.
Gromyko: How many millions did they bring to meet him?
Kissinger: I don’t think they did.
Dobrynin: It was very quiet.
Gromyko: Thus, you are too sensitive as far as this good article is concerned.
Kissinger: We will put it in some other treaty. We will save it. How about the artificial heart machine?
Gromyko: We already signed it. 5
All right. We are sorry, and I say that frankly. Just because you stress too much importance to that, to turn it into a barrier.
So the Sixth Article goes away.
Kissinger: The third paragraph of the Sixth Article becomes the third paragraph of the fifth.
Gromyko: Right.
Kissinger: When do we sign it?
Gromyko: Tomorrow. It seems you have changed your view. Our thought would be today.
Kissinger: It is not a political decision. Our people thought it better for the press . . . We very rarely think about public relations in this Administration.
Gromyko: Now we are on the protocol. [Tab B] 6
Kissinger: Right.
Gromyko: We went a long way as far as concessions to the Americans on this.
Kissinger: We came a long way too. We gave up two paragraphs. But we need that paragraph (d).
Gromyko: Already, I turned.

4 Jackson arrived in Beijing on July 1 for a 6-day visit.
5 See Document 199.
6 A draft of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests is attached but not printed.
Kissinger: You accept it?
Gromyko: I accept it. Right. Will the American side appreciate this gesture?
Kissinger: Yes. Quite seriously, we recognize you’ve made a big concession.
Gromyko: We think you will be more understanding when we discuss the natural factors. Environmental factors.
Kissinger: I have already made a proposal. Your Ambassador rejected your proposal of yesterday.
Dobrynin: I said it was too weak.
Kissinger: Just to finish on the protocol: There are a number of brackets that follow.
Gromyko: Yes.
Kissinger: We don’t have to review them all.
Gromyko: Tomorrow is the signing.
Kissinger: What time is it?
Gromyko: There is a reception at 1:00 p.m. and we shall arrange it so we sign it and the reception comes immediately afterward.
Kissinger: Good. We sign the treaty, the ABM agreement—we see where we are on environment—and the communiqué.
Gromyko: Right.
Kissinger: And the comprehensive SALT Agreement.
Korniyenko: And the two Geneva Protocols.
Kissinger: The SCC documents.
Gromyko: Yes.
Kissinger: We will announce that Kissinger and Gromyko will sign two secret agreements. With loopholes.
Gromyko: How many? Six?
Korniyenko: Six.
Gromyko: With environment, it will be six.
Kissinger: Including SALT?
Gromyko: You are in an extra good mood today. All right.

Environmental Warfare

Now, let’s pass to the subject of environment.
Kissinger: I made the mistake of discussing with your Ambassador who, as always, was not correctly briefed.

Yesterday when we discussed the question of dealing with the dangers of use, there was some dispute about it. We will accept any reasonable interpretation. So we could accept that language that yesterday I withdrew. We will reserve our position for the conference. “Both
sides,”—this formula—“advocate the broadest possible measures to deal with the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.”

[He hands the text of Tab C to Gromyko. They translate to themselves and discuss in Russian.]

Gromyko: The Russian text—“to deal with.” You are better experts in English, and we vice versa. In Russian we will say “with purpose of elimination.”

Dobrynin: Or “doing away with.”

Gromyko: This is the formulation. Does it give this, or does it give permission? Removal or permission.

Dobrynin: “Overcome the dangers.”

Sonnenfeldt: “Overcome the dangers.”

Kissinger: Then we will say the same thing.

Gromyko: It seems to us, though not very strong, “overcome” is a little bit more definite than “deal with.”

Kissinger: I agree, but with the Russian equivalent.

Gromyko: “Ustranyenie”

Stoessel: That means to eliminate. “Udalyenie.”

Dobrynin: “Ustranyenie” means removing the dangers.

Gromyko: We don’t want to mislead you; neither do we want to mislead ourselves. If it gives the impression of permission, it is not our intention.

Kissinger: If someone is deceived, it is better it be you than we.

Let’s be realistic. We understand your position; your position will be to eliminate. We can’t yet state this in a document. Our position is we do not exclude it; you are free to discuss it, but we want a more flexible phrase. “Overcome the dangers” is all right. But we do not want to be told at the first meeting of the Conference that we have already agreed to elimination of it.

This will be well received in America. Therefore unless we are forced into it, if you don’t give any explanation, we won’t give any explanation.

We may have to give an internal explanation to our government, but not publicly. I don’t think it will come up at a press conference, but if it does, I will say the meaning of “overcome” will be determined by negotiation.

Gromyko: I told you we won’t give any explanation. We will use the word “ustranyenie.” To make it stronger we would use the word “liquidate.”

7 A draft of the joint statement on environmental warfare is attached but not printed. See Document 199.
Kissinger: Is there a weaker word?
Stoessel: “Preodolyenie.”
Dobrynin: That makes no sense.
Gromyko: We cannot just play games in Russian. We will take the most flexible expression which shows a tendency and direction. Our intention is liquidation of the danger.
Kissinger: What you desire we understand. But this is a joint document. We understand what position you will take in the negotiation.
Dobrynin: That is why we agree to a weaker word.
Gromyko: We won’t give any official interpretation. But our intention is to act for peaceful purposes.
Kissinger: I don’t know what the Russian will say. But the record could not be clearer. You are free to give your interpretation.
Dobrynin: The Foreign Minister said he won’t give any interpretation.
Kissinger: All right. We accept.
Gromyko: I suggest the following: “Joint Statement,” while we just delete the subtitle which follows.
Kissinger: I agree.
Gromyko: I will just read it through in Russian. [He reads it through aloud quickly in Russian.]
Kissinger: “Have agreed on the following: To advocate . . .”
Dobrynin: Infinitive.
Gromyko: “The United States of America and the USSR . . . to advocate.” It doesn’t make sense.
Hyland: “Have agreed on the following:”
Kissinger: You can say what you want in Russian.
Korniyenko: “Effective” instead of “broadest.”
Gromyko: Let us say “effective.”
Kissinger: “Most effective measures possible”? That is fine.
Gromyko: “To advocate the most effective possible measures,” I repeat “most effective possible measures to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.”
Kissinger: I suggest one modification. “Most effective measures possible.” It reads better.
Dobrynin: We are for elegance.
Gromyko: All right. How about, instead of “experts” in the next paragraph, putting “representatives.”
Kissinger: All right. I shouldn’t agree so easily.
Gromyko: It is not too late to withdraw! Maybe scientists, diplomats.

Kissinger: It is more inclusive.

Dobrynin: Maybe one of his assistants will go.

Kissinger: I want to send my assistants to be observers of the nuclear tests.

The only thing is—it is purely stylistic—instead of saying “they decided,” “they agreed,” we will just say “to advocate,” “to hold,” and “to discuss.”

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: All right.

Gromyko: Mr. Secretary, our opinion—I don’t know what is your opinion—is maybe it is worthwhile to sign this document at the highest level.

Kissinger: I agree. That means all the documents tomorrow will be signed at the highest level, except the SCC.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: And SALT.

Gromyko: Maybe the angels will be invited too.

Kissinger: All right.

Gromyko: Now the technical verification.

Kissinger: Our Ambassador will consult with Korniyenko.

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: On the Consultative Commission, are the technical papers all done?

Dobrynin: All purified in Geneva.

Communiqué

Kissinger: All right. The Communiqué. [Tab D]8

Mr. Foreign Minister, there are a few stylistic things which the translators have found. We won’t discuss here; we will only discuss the substance. Just to give an example, in paragraph 8, “the first U.S.-Soviet meeting in May 1972,” we don’t need “first.” Because there were other U.S.-Soviet meetings. I won’t bother you with that.

Gromyko: The Communiqué. The first page, nothing. On the second page, there was an American suggestion which we accepted. “Security and peaceful coexistence.” It is now combined.

Kissinger: Why do we have a paragraph 9A?

Dobrynin: We will eliminate the numbers. This is a working paper.

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8 Attached but not printed. See Document 199.
Kissinger: All right.

Gromyko: Page 3, no remarks.

Kissinger: Just to show you the technical points, we took out “previous” and added “in 1972 and 1973.”

Gromyko: Point four, beginning of second chapter. Something on strategic. Did you prepare the text?

Kissinger: Let’s decide what we want to say.

Gromyko: Right now I think it is clear; the time is not ripe for signing some document here. Let’s come to an idea put by you yesterday. It is not going against our desire. I wouldn’t say we are filled with enthusiasm, because this is a direction. Aside from the desire to carry out a negotiation and find a common language, it seems both sides have it. So let us say so in an appropriate way in this paragraph: “The sides are completely determined to carry out negotiations to reach a long-term agreement.” “Long-term,” without specifying what we mean; maybe it will indicate it will be up to 1985; and further we will say . . .

Kissinger: Should we mention 1985?

Gromyko: This is just a suggestion to discuss.

Kissinger: I am not opposed.

Gromyko: “Both sides are convinced this would meet the interests of the two powers, the interest of further improvement of their relations, as well as the interest of further international détente and strengthening world peace. The sides agree to immediately begin negotiations with the purpose of concluding such an agreement, having in mind to reach agreement before the termination of the present agreement.”


Gromyko: Right. This is a three-year period. This will seem enough time to carry out serious negotiations. In this we don’t have any one-sided interest whatever.

Kissinger: My problem with this formulation for the United States is, first, it is a tremendous step backward from last year when we said we would conclude an agreement in 1974. Now we are saying we are going to conclude an agreement before 1977.

Gromyko: Let’s say “not later than.”

Kissinger: But that makes no difference. Secondly, it is in the Interim Agreement already. I suggest we say, “to conclude a ten-year agreement within a year.”

Gromyko: When does that period begin? The departing point?

Dobrynin: Then we will continue the Interim Agreement.

Kissinger: We can either replace the Interim Agreement or say that on the conclusion of the Interim Agreement, the next eight years will be governed by a new one.

Dobrynin: We can’t write both variants.

Kissinger: It is not an issue of principle for us. We can say, “to conclude next year an agreement for a ten-year period.”

Gromyko: If we specifically mention 1975, it would be unrealistic. Doesn’t it bother you?

Kissinger: It depends. I don’t know if you had a chance to discuss the idea I proposed to you.

Gromyko: That will be the subject of further discussion.

Kissinger: Because if something like that were in mind, we could negotiate something fairly quickly. The idea I gave your Ambassador this morning. Not the figures, but the idea.

Gromyko: I mentioned the same idea. Yesterday evening we began to discuss it.

Kissinger: Right. We have this problem—how what we do here will be interpreted in the United States. It can be interpreted as meaning there is a total deadlock and we have simply agreed to replace the Interim Agreement in 1977. Some have said the Soviets will never settle until 1977 and let’s just have a race until 1977. It won’t give us a basis to attack the Jackson group. And therefore we have no basis for a domestic debate this year. Or we can lay out a more concrete perspective, like saying a ten-year program, to be concluded next year, to replace the Interim Agreement.

Gromyko: You can say it; we can’t say it. “The sides will make efforts to conclude it next year,” or “will do their best.”

[The U.S. side confers.]

Kissinger: I am trying to decide what it is that we can say we have achieved here or that we have agreed here. If we would say “we will immediately begin negotiations to replace the Interim Agreement with new arrangements through 1985,” then “keeping in mind,” and so on and so forth. I think something like that . . .

Gromyko: So it will be concluded in 1975?

Kissinger: We don’t have to say that.

Gromyko: Would you say it is possible? We don’t have any one-sided interest.

Kissinger: I understand.

Gromyko: We will say what we have in mind.

Kissinger: Give me five minutes to edit this.

[Kissinger works on the draft in front of him.]
I have looked into the deployment of B–1. The device isn’t finished yet that plays the national anthem automatically of the country it’s flying over. If you were smart, you would require in the SALT agreement that we deploy the B–1 as rapidly as possible; we would go bankrupt.

We will get this retyped [the draft of the SALT paragraph] and we’ll go to other subjects.

Gromyko: I just read carefully this joint statement on environment. There is one stylistic correction. In the third paragraph it says, “to establish such measures.” There arises a question of what kind. It has in mind the measures in paragraph one. In between there are two paragraphs, so we should say “the measures provided for in paragraph one.”

Kissinger: I agree. “Referred to in paragraph one.” But I don’t like the word “establish.” “To bring about.”

Sonnenfeldt: “To institute.”

Gromyko: Measures can’t be instituted; they are brought about.

Kissinger: I would also propose taking out the word “also.” “To discuss what steps may be carried out to bring about the measures referred to in paragraph one.”

Gromyko: We need “also” because there are other steps.

Kissinger: All right.

Gromyko: So, to the Communiqué. On page five, there are American and Soviet texts on the underground.

Kissinger: Our paragraph 18.

Dobrynin: Yes.

Kissinger: Yes, 18. What is the problem?

Gromyko: Would you take the end of this paragraph?

Kissinger: No.

Gromyko: What would you take?

Kissinger: “Comprehensive.”

Dobrynin: There is no difference.

Kissinger: If there is no difference, we reject it on stylistic grounds. If there is a difference, we reject it on substantive grounds.

We don’t mind including all weapons; we do mind making an appeal to all countries.

Gromyko: “Comprehensive” means . . .

Kissinger: All weapons.

Gromyko: All right. We agree.

I will read the insertion on underground.

Dobrynin: This is new.
Gromyko: “Desiring to contribute to achievement of this goal, the USA and the USSR concluded, as an important step in this direction, the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests . . .”

Kissinger: All right. I agree. You just changed the reference to an agreement before the end of the year.

We will improve the English a little bit but we accept the substance.

Gromyko: Non-proliferation. American and Russian texts. Let’s take ours. It expresses the position as it was demonstrated several times, not only by the Soviet Union but the United States.

Kissinger: May I make a suggestion? Your Ambassador has a checklist; he tries to predict what I will do. Then he grades himself. We can accept your text, including the reference to Article VI, except the last clause. Up through “increasing its effectiveness.” We agree with the principle but just don’t want to express it in a document.

Gromyko: China again?

Kissinger: France, as always.

Gromyko: All right, let’s end it with “its effectiveness.”

Kissinger: We should have a talk on non-proliferation outside this room. Because we are serious about it.

Gromyko: All right. Outside.

Kissinger: Then 19.

Dobrynin: About environment.

Kissinger: Do we need it? Let Korniyenko and Sonnenfeldt redo it in the context of the statement.

Gromyko: All right. [He reads aloud paragraph 20 on chemical weapons, in Russian.]

Dobrynin: “Dealing with” or “banning.” The old story. [They confer in Russian.]

Gromyko: Good. We take it. Although we don’t share that cautiousness, we stand ready to accept this.

Kissinger: “Dealing with.”

Gromyko: Yes. But the words “as a first step” should be inserted before “international convention.” Just stylistic.

Kissinger: What are you saying in Russian for “dealing with”?

Gromyko: “Kasayushchiisya.”

Kissinger: You don’t want to put that into the Joint Statement on environmental warfare?

Dobrynin: Paragraph 31, second part.

Kissinger: Please.
Gromyko: Let us make it this way, approximately to express what we already discussed before. “Both sides proceed from fact . . .” This was said last year.

Kissinger: How can they proceed from the fact that isn’t a fact yet?

Gromyko: Last year. Maybe it is not perfect in English.

Dobrynin: Henry, last year it was said, “both sides proceed from the assumption . . .” Both ways. You will repeat “assumption;” we will do it the same in Russian.

Kissinger: All right.

Zaitsev: “We proceed from the assumption that . . .” in English.

Gromyko: Now we take the second page out.

Now, the Middle East. [Paragraph 36] I would like to ask what kind of doubts are caused by our text?

Kissinger: I want to consult the Consul-General of the PLO on my staff. You know Mr. Saunders?

[Kissinger goes out to confer privately with Saunders, and then returns.]

Our objection to your draft is that “well known UN resolutions” may raise questions as to which UN resolutions are more well-known. “Legitimate rights of the peoples of the area” introduces a nuance which we have tried to avoid. Those are the most important reasons.

Gromyko: Is that all?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: Let’s make a decision. Let’s take your text and correct it: “in which should be taken into account the legitimate interests . . .”

Kissinger: All right. Provisionally, yes. [He studies it.]

Gromyko: You have doubts about your text?

Kissinger: As long as it was drafted by the Arab wing of the State Department. [Kissinger confers with Saunders.] He thinks Arafat will like it.

Gromyko: He will, because there is no mention of 242, while there is mention of 338. We drafted it together.

Kissinger: All right. Fine.

Gromyko: Now, you know about the Geneva Conference.

Dobrynin: He is speaking about paragraph 38.

Gromyko: Did you order a coffin already for the Conference?

Kissinger: We had a very constructive talk on reconvening it.

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9 See footnote 6, Document 142. Yasser Arafat was the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
Korniyenko: Just “close review”?

Gromyko: Something like this: “As co-chairmen of the Conference, the Soviet Union and the United States consider that this Conference should be convened,” or “should resume its work as soon as possible, with the participation of all sides concerned, including representatives of the Palestinian people.”

Kissinger: Some nuances are not fully acceptable, like the Palestinians.

Dobrynin: You prefer “the Arab people of Palestine?”

Kissinger: This is your full text?

Gromyko: “Main purpose of the Conference is the achievement…” No, that “it should promote on the basis of known decisions of the United Nations a just and stable peace in the Middle East which would secure…”

Kissinger: No sense repeating all of that. It is said above.

Gromyko: No, the task of the Conference is set. “To promote a just and stable peace in the Middle East.” “In the Middle East,” period, and add one more phrase: “It is agreed the Soviet Union and the United States will maintain close contact…”

Dobrynin: That is already agreed. Paragraph 37.

Gromyko: What is bad in this text?

Kissinger: You know, first, it’s the Palestinians. But you didn’t expect me to accept it, so we won’t have a big fight about it. We accept the sense of it otherwise, and if you give me the text, we will edit it and give it back to you at the end of the plenary session.

Gromyko: Just a minute. I will give it to you. [He edits the English text.]

Kissinger: By the end of the plenary session I will give you a version. I am sure we will settle it in 15 minutes.

Gromyko: Maybe you can accept it, its beauty.

Kissinger: I just don’t want Sadat to make a rapid movement twice a year. To shift sides.

Gromyko: Perhaps you know a bit better how to do it.

Kissinger: No.

Gromyko: Indochina. On our text: 13, no, 14 no, 15 no.

You know, as far as the Communiqué is concerned, we have nothing to do further.

Kissinger: SALT. It is here. [He hands over a new U.S. draft, Tab E. Gromyko reads it.]
Gromyko: “Replaced” shows a long shadow already over the agreement.

Kissinger: “Superseded.”

Gromyko: Let’s talk about the new agreement. This is first. Then “based on the principle of equality and essential equivalence”—it gives grounds for doubts, for discussion and doubts. It is unnecessary specification for this communique, unnecessary details. The same can be said about [the reference to] SLBMs.

Kissinger: What do you want to say?

Gromyko: A more general formulation.

Kissinger: It doesn’t give any percentages.

Gromyko: Even the man in the street will get a headache reading it. [He reads over the U.S. draft.] “The two sides will energetically pursue negotiations leading to completion of a new agreement well before expiration of the present agreement.” Then, “their delegations will reconvene in Geneva on the basis of new instructions growing out of this summit.” What means “new instructions”? It is too complicated for this particular case. I tell you frankly. It is not possible. Let us express it in a more general form. Not the text, but let me try. [Korniyenko passes him a paper.]

Kissinger: Korniyenko was just sitting at the typewriter and it came out.

Gromyko: This a text: To give you an idea how we understand the task.

Zaitsev [reads:] “In the course of the talks both sides subjected to a thorough and deep review the question of possible conclusion of a long-term agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on a further limitation of strategic arms. They expressed their determination to achieve an appropriate agreement before expiration of the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow in May 1972. They hold the common view that a new agreement will correspond not only to the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States but also to the interests of further relaxation of international tensions and of universal peace. It was agreed that talks with this aim in mind will be started immediately.”

Gromyko: 1985 should be in it.

Kissinger: You can add it in yours. It has to be added.

I think it will be interpreted by our press as a total stalemate in light of what we have said. And we wanted to be more specific, without saying anything, at least to cover the topics they know we were discussing.
Gromyko: It will be a telling blow to an agreement. Everyone on the street would just say: They gathered together and just blew up this agreement.

Kissinger: I understand. I don’t have your text in front of me, but I wonder if it is not possible to combine your text with ours. Specifically, I don’t object to your first sentence, if we have 1985 in it.

Gromyko: OK, we can do that.

Kissinger: That is fine. I think as a minimum. First, we don’t need “replace;” we can say “follow-on.”

Zaitev: That will follow on the Interim Agreement.

Kissinger: So we don’t use the word “replace.” We don’t insist on the word “replace.”

Gromyko: Preliminary we will.

Kissinger: What we do want is the sentence I underlined here, which at least explains what the agreement is about. It basically says nothing. [He hands over another copy of Tab E with the sentence underlined, “Such a new agreement shall include limitations on the numbers of ICBM and SLBM launchers for each side, as well as on numbers of those ICBM and SLBM launchers that may be equipped with MIRVs.” They study it.]

Gromyko: We can use your last phrase, except for the word “new.” It should say “instructions growing out of this Summit.”

Kissinger: All right.

Gromyko: We are talking only about the last phrase.

Kissinger: But the problem is, Mr. Foreign Minister, we are going to be asked what is this new agreement going to be about.

Gromyko: You can say this is what the negotiation is about.

Kissinger: The headline will be “total collapse of SALT negotiations.” This is the only conclusion possible.

Gromyko: I don’t draw that conclusion. There are not grounds.

Kissinger: There may not be grounds, but that is what the conclusion will be.

Gromyko: No one will understand it.

Kissinger: For Americans it will give the impression of great precision. No one knows the difference between SLBMs and the New York subway.

Gromyko: You know the number of issues being discussed; the abbreviations you discussed do not take into account all of these. All this is a gross oversimplification.

Kissinger: I tell you, as an expert on our publicity, that this will give the impression of a total failure of the negotiation, leading us to look for an entirely new basis. Which is not entirely untrue.
I don’t insist on the last sentence—that sentence we discussed.

Gromyko: Where it says in our text “further limitation of strategic arms,” with an indication of concrete measures. But I will have to report.

Kissinger: How about including “both numbers and technical characteristics”?

Gromyko: Mr. Kissinger, that it is not necessary to say. Regarding specific categories or types of strategic arms, without naming them, there are a lot of factors which cannot be put in this Procrustes Bed.

Kissinger: That is why I say “including numbers of strategic weapons as well as their technical characteristics.” We said that last year.

Gromyko: “Which would embrace both qualitative and quantitative aspects of these arms.” “Which would concern the qualitative and quantitative sides of these arms.” Like that?

Kissinger: I would like to say it more precisely.

Gromyko: If you say that, I would like to put it down and think it over: “Concerning the qualitative and quantitative sides of these arrangements.”

Kissinger: Could I see your text?

[Korniyenko gives him the paper. Kissinger reads it.]

Gromyko: Do not consider it a proposal. It is just a suggestion.

Kissinger: Let us take it and work alone on it for half an hour. We can’t make progress here. We will meet again here afterwards.

There are two things: the Middle East, which shouldn’t be difficult, and this. Otherwise it is agreed.

Gromyko: This a working paper. I came here without a single word.

Kissinger: I know that. I understand. I don’t consider you bound by it. I don’t consider this a formal proposal. I just want to take this, recognizing you might not accept all the Soviet language. I would like to do it more reflectively.

Gromyko: We will have it retyped, and have it ready in two minutes.

[Sokolov runs out to get it retyped.]

Kissinger: So, Mr. Foreign Minister, we will leave you now and see you after the meeting.

Korniyenko: We will bring you the text when it is typed.

[The meeting then ended.]
196. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, July 2, 1974, 4:25–6:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Nikolai V. Podgorniy, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA
Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of USA Division
Leonid M. Zamyatin, Director General of TASS
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Andrei Vavilov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
President Nixon
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr. USA (ret), Assistant to the President
Ronald L. Ziegler, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
M. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor to the Department of State
Jan M. Lodal, NSC Senior Staff
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Senior Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
Tour d’horizon (Middle East, SALT, CSCE, MBFR, Southeast Asia)

Brezhnev: Now we can continue our talks. I think we did well to instruct Dr. Kissinger and Comrade Gromyko to continue their discussions. But speaking quite objectively, your instructions to Dr. Kissinger probably weren’t vigorous enough. There is still time to correct that. On the one hand, Dr. Kissinger likes a fast pace; on the other hand he delays things. That is probably one of his subjective qualities. Please don’t think I am attacking you. But being objective, we would have to say they have accomplished certain work and they have moved our joint documents a distance forward. Not much actually remains, and

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in St. Catherine’s Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace. Brackets are in the original.
what little does remain can be agreed. Especially if we don’t give Dr. Kissinger any cookies.

Podgorny: On the contrary, he should be given as many as possible, and we will be able to have some, too.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, I’ve given an account of our discussions at Yalta\(^2\) to my comrades in the car, which is also natural because these are questions that require consultations between us. We can now see where we reached agreement with you in our discussions, in the documents we will be signing. We have now a few details on strategic arms in its new version. I feel we have correctly understood what Dr. Kissinger said, and by that I assume your position, that is, not to have any specific figures, to provide for a longer duration, and to maintain the existing agreement, in the sense in which we discussed it yesterday.\(^3\)

The second point I want to make is, although we did have a brief exchange on the Middle East, in the car on the way to the airport,\(^4\) I just want to repeat: As I see it, the question is a complicated one, but you and we have not rejected attempts to work jointly on its solution, and to focus our attention and our efforts on the Geneva Conference and its work. Without—I wish to be precise—without of course ruling out the possibility for both of our countries to be in touch bilaterally with various countries in the region while endeavoring to resolve the basic issues of principle through the Geneva Conference, and while continuously maintaining consultations between us on all matters pertaining to that region. And I think on both sides we emphasized one of the important issues is bound to be the Palestinian issue. Of course, in the brief time we had, none of us could think up any specific solution to that problem. And we agreed between the two of us—in Sukhodrev’s presence—that we would act jointly in accordance with the resolution before us, that is, Resolution 242 of the Security Council.

So that therefore was, I believe, if I correctly sum up the gist of our discussions not only at Oreanda but also in the car from Simferopol to Oreanda and back from Oreanda to Simferopol.

I also would like to mention we did briefly touch upon the question of the reduction of forces and armaments in Europe. But that, I say, was only briefly touched upon without any detailed discussion. In fact, it was only mentioned, without any elaboration.

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\(^2\) See Document 190.

\(^3\) A reference to Brezhnev’s and Gromyko’s meetings with Kissinger. See Documents 191, 193, and 194.

\(^4\) No formal meetings took place between Nixon and Brezhnev on July 1, when Nixon traveled from Oreanda to Minsk where he spent the day meeting with Belorussian officials. Brezhnev did accompany Nixon to the Simferopol Airport prior to Nixon’s departure for Minsk. No record of their conversation was found.
This morning we discussed how to exchange between us in terms of the general situation in Europe. We know in the talks in Vienna there are some who want to include the reduction of national forces, and others who are opposed to the reduction of national forces. We know you don’t want these talks to relate to air forces. There are various points of view. So proceeding from our general belief that one cannot do all things in just two years time—that is too small a period—maybe we could all agree that without renouncing our attempts, we continue our efforts but conclude that this question is not yet ripe for a solution.

So if our associates Gromyko and Kissinger complete their work to agree on all of points in the Communiqué and on underground nuclear tests, I think we will have grounds to thank them and say we have made a new step forward in terms of détente and developing relations between us on the basis of equality.

And the last point I want to make is that the agreements that have already been signed and those we will be signing tomorrow will give our peoples grounds to believe we are following the path we jointly chose in 1972, and during our discussions yesterday at Yalta we confirmed that that is indeed our intention once again.

In these remarks I have endeavored to take up only the major issues, so as not to allow second-rate ones to overshadow them.

Of course, there is also the question we again touched upon yesterday, in brief, of course, that objective fact that nuclear weapons are spreading in the world. Although we were busy for the best part of the day yesterday, and I wasn’t able to read all the reports, continuing concern is raised by the continuing aggressive trend of Israel. While it was possible to bring about a cease-fire in that area, Israel is still bombing Lebanon, the camps of the Palestinians. That is something that defies comprehension. But we didn’t have time to really go into that.

And just to mention one general issue: During our discussions we confirmed to one another that we must deal with each other in terms of equality both in strategic matters and economic cooperation and other fields. I just want to underline that all our discussions must be in accordance with that principle.

And lastly let me say the proposals made today by Dr. Kissinger to Comrades Gromyko and Dobrynin on the new version of the formula on the strategic arms, that is, not to refer to the numbers but only the general principles, seems to us acceptable. That is what I wanted to say

5 Not further identified.
6 See Document 195.
about our work the last two days and the work of Comrades Kissinger and Gromyko.

I trust the President will confirm that my summing up was indeed a reflection of what happened these last two days. I’ve tried to be concise. Our discussions ranged over other issues, but I’ve tried to give you the gist.

Nixon: The General Secretary has given a very accurate summary of what we discussed. There were, of course, other matters which we agreed are for the future and were not ripe for concrete discussion. That is, what the General Secretary and I agreed, without discussion and without making formal offers, are subjects we can both think about before our next meeting.

And I would say with regard to the Middle East, only briefly, the General Secretary has precisely stated our position, that while we of course recognize the importance of the Geneva forum, at the same time he recognizes that in such a complex area there are times when bilateral discussions must take place and where each of us—provided we are working for the common goal of peace in that area—will engage in the closest consultation. Obviously what we want in this area, as does the Soviet Union, is results—results that will recognize the interests of both major powers in that area. We wouldn’t want to be in any great public forum where the US and the Soviet Union appear to be at odds in settling the problems of the Middle East. In one fell swoop, in one grand play, one big play—I wish we could. But the complexity of the area requires a step-by-step approach—not because we want to drag our feet, either side, but because we want results; we want to get somewhere.

We will continue to be in the closest consultation, at every level, on the Middle East. And it is also important that neither the General Secretary nor I have a ready-made solution to the Palestinian problem. But we recognize the problem and we have to devote great efforts to find one.

On the question of troops in Europe, we touched upon it only briefly, the General Secretary and I. Here, of course, the proper forum is Vienna because the interests of European allies and the Warsaw Pact—both our allies—are involved. I would hope in the communiqué we could have a strong statement to the effect that we didn’t just push this aside lightly and that we are continuing to have intensive and balanced discussions. For example, the General Secretary’s suggestion—made only as a preliminary matter, which is not on the table for negotiation—of a 5% reduction on both sides, as one approach. And I would hope we could preserve our efforts to get a more forthcoming discussion on this issue. Because I think while the European Security Conference is not directly connected with MBFR the two questions will inevitably have to be considered together at some point.
With regard to the Middle East, one final point I raised, Mr. General Secretary: it will certainly not serve the interests of peace, will not serve the interests of settlement, and not serve the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States to be drawn into an escalating arms race. Restraint on both sides is necessary.

Another area not on the agenda now but was on it two years ago—the spirited discussion we had at the dacha\textsuperscript{7}—was the question of Southeast Asia. It turns out there is an uneasy peace of a sort in that area of the world. But as the General Secretary knows, the seeds of war are still there. The North Vietnamese, for example, are building up at a much higher rate than was allowed by the Agreement. As a result of the actions of our Congress we are providing less to the South Vietnamese than the Agreement allows. But the key to maintaining some semblance of peace in that area is for both sides to exercise restraint in arms supply to our allies in that area. It would be a tragedy if that part of the world, which compared to the Middle East is less important to the strategic interests of our two countries, should draw us into the kind of confrontation that we were facing two years ago, before our first meeting.

With regard to the general results of our talks, I agree with the General Secretary that we have made very significant progress at this summit. In the area of peaceful cooperation, we have met all the goals we set for ourselves at the beginning. In the area of arms, security, we have made significant progress as the General Secretary has pointed out: ABM, the threshold test ban, which was suggested first by the General Secretary. But I think both the General Secretary and I have been disappointed that we haven’t been able to make more progress in the field of SALT. I understand how this came about. This involves our vital interests, both nations. And consequently, it is extremely difficult to find an area of agreement which is one that both sides can, one, accept, and two, defend both to his military and to his people. It was obvious we could not—not only based on our discussions here but in discussions at Oreanda—reach agreement on specific numbers at this time, and even with the diplomatic skill of our Foreign Ministers we are not finding it easy to agree on a general statement. And based on my discussions with the General Secretary, I know he feels as strongly as I do that we must avoid a runaway race in the field of offensive strategic weapons which no one is going to win and which is going to be an enormous burden on both our peoples.

I am sure the General Secretary knows we have made the very best effort we can in this area. The proposal which Dr. Kissinger outlined at

Oreanda is one which would have caused us considerable problems—though we could have surmounted them—but considerable problems in selling it to the people at home. Yet in talking to my friend the General Secretary as frankly as he talks to me, I recognize it also presents problems for him. What concerns me on this is that all of the good things we have done in this historic meeting may to an extent be downgraded because of the tendency of sophisticates in the press and political world to zero in on the fact we were unable to get an agreement on further limitation of strategic arms. Some of the critics, we have to recognize, will jump on this and say this summit was a flop because we were unable to reach agreement on the central issue before us. That criticism will be inaccurate and unfair. One meeting does not solve everything. That is why these annual meetings are so important. Because we must move inexorably forward until we can control nuclear arms and also consider even reductions, which is my goal as well as the General Secretary’s.

It is for that reason that I want to give the General Secretary my commitment—and this is a matter Dr. Kissinger and I have talked about at great length—we are not simply going to wait one full year before discussing this again in a serious way. I consider it the highest priority that before we meet again in Washington, or Camp David, or where else the General Secretary visits, we will have bitten the bullet on this by then. Because the General Secretary knows that once you start down the road of a new weapons system or increasing armaments or increasing budgets, it is very difficult to turn back. We just reach a new level.

I am not an expert on the language, but I trust the Communiqué will indicate our determination in the strongest terms possible to continue negotiations in that area and on this concrete problem and to reach a future agreement. We on our part will examine the situation as surely as we can. We will be prepared to conduct talks at any level that seems appropriate. But I think we must recognize that this, must we say, is a major goal for both of us to work for an agreement in the lowest possible time for this purpose.

Brezhnev: Of course, there are many issues, but could I ask a question concerning one problem, and an important one at that: How do we see our end goal in the Middle East? And where do we want to go on that matter? How do we see the situation from that point of view? Because, as I see it, this region is still an explosive one. You said there is not Arab unity and I agreed with you, because it is a fact. But it may come in the future. Today Sadat goes one way and another goes the other way. But at some future point . . . After all, they are all Arabs. So we can agree on the things we have agreed upon in the Security Council. That may seem to be simple, but it is important because it con-
cerns the interests of the biggest—the United States and the Soviet
Union.

So if you could say your view on this end goal.

Nixon: As for our end goal, it must be 242, that is, the independ-
ence and survival of all the countries. With regard to achieving that
goal, it cannot be achieved, we have found, in one simple action. Nor in
a conference, for example, in one meeting where the people at the con-
ference would be so far apart in their ideas. It requires a constant, con-
tinued exertion of influence, on the part of the nations that have influ-
ence in specific areas. We will continue on the course of taking
measures for a solution.

Tactics are what is essential in this area. The problems are so com-
plex—but as far as the goal is concerned, we have of course subscribed
to the UN resolutions and will certainly work toward that goal. We can-
not of course proceed on a course which is unrealistic. That
is why in the case of the Israeli-Egyptian agreement and Israeli-Syrian
agreement, we found the step-by-step approach was the only feasible
way to move. But we do not consider the first step to be the last; we do
not consider the first course to be the full meal. But it will take some
time; it always takes time to digest the first course. But we will continue
to press forward to the objective to which we are dedicated. We will not
be satisfied with a temporary truce. Our goal is a permanent settlement,
as is the General Secretary’s. [Podgorniy and Gromyko chat] And we
will continue to seek that goal.

The General Secretary knows we have a terribly difficult problem.
He has already mentioned it and it is a problem that we think can be
managed. But it cannot be managed suddenly or drastically, and we
feel the course we are pursuing is the right one.

Brezhnev: Just one more question, which we need not go into in
any detail again. I mentioned it because we are here in our full delega-
tions. We have agreed to act together and jointly in the European Secu-
ritiy Conference so as to make relations between us irreversible, in that
as other areas. So one confirmation of that will confirm our efforts.

Nixon: I made a commitment to the General Secretary in Camp
David, on the porch overlooking Shangri-la, on that subject.\(^8\) We did
not reach the goal we set at the end of the year. But we have sincerely
tried. And as we indicated in our meeting the other day, we will give
renewed impetus as a result of our discussions here to what we agreed
to so as to achieve the objective we set at Camp David.

\(^8\) See Document 126.
Brezhnev: Good. Then Mr. President, do you think we could now give the floor to our respective Foreign Ministers, so they could report on where we stand on the work done today and yesterday, mainly today. So we can be clear about what is ready to be signed.

Nixon: Shall we let the older man go first?

Brezhnev: It is your choice. It doesn’t matter, as long as we get an account of what has been achieved.

Kissinger: Mr. President, we agreed, on the basis of the instructions we received in the Crimea, on the following:

We completed work today on the draft of the treaty on the threshold test ban and on the protocol implementing the treaty. The effective date of that treaty will be March 31st, 1976, and we will use our best efforts to negotiate an agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions.

Secondly, we agreed on a joint statement to be signed by the General Secretary and the President in which the parties agree to advocate overcoming the dangers of environmental warfare and to work out concrete measures to achieve that end.

Sukhodrev: Environmental?

Nixon: Environmental.

Kissinger: Environmental modification. That statement has been completed and it will be ready for signing tomorrow.

We have also completed work on the communiqué, which in my judgment is a very considerable political document, except for two paragraphs. One paragraph is dealing with the Geneva Conference, which I don’t think will require much work. The Geneva Conference on the Middle East. And another paragraph on strategic arms limitation, which will require some further discussion. Partly because I think it is in our common interest that in the United States there is not created the impression that there is a total stalemate. So we still have to find some formulation that makes it clear that by extending the time period for agreement we are trying to find a new balance between the qualitative and quantitative aspects of arms.

On the European Security Conference, we have completed discussions on the paragraph that explains our common objective, and our associates have worked out a means of working out Basket III.

So tomorrow the President and the General Secretary will be able to sign four documents: the protocol on anti-ballistic missiles, the treaty on the test ban, the joint statement on environmental warfare, and the communiqué. The Foreign Minister and I will sign two documents that will have to remain secret, having to do with implementing provisions on strategic arms limitation produced by the Standing Consultative
Commission resulting from SALT I. This is purely a technical matter and won’t be published.\(^9\)

So my colleagues will agree with that.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, just one question, with the President’s permission. The agreement on strategic arms, so far it’s effective until 1977.

Kissinger: That is right.

Brezhnev: Where do we go from there? I think it would be best if we introduced no new figures.

Kissinger: Before 1977 or after 1977?

Brezhnev: After 1977. Because what we have will be effective until 1977.

Kissinger: If you cannot accept the numbers we presented on Sunday\(^{10}\) on multiple warheads, since there are three factors—time, quantity and quality—we will have to establish a new relationship.

Gromyko: I will not repeat what Dr. Kissinger has said. He has correctly set out where we stand and the documents that we have prepared and are ready for signature. Let me dwell very briefly on two matters. First, the Geneva Conference. We will probably find an acceptable formula. For reasons that are easy to understand, it will be rather general. We won’t be able to go into the details—like the Palestinians. Even with a good form of words, one can act at the Conference itself in a good way or in a bad way. One can convene the Conference, make very fine speeches, and then depart, leaving the relevant representatives at the Conference to die, as has once already happened. Information is reaching us more and more frequently that there is an intention to substitute bilateral talks for the Conference. That we feel would be unacceptable indeed and would run counter to our understanding between us. We are in favor of the Conference being the forum for reaching a substantive solution to the problems in the Middle East. The situation will depend to a great extent on whether or not the representatives of the Palestinian movement attend the conference. We are in favor of their attending the Conference from the very beginning because no one but them can set out their position and otherwise the Conference can’t produce results. They themselves are in favor of participation on the basis of full equality. And as regards the outcome and progress of the Conference, much will depend on the actions and attitudes of the two great powers represented at this table.

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\(^{10}\) June 30. See Document 190.
My second comment is this. We are in the process of working out a formula for the communique on strategic arms. It will of course provide a line for our subsequent efforts. There will be basically two elements in this formula—one on a long-term agreement and one on the need to continue talks. We have reached agreement on a very prompt beginning of the talks. But however effectively we undertake to act and in fact act, the achievement of our goal in this responsibility will require some time. Meanwhile, nothing in the communique should cast any aspersions on the existing agreement. If something is said about the need to change the levels or the correlation of various types of arms, that will indicate there is something wrong about the existing agreement and that will be wrong.

So if we find an acceptable formula, and not one that is one-sided, and put it forth as a common agreed view, then I am sure the idea we inject into the communique will seize the minds of public opinion. First, we indicate a long-term agreement and second that we promptly initiate talks. It means the foundation under the talks and the existing treaty will be firm.

Brezhnev: And on the basis of the principle of equality as in the existing one.

Gromyko: In conclusion, I am sure we can find a good formula.

Kissinger: Mr. President, I pointed out to the Foreign Minister yesterday there is no way the United States can possibly permit the Soviet Union to MIRV a substantially larger missile force.\textsuperscript{11} We cannot permit a missile force of 2300 for the USSR and 1700 for the United States. That will never be accepted.

Gromyko: Aren’t you running ahead of yourself? That is a question for the course of future negotiations.

Kissinger: That is exactly correct.

Gromyko: To achieve equality.

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: Do you endorse that, Mr. President?

Nixon: That is an argument for attaching the greatest possible importance to working out something definitive in the earliest possible time. Otherwise we will be in an impossible position where it will appear down the road that we agreed to something we cannot accept, as Dr. Kissinger said. Therefore we think we should have something more definitive in the communique. Something more than just a prayer, a wish that we will negotiate. The General Secretary and I will have to realize that we carry a very great responsibility in this respect. The forces

\textsuperscript{11} See Document 194.
that would welcome an all-out missile race are considerably strong. And it is that that we are trying to deal with. That is why Dr. Kissinger is trying to find an effective formula.

Did you have any further discussions?

Kissinger: Yes, Mr. President, we will try to settle the language now. The Foreign Minister makes so many concessions we can’t absorb them all. His propensity to yield is so intense.

Brezhnev: Good.

Nixon: I will see you later tonight.

(The meeting then ended.)

197. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, July 2, 1974, 6:15–6:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA
Georgiy M. Korniienko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of USA Division
Oleg Krokhalev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Zaitsev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interpreter)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, US Ambassador to the USSR
Major General Brent Scowcroft, USAF, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Senior Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

Communiqué [Middle East and SALT Sections]

Kissinger: Now you will know exactly what our policy in the Middle East is.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in St. Catherine’s Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace. Brackets are in the original.
Gromyko: Your policy in the Middle East is much more complicated than at first glance.

[Mr. Lapin, head of Soviet television, comes in to whisper something to Gromyko. Technicians go in and out from the adjoining room—the Green Room—which is to be used for the President’s TV address at 7:00 p.m.]²

About television. This is the empire of Comrade Lapin. When the President speaks, something between 15–20 minutes, the interpreter will be sitting right here.

Kissinger: But we will be finished by then.

Gromyko: If not, we will have to sit here very quietly.

Kissinger: I have an idea. When the President speaks, you and I will have a terrible quarrel—“Never, Gromyko, will I ever agree!” Then we will run out through that door. [Laughter]

We will finish in half an hour.

The Middle East is already finished. [See US-proposed draft at Tab A]³

Gromyko: No. About dropping the Palestinians, that I can swallow. But I can’t agree to drop “interested parties.”

Kissinger: It is very simple: We don’t want any phrase in this communiqué—so we don’t waste time—that leaves the issue of controversial parties. The issue of participation will be decided by the Conference.

Gromyko: To exclude the parties concerned, we can’t agree. Just as at the first stage, we spoke about interested parties. We spoke, all of us, about them.

Kissinger: Where?

Gromyko: Everywhere. We made a statement in the Soviet Union—“the parties concerned will participate,” though not all of them.

Kissinger: We don’t care what you say.

Gromyko: It is not enough. It is an anti-Palestinian position carried to the extreme.

Kissinger: No, it is not.

Gromyko: Let’s find a compromise position.

Kissinger: It is impossible. By saying “the parties concerned,” that’s a euphemism for the Palestinians.

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² The President delivered an address to the people of the Soviet Union on TV and radio. The address was broadcast simultaneously in the United States. For the text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1974, pp. 559–563.

³ Attached but not printed.
Gromyko: We would not give an interpretation of this. We would make no official statements. No interpretation of this kind would be given by us, and I declare this to you. But please don’t bring to an extreme this anti-Palestinian position.

Kissinger: It is not an anti-Palestinian position. We will say nothing. Just “conclude its work.”

Gromyko: It is not clear if you just omit the Palestinians. It is more logical if the first stage doesn’t, but the Conference doesn’t go only to the first stage. It is not detrimental to you.

Kissinger: The subsequent stages we can settle in Geneva. We don’t have to settle that here.

Gromyko: We are not interested only in the first three days. We are talking about the duration of it as an institution. Mr. Kissinger, it is not against your position. You said it, that you permit it in the future. If you are talking only about the first stage, I would turn the paper over. Two–three days give nothing.

Kissinger: Besides, I thought the idea you gave at the swimming pool was interesting, that the Ambassadors speak first. 4

Gromyko: You have no grounds for objection.

Kissinger: I just accepted it. How can I have objections?

Gromyko: I mean mention of the Palestinians.

Kissinger: If you mean states, no problem. If you want to include “parties,” the intention is obvious.

Gromyko: We don’t conceal our intentions. The sooner the better, that is what we say.

Kissinger: You can say that anyway. You can say in your judgment the Palestinians should be invited. There is nothing in this text that excludes the Palestinians.

Gromyko: This document is bilateral, and we do not insist on the participation of the Palestinians. Probably I acted in a wrong way when I was flexible in other matters; probably you thought this was an ad infinitum proposition.

Kissinger: Not at all.

Gromyko: This doesn’t reflect even your position. We are talking about the Conference as an institution. We don’t subdivide it—2nd, 3rd, 10th stage.

Kissinger: None of this we contest. We just don’t think it should be settled in the Soviet-American Communiqué.

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4 Not further identified.
Gromyko: I do not agree. These aren’t the motives you are speaking about now.

Kissinger: What do you think our motives are?

Gromyko: I don’t know. But your motives aren’t your position. You said yourself the Palestinians will participate at a later stage.

Kissinger: As a possibility.

Gromyko: But a possibility that is completely turned from reality.

Kissinger: We are at this point not prepared to take a position on this.

Gromyko: But if you take that position, it is the opposite of ours. We don’t think it is possible to settle the question of the Palestinians without the participation of the Palestinians.

Kissinger: That is probably true but that is not the issue we face now.

Gromyko: Then you have to take back your statement that you put the question over participation of the Palestinians.

Kissinger: I just want to leave it so you can say what you want and we can say what we want.

Gromyko: In this case, the question will not be agreed. Let’s pass to the next question.

Kissinger: Then how will it be expressed in the Communiqué?

Korniyenko: “With the participation of all the parties concerned.”

Kissinger: That we already rejected.

Gromyko: Without deciphering it. That you don’t say the Soviet Union agreed the Palestinians should not participate.

Kissinger: We are not trying to maneuver you into saying the Palestinians should not participate. We don’t want to be maneuvered into a position either.

Gromyko: We won’t lure you anywhere. Why not this? In the spirit that you accept our understanding?

Kissinger: It is an impossibility for us. It is an enormous domestic problem and its only purpose is to start a debate. Why don’t we say nothing so you can say what you want?

Gromyko: But there is a reasonable sense. How can you object to participation of all the parties concerned?

Kissinger: We won’t be able to say that the Palestinians are not concerned.

Gromyko: We won’t ascribe it to you.

Kissinger: Our approach is that we fight an appropriate battle at an appropriate time, and this is not the time. If we get harassed, there will be a stalemate; this is the history of the Middle East.
Gromyko: But the specifics of the situation is that you say you are harassed but in reality there is none.

Kissinger: You know if we do this, it would turn your Ambassador’s new friend totally against us, and I don’t want to make things difficult for him in Washington.

Gromyko: We can’t adjust our position to one or another shouter in the United States.

Kissinger: We are not asking you to adjust your position. I don’t exclude the time will come for an appropriate role for the Palestinians.

Gromyko: You will stick to the position you hold; we to ours—that the Palestinians must participate. But we won’t say the Communiqué means the Americans assent to our interpretation. How can the Soviet Union take out the phrase and the United States came out against their participation?

Kissinger: We won’t put something like this into a Soviet-U.S. document. We are not stupid; we may be complicated.

Gromyko: Let’s put down honest positions.

Kissinger: I want to put down vague positions, to keep open the possibility of movement at a time we are ready.

Gromyko: It is not a question of vagueness or not vagueness.

Let’s pass to another question.

Kissinger: We can’t accept yours. But why don’t we see if we can find—

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: It is only that one clause. I will check the letter of invitation we both sent out last year, and see if we can find one phrase we can lift.5

Korniyenko: There was the phrase: “The question of participation will be settled at the first stage.”

Kissinger: Korniyenko, you made a mistake. The first stage is over, and the question is settled.

Korniyenko: It was left open.

Kissinger: You have two choices. Either you harass us, and we will go into every delaying action, and you won’t succeed. Or you will leave it open.

It is unavoidable that they will be drawn into it.

Gromyko: But the Conference lasts as an institution. The question of the moment of time of their participation is another matter, for a later time perhaps. But of course we favor it.

Kissinger: What I am willing to do, Mr. Foreign Minister—I have no interest in embarrassing you—let’s look at that letter we sent out. “The participants will be settled at the Conference.” “The Conference will decide the appropriate participants.”

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: [To Saunders] Go find it. [Saunders goes out.]

[The Soviets confer on the SALT section—Tab B]6

Kissinger: Accepted?

Gromyko: Nothing is added.

Kissinger: That is what I feared.

[Gromyko hands back a text with deletions. See Tab B. Kissinger reads it.]

Mr. Minister, to save time, I will accept removal of “an equitable.” I will accept removal of “at the earliest possible date.” I think we need words “well before.”

Dobrynin: In Russian it’s “very early before.”

Kissinger: The trouble is, if you say “before the expiration of,” the way this will be interpreted in America is: Before, we said we would achieve a comprehensive agreement before the expiration; now, if we say only an eight-year agreement, it is a step back, not a step forward. Why don’t we say “at the earliest possible date before the expiration of the Interim Agreement”? We have taken it out up there.

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: We will take out “including the number of missiles with MIRVs.” Frankly, this and ten cents will get us a cup of coffee. In the subsequent negotiations, whether there is a sentence in here or not, I can’t use this against you.

Gromyko: Yesterday, my impression was that it may take the imagination of peoples, the idea of a long[-term] agreement. 1985.

Kissinger: What the General Secretary said, that the delegations meet, and 1985, may take people’s imagination. But this phrase won’t affect the negotiations.

Gromyko: It won’t make any difference.

Kissinger: That is what I am saying.

Gromyko: I will report to my colleagues.

6 Attached but not printed.
Dobrynin: Maybe the Palestinians should be in the SALT negotiations.

Kissinger: They already have anti-aircraft missiles.

We have only the Middle East. I suggest we sit apart from each other at dinner. Then we can shout at each other.

[The meeting then ended. A redraft of the Middle East portion was drafted by Mr. Saunders before dinner, and accepted by Gromyko. Tab C.]\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{7} Attached but not printed.
198. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, July 3, 1974, 12:20–12:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Nikolay V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
Aleksey N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the USA
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of USA Division
Andrei Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Leonid M. Zamyatin, Director General of TASS
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Andrei Vavilov, Interpreter

President Nixon
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the Soviet Union
General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., USA (Ret.), Assistant to the President
Ronald L. Ziegler, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, INR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
Jan M. Lodal, NSC Senior Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECT
US-Soviet Relations

Brezhnev: Good morning, Mr. President.

We agreed this fine morning to have a summing up, then to sign the documents still remaining, and then to end this meeting with a big reception which our government is arranging in your honor.

But first I have the very pleasant task on behalf of all my colleagues to make a general conclusion [summing up] the work we have done. We believe a lot of useful work has been done. Putting it briefly, it is a

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in St. Catherine’s Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace. Brackets are in the original.
continuation of the talks and the documents signed in 1972 and 1973. In all that we said, in all our discussions, speeches and documents will be found the foundations for future development of good relations between our two countries. Of course, at the same time we do have to admit we have not reached definitive conclusions on all the subjects we have discussed. However, we would like you to agree with us that whatever contacts and relationships we have in the future, they should be built on the joint great goal we have mentioned in our speeches—preventing any form of confrontation between our two nations, let alone war. And therefore all of us present here, and all members of the leadership of our Party and State treat with a feeling of human confidence all your statements, Mr. President, regarding friendship and cooperation between our two countries. And we believe, Mr. President, that your Administration and all your officials of various ranks will be working with us in that direction, on your instructions.

Naturally, we include here all the questions we discussed, including our joint active role in the European Security Conference and in the Middle East.

Perhaps in these very brief remarks I have not covered all of the ground, but I do believe that what I’ve said forms the basis for the future. And that is why in speaking yesterday at your dinner, in behalf of our entire leadership, I voiced our gratitude to all those who have assisted us in this very difficult but very useful work.²

Mr. President, that is in brief what I wanted to say to you before we go in to sign the final document.

President Nixon: I think the General Secretary’s summary is very complete and very accurate. I think our disappointment in not being able to reach a more definitive agreement in regard to strategic weapons is understandable, but it is a matter we both agree deserves our most urgent attention so we can get this arms race under control before it’s too late. In the international field, I think our greatest danger lies not in misunderstandings in our bilateral relations, but in our being dragged into confrontation on matters in other parts of the world where each of us has an interest. We all remember how the situation in Southeast Asia poisoned our relations for a period of seven or eight years, and we can see how the development of problems there, or, say, a new attempt by India to move on Pakistan, could again put us in opposite positions. It is inevitable that we, being the realists we are on

² Both Nixon and Brezhnev spoke at the dinner hosted by the President at Spaso House, the Ambassador’s residence in Moscow. For the text of their remarks, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1974, pp. 564–567.
both sides of this table, may tend to have different friends in different parts of the world. The fact that each of us may have different friends among the weaker, smaller nations should not in any way be allowed to make each of us less friendly in our bilateral relations. We must always keep [in mind] first and foremost that whatever disagreements we may have in other parts of the world, the key to peace not only between us but in the world lies in the relationship we have with each other, and we must never let events in other parts of the world weaken our relations. One reason this meeting as well as the other two must be designated as a success is that in non-security areas as well as in security areas we have entered into a number of agreements that make continuation of our bilateral relations valuable to both of us.

I believe too that we must not be at all discouraged by the fact that we don’t settle every issue every time we meet. And I believe work should begin now on exploring new areas where our cooperation may go forward, not only in the security case—which of course we already know requires urgent attention—but in peaceful areas where we have made such progress. And it is interesting how working in these two areas complements one another; working in one area helps us in the other. Where we fear each other and don’t trust each other, we won’t work together, and where we don’t work together we will tend of course to develop old habits of lack of confidence and a policy of fear.

Brezhnev: That is right. [Khorosho].

Podgorny: I believe we can say that this visit has indeed been a very big success. In areas we have not succeeded in resolving, there is agreement on both sides that we should both make efforts; this applies to strategic arms. But much has been achieved and this is of very positive significance. Provided we work vigorously together, bearing in mind our mutual interests and especially the principle of equality in the more complicated ones. But of course a certain time is needed. In short, therefore, this meeting can be assessed as very successful and as a complement to the previous two meetings, which are clearly important not only from the standpoint of our two countries but the world.

Kosygin: Mr. President, I am in agreement with the assessment of this meeting by Nikolai Viktorovich [Podgorny] and Leonid Il’ich [Brezhnev] and your own assessment of the significance of this meeting. This meeting has indeed been a more successful one and it can be more successful provided we make additional progress in these areas.

3 Russian translation of “good.”
I want to say a few additional remarks about the subject you mentioned in your summing remarks. You mentioned the issue of various friends that your side and ours may have in various parts of the world, who might become the causes of conflict between us. That is indeed a very important issue. There are many examples in history which warrant the conclusion that it is indeed an important issue. But I believe we should build our relationships on the basis of previous agreements and whatever future relationships on the complete assurance that whatever we do, none of our actions will be directed against the other side.

And in this respect there is a great difference of principle between the present and the past. In the past, various conflicts arising out of actions by third countries flared up because our two countries didn’t have the necessary contacts. But we now have the means of keeping in contact. If in the past we only had contact after it broke out, now we have the means to keep in touch before, and this is a great historical achievement. And I therefore feel we have at hand today the means of avoiding conflict, and this is an important development and on this basis peace can be a very durable one.

Of course, there will be some in the world who want to see continuing tensions and they will prod us toward continuing tensions, and we will have to avoid it. There are some, I say, who will seek to stir up tension.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, we can end on that note.

President Nixon: The most important thing about this meeting, Mr. General Secretary, in comparison to the other two meetings, is not just the fact of the signing of agreements, though they are important, but how we follow up on the commitments made in those agreements in the next months. And I am sure we are in agreement on both sides that we don’t just take those documents and file them away in a drawer, but in the area we said we would follow up, we do follow up. Whatever this requires in the way of meetings, at various levels, as we discussed with the General Secretary, will be done.

Podgorny: And what’s very important is that we have agreed that if necessary we have not just these annual meetings but if anything comes up in the interim requiring urgent discussion, we meet briefly to take these up. We need not wait for a whole year.

Brezhnev: Therefore, I feel President Podgorny and Prime Minister Kosygin have added to our own assessment of what we have achieved in these last several days. And we all proceed from the assumption that we are succeeding in strengthening good-neighborliness between us, and that means we shall go on cooperating.

We have every reason to go on to sign the remaining documents.
[The meeting ended and the party went over to St. Vladimir’s Hall for a signing ceremony.]

4 In telegram 10984 from Moscow, July 15, Stoessel wrote, “The Soviet leadership’s performance during the Summit left some lingering questions. Why was Andropov absent? Why was there more emphasis on collectivity, and a de-emphasis of personal ties? Does Brezhnev have health problems? On the whole, however, their performance demonstrated continued stability and confirmed their concerted policy of pursuing better relations with the U.S. Post-Summit Soviet propaganda has sought to put the best face on the results. In part this is a genuine assessment, reflecting the Soviet tendency to focus on atmospherics. Nevertheless, there are signs of second thoughts about the failure to achieve progress on arms limitation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

199. Editorial Note

Seven protocols, treaties, and agreements were signed by representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union at the Moscow Summit June–July 1974. On June 28, three agreements were signed: Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Energy, Agreement on Cooperation in Housing and Other Construction, and Agreement on Cooperation in Artificial Heart Research and Development. The Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Energy called for intensified scientific and technical cooperation for the optimal use of traditional and new sources of energy. The Agreement on Cooperation in Housing and Other Construction called for cooperation in building planning and construction, focusing on the quality of materials, including paying particular attention to improving safety in earthquake prone areas (25 UST 1592; TIAS 7898). The Agreement on Cooperation in Artificial Heart Research and Development called for collaborative efforts in developing an artificial heart (25 UST 331; TIAS 7867). For the texts of these agreements, see Department of State Bulletin, July 29, 1974, pages 219–223.

The Long Term Agreement on Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation, signed June 29, called for cooperation between the two countries in these areas for ten years (25 UST 1782; TIAS 7910). For the text of the agreement, see ibid., page 219.

destruction of ABMs (27 UST 1645; TIAS 8276). The Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, reiterating the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, outlined limits for weapons tests and for verification and dissemination of data for its five-year duration. The Protocol on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests called for the exchange of information on the location of test sites, the geology of the testing area, and data for calibration purposes. For the texts, see ibid., pages 216–218. The full texts were also printed in *The New York Times*, July 4, 1974, page 2.

Also on July 3, President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed the U.S.-Soviet communique and the joint statement on environmental warfare. For the text of the joint communique, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1974*, pages 567–577. For the joint statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 29, 1974, page 185. Excerpts from the communique and the full text of the joint statement were printed in *The New York Times*, July 4, 1974, pages 3 and 2, respectively.

Secretary of State Kissinger held a news briefing in Moscow on July 3 on the joint communique. A summary of his remarks was printed ibid., July 4, 1974, page 1.
200. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 10, 1974, 8:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Senator George D. Aiken [R–Vermont]
Congressman John J. McFall [D–California]
Senator John O. Pastore [D–Rhode Island]
Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. [D–Virginia]
Senator Hugh Scott [R–Pennsylvania]
Senator Mike Mansfield [D–Montana]
Congressman Carl Albert [D–Oklahoma]

SUBJECT

Joint Leadership Meeting on the Summit Trip to Moscow

The President: We have a full plate today. I will go over the Brussels meeting\(^2\) and highlight Moscow and Henry will follow up on the meetings with the European leaders following the summit.\(^3\) They were significant. Those of you who saw the communiqués and heard the public utterances know most of what went on.

The stop in Brussels was useful. The Europeans have always been concerned about a US-Soviet condominium. We stopped to consult and sign the NATO declaration.

When I went to Europe in 1969, they thought we should do something about China and relations with the Soviet Union. The problem then for them was a possible US-Soviet confrontation. Since then, European attitudes have turned 180°. They have urged a European Security Conference on us; now they are cooling on it and on the idea of having a summit conclusion. Détente is a period of great opportunity and also of danger for the alliance. The Europeans wanted our assurances on security but they have been less than cooperative on economics, the Middle East, etc. They can’t have it both ways—they can’t keep our forces up and confront us everywhere else. They don’t always have to agree—but they can’t go off on their own and in antagonism. In

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\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 4, July 10, 1974. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Brackets are in the original.

\(^2\) See Document 185.

Brussels, I met with the NAC and then individually with Schmidt, Wilson, Rumor and with others at the reception. Giscard was not there—he is more cooperative but he still depends on the Gaullist forces and he can’t move too fast. The Alliance was invigorated by this. The allies said they would try to strengthen their forces. The Alliance got a security shot in the arm—which is difficult when all of them see the tension receding. On the economic side, we laid the foundation for more cooperation between the US and the Community. The Europeans’ interests were almost exclusively economics. After talking with them, I wouldn’t exchange our problems for theirs.

About Moscow: We didn’t know the type of public reception we would get. There had been differences on the Middle East conflict and the October confrontation. The Soviet approach to the Middle East is to do everything at once. Ours is to use Geneva but also anything else which is helpful. They insist on having the Palestinians and immediate withdrawal to the ’67 frontiers. That would blow up any conference. Thanks to Henry, we have cooled the area. Therefore the positions of the US and Soviet Union were far apart.

The discussions this year were the fullest and the least belligerent, and the relationships were “friendliest” in the proper interpretation of that term. We have laid over the years the groundwork for laying the hard problems out on the table, discussing them frankly, not giving up about disagreements but to continue to grapple. The Soviet Union now has positive interest in good relations with the United States.

In the bilateral area, it can’t be said that these nonsecurity agreements will keep them from confrontation with us when our interests clash; but each one gives them an incentive not to throw over détente. We signed some new agreements—in economics, housing, energy, and on research on the artificial heart. These don’t get much play.

Then we discussed the international field. Europe. The Soviet Union wants a CSCE summit. We agree we’ll do it if the substance warrants. On the Middle East, they accepted the proposal that we must continue bilateral step-by-step efforts but they insist on playing a role and even more so on an early Geneva Conference. Our position is—if you take the steps remaining, to get a pull-back on both fronts, the West Bank and the Palestinians—if you lay it all out in Geneva, everyone there would oppose us and Israel. So they don’t agree, but will go along with some bilateral efforts—but we can’t say this publicly.

Southeast Asia was also mentioned.

In the strategic area, we made some progress which if it happened two years ago would have been monumental. On ABM, we agreed to

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4 Mariano Rumor, Italian Prime Minister from July 1973.
go to one site. Their field covers not only Moscow but also much of their industry and a missile field.

The TTB: The Soviet Union proposed it. Their motives are that we are far ahead in testing. They are worried about the Chinese, so the threshold at 150KT makes sense. Our military think that more testing is essential but fundamentally a comprehensive test ban is unverifiable. We won’t yet submit the TTB because of the side issue of peaceful nuclear explosions. We will work out agreement on PNE. They have agreed on prior announcement and observers. It’s the first on-site inspection ever agreed.

On environmental warfare, we agreed to talks. While it doesn’t seem important now, but who knows what science will bring?

SALT is the toughest of all, as I told you before. The Soviet throw weight is greater but our advantage is enormous—we have a 3.5-to-1 advantage in warheads and also in sophistication and accuracy. As we look to the future, if the Soviet Union agreed to freeze now, it would be freezing itself into a public position of inferiority—which they won’t do. The Soviet Union has a missile advantage, but you get hit by warheads. We would first discuss this, but our own warhead advantage doesn’t include our allies—but they count them. They are also worried about China; and we might have to be also. In 1972, I had a rough 4½ hour session on Vietnam. In 1973, from midnight, we had a rough three hours on the Middle East. Had we crumbled in either case, there would not have been a Vietnam settlement or the present Middle East situation. What we come up with now was an agreement to conclude a 10-year agreement on quantitative and qualitative steps. We have to choose whether to conclude an agreement which will protect us and yet be acceptable to them or, with their MIRV breakthrough, go into a race which we will win but which would leave neither side really better off. There comes a point where it makes no difference who has the most. Those are our choices—negotiate a decent agreement or increase our defense and race with them.

Kissinger: At one point, we told Brezhnev what he would have with MIRVs; he confirmed our intelligence estimate. Then he told us what we had, which included everything—bombers, overseas bases, everything. We never think this way, because we think of second-strike. The significance is that they can’t hit NATO without fearing we will hit them as they cannot hit us, or if they hit NATO and the US, we will still have enough.

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6 See Document 132.
The President: I had a talk with Grechko. We agreed that Henry would go back this fall. We have narrowed the differences. There is still a gulf, but we hope we can agree on something. If we can’t, they will go balls out, and with their throw weight, it will be a problem. It would be a race no one would win. We are laying the groundwork for a longer-term agreement.

Senator Aiken: What effect will the French development have?

The President: The Soviet Union puts great emphasis on French and British developments—and also the Chinese. Looked at coldly, they are mini-powers.

Kissinger: [2 lines not declassified]

The President: The last thing the Europeans want is for us to be more inferior to the Soviet Union, but they also fear a runaway race.

A Senator: Where is China? Better than France?

Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

The President: But the Soviet Union thinks the Chinese are going much faster.

Kissinger: Also, how much is enough? The Chinese in four years could kill millions of Russians, and might accept millions of Chinese killed.

McFall: What would be a reasonable agreement? Can they both agree?

The President: We think so. It is very complex. All systems must be considered. We can’t discuss numbers now. Our general view is that all of us concerned with this must not adopt the view of why bother to try for an agreement because we could win a race. But we don’t want a bigger budget—neither do the Soviets—but lacking an agreement, we will move and have told them so.

Pastore: We have had a deterrent policy for 25 years. Our military now think there could be a limited nuclear war. That is impossible. Do the Soviets think that?

The President: The Soviets believe in inevitable escalation.

Kissinger: Soviet weapons are not geared that way.

Senator Pastore: Then why have more artillery shells?

Kissinger: We must distinguish between battlefield and strategic.

Pastore: A President shouldn’t have to make a holocaust decision because artillery shells are 30 miles from the front.

Kissinger: We agree, but then we need more conventional forces.

The President: That is the point. More and more weapons won’t help us.

Pastore: Let the Germans put up the forces.
Kissinger: The tough speeches the President made last spring have brought the Europeans to fundamentals. The changes in Germany and France have been very helpful.

The Europeans now also see that our energy institutions were far-sighted. They all wanted to talk energy. They are all running balance of payments deficits because of oil prices. Also the new deposits coming in are short-term and lending is on a long-term basis. They now realize we weren’t talking hegemony but enlightened self-interest to keep Europe healthy. The Europeans now want to cooperate. France has been stuck with exorbitant oil prices as result of bilateral deals, and energy cooperation is working so well that Giscard now wants to cooperate if he can do it without publicly reversing his course.

On the previous summits, the Europeans feared condominium. This time most felt it was successful—it contributed to easing the atmosphere; they liked the measured way we are proceeding; and it encouraged progress on CSCE and MBFR. I made good progress on those two without backbiting. The most troublesome things are US domestic carping over US inferiority. Spain asked about Zumwalt’s comment on the Navy having to stay out of confrontations. We must get the Europeans to strengthen their forces. The Soviet Union can’t get superiority strategically, but at some level, though, strategic forces cancel each other out and conventional forces become critical.

They are okay on SALT, but they don’t know enough to discuss the details. Their concern is to look into the future and their concern is economic.

Italy is in bad shape. Talking to them is like talking to a Harvard professor’s seminar. With the communists and fascists, the democratic factions have little maneuver. They are tempted to move to the communists and we told them that would be dangerous.

Scott: Isn’t it time they have decent alternatives?

Kissinger: Yes, they need able democratic parties to govern. In France, Giscard wants to cooperate; he has no hangups. They just need time and must maneuver carefully. Whatever France’s policy, as long as they don’t bring pressure on their allies, we can work it out.

Schmidt has none of Brandt’s rapid sentimentality. Where a year ago they thought we needed them, that has changed. In the Middle East they see we are right and we are urging them to move in economics, as long as it is supportive.

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7 See, for example, Nixon’s radio address about the Fourth Annual Foreign Policy Report to the Congress, May 3, in Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 345–347.
8 Possibly a reference to Admiral Zumwalt’s remarks on June 29 that the United States had lost superiority at sea.
Byrd: What were the issues that were impossible of resolution?
What are parameters of trade and what are the quids pro quo?

Kissinger: There are words being thrown around. Take throw weight. Married with MIRVs and high accuracy, they can be dangerous against fixed targets—so they are more vulnerable than we. So far things have not gone to maximum MIRVing. If we can keep it there, we are okay. But if they put 20 MIRVs on a missile, it would be a problem. Also, we can put a big missile in the Minuteman III silos if need be.

In the Crimea we each told the other our intelligence projection of the each other's forces.9 Any MIRV limitation we could accept would severely limit them and look bad. Also, most of the buildup is coming just at the end of the extended period. We thought if we could extend the time, we could put a cap on numbers which is below the capacity of each side and slow down the arms race. It's still large numbers, but the instability comes from each racing. There is no way an attack on the United States could leave us with less than 4,000 warheads.

The President: An agreement means nothing unless it means both sides restrict what they would otherwise do.

Kissinger: We could have juggled the numbers, but it would have been hard to justify that it was less than their program. We want either to restrict them or to be sure they refuse to be limited.

The economic agreement doesn't involve transfer of resources. They facilitate trade.

There is a myth developing that détente is one sided. But:
1. We settled Vietnam on our terms.
2. We squeezed them in the Middle East in an unbelievable way.
3. We protected Berlin.
4. We stopped a Cuban submarine base.

What did they get? Some Ex-Im credits, a little trade, some wheat—which was not part of détente. We tie everything to good foreign policy behavior. If we prevent benefits to them, they will go back to the cold war.

The President: The balance of trade with the Soviet Union is very favorable.

Kissinger: And if we don’t trade, the Europeans and Japanese already are doing it, and it’s better if it’s done under our close controls than without them.

The President: We are trying to work out methods how a private trading economy can trade with a state system. Also, it will eventually pertain to the PRC.

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9 See Document 190.
Scott: They are opening a big trade center.

Kissinger: Look at the record. Every time they have moved, we have been tough. We have showed them if they move militarily, we will stop them. Conversely, if they cooperate, we will make it useful. Remember, until the 1972 summit, there was no trade at all.

When you get the Soviet leadership and news talking the success of détente, it gives them a stake—though they can change.

We have paralyzed the left in Europe with this policy. What would happen if we had one crisis after another? There were no commitments as to loans, or transfer of resources.

The President: We told them we couldn’t yet get MFN but we’re working on it.

Three things moved them at this summit:

(1) What will happen with China? Will they force us into détente with China and opposition to them?

(2) Why didn’t they react in Vietnam and the Middle East? Why did they settle Berlin: (1) fear of the tough United States. They are still obsessed with World War II. The people were out, and they could not do it just for peace but for friendship. Good relations with the United States is in their interest. They are doing better but they are far behind Europe and even more so, the United States. (2) The more stake we can give the Soviet leadership and people in peace and cooperation, the more they will lose if détente fails.

MFN—you can say: “cut them off”—but it applies in spades to the Chinese. But the more we can give them a stake in good relations, the more we can influence them. If we can get the trade bill, it may improve trade, and it will be more help on Jewish emigration than if we slam the door. In 1969 there were less than 1,000 per year; last year it was 33,000. This year it’s down, probably because of the October War. So we need them to fear us but also there has to be a positive element to give them an incentive. There is no give-away. There will have to be a quid pro quo, but no unilateral giveaways. Without MFN, they certainly won’t change their policies.10

10 The Trade Act of 1974, signed into law on January 3, 1975, included an 18 month authority to waive the Jackson–Vanik Amendment, and consequently the ban on Soviet most-favored-nation status and restriction on Expot-Import Bank credits, on the determination and a report to Congress by the President that the waiver would substantially promote the objectives of the amendment. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Documents 222 and 223. Subsequently, on January 14, Kissinger announced that the United States and the Soviet Union had decided to nullify the 1972 Trade Agreement because of Soviet objections to the requirement imposed by the Trade Act to allow freer Jewish emigration. The text of Kissinger’s statement was printed in The New York Times, January 15, 1975, p. 5.
Cedarburg: Any thought to sending the Secretary of Defense to Moscow?
The President: It might be good for someone to talk to Grechko.
Kissinger: If we want to drive the Europeans and Chinese crazy, just let the military staffs talk.
The President: That is not what the leadership is saying. But it is a sensitive area.
Mansfield: It is most inadvisable, Mr. President, and you better keep control.
The President: I will.
[omission in the original]: Netherlands defense cuts.
Kissinger: I think it won’t happen.
Albert: How about energy?
Kissinger: It’s an agreement on research and development exchanges on alternative sources, etc. It has nothing to do with purchases of Soviet energy, resources.
The President: Just an exchange.
Mansfield: Aren’t these private deals?
Kissinger: For Armand Hammer, etc., yes—but this agreement is on technical exchange. The development of energy resources is private. This is totally separate.

201. Message From the Soviet Leadership to the U.S. Leadership

Moscow, undated.

It is with great concern that Moscow received the news regarding an armed putsch aimed at a forced overthrow of the lawful Govern-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 70, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 24. No classification marking. The covering July 16 memorandum from Vorontsov to Eagleburger stated that Dobrynin had discussed the two attached texts with Kissinger during their phone conversations on the evening of July 15 and the morning of July 16. This message is the first of the two attachments. The second is Document 202. Kissinger and Dobrynin spoke on the telephone at 5:30 and 6:30 p.m. on July 15. The transcripts are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Documents 83 and 84. They spoke again on July 16 at 9:50 a.m. That transcript is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 28, Chronological File.
ment of the Republic of Cyprus headed by President Archbishop Makarios, who had been elected to that post as a result of the free will expression by the people. There are conflicting reports about the fate of the President.

Besides being very deplorable by themselves, these developments, having in mind the history of the Cyprus problem, can bring about a dangerous aggravation of the situation in all the region adjacent to Cyprus and, indeed, beyond it. And that would be contrary to the present tendency towards the relaxation of international tensions and would in no way contribute to the strengthening and deepening of that tendency.

Everything indicates that the criminal armed putsch against the lawful Government of Cyprus was organized by the Greek military and that the responsibility for it is placed upon the Government of Greece.

Moscow would like to hope that in connection with the actions taken by Greece the US Government, guided by the wide considerations of the necessity of preventing an exacerbation of the situation in the Mediterranean, will, on its part, also urgently take appropriate steps, aimed at putting an end to the external interference into the internal affairs of Cyprus.

It goes without saying that we proceed from the assumption that the United States of America, as well as other countries, will not under any pretext take steps that may further aggravate the situation on and around Cyprus.

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2 On July 15, a coup d’etat, sanctioned by the Greek Government, ousted Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus. Turkey intervened militarily on July 20. A de facto division was created with Turkish Cypriots controlling the north end of the island and Greek Cypriots controlling the south. For documentation on the coup and the U.S. and Soviet response, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Documents 79 ff.
202. **Message From the Soviet Leadership to the U.S. Leadership**

Moscow, undated

In addition to our yesterday’s communication L. I. Brezhnev asks to bring to the President’s attention the following.

As is known the complex situation on and around Cyprus existed for many years. In the long run the situation there has to a certain degree stabilized. And not the last role in it has played an understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States—and among many other countries, including Turkey—that the interests of Cypriot people and tranquility in this area as a whole is served by the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus.

However the latest events demonstrated that such state of affairs is not to the liking of those who harboured plans of the so-called enosis, which in fact is an annexation of Cyprus.

But a lawful question arises: what policy should triumph—the policy of peace, which gives to the Cypriot people themselves the possibility to govern their internal affairs, the policy which was not once approved by the United Nations of which Cyprus is a member, or a policy directed at defying all those principles?

We firmly believe that it is not the rifle, which came from Greece, that should write the laws for the Cypriot people. Only the people themselves can and should write their laws.

Meanwhile in the eyes of all the world the Athens Government through their military personnel, which turned up on Cyprus, is waging a criminal act of flagrant interference in the internal affairs of that country, having staged a military coup against the lawful government of the Republic headed by President Makarios.

We are convinced that elementary justice demands from the Soviet Union, the United States, other major powers and generally from all countries to do their say—and if necessary to do more than that—to put an end to the military interference of Greece in the affairs of Cyprus.

We believe that President Nixon and the Government of the United States, proceeding from the general course towards relaxation of international tension, adherence to which by both the USSR and the US was once again demonstrated recently during the Soviet-American

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 70, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 24. No classification marking. This message is the second of two attachments to Vorontsov’s covering memorandum to Eagleburger; see footnote 1, Document 201.

2 Document 201.
summit meeting, will take the line corresponding to the interests of the
cypriot people and the interests of peace.

Among the main and most urgent tasks now is the adoption by the
Security Council of a decision on an immediate withdrawal of Greek
military personnel from Cyprus and on the stopping of the interference
by Greece in the internal affairs of Cyprus.³

In this very spirit we are giving instruction to the Soviet Represent-
ative in the Security Council, and we would like to hope that the U.S.
Representative in the Council will be given an instruction to adhere to
the same line.

³ Security Council Resolution 353 was adopted unanimously on July 20. For the full
text, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1974, p. 291.

203. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Soviet
Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, July 17, 1974, 6:50 p.m.

D: I just wanted to say goodbye to you.
K: Are you going home?
D: Why not?
K: That’s good news. That means things are calming down.
D: Not really. My intention was to say goodbye. No, I just received a
telegram and I want to send it to you.
K: Let me hear the bad news.
D: Not really. You are going to San Clemente?
K: Yes, for a day, tomorrow night. I wanted to tell you we are
sending Sisco to London to talk to the British and Turks about that situ-
ation. We are not going to support the Sampson regime.²
D: This is good news. They are asking me to give you their state-
ment of the Soviet Union in connection with the text of the statement of
the government. I do not have it yet. When I get it, should I give it to
Scowcroft? They are sending a text but it is a public statement.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone
Conversations (Telcons), Box 28, Chronological File. Unclassified. All blank underscores
are omissions in the original.
² Nikos Sampson came to power in Cyprus after the overthrow of Makarios.
K: How can you give it to Scowcroft? No, give it to Eagleburger.
D: Still leaning towards (Europe).
K: I think we should play this with restriction. We are not going to have (consultations) with Greek Colonels.
D: Really, my government asked me to tell you that they recognize that the United States is for the independence of Cyprus and you do not support Greek actions that are against the lawful government of Cyprus.
K: I think the first is correct. I would get carried away.
D: I understand. At some time they expressed that . . . not take any political steps to stop intervention . . . that you do not do it from your side and they hope your representatives of the Security Council will . . .
K: He didn’t say anything?
D: You didn’t want to take any political steps to stop this interference. They would like to hope that you and the President will consider what we mentioned before and you will take the ______ to support the lawful government in Cyprus headed by Makarios. This is what they express.
K: May I make this suggestion. Anatol, I think the course of events, if we all behave in a restrained manner, will lead in this direction, but if anyone behaves provocatively it will get mixed up in the whole East/West debate.
D: I understand.
K: We have no interest in changing the situation as it was on the island last (month). Our problem is how to position it so that the natural balance is not affected. This you can tell them.
D: So, I can say that you hope the course of events will lead to a little-by-little restoration.
K: Certainly. To a restoration of a constitutional government.
D: OK.
K: I don’t want to make a decision on names but we have no fixed view on that.
D: OK. This I will mention to Moscow.
K: Tell them if they send messages to send the second draft, not the first, since you are not here to mediate. Give my warm regards to Brezhnev and Gromyko.
D: OK.
K: _______ And I am planning to be there in October.
D: I sent a telegram yesterday to Brezhnev.
K: We ought to make some progress. Senator Fulbright is here and we are planning détente hearings August 8 when I’m going to testify. It couldn’t happen at a better time.
D: I understand.
K: It turned out to be the best time for it. Well, have a good vacation and give my warm regards to everyone.
D: And to Nancy please give my best wishes.
K: Thank you and I may call you once to ruin you in Moscow. Tell them to get all the recording equipment ready.
D: Alright. (laughter).
K: Thank you.

3 Nancy Kissinger.

204. Note From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Latest Brezhnev Letter

The message, on the whole more pained than threatening, reflects Soviet awareness that developments in Cyprus are likely in the end to leave the USSR less influential in yet another place in the Middle East.

There is of course as always the paranoid reaction of assuming that some sort of larger game, masterminded here or somewhere, is underway.

The two basic Soviet proposals—withdrawal of Greek military personnel and restoration of Makarios—were to be expected. They both continue to be reflected in Soviet UN positions, where the Soviets interpret the SC resolution as requiring Greek withdrawal. It is not perhaps surprising that the Soviets don’t associate themselves with the proposal for talks in London, nor indeed with the call for a cease fire. In part this reflects Moscow’s strange dissociation from the process now underway diplomatically and in the UN; but it also reflects its recogni-

tion that the outcome of these activities is likely to leave the USSR worse off than before (including, incidentally, with regard to Turkey which by its invasion has probably assured itself of some kind of improvement in Cyprus compared with the past which will leave it less in need of Soviet support).

The only threatening element in the Brezhnev letter is the reference in Point 1 to “our two powers” acting “not only under the roof of the UN but also through other means” to get Greek withdrawal and cessation of interference. I think you will need to say something, preferably orally at this stage, to Vorontsov on this. It could be very simple:

— we agree that the UN is not the only means for exerting influence toward restoration of peace and constitutional arrangements;
— we are already, and have been, exerting utmost influence through diplomatic efforts with all concerned;
— obviously, other forms of intervention on the island, unilaterally or bilaterally, cannot be envisaged; they would also contravene the London/Zurich agreements;3
— we are of course prepared to continue close consultations with the USSR.

The Soviet point on restoration of Makarios, while heartfelt, seems mostly for the record. The last part of the point “restoration of the status of Cyprus as an independent state as it existed before the military intervention of Greece” seems to allow for a different personality. (I have already said to Vorontsov that we should not emphasize personalities per se as much as restoration of peace and constitutional arrangements.) In any case, Brezhnev does not call for withdrawal of Turkish forces (he merely says the situation has deteriorated, as evidenced by the Turkish landings.) The Soviets can’t believe that the Turks want Makarios restored in the end.

Altogether, Soviet conduct is having the effect of reducing rather than enhancing the Soviet role in events. It is not in our interest to correct this, though we should not actively promote it either, since it would be likely to bring about an unnecessary confrontation.

You should tell Vorontsov:
— we got the letter and studied it;
— we of course want to cooperate with the Soviets, in the spirit of our relations and agreements (as the President told Brezhnev yesterday);4

3 The London–Zurich agreements, signed in 1959, led to a constitution for Cyprus, which provided for its independence from Great Britain.

4 Nixon’s July 20 note to Brezhnev, in which he emphasized the need for peace, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 70, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 24.
—we have no desire for a confrontation of any kind;
—we think the major task now is to bring about a cease-fire and the opening of negotiations between Greece and Turkey as proposed by the British;
—we want restoration of the status quo ante, including with regard to military forces and the constitutional order;
—above all we want to get the fighting stopped;
—we are exerting maximum influence on Greece and Turkey by all appropriate means at our disposal;
—we hope the Soviets will do likewise;
—there should be no interference by additional powers in the island. (see page 2, above.)

205. Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev


Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have received and carefully studied your message concerning Cyprus which was delivered to the White House by your Embassy early today. There should be no doubt in your mind, as a result of the views already conveyed to you and the actions of the United States throughout the crisis, that we seek no confrontation of any kind and that we wish to cooperate with you in restoring peace and the previous constitutional arrangements in Cyprus. The United States does not support and has not supported external interference in the affairs of Cyprus. It opposes such interference, whatever the source.

The essential task now is to bring about a cease-fire on Cyprus. This is the goal of our active diplomatic efforts with the parties concerned and of our actions in the United Nations. You should know that we have been in contact, literally round-the-clock, with the parties to induce them to accept a cease-fire at the earliest possible moment. Al-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 70, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 24. No classification marking. A covering memorandum from Kennedy to Vorontsov indicates that the letter was sent from San Clemente. “Deliver to the Soviet Embassy at 6:00 p.m., 7/21/74” is handwritten at the top of the memorandum.

2 See footnote 2, Document 204.
though, as I write to you, these efforts have not yet succeeded, we remain hopeful that they will, and in any case we will continue them intensively.

I trust the Soviet Union will firmly and actively support the goal of an immediate cease-fire as well. Implementation of a ceasefire will make possible negotiations, as proposed by the UK and endorsed by the UN Security Council, for the purpose of restoring peace, the constitutional order and the independence of the country. I am convinced that this course accords with the purposes set forth in your message.

I have noted the positive comments you have just made on our relations in your speech in Warsaw. As you know from my own public statements, I share your satisfaction with what is being accomplished in our relations. In the spirit of those relations, it is my hope that you, like we, will exert maximum efforts to pacify the situation, to end fighting and to bring about negotiations so that the independence and integrity of Cyprus can be restored.

Sincerely,

3 On July 21, Brezhnev delivered a foreign policy address in Warsaw, where he was attending ceremonies celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Communist regime in Poland. See “Brezhnev Urges Parley Accords,” The New York Times, July 22, 1974, p. 17.

4 Printed from an unsigned copy.

206. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon

Moscow, July 23, 1974.

Dear Mr. President,

I have received your message of July 21, 1974, regarding Cyprus and want to give you a reply to it at once, since the situation there remains complicated and dangerous.

Your message says about the US readiness to cooperate with the Soviet Union in the matter of restoring peace and the previous constitu-
tional arrangements in Cyprus. We welcome the general spirit of that statement and on our part have already proposed to the American side to act concertedly in Cyprus question.

And we have proposed and are proposing to determine as concretely as possible the goal of our concerted actions, namely: full restoration on Cyprus of the authority of the lawfully elected Government of that state headed by President Makarios, without limiting ourselves to general appeals about restoring constitutionality and so on.

Under existing conditions the achievement of this goal, in our view, can and should be promoted by a speedy implementation of the U.N. Security Council Resolution of July 20, 1974, which the USSR and the US, together with other states, voted for. That Resolution, in our opinion, could have been of a more decisive nature, but none the less we believe that on the whole it is consistent with two main prerequisites, compliance with which can really restore peace on Cyprus.

They are—an unequivocal support of the lawful Government of Cyprus headed by President Makarios (it is exactly in this capacity that he is mentioned in the Resolution) and immediate termination of foreign military intervention against the Republic of Cyprus with withdrawal from there of foreign military personnel.

In your message you, Mr. President, make a big stress on a question of cease-fire on Cyprus. We are also in favor of it. At the same time it is quite obvious that a simple cease-fire will not settle the problem if just after that and without delay effective measures are not taken to ensure that the cease-fire would really bring about peace and order on Cyprus in the interests of the Cypriot people, and would not turn to be only a temporary pause before a new and maybe more bloody outbreak.

We are convinced that only radical measures directed at restoring fully the position of Cyprus as an independent and sovereign state, which existed before the military intervention of Greece, can ensure the only acceptable for the Cypriot people way out from an acute situation, which has developed lately, and at the same time can eliminate a grave source of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean. One should face the truth squarely. It was the very lack of such effective measures—as a result of the position taken by a number of Western countries including the US, that has brought the present bloodshed.

Then let us, Mr. President, do everything possible at least now, let us press together for the speediest fulfillment of the Security Council decision of July 20.

On our part we shall continue to exert most active efforts in defense of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus in their concrete expression—in the sense of eliminating outside interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus and restoring there the legitimate Government headed by President Makarios.

We would like to hope that the United States of America will also make their position on Cyprus as much concrete as possible along the same lines.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

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4 Printed from a copy that bears Brezhnev's typed signature.

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207. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

Latest Soviet Note on Cyprus; Talk with Vorontsov

I called Vorontsov at 10:30 AM to tell him that I had promptly informed you of their note of last night (Tab A), that you were not, however, back in town yet and that I had no detailed response at this time. I did want him to know that round-the-clock efforts were continuing in Geneva to find a resolution among the parties. This being the case, we did not think that action through the UN Security Council was useful or desirable at this time. Vorontsov said that it was a good thing for people to work round-the-clock because the situation has to be brought under control. He said that perhaps the Security Council meetings would serve to put pressure on the people in Geneva to speed up matters. I said I was certain that work was proceeding in Geneva night and

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2 Attached but not printed.
day. I concluded by saying that if we had a further reaction to their latest note following your return I would be in touch. Vorontsov said: “Don’t disappear.”

As you are aware, the Soviets are working with Makarios in New York and Rossides\(^3\) is also in close touch with them. The Security Council is clearly the only real means the Soviets have at this point to inject themselves actively into the diplomatic game; and it is the best way they have to work with Makarios. Their only real program seems to be to keep Makarios in play and to somehow get him into the diplomatic process in Geneva.

Soviet demands for cessation of foreign intervention, withdrawal of troops, implementation of SC Resolution 353,\(^4\) etc., continue to be ambiguous as regards the Turks. Apparently, there has been some direct Soviet-Turkish contact (one was a meeting between the Soviet Ambassador and the Turkish Defense Minister), but just what the substance may be is not clear.

It is a truism that the longer the present situation continues the more entree the Soviets will acquire. Their idea of a Security Council mission to Cyprus may gain ground if the Turks really seek to exclude the UN forces from areas occupied by the Turks.

In any event, our best bet remains to keep the Russians at arms length, as we are doing and the Soviets obviously know we are doing. As long as we can point to progress in Geneva, this tactic will work; if there is a breakdown it will be much harder to make it work and the Soviets would of course have much better ground for direct dealings with Athens and Ankara as well as for UN intervention.

So far in New York, the British have carried the load of argument against the Soviet position. That is fine and we should keep it that way as long as possible.

I still see no value in sending a written communication to the Soviets, though we now have two from them which we have only reacted to orally. The only utility would be to satisfy the ritualistic Soviet desire for formal communication and to meet the seeming requirements of our agreements with the Russians to consult on international problems. But there would be little that we could say; and anything we say that implies some coordination of efforts will be immediately used by the Russians with the Greeks and Turks. (The Soviets told the Greeks that the dispatch of their observer to Geneva was the result of agreement between us; we have of course denied this, but any written communica-

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\(^{3}\) Zenon Rossides, Cypriot Ambassador to the United States.

tion suggesting US-Soviet cooperation would undermine our position with the Greeks and Turks and imply US-Soviet collusion.)

In summary, therefore, if you agree, I think I should call Vorontsov toward the end of today (July 29) and tell him

—Their note and Government statement have been carefully reviewed by you;

—That we continue to believe that the focus of effort should be in Geneva where work continues intensively on an agreement among the guarantors;

—That of course the interests of the Cypriots are not being ignored;

—That we remain in close touch with the constitutional government on Cyprus and that you are having further talks with Makarios as well;

—That we don’t like the accusatory tone of Soviet statements and communications—they imply an adversary position when our entire purpose has been to find a solution acceptable to all directly concerned without making this an international dispute;

—That we continue to hope the Soviets will desist from anything that might inflame the situation or adversely affect the already difficult climate in which the parties are attempting to work out a solution.

Approve further talk with Vorontsov along above lines
Prefer a written communication along above lines
Do nothing further today, July 29
Other

5 None of the options is initialed.

208. Editorial Note

Richard Nixon resigned as President on August 9, 1974, before his probable impeachment for involvement in the Watergate scandal. In his final address to the nation, Nixon listed the accomplishments of his administration, among them the breakthroughs with the Soviet Union on limiting nuclear arms. He concluded, “We have opened the new relation with the Soviet Union. We must continue to develop and expand that new relationship so that the two strongest nations of the
world will live together in cooperation, rather than confrontation.” For the full text of Nixon’s address, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1974, pages 626–629.

Vice President Gerald R. Ford was sworn in as President the same day. Planning continued for the next U.S.-Soviet summit, which was held in Vladivostok in November. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.
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