

FOREIGN
RELATIONS
OF THE
UNITED
STATES

1969–1976

VOLUME XXIV

MIDDLE EAST REGION
AND ARABIAN
PENINSULA, 1969–1972;
JORDAN, SEPTEMBER 1970



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United States, 1969–1976

Volume XXIV

Middle East
Region and
Arabian
Peninsula,
1969–1972; Jordan,
September 1970

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Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that document the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. The subseries presents a documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of both Presidents. This volume documents U.S. policy toward the Middle East region including the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula from 1969 to 1972, as well as U.S. actions during the Jordan crisis of September 1970.

Although part of a larger integrated series, this volume is meant to stand on its own. Readers who want a more complete context for U.S. relations with the Middle East during this time period should consult other volumes in the 1969–1976 subseries of the *Foreign Relations* series. Volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972, covers events in Jordan both before and after September 1970, as well as the Arab-Israeli crisis. Oil and energy issues are addressed in volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969–1974. U.S. bilateral relations with Iran are documented in volume E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV

The editors of this volume sought to present documentation that explains and illuminates the major foreign policy decisions of the President on the Middle East region, the Persian Gulf, and the Arabian Peninsula and Jordan, and represents the counsel of his key foreign policy advisers. The volume focuses on U.S. regional policy in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. It also has chapters on U.S. bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the smaller Persian Gulf states, and on the Jordan crisis of September 1970. The documents used in the Middle East regional part of the volume include memoranda, records of discussions, cables, and papers that set forth policy issues and options and show decisions or actions taken. The Jordan crisis section of the volume uses similar documentation and also relies heavily on transcripts of crucial telephone conversations.

Middle East Region. President Nixon relied upon his two principal foreign policy advisers, Secretary of State William Rogers and Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, for major foreign policy initiatives toward the region. Other high-level officials, such as Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, provided additional counsel. Because the editors' primary focus was on the policy process—recommendations, discussions, and then final decisions—the focus of the volume is largely on events in Washington; however, it also covers events and developments in the Middle East region and the Indian Ocean as they affected the policy process.

The themes of this section are framed by the Nixon administration's efforts to replace the political and military structure left by the former British Empire with a newer structure that met America's cold war needs. As the United States worked with the British to restructure the region militarily and politically, this required diplomatic contact with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the various sheikdoms that eventually made up the United Arab Emirates, as well as Qatar and Bahrain. Other themes emerged after Britain's political and military departure from the region, including the Nixon administration's efforts to articulate a

grand strategy toward the Middle East region through arms sales and military modernization for its regional allies, enlarging the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean through negotiations with the British over Diego Garcia, and preventing Ceylonese and Soviet efforts to demilitarize the Indian Ocean. Additional themes include competition between Kissinger and Rogers for dominance in policymaking and the reluctance of Nixon and Kissinger to be involved in regional issues, unless the Shah of Iran or King Faisal of Saudi Arabia demanded their personal attention.

The Jordan Crisis. This chapter documents the September 1970 crisis in Jordan. This crisis confronted the Nixon administration with the possibility that the monarchy of King Hussein, a major U.S. ally in the Middle East, would not survive. Although conflict existed between King Hussein and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the months preceding and following September 1970, this chapter focuses on the key 4-week period that defined the most intense phase of the conflict. It opens with the hijacking of four commercial airliners by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. These hijackings led to intense fighting between the PLO and the Jordanian Arab Army, and the chapter emphasizes Nixon and Kissinger's close involvement in the day-to-day developments and the final resolution of the crisis.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents in the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified af-

ter declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed by headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified by footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and review volumes, as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Presidential Records and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 U.S.C. 2111 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to

ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA formally to notify the Nixon Estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon Estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All *Foreign Relations* volumes that include materials from NARA's Nixon Presidential Materials Project are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended, on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2005 and was completed in 2007, resulted in the decision to withhold no documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 6 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 27 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide an accurate and comprehensive—given limitations of space—account of the Nixon administration's policy toward the Middle East region from 1969 to 1972 and the 1970 Jordan crisis.

Acknowledgments

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), at College Park, Maryland. The

editors also wish to acknowledge the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing access to the Nixon Presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access. Special thanks are due to Scott Koch, formerly of the History Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, who was extremely helpful in arranging full access to the files of that agency. John Haynes of the Library of Congress was responsible for expediting access to the Kissinger Papers, including the transcripts of Henry Kissinger's telephone conversations. Copies of the Kissinger telephone conversations are now available at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project. The editors were able to use the Kissinger Papers, including the transcripts of telephone conversations, with the kind permission of Henry Kissinger. The editors would like also to thank Sandra Meagher at the Department of Defense.

Linda Qaimmaqami prepared the chapters on the Middle East region. Adam Howard prepared the chapter on Jordan, 1970. They collected and selected documentation and edited the volume under the supervision of Edward C. Keefer, General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. Dean Weatherhead coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Susan C. Weetman, Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. Keri Lewis and Aaron W. Marrs did the copy and technical editing. Breffni Whelan prepared the index.

Bureau of Public Affairs
December 2008

Marc J. Susser
The Historian

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Sources

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leads by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's indexed central files for 1969–1972 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) at College Park, Maryland. Almost all the Department's decentralized office (or lot) files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series also have full access to the papers of President Nixon and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project at Archives II include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Department of State historians also have full access to records of the Department of Defense, particularly the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of Defense and their major assistants. The Central Intelligence Agency has provided full access to its files.

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV

In preparing this volume the editors made extensive use of Presidential papers and other White House records held by the Nixon Presidential Materials Project. Those have proved to be the best source of documentation on President Nixon's and the National Security Council's role in the Middle East. Within the National Security Files, the Country Files, the files of Harold Saunders, the Institutional (or H-Files), Presidential Correspondence files, and VIP visits files, were particularly valuable. Of these, the H-Files were most significant,

providing documentation from the highest levels of White House and National Security Council policy formation and decision making. Transcripts of Henry Kissinger's telephone conversations, originally at the Library of Congress and now at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, were also valuable.

Thanks to the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, Department of State historians have full access to the audiotapes of President Nixon's telephone conversations. The editor of the portion of this volume pertaining to Middle East and Indian Ocean regional affairs and relations with Persian Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, found almost no tapes that dealt substantively with those issues. One tape is used in a footnote to a memorandum of conversation between Rogers and Nixon after Rogers's trip to the Middle East.

Second in importance to the records held by the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff were the records of the Department of State. The Department's central files contain the cable traffic recording U.S. diplomatic relations with the countries of the Middle East, memoranda of diplomatic conversations, and memoranda proposing action or providing information. For this volume, the lot files provided some value.

The Central Intelligence Agency provides access to Department of State historians to high-level intelligence documents from those records in the custody of that agency and at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project. This access is arranged and facilitated by the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to a May 2002 memorandum of understanding. Among the intelligence records reviewed for the volume were files of the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the CIA Registry of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates, DCI Executive Registry Files, Files of the Office of Research and Reports, and Files of the Office of Current Intelligence.

Almost all of this documentation has been made available for use in the *Foreign Relations* series thanks to the consent of the agencies mentioned, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration.

The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National Archives of these records is in process. Most of the records are already available for public review at the National Archives.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below.

Lot Files. For other lot files already transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59, see National Archives and Records Administration below.

INR/IL Historical Files

Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, including records of the 303 Committee, from the 1950s through the 1970s, maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

Central Files

AID(IRAN) YEMEN, bilateral aid relations between Iran and Yemen
 AID(US) 8-7 SAUD, bilateral aid relations in the area of public safety, U.S.-Saudi Arabia
 AV 12, aircraft and aeronautical equipment
 AV 12 US, aircraft and aeronautical equipment
 CENTO 3, organization and conferences of the alliance
 CENTO 3 US(WA), U.S. role in the organization and conferences of the alliance
 CENTO 6-2 PAK, naval defense affairs pertaining to Pakistan's role in the alliance
 DEF 15-4 BAHRAIN-US, negotiation on agreements and base leases
 DEF 4 CENTO, multilateral agreements and organization of the alliance
 DEF 12-5 FAA, procurement and sale of armaments
 DEF 15 IND-UK, bases and installations, Indian Ocean
 DEF 15 IND-US, bases and installations, Indian Ocean
 DEF 19 IRAN-YEMEN, military assistance, Yemen
 DEF 12-5 ISR, procurement and sale of armaments, Israel
 DEF 12-5 JORDAN, procurement and sale of armaments, Jordan
 DEF 1 KUW, general defense policy, Kuwait
 DEF 6 KUW, armed forces, Kuwait
 DEF 12 KUW, armaments, Kuwait
 DEF 12-5 KUW, procurement and sale of armaments, Kuwait
 DEF 1 NEAR E, general defense policy, the Near East
 DEF 12-5 NEAR E, procurement and sale of armaments, the Near East
 DEF 1 SAUD, general defense policy, Saudi Arabia
 DEF 6-2 SAUD, navy, Saudi Arabia
 DEF 6-4 SAUD, military and reserves, Saudi Arabia
 DEF 12-5 SAUD, procurement and sale of armaments, Saudi Arabia
 DEF 19-6 SYEMEN, communist bloc assistance, South Yemen
 DEF 6 TRUCIAL STATES, armed forces, the Trucial States
 DEF 12-5 UAE, procurement and sale of armaments, United Arab Emirates
 DEF 19-8 US-SAUD, military assistance, Saudi Arabia
 DEF 19-8 US-YEMEN, military assistance, Yemen
 E 2-4 SAUD, economic growth and development issues in Saudi Arabia
 ORG 7 S, organization and administration, visits of the Secretary of State
 PET SAUD, general petroleum issues, Saudi Arabia
 PET 6 SAUD, refineries, Saudi Arabia
 PET 17 SAUD, Saudi trade in oil, including communist penetration of petroleum market
 PET 1 SAUD-US, general policy and plans in the oil industry, Saudi Arabia
 PET 17 US-SAUD, trade in oil, including communist penetration, U.S.-Saudi Arabia
 POL 13-6, religious groups
 POL 23-10, travel control
 POL 7 ARAB, visits and meetings, Arab world

XIV Sources

POL 13–10 ARAB, extremist organizations
POL 27 ARAB–ISR, military operations, Arab–Israeli dispute
POL 27–4 ARAB–ISR, use of international force, Arab–Israeli dispute
POL 7 BAHRAIN IS, visits and meetings, Bahrain
POL 16 BAHRAIN IS, independence and recognition, Bahrain
POL 19 BAHRAIN IS, government of dependencies and self-determination, Bahrain
POL 15–1 CEYLON, heads of state, Ceylon
POL CEYLON–US, general policy and trends, Ceylon–U.S.
POL 19 FAA, government of dependencies and self-determination, FAA
POL 33–6 IND, navigation and the high seas, Indian Ocean
POL 27 INDIA–PAK, military operations, India–Pakistan
POL IRAN–UAE, general policy and trends, Iran–UAE
POL 19 IRAN–YEMEN, government of dependencies and self-determination
POL JORDAN–US, general policy and trends
POL 23 JORDAN, internal security and counterinsurgency, Jordan
POL 23–9 JORDAN, rebellion and coups, Jordan
POL KUV, internal security and counterinsurgency, Kuwait
POL KUW–US, general policy and trends, Kuwait–U.S.
POL 23–9 LIBYA, rebellions and coups, Libya
POL 23–9 MUSCAT & OMAN, rebellions and coups, Muscat & Oman
POL 1 NEAR E–SAUD, general policy and trends, Near East–Saudi Arabia
POL 1 NEAR E–US, general policy and trends, the Near East–U.S.
POL NEAR E–USSR, general policy and trends, the Near East–USSR
POL 33 PERSIAN GULF, water and boundary issues, Persian Gulf
POL 15–1 QATAR, heads of state, Qatar
POL 19 RAS AL KHAJMAH, government of dependencies and self-determination
POL 7 SAUD, visits and meetings, Saudi Arabia
POL 15–1 SAUD, heads of state, Saudi Arabia
POL 23 SAUD, internal security and counterinsurgency, Saudi Arabia
POL 32–1 SAUD–SYEMEN, territory and boundary disputes, Saudi Arabia–South Yemen
POL SAUD–UAE, general policy and trends, Saudi Arabia–UAE
POL 32–1 SAUD–UAE, territory and boundary disputes, Saudi Arabia–UAE
POL SAUD–US, general trends and policy, Saudi Arabia–U.S.
POL SAUD–YEMEN, general trends and policy, Saudi Arabia–Yemen
POL 2 SYEMEN, reports and statistics, South Yemen
POL 12 SYEMEN, political parties, South Yemen
POL 13 SYEMEN, non-party blocs, South Yemen
POL 15–1 SYEMEN, head of state, South Yemen
POL 23–9 SYEMEN, rebellions and coups, South Yemen
POL 33 SYEMEN, water and boundary issues, South Yemen
POL SYEMEN–US, general policy and trends
POL SYEMEN–YEMEN, general policy and trends
POL TRUCIAL ST–US, general policy and trends
POL UAE, general policy and trends
POL 3 UAE, organizations and alignments
POL 7 UAE, visits and meetings
POL 16 UAE, independence and recognition
POL 23–9 UAE, rebellions and coups
POL UAE–US, general policy and trends
POL 17 UK–FAA, diplomatic and consular representation
POL UK–US, general policy and trends
POL 15–1 UK, head of state
POL 17 US–KUW, diplomatic and consular representation, U.S.–Kuwait
POL 17–1 US–QATAR, acceptability and accreditation

POL US-YEMEN, general policy and trends
POL YEMEN, general policy and trends
POL 7 YEMEN, visits and meetings
POL 15-1 YEMEN, head of state
POL 27 YEMEN, military operations
PS 7-6 JORDAN, welfare and whereabouts, Jordan
SOC 10 JORDAN, disaster and relief, Jordan

RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Papers of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer

Central Intelligence Agency

Files of the Deputy Director of Intelligence, Robert E. Cushman, Jr. (1969-1971), and Vernon Walters (1972-1976): Job 79-T00832A

Files of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard M. Helms (1966-1973); Executive Registry Files: Job 80-B01086A

Files of the Office of Research and Reports: Job 79-T00935A and Job 80-T01315A

Files of the Office of Current Intelligence: Job 79-T00832A

Files of the National Intelligence Council: Job 79-R01012A

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSD Files: FRC 330-76-0197

Cables and miscellaneous correspondence relating to the Middle East, general

OSD Files: FRC 330-76-067

Cables and miscellaneous correspondence relating to the Indian Ocean, 1970

OSD Files: FRC 330-76-067

Materials relating to Saudi Arabia, 1970

OASD Files: FRC 330-75-125

Materials relating to the Indian Ocean, 1972

OASD Files: FRC 330-4-083

Materials relating to Saudi Arabia, 1971

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330-75-0125

Materials relating to Saudi Arabia, and 1972

Library of Congress, Washington, DC

Papers of Henry A. Kissinger

National Security Council, Committees and Panels

Geopolitical File, Jordan Crisis—September 1970, Selected Exchanges

Geopolitical File, Jordan Crisis—September 1970, Notebook, 1970-73

Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Maryland

National Security Files

Agency Files: Central Treaty Organization and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Country Files: Ceylon, Iran, Jordan; Kuwait; Middle East General; Saudi Arabia; Trucial States; United Kingdom; Yemen

Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files: Memorandum of Conversations

Harold Saunders Files: Middle East Negotiations Files; Basic Policy, Middle East; CENTO; Middle East Water; NSSM 90

Kissinger Office Files: Subject and Chronological Files

Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts: Chronological Files

National Security Council Files: Backchannel Messages, Europe, Middle East, and Latin America; Hijackings

NSC Institutional Files (H-Files)

Draft National Security Council Minutes

National Security Council Meeting Files

National Security Council Minutes of Meeting Files

National Security Decision Memorandum Files

National Security Study Memorandum Files

Senior Review Group Files

Senior Review Group Meeting Files

Senior Review Group Minutes of Meeting Files

Undersecretary's Study Memorandums

Washington Special Actions Group Meeting Files

Washington Special Actions Group Minutes of Meeting Files

National Security Council Meetings; Special NSC Meeting, Jordan

National Security Council Secretariat, Unfiled Materials, 1969 through 1972

Presidential Correspondence: King Faisal; Saudi Arabia

President's Trip Files: Nixon Visit to Iran, 1972

VIP Visits: Visit of Prime Minister Heath, 1970; Secretary of State's Visit to the Middle East and European Countries, 1972; Visit of Prince Fahd, 1969; Visit of King Faisal, 1971; Vice President's Trip, 1971

White House Tapes: Staff from the Office of the Historian prepared transcripts from selected tapes

White House Central Files

President Nixon's Daily Diary

White House Special Files, White House Confidential Files

Muscat & Oman

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- United Nations. *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1970–1971. New York: Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1972, 1974.
- United States. Department of State. *Department of State Bulletin*, 1969–1972. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969–1972.
- United States. National Archives and Records Administration. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973.

Abbreviations and Terms

ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

ACE, Allied Command Europe

Adm., Admiral

AEC, Atomic Energy Commission

AF/AFI, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

AF/N, Office of Northern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

AF/P, Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

AF/RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

AID, Agency for International Development

AID/NESA, Bureau for Near East and South Asian Affairs, Agency for International Development

AID/OPS, Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development

Amb, Ambassador

ANM, Arab National Movement

ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States Alliance

APC, Armored Personnel Carrier

ARAMCO, Arabian American Oil Company

ASW, Anti-Submarine Warfare

ATH, Air Transportable Hospital

AUB, American University Beirut

BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation

b/d, barrels per day

BG, Brigadier General

BIOT, British Indian Ocean Territory

BOAC, British Overseas Airways Corporation

BOB, Bureau of the Budget

CAS, Controlled American Source

CENTO, Central Treaty Organization

CG/FF, Coast Guard/Frontier Forces, Saudi Arabia

Chicoms, Chinese Communists

CHNAVOPS, Chief of Naval Operations

CHNAVSEC, Chief, Naval Section

CHUSMTM, Chief, U.S. Military Training Mission, Saudi Arabia

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency

CINCEUR, Commander-in-Chief, European Command

CINCLANT, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command; Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Forces

CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command

CINCPACAF, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command, Air Force

CINC SOUTH, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command/(NATO) Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe

CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFA, Commander in Chief, Strike Command/Commander in Chief Middle East, Africa and South Asia

CINCUSNAVEUR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy, Europe

CNO, Chief Naval Officer

COE, Army Corps of Engineers

COE MEDDIV, Corps of Engineers, Mediterranean Division

XX Abbreviations and Terms

COMIDEASTFOR, Commander, Middle East Forces

COMLANDSOUTHEAST, Commander, Allied Land Forces, Southeastern Europe

COMSIXFLT, Commander, Sixth Fleet

COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH, Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe

ConGen, Consulate General

CSA, Chief of Staff, United States Army

CSAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

CT, Country Team

CU, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State

CVA, Attack Aircraft Carrier

DA or DATT, Defense Attaché

DAO, Defense Attaché Office

DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission

DeptOffs, Department Officers

DG, Director General, Ministry of Defense and Aviation, Saudi Arabia

DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency

Dissem, Dissemination

DOD, Department of Defense

DOD/ISA, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

DOD/ISA/NESA, Office of Near East and South Asian Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

DOD/ISA/SA, Office of Security Assistance, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

DSAA, Defense Security Assistance Agency

DSYG, Deputy Secretary General

E/IFD/ODE, Office of International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State

EA/RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

EEC, European Economic Community

Emb, Embassy

EmbOff, Embassy Officer

EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/BMI, Office of United Kingdom, Ireland, Malta, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/NE, Office of Northern Europe, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/RPM, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Exdis, Exclusive Distribution (extremely limited distribution or dissemination)

EXIM, Export-Import Bank of the United States

FAA, Federation of Arab Emirates; Federal Aviation Authority

Fatah, Palestine Homeland Liberation Movement (Harekat at-Takrir al-Wataniyyeh al-Falastiniyyeh)

FCO, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom

FIDP, Foreign Intelligence Defense Program

FLOSY, Front for the Liberation of South Yemen

FMRA, Foreign Military Rights Affairs

FMS, Foreign Military Sales

FonMin, Foreign Minister, Foreign Ministry

FonOff, Foreign Office
FonSec, Foreign Secretary
FY, Fiscal Year
FYI, For Your Information

GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCA, Government Contracting Activity
GNP, Gross National Product
GOB, Government of Bahrain
GOC, Government of Ceylon
GOI, Government of Iran, Israel, Iraq, or India
GOJ, Government of Jordan, Japan
GOK, Government of Kuwait
GOL, Government of Lebanon
GOS, Government of Syria

H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State
HAK, Henry A. Kissinger
HE, His/Her Excellency
helo, helicopter
HFAC, House Foreign Affairs Committee
HIM, His Imperial Majesty, the Shah of Iran
HM, His/Her Majesty
HMG, His/Her Majesty's Government
HMS, His/Her Majesty's Station
HRH, His/Her Royal Highness

IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Authority
ICBM, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
IDA, International Development Association
IDF, Israeli Defense Force
IFF, Identification, Friend or Foe
IG, Interdepartmental Group
Indo-Pak, India-Pakistan
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/RNA, Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/RSE, Office of Research and Analysis for USSR and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INTELSAT, International Telecommunications Satellite
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
ISA, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
ISA/EUR, Office of European Affairs, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
ISA/COMP, Office of the Comptroller, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
ISA/I&L, Office of Installations and Logistics, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

J, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
J/PM, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

XXII Abbreviations and Terms

JAA, Jordanian Arab Army

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCS/J-5, Plans Section, Joint Plans and Policy Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum

JIC, Joint Intelligence Committee

JTF, Jordan Task Force

L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

L/C, International Claims, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

L/M/SCA, Assistant Legal Adviser for Management and Consular Affairs, Department of State

L/NEA, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

L/PM or L/PMO, Assistant Legal Adviser for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

L/T, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Department of State

Limdis, Limited Distribution

LOC, Lines of Communication

LPH, Amphibious assault ship (helicopter); landing platform helicopter

Lt. Gen., Lieutenant General

LTG, Lieutenant General

MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group

MAP, Military Assistance Program

MASH, Mobile Army Surgical Hospital

MBFR, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction

ME, Middle East

Med, Mediterranean

MemCon, Memorandum of Conversation

MENA, Middle East News Agency

MFR or MR, Memorandum for the Record

MGD, Million Gallons per Day

MIDEASTFOR, Middle East Forces

MinDef, Minister of Defense

MinFin, Minister of Finance

MinPet, Minister of Petroleum

MinState, Minister of State

MOD, Minister of Defense

MODA, Minister or Ministry of Defense and Aviation, Saudi Arabia

MOU, Memorandum of Understanding

MTM, Military Training Mission

NAC, North Atlantic Council

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

NEA/ARN, Office of Lebanese, Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

NEA/ARP, Office of Arabian Peninsular Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

NEA/IAI, Office of Israeli and Arab-Israeli Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

NEA/INC, Office of Indian, Ceylonese, Nepalese, and Maldives Islands Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

NEA/IRN, Office of Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/PAB, Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/PAF, Office of Pakistan and Afghanistan Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/TUR, Office of Turkish Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/UAR, Office of United Arab Republic Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NFLAP, National Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Peninsula
NG or N/G, National Guard, Saudi Arabia
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NIOC, National Iranian Oil Company
NLF, National Liberation Front, South Yemen
NMCC, National Military Command Center
Nodis, no distribution (other than to persons indicated)
Noform, No Foreign Dissemination
Notal, not received by all addressees
NPT, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NPW, Nuclear Powered Warship
NSA, National Security Agency
NSC, National Security Council
NSCIG/NEA, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group, Near Eastern Affairs
NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum
NSOC, National Security Operations Center
NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum
NUF, National Unity Front, Yemen

OASD/ISA/FMRA, Office of Foreign Military Rights Affairs, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPR/LS, Language Services Division, Office of Operations, Department of State
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
OSD/ISA/NESA, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
OSD/LA, Office of Legislative Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD/PA, Office of Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OST, Office of Science and Technology
OSW, Office of Saline Water, Department of the Interior

PARA, Policy Analysis and Recommended Action Paper/Review
PDRY, Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen
PDRYG, Government of the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen
PermRep, Permanent Representative
PFLOAG, Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf
PFLP, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

XXIV Abbreviations and Terms

PLO, Palestine Liberation Organization

PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; Prime Minister

PM/ISO, Office of International Security Operations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PM/ISP, Office of International Security Policy and Planning, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PM/MAS, Office of Military Assistance and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PM/MC, Office of Munitions Control, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PM/PA, Office of Security Assistance Planning and Analysis Staff, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

P/MSA, Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State

POL, Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants

POLAD, Political Adviser

PR, Political Resident, United Kingdom

PRSY or PROSY, People's Republic of Southern Yemen

PRSYG, Government of the People's Republic of Southern Yemen

R&D, Research and Development

RAF, Royal Air Force, United Kingdom

RAMP, Rapid Acquisition and Manufacture of Parts

RCD, Regional Cooperation for Development

Reece flights, Reconnaissance flights

refair, reference airgram

reftel, reference telegram

Rep, representative

RG, Record Group; Review Group

RN, Royal Navy

Rpt, Repeat

RSAF, Royal Saudi Air Force

RSNE, Royal Saudi Navy Force

S/CPR, Chief of Protocol, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

S/FW, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Fisheries and Wildlife, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

S/PRS, Office of Press Relations, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

S/S, Office of the Secretary, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

S/S-O, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

SAA, Saudi Arabian Army

SAC, Strategic Air Command

SAG, Saudi Arabian Government

SAL, South Arabian League

SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SAMA, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency

SAMP, Saudi Arabian Military Program

SAVAK, Iranian internal police (Iranian National Bureau of Security and Intelligence, Sazman-i Ittili'at va Amniyat-i Kishvar)

SC, United Nations Security Council

SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

SecDef, Secretary of Defense

Secto, Series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while away from Washington

SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SHAPE, (NATO) Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe
SI, Signals Intelligence
SIOP, Single Integrated Operations Plan
Sit Reps, Situation Reports
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOV or SOVs, Soviets, Soviet Union, USSR
SRG, Special Review Group; Senior Review Group
SSBN, Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSM, Surface-to-Surface Missile System
SST, Supersonic Transport
SYG, UN Secretary General; CENTO Secretary General

TASS, Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuz (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)
TDY, Temporary Duty
TIAS, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (publication series from the Department of State)
TOS, Trucial Oman Scouts
Tosec, Series indicator for telegrams sent to the Secretary of State while away from Washington
TOW, Tube Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Guided Anti-Tank Missile System
Trucial States, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah
TWA, Trans-World Airlines

U, Office of the Under Secretary of State
UAE, Union of Arab Emirates
UAR, United Arab Republic
UK, United Kingdom
UKUN, United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations
UN, United Nations
UNDP, United Nations Development Program
UNIDO, United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNRWA, United Nations Relief, and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
US, United States
USAF, United States Air Force
USAFE, United States Air Forces, Europe
USAID, Agency for International Development
USAREUR, United States Army, Europe
USCINCEUR, United States Commander-in-Chief, Europe
USDAO/MAP, United States Defense Attaché Office/Military Assistance Program
USDOCOLANDSOUTHEAST, Documents Office, Allied Land Forces, Southeastern Europe
USDOCOSOUTH, Documents Office, Allied Forces, Southwestern Europe
USG, United States Government
USIB, United States Intelligence Board
USINT, United States Interests Section
USIS, United States Information Service
USMTM, United States Military Training Mission
USN, United States Navy
USNAVEUR, United States Naval Forces, Europe

XXVI Abbreviations and Terms

USNMR, United States National Military Representative

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

VADM, Vice Admiral

VLF, Very Low Frequency; Very Long Range

VTE, Vertical Tube Evaporation Technique

VOA, Voice of America

VTE/MSF, Vertical Tube Evaporation/Multi-Stage Flash Process

WFP, World Food Programme

WFTU, World Federation of Trade Unions

WSAG, Washington Special Actions Group

YAR, Yemen Arab Republic

YARG, Government of the Yemen Arab Republic

Persons

Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz al Saud, Prince, Commander of the Saudi National Guard
Acland, Anthony, Head of the Arabian Department, British Foreign Office, from February 1970 until January 1972

Adham, Sheikh Kamal, (Brother-in-law to King Faisal) Chief Advisor to King Faisal;
Director of the Saudi Arabian Political Intelligence Bureau

Afshar, Hushang, Iranian Ambassador to the United Kingdom

Agnew, Spiro, Vice President of the United States from January 20, 1969, until October 10, 1973

Ahmad ibn Ali al Thani, Amir of Qatar until February 1972

Ali, Anwar, Governor, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency

Allon, Yigal, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister from 1968

Amri, General Hassan al-, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Yemen Arab Republic,
from December 21, 1967, until July 9, 1969, and from August 24 until September 5, 1971

Annenberg, Walter H., Ambassador to the United Kingdom from May 14, 1969

Arafat, Yasir, Chairman, Central Committee, Palestinian Liberation Organization

Aram, Abbas, Iranian Ambassador to the United Kingdom

Assar, Nassir, Secretary General of the Central Treaty Organization from February 1972

Atherton, Alfred L., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from March 1970

Ayni, Muhsin Ahmad al-, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Yemen Arab Republic,
from July 29 until September 2, 1969, from February 5, 1970, until February 26, 1971,
and from September 18, 1971, until December 30, 1972

Bandaranaike, Sirimavo, Prime Minister of Ceylon from May 29, 1970

Bara'kat, Ahmad, Foreign Minister, Yemen Arab Republic

Beam, Jacob D., Ambassador to the Soviet Union from April 18, 1969

Brewer, William D., Country Director, Office of Arabian Peninsular Affairs, Bureau of
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until May 1970; Ambassador to Mauritius from June 29, 1970

Brosio, Manlio, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until 1971

Brown, L. Dean, Ambassador to Jordan from September 8, 1970, until November 29, 1973

Cargo, William I., Director, Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State, from August 1969 until July 1973

Carrington, Right Honorable Lord (Peter), British Secretary of State for Defence

Chafee, John H., Secretary of the Navy from January 31, 1969, until May 4, 1972

Chapin, Dwight, Special Assistant to the President from 1969 to 1971; Deputy Assistant to the President from 1971 to 1973

Connally, John, Member, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, appointed 1969; Secretary of the Treasury from February 11, 1971, until May 1972

Crawford, Sir Stewart, British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf until 1970; Head of Joint Intelligence Committee from 1970 until 1973

Crawford, William R., Ambassador to the Yemen Arab Republic from December 19, 1972

Crocker, Chester A., member, National Security Council Staff, from 1970 until 1972

Davies, Rodger P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Davis, Jeanne W., Director, National Security Council Staff Secretariat, from 1970 until 1971; thereafter National Security Council Staff Secretary

Dayan, Moshe, Israeli Defense Minister

Dickman, Francois M., Economic and Commercial Officer in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, from July until November 1969; Political and Economic Officer in Jidda from November 1969 until February 1972; Director, Office of Arabian Peninsular Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from February 1972

Dinsmore, Lee, Principal Officer in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia until 1972

Dobrynin, Anatoli, Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Douglas-Home, Sir Alec, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from June 1970

DuBridge, Lee A., Science Advisor to the President from 1969 until 1970

Dunlop, Brigadier General Donald D., Chief of the Military Training Mission, Saudi Arabia

Eilts, Hermann F., Ambassador to Saudi Arabia until July 23, 1970

Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State from August 1969

Eshkol, Levi, Israeli Prime Minister until 1969

Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz al Saud, Prince, Second Deputy Prime Minister

Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia

Farley, Philip J., Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from 1969

Fawzi, General Mohammed, Chief of Joint UAR Forces

Flanigan, Peter M., Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs from 1969

Freeman, John, British Ambassador to the United States until 1972

Gatch, John, N., Jr., Office of Arabian Peninsular Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until September 1971; Chargé d'Affaires Manama, Bahrain, from September 21, 1971, until December 1972

Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister

Habash, George, Secretary General, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Haig, General Alexander M., Jr., Senior Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 1969 until June 1970; President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs from June 1970

Hannah, John A., Administrator, Agency for International Development, from April 2, 1969

Hart, Parker T., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until February 4, 1969

Hassan II, King of Morocco

Heath, Edward R.G., British Prime Minister from June 9, 1970

Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence

Hoskinson, Samuel M., Member, National Security Council Staff, from 1970 until 1972

Hussein I, ibn Talal, King of Jordan

Irwin, John N., II, Under Secretary of State from September 1970 until July 1972; Deputy Secretary of State from July 1972 until February 1973

Iryani, Qadi Abd al Rahman al-, President of the Yemen Arab Republic

'Isa bin Salman al Khalifa, Shaikh, Amir of Bahrain

Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir al Sabah, Shaikh, Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait
Johnson, U. Alexis, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1969
Jungers, Frank, President, Arabian American Oil Company

Kearns, Henry, Chairman, Export-Import Bank of the United States
Kennedy, David M., Secretary of the Treasury from January 22, 1969, until February 20, 1971

Kennedy, Colonel Richard T., member, National Security Council Staff, from 1970 until 1972

Khalid bin Abd al-Aziz al Saud, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia

Khalid ibn Mohammed al Qasimi, Shaikh, Sultan of Sharjah from 1965 until January 24, 1972

Khalid, Leila, Hijacker

Khalifah bin Hamad al-Thani, Deputy Ruler, Qatar; Ruler of Qatar from February 1972

Khashoggi, Adnan, Saudi entrepreneur

Killgore, Andrew I., Political and Economic Officer, Office of Lebanese, Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from August 1970 until July 1972

Kissinger, Henry A., President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 21, 1969

Laird, Melvin, Secretary of Defense from January 22, 1969, until January 29, 1973

Lincoln, Franklin B., member, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1969

Lincoln, General George A., Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness, from 1969 until 1973

Linebaugh, J. David, Chief, Office of Plans and Regional Affairs Division, International Relations Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from 1969

Luce, Sir William, Deputy Undersecretary in the British Foreign Office, Ambassador and Special Representative to the Persian Gulf

MacArthur, Douglas, II, Ambassador to Iran from October 13, 1969, until February 17, 1972

Malik, Major General Ibrahim, Director General of the Saudi Arabian Frontier Forces and Coast Guard

Mansfield, Michael, Senator from Montana and Senate Majority Leader

Maswari, Brig. General Husayn al-, Yemen Chief of Staff

Mayo, Robert P., Director, Bureau of the Budget, from 1969 until 1970

McClelland, Walter M., Political Officer in Kuwait from July 1970

McCloskey, Robert J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Press Relations from July 1969

Melhuish, Ramsay, First Secretary, British Embassy

Menemencioglu, Turgut, Secretary General of the Central Treaty Organization until February 1, 1972

Miklos, Jack C., Country Director for Iran, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from July 1969

Millard, Guy E., Minister, British Embassy in the United States

Moorer, Admiral Thomas H., Chief of Naval Operations until July 1, 1970; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 2, 1970

Morton, Rogers C.B., Secretary of the Interior from January 29, 1971

Mubarak, Muhammad bin, Shaikh, Foreign Minister of Bahrain

Murphy, Richard W., Country Director for Arabian Peninsula Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from April 1970 until November 1971

Musa'ad, Prince, Saudi Minister of Finance

- Nasser, Gamal Abdul**, President of the United Arab Republic until September 28, 1970
- Nawwaf ibn Abd al-Aziz al Saud, Prince**, Royal Adviser to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia
- Neaher, Rosemary**, member, National Security Council Staff, from 1971 until 1972
- Nixon, Richard M.**, President of the United States from January 20, 1969
- Nu'man, Ahmad Muhammad**, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Yemen Arab Republic, from May 3 until July 19, 1971
- Nu'man, Isma'il Sa'id**, People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen Permanent Representative to the UN
- Nutter, G. Warren**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from March 4, 1969
- Packard, David**, Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1969 until December 13, 1971
- Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza**, Shah of Iran
- Pederson, Richard F.**, Counselor of the Department of State from January 1969
- Pharaon, Rashad**, Royal Counselor, Saudi Arabia
- Pranger, Robert J.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia, 1970, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and NSC Affairs, 1971
- Qabus (Qaboos) bin Taymour**, Sultan of Oman from July 1970
- Qadhafi, Muammar**, President of the Revolutionary Command Council of Libya from January 1970
- Rabin, Yitzhak**, Israeli Ambassador to the United States
- Ransom, David M.**, Consular Officer, Jidda, Saudi Arabia, from March 1969 until August 1970; Economic and Commercial Officer, Jidda, from August 1970 until November 1970; Political and Economic Officer, Office of Arabian Peninsular Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from November 1970
- Rashid bin Saeed Al Makhtoum, Sheikh**, Ruler of Dubai
- Richardson, Eliot L.**, Under Secretary of State from January 23, 1969, until January 23, 1970
- Rifai, Zaid**, Secretary-General of the Royal Court of Jordan; King Hussein's private secretary
- Rochat, Andre**, International Committee for the Red Cross, Delegate for North Africa and Middle East as of January 1970
- Rodman, Peter**, member, National Security Council Staff, from 1970 until 1972
- Rogers, William P.**, Secretary of State from January 22, 1969
- Rush, Kenneth**, Deputy Secretary of Defense from February 23, 1972
- Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al Sabah, Shaikh**, Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Sabah al-Salem al Sabah, Shaikh**, Amir of Kuwait
- Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Salim al Sabah**, Kuwaiti Minister of the Interior and Defense
- Sadat, Anwar**, President of the United Arab Republic from September 29, 1970
- Saqqaf, Sayyid Omar**, Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
- Saqr bin Mohammed al Qassimi, Sheikh**, Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah
- Saunders, Harold H.**, senior member, National Security Council Staff, from 1969 until 1971
- Scotes, Thomas J.**, Political-Economic Officer, Office of Lebanese, Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from June 1969
- Seelye, Talcott W.**, Country Director for Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until September 1972

- Selden, Armistead I., Jr.**, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1970 until 1972
- Sha'abi, Qahtan Mohammed al-**, President of the People's Republic of South Yemen until June 22, 1969
- Shakespeare, Frank**, Director, United States Information Agency, from 1969
- Sharaf, Abdul Hamid**, Jordanian Ambassador to the United States
- Sisco, Joseph J.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from February 1969
- Smith, K. Wayne**, Director, Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council, from 1971 until 1972
- Sonnenfeldt, Helmut**, member, National Security Council Staff, from 1969 until 1972
- Sowayel, Ibrahim Abd Allah al-**, Saudi Ambassador to the United States
- Spiers, Ronald I.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs from August until September 1969; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from September 1969 until August 1973
- Stackhouse, Heywood H.**, Officer of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, from April 1970
- Stans, Maurice**, Secretary of Commerce from January 21, 1969, until February 15, 1972
- Stein, Robert A.**, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until February 1970; Deputy Chief of Mission in Nouakchott, Mauritania, from February 1970 until February 1972, Principal Officer, Interests Section, Sanaa, North Yemen, from February until July 1972; Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, Sanaa, from July until November 1972; Deputy Chief of Mission, Sanaa, from November 1972 until January 1973
- Stennis, John C.**, Senator from Mississippi; Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee from 1969
- Stoddart, Jonathan D.**, Director, Officer of International Security Operations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from October 1969
- Stoessel, Walter J., Jr.**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from August 1972
- Stoltzfus, William A.**, Deputy Chief of Mission, Jidda, Saudi Arabia, until December 1971; Ambassador to Kuwait from February 9, 1972; Non-resident Ambassador to Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, from January 1972
- Strausz-Hupe, Robert**, Ambassador to Ceylon from May 1970 until December 1971
- Sultan ibn Abd al-Aziz al Saud, Prince**, Saudi Minister of Defense and Aviation
- Sultan ibn Mohammed al-Qasimi, Sheikh**, Amir of Sharjah from January 1972
- Thacher, Nicholas G.**, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, September 22, 1970, until September 19, 1973
- Thomson, John**, Counselor, British Foreign Office; Emissary for Prime Minister Heath on Indian Ocean Affairs
- Throckmorton, General John L.**, Commander in Chief, Strike Command, from 1969
- Twynam, Joseph W.**, Political Officer, Jidda, Saudi Arabia, until August 1970; Political and Economic Officer, Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from August 1970 until November 1971; Acting Director, Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from November 1971 until June 1972
- Van Hollen, Christopher**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from May 1969 until September 1972
- Walsh, John P.**, Ambassador to Kuwait from November 1969 until December 1971
- Ware, Richard A.**, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1969 until 1970

Wheeler, General Earl G., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, until July 1970

Woods, George, President, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank); Coordinator, Israeli Desalting Project

Wrampelmeier, Brooks W., Political and Economic Officer, Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

Wright, Sir Denis, British Ambassador to Iran

Yamani, Shaikh Ahmad Zaki, Saudi Minister of Petroleum

Yost, Charles, Ambassador to the United Nations from January 23, 1969, until February 25, 1971

Zahedi, Ardeshir, Iranian Foreign Minister

Zayid bin Sultan al-Nuhayan, Shaikh, Amir of Abu Dhabi; First President of the United Arab Emirates from December 2, 1971

Ziegler, Ronald L., Press Secretary to the President from 1970

Zumwalt, Admiral Elmo R., Chief of Naval Operations from July 1, 1970

Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

Middle East Region

1. National Security Study Memorandum 2¹

Washington, January 21, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT

Middle East Policy

The President has directed the preparation of two papers on Arab-Israel problems for consideration by the NSC. One paper should consider alternative US policy approaches aimed at securing a Middle East settlement, including (1) direct Arab-Israeli negotiations (2) U.S.-Soviet negotiations and (3) Four Power negotiations.² The paper should also consider the possibility that no early settlement will be reached, and US interests and policies in such a situation. The second paper should consider alternative views of basic US interests in the area and should include consideration of the issues listed in the attachment.

The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East perform this study.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-126, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 2. Secret.

² The first study required by this NSSM is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

The first paper should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by January 25, 1969. The second paper should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by February 24, 1969.

Attachment

1. What is the role of the Middle East today in U.S. global strategy? What are the real U.S. interests there and how important are they?
2. What is the nature of the Soviet threat to the Middle East? How likely is Soviet dominance or predominance? What forces will tend to limit Soviet influence?
3. What is the precise nature of the Soviet threat to NATO via the Middle East?
4. What is the present state of the U.S. position in the Middle East? Is it eroding drastically? Or is there a level of common interests shared with some nations in the area which will prevent it from deteriorating beyond a certain point? Is an early Arab-Israel settlement essential to preserving the U.S. position?
5. In the light of answers to these questions, what is the most appropriate U.S. posture toward the Middle East? What level and kinds of involvement are appropriate in view of our interests and U.S. and Soviet capabilities?

2. Paper Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia¹

NSCIG/NEA 69–1B (Revised)

Washington, January 30, 1969.

BASIC US INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

This paper examines some of the basic interests and assumptions that underlie US policy formulation in the Middle East. Alternative

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–020, NSC Meetings, Briefing by Joint Staff: SOIP, 2/4/69. Secret. This paper was prepared in response to NSSM 2, Document 1. A January 24 version of this paper is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–020, NSC Meetings, Middle East, 2/1/69. Saunders's comments on the paper, sent in a January 23 memorandum to the chairman of the IG, are *ibid.*, NSC Files, Box 1233, Saunders Files, Basic Policy, Middle East, 1/20/69–12/31/69.

views on the following questions are addressed: (1) How important are our interests in that area? (2) How grave is the Soviet threat to these interests? (3) To what extent does the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East threaten NATO? (4) What is the present US position in the area? (5) How important is an early Arab-Israel settlement to the preservation of our interests? (6) What posture should the United States adopt vis-à-vis the conflicting states and groupings of states in the area?

1. *What are our interests and how important are they?*

In the Northern Tier of the Middle East region, the independence and integrity of our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, and perhaps of Iran are generally recognized as *vital* US interests.

While there is also general agreement that the area south of the Northern Tier, comprising the Eastern Arab world and Israel, is important, the degree of its importance is debatable. At one end of the spectrum is the view that the area as a whole is *vital* on the grounds that it represents, in toto, a conglomerate of Western interests whose loss would tip the global strategic balance in favor of the Soviets. This view leans heavily on the importance of Arab oil to the Free World and the need to prevent its becoming a pawn subject to the whims of regimes under Soviet influence or control. Supporters of this view argue that the Arabs control the only geography and resources of vital importance to us in the area and would have us cast our lot firmly with the Arabs.

At the other extreme, it is argued that the foregoing view is based on outmoded strategic concepts (e.g., we no longer rely on forward air bases) and on an oversimplified picture of the Arab world as a homogeneous entity. While not denying the importance of Arab oil to the Free World, supporters of this position argue that the oil flow will not be interrupted for political reasons because the Arabs have nowhere to market their oil except Western Europe. As a corollary, it is also argued that the US commitment to Israel makes that nation's security a vital US interest—an argument frequently bolstered by the contention that a strong Israel offers the best hope for holding the line against further Soviet penetration of the Middle East.

Neither of these theses, it seems to us, correctly defines the degree and ways in which the Arab-Israel area of the Middle East is important to the United States. It is difficult to prove that this area is *vital* to our security, in the sense that our own survival would be threatened by the extinction of any state in the area. With the possible exception of Israel, which is a special case, developments in or affecting a given country at a given time do not vitally affect the United States. On the other hand, the collective or substantial loss of the area to the Free World by incorporation into the Soviet orbit would present a serious long-term threat to the American position in the world.

Although we have no treaty commitment to the preservation of Israel's security, there is a long-standing national consensus that we have a basic interest in Israel's survival. That fact, and Arab opposition to Israel's existence, complicate the analysis. Leaving aside subsidiary though significant considerations related to investment, trade and communications, we are perforce deeply involved in the Middle East for two fundamental purposes: (1) because we wish to assure the survival of Israel, and (2) because, in terms of our global strategic interests, we do not wish the land mass, population and resources of the eastern Arab world to fall under Soviet domination. We seek the achievement of both purposes. But, given the underlying forces of conflict in the area, pursuit of either purpose tends to militate against achievement of the other. While neither purpose is "vital" in the strict sense that failure to achieve it would *require* us to go to war to safeguard our national security, both are of sufficient importance that we cannot disengage from the area without sustaining a serious blow to our Great Power position.

Under any definition of our interests in the Arab-Israel situation, the avoidance of military confrontation between the Soviets and ourselves is the Number One priority. Next in order of priority are the prevention of the introduction by a Middle East power of strategic missiles or nuclear weapons into the area, the avoidance of a situation in which the use of US military forces in the Arab-Israel conflict would be necessary and the avoidance of another war itself between Israel and the Arabs. Beyond that, we see a continuing American interest in Israel's ability to defend itself against any combination of Arab states and in Western access to Arab oil as well as to transit and communications through the area.

2. *How grave is the Soviet threat?* The Soviet Union continues its efforts to reduce Western, and particularly American, positions and influence in the Middle East, and to expand its own. It has established strong—but not "dominant"—positions in the UAR, Syria, and Iraq. It has replaced the bulk of the military equipment lost in the war by these states.² It has increased the number of its military advisors substantially. It has sought to exploit opportunities to expand Soviet influence in the Yemen and the new state of South Yemen. The Soviets have bartered military equipment to Iran and have offered military assistance to Jordan and Lebanon. The Soviet Navy has been strengthened in the Mediterranean, and Soviet ships have made port calls in the Indian Ocean–Persian Gulf area. The Soviet Navy has been allowed greater use of Egyptian ports and repair facilities, and a small number

² The June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967.

of Soviet aircraft (with Egyptian markings) have been conducting reconnaissance operations over the Sixth Fleet.

However, while the Soviets have undeniably made great gains in the Middle East in the past dozen years, it can also be said they were starting from zero and are still a long way from "dominating" the area. The Northern Tier states (Greece, Turkey, and Iran) are strongly concerned over the expansion of Soviet influence over the Arab states. Among the Arabs themselves, indigenous forces of nationalism, xenophobia and desire for full independence are major obstacles to the achievement of Soviet aims. Regional and bilateral rivalries among the Arabs militate against Soviet dominance. Language, religion, and other cultural factors also play their part.

Therefore, powerful indigenous and limiting forces make it unlikely the USSR can ever "dominate" the area, but the high-water mark of Soviet *potential* influence has not been reached.

3. *Is NATO threatened?* There are those that see Soviet successes in gaining access for their military forces in Arab states as the beginning of an outflanking of NATO and the Northern Tier, which could become critical if the Soviets are given full-fledged use of Arab territory for military purposes, including possibly emplacement of strategic missiles. It is our judgment, however, that the threat to NATO is manageable and likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. The Arabs are unlikely to grant the USSR full-fledged military bases on their territory. Even if they did, it would not basically affect the policies of Greece and Turkey, which would continue to play their roles within NATO. The expansion of Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean has mainly political rather than military significance.

4. *What is the current US position in the Middle East?* There are those who see the June 1967 war and its aftermath as having dangerously accelerated the erosion of US influence in the Middle East. The trend toward polarization has intensified, driving the radical Arab states further into the Soviet orbit and making it increasingly difficult for the Arab moderates to maintain ties with the United States. On the other hand, some see our position as difficult but not by any means untenable over the longer run. In this view, the Arabs and Soviets recognize and respect the great power they know we can bring to bear in support of our interests in the Middle East. The Arab moderates will maintain their ties with us because it is in their interest to do so. Our basic position has not really been hurt by the loss of influence in radical Arab states.

To place the foregoing conflicting views in perspective, it is necessary to understand the fundamentals on which the US position in the Middle East is based. Unlike some other areas where the US position is anchored in alliance systems sometimes coupled with a military

presence, in the Arab-Israel area the US position rests largely on how other states, both within and outside the area, assess our capacity and intentions vis-à-vis their own objectives. Viewed in this sense, the principal positive elements of the US position in the Arab-Israel area can be summarized as follows:

(a) Recognition by the countries of the Middle East that the United States is a major global power with the capability, if it chooses to use it, to bring its power to bear in the area.

(b) Desire on the part of the countries of the Middle East for the United States to provide a counterweight against Soviet domination. This consideration weighs more heavily in the Northern Tier and the moderate Arab states than among the radical Arabs but is a factor with the latter as well.

(c) Recognition on the part of the Arabs and the USSR that only the United States has the potential to influence and restrain Israel, which is today the strongest military power in the Arab-Israel complex and which the Arabs see as a threat to themselves.

(d) Recognition by Israel that US support is fundamental to its national existence over the long run.

(e) Arab recognition that the US presence—financial, managerial, and technical—in Arab oil development, production, and marketing, while important to the United States, is also important to the Arabs at the present juncture.

(f) The pro-United States orientation of many members of the Arab elite based on deep-rooted historical, religious, and educational associations.

Viewed in light of these factors, the US position is neither as bad as the Cassandras claim nor as unshakeable as their detractors insist. Our position is still significant, but it is probably vulnerable to the erosion of time. At the present juncture, the key elements of strength in our position are (a) the Arab and Soviet recognition that we alone could exercise some effective influence over Israel, and (b) the Israeli awareness of how important our support is for Israel's survival. However, if the Arabs lose hope that we will use our influence, *or* if the Israelis conclude that we will not use it no matter what they do, these elements of strength will become rapidly wasting assets and our potential for playing a decisive role in the area will be seriously diminished.

Furthermore, despite the various positive elements in our position as sketched out above, it is only too clear that there are limits on how far we can influence any state in the area on any given issue. For example, the Israelis evince a fierce independence of any outside influence on issues which they consider basic to their survival as a state. And it is still most uncertain whether we (or the USSR) can bring sufficient influence on the Arabs, and particularly the radical Arabs, to accept what we would consider as a reasonable settlement.

5. *How important is an early Arab-Israel settlement to our position in the Middle East?* Israel wants "true peace," but the Arabs are not ready

for it. The relevant question is whether any Arab state or Israel is prepared in the near future to make the compromises and concessions necessary to the conclusion of a political settlement that would at least defuse the situation and offer a reasonable basis for stability.

The Government of Israel is the leading advocate of the view that the Arabs are not ready to move for a true peace. The Israelis contend, furthermore, that neither Israel nor the United States need be in a rush to settle for something less that would not remove the roots of Arab hostility. The problem with the latter view, in our judgment, is that it ignores certain dynamics in the Middle East that contain risks for the United States if a settlement is not soon achieved. These include the possibility of a collapse of the regime in Jordan if it cannot recover the West Bank, with potentially dangerous repercussions elsewhere in the area; the growing strength of the fedayeen which could limit the freedom of action of the UAR and Jordan to move toward a settlement; and the opportunity for the USSR to expand its influence with the Arabs under conditions of continuing Arab-Israeli hostility.

6. *What posture should the United States adopt in the Middle East?* It is generally agreed that the US position in the Middle East (and particularly in the Arab world) has deteriorated and is in some jeopardy; also, that the best chance of improving our position would lie in an early Arab-Israeli settlement. It is also agreed that we should continue our close alignment with Greece, Turkey, and Iran.

The basic alternative answers to the question of what posture we should adopt, then, hinge on differing assumptions concerning certain key issues involving the Arab states and Israel: the possibility of achieving a reasonably general settlement in the near future; and the importance of US relations with the Arab states broadly, and particularly with the radical Arab states.

All are agreed that it will be very difficult, and perhaps not possible, to achieve a reasonable *general peace settlement between the Arabs and Israel* in the near future. Argument centers on whether there is enough hope to make it worthwhile to pursue the effort, or whether we should conclude that a general settlement is not now in the cards and concentrate instead on a settlement between Israel and Jordan.

(a) One view is that there continues to be some reasonable hope for a settlement that would encompass both the UAR and Jordan and thus resolve major elements of the Arab-Israel problem. Given the importance of such a settlement, we should emphatically not give up on the effort at this time. This view also holds that a narrower settlement between Israel and Jordan is not feasible because Jordan does not have the strength to break with its radical Arab neighbors on this issue, and that an effort by Hussein to reach a bilateral agreement with Israel would mean the end of his regime.

(b) A second view is that the UAR and Israel will not be able to come to a political settlement, and that our efforts should now be directed toward achieving a separate Israel-Jordan settlement. This view holds that an Israel-Jordan settlement could be the first step to a broader agreement. It also contends that we can be more influential with Israel if we confine our efforts in this regard to the more limited bilateral settlement. The risks to Hussein are recognized, but the gamble is advocated because the present trends, if continued, probably mean he will be eliminated in any case, and also because our arming of both Israel and Jordan becomes harder to explain and defend.

As for *relations with the Arabs*, there is considerable sentiment that we cannot protect and promote our enduring interests unless we base ourselves broadly in the area. This view accepts the particular importance of keeping good ties with the moderate Arab regimes (such as Jordan) but holds that we cannot count on the survival of those regimes under conditions of acute tension between the Arabs and Israel; these conditions impel the moderate states (including those in North Africa) to become increasingly radical and increase the opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence. It is therefore essential, in this view, to benefit from opportunities to improve our relations with the radical Arab states.

A second view notes that the potential growth of Soviet influence in the Arab world is limited primarily by the internal forces in the Arab states, and holds furthermore that unless we are willing to compete at high cost with the USSR in the radical states, our influence in these states can only be marginal under presently foreseeable circumstances. It holds that to maintain broad ties with the radical Arab states would adversely affect our relations with other states, especially the moderate Arab states and Iran; that especially in the absence of a settlement, such broad ties would not mitigate the adverse effects on moderate regimes of fedayeen activities; that it is in the Northern Tier, Israel, and the moderate Arabs that our primary interests lie; and therefore we should remain aloof from greater involvement with the radical Arabs.

In summary, the issues faced by the United States are highlighted by *two differing viewpoints*:

(1) A broad Arab-Israeli settlement is very important and there is enough possibility of achieving it to make its continued pursuit worthwhile. It is important that we seek to establish a broader base for our relations and possible influence with the Arabs, but not at Israel's expense. We should continue to press Israel to agree to withdrawal from major territories it occupied in June 1967, in return for a peace settlement. We must simultaneously exert all the influence we have to prevent Israel from going the route of nuclear weapons and strategic missiles.

(2) A broad settlement, although desirable, is not possible in the near future; without writing off publicly or completely our hope for a more general settlement, we should concentrate on bringing about a

bilateral settlement between Israel and Jordan; we have little to gain in expanding our relationship with the radical Arabs, and should not compete with the Soviets; it would be improper and perhaps impossible to force Israel to give up the militarily important Sinai to a hostile Egypt; our highest and most immediate priority with Israel is to prevent the introduction of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons.

The posture summarized in the first viewpoint is considered preferable by the Interdepartmental Group with the exception of the Defense (ISA) representative. The Defense (ISA) preference is represented by the second viewpoint above.

Both courses would call for a greater involvement by the United States than at present in the affairs of the area. Both assume that the United States retains elements of strength in the Middle East; we need not be panicked into precipitate actions or abandonment of sound positions out of fear that the Soviets are about to take over. On the other hand, there are no grounds for complacency. Our approach should be one of deliberate speed, to take advantage of opportunities attendant on the advent of a new US Administration. Under either viewpoint, it is only realistic to recognize that the realities of the situation in the area and of the limits on external influence are such that the odds for any political settlement between the Arabs and Israel cannot be rated high. As we seek progress along this line, we should also be examining how we can best protect our position in the area in the continued absence of a settlement.

3. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, February 1, 1969.

NSC MEETING ON MIDDLE EAST

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State, William P. Rogers
The Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird
The Secretary of the Treasury, David M. Kennedy

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1969. Top Secret. Drafted by Saunders on May 1. According to an undated draft of the minutes, the meeting was held from 9:35 to 11:55 a.m. (Ibid., Box H-120, NSC Draft Minutes, NSC Meeting—February 1, 1969) All brackets are in the original.

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler
The Director of Central Intelligence, Richard M. Helms
Under Secretary of State, Eliot L. Richardson
State Department Counselor, Richard F. Pederson
US Ambassador to the UN, Charles Yost
Assistant Secretary of State, Joseph J. Sisco
Former Assistant Secretary of State, Parker T. Hart
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Rodger P. Davies
Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness, General George A. Lincoln
Colonel Alexander Haig
Harold H. Saunders
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Briefings

Helms: *History* of Arab-Jewish relations and the course of Arab nationalism (disunity).

Fedayeen movement (Fatah, PLO, PFLP): adamantly opposed to any solution other than the destruction of Israel. Their influence makes it questionable whether any Arab government could reach settlement with Israel. Current significance is that terrorism brings on Israeli reprisals, which raise likelihood of broader conflict.

Military balance: Israelis will almost certainly retain military superiority for next year or so. Superiority qualitative—depends partly on pre-emptive strategy. Jericho missiles—10 or so could be deployed 1970–1. Arabs' 1967 losses just about made up—assume USSR believes equipment sent is about all Arabs can now absorb.

Soviet interests: USSR has leapfrogged Northern Tier. Soviet naval expansion—steadier, more effective than Khrushchev's² rather opportunistic move to put missiles in Cuba.

Question:

President: You talk about USSR's "measured, effective plan." Does this emanate from military strategy or something that just happens? Do they have a meeting like ours here today, decide on policy and then execute it? Or do they just muddle along.

Policy result of high-level decision—considered policy—or just happen?

Helms: Highest level decision. Considered policy.

Briefing (continued)

Helms: *Soviet peace plan*. Acknowledge that peace is a package plan. Arabs want imposed peace. These Arab objections main reason for Israeli rejection of plan.

² Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, Chairman of the Communist Party, 1953–1964, and Premier of the Soviet Union, 1958–1964.

Arab attitudes toward U.S.: Growing hostility—see us as backing Israel—Arab “gift for twisted analysis”—Arabs see even those things we do for them as somehow directed against them.

US image good in Israel. But Israel has its own brand of reservation about our inability to see the Arabs through Israeli eyes, tendency to rely only on themselves.

JCS briefing:

1. Significance of Soviet fleet.

—Sharp increase in 1967 and 1968 [President assured himself that trend was always low before 1963 and that present trend is new.]

—Primary concern: missile and torpedo threat.

—60 technicians at Mers-el-Kebir in Algeria.

—A “challenge” to US operations. Could affect future US decisions to commit forces in the area.

2. Strategic implications for US of renewed conflict.

—Arab-Israeli balance.

[President: Looking at chart showing 2 bombers in Israeli air force asked how Israel was able to take out Arab airfields with just 2 bombers. General Wheeler answered: “fighter-bombers.” President nodded quickly.]

Vice President: How do present air inventories compare with those of June, 1967.

Wheeler: Qualitative differences here and there but generally comparable.

Lincoln: How do Soviet advisors operate in Units.

Wheeler: Strictly advisory. Arabs xenophobic and not likely to submit to Soviet command.

Briefing (continued)

JCS: Imbalance in supersonic aircraft could be dangerous to Israel by June 1969

Strategic implications

—US intervention capability. US contingency plan designed to drive a wedge between opposing forces.

Questions

President: I understand your contingency plan is based on intelligence estimate that local conflict main possibility.

I agree that US-USSR conflict remote, but what if one of Arab countries where Soviet fleet present is attacked?

Wheeler: Contingency plan if US-USSR

President: What if a more limited Soviet involvement?

Kissinger: What if Israeli raid on Aswan dam or Israeli city shelled by Soviet fleet?

President: Could you give some thought to that?

Wheeler: Possibilities we are examining:

- US attack on Soviet bases in Siberia.
- Sink one Soviet ship in Mediterranean.
- Seize Soviet intelligence trawler.

President: Could you consider what we could do indirectly through the Israelis.

Seems to me Soviet naval presence is primarily political. Therefore, we must be prepared for a less-than-military contingency.

Wheeler: Primarily political. But Soviet presence in ports puts a Soviet umbrella over those ports. In a tenuous sense, fleet therefore does have military use.

Briefing continued

Described plan for introduction of US ground forces—initial force, follow-on and on-call forces. Plan could be fulfilled but would degrade strategic reserve.

Final arrival of on-call forces 39 days; 18 days for follow-on; 2–17 days initial. Airlift.

Questions

President: Are we capable of repeating Lebanon-type operation?

Wheeler: I believe so. Would modify this plan.

President: Any military exercises politically useful?

Wheeler: Continuous US bilateral and NATO exercise. NATO has just put together surveillance unit to keep track of subs.

President: Are Sovs, Israelis, Arabs aware of these things?

Wheeler: Yes. This is one purpose of exercises.

Laird: Sixth Fleet not as “ready” as it should be in manning levels. Have to look at this as situation heats up.

President: How is Malta being used?

Wheeler: NATO has returned small air surveillance unit to Malta. Tenuous relationship of Malta to NATO via Secretary General, mainly to keep Soviets out.

President: Is Sixth Fleet NATO-related?

Wheeler: US controlled in peace; in war under NATO.

President: In a Lebanon-type situation, who controls Sixth Fleet?

Wheeler: “You do sir.”

President: Isn’t there significant British and French presence?

Wheeler: Significant French and Italian presence. French navy in Mediterranean. Navy most cooperative since French withdrawal till de Gaulle³ blew whistle.

President: Could Italians and French block or compete with Soviet past presence?

Wheeler: Mers-el-Kebir main instance. Little opportunity for us to exercise influence.

French still have residual influence which, depending on de Gaulle, could be helpful. But unlikely France could swing Algerians away from Soviet backing.

President: What has happened to French political influence?

Lincoln: What if USSR says its fleet will screen UAR coast?

Wheeler: Have to go ashore in Israel.

President: Could we phase deployment?

Wheeler: Yes—move into Europe, for instance.

Vice President: Could we involve NATO instead of us?

Wheeler: We couldn't involve NATO. Only last few months that NATO concerned about Soviet presence.

President: NATO pathological on point of involvement. For instance, may even be problem if Berlin, one of their own cities, threatened.

Vice President: Is that true about political moves?

Wheeler: Not as true.

Kissinger: To what extent could Soviet fleet be used as a hostage in Berlin crisis.

Wheeler: Yes.

President: I'm just thinking about symbolic acts.

Lincoln: If Israeli port attacked, might be unclear who did it.

Wheeler: We have pretty fair surveillance activity. We could identify—though not necessarily prove. This political problem.

Briefing continued

JCS: Main military problem (Soviets would have same problems):

1. —Deployment routes and staging areas. Need Azores or equivalent.

—Transportation resources: would require "major revision of our worldwide program."

2. Would USSR intervene? Paratroops. Two routes—Western over Yugoslavia.

³ General Charles de Gaulle, President of France, 1958–1969.

Questions

President: If Sovs flew troops into Cairo or Damascus, what could we do?

Wheeler: Fly into Crete, Italy, Athens. Turkey not possible. Incirlik not usable in 1967. Malta airfield not good enough. Greeks cooperative in 1967.

Briefing continued

JCS: Syria offers best landing place—eastern overflight route over Iran.

41,000 troops into Damascus in 2 days, without supporting equipment.

By sealift using maritime fleet, could move 6–10 divisions from Baltic (transit 13 days), 3–10 divisions from northern division (15 days), Black Sea 6–10 divisions (3 days). They have exercised in small way in Black Sea.

Impact of local conflict on US commitments. Cause problems in NATO somewhat like Czechoslovakia.

Question

Lincoln: Are Soviets stockpiling?

Wheeler: Not in UAR but in Algeria there is equipment the Algerians can't possibly use.

President: In State briefing, could you include country-by-country relations with us.

Briefing continued

Hart: In *Turkey*, attitude not pro-Arab but rather pro-Israeli but Turkey focuses on Cyprus and that requires Arab votes. Tend favor moderate Arab states. Want good relationship with Iraq, because of Kurds. Trying to bind Iraq quietly to Turkey (gas line). Relations with US basically good, though strains.

President: Is this one area for patting on back—a little preventive medicine? In terms of planning of visits, Turks and others, let's have meeting soon.

Hart: Yes, sir. We have strategic and intelligence installation. Conditions of use—Turkish permission.

Morocco—Algerian tension. Never broke with us, generally friendly relations. Get as much as it can from us. Some influence on other Arab states.

Libya—Considerable US influence. Fears Nasser. US–UK bulwark against radicals.

President: Get in best team we can in terms of ambassadorial appointments. "Get heavy weights in there."

Algeria—If we renewed relations with.

President: What influence does Tito have?⁴ Could he be helpful?

Hart: Mainly in UAR.

Sisco: Shift in his view since Czechoslovakia.

President: I would be open to meeting with Tito if you recommend it.

Briefing continued

Hart: In principle, it would help with radical states—even Iraq—marginally.

Sudan—broke relations but represented there. Would be one of first to resume.

Lebanon—delicate democracy. Genesis based on fear of Muslim majority around it.

Syria—unstable. Will be last to resume relations with us.

Iraq—basic instability. Will not be quick to resume relations unless regime changes.

Arab-Israeli—The main interests involved—Arab fear of Israeli expansion and Israel wants formalized peace. Johnston and Johnson missions.⁵

In 1948, no Arab state lost any territory; it was Palestinians who lost their homes.

Fedayeen riding ground swell of popularity.

In a way, Jordan and UAR have—by accepting UN resolution⁶—accepted existence of Israel.

Jordan most committed to peace settlement but Hussein caught between radicals and need to get land back.

If we resume relations with Arabs, that will strengthen moderates.

⁴ Josef Broz Tito, President of Yugoslavia, 1953–1980.

⁵ The Johnston Mission, led by President Eisenhower's Special Representative Eric Johnston, was organized in October 1953 to secure an agreement among Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel to develop the Jordan River basin. By 1955, the mission had ended. The Johnson Mission, led by Joseph Johnson, President Kennedy's Special Representative to the Palestine Conciliation Commission, was established in 1962 to help resolve the Palestinian refugee problem. Johnson resigned January 31, 1963.

⁶ A reference to UN Security Council Resolution 242. Following the Arab-Israeli War in June 1967, this resolution was passed on November 22, calling for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and for the "termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1967, pp. 257–258)

Questions

President: If we have a Lebanon-type situation in Jordan, what capability would we have—if, for instance, we faced a fedayeen takeover in Jordan?

Wheeler: “Could probably—of course would have problems.”
Problem: Israelis not basically interested in survival of Hussein.

Hart: “I’m not sure they’ve made up their minds finally on this.”
If Jordan became a radical state, easier for Israel to move.

President: “That kind of thinking is a death wish. They must not be given any encouragement.”

The political problem in the US—“we just can’t tote that.” Extremely difficult for us to move in to save Israel.

Laird: What’s the possibility of Israel-Jordan settlement?

Hart: Hard without UAR. Have to be simultaneous movement.

Rogers: We don’t think Hussein could survive separate settlement.

Laird: Hope Israel doesn’t misinterpret mood in US.

Rogers: On basis my talk with Rabin, “I don’t think they misinterpret.”

President: Dayan⁷ says we should have good relations with Arabs.

Lincoln: We should make clear to Israel and its friends importance of Hussein.

President: Harder to explain to Israel’s friends in US.

Rabin–Dayan have fatalistic attitude—it will blow and they’ll take care of it.

Wheeler: Rabin explained deep Israeli feelings against Hussein—in 6-day war Jordanians inflicted much heavier casualties.

Briefing continued

Hart: Israel suspicious of UAR intentions.

Politics in Israel will reduce Israeli flexibility between now and November.

Siege atmosphere in Israel. Don’t trade territory for political agreements.

Status quo of today works against peace and even Israel’s long-term security.

Settlement will require pressure on Israel—for arrangements that will include well-policed demilitarization.

President: Guaranteed by whom?

⁷ Moshe Dayan, Israeli Minister of Defense, 1967–1974.

Hart: UN sanctified.

Lincoln: Who pays for UN forces?

Hart: Senator Javits⁸ interest in refugee settlement.

Briefing continued

Hart: Have to be clear where Israel and US coincide: We don't want Israel destroyed but don't have stake in boundaries. Want lasting settlement. Above all, want to avoid war with USSR.

In deciding how much pressure we apply on Israel, have to decide how UAR can be brought along.

Important to develop maximum public understanding in US.

Sisco: Elements in our policy as it evolved after June War:

—Commitment to territorial integrity.

—Nasser's May 1967 blockade, he was overturning post-Suez US arrangements.

—We wanted to try this time to achieve lasting peace.

—These combined in 5 principles of June 19, 1967. "Parties to conflict, parties to peace." These incorporated in November 22 resolutions.

The equation: withdrawal in return for end of belligerency.

While resolution adopted unanimously, there were not unanimous interpretations. We really passed these differences on to Jarring.⁹ Reflected in semantic argument "accepting and implementing" the resolution.

Rogers: Rabin says Arabs are trying to "force us into settlement short of peace."

Sisco: July 1968, we got Israel to soften stand on (1) direct negotiations as a precondition to exchanging substance, (2) peace treaty. Parties have been exchanging views through Jarring. But Israel wants binding commitment on peace.

President: Israel insists on bilateral agreements. What is Israeli view toward outside participation?

Sisco: Israel wants to be left alone to deal with Hussein—and the UAR.

Israel-Jordan exchanges. Allow plan as non-starter with Hussein.

Israel nervous about big-power intervention. Last Soviet note—"a five-legged horse that could move in any direction."

We don't honestly know what USSR intends.

⁸ Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY).

⁹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972, for documentation on U.S.-Soviet negotiations and the efforts of Gunnar Jarring, a Swedish diplomat, who served as the UN representative in the Middle East appointed to negotiate the details necessary for the implementation of UN Resolution 242.

Shall we await Soviet reply or develop a plan of our own to discuss.

Whatever we put in, we have to be sure we can produce Israel.

Israel's Cabinet divided—explains inability to decide on territorial objectives. Arabs made it easy for Israelis to avoid decision. Election will make flexibility difficult.

President: Javits or somebody mentioned USSR made propaganda hay. What's the answer?

Sisco: Soviets have had a propaganda ride. We didn't refute publicly because we wanted to work out our response without appearing to throw cold water.

Lincoln: Could Israel and Jordan consider Allon Plan¹⁰ with UN force?

Sisco: May be feasible.

President: Israel says it wants peace via bilateral agreements. Yet in intelligence we hear extremists so strong that Arab governments can't control them. Do sophisticated Israelis discount outside guarantees?

Rogers: Fedayeen raids not significant now. Could be handled if contractual peace.

Israelis afraid we'll be stampeded by tension. Say Russians are heating up atmosphere to panic us. Russians won't use nuclear weapons. Arabs won't start war. Sovs won't intervene; they don't have air cover over this fleet. Rabin says: "Don't make decisions because you think you're on the brink of war. We're not going to take more territory. Permanent peace will be anti-Soviet."

President: When you come down to it, a peace that he (Rabin) negotiates with any of these wobbly governments, isn't a peace either with revolutionary movements there.

"I can see the symbolism there; they want recognition." But unless they have some outside recognition.

Rogers: Israelis know they need guarantees.

Sisco: Four-power proposal has to be handled delicately. As proposed, it gives preference to Soviet plan and downplays Jarring. We see Jarring and UN as central. Sovs and French disagree. UK wavers but waiting to see what we'll do.

Response will be one of your Administration's first moves. Jarring wants step by parties or anything four powers can. We're boxed in.

¹⁰ Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Allon proposed that Israel relinquish political control of the West Bank to Jordan in exchange for military control of a strip of land along the eastern side of the Jordan River as a means of securing the border between them.

Propose: informal, individual consultations but they will quickly become more formal. Might nudge Israelis, who are thinking of putting forward ideas through secret channel toward Jordan.

President: What's timing?

Rogers: I have a draft reply for you to consider quickly.

Kissinger: Review Group has not seen proposal. Maybe 2-power approach better. This just one sub-choice in one of three options.

President: I want to tie this into announcement of NPT. Get points with de Gaulle.

UN thinks this a good move?

Yost: Yes, Arabs prefer.

Rogers: Pressure on both sides.

President: Could Jarring make a significant contribution?

Yost: Not going get to first base by himself.

Yost: Hard keep Jarring and four-powers going same time—but possible.

President: Four-powers with Jarring?

Yost: Jarring wants to stay independent.

President: Don't like idea of saying "me too." Propose variant method of implementation.

Kissinger: Choice may be between 2-power and 4-power not 4-power and nothing. May be Soviet talks be more fruitful.

President: Does 4-power rule out 2-power?

Rogers: No. Make it clear 4-power in framework of Jarring.

Yost: Maintain two-power element in four-power.

President: The real powers are the US and USSR.

Rogers: How do we say that.

President: Different—what we say and what we do.

Sisco: USSR has made clear US-USSR dialogue the prime one despite its acceptance of French proposal. Could have four sets of talks going on at same time. Four-powers could do some marginal work.

President: "Trying to be devil's advocate," another element that appeals: reassure our NATO allies. You feel we should go on all four lines?

Sisco: Yes.

Laird: Must move soon. High expectancy of a US move because press aware that NSC discussing the issue.

President: We'll make a move.

Lincoln: What about Israelis?

President: Leave that to Secretary of State! (Laughter)

Yost: Israelis underestimate Fedayeen movement.

Kissinger: Have to distinguish between Israeli statements and what their situation is.

Israelis say they won't settle for less than a real peace, but they must know that isn't possible. They must really be saying that they find it hard to see how legal arrangement could increase their security. They must know that most wars start between countries who recognize each other and are at peace. The only peace arrangements that work are settlements that (1) increase will of the parties to peace, or (2) decrease ability to make war.

We haven't systematically discussed options. Must know what we want if we're going to try to get.

President: Our ability to deliver Israelis gets down to what we will do.

Richardson: Not only what we'll do but what we can do in de-escalating.

President: What will we do vis-à-vis the Russians? That's the heart.

Yost: Italians go along with Four-Power if in UN framework.

Lincoln: Have we gone into guarantees?

Rogers: That's down the road.

President: Have to get to that.

Kissinger: Why can't we go till Wednesday to review systematically?

President: Move Council up to Tuesday at 10:00 A.M.¹¹

What we have in mind:

—Respond affirmatively.

Kissinger: Distribute draft reply to French note before Tuesday and meeting.¹²

¹¹ February 4.

¹² Telegram 19022 to Amman, February 6, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

4. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 10, 1969.

SUBJECT

Long-range Programs for Mid-East Water Development

Knowing your interest in weaving water development into our Mid-East strategy, I suggest that we schedule an NSC paper to help you come to grips with this complex issue.

I do not wish to bother you with the intricacies of this subject now, but you should know of work in progress along two tracks:

1. *Large-scale desalting.* In response to the Senate's December 1967 passage of the "Baker Resolution" supporting the Eisenhower-Strauss plan, the Johnson Administration ordered the Oak Ridge National Laboratory to study the applicability of large-scale desalting to the Middle East. The Eisenhower-Strauss plan grew out of an earlier Oak Ridge study describing how large desalting-agricultural-industrial complexes might work in theory.² Oak Ridge was then asked how that theoretical model might actually work in the Middle East and what costs might be. That study should be done later this year. Technicians have visited the area (including the UAR) to gather data.

2. *Israeli desalter.* President Johnson early in January sent legislation to Congress proposing authorization of US participation up to \$40 million in the construction of a middle-sized development desalter in Israel. This was the result of four years of joint US-Israeli study. George Woods personally framed the final proposal, and Prime

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-141, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 30. Secret; Exdis. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² The Baker Resolution (S Res 155), introduced by Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-TN) and sponsored by 52 Senators, passed unanimously in December 1967. It called upon the President to pursue the "prompt design, construction and operation of nuclear desalting plants" to provide fresh water for Arab and Israeli territories. (*Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, vol. XXIII, 1967, p. 962) Former President Eisenhower and former Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis Strauss proposed in 1967 that an international corporation be established to construct three nuclear-fueled desalting plants in the Middle East. They would be operated by the AEC and would provide ample water supplies for the arid regions through international cooperation, thus easing political tensions. (Ibid.) The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings October 19–20, 1967, which resulted in Senate Resolution 155. Documentation on the Johnson administration's policies on Water for Peace is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XXXIV, Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues, Documents 130–174.

Minister Eshkol said it was acceptable to Israel.³ We can probably delay active consideration of this legislation for a couple of months until you have a chance to review the whole water picture and relate it to your political strategy.

It is only fair to state that these are both controversial issues. On the technological-economic side, the state of the desalting art is still in the research and development stage and is yet short of being a strictly commercial proposition. Experts are divided on the best use of our money at this stage, since it is possible to argue that more water per dollar can be bought today by other methods. On the political side, some experts feel that water development could provide a political vehicle for bringing Arabs and Israelis together while others are highly skeptical that it could by itself ever overcome intense Arab-Israeli hostility, though they acknowledge that it might help reinforce political arrangements once made. But these are the issues we would try to clarify for you.

I would, of course, work hand-in-hand with Lee DuBridge on this. He is aware of this memo.

Recommendation: That we issue the attached NSSM to start a systematic review of this whole issue.⁴

³ In a January 17, 1969, letter to Eshkol, President Johnson stated that, as one of his last official acts, he had recommended to Congress a maximum of \$40 million for U.S. participation in the construction of a desalting plant in Israel that would produce 40 million gallons of desalted water per day. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-141, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 30) Eshkol replied that same day that this decision, along with that of sending Phantoms to Israel, was crucial for the prevention of war and the advancement of Israel's economic progress. (Ibid.)

⁴ Draft attached; the signed NSSM is printed as Document 5.

5. National Security Study Memorandum 30¹

Washington, March 19, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Interior
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, Agency for International Development

SUBJECT

Water Development and Middle East Policy

The President has requested a paper covering the economic and technological aspects of the following:

- the pros and cons in current thinking about the applicability of large-scale desalting in the Middle East;
- the pros and cons of proceeding with a 40-million-gallon-per-day desalting plant in Israel;
- the alternative approaches to water development in the Middle East.

This paper should identify ways in which the U.S. private sector is involved in programs now dealing with these matters.

In addition to the above report on the economic and technological aspects, a paper should present alternative strategies for relating the technological track to our political strategy in the area.

The President has directed that the study be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and that the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Administrator of AID each designate a representative to sit on the Group for this purpose.

These papers should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by May 23.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-141, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 30. Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to Mayo and DuBridge.

6. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 27, 1969.

PARTICIPANTS

Iran:

General Bahram Ariana, Chief of the
Supreme Commanders Staff,
Imperial Iranian Armed Forces
Colonel Vali Allah Dana, Military,
Naval and Air Attaché

Turkey:

General Cemal Tural, Chief of the
Turkish General Staff

UK:

Marshal of the Royal Air Force
Sir Charles Elworthy, Chief of
the Defense Staff
Air Marshal Sir Frederick Rosier,
Permanent Military Deputy
to CENTO

Pakistan:

Lieutenant General Akhtar Hussain
Malik, Permanent Military
Deputy to CENTO

US:

General Theodore J. Conway,
Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
Strike Command, U.S.
Representative
General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant
to the President for National
Security Affairs
Harold H. Saunders, Senior Staff
Member, National Security
Council

USPMD:

Lieutenant General Stanley J. Donovan,
Permanent Military Deputy to
CENTO

The President greeted the group in the Cabinet Room where the Generals were lined up by the French doors in order of rank. After being introduced by General Wheeler and shaking hands with each one, the President invited the group into the Oval Office where he said it would be less formal. The group ranged itself on the sofas and chairs around the burning fire with the President sitting at one end of the sofa by the fireplace.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1234, Saunders Files, CENTO 1/20/69–12/31/69. Confidential. Drafted by Saunders on April 11. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 10:51 to 11:15 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) On March 17, Kissinger had recommended to Nixon that he meet with CENTO officials because "Our real policy toward CENTO is to keep it going until these countries are ready for something to replace it. The patterns of co-operation built up within CENTO have blossomed modestly into broader relationships in the field of communication, politics and investigation of complementary economic projects. Everyone knows CENTO itself is not a vital organization, but everyone also recognizes that Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, Jordan and even Israel clandestinely are groping for some new relationship in the region which would be meaningful for them in the face of British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, increased Soviet activity and radicalization of some Arab governments." (Ibid., Box 212, Agency Files, CENTO)

After a brief session for the photographers, the President opened the conversation by saying that the international situation had changed a great deal since CENTO was formed, but that "the threat was still there." He noted that in the year since the formation of CENTO we have become much more conscious of the relationship between economic progress and security. He felt that the military had played an important role in this progress by maintaining a framework of stability within which it could take place.

The President conceded that each nation had its political difficulties from time to time, including our own. He specifically expressed his concern over the political trouble in Pakistan and pointed out that President Ayub Khan and his military colleagues had played an important role there in bringing stability to Pakistan in the past.

General Wheeler and the other Generals agreed on the importance of this military role. The President returned to his thoughts of the Soviet threat. He noted that the atmosphere within all of the alliances had changed in recent years—even in NATO. However, he had been impressed during his recent tour of NATO capitals² of the need for a strong alliance, not only for military purposes, but also so that the members of the alliance could negotiate credibly from a position of strength. He said he accepted changes in these relationships as normal evolution, but he remained convinced of the importance of keeping the relationship strong, even in a changing context.

The President noted that he had visited each of the countries of the Generals present. In the course of the conversation, he found an occasion to mention each country by name—Iran, in connection with impressive economic progress; Pakistan, in connection with the combination of a firm military and economic progress; Turkey, in its connection as a NATO member; and Great Britain in connection with his European trip.

The President concluded by saying that he had just wished to express a few of his views but would welcome the opportunity to hear from his guests.

General Ariana of Iran, the only one of the guests to speak through an interpreter, commented very briefly that he was honored to meet the President and concurred in the President's views that the important role of the military is to provide a stable atmosphere within which development and progress can take place.

Air Marshal Sir Charles Elworthy spoke of how deeply he and his colleagues had been impressed with the President's NATO trip. He

² Between February 23 and March 2, Nixon traveled to Belgium, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Vatican City.

said that he had stressed to his colleagues after the President's European trip the importance of the contribution of the European governments to the alliance. He felt that the President has spoken truly when he pointed out that the Europeans could not expect Americans to do more if Europe did less. The President agreed, saying he had pressed this point on Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau.

Harold H. Saunders³

³ Printed from a copy that bears Saunders's typed signature.

7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya¹

Washington, April 23, 1969, 0008Z.

62432. Subject: Arab Governments Financial Support for Fedayeen.

1. Department remains very concerned about continued Arab financial support for fedayeen organizations, notably Fatah, sanctioned by Arab governments, particularly Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia.² We aware of numerous arguments put forth by these governments disclaiming that they contribute directly as governments to fedayeen and of allegedly non-official devices for contributions. It is clear, however, that funds flowing to fedayeen are at least officially sanctioned through withholdings from salaries and similar "voluntary" arrangements.

2. Department and concerned posts have repeatedly cautioned Arab governments that financial support to fedayeen who have failed to observe cease-fire and have consistently opposed Security Council Resolution 242³ makes more difficult attainment of peaceful settlement

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. I. Secret. Drafted by Robert P. Paganelli (NEA/ARN); cleared in NEA/ARN, AF/N, and NEA/ARP; and approved by Sisco. It was repeated to Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, London, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tunis, and USUN.

² In telegram 3078 from Jidda, August 10, the Embassy detailed Saudi assistance to the fedayeen. (Ibid., Vol. II) According to a December 7, 1970, CIA memorandum to Wrampelmeier, Saudi Arabian aid to the fedayeen was \$3 million in 1969–1970 and projected to be the same for 1970–1971. (Central Intelligence Agency, ORR Files, Job 80–T01315A, Box 22)

³ See footnote 6, Document 3.

of Middle East crisis, goal endorsed by Arab Summit at Khartoum.⁴ Equally important, we have made point that fedayeen pose serious threat to internal stability of moderate Arab regimes. Jordan and increasingly Lebanon are prime examples of deleterious effect of fedayeen activities on internal security. Counter argument that Fatah in particular is apolitical and not interested in interfering in internal affairs of Arab countries is becoming increasingly thin in light of recent PLO-Fatah merger.

3. We expect that efforts to achieve peaceful Middle East settlement will be entering critical phase over next few months. US-Soviet talks and Four Power discussions are proceeding and, although there have as yet been no major breakthroughs, we do see modicum of progress. We view fedayeen as clear obstacle to peace in the area. Arab argument that there is no alternative to fedayeen struggle in Arab-Israel conflict can be rebutted with argument that an acceptable peace settlement, which would of course include withdrawal which Arabs seek, is a viable alternative to which US has committed its full efforts. As evidence of US active commitment to peace, continuing US-USSR talks, Four Power discussions and Hussein visit⁵ can be cited.

4. During recent Hussein visit to US Jordanians acknowledged that a confrontation with fedayeen in Jordan is inevitable and indicated that GOJ is preparing for it. In Jordan context, we are faced with absurd situation of Kuwaitis, Saudis and Libyans giving financial support to both sides of a potential GOJ-fedayeen confrontation. It can hardly be in net interest of conservative Arabs if moderate Jordanian regime under Hussein seriously weakened and conceivably overthrown by intensifying fedayeen machinations.

6. Department is very much aware of sensitivity of Saudi, Kuwaiti and Libyan authorities when USG representatives continue remind them of counter productive aspects of their support for fedayeen—their counter arguments are familiar to us. We also recognize that addressees previous representations to host governments on this question have fallen on deaf ears. Nevertheless, as fedayeen threat to Government of Jordan and Lebanon mounts, matter assumes increasing urgency. Accordingly, Embassies Jidda, Kuwait and Tripoli are requested to take

⁴ The Khartoum Conference occurred August 29 to September 1, 1968. At the Conference, Nasser and Faisal resolved their differences over Yemen, and subsidies to the oil producing states for Egypt and Jordan were approved. The Arab heads of state also agreed to take "any necessary steps" to consolidate Arab strength against any possible aggression, and to eliminate "all foreign military bases within Arab territory." They also decided to enforce the "principles of non-recognition and non-negotiation, and to make no peace with Israel for the sake of the rights of the Palestinian people in their homeland." (*Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vol. XVI, 1967-1968, pp. 22275-22276)

⁵ King Hussein met with Nixon and Rogers on April 8. (President's Daily Diary; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

an early opportunity to express the Department's concern over host governments continuing support for the fedayeen in light of the circumstances outlined above, emphasizing that such effort seems increasingly to run counter to best interests of our moderate Arab friends.

Rogers

8. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, April 23, 1969, 2100Z.

62792. Subject: CENTO and Military Supply Policy. Ref: Rawalpindi 3982 (Notal) and 4048.²

1. In past several weeks we here have done considerable soul searching over future of CENTO, including helpful discussions with you last month based in part on NEA's "Contingency Study on Pakistan and the Alliances,"³ copy of which had previously been pouched to you.

2. At CENTO Ministerial meeting in Tehran we envisage our principal objective as signifying our continuing deep interest in future of our relations with regional countries (and particularly Turkey and Iran). Foresee collateral objective as "holding action" on CENTO itself while we reassess its future. We would hope get clearer idea of value that regional members and UK attach to CENTO and what changes (including possibly dismantling) they might desire or be prepared to accept. (Copy of our "Objectives" paper for Tehran meeting, as

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 4 CENTO. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Stein, Sidney Sober (NEA/RA), and James W. Spain (NEA/PAF); cleared by Brown (S/S); and approved by Sisco. It was repeated to Ankara, London, and Tehran.

² In telegram 3982 from Rawalpindi, April 21, the Embassy argued that the United States should allow Pakistan to leave CENTO and carefully limit supplies to Pakistan for its own defense. (Ibid.) In telegram 4048 from Rawalpindi, April 22, the Embassy concluded that U.S. interests in Pakistan would be well served by early moves "toward graceful dissolution of CENTO structure, perhaps maintaining CENTO treaty." (Ibid.) Other Embassies had reached a similar conclusion. (Telegram 1090 from Tehran, March 28; and telegram 2023 from Ankara, March 27; *ibid.*) In telegram 1416 from Moscow, April 4, the Embassy noted that although the Soviets already discounted CENTO's military significance, they would not see its dissolution as a sign of opportunity for increased aggression given their desire for normal relations with Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. (Ibid.)

³ Not found.

approved by Secretary, being airpouched all addressees.) We do not wish our interest to be misinterpreted and wish avoid any action in interim which might prejudice Secretary's private discussions with other Council members at Tehran.⁴

3. Your views on need to reassess CENTO's future (reftels and as expressed during your recent consultation here) are not inconsistent with Dept's current thinking. We have no illusions about Pakistanis dim view of CENTO. Basic fact is that decision whether they stay in or get out is up to them. We have not lifted a finger to oppose Pakistan's withdrawal from military exercises, its decision not to be represented by a Minister at annual Council meeting and other actions to downgrade its membership in Pact. We intend no pressure on Pakistan to maintain even its minimal participation in CENTO.

4. Agree with you that any decision on modifying CENTO will have to be weighed in close consultation with our friends. Views of Turkey and Iran, as well as UK, will have to be taken into careful account.

5. Seems to us question of Pakistan's continuing membership in CENTO need not be decisive in terms military sales policy for South Asia. As you know, military sales policy now under review on its own merits in broad context our interest South Asia.⁵ We appreciate your views on it as expressed Rawalpindi 3842.⁶

Rogers

⁴ The Ministerial Meeting occurred May 26–27 in Tehran. The Objectives Paper was not found. Documentation on the Tehran meeting is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 212, Agency Files, CENTO, and *ibid.*, Box 1234, Saunders Files, CENTO, 1/20/69–12/31/69.

⁵ A reference to NSSM 26, "Military Supply Policy in South Asia," February 21; see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 10.

⁶ In telegram 3842 from Rawalpindi, April 16, Ambassador Benjamin H. Oehlert, Jr., provided a lengthy analysis of the deteriorating Pakistani role in regional alliances, its difficulties with India, and its growing ties to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. He argued that a strong Soviet presence in Pakistan would add to the pressures the United States was experiencing throughout the Middle East and Indian Ocean. He urged a liberalization of U.S. military supply policy to Pakistan as the best and perhaps only means of maintaining strong bilateral ties and Pakistani ties with the West. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 4 CENTO)

9. Minutes of a Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 23, 1969, 2:10–3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East Water

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State—William I. Cargo
—Rodger Davies
—Donald McHenry
Defense—G. Warren Nutter
CIA—Edward Proctor
JCS—LTG F. T. Unger

OEP—Haakon Lindjord
USIA—Frank Shakespeare
BOB—James Schlesinger
OST—Warren A. Hall
NSC Staff—Harold H. Saunders
Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

—Mr. Saunders, in consultation with Mr. Cargo and others, will draft a memorandum for the President setting forth the four options:

- proceed with the 40 MGD plant;
- proceed with the 100 MGD plant;
- cooperate in building a 15–20 MGD plant (both the 20 and 40 MGD plants would require construction of a small \$5 million test module either in Israel or in the U.S. to test the new VTE technology);
- do nothing.

The paper will discuss the pros and cons of each option and will reflect the Review Group discussion.²

Mr. Kissinger opened the meeting, commenting that the paper³ on this subject had grown from a Presidential request related to the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1969. Secret; Exdis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes were reviewed and approved by Kissinger. (Memorandum from Davis to Kissinger, September 25; *ibid.*) Prior to the Review Group meeting, Saunders prepared Talking Points and a Draft Issues Paper for Kissinger to send to Nixon. Saunders then recommended the Basic Paper, “Desalting in the Middle East,” to Kissinger. (Memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, September 17; *ibid.*, Box H-039, Review Group Mid-East Water 9/23/69)

² Printed as Document 12.

³ A reference to “Desalting in the Middle East,” undated, referred to as the Basic Paper. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-039, Review Group Mid-East Water 9/23/69) It was a summary of two longer papers: “Proposed 40 Million Gallon Per Day Desalting Plant in Israel” and “The Potential for Large Scale Desalting in the Middle East.” (*Ibid.*) Sisco, as acting Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group, sent it to Kissinger on September 9 (*ibid.*) and it was transmitted to members of the SRG from Davis under a September 12 covering memorandum. (*Ibid.*, Box H-141, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 30)

Eisenhower–Strauss plan of 1967. However, we now faced an immediate operational problem in the necessity to take an Administration position on legislation now being marked up in the House Foreign Affairs Committee which would authorize up to \$40 million in U.S. funds to build a 40 million gallon per day (MGD) desalting plant in Israel.⁴ As an operational problem, it might have been more appropriate for consideration by the Under Secretaries Committee rather than the Review Group, but he and Under Secretary Richardson had agreed to use the RG since they had already been convened for this meeting and because of related preparations for the U.S. visit of Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. Mr. Cargo, who was present at the meeting, could represent the State Department's interests from the point of view of the Under Secretaries Committee.

Mr. Kissinger outlined the four options:

- (1) proceed with the 40 MGD plant now before the HFAC;
- (2) proceed with a larger (100 MGD) desalting plant studied in 1965–68;
- (3) offer to cooperate in building a 15–20 MGD desalting prototype plant in Israel using new technology (both the 40 MGD and 20 MGD plants would require first testing a small module using new technology at a cost of approximately \$5 million);
- (4) do nothing.

He asked if it were agreed that we could eliminate the fourth alternative and discuss which of the three plans we should consider.

Mr. Nutter and General Unger demurred at eliminating the fourth alternative.

Mr. Schlesinger commented that the economics of the situation would not justify any of the plans and the research and development gains would be the only asset.

Mr. Cargo commented that State preferred the third alternative, although the foreign policy advantages are minimal since Israel puts a low priority on the desalting plant in relation to other projects. He and Mr. Davies thought any negative domestic reaction could be contained in view of this lower priority.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the 15–20 MGD option did not exist at the time the 40 MGD plant was chosen. He was told that was the case.

Mr. Schlesinger said the 40 MGD option is scaled down from the 100 MGD, Mr. Hall noted that the 15–20 MGD plant would use new technology, and Mr. Davies added that the 15–20 MGD plant would start with the small test module.

⁴ The issue was raised in a memorandum from Hannah to Kissinger, September 18. (Ibid.)

Mr. Kissinger asked why we could not get money for the 40 MGD plant when we could get it for the 15–20 MGD plant.

Messrs. Hall and Schlesinger pointed out that in fact we had no money for either project.

Mr. Saunders noted that the 40 MGD plant would be built from older technology and that the 15–20 MGD plant, which would begin with the test module, would be built around new technology with some R&D advantages.

Mr. Kissinger asked if Congress would be more willing to fund for R&D and why.

Mr. Schlesinger thought they would, since R&D had more pizzazz.

Mr. Kissinger asked which plant would be more useful.

Mr. Cargo thought that there would be a quicker R&D return from the smaller plant.

Mr. Saunders noted that we were dealing with semi-proved technology in the larger plant versus new technology in the smaller (15–20 MGD) plant.

Mr. Hall commented that the new technology was probably better technology.

Mr. Kissinger asked if that is what the Israelis want.

Mr. Saunders replied that Eshkol had agreed to the 40 MGD proposal.

Mr. Schlesinger said if it was a gift, Israel would take it. He noted two forces at work which had produced the 40 MGD plan: the Water for Peace program under President Johnson and the Eisenhower–Strauss plan, which President Nixon had supported during his campaign.

Mr. Kissinger asked what the urgency is.

Mr. Saunders replied that Israel faces a serious water problem and they are interested in desalting per se.

Mr. Shakespeare noted that the two items stressed in the exchange of letters between Johnson and Eshkol in January 1969 were desalting and provision of Phantom aircraft.⁵

Mr. Nutter and General Unger said Defense would prefer to defer any construction of any desalting facility for Israel until the Oak Ridge and the joint AID/Interior studies are completed, expected in late 1969.

Mr. Saunders noted that these studies will not contribute to an Israeli desalting activity. They are designed to consider how, if peace

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 4.

came to the Middle East, one could design a water system for the area which could contribute to area development. The only relationship between that and an Israeli facility would be if it were possible to make a large Israeli plant a stepping stone toward a broader area system.

Mr. Kissinger asked how much of a commitment exists.

Mr. Davies referred to the Johnson–Eshkol letters, in which President Johnson explicitly stated that he could not commit a successor Administration, and to the legislation submitted to the Congress embodying the 40 MGD proposal, and the proposed Rosenthal amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which would authorize a \$40 million contribution for building the 40 MGD plant.

Mr. Saunders noted that there had been oral exchanges between the U.S. and Israel prior to the exchange of letters.

Mr. Davies commented that we could explain any delay in the project on the basis of other Israeli priorities.

Mr. Kissinger asked if there was a consensus that *if* we agree to go ahead we should emphasize the smaller plant, and that any decision should consider three elements: improvement of technology; foreign policy reasons; and the nature of our commitment.

Mr. Saunders noted that technological development will proceed separately from the Middle East question.

Mr. Schlesinger suggested another alternative: that the Interior Department be given \$5 million to build the test module in the U.S. He thought Interior would prefer this course but that the funds had not been included in the FY 70 budget.

Mr. Hall noted that this step could be used as a basis for deferral of construction in Israel, with the argument that when the Israeli project is implemented, it should be on the basis of the best technology.

Mr. Kissinger asked how many years this would take.

Mr. Hall thought if the test module were funded in FY 71, we should know in two or three years whether we could do it or not, with emphasis on the new vertical tube evaporator (VTE) technique.

Mr. Shakespeare said that if it was agreed that desalinization was important and we could learn something from building at least the \$5 million test module, was it not well worth the relatively minor sum of \$5 million?

Mr. Hall said that if we considered this solely in its U.S. context—as a problem to be solved for the U.S.—we should relate the timing of the construction and testing of facilities, hence, the provision of funds, to the expected time of need in the U.S.

Mr. Kissinger noted that the same relation existed if the funds were spent in Israel.

Mr. Hall agreed that if we build the facility in Israel we will certainly get some technical advantage from it. The question was whether it would be worth it in U.S. terms. Was it necessary to proceed now in budgetary terms? He thought it would take three years from the time funds are appropriated to completion of the test module.

He was looking ahead ten years to the areas in which the U.S. might need water produced by desalinization. He could not see such a requirement in ten years at the present time, but he acknowledged that the situation could change rapidly.

Mr. Saunders pointed out that Israel has such a requirement now.

Mr. Schlesinger noted that Israel was unwilling to divert water from agricultural purposes, where the cost of the water as compared to the agricultural yield was in terms of a factor of 4. He said that Israel needed reallocation of its water to urban and industrial purposes.

Mr. Davies asked if Israel could then be expected to obtain its vegetables and other agricultural products from its Arab neighbors.

Mr. Proctor asked if we went ahead with construction of the 20 MGD plant would we be likely to end with a white elephant on our hands?⁶

Mr. Hall noted that with the expenditure of \$5 million for testing of the new VTE technique, it might be possible eventually to obtain a 25% or even 50% improvement in the price of desalted water. He briefly traced the development of the new concept of water provision since 1964, compared the use of distilled water to water produced by the reverse osmosis technique, and commented that the relationship of water cost to yield in Israel might be reduced to a factor of 2 or 3. He pointed out that desalted water was an entirely different product from any agricultural water now in use. In general, he agreed with the Budget Bureau on the present situation.

Mr. Kissinger noted that it appeared completion of the big study would not add to solution of the Israeli problem.

Mr. Nutter again raised the question of where the plant should be located, noting Israel's attacks on the East Ghor Canal. He questioned the symbolic significance of our helping Israel with its water problem while Israel attacks water facilities of its neighbors.

⁶ According to a September 18 memorandum, the CIA regarded it as "inconceivable [that] the Arabs and Israelis would cooperate on any desalting projects in the Near East for some time to come." The CIA therefore thought it was premature to consider large-scale desalting projects in the Eisenhower–Strauss context, but thought it worthwhile to proceed unilaterally with desalting projects for Israel. (Central Intelligence Agency, ORR Files, Job 80–T01315A, Box 19)

Mr. Kissinger asked if the Israelis are likely to raise the issue of the desalting plant during the Golda Meir visit.⁷

Mr. Saunders replied we didn't know; that Mrs. Meir has many other things on her mind.

Mr. Davies noted that the emphasis had been on economic questions, including extension of credits, etc.

Mr. Kissinger asked how much pressure is behind the legislation.

Mr. Davies replied that the U.S. was committed in the eyes of many members of the Congress.

Mr. Shakespeare asked where Senator Baker stood on this issue.

Mr. Davies replied that Senator Baker backs the regional approach and opposes the Israeli plant because it is not demonstrably and directly linked to the regional approach.⁸

Mr. Kissinger thought that we should look at the problem on a regional basis and from the point of view of U.S. evenhandedness in the Arab-Israel situation.

Mr. Saunders commented that the proposed plant would meet considerably less than Israel's requirement, and that the purpose of the larger study was to develop a regional scheme and provide evidence of an evenhanded U.S. policy.

Mr. Davies noted that this could be tied to refugee resettlement, for example.

General Unger asked if the smaller plant would be nuclear.

Mr. Hall replied no, that it would not be economically feasible.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the 15–20 MGD plant would be nuclear.

Mr. Hall replied no, adding that the source of power has nothing to do with when or where the plant is built.

Mr. Kissinger asked if Israel would be aided in solving its problem by completion of the regional study.

Mr. Nutter replied that they would.

General Unger asked if Israel could opt for a nuclear power source.

Mr. Hall replied that they could theoretically, since the source of power was left to the Israelis to decide.

Mr. Schlesinger pointed out, however, that the U.S. would have to finance any nuclear power installation.

⁷ Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir made a two-day official visit to Washington September 25 and 26, during which time she met privately with Nixon. The issue of desalination did not come up in conversations between Rabin with either Rogers or Kissinger, nor in Meir's conversation with Rogers. The September 26 memorandum of conversation and telegram 163837 to Tel Aviv, September 26, are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

⁸ See footnote 2, Document 4.

Mr. Cargo commented that State would be prepared to go ahead with construction of the 15–20 MGD plant, preceded by the test module. He noted an AID memorandum which opposes the proposed Rosenthal amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act to provide the \$40 million grant to Israel to build the 40 MGD plant, and favors authorizing Interior to build the small experimental plant in the U.S., with the collaboration of Israeli and other foreign scientists, and to promise to help Israel in installing the ultimately improved technology there. He thought AID would join State in their willingness to go ahead with the test module in Israel if their concerns about the source of the financing could be met.

Mr. Kissinger summarized the pro arguments for the 40 MGD plant as: (1) the commitment in the Johnson letter; (2) the relationship to other political objectives (which Mr. Cargo commented would be minimal); and (3) improved technology, which could be achieved even more efficiently through construction of the \$5 million test module.

Mr. Hall noted that it would still be better if the experimental plant were built in the U.S.

Mr. Kissinger asked what would happen if we should decide to do nothing.

Mr. Saunders replied that we would tell the Israelis that we want to defer further action on this project and would persuade interested Congressmen not to push the proposed legislation.

Mr. Davies noted it would not be too difficult to turn Congress around in view of the relatively low priority which Israel placed on this installation.

Mr. Kissinger thought we should wait and see what Golda Meir says and see how we might relate this issue to a settlement in the Middle East.

Mr. Shakespeare agreed that this should only be done as part of a general settlement, but noted that water had become a highly emotional issue and one that had a good deal of public sex appeal.

Mr. Davies pointed out that the Interior Department considered the water problem of great concern to the U.S.

Mr. Hall noted, however, that Interior had a very restricted budget for water problems and he doubted if they would be willing to take the \$5 million required for the test module out of their present budget.

Mr. Hall reviewed the time table: from the time when we perceive the need in the U.S., it will take five years to develop the capability, plus three years on the test module to see whether the new technique will work. The question to be answered is whether we have any spots in the U.S. where we will need to apply such a capability in the next ten years. The alternative would be to push ahead with our research and to try to develop an even better technology.

Mr. Saunders again noted that the need exists in Israel now, and that the proposed activity would advance our research.

Mr. Kissinger asked Mr. Saunders, in consultation with Mr. Cargo and others, to prepare a paper for the President reflecting this discussion. He saw no need to await the results of the general study, since the President would decide how urgent the matter is on the basis of this paper. The paper should discuss the pros and cons of the plan, taking into account the nature of our commitment, the technological assets we would gain, and the things we may ask Israel to do.

Mr. Cargo expressed his view that we should go ahead as fast as possible in advancing our water technology for basic U.S. foreign policy purposes. He cited conditions in Pakistan and elsewhere with hundreds of miles of coast line but with very little or no fresh water.

Mr. Kissinger commented that water technology was likely to be pushed faster in Israel than anywhere else to which Mr. Cargo agreed.

Mr. Schlesinger commented that almost any R&D which would bring down the cost of water would be an advance.

Mr. Proctor compared a five-year program at \$5 million to a more expensive program which would take 10–15 years.

Mr. Hall noted the relationship between funds and ideas. He said ideas develop sequentially—one idea suggests the next one. In this context, a large program would be repetitive and might well exceed the threshold of economic feasibility.

Mr. Kissinger closed the meeting with the comment that we needed a U.S. national policy on desalting.

10. **Intelligence Note From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denny) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson¹**

693

Washington, September 29, 1969.

SUBJECT

Islamic Summit Produces Moderate Consensus and the Makings of a Moslem Bloc

The Rabat meeting of 25 Moslem nations survived postponement attempts and internal conflicts to become the first Islamic Summit Conference. Its concluding declaration and resolutions represented a moderate consensus and may have laid the groundwork for a Moslem bloc.

A Major Achievement: Holding the Conference. King Hassan of Morocco, host of the September 22–25 meeting and one of the original promoters of the Summit, called holding of the conference a “miracle of God” and a success in itself. We agree that bringing together government leaders (including 9 heads of state) representing about 300 million Moslems was a major achievement. It took considerable skill on the part of Hassan and co-initiator King Faisal of Saudi Arabia² to gain rapid agreement for early scheduling of a summit and to persuade suspicious non-Arab Moslems to participate in an Arab-dominated assembly. Less than a week before opening day, President Nasser launched a counteroffensive seeking to postpone the summit indefinitely. In the end, his bluff was called and a UAR delegation was dispatched to Rabat. Only Iraq and Syria of the “progressive” Arab group failed to appear. A final crisis occurred in mid-summit, when a belated invitation to India provoked a stormy Pakistani response and India’s ouster. Even this turbulent event, which might have broken up any other conference, only prolonged the meeting an extra day.

A Moderate Consensus. Out of the conference came a moderate consensus, despite radical Arab and Palestinian lobbying (the Palestinian

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 13–6. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.

² King Hussein had initially called for an Arab Summit in the aftermath of the al-Aqsa fire, but Faisal had insisted on an Islamic Summit, stating “I issued a call to the Islamic world to declare holy war to liberate Jerusalem from the hands of the oppressors and tyrants who keep no promise.” (Airgram A-254 from Jidda, August 27; *ibid.*, POL 27 ARAB–ISR) Faisal’s emotional response to the fire, his determination to be an active rather than passive participant in the effort to recover Jerusalem, his earnest pursuit of jihad, and his desire for a stronger United States role in the Middle East are articulated in telegram 2947 from Jidda, August 26. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. I)

Liberation Organization—PLO—was given observer status at the meeting). The official conference declaration, taking the al-Aqsa mosque incident³ as point of departure, called for restoration of Jerusalem's pre-June 1967 status and speedy withdrawal of Israeli military forces from all territories occupied as a result of the 1967 war; it appealed to the US, UK, USSR, and France to secure compliance with the 1967 Security Council resolution. On Palestine, a solitary sentence affirmed "full support to the Palestinian people for the restitution of their rights" and in their "struggle for national liberation."

The moderate Arab organizers can claim full credit for the language—a compromise that reiterated basic Arab positions without offending non-Arab participants, five of whom have diplomatic relations with Israel. The radical Arabs may regret what might have been added, but can raise no serious objections to the statements in the final declaration.

The Makings of a Moslem Bloc? The moderates undoubtedly hope that they have strengthened the Arab cause in a potentially permanent fashion. The conference declaration spoke of regular consultation and "close cooperation and mutual assistance" among Moslem states. In addition, the principal resolution set a meeting of Islamic foreign ministers for March 1970 at Jidda to review common action undertaken after the summit and to establish an Islamic permanent secretariat. In sum, the moderates can claim to have created a Moslem bloc to be formally organized next March.

Arab moderates will use the success of the Islamic Summit to strengthen their inter-Arab position and to argue against holding an Arab Summit, to which Faisal is adamantly opposed. He fears it would be controlled by radical states, who would call for increased financial contributions from the oil-producers and would push through extreme resolutions. If Faisal also hopes that the projected Moslem bloc will provide an effective counter balance to radical domination of the Arab League, he will probably be disappointed.

A consequence of the moderates' success was the absence of attack on the US or "imperialism" in the final statements. However, it is virtually certain that the radical Arab states will continue to agitate for a more extreme political posture in the Islamic forum; unless Hassan and Faisal can sustain their achievement the resulting dispute could cause a short life—or even stillbirth—for the Moslem bloc.

³ The al-Aqsa Mosque, considered the third holiest Islamic site, was partially burned on August 21. Australian Denis Michael Rohan, a self-styled Christian fundamentalist, was formally charged on September 1 with having set fire to the Mosque. He was found guilty by the Jerusalem District Court on December 30 and was committed to a mental hospital as a paranoid schizophrenic.

11. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Departments of State and Defense¹

Brussels, October 2, 1969, 1925Z.

4449. Subj: Soviet Presence in the Mediterranean.

1. During my recent trip through the NATO southern region, which included extensive conversations with CINCSOUTH, COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH, COMLANDSOUTHEAST plus our Embassies, MAAG staffs and local officials in Ankara and Athens, I gained the strong impression that we need to take a much closer look at the significance of the improved Soviet force posture in the Mediterranean. As Washington is aware, the present NATO assessment, dating from June 1968, is that Soviet objectives in the Med are primarily political and psychological. While this may still be true, I believe we need to have another look at the politico-military implications for the Mediterranean area, which to my mind are disturbing.

2. While it is true that Soviet naval units in the Med lack air support and do not constitute a balanced force, the recent addition of helo carriers, more submarines and the nucleus of an amphibious capability add up to a naval force of important dimensions. The Sixth Fleet would have to deal with this force initially in the event of hostilities and this would clearly distract from its primary mission of supporting the land war on the Mediterranean littoral. The delay might well be critical, given the lack of operating terrain on the southern flank, particularly Greek and Turkish Thrace. And the imperative need for timely [omission in the original].

3. Moreover, while the Soviets have not yet sought to develop an air support capability in the Med, this is not necessarily precluded for the future. Also, given political trends in Egypt, Algeria and Libya, it is not impossible to imagine the Soviets being given turn-around or recovery base rights in those countries which would permit land based air strikes from Bulgaria or the southwestern USSR against NATO forces in the Med.

4. Secondly not since 1944 have US naval forces had to operate in a situation like the one presently prevailing in the Med where its units must operate alongside a potentially hostile naval force of some size. Among other things, this constitutes an inhibition on the Sixth Fleet's capacity to intervene in situations where it may be in our interest to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 275, Agency Files, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. II. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. It was repeated to USDOCOSOUTH, USNMR SHAPE, CINCEUR, Ankara, Athens, Rome, Paris, London, the White House, COMSIXTHFLT for Vice Admiral Richardson, and USDOCOLANDSOUTHEAST for General Harrel.

intervene. Conversely, greater Soviet capability would enable them to intervene if a situation arose in which they regarded it as safe and expedient to do so. Moreover, while the Soviets might have been able to adduce lack of military wherewithal as a reason for inaction during the 1967 War, they could not do so as credibly now and would therefore lose considerable political mileage with dissatisfied local clients.

5. In sum, it seems to me that the Mediterranean constitutes the area of greatest relative change in recent years in the NATO–Warsaw Pact military balance. This is certainly where the current action is as far as the Soviets are concerned, and I believe some shift of our attention from the relatively more stable center region of ACE would be desirable. The problem of Italian-Greek-Turkish relations as it affects NATO strength in this key area needs particular attention in Washington.

6. Our immediate objective should be to focus attention of NATO delegations on this general problem and fortunately the Libyan coup² has already generated considerable local interest. I intend to explore the matter with Brosio and individually with PermReps from the countries most directly concerned, i.e. Italy, France, UK, Greece, Turkey. I would brief them on my impressions, suggest that they themselves visit NATO commands in the area, utilizing roughly the same sources I talked to and solicit their opinions on what NATO might do in response to the whole spectrum of changing military and political factors in the Mediterranean.

7. I think it essential that these countries themselves take the lead in addressing the problem, hopefully looking toward a reassessment we could support either at Ministerial or PermRep level.

8. Where NATO might go after such a reassessment is of course an open question and one the USG should address before proceeding as in para 7. USNATO has various options under consideration, both political and military, open to NATO countries, which may be useful in a possible next round of measures to cope with the Mediterranean situation. In the meantime, we would welcome any addressee comments on this telegram and suggestions for any measures that might be taken.

Ellsworth

² The Free Officers Movement overthrew Libyan King Idris on September 1. As a result, Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi became Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Armed Forces and de facto head of state.

12. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 6, 1969.

SUBJECT

Decisions on Desalting in the Near East

Following your instructions,² I have launched a comprehensive study of possibilities for desalting in the Near East.

The overall study is being done at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory where the concept underlying the Eisenhower–Strauss plan was worked out. It will not be done until the end of the year.

However, decision on a narrower issue is needed sooner. A number of pro-Israeli Congressmen are pressing a rider to the Foreign Assistance Act authorizing \$40 million for a desalting plant in Israel. The Administration should take a position on this legislation since it does not fall within Administration priorities.

I held an NSC Review Group meeting to discuss this aspect of the problem.³ What follows is a brief synopsis of that meeting and represents the consensus. What follows is a brief synopsis.

The legislation now before Congress grows out of a late Johnson Administration proposal. After four years of joint US-Israeli study of the feasibility of a large desalting plant in Israel, President Johnson asked George Woods, who had just stepped down as World Bank president, to review the studies and give him a personal recommendation. This procedure was followed because the bureaucracy was deeply divided and just could not put forward an unbiased analysis. Mr. Woods recommended a smaller plant than the joint studies contemplated and suggested that new technology be considered.⁴

The present options are these:

1. A plant that desalts *100 million gallons per day* and produces 200 megawatts of electricity. Everyone but AEC believes this is too big a technological jump (the largest plant now produces 7 million gallons)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-141, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 30. Confidential; Exdis. Sent for action. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the President approved it and a stamped notation indicates it was returned on October 23.

² See Document 5.

³ See Document 9.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XXXIV, Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues, Documents 171–173.

to take all at once even though this plant would use older technology. This would cost \$60–70 million in US grants.

2. A 40 million-gallon-per-day plant. This was Woods' proposal. It is a more logical technological step from where we are now, although there is still one necessary intermediate step—a 5 million gallon test module to check out a new method that would increase output substantially. The cost for the water plant (it would be hooked to a power plant which would provide steam) would be \$54–58 million, and Woods felt the US could justify up to \$40 million on research and development grounds. This is essentially the proposal before Congress.

3. A 15–20 million-gallon plant. When Interior did not get money in the FY 1970 budget to build its 5 million gallon test module in the US, it proposed that the module be built in Israel as the core of a small operational plant. But Interior would prefer to build the test module in the US and recognizes that the 40 million gallon plant would come closer to meeting Israel's real water needs.

The *Review Group consensus* expressed in the attached memo⁵ is that it does not make sense to go ahead with a \$40 million Israeli plant in this tight budget year but that it might make sense to give Interior \$5 million to build in the US the test module that would have to be built in any case before a larger plant could be built.

Recommendation: Since the latter judgment is a scientific-technical one outside the competence of the Review Group, I recommend the following:

1. That you authorize us to tell the Israelis that we cannot justify a plant in Israel now in the light of our own tight budget and in the light of Israel's other requests for substantial help with economic and military sales credits.⁶

2. That we ask them to tell their Congressional friends that they occur in deferral with the hope that their technicians can participate at some point in any experimental work done in the US that might be a prelude to a later Israeli project.

⁵ Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, undated; not attached. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-039, SRG Meeting Files, Review Group Mid-East Water 9/23/69)

⁶ Attached is an October 16 memorandum from Bryce Harlow, Counselor to the President, stating that he agreed with Kissinger's recommendation against investing in a "large expenditure in Israel." He also noted that during his campaign President Nixon had "strongly favored" the Eisenhower–Strauss Plan, that the issue was seen as a "Republican initiative" with strong support in both Houses, and that the location in the United States of a smaller test facility could be seen as a reward for "a good Congressional friend." (Ibid., Box H-212, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 32) In a November 21 memorandum of conversation, Saunders told General Ben Artzi, Representative of Israeli Prime Minister on the Desalting Project, of the U.S. decision. (Ibid., Box H-141, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 30)

3. That the Administration then take the following position on the legislation before Congress: The Administration intends to press ahead with research in desalting technology but does not believe it possible within present budgetary constraints to proceed with the Israeli project this year. It believes that intermediate experience with a test module to check new technology will be necessary before any larger plant can be built anywhere and believes there are advantages in doing this work in the US, leaving open the possibility of whether to build a plant in Israel once the technology is tested here.

4. That you ask Lee DuBridge and Bob Mayo for a recommendation on whether Interior should be authorized \$5 million to proceed with the test module in the US.⁷

There is one other issue. George Woods also served as a point of contact with the Israelis on this subject. Prime Minister Eshkol named a high-ranking individual as the contact on his side. The reason for this arrangement was to have one person on each side who could draw together a governmental position on a complex issue where bureaucracies split. The question is whether you would like to keep Woods in the picture.

The arguments for doing so are that it is useful to have one person carrying the ball on this issue. It is also useful to have a person of special stature to deal with the Congress on it if special persuasion is required there.

The arguments against include how you may feel about Woods as a personal adviser on this subject. Also, there will probably not be much active discussion with the Israelis if you approve the recommended course.

Recommendation: That I inform Woods what we are doing as a matter of courtesy, says that there will not be much activity with the Israelis in the near future and leave the door open on whether we reinvolve him at a later stage.⁸

⁷ The President checked the approval option.

⁸ Of the approval, disapproval, and other options, Nixon initialed on the approval line. Saunders received authorization from Kissinger on November 6 to go ahead with the suggested course of action. (Memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, October 31; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-141, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 30) See Document 35.

13. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)¹

Washington, November 4, 1969.

Dear Dave:

Attached is a slightly expanded version of the paper that I showed you last Wednesday. It is an effort to reduce to writing some of the more critical foreign policy assumptions that, in my view, should govern military planning in the next several years. We have not tried to be comprehensive, but rather to pick out points which we think are particularly relevant for military planning. We do not intend that this paper substitute for other policy guidance which has emerged from completed NSC studies, such as the FIDP, or to preempt guidance that may flow from future studies. I understand that your staff is working on strategic guidance for the FY-72 budget. This paper should be of some use to them.

I hope that the question of foreign policy assumptions for Defense planning could be pursued by Ron Spiers and Warren Nutter and their staffs as we discussed last week. In particular, I want them to discuss how such guidance might be improved in the future and how State and Defense can jointly develop the strategic guidance that will form the basis for future defense budgets. It seems to me this should be a continuing process so that when Defense feels the need of guidance or assessment in a specific area of foreign policy, it can be provided promptly.

I am sending a copy of this letter and the attachment to Henry Kissinger.

Sincerely,

Alex

Attachment

MIDDLE EAST AND MEDITERRANEAN

A. Despite the absence of formal security treaties with non-NATO powers in the Mediterranean Basin, four US administrations have made clear that the US has a special interest in the security of Israel.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1251, Saunders Files, Basic Policy—Middle East 1/1/70–12/31/70. Secret. A copy was sent to Kissinger.

B. In the Persian Gulf, current American oil and other activities which return some \$1.5 billion annually to the US balance of payments, are likely to expand.

C. The requirement for US forces for this area has never been well defined, but air and naval forces appear to be considerably more important, at least from a political standpoint, than ground forces.

D. Restrictions on US base use (e.g., Greece, Turkey, Spain) if not outright denial (we must regard Wheelus as lost now) will continue to be a significant factor in any contingency involving the Arabs and Israelis. Soviet involvement in such a contingency may relax these restrictions somewhat, but it should not be assumed that they will remove them. Ways to reduce dependence on these bases should be examined.

E. Reopening of the Suez Canal cannot be counted upon for the next two years, or even longer. Therefore, the importance of Diego Garcia and COMIDEASTFOR increases.

F. Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean will not diminish and may expand further. There is a good possibility that the Soviets will gain access to air bases in the Mediterranean area.

G. With the British departure from Aden and the Persian Gulf, the Soviets will continue to manifest increasing naval and other activity in the Arabian Sea region.

H. Any major changes in the Sixth fleet will have important political implications in the Mediterranean Basin and would have to be preceded by careful political-military consultations with allied and friendly governments.

I. While we have no intention of replacing the British in the Persian Gulf area after their withdrawal in 1971, we have no plans to terminate our naval presence there and believe we can maintain our home porting arrangements on Bahrain over the next few years.

[Omitted here are sections on Europe, East Asia, Weapons System, and MAP.]

14. National Security Decision Memorandum 32¹

Washington, November 6, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of The Interior
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, Agency for International Development

SUBJECT

Water Development and Middle East Policy

With reference to the memorandum of September 9, 1969, from the Chairman of NSCIG/NEA to the Chairman of the NSC Review Group entitled "Desalting in the Near East—NSSM 30,"² the President has made the following decisions:

1. He has agreed that decisions on broader policy for overall water development in the Near East should be deferred until early next year.

2. He has approved the following Administration position on the Israeli desalting plant to be used with the Government of Israel and with appropriate Congressional Committees:

a. Budgetary constraints make it impossible for the Administration to proceed now with plans to build a desalting plant in Israel.

b. Budgetary considerations apart, the Administration believes that intermediate experimentation with new technology is necessary before a large operating plant can be built anywhere. The Administration believes that there are compelling advantages in doing this work in the U.S.

c. The Administration is keeping open the possibility of later cooperation in the Israeli project.

d. The Administration intends to press ahead with research in desalting technology and will insure close cooperation with Israeli technicians.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-212, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 32. Confidential; Exdis. Copies were sent to Mayo and DuBridge.

² See footnote 3, Document 9.

3. He has asked that the Director, Bureau of the Budget in cooperation with the Science Advisor to the President coordinate a recommendation on whether a module to test the new technology should now be built in the U.S.

The Secretary of State will coordinate appropriate actions to inform the Government of Israel and the Congressional Committees concerned.

Henry A. Kissinger

15. Editorial Note

On December 9, 1969, Secretary of State William Rogers delivered a major speech titled "A Lasting Peace in the Middle East: An American View" at the 1969 Galaxy Conference on Adult Education in Washington. During this talk, Rogers stated that one of the first decisions of the new administration had been to play a direct role in solving the Arab-Israeli crisis. This included U.S. discussions not just with the United Nations, U.S. allies, and regional states, but with the Soviet Union as well. These talks brought "a measure of understanding," but had highlighted the main roadblocks to useful regional negotiations. In his concluding statements Rogers reiterated the need for a balanced U.S. policy, for good diplomatic relations with all nations in the region, and for U.S. commitment to achieve a just and lasting peace. (Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1970, pages 7–11)

Commenting on his draft of the speech, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph J. Sisco wrote that he had constructed the section of the speech on Soviet involvement "with great care":

"My concern is that there is a general feeling in the Arab world that our preoccupation with Vietnam and the atmosphere which exists in this country preclude a positive United States role in the area. There is, of course, a good deal of truth to this, and our efforts in trying to achieve a settlement are aimed at preventing a situation from developing which could confront us with the most critical decision of intervening or not intervening militarily. I recognize also that words are two-edged: by saying too much we can stimulate undue expectations about American power in the area, and by saying too little we can contribute to the tendency to write us off."

In his comments, Sisco wrote that he had tried to convey the point in his draft that "our preoccupation elsewhere does not mean that we are going to let this area go by default." He concluded:

"I am personally convinced that, if the rubric 'no more Vietnams' leads the world to believe the United States will close its eyes whenever aggression occurs, then we are in serious trouble all over the world, and in particular, in the Middle East. I believe the Middle East will be over the next five years the principal testing point between ourselves and the Soviet Union. The Soviet probes and brinkmanship will go as far as they think they can, short of direct confrontation with us, which I believe they wish to avoid as much as we do. I realize that the strategy being pursued by the Soviets is primarily political, not military, but I am convinced that our strategy in order to be effective politically must have sufficient teeth militarily to make it credible. It must also have political credibility, however, and this will inevitably require some degree of confrontation between ourselves and the Israelis." (Memorandum from Sisco to Rogers and Johnson, November 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 NEAR E-US)

16. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

CA-6701

Washington, December 17, 1969, 7:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

Soviet Policy Toward Middle East

No Fundamental Shift As Yet

The apparent recent upsurge of Soviet maneuvering relating to the Middle East reflected in reporting from Embassy Moscow and other posts raises a question as to whether Soviet policy in the area is evolving toward greater militancy. In the interest of promoting the current dialogue with posts on this subject, the Department offers the following thoughts.² We are inclined toward the assessment that Soviet policy has undergone no recent basic shift, vital Soviet interests continue

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL NEAR E-USSR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by G. Norman Anderson (EUR/SOV); cleared in EUR, EUR/SOV, NEA/IAI, NEA/ARN, NEA/ARP, NEA/UAR, INR/RNA, INR/RSE, and by Sisco; and approved by Adolph Dubs (EUR/SOV). It was repeated to Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Kuwait, Paris, Cairo, Khartoum, London, Jidda, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, USUN, and the Mission to NATO.

² See also INR Memorandum RSE-94 of November 17, 1969—"USSR-Middle East: Dilemma of Involvement—USSR Maneuvers an Uncertain Course." [Footnote is in the original. This memorandum was not found.]

to dictate a large measure of caution for Moscow and, despite recent intensified propaganda over Middle East developments, the Soviets still prefer to avoid peaks of tension in the area. In a broader context, the Kremlin dislikes unpredictability in the Middle East, as in Eastern Europe, at a time when Communist China promises to remain a major headache for the Soviet Union for the foreseeable future.

Immediate Soviet Considerations

While Soviet Middle East policy is motivated by a wide range of factors, two immediate Soviet considerations emerge as overriding: (a) perpetuation of friendly radical Arab regimes, above all the Nasser regime in the UAR, and (b) avoidance of a confrontation with the United States. These considerations require Soviet caution and in particular arouse an aversion to the outbreak of another round of Arab-Israeli hostilities, which would entail a mortal threat to client Arab regimes and increase the chances of a U.S.–Soviet confrontation.

The Fedayeen Dilemma

In line with these considerations, the Soviets have thus far carefully limited their support for the fedayeen, who pose a serious dilemma for the Kremlin. Growing fedayeen popular appeal and influence on the Arab governments cannot be ignored by Moscow. On the other hand, the fedayeen are potential competitors for power with Nasser and the radical Arab regimes, in whom the USSR has invested heavily. They are beyond any significant degree of Soviet control and cannot be trusted by Moscow to take into account Soviet interest in avoiding a confrontation with the U.S. They also oppose such other Soviet policies as public endorsement of the November 22 Security Council resolution³ and recognition of the legitimacy of the state of Israel. As in the past, Soviet support is therefore likely to continue to be largely in the form of inexpensive, although perhaps intensified, propaganda favoring the “national liberation struggle” to regain Israeli-occupied Arab territories. Token material assistance may be channelled through front organizations, but Moscow will, for the most part, probably continue to prefer indirect arms deliveries via friendly Arab regimes. A policy shift toward major direct arms deliveries to the fedayeen would tend to antagonize and encounter opposition from client Arab regimes and raise Arab-Israeli tension, without, however, necessarily giving Moscow much additional leverage over fedayeen policies. (See State 192205 for a fuller discussion of Soviet support for the fedayeen.)⁴

³ A reference to UN Resolution 242. See footnote 6, Document 3.

⁴ Telegram 192205 to USUN, November 14, reported that Soviet policy toward the fedayeen remained the same albeit with tactical variations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 13–10 ARAB)

Risks in the Arms Supply Game

Furthermore, once having rapidly replaced Arab arms losses suffered in the June 1967 war, an action followed by the U.S. decision to supply Phantom aircraft to Israel,⁵ the Soviets have refrained from adding to Arab military capabilities to an extent which might be construed as upsetting the Arab-Israeli military balance, with the result that the Arabs will hesitate for some time to come to court a full-scale war against Israel. Limited Arab absorptive capacity is no doubt a factor in the Soviets' thinking. They are also certainly aware that a further escalation of the Middle East arms race would be costly and dangerous, yet without assured new benefits for the USSR.

The Kremlin would also have little to gain from becoming more actively involved in Arab war efforts, such as through providing combat pilots to the UAR, except perhaps for such a restricted purpose as defending the Aswan Dam if the latter should be directly threatened by Israel. Not only would U.S. reaction to a more active Soviet role be a deterrent to the Kremlin, but Soviet flexibility in general would be seriously jeopardized, and the Soviets would in addition bear a greater onus for any further Arab failures against Israel.

The West, the Mediterranean Squadron, and the "Progressives"

Among longer-term Soviet aims is, of course, the elimination of Western influence in the area and the increase of Soviet influence. Moscow has unquestionably benefited from being alert to every target of opportunity, for example by becoming the major arms supplier to the radical Arab states when the U.S. was unwilling to enter such competition. The USSR has, however, exploited rather than created indigenous trends. It has been acquiring in fact a position of influence to which it could realistically aspire not only because of its willingness to embrace the Arab cause but also because of its growing power and its geographic position. The USSR may still hope to gain even more influence, but it already has a substantial vested interest which can be a factor for conservatism in Soviet policy.

The build-up of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron is tangible evidence of another related long-term Soviet goal: strengthening of the Soviet strategic and military position vis-à-vis the U.S. and its NATO allies. This squadron has both a political impact on the Arabs and a deterrent value against NATO. Nonetheless, it will probably remain inferior militarily to the Sixth Fleet for the predictable future and this inferiority imposes due limitations on its use by the Kremlin.

⁵ The first Phantoms arrived in Israel September 6. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972.

The “spread of socialism” is still another long-term goal. Moscow continues to emphasize pragmatism over ideology, however, subordinating the fate of the Arab Communist parties to the requirements of government-to-government relations. The Soviets encourage “progressive” political movements such as Nasser’s Arab Socialist Union and the Syrian Baath, as well as the “socialist path” in economic development, so that future Soviet-Arab relations will become more institutionalized and less dependent on individual Arab leaders. Concrete results here have thus far clearly been limited from the Soviet point of view, however. The USSR hardly expects, nor would it necessarily even welcome, the emergence of an Arab communist regime at this stage, a development which could bring serious entanglements and burdens for Moscow. Recent increased Soviet urging of the Arabs to work on developing their internal political and economic structure is undoubtedly intended to encourage stability in the UAR and other radical Arab states, as well as being in effect an effort to deflect them from excessive zeal against Israel.

Peking Competition

Another concern for the Kremlin is Chinese Communist activity in the Middle East. The Chinese have, of course, extended minor aid to Arab extremist groups. They also have had well-advertised government-to-government contacts with Syria, among others. These contacts could hardly fail to irritate the Soviets and probably have not induced them to be more forthcoming vis-à-vis the Syrians. While the Chinese can do little in the region at the moment, Moscow may tend to exaggerate both current and potential Chinese capabilities. Along with other observers, Moscow probably believes Communist China stands to gain from continuing chaos in the area, and this could be a factor inclining the Soviets toward wanting stability there.

“Controlled Tension” or Settlement?

The theory is sometimes advanced that the Soviets prefer “controlled tension” to a genuine peace settlement. The Soviets undoubtedly see their choices as lying between the extremes of continuing military engagement and genuine peace. The experience of 1967 no doubt convinced Soviet leaders, however, that tension in the Arab world is not always subject to adequate control and that, while still falling short of genuine peace, a more effective accommodation than in 1949 and 1957 is needed.

A political settlement is the only alternative to war whereby the Soviets can help the Arabs get back Israeli-occupied territories, and lack of a settlement implies an eventual new round of hostilities. Moscow, in the major power talks, has stressed that any settlement should be comprehensive. It is unlikely that the Soviets harbor secret

hopes for a partial settlement limited mainly to Israeli withdrawal because they realize that Israeli agreement to such an arrangement is not in the cards. They also know that if either the Arabs or the Israelis, after agreeing to a comprehensive settlement, sought only partial or selective implementation, a new war would probably ensue.

If a settlement is in fact viewed favorably by the Soviets, why then have they thus far considered it a matter of no urgency to exert the pressure on the UAR and others obviously needed for progress toward a settlement? The answer may lie in part in differing Soviet and U.S. perceptions of what is achievable. The Soviets may feel that UAR acceptance of the November resolution itself represents a major concession, implying as it does UAR willingness to accept for the first time the partition of Palestine and the sovereign existence of Israel in that part of Palestine it has held since 1949. The Soviet settlement plan given the U.S. on June 17, 1969, supplemented by Soviet agreement to Rhodes-type negotiations,⁶ falls short in many basic respects of U.S. desiderata for a viable settlement. It does, however, represent a distinct advance over the UAR position toward Israel previous to June 5, 1967, and the Soviets have said it is acceptable to the UAR, whereas we have given no comparable assurance that Israel will accept the position set forth in our July 15, 1969, document as modified by our reformulations of Sept.-Oct., 1969.⁷

A Soviet assessment that large-scale Arab-Israeli hostilities are unlikely in the near future could also underlie the Soviet attitude. The Soviets can be expected to continue to press for concessions from Israel and the US and will not wish to expend leverage over the Arabs prematurely. Furthermore, the large Soviet investment in the UAR, coupled with the experience of having lost similar investments in Indonesia and Ghana,⁸ presents the USSR with the dilemma of not wanting to antagonize Nasser while at the same time wanting to save him. Moscow also seems to defer to Nasser's view of what is required of him politically to shore up his weakened position at home and in the Arab world, tolerating but not encouraging periodic heating up of the situation along the Suez Canal, "fire-and-blood" speeches, etc.

Whether or not the Kremlin evaluates a settlement as a real possibility, we would expect the USSR to continue to be interested in

⁶ The Rhodes formula refers to the negotiating mechanism used at the January-March 1949 armistice talks held in Rhodes, Greece. This formula required separate meetings led by UN mediator Ralph Bunche with each delegation discussing substantive items until they reached the stage where informal meetings could be held.

⁷ Documentation on these U.S. proposals is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972.

⁸ Reference is to the successful 1966 coups against President Sukarno of Indonesia and President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana.

pursuing major-power talks. If the talks permit Moscow to curry favor with the Arabs and increase pressures on the US and Israel, they also serve the important purpose for the Kremlin of helping to dampen tensions, although their effectiveness in this regard will diminish in the absence of demonstrable progress. Even without such progress, however, the Soviets will think twice about breaking them off for fear of creating a crisis atmosphere in the area.

Soviet Policy Toward the Moderate Arabs

An example of Soviet priorities in practice can probably be seen in Soviet policy toward the moderate Arab regimes. The USSR appears for the present to favor preservation of the Lebanese and Jordanian governments. The Soviets presumably recognize that radicalization of these regimes would be at the cost in Lebanon of internal Christian-Muslim chaos, with possible intervention by Israel and Syria, and an ultimate risk of US-Soviet confrontation. In Jordan, the cost could be a fedayeen takeover, with an attendant undesirable higher-risk policy toward Israel and, again, a likelihood of firm Israeli reaction.

While Soviet propaganda in the recent Lebanese crisis⁹ was unfriendly to the U.S. and designed to enhance Soviet prestige as a friend of the Arabs at the expense of the U.S., it at the same time welcomed and perhaps even encouraged a negotiated settlement between the Lebanese government and the fedayeen through UAR mediation. As in other cases, the Kremlin did not originate propaganda themes but echoed the radical Arabs, especially Cairo, although in less strident tones than those used by UAR spokesmen. Also, Soviet diplomacy apparently tried to curb the Syrians and sought to identify the USSR with the relatively moderate, pro-UAR Lebanese Sunni leader Rashid Karami. Moscow has, of course, gradually built up a substantial presence in Lebanon, which provides it with a uniquely free atmosphere among Arab countries, in the form of a large embassy and extensive commercial and banking representation. It has also shown a persistent desire since the 1967 war to increase cooperation with the Jordanian government in economic, cultural and military fields.

Polarization Along US-Soviet Lines?

Moscow probably recognizes that a complete US-Israel versus Soviet-Arab polarization could entail a dangerous rise in tension in the area, inflate Arab expectations of the USSR, and increase the burden on the USSR of supporting the Arabs materially. The Soviets might not necessarily be hostile, for example, to some increase in US or other

⁹ A reference to ongoing domestic disturbances in Lebanon and the USSR's October response warning against any outside intervention.

Western ties with the radical Arab states, should such a possibility evolve. Any resulting US economic aid to these states could relieve some of the burden on the USSR (as do current contributions to the UAR from Libya, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia), while leaving the arms monopoly in Soviet hands. US-Arab ties would therefore not infringe significantly on Soviet influence, particularly as they would not involve any greater US willingness to support the Arab radicals politically.

In sum, we believe there has been considerable consistency in Soviet policy toward the Middle East over the years. However, we do not discount the growing possibility that this policy might take new directions under altered circumstances which could arise unexpectedly. The Department will, of course, continue to welcome contributions on this subject.

Rogers

17. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 23, 1969.

SUBJECT

Actions to Bolster Moderates Before Arab Summit

You asked at the last NSC meeting on the Mid-East² about actions that could be taken before the Arab summit (December 20) to bolster the moderate leaders.

A number of steps have been taken, some of which are familiar to you:³

—The first shipment of internal defense equipment (3,000 M-14 rifles and other material totaling \$1.5 million) has been airlifted to *Jordan*. King Hussein has also been informed of our readiness to consider

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 644, Country Files, Middle East, General, Vol. II. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

² The NSC meeting occurred December 10. Minutes of the meeting are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

³ A more detailed account of U.S. actions is included in a December 16 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 644, Country Files, Middle East, General, Vol. II)

his anti-aircraft and medium artillery needs. Assistant Secretary Sisco briefed his personal representative on our diplomatic position.

—For *Lebanon*, we have completed the sale of equipment necessary to improve the army's capability to control the fedayeen, and have offered to help re-equip the Army with M-14 rifles. We are negotiating credit assistance via the Commodity Credit Corporation.

—State and our ambassadors have briefed *each government* on our position on an Arab-Israeli settlement in an effort to blunt distortions. The Secretary's speech was designed to clear the record further.⁴

—For better or worse, the Four Powers are talking in New York.

The closer time has come to the summit, the more our reporting seems to indicate that the moderate participants will try to avoid closing any doors. But the dynamics of an Arab meeting can change prior intentions unpredictably.

⁴ See Document 15.

18. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, January 6, 1970.

SUBJECT

Assessment of Rabat Arab Conference—*Information Memorandum*

The Rabat Arab Summit conference ended December 23 with the Arab leaders in clear disarray. Participants confirm that no decisions were taken on the central issue of whether the Arabs should renounce the continued search for a political settlement. In fact, this potentially explosive issue was apparently not even discussed by the conferees. UAR General Fawzi's estimate that it would require at least three years and enormous cost for the Arab armies to reach the point where the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 ARAB. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. Drafted by Wrampelmeier and cleared in NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/IAI, NEA/ARN, NEA/UAR, AF/N, and EUR/SOV. It was transmitted to Kissinger with a January 7 covering memorandum from Eliot.

Israelis are today apparently had a sobering effect on the Arab leaders. As a result, their assessment of the military situation was realistic and the advocates of an early military solution were largely by-passed. The door to a peaceful settlement was therefore tacitly left open. In particular, the UAR emerged with greater freedom of action—if Nasser chooses to exercise it.

Reactions to the outcome of the Summit can be summarized as follows:

1. *Eastern Arab Moderates* (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon)—The moderates were relieved a decision for war was not taken. More importantly, perhaps, the oil-rich states were also able to avoid making substantial new financial commitments to the front-line Arabs. Saudi sources assert that Faisal made no new commitments to the UAR, Jordan, or the fedayeen. The Kuwaitis have announced a one-time payment of \$28 million to the UAR in addition to their regular Khartoum subsidy payment and have promised an unspecified contribution to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

2. *Jordan*—The Jordanians are pleased that the more bellicose Arabs were neutralized at Rabat. They feel that Jordan and the UAR now have greater freedom of action to search for a peace settlement and Ambassador Sharaf expressed to me the view that the efforts of the Summit will therefore be beneficial. Jordanian leaders have expressed some disappointment that the conference ended without positive decisions taken and without firm pledges of additional financial or military aid to Jordan. Some further assistance may yet be forthcoming, however, from the Saudis. Jordan will be consulting shortly with the UAR and other so-called “confrontation” states to assess future courses of action.

3. *The Militants* (Syria, Iraq, Southern Yemen)—These states found no support for their calls for renunciation of the search for political settlement, for adoption of an Arab plan for “total liberation” of Palestine, and for creation of a fund from which the “confrontation” states could meet their arms purchase needs. These three, together with Libya and Sudan, publicly blame Arab conservative leaders for the indecisive outcome of the conference.

4. *The Maghreb*—The Moroccans and Tunisians share with the Eastern moderates a sense of relief that the confrontation with the militants at Rabat did not end with a victory for the latter. Both Tunisia and Morocco avoided definite commitments to the Arab front-line countries, although Morocco has agreed to levy a special tax for the benefit of the PLO. A significant development at the conference was the alignment of Algeria with its moderate neighbors, as well as Saudi Arabia. President Boumediene is clearly concerned about UAR influence on the new Libyan revolutionary regime, and some tension

between him and Libya's Qadhaafi was reported. Libya promised additional aid (\$48 million) to the UAR plus some unspecified assistance to the PLO.

5. *Fedayeen*—There is general agreement that the principal beneficiary of the conference was the PLO. PLO/Fatah leader Arafat emerged from the meeting with enhanced prestige. Details of reported financial pledges of \$36 million plus some arms, however, remain to be negotiated on a country-by-country basis. The belief that any settlement by the Arab states must also have Palestinian concurrence seems to have gained ground, particularly among the North Africans and Kuwait. The Lebanese and Jordanians anticipate increased difficulties with the fedayeen whom they fear will now be encouraged to assert even greater independence in those two countries.

6. *UAR*—Nasser clearly lost his bid to rally the Arabs behind his leadership. He did, however, emerge from the conference with his basic options still open to continue the search for a political settlement, as well as the promise of a modest increase in cash support from the Libyans and Kuwaitis. There are those, in fact, who suspect that Nasser wanted General Fawzi's military plan to be rejected in order that he might be left free to seek additional military and economic aid while remaining open to possibilities for a political settlement. In any event, if Nasser is preparing the ground for an Egyptian-first policy it may be a while before clear evidences of it appear. For the present, he has carefully avoided labelling the conference a failure or blaming the conservatives directly, while at the same time encouraging formation of close Cairo-Tripoli-Khartoum ties. His intentions to continue the search for a political settlement may become clearer following the proposed meeting in Cairo later this month of the "confrontation" states (UAR, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, plus probably Libya and Sudan). The militant radicals will, however, be in the majority at that meeting and Nasser may not want, or feel that for tactical reasons he cannot appear actively to seek, a political solution.

7. *The Soviets*—The Soviets appear relieved that the conference ended without a decision for war. However, the evident disunity in the Arab ranks and the resulting diminution of Nasser's prestige and his claim to Arab leadership must have been disappointing to Moscow. The Soviets may wish to defer further progress in either the Two-Power or Four-Power contexts until Nasser makes up his mind where he wishes to go from here.

8. *Israel*—Despite some initial gloating in the Israeli press at the evidence of Nasser's inability to unite the Arabs behind him, the outcome of the Summit Conference is not necessarily seen in Tel Aviv as beneficial to Israel. The fedayeen have obviously emerged with new prestige and at least some new Arab support. In particular, however,

the Israelis are likely to view with dismay the probability that the USG will be encouraged by the apparently favorable effect its recent Middle East initiatives have had on the Arab moderates to continue pressing its proposals despite strong, adverse Israeli reaction.

Implications for the US—The US came out as well as possible at the Summit. Proposals by the radicals to take further measures against US interests in the Arab world did not materialize. Not only was Nasser's bid to rally the moderate as well as the radical Arabs behind his leadership a failure, but the moderates were able to resist, for the most part, demands for substantial further financial contributions to the Arab military effort. Above all, our Arab moderate friends appear generally pleased by your December 9 speech and by our October 28 and December 18 proposals.² Although these were not formally discussed at the Summit, they apparently strengthened the hands of the moderates and thus helped to keep the door to a political settlement open. While most of the Arabs continue to have strong reservations about the details of our proposals on both the UAR and the Jordanian aspects of a settlement, the assessment of most of our Arab posts—as well as the Jordanians—is that the US should continue to stand on these proposals as a balanced basis for a peace settlement which we should continue to encourage.

² For Rogers's December 9 speech, see Document 15. Documentation on the October 28 and December 18 U.S. proposals is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

19. National Security Study Memorandum 90¹

Washington, February 26, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

US Interests in and Policy Toward the Mediterranean Area

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-170, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 90. Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the JCS. The date is handwritten at the top of the first page.

The President wishes to expand NSC consideration of Mediterranean problems beyond those issues cited in NSSM 87 (North Africa) and in NSSM 88 (Northern Mediterranean).²

Accordingly, he directs that the NSSMs 87 and 88 studies be placed in the context of political developments in the Mediterranean basin as a whole, including the Eastern Mediterranean. Particular emphasis should be given to how US interests in this area will be affected over the next several years.

The study should include considerations of Soviet objectives, policies and prospects and how they affect our interests, and French objectives, policies and prospects and how they affect our interests.

The President wishes to discuss the feasibility of developing policy options with respect to our interests in the area as a whole or in appropriate segments of it. He wishes to examine ways of improving the interrelationship of our programs and policies in individual countries in the Mediterranean area. Policy options should take account of political, economic and military considerations.

The President has directed that this study be prepared by an ad hoc group chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State and including representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and the NSC staff. Work already completed or underway in response to NSSM 88 may be incorporated in the study requested by the present NSSM.

The completed study should be submitted to the NSC Review Group by Monday, March 16, 1970.

Henry A. Kissinger

² NSSM 87, January 22, asked for a review of trends and U.S. options in North Africa. It is published in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E–5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972, Document 5. NSSM 88, February 12, asking for a study on U.S. policy toward Italy and the Northern Mediterranean, is scheduled for publication *ibid.*, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.

20. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11-6-70

Washington, March 5, 1970.

SOVIET POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MEDITERRANEAN AREA

[Omitted here are a cover sheet, table of contents, and map.]

Summary

A. Over the last 15 years, the USSR has established itself as a major power factor in the Mediterranean world. By exploiting postcolonial resentments and especially the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviets have sought to deny the area to Western interests and influence. Their calculation has been that the displacement of Western with Soviet influence would constitute a broad strategic reversal for the West and a considerable gain for themselves. Nevertheless, they have not seen the area as one which engaged their most vital national interests; these remain focused on their relations with the US in general, on Eastern and Central Europe, and on their conflict with Communist China.

B. The Arab-Israeli conflict provides the Soviets with their greatest means of leverage in the Middle East, but it also faces them with the most severe complications. They have extended enough military aid to the radical Arabs to become thoroughly involved in the latter's cause, but their efforts have not created an effective Arab defense. Israeli military attacks, particularly against Egypt, intensify this Soviet dilemma. They wish to provide Egypt with effective defense, but seek also to minimize the risks of direct involvement; yet if they sought to defuse the situation by pressing the Arabs to make concessions to Israel, they would jeopardize their influence in the Arab world. Barring a de-escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviets will probably step up their aid to the Egyptians, and they may provide new weapons systems and additional personnel to improve Egyptian air defenses.

C. Despite the Soviet support for the Arab cause in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Moscow's relations with the radical Arab states are subject to occasionally serious strains; none of these countries is entirely

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-044, Senior Review Group Meetings, Review Group NSSM 90 5/21/70. Secret. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of the CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction. This NIE is partially based on the undated paper, "DIA Assessment of the Soviet Threat in the Mediterranean." (Ibid., Box H-170, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 90)

responsive to Soviet pressures, and each is jealous and suspicious of the others. The still more uncontrollable fedayeen movement is a problem for Moscow, chiefly because any direct Soviet support for it involves embarrassment in Moscow's relations with established governments; nevertheless, we think the Soviets will continue to develop relations with the fedayeen discreetly.

D. The Soviets have aspirations to establish themselves in the western Mediterranean as well, but Tunisia and Morocco remain generally wary of the USSR and retain strong ties with the West. Algeria has accepted Soviet assistance, but more recently it has been drawing nearer to its immediate neighbors and to France. Although the new regime in Libya has close ties with Egypt, it shows no signs of welcoming a Soviet presence, and Nasser is probably not anxious to encourage Soviet influence there. Among European states with interests in the area, Moscow must be concerned to avoid provoking alarm by its activities in the Mediterranean lest this compromise its policies in Western Europe; France, in particular, has ambitions to enlarge its role in the Mediterranean.

E. Since the June War in 1967, the Soviet military presence has grown in the area: roughly 5,000 Soviet military advisers are now stationed in several area countries; the Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean has been strengthened, and is supported by air and port facilities in Egypt. How the USSR might use its military strength in the Mediterranean area in times of crisis and war is examined in this paper in four major contingencies: (1) Arab-Israeli hostilities short of all-out war (paragraphs 41–48); (2) full-scale Arab-Israeli war (paragraphs 49–51); (3) other disputes in the area in which Soviet interests were involved (paragraphs 52–53); and (4) East-West hostilities involving both the US and the USSR (paragraphs 54–55).

F. The Soviet presence in the Mediterranean region is likely to prove durable. Radical nationalist forces will continue to work against Western interests and will continue to receive Soviet support. Thus the rivalry between the US and USSR in the area is likely to persist at least so long as it continues in the world at large.

Discussion

I. The Strategic Setting: Broad Soviet Considerations and Objectives

1. Soviet power first moved into the Mediterranean in the mid-1950s. Seizing on the opportunities for influence offered by Arab-Israeli antagonisms and by increasingly militant and anti-Western forms of Arab nationalism, and leap-frogging over the Middle Eastern members of the newly formed Baghdad Pact (Turkey, Iran, and Iraq), the USSR eased its way into both Cairo and Damascus with offers of arms, economic aid, and political support. During the 1960s, through the use of these and other conventional instruments of influence and

power, the USSR became the primary backer of the radical Arab states. Today the Soviet Union is a major factor in the Middle East, with a number of client states in varying degrees of dependency and with elements of its own armed forces now present in the area. The Soviet leadership almost certainly sees its gains here as the most extensive and successful of all its efforts to expand Soviet influence in areas of the world once dominated by the West.

2. Clearly, the Soviets have in this period looked upon the Middle East as an area of strategic importance. A part of this attitude no doubt was inherited from their predecessors; Czarist planners traditionally viewed this part of the world as a special Russian sphere of interest and periodically sought to expand Russian power southwards. In modern times, especially since the death of Stalin, this geopolitical emphasis has been accompanied by an ideologically inspired hope that the anticolonialist attitudes of the Third World could be made to work for social change and for the emergence of local power elites sympathetic to communism. And this has been joined with the view that the Middle East has become one of the main arenas of the Soviet struggle with the West and the US. The Soviets may see the area as more complicated and the opportunities less immediate than they did in 1955 when they first undertook a military supply program for Egypt. But they evidently still hope to bring the states of the region into an anti-Western alignment and ultimately to establish their own hegemony there. Finally, the area is seen in Moscow as a strategic military zone: in hostile hands, it could pose a threat to the USSR and block Soviet access to the Mediterranean; in friendly hands, it protects the USSR's southwestern border and permits Moscow to move its influence into the Mediterranean world and beyond. The Middle East and much of the non-European Mediterranean world are thus, in the Soviet world view, proximate, important, and vulnerable.

3. This is not to say that the Soviets attach the same weight to their problems and objectives in the Middle East and Mediterranean basin as they do to their prime concerns elsewhere. Their stake there is less critical to their interests than their relations with the US in general, their concerns in Eastern and Central Europe, and their conflict with Communist China. It is in these areas and with these countries that the most vital of Soviet national interests are directly engaged. There are in addition certain self-imposed limitations on Soviet policies in the Mediterranean area and the Middle East. The preservation of the USSR's position in the Middle East would not be worth the serious risk of nuclear war with the US, whereas its presence in, say, East Germany, might be. But at least until recently Moscow has been able to base its approach in the Mediterranean area on calculations of opportunity and risk within the area concerned without serious conflicts with its objectives elsewhere.

4. Inevitably, as the degree of its involvement in the area has grown and the level of its commitment risen, the USSR has found itself faced with mounting costs and risks. It has exhibited some anxiety to control these risks and to curb the excessive enthusiasms of some of its clients. But it has also chosen to live with danger, and its position is now potentially vulnerable to the pressures and perils of events over which it may have little or no control—the actions of the Arab states, of Israel, and even of the US. Broadly speaking, Moscow has behaved as if it wishes the Middle East to remain an area of at least some tension. It apparently believes that the risks attending this are manageable, and that continued polarization in the area will make it increasingly difficult for the conservative Arab states to maintain their ties with the US, thus decreasing US influence throughout the area. But the Soviets clearly recognize that in the event of another explosion in the Middle East they would be faced with some very hard choices.

[Omitted here are Sections II–V, on Instruments of Soviet Power in the Area, Policies in the Middle East, Policies in the Western Mediterranean, and Soviet Capabilities and Intentions in Certain Contingencies, respectively.]

VI. Long Term Prospects

56. Some aspects of the Soviet position in the Mediterranean area are of course susceptible to direct Soviet control. The strength of the USSR's naval squadron, the size of its military and economic assistance programs, and the degree of its political support for radical Arab objectives all are dependent on decisions made in Moscow. But many of the basic circumstances which shape Soviet policy in the area are determined in the main by decisions made elsewhere—in Tel Aviv, in Cairo, in Washington. In the totality, then, the USSR is only one of several principal actors in the area and it is always possible that—as during the June War of 1967—it will find itself playing a part not entirely of its own devising.

57. It is true nonetheless that Moscow's assumption of a leading role in the area is a significant and probably durable accomplishment. It does not now appear that the USSR will again be content to play a minor role in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Even in the event of another Arab-Israeli war and another defeat for major Soviet clients, the Soviets would almost certainly retain some sort of position in the area—though it would probably for a time be reduced—and would continue to have a voice in the shaping of postwar configurations. With or without such a war, the political climate of the region is likely to remain generally turbulent. Radical nationalist forces will continue to work against Western interests in the area and in their endeavors will no doubt continue to find Soviet support.

58. It seems entirely plausible that Soviet estimates of the USSR's prospects in the Mediterranean basin do not depart substantially from the general picture sketched above. In any case the Soviets must be optimistic about their ability to remain among the major movers of the area. Still, over a decade of close involvement with their mercurial clients has probably persuaded them to be fairly cautious in their assessments. Certainly they can have few illusions about the military capabilities of the Arab states. And just as certainly they cannot believe that the problems of the more immediate future will always resolve themselves to the benefit of Soviet interests. By the same token, however, occasional setbacks and miscalculations will probably not seriously discourage them or deflect them from their course. In any case, the rivalry between the US and the USSR in the Mediterranean is likely to persist at least so long as the contest between them continues in the world at large.

21. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 14, 1970, 3–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting of CENTO Ministers with the President

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Secretary of State, William Rogers
Assistant to the President, Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant Secretary of State, Joseph J. Sisco
NSC Staff Member, Harold H. Saunders
Multilateral Organization Advisor, William Helseth
Foreign Minister Michael Stewart (UK)
Ambassador (to Washington) John Freeman (UK)
Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil (Turkey)
Ambassador (to Washington) Melhi Esenbel (Turkey)
Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi (Iran)

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, CENTO 3 US (WA). Secret. The meeting occurred in the White House Cabinet Room. Background information on the meeting, biographical information, lists of attendees, and Talking Points are in a May 13 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon (*ibid.*), and in a May 14 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 212, Agency Files, CENTO)

Ambassador (to Washington) Aslan Afshar (Iran)
Ambassador (to Washington) Agha Hilaly (Pakistan)
Ambassador (to Turkey) Iftikar Ali (Pakistan)
Secretary-General, CENTO, Turgut Menemencioglu

After a brief picture taking session, Secretary Rogers told the President that the group had dealt in its morning session with CENTO organizational issues. He was happy to report that there are no major problems. Bilateral discussions among members of the group would begin after the meeting with the President, and the group would review the general international situation in its formal session the following morning as well as continuing bilateral meetings later in the day.

The President spoke briefly on three issues—the Middle East, Vietnam and U.S.-Soviet relations.

On the Middle East, he noted that the Soviets are now there in a deeper and more potentially dangerous role. They have their own interests to pursue, and the U.S. is watching them with some concern. The U.S. continues its dedication to trying to help the nations on the ground find the way to peace. As he had said on previous occasions, the U.S. is “neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israel but pro-peace.” Unfortunately, he could not report his hope for an early breakthrough.

In Southeast Asia, the U.S. is attempting to find a stability for the situation there. In some senses, the U.S. purpose there is the same as it is in the area of the CENTO nations—stabilizing a dangerous situation so that all the nations of that region can find security and an opportunity to move ahead with their own development.

On U.S.-Soviet relations, the President began by commenting that the U.S. is “very far” from the Soviet Union on Vietnam. The U.S. can understand the reasons for the Soviet position since the USSR must, in the context of the world communist movement, compete with the Communist Chinese. We understand, though we do not welcome, the Soviet position. In the Middle East, the Soviet Union has its own interests to pursue. There is a tendency among many people to see the entire Middle East situation as a confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The President said he hoped that this was a belief that would never become widely held. However, he could unhappily see no change soon in the Soviet position there. He turned then to what he said he regarded as perhaps the overriding issue between the U.S. and the USSR—the strategic arms limitation talks in Vienna. He said that while he could be described as pessimistic about the situations in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, he could be described as optimistic—for somewhat negative and pessimistic reasons—about the negotiations in Vienna. Whereas on the first two issues the U.S. and USSR have their very different interests to pursue, on the strategic arms question both sides have their own very strong reasons for wanting an

agreement. Each has enough weapons to blow up each other and a good bit of the world besides, and the weapons are a major financial drain.

The President said, however, that he did want to assure his friends as he had our NATO allies that the U.S. does not intend to take a position that would weaken it vis-à-vis the USSR. This is not just a question of national prestige or the United States wanting to be the first power in the world. He thought it crucial that the leading power who wants nothing more than to defend its friends and its own interests should not be in a weak position in relation to that leading world power which for reasons of its own ideology has as its objective the expansion of its own influence.

The President said that he was aware that a lot of critics feel that this U.S. Administration has over-used the word "consultation." But he takes "consultation" very seriously. What he means by it is that there will be no effort by the U.S. to achieve a "cynical condominium" whereby the U.S. and the Soviet Union attempt to reach accords for their own sakes without reference to the interests of their friends. The President, in completing his comments on the Vienna talks, noted as evidence of the Soviet interest in an agreement the fact that Chairman Kosygin had in denouncing U.S. action in Cambodia not broken off the Vienna talks. We expected that the Soviet Union would criticize us for Cambodia just as the U.S. had criticized the USSR for its action in Czechoslovakia.

The President concluded by saying that he would like to hear the views of his visitors.

Secretary Rogers said in passing that there were of course differences between the situation in Czechoslovakia and in Cambodia. The U.S. in Southeast Asia would welcome the attention of an international body to go and see what is going on there, whereas the Soviet Union had rejected that sort of effort in Czechoslovakia. The Secretary then asked the Secretary General if he had a few comments to make.

Ambassador Menemencioglu noted that CENTO is very "loose" in its status, not like NATO. The association is based on a series of separate agreements and some bilateral arrangements which the U.S. has with each of its members. The strength of the organization has not been in its legal framework but has rather been in the common interests which the members share.

The Ambassador concluded his remarks by saying that he appreciated the recognition by the President of the importance of the Middle East. The Soviet fleet has become just the latest evidence of a strong Soviet play for influence in this area.

The President interjected to agree that the real contest is not over Israel but for Soviet influence in the Mediterranean, in Africa and in the seas beyond the Suez Canal.

Foreign Minister Zahedi noted that the situation in the Middle East had become worse over the past year. He particularly noted the deterioration of the situation in Jordan where the extremist elements had become more powerful. He felt that the members of CENTO could help nations like Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia if they themselves were strong. The Foreign Minister then noted the dangerous situation in the Persian Gulf where the Soviets backed the Iraqis and were potentially a source of trouble. He said that the CENTO members wanted to do what they could themselves to preserve the stability of this area. He noted the importance of the oil which transits this area not only for the economic progress of the nations on the Gulf but also for the financial position of the UK and the oil supply of Western Europe. In this connection, he noted that the Iranian Government had just reached a satisfactory agreement with the oil consortium.

There was a brief jocular exchange alluding to the fact that Iranian bargainers are never satisfied, and then the Secretary of State asked the Turkish Foreign Minister whether he had any general comments to make.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil said he agreed with the general point of view expressed by Foreign Minister Zahedi. He felt that the central question as far as the Arab-Israeli conflict is concerned is whether there will simply be a solution to the war of 1967 or whether there will be a solution to the Palestine problem. He felt that international organs—the Four Power talks or the UN Security Council—were not likely to find a solution. Meanwhile, the conflict is turning into a war of national liberation and therefore becoming much more difficult to solve. He felt that the situation in a country like Jordan could not go on much longer as it is, and that a drastic change in the balance of forces within Jordan could not help but have an effect in Saudi Arabia and other parts of the area. He felt that it was important at this time to come to the assistance of such countries as Jordan.

In the Persian Gulf, he continued, perhaps the best forum for dealing with those problems there is CENTO.

The President interjected to ask whether he was referring to a military agreement among the CENTO partners for this purpose, and the Foreign Minister of Turkey replied that he would think in terms of consultation.

The President asked how such a consultative group would deal with revolutionary forces and a revolutionary situation in the Gulf. Foreign Minister Zahedi, picking up the tenor of his earlier remarks, said that the advantage of having the nations on the ground strong enough to deal with the situation was that they could move quickly and deal with the situation before outside powers such as the Soviet Union became involved and the problem was escalated to the Great Power level. In response to a direct question from the President, Zahedi said Iran

could and would “gladly” act in this manner if it possessed the requisite military strength.

In respect to the President’s request for his comments, Ambassador Hilaly said that he shared the concern of his colleagues about the Middle East. On the one hand, military power rests on one side, but on the other hand 100 million Arabs will not forever stand aside for that power. Israel’s present policy will not be in its best interest because Israel can only survive by reaching an accommodation with its neighbors. For the moment, however, he felt that the situation could only worsen.

Ambassador Hilaly continued that the nations of the area—each of them in its own way—must be helped to be strong. Pakistan, which has its own problem with the arms balance being upset in India’s favor in the subcontinent, cannot do its share in the Alliance because it is weak and badly in need of arms supply. For the sake of stability, Pakistan should not feel weak. All Pakistan asks is that its Allies help it with military aid so that Pakistan can be a loyal and strong ally in return.

The President interjected that the arms question has been a terribly difficult one for us. We recall the days—“they were good days”—when the U.S. had a close relationship with Pakistan in the 1950s, and “we are trying to work our way back to a similarly close relationship. We have been looking very closely at the arms situation.”

The President continued by saying that he wanted the group to know that the U.S. had also been considering very carefully what it can do to help Jordan. The question is whether or not Jordan can survive. Foreign Minister Zahedi said he thought it could.

The President said that he had asked about how to deal with the problem of revolutionary forces in the Persian Gulf but he wondered about revolutionary forces in each of the countries. For instance, he asked Foreign Minister Caglayangil what he could say about revolutionary forces in Turkey. “Are they ready to blow?”

Foreign Minister Caglayangil said that of course leftist forces in Turkey have freedom of expression in the press and politically. They therefore appear to be stronger than they are. He felt, however, that the leftist forces had reached a high point and would now decline in influence. In any case, Turkey was prepared to cope with them.

Foreign Minister Zahedi said that Iran felt that the only answer was to stay one step ahead of the revolutionary forces in thinking of the things they were pressing for before they themselves started pressing. He noted smilingly that the situation in Iran was not like that in the United States; people there did not yet have everything they needed.

In closing, the President asked Ambassador Hilaly how things were in East Pakistan. The Ambassador replied that they had become a little better. The President thanked him for the good reception that our astronauts had had in Dacca.

The meeting closed with the President jokingly saying that he did not have any very formal gifts for the group such as he had often received on his travels abroad. He did recall, however, that there had been a bill signing in the Cabinet Room that morning and that it was his custom at such occasions to hand out pens with his signature on them. He gave each of the visitors one of these pens saying that it was “a little something that they could take home to their children.”

Harold H. Saunders²

² Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

22. Minutes of a Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, May 21, 1970, 2:35–3:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward the Mediterranean Area (NSSM 90)

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State—

William I. Cargo

Donald McHenry

Thomas Thornton

Defense—

Richard A. Ware

Robert Pranger

CIA—R. Jack Smith

JCS—MG Albert J. Bowley

OEP—Haakon Lindjord

USIA—Frank Shakespeare

NSC Staff—

Harold H. Saunders

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Richard Kennedy

Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

1. The Joint Staff would prepare an analysis of the nature of the Soviet threat and our comparative capabilities in time for the NSC meeting on the Middle East tentatively scheduled for June 3;²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² See Document 26.

2. The Working Group would revise the Cargo paper³ along the lines of the restatement of the approaches done by the NSC staff;

3. The response to NSSM 88 on Italy would be reviewed and a paper on Greece would be prepared as the basis for a brief discussion of the two countries at an NSC meeting on the Mediterranean.

Mr. Kissinger referred to the comprehensive paper for the meeting and mentioned two problems: (1) how to discuss the substance of the paper and (2) how we could meet the President's desire to talk about Greece and Italy in an NSC meeting on the Mediterranean. With regard to the paper, he asked if it made any sense to talk about the Mediterranean as an area or if it would be better to break it up into component parts.

Mr. Cargo said that geographic influences do exist but that political issues can probably be broken out into separate areas with one exception—that of the US strategic position and force levels. He referred to an INR study which had concluded that the features of disunity and the lack of commonality in the area were more distinctive than the unifying features.⁴ He thought, however, there was some educational and orientational value in looking at the Mediterranean as a whole.

Mr. Kissinger said there appeared to be a number of related but separable issues: e.g., Italy was not particularly influenced by Arab-Israeli developments except insofar as Italy might feel isolated by increasing Soviet influence in the area.

Mr. Ware commented that the question of the Soviet military and political role in the Mediterranean is a unifying factor.

Mr. Kissinger agreed that the Soviet strategic role should be discussed.

Mr. Cargo commented that the area appeared more separable than not. He noted the Arab-Israeli question was being considered in a separate group; Greece was being discussed by the Under Secretaries Committee; Italy and North Africa were the subjects of separate NSSMs.

Mr. Kissinger suggested we consider this paper as a general introduction to a specific examination of issues as was done in the case

³ The Cargo paper refers to the March 23 "U.S. Interests in and Policy Toward the Mediterranean," prepared in response to NSSM 90 by an ad hoc group chaired by William I. Cargo. (Ibid., Box H-044, Senior Review Group Meetings, Review Group NSSM 90) It was to be discussed at the April 24 meeting, which did not take place. The Analytical Summary of the paper, prepared for the June 17 NSC meeting, is Document 24. NSSM 90 is Document 19.

⁴ "The Mediterranean Basin: A Poor Prospect for Regionalism," January 30. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-044, Senior Review Group Meetings, Review Group NSSM 90)

of Latin America. We might first take a general conceptual approach which would be followed by a more politically oriented approach.

Mr. Lindjord commented that we might make the case that the Mediterranean had not had any strategic unity since 1945 when British influence was removed.

General Bowley said it was necessary to establish an overall policy for the Mediterranean before one can study the specific issues. He argued that the Joint Staff had not had an opportunity to insert their views into the Cargo paper.

Mr. Cargo replied there had been as much exchange as possible with Defense and JCS within the brief time allowed for the production of the paper.

Mr. Ware said that Defense had not seen the issues and options chapter before the paper came to the NSC staff and that they had serious problems with the paper. He believed that, if this paper were to become an introduction for consideration of specific problems, it would be necessary to take a second look at its basic concepts. He added that the paper recently produced by the NATO group also raised serious issues.

Mr. Shakespeare asked the nature of the fundamental disagreement between Defense and State.

Mr. Ware replied it related to the reason for the decline of the US role in the Mediterranean. Was it based on the success of our policy, as the Cargo paper implied, or have we reversed our policy of working with at least the moderate Arab states? He thought we should pay more attention to the political/military aspects of the area, and that the USSR was very successful in weaving together its political and military roles. He considered that the problem of the Soviet threat and of force structures had not been covered adequately in the Cargo paper. He agreed that the JCS had not had a chance to make their views known in the short time period allotted.

Mr. Kissinger said he saw no sense in discussing the Arab-Israeli question in this group since it was already under consideration in another group and would then move to the NSC.

Mr. Pranger referred to the NATO paper, saying that the issue of the Soviet threat was being discussed in the North Atlantic Council if not in Washington.

Mr. Cargo agreed there was no reason to go into the Arab-Israeli question in this group. With regard to force levels, he agreed that the paper did not discuss them in any detail. He referred, however, to the section on the long-range US role in the area (page 64) and the three options discussed, with their implications of different force levels. With regard to strategic comparability in the area, he believed there was a fairly thorough-going statement of Soviet and US objectives (page 11, page 16 and following).

Mr. Shakespeare asked if the JCS had not participated in the drafting of the paper.

General Bowley said JCS had been a member of the Working Group but had merely read the paper, did not like it, but had no opportunity to change it. He recommended, therefore, that the paper not go forward, and distributed a specific recommendation for a new study to "look at the Mediterranean properly."

Mr. Kissinger, referring to the JCS recommendation, asked if they were suggesting that the present paper took an "undisciplined and unsystematic approach" to the paper.

General Bowley said yes—that the JCS had found the paper generalized and unspecific. He thought we would have to get into the various regions in order to be specific. The paper lacked a comparative analysis of our interests with those of others. It contained no range of threats with matching strategies and did not adequately discuss the increasing Soviet threat in relation to the decreasing US capability. The paper contained four issues: (1) what is the threat; (2) should the Europeans do more; (3) the relation of the Arab states; (4) the relation of the North African states. He thought the last three questions could not be answered without an answer to the first question, and an answer to the first question would automatically provide answers to the other three. He thought the paper did not meet the requirements of the NSSM and that we needed a new start.

Mr. Cargo did not agree with General Bowley. The paper raised the essential questions, and the Soviet interest and threat was the central issue. He thought the JCS suggestions were additive and would provide more detail but he did not consider them essentially a substitute for the existing paper.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we could not add the military analysis and a comparative analysis to the section in the existing paper on the Soviet threat. He asked if we had not done a study of the Soviet threat in the Mediterranean in an earlier WSAG exercise.⁵

Mr. Saunders agreed that such a study had been done but was not as thorough as that now envisaged by the JCS.

Mr. Cargo agreed that we should have an analysis of the Soviet threat but commented that he was reluctant to lose the broader context of the existing paper.

Mr. Kissinger agreed with JCS that, whatever stance we take, we need a clearer idea of what we are taking a stance toward. He asked if

⁵ Presumably a reference to NSSM 33, March 21, 1969, and subsequent studies. Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

we could not try to incorporate a military and strategic analysis of the nature of the threat and our comparative capabilities.

Mr. Pranger questioned the tone of the paper, saying that it implies a fresh approach in viewing the Mediterranean in terms of “the interaction of outside forces on the one hand and subregional problems on the other.” He believed the area had always been viewed in that way and that the existing paper does not add much that is new.

Mr. Kissinger commented that we could distinguish between what is historically true and what has been historically done in the bureaucracy.

Mr. Cargo agreed that we have not looked at the Mediterranean as a whole.

Mr. Shakespeare asked if the JCS wished to analyze various likely Soviet objectives and interests.

General Bowley replied that they wished to examine the nature of the threat in the Mediterranean.

Mr. Kissinger commented that we could agree on the threat without agreeing on what to do about it. He thought we could have an analysis of the threat. However, deciding whether to confront the Soviet Union, let national forces play it out, or a combination of the two—is a political judgment. We need the analysis first. He noted that heretofore he had considered the Mediterranean as an American logistics area, but that he had learned in a WSAG exercise that we probably could not physically move our forces today as we had at the time of the Lebanon exercise.

Mr. Ware said we should not look at the threat as only a military one since the Soviets had integrated the military, political and economic aspects quite well.

General Bowley thought we must make some assumptions as to what the Soviets will do and then consider our options in terms of these various assumptions.

Mr. Shakespeare reminded Mr. Kissinger of the comment by Admiral Moorer at an earlier meeting that next year’s budget would involve substantial reductions in US forces in the Mediterranean and that Mr. Kissinger had thought that unacceptable.

Mr. Kissinger asked what sort of comparative projection we would need.

Mr. Ware asked about the timing of the exercise.

Mr. Kissinger replied that the Arab-Israeli situation would probably be discussed in the NSC in about two weeks.⁶ He thought the threat

⁶ Presumably a reference to the June 17 NSC meeting; see Document 26.

portion of the Mediterranean paper should be ready by then. He thought we had a little more time on the rest of the paper but noted that the President was anxious to discuss Greece and Italy. Since the Italian elections were so close, he suggested we might delay this NSC discussion until after those elections.

Mr. Ware said the Working Group had not been able to function because of the deadlines imposed and suggested that we let the Working Group revise the basic paper.

Mr. Kissinger agreed, except for the threat study which would be useful for the NSC discussion of the Middle East.

Mr. Saunders agreed that the threat study would be useful background and asked how elaborate it would be. He assumed that work had already been done on the Soviet threat in the area and that someone could collect existing material and summarize it in usable form.

General Bowley said the study could be completed in two weeks.

Mr. Smith asked how we could separate the Soviet threat in the Mediterranean from the Arab-Israeli problem. He thought it would be extremely difficult to define except in those terms.

Mr. Kissinger asked if he meant that you could not separate the SA-3's and Soviet aircraft in Egypt from the Soviet threat in a larger area. He asked what would be the effect if Soviet aircraft in Egypt were used against the Sixth Fleet.

Mr. Saunders said there were two questions: the Soviet naval threat and what would a Soviet air system operated out of Egypt do.

General Bowley commented that it was larger than this, noting possible extension to Wheelus. He said we were watching Soviet influence build and should ask where it is leading.

Mr. Kissinger asked why it would be so difficult to estimate the importance of Soviet air bases on US Mediterranean operations.

Mr. Ware referred to the implications in a Soviet use of Malta.

Mr. Smith explained that he meant a study of the threat must *include* Egypt.

Mr. Cargo saw no problem in expanding this discussion. He noted, however, that the existing paper was interlarded with references to Soviet power in the Mediterranean, citing pages 20 and 23.

Mr. Shakespeare agreed, however, that the paper does not lay out clear estimates of probable Soviet moves and how we should be prepared to meet them.

Mr. Smith agreed. He noted, however, that just as we have difficulty in treating the Mediterranean as an area, the Soviets have also found it difficult. He referred in this connection to their Syrian fiasco. He repeated that we would find it hard to agree on the nature of the threat.

Mr. Cargo cited the estimate of Soviet objectives in the area (page 24) which concluded that the Soviet threat to the littoral states is now mainly psychological and political. However, the security of Europe would be seriously threatened if the North African coast and the Mediterranean Sea should come under hostile domination.

Mr. Kissinger remarked that one of the JCS concerns had been with hardware, but that the extent of Soviet political influence was more difficult to measure. He said the paper raised the issue of whether we should deal with the area in terms of a US-Soviet confrontation or to what extent we should rely on regional forces. He asked if this was a real issue—must it be one or the other? Does anyone want a straight military confrontation with the USSR? Does anyone think a military confrontation plays no role? He thought the issue must be a mixture and was, in fact, a question of emphasis. He wondered if it was possible to decide in the abstract where the emphasis should be placed at any given moment in any given situation. He asked to what extent the countries concerned have an interest in reducing Soviet influence in the area.

Mr. Cargo agreed the sense of nationalism is a positive element insofar as the US is concerned, but that it was one factor and must be related to other factors.

Mr. Kissinger commented that, by putting it in the “either/or” context, it was not a live option. He thought an attempt to expel the Soviets by military power alone was simply not in the cards and that there must be a political component. He wondered if we would be more likely to reduce Soviet influence by relying on national forces or by creating a balance of power so that those who want to resist the Soviets will know that they have a friend.

General Bowley agreed this was very important, particularly with regard to Turkey and Greece.

Mr. Cargo said they had tried to get at this question in discussion of the long-range US role in the area. He referred to the options (pages 66–68), saying that Option A was weighted on the military side; Option B saw a shifting of the balance to the Europeans without severing our ties; and C envisaged retrenchment.

Mr. Ware cited the US withdrawal of 1600 troops from Leghorn, ostensibly for budgetary reasons. He said the Italians simply did not believe that a nation such as the US would withdraw 1600 troops for budgetary reasons alone. They assumed other reasons. Then, when they saw the Soviets moving more and more ships into the Mediterranean they would feel they had to decide which way to turn. This would have an impact on the US posture.

Mr. Shakespeare suggested that the novelty of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean has focused attention on Soviet power as opposed

to the acceptance of the established Western presence in the Mediterranean. He thought any unexpected development now, such as the downfall of Hussein in Jordan or a strong leftist election victory in Italy, could have serious psychological effects. It would add to the momentum, would make people in the area exceedingly nervous, and would affect our ability to maneuver. They favored enhancing a NATO capability in the Mediterranean as a counter to Soviet power.

Mr. Kissinger referred to the discussion of the long-range US role in the Mediterranean and a possible division between the US and the Europeans. We can say we should not take a forward role, but this might have different meanings in different areas. We might look to the French in the Maghreb, but in the Arab-Israeli dispute no other European country was able or willing to play a role comparable to that of the US. We could use this paper to state general propositions and outline a basic stance. He commended Mr. Cargo on an "amazing performance" in producing the paper, given the nature of the assignment and the time allowed in which to complete it.

Mr. Cargo commented that the basic difficulty in producing the paper lay in the fact that the common elements in the area are not all that many.

Mr. Kissinger said that we should look at the balance of US and European interests. With regard to the long-range US role in the Mediterranean, no one would consider increasing our military posture, as such, as a solution. It would be consistent with the Nixon doctrine that wherever possible we should rely on national forces. They may not be enough in some parts of the Mediterranean and we may have to reach conscious decisions to go in or go out. We could state the general propositions and try to relate them to specifics. He referred to the restatement of the Cargo options done by the NSC staff (pages 7-8 of HAK's talking points)⁷ which were not mutually exclusive. He thought we might go through a period of containment to reach equilibrium. He thought this restatement of the propositions might provide an approach to a general stance.

⁷ These pages summarized alternative strategies for dealing with an enhanced Soviet role, the balance of U.S. and European interests and responsibilities, and assessment of long-range U.S. interests in the Arab countries and Mediterranean. According to the Talking Points, the alternative strategies were not presented in the Cargo paper, and were broad rather than tactical. The alternative strategies were to offset Soviet military power through establishing a regional balance of power, competition with the Soviets coupled with disarmament, limitation of Soviet influence through regional nationalisms, a lowered U.S. profile without disengagement, and alignment with "progressive" forces in the area. (Talking Points, undated; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-044, Senior Review Group Meetings, Review Group NSSM 90)

General Bowley, Mr. Smith and Mr. Thornton all agreed with Saunders' approach.

Mr. Ware asked if the Working Group could meet on the paper rather than merely comment on a paper circulated for comment.

Mr. Cargo agreed.

Mr. Shakespeare noted French construction of a radio transmitter on Cyprus which would provide a much stronger signal in the Mediterranean than that of the Voice. He saw this as evidence that the French must care a great deal about talking to the Arabs.

Mr. Kissinger asked how we can best handle Italy and Greece. He thought the President's major concern was to get a feel for the impact of the domestic situations in these countries on their foreign policy and the possible impact of the US on their domestic situations.

Mr. Cargo noted that the Greek situation had been discussed in the arms supply context and said he would talk to the Department to see what type of paper might be useful on Greece. With regard to Italy, he noted that they had already prepared a response to NSSM 88.

Mr. Kissinger asked that the Italian paper be reviewed and that a paper on Greece be considered, with a view to a 15 minute discussion in the NSC on these two countries.

Mr. Smith suggested we might throw in Turkey and consider the three countries with relation to NATO.

Mr. Kissinger agreed that this might be helpful but said the President had not asked for this approach. He was primarily concerned about the domestic policies in Greece and Italy, the problems of the Alliance, their future orientation, and the degree to which these could be influenced by the US.

23. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 5, 1970.

President's Meeting with his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Admiral George Anderson
Mr. Gordon Gray
Mr. Robert Murphy
Mr. J. Patrick Coyne

Dr. William Baker
Mr. Franklin Murphy
Governor Nelson Rockefeller
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Brigadier General A.M. Haig, Jr.

The President convened the meeting at 12:05. He introduced the meeting by pointing out that he was to have a National Security Council meeting sometime in the following week.² He made the following points to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board:

—Escalation by the Soviets has put the heat on the United States and the recent action by 73 Senators outlining support for the President in this crisis underlines the importance of the event.³

—The President pointed out that the Board should be aware that Arab moderates could be inclined to lean in the direction of the United States due to the Soviet aggressiveness.

—The Arab moderates obviously do not want the balance of power to shift them.

—It is difficult to maintain a balance in the Middle East with the introduction of Soviet combat personnel into Egypt. The President pointed out that some maintained position that we should do nothing. But if we do nothing the Israelis may be forced to act. Also, it is apparent that there will be no settlement without U.S. and Soviet agreement. This may be possible sooner or later. If we wait for later, then the President visualizes some flash point with great dangers which might then ultimately result in agreement. The Soviets on the other hand probably are delighted with a status quo since they are exploiting it with greatly increased influence.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 276, Agency Files, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.

² See Document 26.

³ A copy of the Senators' May 26 letter to Rogers is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1251, Saunders Files, Basic Policy—Middle East 1/1/70–12/31/70. The letter stated that the appearance of Soviet pilots flying missions over Egypt in April was "a significant change and a challenge to American strategic interests and a growing threat to world peace. Recent Soviet moves have encouraged Arab belligerence, and are creating a growing military imbalance in favor of the Arab states." The Senators urged Nixon to provide additional jet aircraft to Israel in response to this Soviet "escalation."

The President also pointed out that the Soviets fear the fedayeen just as does Nasser. However, on balance, to the degree that we line up solidly with Israel, the Soviets acquire support from the other elements by default. Finally, the President emphasized that the main danger today is that Israel may move militarily and that we will be looking down the barrels with the Soviet Union again. On balance, the President believes that if there is to be a settlement, it must be imposed. It would be a settlement which would be not to the liking of either Israel or the Arabs. It is really a question of the degree of dissatisfaction shared by both. For this reason, the U.S. and the Soviets must talk, but at a time and under circumstances in which the Soviets feel it is in their interest to do so. They do not feel this way at present. So we must keep them worried about the Middle East. The President emphasized that he had no domestic political problem on this issue and it would be influenced only by the national interests. At present, he feels that it is necessary that we put Israel in a position that they can be a serious worry to the Soviets. The President added that the U.S. has no illusions about Four Power or Israeli/Nasser talks. The only solution would be one imposed by both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Franklin Murphy stated that the Arabs feel that the loss of oil is a deterrent to the United States and its actions with respect to Israel. He wondered whether or not we were studying the implications of what it would mean to lose Middle East oil. The President replied that this would be a serious turn of events, especially from Europe's point. On the other hand, the President pointed out the Arab oil producers cannot drink their oil and must have a market. This was the issue in Iran some years ago.

Franklin Murphy then added: Isn't there a wheel within a wheel. Without the benefits and revenues from the oil in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the fedayeen movement would collapse. Dr. Kissinger added that the fedayeen movement was fundamentally subsidized by the moderate Arabs, as well as some Soviet support.

Robert Murphy stated if we examine the Middle East issue in depth, I feel that what you have said will be largely verified. The President replied: Yes, this indicates that the oil problem is not quite so bad as frequently depicted, and that in any event the Arabs must sell their oil.

Admiral Anderson stated that it is also important that we, the United States, do not get isolated on this issue and that we keep our moderate Arab friends with us. The President agreed that this is necessary on the surface at any rate.

Governor Rockefeller stated that as we look down the road, we can see the Soviets behind all the problems in the Middle East and he wondered whether or not they could absorb all of the Middle East's oil.

Franklin Murphy stated that while these are the realities of the Middle East situation, the evidence is that the Soviets' role in the Middle East is not understood in the Moslem world and they view it as strictly an anti-Israeli problem. Dr. Kissinger stated that the Moslems worry about the Soviet Union on entirely different grounds. Robert Murphy stated that he believed that on balance the Soviets do not enjoy that much prestige in the Middle East among the Arab nations. The President interrupted, nevertheless the wheels continue to turn. He wants to consider this issue on the 16th of June⁴ with the view of deciding where we go from here.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Middle East.]

⁴ See Document 25.

24. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, June 12, 1970.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

A U.S. APPROACH TO THE GREATER MEDITERRANEAN REGION

Note: This is not a decision paper. It is an exercise to find a broader conceptual approach to policy in this area. Policy formulation is now handled in more than half a dozen bureaucratic compartments, and real issues are often obscured.

I. The Area Under Study

A. Definition. Some would say that the states bordering the Mediterranean are too diverse to be thought of as a coherent region. The forces and relationships that play across this area, however, are

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1248, Saunders Files, NSSM 90—Mediterranean Policy. Secret. This paper is an analytical summary of the response to NSSM 90, Document 19. The response to NSSM 90, originally dated March 23 and referred to as the Cargo paper, was discussed at the May 21 SRG meeting. See Document 22 and footnote 3 thereto.

significant enough to suggest that a slightly *broadier definition would identify an area of serious policy concerns*. For instance:

—The arena of increased *Soviet activity* defines an area including Iran, Turkey, Greece, Italy, Algeria, perhaps Libya, UAR, Somalia, Sudan, South Yemen, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, potentially the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea itself.

—As a platform for *NATO–U.S. strategic response*, the area has contracted from one including SAC, transit, missile or training bases in the NATO countries, Morocco, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Spain, to one involving only the NATO members, Spain, and the Sea itself. Even on the Sea, the strategic role of the Sixth Fleet has changed somewhat with the threat of Soviet air or naval bases on the southern or eastern shore.

—The area *defined economically* would start with the *Common Market nucleus* and first reach out to include those nations associating with the Market or having a special relationship with one of its members—Greece, Turkey, Israel, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Spain, with more to come. This area might also be broadened to include the *principal suppliers of oil to Western Europe*—Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya—because the oil is a major factor in the area's strategic as well as its economic importance.

—Areas of *special U.S. interest* include, in addition to the NATO countries, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Israel.

—Definition of the area should also take into account the *principal relationships of nations within the area* in addition to those above:

France–Arab nations
France–Spain–Morocco–Tunisia–Algeria–Libya
Maghreb
Arab nations
Israel–Turkey–Iran (recognized common interests and cooperation)
Libya–UAR–Sudan (new association)
UAR–Iraq–Jordan–Syria–Lebanon (confrontation states)
Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, UK (guarantor powers, Cyprus)
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, UAR, Jordan (Khartoum Fund economic assistance)

Conclusion: These interrelationships seem to define a geographical area of intensified activity which includes the states bordering on the Mediterranean plus the mainly Western European, Arab and Persian Gulf states behind them. Beyond that area the criss-cross of interrelationships falls off sharply, though Pakistan and to a lesser extent India as well as the Indian Ocean play a role on one side and sub-Saharan African associations on the other.

B. *Advantages from this kind of treatment.* While it would be artificial to try to formulate detailed policy for an area as diverse as this,

there are advantages in looking at the area's major problems in relationship to each other. For instance:

—*Arab-Israel*. The more narrowly this problem is viewed, the fewer the U.S. options seems to be. Viewed in the context of the broader area, there is greater choice since the U.S.-Soviet contest appears as but one of the forces at work; the dangers of working via proxies become more apparent because the limits on outsiders are seen as a more general phenomenon; ways of strengthening our position elsewhere in the area while riding out the absence of an Arab-Israeli settlement become more apparent.

—*Greece and Spain*. There is substantial pressure to keep each at arms length because of their present non-democratic forms of government. It is only when these countries are seen in light of the fact that they are two of the few points the U.S. can count on for staging into other parts of the Mediterranean that the counter-argument becomes compelling. Also, their influence could add to the number of constructive forces at work in the area.

—*Trade policy* worldwide dictates that the U.S. oppose preferential trade agreements, and preferential arrangements between the Common Market and the Mediterranean countries are not necessarily components of closer relations between them. However, the U.S. may have a strong political interest in evolution of closer economic relationships between the countries of this region and preferential arrangements would speed that process.

—The *Sixth Fleet* was established principally to fulfill a general war mission in connection with NATO forces. Increasingly the contingencies the Fleet is most likely to be called on to deal with are less general war contingencies and more contingencies within the region itself.

—The *Persian Gulf* is sufficiently remote and yet dependent on Western European petroleum markets that the U.S. is tempted to stand back and let the stronger powers around it organize its security and stability. It is only when it is related to broader forces at work in the area as a whole—Arab radicalism, Soviet naval interest, Arab-Iranian rivalry, the drive for modernization—that one becomes less easy about leaving it to its own devices.

II. Analytical Bases for Policy and the Issues

Disagreement over policies in this area often grows out of different judgments over what really are the significant developments there. The annex to this paper² discusses in detail the major actors, their interrelations, and the operational issues flowing therefrom.

² Attached but not printed.

There are two broad views of the dynamics of the area:

—*One view* is that the main factor is that this area has become *the major new arena in the global U.S.–Soviet contest*. This approach emphasizes that, with a stand-off long established on the NATO central front, the East-West conflict has now spilled over to the south of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This bases U.S. policy on the judgment that this is *the main thing* going on in the area.

—*A second view* does not dismiss the fact that this is the major new area for Soviet–U.S. competition, but tends to place this more in the context of other new forces at work there. It asks whether there is advantage in thinking of the area this way: This area is in a period of adjustment to a new configuration of international influences. After years when major powers provided the dominant external influence, now no single external influence is likely to dominate. In the future, a collection of external and internal influences will seek a balance.

The fundamental question for the policy-maker is what blend of the above attitudes to adopt as a touchstone for policy judgments:

—What degree of direct U.S. control and involvement are necessary to counter expansion of Soviet influence throughout the area or to encourage indigenous forces that will?

—Conversely, to what extent can the U.S. take a secondary role, relying on indigenous forces to deny Soviet control?

Whichever view of the area one holds, limiting Soviet influence is a major U.S. interest. The question for argument, in short, is: What is the best way to limit that influence, given the forces now at work in the area?

The answer depends initially on the answers to questions like these:

—How important are our interests in the greater Mediterranean and how much direct U.S. support do they require?

—How great is the Soviet military and political threat and what are its goals?

—What capabilities do the regional states have for preserving the security and independence of the region?

But the basic issue is:

With what combination should the U.S. contest the extension of Soviet influence: mainly by means of military containment—either directly or through proxies like Israel—or mainly by trying to subordinate military containment to a pluralistic strategy based on indigenous political containment?

—Some argue that a strong military posture is the only position that Moscow understands and will respect. The Soviets apparently see a large enough interest in the UAR to accept the risks of operating

weapons systems to counter Israeli attacks. The U.S. risks appearing to have backed down in the face of Soviet pressure if it does not seem prepared to respond directly to protect its friends.

—These would argue that the U.S. has no choice but to bolster the position of its effective friends and allies—NATO members, Israel, Iran—to withstand encroachment by Soviet forces and proxies. If strengthening our friends has the effect of looking like a challenge to the USSR, that may be beneficial. Since U.S. friends tend to be more effective than Soviet proxies, the lesson might be learned that it pays to deal with the U.S.

—Others contend the U.S. has no interest in a direct confrontation with the USSR over the area unless that confrontation becomes an adjunct to a larger confrontation over Europe. If the U.S. does not wish to go to war over any part of this area for its own sake, the U.S. should avoid wherever possible escalating this contest into a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

—The contest is primarily a long-term one for political influence, not mainly for current military position. Neither U.S. nor probable Soviet strategy requires military control over specific territory in the area. Military forces and position will be used mainly to enhance political influence, not vice versa.

—A policy of military containment and confrontation will not be supported by interested European states in the area.

There are two related questions:

1. To what extent is Soviet-U.S. interaction likely to influence the political complexion of this area over the next decade?

—Some believe that, however much the U.S. and USSR may wish to limit their involvement, their interests are such that their rivalry will be a significant influence on the area. This rivalry cannot help but shape political developments. If, for instance, the USSR forces the U.S. more and more into Israel's corner, this will increase the political pressure from the radical side on moderate regimes in the area. Thus the posture of the Great Powers—and their global relationship—will at least indirectly affect the turn of political events in the area. They contend that the U.S. cannot afford to underrate the capacity of the USSR to exploit radical movements to enhance its own position.

—Others argue that the day is over when outside powers will set the direction of events in this area. Local forces are now strong enough not only to limit the involvement of outside powers but to influence their posture. Local forces have brought an end to British and French predominance and, outside NATO and Europe, to U.S. military bases. These forces have shown wariness of too close a relationship, outside

NATO, with both the U.S. and the USSR. They have demonstrated, especially in the Arab-Israeli area, that the major outside powers do not have the capability to prevent the outbreak of war or make peace.

—They believe that to assume that the great powers can play out their contest while minimizing the role of local forces is to base policy on an erroneous appraisal of the strength of these forces. There is no question that these local forces will try to exploit the great powers' rivalry and will in turn be exploited by them to some degree. But the balance is fine enough so that either of the great powers risks being drawn into local conflict against its will if it banks too heavily on its ability to shape the future by manipulating local forces.

2. *To what extent are regional forces likely to work in favor of the U.S. or in favor of the Soviet Union?*

—Some contend that the more prominent political forces are those that work against Western interests: Arab radical movements are directed at traditional governments and Western oil interests; they also create an atmosphere in which it is difficult for the Western approach to economic development to operate. The Palestinian movements will have the effect first of keeping the Middle Eastern pot boiling; even if the Arab-Israeli issue were defused, they would seem likely to turn against established pro-Western regimes.

—Certainly as long as there is no Arab-Israeli settlement, the U.S. cannot hope to improve its position in the Arab parts of this area. Whether or not the radical forces turned loose work in Moscow's favor, the fact that they work against the U.S. is a step in the right direction as far as Moscow is concerned.

—Even some of the Europeans will pursue interests which diverge from the U.S. In this way they tend to operate as a separate force in the area, and the Soviets will be able to exploit these divergencies.

—Others argue that the Soviets have shown themselves wary of close alignment with the more militant movements such as the Palestinian movement. Moscow has kept the door open to them, but Moscow has felt it more prudent to deal primarily with established governments. The more radical movements may attack the foundation of Western interests but they do not necessarily offer a commensurate gain to the USSR. At worst, the USSR has to be concerned that such movements in its own backyard will eventually assume more a pro-Chinese than a pro-Soviet complexion.

—In any case the Europeans involved may decide to concert their approach, independent of the U.S.

—Finally, events outside the area may influence Europeans such as the French to oppose any policy directed openly against the USSR.

—One cannot dismiss the strength of constructive forces in the area. There are extensive wealth-producing resources and a large group of people and institutions who could be engaged in the process of turning that wealth into economic progress. The elites and technocrats of the area know well that it is Western technology and development doctrine that will produce these results and not Soviet. This understanding is certainly apparent in Turkey, Iran, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon and the Persian Gulf, but it is also prevalent even in a place like the UAR.

—Even leaders like Nasser would prefer to balance the great powers off against each other rather than to be beholden to one. On the whole the Europeans offer an alternative to Great Power alignment and thus help to defuse tensions.

III. Possible U.S. Strategies

A. Introduction

For the sake of discussion, it is useful to start by posing two different views toward this area. Neither by itself would represent a viable strategy, but they isolate the elements that must be married in a workable strategy.

1. The first is the view that U.S. interests and the situation in the Mediterranean require a large measure of U.S. *control* in the region. The Soviet thrust requires a forceful military and political response; only the U.S. has the power and the concern to protect Western interests. The U.S. must, therefore, preserve an independent position in the area and sufficient capacity to influence events so that it is a power to be reckoned with.

2. The second is the view that local nationalism and other indigenous forces are now strong enough to *deny* Soviet predominance and that denial is sufficient to create a pluralistic framework in which U.S. interests can be pursued. This does not mean that the U.S. can back off entirely but that the U.S. has the freedom of maneuver to take a few losses.

3. The issue is not to choose between these two views but to draw a line on range of intermediate positions between them. The question is: *What strategy provides the degree of influence the U.S. needs in a situation it cannot control?*

B. *One way of posing possible strategies.* The strategies outlined below are distinguished from each other mainly to identify general differences of approach and emphasis. Elements of several may actually be woven together in working out a realistic course of action toward any given problem. In this conceptual framework there are five basic strategies:

1. Direct containment of Soviet influence.
2. Agreed limitation of U.S.-Soviet involvement.

3. Long-run reliance on an equilibrium of a number of forces in the area.
4. Passing prime responsibility to the Europeans.
5. Aligning ourselves more closely with the “Progressive” forces in the area.

Following the discussion of these strategies below, their application to specific problems is illustrated in the next section of this analytical summary.

[Omitted here are sections outlining individual strategies for dealing with the Soviet threat and the application of those strategies.]

25. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 15, 1970.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Messrs. Lincoln, Anderson and Murphy (Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board)—11 a.m., Tuesday, June 16

Background: You will recall last fall having requested that Messrs. Franklin Lincoln, George Anderson and Robert Murphy visit selected countries from Morocco to Iran for the purpose of providing you with some extra-bureaucratic insights on the role of the United States in this area in conjunction with your thinking about a possible “Mediterranean policy.”² They are meeting with you today to report their findings personally. Each gentleman can be expected to describe his impression of the particular area visited. From preliminary reports from two, you can expect the following:

*Franklin Lincoln [Reports at Tab B]:*³ Mr. Lincoln travelled to the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia (he saw King Faisal) and Beirut (he saw President Helou). Overall impressions include:

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 276, Agency Files, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. IV. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. A handwritten notation at the end of the memorandum says: “No press photo.” According to Nixon’s Daily Diary for June 16, he met with members of PFIAB from 11:20 a.m. to 12:06 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) No other record of the meeting has been found.

² Documentation on the trips of PFIAB members is in *ibid.*, NSC Files, Box 275, Agency Files, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vols. II and III.

³ Tab B, March 10, is attached but not printed. All brackets are in the original.

—U.S. policy is pro-Israel and anti-Arab.

—The Soviet threat is real; close U.S. identification with Israel deprives the moderates of an alternative.

—Further sale of Phantoms to Israel would be disastrous.

—The Gulf States are alarmed at the lack of U.S. appreciation of its own national interest—\$3.5 billion investment and \$2 billion in oil and trade revenues.

—The U.S. must begin a dialogue with the Palestinians.

—The U.S. could compel Israel to a settlement in the Arab view.

—The U.S., in the Arab view, has a role to play in settling the Arab-Israeli dispute which would bring peace and nullify Russian attempts to dominate.

—Lebanon needs U.S. arms to keep the loyalty of its citizenry (especially in Southern Lebanon where fedayeen subversion is strong). Lebanon facing increasing difficulty in avowing its traditional close ties with the U.S.

*Admiral Anderson [Report at Tab A]:*⁴ George Anderson visited Italy, Spain, Malta, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. General impressions include:

—A general trend in all of those countries to be more friendly to the Arabs.

—The reality of the increasing Soviet naval presence as a threat to NATO's southern flank and our Sixth Fleet. (We should resume military aid to Greece and enhance the Fleet.)

—The plausibility of greater U.S. reliance on European familiarity with North Africa to uphold the free world position there. (Our clandestine work is especially weak.) [He may elaborate on his private knowledge of a possible Morocco–Spain–Portugal defensive arrangement which Morocco is suggesting.]

—Evidence that the “lid” is being kept on Cyprus due to greater cooperation by the Greeks and the possibility of greater Greek, Turk, U.S. and UK efforts to move Cyprus toward a Western-oriented rather than just neutral position.

—Evidence of good intentions on the part of the Greeks to be a friendly NATO member. As they feel secure, they will move toward parliamentary government; we can resume military aid while observing their performance.

—Indications that the left-wing anti-NATO opposition in Malta may come to power in 1971. Greater U.S. cooperation with the British (they have the economic foothold there) would stem this, thus protecting our NATO command presence.

⁴ Tab A, January 15, is attached but not printed.

—The need for more U.S. clandestine work in the Italian situation where the communists pose a threat—not as winners but—as a strong opposition force working to improve ties with the Soviet bloc.

Robert Murphy went to North Africa and to Italy, arranging his own schedule, and will report to you personally today.

Discussion Points: As you know, Wednesday's NSC discussion⁵ will concentrate on the Mediterranean, Greece and Italy—a first effort in looking at the possibility of a U.S. policy for the broader Mediterranean. It has long been thought that the many states surrounding the Mediterranean were so diverse as to preclude any broad conceptual approach to this area. However, an examination of the various local and international forces that play across the area suggest now the plausibility of a less compartmentalized policy than in the past.

These three trips were conceived with that idea of providing you with some extra insights into this possibility of a broader Mediterranean policy. In this context, you may wish to:

1. Ask each of these gentlemen to report on his personal reflections.
2. Then ask what thoughts they have about a broad U.S. approach to the entire area:

—What do they feel is the main U.S. policy problem across this area?

—What are the possibilities for an increased U.S. presence in the area outside the context of the Arab-Israeli dispute?

⁵ See Document 26.

26. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, June 17, 1970, 3 p.m.

MEDITERRANEAN, GREECE, ITALY: NSSM 90

President: The Mediterranean is a subject that has been under consideration for some time.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1970. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.

Let's start with a briefing from Director Helms. Dick?

Mr. Helms: I propose to focus on the significance of the area as a whole. The American security interest is recent. For 30 years we have maintained a strong presence there. Our interests are: the southern flank of Southern Europe; the security of Israel; and the security of oil shipments for Europe from the Middle East.

We have seen a fundamental change in the strategic situation. After the Second World War the Soviet Union soon established itself. In the mid-1950's it began its arms aid to the radical Arab states. By the mid-60's it had established a Mediterranean squadron. They have always viewed the Mediterranean in geo-political terms, as a strategic military zone that protects the Southwestern border of the USSR and provides a path for projecting southward into Africa. The Soviets' naval objective is principally political and psychological. Militarily, they shadow the Sixth Fleet. It is clear they plan to stay in the Mediterranean area.

Recently they have made striking gains:

—Their role and presence in providing the air defense in Egypt represents a major upping of their stakes and risks in the area.

—In Italy they have been steady. The Communists did not make gains in the elections—they dropped marginally—but the Party is 1.5 million strong. It is definitely not autonomous; the Soviets have used pressure, for example, backing the old guard faction. The elections have given Rumor a boost.

—In Greece and Turkey—Turkey is firmly committed to its NATO ties and is almost certain to remain in NATO. But while they will exert more vigorous influence in the Alliance, they will probably continue to expand their relations with the USSR, particularly in the economic field.

Moscow has played up to both sides in the Cyprus situation.

President: Thank you, Dick. Henry?

Kissinger: We made an intensive examination of American policy toward the whole area, but we also made several special studies of our policy toward specific areas. The discussion today on the operational side will be confined primarily to Greece and Italy.

We have tried to develop conceptual approaches.

There have been substantial changes in recent years.

President: All bad.

Kissinger: There is the increased Soviet military presence (which has its effects in the Israel/Arab context), the fleet, and NATO. There is political unrest in Greece and Italy. There is the relation with NATO—at a time when for Greece the only point of access is the United States. In Italy there is political uncertainty.

The countries of the area can be divided into four types: the NATO countries; friendly countries like Spain and Israel; moderate littoral countries like Morocco and Tunisia; and radical governments like Algeria and Syria.

There are three types of struggles going on: the Arab-Israel conflict; parallel groups of outsiders; and the great power confrontation of the U.S. and the USSR.

Several policies could be conducted, and are being conducted:

—In the NATO area, the policy is still basically containment of Soviet power.

—There are efforts for peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

—There is an attempt to let the local balances of forces work themselves out.

—There is a future possibility of a greater influence and role for the Europeans.

Generalizations about the area are difficult. It is clearly a tricky area for U.S. policy.

The questions we face are the following:

—To the extent that we continue to seek containment of Soviet power, can we afford not to have firm relations with Greece and not to look at it from the security point of view?

—To what extent must the Soviet military presence on the southern flank of NATO be contained? If we decide to contain it, how do we do it? It is related to the whole question of NATO force levels.

—Can we afford to reduce the Sixth Fleet?

—What is the role of the Fleet in the new situation?

—What is the relationship of the Arab-Israel dispute to and what is the role of Spain and others in the containment policy?

—To what extent should we try to line up the moderate states? What is the U.S. interest to shore up the moderates?

—To what extent can the U.S. rely on Western Europe to play a role in the area? What kind of role can or should Europe play?

President: I expected this would take several meetings. The question of the usefulness of the Sixth Fleet has been directly raised. Let me ask, what kind of military force does Spain have?

Moorer: A good one. It has a problem in technical back-up, but it will be more influential in the future.

Rogers: There are not many encouraging things there, but the Spanish Government at lower levels is good; they're oriented to closer ties with NATO. With Algeria and Tunisia our relations are closer. Our relations with Algeria are improving. They should have some concern about Libya.

President: There are no Soviets in Libya.

Helms: No.

Rogers: Probably there will be later, but not yet. We seem to have neglected the area. We should strengthen our position there.

President: How could this fall down? Many things are not controllable, but how could we let it go? Both we and NATO need to take a stronger view.

Rogers: But they haven't helped on Malta.

Moorer: Spain could be helpful in the Western Mediterranean.

President: I've been in Spain twice before 1968. The younger people are good, and the military too.

Moorer: Yes.

Rogers: The new Spanish Ambassador is very capable. The Foreign Minister may take Franco's place.

[Omitted here is discussion of NATO and possible Greek withdrawal.]

President: We've got to take a hard look at our military posture. Let us suppose late in the summer we get a request from Lebanon or Jordan for assistance, or something happens in Lebanon. What can we do?

Kissinger: We could put a division—10,000 marines and forces from Europe. The problem is what would the Soviets do if we do it.

President: It's different from 1958. The issue is the fedayeen now. We must have ready a plan. There comes a time when the U.S. is going to be tested as to its credibility in the area. The real questions will be, will we act? Our action has to be considered in that light. We must be ready.

Rogers: If our friends in Lebanon asked for U.S. troops—if the Syrians move in—what do we do?

Sisco: I lean toward an affirmative decision.

President: Is the question really a military one or is it our credibility as a power in the area? Congress seems to care only about Israel. Many in the Mediterranean area don't think this is right.

Sisco: I would rather say to the NATO allies: "Would you be prepared to move in multilaterally?" But the NATO allies won't do it. We then hold back.

President: What about the French?

Tasca: If the French thought we would go in, they'd stay out.

[Omitted here is discussion of Greece.]

27. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State¹

Kuwait, September 18, 1970, 1045Z.

835. For Asst Secretary Sisco.

1. As you are aware, we expect PFLP spectaculars here. We are in close liaison with the government and the oil companies and are endeavoring to tighten security posture to optimum degree. We have no illusions, however, about vulnerability of industrial units and Embassy in face of determined and skillful enemies. PLO has called for general strike tomorrow and students will attempt to drum up mass meeting with possible objective of march on Jordanians or US. Police should be able to control them. PFLP, however, may prove different proposition.

2. We simply recognize life as it is, and we anticipate it will get tougher. Our best bet, in my opinion, is the continuation of your effort to get the Arabs and Israelis talking under Jarring's umbrella.² I speak very clearly to the Arabs about their feckless stupidity and viciousness in respect to the missiles and the hijacking.³ They agree, but they are, weakly, what they are. This does not mean, however, that the Israelis are innocent lambs in respect to the present mess or that we should be caught up in their inhibitions and objectives. I urge that we stay very true to our own objectives, which happen to be a legitimate peace. The enormous emotional gains in the Arab world resulting from our peace initiative are beginning to wash away as we respond to Israeli requests and emotionalism which are being given quite a free run as a result of Arab stupidity and chicanery. I believe that we should keep the Arabs focused on their own mess and not permit them to slip it off on the emotional basis that we are in the Israeli camp. In every way we can we should keep their nose in what they have done and, if physically possible, their eye on what they so desperately need—peace. If we say, or do, much more which can be construed in this region as pro-Israeli, we are going to pay some bitter prices.

Walsh

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 KUW. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

² For information on the Jarring Mission, see footnote 9, Document 3.

³ For documentation on the hijackings, see Documents 199 ff.

28. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Turkey, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Iran¹

Washington, October 30, 1970, 0407Z.

178786. Subject: US-UK Talks on CENTO.

1. *Summary:* US/UK discussions on CENTO revealed close similarity of views. Both agreed should continue present support of CENTO even though CENTO has only limited value. UK hopes continue present level CENTO economic support but urges US increase its declining (due completion capital projects) CENTO financial support either via increased CENTO labelling or as actual increase. US noted (a) relatively high level of US aid if both bilateral assistance and CENTO assistance considered; (b) lack evidence Regionals want increased CENTO labelling and (c) failure Regionals suggest capital projects which meet our criteria. UK proposed creation CENTO Multilateral Industrial Fund to assist in industrial development. We agreed consider carefully. Both agreed we should not approach RCD but should be prepared consider RCD request for assistance. Since Pakistani intentions re CENTO uncertain now, both agreed take look later. If Pakistan opts out, UK supports idea of truncated CENTO primarily because UK has no other treaty arrangement with Iran. We reserved our position stating that we would wish consider all options at time. (*End Summary*)

2. Talks with UK on CENTO held Washington October 27. British side consisted of Minister Millard, First Secretary Melhuish and Overseas Development Authority representative McKenzie-Johnson. US represented by DepAsstSec Van Hollen, Schiff, Helseth and Wampler (AID).²

3. UK stated its review stimulated by very gloomy report on CENTO submitted early 1970 by former UK Ambassador in Ankara Allen, who inter alia suggested converting CENTO into ANZUS-type organization without permanent staff. On basis FCO review, UK however had concluded that CENTO: (a) puts USSR on notice against adventures in ME; (b) provides framework for UK alliance with Iran (which UK values) and amongst three Regionals; (c) gives Shah entree into Western councils; and (d) serves useful function in coordinating

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 4 CENTO. Confidential. Drafted by William A. Helseth (NEA/RA) on October 29; cleared in NEA/RA, AID/NESA, NEA/IRN, NEA/PAF, NEA/TUR, and EUR/BMI; and approved by Van Hollen.

² Stanley D. Schiff, Director of Regional Affairs, NEA; William A. Helseth, Multilateral Organizations Adviser, Directorate of Regional Affairs, NEA; and Mary Wampler, AID.

Regionals' interests. UK believes economic program is of most importance and is, in fact key to CENTO's future. Demise of CENTO would be to disadvantage of West, especially in view UK withdrawal from Persian Gulf and USSR expansion there. UK had considered its role in CENTO in this light. Various possibilities had been examined including possible shift to observer status; however, UK has decided its main interest is "to soldier on" and continue its current role.

4. US stated our reviews of 1969 and 1970 had raised essentially same questions and had reached same conclusion: CENTO, even if only of limited value, serves useful purpose at small cost. We therefore intend stay on course and gratified UK anticipates no diminution its role.

5. UK hopes maintain its role at roughly present level including economic assistance of about \$2.4 million per year. UK believes CENTO could be plausible cover for increased naval presence in Persian Gulf (visits and joint maneuvers, not a semi-permanent presence) but care must be exercised not to make Shah think we expanding CENTO military activity. UK noted no decision yet taken so that it remains an option dependent upon number of events, especially stability in Gulf. We said our views not yet crystallized, and we would give UK considered reaction.

6. Brits urged US provide more aid through CENTO either via increased CENTO labelling or as actual increase. Brits argued capital projects spending nearing end, and US support of CENTO would register drop to one half million dollars annually. Brits urged we seek maintain our total CENTO support at roughly \$5 million annually. Discussion revealed Brits prompted mainly by internal UK presentation problems with some within HMG contrasting British CENTO contribution of about \$2.4 million unfavorably with US contribution of about one-half million. We gave no ground on this suggestion. We noted a) no felt need or desire on part Regionals for increased CENTO labelling; b) US had indicated willingness consider support for projects meeting our criteria but Regionals have not presented additional projects for consideration in recent years; and c) US FY 70 aid of all types to CENTO countries totals over \$300 million even if only one-half million dollars slugged "CENTO." Of this, \$11.7 million is Technical Assistance to CENTO countries.

7. UK floated suggestion for establishment of a CENTO Multilateral Industrial Fund (CMIF) with an initial capital of \$250,000 to be contributed by members on basis CENTO cost sharing formula and to be replenished on an as needed basis. Objective would be further development of industrial projects having multinational value, training of industrial managers and provision of consultants. Might also undertake feasibility studies for those projects which meet criteria. Brits pointed out this idea, which not yet cleared with their own Treasury

people, might be useful in heading off regional proposals of more grandiose nature. They are openminded on terms of reference for fund. Brits suggested US and UK might make joint proposal to January Economic Experts meeting, but agreed prior report from Industrial Development Advisor might be helpful in reaching decision. We agreed study proposal and consider carefully both substance of idea and timing of unveiling to others, if we come out affirmatively.

8. Both we and Brits agreed Secretariat could be made more effective and efficient but also agreed inadvisable to push for major changes now. Brits stated no intention reduce their current level of personnel assigned to CENTO. We noted it might be desirable to take hard look at structure of organization, possibly next year, if Pakistan continues its membership.

9. UK proposed switch of Special Assistant and DSYG/Economic positions between US and UK in 1971. We undertook to give them prompt reaction since they need to know soon for assignment purposes.

10. Brits presentation on relationship CENTO and RCD closely corresponded our own views. Consensus was that we should not approach RCD now but should be prepared consider request for assistance by RCD. UK indicated that RCD had approached Hungarians and UNIDO for assistance. We asked for more information re reported approach to Hungary, of which we unaware. We noted question Pakistan remaining in CENTO highly uncertain and suggested we take further look after formation new Pakistani Government. We expressed hope that recent US decision on one-time military sale to Pakistan would help encourage Pakistan to take more positive attitude toward CENTO as well as strengthen regional ties by slowing Pakistani drift toward Chicoms. Brits agreed complete reassessment CENTO necessary if Pakistan opts out. Partly because only formal tie UK has with Iran is via CENTO, Brits urged that CENTO be maintained even without Pakistan; but stated UK might then have to reduce its economic aid to CENTO. If any Regional withdrew from CENTO, UK believes that rapid action including public statement on part remaining members necessary in effort limit danger. UK apparently has in mind example of 1958 London declaration.³

12. We stated US bilateral agreement with Regionals would not automatically expire with CENTO demise. We also expressed belief

³ Reference is to the communiqué issued July 28, 1958, after the Baghdad Pact Ministerial meeting in London, which welcomed the U.S. agreement to cooperate with member states (Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, United Kingdom) for their security and defense. The Foreign Ministers agreed to maintain collective security and to strengthen their ability to resist direct or indirect aggression and to strengthen their united defense posture. The meeting followed a coup in member state Iraq and the deployment of U.S. troops to Lebanon.

Turkey and Iran unlikely withdraw from CENTO in foreseeable future. We not sure Pakistanis prepared make final decision by next Ministerial meeting and suggested UK and US keep in close touch and possibly confer with Turkey and Iran, when new Pakistani Government expresses its intentions toward CENTO. In response specific questions, US stated could foresee continuation of some type truncated CENTO in event Pakistan opts out, but that we would wish take careful look at that time and study all options.

13. Would appreciate addressee comments, especially on British proposals paras 6, 7 and 9.⁴

14. Addressees should not discuss with regional representatives.

Irwin

⁴ The Embassy in Ankara responded in telegram 7348, November 20, that the United States should not wait for a Pakistani withdrawal but explore a transformation of CENTO, although not a truncated version. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 4 CENTO) The Embassy in London responded in telegram 9452, November 16, noting the intense pressure Treasury placed on the British Government to cut expenditures, such as those associated with CENTO, and the possible defense against this pressure provided by U.S. confirmation of support. (Ibid.) The Embassy in London again responded in telegram 9664, November 20, which noted that the British regarded their CENTO review to be complete following the bilateral talks, and the only major question left was how the British CENTO policy would mesh with their policy in the Persian Gulf. (Ibid.) The Embassy in Tehran responded in telegram 4883, November 9, that no real political gains could be accrued from increased usage of CENTO labeling. (Ibid.) The Embassy in Rawalpindi responded in telegram 8611, November 5, that the U.S. attitude expressed in the bilateral talks closely paralleled those held in the Embassy. (Ibid.)

29. Editorial Note

Between December 1970 and May 1971, as Pakistan's ongoing constitutional and electoral crisis devolved into civil war, its ability to maintain its membership in CENTO emerged as a critical issue in the considerations of the alliance. On December 16, 1970, CENTO Secretary General Turgut Menemencioglu informed the United Kingdom's Embassy in Ankara that a potential Pakistani withdrawal in 1971 would mean the end of CENTO. The British responded that, given the recent success of bilateral meetings between Iran and Turkey, perhaps those countries could convince Pakistan to stay. If Pakistan's withdrawal was imminent, it should be encouraged to leave "gracefully," and CENTO could make the appropriate structural adjustments to continue without it. (Telegram 207252 to Ankara, London, Islamabad, and Tehran, December 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, CENTO 6–2 PAK)

The Department of State, anxious that Britain not push too rapidly in this regard, presented four alternatives for CENTO's future premised on Pakistan's withdrawal. (Telegram 828 to Ankara, January 5, 1971; *ibid.*) Alternative A continued CENTO in its present form without Pakistan; Alternative B eliminated CENTO, abolishing the civilian secretariat and the Combined Military Planning Staff; Alternative C maintained CENTO, but abolished the Secretariat and Military Staff, making it more closely resemble the ANZUS arrangement; Alternative D maintained the treaty but streamlined the Secretariat and Military Staff. The Department rejected Alternatives A and B, and stated its preference for C. (Telegram 18946 to Ankara and Tehran, February 3; *ibid.*, DEF 4 CENTO)

In a February 12 memorandum, however, Stanley Schiff, Director of Regional Affairs, NEA, wrote Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph J. Sisco that opinions within the Department had shifted in favor of Alternative D, given the opposition of Turkey, Iran, and the Department of Defense. (Telegram 638 from Tehran, February 3; *ibid.*, CENTO 3; and telegram 863 from Ankara, February 8; *ibid.*, DEF 4 CENTO). The JCS, particularly, had "strong reservations about dismantling the military side of CENTO." (Memorandum from Schiff to Sisco, February 12; *ibid.*, CENTO 3) Subsequent talks with the British in February 1971 brought the United States and Britain to a general agreement on Alternative D, and on the necessity of Iran and Turkey bearing the responsibility of talking to Pakistan. These talks revealed that the United States was less inclined than Britain to predict Pakistani withdrawal or to take an activist stance toward reordering CENTO before conditions inside Pakistan became clearer. (Telegram 32549 to Ankara, Islamabad, London, and Tehran, February 25; *ibid.*, DEF 4 CENTO)

Menemencioglu visited Washington March 1–5, having recently visited Pakistan, and relayed the information that Pakistani withdrawal was not imminent and that no changes to CENTO should be undertaken until the situation clarified. He also urged the United States to help Pakistan "psychologically and materially" and to maintain a "spirit of cooperation" with the United Kingdom, Iran, and Turkey should Pakistan eventually determine to leave. Department officials reiterated the positions taken at the bilateral meetings with Britain. (Telegram 38929 to Ankara, Islamabad, London, and Tehran, March 5; *ibid.*) During his conversation with President Nixon, Menemencioglu said that "CENTO's value lay not in its military commitments or the various meetings but rather in the atmosphere of close association and the umbrella effect which developed within CENTO." For example, the Shah had told Menemencioglu that he "considered CENTO useful in the context of the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. After the British go, it would be possible to continue multi-national naval exercises in the Gulf under

a CENTO label.” The President confirmed his personal support for and commitment to outgoing Secretary General Menemencioglu. (Memorandum of conversation, March 2; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 212, Agency Files, CENTO)

As part of a longer tour of the Middle East (April 29–May 8), Secretary of State William Rogers attended the CENTO Council of Ministers meeting in Ankara at which he reiterated the need to adapt to the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and to maintain CENTO in view of the larger Soviet threat, as evidenced in the recent domestic insurgency in Ceylon. Rogers reported to President Nixon that the decisions to maintain MIDEASTFOR and to establish a U.S. presence in Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean had been sound. Moreover, CENTO maintained communication and development programs among the member states and provided a necessary military umbrella. (Telegram Secto 65/3073 from Ankara, May 1; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S)

30. Memorandum From the Vice Director of the Joint Staff (Freeman) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹

JCSM–206–71

Washington, May 1, 1971.

SUBJECT

The Suez Canal (U)

1. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have conducted a review of the strategic, economic, and political implications of a reopened Suez Canal.

2. (S) Strategically, a reopened canal, operating as an international waterway, would provide the naval forces of all nations with a short, direct line of communications between the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea/Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf.

a. The Soviet Union has demonstrated interest in the Indian Ocean area since 1967, when a Soviet Pacific Fleet naval task force made its first deployment to the area. The continuous presence of a Soviet naval force, averaging three to four naval combatants, in the Indian Ocean, coupled with the fact that this force periodically visits various ports on the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf littoral, indicates that the area is of

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0197, Box 70, Middle East. Secret.

strategic interest to the USSR. With the Suez Canal open, the Indian Ocean would be more readily accessible to the Soviets. Soviet Pacific coast ports, from which most of the Soviet naval deployments to the Indian Ocean originate, are handicapped severely by fog in spring and fall and by ice in winter. Furthermore, the south coast of Arabia is over 6,100 nm from the nearest Soviet Pacific port. From Soviet ports in the more favorable Black Sea environment, the same destination is nearly 11,500 nm via Gibraltar and around the southern tip of Africa. However, if the Suez Canal were open, Soviet ships sailing from the Black Sea would steam only 3,200 nm to reach the same point. This shorter line of communication would facilitate Soviet economic and military activities in the Indian Ocean area.

b. The principal strategic impact of a reopened canal would be to make possible more rapid increases in Soviet military presence throughout the Red Sea/Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area and to reduce the cost of Soviet resupply, repair, and military/economic aid actions. These factors could combine to enhance Soviet influence in the littoral countries and might encourage the USSR to undertake greater political and military risks.

c. Access to the Suez Canal would also permit more rapid reinforcement of US naval forces stationed in the Persian Gulf and could enhance US political influence in the littoral countries of the area. However, the strategic value of the Suez Canal to the United States is reduced by the constraints on operation of NATO-committed forces outside the NATO area and the fact that the larger aircraft carriers cannot transit it. On balance, the strategic value of a reopened canal favors the USSR.

3. (S) In view of the interests and strategic advantages to the Soviets of a reopened canal and the fact that the Soviets have established a considerable military presence in the United Arab Republic (UAR), it appears prudent for the United States to explore the possibility of using US support for the reopening of the Suez Canal as a lever in seeking UAR agreement to reduce the Soviet presence in the UAR. This course may also offer potential for easing Israeli reluctance for movement on this intermediate step toward peace.

4. (S) The primary significance of the Suez Canal, at present, is its importance as an essential element in ongoing efforts to reduce regional tensions and create movement toward a viable Middle East peace agreement. With the continued, substantial Soviet presence in the UAR and the US commitment to the survival of Israel, the danger of great power confrontation in the Middle East is clear. It is equally clear that this threat to world peace requires that the United States continue to pursue initiatives which could lead to a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. An interim agreement to reopen the Suez Canal could demonstrate good faith and facilitate further negotiations to achieve a

final settlement. However, there is the possibility that reopening the Suez Canal without resolution of other substantive issues might reduce pressures for continued meaningful negotiations and, with a continued extensive Soviet presence in the UAR, could serve to perpetuate Middle East tensions and instability.

5. (S) Economically, a reopened Suez Canal probably would benefit US NATO Allies, Japan, and countries which produce primary products along the Indian Ocean littoral. This economic impact could be beneficial to the United States. For the Soviets, a reopened canal would provide some economic benefit, but its principal consequence would be strategic.

6. (C) The US Government has traditionally held that international waterways should be open to all international shipping. Therefore, any contrary position regarding the reopening of the Suez Canal would be at odds with the traditional US position and could hinder US initiatives to obtain international agreement regarding territorial seas and fishing areas.

7. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:

a. A reopened Suez Canal offers a greater strategic advantage to the Soviets than to the United States.

b. On balance, the relative disadvantage of an open canal should be accepted in the interest of promoting peace and regional stability. If, as a part of reopening the canal, Soviet presence in the UAR were reduced, this relative disadvantage to the United States would tend to be offset.

c. The US Government should support a diplomatic initiative which might seek an understanding for a significant reduction of Soviet military presence within the UAR in return for US support for a canal reopening.

d. The primary significance of the canal, at present, is its importance as an element in Middle East peace initiatives.

e. The reopening of the Suez Canal, as part of a viable agreement between the UAR and Israel providing for equal access to the Suez Canal by all nations, would be in the best interest of the United States.

8. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff will introduce background information used in the development of the above conclusions to the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group, Near East and South Asia, for review.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Mason Freeman
Rear Admiral, USN

31. Memorandum From Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 28, 1971.

SUBJECT

CIA Analysis of Soviet Covert Activity in Mideast

Two weeks ago Al Haig sent CIA some questions (Tab A)² about possible Soviet covert involvement in recent events in various parts of the Middle East—such as the upheavals in Morocco and the Sudan, Libya's efforts to buy off Malta, Soviet pressure on Ethiopia via threats of increased aid to Somalia and the Sudan, and the Cyprus situation. Our staff seemed skeptical about the degree of Soviet involvement, and Al wanted an independent judgment. He also wanted to know if the Russians have stepped up their covert action program lately.

CIA has come back with its answers (Tab B),³ which boil down to the following:

—Soviet covert operations increased in the first year after the 1967 war. But events since Nasser's death "are all manifestations of trends in the Arab world that are not only *not* stimulated by Moscow but in general add up to a set-back for the Soviet covert action capacity" in the area.

—Specifically, CIA sees the Moroccan and Sudanese upheavals and Libyan actions as internally generated, with no evidence of Soviet collusion.⁴ "There is no evidence" that Soviet military aid to Sudan and

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 647, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East General, Vol. VIII. Secret. Sent for information. Drafted by Rodman. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² Attached but not printed at Tab A is an August 12 memorandum from Tom Latimer, White House Staff, to Cord Meyer, Acting Deputy Director for Plans, CIA.

³ Attached but not printed at Tab B is an August 19 memorandum from Meyer to Latimer, which enclosed an August 18 report. An attached note reads, "File—White House side of street only."

⁴ References are to a failed coup in Morocco and a successful mid-July coup in Sudan. The August 18 CIA report enclosed at Tab B concluded that the Soviets may have had insight and been supportive of the coups but were not involved. There was no evidence that Libya and the USSR were working "hand-in-glove in the Mediterranean." The report also noted that Qadhafi's offer to Malta of \$10 million annually for 10 years, and an offer to import skilled Maltese labor and technicians in return for eliminating British military bases on Malta was consistent with Qadhafi's stated intentions to eliminate all foreign military bases from the Mediterranean. This ran counter to Soviet rejection of the idea that both the United States and the USSR leave the Mediterranean.

Somalia is “designed to intimidate Haile Selassie,” although it does “serve to put pressures on him” (a subtle distinction!). And Moscow has been cautious on Cyprus, for fear of upsetting the Greeks and particularly the Turks.

—CIA believes that “in the past year the Soviets have, for the first time in more than a decade, been forced by events into a defensive covert action posture.” The Soviets sustained an offensive over the previous decade that was generally successful, but their capability has now suffered serious setbacks—Sadat’s move in May against the pro-Moscow elite in Cairo; extensive damage to the influence of the pro-Soviet WFTU in the Egyptian and Sudanese labor movements. In general, “the political tide is running against the USSR” in Egypt, Libya, and Sudan, and the Soviets are encountering “other problems” (unspecified) in the Persian Gulf and Arabian peninsula.

—In conclusion, CIA believes that the situation in the Mediterranean and Mideast is, “from a U.S. viewpoint, now more favorable for covert action as a means of achieving limited U.S. objectives than it has been for some years.”

32. Memorandum for the President’s Files by the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, March 14, 1972, 11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with His Excellency Nassir Assar, Secretary-General of CENTO, on March 14, 1972 at 11:45 a.m., The Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
His Excellency Nassir Assar, Secretary-General of CENTO
Ambassador Mosbacher
Major General A. M. Haig, Jr.

Following press photographs, President Nixon welcomed Secretary-General Nassir Assar to Washington noting that while he was cognizant

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig MemCons, Jan–Dec 1972. Secret. Drafted on March 18.

of the Secretary-General's international hat, he also wished to express to the Secretary-General his warm regards to the Shah of Iran on whose staff the Secretary-General was previously assigned.

Secretary-General Assar expressed his deepest appreciations to President Nixon for his willingness to receive him and to thereby manifest his support for the CENTO Organization. Secretary-General Assar noted that he had long admired President Nixon's leadership but that as a result of recent events, he had now concluded that President Nixon was indeed the inspirational and intellectual leader of the Western world. He commented that the recent successful trip to Peking and all that it represented for mankind constituted one of the most significant achievements in modern times and that this accomplishment was proof positive of President Nixon's role as a world leader.

President Nixon thanked the Secretary-General for his comments and pointed out that he had long supported the CENTO concept recognizing that many of its original military objectives had changed and that its cooperative effort in functional areas such as trade, communications, etc. had become more important aspects of the role CENTO would play in the future. The President pointed out that in the months ahead the CENTO membership should give particular attention to strengthening the spirit and morale of Pakistan which had suffered grievously in a real and psychological sense in recent months.

The Secretary-General stated that he agreed completely with President Nixon's comments and noted that he would strive to assist the Government of Pakistan through cooperative efforts by the CENTO membership. He also noted that it would be very important in the months ahead for the United States to continue to provide assistance to the CENTO membership and President Nixon agreed that the United States would make every effort to do so.

As the meeting concluded, President Nixon informed Secretary-General Assar that he would be visiting Iran in conjunction with the forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union cautioning him that this information had not yet been made public.²

Secretary-General Assar stated that he had now realized three major accomplishments as a result of his visit to Washington. First, he had had an opportunity to visit personally with the greatest leader of the Western world. Secondly, that leader had promised continuing support for the CENTO Organization and thirdly, as an Iranian, he was moved and pleased beyond expectations as a result of his knowledge that the President would soon be visiting his homeland.

² Nixon visited Iran May 30-31, as he returned from a European trip that included the Summit in Moscow May 22-30.

33. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Acting Secretary of State Irwin¹

Washington, May 4, 1972.

Proposed Reply to Admiral Moorer re CENTO Political Guidance

There is attached at Tab B Admiral Moorer's letter of April 18² to the Secretary alerting us to new efforts on the part of the CENTO regional members (Iran, Pakistan and Turkey) to revise the political guidance for military planning to permit planning for regional contingencies. At present, the guidance limits planning to countering aggression by Communist nations in the context of a global nuclear war.

For years, we and the British have resisted periodic attempts at this type of revision of the standing guidance, both to avoid involvement in regional squabbles and to avoid accusations of assisting in planning military action against such "friendly" countries as India and certain Arab nations. Surprisingly, we are told that in this latest renewal of the effort (relatively dormant since 1969), the United Kingdom military delegate is siding with the regional states and will recommend change in the UK position to the Foreign Secretary.³

A proposed reply to Admiral Moorer is at Tab A.⁴

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached letter to Admiral Moorer.⁵

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, CENTO 3. Confidential. Drafted by Robert W. Chase (NEA/RA) on May 2 and cleared in NEA, EUR/BMI, and PM/ISP and by Van Hollen.

² Attached but not printed.

³ The issue arose at the June 1–2 CENTO Ministerial meeting held in London. Pakistan, backed by Iran, Turkey, and Secretary General Assar, pushed for a revision of the political guidance. Rogers convinced the members to drop their demands and settle for a reassessment of the threat to CENTO. (Telegram 5306 from London, June 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, CENTO 3) The threat assessment is printed as Document 36.

⁴ Attached but not printed at Tab A is the proposed letter in which Irwin assured Moorer that Sisco and his staff would consult with the JCS before the June CENTO meeting.

⁵ Irwin signed the attached letter.

34. Airgram From the Embassy in the United Arab Emirates to the Department of State¹

A-31

Abu Dhabi, October 26, 1972.

SUBJECT

Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. Comes to Town

T. Marvin Hancock, an employee of the Bank of America who arrived in Abu Dhabi recently to participate in the establishment of the Bank of Credit and Commerce (BCC), has provided the Embassy with the following information about the bank, its background and plans.

Background: Approximately ten months ago, the Bank of America was approached by Mr. Agha Hassain Abedi, President of the United Bank Ltd. Mr. Abedi, who is favorably known to the Bank of America, explained that the United Bank, now the largest bank in Pakistan, had lost more than one hundred branches as a result of the formation of Bangladesh and found itself with a surfeit of trained officers and employees. According to Mr. Abedi, there is also a strong likelihood that private banks in Pakistan will be nationalized and a significant percentage of United Bank personnel have become interested in promoting an international banking institution into which they could transfer. The Bank of America agreed to participate in the proposed venture. Mr. Abedi had reportedly made a similar proposition to American Express, but the effort did not work out.

Nature of the BCC: The Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. was incorporated in Luxembourg about one month ago and premises have been selected in that city for an office. Luxembourg was chosen because it offered advantages in incorporation and taxes while at the same time being recognized as maintaining high standards of supervision over financial ventures, a qualification on which Mr. Abedi reportedly insisted. The head office of the Bank will be located nominally in Luxembourg, but the actual operations will be run by the General Manager, Gulf Region who will be based in Abu Dhabi. This position will be filled by Mr. Naqvi, who resigned from the United Bank at the time of the BCC incorporation and is now setting up the Abu Dhabi operation. Mr. Hancock will serve as his deputy in Abu Dhabi.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL6 UAE. Confidential. Drafted on October 10 by W. Nathaniel Howell, Jr., Economic and Commercial Officer, and approved by Philip J. Griffin, Chargé. Passed to Commerce and Treasury. It was repeated to London, Luxembourg, Kuwait, Manama, Muscat, Tehran, Beirut, Karachi, Islamabad, and Dacca.

The BCC is capitalized at \$5 million, of which one half is paid in. It is expected that this ratio will be maintained as the capitalization rises to an anticipated \$10 million in the next five years. The venture is fully subscribed with Bank of America holding a 25 per cent interest and the remaining 75 per cent being controlled by local investors. Mr. Hancock promised to provide a complete list of the approximately 20 investors but gave the following tentative breakdown: Shaikh Zayid, President of the UAE and Ruler of Abu Dhabi, \$1 million; Shaikh Rasid, Vice President of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, \$300,000; and Shaikh Hamdan of the Abu Dhabi ruling family and an unnamed Dubai merchant an undisclosed amount. He added that some private Egyptian money is involved. At present, there is no Pakistani participation, but senior Pakistani officials of the BCC will have options to take over at least a portion of the Abu Dhabi share.

Mr. Abedi plans to leave his position as President of the United Bank in about two months to become President of the BCC. He is a financial and investment advisor to Shaikh Zayid and possesses good local contacts. It is felt that Shaikh Zayid and perhaps other Gulf investors have taken shares to accommodate Mr. Abedi who will become a major shareholder of the bank. Other officials and staff of the United Bank will likewise shift to the BCC, once it is a going concern.

Present Plans: The Regional Office is scheduled to open in Abu Dhabi on or about October 30, 1972. Branches will also be opened in the market place, on one of the main commercial streets (across from the FNCB branch), and at Al Ain in the interior of the Emirate. A branch is under construction in Dubai and should be completed within 30 days, and small, three-man facilities are projected for Sharjah and Umm Al-Qaiwain in the immediate future and for all the Emirates of the UAE within the next year.

Outside of the UAE, negotiations are underway for the opening of branches in Bahrain and Qatar. The BCC plans to function in Muscat but faces some organizational difficulties which are now being worked out. Operations in the Sultanate must be in the hands of a subsidiary which will be capitalized at about \$1 million. This subsidiary will be owned 30% by BCC, 20% by Bank of America, and 50% by a local firm, Towel. The Bank of America will decide in the next ten days whether or not to pick up the 20% offered as its share.

The BCC intends to offer a full range of commercial banking services at the outset. Eventually, trust services will be added. Bank of America, through the BCC, is taking extreme care that the new venture not raid the accounts currently held by the United Bank. Mr. Hancock emphasized that when the United Bank personnel change over to the BCC, they will scrupulously avoid bringing accounts with them. In this connection, the Bank of America's concern is that its association

with former United Bank personnel in this new venture might work to the detriment of Bank of America branches in Pakistan. Rather, the new bank will concentrate on garnering the accounts of the Muslim merchants in the Gulf. One exception to the policy vis-à-vis United Bank, however, is that some of the services which that institution has traditionally provided to Shaikh Zayid will be transferred to BCC. For example, a United Bank representative always travels in Shaikh Zayid's entourage when he leaves the country. This representative serves as banking advisor and carries the party's bankroll in the form of traveller's checks. BCC will now provide this service.

Comment: While it has been publicly announced that BCC will be opening in the near future and it is no secret that Mr. Hancock is in town, he provided much of the information contained in this airgram in confidence. In particular, the BCC does not want details of its plans widely known until it can officially inform the shareholders of its opening. Apprised by the Embassy of some interest in the venture expressed by the Pakistani Ambassador to the UAE, Hancock said for the protection of the Pakistani citizens involved, it was thought best not to mention anything about the new bank to Pakistani officials, here, although apparently Mr. Abedi has informed President Bhutto of his plans.

Stoltzfus

**35. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, December 6, 1972.

SUBJECT

Proposal for a Joint US/Israeli Desalination Development Program

Summary

At National Security Council direction a study was undertaken in 1969 on the desirability of U.S. participation in a large-scale desalting plant in Israel. The study concluded that further research was needed and, therefore, the U.S. should not participate in the project. This recommendation was endorsed by the President and in turn conveyed to the Government of Israel. Since then, Israel has made progress in desalting technology and its overall program has reached a stage where a joint development program including construction of a large-scale desalting facility could be mutually beneficial. This memorandum recommends that such a joint program be undertaken to be funded from the appropriation provided for this purpose under Section 219 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.

Background

National Security Study Memorandum 30 of March 19, 1969,² requested a study of the economic and technological aspects of large-scale desalting in the Middle East and of proceeding with the construction of a 40 million gallon per day (mgd) desalting plant in Israel. This proposal involved the application of then existing technology to a much larger scale facility than had ever been built before. The response to NSSM 30³ pointed out the risks in such a significant scale-up, the unlikelihood that such a project would lead to a significant reduction in the cost of water, and that new technology being developed

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-212, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 32. No classification marking. Attachments not printed. In an October 6 telephone conversation, Kissinger told Morton that a \$10 million project was “symbolically of great interest” to the Israelis and that he should meet with Rabin. (Ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 16, Chronological Files) On October 18, Morton notified Kissinger that he had met with Rabin regarding Israeli plans for desalination and their request for a U.S. commitment of \$10 million in support of this program. He included a timeline of significant decisions regarding desalination in Israel. (Ibid.)

² Document 5.

³ See footnote 3, Document 9.

by the Department of the Interior, Office of Saline Water (OSW) could lead to a significant reduction in the cost of desalting water.

National Security Decision Memorandum 32 of November 6, 1969,⁴ advised that the President had decided that: "Budgetary considerations apart, the Administration believes that intermediate experimentation with new technology is necessary before a large operating plant can be built anywhere. The Administration believes that there are compelling advantages to doing this work in the U.S." However, "The Administration is keeping open the possibility of later co-operation in the Israeli project."

Concurrent with this Administration action, the Congress added Section 219 to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended (Attachment A) and pursuant thereto authorized and appropriated \$20 million to finance U.S. participation in an Israeli desalting project. The funds were provided "for the purpose of improving existing and developing and advancing new, technology and experience in the design, construction, and operation of large-scale desalting plants of advanced concepts which will contribute materially to low-cost desalination in all countries . . ." and, if it is determined to be feasible, to participate in the development of a large-scale desalting prototype plant to be constructed in Israel. The legislation contained safeguards to insure the full availability to the U.S. of any research and development findings. Congress also stipulated that no part of the appropriated funds could be used for construction until the proposed project had been reviewed by the appropriate Congressional committees.

In accordance with NSDM 32, the Government of Israel and the appropriate Congressional committees were advised that the Administration did not intend to go ahead with an Israeli project at that time. Nevertheless, Israeli and Congressional interest remained high and each year Section 219 has been carried forward and the funds reappropriated.⁵

Discussion

In February 1971, the Government of Israel presented to A.I.D. a proposal to establish a partnership venture between the U.S. and Israel to construct a prototype dual-purpose power generating and desalting plant at Ashdod, Israel, with a capacity of 11 mgd. The plant was to employ a horizontal tube, multiple effect process (HTME) technology being developed by Israel Desalination Engineering, Limited,

⁴ Document 14.

⁵ The funds have been carried forward through FY 72. However, they are not included in the current modified Continuing Resolution under which A.I.D. now operates. With passage of a regular FY 1973 A.I.D. appropriation, it is expected that funds will again be reappropriated. No obligation for the proposed project can be made until this occurs. [Footnote is in the original.]

a wholly-owned government corporation. It is a well-known and tested process and by itself not a significant technological advancement. However, Israel proposed using aluminum tubing in the plant, and the application of this low-cost material did hold promise of significantly reducing the cost of desalted water.

A.I.D., utilizing the expertise of OSW, has reviewed the Israeli proposal. A team of A.I.D. and OSW engineers went to Israel in July 1972 to examine the Israeli facilities and its research program in detail, and further technical discussions were held in Washington during late October 1972. The understanding reached by the technical staffs which participated in these discussions is attached (B).

In summary: The Israelis sought U.S. financing for the one mgd pilot plant at Elat now under construction. If operating results from this point are satisfactory, the Government of Israel proposed to proceed directly to design and construction of the 11 mgd prototype plant. An advance commitment to this plant was also sought. OSW representatives have been concerned with the limited amount of operating experience in aluminum tubing and also maintained that, due to the large scaling-up involved in going from a 1 mgd to an 11 mgd plant, there should be an intermediate testing phase. Agreement was finally reached at the recent Washington meetings by staff representatives that there would be an intermediate stage involving the construction of a two-effect test module at the OSW test facility in San Diego, California. OSW considers that, with an expansion of the Israeli program to include module construction at San Diego, sufficient data would become available on scale-up to confirm design assumptions for an 11 mgd plant and, thus, allow its construction without major risks. Furthermore, as many of the ancillary facilities are already present at San Diego, it is expected that construction of the module there will involve cost-savings over construction in Israel.

Israeli engineers tentatively estimate the total cost of the full program at \$32 million (including the test module in San Diego). The U.S. share would be approximately \$15 million. Of this, we estimate that approximately \$2 million would be expended during USFY 1973 and USFY 1974.

The program provisionally agreed to by the U.S. and Israel technical representatives generally complements work being undertaken by OSW. OSW has done some work with aluminum tubing, but the emphasis in the OSW program has been on the vertical tube evaporation/multi-stage flash (VTE/MSF) process, which is believed to represent a significant advance in process technology over the Israeli process.⁶

⁶ At this stage, the OSW VTE/MSF program is ahead of the Israeli program as a four-effect module of a 12.5 mgd plant is scheduled to begin operations in mid-CY 1973, which

OSW does not, however, use aluminum tubing, but more costly copper-nickel due to its corrosion resistance. The Israeli development program has taken a different approach. It has refined existing horizontal tube technology within established limits of temperatures, pressures and other design parameters and concentrated its efforts on the development of a design suitable for the use of cheaper aluminum tubing.

Participation in the joint program would provide the U.S., and through it, U.S. industry which would be involved in module construction, with access to the Israeli technology and operating experience in the design and use of aluminum tubing, the development of an alternative competitive desalting technology, and, most importantly, through the two-effect module program at San Diego, an opportunity to test Israeli equipment extensively over a wide range of conditions and, thereby, explore the possible blending of Israeli materials developments with U.S. process advancements.

Based on the experience gained in the past three years by the Israelis with their process and desalting technology development in the U.S., we believe that it is in our interest to embark with the GOI on the cooperative research and development program proposed by the GOI. We believe that with the inclusion of the intermediate testing phase at San Diego the design technology will be sufficiently developed to justify participation. Through this joint effort we expect to obtain technical and operating experience which complements current U.S. programs and which could significantly advance the realization of a process for the production of low-cost desalted water. We would be acting in accord with the expressed intent of the Congress as set forth in Section 219 of the Foreign Assistance Act. We would be keeping faith with our repeated pledge to Israel to work closely with it in this field.

Therefore, we, together with A.I.D. and the Department of the Interior, recommend approval of our proceeding to conclude a formal agreement with the Government of Israel and, subject to Congressional consultations, to commit funds under Section 219 of the Foreign Assistance Act to finance the U.S. share of the joint development program outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding signed November 3, 1972.

RH Miller⁷

is at least 18 months sooner than the two-effect module proposed in the joint program.
[Footnote is in the original.]

⁷ R.H. Miller signed above Eliot's typed signature.

36. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Turkey, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and Iran¹

A-12456

Washington, December 28, 1972, 1:32 p.m.

SUBJECT

Assessment of the Situation in the CENTO Area

Enclosed are copies of papers prepared in response to the decision of the CENTO Council of Ministers in London last June for an “assessment of the situation” in the CENTO area.²

Embassy Ankara may submit the paper to the CENTO Secretariat as the United States’ contribution to the proposed study.

Johnson

Attachment³

Assessment of the Situation in the CENTO Area

[Omitted here are sections dealing with Syria and Iraq.]

The Persian Gulf

Saudi Arabia is committed to an ambitious program of modernizing its defense and internal security forces although it will remain heavily dependent upon outside military advice and technical assistance for some years. To block further Soviet encroachment into the Peninsula the Saudis are providing economic and some military aid to Yemen and have under consideration requests for similar aid to Oman. The Saudis have also continued to provide arms and money to the National Unity Front and to Southern Yemeni tribal dissidents in their bid to topple the extreme leftist regime in Aden. The Saudi leadership is also aware of the need for closer cooperation with Iran and with the Lower Gulf states if stability in the Gulf is to be preserved. Closer re-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 4 CENTO. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Chase (NEA/RA); cleared in NEA/IRN, NEA/PAB, NEA/TUR, EUR/NE; and approved in NEA/RA.

² See footnote 3, Document 33. In a December 9 memorandum to Moorer, Colonel J. Angus MacDonald, member of the JCS Staff Group, wrote that “judging from the quality of the drafts, I suspect that the UK version will be more acceptable as the matrix for the final report than would the U.S. version. That, however, will be a matter for the SYG to decide.” (National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Admiral Thomas Moorer, Box 125, Misc. File, CENTO Minutes, April 1972)

³ CENTO; Secret.

lations with the UAE will have to await, however, resolution of the lingering Saudi territorial dispute with Abu Dhabi.

The overall stability in the area has not been greatly affected since the nine formerly British-protected shaykhdoms of the Lower Gulf gained independence in 1971. The immediate effect of the British relinquishment of their treaty obligations to manage the defense and foreign relations of the shaykhdoms has been small, aside from the withdrawal of British troops from their former bases in Sharjah and Bahrain. Many British officers, on contract or secondment, have remained behind to assist the new states, particularly in defense and internal security matters. Except for occasional visits by Soviet naval units to Iraq and Iran and the special relationship they have established with Iraq, Soviet presence in the Gulf remains restricted. The Soviets (as do other communist countries including China) have an embassy in Kuwait. Following an approach to the UAE early in 1972, they have an agreement in principle to open an embassy in Abu Dhabi but this has not to date been implemented. Similar approaches to Oman, Qatar and Bahrain have been turned down.

Kuwait

Kuwait's relative calm belies the many external and internal destabilizing forces in the country. Internally, more than half the population is non-Kuwaiti and is in the country on sufferance—its continued presence is predicated upon periodic renewal of residence and working permits. Many in this group are Palestinian white collar workers, who, in their deep-rooted opposition to Israel, would like to see Kuwait more firmly committed to the anti-Western camp of radical Arab nationalism. Externally, Kuwait faces the hostility of Iraq, which from time to time has pressed its claim that Kuwait, formerly a part of the Ottoman Sanjak of Basrah, is Iraqi Territory. So far, at least, Kuwait has been able to counter these pressures by liberal wages for its workers (at least by regional standards) and by including potential opponents among the Arab states which receive generous Kuwaiti development loans and subsidies. As a result, many of these states—including Iraq—have too great a stake in the continued largesse of Kuwait to initiate or countenance moves against it.

Bahrain

Of the nine Lower Gulf shaykhdoms, Bahrain has the largest, most sophisticated population and also the greatest potential for dissidence. About a half dozen dissident groups have been organized in Bahrain, including the Marxist National Liberation Front-Bahrain (NLF-B), the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), Ba'thi groups of both the Syrian and Iraqi brands, and elements of the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). In addition, various Palestinian fedayeen

groups are also active in Bahrain. Further growth of its small (by Gulf standards) oil industry is not to be expected, making the need for economic diversification more pressing in Bahrain than in the other oil exporting states of the area. Over the longer run, if employment opportunities decrease there may be considerable unrest. However, in spite of a rash of labor protest demonstrations in March 1972, Bahraini security forces currently appear to have internal security reasonably well in hand.

Qatar

Although there has already been a coup since independence last year, the political stability of Qatar does not seem to have been adversely affected. In February 1972, Shaykh Khalifa bin Hamid al-Thani ousted his cousin Shaykh Ahmad bin Ali al-Thani and took over as Head of State. The coup was a family affair; however, most residents of Qatar consider the enlightened Khalifa to be a much more competent ruler than his predecessor. The coup has thus increased the popularity of the ruling family in Qatar which like Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, has a large alien population. The growing oil wealth of the country is a stabilizing factor, and an efficient police security force remains alert to counter any subversive activities, particularly any which might be undertaken by the former ruler or his supporters.

The UAE

The seven shaykhdoms of the UAE appear to be relatively stable for the short term. A long-standing border dispute between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia remains unresolved and continues to becloud relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. However, the Central Government under UAE President Shaykh Zayid has recently moved to establish diplomatic relations with Iran. In the poorer shaykhdoms, population is too limited and political awareness still too restricted to pose a threat. In the two oil-rich shaykhdoms, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, comparatively good wages and competent security forces appear adequate for the present to maintain stability. The failure of a coup attempt in Sharjah in January 1972, which cost the life of the Ruler, can be viewed as an example of the stabilizing forces at work within the UAE. Shaykh Zayid immediately dispatched troops from his Abu Dhabi Defense Force who, in cooperation with the Union Defense Force (formerly the Trucial Oman Scouts), quickly put down the coup. This suggests that the various UAE member states can cooperate if the need arises.

Over the long run, the Lower Gulf shaykhdoms will have to be able to maintain their own security without British or other major power assistance. Like Kuwait, they face serious problems—fluctuating relations with much larger neighbors, a large alien population, including numerous Palestinians, and radical Arab groups supported from the outside.

Saudi Arabia has a major interest in maintaining Gulf stability, as well as in finding a solution to its territorial dispute with Abu Dhabi. The latter also involves the question of accessibility to the Lower Gulf of Saudi oil discovered in the Empty Quarter. On balance, however, Saudi Arabia has been slow to show the concern with Gulf affairs that its interests would seem to indicate; it is more preoccupied with its opposition to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).

The interest of outside powers in the Gulf is derived largely from its position as the world's major petroleum exporting region. While Gulf oil is of great strategic interest to the West, and will probably become increasingly important to the Soviets, there does not presently appear to be any significant external military threat to the area states. The greatest present challenge to Gulf stability is from dissident and subversive activities generated in the Gulf states themselves and from their increased exposure to the political and nationalist cross-currents of the Arab world which independence has brought them.

The main political objective of the Soviets in the area is to increase their influence at the expense of the West. It is extremely doubtful that, in the pursuit of this objective, they would intervene overtly in the politics of the area, whether through military action or through support of a military adventure by an Arab radical regime. The political costs of such tactics would be very high in terms of the adverse reaction of the other regional states with which the Soviets are trying to increase their influence. The use of force by the USSR, for example, in support of Iraq or a radical group trying to seize power in a lower Gulf state, would probably so frighten local leaders that they would move closer to the West for support.

In the regional context, Iraq's ambitions to play a leading role in the Gulf are opposed by the conservative Arab littoral states and by Iran.

Oman

All indications are that Sultan Qaboos is succeeding in curbing the rebellion in his Western province of Dhofar, which is supported by South Yemen with some Chinese assistance. The Sultan's armed forces are stretched thin but are effective in interdicting rebel supply lines from neighboring South Yemen. Rebel defections continue. However, the war remains a costly burden, especially since the Sultan has embarked on an ambitious development program for his country, which only recently opened its doors to the outside world. Although unfulfilled Omani expectations have led to some criticism, Sultan Qaboos appears to have widespread support and to be firmly in control.

The Yemens

In September–October 1972, the two Yemens came as close to full-scale war as they had at any time since the People's Democratic

Republic of the Yemen (PDRY) became independent in 1967, but they quickly did an about-face and announced plans for unifying the PDRY and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). In fact, neither effective unity nor all-out war seems very likely at present. Unity has always been the avowed aim of both Yemens, but the obstacles are great. The ruling group in each country sees in union a means of extending its sway over the other rather than establishing a true collaboration. Also, the present leadership of the YAR has become cooler toward the Soviet Union and leans slightly toward the West. The PDRY regime, by contrast, has its antecedents in the radical Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), is militantly Marxist and relies on close cooperation with the USSR.

Despite their basic mutual hostility, however, both sides probably realize that a prolonged war would strengthen the always potentially dissident tribal elements in both countries and greatly overtax their threadbare economies.

The unity talks thus provide a welcome respite for both sides and have served to defuse the border situation. However, Saudi Arabia, deeply worried about the radical orientation of the PDRY regime, has continued to support PDRY exile groups which are based in the YAR. These groups, collectively called the National Unity Front (NUF), sparked the recent fighting through border incursions during September, and they may again be instrumental in provoking armed conflict. For the time being, at least, both sides will probably try to keep border incidents from escalating, but the situation in the southwest part of the Arabian Peninsula remains far from stable.

The Soviets and Arab radical groups will probably rely on political subversion in the lower Persian Gulf rather than on direct intervention. Even so, the Soviets are likely to be cautious in the manner in which they participate in subversive activities and in their support of subversive groups, in an effort to avoid an anti-Soviet reaction among the local leaders.

Attachment⁴

SITUATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE

The Soviet Naval Presence

Over the past five years the Soviets have developed a virtually continuous naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Soviet naval auxiliaries

⁴ CENTO; Secret.

and specially equipped merchant vessels began operating in the Indian Ocean on a more or less continuous basis in August 1967 in connection with the Soviet space program. Soviet combatants, a cruiser and two destroyers, appeared for the first time in the spring of 1968. The combatants were in the Indian Ocean almost four months although they spent about half their time visiting ports in India, Somalia, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, the UAR, Yemen and Ceylon. Submarines were added to the next deployment of surface combatants in November 1968. Since then, except for one week in the spring of 1968, there has always been at least one Soviet combatant in the Indian Ocean.

Soviet naval presence increased slowly from 1968 through 1970. There was an upsurge during the Indo-Pakistani war in December 1971 but the current Soviet naval presence appears to be approximately at the pre-December 1971 level if Soviet ships engaged in harbor-clearing operations in Chittagong, Bangladesh, are excluded from calculations.

While Soviet naval deployment varies from time to time a typical group at present could include some or all of the following:

- 2 surface combatants, 1 of which might be missile armed
- 1 amphibious ship
- 1 diesel powered attack submarine
- 1-2 repair ships
- 2 or 3 oilers
- 1 ocean rescue tug or salvage rescue vessel
- 1 small refrigerator cargo vessel
- 3 space vehicle recovery ships and 1 oceanographic research vessel

In addition the Soviets have about 10 ships presently engaged in the Chittagong operation including a varying number of minesweepers.

The combatant presence is augmented by the large Soviet fishing and merchant fleet operating in the Ocean which can provide emergency support and supply to Soviet naval vessels and perform intelligence functions.

Airpower: Soviet airpower in the Indian Ocean is limited by the absence of shore-base or aircraft carrier capability but the Soviets have flown naval TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft over the Arabian Sea from bases in southern USSR since August 1968 in support of space vehicle recovery operations.

Logistics: The Soviet naval presence is designed to be self-sustaining. Necessary minor repairs and supply operations are conducted primarily in international water at anchorages established near Socotra; Cargados Carajos, about 200 nautical miles north/northeast of Mauritius; Fortune Bank and in the area of the northeast Seychelles. The Soviets also make port calls which are not essential for logistic purposes but do lighten the burden. They have access to a number of ports in which supply and repair operations could be conducted and apparently have made limited logistic use of some of these, for example, in

Somalia, Mauritius and Singapore. Despite reports of Soviet interest in acquiring port facilities in various countries of the area there is no evidence that Moscow has acquired or pressed for formal base rights.

Current Soviet Naval Operations

Soviet development of a naval presence in the Indian Ocean is related to both Soviet global naval policy and to Soviet political interest in the region. The Soviets desire a naval capability in all oceans as an appropriate element of great power status, seeking parity with western naval power. Great power strategic naval competition is not present in the Indian Ocean and the Soviets have not seen it necessary to develop a major strategic force. Nevertheless, they apparently take the view that because they are a great power, and a prominent maritime power in the Indian Ocean with large shipping and fishing interests, a naval force to protect their sea lanes is required. The naval force also performs space program support functions. At the same time the Indian Ocean operations offer an opportunity to enhance on-going Soviet naval capability in the area by providing oceanographic and other scientific research data, intelligence collection, training and familiarization benefits for Soviet ships and crews and opportunities to "show the flag."

The Soviets have played their naval presence in low-key to the regional powers. Port visits have remained at roughly the same level since 1969 despite the gradual increase in Soviet naval operations in the Ocean. The Soviets have avoided implying any potential regional interventionist mission for the Indian Ocean force. This stance can be explained merely as good politics but it also is consistent with an evolving status quo Soviet policy in Asia, a desire to avoid creating anti-Soviet fears among littorals which might be exploited by the Chinese and a fear that any image of gun-boat diplomacy would erode rather than enhance Soviet influence. On two occasions the Soviets did go beyond the mere "presence" function. A Soviet naval visit to Somalia coinciding with the April 1970 threatened coup was extended apparently as a gesture of solidarity with the incumbent regime. There is no evidence, however, that the Soviets considered naval intervention. During the Indo-Pakistan war of December 1971 the Soviets temporarily built up their Indian Ocean force but some elements appeared primarily assigned to track the movements of US ships.

Prospects for Expansion of Soviet Naval Strength

A major expansion of the Soviet naval presence is limited in the first instance by the logistical problems inherent in operations far from home ports. Assuming that the Soviets continue to expand their overall logistical strength they could sustain a steadily increasing combatant presence if their priorities dictate. Reopening the Suez Canal would

reduce logistical problems and allow for expanded self-sustained operations, but the Soviets do not seem to assign a high priority to this.

Beyond logistic restraints on major Soviet naval expansion there are political constraints. Rapid expansion of Soviet naval power would risk reaction among regional countries against potential Soviet imperialism, a theme which the Chinese have already delighted in playing. Littoral sensitivity to Great Power naval presence is real. For example, the Indian Chief of Naval Staff on July 24, 1972 cited the Soviet ship presence along with that of the Japanese, Americans and Chinese as an object of concern for the Indians. Littoral powers, particularly Sri Lanka who are pressing for an Indian Ocean zone of peace would vocally oppose a Soviet (or western) buildup.

Furthermore, the Soviets may calculate that a rapid Soviet buildup would lead to a naval arms race with western powers in the region and there is no present indication that they would want to take this risk. In this regard, twice in the past 18 months the question of avoiding military competition in the Indian Ocean has been briefly touched upon in US/Soviet talks, but not seriously pursued. The last occasion was in July 1971 and the subject has not since been raised by either country.⁵

Although a major expansion of the Soviet naval presence is not likely under present circumstances, the limited Soviet fleet could serve as a nucleus for a larger strategic force, should the USSR consider an expanded presence desirable because of a perceived threat to Soviet interests in the region or possibly if the Soviets were presented with an unusual opportunity to advance their interests.

The Soviets have built assets for such a contingency. They have gained experience in Indian Ocean operations, established a visible presence and have cultivated friendly access to a number of ports in the region. This has permitted their personnel to familiarize themselves with port facilities in a region which for a long time was barely visited by Russian men-of-war. In addition, the Soviets have provided assistance in building or expanding port facilities at Berbera, Somalia; Hodeyda, Yemen Arab Republic; Umm Qasr, Iraq; and Vizakhapatnam, India. They are helping to clear war debris from Chittagong, and the port of Aden has a Soviet harbor master among several foreigners so employed. These activities not only help the familiarization process, but also build up good will and get the population used to at least intermittent presence of Soviet ships and/or naval personnel.

⁵ For documentation on these talks, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971.

Impact on Free World Interests

Soviet naval influence on Free World interests in the Indian Ocean appears to be potential rather than a clear and present danger whether viewed in terms of Soviet forces in being or of Soviet priorities. Soviet appreciation of regional sensitivity to gun-boat diplomacy makes Soviet naval intervention in the region a likely contingency only in the case of developments which the Soviets would consider as a threat to their vital interests or possibly if they were presented with an unusual opportunity to expand their influence. Under present circumstances the Soviets are likely to continue to rely primarily on economic and military assistance and diplomacy to advance their interests in the area.

Soviet successes in expanding their political influence in the region will, however, serve to enhance their naval capability by allowing greater and more useful access to regional ports. Soviet access to littoral airfields for reconnaissance operations likewise would enhance their naval capability.

Furthermore, the Soviet naval presence offers psychological if not tangible support to various littoral powers and may encourage them to increase efforts to undermine neighboring regimes.

In conclusion, it appears prudent to maintain a careful watch on Soviet naval facilities in the Indian Ocean to assure that the current limited use of this force remains limited. Special attention must be paid to any indications that Soviet policy has begun to focus on developing naval-oriented assets in the Indian Ocean as a primary rather than ancillary goal of Soviet activities in the region.⁶

⁶ Another attached paper dealing with India is not printed.

Indian Ocean

37. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, June 24, 1969.

SUBJECT

Congressional Hearings on Diego Garcia Information Memorandum

Representatives of the Defense Department will testify before the House Armed Services Committee on June 30 regarding plans to construct communications and refueling facilities on the island of Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago in the Indian Ocean. Because of current debate on Capitol Hill regarding bases and overseas commitments, the Pentagon is concerned that during congressional hearings on the Diego Garcia project a leak from foreign sources might prove prejudicial to approval.

Diego Garcia is one of a number of Indian Ocean islands included in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). We have an agreement (1966) in principle with the British to construct facilities in these islands.² Diego is attractive because of its location in the middle of the Indian Ocean, it is British territory, and the only inhabitants are non-indigenous copra workers imported from Mauritius and the Seychelles. In the event of U.S. Government approval of the project, the British are obligated at our request to remove these workers. Their repatriation to Mauritius and the Seychelles could cause political problems for the British because of unemployment in those areas.

The Pentagon is proposing the construction of a dredged anchorage, fuel storage, an 8,000 foot runway, and a communications facility

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 IND-US. Secret. Drafted by Grant E. Mouser (NEA/INC); cleared in draft in J/PM and AF/AFI; and cleared in H, EUR/BMI, NEA/INC, and NEA.

² The Anglo-American BIOT Agreement of December 30, 1966; 18 UST 28. Its salient points were summarized as follows. "Purpose: BIOT available for defense purposes of both governments. Terms: BIOT remains UK territory; agreement in principle on each undertaking; detailed agreement between designated administrative authorities (i.e., USN and RN); each government bears cost of its own sites; and initial period of agreement 50 years—provision for 20 year extension." (Attachment to a memorandum from Spiers to Irwin, January 3; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Unfiled Material, Country "Cy-E" 1953-1977, Diego Garcia)

at an estimated cost of \$26 million. Equipment for the communications facility will eventually raise the price by \$11 million.

NEA has supported this project from the beginning—despite some potential problems with the Indians who say they are opposed to great power activity in the Indian Ocean—because of Diego’s obvious value to the United States and the absence of many of the political liabilities which afflict other bases and facilities. We and the British feel that there is a good chance to contain negative Indian reaction if New Delhi is informed in timely fashion of our plans. The Indians know already of our general agreement with the British and they also know that some progress towards a decision has been made. We have stressed to them that no base is envisaged and the Indian Government has taken this line effectively in reply to Parliamentary questions.

We had originally planned to tell the Indians, Mauritians and others on the same day we went to the Congress. This has now slipped to July 3 per agreement with the British. (The Mauritian Prime Minister will be in London on that date.) We have felt that neither the Indians nor the Congress should first hear of Diego through a leak from the other. We still feel that we have a good chance to mitigate Indian reaction, though the Government may feel compelled to state its formal opposition. However, Indian reaction would probably be much harsher if they heard indirectly through a leak which resulted in press stories. This bureau believes that while the decision is difficult, the balance seems to lie in favor of July 3 notification.

Pentagon concern over Congressional reaction has led to increasing nervousness there, including some talk of deferring notification further. We now await confirmation from the British that they still are firm regarding notification on July 3.³

³ The British notified regional governments, such as Mauritius and India, of the BIOT agreement on July 3. (Telegram 5310 from London, July 4, and telegram 9494 from New Delhi, July 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15 IND-US)

38. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Departments of State and Defense¹

London, July 9, 1969, 1546Z.

5406. DOD for OSD/ISA. Subj: Diego Garcia: Stewart/Singh Discussion.

1. Singh² saw Foreign Secretary Stewart this morning and in course of conversation raised question of Diego Garcia. Singh complained at some length that the American plans as explained to GOI threatened to introduce big power competition into the Indian Ocean area, and his govt was "very unhappy" at the prospect. Singh mentioned that the Chinese were already showing interest in the Indian Ocean, and that the Russians had been asking for refueling facilities "from certain countries." Introduction of an American base was certain to result in unwanted rivalry between big powers.³

2. Replying Stewart emphasized the modest nature of the facility envisaged, denied that the term "base" was accurate description, and stated that US has the right under the BIOT agreement to establish such facility. He said this plan in no way constituted a threat to the area or to GOI.

3. Singh said he questioned that the Americans had any need for the base. Stewart responded that the US has obligations in the Far East and that the Indian Ocean facility was needed for refueling and communications in order to carry out these obligations. Singh retorted that if the USG has Far Eastern obligations then let them use the territory of Far Eastern countries to discharge them. What we were now proposing would bring the US into a new area where it had no present obligations and where competition with other major powers would be the inevitable result. He said the GOI was certain other Asians would also oppose the project.

4. Singh inquired about the present status of the proposal within the USG. Stewart said that it was still being considered on a confidential basis by the Congress, and that his personal estimate was that Congressional approval was likely but not certain.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 IND-US. Secret; Immediate. It was repeated to New Delhi, Port Louis, Tananarive, CINCPAC, CINCLANT, and CINCSTRIKE.

² Indian Minister of External Affairs Dinesh Singh.

³ Singh passed on a similar message of concern to Nixon in their July 10 meeting. The memorandum of conversation of their meeting is in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972, Document 26. Background material for this meeting is in a memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, July 10. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1236, Saunders Files, Indian Ocean)

5. In closing Stewart reminded Singh that we had notified GOI on confidential basis and hoped that this would be respected. Singh acknowledged the point but made no promises.

6. Preceding is summary taken from FonOff telegram to UK Embassy in Washington giving full and detailed report of conversation. UK Embassy has been requested to pass complete text to Dept immediately upon receipt.

Annenberg

39. Paper Prepared in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Moorer)¹

Washington, February 11, 1970.

Diego Garcia—Background and Status

The Navy has long recognized the strategic importance of gaining a modest logistics support capability in the Indian Ocean. In recognition of this need a Navy Strategic Island Concept was developed in 1959 and approved by JCS in 1960. In essence it calls for a stockpiling of islands for contingency use of the U.S. Pursuant to this concept a bilateral agreement was signed in December 1966 between HMG and USG which granted the U.S. base rights in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). The BIOT was formed in 1965 and comprises the Chagos Archipelago (includes Diego Garcia), Aldabra, Isle des Roches and Farquhar. The selection of these islands was based on unquestioned UK sovereignty and a negligible native population. The islands were formerly part of the Mauritian and Seychelles groups.

The agreement with the British provides for U.S. use for 50 years with an option for an additional 20 years. The cost of the agreement to the U.S. was one-half of the detachment costs (\$14 M) which was funded by offsetting British Polaris R&D charges.²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 IND–US. Secret. The paper was submitted to U. Alexis Johnson under a February 1 covering memorandum from Moorer.

² The British Foreign Office expressed considerable doubt about making information on the details of BIOT financing available to the U.S. Congress. The Foreign Office felt that “having well and truly cooked its books vis-à-vis Parliament on BIOT financing,” it was vulnerable to any exposure. (Telegram 1318 from London, February 18; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 726, Country Files, Europe, United

The Navy first proposed the establishment on Diego Garcia of an austere naval facility in 1966. The proposal was approved in principle by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 15 June 1968.³ The first increment of funding (\$9.6 million) became the Navy's number one priority in the FY 70 Military Construction Program. Funding for the project was omitted from the FY 70 Military Appropriations Bill by joint Senate-House Committee action during the latter stages of Congressional deliberation on the Bill.⁴ The concept of the proposed facility would have provided for modest logistic support at a total construction cost of approximately \$23 million. Although it enjoyed enthusiastic support from both House Committees concerned with military construction, it failed to win final approval due to apparent misunderstandings of two key senators.

Subsequently, Secretary of Defense Laird indicated that he would continue to support the facility but that the importance of the communications portion must be emphasized. Accordingly Navy submitted a modified proposal which is designed to close the gap in reliable communications coverage which exists today in the central Indian Ocean-Bay of Bengal area. Communications services would include the equipment necessary for entry into the Defense Communications System, minimum ship-to-shore radio, a time-shared single channel high frequency rebroadcast facility to serve U.S. shipping and an air-ground flight service. Personnel would be limited to 164 with no facilities for dependents. Support facilities would include an 8,000 ft. runway, minimum waterfront facilities, personnel support buildings, utilities, POL storage to support the requirements for the facility and dredging to provide a channel and turning basin for deep draft tanker/oiler supply. The proposal has not yet been acted on by SecDef.

Senator Russell,⁵ one of those in opposition, indicated that he might be persuaded to support the concept of the Diego Garcia project but that he would like to "hold the British feet to the fire" in order to force them to shoulder more of the burden of security in the

Kingdom, Vol. II) The Department's response was that the British Foreign Office should not involve itself in the detailed arrangements regarding the flow of information between the administration and Congress, and that the Congressional hearings would be in executive session. (Telegram 41669 to London, March 21, telegram 85099 to London, June 3, and telegram 111351 to London, July 13; all *ibid.*)

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1964-1968, volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 48.

⁴ In Joint State-Defense telegram 211245 to London, December 22, 1969, the United States had notified the Embassies in London and Indian Ocean countries that Diego Garcia was not included in the FY 70 Military Construction Bill, and would be resubmitted for FY 71. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF IND-US)

⁵ Senator Richard B. Russell (D-GA).

Indian Ocean area. This concern by U.S. leaders is not new, of course. Until the devaluation of the pound in November 1967, British participation was made a prerequisite for DOD secretarial approval. The subsequent British decision to withdraw all military presence from East of Suez does not now appear to be negotiable under their present government.

In fact, the British have cooperated with us from the beginning on the project and have invested \$14 million as their half of the detachment costs, for a project which to date only promises U.S. access to the islands of the BIOT. They have agreed to fly their flag and a small British liaison staff will be present at the facility. It thus appears that Diego Garcia will be the instrument for keeping a small British presence in an area where they would otherwise not be at all. It could even provide a basis for greater British activity in the future.

The Navy recently has had informal conversations with the Royal Navy about the possibilities of increased participation. The Royal Navy indicates that it is improbable that more than the minimum presence already agreed could be achieved. The Navy has entered into conversations on a joint intelligence effort which might result in increasing the number of UK personnel on the island.

Senator Mansfield also opposed the funding of the project but on grounds that the facility would mean a visible U.S. commitment in a new area. The Navy already operates in the Indian Ocean area. The Diego Garcia facility would provide low-profile support to make those operations more economical and efficient. If conditions in the Middle East require us to move out of our Naval Communications Station in Asmara, Diego Garcia is the only foreseeable site in which we can relocate these facilities and preserve our ability to exercise command and control in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East.

The support provided by Diego Garcia would enable us to operate Polaris/Poseidon submarines under the same positive command and control now possessed in the Atlantic and Pacific, and would cause the Soviets to cope with a nearly 360° defense problem. This cannot be construed as increased involvement, but rather, gives us an additional option for our vital sea-based strategic forces.

Senator Symington⁶ was not present when the Appropriations Committee decided to omit the project from the FY 1970 Budget. He has since indicated that he supports the project. During one of the hearings of his Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements he said with reference to the project "Unfortunately I was away at the time (of the Committee decision) on personal business, but I am confident that the

⁶ Senator Stuart Symington (D-MO).

Senate will reverse its position. The Navy wants this base and I think the Navy should have it." Senator Symington has also indicated that he would discuss the project with Senator Mansfield in an effort to get him to change his position. Senators Jackson and Thurmond⁷ have also been briefed on the project and have indicated support.

In the House, Representative Sikes⁸ has been a strong proponent of the project and has been responsible for House acceptance. Because of his efforts, the project was only defeated by Senate opposition after extensive House-Senate conferring on the Appropriations Bill. With Senator Symington and Representative Sikes spearheading support we are hopeful of favorable Congressional action for inclusion of the project in the FY 1971 Budget.

⁷ Senators Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) and Strom Thurmond (D-SC).

⁸ Congressman Robert L.F. Sikes (D-FL).

40. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹

I-21269/70

Washington, March 17, 1970.

SUBJECT

Diego Garcia

The purpose of this memorandum is to identify precisely the nature of your decision regarding the proposed US communications facility on Diego Garcia.

Although the attached Navy recommendation² emphasizes communications, ISA believes that it constitutes a considerably larger installation than is politically advisable at the present time. So long as the Cam Ranh Bay Naval Communications State is in operation, there is no requirement for a strategic communications facility on Diego Garcia to link Asmara and Northwest Cape, Australia. CINCMEA/FS

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-067, Box 73, Indian Ocean 1970. Secret.

² Not attached. The proposal is in a memorandum from Chafee to Laird, January 31. (Ibid.)

contingency operations are so unlikely that expenditure of funds to support them would not be warranted now.

Second, the proposed deep-water anchorage dredging would immediately be associated with the potential use of Diego Garcia by Polaris submarines and carrier task groups. Although obviously desirable in the event of general hostilities, this would be highly provocative at the present time. Both in public statements and privately with the UK, we have consistently denied any intention to establish a "Polaris base" at Diego Garcia. Even the appearance of doing so now would inevitably generate a drumfire of criticism from Indian Ocean littoral countries as well as in the UN, which could serve to reinforce Congressional opposition, and possibly defeat the project entirely.

Accordingly, I again recommend that you consider limiting the project on Diego Garcia to tactical communication for ships and aircraft transiting or operating in the area, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. In our view, it should include only such airstrip, waterfront and POL storage facilities as are necessary for construction, and for support of these two activities. Even though the Senate proves willing to fund the entire Navy proposal, which appears doubtful, I believe that a strategic communications capability and anchorage dredging should be eliminated from any work actually undertaken there. Presumably this would result in appreciable cost and personnel reductions as well.

Even our reduced proposal would have significant foreign policy implications, and State should therefore have an opportunity to review the matter fully. Moreover, State Department support could help significantly in overcoming the opposition of such Congressional figures as Senators Mansfield and Proxmire,³ who have reservations from a foreign policy standpoint. In light of the foregoing, we would appreciate an indication of your own desires regarding Diego Garcia, before we officially approach State and advise the British regarding DOD plans.

G. Warren Nutter

Approve Navy 31 January recommendation, including strategic communications and anchorage dredging.

Approve ISA alternative, limited to tactical communications [*less than 1 line not declassified*], plus supporting airstrip and POL storage.

Other⁴

³ Senate Majority Leader William Proxmire (D-WI).

⁴ There is no indication on the memorandum of Laird's action.

41. Editorial Note

President Nixon and British Prime Minister Edward Heath met on October 3, 1970, at Chequers. During their discussion, Heath stated:

“ ‘One advantage of our presence in the Far East is to keep Australians in Singapore.’ The President said he hoped this would be so because he wanted to continue to cooperate. Prime Minister Heath responded, ‘We are concerned with the Indian Ocean. The Soviets are building up. Our strength from Simonstown is not too great. We will help you via communications equipment and personnel for Diego Garcia. The problem that concerns us is a blackmail situation vis-à-vis us and Europe. No one suggests war is likely, but a blackmail capability along the vital routes around the Cape is serious enough.’

“Prime Minister Heath therefore said he believes the Simonstown Agreement should be maintained. He continued that the U.K. was having a major problem with the black African countries about this agreement, but that its position would not change. The President replied that the U.S. would do nothing to embarrass the U.K.

“Prime Minister Heath continued, ‘The disagreements do not seem to me to be enough for other countries to leave the Commonwealth. We do not ask your support but if your Ambassadors could (1) tell the Africans that Heath is not a racist and (2) that they shouldn’t leave the Commonwealth on this issue, it would be a big help.’ The President said the U.S. would do that. Heath said he thought that Apartheid was breaking down for economic reasons.” (Memorandum of conversation, October 3; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 727, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. IV) The Simonstown Agreement referred to is a mutual naval cooperation agreement between Great Britain and South Africa, which involved the British sale of arms to South Africa and the use of the Simonstown Naval Base.

In an earlier meeting on September 23, British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home expressed to Secretary of State Rogers “his concern about the possibility of the Indian Ocean’s becoming a Soviet sea. He said that Britain cannot do anything about that problem at a reasonable cost. If South Africa could do something, it would be regarded as a Western presence in the area. He also noted that Nyerere of Tanzania was probably the only leader of the Commonwealth who might insist on leaving if Britain made arms available to South Africa. He also observed that, if Nyerere took such action, he might start a procession.

“The Secretary replied that, if Britain started arms sales to South Africa, there would undoubtedly be a considerable amount of critical comment in the U.S., with contributions from those who had something to gain politically. He said that the U.S. Government would be quite restrained and would try to strike a note of understanding.

“The Foreign Secretary suggested that the U.S. might talk to other countries interested in the security of the Indian Ocean, such as Australia and Singapore. He wondered whether we might consider it useful to talk to India, although he observed that the Indians might repeat their traditional argument and say that a Western presence in the Indian Ocean would incite a Soviet presence.

“Secretary Rogers said we might be in a better position to discuss this matter after the President’s trip. The President is, of course, concerned about the Soviet naval buildup and he might wish to talk to the Prime Minister about this.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL UK-US)

42. National Security Study Memorandum 104¹

Washington, November 9, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT

Soviet and Friendly Naval Involvement in the Indian Ocean Area, 1971–1975

The President has asked for an assessment of possible Soviet naval threats to U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean area and the development of friendly naval force and basing alternatives consistent with varying judgments about possible threats and interests over the 1971–1975 period.² He has asked that special attention be given to possible U.S. co-operation with British and other friendly forces in the area.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-176, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 104. Secret. A copy was sent to Moorer. In a November 9 covering memorandum, Kissinger stated that the NSSM emerged from an understanding reached between President Nixon and Prime Minister Heath on October 3; see Document 41.

² According to a September 17 memorandum from Chafee to Packard, Nixon called for more information about Diego Garcia and the Reindeer Station Project after Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. (CINCPAC) informed him on the matter. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–067, Box 73, Indian Ocean 1970)

The study should:

—Specify U.S. interests involved in the Indian Ocean area, including political considerations, commercial and trade interests, communications and logistics requirements under current and possible contingency conditions, surveillance needs, and strategic force issues.

—Survey current and projected possible Soviet involvement in the Indian Ocean area and assess the possible threats to U.S. interests.

—Assess the current and possible future roles of British, Australian, South African and other forces in the Indian Ocean area, giving special consideration to possible basing requirements.

—Consider how the political, commercial and other interests of Japan, Australia, India, Indonesia, and other countries in the area affect the options for Soviet and U.S. naval involvement in the Indian Ocean area.

—Develop alternative U.S. force and basing arrangements (specifying the costs of each) consistent with differing views of U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean area, giving special attention to the associated roles of British and Australian and other friendly naval forces and joint housing arrangements.

This study should be carried out by an Interdepartmental Group under the chairmanship of the Department of Defense. It should be completed by December 1, 1970, and submitted to the Chairman, NSC Senior Review Group.

Henry A. Kissinger

43. Telegram From the Commander-in-Chief, Strike Command (Throckmorton) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

November 18, 1970, 2350Z.

STRJ5-ME 08916. Subj: Soviet and Friendly Naval Involvement in the Indian Ocean Area, 19/1-19/5 (C).

A. JCS-J5 5942, DTG 161659Z Nov 70 (U)²

1. (S) Although CINCSTRIKE is not charged with responsibility for the Indian Ocean Area, Middle East Force does operate throughout the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Admiral Thomas Moorer, Box 113, Work File (Indian Ocean). Secret. It was repeated to CINCLANT and CINCPAC.

² Not found.

area and therefore CINCSRIKE is interested in available basing and support arrangements for US fleet units.³

2. (S) The Soviet naval threat is not a “possibility,” it is a present, real, direct, immediate danger. The Soviet naval forces deployed to the area, while numerically small, are a modern, powerful and flexible force. They are already vastly superior in quality and numbers to US naval forces deployed there. The Soviet naval force, since March of 1968, has visited almost every major port in the Indian Ocean littoral, leaving behind favorable impressions of Soviet naval power, national determination, and “goodwill.” The most direct threat is in the possible use of Soviet naval forces to influence events during times of political crises. Soviet gunboat diplomacy can maintain shaky, hostile regimes and discourage formation of friendly governments. Relatedly, the Soviet Union is trying to create a market for its arms. Soviet naval forces represent a direct threat to traditional US/Western arms markets.

3. (S) There is ample evidence of Soviet interest in obtaining at least modest shore-based support facilities. Not only does their acquisition of such support increase their threat, it denies these ports to US naval and commercial shipping. Even in ports where the Soviets do not have special rights or privileges, their visits tend to close these ports to US ships. The combination of changes in regimes and Soviet naval visits have resulted in a drastic reduction of the number of ports in which US ships are welcome. The downward trend is expected to continue. We may soon be forced to operate out of small ports in weak countries and almost invisible islands such as Diego Garcia.

4. (S) The Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean has already seriously undermined US influence in this important area. This presence should be regarded as the cutting edge of a concerted, determined Soviet effort to dominate the Indian Ocean littoral; and to destroy the US position in this area.

5. (S) It seems that the US has only two choices: compete with the Soviets and best them at their own game or face eventual expulsion from this area through lack of support facilities. For instance, follow-

³ CINCPAC, which had responsibility for the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean, upheld this assessment by CINCSRIKE (or CINCPACFLT), whose area of responsibility included the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. CINCPAC concluded its assessment of the Soviet threat to the Indian Ocean by recommending that the “Friday Guest” concept plan, a flexible naval deployment, be followed. Moreover, it recommended that the development of Diego Garcia go forward as “the only satisfactory means of assuring continued operations in the Indian Ocean area which will be unfettered by political, logistic or other constraints likely to arise at any time.” (Telegram 210228Z from CINCPAC to JCS, November 21; National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Admiral Thomas Moorer, Box 113, Work File (Indian Ocean))

ing the June 67 Arab-Israeli War, MIDEASTFOR's only source of oil was from Ethiopia's meager stocks. The rapid drawdown of this resource raised the real possibility that MIDEASTFOR ships might be forced to withdraw from the Indian Ocean for lack of fuel.

6. (S) It seems appropriate for the US to actively seek basing arrangements, either as sole user but preferably on a joint use basis with UK, French, Australian or independent countries in such locations as Diego Suarez, Malagasy; Port Louis, Mauritius; Victoria, Seychelles; Diego Garcia, Chagos; and Keeling (Cocos) Island. Mainland bases in Kenya or Ceylon are not likely to be available in the foreseeable future. Likewise, Indian or Pakistani bases are unlikely although port visits to these countries may be permitted to continue. Base facilities obtained should include not only ship fueling, but also provisions for land-based aircraft in support of US naval forces in the area.

7. (S) MIDEASTFOR ships should continue to homeport at Bahrain. Bahrain is also recommended as an advanced supply and repair base for any US Indian Ocean naval forces. In this context, it would seem desirable to settle soonest on the joint US/UK use of facilities at HMS Jufair, including the potential for berthing, resupply, and repair of increased numbers of US ships.

44. Editorial Note

On November 25, 1970, the United States Senate approved the FY 1971 Military Construction Appropriations Bill, completing Congressional action on the bill. This included funding for the modest BIOT communications facility (Reindeer Station). (Telegram 194511 to London, November 28; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-176, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 104, and airgram CA-6087, December 11; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 IND-US) The United States and Britain were to share the task of informing concerned countries. Clarification on the overall strategic situation in the Indian Ocean, and the "nature and extent of any Soviet threat in Indian Ocean," was expected at the upcoming Anglo-American talks in December. (Telegram 195870 to Indian Ocean Embassies, December 2; *ibid.*, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Admiral Thomas Moorer, Box 113, Work File (Indian Ocean))

News of the plans for Diego Garcia were already rumored in the world press, causing concern, such as in Tananarive, New Delhi,

and Colombo. (Telegram 1391 from Tananarive, December 2; *ibid.*, telegram 205482 to New Delhi, December 17; and telegram 205666 to Colombo, December 17; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 IND-US)

45. Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

NSSM-104 SRG Meeting on December 9, 1970

Attached at the indicated tabs are:

- your talking points,²
- an analytical summary,³
- NSSM-104,⁴
- the full NSSM-104 report tabbed separately.⁵

I recommend you read the analytical summary first then the talking points. You may want to thumb the pages of the NSSM-104 report, although the analytical summary covers it fully and makes several additions.

Considering the short time available, the NSSM-104 study is a first-rate contribution. I believe the result proves that your decision to give DOD responsibility for the study was the correct one.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-176, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 104. Secret.

² Smith amended the language of the attached talking points “in light of the fact that John Thomson will be attending tomorrow’s meeting.” Thomson was British Prime Minister Edward Heath’s Emissary on Indian Ocean Affairs. Smith’s changes involved addressing if the United States would “be accused of an imperialistic racist policy if we cooperate with the U.K. and Australia?”, if it were “possible that the U.K. is seeking our involvement in the Indian Ocean area to justify a resumption of arms sales to South Africa?”, and whether “the Australians and the U.K. [will] do more if we do more or will they do less?”

³ Document 46.

⁴ Document 42.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 46.

The study was intentionally focused on the naval threat in the Indian Ocean and possible U.S. and Allied responses. Thus, it does not give detailed consideration to all the instrumentalities of our presence or the Soviet presence, e.g., military and economic assistance.

While it is true that we could respond to increased Soviet involvement by increasing non-naval activities, the utility of such responses in this case is limited by:

- the fact that we are concerned with an ocean and the threat involved is a naval threat;

- the likelihood that projecting a naval presence is one of the best ways to maximize the contributions of our allies;

- our desire to pre-empt Soviet use of naval facilities such as Singapore because this may be the best way to deny the Soviets low-cost, high-benefit opportunities;

- the limited flexibility we have in our use of other foreign policy instruments such as military assistance in the area. This condition results from the already large Soviet role, our limited economic assistance funds, and, in many cases, hostile political circumstances.

In summary, NSSM-104 is a useful exercise in sub-optimization.

The State Department has been a willing and constructive participant in this study. I have no information that would suggest they will denounce it for its narrow focus. I suspect they will stress the political implications of the activities contemplated, but that is their job.

I have given CIA advanced warning that they will be asked to respond to specific questions on the threat (although I haven't told them what the questions will be). State and DOD have been asked to be up on the plans and wishes of the U.K., Australia, Singapore, etc.

46. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, December 8, 1970.

NSSM 104

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

Introduction

NSSM 104 develops four alternative U.S. force and basing packages for 1971–75 consistent with varying views of U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean area and the threats to U.S. interests, particularly the Soviet naval threat.²

It assesses these alternatives in terms of:

—each's consistency with friendly plans for the area, particularly those of the U.K.

—the presence of U.S. and friendly forces compared with Soviet forces and possible Soviet reactions.

—possible reactions from neutral countries.

—costs and naval force availability.

NSSM 104 does not treat broad alternative U.S. strategies for the Indian Ocean involving trade-offs between different ways of protecting U.S. interests, e.g. MAP, economic assistance, and political actions. The focus is on one instrumentality: naval forces and basing. While NSSM 104 focuses on the relationship of the various postures with allied plans, it does not develop a political program for implementing whatever option is chosen that would encompass the U.S. diplomatic and public relations posture.

Interests and Threats

Interests—Relative to the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean areas, U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean area are modest:

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-176, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 104. Secret.

² NSSM 104 is Document 42. The December 3 response to NSSM 104, entitled "Soviet and Friendly Naval Involvement in the Indian Ocean Area, 1971–1975," was submitted to Kissinger on December 4 by Pranger, Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-176, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 104) The CIA's contribution to the response to NSSM 104 included three papers: the first, November 17, was entitled "U.S. Economic Interests in the Indian Ocean"; the second was a November 19 paper from the Office of Research and Reports, entitled "Soviet Involvement in the Indian Ocean"; and the third was a November 19 paper from the Office of Science and Technology, entitled "Assessment of the Soviet Threat in the Indian Ocean." (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–T01315A, Box 2)

—The U.S. has an interest in insuring open commercial transit through the Indian Ocean and to the Persian Gulf, because of the importance of oil and other supply lines between Europe, the Persian Gulf, Japan, and Australia.

—While the U.S. has no reason to control the Indian Ocean area, it has an interest in denying control of the area or a dominant portion of it to the Soviet Union and other potentially hostile powers.

—Because of the large share of the world's population residing in Indian Ocean countries such as India and Indonesia, the U.S. seeks to encourage their political and economic progress and their friendly participation in international affairs.

U.S. commitments in the Indian Ocean area reflect U.S. interests and include: CENTO (Pakistan, Iran); SEATO (Pakistan and Thailand); an air defense agreement with India, and ANZUS (Australia).

The current U.S. presence in the area is small, reflecting the historical absence of large-scale threats to the area and the stabilizing role played by the U.K. The U.S. has the following assets in the area (see attached map):³

—a 3 ship (Middle East) force at the U.K. base at Bahrain in the Persian Gulf,

—communications facilities at Ethiopia, Australia and one planned for Diego Garcia,

—atomic energy detection stations in nine littoral states,

—space-tracking and support facilities (some militarily related) in five states,

—a navigation station at Reunion.

Threats—The only major threat to the Indian Ocean is that which might result from the expanding Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean area.

The first Soviet ship presence in the Indian Ocean was an oceanographic research ship deployed in 1957. During 1965–67 the Soviets sent a destroyer on annual visits and in 1967 17 surface ships sailed to the Indian Ocean in support of space operations. Prolonged operations by warships began in 1968.

Presently the Soviets maintain a small naval force averaging 2 to 4 combatants in the Indian Ocean (compared with the U.S. Mideast force presence of three ships). The Soviet combatant ship operating days were 980 in 1969 and are expected to at least double that number in 1970.

³ Attached but not printed.

If the Suez Canal remains closed, we can expect the Soviet force to increase to 5 to 7 ships in the 1971–75 period. Opening Suez would raise this number to 7 to 13 ships. To support either of these expanded force levels the Soviets can be expected to develop logistics facilities east of Suez within the next five years.

Comparative U.S., Soviet and U.S. and Allied Presence Under Current Conditions

The following table compares current U.S. and current U.S. plus allied presence with Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean area.

Table 1

Presence of US, UK, and Soviet Combatants and Auxiliaries⁴

	Number of Ships	Ship Days	Port Visits
U.S.	3–4	1100–1400	100
U.K. ⁵	3–4	1100–1400	30
U.S. and U.K.	6–8	2200–2800	130
Soviet	5–9	1800–3300	60

The table shows a rough parity of U.S. and U.K. presence.

U.S. plus U.K. presence is roughly equivalent to Soviet presence, although if U.K. presence at Singapore and Bahrain (home ports for U.K. ships) were included U.S. plus U.K. ship-days would exceed Soviet ship-days.

Because the Soviets visit ports less frequently than U.S. or U.K. ships, U.S. and U.S. plus U.K. port visits are almost double Soviet port visits.

Third Country Views

Indian Ocean countries such as India, Pakistan, and Indonesia are major spokesmen for the non-aligned viewpoint. Reflecting their views the Lusaka Non-Aligned Conference in September 1970 called upon all states “to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which the great power rivalries and competition as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition, either army, navy or air force bases, are excluded.” To this was added: “The area should also be free of nuclear weapons.”⁶

⁴ Annual estimate based on 1969–70 data. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁵ Port visits do not include Bahrain and Singapore. [Footnote is in the original. In the margin next to this footnote, Kissinger wrote: “Why so many junk[ets]?”]

⁶ The meeting was held September 8.

The press and Parliament in India have already protested the planned establishment of a U.S. communication facility at Diego Garcia. Any substantial expansion of the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean area would provoke strong protests from India and probably other non-aligned countries. These protests would be encouraged by the anti-western countries of the area such as Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, South Yemen, and the UAR.

On the other hand, littoral states such as Indonesia, Australia, Singapore, and Iran would probably welcome a larger U.S. role. The U.S. would also benefit from close U.K. relations in the Persian Gulf area, Singapore, and throughout South Asia if its presence were projected in conjunction with U.K. forces. The exception would be South Africa where a greater U.S. involvement, however projected, would cause most non-white states to regard conspicuous U.S. military cooperation with South Africa as condoning the latter's racial policies.

Alternative Force-Base Packages

The following four force-base packages were devised to provide a range of possible U.S. involvement in the Indian Ocean area. Each package has force presence and basing elements and provisions for operations with allies. The basing arrangements vary for Bahrain, Singapore, Diego Garcia, and for Freemantle/Cockburn in Australia.

The elements of the various packages are illustrative and could be combined in different ways.

1. Alternative A. Maintain Current Presence

Description—The U.S. would:

—Retain the U.S. Mideast force of three combatants (one homeported and two in the Atlantic Fleet) at Bahrain.

—Continue occasional transits and port visits by U.S. navy ships in addition to Mideast force and continue occasional air surveillance operations in the Indian Ocean.

—Maintain existing logistics support facilities on islands and littoral and existing command and communications facilities at Northwest Cape, Australia; Kagnaw Station, Ethiopia, and the planned facility at Diego Garcia, BIOT.

The U.S. would urge:

—The U.K. to retain naval units and maritime patrol aircraft at Singapore to strengthen the Joint-Five-Power arrangement and pre-empt Soviet use of Singapore.

—Australia to continue its development of a naval base at Freemantle/Cockburn.

—The U.K. to participate in the utilization of Diego Garcia as a communications facility.

*Assessment—**Pro:*

—Would not provoke an adverse reaction from the non-aligned Indian Ocean states.

—Requires no increase in U.S. involvement or costs over current plans.

—Could not be used by Soviets to justify a further expansion of their Indian Ocean force.

Con:

—While current U.S. plus U.K. involvement exceeds Soviet presence, the absence of any concrete U.S. measures may deny the U.K. a justification for continuing its naval presence east of Suez until 1975. This could cause allied presence to fall short of the current Soviet presence.

—If the Soviets increased their combatant force from 2 to 4 ships to 5 to 7 in the 1972–75 period as expected, this option, assuming the U.K. maintains its current presence, would cause U.S. plus U.K. presence to fall short of Soviet presence.

2. Alternative B. Emphasize Allied Cooperation at Slightly Increased U.S. Force Levels

Description—In addition to the actions called for in Alternative A, this option would step up combined naval activities with allies and friendlies in the form of combined naval operations, cooperative maritime surveillance efforts, and increased joint use of support facilities.

Specifically the U.S. would:

—Qualitatively upgrade its Mideast force by replacing World War II vintage U.S. destroyers with modern ships.

—Conduct a combined cruise with U.K., Australian and other friendly navies at least on a regular annual basis. These cruises would last about a month and include joint naval training exercises with units of friendly littoral states (e.g. Indonesia) as feasible. Scheduled port visits would be an integral feature of these combined cruises.

—Conduct joint maritime surveillance efforts with U.K., Australian and other friendly forces.

—Develop a long-range plan for port visits throughout the Indian Ocean designed to create the most effective political/psychological impact. This action would likely entail increased use of logistic support facilities at Singapore.

—Consider upgrading the POL storage capacity of the planned communication facility on Diego Garcia to provide a limited POL and logistics support capability for transiting friendly units.

Force Presence Comparisons—The following table compares U.S., U.S. and allied and Soviet force presence for this alternative:

Table 2
Alternative B Force Presence Comparisons

	Number of Ships	Ship-Days	Port Visits
A. 1. U.S. (Alt. B)	3–5	1100–1800	115
2. Allied	3–6	1200–1600	35–40
3. U.S. and Allied	6–9	2300–3300	150–165
B. 1. Soviet (Current)	5–9	1800–3300	60
2. Soviet (Projected)	9–14	3300–5000	100–110

Assessment—

Pro:

—Would permit the U.S. to increase its operations with U.K. and other friendly forces and marginally increase its presence at Bahrain, Diego Garcia, and Singapore.

—Would not permit the Soviets to justify a further escalation of their involvement as a response to U.S. escalation.

—One-time cost is \$1.5 million and incremental annual operating costs are \$0.1 million. Force diversions required from Atlantic and Pacific fleets are minor and would not uncover other commitments.

—Even if Indians and other non-aligned states protested the increased U.S. presence under this option, the U.S. could legitimately claim its involvement was less than Soviet presence under current Soviet presence, and roughly half under projected Soviet presence.

—Even against projected expanded Soviet threat would permit the U.S. and allied port visits to exceed Soviet visits although in number of ships and ship operating days the U.S. plus allied force would fall short of the Soviet force.

—Keeps the U.S. presence at near parity with its allies and emphasizes joint operations in a manner that could be viewed as consistent with the Nixon Doctrine and which would make it difficult for India or the Soviet Union to contend that the U.S. was turning the Indian Ocean into another arena for big-power competition.

Con:

—While under current conditions the U.S. presence is on par with the Soviets in ships and ship days, if and when the Soviet threat expands as projected, the U.S. presence would fall well short of the Soviets.

—The U.K. may be seeking more substantial evidence that the U.S. is concerned about the expanding Soviet naval involvement that would result from selection of this option.

3. *Alternative C: Moderate Increase in U.S. Presence and Operations with Allies*

Description—In addition to the actions called for in Alternatives B and C [A and B?], this option calls for the U.S. to:

—Establish a permanent U.S. naval presence in the Eastern Indian Ocean by operating two destroyers drawn from the Seventh Fleet either on a rotational basis or home-ported at Singapore.

—Increase level of combined U.S., U.K. and Australian group operations from one of one month duration each year (Alternative B) to two operations of up to eight weeks duration. Such operations could include a major combatant (carrier or cruiser) from the U.S. Seventh Fleet and similar U.K. and Australian ships.

—Conduct occasional cruises (less than 30 days) of a small U.S. naval task unit in the Indian Ocean. Nuclear powered warships or amphibious task units could be employed.

—Increase U.S. fleet visits and combined operations at Cockburn Sound as new Australian facilities develop there.

Force Presence Comparisons—The following table compares U.S., U.S. and allied, and Soviet force presence for Alternative C:

Table 3
Alternative C Force Presence Comparisons

	Number of Ships	Ship-Days	Port Visits
A. 1. U.S. (Alt. C)	5–8	2200–2400	230
2. Allied	3–8	1600–1900	70–80
3. U.S. and Allied	8–10	3800–4300	300–310
B. 1. Soviet (Current)	5–9	1800–3300	60
2. Soviet (Projected)	9–14	3300–5000	100–110

Assessment—

Pro:

—Would permit U.S. and Allied presence to remain on par with Soviet presence if the latter expands as expected in the time period. Friendly port visits would exceed Soviet visits by a factor of six if the current Soviet posture is maintained and a factor of three if the Soviets increase their force.

—Would provide substantial evidence to the U.K. and other allies that the U.S. was prepared to act to meet the increasing Soviet threat

in the Indian Ocean area. Such evidence might prolong U.K. involvement east of Suez, although it may ease Australian and other pressures on the U.K. to stay.

—Australia would find it easier to implement more rapidly its west coast naval development and to strengthen its commitment to the Five-Power Defense Arrangement for Malaysia and Singapore.

Con:

—The U.S. would be stepping out in front of its allies, expanding its presence beyond what could be justified on an equal partnership basis.

—Could permit the Soviets to justify an expanded involvement as a reaction to U.S. escalation. The Soviets would probably intensify their efforts to gain access to air and naval facilities, possibly anticipating deployment of Soviet-targeted SSBN's to the Indian Ocean.

—Would bring strong protests from non-aligned states of the area.

—One-time costs would be \$1.5 million (same as Alternative B) assuming it were not decided to home-port two destroyers at Singapore. Incremental annual operating costs are \$.61 million compared with \$0.1 million for Alternative B.

—Maintaining a two-destroyer force diverted from the Seventh Fleet to Singapore would require a commensurate draw down of destroyer forces available to meet other requirements in the Western Pacific. If a Seventh Fleet attack carrier were deployed, this would substantially reduce the contingency strike warfare capability and ability to cover the entire Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia areas of the theater. Similarly the deployment of guided missile escorts impacts on the overall air defense posture of the fleet units in the Western Pacific.

4. Alternative D: Begin Major U.S. Task Force Deployments, Upgrade Substantially Area Basing, and Increase Cooperation with Allies

Description—In addition to the actions called for in Alternatives A, B, and C, this option calls for the U.S. to:

—Home-port four destroyers at Singapore (instead of 2 in Option C).

—Conduct combined U.S. and Allied cruises of up to 60 days along the lines called for in option C but also including a helicopter or aircraft carrier task group from the Seventh Fleet.

—Increase air surveillance operations utilizing Navy and Air Force reconnaissance aircraft. Upgrade U-Tapao air patrol detachment to a full squadron and stage a rotational detachment of this squadron to Diego Garcia.

—Consider construction of an airfield in BIOT, possibly on Farquhar Island.

—Upgrade logistics and airfield facilities at Diego Garcia.

Force Presence Comparisons—The following table compares U.S., U.S. and allied, and Soviet force presence for Alternative D.

Table 4
Alternative D Force Presence Comparisons

	Number of Ships	Ship-Days	Port Visits
A. 1. U.S. (Alt. D)	5–10	2200–2600	280
2. Allied	3–8	1700–2100	80–100
3. U.S. and Allied	8–10	3900–4700	360–380
B. 1. Soviet (Current)	5–9	1800–3300	60
2. Soviet (Projected)	9–14	3300–5000	100–110

Assessment—

The pros and cons of this option are essentially the same as for Alternative D [C?] except that for this option:

—The development [*deployment?*] of amphibious units into the Indian Ocean could cause some serious reactions from non-aligned littoral states.

—One-time costs would be \$21.5 million and incremental annual cost would be \$5.13 million.

47. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 8, 1970.

SRG ON INDIAN OCEAN

SUBJECT

The Soviets and the Indian Ocean: Comment on NSSM 104, Particularly Section II of the Basic Study (pp. 6–13)²

Having participated in a number of Indian Ocean Studies during the last five years, I find the NSSM 104 study far and away the best. Although extremely brief in regard to Soviet activities and policies, it comes closer to what I would consider a reasonable view than the earlier efforts.

Since much of the work in the Government on Soviet "intentions" still suffers from what I believe to have been the flaws of the earlier Indian Ocean studies, I want briefly to identify these flaws.

In the first place, earlier studies saw Soviet activities as part of a coherent strategy or master plan of expansion. The NSSM 104 study (p. 6) explicitly concludes that Soviet policy is one of "opportunism rather than of grand design." (Let me hasten to note that there is no necessary comfort in this conclusion: opportunism can be as dangerous as, and probably more unpredictable than design, grand or otherwise.)

Second, previous studies viewed Soviet decision-making as monolithic. They did not allow for conflicting views in Moscow and resulting compromises rather than maximal decisions. The present study does not deal with this aspect. It is of course a highly speculative one since

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-176, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 104. Secret. Sent for information.

² Pages 6–13 of the December 3 NSSM 104 study, "Soviet and Friendly Naval Involvement in the Indian Ocean," state that the Soviet Union, "want[s] to erode western influence, to exclude Chinese influence, and to have the countries in the Indian Ocean area look to them as the leading power. Strategically the Soviets would like to inhibit the U.S. from using the Indian Ocean as an operating area for ballistic missile submarines." It then characterizes the Soviet approach as one of "cautious probing," and states that "Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean area do not pose a direct military threat to any major U.S. interests." It concludes that it was unlikely that the Soviet Union would directly challenge the U.S. desires to use its naval presence to "strengthen certain regimes, neutralize others, and weaken others," as it would be "tempered by their own military limitations, by the negative reaction of the littoral states, and by a concern over being mired down in such an operation, and by moves by the U.S. to counter such opportunism." (Ibid.) See also Document 46.

evidence is extremely hard to come by. The issue however derives from one's assumptions about the Soviet decision-making process and these, in turn, are an important ingredient for our own policy decisions.

Third, past studies did not deal with the problem of opportunity costs: given the known constraints on the Soviet budget, even the military one, what activities are the Soviets unable to undertake by maintaining various levels of naval presence and infrastructure in the Indian Ocean and what does this tell us about their priorities? The present NSSM says that the Soviets "evidently aspire to a greater role in world affairs and to project a greater presence in distant areas." (p. 6) It does not, and probably is not the proper place to attempt a judgment in differentiating among various presences in various places at various times, or among sizes and intensities of presences in various places. Here again, some rigorous analysis could have significant bearing on our own decisions.

Fourth, past studies tended to equate the intentions they imputed to the Soviets with Soviet ability to convert them into reality. Such factors as susceptibility of riparian states, the effect of counter-measures by the US, UK, France, and others, the effect on Soviet decision-making of either setbacks or successes in the implementation of the imputed intentions etc. etc. were generally ignored. NSSM 104 is a distinct improvement, though only a beginning, on this score. Past studies also seemed to confer a near-magic significance on Soviet naval ships, even when present in tiny numbers and for short periods of time. NSSM 104 still does so to some extent. In fact, Soviet influence in the area resulted in the first place from the use of other devices, such as aid, political support, local Communist parties. There no doubt is some special weight that attaches to Soviet ships because of the novelty of their presence. But we should not add to it unnecessarily.

Fifth, related to the previous point, all past studies foresaw a growth in Soviet naval presence on more or less a straight line, based on the rate of growth thus far observable. NSSM 104 on the whole tends to accept this prognosis (pp. 8–10) but represents a substantial improvement over past efforts in noting factors which "militate against sustained deployment of larger forces in this area." (p. 10)

Sixth, past studies on the whole agreed, as does NSSM 104, that the Soviets desire to avoid a confrontation with the US. Past studies, like NSSM 104, also attributed to them the goal of maintaining friendly relations with non-aligned nations in the area (p. 11). The earlier studies were, however, far more certain than NSSM 104 that beyond this goal (which, incidentally, also serves to *restrain* Soviet actions because of the sensitivity of many riparians to great power involvement in the area), the Soviets sought to establish over time paramount influence up to and including establishment of client states and the use of vital land facilities. NSSM 104 does allow, correctly in my view, for the strong

likelihood that the Soviets will seek support facilities for their naval forces (probably in South Yemen) in order to extend their time on-station. But it avoids the more extravagant projections relating to the establishment of a network of air bases, rail heads, oil pipe-lines, supply dumps etc. etc. all around the periphery.

Seventh, related to the previous point, all studies assumed a Soviet desire at least to increase their prestige and influence, though the operational meaning of these terms is never adequately defined and no rigorous judgment is attempted of how this goal relates to and may be constrained by (1) the desire to avoid confrontation with us, (2) maintain friendly relations with non-aligned riparians and (3) the cost, in rubles, of doing so.

Eighth, NSSM 104, though again only very briefly, greatly improves on past studies in identifying certain operational uses of Soviet naval forces and, indeed, of the over-all Soviet presence in the area: to help a toppling government, to protect Soviet personnel (though only as a pretext), to strengthen certain regimes, neutralize others and weaken still others, to influence the outcome of a politically sensitive situation. (pp. 12–13). Another possible use that might have been considered is that of a stand-by force for use in pursuance of a UN resolution in the absence of other immediately available national forces in some fast-moving situation. The NSSM does well to consider deliberate “vigorous adventurism doubtful” (p. 12), although it fails to define this concept and to explain how, in some circumstances, “vigorous adventurism” would be distinguished from helping a toppling government, protecting Soviet personnel etc. etc. as mentioned above.

In some way, all these points relate to certain imponderables regarding Soviet behavior that have a bearing well beyond the Indian Ocean. Thus, we do not yet really know how, or understand why, the Soviet Union went in for a large overseas naval force when Khrushchev explicitly in 1956 mocked such a force and throughout his rule fought stout political battles against it as well as against conventional forces generally. Yet all the ships that now trouble us were bought while he was in power.

One answer might be that Khrushchev tried to deceive us, even to the point of emitting false Kremlinological signals about internal arguments over military posture. (For various reasons this seems unlikely.)

Another answer might be that Khrushchev never had the power to make his military policy, enunciated repeatedly between 1955 and at least 1961, stick. If Soviet military pressure groups were able to negate the decisions of as powerful a figure as Khrushchev was precisely during a portion of this period (1957–62), one must assume that they can do even better when the leadership is collective and hamstrung by a multitude of impediments to its capacity for decision-making.

Another answer, not inconsistent with either of the above, might be that the USSR is subject to a dynamic impulse toward great power status with all the trappings appertaining thereto, including, specifically, a capacity to maintain a military presence all around the globe. Such impulses have of course propelled many other nations over the centuries; the Soviets may merely be late starters, in part, perhaps, in subconscious admission of the fact that their *special* kind of imperialism, i.e. the potency of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the role of the USSR as a model for others near and far, has lost momentum. Actually, in the Indian Ocean we may be seeing, on the part of the USSR as NSSM 104 suggests (p. 6), a combination of the emergence of a more traditional kind of imperialist behavior with the urge to contest the growth of Chinese influence. That influence stems in part from Peking's appeal to radical forces. The Soviets while mustering what radicalism they can to meet the challenge seem on the whole inclined to utilize tools invented by Western capitalist states.

If the hypothesis is valid that what is happening in the Seven Seas is at least as much the result of impulse as design in Moscow, the danger of rash action by Soviet forces in distant places may in fact be greater than NSSM 104 suggests. For if the impulse is toward great power status and a place in the sun, there may easily develop a strong compulsion to demonstrate on some occasion that the USSR is not a giant with clay feet. There will be investments to protect (not the traditional capitalist kind, but investment in prestige, and foreign aid and in hardware that is supposed to be felt as well as heard and seen): and there may be strong temptations, especially when risks seem low, to intervene in one or another situation to prove the efficacy of Soviet power.

Moreover, and disturbingly, the Indian Ocean is not unique as an arena of Soviet great power display. The Caribbean is far closer to home and already contains one clear client subject, at least verbally, to Soviet protection.

It is considerations like these that lead me to a rather less relaxed conclusion than NSSM 104 not just about the Indian Ocean itself but about Soviet long-range military activities everywhere, including in our own front yard. I thus have no particular quarrel with the military options in the NSSM. But I don't think we have begun to cope with the more general phenomenon of the Soviet Union's emergence as an overseas power; a phenomenon all the more disturbing because it coincides with weakness in political leadership in Moscow and perhaps even with a more convulsive structural crisis in the Soviet system in which the tiny ruling "elite" may find resort to foreign adventurism a tempting defense against an alienated and frustrated society.

48. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 8, 1970.

SUBJECT

SRG on Indian Ocean—A Complement to Your Briefing Book

The papers that Wayne Smith has prepared for your SRG meeting on the Indian Ocean concentrate on possible U.S. naval responses to the Soviet naval buildup there.² This is appropriate because NSSM 104³ specifically defined that as the scope of the study.

What I would like to add is a complementary political dimension which might affect our timing and expectations in implementing some of the naval options proposed in the NSSM 104 papers. In the last talking point which Wayne proposes for your use at the meeting, it is suggested that State prepare a political strategy paper to pre-empt the reactions of Indians and others. I would like to elaborate on this suggestion.

My point is this:

—If we deal with the Soviet naval buildup in the Indian Ocean purely in terms of a U.S. and allied naval response, we are relying entirely on a naval response to deter or match the Soviet buildup. This could produce steady escalation.

—It may be possible along with a modest naval response to develop a political strategy which would help limit further Soviet buildup without moving to a costly increase in the U.S. naval presence which would in turn provoke a sharp Soviet increase.

—From all indications the Soviets are exploiting a target of opportunity and may not be willing to jeopardize their political relations with key littoral states for the sake of simply advancing their rather low priority naval interests. This means that we might be able to inhibit the Soviets by raising the political costs of their naval involvement in the Indian Ocean.

Such a political strategy would build mainly on the expressed desire of the littoral states to limit or exclude foreign forces from the Indian Ocean. Its purpose would be to decrease any political benefits the USSR might hope to gain from increasing its naval presence. It would be consistent with a general U.S. interest in not sharply increasing its naval presence there.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) Box H-176, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 104. Secret.

² Document 45.

³ Document 42.

A number of the littoral states have long expressed concern over the prospect of foreign naval forces in the region and especially, as they see it, shifting great power rivalry into the Indian Ocean. This feeling is strong especially in South Asia and has been reiterated recently. The resolution adopted by the Conference of Non-aligned States at Lusaka in September⁴ and the recent report of a possible initiative by Ceylon at the 1971 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference highlight the possibility of efforts by local states to limit, or even to exclude, foreign forces from the area. The strong possibility of growing local agitation against foreign forces suggests that we consider a course of action which might:

a) heighten local resistance to Soviet naval activity, hampering the maintenance of Soviet forces in the area and tending to neutralize at least partially the political effect of those that do operate there; and

b) reduce or divert pressures against any U.S. forces or installations there.

In general terms, such a course of action would involve identifying ourselves with the concerns of the Indian Ocean states regarding foreign forces. There is a considerable range of specific steps which could be taken from the most general expression of understanding for the concerns to the presentation of quite precise formulations for limitation of forces.

A more general statement, at least as an initial step, would have most of the advantages of a more specific and elaborated measure and few of the disadvantages. The U.S. could state, perhaps in response to an Indian initiative, that it appreciated the concerns of the Indian Ocean states and stood ready to cooperate in limiting foreign military presence.

If the Soviets did not respond affirmatively, as is likely, we would not be bound to exercise more restraint than they have shown. Our good intentions would have been demonstrated, however, and we could, if we wished, leave it that we continued to be prepared to limit forces if all outside powers were similarly willing.

If the USSR should agree to consider some form of mutual restraint, we could propose a formulation that curbed a sharp increase in Soviet activity without seriously inhibiting modest U.S. activity at about present levels or slightly more.

The main disadvantages in this approach would be:

—if any such move bound us to a “nuclear-free” provision *and*
—if we now saw a clear need to station ballistic missile submarines in the Indian Ocean.

⁴ See footnote 6, Document 46.

Recommendation: That this political option be considered as a possible complement to a modest U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean—a presence such as described by a slightly reinforced Option B in your SRG papers.

49. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to British Secretary of State for Defence Lord Carrington¹

Washington, December 9, 1970.

Dear Lord Carrington:

I am writing to confirm formally the request, made during your recent visit here, for the United Kingdom to participate in operating the naval communications facility which the United States is planning to construct on the island of Diego Garcia, in the Chagos Archipelago.

As you know, the British Indian Ocean Territory was set aside in the mid-sixties for defense projects of either country. I understand that in 1967 our predecessors had reached agreement for a joint air base on Aldabra Island, a plan later abandoned.² British participation in the new Diego Garcia facility would therefore be wholly in keeping with previous planning between our two nations for the Indian Ocean area, as well as most welcome from the standpoint of this Administration.

The facility on Diego Garcia is designed to strengthen U.S. naval communications in the large area between Kagnew station, Ethiopia and Northwest Cape, Australia. Its airfield and POL storage will also provide minimal logistic support, but will be strictly supplementary to the communications function. We are prepared to substitute Royal Navy officers and enlisted men for U.S. personnel on a one-for-one basis in a range of billets in the communications, maintenance, meteorology, and station support categories. Enclosed is a list of 53 such billets which would be appropriate for U.K. manning.³ In order to play

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-067, Box 73, Indian Ocean. Secret.

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1964-1968, volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Documents 34, 37, 38, 39, and 42-47.

³ Not attached.

an active role in the operation of this facility, beginning in 1973, we would suggest that the Royal Navy select up to 25 or 30 of these billets, representing about 10% of expected station strength, with details being arranged between our two Navies.

I am pleased to report that funds for this project have now been approved by the Congress, and their apportionment is expected shortly. We will be most interested to have your response,⁴ and trust that it will lead to another fruitful example of Anglo-American partnership.

Sincerely,

Mel Laird

⁴ In his December 21 response, Carrington wrote Laird that the British agreed to help with manning the station, but that shortages of naval manpower meant their numbers and specialization required careful study. He also suggested that conditions for constructing and operating the facility could be covered by a memorandum of understanding. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–067, Box 73, Indian Ocean)

50. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, December 9, 1970, 11:05–11:50 a.m.

SUBJECT

Soviet and Friendly Naval Involvement in the Indian Ocean Area, 1971–1975
(NSSM 104)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. According to Talking Papers prepared for the meeting, OSD was to argue for postponement of any decisions until after discussions with the British were complete because 1) it was not clear that a U.S. naval response was the best way to counter an increased Soviet naval presence; 2) the United States and its allies had significant political assets in the area; 3) an enlarged Diego Garcia facility would encounter Congressional opposition; 4) the Navy was already over-committed; and 5) the United States might be “getting out ahead of our allies and the local powers in our military presence, and thereby be contradicting the Nixon Doctrine.” (OSD paper, undated; Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–067, Box 73, Indian Ocean, 1970) The JSC recommended Alternative C, a moderate increase in U.S. presence. They based their decision on 4 principles: the importance of U.S. interest in the region, the connection between increased Soviet naval presence and economic and political inroads, the possible drawdown of British forces, and the need to be able to mount a response in the event of a naval threat. (JCS paper, undated; *ibid.*)

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State—John N. Irwin

Joseph J. Sisco

Thomas Pickering

Joseph Neubert

Defense—David Packard

G. Warren Nutter

Robert J. Pranger

CIA—Richard Helms

Bruce C. Clarke

JCS—Lt. Gen. Richard Knowles

Admiral William St. George

Mr. John Thompson, UK Cabinet Office

NSC Staff—Dr. K. Wayne Smith

Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Mr. Harold H. Saunders

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

Jeanne W. Davis

Mr. Robert Sansom

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

. . . CIA would prepare a paper on the Soviet offensive buildup in the UAR;

. . . JCS would consider how Soviet moves in the Indian Ocean relate to other Soviet naval moves;

. . . we must now examine the political implications of Soviet moves in the area, analyze our own interests and those of others and work out a coherent strategy.

Mr. Kissinger: We welcome John Thompson of the British Cabinet Office to our meeting today. As you know, the President and Prime Minister Heath had agreed to cooperate on an Indian Ocean study² and Mr. Thompson's presence here will give us an opportunity to hear the British perspective. (to Mr. Thompson) It will also give you an opportunity to compare what you are told privately and publicly. We have prepared a paper of our own and the British have a study.³ I suggest we talk about some aspects of our own paper and then ask Mr. Thompson to comment on how the British see the issue. (to General Knowles) Could you give us a rundown on how the Soviet naval threat developed in this area.

General Knowles: (handing out an annotated map which is attached)⁴ The current situation in which the Soviets have a small task force in the area is about par for the course. They came into the area for the first time in March of 1968 and have kept 2 to 4 ships, or more, there ever since.

² See Document 41.

³ See Document 46. The British paper was "The Indian Ocean Area—Soviet and Chinese Capabilities: Intentions and Opportunities." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files, (H-Files), Box H-176, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 104)

⁴ Not attached.

Mr. Kissinger: Do they come around the Cape or from Valdivostok?

Admiral St. George: Both.

Mr. Thompson: The bulk come from Vladivostok; some from the Black Sea.

General Knowles: In addition, the Soviets have six space-related ships and three hydrographic research ships in the area. They seem very interested in airfields and may be looking for a radar site. They have made frequent port visits, apparently practicing old-style gun-boat diplomacy. They may also be looking to fill the void left by the UK withdrawal, though there is still the key UK base at Singapore to which our ships are allowed entry. The Soviets are gaining operational experience in the area, learning the facilities, becoming acquainted with the people, and generally increasing their presence. With regard to port visits, Soviet ships spent 1106 ship-days in area ports in 1968 and 2127 ship-days in 1969. US ship-days were dropping during this same period. In 1970, the US had 560 ship-days in port and the USSR 2239 ship-days. This is not significant in itself but it is an indicator. Annex B of the study gives one a feel for the number of visits by area.

Mr. Thompson: (showing Dr. Kissinger a map) This will give you an impression of the intensity of their presence.

Mr. Kissinger: I have a number of impressions that I would like to mention. First, this study was focused on the Navy, and the response is entirely in naval/military terms. We should, of course, discuss the relationship of the increase in the Soviet naval presence and their political objectives. Is it true that political influence grows commensurate with naval presence? At what point? When they increase from two to four ships? From two to twenty ships?

Second, if there is some relationship, can or should it be countered by a build-up of the US Navy alone? With Free World navies? And/or with other means? We should look at the political context of the littoral states.

Third, assuming we should react by increasing our naval power, what should be the timing? Should we wait for the Soviets to increase and then react, or should we preempt Soviet action by an increase of our own?

Fourth, our recent experience in Cuba indicates a world-wide overseas deployment of Soviet power.⁵ Is this more pronounced in the Indian Ocean? What is the US position? I think we should look at the whole outward projection of Soviet forces, including all the exercises they have run recently.

⁵ Reference to the Soviet submarine base at Cienfuegos, the southern coast of Cuba.

I'm aware, of course, that we didn't ask for that in this study, but I think we should address these questions in the next phase. I would like to ask Mr. Thompson to outline for us any preliminary conclusions the British have reached from their study.

Mr. Thompson: I am extremely grateful to have this opportunity—it is a privilege. I had a long talk with the Prime Minister before I left, and he views the problem of Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean as of great importance but not very singular. He wants to examine it jointly, and has it in mind that, depending on the outcome of the joint study, we should be prepared to do something. It would be imprudent at this time to try to indicate what that “something” might be.

We see the development of Soviet power in the area as part of their general political-strategic policy. They are increasingly confident—for example, in Europe and the SALT negotiations. They are assertive, as in their building of both an offensive and defensive capability in the UAR. Their general attitude in the Caribbean and the Mediterranean is one of confidence. They have built their navy to a point where they have some spare capability beyond that required for their national security. They can use their capacity for political purposes, and we think this tendency will increase. They are interested in the acquisition of power for its own sake, and there is some probing of Western intentions. We believe their activities in the Indian Ocean are in line with this general policy and are not defensive—they have no high defensive priority in that area. Their actions there fit with their general assertiveness, their desire to probe our intentions and the potential for picking up some political dividends cheaply. The Russians in general don't see the Indian Ocean as a unified area, but the Soviet Navy is an exception. While others see it as different bits, the Soviet Navy puts it together. They are exploiting their naval power to acquire more political influence so as to use this influence in the littoral countries as the opportunity arises. And, of course, they are not averse to creating that opportunity. In Mauritius, for example, which has the highest population density in the world, they can exploit the existing political instability and use their presence to keep a pro-Soviet party in power. It is the sort of situation they can create and exploit. By increasing their power in the Indian Ocean they are putting themselves in a position to threaten Western interests. They are creating new options for themselves—primarily political, but some military—and are putting constraints on Western actions. I think these general statements apply, but we will have to go into specifics in our later talks.

There have, however, been three recent developments which have sharpened our interest in this problem. First, the development of Soviet offensive capability in the UAR in the Aswan area, by which they could have military domination of the Red Sea.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the buildup in the UAR?

Mr. Helms: (to Mr. Thompson) Which thing are you referring to John?

Mr. Thompson: The three airfields the Soviets now have in the UAR which appear entirely unconnected with Israel. Their communications systems are different, and their facilities indicate that they are entirely offensive in nature.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Helms) May we have a separate paper on that?

Mr. Helms: Yes. We have been reporting regularly on these and working with DIA on them. We will tie it all together in one paper.

Mr. Packard: They have some long-range missiles that they need aircraft to guide in. Having air fields and aircraft in this area would greatly increase their capability by making it possible to use these missiles, some of which have a 200 mile range.

Mr. Kissinger: Where are the missiles they would guide in?

Mr. Packard: On submarines, for example.

Mr. Thompson: We do not think it accidental that Aswan was chosen as the site for this facility. They can operate both ways from there. While it is probably designed to move against the 6th Fleet, it is also well-placed for coverage of the Indian Ocean.

Mr. Kissinger: Why should they go so far south if it is directed against the 6th Fleet? To get out of the range of Israel?

Mr. Thompson: Partly, but also because it gives them more capability in the other direction.

The second development which interested us was the extreme pressure the Russians put on Lee Kuan Yew during his visit to Moscow. The Russians are obviously interested in acquiring facilities in Singapore. This would not be terribly serious for us but it would be awkward. It would enable them to keep their fleet at a higher state of operational readiness.

The third development is the Soviet activity with regard to Grand Port in Mauritius. The Russians are clearly aiming to establish a facility there, which was a World War II port, now used hardly at all. If they succeed, they would have an exclusive port in the area.

Mr. Kissinger: Do the Russians have representation in Mauritius?

Mr. Thompson: They have the biggest Embassy in the country. They have signed a fishing agreement and a cultural agreement with Mauritius, and we recently persuaded the Mauritius Government to turn down their request for a communications facility. They are also bringing in a Soviet mother ship for their fishing fleet. They have gone a long way in Grand Port although in a fairly low key. They are establishing facilities around the area—we think Aden is a high-priority target. When and if the Suez Canal is opened, this will mean a sig-

nificant up-grading of their naval capability because they can use Alexandria.

But, while we do not think what is happening in the Indian Ocean is exceptional, we shouldn't close our eyes to it. We believe the Russians think they are getting good dividends for some expenditure, and that they will continue along this line and that the dividends will increase.

Mr. Helms: If you look at the world from Moscow, the Middle East, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean all tie together. It would be logical to tie it off at the bottom of the Indian Ocean—it makes a tidy package. We see the Arab-Israeli conflict in a narrower context because we are deeply engaged in it, but the Soviets are looking at it in a larger context. What can the conflict do to promote their interests in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and other places?

Mr. Thompson: Also, there are a lot of sensitive things in the area that the Soviets would like to put their finger on. For example, 88 percent of Japanese oil goes through there.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Irwin) What do you think, Jack?

Mr. Irwin: I think Mr. Thompson has given us an excellent summary of the situation and that Dick Helms' comments about the view from Moscow are very perceptive. This is also tied into Soviet China policy. We have always known that one of the reasons for their desire for access to Suez was that it quickened the route to the Far East. The paper is, of course, limited in scope, and we should put the issue into a larger context and try to tie the whole thing together. The Indian Ocean is a back-door to our interests in the Middle East and in South East Asia. We don't have a real interest in the Indian Ocean as such, although we want to fly over it and sail through it and maintain commercial relations with the countries bordering it. We have treaty ties with some of them through SEATO, CENTO and ANZUS.

Mr. Kissinger: Except in the sense Mr. Thompson describes, I agree that any one interest in the area is not vital. There is, however, the domino effect of an increased Soviet capacity to exert a political effect in the countries.

Mr. Irwin: To the degree one can take advantage of a great-power competition, I believe we should keep our presence low.

Mr. Kissinger: Are you saying that the best way to counter the Soviet presence is to keep ours low so as to avoid competition?

Mr. Irwin: I'm saying that I'm not sure the best position is to increase our naval presence there.

Mr. Packard: We should study this issue on a much broader basis. Our interests are quite important if we add them up. We need a more imaginative view of this problem. The SST might well be more important to our interests in the Indian Ocean than nuclear submarines. It would give us a tremendous capacity to improve our relations. Our

ability to move in with the SST for commercial travel and with the attendant economic support could be an important factor. Remember that one SST would be equivalent to four *Queen Mary's* so far as the passengers it could carry. We need to think about ways to exert our influence, not based on the way it has been done in the past but on ways in which it might be done in the future. I see no case for a big naval buildup. The Soviet buildup was not decided on recently; we are only now beginning to understand it. Soviet forces have been designed to thwart our capabilities in the Mediterranean and we must now recognize this. We have the advantage of nuclear propulsion on carriers and support vessels. But I don't think any short-term naval moves are necessary. Economic, social and other supporting moves are just as important.

Mr. Irwin: Three things have helped the Soviets in their entry into the Indian Ocean, as elsewhere: 1) The Arab-Israeli conflict, which ensures them the support of all Arabs. If the Middle East conflict is settled, this would start the possible removal of one of the mainbases for Soviet strength in the area.

Mr. Kissinger: How does the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean relate to the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Mr. Irwin: Soviet strength in the Mediterranean has been increased by their bases in Egypt and by their potential in the lower end of the Arabian peninsula. If we solve the Arab-Israeli dispute, we lessen in some degree the base that enabled the Russians to come in.

Mr. Packard: I disagree completely. If the Arab-Israeli dispute is settled, the Suez Canal will be reopened which will enable the Russians to move still further forward.

Mr. Kissinger: The effect is not felt equally in all areas. In the Persian Gulf, for example, the Arab-Israeli dispute is peripheral.

Mr. Irwin: The other two elements are the situation in South Africa and its effect on US relations with Africa as a whole, and the revolutionary influence throughout Africa which creates a situation which the USSR and China can both take advantage of.

Mr. Kissinger: How is South Africa related?

Mr. Irwin: It is an added difficulty in US relations with East Africa.

Mr. Kissinger: Short of the collapse of South Africa, what can change this?

Mr. Irwin: I don't know that anything can change it, but it is a factor we should consider.

Mr. Sisco: I agree with Mr. Thompson and Dick Helms that we are confronted in the Indian Ocean with a basic Soviet strategy and that their objective is political. The Soviets have, in their naval presence, an important tool with which to exercise political influence. Mr. Thomp-

son's examples are all good ones. We as a government have not been as keenly aware of what is going on. We have a gradation of interests and not all areas are of equal importance to the US. We have focused on the Arab-Israeli dispute and on the Mediterranean. We must assume that the Arab-Israeli problem won't be solved probably in the next five years. There is no doubt that it has improved the climate for Soviet influence—in the first instance in the Mediterranean, but it has also had tremendous impact in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Even if the problem is resolved, I don't think the Soviets will get out of these areas. We are confronted with a long-range political strategy, bulwarked by increased naval strength used for political purposes. I can draw no conclusions on this but it definitely needs more study. It would be difficult to come to a judgement in which we would not have to take the increased Soviet projection into account. Mr. Thompson's major contribution today was to underscore the systematic approach Moscow has taken to this problem.

Mr. Packard: It can't be solved in World War II terms.

Mr. Irwin: It is also related to the overall strength of the US Navy. We can't solve the problem by thinking in terms of the past in the military sense.

Mr. Kissinger: This study and this discussion have been a good introduction to tell us what we are up against in the military sense. Mr. Pranger's group has done an outstanding job with this paper. Now we need an analysis of the implications of what Mr. Thompson has said. We need to examine our interests, those of others and the long-range political implications, and work out a coherent strategy, taking in account the impact of the Middle East dispute and of South Africa. Let us also get from the JCS a feel as to how Soviet moves in the Indian Ocean relate to other Soviet naval moves. (to Mr. Irwin) We will talk to you on how to set this up. There is no sense discussing the number of ships and port calls until we have addressed these other questions. (to Mr. Thompson) We will stay in close touch with you on this.

Mr. Irwin: (to Mr. Thompson) Our problem relates to the question of the political atmosphere on the East Coast of Africa with regard to South Africa. To the degree that the US is implicated in South Africa through US-UK military ties and UK supplies to South Africa, it affects our relations with and abilities in East Africa. It also affects Soviet abilities there. How much, is the question.

51. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 10, 1970, 4–5:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. John Thomson
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Dr. K. Wayne Smith

SUBJECT

Dr. Kissinger's Discussion with Mr. Thomson

Dr. Kissinger welcomed Mr. Thomson and remarked that he was pleased that Thomson had been able to attend the SRG meeting² the previous day on the Indian Ocean study. He went on to say that this particular view of our bureaucracy in action could only be shown to our British friends—that he could never invite officials from other countries to such a meeting. Mr. Thomson expressed his gratitude at being invited and said he had found the meeting very satisfactory and very useful. His general impression from the meeting and from his discussions with the NSC staff was that there were no important differences between the two countries on the basic facts or the interpretation of those facts. He continued by saying that in his discussions with Prime Minister Heath before his visit he had explored the question: Since it was at U.K. initiative that the Indian Ocean problem was being studied, what if the U.S. asks us what we are going to do? The Prime Minister's position, he explained, was essentially that:

—He believes there is a growing problem in the Indian Ocean area resulting from the Soviet naval buildup.

—He is not at all sure what should be done about it.

—He is not going to go it alone.

—But he is prepared to do something.

Dr. Kissinger replied that we are not yet prepared to say what we will do either, but based on his experience, the President would probably be inclined toward increasing our naval strength. Dr. Kissinger at this point also assured Thomson that the South African issue would be treated separately and would not interfere with developing joint responses to the Indian Ocean problem. Mr. Thomson stated that the Prime Minister would probably also want to do something on the naval

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 727, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for information. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office. All brackets are in the original.

² See Document 50.

side and that this decision would have to take account of British concerns in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea as well.

Dr. Kissinger noted that we need to put this problem into a larger context for the President's consideration.³ The problems caused by the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean are only part of a larger problem caused by the increases in Soviet naval capabilities. He also noted that the President had not yet focused on the Indian Ocean but was convinced that the President would be very concerned once he became aware of the various Soviet activities. Dr. Kissinger pointed out that he himself had been somewhat shocked by the summary presentation given by Thomson at the SRG meeting. The presentation had, he declared, effectively synthesized the various problems and given the SRG members a good overview of the problem. Mr. Thomson then emphasized that the U.K. did not see this as the greatest problem we face, but simply as a problem. He expressed the view that recognition of the problem and increased cooperation could go a long way toward meeting it; he did not, he continued, believe the amount of extra resources required would be large.

Mr. Thomson then turned to the upcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference scheduled for February in Singapore and asked if Dr. Kissinger thought it would be a good idea to raise the Indian Ocean problem in this context. One possibility he had in mind, he explained, was to get eight or nine countries to do something jointly. [At this point Dr. Kissinger had to leave to see the President. He returned twenty minutes later.] Dr. Kissinger renewed the discussion by asking if, after the phase two portion of our study is completed, Thomson could return for another round of discussions. Mr. Thomson said that he would like very much to do so. Dr. Kissinger then explained the difficulties he had in getting papers that clearly stated the views of each agency. What he normally got, he noted, was a "negotiated" paper. Mr. Thomson noted that the same problems existed in the U.K.—indeed, that it had been institutionalized in the form of a "coordination man" who was sent around to coordinate a paper but knew nothing of its substance.

³ Smith had drafted a memorandum for Kissinger to send to Nixon. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-176, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 104) In an internal December 15 NSC memorandum to Kennedy, Robert Houdek wrote that the draft was "too lengthy and detailed for the President's use," although he thought Kissinger should read it. He felt that Sonnenfeldt covered the issues adequately in the talking points and background information prepared for Heath's visit and wrote, "There is no indication on the memo that it has been coordinated with either Hal Sonnenfeldt or Hal Saunders. I have not called Smith on this point, because of his past sensitivity on this precise subject but will if you wish." In the margin Kennedy agreed that the memorandum not go forward. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 942, VIP Visits, United Kingdom Visit of PM Heath, December 1970)

Dr. Kissinger inquired as to what Lord Rothschild⁴ was going to do. Mr. Thomson said he didn't know for sure, but would probably concentrate on the domestic side. Dr. Kissinger stated that his impression of Rothschild was that he did not seem to be a man capable of taking charge of the bureaucratic machinery. He then explained that our system demands that one take charge from the first day and that was one great lesson he had learned from McNamara.⁵ He had explicitly done this, he noted, in his dealing with the bureaucracies during the first year and had begun to let up only recently after he had established control. Mr. Thomson volunteered that he had been asked at the Embassy how Dr. Kissinger had dealt with the SRG meeting and that he had responded by saying "with easy mastery."

Mr. Thomson then turned to the possibility of doing some advance work with the Australians before the Commonwealth meeting in Singapore. Dr. Kissinger responded that he thought that was a good idea. Mr. Thomson then returned to his earlier question about getting the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference to focus on the problem. Dr. Kissinger asked if Thomson thought India and Pakistan would recognize this as a joint problem. Mr. Thomson said he didn't know. Dr. Kissinger said he thought it would be interesting to see if the Commonwealth countries would be willing to undertake some kind of joint efforts. He noted that the Indians know how to use power and might be interested. He added that we now have some influence with Pakistan and would be willing to speak to that country regarding the Indian Ocean problem if some kind of plan was worked out. Mr. Thomson asked if Dr. Kissinger would be willing to send a member of the NSC staff to the Commonwealth meeting as an observer. Dr. Kissinger responded that he would.

Dr. Kissinger then asked Mr. Thomson about his position. Mr. Thomson replied that he was in the Cabinet office and theoretically was responsive to requests from all the Cabinet members. In fact, however, almost all of the requests came from the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Defense Minister. Dr. Kissinger inquired if the Prime Minister could keep certain facts from the others. Mr. Thomson stated that he not only could but on occasion did.

Dr. Kissinger pointed out the advantages of having a small but capable staff. His staff sometimes complained bitterly while they were here, he explained, but often came back on their knees (like Larry Lynn)⁶

⁴ Nathaniel Mayer Victor, the 3rd Baron Rothschild, appointed in 1970 by Heath as the first Director General of the Central Policy Review Staff.

⁵ Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, 1961–1968.

⁶ Larry Lynn was a member of the National Security Council from 1969 to 1971; he resigned in 1970 over the invasion of Cambodia.

after having been away for a while. A student of international relations needed to stay in the government to be relevant he pointed out. He concluded by noting that this job had ruined him for any future consulting work because he had found that consultants almost never contribute anything. We use consultants largely, he added, for eyewash. What we needed from them was help in framing questions but what they wanted was to be operators. As an example, he cited Vietnam. Here he declared our consultants were always suggesting gimmicks, ignoring the fact that our policy couldn't really make drastic turns, because each change had to be negotiated and explained to the U.S. bureaucracy, the South Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese, etc.

Mr. Thomson agreed wholeheartedly and noted that the same factors which prevented drastic changes in policy in Vietnam also prevented such changes in the Middle East. Dr. Kissinger, after noting that our Middle Eastern diplomacy is probably not going to go down in history as brilliant, asked Thomson what he thought we should do there. Mr. Thomson declared that he thought most of the chances for a solution have slipped away. The key to a solution he stated lay in the Soviets and the Egyptians decoupling themselves from Syria. The Israelis would simply not negotiate away from the Golan Heights, he believed. Dr. Kissinger agreed that a moderate Syrian government right now was a nightmare. Assuming Syria could be decoupled, what, he asked, would Thomson then suggest? Mr. Thomson responded that he would then suggest going ahead with the basic scheme worked out in the four-power talks earlier. The key problem in this, he pointed out, was whether or not Israel would be willing to go back to this plan. Dr. Kissinger stated that Israel would have to be forced back. Mr. Thomson suggested that this might not be the case, that he believed they would not want to go back but could be persuaded. Dr. Kissinger asked how. Mr. Thomson said with the promise of arms, aid, and Western guarantees. In light of recent Western performance regarding guarantees, Dr. Kissinger asked, wouldn't this be insane? Mr. Thomson noted that what Israel wants is protection against guerrilla attacks and that Israel might accept some kind of arms package coupled with an agreement to withdraw. Dr. Kissinger then noted this did not seem likely since they are already getting arms without withdrawing. Mr. Thomson observed that it appeared that both sides were now simply putting on a show. Dr. Kissinger said that this might be so. He then expressed his belief that by summer time for an agreement will have run out. [At this point the meeting broke up and Mr. Thomson departed.]

52. Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, December 17, 1970.

Diego Garcia: The initial reaction around the Indian Ocean littoral to the announcement of our intention to set up a small communications facility on Diego Garcia has been fairly much as expected.² Most of the governments did not seem to be particularly disturbed, at least at first blush, although there did seem to be considerable suspicion that we would be developing more than an austere facility. The most negative reaction not unexpectedly came from Somalia which was “strongly opposed.” The Indians, in what appeared to be a prepared statement, also registered a negative response insisting that Diego Garcia was a “base” and deploring the whole operation.

We have not yet heard the last word on Diego Garcia since there is likely to be a second, and in some cases more important, wave of reaction. When the final results are all in we should have an interesting test of sentiment around the Indian Ocean against which to judge possible naval moves we might wish to make in the future.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-176, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 104. Secret. A typed notation reads “For HAK.” This paper was prepared for, but not included in, the President’s December 18 briefing. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 29, President’s Daily Briefing Files, December 16–31, 1970)

² On December 15, the Department of State released information that the United States would begin construction of an austere naval communications facility on the Diego Garcia atoll in the Chagos Archipelago, British Indian Ocean Territory, in March 1971. This was in concurrence with a 1966 bilateral agreement. Both British and American flags would fly over the facility and the United Kingdom would assist in its manning. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Unfiled Material, Country “Cy-E” 1953–1977, Diego Garcia) Circular telegram 202722, December 14, contained a copy of the public announcement and a long listing of anticipated questions and approved answers. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 727, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. IV) Attached but not printed is a December 16 letter from Eliot to Kissinger transmitting a summary of reactions to the announcement. Australia, Iran, and Malawi had favorable reactions; India and Somalia had unfavorable reactions; Indonesia, Kenya, South Africa, the Malagasy Republic, and New Zealand were noncommittal; and U.S. notifications to Bahrain, Ceylon, the Maldives, and the Seychelles were delayed. No reaction had yet been received from Moscow.

53. Editorial Note

On December 17, 1970, during British Prime Minister Edward Heath's visit to Washington, December 17–18, British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home told Secretary of State Rogers that, since Britain could not itself put a fleet into the Indian Ocean, it seemed "only sensible" to maintain South Africa's capability. If the United States "could do more in Indian Ocean," however, "this would reduce U.K. dependence on South Africa." (Telegram 206630 to London, December 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 UK) In a January 11 telephone conversation, Under Secretary of State John Irwin told Kissinger of his concern that the British would "try to tie an interest in the Indian Ocean into effect our approving their actions in South Africa." President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger stated that the United States intended to maintain the arms embargo on South Africa. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 8, Chronological File)

At the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore, January 14–22, 1971, Heath presented the British policy of arms sales to South Africa "as necessary to counter the growing Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean and around the Cape." National Security Council staff member Helmut Sonnenfeldt felt this reflected the further assessment that "South Africa can be counted on as a reliable partner in the future and the black Africans (except possibly Nigeria) cannot." The policy provoked significant opposition throughout the Commonwealth, particularly in Parliament, in members of Heath's government (including Douglas-Home and Lord Carrington), and in Africa. Indeed, India argued that the Indian Ocean should be free of great powers altogether. Sonnenfeldt noted that U.S. interests would suffer from the potential "anti-western" reaction and that the United States needed to make clear its support of the arms embargo against South Africa. If it did not make its support clear, Sonnenfeldt predicted, U.S. policies toward the Indian Ocean would become "enmeshed in Commonwealth politics" and "generate more controversy here at home." By contrast, he noted, the Soviets portrayed their presence in the Indian Ocean as entirely peaceful. (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, January 21; *ibid.*, NSC Files, Box 728, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. V)

54. National Security Study Memorandum 110¹

Washington, December 22, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Follow-on Study of Strategy Toward the Indian Ocean

As a follow-on to the study developed in response to NSSM 104,² the President has directed that a further study be prepared outlining alternative U.S. strategies through 1975 for dealing with the increase in Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean area. Whereas the NSSM 104 study concentrated on Soviet naval threats and friendly naval force and basing alternatives, this study is to provide the broader framework necessary for judging a naval response in the context of other possible strategies.

This study should provide answers to the following questions:

1. What is the political significance in the Indian Ocean context of the Soviet naval presence? In each case, attention should be given to the effect of the passage of time.

—What states in the area are more susceptible and less susceptible to this sort of Soviet influence?

—In what specific ways in these states could the Soviet Union be expected to enhance its influence by increasing its naval activity?

—In what parts of the area could local tensions develop to the point of (1) tempting Soviet exploitation and (2) producing local invitation for Soviet involvement?

—In what specific ways in these states could an increase in Soviet naval presence be expected to work to Soviet disadvantage?

—In these states, how does Soviet naval activity compare in effectiveness with military aid, economic assistance, political support and local Communist parties as devices for increasing Soviet influence?

—Does Soviet political influence increase commensurately with increases in Soviet naval activity?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-178, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 110. Secret. A copy was sent to Moorer. Submitted to Kissinger under a December 18 covering memorandum from Kennedy, Saunders, Smith, and Sonnenfeldt. (Ibid.)

² See Document 46.

2. What is the military and political significance of the Soviet naval deployments in the Indian Ocean viewed in the context of global Soviet naval strategy and overseas deployments elsewhere?

—What are the principal views of the relationship between Soviet naval and political strategy?

—Against the background of the global context, what seem to be Soviet objectives in the Indian Ocean?

—In what Indian Ocean states is the Soviet interest greatest and least?

3. What is the political significance of Chinese Communist activities, e.g. ICBM testing and political relations with littoral states?

4. What are the U.S. options in setting a strategy toward this area? The NSSM 104 study outlined options for a naval response. The purpose of this study would be to develop a political framework for the naval response.

—In which states are U.S. and allied interests greatest and least?

—What activities other than naval are potentially useful devices in countering Soviet influence? How do these differ in various littoral states or regions?

—In what ways can Soviet activities be made more costly politically for the Soviets?

—What U.S. responses are most likely to encourage or discourage response by allied governments?

—What U.S.-allied responses are more and less likely to elicit hostile and friendly responses from the indigenous nations?

—What is the appropriate political posture for the U.S. to take with the states in the area in connection with each strategy option?

5. If there were to be a U.S. and allied naval response to the Soviet buildup, which is the more appropriate timing for the U.S. and allied response? Is it better to move quickly to try to pre-empt further Soviet buildup or to keep pace with the Soviet buildup?

This study should be prepared by an NSC Ad Hoc Group to be chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State. It should be submitted by January 22, 1971.²

Henry A. Kissinger

² The paper was submitted to Kissinger on February 8. See Document 57 and footnote 4 thereto.

55. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, March 27, 1971, 0135Z.

51640. Subject: Indian Ocean: Secretary–Dobrynin Conversation, March 26. Following is uncleared, FYI, Noform, subject to revision upon review. During discussion with Secretary prior to his return to Moscow to attend 24th Party Congress,² Dobrynin raised question of Indian Ocean. He did so by referring to recent international conference on this subject held at Georgetown University in Washington.³ Dobrynin commented that Soviets had at times been accused of sinister motives in this area. Dobrynin said he wished to ask informally whether USG might be interested in idea of a pronouncement or declaration to the effect that this area should be kept free of major-power competition. He asked whether U.S. would have any strong opposition to declaring that Indian Ocean remain “free of military bases and fleet concentration.” He noted that Indians, Ceylonese and some others had expressed interest in such a possibility.⁴ Dobrynin emphasized that he was advancing these queries informally but was interested in our reaction since he would be seeing Gromyko during Party Congress which convenes on March 30. Secretary said he had no comment at this time.

Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 IND–US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted on March 26 by Adolph Dubs (EUR/SOV) and approved by Richard T. Davis (EUR). It was repeated to Canberra, Colombo, Djakarta, London, and New Delhi.

² Documentation on Dobrynin’s conversation with Rogers is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971.

³ Indian Ocean Conference, Center for Strategic and International Studies, held in Washington, March 18–19. Several of the papers presented at this conference are summarized in an April 14 memorandum from Kennedy to Kissinger. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 304, National Security Council, Feb–Aug 1971)

⁴ Presumably a reference to Bandaranaike’s January 21 speech before the Commonwealth Conference. (Telegram 170 from Colombo, January 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 CEYLON)

**56. Memorandum From the Chief of Naval Operations
(Zumwalt) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Moorer)¹**

OP-61/maw Ser 00481P61

Washington, April 17, 1971.

SUBJ

US naval presence in the Indian Ocean (U)

1. (C) Recently the US Ambassador to Ceylon, Robert Strausz-Hupe called on me, and the Ambassador to the Malagasy Republic, Anthony D. Marshall visited Under Secretary of the Navy Warner.² Each of the two ambassadors spoke at length concerning US presence and the desirability of US ship visits to Indian Ocean ports. I believe you may find the essential points of their discussions useful in your meeting on 20 April with the Senior Review Group concerning NSSM 110.³

2. (S) Ambassador Strausz-Hupe believes the USSR is augmenting its naval strength in the Indian Ocean to gain greater influence in the region. The Soviet Navy is a highly visible force in the Indian Ocean and has sought this visibility by the deployment of modern, major combatants. By way of contrast, the US Navy is not very visible and not impressive, i.e., three old ships assigned to the Middle East Force. The Ambassador favors an increased presence of impressive naval forces similar to the nuclear task force cruise of 1964. He believes a show of US naval strength in the Indian Ocean is necessary to counter the Soviet presence.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Admiral Thomas Moorer, Box 113, Work File (Indian Ocean). Secret.

² Under Secretary of the Navy Richard E. Warner. Saunders detailed Strausz-Hupe's views on the Indian Ocean in an October 15 memorandum to Kissinger. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Ceylon, Vol. I) On July 8, 1970, the Ambassador had written to David Schneider, Country Director for Ceylon, outlining great power maneuverings in the Indian Ocean and possible U.S. policies. (Ibid.)

³ The meeting took place on April 22. See Document 58. A memorandum prepared for Moorer's use at the meeting stated that "certain forces are at work within the NSC Staff that could lead to serious restrictions on the use of the sea—in the theological format of arms control." The paper noted that only Defense and JCS were opposed to the initiation of an arms control study, and that a "hard and persuasive line will be necessary to prevent the preparation of this potentially damaging study." (Memorandum from R.C. Robinson to Moorer, April 20; National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Admiral Thomas Moorer, Box 113, Work File (Indian Ocean))

3. (S) Ambassador Marshall believes that increased US naval presence now in the Indian Ocean could obviate the need for greater military forces at some future time. He favors increased ship visits, particularly of modern ships and submarines, including nuclear propelled vessels. He further believes that we should assign a resident naval attaché to the Malagasy Republic, and recommends a US initiative for closer liaison with the Government of France in Indian Ocean matters and greater US utilization of the French Navy base at Diego Suarez.

4. (C) Unfortunately, these views are not universally held by Department of State officials.

E. R. Zumwalt

57. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY AND ISSUES PAPER

NSSM 110—Indian Ocean Follow-On Study

Introduction

NSSM 110² directed an Ad Hoc Group chaired by State to prepare a follow-on study filling in the broad political context necessary for judgment on possible U.S. responses (including the naval options presented in the NSSM 104 Study)³ to increased Soviet naval activities in

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-060, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting Indian Ocean 10/6/71. Secret. All brackets are in the original. On April 21, Smith complained to Kissinger that the views of his staff were left out of this final summary, which failed to advance knowledge on Indian Ocean problems. Moreover, it set up a series of false dichotomies the result of which created a naval response without any real political or economic component and without any assessment of the competitive forces at work within the region itself. Smith concluded, "there is no analysis of the details of the threat, the local situation, and the impact of free world programs on which to base any firm conclusions on Soviet interests, our's, or the U.K.'s or anyone else's and how they impact on the littoral countries." (Ibid., Box H-054, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting, Indian Ocean (NSSM 110) 4/24/71)

² Document 54.

³ See Document 46.

the Indian Ocean. The NSSM 110 Study⁴ assesses Soviet objectives and the political implications of Soviet naval activity, Chinese involvement, and U.S. interests and the threats to them. *On the basis of this material, the Study offers two basic options: (1) a decision to explore the feasibility of a U.S. arms limitation initiative for the region, or (2) a decision to move ahead now with some form of naval response to Soviet activities.*

This paper sets forth the Study's principal findings; our views are indicated within brackets.

The Criteria For Choice of a U.S. Indian Ocean Posture

[The basic problem with this Study, as with its predecessor, is the difficulty of identifying useful criteria for choosing between different naval options, or between naval and other means to enhance our interests. Both Studies argue for a low to moderate level of Soviet threat and U.S. interest, stressing that since the region is not of central strategic concern to either power, the key variable is local stability. The littoral's fragmented character and the lack of unifying strategic issues complicate our decision. The key criteria are discussed below.]

1. Soviet Objectives in the Indian Ocean

[The key issue here is: Should we view increased Soviet naval activities in the region as an integral part of a global naval challenge?]

The Study notes a variety of motives for Soviet naval actions:

—The desire to enhance their space, oceanographic, intelligence, and ASW capabilities (the latter probably directed against possible U.S. deployment of SSBN's to the area).

—The U.K.'s continuing disengagement from the region with the prospect of uncertainty and possible instability providing opportunities for political gains at low risk.

—The desire to underline Soviet achievement of parity with the U.S. beyond the strategic nuclear sphere, thereby offsetting previous U.S. supremacy in worldwide conventional capability and bolstering Soviet diplomatic efforts in littoral states.

[—Another factor, not discussed in the Study, is that Soviet Indian Ocean policy may reflect internal debate (including inter-Service rivalry) within the Soviet decision-making group.]

On balance, the Study argues that the Indian Ocean will rank ahead of Africa and Latin America, but well behind the countries on their periphery and the Middle East in the Soviet order of priorities over the

⁴ Attached but not printed is the February 1 study entitled, "Strategy Toward the Indian Ocean 1971-1975: Response to NSSM 110." It was submitted to members of the Senior Review Group on February 8. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-178, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 110)

next five years. Soviet policy will be one of “cautious opportunism,” but the “political use of naval forces” will increase. The Study doubts that the Soviets are seriously concerned that the Indian Ocean might become the theatre of U.S.-Soviet or Sino-Soviet hostilities.

The analysis explicitly recognizes the parallel with Soviet naval policy in the Mediterranean. However, it notes that the USSR may confront local resistance in attempting to translate naval presence into the degree of influence it has achieved with the radical Arabs.

In sum, the Study reflects consensus that Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean “represents a departure from the traditional missions of the Soviet navy” and that this effort to project influence “is having an impact in countries where it was unimportant a few years ago.” Despite uncertainties in evaluating Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean, there is consensus that some form of Western (including U.S.) naval presence or, alternatively, some type of arms limitation arrangement, is required.

2. Chinese Involvement

The Study takes the position that PRC interests in the Indian Ocean littoral have no common denominator, apart from a general desire to counter U.S. and Soviet influence. Chinese concern over Soviet naval deployments reflects sensitivity to Soviet influence along its southern border rather than a sense of direct military threat.

Should the Chinese decide to undertake missile testing in the Indian Ocean, they would almost certainly seek support and monitoring facilities, perhaps in such littoral states as Tanzania and Pakistan.

[In the long run, the Chinese may perceive a need for a presence of their own as a badge of great power status, particularly if the U.S. and the USSR have a permanent presence in the area.]

3. U.S. Interests and the Threat to Them

The NSSM 110 analysis follows closely the predecessor Study, arguing that our interests—oil flows and investment, intelligence and communications assets, political influence, security commitments, and access and transit—are of moderate importance and face a moderate level of threat. The likelihood of a direct Soviet physical threat to U.S. interests is heavily discounted, though indirect Soviet political leverage flowing from naval and other programs could support local pressures against U.S. interests. On balance, *the Study takes the view that the primary threat to our interests will come from the states of the area, and that the root of the problem is the low level of economic development and political stability in much of the region.*

[The judgment that our interests in the region face a relatively low level of threat rests on the premise that we share more common interests and commitments with the littoral states than do China and the

USSR. The corollary is that "our best hedge against an excess of Soviet influence in the area is the good sense and rather abrasive nationalism" of the littoral states.]

[It can, of course, be argued that the Soviet-radical Arab pattern of alignment *could* be duplicated elsewhere along the littoral as the fruit of local tensions in such areas as the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, or Southern Africa. This possibility buttresses the view that we should not adopt a unilateral self-denying ordinance. On the other hand, highly visible deployments of U.S. power along the littoral would not necessarily enhance local stability, and could actually spawn future alignments between the USSR and local nationalism. *Hence, we need to steer a middle course which gives the Soviets neither a completely free ride nor the high moral ground of siding with littoral state sensitivities to gun-boat diplomacy.*]

4. The British Factor

[The key issue is: *What is the nature of the linkage between U.S. and U.K. policy in the region?* The NSSM 110 Study does not address this question, apart from noting that even implied support for the U.K. decision to supply arms to South Africa "will be costly to us in terms of our relations with the Afro-Asian world." This is a comparatively minor aspect of the problem: there is no question of our publicly opposing the arms deal, nor are we likely to endorse it. The Study recognizes this since none of the options calls for any change in our stance vis-à-vis South Africa or the U.K. arms sales.]

[Far more important is the fact that our Indian Ocean reviews were generated, in substantial measure, by the talks between Heath and the President last October.⁵ Both NSSM's assumed a linkage of some sort between what we do and what the British do. In general, the naval options offered by the NSSM 104 Study posited increasing levels of U.S.-U.K. cooperation and of U.K. naval effort as the U.S. increased its naval deployments and activities.]

[This may not be an especially useful way to approach the problem. The British have not suggested that their continued presence in the area is contingent upon any particular level of U.S. effort, nor that they would increase their presence if we increased ours. Their stance is based on two assumptions:

—That a continued U.K. presence, even if only symbolic or intermittent, could enhance local stability and British interests in such areas as Singapore-Malaysia and the Persian Gulf.

⁵ See Document 41.

—That Britain's (and Europe's) substantial interests should not go unrepresented in a region of growing interest to the Soviets.

[In addition, East of Suez deployments coincide with factors of sentiment and continuity almost irresistible to a Tory Government, despite the constant reorientation toward Europe.]

[On the other hand, *the British are most unlikely to increase their Indian Ocean presence, regardless of our posture.* They are currently in the process of reducing considerably the nearly 40,000 men and 16 combatant ships they support East of Suez. Rather, it is a matter of holding on at reduced levels instead of withdrawing virtually everything as envisaged by Labor.]

[*What the British appear to seek is a general U.S. endorsement for their view of the strategic problem and for the relevance of U.K. efforts there.* Such an endorsement, even if confined to low-key recognition of increased Soviet activities and to modest collaborative projects as in BIOT, would lend credibility to a U.K. posture rooted historically in the colonial era. Given the broad congruence of U.S. and U.K. interests in the region—apart from the South African arms deal—there are advantages in not adopting a disinterested posture which might tend to accelerate an eventual total U.K. withdrawal.]

5. *The Political Impact of a Naval Presence*

NSSM 110 asked for analysis of the *political* implications of Soviet naval activity in the area, and of the relevance of a U.S. *naval* response. The Study argues that “the Soviet naval threat in the Indian Ocean can only be dealt with on a global basis” in the context of worldwide Soviet naval policy, but it also identifies certain political ramifications of the naval effort in littoral states:

- promotion of an image as a world maritime power with expanding strategic interests and capabilities;
- establishment of naval aid and training relationships;
- symbolic sympathy and support for littoral regimes and movements;
- conditioning of littoral states to Soviet probing and presence in the region.

While the impact of this effort varies considerably in different littoral states and could “arouse latent fears of a new Soviet imperialism,” it is ultimately aimed at establishing a position to deter or neutralize Western activities and influence.

The Study judges, however, that other Soviet actions—arms supply, training, economic aid, political moves—have a greater impact on littoral states than Soviet naval activity which is essentially supplemental. Moreover, it argues that U.S. naval presence is a relatively minor tool in enhancing U.S. influence in the region.

But the Study nonetheless concludes that given the Soviet naval initiative, there is a political, though not a military, requirement for some Western presence.

The argument that naval presence translates into political influence is elusive. It seems to boil down to a judgment that gunboat diplomacy is *not* outmoded in Afro-Asia, even where actual on-scene capabilities and the willingness to use them are minimal. Perhaps the case was best summarized in Ambassador Strausz-Hupé's recent observation that Western interests will not be best served "if littoral states believe they can count on our absence."

The Options

The Study explicitly states that, given the moderate level of U.S. interest and Soviet threat, there is little requirement for a significant increase in U.S. presence and programs in the area. Consequently, "there is little absolute difference" between the options it offers. Rather, the issue boils down to a tactical judgment on how best to achieve our objectives of:

- avoiding U.S.–Soviet military rivalry in the area;
 - inhibiting the growth of Communist influence;
 - keeping open the option to exert military influence if needed;
- and,
- maintaining access and good relations in this core region of developing Afro-Asia.

[As indicated above, an additional objective of U.S. policy should be to respond to our British friends in such a way as to enhance the credibility of their role, thereby maximizing its size and duration, while profiting from British assets and experience through periodic consultations and intelligence exchanges. Hence, the options should also be costed in terms of their impact, if any, on British policy.]

The Study presents a choice between a strategy emphasizing limitation of super-power competition and a strategy including an element of naval response to Soviet activities. *Hence, the primary issue is whether or not to explore further the arms control option—inside the government, with our allies, and with important regional powers.*

1. The Arms Control Option

This option is not spelled out in detail, and would require considerably more interagency study before any decisions were made. The issue here, therefore, is whether this extra effort is worthwhile. It could range from a general unilateral statement of understanding for the concerns of littoral states that the Indian Ocean not become an arena of U.S.-Soviet rivalry to quite detailed scenarios for negotiating limitations on great power military presence in the area.

The Study tentatively judges the former approach more attractive, at least as a first step—we would simply be aligning our posture with that of important regional states and expressing our preparedness to limit our forces *if the USSR did likewise*. This would place the ball in the Soviet court, demonstrate our good intentions, and leave open our ultimate stance until the Soviets responded. [However, this approach could be dangerous: we would refrain from vague but virtuous initiatives until we know our position on specific potential Soviet counter proposals.]

The Study recognizes the many issues that formulation of a detailed arms control proposal would pose for us: (1) the problem of denuclearization and the possibility that we might want to deploy SSBN's in the area—this apparently poses no immediate strategic problem, but we might want to keep the option open; (2) the importance of Diego Garcia and what, if anything, we would accept as a quid pro quo for giving it up; (3) the feasibility of securing Chinese adherence, the impact of probable Chinese non-participation, and the need for an escape mechanism if they refuse to participate; and (4) our continuing interest in freedom of naval access and transit worldwide.

However, the argument is that the potential attractiveness of an arms control approach warrants a full in-house study of possible proposals. *Such a study now provides us the best opportunity we are likely to have to confirm or refute the apparent attractiveness of the arms control option.* If we subsequently decided to go ahead with a proposal, it could lessen U.S. strategic involvement and U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the region, it would align our policy with important regional states (i.e., India), and it could heighten regional resistance to Soviet activity. If the Soviets responded negatively, it would place the onus for subsequent naval rivalry on them. *In addition, such an approach would be a unique and striking application of the Nixon Doctrine to the Afro-Asian world.* [Finally, an agreement limiting U.S. and Soviet deployments would permit us to pursue our interests through political means, backing up the residual role of Britain and the potentially growing roles of Australia, Japan, and friendly littoral states.]

The major counter-argument is that such a proposal could hand the Soviets and their friends a propaganda field-day if our proposal was so hedged with qualifiers as to appear self-serving. They, for example, could focus on denuclearization or our Diego Garcia facility. Furthermore, an Indian Ocean agreement could generate pressures for similar agreements elsewhere. We have an interest, as the world's largest naval power, in maintaining the traditional freedom of the seas. An agreement could restrict our role in an unstable zone, thereby encouraging insurgents and discouraging allied and friendly states. [This option could also create an undesirable impression of "bargaining from weakness" in a region of modest but growing Soviet activity.]

[The unknown factor is whether it is possible to design an arms limitation proposal which cannot be turned against us. A related question is whether we should view a proposal as a *tactical gambit* to place the Soviets in a poor light, or as a *serious* effort to exclude U.S.-Soviet naval rivalry from the region.]

[The question of timing and tactics was recently highlighted by an approach from Ambassador Dobrynin to Secretary Rogers (a cable⁶ on this approach is in your book). Referring to discussion at the recent Georgetown Indian Ocean Conference,⁷ Dobrynin asked “informally” whether we would be interested in a declaration that this area be kept free of major power competition, including “military bases and fleet concentration.” He sought our views—Secretary Rogers was noncommittal—on the grounds that he would be seeing Gromyko during the Soviet party congress starting March 30. *Should the Soviets go public with the arms limitation idea, surfaced by several participants at the Georgetown Conference, we would not only lose the initiative but would face the need to respond.* This may constitute a compelling reason to order an in-house study now.]

[There is also a bureaucratic problem. The Ad Hoc Group’s efforts surfaced sharp disagreement between representatives of State (pro) and OSD/JCS (con) over whether such an option should even be presented to the SRG, much less explored in depth. If we do want to examine further the possibilities of the arms limitation route, we will need to give study guidelines designed to elicit the full range of agency views. Such a study should evaluate alternative proposals in terms of their impact on (1) U.S. global and regional interests, and (2) allied and friendly policy, particularly those of the U.K. and Japan (the NSSM 110 Study assumes that U.K. forces would not be restricted); and it should assess the salability of various proposals and tactical approaches.]

2. Naval Options

If it is decided not to explore the arms limitation route, we need to consider possible naval responses. The Study concludes that *any* of Options A through C in the NSSM 104 Study would be appropriate, ranging from continuation of present policy to modest increases in U.S. visibility through qualitative upgrading of MIDEASTFOR, permanent deployment of 2 destroyers in the eastern Indian Ocean, and increased joint U.S.-U.K.-Australian operations. Option D—a higher option calling for homeporting 4 destroyers at Singapore, extensive joint cruises and air surveillance, and improved support facilities—is judged inappropriate in view of the findings of the NSSM for the period up to 1975.

⁶ Document 55.

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 55.

The advantages of one of the relatively low-visibility naval options over the arms limitation approach would be:

—It would underline our willingness to help our friends resist Soviet encroachments or Soviet-sponsored internal pressures, and demonstrate to all concerned that they cannot count on our absence.

—It would give us some capability to meet local contingencies (evacuation of nationals, show of force, etc.).

—It would indicate to the Soviets that they face another arena of politico-military competition if they continue to up the ante.

On the other hand, such a course could complicate our relations with some littoral countries which would accuse us of bringing the cold war to the Indian Ocean, and it could require higher levels of economic and military assistance to regional states. Moreover, any increase in U.S. naval activity could lead to spiralling naval competition in an area of limited U.S. interest. [Finally, we would need to weigh likely Congressional and public reaction to any new military undertakings overseas, regardless of the rationale.]

Apart from the judgment that Option D (of the NSSM 104 Study) is too “high” to be consistent with our interests and the threat to them, the Study does not evaluate the naval options offered by the earlier Study. The NSSM 104 Study assessed Options A through D in terms of:

—the consistency of each with friendly plans for the area, especially those of the U.K.;

—the relative presence of U.S. and friendly forces compared with Soviet forces, and possible Soviet reactions;

—possible reactions from neutral countries;

—costs and naval force availability.

[In addition, the options should probably be assessed in terms of the local political impact of particular naval deployments, e.g., in the Persian Gulf.]

[A capsule evaluation of each Option is outlined below. For a fuller discussion, turn to the Analytical Summary of the NSSM 104 Study which is in your book.]

Option A. Maintain Current Presence

We would maintain our present activities and assets in the Indian Ocean area, while urging the U.K. to retain a presence at Singapore to strengthen the Five-Power arrangement, and to participate in the use of Diego Garcia.

This Option would not provoke adverse reaction from littoral states or from the USSR, and it requires no increase in U.S. involvement or costs. On the negative side, the absence of any concrete U.S. steps in response to Soviet activities may deny the U.K. the justification it seeks for its residual role in the area, which could cause allied presence to fall below the current Soviet presence. Moreover, even if

the U.K. retained its presence, allied presence would fall below the anticipated Soviet presence over the period 1972–75.

Option B. Emphasize Allied Cooperation at Slightly Increased U.S. Force Levels

We would qualitatively upgrade MIDEASTFOR by replacing World War II vintage destroyers with modern ships, and we would conduct combined allied cruises, port visits, training exercises, and maritime surveillance efforts with U.K., Australian, and other friendly forces. We would make increased use of Singapore for logistic support and consider upgrading Diego Garcia's POL storage capacity.

This Option would not open us to the charge of initiating big power competition and would keep our presence at parity with our allies, while enabling allied presence to roughly match the Soviets in port visits. Costs and force diversions would be minor, and it would not justify Soviet escalation. Disadvantages are that we would still fall below the Soviets in terms of ships and ship days, and that the U.K. may be seeking more substantial evidence of our concern.

Option C. Moderate Increase in U.S. Presence and Operations with Allies

In addition to the above, we would establish a permanent presence in the eastern Indian Ocean by operating two destroyers at Singapore, and we would increase the level of U.S.–U.K.–Australian group operations, conduct cruises of U.S. naval task units, and increase fleet visits.

This Option would enable U.S. and allied presence to remain on a par with the Soviets if they expand as anticipated, and it would provide tangible evidence of our concern, thereby encouraging the U.K. and Australia to maximize their efforts. On the negative side we would be stepping out in front of our allies and we could expect Soviet counter-escalation and strong neutralist reaction. In addition, this Option would divert destroyer and other forces from our fleet capability in the Western Pacific.

Option D. Begin Major U.S. Task Force Deployments, Upgrade Substantially Area Basing, and Increase Cooperation with Allies

In addition to the above, we would homeport four destroyers at Singapore, increase the duration and size of joint cruises, increase air surveillance operations utilizing both U-Tapao and Diego Garcia, upgrade Diego Garcia facilities, and consider construction of an airfield elsewhere in BIOT.

The pros and cons are essentially the same as for Option C except that it could cause more serious reactions from non-aligned littoral states and would entail somewhat higher costs.

Another naval option surfaced by the Study, but not by its predecessor NSSM 104, is the possibility of an *intermittent naval presence*

through a systematic program of visits by more impressive units than those in the 3-ship MIDEASTFOR. This option has some inherent merits not available in options calling for a given level of permanent U.S. presence:

(1) It frees us from the stigma attached to foreign military bases in the nationalist environment of most littoral states. However, Diego Garcia could offer some of this advantage since the political vulnerability of our base would be minimal.

(2) It would probably be cheaper than permanent basing arrangements.

(3) It would upgrade the size and quality of our ships in the area.

(4) Timely visits/exercises could make a greater impact than a permanent presence.

On the negative side, the irregularity of our presence would downgrade our assured capability (currently minimal outside the Persian Gulf); it could be seen as a sign of disinterest and might be equated with withdrawal; it would give us support problems and put our presence on the same footing as the Soviets'.

[Advocates of an intermittent presence would note that we get limited mileage from MIDEASTFOR's World War II vintage units, essentially a Persian Gulf force. No presence may be preferable to one so easily outclassed by modern Soviet ships, particularly if our interests do not seem to demand a permanent presence. In addition, a permanent force such as MIDEASTFOR could become a questionable asset in an area of potential instability.]

[Others would counter that even MIDEASTFOR pays dividends along the African and Arabian littoral as a familiar symbol of our interest and a form of contact with local peoples. On-scene (or over-the-horizon) naval capabilities are seen to provide inherent leverage, if only for pre-emptive purposes, in local affairs. Proponents of this view would argue that our naval presence should be designed in terms of concrete circumstances in key parts of the littoral—e.g., Bahrein or Singapore—not by an illusory need to match the Soviets ship-day for ship-day in the Ocean as a whole.]

[Since the Study does not make a case for the urgency of deciding on a naval option, there may be merit in deferring a long-range decision until we've explored the arms limitation idea, especially in light of the Soviet approach. *As a practical matter, if we are going to have a study of the arms control possibilities, we do not want to move in the interim to measures which clearly suggest a permanent, higher level of U.S. concern and activity.* Construction of new facilities (apart from Diego Garcia as planned) and negotiations for new base rights fall into this category.]

[By the same token, however, an interim decision for a relatively low level naval option—e.g., Option A or B or a program of cruises and visits—may be a useful holding device while an arms control study is underway.]

3. *Non-Naval Elements of a U.S. Response*

The NSSM requested a political framework for a naval response and asked what non-naval activities are potentially useful in counter-ing Soviet influence. The Study notes that each Option would be accompanied by continued economic aid, but it rules out an approach based either solely on aid or solely on a strengthened military presence.

[In theory, it would be desirable to design alternative policy packages including naval, political, and economic aid elements, since naval policy itself is only a small part of both the Soviet and U.S. postures in the area. *In practice, a package approach for the whole region is possible only at the highest level of abstraction.* For example, if we go the arms control route (after studying it), we would support the views expressed by the non-aligned states at Lusaka and emphasize our desire to avoid super-power competition in the area. An appropriate political rationale for a modest naval option would stress our concern at Soviet activities and our inability to unilaterally refrain from naval activity.]

[The basic problem with designing policy packages for the Indian Ocean is that we tend, like other powers, to focus on its subregions rather than the area as a whole. Aid levels and bilateral political relations are set in conjunction with our priorities in East Africa, South Asia, or the Persian Gulf rather than in terms of Ocean-wide criteria. Naval policy is probably the only area where it makes conceptual sense to think in Indian Ocean terms, and it may not be helpful to attempt to squeeze all our programs and postures into what is essentially a naval strategic frame of reference.]

58. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, April 22, 1971, 3:42–4:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

Indian Ocean (NSSM 110)

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State—U. Alexis Johnson

Ronald I. Spiers

Christopher Van Hollen

Thomas P. Thornton

Defense—David Packard

G. Warren Nutter

Robert J. Pranger

Capt. Robert N. Congdon

CIA—Richard Helms

William Parmenter

JCS—Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

R/Adm. William St. George

OMB—James Schlesinger

ACDA—Philip J. Farley

NSC Staff—Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

Harold H. Saunders

Dr. K. Wayne Smith

Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

A Working Group will be established to examine in detail:

1) the various types of U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean and what each would do; and

2) the various arms control options and what they would do, with all their shortcomings, and with the understanding that the JCS does not believe any such agreement would be acceptable.

Mr. Kissinger: This is a follow-on to the earlier meeting we had on this subject in which the British participated.² It involves primarily the question of a U.S. naval presence in the area or some form of arms limitation agreement. Before we get to that, how fruitful is it to talk about the Indian Ocean as one unit? There are so many different countries

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-112, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes (Originals) 1971. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Saunders and Kennedy prepared an April 17 briefing memorandum for Kissinger that included talking papers. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 304, National Security Council, Feb–Aug 1971) An April 22 memorandum from Saunders and Hoskinson to Kissinger discussed Soviet and Chinese policies toward Ceylon within the wider context of access to the Indian Ocean. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-054, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meetings Indian Ocean (NSSM 110) 4/22/71) Nutter prepared a memorandum for the record of this meeting on April 26. (Ibid., RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Admiral Moorer, Box 113, Work File (Indian Ocean))

² See Document 50.

and interests involved that it might be misleading to talk about our “relatively slight” interest in the Indian Ocean. If we add up our interests in the littoral countries it might be a helluva lot more.

Mr. Johnson: I have understood that we were talking about the Ocean as such, not the littoral powers.

Mr. Kissinger: The British make the point, as have some of our Ambassadors, that the presence of the Navy has an impact on the political consciousness of the littoral, independent of its military purpose. Is that a valid statement? Is it true that we cannot quantify its value simply in terms of its naval activity?

Adm. Moorer: There is no question about it.

Mr. Kissinger: If we carry this syllogism to its extreme—if the political orientation of these countries is of major policy interest to us, and if it can be influenced by the Navy, Tom [Moorer]³ will be asking for three more carriers.

Mr. Spiers: It depends on what kind of naval presence you are talking about.

Mr. Packard: If we had the SST, we could be flying it into these countries with the same effect.

Mr. Kissinger: In terms of what criteria should we look at the question of the military presence in the Indian Ocean? How do we merge the two considerations?

Adm. Moorer: We want to maintain our freedom to go into the area if it should become necessary for military purposes. Also, it is very useful from a political point of view to demonstrate our presence from time to time. I have just come from the MIDEASTFOR meeting.⁴ Although our MIDEASTFOR military force is small, there is no question of its political impact, with regard to Iran, for example. Also, it gives us some communications capability and the ability to move quickly for humanitarian or other reasons. In general, it demonstrates U.S. interest in the area. We are already being attacked on this question of freedom of the seas in the Law of the Sea discussions. I think the country’s national security would be damaged if we deny ourselves access to the oceans in any way. The day could come when we might want to put Polaris submarines into the Indian Ocean. The U.S. is a maritime nation; anything that restricts its movements on the ocean is inimical to our interests.

Mr. Johnson: No one is suggesting that we do anything like that.

Mr. Kissinger: What is our attitude toward the British presence? Do we welcome it or are we indifferent to it?

³ Brackets are in the original.

⁴ Apparently the CENTO Economic, Technological, and Scientific Cooperation Meeting held in Tehran March 9–10.

Adm. Moorer: We want them to stay as long as they can with as much as they can. They are limited by their resources.

Mr. Kissinger: Does anyone hold a contrary view?

Mr. Van Hollen: No.

Mr. Spiers: We have traditionally favored the British presence there.

Mr. Johnson: And we still favor it. Even with their pull-back East of Suez, they decided to maintain some presence in the Indian Ocean and we welcome it. It has symbolic importance if nothing else.

Mr. Kissinger: Are their activities related to ours or are they independent?

Adm. Moorer: They are definitely related. It is much easier for us to have the British there. It means, for example, that there is logistical support available. Also, we are going ahead with Diego Garcia which is part of BIOT. The basic characteristic of naval operations is their mobility—they do not stay at a fixed point. The British presence gives us greater access to ports, greater flexibility and consequently a quicker response.

Mr. Kissinger: The paper presents the choice between the arms control option and a naval presence.⁵ However, almost all the various types of naval presence (except the highest option) seemed quite consistent with the arms control option. It is obvious that the Soviets don't believe that an increase in their strategic forces is inconsistent with SALT. Why would a U.S. naval presence in the area, pending an arms control agreement, be inconsistent?

Mr. Johnson: The paper does not say that.

Mr. Kissinger: It says there is a choice between them. Why couldn't we pursue both courses simultaneously? What do we mean by arms control? No ships?

Mr. Farley: There is range of possibilities: no ships in the area, the definition of the level of ships or weapons, nuclear free zone, limitation on bases, as Dobrynin indicated in his feeler to Secretary Rogers.⁶ I think we should consider whether there is a possibility that the Soviets might agree to some restraints and that we might want to avoid prejudicing this possibility in any naval buildup we might undertake. Other than that consideration, I agree we could proceed in parallel.

Adm. Moorer: There is a big difference between arms control limitations on naval forces and on strategic missiles. You're talking about controlling the area in which our ships operate. You would be putting a voluntary limit on the flexibility of U.S. forces. I consider this the height of imprudence for a maritime nation.

⁵ Reference is to the NSSM 110 response; see Document 57.

⁶ See Document 55.

Mr. Kissinger: Why would this put the Soviets at an advantage and us at a disadvantage?

Adm. Moorer: We abide by agreements and they don't.

Mr. Johnson: If it were estimated that, without some limitation agreement, the Soviets would seek to increase their presence in the Indian Ocean, would there be an advantage in exercising some restraint on the Soviet presence?

Adm. Moorer: The Soviets want to control both ends of the Suez Canal. They want to control the Persian Gulf and the Oman area. They will go ahead regardless of what we do.

Mr. Kissinger: Wouldn't some limitation agreement reduce their ability to put their forces in?

Adm. Moorer: No. They could come down the Suez in two or three days.

Mr. Johnson: (to Adm. Moorer) I understand that you don't think any restrictions would be effective. But for the sake of argument, if we *could* get some restrictions that were at least partially effective, would it be useful?

Adm. Moorer: You also have the question of the Chinese navy. They will be putting several submarines out of Hainan, and they may be testing missiles in the Indian Ocean in the future. The Japanese are also building up their navy to maintain their LOC with the Middle East.

Mr. Johnson: We are not concerned about the Chinese navy now. We consider the Japanese naval interest as complementary to our interest.

Adm. Moorer: But the Soviets might argue that they have been forced into the Indian Ocean by the Japanese presence.

Mr. Kissinger: The abstract options given in the paper are almost impossible to discuss. We haven't staffed out the details of a naval presence or of an arms limitation. I think it would be extremely helpful if we could get a working group to work out various models of an arms limitation agreement, with the full understanding that the JCS does not think any agreement would be acceptable. I think we should carefully work out what such an agreement would do, its shortcomings, its influence on military capabilities, questions of asymmetry, etc. Second, we should work out what we mean by the abstract options of a naval presence. I know we have done that to some extent in the response to NSSM 104⁷ but it needs refining. Then we can put these two things side by side and get a definition of what we are trying to achieve with a naval presence. We can also consider what Soviet presence we should be reacting to and the best way to react.

⁷ See Document 46.

Adm. Moorer: We had a good program in this area when the Vietnam war started. I was in command of the 7th Fleet, and every quarter we moved some ships into the Indian Ocean. We visited India, West African ports—we were never out more than two or three weeks at a time so we didn't wear out our welcome. I think we should be doing the same thing now. We should upgrade MIDEASTFOR with newer, more modern ships. At the CENTO meeting, the CNO of the Iranian Navy told me that a Soviet naval force had visited Iran. Also, my Iranian counterpart was very concerned about Iraq and the Persian Gulf. I think periodic visits would be very useful, politically as well as militarily.

Mr. Kissinger: There is no doubt that in the absence of an arms control agreement we have to look very carefully at the Soviet naval presence and see how best to protect our interests. We have no quarrel with that. However, we do have the feeler from Dobrynin about some sort of limitation agreement, and they can force us to respond at any time by surfacing a formal proposal. Even if we reject the idea, we must have marshalled our arguments. If the Soviets are only two days from the Persian Gulf and our nearest base is X days away, we must certainly take this into consideration. We must decide what we are trying to limit. We can't keep Soviet naval forces from operating in the Indian Ocean if they want to. One thing that makes it easier, of course, is that, if they do come in in numbers larger than authorized in any agreement, the problem of evasion is more difficult with naval ships than with anything else. They are so much easier to find and identify. I have never thought of putting limits on naval deployments. When we look at it, we may find that no scheme would be worth the anguish. However, even if we should decide on some agreement to permit X number of naval visits, this would be unrelated to the question of modernizing MIDEASTFOR. We would probably want to do that in any event. I think we need to do two things: we need to look in detail at the various types of a U.S. naval presence and what each will do; we also need to examine the various arms control options and what they would do, with all their shortcomings. We could be forced into the latter consideration by the Soviets at any time.

Mr. Van Hollen: We have already done a lot of work on the naval options but we can refine it.

Mr. Spiers: We should also consider upgrading Diego Garcia and modernizing MIDEASTFOR.

Adm. Moorer: We can upgrade Diego Garcia easily. We recommended the present plan only to get started.

Mr. Kissinger: We will get the working group established and working on these two studies. We will discuss them in detail with the JCS, of course.

59. **Memorandum From Richard Kennedy and Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, August 9, 1971.

SUBJECT

August 11 SRG Meeting on the Indian Ocean²

The Purpose of the Meeting

The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the two Indian Ocean follow-on studies generated by the April 22 SRG.³ You will recall that your memorandum of May 4 (at tab)⁴ called for the preparation of:

—a paper describing a full range of possible arms control arrangements for the Indian Ocean and providing an overall assessment of this approach; and

—a proposal for U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean for FY 72.

These papers were submitted in June. They are tabbed in your book⁵ together with our summary of them.

Your objectives in this meeting are:

1. to gain SRG approval of the interim naval presence paper;
2. to probe the need for some sort of posture (both public and diplomatic) on the Indian Ocean arms control question;
3. to examine critically whether we have any positive interest in pursuing further the arms control idea.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-060, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting Indian Ocean 10/6/71. Secret. Sent for information. A handwritten note by Kissinger reads: "I agree Smith should participate." Above Kissinger's comment, Haig wrote "will be there" and his initials.

² The Senior Review Group did not meet on this topic until October 6. See Document 61.

³ See Document 58. The first of these two studies was "Indian Ocean Arms Control" prepared by ACDA, undated. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-060, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting Indian Ocean 10/6/71) The second was "Report on NSSM 110 Follow-On: Proposals for a U.S. Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean for FY 1972," prepared by an interagency working group chaired by the Department of Defense. Packard submitted it to Kissinger under a June 16 covering memorandum. (Ibid., Box H-178, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 110)

⁴ Attached but not printed.

⁵ Kissinger's briefing book for the meeting, with its tabs, is attached but not printed.

The Situation

The Soviets do not appear to be considering Indian Ocean arms control a matter of urgency or high priority. You recall that on March 26 Ambassador Dobrynin approached Secretary Rogers (see “Dobrynin Approach” in your book) concerning the U.S. attitude toward limitation of naval forces and bases in the region.⁶

Since then, Brezhnev has publicly criticized U.S. complaints about the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean, and said the USSR was willing to solve “on an equal basis” the problem of “the navies of great powers . . . cruising about for long periods far from their own shores.” (See Brezhnev June 12 speech at tab in your book.)

However, as you know, Gromyko was not prepared to discuss Indian Ocean arms limitations when Ambassador Beam raised the subject in their meeting on July 28. (The reporting cable⁷ is tabbed in your book.) Although the ball is now in their court, we should probably have a position in case they surface the issue again.

Recently, the arms control issue was given fresh impetus by the decision of Ceylon’s Prime Minister Bandaranaike to campaign actively for the establishment of an “Indian Ocean Peace Zone” which would virtually bar all external military presence. (The proposal is tabbed and summarized in your book.) An important feature of the proposal is its apparent anti-Soviet flavor and its timing shortly after the Soviet-Indian treaty. State has circulated a paper (tabbed in your book) which discusses the Soviet-Indian treaty in the context of arms control options.⁸ Briefly, it notes that an arms control arrangement could help reduce U.S.–USSR polarization in the region symbolized by the treaty, and could limit specific military advantages the Soviets may have gained from the treaty; at the same time, however, an agreement limiting external military presence could free India’s hand to operate as a Soviet proxy or to undertake destabilizing activity in the area.

In any event, *since Prime Minister Bandaranaike will be meeting the President after having presented her proposal to the UNGA, we have an additional*

⁶ See Document 55.

⁷ The tab is telegram 5355 from Moscow, July 28, in which Beam noted that while Gromyko was not prepared to discuss the issue, he did offer the “general observation” that the Soviets believed in the principle that “all open seas, including Indian and other oceans, should be free of military competition.”

⁸ The paper, entitled “Possible Soviet Gains in Indian Ocean Arms Control Talks,” concluded that “The USSR is particularly afraid and would do its utmost to prevent deployment of ballistic missile submarines on regular patrol in the Indian Ocean. The US decision, announced last December, to begin building a communications facility on Diego Garcia has probably strengthened Soviet fears that SSBN deployment is ultimately in the cards. The Soviets would probably also like to keep the Indian Ocean free of the periodic or regular US carrier or amphibious task forces which have been advocated by US proponents of a ‘blue water’ strategy in support of the evolving Nixon Doctrine.”

reason to develop a position on Indian Ocean arms control. Embassy Colombo takes the view that Ceylon's proposal does not offer a practical basis for resolving our Indian Ocean problems and is not at this time compatible with U.S. interests vis-à-vis the Soviets. Ambassador Strausz-Hupé states that it has been advanced partially to enhance the Prime Minister's non-aligned image at India's expense. He concludes that the proposal should be "decently but convincingly shelved," while "nursing" the Prime Minister's political objectives in taking the initiative.

Naval Presence Paper

The naval presence paper recommends a package of FY 72 proposals which closely resemble Option B of the initial NSSM 104 Study. (See pp. 7-8 of the NSSM 104 Summary⁹ in your book.) Basically, it calls for:

- a *qualitative upgrading of MIDEASTFOR* by assigning a modern flagship and rotating modern destroyer types.
- scheduling 2 task unit operations during FY 72.*
- modestly increasing the frequency of port visits* stressing areas not normally visited by MIDEASTFOR.
- increased utilization of Singapore for logistic support.*
- deployment of the existing maritime air surveillance detachment (3 planes) based at U-Tapao into the Indian Ocean as Vietnam requirements permit.*

In our view, this is a modest package; the Navy's over-stretched assets have probably been a factor in keeping it that way. The paper judges—and we concur—that the proposals keep open our future options and should not trigger significant reaction, provided they are tactfully implemented with an eye on the evolving diplomatic situation. At the same time, they achieve our purpose of not letting the Soviet naval increases go completely without U.S. response.

We nevertheless think you may want to use the SRG meeting to re-emphasize the political dimension of our Indian Ocean review and to underscore the importance of not handing the Soviets or the littoral neutralists a propaganda field day.

On balance, our studies have concluded that we do not need a naval presence capable of matching the Soviets ship-for-ship, but one that signals, in the littoral state context, that our absence cannot be taken for granted. The political logic of this approach also requires that we not ignore littoral sensitivities in implementing our naval improvements. The *style* and *timing* of such measures as upgrading MIDEASTFOR should be considered in the light of possible developments in the littoral state context and in the arms control field.

⁹ Document 46.

You may want to underscore this point with JCS, by gently probing concerning the new flagship for MIDEASTFOR—the most permanent and, perhaps, visible naval improvement recommended. The point here is simply that there may be advantage in not delaying the replacement much longer, in view of the possibility of further diplomatic moves on arms limitation and in light of the U.K.'s impending withdrawal from the Gulf. The Navy, on the other hand, appears to be planning on replacing the present flagship towards the beginning of FY 1973. In our view it should be done as soon as possible.

Arms Control

You will recall that our initial purpose in looking at possible arms control arrangements was to discover if it might be possible to deal with the Soviet naval challenge by an agreement on mutual limitations. (You may want to refer to pp. 6–9 of the NSSM 110 Summary¹⁰ in your book.) In addition, there was concern that the Soviets might launch an arms control “offensive,” forcing us to respond or at least to think of possible responses. Although the Soviets appear to have put the issue on the back burner, we should probably not shelve the question without first:

—deciding whether there is any positive advantage in pursuing the matter further. *The issue here is whether the nature of the challenge and the level of our interests make a regional agreement more desirable than continued, low-level naval competition.*

—reaching some general consensus on what our posture should be in the event that the Soviets surface the subject again.

The ACDA/DOD Paper

There appears to be a consensus that Soviet interest in Indian Ocean arms control is focused primarily on limiting possible U.S. SSBN deployments to the area and, to a lesser extent, on limiting U.S. bases. Our interest, on the other hand, lies primarily in limiting Soviet surface deployments.

Turning first to the question of whether there is any advantage in pursuing arms limitation, the paper fails to come to grips with the issue of what, if anything, we should be prepared to sacrifice to get an agreement limiting Soviet naval presence, primarily because of sharp interagency disagreement over the merits of the exercise. Furthermore, assessment of the paper's seven options is hampered by confusion between the criteria of negotiability and desirability.

Briefly, the seven options (spelled out in pp. 18–22 of our summary) are:

¹⁰ Document 57.

Option I: An informal, generalized understanding to limit naval presence. (This is largely a procedural option which does not define our position on key substantive issues.)

Option II: An agreement limiting surface combatants and existing bases, but *not* strategic systems such as SSBNs.

Option III: An agreement limiting surface combatants, bases, *and* SSBNs.

Option IV: An agreement limiting surface combatants less severely than the above, limiting existing bases, but *not* SSBNs.

Option V: An agreement limiting surface combatants but *not* bases or SSBNs.

Option VI: An agreement to freeze existing deployment and establish no new bases for one year while negotiations continue. (Like Option I, this is a procedural variant which does not spell out our substantive position.)

Option VII: A multilateral undertaking by all outside powers to exclude all their forces from the Indian Ocean except for transits. (This is similar to the Ceylonese proposal.)

You will probably want to concentrate on Options II–V, and raise the following issues at the meeting:

Issue 1: SSBNs

The central strategic issue in the paper is our attitude toward the option of Indian Ocean SSBN deployments. The paper concludes that an agreement limiting such deployments would be “undesirable from a strategic standpoint.” (See the discussion on pp. 13–14 of our summary.) The argument here stresses asymmetry:

—We would in effect be bargaining away a strategic option—targeting the USSR, or the USSR and China simultaneously without overflight of the other—in exchange for the strictly local political benefit of limiting naval competition. Since the USSR cannot offer us a strategic quid in the Indian Ocean context, we should not accept unilateral limits on our force deployments.

We have no quarrel with this judgment. There are *some, however, who would argue that SSBN deployments in the Indian Ocean are a purely hypothetical option which we should be prepared to sacrifice rather than take the blame for the failure of possible future talks with the Soviets.* You may want to probe DOD and/or JCS on the likelihood of our wanting to deploy SSBNs in the area, but we *doubt that anyone will argue in favor of placing our Indian Ocean interests ahead of our global strategic ones.*

If one concludes that SSBN limitations are undesirable, this rules out Options III and VII in the paper. However, *the argument for sacrificing SSBN deployments would become more cogent if we could get some*

sort of global or geographical limitation on Soviet strategic naval forces in return. You may want to raise this point at the meeting.

Issue 2: Bases

If one rules out an agreement limiting SSBNs, there is still the possibility of an agreement limiting only surface combatants and bases. (Options II and IV) The paper does not take a position on base limitations, though here again there is the problem of asymmetry since we and our allies have bases whereas the Soviets do not.

In our view, there are obvious disadvantages in an agreement requiring the dismantling of Western bases in exchange for a prohibition on future Soviet bases. However, supporters of this approach could, of course, argue that an arrangement limiting Soviet surface deployments to levels approaching our own would be a sufficiently attractive trade-off for base limitations. (Option II would do this, while Option IV which permits a higher level of Soviet deployments appears to be a non-starter.)¹¹

Issue 3: Surface Combatants

Option V confines itself to surface combatants. Though obviously the most desirable in terms of U.S. interests—or least undesirable, the JCS view—there are serious doubts about its negotiability.

A U.S. proposal along these lines could lead us straight to an impasse with the Soviets who would focus on, and perhaps, publicize, the issues of central concern to them—prohibiting SSBN deployment and limiting bases.

There is thus a risk of political embarrassment in any U.S. initiative which may outweigh the potential advantages of an agreed limit on Soviet naval forces. Nevertheless, it might be worthwhile to ask ACDA to outline a negotiating scenario designed to protect our interests on bases and SSBNs while achieving some limit on naval presence. The scenario could be submitted for review before final judgment on whether we wish to take the matter any further.

Issue 4: A U.S. Position: What you Want from this Meeting

If one concludes from the above that the U.S. does not at present find advantage in actively pursuing arms limitation in the Indian Ocean, *there is still one avenue of further work that should be pursued:*

To protect our public and diplomatic posture, it would be useful to *direct the preparation of a U.S. position paper for possible use in handling the Ceylonese initiative or future Soviet proposals.* This would have the

¹¹ A handwritten note by Kissinger reads: “Also what procedure. How do we do it?”

additional advantage of having on paper an agreed government view on the subject. Such a paper would outline:

- a U.S. counter to proposals either from the USSR or from the littoral states. This should be cast in terms of both diplomatic and public positions.

- arguments to defend our position and deflect attention from issues which could cast it in an unfavorable light.

This paper should be produced over the next few weeks¹² so that it will be available before Mrs. Bandaranaike's visit (October 19).

In developing such counters, you may want to consider whether there would be advantage in dealing with the Indian Ocean arms control idea by *broadening the discussion* to include:

- global naval force limitations;
- regional trade-offs in limiting strategic naval deployments near the U.S. and the USSR.

We recognize that this would take us far beyond the confines of our Indian Ocean review, and that we would not want to get into such a discussion without full consideration of the global strategic and force posture issues which are clearly involved. Hal Sonnenfeldt and Wayne Smith concur in the judgment that *we should not pursue either global naval force limits or regional trade-offs in the Indian Ocean context at this time.*

Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that we may be hard pressed to find credible and defensible counters should the pressures mount for inherently asymmetrical force cuts in the Indian Ocean or, for that matter, the Mediterranean. In time, events could develop in such a way that our interests would be best served by broadening the discussion—e.g., if the Soviet navy continues its rapid growth, or if we become especially anxious to limit Soviet strategic naval deployments near the U.S. Your talking points raise this issue, should you decide to pursue it at the meeting.

[Omitted here are a scenario for conducting the meeting and a list of the tabs of the briefing book.]

¹² See Document 60.

60. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY
of the
CEYLONESE PROPOSAL

On September 22, the Ceylonese handed us a 7-point aide-mémoire describing Madame Bandaranaike's proposal for an "Indian Ocean Peace Zone."² The proposal is generally similar to Option 7 of the arms control paper,³ barring nearly all forms of external military presence, though the Ceylonese have hinted at considerable flexibility in their position.

1. *No armaments of any kind, defensive or offensive, may be installed on or in the sea, on the subjacent seabed, on land areas within the zone that are under the jurisdiction or control of any state.* The Ceylonese apparently intend this to apply only to external states. They have informed us that Diego Garcia would not be affected as long as it remains a communications facility, but it would presumably rule out Bahrain and certain allied facilities.

2. *Ships of all nations may traverse the area, but warships and ships carrying war-like equipment must remain in transit and cannot stop other than for emergency reasons of a technical, mechanical, or humanitarian nature.* This would prohibit all non-transit deployments in the area such as MIDEASTFOR, 5-Power operations, unless specifically excluded. While we would retain freedom to utilize the Indian Ocean as an LOC, this prohibition could set undesirable precedents for other ocean areas, and it would constitute a ban on projection of naval power as an instrument of foreign policy by external powers. It is unclear whether it would prohibit port calls.

3. *Submarines cannot rest on the seabed except for emergency reasons.* This is unclear in that SSBNs do not normally operate on the seabed. It is also unverifiable. If it ruled out SSBN patrols, or obliged us to conduct them clandestinely, it would obviously affect the central strategic question raised by our arms control study.

4. *No warships of any state may carry out maneuvers in the area.* This would rule out U.S. and allied exercises in the area and preclude surge operations of any kind. (No escape clause appears in the proposal

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-060, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting Indian Ocean 10/6/71. Secret.

² Attached but not printed is telegram 2728 from Colombo, September 22.

³ See Document 59.

which “ideally” would take precedence over all defense pacts now operative in the area.)

5. *No ships may carry out intelligence operations in the area.* This is probably not verifiable.

6. *No tests of weapons of any kind may be carried out in the area.* This would probably not affect the U.S. and appears to be directed primarily at China and, possibly, India.

7. *The regulative prescriptions will be supervised by an international authority.* While this is not spelled out, it could subject outside powers, including the U.S., to a continuing propaganda exercise, and would not necessarily reduce East-West polarization in the Indian Ocean context.

61. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, October 6, 1971, 3:10–4:02 p.m.

SUBJECT

Indian Ocean

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State—U. Alexis Johnson
Christopher Van Hollen
Ronald Spiers
Thomas Thornton

Defense—Armistead Selden
R/Adm. H.H. Anderson

JCS—Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
R/Adm. James H. Doyle

CIA—Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
Bruce Clarke

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-112, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes (Originals) 1971. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The Assistant Secretary of Defense's office prepared a memorandum for the record on the SRG meeting; the memorandum and the Talking Paper prepared for Packard and Moorer are *ibid.*, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Admiral Thomas Moorer, Box 125, Misc. File, SRG, VP Minutes.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed:

—to issue a NSSM calling for a study of the general question of naval arms control;²

—that we are not prepared to accept any deployment limitations on SSBNs in the Indian Ocean;

—to prepare a more specific paper on the question of naval deployment limitations for presentation to the President, and that nothing would be discussed with any government prior to a Presidential decision;

—State will prepare talking points for the President's meeting with Prime Minister Bandaranaike and obtain agency views on them;³

—our instructions to our UN Delegation on the Ceylonese proposal will be based on the President's conversation with Mrs. Bandaranaike.

Dr. Kissinger: We have two issues today: 1) the composition of the naval presence in the Indian Ocean and plans for upgrading, if any; 2) the various schemes for arms control in the Ocean, triggered by the Ceylonese initiative and Dobrynin's presentation to Secretary Rogers in March.⁴ Is that a fair statement of the issues?

All agreed

Dr. Kissinger: Let's start with the naval side.

Adm. Moorer: We have been maintaining three ships in MIDEASTFOR: the *Valcour*, a communications and flag ship, and two WWII destroyers rotating around the Cape into the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. We have depended on the British at Bahrein for our ground support for these ships. The British are pulling out now, but we have negotiated for access to some of their installations there to support MIDEASTFOR. We have no problem in this regard.

Dr. Kissinger: Are the British turning over their facilities to Bahrein? Are we dealing with Bahrein for these facilities?

Adm. Moorer: We're getting part of them from Bahrein. In any event, our logistic support will continue. We also have in mind upgrading the force. We plan to have an LPH, an amphibious ship with helicopter capability and good aircraft communications capability.

Dr. Kissinger: Would you have troops abroad?

² The NSSM was drafted only. See Document 63.

³ Briefing material, including the Talking Points, are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Ceylon, Vol. I.

⁴ See Documents 60 and 55.

Adm. Moorer: No, but there is room for troops which would give us greater evacuation capacity if we should need it. We plan to put that in next summer.

Dr. Kissinger: Would this replace the *Valcour*?

Adm. Moorer: Yes. It's bigger, better looking and more modern. We would scrap the *Valcour*. We also plan to begin intermittent deployment of two new missile-carrying destroyers similar to the Berkeley class. We would hope for continuous deployment soon.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you still planning two Task Unit operations?

Adm. Moorer: Before Vietnam we used to send Task Forces from the Seventh Fleet into the Indian Ocean from the Persian Gulf. We had the Shah of Iran and other VIPs from the littoral states aboard at one time or another. When Vietnam drops off, we will resume the practice. That would involve a carrier, a tanker and four or five destroyers. We also run a maritime patrol from Udaipai in Thailand. There is a good Australian base on the west coast with VLF communications facilities. We will visit there and at Singapore from time to time. In other words, we would have intermittent cruises into the Indian Ocean in addition to a permanent presence.

In connection with Diego Garcia, I wrote the first report in 1962 recommending that we go ahead with it, and it's taken ten years to get it. The Seabees are there now and we plan some austere communication facilities, an airfield, some fuel storage and an anchorage. We are doing it in three increments: the first was in FY 1971, the second is included in this year's military construction bill, and the third will come next year. We have had difficult fueling, since we have port problems in both India and Ceylon. Also, we will be conducting a CENTO exercise, MIDLAKE 14, with the British, Iranians, Turks and Pakistanis. This will involve one submarine and two destroyers in the Persian Gulf.

Dr. Kissinger: Does anyone have any comment on the program Tom (Moorer) has outlined?

Mr. Johnson: I think it's first class.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Moorer) How about the defense program for FY 73? Do you think it adequately responds to the differences you had noted earlier between us and the Soviets with regard to port calls, etc.

Adm. Moorer: Yes, but we're not trying to match ship-day for ship-day.

Mr. Selden: You will make selective port calls, though?

Adm. Moorer: Yes, for all forces.

Dr. Kissinger: Okay. Can we talk about arms control now. This was, of course, triggered by Dobrynin's discussion with the Secretary (Rogers), by the comments by various littoral states about a "sea of peace," and by the September 22 aide-mémoire from Ceylon with its

seven points. Mrs. Bandaranaike will be here on October 19. We have two issues: the question of arms control at sea in the Indian Ocean and that of naval arms control all together. There are obvious significant differences between naval and land arms control—restraints on deployment have different significance, the ability to reinforce is different. We have never formally addressed the question of arms control at sea, except as a part of some other issue such as SALT.

Mr. Farley: Only in combination with other forms of control.

Dr. Kissinger: If Phil (Farley) agrees, I think we should put out a NSSM to look at the question of naval arms control in a general way.

Adm. Moorer: Before we get into this I'd like to make two points. First, we're a maritime nation and any action that is taken to inhibit the freedom of the seas can only be detrimental to our interests. The Soviets have a geo-political problem which makes it more difficult for them to operate naval forces. We mustn't do anything to degrade our advantage here. Second is the problem of enforcing any arms control at sea or of isolating an area. No matter what you take out, they can always move back in in a few days. A sanitized area doesn't mean anything.

Dr. Kissinger: Those are exactly the sorts of questions we should address in a general consideration of arms control at sea. We must take into account Tom's (Moorer) point of the geo-political differences. Naval arms control would have a different impact on a maritime nation than on a land nation. Let's defer that issue to the general study. We understand that Tom (Moorer) is opposed to any limitation on naval arms in the Indian Ocean and probably anywhere. In the general study we can address the issue of naval constraints and the types of arms to be considered.

Have the Soviets re-raised the issue of limitations in the Indian Ocean?

Mr. Johnson: No, the ball is in their court.

Dr. Kissinger: It didn't come up in the Beam-Gromyko conversation.⁵

Mr. Spiers: Gromyko said he'd look into it but we haven't heard back from him.

Dr. Kissinger: So this isn't an immediate issue unless we want to force it. I assume we are talking about limitations on outside forces, not on the littoral countries. Then we would have to consider the question of limitations on us in other places where we were not a littoral.

⁵ See footnote 7, Document 59.

We have an ACDA–DOD paper with seven options⁶ and, to my surprise, the middle option seems to be the more realistic. The options are (reading from the paper): I—an informal, generalized understanding to avoid conflict and limit naval presence; II—a bilateral agreement limiting surface combatants and existing bases, but not SSBNs; III—a bilateral agreement limiting surface combatants bases, and SSBNs; IV—a bilateral agreement limiting surface combatants less strictly, and limiting bases, but not SSBNs; V—a bilateral agreement limiting surface combatants but not bases or SSBNs; VI—a bilateral agreement to freeze existing deployment levels and establish no new bases for one year while negotiations continue on detailed arms limitations; VII—a multilateral arrangement whereby all outside powers would exclude all their forces from the Indian Ocean except for direct and immediate transit.

Before we get into the options, what are we trying to accomplish by arms limitation in the Indian Ocean?

Mr. Farley: A primary consideration was that we needed our ships elsewhere more. We have a situation of increasing Soviet activity, and we would find it painful to step up our activity to match. Therefore, we might find a means to hold the Soviets at their present level. Also, there is the question of our general posture toward the “sea of peace.” There are lots of holes in this, but we might try to do something with the Soviets to avoid a build-up of competition in our naval postures. It would be better public relations.

Dr. Kissinger: Toward whom?

Mr. Farley: Toward the countries in the area, and also in the situation that might develop here if we appear uninterested.

Dr. Kissinger: Am I correct that the Soviets don’t have a base on the Red Sea?

Adm. Moorer: They’re all over the area. They’re at Socotra, they refuel at Mauritius . . .

Dr. Kissinger: If there were a significant Soviet base in, say, Alexandria, any restrictions on their activities would be marginal. How long would it take to get from Alexandria assuming the Canal were open?

Adm. Moorer: One or two days.

Dr. Kissinger: What is our closest base?

Adm. Moorer: Camranh Bay, the Philippines, Western Australia. When the Canal is open the situation can be shifted overnight. That’s why I don’t think we should let the Ceylonese tail wag the dog.

⁶ See Document 59.

Mr. Johnson: There's another side, though. If we're not going to do any more in the area and the Soviets are planning to do more, is there any value in seeing if the Soviets will agree to limit their activities to our level.

Dr. Kissinger: Is there any Soviet base in the Indian Ocean?

Adm. Moorer: No, but they are always there.

Dr. Kissinger: If they have nothing based in the Ocean, what are we trying to get them to do? To agree not to have more than three ships there at a time?

Gen. Cushman: They keep two to four ships there all the time. Once they had eight.

Dr. Kissinger: Would we say they couldn't have more than four ships under the status quo option? What if they say 'okay, you can have the same'? What would that mean?

Adm. Moorer: It would knock out any Task Force operations.

Mr. Farley: It would depend on the formulation.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's say transits were permitted. Could they be staged so that there were always more ships there *de facto*?

Adm. Moorer: Yes. And, of course, they could change course at any time.

Dr. Kissinger: It would be interesting to know what each side could actually do. They have in fact been conducting maneuvers since they have no base there.

Mr. Farley: They have had a continuous presence at the two-to-four level.

Adm. Moorer: Plus support.

Dr. Kissinger: Does anyone see any sense in banning SSBNs from the Indian Ocean?

Adm. Moorer: No.

Gen. Cushman: It would be impossible to verify.

Adm. Moorer: It would greatly simplify their warning system and ASW system. We want them to have to look 360 degrees.

Gen. Cushman: Their Y-class submarines might be a threat some day, but they aren't now. And we couldn't verify an agreement to ban them anyhow.

Adm. Moorer: We can use the Indian Ocean against them better than they can use it against us.

Dr. Kissinger: So we are all agreed that we're not prepared to discuss deployment limitations on SSBNs. That knocks out all the SSBN options.

Let's go back to deployment limitations. The question of whether we would ever agree to deployment limitations on our naval activities

would have to go to the President. We need a more specific paper on this—how to distinguish transit from permanent presence; maneuvers from transit and permanent presence. There is a surface attractiveness to the proposition that we won't build up our naval forces and we might get the Soviets not to. That's okay if that's all that would happen. But we have to consider the possible precedent.

Mr. Johnson: The question of precedent is most important.

Dr. Kissinger: We would have to go to the President.

Adm. Moorer: This would fly in the face of the Nixon Doctrine. If there were a crisis in the Indian Ocean, in which the Soviets were not involved, and the President wanted to send a force in, he couldn't do it.

Mr. Johnson: That depends on the type of agreement you have. You understand I'm not advocating an agreement. I'm very skeptical that we could devise anything that we would find acceptable.

Dr. Kissinger: Do we all understand that nothing is to be floated to any government prior to a Presidential decision?

All agreed

Dr. Kissinger: On bases, we're only talking about one at Diego Garcia, aren't we?

Mr. Spiers: We don't call it a base.

Adm. Moorer: Communications facility, then. The Soviet agreement with the Indians includes utilization of their ports—I call those bases.

Mr. Farley: Will we have people stationed at Bahrein?

Adm. Moorer: We'll have some mailmen and dependents—no combat forces.

Dr. Kissinger: American naval personnel?

Adm. Moorer: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Isn't that a good definition of a base? We have two bases, then—Bahrein and Diego Garcia.

Adm. Moorer: They're facilities.

Dr. Kissinger: Could each side be permitted unlimited facilities but no bases?

Mr. Selden: Diego Garcia is a joint facility. The British have personnel there.

Mr. Spiers: The British and French also have facilities at Djibouti and Diego Suarez.

Dr. Kissinger: Are we sufficiently concerned that the Soviets might establish a base in the Indian Ocean to make it significant to discuss?

Adm. Moorer: We've seen no sign of construction, but they can anchor and stay for days at Socotra.

Dr. Kissinger: When we talk about arms control, there are a number of ways to do it: limitations on the types of ships, the number of ships, the types of activities, bases . . .

Mr. Johnson: If you are asking me if I think there is a danger of the Soviets establishing a Soviet base in the Indian Ocean, the answer is no. That's not the way they operate. Alexandria is not a Soviet base. It's not likely under the present circumstances, but I don't exclude it.

Adm. Moorer: But they have one in India.

Mr. Johnson: It doesn't fly the Soviet flag. We have the problem of defining a base. We fly our flag on Diego Garcia.

Dr. Kissinger: I assume we're not prepared to discuss the Ceylonese proposal affirmatively with Mrs. Bandaranaike. Should we say anything else other than we are studying it?

Mr. Johnson: We could use various stalls—ask her what her neighbors think. No one is proposing a positive response.

Mr. Spiers: She will have considerable support in New York.

Mr. Selden: The best way to stop it is to say we're not interested—that we're opposed.

Mr. Farley: The Ceylonese have already introduced it in the UN, and Mrs. Bandaranaike will make her speech on October 12.

Mr. Spiers: We need to get some guidance to our UN Delegation on it.

Adm. Moorer: Why not just turn her off?

Dr. Kissinger: We know there are a number of items we won't accept no matter how much we study it—restrictions on submarines, restrictions on maneuvers . . .

Mr. Spiers: We have a list of suggested talking points for the President's meeting with Mrs. Bandaranaike. (handed them to Dr. Kissinger)

Mr. Johnson: Why don't we look at these and see if there is any consensus.

Dr. Kissinger: The talking points, in effect, say that we don't want Big Power competition in the Indian Ocean. That Mrs. Bandaranaike should consult the other littoral states and, if they agree, we would have to take a position which would most likely be in opposition. Could we tell her now that most of the items are not likely to be acceptable? We could say we are studying the proposal and would come back to her if our reaction were more favorable.

Mr. Spiers: We hope she would get bogged down in differences with others and that the proposal will go away. If we try to get into specifics, she will offer to make changes to accommodate us.

Dr. Kissinger: I think the issue is clear. We can either bog her down with general good will, or turn her off.

Mr. Johnson: Under the heading of general good will, we could say we don't want Big Power competition.

Dr. Kissinger: When the Soviets are moving into India, it's silly to talk about Big Power competition as sea power.

Mr. Johnson: But we're talking about sea power. We can say her proposal gives us difficulties and we don't see how it would work out.

Dr. Kissinger: We need two things: what the President should say to Mrs. Bandaranaike and what position we take at the UN. When does it come up in the UN? After the President sees her? Can we be guided by what the President says?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: It will be hard to raise this with the President this week. We'll try to get to him next week.

Mr. Johnson: We can see what the President says and take our instructions for our UN Delegation from that.

Dr. Kissinger: Would October 20 be soon enough?

Mr. Spiers: Fine.

Dr. Kissinger: I'll get this discussion to the President. We won't ask for a formulation from the bureaucracy until the President sees Mrs. Bandaranaike.⁷ Based on that conversation, we can draw up something for the UN.

Mr. Johnson: We'll refine these talking points for the President and get a reaction from you all.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we need to see the talking points. The President can express his desire to avoid Big Power competition, then he can either follow the line we have been discussing here, or say that the fault lies more with the Soviets than with us. Let's redefine these present talking points.

Mr. Spiers: There is also the question of how deeply we want to go in defining our objections.

Mr. Selden: Will delay on our part run the risk of building up support in New York?

Mr. Spiers: She's already getting a lot of support. There will be some resolutions but nothing will happen unless the Big Powers are interested. There is no evidence of any Russian interest. If we follow Option 1, it may provide a good framework for dealing with proposals like the one from Ceylon. But if Ceylon is encouraged to talk to others, there will be lots of problems.

⁷ See Document 62.

Dr. Kissinger: If we know we don't want anything, we might be better to put her out of her misery. It's better to turn down one country than seven.

Mr. Spiers: We do have some diplomatic means to influence some of these people.

Dr. Kissinger: We have a choice of formalizing an arrangement, or of saying we are restraining our activities and will be watching the Soviets to see if they do.

Adm. Moorer: Instead of saying we will study her proposal, why not say we have studied it?

Dr. Kissinger: (to Johnson) You will get us a refinement of your proposed talking points. I won't try to get the President's reaction until the end of next week.

62. Editorial Note

During her October 1971 trip to the United States, Ceylonese Prime Minister Sirimayo Bandaranaike spoke to both the United Nations General Assembly and to top U.S. officials concerning the proposal to turn the Indian Ocean into a "zone of peace" along the lines of the Ceylonese aide-mémoire (see Document 60). Although Bandaranaike had submitted a draft of her upcoming speech to the U.S. Embassy, according to telegram 3007 from Colombo, October 14, the version she delivered to the General Assembly was less compatible with U.S. policy than had been her original draft, as she had made changes after her arrival in New York. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–6 IND)

On October 19, Madame Bandaranaike met with President Richard Nixon in Washington. Neither the memorandum nor the tape of the conversation indicates that Bandaranaike or Nixon raised the issue of the Nuclear Free Zone proposal. (Memorandum of conversation, October 19; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Ceylon, Vol. I, and *ibid.*, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 596–4) At a working lunch with Secretary of State William Rogers that same day, Rogers asked about the proposal and noted that the United States was studying it. (Telegram 195054 to Colombo, London, and USUN, October 23; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–6 IND) However, according to a later report on her trip, Nixon expressed interest in the proposal and Bandaranaike talked at length on its origins stemming back to 1964. Bandaranaike was also reported to have discussed it with Rogers and to have said that both Rogers and Nixon had

indicated they would study it further. (Memorandum from Helms to Kissinger, November 16; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Ceylon, Vol. 1)

Subsequently, the Departments of State and Defense rejected the Indian Ocean declaration as a basis for negotiation because it meant a special Law of the Sea regime for the Indian Ocean, put the General Assembly behind a declaration that was inconsistent with the Law of the Sea, reduced strategic mobility, and affected the security interests of any state that relied on a military balance of power for its stability. The U.S. Delegation at the UN was to seek the cooperation of the Soviet Delegation on the grounds that the United States agreed to the principle of avoiding military competition, as Gromyko had brought up July 28, but outside of the General Assembly. (Joint State/Defense telegram 200345 to Indian Ocean Embassies, November 3; *ibid.*)

63. Memorandum From Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, October 15, 1971.

Al:

Henry asked for this NSSM at the Indian Ocean SRG meeting.² I want to express my serious reservation that this might be a source of embarrassment. The fact of the study could be leaked by:

—Those opposed to any naval limitations to embarrass the President and bring down the wrath of public opinion,

—Those who favor a defense budget cut in the interest of showing that the President really is looking for ways to counter Navy and Defense pressures for increased Navy expenditures.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-178, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 110. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. Sent for action.

² See Document 61. The draft NSSM is attached but not printed. Entitled "Concepts of Naval Arms Control," it stated: "while directed specifically at bilateral arms control arrangements between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., the study should also consider multi-lateral arrangements (similar to MBFR) on both a global and a regional basis. The importance of NATO and Warsaw Pact fleets should be considered in both instances." The study was to assess "the relative balance of U.S. and U.S.S.R. (and NATO-Warsaw Pact) fleets existing and projected in the foreseeable future. . . . The assessment should include both military implications and the role of naval forces in alliances and general foreign policy."

Either case could be embarrassing in the charged atmosphere of the coming year. The counter argument of course would be that such proposals are being surfaced from a variety of foreign sources and in a variety of forms. The US, therefore, must be in a position to effectively deal with such proposals on their merits rather than be caught with counter arguments which won't wash, unprepared entrance into some sort of discussions forced by others, or opposition which the other side could call intransigence.

I wanted to flag this for you in the event you thought Henry should focus again on this.³

³ On another copy of this memorandum, Haig wrote: "HAK—I agree this is wrong time." Kissinger initialed and a handwritten notation reads: "HAK agrees." (Ibid., Box H-176, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 104)

64. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 28, 1971.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Deputy Director, ACDA
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT

Further Study of Indian Ocean Arms Control

As agreed at the Senior Review Group meeting of October 6,² the study of Indian Ocean arms control should be further developed by the preparation of a paper which specifically analyzes the issues raised in designing non-strategic naval limitations in the Indian Ocean. Using as a point of departure Options II, IV, and V of the arms control study prepared as a follow-on to NSSM 110,³ the paper should concentrate on such issues as:

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-060, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting Indian Ocean 10/6/71. Secret.

² See Document 61.

³ See Document 57.

—the comparative impact on the U.S. and USSR of limitations on Indian Ocean bases and support facilities;

—the question of distinguishing naval transits from exercises and “show of force” maneuvers and of distinguishing all of these from a permanent presence;

—the comparative impact on the U.S. and the USSR (in terms of surge capability and reaction time) of deployment limitations on non-strategic naval forces, both with and without Indian Ocean bases and support facilities.

The issue of possible precedents which could be set by such Indian Ocean limitations should be weighed in assessing the attractiveness of non-strategic limitations as a means of dealing with the increased Soviet naval presence in the area. Interagency differences should be clearly identified.

The paper should be prepared by an Ad Hoc Group chaired by representatives of ACDA and DOD and comprising representatives of the addressees and the NSC Staff. It should be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs no later than November 19.⁴

Henry A. Kissinger

⁴ See Document 69.

65. Telegram From the Embassy in Ceylon to the Department of State¹

Colombo, December 9, 1971, 0645Z.

3434. Subj: Ambassador's Conversation on Indo-Pak Developments with Felix D. Bandaranaike. Ref: Colombo 3433.²

1. In conversation Dec 8 with Ambassador, Home Minister Felix Dias Bandaranaike said Prime Minister was increasingly disturbed about developments in subcontinent which she holds fundamentally upset balance of power in Indian Ocean. Felix, in response Ambassador's

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Admiral Moorer, Box 113, Work File (Indian Ocean). Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to Islamabad, New Delhi, and USUN.

² Telegram 3433 from Colombo, December 9, reported on a Ceylonese peace proposal aimed at achieving a ceasefire between India and Pakistan, as noted in the *Ceylon Times*. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 INDIA-PAK)

query on GOC plans for Indian Ocean resolution in UNGA, said that last two weeks³ have “changed everything”, and that he, Felix would urge PM to shelve resolution. Felix went on to say “our interests now converge” and that Ceylon’s stand on Indo-Pakistan conflict was same as yours.”

Felix then digressed on emerging strategic situation. He envisages a “coastline of 3,000 miles” available to deploy Soviet power via her “Indian proxy.” He foresaw trouble, too, in Ceylon’s north, i.e., the Tamil area, and said he would not be surprised if India were, within next few years, to foment communal trouble in Ceylon.

3. *Comment:* While GOC is still gingerly seeking to readjust their position to the emergent realities in subcontinent and while government has thought fit to suppress press reports of its own UN plan (reftel), it seems that, at least for time being, Ceylon is searching for counterweight to India, since GOC increasingly skeptical of Chinese ability to check India, not to speak of Soviet Union. From general drift of Felix’s observations GOC now appears to have second thought re U.S. naval presence in Indian Ocean and is likely to welcome, at least tacitly, tokens of U.S. naval power. Our star appears to be rising.⁴

Strausz-Hupé

³ A reference to the India–Pakistan war, which began December 3 and ended December 17. For documentation, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971.

⁴ By late February 1972, the Ceylonese Prime Minister asked for visits by both the U.S. Navy and CINCPAC. This change in attitude reflected the impact of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, the India–Pakistan war, and the “realization of high degree of dependence on West for assistance.” (Telegram 535 from Colombo, February 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CEYLON–US)

66. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, December 10, 1971, 1641Z.

11267. Subj: Diego Garcia Agreement. Ref: London 11245.²

1. New U.S. position embodied in State 219330³ appears to have transformed Diego Garcia negotiation from near-total impasse to drafting exercise. While British reactions described in reftel are necessarily provisional, it is clear that officials in both MOD and FCO now believe we are on road to early agreement and are immensely relieved.

2. In past few months British have had growing conviction that U.S. was attempting to write an agreement which would expand HMG's approval of a limited communications facility to a license to do whatever we please in Diego Garcia. While construction on island proceeded apace, we maintained official positions, seen here as contradictory, that (A) we had no present plans for construction beyond what we had already told HMG, but (B) we could not accept any British inhibitions on future construction or land use. As recently as December 8, we jokingly reassured MOD official that USN did not really intend to sneak in a Polaris base under cover of darkness, and met stony reply "you have given us very little reason to feel sure of that."

3. Compromise solution of scope paragraph⁴ was major substantive element in restoring British confidence and permitting both sides to resume genuine negotiation. British apprehensions had reached a point which required the additional concession we have made, by including many administrative details in the government-level exchange, to make the package work. In Embassy's opinion, these concessions will not in themselves work seriously to our disadvantage, or inhibit achievement of legitimate US objectives in BIOT.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Admiral Thomas Moorer, Box 113, Work File (Indian Ocean). Confidential; Exdis.

² Telegram 11245 from London, December 9, reported on the preliminary reaction of the British to the current draft of the Diego Garcia agreement. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 IND-UK)

³ In telegram 219330 to London, December 4, the Department suggested that a counterproposal be focused on the principles of the 1966 BIOT agreement, leaving the details to subsequent agreement by "appropriate administrative authorities." (Ibid., RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Admiral Thomas Moorer, Box 113, Work File (Indian Ocean))

⁴ This paragraph detailed provisions under which the United States had the right to construct, maintain, and operate a limited naval communications facility on Diego Garcia. (Ibid.)

4. We believe we will now get a good agreement, and put to rest lingering British doubts. We are grateful to Washington for excellent support in providing instructions which will make it possible.

Annenberg

67. Editorial Note

The Ceylonese Resolution, adopted on December 16, 1971, by the 26th session of the UN General Assembly as Resolution 2832, declared the Indian Ocean a “zone of peace.” It called on the great powers to consult with the littoral states in order to halt the expansion of their military presence, and to eliminate all bases, facilities, and nuclear weapons. Littoral and hinterland states were likewise to consult with other nations to ensure that no other power used the Indian Ocean to threaten or use force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or independence of the littoral and hinterland states. The right of free use of the Indian Ocean was not affected by the resolution. The vote was 61 in favor, with 55 abstentions. Among those voting for were Japan, China, India, and Pakistan. Those who abstained included France, Australia, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1971, pages 11, 33–35)

68. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Chief of the Plans and Regional Affairs Division, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Linebaugh)¹

Washington, February 14, 1972.

SUBJECT

Indian Ocean Naval Limitations

REF

Your Draft Memorandum of 2/7/72²

I believe it would be a mistake for us to go back to the Soviets now on the Indian Ocean. The Soviets are well aware of our initial expression of interest after Ambassador Beam's follow-up with Gromyko in July. The fact that Gromyko did not raise it with the Secretary during their conversations at UNGA last fall (although the Ceylonese Peace Zone proposal had been put forward), and that Dobrynin did not raise it during a meeting with the Secretary on February 4 despite widespread publicity of Ambassador Johnson's remarks the same week,³ suggests to me that the Soviets are not greatly interested in pursuing the subject at this time.⁴ In any event, they owe us a reply. For the US to press now could be interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of weakness in the aftermath of the Indo-Pak war which they might then seek to exploit.⁵

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 IND-US. Secret. Drafted by Robert W. Chase, Regional Political Adviser, and Stanley D. Schiff, Director of NEA/RA, on February 11.

² Attached but not printed. Linebaugh drafted a memorandum to Nixon urging a U.S.-Soviet compromise to exercise restraint in permanent naval deployments as the best means to limit Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean. In his cover letter to Davies, Linebaugh also suggested that Rogers raise the issue with Dobrynin, following the line used by Beam with Gromyko on July 28. For the Beam-Gromyko discussion, see footnote 7, Document 59.

³ The memorandum of conversation between Rogers and Gromyko, February 2, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL US-USSR. On February 1, Johnson testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on U.S. base rights in Bahrain, noting the "good will" implicit in this U.S. policy. (Department of State *Bulletin*, February 28, 1972, pp. 279-284)

⁴ According to an October 11 memorandum from Richard Nethercut (EA/RA) to John Kelley (PM/ISO), a "foreign diplomat was told by a Soviet Foreign Ministry official earlier this year that the Soviets had broached the Brezhnev proposal with Hanoi and were given a negative reaction. Hanoi reportedly stated that it was premature to effect a regional security arrangement in Asia before the Indochina question had been settled." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 IND-US)

⁵ A handwritten note in an unknown hand in the margin next to this sentence reads: "no longer true."

I understand there is a reasonably good prospect for a successful conclusion to the SALT talks before the President's trip to Moscow.⁶ Should that happen the stage would be set for consideration of the next practical step in arms limitation for discussion with the Soviets. Conceivably, one such step might be an agreement to explore mutual "restraint" in the Indian Ocean.

I suggest that we use the time remaining before the trip to consider what the President might say on the subject in Moscow should he judge that, following a SALT agreement, he might want to suggest to the Soviets the possibility of some exploratory talks on the Indian Ocean.

⁶ Nixon was in Moscow from May 22 to 30 for the Moscow Summit. SALT I was signed on May 26.

69. Study Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for the Indian Ocean¹

Washington, undated.

Non-Strategic Naval Limitations in the Indian Ocean

I. Summary and Conclusions

Separate statements concerning the summary and conclusions of this paper were prepared by the State, ACDA and CIA representatives and the OSD and JCS representatives.²

A. The following views are those of the State, ACDA and CIA representatives.

1. A US–Soviet agreement to avoid competition by limiting their permanent naval deployments in the Indian Ocean may prove to be in the US interest. While the US plans to upgrade MIDEASTFOR qualitatively, it does not now plan to increase the size of that force or to make other permanent deployments. The Soviet Union may continue to increase its deployments, as it has in the last few years. Hence, it may be in the US interest to bind the Soviets to a level comparable to our own.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–060, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting Indian Ocean 10/6/71. Secret. Under a February 15 covering memorandum, Farley and Selden submitted the paper to Kissinger in response to his request of October 28; see Document 64.

² Not attached.

2. The Indo-Pak war and the surge of the *Enterprise* task force, which were not considered in this study, could affect the timing of any US initiative with the Soviets for naval limitations in the Indian Ocean. It would be best to await further clarification of the situation on the subcontinent and in the area before undertaking such an initiative, although a naval limitation understanding with the Soviets might well form part of our efforts to normalize the situation in the area.

3. A US-Soviet agreement to limit their permanent naval presences need not affect either our right or our ability to “surge” temporarily into the Indian Ocean if we needed to and as we have done with the *Enterprise*. We could do it again—if this seemed advisable and effective—even if we had concluded an agreement with the Soviets similar to those considered in this study, since only permanent deployments would be limited. On the other hand, frequent surges, even though called “temporary”, would vitiate an agreement.

4. The Soviets do not have direct land access to South Asia and would have to cross international borders to send ground forces to intervene there. Such a move would entail serious international political risk with implications far beyond local effect in the Indian Ocean area. There is no evidence that the Soviets are prepared to take those risks.

5. Relative geographic propinquity may give the Soviets some advantage over us in influencing states of the Indian Ocean area—although great power “influence” is based on a whole array of factors in addition to geography. Nonetheless, if geography somewhat favors the Soviets, they should not also be allowed the additional advantage of a greater naval presence as well.

6. In accordance with the terms of reference in Dr. Kissinger’s memorandum of October 28, the study analyzed certain specific issues of non-strategic naval limitations and their comparative impact on the US and USSR. These issues and the conclusions of the analyses are as follows:

a. Bases and Support Facilities

A prohibition on bases would probably favor the Soviets. They have developed a *modus operandi* which allows them to support their forces without a base structure comparable to ours. Although we have not developed such a *modus operandi* in the case of MIDEASTFOR, it would be possible to maintain that force without a base, if we were willing to spend the extra resources involved in deploying another auxiliary ship to the area. However, for a number of reasons primarily political in nature, it is important that the base at Bahrain be retained. It is also important that Diego Garcia be retained, at least as a communication facility.

b. Surge Capabilities

“Surge” capabilities involve the insertion of forces from outside the area. They would not be affected by an agreement limiting permanent naval deployments within the area.

Surge capabilities depend on the location and nature of the forces surged. US forces would probably come from the Seventh Fleet, as recently demonstrated by the surge of the *Enterprise*. The Soviets would most likely send their forces from their Pacific Fleet based at Vladivostok as they also did recently or, if the Suez were reopened, from their Mediterranean squadron. In the latter case surging forces of the two sides would arrive at about the same time. In the former, US forces from the Seventh Fleet would arrive sooner. A Soviet surge force cannot match the amphibious and air capabilities of a US surge force; thus the Soviets would not have the same capability to project power ashore.

c. Possible Precedents

A US decision, in agreement with the Soviets, to exercise restraint in naval deployments to the Indian Ocean would not be a limitation on our rights with respect to the international waters of the world. Those rights are based on principles of international law and on the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and cannot be affected by a bilateral US-USSR agreement to limit their own naval deployments. The US and the Soviet Union would not be “legislating” for others. Limitations of the nature considered in this paper could be structured so as not to establish precedents adverse to our interest in freedom of the seas or the Law of the Sea. In fact, voluntarily accepted restraints would tend to strengthen rather than weaken the rule of law.

d. Distinguishing Naval Activities

Distinguishing between naval activities might be done in terms of time in the area, or in terms of specific types of activities (e.g., transits, visits, training exercises, maneuvers, port visits). An agreement which attempted to sanction some but prohibit other types of activities might be difficult to formulate and might establish an undesirable precedent.

A generalized understanding (Option 1) would probably not require definition of naval activities, in terms of time or otherwise. On the other hand, for reasons of both policy and precedent, an agreement which placed specific limitations on sailing days or number of ships (Options 2, 4 and 5)³ in terms of time in the area should only limit their “permanent presence.” This could be defined as naval deployments in

³ For these numbered options, see Document 59.

the Indian Ocean for X months or longer. Transits or visits of shorter duration would not be limited. The US would remain free to introduce forces for a temporary period.

e. Caveat Clauses

Various caveat or escape clauses which recognize the right of withdrawal under certain circumstances should be part of any specifically worded naval limitation agreement. A generalized understanding limiting US-Soviet naval competition in the Indian Ocean would require less caveating and might not require a specific "escape clause".

7. Options

Two types of options have been considered in this study, as they relate to the above issues:

a. A Specifically Worded Agreement

Such an agreement would place numerical limitations on the total number of certain types of ships and limitations on total ship days. Only permanent deployments would be limited; short term visits and transits would be allowed. The agreement would include an escape clause. Bases and SSBNs would not be limited. This type option would present obvious problems of negotiability since the Soviets would probably press for limitations on bases and submarines. Also, a formal and detailed agreement, in contrast to a general understanding, would seem to be disproportionate to the magnitude of the problem it would seek to solve.

b. A General Understanding

Potentially undesirable features of a specifically-worded non-strategic naval limitation could be avoided or minimized by casting an agreement in general terms. A general understanding would place inhibitions on sharp increases in the level of Soviet naval forces, while allowing us the flexibility to match low level increases.

Such an agreement might consist of declarations of restraint by the US and USSR, with the definition of "restraint" being part of the negotiating record.

B. The following views are those of the OSD and JCS representatives.

1. OSD and JCS representatives believe that recent events in the Indian Ocean area make it inadvisable to enter into a dialogue with the Soviet Union on naval arms limitations at this time. It is certain that the Indo-Pak war will have significant effects on political relationships and major power influence in the area. It is not at all clear, however, what these effects will be. Until the results of the recent war can be better assessed, it would not be prudent to undertake discussions with the Soviets leading toward closing of some of the US political and military

options in the area. To a lesser (but still important) degree, this argument also applies to the UNGA resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a “zone of peace.”

2. Further, aside from recent events, OSD and JCS representatives believe that neither a specifically worded agreement nor a general understanding (Option 1) with the USSR which places restrictions on naval activity in the Indian Ocean would be in the best interests of the United States for the following reasons:

a) The USSR occupies a central geographic location while the US does not. They are less dependent on overseas sources of supply and are less involved with overseas allies. Primarily for these reasons, the Soviets have developed a naval strategy designed to disrupt our sea lines of communication and to obstruct the projection of our sea power ashore. In the political arena, they have traditionally pressed for the concept of closed seas, which would transform the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas contiguous to the Soviet Union into “Soviet lakes” and facilitate achievement by the Soviet Union of military and political preponderance in these areas.

The naval strategy of the US on the other hand, is designed to maintain control of the vital sea lines of communication on which we and our allies depend and to project military force inland from the sea when necessary. Thus any agreement or understanding which would place “equal” restrictions on the US and Soviet naval forces would tend to support the Soviet strategy while, at the same time, it would counter the US strategy. Likewise, any agreement or understanding which would advance the principle of closed seas to the detriment of free seas would tend to work to our disadvantage and establish a damaging precedent.

b) Any agreement or understanding (Option 2) reducing or limiting US naval forces in the Indian Ocean would be viewed by the littoral nations as reflecting a lessening of US interest in the area at a critical time. The importance of MIDEASTFOR has increased now that the British have withdrawn their forces from the Persian Gulf area. The Trucial States in particular view MIDEASTFOR as a stabilizing influence between the Arab world and the expanding Iranian interest in the Persian Gulf area.

c) Any agreement or general understanding (Option 1) that would place restrictions on the use of naval forces in the Indian Ocean area could serve to complicate efforts to settle the situation in the Middle East. At the present time the options available to negotiators include the possible use of US naval forces. However, the flexibility afforded by this range of options could be reduced by placing restrictions on the number, size or time on station of naval units in the Indian Ocean area.

d) A naval arms limitation agreement or even a general understanding (Option 1) with the USSR in the immediate aftermath of the Ceylonese peace zone resolution would be viewed by many as major power accession to pressure by littoral states and as a tacit acceptance of the principle that coastal states have a right to regulate activities of other nations in high seas areas adjacent to their territorial waters. Such negotiations would thus weaken the US position on Law of the Sea, would lead to additional pressures at the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference to limit naval uses of the high seas even further and could cause us to fail in achieving our overriding ocean policy objective—to preserve the freedom of the sea in the largest possible area of the world's oceans.

e) The incorporation of a caveat or "escape" clause could not adequately serve our national interests in regards to limitations of naval forces in the Indian Ocean area. The invocation of an escape clause would have a political price which might be significant in any specific instance. Since the US in all likelihood would be more reluctant than the Soviets to implement the escape provisions of an agreement, the delay involved in considering the decision would operate to give the USSR a time advantage.

f) Naval units can be deployed around the world without crossing national boundaries. To enter into an agreement or understanding that in any way restricts the use of naval forces would be to give up an option of great flexibility and value to US national security interests.

g) A naval arms limitation in the Indian Ocean would not necessarily serve to hinder or dampen the efforts of either the US or USSR in seeking greater influence with the littoral states of the Indian Ocean area. The problem involves the various means of access to the sub-continent area. A naval limitation in the Indian Ocean would not reduce competition equally since the Soviets would still have a distinct advantage by being part of the Euro-Asian continent. In addition, we cannot overlook the military and political power of the Chinese and their influence in the sub-continent.

h) Finally, OSD and JCS representatives do not believe it would be feasible to have meaningful discussions with the Soviets since SSBNs will not be included in any such negotiations. It is not realistic to believe that the Soviets would seriously discuss limitations on their anti-submarine forces without demanding similar restrictions on our SSBNs. If talks are started, we expect that the Soviets would press hard to include SSBNs and would propagandize in an effort to bring maximum pressure on the US to accommodate the Soviet demands.

3. The OSD and JCS representatives' conclusions as regards limitations on Indian Ocean bases and support facilities, distinguishing

between various naval activities and US and USSR surge capabilities are as follows:

a) Any agreement or understanding that restricted bases and support facilities in the Indian Ocean area would favor the Soviets. The Soviets to date have not relied on establishment of a specific base in the area. Their present *modus operandi* allows them to operate by relying on their support ships in the area rather than local area facilities. Conversely, it would be very expensive for the US to maintain any presence in the Indian Ocean if denied access to base facilities. The expense would involve the reassignment of a considerable number of ships from other forces both for rotational purposes and logistics.

b) The question of distinguishing naval transits from exercises, “show of force” maneuvers and rotation of naval forces, and of distinguishing all of these from a permanent presence in the area would be both difficult and argumentative. Any definition distinguishing between mobile force and permanent presence would, of necessity, be restrictive. Acknowledging this type of restriction is not in our national interest. Basically, it is inconsistent with our view of freedom of the seas. Further, it could later lead to undesirable applications in other ocean areas of higher US interest.

c) A comparison of the impact of deployment limitations in terms of surge capability and reaction time on US and USSR non-strategic naval forces tends to favor the US at the present time. However, the likely opening of the Suez Canal coupled with the present Soviet/Egyptian relationship would give the Soviets a decided advantage in the more economically important western part of the Indian Ocean area. The US would be restricted in the use of an open canal primarily because of the size of our aircraft carriers. The possibility also exists that, with Egypt in control of passage through the canal, our ships could be delayed by passage procedures. The Soviets would not be similarly restricted.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the paper.]

70. Memorandum From Chester Crocker of the National Security Council Staff to Richard Kennedy and Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, March 28, 1972.

SUBJECT

The Indian Ocean and the Moscow Summit

Background

Hal Sonnenfeldt is currently staffing a March 21 memorandum (Tab A) from Gerard Smith to HAK proposing two Presidential initiatives in Moscow, one of which would be "a declaration, perhaps in the context of working to reduce tensions in South Asia, that the two Governments intend to exercise restraint in deploying naval forces to the Indian Ocean, so as to avoid military competition there." The Smith memo refers also to an ACDA paper on various arms control possibilities for the Moscow agenda. The Indian Ocean portion is at Tab B.² It reflects ACDA's conclusions from the most recent interagency study entitled "Non-Strategic Naval Limitations in the Indian Ocean," which was submitted February 15. This study (Tab C),³ responding to HAK's October 28 memo (Tab D),⁴ has not yet been staffed.

The Problem

The problem is what to do with the various parts of this puzzle. The reflex response of our Soviet area colleagues is that this whole subject is a "No-No" and that a Presidential initiative would be "out of the question." I do not endorse the Presidential initiative suggested by Smith. But there are at least three valid objections to simply shelving the Smith memo and ignoring the subject in our preparations for Moscow:

1. *The need to have a position should the Soviets bring up this or related subjects.* There is no certainty that they will do so. In fact, *we* initiated the last exchange on the subject last July⁵ and have made it clear pub-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-178, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 110. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. All tabs, with the exception of Tab D, are attached but not printed.

² Attached at Tab B is the suggested language for a U.S.-Soviet communiqué declaring that both nations seek to avoid naval competition and exercise restraint in deploying naval forces to the Indian Ocean. It also explained the administration's reassessment of Indian Ocean policy.

³ Printed as Document 69.

⁴ Document 64.

⁵ See footnote 7, Document 59.

licly on several occasions since (a) that the ball is in their court and (b) that we support the principle of avoiding military competition in the area. Moreover, the Soviets may prefer exploiting their position following the Indo-Pak war to pressing us for naval limits in the area. However, it is quite possible that the subject could surface in the context of discussions on bilateral rivalry in the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and South Asian regions. It would be surprising if our respective political-military objectives in these areas were *not* discussed, and the President should be prepared to deal with such discussion. *This is not to say he should advocate Indian Ocean naval limits, but it does suggest that he may want to:*

- (a) set the record straight on who initiated naval escalation in the area,
- (b) place our military presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in a broader context of U.S. support for military balance and super-power restraint, or
- (c) reaffirm our public and diplomatic support for the general principle that both countries have an interest in avoiding military competition in the area.

All this is merely another way of saying that our preparations for Moscow should accurately reflect the record to date:

—The Soviets have twice brought up the subject of restraint and/or naval limitations.⁶

—Ambassador Beam has told Gromyko we favor the principle of avoiding military competition in the area.⁷

—State Department publications have affirmed this principle, while U. Alexis Johnson has told the SFRC⁸ we favor restraint and are not about to get involved in naval competition there.

2. *There may be South Asian arguments for the U.S. side to raise this general subject, if it is considered a political rather than an "arms control" initiative.* Our studies have concluded that the primary issues, interests, and threats in the Indian Ocean are political, not military-strategic. Military presence in this area seems, more than is usually the case, to have principally a *political* impact and relevance. Consequently, there is little logic in dealing with a political problem, such as growing Soviet presence and influence, through arms control measures *whose one clear impact is to restrict military flexibility.* We clearly do not want restrictions on U.S. *naval* flexibility—the one aspect of overall U.S. military power which is demonstrably superior to the USSR's and, therefore, the one military element in which we possess a *potential* Indian Ocean advantage.

⁶ See Documents 55 and 59.

⁷ See footnote 7, Document 59.

⁸ See footnote 3, Document 68.

Not surprisingly, there are few advocates of Indian Ocean arms control, even of the "non-strategic" variety. The most recent study should convince any doubters on this score. Even ACDA argues only for a "general understanding" of a few lines which would serve as a joint U.S.-USSR statement of common interest in the principle of naval restraint.

In my view a U.S. initiative in this area begins to make more sense when the arms control aspects are eliminated.

If the subject of U.S.-USSR bilateral relations in areas of rivalry is likely to arise in any event—as suggested in subhead 1 above—it may be wise for our side to raise the general point that *as superpowers we have a responsibility to exercise political restraint to avoid exploiting local conflicts, and to refrain from steps which could heighten local tensions*. If discussion developed, we could say that the size and nature of superpower military activity in such areas as the Indian Ocean was an element of such restraint. Such an initiative:

- would be wholly consistent with our public posture to date on both the Indian Ocean (including MIDEASTFOR, Bahrein, and Diego Garcia) and the Subcontinent.

- would enable us to continue to take the public position that we oppose cold war competition for unilateral advantage in the area, and have urged Soviet acceptance of our view.

- could, if accepted by the Soviets, help reduce present tension and polarization on the Subcontinent and focus regional attention on any future Soviet behavior incompatible with its spirit.

- would leave us as free as we are today to take any military steps we wanted in future contingencies, since no specific arms control undertakings would be involved.

3. *We need to put our Indian Ocean review to bed and it is logical to do so now.* Our review of Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean has developed a life of its own. Folding it into the Summit preparations has certain obvious advantages:

- It would enable us to "consider" both Smith's recommendation for a naval arms control initiative and the most recent ACDA/DOD study on Indian Ocean arms control. A brief summary of the ACDA/DOD study, covered by our recommendations, could be prepared for HAK and the President as part of the staffing of Smith's memo.

- It would be an appropriate way of apprising HAK and the President of the Indian Ocean review and of ensuring that the regional (i.e., Persian Gulf and South Asia) political context of U.S.-Soviet relations is adequately reflected in our preparations for Moscow.

- It could serve as a mechanism for wrapping up the review, while indicating general White House interest in the level of Soviet and U.S. naval activity in the area. Specifically, we could respond to Smith or to the agencies via a memo reflecting Presidential consideration of Smith's memo and the ACDA/DOD study. Such a memo would stress our desire to retain flexibility, while avoiding actions which could open the U.S. to charges of military escalation in the area.

Comment

I urge that we factor the ACDA/DOD study and Smith's memo into the South Asia/Middle East input to the Summit preparations—with the recommendation that the President raise in Moscow the desirability of superpower political restraint in the Indian Ocean area.⁹

⁹ Neither discussions at the Moscow Summit nor the declaration issued May 29 included material on the Indian Ocean. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, for documentation on the Summit and the concluding declaration.

71. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Security Operations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Stoddart) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Stoessel)¹

Washington, September 14, 1972.

SUBJECT

US–UK Agreement on Diego Garcia

Working-level negotiations on the proposed agreement with the UK for the use by the Navy of Diego Garcia as a limited naval communications facility have been completed, and the agreement is now ready for formal approval by both governments. An airgram is attached which authorizes our Embassy in London to sign the agreement.²

As you know, this agreement has been the subject of lengthy negotiations with the British beginning in December 1970, conducted pursuant to the 1966 Agreement with the UK on defense uses of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). Several major points that were at issue with the British have been satisfactorily resolved. These include:

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 IND–US. Confidential. Drafted by John E. Kelley (PM/ISO) and cleared in L/PM, L/T, H, NEA/RA, AF/RA, and EA/RA. Sent through Burns (EUR/NE). The memorandum was a revised version of one prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense on August 17. (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–125, Box 3, Indian Ocean Islands 000.1 1972)

² Not attached. Notes were exchanged on October 24. (Airgram A–1567 from London, October 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15–IND US)

1. *Area of the facility.* The US had originally desired exclusive use of the entire island, while the British had sought to delimit narrowly the extent of the facility. The problem was resolved by delimiting the area in which permanent construction could take place without further UK approval. The British retain the right to build their own defense facility within that area, provided there is no interference with US operations. We have freedom of access to the entire island, and may also undertake construction in support of the facility in areas other than those reserved for permanent construction with the prior agreement of UK authorities.

2. *Civil aviation.* Another question arose over possible use of the island by civil aircraft, especially those chartered by BOAC and the Military Airlift Command. We were concerned that such use might cause third countries, including the USSR or its satellites, to assert rights to use the airfield under the Chicago Convention. As finally worked out, the agreement simply states that "state aircraft owned or operated by or on behalf of either Government" may use the airfield; this phraseology should serve to preclude such third-country claims.

3. *Protection and security.* The original British draft had called for inter-governmental consultation concerning threats to the security of the entire Chagos Archipelago. Our more limited language, now accepted by the British, calls only for consultation if there is any threat to the facility. We believe that this language will help us to avoid Congressional criticism when the agreement is published in the TIAS series.

In addition to the foregoing, the relocation of the former copra workers on Diego Garcia has worked out fairly well, with little adverse publicity, although resettlement is not yet completed and the possibility exists that unfavorable publicity may still result from this process. The UK is responsible for the resettlement, but the US cannot escape identification with the problem.

The Department of Defense has cleared the Agreement. Your approval is required in order to authorize the Embassy to conclude the Agreement.³

³ Stoessel initialed his approval on September 15.

Persian Gulf States

72. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

US-UK Talks—Persian Gulf

PARTICIPANTS (Morning Session)

UK

John Freeman—British Ambassador
Geoffrey Arthur—Asst. Under Secretary,
Foreign Office
Sir Leslie Glass—Ambassador, Deputy
Permanent Rep., UKUN
Edward Tomkins—Minister, UK Embassy
John Thomson—Counselor, Foreign
Office
Michael Wilford—Counselor, UK
Embassy
Alan Urwick—First Secretary, UK
Embassy
Stephen Egerton—First Secretary,
UK Embassy

US

Joseph J. Sisco—Asst. Secretary,
NEA
Richard Pedersen—Counselor
Ambassador William Buffum—
USUN
Rodger P. Davies—Deputy Asst.
Secretary, NEA
Harold Saunders—White House
Elizabeth Brown—IO/UNP
William Brewer—NEA/ARP
Theodore Eliot—NEA/IRN
Arthur Day—IO/UNP
John Gatch—NEA/ARP

Mr. Arthur said that there was such a short time left during the morning session to discuss the Persian Gulf that he was prepared to come back in the afternoon with whomever was interested and consider the rest of the agenda. Mr. Sisco said he was extremely sorry that he could not come back in the afternoon but asked Mr. Arthur to give him a succinct statement on the Persian Gulf, which Mr. Arthur could expand on in the afternoon session. Mr. Arthur said he would be glad to do this, noting that the UK had only three specific questions it wanted to have answers to. These concerned:

- 1) US plans for MIDEASTFOR;
- 2) US views on Saudi policy; and
- 3) US plans for diplomatic representation in the Gulf.

Mr. Arthur then said that the important thing to remember about the Persian Gulf is that it is the dividing line between the Persians and

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL UK–US. Secret; No-forn. Drafted by Gatch on March 17. Sisco provided Rogers a brief account of this conversation in a March 17 memorandum. (Ibid.)

the Arabs. The British have been there in some force for 100 years and have, in effect, frozen the situation at minimum cost. By the end of 1971 the British will have gone and there will be a serious danger of a confrontation between the Arabs and the Iranians. The main problem lies not on the mainlands of either side but is represented by the islands in the Gulf—Bahrain and the other smaller islands. Mr. Arthur said that if we can settle the problem of Bahrain, we can avoid a confrontation between the Arabs and the Iranians that could prove disastrous. Also, if we can settle the Bahrain question, the question of the other islands would be much easier to dispose of. The main British aim is to do what we can to avoid an Arab/Persian confrontation. The British believe the Soviets will not be able to penetrate the Gulf effectively if the Bahrain question is solved, because such a solution would foster Iranian cooperation with the Arab side and this cooperation would be an effective block to Soviet efforts. Otherwise, the Soviets would be able to play both sides of the Gulf and undoubtedly would be able to establish a position of some influence on the Arab side.

Mr. Sisco asked what the British can do to ensure that a settlement of Bahrain is reached prior to 1972. Mr. Arthur replied that the UK could not “produce” either side. He noted the Shah’s previous insistence on a plebiscite² and British and Bahraini views of the dangers of a plebiscite. Mr. Sisco asked how a plebiscite would come out. Mr. Arthur said that perhaps a bit of background was necessary here. He said that the Shah does not really want Bahrain—it has a stagnant economy with small and diminishing oil resources. But the Shah regards Bahrain as a “jewel in his crown,” and he doesn’t feel he can give it up unless a way is found to save Iranian face. His first thought had been a plebiscite in which Bahrainis were simply asked whether they wanted to be a part of Iran or not. The British had discussed this with the Bahrainis who rejected it, as indeed had the Kuwaitis³ and as indeed would all Arabs. This rejection is based on both formal and practical grounds. The formal grounds are that, for the Ruler of Bahrain to allow a plebiscite, would be to admit that the Iranian claim had some validity. The practical grounds are that the social fabric of Bahrain is very fragile, made up as it is of about half Sunni and half Shia Moslems, between whom feeling often runs high. To hold a plebiscite would undoubtedly cause serious intercommunal disturbances in Bahrain. Moreover, Bahrain has never had any representative body in its history. A

² Apparently a reference to a statement by the Shah at a January 4 press conference in New Delhi.

³ In airgram A-047 from Kuwait, March 18, Ambassador Cottam stated that the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah, believed a plebiscite was not a good alternative and that perhaps the UN was a better one. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL KUW-US)

serious security situation could arise if a plebiscite were held. Added to this is the fact that the al-Khalifa ruling family is not basically strong.

Mr. Arthur went on to say that the Shah had backed away from his insistence on a plebiscite, and efforts involving the UK, Kuwait, Bahrain and Iran but *not* Saudi Arabia have been going on to find some other solution. One thing that has been suggested is to involve the UN, through the SYG, and appoint a representative to ascertain the wishes of the people of Bahrain. The real crunch, according to Mr. Arthur, is that the manner in which this representative would ascertain such wishes would have to be acceptable both to the Shah and to Shaikh 'Isa, the Ruler of Bahrain. Mr. Arthur said that, before the Shah went on his skiing vacation, this approach (through the SYG) had appeared to be pretty much on the rails but, during the Shah's absence, both Afshar in Tehran and Vakil⁴ in the UN had taken some backward steps, at least in the UK view. They both had talked about taking the Bahrain issue directly to the Security Council, a procedure which the British opposed. Mr. Arthur noted the British were very gratified for the line taken by Secretary Rogers and Deputy Assistant Secretary Rockwell with Iranian Ambassador Ansary when the latter had raised this possibility here.⁵

Mr. Arthur said that the British had not seen the Shah since his return from Switzerland on March 6 and had hoped that the Bahrain issue could be discussed before the Oil Consortium issue. The British are afraid of interaction between these two problems. Mr. Arthur characterized the position at present as not too bad, with the "crunch" not yet reached. The UK realizes that it is going to have to exert pressure on Shaikh 'Isa, even to persuade him to accept a representative from the SYG to ascertain Bahraini wishes.

Mr. Sisco asked whether a conference of all groups on Bahrain could not be convened to express such wishes. Mr. Arthur said that such a conference would be accused by unfriendly elements as being an instrument either for the Bahrain ruling family or for the British and would not be regarded as representative.

⁴ Amir Aslan Afshar, Iranian Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (and future Iranian Ambassador to the United States), and Mehdi Vakil, Iranian Representative to the UN General Assembly.

⁵ Telegram 28291 to Tehran, February 22, relayed the information that Iran might take the Bahrain issue to the UN. Iranian Ambassador Ansary also asked for U.S. support in whatever steps Iran might take to solve the dispute. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF) The State Department informed Middle Eastern posts: "Now that Iran has involved us directly by reason Ansary's approach (State 28291), we informed UK we believed time had come put our principal officers in field more fully in picture." (Telegram 29573 to Jidda, February 25; *ibid.*)

Mr. Eliot asked Mr. Arthur to elaborate on the relationship between the Bahrain problem and the problem of the other islands—i.e. the Tunbs and Abu Musa. Mr. Arthur said these islands had historically been pirate islands used by the Qawassim. The Qawassim still are in control in Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah. As far as he knew, Iranians have had nothing on the islands, at least in recent times. Nonetheless, the UK presently regarded Iranian claims to these islands as having more validity than the Iranian claim to Bahrain, although of course they could not admit this to the Iranians. In fact, last summer the British, as we knew, had been trying to arrange a package deal under which the Iranians would give up their claim to Bahrain in return for the Tunbs Islands, as part of a median line settlement. Iran had finally said no. Iran had subsequently been negotiating with Ras al-Khaimah about the Tunbs. SAVAK had become involved, heavy-handedly, on the Iranian side. Originally the UK had hoped that Ras al-Khaimah would acquiesce to the stationing of Iranian troops on the islands in return for some monetary contribution, with the issue of sovereignty left in abeyance. These negotiations had broken down in December.

It had been the Shah's view that these smaller islands represented a separate issue from Bahrain, but recently there had been a retrogression in this Iranian position and now the Iranians have hinted that the settlement of the Tunbs and Abu Musa was a prerequisite to the solution of Bahrain. The British were nevertheless very much aware of the importance of their own relations with Iran and would go a long way to expedite a settlement of these smaller islands issues.

Mr. Sisco asked whether there was any possibility of having a third party come in to help settle the Bahrain question, noting this device had been used in Indonesia. Mr. Arthur said there had been some discussion about a "regional approach," an idea which originally had been the Shah's. The British now like this idea but the Iranians have turned against it. Mr. Sisco wondered whether there could not be a variant where there would be three representatives, perhaps from Turkey, Scandinavia and some Southeast Asian country who would go to Bahrain and try to ascertain the wishes of the people. Mr. Arthur said that he thought the Bahrainis would accept this kind of approach, but reminded the group that the main problem always remained—i.e. that whatever means were used to ascertain the wishes of the Bahrain people would have to be acceptable both to the Shah and the Ruler of Bahrain.

Mr. Sisco thanked Mr. Arthur for his clear presentation and reiterated his extreme regret that he could not attend the afternoon session. He said he hoped the meetings of the last two days represented the first of many such meetings and that he looked forward to the closest of cooperation with the UK on these matters in future.

PARTICIPANTS (Afternoon Session)

UK

Geoffrey Arthur—Asst. Under
Secretary, Foreign Office
Michael Wilford—Counselor,
UK Embassy

US

William Brewer—NEA/ARP
Theodore Eliot—NEA/IRN
William Hallman—NEA/IRN
John Gatch—NEA/ARP
Thomas Carolan—IO/UNP

Mr. Arthur said that he wanted to fill the group in on the latest developments in the effort to settle the Bahrain issue. He said Sir Denis Wright in Tehran had been instructed to see the Shah as soon as possible and to point out to him that, in his absence, the Iranian position appeared to have gone backwards. Wright was told to point out that the UK does not like the Security Council approach because it believes this would be an uncontrollable exercise. The British do not believe that Iran could get sufficient support in the UN to help its case. The UK wondered whether Iran was really serious in proposing this step. The Shah was to be told that the UK simply could not get Bahrain to agree to a direct approach to the Security Council. Sir Denis was also instructed to propose again either a pre-agreed approach to the SYG, or the regional approach. Sir Denis was instructed to say that a variant of the latter could be considered: once the regional committee had made its findings on Bahrain, these findings could be given some form of UN endorsement. Mr. Arthur said that Sir Denis has not yet seen the Shah.

Mr. Arthur said that the British might have to take another look at the question of the Tunbs and Abu Musa in light of recent developments, particularly since the Iranians had now taken the position the settlement of these smaller islands was a prerequisite to the settlement of Bahrain.

In this connection, the British felt it was extremely important that the Bahrain issue be settled because of the future of the FAA.⁶ He believed the Shah could break up the FAA very easily and reported that the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Sabah al-Ahmad, had expressed his astonishment to Mr. Arthur last fall at the extent of Iranian influence on the Trucial Coast. This ability of the Shah to influence developments in the area is one reason why the British wanted to take quick action to get the Bahrain question settled. The British feel that it might be feasible and desirable to postpone action on the Bahrain issue for a little

⁶ The potential members of the proposed Federation of Arab Emirates (FAA) were Bahrain, Qatar, and the seven Trucial States of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah. According to airgram A-008 from Dhahran, January 19, 1972, after 1968 the British referred to the United or Union of Arab Emirates or UAE, in contrast to the American usage of Federation of Arab Emirates or FAA. (Ibid., Central Files 1970-73, POL 16 UAE)

while except that the Oil Consortium negotiations were an added complication. The Shah might become so disturbed at the outcome of the Consortium negotiations that he would be unreasonable on Bahrain. On the other hand, if the British let consideration of Bahrain drag on too long, the Shah might accuse the British of shilly-shallying and put it directly to the Security Council. It would have to be a nice judgment on the part of Sir Denis Wright as to how he approached the Shah on these two matters.

Mr. Arthur said there was another possibility which had not yet been put to either side. Iran might renounce its claim to Bahrain but simultaneously conclude a close treaty of friendship with Bahrain under the terms of which Iran would be in a very favorable position in Bahrain. He did not contemplate that Iran would have military bases in Bahrain but would have almost any other concession that it wanted. Under this scheme the act of renouncement and the treaty of friendship could be presented to the Iranian Majlis at the same time.

Mr. Brewer asked how this would affect the rest of the FAA. Mr. Arthur said he did not think they would mind particularly and, in any case, the importance of a Bahrain settlement transcends the importance of the FAA at the moment. If the Bahrain issue could be solved at a cost of not having any FAA, it would be a risk worth taking. Finding a solution to the Bahrain problem was overriding.

Mr. Brewer asked Mr. Arthur for his assessment of what the Shah expects in the Gulf. Mr. Arthur said that the Shah wants to be "boss" of the Gulf and also wants the question of the lower median line settled on as favorable terms as was the median line between Iran and Saudi Arabia. He is also interested in increasing his influence around the Musandam Peninsula and down into Muscat and Oman.

Mr. Arthur then furnished details on the latest meetings in Geneva between the Bahrainis, Iranians and Kuwaitis (along lines previously provided by Mr. Urwick). He said the UK had a commitment to Bahrain and would never try to force the Ruler to accept a plebiscite. Aside from the moral aspects of the commitment, he pointed out that the British want to go to any length to avoid using the UK troops on Bahrain to quell the disturbances that would inevitably arise if a plebiscite were held.

He then discussed the other islands again. He said he had not mentioned the island of Sirri, which the British recognized *de facto* as belonging to Iran. Actually the British position was that Sirri, the Tunbs and Abu Musa all belong to the Qawassim, but the British felt that, if a satisfactory solution to the Bahrain issue could be found, the Arabs would not be too upset if the Tunbs or, for that matter, Abu Musa went to Iran. He had been assured along these lines by Badr al-Khalid of Kuwait. Realistically, the British expect that, when they go, the small

islands will go to Iran. He then quoted a legal appraisal prepared in the Foreign Office regarding the Tunbs and Abu Musa: "We consider any international adjudication of the question of the Tunbs would have a 60–40 chance being decided in favor of Ras al-Khaimah. Likewise, we believe that the same odds would prevail in regard to Sharjah and Abu Musa." Nonetheless he reflected a pragmatic view of the small islands issue, and said the UK might even withdraw protection over the Tunbs if Ras al-Khaimah were to prove unreasonable in failing to accept an Iranian offer with which HMG might concur. He implied as much with respect to Abu Musa.

Mr. Arthur said, of course, the UK does not want to go to law on these matters because this would have a very bad effect on UK-Iranian relations which the British value highly. He added that, since Iran wants to extend its influence around the Peninsula into Muscat and Oman, it would be bad for the Iranian position if the smaller islands were settled in favor of Iran without a Bahrain settlement. If this happened, the Arabs could say that the whole thing was an Anglo-Iranian plot to substitute Iranian influence for British influence on the Arabian side of the Gulf. This is why the UK wants to get Bahrain out of the way first and then get the other islands question settled. Curiously enough, there have been no negotiations between Sharjah and Iran over Abu Musa. The UK is not quite clear why, but Arthur noted that the Iranian Ambassador in London, Mr. Aram, had told him that the Abu Musa question was "easier." Mr. Brewer noted that Afshar had told Sir Denis Wright that the Iranians had recently developed some new evidence that strengthened their claim to Abu Musa.

Mr. Arthur then turned to Saudi Arabia. He said the UK was puzzled by Saudi policy. The Saudis support the FAA but have taken no positive action. They have given the impression regarding the Buraimi dispute⁷ that they have temporarily inactivated their claim, but on all other fronts they have been passive in their relations with the Gulf. The UK Ambassador in Saudi Arabia had tried to persuade King Faisal to send Prince Fahd or someone on a mission to the Gulf to encourage the Shaikhdoms in their efforts to form the FAA, but Faisal had not responded to this suggestion. Mr. Arthur did note that Saudi inaction

⁷ The Buraimi oasis had been an area of contention for various tribal groups in the eastern portion of the Arabian Peninsula for centuries. Most recently, Saudi Arabia claimed the oasis in 1952, sending troops through Abu Dhabi to capture it. The Saudis withdrew under international pressure, a blockade, and military action by regional expeditionary forces. Arbitration resulted in the establishment of a Saudi police post in the oasis, but by 1955 Abu Dhabi and Oman, with British military and political support, expelled the Saudi police. Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia continued to claim Buraimi.

was perhaps helpful in a negative way. At least they were not causing problems.⁸

Mr. Arthur read a telegram that had just been received from London concerning the Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Rumaih (Amb. Rumaih is the Saudi Government's "expert" on Gulf matters. He was previously Saudi Ambassador in Kuwait.) According to this telegram, Rumaih had been in Abu Dhabi and had spoken quite sharply to Zayid on the Buraimi issue. Shaikh 'Isa had urged Rumaih to talk to Faisal about further Saudi support for the FAA, and 'Isa had also recommended that the British talk to Faisal again along these lines. Mr. Arthur said the British were not too sure of what Rumaih had been up to in the Gulf.

Mr. Arthur said that perhaps the UK had been too optimistic about Faisal's position on Buraimi—i.e. that he was tacitly dropping the issue. He noted that Sir Stewart Crawford thought that there were several things involved in Faisal's current attitude towards Buraimi. He was preoccupied with events on his own southwestern border, and might over-rate the Saudi potential to prosecute its claim to Buraimi later. Sir Stewart pointed out that Saudi Arabia lacked troop strength to take positive action to support its claim, and furthermore no longer had the financial potential to outbid Zayid in bribing the tribes.

Mr. Arthur asked what the US views were on the reasons for Saudi inattention to Gulf matters. Mr. Brewer said that we were not at all certain of all of the reasons; but thought perhaps that the Saudi attitude could be explained by a combination of slothfulness, statesmanship and preoccupation with other matters. Mr. Brewer recalled that Faisal had appointed Prince Nawwaf to keep a watching brief on the Gulf, but Nawwaf had not been active and lacked prestige. We did believe that Faisal had taken a statesmanshiplike attitude on Buraimi and that this had, in effect, helped the FAA. Mr. Brewer also noted that Faisal was extremely preoccupied with the Arab-Israeli issue—particularly the Jerusalem aspects of it, and was also paying large amounts of money to the UAR and Jordan. All of the foregoing added up to the fact that the Saudis were in fact playing an inactive role. We had, however, done what we could to encourage Saudi interest. Mr. Arthur replied that too much encouragement might be bad, since the Buraimi claim might be reactivated at the wrong time.

⁸ In telegram 1120 from Jidda, April 3, Eilts wrote that Saqqaf described Saudi policy in the Gulf as "conscious self-restraint" to allow the Shah time to find a solution to the Bahrain problem and to cement Saudi-Iranian relations. Saqqaf also noted that Saudi Arabia was concerned about the activities of Sheikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi and possible NLF subversion. He also recognized that Saudi Arabia suffered from limitations such as Faisal's reluctance to delegate authority, a shortage of qualified personnel, and an unprogressive image. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 NEAR E-SAUD)

Mr. Arthur said the Saudis were critical of the role Kuwait had played and felt that the Kuwaitis had interfered too much in Gulf matters. Mr. Arthur said he had responded rather sharply to Faisal on this matter last fall, and had defended the Kuwaiti role which he said had been a very helpful one.

In summing up this particular aspect of the picture in the Gulf, Mr. Arthur felt that we still must encourage Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to cooperate before any real progress can be made.

The discussion then turned to the FAA. Mr. Brewer asked Mr. Arthur what his assessment was of the chances of success of the FAA, putting the Bahrain question aside for a moment. Mr. Arthur said that everything really depends on Iran's attitude. If Iran is against the FAA, it won't work. Although the converse is not necessarily true, he believes that, if Iran does not oppose the FAA, it has a reasonable chance of success. He said that Zayid is the main worry. The British believe that Zayid wants an FAA if this means that he won't be exposed on the Buraimi issue. The British believe Zayid thinks he can dominate the FAA and has been trying to moderate his ambitions. In sum, the British believe that things in relation to the FAA are much better than they possibly could have thought a year ago but they are still not overly confident that it will become a going organization. The two main stumbling blocks are Bahrain and Zayid. Zayid has to be persuaded to cooperate and not to dominate. The UK is in a difficult position because it is equally obligated to each member of the FAA. The British have a special responsibility to Abu Dhabi because of Buraimi.

Mr. Arthur then gave a state-by-state assessment of the Trucial States, Bahrain and Qatar.

Bahrain

There is a softness about the situation in Bahrain that is worrisome. There are many disparate elements in Bahrain including a growing number of semi-literate youths without jobs. The situation is potentially unstable and there are several subversive groups, including the NLF, present on the island, although there is a very good Special Branch on Bahrain which has countered these groups quite successfully. One point to remember is that potential subversives assume that the UK troops on Bahrain would be used to put down disturbances, although the British want to avoid this at all costs. The British believe that, left to itself, Bahrain has only a fair chance of surviving in its present form. The British feel, and the Kuwaitis agree, that the Khalifas are a poor ruling family and have not yet demonstrated their ability to stay on top of the situation. Naturally the most important thing to consider in relation to Bahrain's future is whether Iran's claim is settled.

Qatar

The regime in Qatar is safe enough, and the British do not anticipate too much trouble there. This state of affairs is not necessarily because the Qatar rulers are more capable than the Bahraini ones, but simply because there is less inherent difficulty in the Qatar situation. Mr. Arthur noted that the Egyptian advisor, Hasan Kamel, apparently was providing the ruling family in Qatar with good service.

Abu Dhabi

Shaikh Zayid enjoys widespread popularity because of his great wealth. Abu Dhabi will shortly be equal to Kuwait in terms of per capita wealth and potential for development. The British believe Zayid's position is stable and that Abu Dhabi will remain intact as long as he lives. The relationship between Zayid and Rashid of Dubai is important, and the British are encouraged by recent indications that the two are settling their difficulties.

Dubai

Rashid is in a strong position since he has built up a relatively prosperous country without oil income which is now in prospect. There are some subversives in Dubai but Rashid looks capable of controlling the situation. The most pressing need is for the modernization of Dubai's administration, and some steps in this direction are being taken.

Sharjah

Sharjah has real problems and the future is uncertain. The danger to the ruling family lies more from its relatives than from any subversive forces.

Ras al-Khaimah

The ruling family has recently had serious trouble with one of the tribes. The Ruler's unpopularity is not for anything he has done, but because he has been unable to placate the tribes with any kind of financial support. Abu Dhabi has not been helpful in this regard but here again there have recently been some helpful signs of reconciliation between Abu Dhabi and Ras al-Khaimah.

The British fear that Abu Dhabi will far outweigh the other FAA members, particularly in the military field, and this may make it difficult for it to succeed. Abu Dhabi has tried to attain a position of great superiority. The British have tried to moderate Zayid's ambitions but his army stands at 2,000 now and he has plans to increase it to 3,500 which will make it twice as big as the Trucial Oman Scouts. Abu Dhabi already has a navy of seven fast patrol boats, and has ordered twelve Hawker Hunter aircraft. The army is officered by Jordanian, Pakistani,

and UK seconded officers. The British Commander of the Abu Dhabi defense force, Colonel Wilson has recently retired and has gone to live in Buraimi. Mr. Arthur reported that the Abu Dhabians claim that they had received the approval of the other rulers for the acquisition of the Hawker Hunters.

Mr. Arthur then gave a rundown on other local military forces in the area. The Trucial Oman Scouts have a strength of 1,700. Bahrain has a national guard of two battalions, largely Jordanian-officered. Qatar has a police force of 1,850 under Maj. Cochran, a Moslem convert known as Mohammad Mahdi. Dubai planned a defense force of about 500 but is not pressing too hard to achieve this figure. Ras al-Khaimah has a police force of 220 to 300 now trained by the Trucial Oman Scouts. The Sultanate of Muscat has three infantry battalions of approximately 750 men each, mostly Baluchis. The Sultan has five Provost prop aircraft and has ordered six BAC-167s and four Beaver aircraft.

Mr. Gatch asked Mr. Arthur as to the extent of influence Nadhim Pachachi⁹ had over Zayid. Mr. Arthur said that Zayid took Pachachi's advice on oil matters but doubted that Pachachi's influence extended to the political field. Mr. Arthur said that Zayid does not really feel that he needs much advice in the political field, since he apparently is following successful policies of his own making.

Mr. Arthur then turned to the British military presence in the Gulf. He said there were now about 7,000 men and three naval frigates, one of which is always in Gulf waters. Mr. Arthur said that the military withdrawal schedule currently is as follows:

1) *In mid-1969*, the Gulf frigates will become a part of the Far Eastern Command, although they will stay in the Gulf area.

2) *On April 1, 1970*, thinning out of troops will start in Sharjah.

3) *On January 1, 1971*, thinning out of troops will start in Bahrain.

4) *On May 13, 1971*, the Kuwait commitment will cease.

5) *On June 30, 1971*, all contingency plans will lapse which call for the use of British forces in the Gulf outside the Gulf area. The forces will have no further mission except to protect the Arab states of the lower Gulf.

6) *On October 1, 1971*, UK forces will be reduced to the minimum necessary for their own protection.

7) *On January 1, 1972*, the withdrawal will be completed.

8) The Navy will be the last service to leave.

9) The troops on Bahrain will probably be the last to go—i.e. the troops on Sharjah will leave first.

10) Fixed assets of a military nature will be turned over to Bahrain and Sharjah after the British leave.

⁹ Iraqi adviser to Shaikh Zayid, representative to OPEC for Abu Dhabi, and Secretary General of OPEC, January 1971.

11) The Trucial Oman Scouts (TOS) will remain in being. By that time arrangements should be in hand to make them self-supporting, the future of the TOS is very much bound up by the evolution of the FAA.

Mr. Brewer asked whether the British Government would help the TOS after 1971. Mr. Arthur said it depends on what kind of help was meant. He recalled that HMG had strongly opposed a suggestion that the British military presence remain in the Gulf but be paid for by the local states. The British would not want to have a direct financial or command relationship with the Trucial Oman Scouts after 1971. Mr. Arthur then turned to the subject of the UK diplomatic position after 1971. Subject to the way the situation develops, the British contemplate putting an Embassy in the capital of the FAA and a consul in each of the other member states where they now have political agents. He noted that the British Consulate General in Muscat is to be raised to Embassy status.

Mr. Brewer then raised, on behalf of Mr. Sisco, a question regarding future US representation in the Gulf. He said the US would appreciate UK views on when US planning to open an office could start. Mr. Arthur mentioned the difficulties that were inherent in the confused situation in the Gulf and said that it would not be advisable for us to put an office in until we knew where the capital of the FAA was going to be. All things considered, he felt we might start planning within a year. He added, however, that the UK was ready to review this question with us at any time and to facilitate the opening of a US office whenever we felt this to be an urgent requirement. It is clearly important that the US be as widely represented as soon as possible in the Gulf, but the only question was putting an office in the wrong place. Mr. Brewer said that we were, of course, awaiting clarification as to how the FAA might turn out. Mr. Arthur said that the UK would like to see a US resident representative in Muscat right now. He also said that the Rulers in Bahrain and Kuwait have both asked him to find out what the US position would be in the Gulf when the UK goes. They are both anxious to find out. He asked Mr. Brewer how he foresaw the US position after 1971. Would it be simply a modest diplomatic presence and MIDEASTFOR? He said for numerous reasons the British would like to find out what US intentions are regarding MIDEASTFOR. The British still want to give the US first refusal on the facilities on Bahrain and the sooner they could get an answer from us the better.

Mr. Brewer said that, as the situation in the area evolves, we will be looking at several possibilities for US representation. As of now, we feel that the FAA has a higher priority for our interests than Muscat. Regarding MIDEASTFOR, Mr. Brewer said that our current position is the same as it was last fall—i.e. we have no present plans either to augment or decrease MIDEASTFOR, and have no present plans to remove it

from Bahrain after the British withdrawal. We are not yet, however, at a stage where we can determine what British facilities we might need. Time will be needed to consider this matter. Mr. Arthur thought that we could wait at least two or three months before the British have to say anything to the Bahrainis about the future of the facilities.

Mr. Arthur said the UK hopes to retain facilities at Masirah Island, including the airport and the BBC medium wave relay station. The British expect that the Sultan will want them to continue providing UK officers for his forces as part return for permission to keep these facilities. The British also hope to keep some minimum facilities at Muharraq airport on Bahrain, and to continue to enjoy landing and overflight rights. He suggested that, when the USG is ready to discuss MIDEASTFOR with the Bahrainis, we should then seek landing and overflight rights at the same time. In general, said Mr. Arthur, the British hoped the US would be in the Persian Gulf in as widely a representative way as possible, both militarily and diplomatically.

Mr. Arthur said he wanted to add one point which was embarrassing but he felt it necessary. The present COMIDEASTFOR had been quoted by Bahrainis as saying that the MIDEASTFOR presence on Bahrain was not only permanent but might increase. If this were in fact true the UK had no objection, but the UK was afraid COMIDEASTFOR might be creating a false impression among the Bahrainis.

Mr. Arthur then turned to a discussion of Muscat and Oman. He said that he knew the Sultan would welcome permanent US and Iranian representatives in Muscat. He said that the Iranians were currently trying to work something out but there had been a hitch because of Iranian reluctance to address the Sultan as Sultan of Muscat and Oman, rather than just of Muscat. Mr. Arthur noted that the Saudis have been taking a more reasonable position in their relations with the Sultan and had stopped supplying arms to the Omani and Dhofari dissidents. Mr. Brewer noted that one of our troubles in dealing with the Sultan was that he still remained in Sallalah.

In conclusion, Mr. Arthur said he wished to express a note of caution about the Persian Gulf. He said that the tentacles of the Palestinian problem reached far down into the Gulf and whatever happens in Palestine would have a profound effect on the Western position in the Gulf. The only exception to this would be Muscat and Oman under present management.

73. National Security Study Memorandum 66¹

Washington, July 12, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Treasury
Director, Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Policy Toward the Persian Gulf

The President has directed a study of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf which would include the following:

1. Discussion of the problems created by withdrawal from the Gulf of the British presence in its present form, including the possibility of an Arab-Iranian confrontation in the region.
2. Discussion of our choices in setting a general U.S. posture toward the various political entities in the Gulf area—our political relationships, diplomatic representation, arms aid policy.
3. Description of the specific decision to be made regarding continued U.S. naval activity in the region after the British withdrawal and a discussion of the merits of each of the significant courses of action open to us.

The President has directed that this study be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia and be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by September 30.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM's), NSSMs No. 43–103. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In an undated covering memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger wrote that the Persian Gulf “will become increasingly difficult to cope with over the next two years,” and the British departure would require both difficult readjustments of local relationships and a clearer definition of the U.S. role in the area. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-156, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 66)

74. Editorial Note

In October 1969, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, the Shah of Iran, visited the United States. He met privately with President Nixon on October 21 in an off-the-record conversation, and with Secretary of State Rogers on October 22. The Shah told Rogers that the Persian Gulf was unstable. He felt Gulf security should be guaranteed by an alliance between Iran and Saudi Arabia, but that Saudi Arabia was unreliable due to its limited military ability and weak internal situation. The Shah also stated that, despite Iran's legitimate claim to Bahrain, he would accept UN mediation to determine the will of the Bahraini people. (Memorandum of conversation, October 22; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1245, Saunders Files, Visit of Shah of Iran Oct 21–23, 1969)

In January 1970, Iran again broached the idea of a regional security arrangement including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Ambassador to Iran Douglas MacArthur approved of the idea, finding it "very much in our national interest" and in keeping with the Nixon Doctrine. (Telegram 36 from Tehran, January 5; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 NEAR E) Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Hermann Eilts agreed, but warned that Iran should not push the idea too fast. (Telegram 54 from Jidda, January 7; *ibid.*) CINCSRIKE also supported a regional security arrangement, stating that combined contingency planning "would provide the least costly and the most practical and credible approach to regional security." (Telegram STRJ5–ME 287 from CINCSRIKE, January 13; *ibid.*)

75. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, December 12, 1969.

[Omitted here are a cover page and a map. See Appendix A.]

SUBJECT

The Persian Gulf: Groping Toward a New Power Balance²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-044, Senior Review Group Meetings, Review Group NSSM 90 5/21/70. Secret.

² This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of National Estimates and was coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Economic Research, and the Clandestine Services. [Footnote is in the original.]

SUMMARY

British guardianship of the Persian Gulf kept the peace but froze the political makeup of the area for a century. The prospective withdrawal of British forces in 1971 promises to change this situation.

For the US, the principal concerns for the next several years are whether weakness and turmoil in the small Gulf states might lead to interference by the larger regional powers, intervention by a revolutionary Arab state, or threats to the American commercial involvement in oil production in the Gulf.

On the whole, we think the chances favor the situation in the Gulf rocking along without serious disruption for at least a year or two after the British pull out in 1971. Virtually all the riparian Gulf states—the Arab Amirates which are trying to federate as well as Iran and Saudi Arabia—have a stake in avoiding turmoil. Other Arab states ideologically inclined to make trouble for the conservative sheiks are likely to be distracted by domestic concerns and by their confrontation with Israel. Moreover, the proposed Federation of Arab Amirates need only carry out a few of the functions of a state in order to serve its essentially passive purpose of preventing trouble among its members.

Yet a number of troublesome contingencies can be identified. For example, cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia—important to the Federation—could easily degenerate into competitive interference in the lesser states. Again, revolutionaries may try to take advantage of the UK departure to overthrow sheikly rule—a development most likely to occur on Bahrain. In these contingencies, at least some of the contending parties would turn to the US for diplomatic support. American oil interests however, are not likely to be seriously damaged, though the commercial position of the major international oil companies in the Gulf—as elsewhere—will probably be eroded over time.

[Omitted here is an 18-page Discussion section.]

76. Memorandum From Peter Rodman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 31, 1969.

SUBJECT

IG Paper on U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf

A summary of the IG paper on the Gulf is attached.

The IG paper itself—actually a draft by State—is not worth reading.² Hal Saunders and Dick Kennedy agree that it is a disaster. It devotes one paragraph to analysis of Soviet policy, while it spends a full page on the need for advance planning in setting up a Foreign Service post in Dubai. It presents three options:

- (1) Do Nothing (which it concludes would be “an abdication of responsibility”),
- (2) Encourage the UK to Stay On (which would be “unworkable”), and
- (3) Manifestation of Greater U.S. Interest (i.e., “we can do a good deal in small ways . . .”).

The first two options are discussed and are dismissed in one paragraph each, and the rest of the paper is devoted to spelling out the operational details of the third (e.g., setting up a Foreign Service post in Dubai). The paper is also about a year out of date.

Saunders is lighting a fire under the IG to try to get a better paper. The Review Group is tentatively scheduled to meet February 16. With Saunders' assistance, I plan to work on an Issues Paper.³ I will try to get something to you by mid-January.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-156, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 66. Secret. Sent for information. Rodman wrote his summary of the Interdepartmental Group paper after consulting with Saunders. (Memorandum from Rodman to Saunders, October 23; *ibid.*)

² “Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf,” undated, was drafted by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia. (*Ibid.*) The revised version was eventually discussed at the June 5, 1970, Review Group meeting. See Documents 82 and 83.

³ A draft of the paper, “Outline of Persian Gulf Issues Paper,” January 21, 1970, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 16, HAK Administrative and Staff Files, Persian Gulf: Drafts.

Attachment

SUMMARY OF DRAFT OF IG PAPER ON U.S. POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Foreword (pp. 1–2)

Policy guidance will be needed on the following key issues: USG attitude to UK withdrawal; role of and home-porting arrangements for MIDEASTFOR after 1971; USG policy toward federation arrangements; USG attitude to FAA (Federation of Arab Amirates) and/or Bahrain application for UN membership; USG arms policy to Kuwait and small states;⁴ feasibility of future Foreign Service posts, especially on Trucial Coast.

There should also be consideration of: Iranian intentions; Saudi-Iranian relations; Median line issues; Arab suspicion of Iran; and increasing Soviet attention to Gulf.⁵

I Policy Considerations

A. U.S. Interests (pp. 2–3)

U.S. interest is in access and influence. Important military interests, including communications and intelligence facilities in Iran, over-flight privileges across Iran and Saudi Arabia. General U.S. interest in stability, to minimize radical or Soviet gains.

U.S. citizens live there (15,000). Balance of payments surplus (\$1.5 billion). Oil is crucial to West Europe, Japan, and U.S. forces in SE Asia.

B. UK Withdrawal (pp. 3–6)

UK military presence today not directly linked with oil situation (i.e., is not in the UK's main oil-source states.)

In any case, UK withdrawal is now fact of life in the area. Gulf states have already started adjusting to UK absence, and this process is irreversible.

C. Current U.S. Policy (p. 6)

We can't replace UK presence, and therefore urge greater cooperation among Gulf states themselves, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran. But we must avoid giving impression of "backing out," or else we weaken our friends, undermine stability, and encourage USSR.

⁴ A handwritten notation reads: "What's that?" These are Kissinger's comments, relayed from San Clemente by Anthony Lake and written into the margins by William Watts. (Memorandum from Watts to Rodman, January 7, 1970; *ibid.*, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-156, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 66)

⁵ A handwritten notation in the left margin reads: "Absolutely." Another handwritten notation at the end of the paragraph, reads: "Iraq."

D. *Increasing Soviet Attention to Gulf* (pp. 6–7)⁶

1. *Soviet Policy* (p. 6): Russian ambitions there since Czarist days. Ultimately they hope to supplant Western presence.

2. *Recent Soviet Actions* (p. 6): Naval visits.

E. *Conflicting Iranian-Arab Interests* (pp. 8–9)

Iran has disputes with Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

F. *Conflicts Among and Instability in Arab Gulf States* (pp. 9–10)

Manifold feuds and internal rumblings.

G. *Effects of Arab/Israel Issue in the Gulf* (pp. 10–11)

Many Palestinians living in the Gulf States. Shaykhs raise money for fedayeen. “Palestine question” is irritant in our relations with moderate Gulf Arabs; if that conflict remains unsettled, outlook is for “steady erosion” of U.S. position in the Gulf. Arab-Israeli tension also affects Arab-Iranian relations, since Iran has ties with Israel.

II *Overall Policy Options*A. *Do Nothing* (pp. 11–12)

Given “tremendous importance of the area to us,” increasing Soviet interest, and local instabilities, “a do-nothing course” would represent an abdication of responsibility from which our interests would surely suffer.⁷

B. *Encourage UK to Stay On* (p. 12)

Unacceptable in London and unworkable in the Gulf.

C. *Manifestation of Greater U.S. Interest* (p. 13)

“To have influence in the Gulf, we must be seen to be there and to be interested.”⁸ We can do a good deal in small ways to provide reassurances that we are not abandoning our stake in the region.”⁹

III *Specific Issues*A. *Areas for U.S. Action*

1. *MIDEASTFOR* (pp. 14–15): Talks with Bahrain, to keep our port there, must await resolution of Iran’s claim to Bahrain.

2. *Foreign Service Posts* (pp. 15–16): Start planning now, because it takes a long time to set up a post.

3. *U.S. Arms Policy* (p. 16): Shaykhdoms should rely on UK arms, but we might want to supply some to FAA.

⁶ A handwritten notation in the margin next to paragraphs D and E reads: “You must give me more detail or I won’t understand.”

⁷ A handwritten notation reads: “Agree—option’s silly.”

⁸ A handwritten notation reads: “This is the question. Must be many options.”

⁹ A handwritten notation pointing to the first part of this sentence reads: “Like what?”

4. *Cultural Affairs* (pp. 16–17): Cultural exchange with Shaykhdoms.
5. *Economic Aid* (p. 17): Technical, not capital, assistance is needed.
6. *Visits* (pp. 17–18): Arab rulers want to visit us. They want better protocol treatment than they've been getting.

B. *USG Policy toward Arab Federation* (p. 18)

"We believe the FAA represents the best hope for stability among the Arab Shaykhdoms."

C. *Arab/Iranian Relations* (p. 19)

Future stability of region will depend on Saudi-Iranian relations. We should encourage settlement of Median Line and Bahrain issues.¹⁰

D. *Response to Increasing Soviet Role* (p. 20)

Steps for USG listed above are in part designed to show Moscow we intend to sustain an active interest in the Gulf.¹¹

IV Specific Recommendations

A. Encourage a non-military UK presence. (p. 20)

B. Lower our MIDEASTFOR profile on Bahrain, and plan on basing it somewhere else in long run. (pp. 20–21)

C. Allow modest arms sales to Kuwait and Arab states in lower Gulf if UK can't meet the demand. (pp. 21–22)

D. Proceed with informal administration arrangements for Foreign Service post in Dubai. (p. 22)

E. Discreetly help along the formation of FAA. (p. 22)

F. Foster Arab/Iranian and especially Saudi/Iranian cooperation. (pp. 22–23)

¹⁰ A handwritten notation reads: "How?"

¹¹ A handwritten notation reads: "What are issues of Soviet-Iranian relations?"

77. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, February 4, 1970, 1230Z.

418. Subject: U.S. Persian Gulf Policy.

1. Latest draft of Persian Gulf policy paper² recently received here strikes us in general as comprehensive, reasonable analysis of problems to be expected in post-British era and of possible measures for meeting them. Following comments offered in light of problem as seen from Tehran:

(A) We find ourselves unable share paper's optimism (page 19) that potential Gulf instability unlikely be of magnitude threaten U.S. interests or oil operations. As we see it here a vacuum will inevitably be created when British pull out end of 1971. Basic question is not whether there will be vacuum but who will fill it and when (i.e., before or after end of 1971). If by end 1971 no arrangements (informal though they may be) have been made for at least a limited degree of cooperation between some of more important moderate riparian states, it is difficult to believe that radical Arabs, aided and encouraged by Soviets, will fail to exploit vacuum to detriment of our vital interests. Today Prosy seems already serving as base for radical Arab subversive activities and even for armed attack on moderate Arab regimes.

Indeed paper (page 12) recognizes radical groups may be able to seize one or more governments in 3 to 5 years. Japanese Ambassador tells me in strict confidence GOJ deeply concerned re future of Gulf because Gulf oil essential to Japan's very life. He pointed out smaller sheikhdoms that have struck oil are having to import Arab speaking teachers, technicians, etc., and they come largely from Egypt, Syria and Palestine and will facilitate radical efforts to take over. In absence of new and constructive developments Japanese Middle East experts who recently examined question only give Kuwait regime about three years before it succumbs to radicals and if there is Arab-Israel settlement, Japanese believe radicals will almost immediately step up actions against moderates.

Paper's recognition that Soviets are devoting greatly increased attention to Gulf and to Soviet presence there also seems support this conclusion as does generally held international estimate that Gulf oil

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret. It was repeated to Jidda, Kuwait, London, New Delhi, and CINCPAC/AFSA.

² See footnote 2, Document 76.

will be vitally important to Soviet and satellite requirements in next 10 to 15 years. Soviets already have foot in oil door and Iraq through exploitation of north Rumaila concession.

(B) We are not quite so sanguine (page 10) that Iraq's preoccupation with Arab-Israel, Kurds, and dispute with Iran will prevent it from undertaking, with Soviet encouragement, more active subversive role against weak, moderate Arab regimes in Gulf arena. Certainly if vacuum develops end of 1971 there will be almost irresistible temptation to subversive activity.

(C) As to intra-Gulf tensions, paper seems obsessed with difficulties and obstacles to any meaningful cooperation (even informal) between Iran and moderate Arab regimes. While there are of course major obstacles and paper's estimate seems valid for recent years—and indeed it may continue to be so—we do not believe that we should take a defeatist stand on this issue for vitally important period ahead. Until comparatively recently Iran's attitude was not constructive. However, with prospect of vacuum developing after British withdrawal, Iran's attitude has changed and it is now seeking allay fears and suspicions of Arab Gulf states by treating their leaders with respect (recent visits of Sheikhs of Sharja and Ras-al-Khaimah) and extending assistance to Saudi Arabia so that some arrangement for cooperation between Iran and moderate Gulf states can be developed. While at this juncture prospects are not very bright, when or if it becomes obvious to some moderate Arab regimes that unless something is done a vacuum may develop which could result in the disappearance their present attitude towards Arab-Iran cooperation.

Bahrein settlement involving Iranian abandonment of its traditional claim and acceptance of Bahrein membership in FAA if Bahrein so desires could increase possibility of at least informal cooperation which could result in partially filling vacuum of British departure. In any event we feel that it serves US interests to encourage Iran-Arab cooperation in Gulf where this can be done without being counterproductive, as it can be done in Iran. (See E below.)

2. Following are views re certain matters on which paper indicates early decisions needed:

(A) Future of MIDEASTFOR. We believe continuation MIDEASTFOR useful demonstration of US interest in peace and stability of region. Conversely, its withdrawal, unless riparian states so desired, might be interpreted as US indifference to future of region. Until there is Bahrein settlement, it awkward to discuss this matter with Shah. However, when Bahrein's future decided, we believe Shah's hands will be free to adopt more tolerant attitude, particularly if an independent (or FAA federation member) Bahrein is agreeable to continued home porting there of MIDEASTFOR. If necessary I could discuss this matter with Shah before

Bahrein settlement basing my presentation on assumption that independent Bahrein agrees to continuation home porting of MIDEASTFOR in Bahrein. However, it very delicate matter and pending Bahrein settlement Shah may feel unable to be very forthcoming on future arrangements re territory he considers traditionally Iranian.

(B) US policy toward UN membership for FAA for single states.

(No comment.)

(C) US arms policy toward Gulf Arabs. We concur US should be prepared to consider any actual requests for sales carefully on case by case basis in light our over-all Gulf policy. While Iranians might be sensitive if these small states sought massive arms shipments which they obviously could not use and which might become a windfall arms cache in unfriendly hands, a reasonable policy of arms shipments should not disturb them, particularly since GOI would probably prefer to have us rather than some other states supply them.

(D) Foreign Service posts in area. Both political factors and commercial considerations argue for establishment of additional Foreign Service presence in lower Gulf. In first place, with increasing oil revenues to small Gulf states our commercial interests alone, on which our balance of payments so heavily depend, would seem to require a presence that could assist American business and industry more effectively than now in getting a greater share of this lucrative and steadily expanding market, which British obviously hope to retain largely for themselves. While such a presence could be relatively low profile, it would enable us to explain our policies and, if coupled with some cultural and technical assistance, could lead to a slow expansion of our over-all influence. If we retain MIDEASTFOR in Gulf, it should not be only US presence there and if we withdraw it a commercial and political presence would still serve our own best interest.

(E) We also suggest a considered decision would be useful as to whether we discreetly encourage, where we can do so without being counter-productive, cooperation between moderate Arab riparian states and Iran looking to arrangements that could strengthen security and stability in Gulf. While in no way underestimating difficulties of such cooperation in security and other fields, we think that if it could take form (even though it initially might be very informal) it would hold best hope for filling vacuum caused by British withdrawal and thus contribute to maintenance of peace and stability in this vital area so essential to our own balance of payments and other interests and even more essential to our NATO and Japanese allies. This does not involve our “sponsorship” of such an arrangement but discreet “encouragement” where possible.

MacArthur

78. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson¹

Washington, February 4, 1970.

SUBJECT

Kuwait Request for Military Equipment—*ACTION MEMORANDUM*

Discussion

Ambassador Walsh has reported a Kuwaiti request to purchase two C-130 aircraft, fifty 106mm recoilless rifles and an unspecified amount of surplus military equipment from our European stockpiles. The Ambassador believes the Kuwaitis will consider our response as a basic test of our credibility as a friendly power. The Ambassador has requested authorization to inform the Kuwaitis that we are prepared to consider their request favorably (Kuwait 57 attached, Tab A).² In response to our request (State 11680 attached, Tab B) for additional information, Ambassador Walsh has replied that Kuwait would want C-130s primarily to transport fighter aircraft engines to the UK for overhaul, and supplies and replacements for the Kuwaiti battalion in the UAR (Kuwait 76 attached, Tab C).

Kuwait is not presently eligible to purchase arms from the U.S. Government under the Foreign Military Sales Act (FMSA) and it would require a Presidential Determination to establish Kuwait's eligibility. This would at present be difficult to justify, since Kuwait never accepted the 1967 cease-fire, does not accept the November, 1967, UN Security Council Resolution, and continues to maintain a token, if inactive, military force in the UAR. We therefore plan to inform the Kuwaitis that we continue to believe Kuwait should try to meet its arms requirements from traditional British sources but that we would be prepared to give this further consideration should instances arise in which Kuwait's legitimate defense needs could not be met from British sources.

This leaves the question of how responsive we may wish to be with respect to agreeing to license the commercial sale of two C-130s, since Lockheed is offering these for commercial sale with a lead time of approximately one year. A commercial sale of this aircraft would

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 KUW. Secret.

² All tabs are attached but not printed.

require the Department's approval of a license under our Munitions Control Procedure.

Lockheed also has a civilian version, the L100–20. This has the same wing span as the C–130, a larger fuselage and thus larger cargo volume, and it loads on international pallets. The main difference from the C–130 is that the L100–20's doors will not open in flight so the aircraft has no paradrop capability. The L100–20 is available for immediately delivery. An export license from the Department of Commerce would be required.

I believe we can tell the Kuwaitis either: (a) that we would be prepared to license either two C–130s or two of its civilian version, the L100–20, at their option, noting the immediate availability of the latter; or (b) that a civilian version, the L100–20, is available for immediate delivery, implying that we would not be prepared to license the military version. In order to be partially responsive to the specific Kuwait request, and to avoid Kuwait speculation as to why we were prepared to license an aircraft identical with, but differently numbered from, the C–130, NEA believes we should follow course (a). We will separately inform Ambassador Walsh that we are not prepared to seek FMSA eligibility for Kuwait at this time and provide him with talking points to use with the Kuwaitis on this subject.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to instruct Ambassador Walsh to inform the Kuwaitis that we would be prepared to license either two C–130s or two L100–20s, at their option, noting the immediate availability of the latter.³

³ Richardson initialed his approval on February 14, crossing out the phrases "either two C–130s" and "at their option," and adding the handwritten comment: "This seems to me better on balance than opening up 'military sales' route in light of fact that L–100–20s are immediately available." When Walsh relayed the information on Kuwaiti ineligibility to purchase arms under the FMSA, because of the government's refusal to accept either the ceasefire or UN Resolution 242, Under Secretary Rashid "sighed." (Telegram 54 from Kuwait, February 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 KUW) Subsequent negotiations on the L–100–20s temporarily stalled over Kuwaiti insistence on a 5½ percent rate of interest, and Ex-Im Bank fears that the planes could be used for offensive (military) purposes. (Telegram 639 from Kuwait, July 15; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 620, Country Files, Middle East, Kuwait, Vol. I) In telegram 115438 to Kuwait, July 17, Walsh was notified that Lockheed would accept the 5½ percent, and that additional wording would be sufficient to satisfy Ex-Im Bank concerns. (*Ibid.*)

79. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dhahran¹

Washington, February 20, 1970, 2019Z.

26087. Subj: Union of Eight in Lower Gulf. Ref: Dhahran 175.²

1. Without referring reftel, we asked British Emboff last week whether he had seen any reports of possible union of eight which would exclude Bahrain. Emboff had not but on February 19 he furnished following details.

2. As reported reftel, Rulers Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Qatar have tentatively agreed on federation of eight members. Zayid reportedly told British he could no longer delay because of risk of alienation Qatar and Dubai. However, he said door for later Bahraini accession would not be fully closed. Moreover, there was genuine concern that union of nine would open Trucial area to subversive ideas held by elements Bahraini populace.

3. London's reaction to foregoing has been to instruct British Gulf Representatives to take line with local Rulers that there would be no objection union of eight provided door kept open for Bahrain. British guidance has been to caution local Rulers to do nothing precipitate, however, and to make no premature announcement, in light continued problem Iranian claim to Bahrain. British also have taken position that union of nine should be dissolved by mutual consent with no overtones of Bahraini expulsion. Rashid and Zayid reportedly agreed but each understandably reluctant to break news to Bahrain. Emboff speculated that Zayid probably asking Ahmad Suweidi to do this but Suweidi dragging his feet. British Embassy Kuwait has been asked solicit Kuwaiti support in assuring that move from nine to eight on part Trucial States will be within foregoing parameters.

4. While British would prefer silence on this issue until Bahrain claim laid to rest, Emboff noted issue certain to be discussed at February 28 meeting Trucial States Council session in Dubai. It even pos-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 FAA. Secret; No-forn. Drafted by Brewer on February 19; cleared by Miklos (NEA/IRN) and Davies (NEA); and approved by Sisco. It was repeated to Jidda, Kuwait, London, and Tehran.

² In telegram 175 from Dhahran, February 13, Dinsmore wrote that Shaikh Rashid of Dubai, who had "dragged his feet" for 2 years over the establishment of a federation, was now pushing for a federation of eight without waiting for resolution of the Bahrain issue. Dinsmore believed that Rashid adopted this strategy because of "tacit" Iranian approval for a federation without Bahrain, and because Zayid thought he could better manage a federation of eight. (Ibid.)

sible that some announcement about federation of eight could emanate from that meeting.³

5. *Comment:* Bahrainis have at times themselves appeared disillusioned with FAA, and it therefore possible that divorce can be arranged with feelings of relief on both sides. Our own position should continue be one of benevolent neutrality, reflecting view that whatever arrangements peoples themselves can work out in lower Gulf are those most likely prove viable after British go.

Richardson

³ The British Government continued to press the Gulf sheikhdoms for a federation of nine and for more time to settle Iran's claim to Bahrain, believing that a shift from a nine to an eight member federation would promote tension. (Telegram 1602 from London, February 27; *ibid.*)

80. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, March 11, 1970, 1415Z.

901. Subject: Kuwait Ambassador's Views on Future of Gulf.

1. Kuwait Ambassador Al-Sabah (closely connected with Kuwait's ruling family) confidentially discussed future of Gulf with me March 11. He agrees in principle with Shah that future peace and stability could best be maintained in Gulf after British withdrawal by cooperation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, prospective Gulf Federation and Iran but ability of Gulf Arabs to cooperate with Iran depends on satisfactory solution to territorial problems: (a) Bahrein and (b) Abu Musa.

2. Bahrein. He believes and hopes that solution granting independence to Bahrein will be reached by June and that federation (FAA) including Bahrein can then be formed. If this can be achieved through Iranian renunciation of its traditional claim, it will be much easier for Gulf Arab states to cooperate and agree to mutually satisfactory solution of remaining territorial issues of Abu Musa and Tunb Islands.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 NEAR E. Confidential; Limdis. It was repeated to Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, and London.

3. Abu Musa and Tunb. Al-Sabah did not think Tunb Island represented too difficult a problem since he said many Gulf Arabs had traditionally considered it Persian. Abu Musa, however, was much more difficult. While he felt that after Iranian renunciation of claims to Bahrein an arrangement could be worked out regarding Abu Musa, he said he had privately told Shah and FonMin Zahedi that under no circumstances whatsoever should Iran use force to take Abu Musa, for forceful action would permanently alienate Gulf Arabs and make cooperation with Iran impossible. He said, "I have advised Iranians to buy it, not take it" and added use of force by Iran against Abu Musa would give radical Arab regimes club they needed to beat moderate Gulf regimes to prevent cooperation with Iran.

4. Speaking of threat to Gulf, Al-Sabah said Iraq represented greatest direct danger—"much more than Egypt as Nasser is realistic and reasonable man." He also expressed concern re increasing Soviet presence in Iraq as well as Soviet efforts to penetrate further other Arab states such as Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, "and also probably Libya very soon." He concluded that FAA is necessary since otherwise sheikhdoms will be picked off one after another and if Bahrein and Abu Musa can be solved, prospects for cooperation with Iran by Arab Gulf states should be reasonably good.

5. He also told me that recently GOK had been obliged to "close down" a school in Kuwait which had predominantly Iranian students (and in which I gather instruction was in Iranian) because Kuwaiti national who had obtained permission to operate school had violated Kuwait Ministry of Education regulations. Violation, I understood, consisted in some of teaching material showing Arab territory as Persian and in other acts of Iranian nationalism despite fact that institution was a Kuwait school. Iranian Ambassador in Kuwait (who he described as being much like Iranian Ambassador in Jidda in that he was zealous in portraying himself to Shah as defender of all things Iranian) had protested vigorously but to no avail. Al-Sabah had seen FonMin Zahedi to personally explain situation and he said Zahedi had been "most understanding" and had apologized for action of his Ambassador in Kuwait. He added that Zahedi's whole attitude in past six months had been much more cooperative and understanding about Kuwait and he felt problem of this particular school would be amicably resolved, adding however that Shah, whom he saw fairly frequently, was most understanding of all.

MacArthur

81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dhahran¹

Washington, May 16, 1970, 0123Z.

75074. Subj: Bahraini Call on Sisco.

Summary: Bahrain Foreign Affairs Director Shaykh Mohammed bin Mubarak and Legal Advisor Baharna called on Assistant Secretary Sisco and Deputy Assistant Secretary Atherton May 14. Discussion centered on Persian Gulf situation in wake successful SC action on Iranian claim² and in anticipation UK withdrawal. Mubarak requested increased US presence in Gulf. He said Bahrain believes FAA best hope for future but only if well organized with strong central authority. He added if FAA does not so develop, Bahrain will be forced go it alone.

1. Sisco congratulated Mubarak on outcome SC action and, looking forward to future in Gulf, asked what can US do to be helpful. Mubarak said Bahrain wanted more direct contact with US. Bahrainis appreciated their relations with ConGen Dhahran but believed in changed circumstances US should have permanent office in Bahrain, either consulate or trade office. He noted trade offices of Saudis, Pakistanis, Australians, and Iraqis already established and said Bahrain under some pressure from Soviets for closer relations. He anticipated Soviets would increase these overtures, not only toward Bahrain but also other Gulf states.

2. Sisco asked what Mubarak saw in Gulf's future. Mubarak said Bahrain regards FAA as best bet, but only if it is strong. Bahrain believes FAA should be founded on five principles: (1) constitution; (2) strong central authority; (3) fair representation in National Council; (4) common budget; and (5) common defense and foreign affairs. If these principles not followed, FAA will fail.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 BAHRAIN IS. Confidential. Drafted on May 14 by Gatch (NEA/ARP); cleared by Murphy (NEA/ARP) and Atherton; and approved by Sisco. It was repeated to Jidda, Kuwait, London, Tehran, USUN, CINCSRIKE–CINCMEDIAFSA, and COMIDEASTFOR.

² On May 11, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 278 (1970) endorsing the report of the Secretary General's Personal Representative (Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi) and its conclusion that the majority of the people of Bahrain wished independence and denying Iran's claim to the island. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1970, pp. 284–287) The Iranian Senate unanimously approved the UN Report on May 18. (Telegram 2153 from Tehran, May 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 BAHRAIN IS) The Defense Intelligence Agency prepared an Intelligence Summary, "Developments in the Persian Gulf," May 27, which noted that Bahraini independence would improve chances for regional stability. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–156, NSSM Files, NSSM 66)

3. Sisco asked about the prospects for the FAA. He said US realized there were variety of views among Rulers and differing stages of development among shaykhdoms. He emphasized his belief that there should be progressive outlook in area. This was 20th century and force of desire for modernization strong. He noted he had expressed himself to King Faisal recently in same terms. He asked Mubarak what hurdles there were in FAA's path.

4. Mubarak said situation would become clearer next month when FAA Rulers met. (He later told Deptoffs that precise time and venue not yet fixed.) Problem is that Rulers are looking at FAA in different ways. For example, Qatar's new "constitution" proclaims it as independent, sovereign state but at same time FAA member. Trucial states attempting line up either with Shah or Faisal for support. What was needed was push for FAA along lines above-described five principles. He said he had told UK's Luard³ that UK was not giving enough concrete advice on formation FAA. Rulers must agree now on form of FAA and time is growing short.

5. Mubarak said he neither optimistic nor pessimistic at this stage, but next two months should tell story. Bahrain prefers FAA but will have to act independently if FAA fails.

6. Sisco urged Mubarak to let us know if we can be helpful. We have thus far stayed in background, but situation is changing. We feel it very important matters be arranged before UK leaves. Regarding area in general, Sisco said he understood from his recent talk in Tehran that Shah wants to play helpful and significant role. Saudis also want stability in area. Mubarak reiterated that FAA offered best hope for stability. Even if FAA failed and Bahrain initially applied for UN membership independently, Bahrain would keep option open to join FAA later. Regarding area countries, he said FAA really can work only if Saudis, Iranians and Kuwaitis support it actively. Other FAA members apparently do not yet feel urgency move ahead that Bahrain does. Bahraini people actively pushing Bahraini Government on all fronts, and it not at all sure that Bahrainis will accept FAA unless it fulfills their expectations. In light recent Winspeare mission,⁴ Bahrainis may even demand right to vote on whether they wish to become part of FAA. Sisco said that if FAA can show progress, he felt there would be a predictable favorable response from the area's people.

³ Parliamentary Undersecretary Evan Luard.

⁴ Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi was appointed Personal Representative of the Secretary General to ascertain the wishes of the people of Bahrain. (Telegram 31680 to Dhahran, March 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 BAHRAIN IS) He was in Bahrain from March 30 to April 18. (Telegram 60678 to Jidda, April 23; *ibid.*)

7. Sisco reverted to matter American presence and asked about MIDEASTFOR. Mubarak said Bahrain welcomes MIDEASTFOR now and after UK departure. US should start making arrangements for post-UK period. He stressed that what Bahrain wanted was US “presence, not a base”—a token of Bahrain’s link with the West. Sisco said we are considering carefully what sort of US presence we should have. We want to help if our help is wanted but do not want to import cold war into area. We regard Persian Gulf as important area in transitional stage. We look to enlightened leadership from Shah, Faisal and other leaders, including Bahrainis. US can only play complementary role. Primary reliance will have to be on indigenous leadership. Sisco said we have made no decisions yet but in general we see mutual benefit in establishing modest US presence on Bahrain.

8. In later discussion with Atherton and Deptofofs, Mubarak and Baharna said Arab-Israeli issue, if not satisfactorily solved, would have deleterious effect on Persian Gulf.

Rogers

82. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, June 4, 1970.

PERSIAN GULF

Analytical Summary of IG Response to NSSM 66

1. *The Problem (p. 1)*

The Persian Gulf is a region of potential instability—vulnerable regimes, regional conflicts, and rivalries between outside powers—which is potentially exploitable by Arab radicals and by the Soviet Union. The question for U.S. policy is, how do we deal with it?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Secret. All brackets are in the original. The paper is an analytical summary of “Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf,” the response to NSSM 66 prepared by the Interdepartmental Group, which was transmitted to the Review Group under a June 2 covering memorandum from Davis. (Ibid., Box H-156, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 66) The paper was initially drafted at the end of 1969; see Document 76. A May 21 version was part of the NSSM 90 studies. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-044, Senior Review Group Meetings, Review Group NSSM 90 5/21/70) NSSMs 66 and 90 are Documents 73 and 19, respectively.

The problem is raised by the certainty of Britain's withdrawal of its defense commitments, protectorate responsibilities, and virtually all its military forces by the end of 1971. Eleven small Arab states in the lower Gulf—Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the seven Trucial States, and Muscat/Oman²—will no longer enjoy this formal British protection or tutelage. [Britain's *political* presence, however—in the form of active diplomacy, commercial involvement, military supply and training, and possibly even military contingency planning—will remain and will probably outweigh that of any other outside power in the lower Gulf. This, plus the desire of regional powers to manage regional affairs, could fill any potential “vacuum,” if the U.S. lends its encouragement and support and deters Soviet involvement.]

The paper presents two levels of policy decisions—six basic options (alternative strategies), and four specific operational questions. [Most of the options are impractical; the optimum strategy will be readily apparent. But some of the operational questions present important choices.]

2. *US Interests (pp. 2–4)*

Our overall interest in the stability of the Gulf area comprises the following particular interests:

—*Economic*: Oil production and sales by 20 US companies yield a net \$1.5 billion surplus for our balance of payments. The Gulf provides 55% of Western Europe's oil, 90% of Japan's, and 85% of the oil used by US forces in Southeast Asia. Britain's commercial relationships in the area (the Sterling Area relation and £200 million income from investments) are crucial to the stability of the pound and of the international monetary system.

—*Political*: The spread of radicalism in the Gulf would alter the balance within the Arab world and aggravate the Arab-Israeli conflict. Soviet political penetration would affect the East-West geopolitical balance (e.g., by increasing Soviet pressure on Iran and Turkey). Our friendly relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia are the mainstay of our influence in the area.

—*Military*: The US has communications and intelligence facilities in Iran, and overflight and landing privileges in Iran and Saudi Arabia which provide an air corridor to South and Southeast Asia. A small US naval force (MIDEASTFOR), home-ported on Bahrain, enjoys refueling and port call privileges in much of the region.

3. *UK Withdrawal Decision; Repercussions (pp. 4–8)*

The British decision (January 1968) was more a part of an overall rearrangement of priorities than an economy measure. (Only £12 mil-

² See map at the end. [Footnote is in the original. The map is attached but not printed.]

lion annually will be saved.) But a reversal of this decision is doubtful, even if the Conservatives take power; the January 1968 announcement of the change in British policy has already set in motion the process of historical change and political adjustment in the Gulf.

The British presence served to exclude unfriendly major powers from the Gulf and to dampen intra-regional antagonisms and internal instabilities—which all show signs of re-emerging with the change in the British role. Territorial disputes (exacerbated by oil) are rife, Arab-Iranian ethnic and religious animosities remain strong, and radical pressures are beginning to develop in some of the shaykhdoms.

The nine shaykhdoms of the lower Gulf have yet to determine the form of their future independence. Their efforts to create a Federation of Arab Emirates (FAA) among all nine may or may not succeed; parochial differences and personal suspicions may prove stronger than the conservative *skaykhs'* common interest in stability. The larger the unit, the better the chances of containing instability in the lower Gulf.

4. *Soviet Interests* (pp. 8–10)

Recent Russian naval visits in the Gulf (the first in 60 years) and memories of the 1940 Molotov–Ribbentrop protocol (which cited the area “in the general direction of the Gulf . . . as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union”) have aroused fears of Soviet penetration. The paper considers it “virtually certain that the USSR will seek to increase its presence in the Gulf after the British leave.”

[But it is less clear what this presence would consist of, and what Soviet objectives would be. Different points of view are possible:

—The complexities and potential instabilities in Gulf politics will present a tempting target. *But* greater involvement may magnify the contradictions in Soviet policy, i.e., supporting Arab radicalism while expanding ties with the Shah (an avowed conservative who has ties with Israel and disputes with Iraq).

—The importance of Western economic interests in the Gulf makes the potential Soviet threat ominous. *But* a cutoff of oil supplies to the West would not be in the interest of the producing states, whatever their ideology. The USSR is likely to develop a stake in the Gulf’s oil (especially for Eastern Europe), which will be large enough to give it a stake in the stability of the oil flow but not large enough to diminish the importance of the West as a customer.

—Soviet naval activity in the Gulf is disconcerting. *But* the USSR could not sustain a significant force in the Gulf region (especially while the Suez Canal is closed), and the establishment of a Soviet naval base in the Gulf is improbable.

—While a rational calculation of their national interest might thus lead the Soviets to avoid deliberate mischief-making, short-sightedness or opportunism might draw them into greater involvement. Even if

they end up facing the very difficulties that *we* can foresee for them, their involvement would be harmful to our interests.]

5. *Arab/Iranian and Inter-Arab Problems; Radical Pressures* (pp. 10–14)

Iran's claim to Bahrain, a potential obstacle to the Federation and an irritant in Arab-Iranian relations, has been relinquished, with the UN providing a face-saving device. But the irritant caused by Iran's claim to the Tunb and Abu Musa islands remains. Iraqi-Iranian tensions over the Shatt-al-Arab waterway continue, and may intensify now that Iraq has resolved its Kurdish problem. But Iraq is weak, and preoccupied with the Arab-Israeli issue.

The ideological pressures produced by the Arab-Israeli conflict threaten to spread to the region, which used to be relatively insulated from that conflict: Many thousands of Palestinians hold important governmental or social positions throughout the lower Gulf. Iran's ties with Israel may impede Iranian-Arab cooperation. The paper declares that, unless the Arab-Israeli problem can be resolved, "the outlook is for a gradual but steady erosion of our position in these Arab states."

The paper concludes that "if a federation can be formed with a significant counter-intelligence and police capability, these radical activities are not likely in the short run to be successful in subverting existing regimes. If federation fails, and local tensions increase, these groups may be able to seize one or more of the governments in, say, three to five years." Bahrain is especially vulnerable.

6. *Iran and Saudi Arabia; Regional Security* (pp. 15–18)

Iran is by far the strongest and most stable nation in the Gulf region. The Shah is determined that Iran should replace Britain as the dominant power in the Gulf, to the exclusion of any outside power. But he is willing to cooperate with, and to aid, Saudi Arabia (as he did recently when South Yemen raided Saudi territory).³ Saudi Arabia is weaker, and its future stability is less certain. Faisal has sought our support in restraining Iran's domineering.

Iran has suggested to us and the Saudis the possibility of a regional security arrangement, either formal or informal. But the paper suggests that the various animosities and suspicions will make this difficult, especially while the Arab-Israeli conflict continues.

³ As reported in telegram 118 from Dhahran, January 28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. I) According to telegram 1483 from Tehran, April 15, cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran continued in the form of Iranian loans of MAP-furnished weapons to Saudi Arabia and confidential talks on how Iran could help Saudi Arabia if attacked again. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 NEAR E)

7. *Future Oil Development; Economic and Commercial Trends* (pp. 18–20)

There is a “real possibility,” the paper states, that the flow of oil to the West “may increasingly be arranged directly, on a government-to-government basis, between the producing and consuming countries.” This would “drastically curtail” the operations of US firms and reduce the \$1.5 billion net balance-of-payments surplus which the US enjoys. The continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict poses a threat to US citizens and US firms there.

8. *The Outlook for the Future; Implications for US Interests* (pp. 20–23)

“It would be wrong to assume,” the paper concludes, “that when the British leave there will be a vacuum in the Gulf area.” Britain will continue to play a significant role, through its continued diplomatic presence and military supplies. The US economic presence will continue to be politically significant.

More important is the possibility that a new set of regional inter-relationships will fill the vacuum. But a stable regional system will depend largely on Iran’s willingness to avoid strong-arm methods, and on Saudi Arabia’s willingness to exert its influence more actively in the shaykhdoms.

At the moment, says the paper, the prospects for stability look good—at least if no “major new Arab/Israeli crisis” occurs. “The U.S. should give careful attention to discriminating among those regional issues and differences which bear directly on our interests, and those which are best left to resolution by the parties directly involved.” [This bit of wisdom is not elaborated on.]

9. *US Options in the Gulf* (pp. 24–39)

The paper first rules out three possible strategies: (a) convincing the UK to reverse its policy; (b) proposing to the USSR that we both adopt a hands-off policy in the Gulf; and (c) standing back from the area in any case.

The paper then recommends six options for consideration:

1. Taking on the UK role of “protector” ourselves;⁴
2. Backing a *chosen instrument*—either (a) Iran or (b) Saudi Arabia;
3. Fostering *Saudi-Iranian cooperation*;
4. Developing significant *bilateral contacts* and presence in the small states of the lower Gulf;⁵
5. Continuing to deal with the small states *indirectly* as at present; and
6. Sponsoring a *regional security pact* between Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the small states.

⁴ This sentence was circled and checked by Kissinger.

⁵ Kissinger circled the number 4, and put a check mark in the margin.

[Options 1, 2(b) and 6 are impracticable; options 4 and 5 represent more an operational sub-issue than a strategic choice. Present policy is a blend of 2(a) and 3, and it is difficult to see a feasible or desirable alternative.]

Option 1: Assume the UK Role Ourselves (pp. 26–29)

Operationally, we would: make formal or informal security commitments to Kuwait and the smaller Gulf states; establish a naval base in the Gulf; increase our diplomatic representation to replace the UK Political Agents; provide MAP to the FAA.

Pro: The conservative regimes would welcome us as a protecting power. This would cost little, and give us direct influence over the Gulf's future. *Con*: Iran and Saudi Arabia would strongly object. Radical Arabs and the USSR might be provoked into responding. The US would be drawn into the complex and volatile regional diplomacy. [In short, a straw man.]

Option 2: Back a Chosen Instrument (Iran or Saudi Arabia) (pp. 24–32)

Operationally, we would favor our "chosen instrument" with military assistance, with support in Consortium negotiations for oil revenues, and with support in territorial disputes in the Gulf.

Iran: Pro: Iran is the most powerful and most stable state in the area. It is eager to take on new responsibility. The Shah shares our outlook. *Con*: The Arabs are already suspicious of Iran's intentions and resentful of Iran's domineering. An aggressive Iranian policy could stir up Arab militants. US backing of Iran would alienate the Saudis. [In short, there are strong elements of this in what we are already doing, though we have not had to choose Iran to the exclusion of Saudi Arabia.]

Saudi: Pro: This would establish a Saudi-Iranian balance of power. The Saudis might be able to maintain order among the small shaykhdoms. *Con*: The Iranians would never acquiesce, and could turn to the Soviets. Saudi stability is less reliable than Iran's. The Saudis are not eager for a dominating role. US backing would stigmatize the Saudis as "US tools" and weaken the moderates in the Arab world. [In short, self-defeating.]

Option 3: Foster Saudi-Iranian Cooperation (pp. 32–34)

Operationally, we would: encourage ministerial-level contacts and intelligence cooperation between the two; urge Iran to moderate its relations with Israel; urge each to refrain from unilateral efforts to dominate.

Pro: There is no reason for us to want to choose sides, unless forced to by a crisis. Cooperation has begun discreetly; they are aware of their common interests (which coincide with ours.) Their common power may be sufficient to maintain regional stability. *Con*: This might taint

the Saudis in Arab eyes and weaken Faisal. It would require the US to restrain Iran, which could strain US-Iranian relations. It runs a risk that collaboration might break down, or that the Saudi regime is unstable or incompetent.

[*Comment:* Options 2(a) and 3 are not mutually exclusive: There is no reason to back Iran and not use our influence to encourage Saudi-Iranian cooperation. There is no feasible way to promote cooperation without recognizing Iran's physical preponderance.]

Option 4: Develop Significant Bilateral USG Contacts and Presence in Lower Gulf (pp. 34–36)

Operationally, we would: establish diplomatic posts in the lower Gulf states; encourage a more active US commercial presence; develop cultural, economic, and technical assistance programs.

Pro: This would give us a more direct influence over events, without the burden of being a "protector." It would be welcomed by the shaykhs, and might not be objected to by Iran or the Saudis. *Con:* The Soviets would oppose this, and might adopt a more active policy than if we left the shaykhs alone. The British are more expert than we in this area. [Not a real strategic alternative, but a tactical posture that would be consistent with the new political status of the small states of the lower Gulf.]

Option 5: Continue to Deal with Lower Gulf States Indirectly (pp. 36–37)

Operationally, this means not expanding our diplomatic presence beyond the present Consulate General in Dhahran.

Pro: Iran and Saudi Arabia are the key states; there is no need to involve ourselves directly in the shaykhs' squabbles. *Con:* The shaykhs have relied on the UK and may continue to need outside support. Some might even turn to the UAR. It would not offer any direct means of protecting US interests in the lower Gulf. [Not a real strategic alternative; consistent only with aloof US posture.]

Option 6: Sponsor Regional Security Pact (pp. 37–39)

Operationally, we would: encourage exploratory talks between Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia; increase military aid to Saudis and Iran and undertake military aid to Kuwait and FAA; involve ourselves in the formative efforts of the FAA and encourage its collaboration with Iran, Kuwait, and the Saudis; same for Bahrain if it becomes an independent state.

Pro: The combined military power and political unity would exclude outside-power interference. *Con:* It is politically difficult for the Arabs to collaborate openly with Iran because of Iran's ties with Israel. Our sponsorship of the pact would discredit it. [An unrealistic option unless so informal as to be identical to Option 3.]

10. *Limitations on US Action* (pp. 39–41)

"There are serious limitations on our ability to act effectively in the Gulf region," the paper notes. One of our important instrumentalities of influence—capital assistance—cannot be effectively used: Many of the small FAA states are capital-surplus countries because of their oil wealth, and would not qualify for US capital aid. But all the Gulf states, large and small, badly need technical assistance, which the US should be able to provide. This form of aid, plus USG and private cultural and educational assistance and exchanges, will probably be the extent of the "US presence" in the Arab world for the foreseeable future.⁶ But there is as yet no office in the USG able to react promptly to requests for such programs.

The political fall-out from the Arab-Israeli conflict is, of course, another factor limiting our influence in the region.

11. *Specific Operational Decisions Required* (pp. 41–48)

[The four operational questions will have to be answered independently of the choice of options. They involve instrumentalities—military, economic, and diplomatic—which would not necessarily be ruled out by any option, and which should be decided upon according to (1) their inherent feasibility and (2) the acceptability to us of the degree of involvement they imply.] The operational questions are:

- (a) the future of *MIDEASTFOR* (now home-ported at Bahrain by agreement with the British);
- (b) *UN membership for the FAA* or for any new states singly;
- (c) *US arms policy* toward Kuwait, the lower Gulf states, and Muscat/Oman; and
- (d) the establishment of *US diplomatic posts* in the new states.

[Only (a) and (d) are serious issues now; (d) really raises the important issue of the nature of our presence—diplomatic, economic, and cultural.]

A. *The future of MIDEASTFOR* (pp. 41–44)

The British have offered us first refusal of their Bahrain facilities⁷ A decision is needed now, so that arrangements can be worked out with the Bahrainis (and Iran) before the British go.

⁶ This paragraph reflects a March 9 briefing paper entitled "The U.S. in the Broader Middle East" prepared for the June 5 Review Group meeting; see Document 83. The briefing paper summarized that part of the President's February 18 foreign policy report to Congress concerning the Middle East. The President's "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s" is printed in *Public Papers: Nixon*, 1970, pp. 115–190.

⁷ See Document 72.

The *argument for* continuing the MIDEASTFOR presence is: The shaykhs would welcome it. It would counter the symbolic effect of the increased Soviet naval activity. A pull-out at the same time as UK withdrawal would seem to signify abandonment of Western interests. CINCSTRIKE does not see any other home-port (e.g., Diego Garcia) as a feasible alternative to Bahrain. The *argument against* staying in Bahrain is: It could increase the vulnerability of the already-unstable Bahrain regime. It might antagonize Iran. The force is too small to be militarily significant.

B. UN Membership for the FAA (pp. 44–45)

The FAA would meet our mini-state criteria for UN membership. Iran's claim to Bahrain has been a complicating factor. [But this has now been settled.]⁸

C. US Arms Policy Towards the Gulf Arabs (pp. 45–47)

Neither Kuwait, the nine shaykhdoms, nor Muscat/Oman is eligible under the Foreign Military Sales Act. They have relied before on UK sources but are interested in US arms. Unless we choose Option 5 (continuing to deal only indirectly with the lower Gulf), the paper recommends, we should consider arms sales on a case-by-case basis.

The *argument for* arms sales is: They would improve our position, but need not be substantial in amount. The states are rich, and would be able to get arms elsewhere. The area is remote from the Arab-Israeli conflict. The *argument against* is: Sales could involve us in local rivalries and could stimulate radical pressures. The UK might resent US efforts to replace it as the main supplier. [We do not face this decision now.]

D. Foreign Service Posts (pp. 47–48)

The British, who have up to now resisted the creation of US posts in the lower Gulf, would no longer object. Because of the uncertain status of the FAA, the best location for possible new US posts is not yet clear. But if it is decided to increase US activity there, financial and staff projections should be undertaken well in advance.

[State might also be asked to draw up a comprehensive plan for a US presence in the Gulf, which would include cultural exchange, trade promotion, and technical assistance, as well as diplomatic representation. This planning will be useful for the whole Middle East, but it is particularly appropriate for the Persian Gulf.]

⁸ See footnote 2, Document 81.

83. Minutes of a Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, June 5, 1970, 3:08–3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Persian Gulf

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State—Richard F. Pedersen
Donald McHenry
Christopher Van Hollen

Defense—Robert Pranger

JCS—Lt. Gen. F. T. Unger

CIA—Edward Proctor

OEP—Haakon Lindjord

USIA—Frank Shakespeare

NSC Staff—Harold Saunders
Peter Rodman
Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

1. The Under Secretaries Committee would be asked to develop within the next four weeks a blueprint for an optimum American presence in the Gulf in terms of diplomatic establishments, economic and cultural programs, etc.²

2. A memorandum to the President would be prepared, giving the consensus in favor of continuing Option 3 and moving to Option 4 at an appropriate time and containing the USC blueprint.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. A June 3 memorandum from Saunders and Kennedy briefed Kissinger for the meeting. The following day they provided talking points. (Both *ibid.*)

² The “Blueprint of an Optimum U.S. Presence in the Persian Gulf,” July 30, stated that the area was too wealthy for U.S. assistance but backward enough to need its technical capability. An active U.S. presence without central responsibility for area security required a diplomatic establishment, a small naval force, a substantial educational and technical relationship, and U.S. business presence. The paper also detailed logistical and operational options for future U.S. Embassies in the Persian Gulf. (*Ibid.*, NSC Files, Box 1248, Saunders Files, NSSM 66—NSDM 92—Persian Gulf)

³ See Document 89.

Mr. Kissinger opened the meeting referring to the number of options presented in the paper⁴ as equally plausible for consideration by the President. He questioned whether the likelihood of our assuming the UK role in the Persian Gulf (Option 1) was as great as some of the other options.

Mr. Van Hollen agreed it was not.

Mr. Kissinger asked for any general reactions to the paper.

Mr. Shakespeare commented on the statement that 90 percent of Japan's oil comes from the Persian Gulf. Given Japan's status as the third industrial power, he thought the security of their oil supply must be of major interest to the Japanese. He asked if we had discussed this with the Japanese in relation to a possible role for them in the Gulf.

Mr. Van Hollen said that we had asked our posts in Western Europe and Japan if the various countries might join a consortium and through it participate in technical assistance in the Gulf area.

Mr. Shakespeare asked if Japan were now involved in aid in Iran or Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Saunders replied they have commercial interests, with some small companies involved in oil exploration in a minor way.

Mr. Shakespeare asked if Japan has a ready alternate source of supply if their Persian Gulf pipeline should be threatened.

Mr. Van Hollen replied they could obtain oil from Southeast Asia, Indonesia and the U.S. West Coast, but he did not know how "ready" those alternates would be.

Mr. Pedersen agreed that any Japanese interest in the Persian Gulf would be helpful.

Mr. Saunders asked if, in fact, there would be a threat to Japanese oil. He thought a radical regime might well cut off oil flow to the West, but not necessarily to Japan.

Mr. Shakespeare commented that Japan should, however, be interested in what happens in the Gulf.

Mr. Van Hollen agreed, and said we had not talked to them in terms of greater Japanese involvement.

Mr. Saunders noted there might be a cultural problem between the Arabs and the Japanese and that they might wish to stick to a straight technical, commercial relationship.

⁴ For a summary of the basic paper the Review Group discussed, see Document 82. Sisco transmitted the final version of the basic paper, "Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf," to Kissinger on July 30. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-165, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 66)

Mr. Lindjord said in previous conversations with the Japanese they had seemed most aware of their Persian Gulf lifeline.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we recognized the importance of the Persian Gulf to Japan, then what?

Mr. Shakespeare replied that Japan was becoming a super power. Within the next five to ten years Japan's interests in the Gulf might be greater than ours. He thought Japan would have to be concerned with what happened in the Gulf and, for this reason, we might wish to try to involve their aid in the area.

Mr. Pedersen agreed this should be put on the agenda for talks with the Japanese.

Mr. Van Hollen added that they might provide technical assistance to the Federation of Arab Emirates if it should come into being.

Mr. Shakespeare thought there would be a psychological factor if the Soviets felt Japan was interested in and was a part of a program in the Persian Gulf.

Mr. Kissinger asked for other general comments.

Mr. Lindjord questioned whether the residual role of the British after 1971 was adequately stated. He wondered if considerable British influence would not remain.

Mr. Van Hollen agreed that some of the sheiks would undoubtedly work out side deals with the British and that many British officials would stay in the area.

General Unger referred to the British role in arms sales. He also said the British plan to retain a battle group and a staging area on Masirah Island. He agreed with Mr. Kissinger that British withdrawal was not for financial reasons.

Mr. Pedersen noted that the basic paper needed updating in several places—specifically, the fact that the Bahrain issue had now been settled.

Mr. Kissinger referred to the six options in the paper saying he assumed we could eliminate Option 1. He thought Option 4 was something we would have to do in any case and did not consider it exclusive in relation to the other options. He thought Option 5 will be unnecessary with the various states becoming independent.

Mr. Pedersen saw some difference between Options 4 and 5, with 4 being more active.

Mr. Kissinger said that neither 4 or 5 was incompatible with Options 2 or 3.

Mr. Pedersen agreed that they were not incompatible with any of the options and that we were now operating roughly along the lines of Option 3.

Mr. Kissinger asked if Options 2, 3 and 6 are viable options.

Mr. Van Hollen said State would choose to continue Option 3 and take on Option 4 at an appropriate time.

General Unger said the JCS agreed with that view.

Mr. Van Hollen added, with regard to Option 4, that much would depend on whether and how the Federation of Arab Emirates works out.

Mr. Shakespeare asked if State objected to Option 6.

Mr. Van Hollen replied they would not object if the regional pact were indigenous. He noted, however, that Gene Rostow had hinted at such an arrangement a few years ago and there had been a strong negative reaction in the area to such U.S. "interference."

Mr. Shakespeare asked if NATO was helpless in this area, commenting that so many NATO members have a stake there.

Mr. Van Hollen said a NATO role would not be possible, noting that the Scandinavian countries and Canada were strongly opposed to extending the NATO commitment.

Mr. Kissinger asked, assuming general agreement on strategy along the lines of Options 3 and 4, what kind of a presence could the U.S. have with our present program. He suggested we prepare a blueprint of what the optimum American presence would be in terms of establishment of embassies, economic and cultural programs, etc. He believed we could take this issue to the President in a memorandum and we would not need an NSC meeting on the subject.

Mr. Pedersen suggested the Under Secretaries Committee might be asked to prepare the blueprint.

Mr. Shakespeare noted the poor communications in the area, saying that the VOA signal was only marginal while the BBC was very strong. He said he would wish to have the construction of a transmitter included in such a program.

Mr. Kissinger suggested that we ask the Under Secretaries Committee to work out this optimum plan within the next four weeks, with a view to presenting a memorandum to the President in early July.

Mr. Pedersen agreed.

Mr. Saunders said that the memorandum to the President would summarize the consensus of the agencies.

Mr. Shakespeare agreed, but asked if the program would contain specific recommendations on the future of MIDEASTFOR.

Mr. Kissinger said this would be included in the program. He asked Mr. Saunders to draft a directive to the Under Secretaries Committee to prepare the blueprint.

Mr. Lindjord asked the status of proposed facilities at Diego Garcia to support MIDEASTFOR.

Mr. Van Hollen replied that the issue was still pending and that Senator Mansfield was opposed.⁵

Mr. Pranger commented that almost \$16 million had been included in the Navy budget for these facilities.

(General Unger circulated at the table some proposed minor changes in the paper. Mr. Proctor submitted after the meeting some additional proposed changes and indicated that he had several nitpicks above and beyond these changes.)⁶

⁵ See Document 39.

⁶ Changes proposed by the JCS are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Proposed CIA changes, June 5, are *ibid.*, Box H-046, Senior Review Group Meetings, Senior Review Group Persian Gulf 6/5/70.

84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, June 17, 1970, 2341Z.

95492. Subject: Persian Gulf—Talk with British.

1. Assistant Secretary Sisco raised subject of Abu Musa and Tunbs islands with British Embassy Minister Millard June 16. He said we are very concerned for sake of British and US interests that no canker sore be left after British withdrawal from Gulf in 1971 which could be exploited by radical Arabs. We were gratified London has decided to press sheikhs to seek rapid agreement with Iran over islands. We have asked Ambassador MacArthur to counsel restraint on Iranians on this issue and urge cooperation on arrangements. We have impression Shah willing to be quite flexible and ready to fuzz sovereignty question.²

2. Sisco stressed view that if this issue to be resolved it absolutely essential for British to put forward concrete proposals. US attaches great importance to UK taking such initiative.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Walter B. Smith II (NEA/IAI) and Miklos; cleared in EUR and NEA/ARP; and approved by Sisco. It was repeated to Tehran, Jidda, Kuwait, and Dhahran.

² Zahedi's explanation of the Shah's willingness to "fuzz" the sovereignty issue is in telegram 2318 from Tehran, June 1. (*Ibid.*)

3. Millard said UK also considers this most serious matter and wants to use three-month breathing period we now have to work toward agreement between sheikhs over conflicting concessionary problem and also agreement between Iran and sheikhs over status of islands. He said UK, including British Ambassador Tehran, does not believe it wise to go to Shah with proposal until it has something specific and agreed to with sheikhs.³ He noted UK's dilemma is that it must not appear to be selling out Arabs to Iran on eve of British departure. Sisco thought Shah's willingness to fuzz sovereignty issue important. He thought it conceivable rulers could take position with other Arabs that rulers themselves reached agreement with Iran over details of use of islands and exploitation of resources on them or in surrounding territorial waters while maintaining islands continue to be theirs. Under such circumstances did not believe Iraqis or other radicals could make much of an issue of the arrangement.

4. *For Ambassador Annenberg from Sisco*: Request you weigh in with Foreign Office at high level emphasizing seriousness with which we regard this matter and our earnest belief that it essential for UK to put forward concrete proposals to sheikhs to get settlement moving. You may say that we will of course exercise our influence with Iranians in trying to bring about a satisfactory agreement with sheikhs.⁴

Rogers

³ In telegram 2571 from Tehran, June 16, MacArthur reported that, according to British Ambassador Wright, the UK was probing the Sheikhs of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah on the principles that could be embodied in agreements between the sheikhdoms and Iran. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. II)

⁴ Annenberg had such a meeting on June 10, prior to receipt of instructions. (Telegram 4778 from London; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF)

85. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, June 26, 1970, 1836Z.

5038. Subject: New British Government's Policy re Persian Gulf. Ref: London 4791.²

1. Unexpected Conservative election victory³ brings into play Tory Party's east of Suez policy including commitment to re-examine UK plans for withdrawal of military forces from Persian Gulf. FonOff Arabian Dept sources are up to their ears in doing briefing papers and oral briefings of new FonOff leadership (one officer admitted that he and his colleagues had not really anticipated that briefings for a new government would be necessary). However, we have had opportunity for brief low-key talks with Arabian Dept officers and have gleaned following re probable unfolding of Tory government policy re Persian Gulf:

2. First, our impression is that Arabian Dept staff is somewhat more at ease with new leadership, and relieved that withdrawal policy is to be re-examined.

3. Arabian Dept is satisfied that new govt's initial step re Gulf will be restricted to careful consultations with littoral states, including most particularly Iran, and with top British officials in area. This may or may not involve visit to area by new minister.

4. First public statement of new govt's plans re Gulf will be brief mention of proposed area consultations during Queen's speech July 2.

5. In personal view of Arabian Dept officers, HMG's Gulf consultations will result at most in "some" delay in withdrawal process.⁴

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 1 NEAR E. Secret. It was repeated to Jidda, Dhahran, Kuwait, and Tehran.

² In telegram 4791 from London, June 19, the Embassy reported that it expected the new Conservative government to play a more active and positive role in foreign affairs, including retention of a British military presence east of Suez and a careful probing of the situation in the Persian Gulf. (Ibid., POL 12-1 UK)

³ In the June 18 elections, the Conservative Party under Edward Heath defeated Harold Wilson's Labour Party. During his 1969 tour of the Persian Gulf as opposition leader, Heath had stated that the Conservative Party wanted to reverse Labour's decision to withdraw British forces from east of Suez. (Telegram 3057 from London, April 22; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 726, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. I)

⁴ According to telegram 2787 from Tehran, June 29, Wright informed MacArthur that a "searching review" of UK Gulf policy was under way in London, but he doubted it would result in any significant change in policy given the Iranian position and opposition from the sheikhdoms. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 1 NEAR E) Telegram 780 from Dhahran, July 18, passed on the information that nearly 100 percent of all British regional posts said the UK should pull out. Regardless of whether the initial decision had been wise, it was now too late to change. (Ibid.)

6. FCO officers say that Trucial States now fully expect HMG to stay on. Indication of this is that sheikhs are now noticeably relaxing re FAA schedule. Arabian Dept expects to have difficulty in persuading them to feel any sense of urgency.

7. FCO officers have been following Iranian press campaign re Gulf.⁵ They understand clearly that campaign springs from GOI's uncertainties re future HMG policies re Gulf but appear to feel that Iranians will become somewhat calmer as soon as consultation process gets under way.

Annenberg

⁵ Iran's press campaign reiterated the Shah's stated opposition to any reversal of the British policy of withdrawal. (Telegram 2660 from Tehran, June 22; telegram 2690 from Tehran, June 23; telegram 2714 from Tehran, June 24; and telegram 2794 from Tehran, June 29; all *ibid.*)

86. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

London, July 12, 1970, 1335Z.

Secto 110/5496. Subj: Sec Visit: Discussion with Foreign Secretary—Persian Gulf.²

1. Sir Alec said that the situation in the Gulf presented a complicated problem. The basic UK purpose was to contribute to stability in the area. The previous government had tried to employ shock tactics in the hope that the Gulf rulers would be obliged to work out their

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S. Secret; Exdis. Rogers was in London July 10–12 to meet with Heath and Douglas-Home.

² Telegram 11787 to Tehran, July 22, summarized the meeting between Rogers and Douglas-Home. (*Ibid.*) Freeman met with U. Alexis Johnson to provide detailed information on current British thinking about the Gulf prior to Rogers's visit. (Memorandum of conversation, July 2; *ibid.*, POL UK–US) Between this meeting and Rogers's meeting with Douglas-Home, the Foreign Office completed its review of Persian Gulf issues, emphasizing its expectations of trouble with both Saudi Arabia and Iran, and its need for U.S. support for British efforts with both countries. (Telegram 5379 from London, July 8; *ibid.*, DEF 1 NEAR E) Both MacArthur and Eilts agreed with this British assessment, but believed it was necessary for the British to make every effort to work with Iran and Saudi Arabia. (Telegram 2659 from Jidda, July 9, and telegram 2972 from Tehran, July 10; *ibid.*)

differences and move toward some effective arrangement. Sir Alec thought the Labor Government's main mistake had been that they set too short a time frame.

2. Sir Alec said the general aims were to get local disputes settled, to assist in the formation of a federation or confederation and to provide for the establishment of a security force of some kind.

3. Sir Alec had seen the Shah on the previous day.³ The Shah was adamant that Iran should have control over the three disputed islands in the Gulf (the Tunbs and Abu Musa). If diplomatic efforts did not result in giving satisfaction to Iran, the Shah would take the islands by force. Such a situation would mean that Britain would be bound to resist the Iranians; consequently, the UK intended to make maximum diplomatic efforts to influence the Gulf rulers concerned and Saudi Arabia to agree to some arrangement to satisfy the Iranian demand on the islands. If the island question could be settled, the Shah would then cooperate with British efforts to promote stability in the area. The Shah would support some form of union of the Emirates and British plans for providing a security force for the union. Sir Alec thought British officers could be seconded to such a force and that British training missions might also be provided. It was hoped that the Trucial Oman Scouts could be installed as the security force for an FAA. The Shah also suggested that a continued British naval presence in the Gulf be effected through expanded British participation in CENTO. This could provide for more frequent visits by British naval units and participation in collective training exercises.

4. Sir Alec said that one of the principal obstacles to achieving this rather complicated design was the hopeless incompetence of the Arabs. This was particularly true with the Saudis.⁴ Faisal was getting old and was inclined to do things without telling his subordinates; furthermore, he did not have people around him capable of giving good advice. The UK intended to make an intensive diplomatic effort with the Arabs. There would soon be a new British political adviser in the Gulf and Sir Alec also intended to send a personal representative to the area.⁵

³ A summary of this meeting was transmitted in telegram 5406 from London, July 9. (*Ibid.*, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF)

⁴ Telegram 5591 from London, July 14, relayed the information that Faisal had refused to meet with Douglas-Home despite repeated requests. (*Ibid.*, DEF 1 NEAR E)

⁵ Geoffrey Arthur, Assistant Undersecretary in the Foreign Office, became the Political Resident in the Gulf, and Douglas-Home appointed Sir William Luce on July 30 as his personal envoy to the Persian Gulf. The primary objectives of the Luce mission were the creation of a federation of nine states that could guarantee post 1971 stability against subversion and the settling of outstanding disputes. (Airgram A-1233 from London, July 30; *ibid.*, POL 17 UK-FAA, and telegram 6281 from London, August 10; *ibid.*, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF)

5. The Secretary inquired what the publicly announced British policy would be in the circumstances described. Sir Alec responded that the British presence would be indirect and that the main visible presence would be naval. Sir Alec went on to indicate his conviction that the Gulf rulers concerned, as well as the other Arab nations, would not publicly state that they wanted the British presence to remain, although some of the Gulf rulers would say so privately. Sir Alec thought it unlikely that the British presence could remain much longer than about six months later than the withdrawal date originally set by the previous government.

The question was raised whether a treaty arrangement under which a union of Emirates would express their desire to receive a British force might be feasible. Sir Alec thought it might be worth trying but that it would be difficult to insert a British presence anew. He thought he could begin to see the outlines of an arrangement which would involve mainly the Trucial Oman Scouts serving as an organ of the Emirates and a British naval presence under the umbrella of CENTO.

7. The Secretary said the U.S. would like to see as much British presence in the area as possible. He thought that if a naval presence were to be maintained under CENTO, it should be done in a regular way and not intermittently. In response to Sir Alec's request, the Secretary indicated that the U.S. would be prepared to help with the Shah.

8. Department repeat other posts as desired.

Rogers

87. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs and South Asian (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, July 29, 1970.

SUBJECT

New Sultan in Muscat and Oman—*Information Memorandum*

Qabus bin Taymour, longstanding heir apparent, seized control of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman on July 24 by leading a palace revolution against his father. The United Kingdom apparently knew of Qabus' plans in advance but disclaims any responsibility.² We learned of the coup through wire service reports on July 26.³ The deposed Sultan has been flown by the RAF to exile in London. British reports indicate that Qabus has taken over firmly, his action has been welcomed by the populace, and that the situation in the Sultanate is quiet. The USG will probably soon receive a request for recognition of the new regime and we will most likely recommend that this be accorded promptly.⁴

Political Situation

Through a policy of political and economic repression, the deposed Sultan, Sa'id bin Taymour, kept his country totally undeveloped and isolated from the outside world. His policies could not cope with the increasingly active rebellion in Dhofar Province which was supported from South Yemen with some Chinese Communist involvement. The old Sultan had also failed to end the rebellion in Oman Province.⁵ He

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 OMAN. Confidential. Drafted by Wrampelmeier and cleared by Atherton, Murphy, Greenwald (L/NEA), and Aldrich (L). Sisco added a handwritten note under the subject line: "A hopeful development." The memorandum was forwarded to Kissinger under a July 30 covering memorandum from Eliot. (Ibid., POL 23-9 MUSCAT & OMAN)

² According to telegram 117656 to London, July 22, a variety of sources available to the Embassy had indicated that "something must be done" to get rid of Sultan Said. (Ibid.)

³ Telegram 5924 from London, July 27, and telegram 824 from Dhahran, July 28, contained full accounts of the coup's events. (Ibid., POL 23-9 MUSCAT-OMAN)

⁴ In an undated memorandum to Nixon, based largely on this memorandum, Kissinger recommended that the United States recognize Qabus's government. Kissinger then initialed approval for Nixon. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, White House Confidential Files, Box 8, [CF] CO 105 Muscat & Oman)

⁵ Telegram 666 from Kuwait, July 21, transmitted an analysis of the various opposition groups in Oman. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 620, Country Files, Middle East, Kuwait, Vol. I)

had made virtually no effort to use the new oil wealth (some \$95 million in 1969) for the benefit of his people.

New Era Promised

The new Sultan is in his late twenties and was educated at Oxford and Sandhurst. Since his return, however, his father had kept him under virtual house arrest and allowed him no part in governing the Sultanate. Qabus promised in his July 26 statement to move promptly to establish a modern, effective government. He must deal with two separate rebellions: the Dhofari and the Omani. Qabus may lack sufficient toughness to rule but this problem could be overcome if his uncle, Tariq, should return from exile to join his nephew in running the Sultanate.

Efforts to Broaden Foreign Relations Likely

Qabus' accession to power may lead to closer cooperation with the Trucial States and Saudi Arabia. In particular, it might open the way to a dialogue with King Faisal to resolve the long-standing Buraimi Oasis dispute. Qabus has announced that he will take "necessary constitutional steps" to obtain recognition from countries with which the Sultanate has relations—i.e., the UK, India and the U.S.

British Reaction

Current British interest in Muscat and Oman centers on oil, the strategic airfield and radar facilities on Masirah Island, and the desire to preserve Muscat and Oman as a buffer between the emerging Gulf states and the radical regime of South Yemen. We expect that Qabus will not harm these British interests and will retain the 100 British officers now with the Sultanate's armed forces. Whitehall believes that Qabus has effective control over the Sultanate. UK recognition was extended July 29.

U.S. Interests

USG contacts with Muscat and Oman date back to 1833, but our relations in recent years have been minimal. Our official contact with the Sultanate has consisted of occasional calls by the Commander, Middle East Force, and semi-annual visits by our Consul General from Dhahran. We expect that Qabus will proceed to consolidate his position and will soon submit a formal request for USG recognition of his regime. We expect that he will honor the Sultanate's international obligations; these are, to be sure, few in number but include a Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights in effect with us since 1960. Barring unforeseen developments, we will recommend that the request for recognition, when made, be granted.

88. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Iran and Saudi Arabia¹

Washington, October 14, 1970, 0117Z.

168989. Subject: Support for FAA. Ref: State 165711; Dhahran 1145; Tehran 4473; London 8354.²

1. After Sisco–Millard meeting October 7 (reftel) UK Embassy passed to FCO our suggestion that UK resume discussion with Iranians in aftermath Zahedi–Faisal talks to urge Iran do nothing to weaken prospects for FAA pending settlement of dispute over Tunbs and Abu Musa.³ FCO has now replied that HMG has repeatedly assured Iran it doing all possible to facilitate settlement island dispute (Sir William Luce informed Hoveyda⁴ of this as recently as September 21). Luce will discuss islands problem again with Iranian Ambassador to UK Afshar as well as with Saudi advisor Kamal Adham soonest. UK Embassy Washington, however, has been instructed by FCO to request once again US expression to Iran of our support for FAA.

2. According to UK Embassy, HMG genuinely concerned that so long as island settlement satisfactory to Iran is not forthcoming GOI will make either public statement or privately inform one or more Gulf Rulers about its opposition to FAA. British consider this eventuality would be highly detrimental to prospects of successful outcome

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 FAA. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Twinam; cleared in NEA/ARP, L/NEA, EUR/BMI, NEA/IRN, NEA, and S/S–O; and approved by Sisco. It was repeated to London, Kuwait, Dhahran, CINCSTRIKE–CINCMEAFSA, and COMIDEASTFOR.

² Telegram 165711 to London, October 8, passed on the information that Millard, in an October 7 meeting with Sisco, had requested that the United States urge Iran not to link the formation of the FAA and settlement of the Abu Musa and Tunbs dispute. Sisco suggested that the UK approach Iran directly after the upcoming Zahedi–Faisal talks. In telegram 1145 from Dhahran, October 11, Dinsmore took issue with MacArthur’s assessment as set forth in telegram 4473 from Tehran, October 10, of the Iranian position, arguing that an assertive Iran would add to Gulf instability and that the islands had no value. In telegram 8354 from London, October 12, Annenberg noted how close the Iranian position on the islands had come to that originally proposed by Iran on June 1. (All *ibid.*)

³ The Zahedi–Faisal talks were to begin on October 19 in Geneva, where the King had gone for medical attention. Zahedi hoped to encourage the Sheikhs of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, through Faisal, to reach an accommodation with Iran that ensured the islands did not fall into unfriendly hands. (Telegram 4394 from Tehran, October 6, and telegram 4473 from Tehran, October 10; both *ibid.*) Faisal and Zahedi failed to arrive at an understanding, increasing the likelihood that Iran would use force to take the disputed islands. (Telegram 9068 from London, November 2, and telegram 4790 from Tehran, November 3; both *ibid.*)

⁴ Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister of Iran.

October 24–26 meetings on FAA. UK feels that good word from US to Shah on FAA could forestall such occurrence. (*Comment:* There is, of course, no way to prevent those Gulf Amirs, particularly Qatar or Dubai, who are tepid to idea of Federation using presumed Iranian opposition as pretext for disrupting October constitutional meetings.)

3. Department considers that previous commitments to support UK as necessary in attempt to foster future stability and security of Gulf (London 5496)⁵ require our being responsive. We, however, have no intent involving USG in sticky territorial disputes over Tunbs and Abu Musa and Saudi/Abu Dhabi borders. Dept. believes that any US approach in support of FAA should be made to SAG as well as GOI and in context wider discussions re Gulf.

4. Ambassadors Tehran and Jidda are requested to seek early meeting with appropriate official host government to exchange views on prospects for future stability in Gulf and to make following points: We raising Gulf situation with both SAG and GOI. US well aware of Iranian and Saudi concern for future stability in the Gulf and cooperation toward this end. US position remains that major Gulf littorals should bear primary responsibility for Gulf stability as British withdraw. USG interested in supporting major littorals in this policy without intervening in Gulf affairs. We also encouraged by indications that nine Amirates may be moving closer toward achieving some sort of viable Federation. While USG has no preconceptions as to form such Federation should take, US continues to support creation of workable Federation, hopefully including all nine Amirates as best prospect for future stability in area. We hope that SAG and GOI share US view on desirability of Federation and are also prepared to support concept.

5. In discussions you should seek host government's views on current prospects for Gulf stability, cooperation among larger littorals, and prospects for FAA concept. You may also wish to seek their views on how Iraqi and other subversive threats to area can best be contained.

6. Should question of territorial disputes arise, either Saudi/Abu Dhabi or Tunbs/Abu Musa, you may wish express our understanding that UK actively seeking in cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Iran to bring these issues to prompt solution satisfactory to all parties concerned. You should note USG, while interested in seeing mutually

⁵ Telegram 5496 from London, July 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S)

satisfactory resolution these problems, has not involved itself in these issues and considers that to do so would serve no useful purpose.⁶

7. In light Tehran's 4473 Department considering approach to UK, based on results above requested *démarches* to SAG and GOI, suggesting UK intensify its efforts to move Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah to respond to GOI proposals on islands.

Rogers

⁶ MacArthur met with Acting Foreign Minister Khalatbari on October 15, who insisted that the island dispute be settled before the FAA came into existence and that Iran had no intention of making this stand public prior to the October 24–26 deputy rulers' meeting. (Telegram 4546 from Tehran, October 15; *ibid.*, POL 19 FAA) Thatcher met on October 15 with Acting Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Mas'ud, who emphasized Iraqi-Soviet schemes to open the Gulf to the Soviets, the need for clarification of British policy, the desirability of a more active U.S. role in Gulf affairs, and Saudi support for a federation of nine. (Telegram 3836 from Jidda, October 15; *ibid.*)

89. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 22, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Persian Gulf

The NSC Review Group has completed a study of the Persian Gulf following withdrawal of British military forces and termination of formal defense treaties and protectorate responsibilities.² Since the British never planned to withdraw their political presence and since announcement of the revision of their relationship has released local nationalist aspirations, the problem is less one of filling a vacuum than of dealing with a readjustment of the balance in the area.

It does not seem that this subject warrants discussion in the NSC at this time, but it does seem desirable to describe the options considered and to seek your concurrence in the general line of policy that is

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-220, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 92. Secret. Sent for action.

² See footnote 4, Document 83.

being followed. There will be discussions soon with the Shah and the British about a base for our Persian Gulf naval force after the British military leave, and plans must be included in your next Budget for slightly increased diplomatic representation and other activity. A longer paper reflecting the Review Group discussions is at Tab B,³ but the options and decisions to be made are summarized below.

The Problem

The central problem is that it is easy to recognize the potential for instability in the Gulf and increased Soviet and radical exploitation, but it is difficult to determine how the U.S. can best help minimize the consequences.

While the Persian Gulf is important to U.S. allies and friends, its potential instability seems relatively unresponsive to U.S. power. The main evolution will come through political intrigue or subversion in politically unprogressive and often inaccessible areas. Because the main U.S. interest lies in the interests of allies and in the area's relationship to the global strategic balance and because U.S. power may not have significant impact on evolution within the area itself, the problem is more one of devising the best possible international framework for that evolution than it is figuring out how the U.S. can influence it. Within the limitation of that framework, though, it is important to determine what kind of U.S. presence can be most constructive.

The Strategy

The Review Group went through the exercise of considering five distinct strategy options:

1. assuming the UK's role as protector ourselves;
2. backing Iran as our "chosen instrument" to be keeper of stability in the Gulf;
3. promoting Saudi-Iranian cooperation;
4. dealing directly with the new states of the lower Gulf; *and*
5. actively promoting a regional security pact.

The first and the last were ruled out as impractical, and the middle three options are not really alternatives. The logical course seems to be to marry those middle three. Our course then would be:

—to promote Saudi-Iranian cooperation as the mainstay of a stable regional system *but*

³ Attached but not printed at Tab B is the October 19 paper "U.S. Policy Options Toward the Persian Gulf." A handwritten note attached to another copy of the paper reads: "Peter: You did a truly *outstanding* job on your draft of the Persian Gulf paper. The more I worked with it, the higher my respect for it became. I am most grateful for your help. Hal." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 16, Subject and Chron Files, Persian Gulf Drafts)

—to recognize that Iran is in fact the preponderant power in the Gulf *and*

—to do what we can to develop a working relationship with the new political entities in the lower Gulf.

A Saudi-Iranian confrontation would increase instability, and both at present recognize the importance of their cooperation. If a radical regime were to take over in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. would have little choice but to move closer to Iran—and there is no reason now not to go on preparing Iran for that contingency. But as long as those two major regional nations are trying themselves to create the framework for political evolution, the U.S. has every reason to support it.

As for an independent U.S. presence, the U.S. interest is two-fold:

—imaginative technical and educational assistance through governmental and private programs can inject Western methods and relationships into political and economic evolution;

—while the U.S. may not have plans for military involvement, now would not seem the time to cut back the small U.S. naval force that operates from Bahrain. This show of interest seems important vis-à-vis both the regional entities and the USSR.

It is important to note that the British—despite revision of their formal relationships—intend to remain active in the Gulf's political, diplomatic and commercial affairs and in military supply and training.

The Decisions To Be Made Now

1. *General U.S. strategy.* While no precise decision is required now, it would be helpful to have your general reaction to the strategy that is now contemplated for the near term. I am doing a further study to look at our longer term interests and objectives in the Gulf area.⁴ The proposed short-term strategy will not foreclose any options for the longer term.

Recommendation: That you approve the general strategy outlined above for the near term—promoting Saudi-Iranian cooperation while recognizing Iran's preponderant power and developing a modest U.S. presence in the new states.⁵

2. *The future U.S. naval presence.* The small U.S. naval force (2 destroyers and a converted seaplane tender) is home-ported on Bahrain by agreement with the British. The Bahrainis would like us to stay. The

⁴ "Long-Term U.S. Strategy Options in the Persian Gulf," December 30. (Ibid., NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-165, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 66) Kennedy's December 30 covering memorandum to Kissinger noted that the paper looked at the "broader range of issues and considers our interests and likely prospects in the region several years into the future."

⁵ Nixon initialed his approval under all the recommendations in the memorandum.

British have offered us first refusal on some of their facilities (a dock and a few small communications and storage shacks).⁶ They will need to know soon whether the U.S. wants them to work out a transfer. We should also sound out the Shah. There would be an argument against introducing new forces, and the present force may not be welcome there for a long time. But while most of our friends regard it as an important sign of U.S. interest, it seems untimely to remove it.

Recommendation: That you approve a decision in principle not to reduce the U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf at this time unless further exploration should prove it politically unacceptable to friends of the U.S. in the area.

3. *U.S. diplomatic and aid presence.* One of the serious limitations on U.S. ability to contribute to orderly evolution in the Gulf is that one of our usual instruments of policy is not available. Capital assistance is not needed by these oil-rich states. While they do need the technical assistance relationship that usually goes with capital aid, we do not now have a well-developed program for providing it to states with their own financial resources. When asked for a plan for a U.S. presence in the lower Gulf, State came back with a fairly conventional blueprint for diplomatic posts.⁷ While modestly expanded diplomatic representation is desirable, our main interest is in pressing the agencies to break new ground in a serious effort to adapt our programs to meet the needs of an area like this. Your foreign policy message to Congress last February identified this problem.⁸ Some staff work has been done and the new technical assistance institute would help. But a prod would be in order.

Recommendation: That you approve the general principle of a U.S. diplomatic presence in the lower Gulf but instruct the Under Secretaries Committee (1) to review plans for this presence to assure that it is imaginatively adapted to the needs of this emerging area and (2) to oversee the development of programs—emphasizing technical and educational assistance, exchange, and effective use of private as well as public resources—that can provide for a growing U.S. presence consistent with the strategy of promoting regional responsibility for stability.

4. *Arms sale policy.* The British have been the traditional supplier of arms and would like to remain a major supplier. The U.S. has reason to want the British to remain in the business of military training and supply. At the same time, Kuwait has approached us to buy some transport aircraft, and there have been other feelers from some of the states in the lower Gulf. The only logical way to deal with this would seem to be to

⁶ See Document 72.

⁷ See footnote 2, Document 83.

⁸ The President's "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s" is printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 115–190.

look at a few concrete cases to get a feel for the political and legal problems involved rather than trying to make a decision in the abstract.

Recommendation: That State and Defense be asked to prepare a recommendation for you on outstanding requests for military supply and that you withhold decision until it can be made on concrete cases.⁹

The above decisions—if you approve—would be recorded in the decision memorandum at Tab A.¹⁰

⁹ Memorandum from Sisco to Kissinger, November 4; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-220, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 92.

¹⁰ Tab A is printed as Document 91.

90. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, November 2, 1970, 1430Z.

3999. Subj: FAA. Ref: State 179688; Dhahran 1199.²

1. We concur with premise underlying Dept's message: there is indeed precious little time left to accomplish a difficult task and moment has come for imaginative consideration every possible means achieve it. British perhaps are agged [*aggrieved?*] by sense of past failures, particularly in Aden, but Gulf situation contains two important elements which seem to us augur better prospects for FAA: Gulf states are lucky to possess the money which Aden does not have and to lack the great impetus to radical political forces inevitably created wherever British are driven out instead of leaving of their own accord. But Aden aftermath also has probably left British reluctant push rulers hard towards

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 FAA. Secret. It was repeated to Dhahran, Kuwait, London, Tehran, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and COMIDEASTFOR.

² Telegram 179688 to Dhahran, October 31, transmitted the Department's request for information on current negotiations, but also added that the view of the British Embassy in Washington was that the "UK and Rulers have no definite plan of where to go from here." Telegram 1199 from Dhahran, October 28, reported on the failure of recent meetings in Abu Dhabi. Other responses to the Department's request for information are in telegram 1224 from Dhahran, November 2, and telegram 978 from Kuwait, November 3. (All *ibid.*)

ephemeral federation, and UK may be tempted too by possibility retaining special positions in individual states of economic interest to them.

2. From viewpoint of US interests the more unity in the Gulf the better. Fragmentation provides greater opportunities for subversive elements to infiltrate individual entities and for sudden coups. It is essential particularly that small, weak, poor units like Ajman and Ummal-Qawayn not be left drift by themselves as highly vulnerable targets of opportunity to radical and subversive forces.

3. Bahraini membership would bring to federation commercial and administrative skills not available elsewhere and any federation dependent solely on limited administrative talents now to be found in Dhubai and Abu Dhabi would face serious weaknesses at outset. Yet we recognize too inclusion of Bahrain would force new federation to labor under stresses and strains of suspicions which inevitably accrue where one member of any political grouping is much stronger than others. If Bahrain remains willing try for federation we gather Qatar would not want to be left out. On balance we come down in favor continuing efforts include Bahrain.

4. However, it must be for UK to decide point at which diminishing returns are reached with respect efforts have Qatar and Bahrain included. We recognize that tactics required bring federation into existence and proposals for post independence aid by UK will probably be affected by precise nature of goal for which British will be striving. Thus a federation including Bahrain would have some modest administrative and commercial experience on which to draw. If Bahrain and Qatar to be excluded, then British should probably begin thinking now of where and how key British officials need to be inserted into governmental structure of new federation. From here we find it difficult judge extent to which sheikhs would welcome skeletal British manning of their federation's bureaucracy, but would think smaller units particularly would welcome such continued British presence.

5. With so little time remaining, it seems imperative to us British should engage very soon in continuing and determined effort bring about some feasible FAA. To make British effort fruitful, we wonder if HMG might not select top representative with capable staff of one or two come to Gulf and remain on spot moving constantly but discreetly among Gulf states, Tehran and Riyadh in effort establish elements of agreement among all parties as foundation on which FAA can be built. To achieve results will require constant nudging, cajoling, plus endless tact and patience on part British team.

6. With regard Saudi role, we keenly aware SAG quite unhelpful so far though we believe they still favor grouping of nine. British need to press Saudis send top representatives to Gulf to indicate clearly Saudi hope FAA will come into existence and succeed. US should seek opportunities reinforce British pressures on Saudis to whom we

can reasonably point out that their constant complaints about being encircled by hostile forces are hardly consistent with their hands-folded attitude toward their crucial eastern front. US could be helpful too, we believe, by discussions in Washington and London intended draw British out on goals they think can be realistically tackled and tactics necessary to accomplish them. In such context, we could suggest establishment of team on spot in Gulf area working continuously to find common elements in sheikhs' differing viewpoints. At same time, we should under no circumstances tempt weary British with notion that we might assume for them principal burden of infusing life into FAA.

7. If we are to nudge Saudis to play more helpful role, perhaps there may be means also for encouraging Iran support FAA despite Shah's preoccupation with little islands matter. Might it not be possible at some stage point out to Iranians that their present posture of opposition to FAA may neither get them what they want with regard Tunbs and Abu Musa nor allow beginning steps to create political institution which seems to promise best prospects for defending region against the very subversion and radicalization which GOI fears most. Iranian opposition seems to us supply convenient excuse for those sheikhdoms which seek delaying tactics as best means increasing their own bargaining power. In long run, creation of FAA would seem as important to Iranian goals in Gulf as possession of little islands themselves.

Thacher

91. National Security Decision Memorandum 92¹

Washington, November 7, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director, U.S. Information Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1248, Saunders Files, NSSM 66—NSDM 92—Persian Gulf. Secret. Copies were sent to Moorer and Mayo. In an attached undated memorandum, Kissinger authorized Sisco, as head of the Interdepartmental Group, to take appropriate steps to implement NSDM 92. In particular Sisco was to plan for a continuation of MIDEASTFOR; to prepare for future UN membership of the FAA, Bahrain, and Qatar; to place Kuwait on the list of countries eligible to purchase U.S. arms; and to proceed with planning for required diplomatic posts.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf

In response to the memorandum of July 30, 1970, "Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf,"² submitted by the Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East and South Asia, the President has:

1. Approved a general strategy for the near term of promoting cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia as the desirable basis for maintaining stability in the Persian Gulf while recognizing the preponderance of Iranian power and developing a direct U.S. relationship with the separate political entities of the area.

2. Made a decision in principle not to reduce the U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf at this time unless further exploration should prove it politically unacceptable to friends of the U.S. in the area, in which case a special report should be submitted to the President.³

3. Approved in principle expansion of U.S. diplomatic representation in the lower Gulf but directed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee to assure that this representation is imaginatively adapted to the requirements of this unique area and the pursuit of U.S. interests there.

4. Directed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee to review plans for U.S. technical and educational assistance and cultural exchange in this area through private as well as public programs to assure the development of imaginative programs consistent with the strategy of promoting orderly development and local responsibility for maintaining stability.

5. Directed that a special memorandum be prepared for the President's decision on all significant requests for military assistance from states (excluding Iran and Saudi Arabia) in the Persian Gulf. This memorandum should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia and submitted to the Senior Review Group by November 26, 1970.⁴

Henry A. Kissinger

² See footnote 4, Document 83.

³ Sisco informed Kissinger on November 4 that the Departments of State and Defense were taking steps to implement NSDM 92 by maintaining MIDEASTFOR in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf area, homeported in Bahrain. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1276, Saunders Files, Persian Gulf) Faisal was informed December 22. (Telegram 4519 from Jidda, December 23; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF)

⁴ Apparently the Review Group meeting scheduled for November 26 did not take place.

92. Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 3, 1971.

SUBJECT

Eligibility of Kuwait for Foreign Military Sales

Enclosed (Tab B)² is a memorandum to the President from Secretary Rogers which recommends that

—The President make a formal determination that the furnishing of defense articles and defense services to Kuwait will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace. Such a determination is required by Section 3(a)(1) of the Foreign Military Sales Act to establish Kuwait's eligibility for cash or credit sales.

—Although not required by law, the Congress be notified of this determination in keeping with past practice.

The case for selling Kuwait modest amounts of military equipment (presumably on a cash basis since Kuwait has a very strong foreign exchange position) seems to be valid since

—The British are terminating their defense commitment to Kuwait (although they will continue to provide some equipment and training).

—In the wake of the British decision, Kuwait is interested in diversifying its sources of supply for military equipment and would apparently like to make some purchases from the U.S.

—Kuwait faces an external threat from its unpredictable and radical neighbor Iraq, which laid claim to Kuwait in the early sixties and has raised a number of border disputes since then. It is in the U.S. interest to help Kuwait deter this threat since military action in the area could disrupt the supply of Kuwait oil to Western Europe.

—Kuwait also has an internal security problem, given the large number of Palestinians in the country, and we have been encouraging improvement of Kuwait's internal security forces.

—The volume of sales involved would be modest given the small size of Kuwait's armed forces (8,000 man army, 50 man air force).

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1270, Saunders Files, Kuwait. Confidential. Sent for action.

² Tab B, Rogers's December 22 memorandum, is attached but not printed. Rogers also signed another December 22 memorandum to the President, which placed the decision to sell arms to Kuwait in the larger context of oil supply, oil wealth for regional social and economic development, and U.S. balance of payments. (Ibid.)

—There are no economic development issues raised by Kuwait's military purchases since Kuwait's military purchases since Kuwait's economy and balance of payments position are very strong.

Recommendation

That you approve for the President the memo to Secretary Rogers at Tab A making the Presidential determination required by Section 3(a)(1) of the Foreign Military Sales Act so that the President's signature can be machine-signed.³

Hal Saunders concurs.

³ Kissinger initialed his approval. Attached but not printed at Tab A is a December 22 memorandum from the President to Rogers.

93. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

Persian Gulf: Luce Visit

PARTICIPANTS

Sir William Luce, Secretary of State's Special Representative for the Persian Gulf
 Mr. Guy E. Millard, Minister, British Embassy
 Mr. Ramsay Melhuish, First Secretary, British Embassy
 Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
 Mr. Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
 Mr. Alfred L. Atherton, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
 Mr. Harold H. Saunders, Member, Senior Staff of National Security Council
 Mr. Thomas P. Thornton, Policy Planning Staff
 Mr. Dayton Mak, Director, Near East/South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence & Research
 Mr. Jack C. Miklos, Country Director for Iran
 Mr. Richard W. Murphy, Country Director for Arabian Peninsula Affairs
 Mr. Joseph W. Twinam, Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs
 Mr. Timothy W. Childs, Office of Iranian Affairs

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 UK. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Twinam (NEA/ARP) and Timothy W. Childs (NEA/IRN). Initialed by Sisco. Luce, Millard, and Melhuish also met with Rogers. (Memorandum of conversation, January 13; *ibid.*, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF)

In discussions lasting over four hours, the U.S. side, led by Mr. Sisco, posed a variety of questions relating to the future of the Persian Gulf. During the discussion Mr. Sisco made the following points:

The U.S., and even more so the U.K., have important interests in the Gulf. Strategically, events there have a bearing on a wider area. We are concerned with geopolitical aspects of the Gulf situation, including the Soviet capability to cause trouble in the future. In the tiny Gulf states small investment in subversion could cause wide-ranging problems while a modest investment in stability might prevent the U.S. and U.K. much grief. We recognize that internal instability is a more likely threat than outside aggression. The U.S. has always supported a strong British presence in the Gulf, regrets the Labor Government's decision to withdraw, and hopes that the future British presence will be as strong as possible. In planning to continue the homeporting of U.S. Middle East Force in Bahrain, a decision which has received at least tacit acceptance by friendly littoral states and enthusiastic welcome by Bahrain's Ruler, we will wish to cooperate closely with the British. This desire for close cooperation extends to other questions of adjusting our presence in the Gulf to meet the situation created by the changing British presence.

In response to questions, Sir William made the following observations:

Policy Decision

The British Government has reached a decision on its role in the Persian Gulf. There will be an announcement in Parliament about mid-February after Sir William has notified King Faisal, the Shah, the Amir of Kuwait, and the Rulers of the four larger Gulf Amirates. Until then he hoped what he told us about the decision would be held in strictest confidence. It should under no circumstances be repeated to other governments and preferably should not be repeated to our Embassies, since UK Embassies have not yet been informed.

UK Interests

Sir William pointed out that Britain's major interest in the Persian Gulf is, of course, oil as a vital source of fuel and important source of revenue. As an oil consumer, the UK interest in the Gulf exceeds the US interest. Also Britain wants to limit the expansion of Soviet influence in the region. The Government's primary objective is to create the necessary pre-conditions for (a) peace and stability in the Gulf States; (b) preserving British political influence and countering Soviet expansion.

Policy Setting

The Heath Government's review of its predecessor's policy had to face the conditions which were created by the announcement in 1968 of withdrawal by the end of 1971. Different attitudes within the

Conservative Party and the resources that the UK could make available to the Gulf in view of commitments elsewhere were other considerations. The Labor Government's announcement, however, has been the dominant factor in developing the attitudes of the Gulf States about the area's future.

The announcement had certain desirable effects. It has encouraged Saudi/Iranian cooperation, contributed to the Bahrain settlement, and spurred the movement toward political integration of the Arab Emirates. In the environment created by the announcement, however, three major problems have developed: The movement toward political integration has not progressed in the way in which the British had hoped, Iran has reasserted its claim to Tunbs and Abu Musa, and long-standing Saudi/Abu Dhabi border disputes have flared up again. The major task of UK Gulf policy at the moment is to seek to resolve these problems in order to create conditions for future stability.

End of Treaty Relationship

After coming to power, the Conservative Government appointed Sir William to consult with the area states as a basis for a policy review. He found the four major Emirates determined to be fully independent by the end of 1971. The British feel this is proper. Therefore, the Government concluded that there should be no attempt to prolong the present treaty arrangements with the Persian Gulf after December 1971. The political aspect of the UK role in the Gulf is often overlooked in focusing on the question of military presence. For example, the Soviets have been kept out of the lower Gulf not because British forces are stationed there but because the British have controlled the foreign relations of the lower Gulf States.

Military Role

It was recognized that once the UK's protective treaty responsibilities end, so would the basis for the present British military presence in the Gulf. The question then arose, ought there to be some new relationship providing for a specific military presence, and with whom should this relationship be made? In his visit to the area, Sir William sought the views of the Gulf Emirates and major area states on this question. He received predictable but conflicting answers. All of the Emirates except Qatar wanted a British military presence after 1971. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait wanted the British to leave since their continued presence might cause conflict in the area. The Shah urged the UK to go forward with its earlier decision to withdraw. He noted that if a future Gulf Federation asked for a defense relationship with the UK he could not object, but he doubted that such a request would be made. Iraq and the UAR said that on principle they oppose foreign bases on Arab territory and, therefore, could not ignore a reversal of the announced British decision to withdraw.

A new defense commitment to be meaningful would require a force in being no smaller than the present level of British presence; that is, two RAF squadrons in Bahrain, six mine sweepers in Bahrain and one frigate on station in the Gulf, and a battalion divided between Bahrain and Sharjah. The Government had concluded that retaining such a force would be unwise. The basic role of the present force, particularly the RAF in Bahrain, has been to fulfill the British defense understanding with Kuwait. The Kuwaitis have notified the British that they will permit this understanding to lapse this March. The British see no direct Russian military threat to the Gulf at the moment. The only foreseeable external threats to the Amirates are Saudi Arabia and Iran reacting to territorial claims. It is not in the UK interest to come into conflict with either of these States over territorial questions. The UK cannot antagonize Saudi Arabia and Iran which are the primary local forces for limiting Soviet expansion in the Gulf.

The British see the main threat to the area as subversion and revolution either in the Gulf Amirates or Saudi Arabia. If British forces remained in strength in the area and subversion occurred, inevitably the British would be drawn in and would have to be reinforced, which would be extremely difficult in view of British commitments elsewhere. Moreover, the presence of British forces would only serve to complicate the relations of the Rulers with their larger neighbors and such forces could themselves become targets for radical propaganda, thus enhancing the prospects for the very subversion Britain sought to avoid.

Therefore, the Conservatives have decided, on balance, not to reverse the Labor decision of 1968, however regrettable that decision may have been. But HMG does not wish to leave the impression that it is abandoning the Gulf. This calls for a political/military manifestation of interest. Therefore, the UK will offer the following to the Rulers:

1. A new treaty of friendship, providing for consultations in the event of any security threat but without any specific commitment to provide military assistance, although this would not be excluded. (This would be concluded with a Federation and/or with the four larger Amirates separately but not with the smaller five.)

2. Visits:

- a. Frequent visits of British naval frigates, where appropriate in connection with CENTO exercise.

- b. Visits to the Trucial Coast of company strength army units for training exercises.

- c. Training visits by RAF units.

3. Liaison Missions:

- a. A small token contingent of naval personnel (but no ships) to remain on Bahrain in a training/liaison role; they would also provide logistic support for naval visits.

b. A small token military/air contingent (but no aircraft) to remain on the Trucial Coast (Sharjah or Abu Dhabi) in a training/liaison role. (In addition the 90-odd military advisors in Kuwait will remain. The RAF staging base at Masirah will remain, but it is not related to Gulf policy. The possibility of stationing a force for the Gulf in Masirah was rejected, primarily because it would be too far away from the area to achieve its primary role of serving as a visible show of British interest.)

4. Continuing to lend officers and other personnel to local forces, principally the Trucial Oman Scouts (90 UK personnel) as the nucleus for a Federation land force (Willoughby Study)² and the Abu Dhabi Defense Force (100 UK personnel). An effort to strengthen local police forces, including providing British Special Branch officers, will also be made.

The proposed British presence would for all practical purposes not be effective militarily.

Security and Stability

At present the only permanent Soviet presence in the Gulf, aside from Iraq, is a diplomatic presence in Kuwait. Once the Amirates are independent, the Soviets will undoubtedly seek diplomatic relations with them, and the Rulers will be in no position to refuse. In viewing the Soviet threat, however, the essential problem is the likelihood of revolution in the Amirates.

The security of Saudi Arabia is the key to the internal security of the Gulf. So long as the Saudi monarchy remains it will buttress the security of the smaller states. Even should a radical revolutionary government come to power in one of the smaller amirates, its survival may not be tolerated by Saudi Arabia and Iran. After all, it was 8 months after a radical group seized power in South Yemen before the Soviets decided to establish a presence there. Iranian intervention against a revolution in the Amirates would cause special problems.

It is noteworthy however that the Ruler of Dubai told Sir William that he was confident the Shah would come to his aid in the event of internal disorder.

Since 1963 the UK has seen no threat to Kuwait from external aggression by Iraq. The danger there is an internal one with Iraq and other radical elements playing a subversive role. The Palestinian movement in Kuwait is becoming of increasing concern elsewhere in the Gulf. The respectability of the Palestinian label in the Arab world provides an excellent cover for radical elements.

² Airgram A-1318 from London, July 26, transmitted the Willoughby Report. (Ibid., DEF 6 TRUCIAL ST)

Among the Amirates, Bahrain is the most "sensitive" politically. Here, however, there is a strong moderate reformist element which serves as a counter to radical tendencies. Unless the ruling Khalifah family moves quickly to provide reform, progress and prosperity, there is a possibility that this group might seize power. The possibility of a radical takeover is slim. The Special Branch, assisting local authorities, have good surveillance of revolutionary elements. Various radical groupings are small in number, varying from 100 to 200 in number.

While the ruling family of Qatar is in many ways the least attractive in the Gulf, it is difficult to see how any subversive group could get a footing there in view of tight control by a large and tough ruling family.

A coup in any of the Amirates is unlikely unless local security forces can be subverted. There has been some dissidence in the Bahraini Defense Force, but this now appears under control. The presence of British officers with the Trucial Oman Scouts and the Abu Dhabi Defense Force is a major factor for stability. The Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah is cause for some concern since he is both poor and "slippery." The Iraqis may seek to establish influence there by exploiting his need for money but, on balance, it is unlikely that Abu Dhabi and the major Gulf littorals will permit this.

Trucial Oman Scouts

The role of the Trucial Oman Scouts to the security of the area is a key one. The prospect of there being no Federation to provide a framework in which to place the Scouts is an "awful" thought. Should this occur the TOS might be broken up between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, with some provision being made for Ras al-Khaimah.

Future Role of the Major Littorals in the Gulf

Iraq has relatively little scope for doing mischief in the Persian Gulf states. The people of the area dislike the Iraqis, and Iraq is probably too fearful of Iran's reaction to risk any adventures in the Gulf.³ Iraq has established trade missions in Bahrain, Abu Dhabi and Dubai and has sent some high-ranking visitors to the area. Last fall there was some evidence of dissidence in the Masandam Peninsula in which Iraq may have played a role, but this now appears under control. The disruptive Iraqi influence is likely to be limited to largely verbal support for opposition elements in the Amirates.

³ In Airgram A-011 from Dhahran, January 13, Dinsmore suggested that the Department pay more attention to Iraq's interest in the Persian Gulf and the likelihood it would seek a future role in Gulf Affairs. (Ibid., POL 33 PERSIAN GULF)

In spite of Kuwait's contributions to the area states, the Gulf Arabs generally regard the Kuwaitis as arrogant. Kuwait's influence is therefore limited.

The radical regime in South Yemen has little capacity for causing trouble in the area except for supporting the revolution in Dhofar. Under the new Sultan there is hope that the rebels can be isolated politically and that the insurgency can be contained in the mountains.

Saudi Arabia has a key role to play in the security of the area. History suggests, however, that the Saudis must be careful about over-extending themselves in pursuit of domination of the lower Gulf.

Iran is unquestionably the strongest power in the region, but in Sir William's personal opinion Iran by itself cannot guarantee stability on the Arab side of the Gulf. For this Saudi cooperation is essential. Iran may be able, however, to establish maritime supremacy in the area. Such supremacy was after all good enough for the British until oil interests drew them onto the Arab shore after World War II.

Federation

A Federation of all 9 Amirates would still be ideal, but it appears impossible. After the Bahrain settlement, public opinion on the island, which had never been enthusiastic about a Federation, hardened against Bahrain's participation. The ruling family, itself always half-hearted in support of federation, has been influenced by local feeling.

Sir William had worked hard on the constitutional question to remove an obstacle to Federation. He found, however, at the Deputy Rulers' meeting in late October 1970, that the old Bahran/Qatar rivalry had polarized on constitutional questions. The constitution itself is not the real issue. The real problem is an apparently irreconcilable competition between Bahrain and Qatar for predominance.

This month's Saudi/Kuwait joint mission will concentrate on trying to resolve the Bahrain/Qatar problem to achieve a 9-state Federation. The UK, however, holds little hope for this mission, which will probably not deal with specifics and will not be enhanced by Prince Nawwaf's leadership.

Sir William will go to the Gulf in late January and will use the imminent announcement of the UK policy decision as a lever to try to force as many states as possible to federate. He sees no hope for Bahrain's joining, but Bahrain does not feel it can publicly admit it has abandoned the Federation concept. The UK also does not want to bear the onus of abandoning the concept of a 9-state Federation. Bahrain sooner or later will have to make a move. By early fall it will want to apply for UN membership if it is going to seek independence separately. Qatar says it will go with the seven Trucial States in the Federation but Sir William doubts this.

There is a real possibility of a Federation of all seven Trucial States. Abu Dhabi would dominate this grouping because of its oil wealth. The Saudis would not prefer a Federation dominated by Abu Dhabi, but it is a viable possibility. Dubai's advisor Mahdi Tajir is promoting the idea of a rump Federation of Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai. This scheme would have Bahrain seek independence on its own, and would leave the five smaller shaykhdoms to sort out their problems with the possibility of some of them later joining as one unit. The attraction of this scheme is that the Federation would not be burdened with Iran's claims against the Rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah over Abu Musa and Tunbs.

There is also the possibility that Abu Dhabi can gather the five smaller shaykhdoms, or four excluding Fujaira, under its leadership to form a five-to-six state Federation. Dubai might welcome the opportunity to go it alone as a sort of "Monaco of the Gulf."

The absence of any Federation at all by the end of 1971 would not in itself postpone British determination to end the treaty relationships. It is possible, however, that if a specific process of Federation were underway with reasonable chance for quick fulfillment the Government might postpone briefly the date of withdrawal.

Abu Musa/Tunbs Islands

The Shah's intense concern about the islands must be primarily motivated by reasons of prestige. It is hard to believe that the Shah really thinks the islands have the strategic importance he claims, given his control of Qeshm island. Whatever the Shah's motivation, there is no doubt that he is in deadly earnest when he says he will take the islands by force if a negotiated settlement satisfactory to Iran cannot be reached. A year or more ago the Shah might have agreed to a demilitarized proposal; now Sir William believes the Shah would accept no less than joint garrisoning of the islands under joint flags, with a split on any oil that might be found.⁴

If the Shah did take the islands by force, there would of course be an outcry among the Arabs, but Sir William doubts that they would be able to do more than protest. The UK is pressing the Rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah very hard to reach an accommodation with the Shah, but there is a limit to what the UK can do. They cannot force the Rulers to sign away the islands. The Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah says he would be a target for assassination if he gave away Arab territory; and therefore prefers that the Shah use force, since he could then plead force majeure.

⁴ See Document 88.

Responding to specific hypothetical questions, Sir William said numerous schemes for settlement had been explored. [5½ lines not declassified]

[3½ lines not declassified] (Iranian opposition because of the islands, however, could keep some of the Amirates out of a Federation.) There are no “substitute” shaykhs who could be put in office to make a deal with the Shah. “Moving shaykhs around” is difficult in any case and only possible with consent of the ruling family. The Qasimi family (Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah) is united in opposition to signing away the islands. Selling the islands to Iran was considered as early as 1930 and rejected: it is now out of the question. The Shah would never “buy” that which he already claims to own. [3 lines not declassified]

Saudi/Abu Dhabi Border Dispute

King Faisal’s latest proposal for settlement is indeed more reasonable than earlier Saudi claims. Nevertheless, the Saudis still are demanding: a) a large piece of territory giving an outlet to the Gulf on the west of Abu Dhabi between that state and Qatar; b) adjustment of the southern border which would cost Abu Dhabi some territory of petroleum interest and c) a plebescite on Buraimi.⁵ The British are puzzled at the intense Saudi interest in the outlet to the Gulf. The area seems unsuitable for an oil terminal, so presumably the Saudis want the outlet for security reasons. Possibly they feel more comfortable with a position on the Gulf controlling land movement between Qatar and Abu Dhabi.

Sir William had recommended the postponement of the proposed September Dammam conference to negotiate this dispute since he was convinced it would be abortive. Abu Dhabi advisors were preparing to present a position based on the 1952 Abu Dhabi claim. Faced with this position the Saudis would undoubtedly have walked out and Faisal would have reverted to his 1949 claim on Abu Dhabi. The British are now trying to get a reasonable response from Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi in hopes of working out a settlement with Faisal. There may be some further flexibility in Faisal’s position.

Oman

Last summer’s change in leadership was for the good.⁶ The new Sultan Qabus is intelligent, well-educated, and has the right ideas. His uncle Tariq, whom he brought back from exile as Prime Minister, is a talker not a doer. Their relationship is troubled and Sir William’s personal guess is that Qabus will emerge as the stronger of the two. Tariq

⁵ See Document 72.

⁶ See Document 87.

may eventually accept a position outside the country, such as Ambassador to the United Nations.

Oman is potentially the "least unviable" state in the area. Shell's oil production (over $\frac{1}{3}$ of a million barrels per day) now brings an annual oil income of over 100 million dollars. There is good potential for agriculture and fishing. Unfortunately the administrative apparatus of the country is chaotic or non-existent. Only the defense establishment, officered by the British, works. It is disappointing that since Qabus took power last summer there has been no real evidence of progress. The advantage of the change in leadership will wear off if there is not soon some sign of progress.

In the long run, Oman seems destined to play some role in the neighboring Trucial States. All the people of the coast, except the rulers there, consider themselves Omanis. For the moment, however, the leadership of Oman is much too preoccupied with internal problems to exert any external role. Qabus does plan to send a good-will mission to the Arab states, and will probably seek UN membership. If there were chaos in the Trucial Coast, particularly in neighboring Fujaira, Oman might be moved to try to play a role. In the near term, however, these are the conceivable limits of Oman's role beyond its borders.

Sir William thinks that Qabus would welcome US representation in Oman in the not too distant future. It is possible that Oman may wish to obtain UN membership before permitting the expansion of diplomatic representation in the Sultanate.

Middle East Force

Sir William doubted that the US decision to maintain Middle East Force homeported in Bahrain would present much of a target for hostile Arab propaganda. He noted that Shaykh 'Isa, in discussing the future British presence on the island, had made a sharp distinction between naval forces, which he wanted to stay, and the British Army, which he felt must go as a symbol of colonialism. In Sir William's view, the key consideration making retention of Middle East Force acceptable is that it reflects no change from the existing situation and, unlike the UK, the US is not burdened with a previous announcement that its forces will be withdrawn.

Final Remarks

In thanking Sir William for his extremely helpful presentation, Mr. Sisco reiterated the US desire for the most effective possible British presence in the Persian Gulf area and our wish to cooperate and coordinate fully with the British in pursuing our own limited future role in the area. He reiterated US willingness to be helpful to the British where appropriate with the Shah on the islands issue.

Sir William replied that at the moment the burden is on the UK to come up with reasonable proposals from the Rulers on both the islands and the Saudi/Abu Dhabi border disputes. If such proposals are obtained, the UK may indeed ask US assistance in both Tehran and Riyadh.

94. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

ER IM 71–43

Washington, March 1971.

SOME REVENUE IMPLICATIONS OF THE 14 FEBRUARY OIL SETTLEMENT WITH THE PERSIAN GULF STATES

INTRODUCTION

On 14 February 1971 the six Persian Gulf members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar—reached a highly favorable settlement with the region’s private oil producers. Acting in concert, these countries, which produce nearly all Persian Gulf output, won tax and price concessions that will greatly increase their oil revenues over the next five years.

These increased revenues come at a time when some Persian Gulf governments face balance-of-payments problems as well as limitations on development and defense spending. In other cases the increased revenues will merely add to already large coffers, both public and private. This memorandum estimates the level of increased revenue generated by the February 1971 agreement and analyzes briefly the impact that the increases will have on the individual countries.

The Persian Gulf Oil Settlement

1. The very substantial Persian Gulf oil settlement on 14 February 1971 reflected the fact that the producing countries were in the negotiating driver’s seat for the first time. The shift from a buyers’ to a suppliers’ market in 1970 was an outgrowth of especially heavy increases in demand by Western Europe and Japan at a time when supply re-

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ORR Files, Job 79–T00935A, Box 55. Confidential; No Foreign Dissemination. This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Economic Research and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.

strictions and tanker shortages were caused by closure of the Suez and Tapline.² Capitalizing on this situation, Libya had already concluded an agreement in September 1970 that provided substantial income tax and posted price increases. This agreement set the stage for followup demands by OPEC³ in December 1970 for higher revenues on the basis of regional settlements. The Persian Gulf States, as a group, began negotiating with the oil companies in early January leading to the present settlement.

2. The key features of the 14 February 1971 agreement are: (a) assurance from the producing countries of security of supply and stability of financial arrangements for five years (1971–75); (b) stabilization of the income tax rate on Gulf crude oil export profits at 55%; (c) uniform increase of 35¢ per barrel in the posted price (that is, the price on which taxes are based) of Gulf crude oil exports; (d) an inflation adjustment in the posted price of 2½% effective 1 June 1971 and on the first of each of the years 1973 through 1975; (e) a further increase of 5¢ per barrel in the posted price per year on the same four dates; and (f) elimination of some earlier allowances used by the companies in computing profits.⁴

3. The revenue increases to the Persian Gulf governments generated by the 14 February settlement are considerable.⁵ In 1971 alone, revenues will increase about \$1.3 billion as a result of price increases and tax concessions alone. For the five years, 1971–75, the total revenue increase resulting from the agreement will amount to an estimated \$12.6 billion (see Table 1).⁶ The increase in revenue per barrel coupled with the rise in the volume of oil exports is expected to produce total revenues in 1975 about three times the 1970 level.

² The Suez Canal has been closed since the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967, and Tapline, ARAMCO's pipeline from Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean, was inoperative from early May 1970 to 1 February 1971. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries consists of Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Indonesia, Venezuela, Libya, Kuwait, and Algeria, which together produce 90% of the Free World's oil exports. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁴ For new posted prices in Persian Gulf oil through 1975, see Table 2. [Footnote is in the original. Table 2 is not printed.]

⁵ In the case of Iraq, about two-thirds of the oil is exported via the Mediterranean, while for Saudi Arabia only about 12% of output exits by the Mediterranean (via Tapline). The price of Iraqi and Saudi oil delivered at the Mediterranean will be determined by the outcome of the negotiations between the oil companies and the Libyan government. [Footnote is in the original. Documentation on the negotiations with Libya is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969–1974.]

⁶ Not printed.

4. The disparity between the six countries in both total revenues and revenue increases is considerable and reflects primarily the differences in oil output and the rate of growth in oil output among the producers. Because of their pre-eminent output roles, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait will receive most of the area's total revenue, and increases derived from the new agreement—roughly 86% of the total. Of the remaining three producers, Abu Dhabi will receive the largest amount of revenue and revenue increases. In Iraq, where only about one-third of the total oil output is exported via the Persian Gulf, the revenue increases generated by the 14 February 1971 settlement will account for only a part of Baghdad's total anticipated increase in revenue; the remainder is expected to come from negotiations now under way regarding a Mediterranean area settlement. Qatar, smallest producer of the six signatory states, will receive about \$330 million in increased revenues during 1971–75 as a result of the February settlement.

5. The revenue gains achieved by the six OPEC producers are almost certain to result in similar increases for the non-member oil producers of the Persian Gulf, principally Oman, Dubai, and Bahrain. Increased revenues to the three non-members in 1971 alone should amount to about \$54 million—Oman, \$36 million; Dubai, \$10 million; and Bahrain, \$8 million—and for the full five years (1971–75) could mean increased revenues of about \$450 million. Total revenue gains to the Persian Gulf States as a result of the February agreement would amount to somewhat more than \$13 billion for the five-year period.

The Impact on Individual Countries

Saudi Arabia

6. The windfall of some \$4.6 billion during 1971–75 reinforces the already optimistic outlook for Saudi finances during the period ahead. More immediately, it should lead to some expansion in government outlays on non-defense development—an area that has suffered in recent years as the government held to a balanced budget while allocating an increasing share of its revenues to defense⁷ and was faced with meeting the costs of Khartoum and other aid payments to Jordan and the UAR.⁸

⁷ Saudi defense expenditures rose from 28% of budget outlays in fiscal year 1966 (25 October 1965–15 October 1966) to an estimated 42% in fiscal year 1970 while non-defense development fell from an estimated 36% to possibly less than 10% during the same time period. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁸ As a result of commitments made at the Arab Summit Conference in Khartoum, Sudan, after the June 1967 war, Saudi Arabia has paid about \$140 million annually in 1968–70 to the UAR (\$100 million) and Jordan (\$41 million). In addition, Saudi Arabia has made payments averaging somewhat over \$7 million per year since 1968 to cover the costs of a \$36.7 million purchase of arms made by Jordan from the United Kingdom. [Footnote is in the original.]

Initial Saudi revenue forecasts for fiscal year (FY) 1971 (ending 21 August 1971) implied that non-defense development spending would be limited to about \$250 million, but the new oil settlement could easily add an additional \$100 million or more. This would permit the government to reinstate some of the infrastructural and agricultural settlement programs previously dropped or suspended. An increase in public developmental investment would also stimulate the private industrial and commercial sectors of the economy, which have slowed in the past two years because of a downturn in government developmental spending. Even if other government spending, including defense, also increases (as it almost certainly will), the added oil revenues should exceed total spending by a considerable margin. Thus, over the next four years, Saudi Arabia is expected to have significant budgetary surpluses.

7. Saudi Arabia's already large foreign exchange reserves will almost certainly increase. At the end of 1970, reserves were almost \$900 million, more than double the amount needed to meet the legal requirement for 100% currency coverage and adequate to cover over one year's imports at the 1969 rate. A rapid increase in foreign exchange holdings will provide the Saudis with options for paying off existing arms debts ahead of schedule and increasing the amount of aid they are currently paying to Jordan and the UAR, as well as stepping up economic development. Future decisions on aid extensions, however, almost certainly will be based more on political than financial considerations.

Iran

8. Iran, unlike Saudi Arabia, has not had large foreign exchange reserves in recent years, and its rapid economic and military expansion has led to considerable deficit financing and balance-of-payments problems. At the end of 1970, Iran's holdings of gold and foreign exchange had fallen to a six year low (about \$210 million), or less than two months' imports. The revenue increases generated by the February oil settlement afford Tehran an opportunity to push economic development further or to pay off burdensome short and long-term debts. It seems likely that the Shah will choose expansion and will spend to the limit of Iran's resources.

9. On 24 February—ten days after the agreement—the Shah proposed a budget for FY 1971–72 (21 March 1971 to 20 March 1972) that not only will consume all the increased oil revenues but also will require substantial deficit financing. The new budget will include a \$1.3 billion deficit, or one-fifth of the expenditures, which will be covered by drawdowns on foreign loans of about \$800 million and domestic borrowing of approximately \$500 million. Both forms of borrowing will exacerbate an already difficult financial situation. The increased

recourse to foreign loans, some short-term, will increase the debt service ratio, which already is more than 15% of foreign exchange earnings and requires foreign payments in excess of \$150 million annually. By expanding its domestic borrowing, the government is using up credit normally available for private investment. Thus Iran will continue to walk a narrow financial tight rope.

Kuwait

10. In Kuwait, where oil provides about 95% of the government revenues, the probable increase resulting from the February settlement will help to swell total revenues in FY 1971–72 by about \$470 million to a total of about \$1,365 million.⁹ The increase not only will make it easier to finance Kuwait's Khartoum and other aid payments,¹⁰ but also will permit a significant growth in developmental spending and a large accumulation of reserves. Even assuming that growth in total spending is double the rate of last year—that is, 10% instead of 5%—Kuwait will have a surplus of about \$380 million in FY 1971–72. This surplus when added to the already large reserves¹¹ would be equivalent to more than two years' imports.

Iraq

11. The increase in oil earnings from the February settlement—about \$640 million during 1971–75—accounts for only about 30% of the total increase Iraq will receive when negotiations for its Mediterranean oil are settled. On the basis of the February settlement alone, however, Iraq will have sufficient additional revenues in 1971 to eliminate an anticipated deficit in its planned budget while increasing developmental spending about 22%. Developmental spending in recent years has been pared in order to accommodate the rapid expansion in other government expenditures, particularly for defense. The heavy debts incurred in conjunction with defense preparations coupled with its servicing of past loans for economic development have imposed a burden on Iraq's balance of payments and in recent years have caused occasional late payments and sharp prompting from creditors. The settlement of Iraq's Mediterranean production will raise revenues to the

⁹ Increase in FY 1971–72 (31 March 1971–1 April 1972) over FY 1970–71 budgeted revenue of \$894 million, of which \$848 million was to come from oil revenue. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁰ Khartoum payments at present amount to about \$91 million annually to the UAR. Payments to Jordan of about \$39 million annually have been suspended for political reasons, but may be resumed shortly. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹¹ At the end of 1970, official reserves amounted to \$203 million, excluding large sums held by the ruling family. [Footnote is in the original.]

point where Baghdad will be able to increase government spending substantially, pay off some debts, and still accumulate large reserves.

Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Other Gulf Emirates

12. Oil provides about 90% of the revenues of the five oil producing Emirates,¹² and much of the increase will be added to the fortunes of the rulers' families and the privy purse. Economic development has been allocated only about one-third of total revenues. There are, of course, some disparities among the individual countries, both in oil revenues received and spending patterns.

13. Abu Dhabi, largest of the five oil producers, will receive the equivalent of about \$1,600 per capita in increased oil revenues in 1971 as a result of the recent settlement. This sheikdom, almost uniquely among the five, is expected to use substantial sums for economic development. In 1969, for example, more than half of its revenues went for this purpose. Nevertheless, large surpluses will accumulate, some of which will doubtless end up with the ruling family.

14. Much of Bahrain's increased revenues—only about \$39 per capita—probably will go to the rulers—at present about 40% of the country's receipts are used for this purpose. In the past two years, only 10% of total government revenues went for development. Some increases, however, may occur in spending on defense and social services such as education and health.

15. Despite some recent interest in increasing development spending, Qatar's royal families probably also will get most of the additional revenues. They have been receiving more than half of the government's total revenues.

Conclusions

16. The February 1971 agreement will result in substantially increased revenues for Persian Gulf oil producers during its five-year life. Revenues in 1971–75 are expected to increase \$13 billion. Final settlement of the Saudi and Iraqi exports to the Mediterranean could add \$2 billion more.

17. The magnitude of the increase and its impact on spending patterns in individual countries will vary considerably. While Iran probably will spend all of its revenues, the others clearly will not. Iraq and Saudi Arabia (when the Mediterranean agreement is concluded) will likely spend considerable sums on both development and the military. Even so the increased earnings are so large that substantial additions to reserves seem certain. As for the Sheikdoms, it is highly unlikely

¹² In addition to Abu Dhabi and Qatar, these oil producing Emirates include Bahrain, Dubai, and Oman. [Footnote is in the original.]

that they will increase their spending more than a fraction of the increased revenues. Most of the gains will end up either in official reserves or in the private hoards of the various ruling families.

18. Regardless of how these countries dispose of their increased earnings, nearly all the money will eventually return to Western Europe (and to a lesser extent Japan and the United States) either in the form of payments for increased imports or in various direct and portfolio investments.

95. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, March 3, 1971, 1305Z.

682. Subject: Persian Gulf Future. Ref: Tehran 0965.²

1. It is our feeling that British relinquishment of islands to Iran (para 4 reftel) would make Albion's perfidy known to even remotest and smallest shaikh, and British prestige needed to fulfill ongoing obligations outlined in Foreign Secretary's March 1 statement to Commons would be significantly undermined to detriment of UK, US and even Iranian interests. While Saudis might secretly welcome UK's assuming obloquy of releasing Arab soil to Iran, Saudis would also find it useful as tool for belaboring British or as excuse not to accept British urgings in such matters as settlement of Abu Dhabi boundary dispute. However, we think our urging Saudis to mute their public reaction would probably be unnecessary.

2. We were encouraged by UK FonSec's firm reassertion of British intent to continue endeavors create Gulf federation. Accordingly, unless Dept perceives objection we intend indicate to Saudis in discussions here that we find Douglas-Home declaration heartening and positive evidence of British intention to leave Gulf in as good condition as possible and that we agree in general with policy Home's statement lays down.

3. Fundamental problem with which we most concerned is that of future of FAA. Its defects are many and its progress has been slow, but alternatives seem far less promising. Without some such frame-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis. It was repeated to Dhahran, Kuwait, London, and Tehran.

² Dated March 1. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF)

work little states will become (with possible exception of Bahrain) punching bags for power politics of their neighbors, Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and perhaps even for USSR.

4. In their projections of Gulf's future, Iranians seem to have downgraded federation's possibilities to almost zero, but a system of undefined ad hoc relationships between Iran and little states does not, it seems to us, offer prospects of stability and security which our enormous interests in Saudi Arabia require. Saudis have been badly distracted by their deep emotional involvement in Arab-Israel situation, disappointingly slow in activating their own role in Gulf and are not as well informed as they should be. Yet, fact remains they have some very clear notions as to their own interests and rights in region. We have had intimations already that they might feel moved to assert rather vigorously what they regard as their just due.

5. In recent weeks Saudis have put their shoulder to wheel towards FAA's realization, and we are optimistic that with British prodding SAG will make further moves towards assisting FAA to come to life. Such a trend draws Saudis into useful, constructive role in Gulf affairs, builds up concept in Saudi minds that co-existence rather than co-opting is best means for living with Gulf shaikdoms.

6. Comparison of proposed FAA with PDRY as probable sad sequel to British efforts in Aden seems to create automatic pessimism in many minds regarding FAA's future. There are two important differences: FAA would have money with which to buy arms and/or mercenaries they need for defense. Secondly, the British are withdrawing voluntarily from Gulf rather than being driven out by well-organized, outside-supported, leftist elements who became inevitable successors in Aden.

7. Saudi regime, whatever its weaknesses and peculiarities, does have the power to play a useful role in supporting Gulf stability. Like Iran, it is overly pre-occupied at moment with a territorial matter—its dispute with Abu Dhabi. When it comes to matter of substance Faisal is still shrewd and preceptive, and it is worth noting that Saudi Arabia under its present system has enjoyed absolute quiet and security in recent months, whereas in Arab states elsewhere Palestinian guerrillas have disrupted some with acute insecurity and afflicted others with severe internal tensions.

8. We would still hope there might be some means of encouraging Iranian support for federation. If there is not, then in any case we believe US policy should continue urging collaborative UK-Kuwait-Saudi support for it and that we ourselves would recognize clearly that some form of federation is the only hopeful alternative we have for future of Gulf and correspondingly for protection our large interest in Saudi Arabia.

Thacher

96. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 30–1–71

Washington, April 1, 1971.

[Omitted here are a cover sheet, table of contents, and a map.]

THE PERSIAN GULF AFTER THE BRITISH DEPARTURE**Note**

This Estimate focuses on the prospects for stability in the Persian Gulf over the next few years. For more detail on Iran, see SNIE 34–70, “Iran’s International Position”, dated 3 September 1970, SECRET; for the world oil situation, see NIE 20/30–70, “The Security of Oil Supply to NATO and Japan”, dated 14 November 1970, SECRET; for Saudi Arabia, see NIE 36.6–70, “The Outlook for Saudi Arabia”, dated 7 April 1970, SECRET.²

Conclusions

A. The British decision to terminate protective arrangements with the small states of the lower Gulf by the end of 1971 will open the area to accelerating political change. There is little prospect that British-sponsored efforts to organize a federation of these tiny sheikhdoms will come to fruition. The rulers are jealous of their prerogatives. Rivalries, particularly among the four larger principalities, and general lack of sophisticated leadership further complicate federation efforts. Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai have a reasonable prospect of maintaining their existence as independent states; the five smaller entities probably cannot survive over the longer run, though they do not face immediate challenge.

B. As ruler of the most effective and powerful state of the region, the Shah of Iran is determined to assert his leadership of the Gulf after the British departure. If, as seems increasingly likely, negotiations

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1276, Saunders Files, Persian Gulf. Secret. Sent to Kissinger under a June 18 covering memorandum entitled “The Persian Gulf: Back-Up.” A note on the cover sheet of this NIE indicates that it superseded NIE 30–1–67, “The Persian Gulf States,” May 18, 1967, printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 94. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction.

² SNIE 34–70 is published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E–4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972, Document 86; NIE 20/30–70 is scheduled for publication ibid., volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969–1974; NIE 36–6–70 is Document 140.

with the sheikhs over the tiny islands of the Tunbs and Abu Musa which lie near the Strait of Hormuz fail to end in acceptable compromise, the Shah is likely to seize these islands once the British protectorate is ended. The Arab states of the area lack military capability to challenge this move, although some would protest vigorously.

C. King Feisal of Saudi Arabia is also attempting—though less skillfully than the Shah—to extend his influence in the Gulf. His dispute with Abu Dhabi and Oman over the Buraimi Oasis has little prospect of amicable solution in the near future. While Feisal would be tempted to use force to occupy this area, he is cautious by nature and probably recognizes at least some of the logistical and political difficulties attendant on such an operation.

D. If a radical regime should come to power in one of the sheikhdoms—and the chances of this are growing in Bahrain—both Saudi Arabia and Iran would probably seek to unseat it by indirect means. If these tactics did not succeed, they might attempt direct military intervention; both have the capability of launching successful attacks on any of the lower Gulf states. While the Shah and the King have common interest in this regard, their cooperation is not a foregone conclusion. The prospect of an Iranian lodgement on the Arab littoral might spur Feisal as a last resort to commit his own armed forces to pre-empt an Iranian move.

E. The USSR is certainly interested in establishing greater influence in the Gulf. Once the British leave, the Soviets will seek diplomatic relations with the lower Gulf states and may offer military equipment to the rulers. Soviet naval presence in the Gulf will doubtless increase, but there are constraints which will inhibit any striking upsurge; for example, the risk of disturbing present friendly relations with Iran. Though the Soviets are generally interested in acquiring shore facilities in the Indian Ocean area for regular use by naval vessels, they will probably not attach high priority to securing them in the Gulf. The USSR already is permitted regular naval visits at the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr.

F. The main US interest in the Gulf resides in assuring the unimpeded flow of oil from the region to consuming countries. The producing countries of the Gulf are displaying far greater regional cooperation than in the past, and are likely to advance new demands before the end of their five-year agreement with the oil companies in February 1976. We do not believe, however, that cooperation among the producing states would soon reach a point where they would concert to withhold oil for an extended period.

G. Rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf could also prove troublesome for the US as it would be difficult to reconcile the many US interests involved. After the British depart, the states of the

Gulf will almost certainly seek to involve the US more directly in their problems.

Discussion

[Omitted here are sections I–V, 14 pages of text.]

VI. Implications for the United States

40. The main US interest in the Gulf is assurance of an uninterrupted flow of oil to Western Europe and Japan and the contribution to the US balance of payments from the profits of American oil companies and US exports. US companies produce over 50 percent of the oil in the Gulf. About half of Western Europe's oil comes from the Gulf; Japan gets 90 percent of its oil from this region. Because presently most of the world's spare oil producing capacity (about two million barrels per day) is located here, Gulf oil would be important in compensating for a deficit developing from interruption in supply from any major oil producer elsewhere. Furthermore, only in the Gulf is there the likelihood of developing large increments of additional new production over the next few years.

41. In the past few years oil has been moving from a buyers to a sellers market. Rapidly rising demand in Western Europe and Japan has strained tanker availability; increasing consumption in the US has significantly reduced its spare oil producing capacity, and spare capacity in the Gulf has also declined. In this situation, the producing countries have become increasingly aware of their leverage and their ability to extract higher prices for oil. At the same time, competition which in the past stimulated eagerness to take advantage of one another's difficulty is lessening as substantial increases in production for all producers are in prospect. These factors were at work in the sharp confrontation with the international oil companies in the wake of the December 1970 meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). While some disunity in approach was still evident during these negotiations, the producing countries showed a greater degree of unanimity than had been apparent in the past.

42. In particular, the recent oil negotiations stimulated regional solidarity among the oil producing states of the Gulf. Common interest in higher revenues and an emerging conviction that they held the whip hand animated the Gulf producers to stand behind the Shah who dominated the confrontation with the international companies. While there was a certain amount of bluffing on both sides—neither side was really willing to see the flow of oil stopped—the Shah proved an effective bargainer. His performance in winning a five-year agreement for large and steady increases in posted prices has enhanced Iran's stature as a leader in this area.

43. This successful venture in regional cooperation is likely to have lasting effects. At least as long as the world's excess capacity is not ad-

equate to offset a shutdown by a major producer, the Gulf states are likely to view their interests as collectively pressing for higher per barrel revenues rather than return to the previous intense competition for greater oil revenues which led individual exporters to stress primarily increasing their own production. The Shah, however, would object strongly should Saudi Arabian production grow at a faster rate than production in Iran. But we believe that the Gulf countries will far more than in the past coordinate their bargaining approaches to the international companies.

44. We believe that the Gulf states are likely to consider ways to extract additional benefits from the oil companies before the end of the five-year term of the February 1971 agreement. The example of Libya and Venezuela which are pressing for more favorable terms will have important impact on the Persian Gulf producers. Hence, if the supply of oil remains tight, and if prices of Western goods rise rapidly, within a year or two the Gulf states are likely to advance new demands. These may include matters not covered by the present agreement, such as greater control and decision-making authority over oil operations in the form of equity participation in oil producing companies or relinquishment of additional concession areas, but they may also involve demands for higher prices. We do not believe, however, that cooperation between the Gulf producing states would soon reach the point where they would concert to withhold oil for an extended period in order to achieve their demands. Both the Shah and King Feisal, whose example would probably determine the actions of the lesser Gulf states, have little uncommitted oil income and would find any interruption in revenue painful.

45. In matters other than oil, conflicting politics of the larger states in the Gulf may prove troublesome for the US. If Feisal and the Shah, for example, were to fall into dispute over their respective roles in the Gulf, both would expect American support. While both Iran and Saudi Arabia almost certainly would do no more than verbal fencing in any event, a dispute between them would complicate the program of US military aid to Iran. In this situation, deliveries of advanced military equipment to the Shah would undoubtedly disturb the Saudi leadership. In view of the many US interests involved, it would not be easy to find a solution that would satisfy both sides.

46. The US Navy's Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR), operating from Bahrain, consists of a converted seaplane tender flagship and two destroyer-type vessels. The ruler of Bahrain is amenable to the continued operation of this force from his island. While Iran in particular opposes foreign forces moving in as the British leave, there is throughout the Gulf a general acceptance of the continuation of a long-standing activity. Nonetheless, pressure against MIDEASTFOR is likely to grow after the British depart. Should the present regime

in Bahrain fall, however, the impetus to oust these naval units will probably accelerate.

47. In any event, the US is going to have more problems facing it in the Gulf in the future than before the British withdrawal. Not only will the pace of developments accelerate, but the states of the Gulf will almost certainly seek to involve the US more directly in their problems.

97. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait¹

Washington, April 13, 1971, 0030Z.

61915. Subj: Gulf Federation. Ref: State 38119; London 2843; Jidda 1143.² From Sisco.

1. We understand that British plan to wait out Saudi/Kuwaiti mission's next attempt, expected this month, to talk Gulf Amirs into nine state federation before UK itself tries to bring Saudi/Kuwait thinking around to accept reality that neither Bahrain nor Qatar will in final event accept membership in FAA. Embassy London should inform FCO of instructions set forth herein noting that we plan coordinate our own démarche with that of British and request we be advised of timing proposed UK approaches to SAG and GOK.³

2. When Dept instructs, Embassies Jidda and Kuwait should discuss following USG views on Gulf Federation at highest appropriate level.⁴

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 FAA. Secret, Limdis. Drafted on April 12 by Murphy; cleared in EUR/BMI, NEA/IRN, and NEA; and approved by Sisco. It was repeated to Tehran and Dhahran.

² In telegram 38119 to Jidda and London, March 8, the Department made no objection to Thatcher and Walsh reiterating U.S. interest in a federation. (Ibid.) Telegram 2843 from London, March 31, contained information on the March 29 conversation among Murphy, Luce, and Acland. This discussion was a follow-up conversation to that of March 8, reported in telegram 2063 from London. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 728, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. V) In telegram 1143 from Jidda, April 11, Thatcher relayed the information that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia would deploy another joint team to visit the Gulf states to urge a federation of nine. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 FAA)

³ Annenberg passed on the instructions to Acland on April 14. (Telegram 3305 from London; *ibid.*)

⁴ Walsh passed on the information according to telegram 403 from Kuwait, April 14. Thatcher referenced it in telegram 1195 from Jidda, April 15. (Both *ibid.*)

3. a) USG had originally hoped that all nine Amirates would agree to join together in Federal framework and still hopes this may be possible at some future date. However, reports of past several weeks have convinced us this goal unattainable by end of 1971 and its pursuit to exclusion more modest goal likely to be counterproductive.

b) Only few months remain, since we are convinced establishment of FAA would be far more difficult after UK withdrawal and perhaps impossible.

c) Appears maximum likely Federation attainable now will consist of seven Trucial States.

d) USG therefore strongly supports efforts of seven Amirates to join in Federal framework and urges GOK and SAG do likewise in interest future stability of Gulf area.

4. If no FAA materializes this year we foresee:

a) Dispersal and dissolution of Trucial Oman Scouts leaving no effective force capable of intervening throughout Trucial Coast to restore order if necessary;

b) disruption and probable disintegration of existing inter-Amirate counter-intelligence and counter-subversion liaison;

c) weakening or loss of promising institution for inter-Amirate economic cooperation (Trucial States Development Council);

d) exposure of smaller Amirates to individual subversion by radical powers.

5. Dept hopes Amb. Thacher will have opportunity at some point review foregoing personally with King. We are particularly apprehensive that Faisal may be reluctant endorse truncated FAA, on assumption he will find it difficult to support grouping which will be dominated by Abu Dhabi. Should there be appropriate opening in meeting with Faisal, Ambassador should note we assume SAG leadership shares our conviction that Federation, even if consisting of only 6/7 Amirates, is indispensable to Peninsula stability. If Faisal or other Saudis raise Saudi/Abu Dhabi border dispute, suggest you respond USG has no intention interject itself into this problem but does hope SAG will separate this dispute from urgent task of launching FAA.

Rogers

98. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Rosemary Neaher of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 19, 1971.

SUBJECT

Status Report on the Arabian/Persian Gulf

There is just about half a year remaining before the special treaty relationships between the British and the Gulf states come to an end. British efforts to get a Gulf federation in train before withdrawal were accelerated last year by London's appointment of Sir William Luce, an old Gulf hand, as the Prime Minister's special representative on that issue. He has periodically made the rounds in the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia and Iran and has remained in touch with Washington as the situation evolved. Secretary Rogers, in London for SEATO, had the opportunity to get high-level assessments on the British outlook,² and Luce has now gone back to the area for yet another round of discussions.

This paper is intended to bring you up to date on the state of play in the negotiations between the British and the states in the Gulf as we move into the last lap before official British ties terminate in December. [The attached map should be helpful.]³ We will be coming to you separately later with a broader strategy paper on U.S. options in the Gulf after 1971, so this paper will not address any larger issues or great power interests in the area.

The present situation can be described in terms of developments in three broad areas:

(1) Efforts to achieve a federation among all or some of the nine states.

(2) Efforts to resolve the dispute between Iran and two of the states (over possession of three tiny islands) which has resulted in the Shah's withholding his support for the formation of a federation. Failure to resolve this dispute could lead to the Shah's seizure of these islands and trigger the first Persian Gulf crisis.

(3) Refinement of British plans for the manner and extent of their withdrawal and the shape and intent of their post-withdrawal presence.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 647, Country Files, Middle East, General, Vol. VIII. Secret. Sent for information.

² Telegram Secto 27/3859 from London, April 28. (Ibid., Box 728, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VI)

³ Attached but not printed. All brackets are in the original.

I. Federation

Whether a federation will emerge at all and whether, assuming it does, it will be subscribed to by all nine or less than nine states are still the big questions. To date, there has been no agreement among the states on what powers would be delegated to the proposed Federation of Arab Emirates (kingdoms) or where its capital should be. In the interim, some have developed interest in going independent, two are caught in the dispute with Iran and all have demonstrated their capacity to allow historic family and tribal rivalries to obscure issues of longer-term security.

Exhaustive consultations on the question of a federation of nine members led the British to conclude early this year that that prospect was dead and that prospects for a configuration short of nine were very much up in the air; their recent talks with us confirm British skepticism. The matter stands as follows:

—*Nine is dead* because *Bahrein* has made clear—in every way short of a declaration—that it wants to go independent. *Bahrein's* ruling family (related to Kuwait's Sabahs) has a more sophisticated and developed society and found the proposals for sharing power in the FAA with poorer and more backward neighbors unsatisfactory.

—*Eight also seems impossible*. *Qatar*, it appears, does not want to remain in a federation without *Bahrein*, putting it in competition with entities among the remaining seven with which it has had vigorous disputes. Everyone is fairly certain that *Qatar* will opt for independence if *Bahrein* does.

—A union of seven has not been ruled out but there have been problems:

—The seven states, running west to east, are Abu Dhabi, Dubai and the five Trucial States of Sharja, Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain, Ras al Khaimah and Fujairah.

—The *Saudis* and the *Kuwaitis*, finally persuaded to lobby in the Gulf on behalf of union, have until recently pressed for a federation of the nine [despite the fact that *Bahrein's* intentions have been clear for some time]. This has inhibited serious consideration on the part of the Gulf states of a union of anything less than nine. Just this past month, the two littorals acknowledged that nine was a dead question.

—One helpful factor in the British view would have been an immediate declaration of independence by *Bahrein*. *Bahrein*, however, has been reluctant to do this without *Faisal's* go-ahead. *Faisal* has dawdled because he would have preferred a union of the remaining eight—now deemed impossible—over seven. [The latter would undoubtedly be dominated by wealthy Abu Dhabi with which *Faisal* has two serious border disputes.] The latest development is that *Bahrein*, with Saudi approval, is expected to make its declaration for independence in June. The British have felt this to be an unnecessary delay.

—Two of the seven—*Sharja* and *Ras al Khaimah*—respectively claim the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs which the Shah has made unquestionably clear will be his—by force if necessary. The Shah has made his

support for a federation contingent upon resolution of the islands question.

—Finally, there are *tribal rivalries among the seven*. For example, Dubai for historic reasons might align with Qatar rather than remain under the predominant influence of Abu Dhabi. The five small Trucial States are virtual desert kingdoms which have barely moved into the 20th century, although there is some suggestion that Abu Dhabi could have jurisdiction over them. [Dubai, of course, is geographically situated between Abu Dhabi and the five.]

The purpose of the foregoing was not to recount bothersome details but to demonstrate the kinds of mind-boggling jealousies and tribal prerogatives that affect regional cooperation among the Gulf states.

The British have been monitoring and keeping the lid on these squabbles throughout the protectorship period. Preparing to shed the veil as the protector power, they must settle some of these rivalries if the Gulf states are ever to work together. The British have given some thought to the smallest combination of states—perhaps two or three (in addition to an independent Bahrein and Qatar)—but questions remain as to the viability of such a configuration and the status of those shaykhdoms which might be excluded. Nevertheless, Luce is out in the field now pressing for a federation of seven which now Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran also think is the best arrangement.

The *short-range British strategy vis-à-vis federation can be summed up as follows*: (1) They will press Bahrein to stick to its intention to declare independence in June. (2) They told Secretary Rogers in London that they will continue to take a public position as favoring a union of seven, as Bahrein's intentions (and Qatar's) are now clear in the public view. [Their objective would be to go with Bahrein, Qatar and an FAA of seven to the U.N. in the fall for membership.] (3) They will press the Arabs to work out a union of the seven but they have privately told us that, all else failing, they will accept a union of even as few as two. (4) They will press the Shah and the two Trucial States to resolve the islands question.

British intentions in the event that no federation is formed are less precise. They have told us privately that they would probably have to work out some kind of bilateral relationship with the four larger states analogous to that which they would accord any federation that would have been formed [Section III of this paper]. The ticklish question in their view would be what would happen to the five tiny Trucial States.

II. The Islands Dispute

Standing right in the neck of the entrance to the Gulf are Abu Musa (claimed by Sharja) and the Tunbs (claimed by Ras al Khaimah). Sovereignty over and a military presence on all three of the islands are claimed by the Shah. [His adamance on the islands is reinforced by his

feeling that he was magnanimous in relinquishing Iran's claim to Bahrain.]⁴ The following attitudes affect resolution of the problem:

—The *Shah* has said that these islands are necessary to him for the defense of Gulf security and that a military presence alone would not be enough; he must also have sovereignty (which would permit him exclusive rights over the oil believed to be offshore Abu Musa). Until February, he was willing to settle for a negotiation which fuzzed the sovereignty question (letting the Arabs temporarily off the hook) but gave him an immediate presence on the islands. This would facilitate movement towards a federation since he has said he would advance his support for it as soon as the British worked out with the two Gulf states to permit Iran its rightful presence on the island. The Shah has told Luce he is fully prepared to be very financially and economically generous to the shaykhs.

Neither side has been given to compromise. In February, frustrated at the lack of progress in talks, the Shah declared that he demanded both sovereignty and a military presence and that he would seize the islands the moment the British departed if the matter was not settled in advance of withdrawal. The British saw this as a turn for the worse.

It would seem that the Shah would want to avoid a precipitous move if he is to play a leading role in the Gulf. This may have been his thinking when, last month, he advanced to the British a softer negotiating position in which he returned to interest in fuzzing the sovereignty (for a period of two years at most and on the assumption it would be resolved in his favor), generous compensation for the Trucial States (he has even asked that the British begin researching the economic needs of Sharja and Ras al Khaimah), and some joint garrisoning in only the first weeks of ceding the islands to the Shah. If the shaykhs would accept this, the Shah would immediately declare his support for a federation (provided no documents related thereto mentioned the islands question). Luce is currently peddling this last offer in Sharja and Ras al Khaimah and will be going back to Tehran. We will keep you informed of the results.

—The *Trucial shayks* are nervous about ceding "Arab territory," especially in a time when nationalist, radical forces are growing in the area, and they are also fearful of the accusation of collusion with the Shah. Sharja also sees a valuable asset in the prospective oil deposits off Abu Musa. Both Trucial leaders are characteristically of a desert mentality and not inclined to budge in any event. They have indicated that they would almost prefer to have the islands seized, thus absolving them of responsibility. Luce has not been overly sanguine that the

⁴ As reported in telegram 780 from Jidda, March 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 19 FAA)

Shah's latest negotiating position is saleable to the Trucial rulers, although he customarily takes a dim view in advance.

—*The British*—in the eyes of the Shah, Faisal and the Kuwaitis—are the only ones who could work out a compromise and the picture of these negotiations over the islands contains nuances of deeper British concern for their long-term future in the Gulf as well as their especial favoritism for their Gulf state clients, over Iran. The British have several options, each of which produces a different set of dilemmas which they appear to be weighing:

(1) *Pressing the shaykhs harder*, pushing the theory that ceding the islands to the Shah for security purposes is in the interests of Gulf security. Done before withdrawal and in a package which fuzzed the sovereignty issue, short-term public outcry could be muffled as attention switched to focus on the formation of a federation. The Saudis and the Kuwaitis have taken the position that the British should work out any mutually satisfactory agreement. They are less concerned about the disposition of the islands than being forced to take a position—which they would have to do—if the Shah seized the islands.

—The British have expressed real interest in using the concept of “in the interests of Gulf security” as the mode for getting over the island question and, assuming the shaykhs bought the Shah's latest proposal, it would appear the route. At the same time, there are clear signs of reluctance to press too hard on these Arab clients on a question of “Arab territory” and wishful hoping that the Shah will back down. This is because their problem is very *deep concern about their long-term credibility with the Arabs*, particularly vis-à-vis their interests in the Gulf in the future when formal British responsibility will have ceased. The effects of U.K. involvement in ceding “Arab territory” on the eve of withdrawal would have to be weighed against the effects of U.K.-Iran antagonism.

(2) *Permitting the Shah to simply set up a presence on the islands now*. The British would assume a posture of helplessness which would protect them against Arab criticism.

—This would have some of the same drawbacks as option 1 without the advantage of being able to characterize the deal as part of British efforts to tidy up outstanding problems before withdrawal. It would be a less helpful way for the Shah to begin a “cooperative” role in the Gulf and the Shah himself is really more interested in getting his islands as unprecipitously as possible.

(3) *Permit the matter to drift. The Shah will seize the islands at the beginning of next year*. The British have hinted that they rather like the fact of being entirely off the hook. At the same time, they are fully aware of the drawbacks.

—With the termination of formal British ties, the British would no longer have the formal cover for intervening in the face of whatever

public outcry might occur. The Arabs could take the case to the U.N. for a long drawn-out debate, and the Shah's forceable seizure could become an issue to inflame prospects for cooperation of the littorals. The moderate Arab littorals (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) would have to take a position against the Shah and the radicals would have a cause celebre. In the meantime, the Shah would have advanced no support for a federation. [It has not been established that his support is the determining factor in the establishment of the FAA. There would seem to be enough bickering on the Arab side to prevent its formation. However, the Shah's frustration of unity efforts—in distracting two potential members—is one more hurdle and a potential source of irritation between the littorals if it goes unresolved.]

Comment: The results of Luce's most recent Tehran-Trucial States exchange, as time runs out, will be crucial.

III. British "Withdrawal"

If the foregoing issues bear an air of tentativeness, the nature and timing of British withdrawal and the shape of the post-withdrawal U.K. presence is even less clear. Much, we are told, will depend on the outcome of negotiations to get a federation effectively in gear.

As the protector power, Britain was, in effect, the parent of the Gulf states in helping to resolve issues between them and in conducting their foreign policy. The British were also responsible for the defense of the Gulf states and *committed* to coming to their defense.

The British describe their actual physical military presence as rather small; the important point is that internal security forces were ably led by British officers who have formed a network of effective leadership and qualified local ranks throughout the Gulf. On top of this is the British commitment to come to the defense of Gulf states under threat, either subversively or externally. U.K. defense officials have quantified their existing facilities as the following: an army battalion on Bahrein; several engineer squadrons (companies) at Sharja; two squadrons of Hawker Hunter aircraft on Bahrein (in fulfillment of a U.K. commitment to Kuwait); several frigates and minesweepers at Bahrein; contract officers with the small Bahrein Navy; seconded officers and non-commissioned officers with the Trucial Oman Scouts (the local security forces developed by the U.K. and the important element of local control).

Post-withdrawal policy was officially described on March 1 in the British parliament as the following: [This was the Conservative Government affirmation of its decision to carry out the 1968 decision of the Labor Government.]

(1) *Strong support for a union of the Gulf amirates and the offer to the union of the following assistance:*

—A treaty of friendship "containing and undertaking to *consult* together in time of need."

—Contribution of the Trucial Oman Scouts to form the nucleus of an FAA army. Availability of British officers and other personnel on loan to FAA forces and assistance in supply of equipment. [The FAA would finance its own forces.]

—Offer of elements of British forces, including training teams to assist with the training of union security forces. They could be stationed on a continuing basis to act in liaison and training roles.

—Regular training exercises involving the British Army and RAF units.

—Regular visits to the area by Royal Navy ships.

—Review of these arrangements where relevant.

(2) *HMG would expect the Union to continue to permit overflight rights and the staging of British military aircraft through Union territory as at the present.*

This policy statement was prefaced by the remark that it was related “solely to the situation as it stands at present”, i.e. that Bahrein, Qatar and the seven Trucial States were continuing discussions on the formation of an acceptable federation, with help from the Saudis and Kuwaitis. Discussions with the British since have shed the following light:

—The statement contained an element of flexibility; there may be a lingering in the withdrawal process. [Presumably, this means in the event a federation cannot be formed before the year is out.]

—Nevertheless, British defense is operating on the assumption that U.K. forces will be withdrawn before the end of the year, perhaps with the most activity coming in the fall.

—Periodic Army and RAF exercises would continue and Royal Navy visits would amount to about four per year. Overflight and staging rights at Bahrein along with a communications facility will be kept at Bahrein. The U.K. wants to provide training teams and leave its officers and NSOC⁵ with the Trucial Scouts. [The Sharja facility (a small airport) would be abandoned although the UK will maintain a facility at Masirah (Oman).]

It is as yet unclear as to what extent the British have discussed these items with the Gulf states, although this was one of the original purposes of Luce’s present trip. Presumably, the situation will change as steps towards or away from federation occur. In the event no federation is formed, the British are aware that they will have to face several questions:

—What would be the British relationship to *each* of the Gulf states?

—What arrangement would be made for the important Trucial Oman Scouts? [The British would like to avoid dividing them up and distributing them to each state as the core of individual armies.]

⁵ This is a possible reference to either seconded and non-commissioned officers, or to the sector operations center.

—What would be the British relationship to the states in general in the event each remains a separate identity?

Conclusion: Sir William Luce is back in the Gulf at the moment to draw the Shah out on his compromise proposal (Luce has already told our embassy in Tehran he is not “sanguine” about its saleability to the Shaykhs)⁶ and to make the rounds with the Shaykhs as well as the Saudis. From the information base established in this paper, we will keep you informed via briefer memos from now on.

⁶ As reported in telegram 2359 from Tehran, May 6. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 602, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. III)

99. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

Your Trip to London—Wrap-up on Persian Gulf

As you depart for London, the state of play in British efforts to organize the Gulf before withdrawing remains fluid. Since this is an issue on which the British are well-versed, you may find the following a useful summary of where matters stand at the moment.

1. *Federation.* You have seen the CIA assessment of the broader implications of British withdrawal,² my background memo³ and the recent cables following William Luce’s latest swing through the area.⁴ As you know, on Luce’s advice the British decided to approach King Faisal directly to impress upon him the fact that a federation of all nine states appeared to be a non-starter and to seek his cooperation in getting the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 647, Country Files, Middle East, General, Vol. VIII. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. Hoskinson initialed for Saunders. A typed note indicates the memorandum was for the London Briefing Book.

² Document 96.

³ Document 98.

⁴ Attached but not printed are telegram 2079 from Jidda, June 18; telegram 2112 from Jidda, June 20; telegram 10991 to London, June 19; and telegram 826 from Dhahran, June 22, on which Saunders wrote: “Bahrain exasperated with Faisal’s intransigence.”

Bahrainis to go ahead with their intention to declare independence this summer. With that obstacle overcome, the British were hopeful that serious work would begin on forming a federation of seven states (presuming that Qatar would follow Bahrain on the road to independence).

—As you know from this morning's briefing, King Faisal replied that his policy remains a federation of the nine and that the next step should be the convening of a meeting of the nine rulers to determine "who is cooperating and who is not." [Tab A]⁵ With many fruitless rulers' meetings behind them, the British appear exasperated at the thought of another one covering the same ground. At the moment, they are expecting the Saudi Foreign Minister, Saqqaf, in London for further discussions next week. They would like Bahrain to go ahead and declare independence without Faisal's blessing, and think the King would be manageable.

—The Bahrainis have now expressed their unhappiness over Faisal's intransigence. They have indicated they will continue to prepare themselves for a mid-summer declaration of independence, despite Faisal's reaction, but want to avoid being blamed as the one Gulf state unwilling to cooperate in federation. They are exasperated that the other Gulf states and Arab states (except Kuwait) have not come to grips with the fact that a federation of the nine is not possible. Nevertheless, our consulate in Dhahran has pointed out that the Bahrainis are still very reluctant to move ahead without Faisal's blessing. [Tab B]⁶ It remains to be seen whether they will do so before the deadline for U.N. membership applications in early August.

—State feels that Faisal is convinced that the British have not tried hard enough to demonstrate that a federation of the nine is dead. They believe that a rulers' meeting, as Faisal suggested, with a public head count of "who is cooperating and who is not" would provide the King with the kind of tangible proof he needs to show from his Gulf colleagues—the results of which he could either publicly endorse, giving the go-ahead to Bahrain, or ignore and permit matters to move towards a federation of seven.

2. *The Islands' Dispute* remains as described in our back-up papers.⁷ William Luce presented the Trucial States with the Shah's compromise

⁵ Attached at Tab A but not printed is a June 21 paper prepared by Saunders for Kissinger, presumably for inclusion in the President's Tuesday (June 22) briefing. All brackets are in the original.

⁶ Attached but not printed at Tab B is telegram 826 from Dhahran; see footnote 4 above.

⁷ The back-up material, sent to Kissinger under a June 18 covering memorandum entitled "The Persian Gulf: Back-Up," included a June 11 paper entitled "The Persian Gulf"; NIE 30-1-71, Document 98; telegram 5363 to London, June 10, detailing a review session with British officials; and telegram 3243 from Tehran, June 17, which explored

proposal and the matter was left that the Arab side would consider it—but there is little optimism that they can accept the Shah's insistence on sovereignty. The atmosphere has been clouded somewhat by recent public statements in Kuwaiti press asserting that the islands are "Arab" territory [although privately the Kuwaitis have said they are less concerned about the ultimate disposition of the islands than the way in which a transfer is handled]. These have prompted sharp rebuttals in Iran. *Comment:* Knowing the Shah's sensitivities on this question, these public exchanges are not helpful. Further, they may move Kuwait to a position much tougher than the one that they have privately taken. The Shah, like King Faisal, is also suspicious of the British at this point.

Other Issues

Conceivably, the following items may be mentioned in any discussion of the Gulf.

—*COMIDEASTFOR*—As you know, we will be taking over the British naval facility on Bahrain and during the next fiscal year will probably qualitatively upgrade our presence by rotating in more modern destroyers and replacing the aging flagship.

—*U.S. Diplomatic Presence*—The imminence of the "formal" British withdrawal—permitting the establishment of diplomatic presences of other nations—has set in motion processes within the bureaucracy relating to the establishment of a U.S. presence. State is preparing for consideration in the Under Secretaries Committee proposed staffing for the Gulf, focussed on Bahrain, Oman and one mission in the Trucial States. They are thinking of a lower profile presence at the chargé level, with our ambassador in Kuwait accredited to the three missions. They are also looking at the question of recognition of Bahrain in anticipation of its declaration of independence.

—*Yemen:* As you know, after the long war of the sixties between Yemen Royalists (supported by Faisal) and rebels (supported by the UAR), Faisal finally reached an accommodation with North Yemen which brought into power moderates satisfactory to him in 1969. North Yemen has been and remains heavily in debt (especially to the Soviet Union and the Chinese) and despite the Saudis' oft-repeated concern about radical elements in the Gulf, they have not been very forthcoming on financial assistance. The Yemenis have floated their interest in resumed diplomatic relations with the U.S. but are nervous about getting out in front of the UAR on this question. We have tried to impress upon King Faisal the importance of his following up North Yemen's

the historical basis for Iranian suspicions of British activity and warned of a possible Iranian-British crisis brewing over Persian Gulf issues. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1276, Saunders Files, Persian Gulf)

more favorable political situation with aid, but with little success. King Faisal continues to pursue a policy of confrontation with the radical South Yemen regime based in Aden. Currently, he is encouraging tribal dissidents, in part through North Yemen, but with little visible success.

100. Memorandum of Conversation¹

London, June 25, 1971, 10:15–11:50 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

British Foreign Office Officials: Messrs. Crawford, Brimelow, Parsons, Munson
Mr. William J. Galloway, American Embassy London
Dr. Kissinger
Mr. Sonnenfeldt
Mr. Lord

[Omitted here is material on the Middle East not related to the Persian Gulf.]

Persian Gulf

Mr. Parsons recalled that the British were withdrawing their presence by the end of the year, and ending their protectorates, while trying to leave a tidy stable by getting a federation of nine states. Dr. Kissinger believed this would not work, and Mr. Parsons agreed that a nine-power federation was a nonstarter. Bahrein and Qatar were not cooperating, and the British believed they would go off on their own. This left them free to concentrate on the federation of seven states on the Trucial Coast. The Kuwaitis agreed but were stymied because of Faisal who for obscure reasons insists on a federation of nine. In response to Dr. Kissinger's question of why he took this position, Mr. Parsons said that it was partly a hardening of the mental arteries, partly because he didn't want to see Abu Dhabi predominant, partly his experience with Aden, and partly his suspicion of the British and his approach that anything they want he doesn't like.

Dr. Kissinger asked whether he preferred to have seven emirates since nine was out. Mr. Parsons said this was a sticking point. Bahrein and Qatar didn't want to alienate Faisal and go off on their own and this prevents the British from getting a federation of seven.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 62, Country Files, Europe, UK MemCons (originals). Secret. The meeting was held in the Foreign Office.

Dr. Kissinger said there were two possibilities: either they would not go off on their own and there would be a nine-power federation, or they would go off and there would be a seven-power federation. Mr. Parsons said a third possibility was that nothing would happen, and Dr. Kissinger commented that this meant nine separate entities. Mr. Parsons said this was much more likely and Dr. Kissinger asked whether Faisal really preferred this. Mr. Parsons said it was hard to figure him out; he would like to see all options open. Dr. Kissinger wondered whether he preferred nine independent states to seven federated ones. Mr. Parsons commented this sounded ridiculous on the surface. The British couldn't get past his blank insistence on a federation of nine and his own advisers didn't know his reasoning. Time was running out with only six months left and a lot to do.

Dr. Kissinger asked whether a union of seven would be a single state or would they all be run independently. Mr. Parsons thought that a federation was viable, since there was a considerable infrastructure already. In response to Dr. Kissinger's question, Mr. Parsons thought that the likely capital was Dubai or Abu Dhabi. He described some of the existing infrastructure and believed that a federation of seven was a practical possibility. Mr. Crawford remarked that it would look like a federation but with tribal autonomy. The federation would have certain governmental authorities such as security and foreign affairs.

Mr. Parsons said that anything that "our friends" could do to influence the situation would be profoundly appreciated.

Dr. Kissinger noted that Faisal was not too responsive to our leadership. He asked whether the US should try to move him toward a federation of seven. Mr. Parsons said that the US should use tactful leverage without appearing to gang up on him and make him more obstinate. Dr. Kissinger said that the US knew the problem and that its preference was the same as the British. He didn't know what we had done.

Mr. Galloway said that we had been waiting upon the British and that our degree of influence was not great. Dr. Kissinger commented that we would talk to Faisal. He had the impression that we had not done anything and were waiting on the British. We preferred a federation of nine to one of seven, with the least favorable solution being nine independent states. There might be a low key way to talk to him. *Dr. Kissinger said he would talk to Sisco about it.* Mr. Parsons thanked him.

Mr. Parsons said that the other problem was the Shah and the two islands. If they solve the problem of Faisal and get a federation of seven they then face the problem of a Shah who opposed any federation as long as the two islands problem was unresolved. Dr. Kissinger commented that everyone agrees that the Shah could be on the islands and the question was one of technical sovereignty. Mr. Parsons said

this was broadly correct; Iraq and Southern Yemen were opposed but this did not matter too much. If a couple of policemen were left and there was no talk of sovereignty, and the Shah had his garrison, he believed all parties could be brought to accept this arrangement.

The Shah had made some violent anti-British statements recently. It would be difficult to get any settlement which would not completely sell out sacred Arab soil and cause an uproar. He believed the Shah underestimated the Arab reaction to a Persian takeover. The British doubted his view and thought the wolf pack would howl. The alternative was to do nothing and let him take over when the British had gone. The trouble with that was that it would not help with the federation problem—so long as there was no settlement the Shah would oppose federation.

Dr. Kissinger asked whether he could thwart a federation. Mr. Parsons was not sure he could stymie six of the entities, but Dubai, one of the two big ones, was under the Shah's thumb. The other six maybe could go ahead. Perhaps one could go for a federation of six with the hope of Dubai jumping on. Mr. Crawford believed that Dubai would like to do this if they could convince the Shah to keep quiet on the question of formality.

Dr. Kissinger said he was not sure of the US position and asked Mr. Galloway to comment. He said we had impressed on the Shah that the British were doing their utmost to help him. Dr. Kissinger had said that the US had not taken a position on the question of sovereignty versus garrisons. He asked whether trouble was likely to break out this spring, and Mr. Parsons said that January 1 was the key date. Mr. Parsons said that if the Shah were more reasonable on the sovereignty question, this could tide us over. Dr. Kissinger said that his impression in the talks with the Shah last year was that he wanted hegemony over the seven Gulf states. We were not sure he was for a viable federation. Mr. Parsons said that the British always had that suspicion because of some remarks he had dropped. It would be hard to get an acceptable hegemony [*federation*] if he causes an Arab-Iranian split over the two islands. Dr. Kissinger remarked that this was true unless he used the islands to prevent a federation and then picked off the states one by one. Mr. Parsons said that was a very sobering thought. Dr. Kissinger remarked that the Shah was extremely intelligent.

Dr. Kissinger said that he would look into both these matters when he got back. On the first one (Faisal) perhaps we could do something in a low key way; on the second one, he would have to assess the Shah's motive. He said that the US basically agreed with the British position to try to get the largest possible federation, nine, then seven, then six. In response to his query, Mr. Parsons said that there was nothing realistic below six, i.e., the five tiny states plus one of the big ones.

[Omitted here is material on the Bahamas and East-West relations.]

101. Report Prepared by Director of Central Intelligence Helms¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Views on the Persian Gulf [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

1. [*3 lines not declassified*] The two pressing issues in this area are clearly the status of three islands in the Strait of Hormuz (Abu Musa and the two Tunbs) and the prospects for a Federation of Arab Amirates among the Trucial States and neighboring Shaykhdoms.

2. *Conclusions:*

A. There appears to be an almost total breakdown of constructive communication among the major parties: Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom. This communication breakdown could, if unresolved prior to British withdrawal, lead to a political breakdown among the Gulf Shaykhdoms. The ability of all parties concerned to control the aftermath would then be considerably less than it is today.

B. [*1½ lines not declassified*] HMG's officials state that the decision to withdraw is final, that there will be no large-scale British reintervention after withdrawal, and, by implication at least, that they have all but despaired of working out a "reasonable solution among reasonable men." Given bad Saudi-Iranian feeling against Britain and apparent British determination to pull out with as little additional fuss as possible, it is difficult at present to see how anything more than drift will occur in the area during the remainder of this year.

C. Failure to find a settlement before the British withdraw would not only add to turbulence in the Gulf area but could also open yet another front in the Arab-Israeli struggle. The Israelis' principal objective in the Persian Gulf is to maintain the flow of Iranian oil to Israel but in the bargain they would not mind increasing friction between their friend Iran and the Arab states. This friction seems predestined by Iran's insistence on regaining sovereignty over the three islands, one way or another. If the Iranians seize the islands, the Arab countries, led by Iraq, will probably close ranks in vocal opposition. The Soviets will undoubtedly support the Arabs in projecting any takeover of the islands as an Iranian-Israeli-(and most likely)-US plot.

D. The British believe the Soviets will move slowly at first, limiting initial representation to a modest diplomatic and commercial

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 647, Country Files, Middle East General, Vol. VIII. Secret. Sent to Haig under a July 8 covering memorandum from Helms.

mission in Bahrain. The Iranians and Saudis seem too preoccupied with their own parochial interests to have given much thought to likely Soviet moves after British withdrawal. On the other hand, Soviet policy in Arab countries with newly changed status (e.g., South Yemen and Libya) suggests it is overly optimistic to conclude that the Soviets will be inactive in the Gulf.

E. The American stake in the Persian Gulf is obviously our trade surplus in this area, now \$1.5 billion per year, and the current oil output of 16.5 million barrels per day which is expected to rise to 22 million barrels by 1975. On this basis alone, the continuing search for a formula to bring together Iran and Saudi Arabia plus the Arab Shaykhdoms would seem to be indicated and additional effort perhaps warranted. The extent to which the U.S. Government should involve itself in good offices is clearly a policy question.

3. The following is a summary, country by country, [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

A. *British View*: [*less than 3 lines not declassified*] The British recognize Iran as the unchallenged military power in the area. Iran is rapidly expanding naval and air force facilities along the Persian Gulf littoral. These facilities, without the islands, will insure Iranian control of the Gulf straits. HMG is ready and anxious to work out a reasonable solution among reasonable men. The difficulty is that the Iranian officials, particularly Foreign Minister Zahedi, appear to be misinforming the Shah and laying nearly total blame for the lack of a settlement on what they see as HMG's "double-dealing." King Faysal of Saudi Arabia is avoiding (and probably incapable of playing) any constructive role. Kuwait is not expected to make any useful initiatives, not taking sides in the controversy probably being its optimum position. Bahrain, which almost certainly will opt to become independent in the next month or so, to be followed by Qatar, is too concerned with national survival to emerge as a Gulf leader. The Trucial Shaykhdoms may eventually end up a federation of seven States, or possibly six if Dubai refuses to join, but in any case are too small, too weak militarily and too much tied to traditional petty rivalries to become an effective unified force. Perhaps surprising, Iraq has turned inward and become notably less aggressive after several years of active involvement with Gulf insurgent movements. Also, the UAR, once possibly the greatest threat to future area stability, appears to be preoccupied with more important problems elsewhere and is not now considered a significant factor in the Gulf. The British think that the main source of future trouble will come through internal subversion. Two theories prevail: either Bahrain, the most sophisticated and developed of the Shaykhdoms, will go first, or the initial threat will be a domino-type reaction sparked by the radical regime in Aden, moving through Dhufar and the rest of Sultanate of Oman [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

and affecting all the Trucial Shaykhdoms as far as Abu Dhabi. The British tend to be fairly relaxed, perhaps overly so, about the Soviets. They believe the Soviets will move cautiously for the first year or two after British withdrawal, limiting early representation to small diplomatic and commercial missions in Bahrain. Whatever the source of future subversion—purely internal or fomented by external forces such as the Soviets, the British are unanimous that there is almost no chance of large-scale reintervention or counteraction by HMG after withdrawal. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] there are so many vital international problems for Britain today, pre-eminently the common market question, that HMG simply cannot afford to get bogged down in Persian Gulf politics after 31 December 1971. And except for stated willingness to offer advice to, and meet with, the parties most directly concerned, there is little, if any, indication that HMG plans major new diplomatic efforts to resolve the outstanding issues of the Gulf before British withdrawal.

B. Iranian View: [5 lines not declassified].

The British are becoming more troublesome. The central issue began 80 years ago when the British “stole” the three islands from Iran. Now Iran will get the islands back, by force if necessary. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] The British are meddling with the Kuwaitis and even non-Gulf countries such as the UAR. As has occurred elsewhere when they withdrew from overseas territory, the British are leaving (perhaps intentionally) a “mess” in the Persian Gulf. The one hope is that British concentration on other problems, especially the EEC, will reduce their capability for troublemaking in the Gulf. Iran is the strongest and only stable country in the area. King Faysal is old and rather ineffectual. The main concern about Saudi Arabia is who or what will succeed King Faysal, and when. Bahrain, Qatar and the seven Trucial States are free to do what they want without interference from Iran. Iran welcomes a federation of the Shaykhdoms, if this is the Shaykhdoms’ choice, and is even prepared to offer financial assistance to the needy Trucial States. But Iran must first regain the three islands. Iraq could be more of a problem if reinforced by further Soviet military hardware. Soviet “friendship” treaties with Iraq and Syria, patterned after the UAR model, would be particularly dangerous for Iran. The Soviets have not given up their historic aim of seeking a land route to the Persian Gulf.

[*1½ lines not declassified*] Iran may be misreading British intentions and overestimating British capabilities in the post-1971 Gulf. After all, Iran and the UK as well as the US and other countries concerned, all want the same thing—stability in the area. The usual Iranian response was, “yes, but . . .”, and citing the British briefing of Egypt on the Gulf problem as clearly mischievous. On 28 June the local press highlighted a speech by the Prime Minister pointing up Iran’s determination to get the three islands whatever the cost. According to [*less than 1 line not*

declassified] “the cost may be the collapse of CENTO if the British force Iran to quit by remaining obstinate over the islands.”

C. *Saudi View*: (Note: Although I did not visit Saudi Arabia or talk with Saudi officials on this trip, the following is based on an assessment given me [*less than 1 line not declassified*])

King Faysal regards himself as the greatest Arab, dangerously overestimating his own and his country's capability to influence events in the Middle East. He has refused to discuss any solution to the Gulf situation other than that based on a federation of nine Shaykhdoms, even though this is a patently dead issue. He has requested that the Bahrainis postpone any final decision on independence, but has left them baffled as to his own intentions. In mid-June the British Ambassador in Jidda informed King Faysal that HMG felt compelled to abandon efforts to achieve a federation of nine Shaykhdoms and asked for Saudi support for a union of seven (without Bahrain and Qatar). King Faysal reportedly lectured the Ambassador that Saudi Arabia could not be a party to destroying the original concept of a federation of nine. The King further warned the Ambassador that a federation of seven would confirm the world's suspicions of British perfidy, that HMG's ultimate objective is the perpetuation of British dominance of the lower Gulf. The British vehicle, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] would be the “stooge” Sultan of Oman who would then attempt to absorb the seven Trucial States. Contrasted [*less than 1 line not declassified*] views [*1 line not declassified*] that a federation of nine is out of the question and that, in fact, Bahraini independence is desirable. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Saudi Arabia would not object to Iranian takeover of the disputed islands, provided this could be done in such a way to avoid the appearance that Saudi Arabia acquiesced in the seizure of Arab territory by non-Arabs. [*name not declassified*] talks of Saudi Arabia's “Manifest Destiny” to unite the entire Arabian peninsula under the Saudi flag and, in particular, suggests that any internal unrest in Abu Dhabi would be used as a pretext to take over that Shaykhdom. [*3 lines not declassified*] Conspicuous failure of any of King Faysal's policies would make him appear a foolish old man, spoil chances of achieving solidarity with Iran in the Gulf, and eventually result in a serious weakening of the monarchy in Saudi Arabia.

D. *Jordanian View*: King Husayn favors a federation of the Arab Shaykhdoms and is willing to support a grouping of seven if nine is not possible. Although aware of the dispute between Iran and the UK, he is trying to stand aside and avoid playing an active role. He is obviously not interested in offending his benefactor, King Faysal.

E. *Israeli View*: [*1½ lines not declassified*] There are two essential Israeli interests in the Persian Gulf; maintaining and improving the Israeli defense posture, and securing the oil lifeline from Iran to the port of Eilat. The Israelis are influenced by their desire to support the Ira-

nians, their continued involvement with the Kurds in Iraq (with whose help 400 Iraqi Jews have recently been brought to Israel), and their interest in any action which could weaken the development of an effective common Arab military front against Israel.

Israeli officials do not see the three islands in the Strait of Hormuz as being of great strategic importance. They believe that shipping in the Bal al-Mandab Strait in the Red Sea can be secured with a naval presence (aided by bases in Ethiopia). They would presumably agree that the Iranian Navy, operating from Iranian coastal bases, could protect shipping in the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. Israel would tend to support Iranian seizure of the islands, but this position is probably derived primarily from interest in the best possible security for the tanker route from Iran to Israel.

Israelis have ample experience with the nuisance value of guerilla movements. They strongly favor rapid action against such movements before they become entrenched. This philosophy encourages a wary eye toward the Soviet and Chinese presence in the area. Thus the Israelis believe that guerrilla movements in Oman and elsewhere in the Arabian hinterland could be eradicated with the judicious and not inordinate application of men and materiel, especially helicopters, even by the Saudis.

The Israelis see inter-Arab relations as an elaborate scenario in which claims are rarely pushed to the acid test of war. In this context, they believe King Faysal with money and religious prestige can wield political influence within the Arab World despite military weakness. They view King Faysal as less effective, however, in dealing with Iran due to historic Arab-Persian mutual distrust and the vast superiority of Iran's military forces.

According to the Israelis, the UAR has been inactive in the Persian Gulf since the June War of 1967.

The Israelis have little respect for the declining British authority in the area. They tend to agree that British policy is designed to avoid antagonizing the various Shaykhdoms and to retain maximum influence in the area, via commercial interests, after final withdrawal at the end of 1971. In this view, the Israelis are probably influenced by the opinions of their Iranian friends.

There is considerable Israeli interest in Iraqi intentions in the area, related directly to Iraqi capabilities against Israel. Israel viewed favorably the removal of most Iraqi forces from Jordan and their relocation opposite Kuwait and on the Iranian border (where they are too distant to pose a coup threat to the Government in Baghdad). Israel is sympathetic with the Iranian thesis that the Soviets wish to use Iraq as a subversive base of operations in the area. Soviet naval visits to Iraq and the presence of Soviet fishing boats in the Persian Gulf have been

noted. The Israelis have no doubt that Iranian forces could defeat the Iraqis and they see no immediate Iraqi threat to Kuwait. Without much respect for the Iraqi regime, the Israelis nevertheless closely watch Iraqi actions, including alleged Iraqi assistance to the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf.

The Israelis have little to suggest regarding the small Shaykhdoms. They are cynical about the chances of a federation and are deeply pessimistic about the capacity of the various Shaykhs to handle their affairs once the British leave. They see the Shaykhdoms' need for a new "uncle" and they fear, whoever it is, their interest will suffer.

102. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 14, 1971.

SUBJECT

U.S. Recognition of the Gulf States of Bahrain and Qatar

Secretary Rogers has sent you a memo (attached)² recommending that you approve now U.S. recognition of the two largest Persian Gulf states—Bahrain and Qatar—when they declare their independence some time before the deadline for applications to the U.N. in early August. The Secretary also recommends that you approve the establishment of diplomatic relations with those two states by accrediting your Ambassador to Kuwait [John Patrick Walsh]³ as your non-resident Ambassador to Bahrain and Qatar. The Secretary notes that in NSDM 92⁴ of last November you approved in principle the expansion of U.S. diplomatic representation to the lower Persian Gulf as the British protective treaties come to an end this year.

The purpose of these actions is to pre-position the U.S. to respond to what appears to be the irreversible decision of Bahrain to declare its

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 632, Country Files, Middle East, Trucial States. Confidential. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

² Not attached. A copy of the memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, July 2, is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BAHRAIN IS.

³ Brackets are in the original.

⁴ Document 91.

independence this summer. When this happens, it is most likely that Qatar will follow suit. By approving now, the U.S. would be able to extend its recognition immediately upon a public announcement by these states. The best estimate now is that they will declare independence before the end of the month. Early diplomatic recognition of Bahrain and Qatar is in our interest and should not cause any significant problems with the other Persian Gulf states.

As you know, the British have been intensely engaged in attempting to establish a federation of the Persian Gulf entities before they depart at the end of this year. For some time, Bahraini intentions have been clear and the British conceded earlier this year that a federation of all nine, or even eight, states was a non-starter. A federation of the seven plus two independents was felt to be the most viable alternative and the problem became one of getting serious attention turned in that direction. An early declaration of independence by Bahrain would have provided incentive for that movement but the Bahrainis have been reluctant to do this without King Faisal's approval. Faisal, mainly because of his rivalry with Abu Dhabi (the state which would dominate the federation of the remaining seven) and sensitivity to the appearance of acquiescing to British pressure, has held back to date on this approval.⁵ Meanwhile, Bahrain is performing every pre-independence act short of a public statement and, with British help, probing avenues to Faisal's formal acceptance before the U.N. deadline in August.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve U.S. recognition of *Bahrain* as that state becomes fully independent and the establishment of diplomatic relations thereupon by accrediting our Ambassador in Kuwait as non-resident Ambassador.

2. That you approve U.S. recognition of *Qatar* as that state becomes independent and the establishment of diplomatic relations thereupon by accrediting our Ambassador in Kuwait as non-resident Ambassador.⁶

⁵ In telegram 2845 from Jidda, August 14, Thacher noted that United States recognition should follow that of Saudi Arabia, but should Saudi Arabia not recognize Bahrain, then U.S. recognition should follow "at least" that of Kuwait, Iran, and UAR. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 16 BAHRAIN IS) Faisal signaled his acquiescence to Bahraini independence August 15. (Telegram 2853 from Jidda, August 15; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1276, Saunders Files, Persian Gulf)

⁶ Nixon initialed his approval of both recommendations. The United States recognized Bahrain on August 15, one day after it declared independence. (Telegram 149358 to COMIDEASTFOR and Dhahran, August 14; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 16 BAHRAIN IS) The United States recognized Qatar on September 6. (Telegram 1140 from Dhahran, September 6; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1276, Saunders Files, Persian Gulf)

103. Memorandum of Conversation¹

London, July 20, 1971.

SUBJECT

US/UK Bilaterals July 20—Persian Gulf

PARTICIPANTSSir Alec Douglas-Home, British Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs

John N. Irwin II, Under Secretary of State

Sir Alec said that after endlessly patient negotiating by Sir William Luce, it appeared that a union of 6, or perhaps 7, might be formed.² Bahrain and Qatar will probably stay independent. This would be a satisfactory outcome for the British, but they still had “mild trouble” on two counts: Faisal’s continued opposition (Faisal would accept a Federation of 9, but not of 7), and the islands. Faisal has succeeded in frightening Bahrain somewhat, but he thought they would go through with independence.

On the islands, Sir Alec said the Shah seemed determined to brook no compromise: he not only insisted on having the islands, but wanted the British to deliver them. The British could find no way of doing so without bringing down the wrath of the Arabs on their heads. It was now conceivable that the Shah might attempt to seize the islands before British withdrawal.

The Under Secretary asked about the scheme that had once been talked about of having an Iranian military presence on the islands with

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL UK–US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by B. Scott Custer and approved on July 30 in U. This is Part 8 of an 8-part memorandum of conversation that recorded discussions on the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe. Parts 1–7 are not printed.

² On July 18, after a week-long meeting in Dubai, the seven Trucial States announced agreement on the establishment of a federation to take place before the British military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. The federation would have a Supreme Council, a cabinet, and a legislature, with Sheikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi the most likely first president of the new United Arab Emirates. Ras al-Khaimah refused to sign the agreement due to disagreement over representation in the legislature. On October 1 Saunders and Neaher informed Kissinger that the British did not respond to the Dubai announcement because they were working on the island dispute and because Iran had perceived the Dubai announcement as British manipulation. (President’s Saturday Briefing Paper, October 1; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1276, Saunders Files, Persian Gulf) Telegram 1286 from Dhahran, October 1, summarizes the status of the six-member federation, emphasizing their determination to declare independence by year’s end. (*Ibid.*)

the issue of sovereignty being fudged, at least initially. Luce said the British were presently negotiating with the Iranian Ambassador in London. The two rulers (Shah and Faisal) have agreed that there can be an Iranian military presence. What the Arabs have not as yet accepted is the cession of sovereignty to Iran, and whether or not the question is publicly mentioned. The British were now talking to both sides about the length of the interim period before the rulers would withdraw the token police force, and the further interim period during which the sovereignty issue would be fudged. Sir Alec said he thought some solution still possible but noted that the Shah's position has been getting harder over the past few months. Sir Alec suggested that the Shah had had too great a success in the oil negotiations and this had gone to his head. Godber asked what the US proposed be done. The Under Secretary indicated we hoped the British would be able to work out some solution.

The Under Secretary asked about the Shah's attitude on oil and economic aid. Luce confirmed that the Shah is prepared to be generous: but the difficulty for the Arabs is in appearing to sell out Arab interests. The formation of a union may help in this respect by shifting at least part of the onus to seven rather than two.

Sir Alec said that Britain is continuing to work for a compromise. He wondered what advice the US is giving the Shah. The Under Secretary said we are continuing to urge him to reach a compromise solution: the results for everyone, including Iran, would be better than an arbitrary takeover.

In closing, Sir Alec repeated it is conceivable that the Shah might decide to move before the British are out. He said the Shah calculates that there would be no reaction if he seizes the islands. Shaking his head, Sir Alec said "I'm not sure he's right."

104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Saudi Arabia and Iran¹

Washington, July 21, 1971, 0041Z.

131518. Ref: Jidda 2536; Tehran 3923.² Subj: Federation of United Arab Emirates; Saudi Position.

1. Commend your presentation to Mas'ud encouraging SAG to speak out in support of July 18 step by Gulf rulers towards formation of six-member federation. We are concerned that if Faisal withholds his support for Federation of Trucial States he will considerably weaken prospects for its success.

2. You are therefore authorized in your next meeting with Mas'ud to make on instructions points contained para 6 Jidda 2536.³ You should state in addition that we have been giving careful consideration to King's views, most recently expressed to Vice President Agnew,⁴ about the undesirability of a Gulf federation of less than nine states. King is aware USG has from beginning hoped that all nine Gulf states would find way to unite prior to UK withdrawal. July 18 decision of six Trucial rulers to form Federation has added to mounting evidence that prospects for nine state federation this year are nil. Our own judgment is that grouping of majority of Trucial States is prerequisite for stability in that part of Peninsula. We share with SAG its goal of orderly progress for Gulf and consider it essential to defense against such troublemakers as Iraq and PDRY that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran assist whatever political entities emerge this year in the Gulf, while continuing to urge on these entities the longer term goal of greater regional unity.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 UAE. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Twinam and Murphy; cleared in NEA/IRN, NEA, and S/S–O; and approved by Sisco. It was repeated to Kuwait, London, and Dhahran.

² In telegram 2536 from Jidda, July 19, Thatcher reported that the Saudi Government had not developed a position on the newly announced UAE although he had urged Mas'ud to endorse it as soon as possible. Thatcher asked that he be instructed to relay to Mas'ud that the United States approved and that the King should be so informed. (Ibid.) In telegram 3923 from Tehran, July 19, MacArthur wrote that Zahedi seemed "relatively relaxed" about the announcement, but that Iran's overall position on the islands remained unchanged. (Ibid., POL 33 PERSIAN GULF)

³ In paragraph 6 Thatcher requested that he be instructed to inform Mas'ud that the United States "warmly endorses" the UAE, notes with "particular approval that door has been left open for adherence of other states," sees the signing of the temporary constitution as "a welcome and tangible step toward a new political era in Gulf," hopes that other governments and Saudi Arabia "in particular" will give early encouragement to UAE, and that these points be "passed promptly and clearly to King Faisal."

⁴ Agnew met with King Faisal on July 8. See footnote 2, Document 155.

3. In making above presentation you should note that we are of course mindful of the unsettled problem concerning the Gulf islands in dispute between Iran, Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. We have not and will not take sides over the merits of the conflicting claims in these cases but understand that Britain and Iran are working diligently to find solutions. We are hopeful some accommodation will be reached prior to actual establishment of Federation and moves by it to seek formal international recognition.

4. Should Mas'ud ask US position on Bahrain's and Qatar's status, you may comment that while we continue to hope those states will one day associate themselves with Federation, we accept likelihood that Bahrain and Qatar will soon seek independent status and for period at least follow course independent of Trucial States. We consider both states better equipped in comparison with individual Trucial States to stand on their own.⁵

5. *For Tehran.* Department is pleased that Zahedi's initial reaction to July 18 announcement has been "relatively relaxed." We share the view you put to Zahedi that nothing has happened to challenge Iranian position on islands. We are heartened that majority of fractious Gulf rulers seem prepared to put aside welter of rivalries and grudges to cooperate in larger, more viable political unity. We hope that Iran will continue its search for an amicable solution concerning islands and that in expectation of success it will forego public positions complicating plans for a UAE. If asked, you may confirm that we have spoken favorably to the Saudis about this development which in our view does no violence to Iran's position.

Rogers

⁵ Telegram 2571 from Jidda, July 22, details Thatcher's presentation to Mas'ud. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 16 UAE)

105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the United Kingdom and Iran¹

Washington, September 13, 1971, 2106Z.

167792. Subj: Gulf Islands: Secretary's Letter to Douglas-Home.
Ref: Tehran 4970.²

1. Following is text of Secretary's letter to Douglas-Home which is being pouched London for delivery. Request Embassy deliver text prior to receipt of signed original.³

"The Right Honorable, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, K.T., M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, London. Dear Alec: Since we discussed the Gulf Islands dispute in London last April⁴ I have followed this difficult problem with continuing interest. I now understand that Sir William Luce has negotiated an agreement in principle with the Iranians on an arrangement which would satisfy basic Iranian demands.⁵ I consider this a significant and encouraging development and wish to express my great admiration for the skill displayed on your side in bringing about this agreement.

We have received a message from the Shah indicating that the terms to which he has agreed⁶ are as far as he can go in being accom-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 729, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VII. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Twinam; cleared in NEA, NEA/IRN, NEA/ARP, and EUR/BMI; and approved by Rogers. It was repeated to Dhahran, Ankara, Kuwait, and Jidda.

² In telegram 4970 from Tehran, September 7, the Embassy reported that the Shah and Britain had reached an agreement in principle. For the British, this agreement depended on concurrence from the Sheikhs. MacArthur recommended that the United States press the British to get the Sheikhs' agreement. (Ibid., Box 602, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. IV)

³ Delivered September 15. (Telegram 8552 from London, September 15; *ibid.*, Box 729, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VII) In telegram 167813 to London, September 13, the Department suggested that, when delivering this letter, Annenberg state that in the event the Sheikhs responded negatively, the British should consult with the United States to determine whether an American approach to either Iran or the Sheikhs would be desirable. (Ibid.)

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 98.

⁵ A reference to ongoing Luce-Afshar talks, which the British disclosed to the United States on August 5. As reported in telegram 7280 from London, Acland told Annenberg that the Shah had recently shown flexibility on the issue of how to blur sovereignty. Moreover, if the Shah agreed to the criteria then under debate, Luce would be able to wrap up the islands issue by the end of August, paving the way for a federation. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 728, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VI)

⁶ In a September 8 paper, Saunders summarized the terms of the "London Formula." In it, the Shah agreed to the following principles: 1) withdrawal by the two sheikhdoms of their official presence from the islands 12 months from the date that Iran

modating on this question. He has told us that if the Arab Shaykhs refuse to accept the terms to which the United Kingdom and Iran have agreed, Anglo-Iranian relations will be seriously jeopardized, Iran will denounce the proposed Federation of Arab Amirates, and Iran will reserve its rights to take such action as it deems necessary to protect its national interest. I am informed that the Shah has conveyed a similar message to you.

I fully understand the difficulty of bringing the Arab Shayks to accept this arrangement. I am confident, however, that the terms which you have negotiated on their behalf are as good as the Shaykhs can expect.

I know we are fully in accord that an amicable settlement of this nature is essential if there is to be cooperation and stability in the Gulf in the future. In looking at ways we might assist, I see little we could add to your efforts at this time to influence the Gulf Shaykhs. We do intend, however, to reply to the Shah that we are confident that the United Kingdom will make every effort to bring this promising opportunity for a settlement to a successful conclusion. With best personal regards, sincerely, William P. Rogers.⁷

2. When London has delivered text Ambassador MacArthur may wish to reply to Shah's message giving assurances indicated last sentence of letter.

Rogers

established its presence; 2) silence on the issue of sovereignty for 18 months from the same date; and 3) an annual payment of \$1.5 million to each of the sheikdoms for 10 years, in addition to a generous sharing of any oil or other mineral revenue by Iran. Saunders concluded: "the issue for us is whether to leave the British and the Shaikhs alone at this critical point or weigh in with one or both sides." (Paper prepared for inclusion in the President's September 9 Daily Briefing; *ibid.*, Box 1276, Saunders Files, Persian Gulf)

⁷ Douglas-Home responded on September 21 that while he took the Iranian position very seriously, he thought the Shah was anxious to achieve a negotiated settlement. Moreover, the Shah "may have anxieties about having his bluff called since he cannot want to use force if he can avoid it, thus jeopardising his relations both with the Gulf States and the whole Arab world. There is a chance therefore that he may not have spoken his last word. He is, of course, as we all know, a very accomplished brinkman." Failure to achieve a settlement acceptable to the Shah would have an "undesirable" effect on British-Iranian relations, but Britain could not just hand the islands over to Iran since this would harm Britain's relations with the Persian Gulf states. (Telegram 175137 to Dhahran, September 23; *ibid.*, Box 630, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. III)

106. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

US Relations with Lower Persian Gulf States

With your approval this summer, the US has recognized the independent states of *Bahrain* and *Qatar* in the Persian Gulf and is establishing diplomatic relations with them by accrediting your Ambassador in Kuwait as non-resident Ambassador.

This leaves two entities to be dealt with—the *proposed Federation of the seven remaining "Trucial" states* and our relations with the tenth state, *Oman*, which will not be joining any federation for the foreseeable future.

Following a review of our Persian Gulf options last year, you approved in principle the establishment of diplomatic relations with the lower Gulf states. *Secretary Rogers is now recommending specifically that you:*

—*approve US recognition of the proposed Trucial States Federation when it becomes formally independent and the establishment of diplomatic relations by accrediting our Ambassador in Kuwait as non-resident Ambassador [Tab A];*²

—*approve informing the Sultan of Oman of the US readiness to establish formal diplomatic relations* (the US has recognized Oman since 1833) and accrediting our Ambassador in Kuwait as non-resident Ambassador. [Tab B]

Background: The British have been working at an increasing pace to leave behind an orderly pattern of Gulf state relationships when the formal UK treaties terminate at the end of this year. The pattern that has emerged has become one of (a) two independent states (Bahrain and Qatar), (b) a federation of the remaining seven tiny states and (c) Oman, which has been independent through the years.

—The *Federation* of seven was considered the most viable alternative to the original scheme for nine as Bahraini and Qatari intentions to go it alone became clearer this year. The Trucial state rulers have issued a declaration of "intent" to form a federation but are momentarily holding up formal announcement pending resolution of the dispute

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 647, Country Files, Middle East, General, Vol. VIII. Confidential. Sent for action.

² Attached but not printed at Tabs A and B are October 5 memoranda from Johnson to Nixon. All brackets are in the original.

between the Shah and two of the states over three small islands at the entrance to the Gulf. The negotiations between the British, Iranians and Arab rulers are, incidentally, in the final stages and will hopefully reach some compromise settlement. The Shah has made clear, however, that he will frustrate the formation of any federation until the issue is settled; hence, formal announcement of a federation is being held in abeyance. The British are moving ahead with plans to transfer powers to a budding federation bureaucracy and hope that the new entity can be formalized by mid-December. Your agreement to extend recognition would permit State to be forthcoming on the question of relations, although the timing would be reviewed when the actual circumstances become clear.

—Through the years, *Oman* has maintained a very close relationship with the British and always friendly—if limited—contacts with the US. At the entrance to the Gulf, Oman has substantial oil wealth and a population larger than all nine lower Gulf states combined. With the general awakening of the Gulf area, the Sultan of Oman (who deposed the near-medieval rulership of his father last summer) has begun to develop contacts with the outside world and is in the process of establishing ties with India, Japan and Pakistan. He has approached the USSR and has engaged Arab government and UN support. Finally, he has expressed the desire to have a formal indication of US interest in establishing diplomatic relations. The Sultan has decided to concentrate on domestic priorities for the foreseeable future rather than linking up with other Gulf states, since he is coping with a longstanding insurrection in his Dhofar province fed by radical forces in neighboring South Yemen. The Secretary believes it would be appropriate to round out our development of a diplomatic presence in the Gulf by offering to have ties with Oman.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve in principle recognition of the Federation and establishment of diplomatic relations with exact timing to be reviewed in the light of the situation when the Federation's independence is proclaimed.
2. That you approve indicating to Oman our willingness to establish diplomatic relations.³

³ Nixon checked his approval of both recommendations. The United States recognized the UAE on December 3 and established diplomatic relations with Oman on October 20.

107. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, November 15, 1971, 0803Z.

6452. Subject: Gulf Islands. Ref: State 207380.²

1. Sir William Luce (accompanied by Amb Ramsbotham and British DCM Murray) briefed me November 13 much along lines of refTel, on status of his meeting with Shah at Caspian November 12. Luce confirmed Shah had demonstrated considerable flexibility and said two sides were very close on all points except for oil concession arrangements in Abu Musa area.

2. Luce said he left session with impression Shah was no longer as preoccupied as he had been over question of sovereignty and was now more interested in security aspects of island arrangements.

3. Virtual agreement reached on:

(A) Area of Abu Musa to be occupied by Iranians and Sharjah (during meeting Shah drew new and more generous line across map giving Sharjah well, Khalid's grandfather's grave and deep water needed for oil facility).

(B) Public statement by Khalid.

(C) Khalid's request for agreement in writing. (Shah was opposed to signing agreement with Sharjah but accepted Luce's suggestion that agreement be in form of exchange of letters between Iran and UK followed by exchange between UK and Sharjah. Luce believes he can sell this to Khalid.)

(D) Territorial waters, with both sides recognizing each other's 12-mile limit.

(E) Right of Abu Musa inhabitants to fish around islands.

4. Shah also accepted exploitation of oil resources off Abu Musa to be conducted by company designated by Sharjah (earlier in day Ely told us this would be Buttes).³ Agreement also reached on 50/50 split

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 602, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. IV. Secret; Priority; Exdis. It was repeated to Brussels (Priority) for Ambassador MacArthur, London (Priority), Dhahran, Jidda, and Kuwait.

² Telegram 207380 to Tehran, November 12. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF)

³ Northcutt Ely, an American lawyer, was hired by Shaikh Khalid to represent Sharjah in its offshore concession boundary disputes and to protect the entirety of its interests in regards to Abu Musa. Ely also represented Buttes Oil Company. (Telegram 2806 from London, April 14, 1970; *ibid.*) Sharjah had granted Buttes Oil Company drilling

of oil revenues. However question of oil concession terms still unresolved. Shah rejected phraseology that oil operations conform to OPEC standards and said operations must be carried out in conformity with relevant laws and regulations of Iran. Luce said Iranian insistence on this point was last remaining hurdle and it was proving to be a difficult one because Sharjah decrees and Iranian laws on mineral resources are basically incompatible and negotiators are having trouble finding formula under which company can operate in manner acceptable to both Sharjah and Iranian laws.

5. Luce is clearly troubled by difficulties he has encountered on this point. Matter is now being discussed with Ambassador Afshar, who Luce says is legalistic, and with NIOC lawyers. Frustrating point is that there is agreement in principle on oil concession but language has not yet been worked out to reflect this agreement and Luce fears this aspect of negotiation will be bogged down in legalistic fine print unacceptable to Sharjah which could threaten entire agreement. Ely is now hard at work on language but if lawyers cannot agree Luce believes he will have to go back to Shah for decision based on political rather than legal considerations.

6. Basic agreement has no time limit although separate agreement on financial assistance specifies that Iran will provide aid for period of nine years. During meeting Shah said he wanted to append statement to basic agreement reserving right to intervene if security of Iranian forces in Abu Musa threatened or if stability of Gulf endangered. Luce said touchy point for Sharjah but he thought Khalid letter of last March accepting principle of stationing troops on Abu Musa in interest of security of Gulf might provide loop-hole to get around this problem. Luce added that, during private moment with Shah, he again stressed overall agreement as now envisaged gave Iran everything it needed from security viewpoint. He urged Shah not to be precipitous in exercising right of intervention and let matters develop gradually.

7. Assuming question of oil concession can be worked out, Luce said remaining problems are:

(A) Arranging for adequate provision for Umm al-Qaiwain and Ajman from Iran's half of oil revenue. Shah has agreed in principle to paying these sheiks but amounts and methods of payment have yet to be worked out. Shah is reluctant to pay sheiks directly because their dispute is with Sharjah and Iran is not a party thereto.

concession rights in Abu Musa territorial water, an offshore area contested by Umm al-Qaiwain, and, as MacArthur reported in telegram 1420 from Tehran, April 13, 1970, by Iran, which claimed Abu Musa itself. MacArthur thought Khalid's actions might have been a bid to get the United States involved in the dispute. (Ibid.)

(B) Language of Sharjah's public announcement re basic agreement, as well as public statements which Iran and UK will have to make to their parliaments. Luce had assumed agreement will have to go to Majlis but Shah seemed undecided whether this would be necessary. In any event Luce foresees problems if language of these announcements does not follow same general lines. There is also problem that agreement in form of exchange of letters between Iran and Sharjah through UK is planned to be confidential. Luce said much more homework need to be done on this point.

(C) Timing of arrangements. Luce has stressed to Iranians that he has roughly two weeks to reach final settlement and time is rapidly running out. He said sheikdoms plan declare establishment of federation on December 4 in time to apply for UN membership at this session of UNGA. Working backwards from that date, agreement re islands must be ready for signature; Sharjah, UK and GOI must have public statements in symmetry and Iranian forces should be in place on islands. Luce visualizes stationing of Iranian forces on islands should take place day or so before public announcement, most likely period being between November 30 and December 3. This is a complicated and tricky scenario hence Luce's itchiness to get all details worked out in Tehran in next day or so so he can proceed immediately to Sharjah for final settlement.

(D) Tunbs Islands. Luce confirmed Ras al-Khaimah would not agree to voluntary cession of islands and refused to take Iranian money for them. He so informed Shah who said Iran would nevertheless be "generous" in financial settlement once Iran had islands unless Ras al-Khaimah created major fuss. British solution to this apparent impasse appears to be simple one, i.e. acquiescence in Iranian take-over to be implemented during November 30–December 3 time-frame. Luce said he believes Ras al-Khaimah would cave when faced with fait accompli. In any event in reply to inevitable questions in Commons on Tunbs, HMG proposed to state that Iranian take-over of Tunbs Islands was consistent with arrangements for security of Gulf as envisaged in overall settlement of island dispute—or words to that effect.

8. It was during discussion with Shah over timing of Iranian take-over of Tunbs Islands that Luce raised question of British participation in MIDLINK, noting this would overlap with Iranian garrisoning of forces on islands. Shah for obvious reasons made immediate decision to postpone MIDLINK exercise (ref Tehran 6441).⁴

⁴ Telegram 6441 from Tehran, November 13, reported that Shah and Luce had discussed the question of British participation in MIDLINK; the Shah decided to postpone the exercise. (Ibid., DEF 6–2 CENTO) MIDLINK, the annual CENTO naval exercises in the

Comment: In spite of several nagging details both sides appear to be very close to agreement and Luce is now more cautiously optimistic than after previous visits here this year. Given package that Luce brought with him from Sharjah, British acquiescence on Tunbs Islands and Shah's flexibility and desire to reach settlement quickly, we agree with Luce's cautious optimism. However, even if agreement signed we are not entirely out of woods and some contingency planning will be necessary on:

(A) What comment USG makes in answer to questions at time agreement is announced and Iranians have their forces on the islands. Luce expressed hope that we would take generally same line as British. However matter is not simple one because, according to Luce, once agreement reached and implemented, HMG apparently plans pull back and adopt position that agreement is between Iran and Sharjah, and not between Iran and UK on behalf of Sharjah.

(B) Position USG should take if issue goes to Security Council. Luce seems to be of impression Iraqis may well take matter to UN.

(C) Luce asked we not raise these two points with HMG in London or Washington until he has had opportunity to go over them with his own government back on London after which HMG will be in touch with us. *End Comment.*

9. Luce concluded with expression of appreciation for our continuing offer of assistance. He still did not think this necessary but if there is a final "crunch" in next few days over last minute impasse on such items as oil concessions he may recommend that we weigh in with Shah. He asked that we be ready for such eventuality because if we agreed to support British we would have to move quickly.

10. Ely also gave us briefing Nov 13 along same lines as Luce and left with us copies of documents on which State 203594⁵ based. He asked us not divulge to British that we in possession these papers.

Heck

Indian Ocean operations area, was to be held November 27 through December 7. In a November 10 memorandum, Saunders informed Haig that there was some question as to whether the British would participate given the "delicacy" of their final negotiations in the Persian Gulf. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1276, Saunders Files, Persian Gulf)

⁵ In telegram 203594 to Tehran, November 8, the Department noted that Ely had provided a "virtually identical rundown" of the final Iran-Sharjah deal that resulted from recent Luce talks. He did add "refinements," the main one being that neither Iran nor Sharjah would give up its claim to Abu Musa nor recognize the other's claim. (Ibid., Box 602, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. IV)

108. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State¹

Kuwait, November 17, 1971, 0737Z.

1293. Subject: Kuwaiti Internal Security and Defense Programs.

1. *Summary.* There has been a remarkable shift in the past two years in Kuwaiti attitudes toward the United States. Today we have excellent possibilities of working out mutually beneficial relationships in the security, military and commercial fields which should spin-off beneficially in all directions. All of this could be locked-in in the course of the next few months, although detailed contracts will naturally involve time. Hundreds of millions of dollars in export sales are potentially involved² as well as the possibility of making a major contribution to the peace and prosperity of this region. All of this is occurring against the back-drop of the turbulence of the region and the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict. As the Kuwaitis have quietly contemplated their future in the midst of turbulence, they have decided that their future rests with us. The doors are open.

End summary.

2. In the course of the past two years there has been a remarkable reversal of GOK attitudes toward the United States. Starting from a position of bristling antagonism they have come full circle to a position of intimacy and basic trust. This is particularly true in respect to internal security and defense matters.

3. Long and patient discussions with senior Kuwaiti officials have contributed to their high level decision to strengthen their internal security and defense forces in coordination with the United States. This decision now has been formally confirmed by the Supreme Defense Council.³

4. Two years ago Kuwait internal security was a forbidden city to all foreigners, except the British, and it was evident that there was an inner sanctum closed to them. Gradually, however, the Kuwaitis re-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 KUW. Secret; Exdis.

² Walsh made this argument during his August consultation trip to Washington. During this trip, Walsh told representatives of the Department of Defense that Iran was not the only answer to problems in the Persian Gulf and that the Arab governments were both willing to act responsibly as the British withdrew and to form closer ties with the United States. The United States, he argued, could not afford to ignore a military market in Kuwait of \$100 million. (Memorandum from Lieutenant General Donald V. Bennett, Director, DIA, to Moorer, August 23; *ibid.*, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Admiral Moorer, Box 17, 091 Kuwait)

³ As reported in telegram 1227 from Kuwait, October 24. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 KUW)

laxed in respect to US with the first breakthrough being in the field of physical security and narcotics. The superb performance of the Secret Service during the Vice President's visit was quite helpful. Subsequently the Minister of Interior requested our help in terms of training, equipment and technical assistance in establishing a security command center. This, in turn, led to the successful visit of Major General Abdul-Latif al-Thowaini to the United States. It is my expectation that in the weeks ahead we will complete arrangements with the Kuwaitis which will prove of inestimable value here and elsewhere in the region for years to come. It should cover the entire spectrum of security interests.

5. When I arrived in Kuwait I found the Crown Prince, the Minister of Defense and Interior, and other significant Kuwaitis bristling over the fact that Kuwait was not eligible for FMS treatment. The ultimate removal of this anachronism had a significant effect on their reactions to US and to me as an Ambassador. It has had broad and favorable ramifications on many issues.

6. In the defense field it has opened up a new game with most promising implications for our export sales, our relations with Kuwait, and our possibilities of contributing to peace and cooperation in the Gulf area. The small Kuwaiti military forces have been traditionally equipped by the British, although American trucks and sundry other commercial-type equipment show up in their inventory. Our first major equipment sale consisted of two Lockheed Hercules aircraft (L-100-20).⁴ The negotiation was extended, enlightening to both sides, and extremely valuable in terms of our mutual relations. There have been many spin-offs from it. When it was over Shaykh Sa'ad apologized for their indecisiveness. He and Major General Mubarak explained that it reflected lack of experience with our documentation and negotiating methods, and their bitter experience with the British over the years. No one should misunderstand the bitterness of the Kuwaitis in respect to their past contracts with the British. They are absolutely convinced that they have been consistently cheated—and there is some evidence to support their beliefs.

7. Last summer Shaykh Sa'ad told me that the government had decided to strengthen its military forces across the board and wished the United States to help them. This led to a GOK request to Lockheed to manage their planned air defense system program. Lockheed produced its first rough cut last month and will return in about a week with a more detailed draft.

8. Meanwhile in an absolutely astounding reversal of traditional Kuwaiti customs, Major General Mubarak has raised with me the possibility of seconding an American military officer directly to him as a

⁴ See Document 78.

technical adviser and the Minister of Defense has sent me a letter requesting that “the authorities concerned in the Department of Defense in Washington be contacted to send a team, expert in air defense matters to prepare the necessary studies and research to set up an air defense system for Kuwait.” While eschewing a negative response I have suggested that Lockheed is quite capable of preparing the basic air defense study. We now have, however, a direct invitation for the introduction of American military advisers in Kuwait. The potential advantages and disadvantages should be carefully studied in Washington.

9. Lockheed is proceeding on the basis of a number of assumptions given to them by the Kuwaitis and variously influenced by me, namely, 1) in the next ten years the primary potential enemy is Iraq; 2) an objective is military/political collaboration with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the Federation, and hopefully, Iran; 3) there must not be a confrontation with Iran; 4) weaponry in region should be compatible. This essentially means Lockheed, Northrop, Raytheon, and Bell in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran; 5) Lockheed has been told by Major General Mubarak to leave the Lightnings out of its calculations and has been asked to act as the GOK’s agent in disposing of all air equipment currently held by the Kuwaiti Air Force except the two Hercules.

10. The throttles are down and the companies are swarming in. Lockheed’s President was here in late October and we believe we have set the stage for the sale of three Jet Stars, and I suspect two more Hercules. They will be back in about one week with the second stage of their air defense study and with a firm Jet Star proposal, embodying Kuwaiti requests for technical modifications of the inner configuration of the plane which appear reasonable.

11. About ten days ago Northrop made a first class opening sales pitch to which the Kuwaitis responded by requesting thirty planes (6 trainers and 24 FSEs). Northrop will return about Nov 27 with a technical team. If this contract can be worked out, it will significantly help the Northrop production line.

12. In response to Shaykh Sa’ad’s request to me, a Bell Helicopter representative is expected here soon. Sa’ad tells me flatly they wish to buy Bell helicopters and I suspect the opening number is sixteen.

13. Raytheon was also here last week with an attractive GCA proposal in response to Sa’ad’s approach to me and my subsequent visit to Andover. Down the road a bit, and dependent upon the Lockheed air defense study, a request for a Hawk briefing team is possible.

14. The proposal by Fitzgeralds Laboratories for a small navy is also under study but the Kuwaitis wish to delay this until January while they focus on air defense. They simply do not have the skilled manpower to do everything in a tight span.

15. On the army side, I have persuaded Sa'ad to put the possibility of TOW missiles on the shelf and to concentrate in the interim on 106 recoilless rifles. In a practical sense, they have no anti-tank equipment today.

16. Manifestly there are big export possibilities in this picture with many potential commercial spin-offs. To cite but several, we would not today be on a verge of Jet Star sales if the need had not been made apparent to Sa'ad and others over a long time and if Lockheed had not done such a good sales job on the Hercules. Lockheed, in turn, clearly sees the sales possibilities for further Hercules and the 1011, although Douglas is a competitor. Again, the Lockheed people have done quite a job in demonstrating the need for GCA equipment. This and our chipping away is pushing the Kuwaitis into belatedly getting at the task of modernizing their airfield. I have now been informally asked if we could make available an FAA adviser to the Ministry of Public Works. In conjunction with them we are trying to develop the technical justification. If this can be worked out it would enhance our chances to get the construction and management contract for the field. Northrop, among others, is warmly interested in competing for this lucrative contract. It is clear to me that we have a splendid opportunity to work out with the Kuwaitis a complete association in the civil and military aviation field. This would enhance our sales position in the entire region and could, again, contribute to fruitful relationship between the people of the region.

17. All of this also carries over into intellectual circles. The Kuwaitis now invite us into their university and we are trying to work out relationships between Kuwait University and American universities involving American professors here. One slide-off possibility is a Smithsonian scientific chair and a Smithsonian/Kuwaiti/others oceanography study of the Gulf. The potential benefits should be manifest. Our STAG lecturers are now enthusiastically received. Two years ago they could not get a visa.

18. If what I have outlined can be worked out, it would involve several hundred millions of dollars in export sales and great possibilities of mutual benefit for US and the people of the region. Furthermore, it would undoubtedly contribute to a lucrative spin-off in terms of non-military equipment. The Kuwaitis have been so burned, or at least have felt deeply so, by the British, French and Commies in past deals that they are absolutely set to go American.

Walsh

109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dhahran¹

Washington, November 27, 1971, 2111Z.

215001. Subj: Ras al Khaimah Request for U.S. Support. Ref: Dhahran 1560.²

1. Dinsmore requested personally deliver following reply to Deputy Ruler Ras al Khaimah:

“Your Highness:

I have received your letter of November 27 asking the United States to reconsider Ras al Khaimah’s earlier request for recognition and support in light of the decision by the United Kingdom to terminate the treaty relationship with Ras al-Khaimah on December 1.

During our recent discussion in Washington and in your subsequent talks with other American officials³ we tried to convey the sincere friendship of the United States for Your Highness, His Highness the Ruler, and the people of Ras al Khaimah and our appreciation for the difficult decisions facing Ras al Khaimah during this period of historic transition in the Gulf. I would like to reiterate our concern for the welfare and prosperity of Ras al Khaimah and of all its neighbors. As you know, the United States Government considers it in the interests of those Gulf states becoming independent this year to join in the largest and most effective grouping possible. I believe that Ras al Khaimah and its neighbors are also dedicated to this concept of cooperation and unity.

As the Gulf states enter a new era of independence, each will face numerous difficult problems calling for cooperation to enhance mutual security and prosperity. From our own American experience in forming a union, we recognize that initial arrangements need not be permanent and that states with the need and will to join together can eventually find workable arrangements. Therefore, I urge that Ras al

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL TRUCIAL ST–US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Twinam; cleared by Davies and Atherton; and approved by Sisco. It was repeated Immediate to Beirut, Jidda, London, and Manama, and Priority to Kuwait and USUN.

² Telegram 1560 from Dhahran, November 27, transmitted a letter from Khalid Bin Saqr al-Qasimi, Deputy Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah. (Ibid.)

³ Sheikh Khalid and his delegates had lobbied the United States for recognition of Ras al-Khaimah as an independent state outside of the federation, U.S. good offices in settling the islands dispute with Iran, and a 1-year U.S. AID program. In return, Sheikh Khalid offered the United States a military base anywhere within Ras al-Khaimah’s sovereign territory. (Telegram 176693 to Dhahran, September 24; telegram 203909 to Dhahran, November 9; and telegram 206438 to Beirut, November 12; *ibid.*)

Khaimah not take decisions now that might set it unilaterally on a course away from future cooperation with her neighbors, and that you reconsider the possibilities of joining with other Gulf states in the coming months.

I assure Your Highness that the position of the United States Government is based on concern for Ras al Khaimah's security and welfare. Personally, I wish to reiterate my pleasure in meeting Your Highness during your recent visit to Washington and to stress my hope to soon again have the pleasure of renewing our acquaintance and of meeting His Highness, the Ruler.

Warmest personal regards,

Sincerely, Joseph J. Sisco"

2. In view travel problems cited your immediate message just received suggest you go to Bahrain morning November 28 to coordinate timing of delivery above message with Residency in light possible British "last try" with Ruler of RAK. Whether or not British see Ruler again believe it would be helpful for Khalid to have above reply not later than November 29. While it might be additional help for you to deliver it to him personally and to convey its substance to Ruler, leave this to your judgment in light of fast developing and British orchestrated situation in area.⁴

3. Request London brief FCO on above.

4. *FYI* We have not received Khalid's letter of November 24.⁵ *End FYI.*

Irwin

⁴ Sisco's letter was delivered on November 29. The Deputy Ruler's response was one of "resigned bitterness," followed by a statement of intent to declare independence. (Telegram 1582 from Dhahran, November 30; *ibid.*)

⁵ The letter was pouched in airgram A-140 from Dhahran, November 30, and received in the Department on December 9. (*Ibid.*, POL 19 RAS AL KHAIMAH)

**110. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, December 1, 1971.

SUBJECT

Persian Gulf Situation

On the morning of November 30 Iranian forces landed on the disputed Persian Gulf islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb. The Abu Musa landing was in accordance with the British-negotiated arrangement between Iran and the Ruler of Sharjah. The Iranian troops were welcomed by Sharjah officials and occupied a pre-determined portion of the island with the remainder left under Sharjah's civil administration. Prior to the landing, the Ruler of Sharjah had announced the terms of the arrangement with Iran.

The landing on the Tunbs was made with British acquiescence and was an implicit part of the Abu Musa settlement. The Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah has consistently refused British urging that he cede the Tunbs to Iran in return for Iranian financial assistance. He was notified the Iranian forces would land on the Tunbs but failed to advise his six-man police force on the Greater Tunb which opened fire on the 30-man Iranian occupying force. Three Iranians and four Ras al-Khaimans were killed in the exchange. Ras al-Khaimah has publicized a strong protest to the British, stressing its continuing claim to the Tunbs. The Iranian Government has announced to the Majlis its occupation of the Tunbs and the landing on Abu Musa stressing Iran's desire to cooperate with all the shaykhdoms on the Arab side of the Gulf.

Arab Reaction:

Prior to the landings, the British briefed Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on the Abu Musa arrangement and the Iranian plan to occupy the Tunbs. All were noncommittal in response, although Saudi Arabia and Egypt indicated the possibility of adverse Arab reaction.

The Kuwaiti, Iraqi, and Syrian governments have now publicly denounced the Iranian occupation, and Iraq has broken diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom over the event. Some Kuwaiti National Assembly members have called for breaking relations with the United States and the United Kingdom as well as Iran.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 647, Country Files, Middle East, General, Vol. VIII. Secret.

Iraq has called for Arab League action and is exploring the possibility of bringing the matter to the United Nations Security Council. According to the British, the Kuwaiti delegation in New York has been instructed to "be reasonable" and we understand Egypt is not eager to pursue the matter in either the United Nations or the Arab League.

British Assessment:

Sticking to their timetable, the British terminated their treaty relations with the Trucial shaykhdoms December 1. The United Arab Emirates is still scheduled to be fully established December 2. The British anticipate making an official statement in Parliament on the Gulf developments December 2.

A Foreign Office spokesman has expressed regret for the loss of life on Greater Tunb. The British, of course, anticipated some adverse Arab reaction, although Iraq's breaking relations seems to have come as a surprise to them. On balance, the British do not seem unduly concerned about the reaction to date, although they recognize that the unfortunate loss of lives on Greater Tunb will be a peg for more intensified Arab reaction than might have otherwise been the case.

R.H. Miller²

² Miller signed for Eliot above Eliot's typed signature.

111. Telegram From the Departments of State and Defense to the Embassy in Kuwait¹

Washington, December 10, 1971, 0039Z.

222618. Subj: Kuwait Internal Security and Defense Programs. Ref: Kuwait 1293, 1358.² Joint State/Defense Message.

1. State and DOD wish to commend Ambassador for effective manner in which he has kept U.S. private firms rather than USG in front as Kuwaitis consider various possible military equipment purchases mentioned reftel. We agree that any of these sales would represent attractive commercial opportunity for American private companies and that those companies under consideration would appear capable of performing necessary training and maintenance services involved.

2. GOK and commercial firms wishing to sell military equipment and services to Kuwait should clearly understand that U.S. would prefer to see any sales handled on cash, progress payment, or private credit basis and that there is no assurance that FMS credits or guarantees would be available. Given Kuwait's growing foreign exchange reserves, we would assume credit would not be major problem in these transactions. Moreover, present and foreseeable future financial position of GOK is such that reasonable additional military expenditures would not deprive civil sector of essential development funds. Each type of equipment under discussion, F-5's, Hercules, Bell helicopters, Hawk missiles, would appear in itself a reasonable item for GOK to acquire. Question arises, however, when one looks at "total package" Kuwaitis appear to be considering, including 30 F-5's, 16 helicopters, and Hawks. Before considering sale of such item USG would require fairly firm knowledge of totality of near term GOK equipment wishes. Problems we foresee are appropriateness of total package to reasonable Kuwait defense requirements and Kuwait's ability to utilize and maintain total package. We need to strike proper balance between desires of American companies to pursue individual sales initiatives and desire of USG to not see Kuwait saddled with more military equipment than

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 KUW. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on December 9 by Twinam; cleared in draft by Noyes (DOD/ISA), Kelly (DOD/ISA/SA), and Reed (DOD/ISA/NESA); cleared in substance by Padel Ford (NEA/RA) and Dorough (PM); and approved by Davies. It was repeated to CINCEUR, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFA, COMIDEASTFOR, and CINCUSNAVEUR.

² Telegram 1293 is Document 108. In telegram 1358 from Kuwait, December 4, the Embassy reported that Kuwait was actively considering the purchase of six F-5B and 24 F-5E aircraft to replace existing Hawker Hunters, Lightnings, and Jet Provosts. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 KUW)

it can effectively use, maintain, and integrate into its armed forces. There is an additional question of disclosure of security information in foreigner-impacted society such as Kuwait's and, of course, assurances as to use and non transfer of any equipment sold to Kuwait.

3. With these considerations in mind, it would be desirable for DOD to have its own independent assessment of Kuwait's needs and capabilities. Reftel para 8³ indicates GOK interest in DOD assistance with studies and research in air defense matters. While we fully support Ambassador's efforts to turn GOK into private channels for advice, we wonder if this request does not provide fortuitous opportunity for brief DOD survey of overall GOK military requirements and capabilities without commitment to subsequent sales of U.S. equipment. Would appreciate Ambassador's assessment of desirability of such survey team as partial response to Kuwaiti request para 8 reftel. Team could visit early in 1972 to take look at overall Kuwaiti defense requirements. Team would also be available to advise GOK on general air defense and other requirements and might be useful in discouraging any Kuwaiti desires in excess of reasonable needs. Survey team would also provide basis for informed USG decisions on any sales request which might result from current private company efforts to interest GOK in U.S. military equipment and services. For moment would appreciate Ambassador's views on basis his present assessment Kuwaiti attitudes and wishes without raising with GOK officials possibility that such survey team might be forthcoming.⁴

Irwin

³ Reference is to telegram 1293, Document 108.

⁴ In telegram 1401 from Kuwait, December 13, Walsh explained the activities of Lockheed, Northrop, Bell, and Raytheon in Kuwait and noted that he had consistently emphasized the need for a requirements and capability study, and that the Minister of Defense had requested a Department of Defense in-country survey team, which Walsh supported. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23 KUW) In telegram 225995 to Kuwait, December 15, the Department suggested that Walsh raise the subject with General Mubarak. (Ibid., DEF 1 KUW)

112. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 16, 1971.

SUBJECT

Persian Gulf

The British decision to terminate the protective treaty relationship with the lower Gulf shaykhdoms has now been fully implemented. While the Gulf will continue to present its share of problems, the statesmanship demonstrated to date by the principal parties concerned augurs well for the future evolution of that important region. The independent states of Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have emerged, enjoying United Nations and Arab League membership and the recognition of most countries interested in the area including the United States. Ras al-Khaimah has not yet joined the United Arab Emirates but is likely to do so in the near future.

Successful implementation of the British decision involved dealing with several longstanding and difficult territorial problems: Iran's claim to Bahrain, the dispute between Iran and two Trucial States over three small Gulf islands, and the Saudi boundary dispute with Abu Dhabi. Iran relinquished its claim to Bahrain in the spring of 1970. The dispute over the islands of Tunbs and Abu Musa was resolved as the Trucial States became independent, through

- a) agreement between Iran and Sharjah with respect to the largest island, Abu Musa, and
- b) Iranian occupation of the sparsely populated Tunbs, with the knowledge but not the acquiescence of the Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah.

Saudi Arabia is withholding recognition of the United Arab Emirates pending solution of its boundary dispute with Abu Dhabi, but there are indications this problem will be resolved in an atmosphere of friendship.

There has been considerable verbal Arab reaction to the Iranian occupation of the Tunbs. Iraq broke relations with Iran and the United Kingdom over this issue, and the Qadhafi regime used it as a pretext for nationalizing British Petroleum interests in Libya. On balance, how-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 NEAR E. Confidential. Drafted on December 13 by Twinam; concurred in in draft by Miklos; and concurred in by Atherton and Pelletreau (AF/N).

ever, the transition in the Gulf has taken place in a manner permitting a continuing British role in support of the security of the region and offering reasonably good prospects for the stability of the newly independent political entities.

In these developments we have played a supporting role in close consultation with the British, encouraging their efforts to resolve the problems of withdrawal while urging Iran and the Arab states concerned to approach these problems in a cooperative and flexible manner. As the difficult transitional period in the Gulf ends, Anglo-American cooperation in the area remains unimpaired as do our relations with the littoral states. We are proceeding to implement your decision to extend our diplomatic representation to the newly independent states. We are also negotiating with Bahrain stationing arrangements to permit the continued presence of the U.S. Navy's Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.

William P. Rogers

113. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 13, 1972.

SUBJECT

U.S. Presence in the Persian Gulf—Summary of Developments

In November 1970 you approved a basic strategy for the Persian Gulf as British "withdrawal" approached. [NSDM 92 at Tab B].² The NSC Under Secretaries Committee was instructed to develop an imaginative US presence. With the British treaties formally terminated at the end of 1971, the Committee is now reporting to you at Tab A on

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-220, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 92. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

² Tab B is Document 91. Brackets are in the original.

the steps that have been taken.³ A map is attached to complement the following summary:⁴

Diplomatic Representation

You had approved the expansion of diplomatic representation to the Lower Gulf and the accreditation of our Ambassador in Kuwait to posts there.⁵ Late last year the final political configuration of the Gulf emerged with four independent entities: *Bahrain*, *Qatar*, the *Union of Arab Emirates* (the seven tiny Trucial states⁶ of which the largest, Abu Dhabi, is taking a lead) and *Oman* (independent since 1833).

—These four states have all been accepted as members of the United Nations with our support.

—You have sent letters congratulating the heads of each state on their independence (and to Oman on our establishing diplomatic relations). You have received warm replies. Your letters were delivered personally by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the area.

—You have accredited our new Ambassador to Kuwait (William A. Stoltzfus) as our first Ambassador to the Gulf states.⁷ His impressive performance as our DCM in Saudi Arabia promises an imaginative presence.

—State plans three *Missions* at the Chargé level—in *Bahrain*, in *Abu Dhabi as the capital of the UAE* (it will also serve Qatar) and in *Oman* at the very tip of the Gulf. Bahrain, as the more developed state, has been the first priority and a Chargé was dispatched there last fall to set up our machinery.⁸ As facilities can be arranged, State will be moving to create the remaining two missions with emphasis on an imaginative rather than quantitative presence. Some upgrading in our Kuwait embassy on the economic/commercial side is required since they will bear prime immediate responsibility for overseeing regional cooperation in this field.

Assistance and Exchange in the Gulf

The heart of our presence will be US technical and educational assistance and cultural exchange through private and public channels.

³ Attached but not printed at Tab A is a December 23 memorandum from Irwin to Nixon. The report, "Diplomatic Representation in the Persian Gulf and Oman," was contained in an August 16 memorandum from Sisco to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee. Kissinger approved the report on November 9. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-220, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 92)

⁴ Attached but not printed.

⁵ See Document 106.

⁶ The UAE accepted Ras al-Khaimah as a member in January 1972. (Telegram 115 from Dhahran, January 18; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1187, Saunders Files, Persian Gulf Cables)

⁷ Stoltzfus was appointed Ambassador to Kuwait on December 9, 1971; confirmed by the Senate on January 7, 1972; and presented his credentials on February 9. Resident at Kuwait, he was also accredited to Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

⁸ The Embassy in Manama opened on September 21, 1971, with John N. Gatch, Jr., as Chargé.

These states have their own oil money and do not need economic aid. This will require new kinds of effort and programs. To this end, the Under Secretaries Committee is recommending (1) increasing State's budget for scholarship and exchange fellowship activities in FY 73; (2) focusing now on opportunities to provide technical advisors on a reimbursable basis and on concessionary terms when legislative authority and appropriations can be obtained; (3) encouraging the private US sector to become interested in meeting the needs of the Gulf.⁹

Military Presence

The Under Secretary will be forwarding separately a study and recommendations on arms sales to the Lower Gulf. On your approval, however, steps were taken to place Kuwait on the list of countries eligible to purchase arms under FMS credits.¹⁰

In December, we concluded an arrangement by Executive Agreement to retain—with Bahraini, Saudi and Iranian approval—our small naval presence of three ships which have been there for the last twenty-two years.¹¹ We will be utilizing a consolidated 10% of the base formally used by the British and replacing the obsolete flagship with a larger and more modern one which will increase somewhat the numbers of US personnel involved. In short, the size of the force remains the same, and the Bahrainis rather than the British are now our landlords. Nevertheless, there has been some reaction in the Arab countries and on Capitol Hill.¹²

One comment that might be made in conclusion is that the transition in the Gulf has at least begun with more ease than we—or the

⁹ The recommendations are in the report, "U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf: Technical, Educational and Cultural Programs," transmitted to the Under Secretaries Committee by Irwin, August 4. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-220, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 92)

¹⁰ See Document 92.

¹¹ See footnote 3, Document 91. In telegram 187449, November 16, 1970, the Department notified regional posts that it would inform the British of the decision on MIDEASTFOR and advised the posts of the order in which the Gulf states would be similarly informed. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. III) As reported in telegram 190369 to London, November 20, the Department had already notified Britain in confidence of the decision to maintain MIDEASTFOR. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF)

¹² In a December 14 letter to Rogers, J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote: "It is apparent from the documents which have been furnished to the Committee on Foreign Relations that the plan to establish a naval base on Bahrain reflects a considered decision on the part of the Executive Branch. . . . Sharing a British base is one thing, but establishing a base of our own is quite another matter. In the past our role in the Persian Gulf has been subsidiary to that of the British. With their departure from the Gulf and with the establishment of a U.S. base, we will immediately become directly involved in all matters affecting the Gulf." (Ibid., DEF 15-4 BAHRAIN-US)

British—dared hope. In addition to Oman (independent since 1833), Bahrain, Qatar and the Union are now launched and we are moving into a relationship with each.

There have been two minor ripples; both are largely viewed as products of internal, endemic squabbling.

—The ruler of Sharjah, member of the Union, was assassinated by his cousin last month. The UAE troops helped install the deputy ruler of Sharjah as the new ruler to maintain the line of government against the plotting cousin. This was, incidentally, the first time the UAE acted in the interests of Gulf security. There was a strong suggestion of complicity in the assassination by another Union member and Union members have made their displeasure known.¹³

—Recently, Qatar's deputy ruler deposed the ruler and assumed office. The new ruler has long been regarded the chief executive in fact while the ex-ruler has been known to vacation abroad at great lengths.¹⁴

This is just to point out that while the transition went reasonably well there is still potential for instability.

¹³ Telegram 516 from Tehran, January 25, relayed confirmation of the assassination. (Ibid., POL 23–9 UAE) Sheikh Zayid, the new President of the UAE, told Dinsmore that Sheikh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah "triggered the action." (Telegram 317 from Dhahran, February 16; *ibid.*) An account and assessment is in Intelligence Note RNAN–6, "Persian Gulf: Coup and Countercoup in Sharjah," February 4. (Ibid.)

¹⁴ On February 22, Deputy Ruler and Prime Minister of Qatar Khalifa bin Hamadi Than replaced Sheikh Ahmad in a coup. The overthrow was announced the following day in Qatar. (Telegram 368 from Dhahran, February 23; *ibid.*, POL 23–9 QATAR) This required Stoltzfus's credentials to be rewritten to reflect the new ruler. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, March 2; *ibid.*, POL 15–1 QATAR) United States officials conveyed their desire to reaffirm a friendly relationship. (Telegram 33390 to Dhahran, February 29; *ibid.*)

114. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State¹

Kuwait, March 16, 1972, 0600Z.

427. Subject: US Military Sales to Kuwait.

1. Saw Chief of Staff General Mubarak Mar 15. Said I wanted to consult with him on current state of play regarding possible US mili-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 KUW. Secret.

tary sales to Kuwait.² As I understood it DOD survey team's report was to provide basis (A) for Kuwaitis to determine their defense needs and (B) for USG determine what we prepared offer Kuwait in terms of weapons, spare parts and training. Until report received,³ GOK would not take any decision to buy any major military items connected with air defense from anyone. Gen Mubarak said this was exactly right. He expected US report to "open our eyes" as to Kuwait's defense needs. Once these needs identified, GOK would be requesting US equipment and help. Mubarak said he required report urgently.

2. I said frankly was glad obtain this reading from Gen Mubarak since we did not want to be told later, or read in newspapers, that GOK had tired of waiting for USG reply and had decided make its purchases elsewhere. Gen Mubarak replied GOK did not intend sign any air defense related contracts before studying USG report. "We still intend to go US on these military requirements," he said.

3. I said as Gen Mubarak aware, number of American companies were visiting Kuwait wanting to see highest level Kuwaiti military and financial government officials. What did he advise? I added it would be useful if our company reps were able see knowledgeable officers in Kuwaiti military who would listen to their briefings and receive materials on weapons systems. Such information would be valuable at such time as Kuwait began to make firm decisions on purchases. Gen Mubarak said it would be premature for company reps to see him or MinDef. However, obtaining information on various weapons systems useful. He said he would assign Col Sayegh and working military committee to be points of contact for any US companies interested in military programs for Kuwait. He added any discussion with GOK reps of possible commercial financing for military sales also premature.

4. Gen Mubarak said GOK had made decision to "go government-to-government" on US military contracts. I observed we had been

² On January 13, Selden wrote Laird that "Kuwait clearly intends to lessen its dependence on British arms and, if the U.S. is unable to respond, will undoubtedly turn to French or other third country alternatives. The U.S. already has a considerable stake in Kuwait, principally in oil, and would stand to preserve and enlarge the stake by a well-conceived and successful arms sales program." Selden argued that this could best be met through a Department of Defense survey team. Laird signed his approval. (*Ibid.*, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Admiral Thomas Moorer, Box 17, 091 Kuwait) The team, which included Wrampelmeier, arrived in Kuwait on February 19. (Telegram 21113 to Kuwait, February 4; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 KUW)

³ While General Mubarak received an advance copy, the report of the survey team was submitted to the Kuwaiti Government on April 12. (Telegram 601 from Kuwait, April 10, and telegram 635 from Kuwait, April 13; *ibid.*, DEF 6 KUW) No copy of the report was found. The Kuwaiti Government was to have transmitted the results of its review of the report to the United States by June 27. (Telegram 1094 from Kuwait, June 18; *ibid.*) However, no evidence that Kuwait actually transmitted a formal response to the survey team's report was found.

thinking in terms company-to-government, and there many advantages to this arrangement which I would be glad review. Mubarak replied he familiar with pros and cons of both routes. "Our decision to go government-to-government is final," he said.

5. In answer my question, Gen Mubarak said he planned send Kuwait AF team (Kuwait 0186)⁴ to US "about June." I asked him let me know as much in advance as possible in order insure our companies ready to receive team. Mubarak agreed.

6. *Comment:* Foregoing puts present situation in clear perspective: (A) GOK wants team report soonest, (B) GOK at this writing not contemplating signing military contracts connected with air defense with anyone prior receipt our report, (C) until report received and studied it premature for our companies to expect do any serious negotiating with GOK, or indeed to see any Kuwaiti military figures higher than working committee, (D) GOK expecting report to contain specific recommendations re weapons systems for Kuwait; it obviously to our interest do so, within limits our laws. More specific we are, quicker and smoother will be our road to actually signing contracts. Freewheeling competition only calculated confuse Kuwaitis and give advantage to competitor nations who free to push individual firms.

7. Suggest Dept brief our interested companies on present state of play as described above.

8. Obviously sooner we obtain survey team's report and can deliver it to GOK, sooner we able get off pad on US military sales in Kuwait.

Stoltzfus

⁴ Dated February 8. (Ibid.)

115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait¹

Washington, May 24, 1972, 2233Z.

92049. Subj: Military Equipment Sales to Gulf States. Ref: Kuwait 768.² Joint State-Defense Message.

1. State and DOD concur in observations para 4 reftel that we do not wish to stimulate sales of US military equipment in Gulf and that there is need for official monitoring insofar as possible of contacts between private American companies interested in stimulating such sales in Lower Gulf states. Problem is to find most effective and realistic method of monitoring which will on one hand serve to dampen Gulf state enthusiasm for unnecessary equipment while on other assuring that American commercial firms rather than USG are in forefront of those equipment supply relationships which may develop. A basic problem is that we cannot, nor should we, declare Gulf states off limits to American firms interested in the supply of equipment when competitors from other countries are working the territory. Moreover, when interest of Gulf states in certain types of equipment comes to USG's attention, there are problems in contacting suitable American firms. To call in one American company to exclusion of others would amount to USG's selection of "chosen instrument" to sell a particular type of equipment in the area. On the other hand, if interest in the type of equipment is developed by one American firm, there are inhibitions on USG's passing the sales opportunity to the attention of its competitors.

2. Although USG cannot prevent American firms from contacting Gulf states, we can maximize use of existing controls to partially meet the problem. In cases where requests for a license to export technical data or equipment come directly to Munitions Control from American private firms, USG will exercise responsibility to approve or deny requests on a case-by-case basis in accordance with guidelines of US arms policy for Lower Gulf and, when US classified military information is involved, in accordance with our security policy. When, as in the Sullivan case,³ an American firm asks us for policy guidance prior to

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 UAE. Secret. Drafted by Twynam; cleared in NEA/ARP, NEA/RA, DOD/ISA, DOD/ISA/SA, MC, PM/MAS, and JCS/J5; and approved by Atherton. Also sent to Jidda, Tehran, London, and USCINCEUR.

² In telegram 768 from Kuwait, May 1, the Embassy discussed the need for a flexible U.S. policy toward the sale of arms to the lower Persian Gulf, and suggested ways to deal with Sheikh Zayid's desire for arms. (Ibid.)

³ Not further identified.

making unclassified presentation, USG will endeavor to discourage it from stimulating interest in equipment which under guidelines of US arms policy for Lower Gulf we would prefer not to see sold to Lower Gulf states. As general rule, in situations in which we learn second hand that Lower Gulf state may be interested in US arms we will ask diplomatic posts to check out seriousness of host government interest in equipment. We would probably not follow this procedure in cases involving insignificant amounts of items such as small arms, but would, as a general rule, follow it in all significant sales cases and in cases raising policy problems. Action on sales cases of latter type would not be taken until diplomatic post involved has confirmed that host government interest in equipment was indeed serious. Beyond above restraints, burden will fall largely on diplomatic posts in area to monitor US sales promoters.

3. In cases where Gulf states officials raise directly with area posts their interest in American equipment, Lower Gulf arms policy when finally approved, should be guideline for initial response. Formal requests through diplomatic channels should be, of course, forwarded to Washington for decision.⁴

⁴ Printed from an unsigned copy.

116. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State¹

Kuwait, June 15, 1972, 1145Z.

1085. Dept pass Cairo. Subject: Kuwaiti Views on Mideast and Peninsula/Gulf Region.

Summary: Kuwaiti Foreign Minister expressed worry over Soviet and Chinese encroachment in area which he believes abetted by US Mideast policy. Kuwait also feeling squeezed between conflicting interests of three bigger neighbors, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran. USG should not be building up Iranian and Saudi military machines whose presence (A) might result in establishment of military regimes in both

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR. Secret. It was repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jidda, London, Manama, Tehran, Tel Aviv, and Abu Dhabi.

countries and (B) encourage their aggressive tendencies in Gulf. Kuwait wants better relations with Iranians who must stop their public blasts against Kuwait. Saudi tough policy toward Abu Dhabi and South Yemen counterproductive. Foreign Minister was told US had no chosen instruments to carry out policy of polarization or carve out exclusive sphere of influence in Mideast, including Israel. US wanted just settlement of Arab-Israeli dispute and believed Gulf security responsibility of local states themselves. US did not expect Kuwait to walk around hand in hand with it in public but Kuwait should remember fundamentals, most important of which is that Kuwait interests lie with West. *End summary.*

1. Called on Foreign Minister Sabah June 14 for hour's chat. Told him I proceeding Washington on business (did not mention British connection)² and would be seeing Mr. Sisco and others who would be interested in latest Kuwaiti views on Mideast in general and on Peninsula/Gulf in particular.

2. Sabah said Kuwaiti view of USG policy on Arab-Israeli question quite clear. Aside from rights and wrongs of situation, GOK deeply worried about steady [garble—rapid?] spreading of Soviet and Chinese presence in Mideast, problem with inevitable spill-over into Peninsula and Gulf. GOK believes US Mideast policies greasing wheels of this process which is not in Western nor Arab interest. Unable budge Israel themselves, Arabs have no choice but turn to Communist powers. These are facts, and no need belabor them.

3. Sabah said survival of Kuwait, situated as it is between three larger states of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran, was tricky business. No use criticizing Kuwait for taking special pains stay on good terms with Iraq which had been aggressive in past and could be again. Not at all clear that someone ready pull Kuwaiti chestnuts out of fire if trouble with Iraq erupted. Moreover, while Baathis bad enough, Communists worse, and GOK believed its policy of assistance and close ties with Iraq was factor helping to prevent Communist takeover in Iraq.

4. Similarly, Sabah said, Kuwait held out its hand to South Yemen because country poor and people hungry. No one helping except Russians and Chinese. GOK believed radicalism of PDRY dictated more by these factors than love of world revolution and Communism. Saudi efforts push South Yemenis to wall very expensive and likely lead to very opposite result.

5. Sabah said he concerned about US build-up of military forces of Iran and Saudi Arabia, two main friends of US beside Israel in area. Such build-up dangerous because (A) it greatly increased possibility of

² Presumably a reference to ongoing U.S.–U.K. negotiations over Persian Gulf issues.

leftist military take-overs in these countries where internal opposition to both regimes is growing (B) encouraged aggressive action by both countries in Gulf which likely lead to unhelpful counter-action by radical states and big power rivalry as well.

6. Sabah said Kuwait sincerely wanted closer relations with Iran. But Iran needs understand that Kuwait must live with Iraq and that violent anti-Kuwaiti statements in Iranian press only make rapprochement more difficult.

7. Kuwait trying its best to play constructive role in Gulf both on its own and in cooperation with Saudis, but Saudis no help. SAG had some good people like Kamal Adham, Saqqaf and Pharaon but King Faisal unbending and tough beyond all reason. He still actively claiming Kuwaiti islands and large part of present-day Abu Dhabi, despite fact he has huge country, most of oil in world and has need for stability and friends on his eastern flank. Shaikh Zayid could not be blamed for wanting Soviet mission in Abu Dhabi; Soviets in any case would be no less dangerous if forced carry out their activities behind Zayid's back. US should point out to both Saudi Arabia and Iran realities in Gulf and ill effects of their bulldozer approach to this region.

8. I thanked FonMin for his frank comments which I would convey to Washington. As smallest of three countries but also largest and most experienced of Gulf states, I said, Kuwait had unique role to play which fortunately well understood and appreciated by rest of Gulf states. USG thus valued Kuwait's views and looked to Kuwait as well as Iran and Saudi Arabia to help preserve stability and promote progress in Gulf area. Kuwait's financial and project help throughout Arab world also well known to US. It important that GOK not infer that USG had chosen instruments in Mideast to carry out policy of polarization of area or carving out exclusive US sphere of influence. Israel not American tool in Mideast; we only trying help arrive at just solution to problem between Israeli and Arab friends. Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait not tools of US; on contrary they responsible for security and progress of Peninsula and Gulf not we.

9. I said most people wanted a just end to Arab-Israeli dispute, but no one could say when settlement would come. In meantime, among realities of current Mideast scene was US Mideast policy, which was sincere effort to help, like it or not. I personally hoped Kuwait would not lose sight of fundamentals. Mutual US-Kuwaiti interests very important in long run, and both US and Kuwait would be making mistake by drifting apart. US and Kuwait did not need publicly walk around area hand in hand, but they should consult closely and frequently and keep eye on essential question: what needs to be done to promote orderly development of area and its people. US and Kuwait could work together in quiet way. Kuwait should not wear coat of too many colors which was confusing to budding states of Gulf and could

be sometimes misunderstood by Kuwait's friends, including US. Incidentally, Zayid should be unequivocally discouraged from allowing Russians establish mission Abu Dhabi at this time. Such step would rip it with Saudis for long time to come.

10. Regarding arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia, I said it was not US policy to pour weapons into any Mideast country. However, we did not control these governments; they were friends and deserved our support. We always tried to respond as reasonably as possible. We would do same for Kuwait. Our assessment was that Saudi and Iranian regimes here to stay for foreseeable future.

11. I said we trying do what we could as friends both sides to encourage Saudi-UAE rapprochement. Anything Kuwait could do would be in all of our interest. Sabah said he not sanguine but would help as possible. He wished us luck.

12. *Comment:* Sabah was most cordial and I think appreciated opportunity pass to USG some of GOK's current worries. Believe conversation also beneficial in conveying to Sabah idea that while we can understand its desire cover its left flank, we think Kuwait needs to show a little more spine; that is, in not always trying hide fact that its true interests lie with West.

Stoltzfus

117. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rogers in Australia¹

Washington, June 28, 1972, 0153Z.

Tosec 93/116175. Kuwait pouch for Abu Dhabi, Oman, and Manama. Tokyo for Asst. Sec. Sisco. Subj: US-UK Talks—Persian Gulf.

Summary: US and UK exchanged assessments Persian Gulf situation, revealing broad unanimity of views and cautious optimism about overall situation in Gulf. Both sides agreed on general approach to difficult question of arms sales in area. British expressed concern about

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL UK-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Twinam; cleared in NEA/ARP, S/S-O, and EUR/BMI; and approved by Atherton. It was also sent to London, Paris, Tehran, Amman, Jidda, Tokyo, Kuwait, and Sanaa. Secretary Rogers was in Australia to attend the SEATO and ANZUS Council meetings.

UAE developments. British stressed intention to maintain “high profile” active role in support of Gulf stability. Re Secretary’s Kuwait visit, in response query UK suggested it might be useful for Secretary to urge Kuwaitis to act more firmly in their own self interest, especially in Gulf and oil matters, and not bend so easily to Arab nationalist pressure.²

1. UK group headed by Assistant Under Secretary Parsons met with NEA group headed by Assistant Secretary Sisco in Washington June 26 to discuss Persian Gulf situation. Sisco opened talks by saying US and UK efforts in Gulf are parallel. US Gulf presence limited and in many respects UK in better position to assess situation there. We need to share assessments. Gulf is very much to forefront in US thinking and much thought has been given to US role over last year or two. We want to make certain we are marching together with UK. We particularly interested in how FCO sees UK role developing. As US proceeds to develop diplomatic contacts we are trying to make clear that USG not attempting to assume former British role in Gulf. We are encouraging littoral states, especially Iran, and Saudi Arabia, to take the lead while recognizing ongoing British role, especially in Oman. On the whole, we do not feel Gulf situation going too badly. Newly independent states appear to be approaching their new situation sensibly and generally cooperative thrust is encouraging. We also see role for Jordanians in Gulf and have talked with them about importance of coordinating activities with UK, Saudi Arabia and Iran.³ For the moment, we are softpeddling possible Kuwaiti participation in connection with the Jordanian cooperative role since we uncertain how far we could push Kuwaitis to cooperate with Jordan given Arab nationalist pressures in Kuwait. Sisco continued USG has fielded limited team of diplomatic representatives into Gulf, testing what eventual representation requirements might be. We are being pressed by Qatar for resident representation but we have budgetary problems.⁴ Re technical assistance, we prefer our help to be in civilian sector through entities such as Peace Corps and want our efforts to complement British activities and stimulate regional cooperation. Military assistance is touchy problem. While recognizing we can not ignore requests from Gulf states

² Rogers was in Kuwait from July 3 to July 4 as part of a longer trip to Sri Lanka, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Italy, which took place between July 1 and July 11. A summary of his talks in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Yemen is in Document 118.

³ A report on British thinking on the uses of Jordanian troops in Oman is in telegram 5349 from London, June 9. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 729, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VII)

⁴ As reported in telegram 489 from Kuwait, March 27. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 17–1 US–QATAR) In telegram 228979 to Jerusalem, December 19, the Department notified the Embassy that it had just created the position of chargé for Qatar. (Ibid.) The Embassy in Doha, however, was not established until February 24, 1973.

we are not keen to do too much in this field, do not want to stimulate arms race, and do not want to replace British.

There is also political climate in US against extending overseas commitments. Re equipment sales, we must work on case-by-case basis. Case provisions re Bahrain Stationing Agreement reflect essentially domestic political issue in which many Senators voting to cut funds unless agreement submitted to Senate do not disagree with substance of our naval presence in Gulf. We hope problems with Senate will be straightened out this week. Sisco also wanted to mention Secretary's brief planned visits to Bahrain and Kuwait which are intended to manifest US interest in Gulf.

2. Parsons said that over large part of Gulf area things are going better than British expected. In Oman, Sultan's campaign is going well though Omani situation is still fragile. Qatar is better off under new Ruler who is most sensible man in Gulf. Bahrain more stable than UK had thought it would be. Kuwait is "going on in its usual way." There are, however, serious problems in UAE. In Gulf, British have diverted from "conventional withdrawal policy" and have decided to have "high profile." UK has modernized its relations. Arab world, except Qaddafi, seems to be satisfied with new British role which is designed to bolster confidence of small states by indicating British have not "gone away." There is fairly substantial UK physical presence bolstered by treaties of friendship. There is military advisory team in the UAE. This year Royal Navy has made two of its planned 3-4 Gulf visits. Assistance to police and special branch offices continues. UK carrying on technical assistance although phasing out payments for this purpose in view wealth of small Gulf states. Strong cultural role through British Council continues. Long term British objective is to maintain this role so long as it is not damaging to local regimes. Although FCO's thinking is only tentative so far there is recognition of eventual need to phase our British presence in defense forces to permit "Arabization." UK will be discussing this with Ruler in next year or two. This is where Jordanian role in Gulf comes in. Conventional Arab pressures against new UK role do not seem to be developing at least so far. British think they can stay for sometime, running down presence slowly in coordination with Gulf rulers.

3. Arms Policy: In response Parson's question, Sisco summarized recommendations on US policy toward supply of military equipment to Lower Gulf now awaiting approval.⁵ Policy recognizes interest of American commercial firms in arms sales and recommends making Gulf states eligible for FMS but seeks as general rule to approve sale

⁵ See Documents 119 and 120.

of equipment which would enhance internal security capability Gulf states and not approval sophisticated offensive weapons which might be destabilizing factor. Policy also seeks avoid US military presence in Lower Gulf in maintenance or training functions and to avoid undermining UK advisory role. Sisco noted policy must be implemented on case-by-case basis and USG wants to stay in close touch with British and to complement not compete with UK role. Sisco added we want to emphasize civilian economic development side in our contacts with Gulf shaykhdoms in effort to strengthen structure of these states. Parsons said this “very fair policy” and that US and UK in agreement. It unrealistic to attempt Anglo-American-French effort to impose arms limitation since rulers such as Zayid would turn to Soviets. There is no tidy solution and we must realistically recognize conflict between commercial interests US and American arms salesmen. On political level, however, we are in agreement and are convinced must try to find area outside commercial competition where we can cooperate in restraining flow of unnecessary arms to Gulf states. Sisco noted UK could play useful role in assuring close consultation not only with USG but also with French Government.

4. Two sides then shared assessments situation in individual Gulf and Peninsula states. (Details follow by memcon).⁶ Highlights:

(A) Re Bahrain, UK noted internal stability going well with regime keeping a step ahead of popular opinion. “Kuwaiti-type” constitution will be announced 2–3 weeks to take effect in 2–3 months. It will probably not recognize labor unions but GOB confident it has labor situation under control. Special branch under Ian Henderson major prop to internal security. Bahrain defense force is cause for some worry as possible source future coup. Sisco assured British proposed US coastal surveillance team will work closely with British advisors to stress police rather than conventional naval aspect any expansion Bahraini coastal patrol capability. Re Middle East force Stationing Agreement, Sisco said we regret publicity and are trying again with Senate this week to remove problem. We doubt Bahrainis in position to enter treaty with US re Middle East force but do not wish to remove naval presence from Gulf. Parsons asked if we had considered Das Island as alternative for Middle East force; Sisco said we would examine this.

(B) Qatar: UK encouraged by Qatari development under Khalifa’s rule, including political liberalization and overtures for better relations with Bahrain. Presence deposed Qatari ruler and his son in Dubai hurting Qatar’s relations with UAE. British contemplating weighing in with Dubai ruler, and asking Shah to weigh in also, to urge deposed ruler be

⁶ Not found.

sent to Switzerland. Parsons opined USG will eventually have to open resident mission in Qatar and that present chargé-level resident relations with other Gulf states may be only interim solution. Gulf states will put great emphasis on resident Ambassadorial representation. American Ambassador in UAE for example could "breathe down Zayid's neck" to offset Soviet or Iraqi influence. Sisco explained funding limitations on any early expansion US diplomatic representation in Gulf. Parsons thought Iran should swallow its pride and press for Ambassador in Abu Dhabi rather than Consul in Dubai. French will have resident Ambassadorial representation in each of Gulf states.

(C) Kuwait: Two sides agreed labor situation is worrying, National Assembly more virulent and government seems in sort of paralysis preventing its pursuing Kuwait's real interests for fear of reaction of Iraq, Qaddafi and National Assembly. Parsons said prosperity is what keeps Kuwait afloat but foreign policy toward Iran and Jordan particularly worrying. Parsons added primary UK concern re confrontation between Iraq and IPC was assessment that Iraq could persuade GOK to cut off oil to the West. Parsons hoped Secretary Rogers might get across to GOK leaders that while we understand pressures on them it not necessary to yield to Arab revolutionary sentiment to extent GOK does. Suggested Secretary might urge that Kuwaitis particularly seek to restore strong, underlying relationship with Iran although public posture towards Iran need be no more than "correct." Parsons said Iran could do much to check any Iraqi pressure on Kuwait but is disinclined to do so given present state of Iranian-Kuwaiti relations. British suggested GOK might be advised to keep strong "pro-Arab" stance on Palestine question, if this seems necessary, but to stand for Kuwait's own self interest in Gulf and economic matters. Parsons mentioned recently reported Kuwaiti offer to train Egyptian pilots in Lightnings. Two sides agreed that UK in no political position to oppose this and that purpose of such training appears to be essentially to manifest Arab political solidarity.

(D) British assess UAE situation as "worrying." While it miracle that there is any federation at all. There no doubt that Zayid has been extremely foolish in external policy, alienating Faisal and Shah as well as Rashid of Dubai, failing to improve relations with Oman and currying favor with wider Arab world which cannot help him while neglecting close neighbors who can. There is real possibility Dubai may pull out of UAE. Re Saudi-Abu Dhabi border both sides agreed that standing Saudi offer is reasonable and Parsons described it as "good deal" for Zayid. Parsons said UK simply unable last year to persuade Zayid to accept and has less influence on him now. Re Iranian desire to see Zayid replaced, British side said it unworkable and noted Zayid for all his faults in foreign policy extremely popular in Abu Dhabi. Parsons reviewed British role in police and military in UAE assessing it as ample. British noted inability to effectively coordinate Special Branch

functions in each state but felt basic internal security apparatus, focused in UAE defense force, sound and adequate under British leadership. British reverted to concern about Iranian irritation with Zayid saying they had promised Iranians that they would work on Zayid at home and in London during summer and that Shah had indicated he might send emissary to Abu Dhabi in September. Sisco said USG will support British effort with Iranians.

(E) Oman: Parsons said progress Sultan's campaign has been encouraging but he has to keep winning for next year or so to have reasonable prospects disinfecting Dhofari hinterland from significant rebel presence. British enthusiastic about Jordanian interest in role in Oman but coordination with UK, US, Saudis and Iranians essential. Coordination should start in Amman and should link up with the ground coordinating effort in Oman itself. At present, UK officer role essential in Oman but Jordanians provide good start to "Arabization-Omanization" which will take 20 years. Both sides agreed that cooperation in support of Oman should appear as Omani initiative and that US and UK should be in background. Sisco noted we had weighed in hard with Prince Sultan⁷ for greater Saudi support of Oman and he had indicated Saudis will be forthcoming on economic side, but have limited capability for direct military assistance. Both sides agreed there are problems in Jordan's desire for US and UK financing of its role in Oman and Gulf. Both sides agreed Kuwait should be kept out cooperative effort in Oman for the moment.

(F) Subversion: British said PFLOAG certainly effective in Dhofar but Sultan's growing acceptance in Arab world weakening PFLOAG's position even in Oman. Outside Oman, PFLOAG is weak and to extent that subversive threat exists it would come from Iraqi influence most notable in Abu Dhabi. Parsons noted that most significant factor insofar as subversive capability in Gulf is concerned was June 1967 War which "knocked the stuffing" out of Nasserists and other Arab revolutionaries. As a result, Egyptian influence in Gulf has been at worst passive and at best constructive and it was agreed this situation unlikely to change in foreseeable future.

(G) Saudi Arabia: British noted their difficulties in their relations with Saudi Arabia and expressed concern about stability after Faisal. Parsons said UK concerned by lack of "forward Saudi policy" toward Gulf, with resultant decline in Faisal's influence in Gulf situation over last decade and corresponding increase in Iranian role. In present circumstances, if UAE went radical, for instance, Shah might feel compelled to intervene directly since he uncertain Faisal would. Sisco gave detailed US

⁷ Prince Sultan of Saudi Arabia was in the United States in mid-June. See Documents 161 and 191.

assessment of Saudi situation, considerably more optimistic than British, noting favorable internal developments, good relations with Iran, improved Saudi morale as a result of rapprochement with Egypt and evidence of growing constructive Saudi role throughout the Peninsula.

(H) Yemen and PDRY: Both sides agreed Saudi support of Yemen important and should be directed development of civil economy to strengthen structure of state rather than dissipated in fomenting anti-PDRY para-military activity. Parsons said UK would like to see US resume relations with YAR. Both sides agreed PDRY should be left to stew in its own juice. British noted internal conflicts in PDRY between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions and PDRY's isolation in Arab world. HMG feels that PDRY wishes to maintain its relations with UK, however strained they may be.

(I) Iraq: Parsons felt Soviets might step in to help Iraqis if real confrontation between Iraq and IPC developed. Both sides agreed that there would be political motivations for such Soviet intervention but that Soviet interest in Iran would be inhibiting factor. US side noted economic limitations on increased Soviet role in Iraqi oil. Both sides agreed there limitations on extent to which Iraq is "Soviet stalking horse" in Gulf particularly in view of Iraq's internal weaknesses. Parsons opined Soviet approach toward Lower Gulf regimes might be to "play it quiet" as in Kuwait.

(J) Chinese role in Peninsula: Both sides agreed PRC views Peninsula essentially as an area of rivalry with the Soviets. Chinese recognition of Bahrain and Qatar had irritated PDRY. Chinese have influence in PFLOAG but PFLOAG's impact is limited mainly to Oman.⁸

⁸ Printed from an unsigned copy.

118. Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, July 11, 1972.

SUMMARY

SECRETARY ROGERS' TALKS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

The following is a summary of the Secretary's talks with heads of government in North Yemen, Bahrain and Kuwait. It follows the route which the Secretary took. On the last page is a rundown of the line which the Secretary took on the Mid East problem.

North Yemen

The Secretary was warmly received by *President Al-Iryani* and *Prime Minister Al-Aini*. The highlight of the trip, of course, was the resumption of US/Yemen relations.²

[*Background:* Yemen is a highly underdeveloped desert country. Throwing off a backward-looking tribal leader in 1962, Yemen then became a battlefield between royalists/moderates supported by the Saudis, and more radical types supported by the Egyptians; Saudis and Egyptians ultimately clashed and the situation was not relieved until Nasser, tied up with the Arab/Israeli problem, began pulling out his troops after the 1967 war. By 1970 the moderates, with Saudi help, won and Yemen began to become an acceptable family member among our friends in the area. At a time when the US is less able to do so directly, Yemen is badly in need of assistance. We made clear that resumption of ties would not mean large-scale assistance; nevertheless, acknowledging that, much of Yemeni discourse revolves around their requirements for aid.]

The Yemeni leaders made the following points:

—*The greatest danger to Yemen, and to the Arabian peninsula, is the spread of communism from South Yemen (Aden) next door which the Soviets supply wholeheartedly.* [They made no reference to Chinese support.]

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 953, VIP Visits, Secretary of State's Visit to the Mid-East and European Countries, 28 June–7 July 1972. Secret. All brackets are in the original. The paper was transmitted to Kissinger under a July 11 covering memorandum from Saunders as part of briefing material prepared for Nixon's projected meeting with Rogers on July 13. Rogers met with Nixon in San Clemente on July 15 and 17; no memoranda of conversation or tape recordings of the meetings were found.

² Rogers's account of his visit with President Iryani is in telegram Secto 203/3315 from Belgrade, July 7, and his account of his visit with Prime Minister al-Aini is in telegram Secto 212/3328 from Belgrade, July 8. (Ibid.) The Embassy in Sanaa was re-established on July 1, 1972, after the Yemen Arab Republic severed relations with the United States on June 7, 1967.

—*Saudi Arabia and Libya are helpful* militarily but they provide the equipment to rebel tribal groups rather than to the Yemen Government and military; the latter should be properly built up, rather than wasting aid on tribal groups who have not been successful to date. They should understand.

—The Soviets promised military aid to North Yemen but sent nothing; *there is a virtual "Soviet conveyor belt" to South Yemen.*

—Yemen can hardly pay government salaries; the government will lose the confidence of the people if it cannot produce some results. Nevertheless, *Yemen understands the US position and will not ask for military aid. But it desperately needs economic assistance*, hopes we can speed up old projects and initiate new ones, lobby for Yemen in international institutions, draw private American business to Yemen. Still, Yemen must be militarily prepared.

—*Yemen felt from talks with Saudis that Saudis said the US would be very helpful about assistance once Yemen resumed ties.*

—*Yemen hopes something can be worked out on the Mid East. In the absence of peace, the Soviets are gaining in presence. They applaud your Peking/Moscow trips.*

—President Al-Iryani appreciated the Secretary's hope he might visit the US. (He has never been here.)

—*Yemen is still sensitive to Arab activist views on its decision to resume ties.* They hope we can acknowledge publicly our interest in contributing to Yemen so that Yemen can show something tangible.

The Secretary wants good follow-up on Yemen's needs within the circumstances, and continued consultations with the Saudis.

Bahrain

Secretary Rogers warmly received by the elderly Amir, Crown Prince and Foreign Minister, *was gently reminded—by old friends who stand with the US—that the Arab Mid East is important to us and hope we appreciate that.*³

[*Background:* The Bahrainis, much like but weaker than the Saudis, consider themselves steadfast friends who feel we need their wise counsel and hope we understand their purpose in delivering it. They were proud to have followed through with the US on the vote on China's UN entry last fall, while others' delegates at the UN—Morocco, Oman, Cyprus—caved in to Arab pressures. By the same token, they expect our understanding of the delicacies they feel they must deal with on our COMIDEASTFOR in Bahrain. Concerned about Arab radical reaction to

³ Rogers's account of his visit with Bahraini officials is in telegram Secto 210/3326 from Belgrade, July 8. (Ibid.)

“imperialist” forces there, they were naturally upset with Congressional and press publicity on the Case resolution (Azores and Bahrain agreements to be submitted as treaties). They are pleased the matter has subsided with last month’s Senatorial deletion of Bahrain from the amendment.]⁴

The Bahrainis made the following points:

—*They are pleased the “acutely embarrassing” problem of the Bahrain naval facility has subsided; it should not now affect US/Bahraini relations. Bahrain stands with its friends.*

—*The greatest threats to regional stability are (1) the spread of communism from South Yemen and (2) the gnawing Arab/Israeli impasse which is being felt in the Gulf. The US must help its Arab friends in this regard.*

—*Bahrain wishes to maintain its good relations with the US and UK and has noted with pleasure US ties with Yemen and enhanced prospects with Sudan, Algeria, etc. We have many friends but we must support them.*

—*The Arab/Israeli problem is at the heart of Bahrain’s worries and having increasing repercussions in the Gulf—where the US has huge investments. It is difficult to predict the future and Bahrain does not wish to be forced into taking hostile positions to the US. The US concentrates on specific problems such as reopening the Canal, whereas the broad trends are the real threat—nationalization for one, Arab public opinion for another.*

—*Arabs are becoming increasingly anti-US; the Israeli problem must be “frozen.” The US doesn’t seem able to support its friend Lebanon in the UN Security Council when resolutions come up. Bahrain wants the US to be fair; a strong US in the Mid East is important for Bahrain.*

—*Arabs’ greatest need is to save face. Talks should be held between the parties but it requires a good atmosphere. Israel has to make some gesture to demonstrate flexibility, and do this itself without using the US as its interpreter. For the Arab part, Egypt, not Jordan, is key.*

—*Bahrain is grateful for US efforts and stands by it. American investment is welcome.*

Kuwait

Secretary Rogers had “lively” discussions with the Acting Amir and Crown Prince (Amir away) and it would appear received *a fair dose*

⁴ The Case Resolution, introduced by Senator Clifford P. Case (R-NJ) and four other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called on the Nixon administration to submit the executive agreements with Bahrain and Portugal on basing rights to the Senate as treaties, and thus subject to Senate approval. The non-binding Resolution passed March 3 by a vote of 59–6.

of modern Kuwaiti pro-Palestinian, anti-Israeli feelings and inflexibility on US positions.⁵ The Kuwaitis did not compromise.

[*Background: Kuwait, once of the Saudi, Bahraini traditional ilk, has become increasingly strident in support of more radical Arab views. Despite Kuwait's traditional pro-Western pull, this is partly a function of (1) the fact that over half of Kuwait's population is non-Kuwaiti—most of these are Palestinians in a time of revived self-consciousness and constitute a domestic political challenge to the ruling family; (2) the fact that Kuwait is reaching accommodation on border problems with Iraq—which once claimed Kuwait territory and scares Kuwait—and thus adopts positions important to Iraq but not necessarily vital to Kuwait. One of these is Iraq's vocal stance on Iran's seizure of three islands—protectorates under the UK but claimed by the Arabs—when the British withdrew last fall. Kuwait's support of Iraq's claims of "Arab sovereignty" over these three islands enrages the Shah.*]

The Kuwaitis made the following points:

—Kuwait welcomed the visit as a gesture of good US/Kuwaiti relations, but:

—*Great powers need not solve the Gulf problems after the UK withdrawal; the Gulf should avoid great power associations and assume common responsibility for the region.*

—*Kuwait regrets the US did not prevent Iran from forcibly taking the three Gulf islands. That action contributed to the mood for a Soviet/Iraqi friendship treaty. At the same time, US shouldn't be interfering in Gulf affairs.* [The Crown Prince could not explain this inconsistency.]

—*Re the Arab/Israeli impasse, your policy is not like President Eisenhower's and you have given more arms to Israel than anyone else. [This is a favorite theme.] The US policy now is contradictory—it claims not to believe in force, yet supplies Israel with military means to retain the occupied territories. Consequently, Arabs are forced to turn Soviet.*

—The US lost its credentials of impartiality after the 1967 war and is acting against its own interests.

—*Kuwait does not support Security Council Resolution 242 because it is against Arab interests; it will go on supporting the despairing fedayeen. Kuwait does not care what the parties "directly concerned" feel about 242—they can do what they wish.*

—Ducking questions about whether Israel had the right to exist or whether Egypt might agree to a settlement with it, the Crown Prince said

⁵ Rogers's account of his visit with Kuwaiti officials is in telegram Secto 213/3330 from Belgrade, July 8. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 953, Secretary of State's Visit to the Mid-East and European Countries, 28 June–7 July 1972)

Israel must withdraw from all Arab territories. The Kuwaitis would welcome whatever the Palestinians agreed to, including continued fighting.

—*Fatah leader Yasir Arafat, who receives Kuwaiti as well as Saudi coffers, is the true spokesman; others, leftists, are useless.*

—*Kuwait believes in peaceful solutions but could not accept peace at the price of misery for the Palestinians.*

—*Regardless of what Egypt does, Kuwait would never deal directly with Israel.*

Secretary Rogers in all his Gulf talks took the following line on the Mid East:

—*The US has—and will continue to—work hard for a settlement with Resolution 242 as the basis; the problem is that both sides interpret it differently, Egypt demanding total withdrawal, Israel needing secure borders. The US understands Arab positions; it cannot tell Israel what to do.*

—*The parties should talk, not necessarily face to face but perhaps in proximity with Sisco possibly in between and the US is available. The only solution lies in negotiations between the parties. Everywhere but the Mid East opposing parties are talking; in the Mid East they are unwilling, yet there is flexibility on both sides behind the scenes.*

—*Among the main obstacles are (1) the presence of significant numbers of Soviet troops in Egypt, giving a great power dimension to the Arab/Israeli problem; (2) that Arabs speak with more than one voice: supporting extremists is senseless. The US tried to resist an arms provision to Israel but had to maintain the balance.*

—*A territorial settlement is still the best hope for progress.*

—*In our view, (1) Hussein is reasonable and entitled to have most of his lands back; (2) most of the territory occupied by Israel should be returned but Israel should have some degree of security; (3) any arrangement would probably involve a demilitarized zone. (In North Yemen, the Secretary referred to the 1969 Rogers Plan as the US view of the best route.)*

—*The Arabs must accept Israel.*

—*The US encourages Gulf regional cooperation above all.*

119. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, August 14, 1972.

SUBJECT

Military Supply Policy for the Lower Persian Gulf States

With the transition of the lower Persian Gulf sheikhdoms from complete British protection to independence, we must now decide whether and under what guidelines the US will supply military equipment to these states. When the British maintained them as protectorates, we left the field completely to them. Now, however, some of the states are interested in developing a supply relationship with the US as well.

The Under Secretaries' Committee has completed a study of possible US postures, which Under Secretary Johnson has summarized in the memo at Tab A.² A summary of the entire study is on top.

The central recommendation of that study is that you approve a policy of US readiness to supply arms selectively to these states. This would be done within the following general guidelines:

—The overall thrust of US policy, as you told the Shah in Tehran,³ is to encourage the larger friendly states bordering the Gulf (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) in cooperation with other interested states like Jordan, gradually to assume the main responsibility for the security of the entire Gulf area and Oman.

—The British should be encouraged to remain as heavily involved as possible, especially in assisting the development of local security forces. We should consult carefully with the British on our policy toward the Gulf in order to avoid creating any impression that we are trying to assume a role as primary protector of the Gulf states.

—Attempting to preserve the British role in the area of security, we should not, however, forego direct sale of US arms but should try to strike a balance between our interest in preserving the British role

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-236, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 186. Secret. Sent for action. Haig initialed the memorandum for Kissinger. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² Attached but not printed at Tab A is a memorandum from Johnson to the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, April 24, which forwarded to Kissinger the undated report, "Sale of Defense Articles and Services to Lower Persian Gulf Shaykhdoms and Oman." Earlier drafts of the paper are *ibid.*, Box H-255, Under Secretary's Study Memorandums, U/SM 70-73.

³ Nixon visited Tehran May 30 and 31 on his return from the Moscow Summit. See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972, Documents 200-202.

and our political and commercial interest in the closer direct relationship which would emerge from the direct supply of arms to these states.

—The US Government would support efforts by private firms to sell reasonable amounts of defense equipment and services to these states and we would make these states, where commercial channels are inadequate, eligible to purchase equipment under the Foreign Military Sales Act.

—We would try to avoid situations in which US military personnel would be in these states except perhaps briefly to provide temporary advisory or maintenance instruction with new equipment.

—We would review carefully sales of large quantities of heavy equipment to minimize disruption of the relationships which are in our broader interest.

The main decision being made here is the decision to move from a position of providing no significant equipment to one of providing some military equipment, moving cautiously so as not to disrupt other relationships in the area that are important to us.⁴ The basic decision is whether to supply or not.

A follow-on decision is, if we are going to supply arms, whether to set guidelines for ourselves which would require review of each significant sale in the light of how it would affect the Saudis, Iranians and British and how it would affect the general level of equipment in the area. Such guidelines would seem important at least to protect the role and sensitivities of the British, Iranians, Saudis and Kuwaitis. In addition, there is an issue whether or not we are going to try to encourage some limits on the kinds of arms these states procure once we have taken into account the sensitivities of our friends in the area. The only practical answer seems to be that an eye should be kept on this while recognizing that our ability to affect the level of arms in the Gulf will be limited. The Gulf states will try to procure advanced weapons, and because they have the money, they will probably be able to buy them somewhere. Our ability to win the cooperation of other suppliers is limited. So our main concern is to be sure that our sales are understood by our friends and are consistent with the broad regional cooperation we are encouraging.

Recommendation: That you approve US supply of military equipment to the Persian Gulf states subject to review of each major case in the NSC Under Secretaries' Committee in the light of its effect on our general policy of encouraging the principal states of the area to assume primary responsibility for its stability. If you approve, the decision memorandum at Tab B will be issued.⁵

⁴ In telegram 2535 from Jidda, July 2, the Embassy detailed the caution that needed to be exercised in U.S. arms policy so as not to negatively impact relations with Saudi Arabia, and not to create centrifugal rather than unifying forces in the newly established states. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 FAA)

⁵ The President initialed his approval. Tab B is Document 120.

120. National Security Decision Memorandum 186¹

Washington, August 18, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries' Committee

SUBJECT

US Military Supply Policy for the Lower Persian Gulf States and Oman

The President has considered the report of the Under Secretaries Committee forwarded with the memorandum of April 24 from the Acting Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries' Committee, "Sale of Defense Articles and Services to Lower Persian Gulf Shaykhdoms and Oman."²

The President has directed that our policy on this subject should be based on the principles that the primary responsibility for the stability of the Gulf region should fall upon the states of the region, that the US should encourage cooperation among them for that purpose, that a continuing British role should be encouraged and that, within that overall context, the US should play an active and imaginative direct role. Maintaining this US posture will require continuing close consultation with the British and with the friendly states primarily involved in promoting stability in the Gulf area.

The President has approved the provision of military equipment to the states of the Lower Persian Gulf and Oman on a selective basis as described in the memorandum of the Under Secretaries' Committee. Specifically the following position is approved:

—American private firms should be supported in selling to these states reasonable amounts of defense articles and services of a type which will meet their security needs.

—In cases where commercial channels are inadequate, these states should be made eligible to receive United States military equipment and services under the Foreign Military Sales Act when that is consistent with the objective of furthering cooperation among the regional states.

—As a general rule, the sale of equipment should be arranged in such a way as not to require the presence of United States military

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-236, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 186. Secret. Copies were sent to Helms and George Shultz, Director, Office of Management and Budget.

² See footnote 2, Document 119.

personnel in these states on other than a temporary basis for providing advice or maintenance. Private American companies should not be discouraged from providing, in connection with the supply of United States equipment, administrative and training personnel to the region, but every effort should be made not to undermine the ongoing British advisory role there.

—The sale of weapons and other types of equipment which could be destabilizing will be carefully reviewed in the light of broader U.S. interests in the area.

The NSC Under Secretaries' Committee should oversee the implementation of this policy and should provide for review of major requests for sale before licensing or credit is approved.

Haig³

³ Haig signed for Kissinger above Kissinger's typed signature.

121. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State¹

Kuwait, September 10, 1972, 1050Z.

1666. Subject: Possible Kuwaiti Purchase of French Mirages. Ref: Kuwait 1491 and previous (notal).²

1. In conversation with MinDef and Interior Shaikh Saad, I asked him status of Kuwaiti study of its military requirements, US survey team report and when he planned send team to Pakistan, Europe and US. Was there anything further US companies such as Northrop could do help Kuwaitis make up their minds re aircraft or other equipment they wanted?

2. Saad replied GOK had still not made up its mind finally on aircraft. Mirage and Harrier were still in running in addition to F-5s and A-4s as proposed in US report. What about F-4, he asked. I replied

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 KUW. Secret. It was repeated to Amman, Beirut, Islamabad, and Tehran.

² In telegram 1491 from Kuwait, August 10, the Embassy reported that the Kuwaiti Air Force had completed its study of the Department of Defense survey team report; that the Kuwaiti Army was now evaluating its portion; and that, eventually, a Kuwaiti team would visit several countries and prepare a final report for the Minister of Defense. (Ibid.)

that, as we had explained before, F-4 simply not suitable weapon to defend against threat as agreed upon between Kuwaiti military and US military survey team.³ Moreover, said I thought GOK should think hard before acquiring odd and incompatible assortment of weapons from various countries. Such approach might make sense politically, but certainly not militarily or economically. Compatibility of one's own system internally, and with friendly neighbors (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan) very important also. I said these points argued strongly for US equipment throughout including F-5s, since US equipment best in world.

3. Saad replied emphatically that politics not involved in GOK decision re aircraft or any other military item. Added he hoped have additional info for me "in about two weeks."

4. I saw Saad again at function Sept 9 and said would be glad ask Northrop reps visit Kuwait again if he felt this would be useful in helping make up Kuwaiti minds re aircraft to buy. Saad sidestepped question but asked me see him again Sept 14.

5. *For Tehran:* Re Tehran 5400,⁴ Emb here in close touch with Kuwaitis on their military program and plans. For Pitts' info, Northrop rep Rogan in Beirut fully clued in on status Northrop offer of F-5s to GOK. We obviously cannot guarantee Kuwaiti eventual decision to purchase F-5s but we and Rogan working hard on it. See no need at moment for additional Northrop effort here but of course this decision is Northrop's to make.

Stoltzfus

³ The Departments of State and Defense had earlier identified Iraq as the only real threat to Kuwait. (Memorandum of conversation, August 11, 1971; *ibid.*) Kuwait also identified significant internal security threats. (Telegram 1796 from Kuwait, September 27; *ibid.*)

⁴ In telegram 5400 from Tehran, September 7, the Embassy reported that Kuwait was seriously considering the purchase of French Mirage aircraft that would be based in Pakistan. Northrop had thought Kuwait would purchase F-5s, and was now trying to get King Hussein of Jordan to convince Kuwait to purchase the F-5s. (*Ibid.*)

122. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, September 21, 1972.

The Persian Gulf: The End of Pax Britannica

The Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf has ended after more than 150 years, and three newly independent states have emerged. They will be seeking their way without the threat of British intervention or the comfort of British protection. Singly or in tandem, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been touted as candidates to fill the vacuum left by the British. If military power were the sole prerequisite of leadership, Iran could provide a Pax Persica, but the Shah is embroiled in disputes with Kuwait and Iraq at the head of the gulf and Abu Dhabi down the coast. Cultural and historical differences are added impediments to the exercise of leadership by Iran. Saudi Arabia seems precluded from the role of protector for many of the same reasons, although it does have a good deal of influence with the ruling families in Bahrain and Qatar.

Two non-gulf states, Jordan and Pakistan, have stepped forward, primarily to offer trained and politically safe military and security personnel to replace British forces. But neither country is likely to become an effective force in gulf affairs. Regional cooperation or security arrangements will probably not develop in the near future, but the chances of success would be brightened if the difficulties that the United Arab Emirates is having with Iran and Saudi Arabia could be resolved.

[Omitted here are 12 pages of background on crises, bringing all issues up through September 1972. A short conclusion states that the UAE dispute with Saudi Arabia and Iran represented a major problem that could impede regional cooperative security arrangements. Even if resolved, it was doubtful the new UAE would join in any formal or informal arrangements. Moreover, the region faced potential subversion and threats from extremist dissidents in Oman.]

Background

Britain's decision of January 1968 to terminate its treaties of protection with nine Persian Gulf sheikhdoms and to withdraw its military forces from the area by the end of 1971 signaled the conclusion of the last vestige of the 19th century's Pax Britannica. The dismantling of the British advisory and defense arrangements opened the way for

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence Files, Job 79–T00832A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence in the Directorate of Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.

political changes in the sheikdoms and ordained that their isolation from international affairs would be a thing of the past. Many knowledgeable observers believed that the British exodus would bring upheaval in its wake and open the area to revolutionary movements.

Three independent states—Bahrain, Qatar, and the seven-member United Arab Emirates—were established in the second half of 1971 as the British completed their withdrawal. An effort by the UK to get all nine of these sheikdoms to federate was wrecked by traditional antipathies and the fear of some rulers that they would be eclipsed by others. For Bahrain and Qatar, the transition from the status of protected sheikdoms to sovereign nations was a relatively painless procedure. The union of the other seven sheikdoms into the United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, was difficult. Three years of negotiations were required before the feuding sheikdoms, formerly known as the Trucial States, accepted union. Iran's threat to oppose a union of the Trucial States unless the Shah's claim to ownership of three gulf islands—Abu Musa and the two Tunbs—was recognized also inhibited the establishment of the union.

The oil wealth of the sheikdom of Abu Dhabi guaranteed that its ruler, Sheik Zayid, would be the dominant figure in the union. Now the president of the United Arab Emirates, Sheik Zayid has energetically involved himself in Arab world politics. He has traveled extensively and has contributed gifts and loans to other states. Zayid sees his international connections as potential assets if support is needed against Saudi Arabia or Iran and also thinks these connections will increase his prestige at home.

The rulers of Qatar and Bahrain, on the other hand, have been content to devote themselves to domestic affairs, and their countries remain in the backwater of Arab life. Qatar's ruler, Amir Khalifah al-Thani, was momentarily in the limelight in February 1972 when he deposed the former ruler, his cousin, in a quiet palace coup. Amir Isa, the ruler of Bahrain, is preparing a constitution and planning for the election of a constituent assembly. These political changes will probably be effected by the end of 1972.

Bahrain, with more than 200,000 people, has the largest and most sophisticated population of the gulf sheikdoms, but is not as richly endowed with oil as Qatar or Abu Dhabi. Qatar, whose population is about 130,000, had an oil income in 1971 estimated at \$200 million. Abu Dhabi, with a population of perhaps 60,000, had an estimated oil income of \$440 million in 1971. In per capita terms, it is the richest state in the world, although only ten years ago it was sunk in the traditional penury of desert isolation. Dubai, the largest of the seven members of the United Arab Emirates, has a population of about 75,000. It is the commercial center of the lower gulf coast with a flourishing entrepot

and gold smuggling trade and has recently begun to exploit an offshore oil field. The population of the other five sheikdoms—Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah—range from about 5,000 to 35,000. These sheikdoms are scarcely more than strips of desert and lagoon interspersed with poor fishing and agricultural villages. Only Sharjah has pretensions to prosperity. The principal sources of income for these sheikdoms are bizarre excursions into the field of international philately, rents obtained from oil companies for exploration concessions that have so far proved unrewarding, and stipends from Sheik Zayid. Their main hope is that some day they too may strike it rich with oil.

Critics of Britain's decision to end its military and political commitments argued that, in the absence of a regional security system, the gulf would become subject to subversive movements, persistent conflicts between rival Arab states, and international tension between Arabs and Iranians that would be exploited by the Soviet Union. The result, they said, would be grave peril to Western oil interests and supplies. The political transition was relatively orderly, however, and the dire predictions have not yet been borne out. Although there has been wrangling and some tension, overt external military attack on any of the gulf sheikdoms seems unlikely. The political institutions of the new states are fragile, however, and their security may be threatened by other developments. Intra-ruling family disputes may lead to palace coups, which are usually unrelated to ideology; territorial disputes, revolutionary movements, or external disruptive influences could cause trouble; indeed, the union itself could break up.

Breakup of the union

Sheik Zayid's oil wealth is a powerful adhesive for the union, but at the same time it has led to jealousy and has raised questions in the minds of the rulers of the other six members of the union about the Sheik's intentions. Zayid's efforts to enlarge the Abu Dhabi Defense Force rather than the union army provide evidence for those who suspect that the Sheik's goal is to become the sole ruler of the union. Some of Zayid's actions on the international scene—his recognition of the Soviet Union without consulting the other rulers and his controversies with Iran and Saudi Arabia—are regarded as high-handed and unwise by [less than 1 line not declassified] and some of the other rulers.

[Omitted here is a photograph of Sheik Zayid chairing a meeting of the union's council of rulers.]

While none of the poorer sheikdoms seems likely to pull out of the union soon, several are keeping their options open by maintaining contact with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, and Ras al-Khaimah either have been securing, or are negotiating for, financial aid

from King Faysal or the Shah. Zayid and the union government understandably oppose direct foreign assistance to a sheikdom and have requested that all aid be funneled through the union government.

The fragility of commitment to the union is also demonstrated by Fujairah's and Ras al-Khaimah's approaches to the Sultanate of Oman on possible union. Worsening relations between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, or Iran and Abu Dhabi, could lead to problems for the union.

Territorial disputes

The numerous territorial disputes in the Persian Gulf—most of them related in one way or another to oil issues—are probably the greatest threat to regional stability and cooperation. Prominent among them is the longstanding quarrel between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia that has disturbed relations between Sheik Zayid and King Faysal. The Saudi monarch refuses to establish diplomatic relations with the union until the matter is settled. Zayid's decision in early 1972 to exchange diplomatic missions with Moscow, although it has not yet been implemented, further irritated the Saudi monarch.

The core of the Abu Dhabi–Saudi dispute is popularly, but inaccurately, believed to be the ownership of the Buraimi Oasis. Its nine towns and villages are now divided between Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate of Oman, but, it is said, all are claimed by Saudi Arabia. In fact, King Faysal has indicated that he is willing to abandon his claim to Buraimi in return for border modifications elsewhere. As a face-saving device, King Faysal has suggested that a referendum be held in Buraimi to determine the residents' wishes. This was done in Bahrain in 1970 when Iran's claim to the island was laid to rest. The real barrier to reaching a settlement is the Saudi demand for a corridor to the Persian Gulf, to run between the Qatar border and a point west of Abu Dhabi's oil terminus at Jebel Dhanna. This would give the Saudis access to a bay that could be developed into a port. The Saudi territorial plan is known as the "Riyadh Line of 4 May 1970."

Sheik Zayid is reportedly willing to cede the Saudis a corridor to the gulf (though narrower than that sought by Faysal), to redefine the border, and to share potential oil revenues in certain disputed territories. But the Sheik contends that to give in to King Faysal's full demands would lead to the dismemberment of Abu Dhabi and the loss of at least a third of its territory. If the Saudis were to acquire a corridor and a stretch of the coast, it is not clear what this would mean for the existing Daruma offshore oil concession area. Oil has not yet been found in commercial quantity, but the prospects seem promising.

Zayid's proffered concessions have been rejected. A Saudi official has stated that unless Saudi demands are met by Abu Dhabi, his government may reassert the even more extensive claims it made in 1949.

King Faysal's demand for a "window on the gulf" is publicly justified by the Saudis on the rather vague grounds of economic development and defense needs. More specifically, the Saudis want a corridor so they can lay a pipeline from the new, and not yet producing, Shaybah oil field to the coast. [3½ lines not declassified] The most economical outlet for a pipeline would be a route straight north to the Abu Dhabi coast. The Saudis' corridor plan is designed to provide a site within Saudi jurisdiction that would serve not only Shaybah, but also any other Saudi fields in the Rub al-Khali area. Otherwise, output from this area would have to pass far to the north to the Saudi coast, through Abu Dhabi or Oman—the latter undesirable for security reasons.

A Saudi military take-over of a gulf corridor is not likely; such an effort would be difficult to mount logistically and would have adverse political repercussions. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia displayed its military capability when it moved several thousand National Guard troops to Salwah on the Qatar border in early 1972. This was presumably done to bolster the new Amir of Qatar following his ouster of the former ruler, but the troop movement may also have been designed to impress Sheik Zayid.

The US has tried to get the Abu Dhabi–Saudi territorial dispute off dead center, but the Saudis have been intransigent, talking about "sacred Saudi soil" and sticking to what appears to be a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer to Sheik Zayid. King Faysal is not convinced by US arguments that Sheik Zayid would be less likely to enter into ties with Iraq and other Arab radicals if the Saudis improved their relations with the United Arab Emirates. King Faysal's displeasure with Zayid was increased by Abu Dhabi's acquisition of jet fighter-bombers and tanks. The Saudis, who suspect that the weapons would only be used against them, have called the purchase "criminal and senseless." King Husayn of Jordan, wishing to carve out a role for himself in the area, has offered to serve as a mediator in the dispute. Husayn plans to visit Saudi Arabia in the near future and has already met with Sheik Zayid. The Jordanian monarch sought to convince Zayid that better relations with the Saudis and Iranians are a prerequisite for regional stability, but his efforts to resolve the territorial issue have so far shown no signs of success.

Relations between Sheik Zayid and the Shah of Iran are also marred by a territorial dispute. In late 1971, shortly before the termination of the British role in the gulf and just prior to the formal establishment of the union of the Trucial States, Iran took over three islands in the gulf—Abu Musa and the two Tunbs. Iran's claim to the small and sparsely populated islands had an historical basis. But more important was the Shah's conviction that the islands were strategically essential to Iran. If they were in unfriendly hands, he contended, they could provide bases from which Iran's vital shipping routes might be

attacked. The Shah therefore made it clear that he would oppose any union of the gulf states unless he controlled the islands. The ruler of Sharjah [*less than 1 line not declassified*] eventually agreed to give in to the Shah in return for financial and economic aid from Iran. On 30 November—one day before the British responsibility for defense of the Trucial States lapsed—an Iranian naval task force landed a small garrison on Abu Musa without incident. As for the two Tunbs, the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah refused to negotiate. Nonetheless, an Iranian force landed there and skirmished briefly with the Ras al-Khaimah police. The message of this operation was not lost on the gulf rulers. Nonetheless, it aroused considerable resentment and provoked a loud outcry throughout the gulf.

Essentially, the islands dispute is a conflict between the different cultures, Arab and Persian. The Arabs resent Iranian intrusion into the gulf, and Sheik Zayid has not been content to drop the issue. In his travels and reception of Arab leaders, the Sheik has gone out of his way to flag the matter by frequently referring to Arab ownership of the islands and to the need to preserve the "Arab character" of the gulf. Zayid has probably been under some pressure from radical Arabs to pursue the issue, and Iraq has been the cheerleader for Zayid's comments, apparently hoping to reduce Iran's influence in the gulf by keeping the dispute alive. The Shah, who had felt that the gulf islands issue had been put to rest, has reacted angrily to Zayid's carping. Some Iranian officials, perhaps as a stratagem to frighten Zayid into silence rather than with serious intent, have suggested that Iran is "tempted to do something about Zayid." [*less than 1 line not declassified*] pointed out to the Iranians that the removal of Zayid would open a Pandora's box of dynastic feuds in the gulf and could well produce an even more irresponsible successor. Moreover, Iranian adventurism on the Arab side of the gulf would engage [*enrage?*] the Saudis and jeopardize any hopes the Shah might have of injecting Iranian influence into the area. Relations between the United Arab Emirates and Iran have been so strained that ambassadors have not been exchanged, although Iran has been given permission to open a consulate in Dubai.

There were indications in July 1972 that the differences over the islands were being resolved. Low-level talks between union and Iranian officials were under way, and negotiations for a meeting in Europe between Sheik Zayid and a personal emissary of the Shah were in progress. Since then, however, many of the Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates, have again publicized the dispute over the islands, this time via a letter to the UN Security Council. As a result, it seems unlikely that the Shah or any Iranian official, except perhaps the Iranian ambassador in London, will now meet with Zayid. The Shah has threatened to withdraw diplomatic recognition from the United

Arab Emirates by 30 September if the controversy is not resolved to his satisfaction.

Another source of territorial disputes centers on oil exploration and exploitation in the Persian Gulf. A number of states have signed median-line agreements to set off areas for exploration, but not all have been able to reach accords. Currently under review are conflicting claims for exploration rights advanced by competing US oil companies that involve the offshore boundaries of Sharjah and Ajman and of Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain. On land, conflicts between the member sheikdoms of the United Arab Emirates resulting from complex family and tribal jealousies and the profusion of enclaves have led to frequent territorial disputes and to occasional violence. The latest outbreak of armed conflict occurred in June 1972, when Sharjah and Fujairah tribesmen fought over the ownership of agricultural land. The United Arab Emirates Defense Force (the former Trucial Oman Scouts) and the Abu Dhabi Defense Force intervened to end the clash.

Revolutionary Movements

Revolutionary movements also pose a threat to the gulf states. Operating under the banner of Arab nationalism, a number of leftist clandestine groups are continuing to encourage domestic discontent. The unpopularity and conservatism of some ruling families, traditional tribal and dynastic rivalries, and the disorientation of populations swept into new social and economic situations by oil wealth are all sources of discontent. Until the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, much of the external support for subversive movements came from Cairo, but changing Egyptian policies since then have opened the field to other contenders for the revolutionary spoils, such as Iraq and Yemen (Aden).

Of the new gulf states, Bahrain is probably the most susceptible to revolutionary movements. [4 lines not declassified] Order and stability may be enhanced by the adoption of a constitution and popular representation; in the long run, however, political reforms will probably only whet the appetite of extremist groups. Bahrain has a variety of extremist popular front groups, such as the Arab Nationalist Movement, the National Liberation Front, and Baathists. The Bahraini Baathists—only some of whom have close ties to Iraq—assert that they favor evolution over violent revolution and have kept pressure on the ruling family to share its political power.

Among the other lower gulf states, dissident organizations are disunited and ineffective. Local security forces, usually British-led, will probably be able to cope with domestic threats for some time to come.

The Baathist regime in Iraq, which is hostile to all sheiks, sultans, and shahs and has been trying to extend its presence and influence in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, poses a threat to the gulf states. The Iraqi Government has established a number of commercial

enterprises in gulf states (banks, insurance companies, and trade centers) that function as centers for the collection of information, propaganda dissemination, and support for local revolutionaries. Iraq apparently marked Bahrain for special attention during the first half of 1972, but its efforts were inept and largely unsuccessful. The sheikdom of Ras al-Khaimah, a member of the United Arab Emirates, is also considered to be a center of Iraqi activity. [3 lines not declassified] Baghdad has long believed that it has a legitimate and important role in gulf affairs, and it is anxious to expand its trade and presence in the region. Suspicion of Iraqi intentions is strong in the area, however, and the Baathists' ability to achieve influence is limited, given Iraq's domestic troubles with the Kurds, its current financial problems, and its preoccupation with disputes with Iran. Although Iraq, the self-appointed leader of "progressive" forces in the region, has scored points with gulf radicals by championing the Arabs' condemnation of Iran over the islands issue, Baghdad's meddling in the gulf is still only a nuisance, not a serious threat.

Another subversive element of considerable importance to the three new gulf states is the "Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf," a movement first organized in 1963 to oppose the rule of the former sultan of Oman. Most of the Popular Front's activity is still limited to Oman, but the movement has branches throughout the Persian Gulf. The Popular Front is supported and influenced by the radical regime in Yemen (Aden); there have been persistent reports of Chinese advisers and Soviet and Chinese arms filtering from Aden to the rebels in Oman's Dhofar Province. The rebels' grip on the interior of Dhofar and the threat of their eventual expansion from the mountains of Oman into the gulf sheikdoms were one reason for the palace coup of July 1970, when Sultan Qabus overthrew his autocratic and eccentric father Sultan Said. Oman is spending more than half of its revenue for defense purposes, although the Popular Front has never had a force numbering more than a few thousand.

External Influences

Several external influences affect the gulf. The residue of the old British presence makes some contribution to stability. The British are still using airfields in the gulf as staging posts for the Royal Air Force, there are occasional British naval visits to gulf ports, and gulf facilities provide special desert training for small British army units. More important is the incorporation of seconded and contract British officers into local military and public security forces. In addition, London will continue to give de facto protection to the neighboring Sultanate of Oman, as it has since 1798. On the other hand, there is a risk that the revolutionaries and the discontented will try to use the continuing British presence, no matter how diminished, as a rallying call for action against the governments of the new states.

The British leverage in the gulf, is, of course, declining. Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates are seeking to end their dependence on the UK for military and security advisory personnel and also for military equipment. Sheik Zayid has recently purchased some French military equipment, and all the governments have made inquiries about purchasing US arms. Sheik Zayid's thirst for sophisticated weapons is difficult to quench, causing some of his neighbors, including members of the union, to question his intentions. They accuse him of threatening an expensive arms race in the gulf.

US influence in the gulf is mainly projected by the large US companies that control much of the area's oil production and by a small US Navy detachment operating from Bahrain. US commercial enterprise is a stabilizing force since it produces the cash that all gulf regimes desire. But it is also a target for "anti-imperialist" sloganeering by some. The modest US naval contingent, which consists of a flagship, the 522-foot USS *La Salle*, and two or three destroyers, has operated from Bahrain for over two decades under arrangements with the British; currently it is using these facilities under a rental arrangement with the Bahraini Government. This force is a convenient target for local extremist and Soviet propaganda. The Russians carried out an intensive campaign against the US role in the gulf in mid-1972, charging, among other things, that the US has established a large air base on the island of Abu Musa.

The departure of the UK and the emergence of new independent states in the gulf presents the Soviet Union with an opportunity to introduce its influence into the region. The Soviet Union will probably turn to the standard tools of diplomatic and commercial relations wherever possible and, perhaps, to economic and military aid. In the long run, the USSR may encourage leftist movements, but it is unlikely to provide substantial equipment or support to any group before it has demonstrated its worthiness. There are, in fact, limits to the Soviet Union's freedom of action. Iran, for instance, is sensitive to great power presence in the Persian Gulf, and Iranian-Soviet relations would be tested by evidence of additional Soviet activity. The Shah is already discomforted by the Soviet-Iraq Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

Russia moved with alacrity in early 1972 to offer to exchange diplomatic missions with Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Only Sheik Zayid of the United Arab Emirates accepted the offer, doing so without consulting the other rulers of the union sheikdoms. Under pressure from several countries, Zayid has postponed the actual exchange of representatives, but he says that the agreement must be honored. An effort is being made to ensure that the Soviet mission in Abu Dhabi is small and that consulates are not set up elsewhere in the union.

Jordan and Pakistan are making intensive diplomatic efforts to establish themselves as significant actors in the gulf arena. King Husayn's growing interest in establishing ties with the gulf states is related, in

part, to Jordan's estrangement from some Arab states such as Egypt. Rebuffed by his neighbors, the King has turned to one of the few areas in the Arab world where Jordan may still exercise influence, make friends, and secure badly needed financial assistance. In addition to offering military and security personnel to the new gulf states and Oman, King Husayn has been active on the diplomatic front. He has recently visited Sheik Zayid and the Shah, and will visit King Faysal soon. Husayn hopes on these trips to mediate Abu Dhabi's disputes with the Saudis and Iranians.

Pakistan has long had commercial interests in the gulf, and thousands of Pakistani workers are employed there. The defeat by India and the loss of East Pakistan last year led President Bhutto to emphasize ties with Muslim states, especially the more affluent ones in the Persian Gulf, where he might tap the oil wealth of the sheikhdoms. By associating himself with Islamic states of the Middle East, President Bhutto hopes to gain political benefits among the Muslims at home.

Pakistan's major effort is being made in Abu Dhabi. In discussions with Bhutto in Islamabad last March, Sheik Zayid requested that Mirage-qualified Pakistani pilots and technicians be assigned to the Abu Dhabi Air Force. Bhutto agreed to the request. In return, Abu Dhabi will provide Pakistan with financial aid for its military reconstruction program. Sheik Zayid has purchased 12 Mirage-5 fighter-bombers from France. They will be based in Abu Dhabi, but will be available to Pakistan if needed.

The fact that Pakistani pilots will fly the Mirages and that a Pakistani has been named commander of the Abu Dhabi Air Force will probably go a long way to mollify Saudi Arabia, which was displeased when Sheik Zayid acquired the sophisticated jets. Both King Husayn and President Bhutto recognize that they must avoid offending the sensibilities of Saudi Arabia and Iran—states to whom both also look for support.

Conclusion

The United Arab Emirates' disputes with Saudi Arabia and with Iran are the major problems in the gulf. Although neither dispute is likely to produce armed conflict, each impedes moves toward cooperative security arrangements. Should the territorial disputes be resolved, however, the new gulf states—proud of their independence and suspicious of their bigger neighbors—are unlikely to rush into formal or informal arrangements with more powerful nations. In addition, the gulf states all suffer from domestic stresses and strains that could be aggravated by subversive elements. Important factors in determining how long the gulf states have to put their own houses in order will be the ability of the new states to hold external subversive influences at bay and whether the neighboring Sultanate of Oman can hold its extremist dissidents in check.

123. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State¹

Kuwait, October 29, 1972, 0952Z.

2072. Subj: Military Sales: Kuwait Views on Arms Procurement.
Ref: Kuwait 1753.²

Summary: Conversation Oct 24 with Kuwait Army Major Shaikh Jaber Hamoud al-Sabah provided frank insight into current status GOK arms procurement. Jaber said travel plans of Kuwaiti military procurement team have been currently shelved. He cited involvement of Crown Prince/Prime Minister Jaber al-Ahmad (his cousin) into routine military affairs and implied this was cause of delay. Jaber also gave strong hint that Kuwaitis were leaning toward improved Hawk, but said final decision would depend on first hand demonstration. Re aircraft, Jaber reiterated remarks of Shaikh Saad (reftel) that only Mirage and Phantom were real possibilities: he said Northrup F-5 was inadequate for technical reasons, primarily its slow speed and lack of range to strike into Iraq. *End summary.*

1. On Oct 24, EmbOff made call on Army Major Shaikh Jaber Hamoud Sabah (member ruling family and cousin Prime Minister) to pass information received from Washington re schedule Hawk live-firing demonstration.³ In resulting hour-long conversation, Jaber gave frank expression his views regarding weapons procurement. Jaber's comments, while admittedly personal, are also indicative of current GOK thinking re arms (reftel). Highlights of conversation are described below:

2. Kuwaiti military procurement team: Jaber said that travel plans of military team had been shelved for time being. He himself was unhappy over delay and expressed dissatisfaction with whole arrangement. Jaber said army had completed its study several weeks ago and

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 KUW. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

² In telegram 1753 from Kuwait, September 20, Stoltzfus reported that during a September 14 meeting with Shaikh Sa'd, the Shaikh insisted that Kuwait wanted to purchase Phantoms and implied that the French Mirage was the second choice. Stoltzfus had urged the Shaikh to look more carefully at the F-4s, as had Saudi Arabia, and suggested to the Department that A-4s be offered also. (Ibid.)

³ Following a formal presentation of material on improved Hawk and TOW systems, the Kuwaitis made a formal oral request for live demonstrations of the systems in the summer of 1973. (Telegram 1907 from Kuwait, October 10; *ibid.*) The Embassy noted strong competitive pressure from the French. (Telegram 2020 from Kuwait, October 24; *ibid.*) The Department of the Army agreed in principle to the request for a live demonstration, but insisted that Kuwait pay for it despite French competition. (Telegram 200110 from the Departments of State and Defense to Kuwait, November 3; *ibid.*)

was ready to make inspection tour. He said "politicians" were interfering and holding up team's trip. Jaber asked how much advance notice would be needed to set up US portion of trip. EmbOff replied that we would like to have minimum one month's notice in order arrange appropriate program. Jaber noted this but indicated that it was anybody's guess when and if team would actually depart.

3. Role of Crown Prince: Jaber indicated that CP/PM Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmad was becoming more directly involved in day to day affairs of GOK military procurement team. He said Jaber al-Ahmad was now making all decisions including most routine ones re team's schedule, itinerary, and composition and implied this was real reason why things were moving so slowly. Interestingly, name of MinDef Shaikh Saad or Chief of Staff Mubarak did not come up at all during conversation.

4. Improved Hawk: Jaber said Kuwaitis were satisfied with Raytheon's presentation and that next step would be see actual live firing of improved Hawk in order get better idea about its capabilities. Jaber said he had already done research on Swiss, Italian, and French air defense systems. He hinted strongly that Kuwaitis were leaning toward Hawk but that it was imperative see system first hand before making final decision. He noted there would be no Hawk firings in November and December and indicated this would be taken into consideration in scheduling team visit.

5. Northrop's F-5: Jaber said Kuwaitis do not consider Northrop's F-5 as best choice of aircraft to replace British Lightnings for several reasons: F-5, when fully loaded with armament and topped off with fuel, did not have sufficient range to cover northern areas of Iraq past Baghdad and could barely make it from Kuwait to Bahrain. F-5's speed was another weakness cited. Jaber said MiG-21s presently deployed in Iraq near Kuwaiti border had speed of Mach 2.2, F-5 had only Mach 1.7 capability which he personally felt was closer to Mach 1.5.

6. Mirage and Phantom: Jaber said Mirage (F-1) and Phantom were only real choices for Kuwait. Phantom had greater capability but also required more maintenance. Mirage, he said, had advantage of being single engine aircraft. He stated that Phantom was not real possibility anyway since Washington would probably never sell it to Kuwaitis. EmbOff replied that decision re selling Phantom as well as other types aircraft was still in hands of Washington. Jaber was specific in singling out Iraq as main source of threat; he did not touch upon Arab-Israeli considerations. Jaber also voiced concern about Russians' MiG-23 Foxbat which he said had successfully overflown Israel without detection. His real worry was that Foxbat would be deployed in Iraq. F-5, he said, would be hopeless against this threat.

7. *Comment:* Jaber's remarks constitute first time Kuwaitis have openly expressed their views to us at this level. It should be noted Jaber

is key member of MOD military procurement team and one of few officers who attended both Hawk and TOW briefings two weeks ago. Jaber's comments also echo remarks made to Ambassador by Shaikh Saad himself, particularly re aircraft. Although Jaber is only an Army Major, he is a Sabah and probably well informed on Kuwaiti military affairs. We have no reason to doubt his remarks re plans of the military procurement team or other subjects discussed. We were impressed by his specific reiteration of point made by Shaikh Saad that Mirage and Phantom were only ones now in running and his rationale, presumably after he had seen memo Northrop rep had sent General Mubarak re comparison of Mirage and F-5. Jaber's unprecedented frankness on subject may have been another warning GOK was going to buy the Mirage—or just more pressure on US to offer Phantom. We tend to accept his sentiments as one more straw in the wind, while realizing that the final decision will be taken by the Crown Prince after consideration of the views of Shaikh Saad and General Mubarak and that different considerations may come into play.

McClelland

124. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait¹

Washington, November 7, 1972, 0129Z.

202365. Subject: Military Aircraft Sales to Kuwait. Ref: (A) State 187880. (B) Kuwait 1753. (C) Kuwait 2072.²

1. Re question raised in para 5 reftel (B)³—State and Defense have decided it not in US interest, nor in long-term interest GOK, that F-4, in any configuration, be acquired by Kuwait Air Force. We believe F-4

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 KUW. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by G.Q. Lumsden, Jr. (NEA/ARP); cleared in draft by Scotese, Stackhouse, and Miklos; cleared by Dickman, Atherton, Norland (PM), Sanford (PM/MC), and Timberlake (DOD/ISA); and approved by Sisco. It was repeated to USCINCEUR.

² In telegram 187880 to Kuwait, October 13, the Department stated that the Ambassador should tell the Kuwaitis to examine all possible aircraft, continue to recommend against F-4s, and recommend that Kuwait buy no more than one type of combat aircraft. (Ibid.) For telegram 1753 from Kuwait, see footnote 2, Document 123. Telegram 2072 from Kuwait is Document 123.

³ Stoltzfus had asked if he was correct in assuming that the Department was not willing to sell F-4s to Kuwait in any configuration.

too sophisticated and too difficult for GOK to support and maintain, and that USG would be doing GOK disservice by selling it aircraft which could well produce another Lightning problem. As result this decision, USG will be unwilling consider F-4 sales to GOK, and we will not schedule visit to F-4 factory by Kuwait military procurement team when and if it comes to US.

2. We believe GOK needs small, highly-effective air force equipped with one type high-performance aircraft capable meeting both air-to-air and air-to-ground requirements. This aircraft should (A) have relatively low initial and operating costs, (B) require minimum training and logistics support, (C) eventually be operated and maintained by Kuwaiti personnel with minimum outside support, and (D) should be compatible with aircraft of neighboring friendly states. We firmly believe F-5E best meets these requirements.

3. In addition to logic para 2 above, which you should stress in your discussions with Kuwait MOD, several other factors have influenced our decision. Although these should not be passed on to any foreign sources, we feel you should know our decision was influenced by our strong belief that F-4 sale to Kuwait might saddle GOK with program it could never hope manage successfully without continuing intensive supplier-country maintenance of the type which has sometimes been lacking in Lightning program. This could, in long run, impair our relations and harm our commercial reputation both in Kuwait and Gulf. F-4 sale would also complicate US relations with Saudi Arabia, which has been persuaded to buy F-5 rather than F-4, and with Israel and Iran. Our relations with Jordan could also be affected; if we make such a sale, we would be hard put to refuse Hussein.

4. Rationale countering argument voiced by Major Sabah in reftel C follows by septel.⁴

5. We welcome your comments as to manner and timing our informing GOK of decision described para 1 above.⁵

⁴ To counter statements voiced by Major Jabel al-Sabah and following discussion with USAF experts, the Department wrote a detailed technical comparison of the various systems under consideration in terms of their usefulness in an air war with Iraq: the Northrop F-5E, the Dassault F-1 air-to-ground attack aircraft and day fighter, and the Fishbed J version of the MiG-21. The Department suggested that a small team of USAF experts brief Major Jabel on the comparative features and that the Ambassador make the strongest possible presentation in favor of the F-5E before Kuwait reached a final decision on aircraft purchase. (Telegram 214153 to Kuwait, November 24; *ibid.*)

⁵ Printed from an unsigned copy. In telegram 2337 from Kuwait, November 22, Stoltzfus noted that since the Kuwaiti Government had not yet decided on the type of military aircraft it wished to buy, he believed it best to avoid any mention of F-4s until Kuwait raised the subject. When and if this occurred, he would argue the F-4s were too complex, requiring a level of maintenance and number of trained personnel beyond present Kuwaiti capabilities. (*Ibid.*)

125. Memorandum From the Director, Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Dickman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

Washington, December 12, 1972.

SUBJECT

Saudi Abu Dhabi Border Issue

REF

Your note on Abu Dhabi's 735²

I have come to the conclusion that the best thing we can do concerning the long-standing Saudi–Abu Dhabi boundary issue is to continue and make both sides realize it is in their best economic and security interests to settle the issue. In so doing, we should not get involved in offering a specific solution. Shaykh Zayid, who feels the US has great influence with King Faisal, would very much like to transfer responsibility for solving the boundary problem to our shoulders. However, this issue can only be resolved directly by the two parties. We have, as you know, tried a number of different approaches this year:

In April we discussed with the British a proposal where they would urge the UAE and we would urge the Saudis to meet in Europe or in the US to discuss the border issue. The British felt that the time was not ripe for a settlement and that neither the US nor the UK would benefit from becoming involved in the issue. Embassy Jidda basically echoed these views. Saudi Foreign Minister Saqqaf's comments indicated that the Saudi position on the boundary would soften very slowly and Jidda felt we should be cautious in pressing for direct Saudi–Abu Dhabi contacts lest they deteriorate into a confrontation over the boundary question.

In May we tried another tack of using the possibility of UAE–Soviet relations as a point to spur the Saudis to establish diplomatic relations with the UAE leaving the boundary question in cold storage for the time being. Jidda thought this was a non-starter. It felt the Saudis would be incredulous of any deal by which the UAE would promise

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 32–1 SAUD–UAE. Confidential. Sent through Atherton. A handwritten note by Sisco reads: "I remain unconvinced. I'll sit tight a little while longer and then we'll see." Attached but not printed is a map of the Abu Dhabi–Saudi Arabia boundary.

² On telegram 735 from Abu Dhabi, December 9, reporting on a private conversation between Senator Fulbright and UAE President Zayid, Sisco wrote: "Can we intervene usefully on this [the boundary dispute]? JS" (Ibid.)

to hold off further ties with USSR in return for Saudi recognition. Also Jidda felt that it was best for the UK not to become associated in a renewed endeavor to settle the border issue because Saudi suspicions of the British on this matter remain deep.³

In June you raised the subject with Tony Parsons during the June 26 Gulf discussions. Parsons told you that while he thought the earlier Saudi proposal for a boundary settlement was reasonable, he did not think Shaykh Zayid would budge, and the UK did not want to reentangle itself with Faisal over the matter.⁴

During the summer we quietly encouraged the Jordanians to play a role. Through Amer Khammash, the Jordanians indicated that they might be able to be of some assistance following their earlier efforts to patch up Iranian-UAE relations at the time of King Hussein's visit with the Shah in late July. So far nothing has come of these Jordanian endeavors.⁵

Early in September, Shaykh Zayid visited London. There he got a talking to from the British who encouraged him to work out an exchange of ambassadors with Iran. At the same time, the British encouraged Zayid to resolve his boundary differences with the Saudis. Zayid at that time welcomed the prospect of Jordanian mediation although he was disheartened at the lack of momentum.⁶

In October, during the UNGA bilaterals, we raised the boundary issue both with the UAE and the Saudis. When UAE Foreign Minister Suwaidi hinted at a direct US role, the Secretary quite rightly told him that the US was prepared to do what it could to help but could not assume a problem in which the US was not previously involved or tell the Saudis how to settle the boundary.⁷

Since then we have heard expressions from Zayid that he wants to settle the issue with Faisal. However, he has been deliberately vague in spelling out how it is to be resolved. The Saudi position which was presented by Faisal in June 1970, and was most recently restated by Saqqaf to a journalist in Tehran on December 11, remains very clear.⁸

³ As reported in telegram 740 from Kuwait, April 27; telegram 1346 from Jidda, April 23; and telegram 74841 to Kuwait and Jidda, April 29. (All *ibid.*, POL SAUD-UAE)

⁴ See Document 117; also telegram 108505 to Jidda, June 16; telegram 1038 from Kuwait, June 11; and telegram 1964 from Jidda, June 13. (All *ibid.*) The details of the border dispute are in a letter from Hume Horan, Deputy Chief of Mission, Jidda, to Twinam, June 5. (*Ibid.*)

⁵ As reported in telegram 3296 from Amman, August 8. (*Ibid.*, POL IRAN-UAE)

⁶ As reported in telegram 6068 from Tehran, October 5; telegram 182988 to Abu Dhabi, October 6; telegram 9522 from London, October 6 (all *ibid.*); and telegram 2173 from Kuwait, November 7. (*Ibid.*, POL SAUD-UAE)

⁷ As transmitted in telegram 3537 from USUN, September 28. (*Ibid.*, POL UAE-US)

⁸ As reported in a December 13 memorandum of conversation. (*Ibid.*, POL 7 UAE)

I do not believe that we will see any progress on the boundary question until both Saudi Arabia and the UAE decide to develop the very valuable oil resources in the Zararah–Shaiba field which remains unexploited. This is probably one of the world's largest oil fields. It straddles the 23rd parallel, running through both UAE and Saudi territory. Its light-grade crude (low sulphur) is in great demand. Sooner or later, economic forces will probably move both countries to try and work something out that will be acceptable.

In the meantime, all we can do is to support Jordanian mediation, albeit weak, and encourage both the Saudis and the UAE to enter into direct contacts to resolve this issue.

126. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State¹

Kuwait, December 24, 1972, 0955Z.

2707. Dept pass SecDef ISA and USCINCEUR. Subject: Saudi MinDef Visit to Kuwait; Kuwaiti Military Purchases. Ref: Kuwait 2708 (Notal).²

1. I told Prince Sultan that, as he probably aware, Kuwaitis had some tentative ideas about strengthening their military defenses. I said that USG not urging Kuwait to buy arms, nor was I arms merchant. However, if Kuwait intended acquire costly defense weapons system, it was only sensible that they be compatible with strong friendly neighbors, namely Saudi Arabia and Iran.

2. Sultan replied he not only agreed hundred percent but he also discussing precisely this subject with Kuwaiti military. Sultan said he urging Kuwaitis to buy "four or five" batteries of improved Hawk and F-5's, emphasizing re aircraft that Kuwaiti purchase of more sophisticated aircraft than F-5 would be serious and costly mistake. Sultan added he sending some of his officers to discuss defense requirements and Saudi experience with Hawk and F-5's and has invited Kuwaiti officers to inspect Northrop facilities and operations in Saudi Arabia.

Stoltzfus

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 KUW. Confidential; Exdis. It was repeated to Tehran.

² Telegram 2708 from Kuwait, December 24, discussed Prince Sultan's recent visit to Kuwait, Kuwaiti aid to Jordan, Saudi-Abu Dhabi relations, and Kuwaiti plans to purchase military equipment. (Ibid., POL 7 SAUD)

Saudi Arabia

127. Telegram From the Consulate General in Dhahran to the Department of State¹

Dhahran, February 5, 1969, 0625Z.

112. Following is from Ambassador in Riyadh. Subject: King Faisal's Views on Various Middle East Problems.

Summary: In lengthy audience with King Faisal Feb 3, he reiterated his concerns about growing Communist influence in ME and about Zionist territorial ambitions. He hoped new administration will devise more "balanced policy" toward Arab-Israel conflict. Suggested first step in peace settlement ought be ascertaining Israel's territorial intentions. If these reasonable and compensation offered, he thought Jordan could agree. Remained adamant however that Israelis must leave old Jerusalem. Re Yemen he noted SAG is urging both Royalists and Republicans to work out compromise and thought situation there might become clearer in two or three months. He still waiting for indication Shah's intentions re Bahrain and continues favor nine-member FAA to include Bahrain.

1. On evening Feb 3 I had three-hour audience with King Faisal during which we reviewed various Middle East problems. Rashad Pharaon also present. Summary of Faisal's observations follows:

2. Communist influence in Middle East. At outset Faisal launched into his customary expression of concern about growing Communist influence in Middle East, Israel and what he described as "anti-Arab policy" of previous administration largely responsible for boosting Soviet influence. Already UAR, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and South Yemen are Communist or Communist-oriented states. Jordan is exposed to Communist threat and, unless USG and SAG continue support Hussein, it too may fall. Only Saudi Arabia is left as island of moderation in what has now become leftist sea. SAG is receiving constant criticism from other Arab states for its pro-US policies. He hoped new administration will seek to stem tide of leftist influence by adopting policies which strengthen few Arab moderates who remain.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. It was repeated to Jidda.

3. I assured Faisal that new administration is fully aware of importance moderate Arab friends such as he.² I cautioned, however, that problem of combatting Communism Middle East area is a difficult one. Much depends on peoples themselves. As I had several times previously discussed with him, moderate Arab govts can help themselves by accelerating political, economic and social reform. Faisal contended latter concept only partially true. Communist tactic is to exploit liberal movements and ultimately take them over. Saudi people, for example, are not yet ready for greater voice in political processes. Faisal recalled ruefully that in 1957 he had had three-hour talk with late Secretary Dulles in which he had argued against what he claimed was contemporary USG “plan” to topple Syrian Govt. He now saw that he had been wrong. He felt sure that even now USG has “ways” of combatting Communist regimes in area.³

4. Zionism. As is his wont, Faisal’s discourse quickly spilled over from Communism into Zionism. He sees Zionism as another part of Communist conspiracy. Introduction of Zionism into Middle East and its territorial ambitions have been chief causes of area instability. Zionists disclaim territorial expansion design, but Protocols of Zion⁴ demonstrate otherwise. USG should be alive to Zionist threat and danger it poses to American interests in Middle East.

5. I told him my understanding Protocols of Zion is a spurious document. He insisted on its validity. When I twitted him on being able to buy Arabic, English and French editions of that book otherwise bare Jidda book market, he engagingly admitted that SAG has had copies printed. He stated very frankly that SAG is doing this to make “Zionist threat” more widely known.

² In a February 24 letter to Faisal, Nixon stated his desire to maintain cordial ties, his intent to make the Arab-Israeli dispute “a first order of business,” his support for UN Security Council Resolution 242, and U.S. “support for the integrity” of Saudi Arabia. (Telegram 28507 to Jidda, February 24; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL SAUD–US) Faisal’s response is in telegram 896 from Jidda, March 17. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. I)

³ A copy of the September 23, 1957, memorandum of conversation among Faisal, President Eisenhower, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, is attached to a February 11 letter from Eilts to Brewer. During the meeting, Eisenhower stated that the United States was deeply concerned over developments in the Middle East, particularly Syria, and was “anxious for the countries in the area to develop in accord with their desires.” Faisal responded that he was “hopeful that everything in the end would be worked out ‘in a good manner.’” Both stated their concerns over any potential Soviet presence in the region. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, NEA/ARP Files, Entry 5633, Box 4, Saudi Arabia Correspondence with Post 1969)

⁴ *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, a forgery written by the Okhrana (secret police) in late 19th century Tsarist Russia, claimed that a secret Jewish cabal was plotting to take over the world. The Protocols have remained in circulation since 1905.

Arab-Israel. Adverting to substance of USG reply to Soviet note, which I had earlier conveyed to King through Saudi FonOff, I took opportunity explain that there had apparently been some misunderstanding about our reply.⁵ It was part of continuing exchange with Soviets and not intended as comprehensive policy statement. He wanted to know if new administration had endorsed it as UAR specifically claimed. He recalled UAR had told Saudis and other Arabs that US representative, when giving text to UAR, stated it had new administration's endorsement. I told him that this was not so and invited his attention to subsequent UAR press efforts back away from their earlier charge. He did not pursue point, but expressed fervent hope that President Nixon will take new look at Arab-Israel problem and devise policy based on "right and justice".

7. I asked him what he thought ought to be done to break present Arab-Israel impasse. He responded could not speak for Arab states directly involved and SAG is only interested by-stander. In his view, however, first step should be to obtain a clear indication of Israel's territorial intentions. Unlike on previous occasions, he did not this time speak of June 5 armistice lines, but referred to "secure and recognized boundaries." Arab states, who had been "treacherously attacked" by Israel and defeated, could not be expected to state what such boundaries should be. They, and indeed all Arab states, are fearful that Israel harbors territorial ambitions at their expense. Israelis must be induced lay their cards on the table and indicate what they want. If their territorial demands are reasonable and compensation is offered, he thought Jordan would be willing and able work out something. SAG will accept anything which parties directly involved agree upon.

8. Faisal made it clear however, that Jerusalem is single exception to his willingness accept such rectification of boundaries. He insisted that Israelis must get out of Jerusalem. Failing this, SAG will not accept any peace settlement and will seek to rally Arabs and Muslims against it.

9. I noted that UAR intentions are also unclear. It equally necessary, therefore, for UAR to stipulate what it means by a state of peace. Faisal answered that he assumes this should mean freedom of navigation in Suez Canal and through Straits of Tiran. When I asked if UAR had specifically stated this to him, he said it had not. SAG and UAR have not discussed this matter. Faisal noted that refugee problem will also have to be tackled, but would not be drawn out as to how he thought this should be done.

⁵ Telegram 267 to Jidda, January 23. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. I)

10. Faisal expressed his deep distrust of Soviet proposal,⁶ which UAR had also given to SAG, but spoke approvingly of French Four-Power conference idea.⁷ In response my point that outsiders cannot impose peace on area, Faisal agreed this could not be done militarily. He thought, however, that Four-Powers should sit down and decide what they mean by UNSC Resolution of Nov. 1967⁸ since neither Arabs nor Israelis are likely be able to do so. He saw nothing wrong with Four-Powers developing a general blueprint for peace settlement, with possible alternatives, which might then be used by Jarring⁹ to pursue his efforts. Thus far, he opined, despite all USG's past claims of some progress in Jarring mission, he could see none. He was fearful that unless some new guidelines are soon given to Jarring, his mission will get nowhere. If area states do not accept Four-Power ideas on a peaceful settlement, and here he did not specify any particular state, he thought Four Powers could exert pressure by means of sanctions or in other unspecified ways. Essential element, he stressed, is to get real peace efforts underway soon. Time is on no one's side. He applauded Pres Nixon's inaugural comments on the quest for peace¹⁰ and hoped Middle East will be given high priority. I assured him that, along with Vietnam, ME is receiving high priority in new administration's planning. I invited his attention to President's January 27 press conference comments,¹¹ which he recalled reading. I hoped before long to be able to tell him a bit more about how new administration's thinking is evolving. I said was sure new administration would welcome his wise counsel as long-term and proven friend of US.

⁶ The Soviet proposals, given to France, Britain, and the United States on December 30, 1968, included a time schedule for Israeli troop withdrawals in two stages, free navigation through the Straits of Tiran, and a Security Council decision on guarantees for Arab-Israeli borders. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968, Document 374.

⁷ On January 17, the French proposed that the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union meet with the UN Secretary General to determine how best to contribute to a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The United States agreed in principle with this approach on February 5. Documentation on this is scheduled for publication *ibid.*, 1969–1976, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

⁸ Reference to UN Security Council Resolution 242.

⁹ See footnote 9, Document 3.

¹⁰ For the text of President Nixon's inaugural address, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 1–4.

¹¹ Nixon commented that the Middle East situation required new initiatives and new leadership; that the Middle East was a powder keg that needed to be diffused; and that any potential future conflict had to be avoided since it might involve a confrontation between the nuclear powers. He also said that although the United States would devote a significant amount of effort, ultimately, the problem had to be settled by the parties in the area. See *ibid.*, pp. 15–23.

11. Yemen. I noted apparent strengthening of YAR as Royalist position seems to be deteriorating, and asked for his views on how he believes Yemen situation will unfold. He responded that, while there are indeed differences in Royalist ranks, he does not consider Royalist position so weak that they should be written off. He recalled SAG has stopped all aid to Yemeni Royalists. In response persistent Royalist appeals, SAG continues to urge that they find some way to work out peaceful coalition settlement with Republicans. He stated that "both sides have been in touch with us," but gave no details. SAG had replied to both that they should work out settlement which should be neither a monarchy nor a republic. He again mentioned "State of Yemen" concept. If Republicans and Royalists can agree on form and content of such coalition govt, SAG will "bless" it.

12. Faisal thought that it is still premature to believe that some coalition settlement is not possible. He opined in two or three months situation should be somewhat clearer. He thought we all ought to wait for this period before making any new judgments on Yemeni situation.

13. Iran and Gulf. In answer to my query Faisal said there have been no new developments in Saudi-Iranian relations. He noted ratifications have recently been exchanged for median line agreement and that Saqqaf hopes shortly (no date mentioned) to visit Tehran for first of periodic reviews which were decided upon during Shah-Faisal meeting. He also referred to Shah's New Delhi statement re Bahrain.¹² Perhaps when Saqqaf visits Tehran, Iranian thinking on Bahrain issue may have evolved somewhat more and Shah will have found an honorable way out of his dilemma. Faisal again emphasized, however, that SAG considers Bahrain as an independent Arab state.

14. On lower Gulf islands, Faisal disclaimed any talks with Iranians. He noted these islands belong to individual lower Gulf principalities or to FAA, if it becomes effective, and that SAG is simply not in a position to give other people's territory away.

15. He thought movement toward a more effective FAA, while slow, continues. Although FAA concept is receiving "needles" from British, Iranians, and some of lower Gulf rulers themselves, sooner or later all will realize need for unity in order to protect themselves from subversion. In his view any federation without Bahrain will not succeed. FAA should be nine-member grouping to include Bahrain.

16. Faisal suggested that the USG should develop "assets" in lower Gulf principalities. I noted our Consul General in Dhahran has informal jurisdiction over lower Gulf area and frequently visits there.

¹² See footnote 2, Document 72.

Faisal thought this was very good, but urged that we develop widest possible body of contacts in these states.

17. *Comment:* Various non-political matters discussed are being reported separately.¹³ Meeting was relaxed and cordial. Faisal looked tired, but was certainly mentally alert. His theme throughout was hope that new administration will show more concern for Arab sensibilities.

Dinsmore

¹³ Not further identified.

128. Telegram From the Consulate General in Dhahran to the Department of State¹

Dhahran, August 31, 1969, 1300Z.

782. Ref: Jidda 3009.² Subj: ARAMCO Offtake Problem.

1. ARAMCO VP Jungers has provided account meeting with Yamani and Musa'ad reported reftel.

2. Jungers told Musa'ad revenue forecast for next SAG fiscal year down \$39 million from earlier forecast (\$997 million instead of \$1,016 million.) These tidings precipitated frank remarks by Musa'ad who engaged in long deliberate monologue about entire question. He opened by saying that over years ARAMCO has been a most helpful force in Saudi Arabia. The company has done many things for the country, often at its own initiative and without promptings from the government. The whole history of the ARAMCO–SAG relationship has been one of trust and mutual confidence. The situation is changing he claimed. SAG is asking for help and ARAMCO is unable to comply and also unable supply convincing answers as to why it cannot.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PET 6 SAUD. Confidential; Limdis. It was repeated to Jidda.

² In telegram 3009 from Jidda, August 31, the Embassy reported that Yamani and Musa'ad told ARAMCO representatives that the projected offtake increase was inadequate. Eilts noted that Saudi expenditures were going up, the government was feeling financially pinched, and that the Saudis believed the shortfalls in estimated offtake were the result of ARAMCO parent companies giving preference to marketing Iranian oil. Eilts concluded that ARAMCO parents were "not sufficiently alive to growing Saudi dissatisfaction on this score." (Ibid.)

3. Musa'ad said he convinced ARAMCO's performance is a reflection USG policy and ARAMCO is in fact a "tool" of USG. Jungers denied this was true. Musa'ad replied he would like to believe this but found it difficult to do so. Musa'ad then was more specific. Firstly, he said, actions and policy Iran detrimental Arab interests. The Shah is mistrusted by Arabs but he is in fact aided and abetted by USG. The oil companies gave into Shah's pressure over Iranian offtake despite their knowledge Shah's performance largely bluff. He could attribute this largely to USG efforts on Iran's behalf. Secondly, he alleged, Saudi offtake problem contrived by USG in order to reduce SAG's ability to make payments to UAR and Jordan, purpose being to put pressure on Arabs to come to terms on the Middle East problem and get the Suez Canal opened without necessity of putting muscle on Israel.

4. Jungers endeavored to counter these points but found it difficult to dispel what appear to be ideas firmly implanted in Musa'ad's mind. Jungers said it is clear Musa'ad is expressing what he sincerely believes and this is the main point. Jungers also concludes that Yamani staged the meeting so that Jungers could hear these views firsthand. Yamani has outlined the seriousness with which SAG views the offtake problem to ARAMCO in the past and he probably wished Jungers to clearly understand that Yamani has difficulty in getting ARAMCO to move within inner SAG circles.

5. Jungers convinced Musa'ad's views reflect those of King Faysal himself on the offtake problem and that Saudis will not bargain on this issue. Once their mind is made up on the course of action they will not be easily diverted.

6. Later when Yamani and Jungers alone Yamani reminded Jungers that ARAMCO reserves the greatest in the world and said if ARAMCO fails to respond in a satisfactory manner ARAMCO will lose the concession as the company now knows it and ARAMCO's favored position. He did not go into specifics. Jungers can only believe that lurking in Yamani's mind is SAG action which would take away from ARAMCO oil fields not now producing or producing far below capacity. There would be companies willing to take these concession areas over and they likely be non-American.

7. Jungers commented that ARAMCO relations with SAG are deteriorating as a result of the offtake problem. ARAMCO itself is faced with economic realities of the oil marketing situation and there is no easy way out. But if some solution to SAG is forthcoming ARAMCO expects very troubled days may be ahead.

129. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, September 10, 1969, 1356Z.

3114. Ref: State 149073; Jidda 3059.² Subj: King and SAG Reaction to Phantom Deliveries.

1. At meeting September 9, Acting MinState for FonAffs Mas'ud said that he had presented info conveyed Jidda 3059 to King who requested Mas'ud deliver orally following message: "Please emphasize to American Chargé our great regret step taken by USG to provide Phantoms to Israel. This will do far more to exacerbate Middle East problem than to solve it."³

2. Mas'ud added King and SAG cannot accept thesis that providing Phantoms to Israel redresses balance of armaments between Israelis and Arabs. Israel now on its "high horse." It pays no attention to US, or indeed to UN where "in your presence" it flaunts UN decisions. If US truly interested in efforts bring peace to Middle East, Phantom deliveries wrong way to go about it. Mas'ud continued with long tirade against Israel, stating there no previous example in history of power which not only occupied other peoples territories but chased them out of their homes and off their land.

3. Chargé observed whatever rights and wrongs of past were, it unrealistic to attempt turn clock back. Israel in ME to stay, and problem in simplest terms was reaching accommodation between Israelis and Arabs that both sides could live with so that governments and peoples throughout area could get on with priority tasks of development.

4. Mas'ud said US in own interest should desist from its "excessive preoccupation" with Israel and concentrate its attention more heavily on combatting Communism in ME. He cited Egypt and Syria as examples where "Communism" has taken hold. Chargé countered thesis that Arab radicalism due to US policy in area incorrect. Rise of radicalism primarily result of frustrations from failure Arab governments get down to solving domestic problems and meeting needs of their own peoples. Attempts to make US policy scapegoat for Arabs' own failures is only further proof of inability radical Arabs to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis.

² Telegram 149073 to Amman, September 4. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 ISR) In telegram 3059 from Jidda, September 5, Stoltzfus relayed information on initial Saudi response to the sale of Phantoms to Israel. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. I)

³ See footnote 5, Document 16.

make contact with reality. We admire SAG for so far having resisted this temptation. It appeared Saudi best interests would continue be served by supporting efforts to achieve peaceful settlement and at same time bolstering internal strength with meaningful progress and reform.

5. Mas'ud did not take issue. He closed this lengthy portion of conversation with renewed pleas that US urgently reassess its interests which, he asserted, rapidly deteriorating in Arab world.

Stoltzfus

130. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)¹

Washington, September 15, 1969.

Dear Dave:

As you may know, Secretary Rogers has invited Prince Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz, Second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior of Saudi Arabia, to be his official guest in Washington October 13–15. Because of the importance we attach to our relations with Saudi Arabia, Prince Fahd will be received with most of the courtesies normally extended to an official guest of the United States Government. He will stay at Blair House, be the Secretary's guest at a formal dinner at the Department, and give a return luncheon for the Secretary. He will also be received by the President who recently sent a warm letter to King Faisal expressing his pleasure that the Prince's forthcoming visit will provide an opportunity for a full exchange of views on matters of mutual interest to our two countries.²

We attach particular significance to the visit at this time in view of the strains placed on USG–Saudi relations by the rising tensions of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The major American stake in Saudi oil, the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 SAUD. Limited Official Use. Drafted on September 11 by Wrampelmeier and cleared by Brewer, Sisco, and in draft by Mosbacher (S/CPR).

² The text of the letter is in telegram 147458 to Jidda, August 30. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 761, Presidential Correspondence 1969–74, Saudi Arabia King Faisal 1969) Faisal's reply is *ibid.*, Box 1245, Saunders Files, Visit of Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia, Oct. 13–15, 1969.

benefits this brings us in terms of balance of payments support, and our continuing reliance on long-term Saudi overflight and landing privileges for the USAF at Dhahran (currently these average over 520 flights per year), have not so far been affected. But our close ties with the Saudis are beginning to deteriorate as a result of what they regard as our “neglect” of the Arabs and our support of Israel. The Saudis are also disturbed over the recent military take-overs in the Sudan and Libya³ and see themselves as being increasingly encircled by “Communist” or pro-Soviet radical nationalist regimes while the US in their view does nothing to support its moderate Arab friends. We hope to counteract some of this attitude through Prince Fahd’s visit and thus to reassure the King and Saudis generally that we continue to attach importance to our ties with Saudi Arabia.

Already the third-ranking Saudi official, Prince Fahd has assumed many of the responsibilities for coordinating the day-to-day operations of the Saudi government. While the Crown Prince is expected eventually to succeed to the throne, it is Fahd whom most observers calculate will wield the real power, perhaps as Prime Minister. A power in his own right, Prince Fahd is also the elder brother of Saudi Minister of Defense and Aviation Prince Sultan, with whom we enjoy a close working relationship. A US Military Training Mission has been assisting the Saudi Army, Navy, and Air Force since 1953 and the Chief of that Mission serves as principal military advisor to Prince Sultan. The US Army Corps of Engineers is engaged, on a reimbursable basis, in various construction projects on behalf of the Saudi Armed Forces. US sales of military services and equipment to Saudi Arabia have averaged \$33 million annually, taken over a period of years. Any courtesies or hospitality extended to Prince Fahd during his visit by the Department of Defense would, I am sure, be fully appreciated by Prince Sultan. Prince Fahd himself has served as Acting Minister of Defense in his brother’s absence and on these and other occasions has proved helpful to the US military, e.g., in cutting through Saudi red tape to arrange overflight clearances on an urgent basis.

³ On September 1 the Free Officers Movement, headed by the 12-member Revolutionary Command Council, overthrew the government of King Idris. Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi became de facto head of Libya. Saudi concerns regarding Libya are described in telegrams 3029, September 1, and 3081, September 7, from Jidda. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 LIBYA) Saudi concerns regarding Sudan are described in telegram 114536 to Khartoum, July 10 (*ibid.*, POL SAUD–US), and telegram 2317 from Jidda, July 9. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. I)

I therefore would like to solicit the cooperation of the Department of Defense in making Prince Fahd's visit to the US a success. Specifically, we would like your help in the following ways:

—As the result of informal discussions with Ambassador Eilts, we believe it would be most useful if Prince Fahd could be received with appropriate military honors at one of our major installations. Specifically, we would hope DOD could arrange a visit to Ft. Bragg on the afternoon of October 16. Saudi Arabia is in the CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA area, and General Throckmorton has scheduled a visit there in late October, at which time he will no doubt be received by Prince Sultan. We therefore think it would be particularly appropriate if General Throckmorton could be at Ft. Bragg to receive Prince Fahd and host a dinner in his honor. I hope with your help that it will be possible to work this out.

—We also believe it would be most useful for the Secretary of Defense or yourself to extend hospitality to the Prince during the Washington portion of his visit. A small luncheon given by the Secretary in Prince Fahd's honor would, I know, be deeply appreciated.

—In view of the Prince's high rank, the great interest of the US Government in his visit, and the need to facilitate adequate security (a five-man Department of State security detail will accompany the Prince throughout his stay in the US), it would be highly desirable for the Prince's party to have US Government transportation at its disposal during the private portion of his visit October 16–20. The Prince's itinerary for this portion of the visit is not yet firm but we anticipate that, in addition to the proposed visit to Ft. Bragg, he will visit Cape Kennedy, Santa Barbara, and New York City. Certainly in traveling from Washington to Ft. Bragg and Cape Kennedy the Prince should fly in an official aircraft. I would appreciate your reaction to the possibility of a suitable Air Force plane being placed at the Prince's disposal.

I very much hope your people can be helpful on this, Dave. Details can of course be worked out between appropriate DOD officers and our NEA Bureau.

With all best wishes,

Sincerely,

Alex

131. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 13, 1969.

SUBJECT

Saudi/U.S. Relations

PARTICIPANTS

HRH Prince Fahd, Second Deputy Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia

H.E. Omar Saqqaf, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

H.E. Ibrahim al-Sowayel, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia

The Secretary

Assistant Secretary Joseph J. Sisco

Ambassador Hermann Fr. Eilts, American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia

William D. Brewer, Country Director, NEA/ARP

Camille Nowfel, Interpreter

Calling on Prince Fahd at Blair House, the Secretary said that the President was looking forward to meeting Fahd and asked that his warm regards be conveyed to His Majesty. The Secretary then expressed pleasure at the good relations which exist between Saudi Arabia and the United States. Both the President and he wished to maintain and develop these ties.

Prince Fahd responded that the Saudis had sensed this feeling on the part of the new Administration. They were proud to be friends with the most powerful country in the world. Because the Secretary's time was limited, he hoped he could dispense with formalities and get to question of substance. The first of these was the Arab/Israeli problem.

Arab/Israeli Problem:

Fahd said he hoped the USG could work out a just settlement. The Arabs were ready to accept what was fair and just and friends of the USG expected no less. Meanwhile, communism was becoming increasingly strong in the region. Saudi Arabia sought to explain USG positions. While the Saudis relied first on their domestic strength, their larger role required USG help. Over one million refugees could only be convinced of something which was fair and just for them.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 SAUD. Secret. Drafted by Brewer and approved in S on November 7. Fahd also met with Agnew. (Memorandum of conversation, October 14; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 1245, Saunders Files, Visit of Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia, Oct. 13–15, 1969)

Saudi Domestic Needs:

Fahd continued that, to develop Saudi Arabia, substantial funds were needed. In the light of present area tensions, Saudi Arabia could not afford to devote such funds to economic development. At the same time, he hoped to make every Saudi citizen aware that he is progressing and enjoys freedom and true democracy. Every Saudi should feel that he is part of this process. In these efforts, SAG needed to know it had USG support. Saudi Arabia was compelled to arm itself for its defense. United States experts had studied the question of Saudi naval requirements.² SAG financial responsibilities were such that Saudi Arabia could not do what it should on this matter right away. The same was true in the case of the Coast Guard.³ Fahd said the Saudis would appreciate the same kind of USG help with respect to their navy and coast guard problems as they had seen in other areas in the past. Fahd also hoped the repayments on the Hawk missile contract with Raytheon could be deferred.

Arms for Israel:

Fahd then noted that some agencies in the Near East, apparently with communist ties, were claiming that the USG intended to give Israel more arms in the future. As far as SAG knew, the USG had no such intention. But it would be in Saudi interest, and that of the USG, for a public statement to be made to the effect that there was no USG intention to supply more arms to Israel and that the USG wished to treat all countries in the area even-handedly.

The Secretary responded that we have long sought to follow a path of fairness and justice on Arab/Israeli issues. He recalled our action in arranging Israeli withdrawal in 1957, an action in which the then Vice President Nixon and himself had themselves been involved. However, for there to be a lasting settlement, there must be flexibility on both sides. Our main effort is to try to help get the parties to agree to a lasting understanding between them. Failing that, unproductive expenditure of resources on arms by both sides would no doubt continue.

² The Saudi Government was studying a French proposal for a 10-year improvement of the Saudi Navy, which Thatcher regarded as "grandiose," and a U.S. survey that did not include anti-ship missile capability. (Telegram 2849 from Jidda, August 18; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 6-2 SAUD) Prince Sultan regarded naval improvement as of the "highest priority." (Telegram 2768 from Jidda, August 11; *ibid.*, DEF 19-8 US-SAUD) The preliminary results of the U.S. naval survey are summarized in telegram 5325 from Jidda, September 12, 1968, printed in *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 315.

³ Saudi review of the U.S. survey of the Saudi Coast Guard/Frontier Forces, regarded as part of Saudi internal defense and aimed at controlling illegal infiltration into the country, had just begun. (Telegram 104077 to Jidda, June 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23 SAUD) As reported in telegram 726 from Jidda, March 3, Prince Fahd was "interested in strengthening this internal security force as counterweight to National Guard in eventual succession issue." (*Ibid.*, DEF 1 SAUD)

The Secretary continued that there must be Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognized boundaries. Jerusalem must be a united city with free access for all. We were trying to get more active negotiations going on these bases.

Saudi/USG Relations:

As to Saudi/USG bilateral relations, the Secretary expressed pleasure at Saudi development efforts. He assured Fahd that we would continue our policy of help and support as in the past. In the last few years the USG had been very responsive to Saudi requests. Saudi appreciation for our efforts encouraged us to continue. Fahd expressed gratification. He asked the Secretary to explain the united city concept for Jerusalem. The Secretary noted that the chief need was free access. We opposed Israeli unilateral actions in Jerusalem but felt that other aspects of this problem could best be dealt with after the other questions involved in the Arab/Israeli dispute had been worked out. Fahd noted that a public statement regarding no more arms for Israel would be considered very important by King Faisal. The Secretary said he doubted the utility of saying what we were not going to do but, at present, we had made no decision to do more than we were already committed to do. Fahd said that, as far as he was concerned, the Secretary's personal statement was enough.

Fahd then referred again to deferring the Hawk payments and help on the Coast Guard and Frontier Force. Mr. Sisco said that we would study Fahd's requests. Ambassador Eilts outlined the current status of these matters.⁴ The Secretary indicated that our reaction would be as favorable as feasible.

Oil:

Fahd then said he wished to discuss "economic aid." Specifically, he wondered whether the USG could purchase SAG's share of current oil production. This would help the Saudi revenue picture. Saudi Arabia hoped American oil companies could be encouraged to buy more oil in Saudi Arabia, specifically the Saudi share of current production. Fahd said that he had no special instructions from His Majesty since the King had told him that he would be among friends.

Minister Saqqaf noted that Arab foreign and defense ministers would be meeting on November 8. The meeting might declare that the

⁴ In telegram 174564 to Jidda, October 15, Eilts stated that the Coast Guard/Frontier Force study was in its final stages of preparation, and the United States had received no word from the Saudis on the 1968 naval study. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 937, VIP Visits, Prince Fahd Visit, October 1969)

Jarring mission had failed. As a moderate, Saudi Arabia would be in difficulties. There would be a possibility of a new Arab summit and later preparations for military action. He asked the Secretary if he could request Mr. Sisco to give attention to this difficult Saudi position when he talked to Prince Fahd on October 15.⁵ Mr. Sisco said he would certainly address himself to this and noted the constructive role Saudi Arabia had played at the most recent regional meeting, the Rabat Islamic Conference. Fahd said he thought the Rabat conference had been successful, since a stand had been taken against communism. The Secretary commended the Saudi Government for the part it had played at the meeting.

Arab/Israeli Reprise:

Turning again to the Arab/Israeli impasse, Fahd said he hoped a solution could be found soon. The longer the impasse continued, the more difficult it was for Saudi Arabia. Expressing understanding, the Secretary said that, after the Israeli elections later in October, we thought that a major effort should be made to make progress.

Saudi Internal Development:

Saqqaf called attention to His Highness' interest in education and social welfare. The Secretary said he knew of Fahd's important role in these areas which, in the final analysis, represented the essence of stability. We were gratified that Fahd had accomplished so much for his country in these fields. In response to the Secretary's request, Fahd then detailed some of the accomplishments in these fields in Saudi Arabia under his aegis. The Secretary extended his warm congratulations for such constructive efforts. Fahd replied that SAG was pleased that its friends, on whom Saudi Arabia depended, understood the actual situation. He praised Ambassador Eilts as extremely cooperative and helpful. The Secretary said that Ambassador Eilts was regarded as one of the USG's outstanding Chiefs of Mission and was glad to hear that the Saudis agreed.

⁵ A record of the meeting was transmitted in telegram 175623 to Jidda, October 16. (Ibid., Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. I) Sisco also met with Fahd as the Prince was departing from Dulles Airport. Sisco told Fahd that he would refer his question on barter oil to the oil companies; that the United States was still willing to be helpful toward the Saudi Navy and the Coast Guard/Frontier Forces; and that the original contract on Hawk missile repayments was "very favorable" and that the United States would study the details. (Telegram 175625 to Jidda, October 16; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 SAUD)

132. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 14, 1969, 11:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prince Fahd, Saudi Arabia
Omar Saqqaf, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Ibrahim Al-Sowayel, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia

The President
Hermann Eilts, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff
Emil Mosbacher, Jr., Chief of Protocol

At the Prince's request, he and Saqqaf (with Mosbacher and the American interpreter, Camille Nowfel) went into the President's office for about five minutes of discussion before the rest of the group joined. According to the US interpreter later, nothing of substance was covered during that short period that was not covered in the later meeting.² As the rest of the group joined the President and Prince Fahd in the President's office, the conversation was going as follows:

The President said he was aware that being a friend of the United States may cause difficulty for the Saudi government with some extremist groups who are Saudi Arabia's neighbors. The President hoped that our policies will be such as not to be a liability for our friends but an asset. He said that the US has to talk—and should talk—with both sides in the conflict involving Israel, the UAR, Syria and Jordan. The US is trying to play a role fair to both sides—that of the peace maker rather than of the trouble maker. The President said that was the difference between the US and Soviet roles.

The President continued that, with the British leaving the Persian Gulf area, it becomes doubly important for the US to play a stabilizing role there. The US therefore welcomed Saudi advice on how best to play that role. King Faisal, he said, is a just man who wants to be fair to all sides, and the President would welcome his advice.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. Drafted by Saunders on October 16. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Briefing materials for this meeting are in an October 11 memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger. (Ibid., Box 937, VIP Visits, Prince Fahd Visit, October 1969)

² According to an October 18 memorandum for the record, Fahd conveyed Faisal's greetings, expressed hope that Nixon would act promptly to resolve the Middle East crisis, and noted that Saudi Arabia was increasingly criticized by its Arab neighbors for its close ties with the United States. (Ibid.)

The President added that it would be very helpful if His Highness and King Faisal could convey these sentiments as the President has stated them to their Arab colleagues. Sometimes, the President said, rhetoric and news stories make it seem as if the US, to be blunt, had written off the Arab world. The President said he had a very strong conviction that the US must work with the moderates so that there could be a peace in which all could work and live together.

Prince Fahd said he was very pleased to hear these words. King Faisal shares the sentiments the President had expressed, particularly on the necessity for stability in the Persian Gulf after the British withdrawal. The Saudis trust that actions may be taken so that there will be no trouble after the UK departure. Fortunately, he said, relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran—and personally between King Faisal and the Shah—are very good. This will help improve chances for stability.

The President said that he would be seeing the Shah next week. He was glad to hear that good relations exist between our two friends. Good relations are essential. They are “an anchor in a very troubled sea.” The President said it was important to build strong relations among those who have similar views.

Prince Fahd said that the Shah has shown understanding on the Bahrain issue and had indicated his intent to see it solved.

The President said that he would convey Prince Fahd’s sentiments to the Shah the following week. He said that we must not allow again to happen the kind of divisive experience that the “Yemen exercise” had become in the past.

The President stated his view that it is necessary to separate the forces of stability, responsibility and peace from those bent on destruction by revolution and extremism. Saudi Arabia sits very solidly in that troubled part of the world in the former camp.

Prince Fahd said he was pleased that the President was going to meet the Shah. He suggested that this may be an opportunity to discuss the Bahrain issue and to reach a solution.

He continued, saying that the Communists often publicize false statements about Saudi Arabia’s relations with the US. Their aim is to destroy good relations between us. He said that when he had seen King Faisal before leaving for the US he asked the Prince to assure the President that Saudi Arabia’s intentions are to continue as a friend of the US. The King had asked the Prince to seek the President’s assurance in return, that the US intended to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia. He said that the King regards the US as a friend.

The President said, “His Majesty has that assurance absolutely.” As far as the Communists are concerned, he said, he has had a great deal of experience in dealing with them. His practice is never to believe their word but only their act. In this case, he said that the Com-

munists would not succeed in driving a wedge between Saudi Arabia and the United States. The President continued that the US wants peace and good relations with the USSR but the road to peace is not through vague sentimentalities and soft words but through hard realities and interests on both sides.

Prince Fahd said he is certain that the President realizes Communist objectives throughout the world and particularly in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is in a serious struggle fighting against powerful forces. He believes that Saudi strength comes to a large extent from the US. Saudi Arabia intends to continue as in the past in this struggle because of its interest in democracy and freedom. Saudi Arabia intends to strive to develop the country and make it possible for the Saudi people to enjoy freedom and the good things of life.

The Prince continued, saying he believed that everything in his area depends on a just and fair Arab-Israeli settlement because the longer the problem remains unresolved, the more difficult it becomes.

The President said he could assure the Prince that the highest talents of the US Government are being devoted to the Middle East problem. Next to Vietnam, it is receiving our highest priority attention and energy. A settlement must be a lasting one in which both sides have a vested interest. It is difficult to achieve such a settlement with both sides so far apart and with the Soviets not being very helpful with their friends.

The President said that as he looked at the entire area—the Middle East and the broader Mediterranean area—he saw Iran, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco all trying to proceed on the same course—a path avoiding extremism. Then there were the UAR, Syria, the Sudan and now Libya where revolutionary forces had come out on top. And throughout the area in even the moderate countries there were extremist forces at work. As he looked at these two groups of countries, he saw a race between the forces of stability and those headed for revolution and destruction. The United States, he said, is solidly on the side of the first group.

Prince Fahd said he agreed with the President's description and believed it was necessary for the people of the area to choose between destruction and salvation. Saudi Arabia would continue to depend on American efforts.

The President said, "We will work together."

Prince Fahd said he had attended a number of high level Arab meetings. When the US position is discussed critically, he said he reminds the delegates that in 1956 President Nixon was Vice President and the United States took a strong stand in favor of the Arabs. He said he reminds the delegates that the same man is now President of the United States and he cannot believe that the United States does not intend to be on the right path.

At this point, the President sent for four gift wrapped newly struck copies of the inaugural medal for the three members of the Saudi party and for King Faisal. He presented these to them as "a small token of friendship."

As the party was waiting for photographers to come in, Saqqaf spoke up, prompting the Prince and saying that the Saudis feel that time is working against them. They feel a rope around their neck. They believe that a settlement cannot wait too long. After the session with the photographers and as the President was shaking hands with Saqqaf after having escorted the Saudi party to their car, Saqqaf underscored his point about the urgency of a settlement, and the President replied that we would continue to make every effort but we had to assure that it be the "right kind of settlement."³

H.S.

³ According to Rogers, Fahd was very pleased with his visit, indeed he was quoted as saying that the "chief of state of the greatest nation in the world" walking "with me to the car has overcome me." (Memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, October 31; *ibid.*)

133. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia (Sisco) to the Chairman of the Review Group (Kissinger)¹

NSCIG/NEA 69-41

Washington, November 21, 1969.

SUBJECT

Country Policy Statement on Saudi Arabia

The NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East and South Asia has approved the attached Country Policy Statement on Saudi Arabia. This paper is one in a series intended to provide a fresh look at our interests and objectives in various NEA countries and to review the adequacy of our policies. As in the case of the earlier papers, subject to any comment you may have, we propose to issue the attached

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1319, NSC Secretariat, Unfiled Material, 1969. Secret. Drafted by Rassias and Boughton. A handwritten notation by Kissinger reads: "AI—Status? What happens next?"

paper for the guidance of all concerned with United States policy and programs in Saudi Arabia.

The preparation of this paper has had the benefit of the detailed suggestions of our Embassy in Jidda. Representatives from the following agencies participated in the NSCIG/NEA consideration and approval of the paper: State, Agriculture, AID, CIA, Commerce, Defense, Interior, Ex-Im Bank, Labor, NSC, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Treasury, and USIA.

Attachment

[Omitted here is a Table of Contents.]

COUNTRY POLICY STATEMENT—SAUDI ARABIA

I. Assessment

A. Balance Sheet

Saudi Arabia continues to make a uniquely valuable contribution to important United States interests. The U.S. balance of payments receives a direct transfusion from Saudi Arabia of well over one-half billion dollars per year from American oil company earnings, exports to Saudi Arabia, and profits from a variety of military and civilian contracts with American firms. Some \$150 million in Saudi funds are in medium and long-term American investments. The U.S. enjoys military over-flight and landing privileges currently averaging at least 520 clearances annually. U.S. Naval vessels have access to Saudi Arabian ports and bunkering facilities. Saudi oil continues to be available on reasonable commercial terms to our Western European and Oriental allies. U.S. forces in Southeast Asia obtain approximately 85% of their refined petroleum requirements from Saudi Arabia and the adjacent island of Bahrain. Those Saudi funds which go to prop up Jordan and to exert at least some limited leverage on the UAR are expended in consonance with our own interest as well—at no cost to ourselves.

In return, *the Saudis have looked to the U.S. for support against outside aggression.* Five successive U.S. Presidents have reaffirmed support for Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity and security against unprovoked external aggression. During the period of the Saudi–UAR confrontation in 1963, a squadron of U.S. fighters was temporarily stationed in Saudi Arabia to deter Egyptian attacks.² President Nixon expressed

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963, Documents 268–270.

renewed support for Saudi Arabia's integrity in his February 24, 1969 letter to Faisal.³ In terms of dollars-and-cents value to the U.S., the total U.S. Government expenditure of about \$2.5 million annually for our Embassy, Consulate General, USIS, Military Training Mission, and other activities seems modest indeed.

B. Political

1. *Saudi foreign policy reflects King Faisal's desire to follow an independent but strongly anti-communist course in world affairs.* Saudi Arabia has no diplomatic relations with any Communist state and known Communists are excluded from the Kingdom. Faisal deeply distrusts Arab radical nationalists, and particularly UAR President Nasser whom he has in the past characterized as a Communist "tool." He has strongly resisted Nasser's efforts to extend Egyptian influence into the Arabian Peninsula. Faisal is, however, determined to defend general Arab interests, particularly in Palestine, and shares the Arabs' enmity toward Israel. As "Keeper of the Islamic Holy Places," Faisal insists with considerable emotion that East Jerusalem must be restored to Arab control.⁴ Saudi Arabian policy seeks to maintain good relations with other oil producing and oil-purchasing states and to enhance Faisal's own role as an Arab and an Islamic leader.

2. *Barring a new, major Arab-Israel conflict, no radical reorientation of Saudi foreign policy is likely during the lifetime of King Faisal.* U.S.-Saudi relations have been uniformly close for more than a generation. The main ingredients of this relationship are mutuality of basic interest—in the uninterrupted flow of oil and of oil income and in the preservation of Saudi Arabia from Communist and Arab radical influences—and Saudi respect for American power and for American advice and expertise in myriad modern technical fields. U.S.-Saudi relations are expected to remain good for the five-year time-frame of this paper, provided always that our support of Israel does not go to such lengths as to convince the Saudis that they must break with the U.S. in order to protect themselves within the Arab community.

3. *The Palestine question is the chief area of misunderstanding which could seriously damage U.S.-Saudi relations.* The Saudis see U.S. policies in the area as overwhelmingly pro-Israeli at the expense of other U.S. interests in the Arab countries. King Faisal feels deeply about this issue and also knows he is under pressure from his own people as well as from other Arabs to demonstrate that he is not an American "lackey." He is disturbed by his inability to influence U.S. policy on the Arab-

³ See footnote 2, Document 127.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 10.

Israeli issue. The frustration and resentment this predicament causes among Saudis could result in a serious deterioration of U.S.-Saudi relations. For their part, the Saudis are sympathetic to the aims of the fedayeen and have officially sanctioned salary withholdings and other voluntary financial contributions which eventually reach fedayeen coffers. USG warnings that the fedayeen undermine the search for a peaceful settlement and constitute an internal threat to moderate regimes in Jordan and Lebanon have been unavailing in the face of Saudi emotionalism on this issue. The May 30 sabotage of Tapline by commandos of the ANM-affiliated Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine cost the fedayeen some sympathy in Saudi Arabia. However, the Saudi Government has reaffirmed its support for Fatah which Faisal continues to consider politically reliable. Flowing from this primary problem—Palestine—is the King's belief that the U.S. seriously underestimates, or is indifferent to, the danger of Communist encroachment into the Middle East, either directly or through the growing Soviet presence in some Arab radicals, whom Faisal uniformly regards as "Communists." The King believes U.S. policies toward Israel encourage the Arabs to look increasingly to Moscow for support while undermining the standing of moderate Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The Saudis are also concerned regarding future developments in the Persian Gulf where they would like the USG to play a more positive and helpful role. We do not agree with the Saudis' view that the danger to Saudi Arabia is solely external in nature but have had little success thus far in encouraging Faisal to carry out political and social changes that might undercut the appeal of leftist revolutionaries within the Kingdom. We have also given the Saudis no reason to believe that we will attempt to solve their problems with Israel or Iran for them but have instead encouraged them to work for peaceful settlements of outstanding issues in cooperation with other regional states.

4. *Consequently, there are signs of an erosion in our position in Saudi Arabia over the past two years.* Our preoccupation with Vietnam, our failure to support the Saudis as vigorously as they believed was warranted during the Saudi-UAR confrontation over Yemen, our temporary suspension of arms shipments to Saudi Arabia at the time of the June 1967 conflict, what is seen as our partisanship for Israel, and our inability to persuade the Israelis to evacuate their troops from the Saudi island of Tiran (occupied during the 1967 hostilities) have all combined to call into question the credibility of our assurances of support for Saudi Arabia. Now aging, King Faisal is in an increasingly bitter mood and may reluctantly conclude that he must turn more and more to other sources than the U.S. for assistance. The Saudis are already seeking to reduce their dependence on the U.S. for arms and military expertise. Over the long term, this could mean less Saudi receptivity to U.S. advice as well as a less favorable climate for American business in Saudi Arabia.

C. Economic/Social

1. *The Saudi economy, supported by expanding petroleum production, has enjoyed rapid and relatively stable growth during King Faisal's reign.* Thus far the rapid growth of the economy, from which most individuals have benefitted, has served to minimize existing problems. The Saudi GNP is increasing at roughly 10% per year. There has been great emphasis on developing a sound infrastructure for economic development through improving highways, air, and sea communications; upgrading of educational standards, including schooling for girls; and expansion of radio and television networks which are now the greatest forces for social change in the Kingdom. With the country's large income from petroleum, the shortage of manpower more than any scarcity of cash is likely to be the main factor in delaying more rapid economic development. However, in the past year, growing military expenditures and subsidies to Jordan and the UAR have curtailed some desirable civil projects. It should also be noted that thus far Saudi Arabia has had only minimal success in diversifying the economy and reducing its dependence on petroleum.

2. *The pace of social and political reform, however, has been slow.* Continued conservative internal pressures, the King's focus in recent years on foreign policy matters, and the regime's attempts to insulate itself from radical Arab influences have discouraged efforts to modernize the Saudi political and social structure. In the long run, Saudi economic and technical progress may well boomerang if political and social liberalization fail to keep pace with the aspirations of an increasingly sophisticated citizenry.

3. *The American role in the Saudi economy is large and profitable.* Almost one half the direct profits from Saudi oil go to the U.S. and virtually all of the oil continues to flow to the free world. A recent barter deal with Romania, the first flaw in the otherwise Western aspect of Saudi oil operations, was temporarily suspended at Faisal's order. No basic problems are pending between the Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco) and the Government. However, Saudi Government determination to strengthen the position and future role of Petromin, the state oil enterprise, and mounting Saudi pressures on Aramco to maintain an acceptable level of offtake loom as possible sources of friction in the future. The issue of Saudi Government "participation" in Aramco's concession and its owners' down-stream operations, raised in general terms by the Minister of Petroleum in 1968, will not go away but is unlikely to be pushed in the near future. U.S. Government agencies and private enterprise continue to play a major role in economic development activities, including the television network, the mobility program for the Saudi armed forces, mineral resources exploration, and desalination. However, the Saudis are actively seeking alternative

sources of expertise and American firms face growing competition from Japanese and European companies, both for petroleum concessions and for lucrative development project contracts.

4. *For the near future, the Aramco labor scene will probably remain under control* and the company's mechanism for handling employee grievances will continue to be reasonably effective. Labor unions or other workers' societies continue to be banned in Saudi Arabia. Yet a great deal remains unknown about the dynamics of the Aramco labor force, which because of its relative sophistication and its concentration in the Eastern Province has the potential for serious harmful action against the company and the regime.

D. Security

1. *There is no immediate serious external threat to Saudi Arabia.* Saudi security was enhanced, in the short run, by the Six Day War. This provided the opportunity for Nasser to liquidate the Yemen adventure while Faisal agreed to pay the UAR a quarterly subsidy of \$25 million "until the effects of the aggression have been liquidated". This arrangement, plus the mutual need to maintain Arab solidarity vis-à-vis Israel has resulted in a UAR/SAG détente. Although Royalist-Republican contacts are in abeyance, the moderate Republican leadership's desire for improved relations with Faisal should further lessen the danger to Saudi Arabia from the Yemeni civil conflict. There is tension between the Saudi Government and the leftist-oriented regime in Southern Yemen but the latter is hardly likely to be capable over the near future of supporting activities which would seriously threaten Saudi security. The Saudis are even more concerned by what they regard as Israel's expansionist designs, citing Israel's refusal to evacuate Tiran Island as proof of Israeli aggressive intentions. While Saudi Arabia was not actively engaged in the June 1967 war, a Saudi Army reinforced brigade has since been stationed in southern Jordan where it might well clash with Israeli forces in the event of new Arab-Israeli hostilities. The Saudis have no confidence that the U.S. would come to their support in the event of an Israeli attack on Saudi Arabia. This assessment is reflected in the Saudi Government's continuing build-up of its own military forces and in its efforts to diversify its sources of military equipment and expertise. However, the Saudis do continue to value USG military sales to help provide reassurance against any renewed Egyptian threat. Moreover, the Saudis are increasingly uneasy over what they regard as an activist Iranian policy bent on assuring Tehran's dominance in the Gulf after the British go.

2. *Over the longer range, however, the Saudi Government will still value the U.S. Government's assurances of support.* The Saudi regime sees a looming external threat from the Soviet Union, assisted by Arab radical

regimes dependent upon the Soviets for military, economic, and diplomatic support. Saudi relations with the more radical Arab states—Iraq, UAR, Syria, YAR and PRSY—remain cool to poor and the Saudi regime continues to be on its guard against subversion from these quarters. The Saudis are also concerned over the implications of the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971. Saudi Arabia has historically cultivated a great power protector. King Faisal still sees the USG in this role but would like us to do more to support conservative and pro-Western forces which, in his view, are now an excessively heavy burden on Saudi Arabia.

3. Despite their recent purchase of some military equipment from other countries, *the Saudis continue to look to the U.S. as their principal source of military equipment and military expertise.* The Saudi purchase of military equipment from the U.S., taken over a period of years, has averaged \$62 million annually. This represents an important economic advantage to the U.S. in terms of our over-all gold-flow problem. More importantly, it shows our continuing interest in Saudi security. U.S. material and training, through our Military Training Mission and by private civilian contractors, are involved in a wide range of projects, including: increased ground mobility, air defense, automotive and armament maintenance, increased airlift, radio communications, increased firepower, and improved facilities, administration, logistics, and training for Saudi military personnel. As of mid-1969, however, the French appeared to be making a strong effort to increase their share of the Saudi market for military equipment; Britain is the principal supplier of jet fighters to the Royal Saudi Air Force; and Pakistan has become an increasingly important source of military expertise for the Saudi air and naval forces. Saudi Arabia has fostered this competition for economic reasons and possibly to avoid becoming solely dependent upon U.S. sources.

4. *Saudi Arabia has enjoyed a relatively high degree of internal political stability.* However, the regime's concern about internal security intensified in May, 1969, as a consequence of the military take-over in the Sudan and the sabotage of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline by radical leftist Palestine commandos. These concerns have been heightened by subsequent military coups in Libya and Somalia. A wave of arrests of known or suspected dissidents, both military and civilian, began in June/July, 1969.⁵ To date the SAG has denied that its investigation has discovered any evidence of anti-regime coup plotting although some of the officers arrested were allegedly in contact with the UAR and other radical Arab governments. The regime appears to be in full control of

⁵ As reported in telegrams 619 from Dhahran, July 9 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 SAUD) and telegram 126767 to Jidda, July 30. (Ibid., POL 29 SAUD)

the situation and seems determined to show its strong arm. However, over the long term the arrests are likely to aggravate anti-regime feelings, particularly within the military, and in the long run encourage more underground activities among disaffected officers even if there were none before. On balance, however, internal security seems reasonably well-assured during the lifetime of King Faisal (now in his mid-sixties). While the regular armed forces may now be increasingly suspect in the eyes of the regime, the separate, tribal-based National Guard (with a strength—28,000 men—about that of the regular armed forces) supports the regime. Strong factional rivalries exist within the Royal Family. These interests will probably be sufficiently compromised, however, to permit the orderly succession of Crown Prince Khalid. The nascent Communist National Liberation Front was dealt a hard blow by the arrest of many of its leaders in 1964 although it and other clandestine political organizations such as the Ba'ath and the Arab Nationalist Movement are probably continuing secret efforts to recruit new members, particularly among non-Saudi expatriates in the Kingdom.

5. *Beneath the surface of apparent domestic tranquillity, however, there are areas of potentially serious weakness.* Saudi Arabia still lacks a meaningful national consciousness. An undercurrent of inter-provincial rivalry has traditionally existed between the xenophobic people of Najd, the political and spiritual heartland of the Kingdom, and the more cosmopolitan people of the Hejaz, the Kingdom's commercial and cultural center, who also make up the majority of the regular army officer corps and the educated civilian elite. The fact that Saudi oil resources are all located in the Eastern Province has been important in discouraging any political tendencies which could divide the country. This situation and the continued loyalty to the throne of the Najdi tribes and the National Guard constitute considerable protection against a military coup. But the internal dissident threat is likely to grow as more people become better educated, urbanized and modern. Reluctant to broaden the base of political participation, the regime is faced with the classic dilemma that its rapid economic progress will have a short-range effect of giving potential opposition elements greater base from which to operate.

We are doing what little we can to encourage an orderly evolution which would forestall the possibility of a radical reordering of the country. In the meantime the U.S. is providing technical assistance to the Saudi public security forces on a reimbursable basis in order to upgrade their quality.

E. Cultural/Psychological

An assessment of the current Saudi cultural/psychological situation indicates that Saudi/U.S. friendship cannot be taken for granted. The anomaly of our position in Saudi Arabia is that it is currently all-pervasive, yet has little political depth. It rests largely on the personal disposition

of King Faisal, a handful of senior officials, various public security agencies, and public media systems. Below that layer public sentiment opposes us and is probably simply biding its time to show this. Traditional Islamic views remain strong. The permissiveness of Western society is condemned. There is a growing emotional identification with Arab nationalism on the part of younger Saudis. Anti-American sentiment has increased since the Arab-Israeli conflict and could take the form of demonstrations or attacks on American personnel and property (such as occurred in June 1967) in the event of another outbreak of hostilities.

II. U.S. Objectives

A. *Maximum protection for our substantial interests in Saudi Arabia.* These include (1) continued availability of Saudi oil, on reasonable commercial terms, to our Western European allies and Japan, (2) preservation of the substantial American capital investment in the country, and (3) continued overflight and landing privileges for U.S. military aircraft and bunkering facilities for U.S. naval vessels. The continued denial of these facilities to forces hostile to the U.S. and other friendly states serves our interests, as does Saudi opposition to Communist overtures for diplomatic relations. Our aim, therefore, should be the maintenance of the existing close, friendly, and mutually beneficial relationship with the U.S. by whatever Saudi regime may be in power. This will require continuing Saudi understanding of the value of this relationship to basic Saudi interests. At the same time, it will also require continuing efforts on our part to identify the U.S. with those interests, not only in the eyes of King Faisal and the present Saudi leadership but also in those of the younger Saudi generation nurtured on virulent Arab nationalist propaganda.

B. *Preservation of Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity and political independence from unprovoked aggression and subversion.* Although Saudi Arabia's own armed forces are being expanded and modernized, they are still incapable of defending Saudi Arabia from attack by a major foreign power or even by one of Saudi Arabia's stronger regional neighbors. Protection of our own interests in Saudi Arabia, therefore, will continue for the foreseeable future to require our active support. U.S. willingness to support Saudi Arabia's integrity will continue to be a principal determinant of the successful achievement of our other policy objectives in Saudi Arabia.

C. *A developing and modernizing Saudi Arabia capable of preserving internal stability and national unity.* U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia require a stable and prosperous country capable of evolutionary development. This will require an acceleration of political and social reform programs, as well as continued investment in economic development, responsive to the growing aspiration of the Saudi people. Delay in po-

litical and social reform not only feeds domestic unrest but tends to discredit the U.S. within Saudi Arabia and elsewhere by seeming to associate us with an unenlightened, archaic social and political system. On the other hand, progress in these fields would enhance Saudi prestige and give added weight to its moderate voice in Arab and world affairs. In the meantime, development of a more efficient and better coordinated internal security apparatus is urgently needed, both to maintain political stability and to preserve public order in a country with over 7,000 American citizen residents and millions of dollars of American-owned property.

D. *A positive Saudi role in strengthening stability and furthering orderly development elsewhere in the Peninsula.* A strong, independent Saudi Arabia is vital to preservation of stability in the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi willingness to play a more active and constructive role vis-à-vis its neighbors would reduce tensions in the area. Saudi Arabia, together with Iran, is expected to play a major role in preserving stability in the Gulf after the British withdraw in 1971. Because of the close USG/SAG relationship, Saudi support for efforts to end the Yemen civil war and, eventually, Saudi willingness to provide economic aid to Yemen, would help pave the way for improvement of our own relations with Yemen while reducing the likelihood that hostile forces could again use Yemen as a base for aggression or subversion against Saudi Arabia. Continuing Saudi support for other moderate regimes in the area, e.g., Jordan, is also important to us, as is Saudi acquiescence in concrete steps that Jordan and the UAR might take to end the Arab-Israeli conflict.

E. *A continued Saudi contribution to US balance of payments efforts.* We will want the Saudis to continue to maintain a climate favorable to American capital investment in the development of Saudi Arabia's natural resources and to effect any changes in existing oil concessions through negotiation, not unilateral action. We will also wish to preserve full access by American business on a reasonably competitive basis to contracts for goods and services; to expand the already substantial U.S. share of the Saudi market; and to enlist continued and, as possible, increased Saudi cooperation in measures to reduce our gold out-flow problem.

III. Strategies

In formulating our basic strategies to achieve the above objectives, we must keep firmly in mind the following two considerations:

- i. In the highly centralized system of authority that currently exists in Saudi Arabia, *the focal point of decision making will for the immediate future continue to be King Faisal.* Hence, the dialogue with the King and his principal advisers will remain crucial. Although increasingly disenchanted with what he regards as U.S. policies and actions in the

Middle East contrary to Saudi interests, the King and most other members of the Saudi "Establishment" remain fundamentally well-disposed toward the U.S. This ingrained confidence of many older and middle-aged Saudis in the U.S. and in American technical accomplishments, is an important U.S. asset in Saudi Arabia and one that we should rightly seek to preserve. However, in the longer run we cannot assume the continuation of the political and social order upon which U.S.-Saudi cooperation was built. Our problem will be to devise policies and courses of action which both preserve the momentum in the long-standing orientation of the present Saudi Government yet do not overlook the growing number of younger Saudis who view the United States more critically. We will need to give serious attention to a more vigorous U.S. effort in Saudi Arabia if our interests are to be assured in the long term.

ii. *As long as the Arab-Israeli conflict remains unresolved* and we are suspected of partisanship for Israel, our immediate efforts will have to be directed at the more limited goal of holding on to what we have in Saudi Arabia. We should, of course, take advantage of any opportunities which may arise to strengthen our position. Should there be a new and longer Arab-Israeli conflict, our present assets in the country would hardly remain unaffected. Against the backdrop of the foregoing, we suggest the following strategies:

A. *Maintenance of our active interest in Saudi Arabia's integrity and independence.* We should maintain our limited security undertaking which continues to contribute to our considerable influence despite the erosion of Saudi confidence in the U.S. since 1967. We should also recognize, as the Saudis do, that in moments of real crisis only we have the power and influence to protect Saudi Arabia and our own substantial interests there. This of course gives us a special interest in doing what we can to defuse tensions in the Peninsula likely to erupt into serious threats to Saudi security.

Courses of Action:

1. We should be prepared appropriately to recall to SAG our continuing interest in the country's integrity against unprovoked outside aggression, taking care to retain flexibility regarding any possible implementation.

2. While we should seek to avoid giving the impression of an open-ended U.S. commitment to defend Saudi Arabia under all or any circumstances, it is equally important that our security assurances not be further weakened in SAG eyes or others. Planning for the future disposition of our naval presence in the region should take into account the likely psychological impact on the Saudis, particularly if U.S. forces were withdrawn from the waters adjacent to Saudi Arabia.

3. We should welcome a wider international interest in Saudi Arabia's security, such as the developing British, French, and Pakistani involvements in the Saudi defense effort. At the same time, these cannot be a replacement for our own continued efforts (see D below) if we are adequately to safeguard U.S. interests.

B. *Demonstrate that close USG/SAG relations pay dividends for SAG.* Particularly in view of the Arab/Israeli problem, we should be prepared to take positive action to demonstrate to King Faisal and to other Saudis that the U.S. has not lost interest in its Arab friends and that continued close cooperation with the U.S. is still in the Saudi interest.

Courses of Action:

1. Continue our present dialogue with the King and his key advisers to improve understanding, if not acceptance, of our policies and actions in the Middle East. Keep Faisal informed of our efforts to support the moderate regime of King Hussein in Jordan.

2. Continue to do what we can to seek Israeli withdrawal from Tiran, on the understanding that Saudi Arabia will make no move to militarize the island.

3. Extend an invitation to King Faisal to visit Washington by spring of 1970. Meanwhile, we should encourage senior U.S. Government officials who may be travelling in the area to exchange views with Faisal as a means of retaining his personal interest in the U.S. connection.

C. *Encourage SAG to devote more attention to improving relations with its neighbors in order to further stability in the Peninsula, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf regions.*⁶

Courses of Action:

In part because of past differences over Yemen, we have less influence with the Saudis on Peninsula issues than on other matters. We should nevertheless:

(a) Continue appropriate efforts with SAG towards an eventual rapprochement with a moderate, even if Republican, regime in Yemen;

(b) Note, as necessary, the counterproductive nature of any future Saudi adventures in support of PRSY exiles;

(c) Hold before SAG the desirability of improved relations with Ethiopia, particularly with reference to both the Yemen and PRSY issues;

⁶ A discussion of the Saudi policy of "immobilisme" is in telegram 115459 to Jidda, July 11. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. I)

(d) Quietly encourage greater Saudi contacts with Muscat and Oman and the Trucial States, through exchanges of visits and more active Saudi representation; note the favorable impact of Saudi aid already extended to the Trucial States as a means of encouraging further similar activities;

(e) Promote, as we can, greater Saudi/Iranian cooperation, notably on Gulf matters. Encourage Kuwaitis to continue playing a constructive role in this region.

D. *Maintain an effective Military Training Mission (MTM) and remain willing to meet legitimate SAG requests for military equipment and services on a sales basis.* Our continued MTM presence and willingness to assist in the modernization of the Saudi military/security establishment has been a key element in preserving our influence. Such a posture lends credibility to our assurances of support for Saudi Arabia's security, acts as a quid pro quo for our special overflight and landing privileges, enables us to monitor and to some extent influence the rate and direction of the Saudi military build up, preserves our entrée to key elements of the Saudi armed forces, encourages the development of a pro-U.S. orientation within the Saudi officer corps, serves as an important source of hard currency earnings, and helps reassure the large American community as to local stability. We should, however, consider Saudi requests carefully in order to do what we can to discourage any undue SAG military build-up that would seriously curtail the orderly progress of economic development. Any USG refusal to assist the Saudis in meeting their reasonable military sales requests would not deter them from making such purchases elsewhere but definitely would lead to a further erosion of Saudi confidence in the U.S.

Courses of Action:

1. Seek to focus Saudi attention on rational, long-term procurement policies reflecting a clear set of Saudi priorities and resources, as well as USG technical support capabilities. Explore, if requested to do so by the Saudis, the possibility of carrying out a detailed study of the overall Saudi military establishment and making appropriate recommendations on future force goals. To do so, we should be willing to execute the component projects of such a plan in orderly fashion, thus preserving the U.S. role as the principal source of military equipment and expertise to the Saudi armed forces.

2. Meanwhile, continue with our present practice of responding promptly and positively to Saudi requests for assistance in procurement and training, while limiting financial help to normal credit availabilities.

3. Continue a modest level of FMS credits or credit guarantees in future years.

4. Continue to support from MAP funds an effective military training mission in Saudi Arabia with sufficient personnel to do the job. A

serious run-down in the size and effectiveness of USMTM would jeopardize its role as principal military adviser to the Saudi Armed Forces, arouse Saudi fears that U.S. interest in Saudi security had lessened, and give rise to concern on the part of the large American community in the Eastern Province.

5. Continue to make available, on request and at Saudi expense, the services of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to supervise existing or new military construction projects. The Saudis have confidence in the Corps' integrity and professional capability.

E. *Preserve and, where possible, expand our few other official assets in Saudi Arabia.* Both the more immediate "holding operation" and a possible future broadly based program of support for Saudi Arabia will require a skillful deployment of our assets, which are primarily people—qualified American personnel. Apart from the partial MAP funding of USMTM (for which the Saudi Government pays two-thirds of the expenses), all services which we provide to Saudi Arabia are reimbursed by the Saudis.

Courses of Action:

1. Improve and enlarge the facilities and program possibilities of the American Cultural Center in Jidda and, as feasible, the scope of information and cultural activities in the USIS-operated English Language Center in Riyadh. USIS, with the support of other elements of the U.S. Country Team, has a major role in implementing our coordinated youth program to cultivate potential young Saudi leaders. English language training deserves to rank high in our activities. We should consider the possibility of introducing Peace Corps personnel or similar volunteers as English language teachers. Present opportunities for education and training of Saudis in the U.S. should be continued and increased.

2. Continue our present cooperation with the Saudis in the fields of desalting, minerals exploration, and police training when current agreements expire. Be willing to consider, on a reimbursable basis, providing advisers on either a long-term or a TDY basis as requested by the Saudis. We should be particularly alert to opportunities to assist Saudi Arabia in the areas of manpower planning, labor legislation, and training of Saudi personnel in labor relations and labor standards.

We shall seek within existing legislative constraints to be responsive to occasional requests for technical assistance on short-term, specific projects, or for topping off salaries and allowances of American technicians, professors, or advisers where that would encourage them to accept contracts with Saudi Government agencies or private institutions.

F. *Mobilize American business and private efforts to strengthen the American position and to refurbish the American image in Saudi Arabia.*

Private American companies operating in Saudi Arabia are direct beneficiaries of our close relationship. More than any other company, Aramco has done much to further the U.S. image in Saudi Arabia. Raytheon and other American private firms operating there have also generally inspired the confidence of the Saudis in their integrity and professional competence, providing an asset which can be exploited through appropriate U.S. Government and business coordination. More American firms should be encouraged to explore the possibility of operating in Saudi Arabia.

Courses of Action:

1. Department of Commerce should make stronger efforts to encourage American manufacturers and companies to sell American goods and services to Saudi Arabia on commercially attractive terms. Other agencies not regularly represented in Jidda, such as Treasury, Agriculture, and Export-Import Bank, should recognize the importance of Saudi Arabia to their programs and be responsive to Saudi interest in economic cooperation.

2. To the extent possible, find ways to use more effectively the person-to-person contact potential of the more than 7,000 Americans in Saudi Arabia to advance basic U.S. interests. Our Embassy is continuing, to the extent its limited personnel resources allow, orientation programs for new private Americans to brief them on local customs and conditions and to acquaint them with the rationale for our policies. In particular, the U.S. Government's dialogue with Aramco and other major firms should be maintained.

134. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, December 3, 1969, 1345Z.

3974. 1. At dinner last night, I tackled SAMA Governor Anwar Ali² about growing Saudi military expenditures. Told him about Fahd's

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 SAUD. Secret; Limdis.

² Anwar Ali, a Pakistani accountant, was Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), which operated as the Kingdom's central bank. King Faisal recruited Ali from the International Monetary Fund for the purpose of handling the financial ramifications of Saudi overspending.

request to extend Hawk payments schedule and Sultan's modified request payments be equalized under existing schedule. He seemed unaware Saudis currently considering additional, costly naval, coast guard, artillery and other programs. I noted Saudis are shortsightedly building up heavy future financial liabilities for equipment, much of which they show little capability of effectively using. I urged that he, Gov Ali, use his influence to try to curb current Saudi military appetites.

2. Gov Ali indicated he equally concerned. He stated even MinFinance Prince Musa'ad, whose tightfistedness is proverbial and who has constantly been strongest opponent of more military purchases, has recently apparently been won over to the view that urgent arms purchase requirement exists. Musa'ad had recently told him planned to dip additionally into reserves to pay for arms purchases. Musa'ad overruled Ali's strong demurrals. While having to follow MinFin's instructions, Gov Ali claimed he has written letter to King Faisal pointing out that if SAG continues dip into its reserves at present rate, they will be exhausted (apart from those committed to currency cover) in two years' time. He deplored continuing subsidy payments to UAR and Jordan and heavy military spending, which divert funds from needed economic development projects. Said he is making this point to anyone who will hear, but current Saudi phobia about Communist encirclement causes his argument fall on deaf ears. Nor does there seem be any awareness rapid obsolescence weapons systems. Gov Ali blamed Adnan Khashoggi³ for encouraging more Saudi military purchases.

3. I told Gov Ali that I was probably only Western Ambassador here who has not sought to peddle arms. We have indeed sold military equipment and services to SAG in response specific requests and in context close USG–SAG bilateral agreement, but have consistently urged Saudis not buy what they cannot use or do not need. We value our relationship with SAG and do not wish be negative or unsympathetic re legitimate Saudi concerns. In this context, however, we are continuing efforts somehow find way persuade Saudis not to overindulge in expensive weapons systems of only cosmetic or marginal value to them. I hoped he and I might quietly carry on complementary dialogue with SAG to this end. We agreed discreetly keep in touch on subject.

Eilts

³ Adnan Khashoggi, an international businessman, middleman, and arms broker, amassed a fortune in business deals related to Saudi military purchases. Khashoggi had made the initial suggestion to invite Prince Fahd to the United States, but Saunders informed Chapin, May 2, that an invitation through Khashoggi might embarrass both the Prince and King Faisal. Saunders suggested that the invitation come from Rogers through the Ambassador. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Box 8, Subject Files, Confidential Files, CO 128 Saudi Arabia, 1969–1970)

135. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)¹

Washington, December 30, 1969.

SUBJECT

Saudi Security Situation—Information Memorandum

I understand that you have asked whether there is anything we should be doing on the Saudi security front as a result of the assessment contained in our 211261 (attached, Tab A)² which gave our estimate that the Saudi regime is vulnerable in the long run to growing internal political and social demands and rising area tensions. Jidda's 4186, which concurs in our assessment, is attached (Tab B).³

We have been concerned for some time at the long-term prospects of the Saudi regime. Moreover, the Libyan experience has fortified our view that some sudden coup is always possible in Saudi Arabia. On balance, as indicated in State 211261, we believe the recent Saudi/PRSY confrontation has temporarily strengthened the Saudi establishment. Other factors, such as King Faisal's energy, the size, role and ruthlessness of the Saudi royal family, suggest that an early collapse of the regime, as happened in Libya, is unlikely. To ameliorate prospects for the longer term, we have been seeking to strengthen the Saudi security establishment and also to do what we can to move the regime in the direction of modest political and social reform.

On the security front, we are engaged in a police and security training program with the Saudi Ministry of the Interior. Our Military Training Mission is the chief source of advice for the Saudi armed forces.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23 SAUD. Secret. Drafted by Brewer and cleared by Rockwell.

² Tab A is not attached, but a copy of it, telegram 211261, December 22, is *ibid.*, POL 32-1 SAUD-SYEMEN.

³ Tab B is not attached, but a copy of it, telegram 4186 from Jidda, December 23, is *ibid.* In it, Eilts disagreed with Iranian and Moroccan concerns over Saudi Arabia and found that "despite various worrisome recent developments, short-term prospects of Saudi regime survival still good. This assumes loyalty of National Guard to regime. In longer terms, if current Arab-Israeli tensions continue to rise and there is no appreciable progress in meeting domestic political and social aspirations, outlook for Saudi dynasty may be gloomier." Davies forwarded a Department of State paper, "Assessment of the Saudi Internal Security Situation" to Pranger on January 28, which further elucidated the consensus in the Department on Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, he told Pranger that the paper had been sent to Rogers and Kissinger. (*Ibid.*, POL 23 SAUD) The paper, dated January 20, is *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. I.

We have recently completed surveys of the Saudi Navy and the Coast Guard/Frontier Force and have offered to help implement these proposals to the extent we can. We also continue to be forthcoming in meeting periodic Saudi requests for specific military items.

Such measures are, of course, at best only negative ways of controlling what could become a difficult and uncertain internal security situation. A developing and modernizing Saudi Arabia capable of preserving internal stability and national unity is one of our prime objectives as set forth in the most recent Country Policy Statement on Saudi Arabia of November 21, 1969.⁴ For this purpose, an acceleration of political and social reforms will be required, and we have sought to do what we can on this difficult and sensitive issue. One of the primary purposes of arranging the visit here last fall of Prince Fahd, Saudi Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, was to stimulate further attention to this problem. Fahd has spoken favorably in the past of the need to establish municipal councils and similar organs of local government. While he only returned to Saudi Arabia on December 17, his talks here with top-level officials,⁵ and his experience in visiting the country privately, may already be bearing some fruit, as indicated below.

Ambassador Eilts has periodically sought to remind the Saudis of the need for evolutionary political change and the inutility of excessive arms purchases. He took this line most recently with Acting Foreign Minister Mas'ud on December 23. Jidda's 4215 (attached, Tab C)⁶ reports the welcome news that Prince Fahd is now asking, through the Saudi Embassy here, for a team of experts to evaluate Saudi military plans and the technical and manpower skills available to support them. We are encouraged by this evident recognition that military purchases, with their attendant waste, have to be related to Saudi Arabia's absorptive capacity and competing priorities. We plan to respond positively to the Saudi request when received.

Through these and other ways we will continue to try to strengthen Saudi Arabia on a bilateral basis and encourage its leaders to look to the future. It is unfortunately true, however, that Faisal is aging and unreceptive in the best of circumstances to advice on internal matters. At present, there is also the additional handicap that, in view of the Arab/Israeli situation, even friendly Arabs are less likely to heed our advice than might otherwise be the case. We are nevertheless watching the situation closely and will continue to do all we can to encourage Saudi internal stability and evolutionary progress.

⁴ Document 133.

⁵ See Documents 131 and 132.

⁶ Attached but not printed. Telegram 4215 dated December 27.

136. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, January 27, 1970, 1315Z.

307. Subject: Fahd's Requests to Secretary Rogers. Following is from Ambassador in Riyadh:

Met with Prince Fahd at his home evening Jan 26. After conveying greetings from Secretary and other friends, I said could now provide some answers to questions he had put at his Oct 13 meeting with Secretary.² Fahd asked that I convey his greetings to Secretary, Assistant Secretary Sisco and "other friends" and recalled with obviously genuine pleasure his visit to US:

1. Barter Oil: Drawing on Dept's CA-6046,³ I recalled we had immediately approached ARAMCO to see what might be feasible. ARAMCO had pointed out barter oil deal specifically limited to East European countries for what struck us as very good reason that it should not displace commercial oil on Western European markets. Principal revenue earner is of course commercial oil and we had been assured subject of increasing offtake already under active discussion between ARAMCO and MinPet and that prospects seem good for a substantial increase in offtake coming year. So far as US concerned I noted study currently underway within USG re possibility eliminating existing oil import quotas. Ultimate outcome still unclear, but it highly unlikely any specific country quotas will result. Should import quotas be at any time removed, I felt personally confident that ARAMCO offtakers would be among those scrambling for share of any such market. In any case offtake under constant discussion between ARAMCO and MinPet where it belongs. Fahd readily agreed increased offtake is most effective way increase Saudi revenues and seemed satisfied with response.

2. Defense Program Payments: Recalling his request for stretchout of Hawk payments, I explained that MODA Prince Sultan had subsequently clarified this⁴ to indicate Saudi interest in equalizing Hawk, SAMP and RAMP payments if this should be possible. State/DOD had studied request as amended in some depth, and I then went through

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL SAUD-US. Secret; Limdis. It was repeated to the Secretary of Defense, CHUSMTM, and CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA.

² See Document 131.

³ In airgram CA-6046 to Jidda, November 7, 1969, the Department stated that ARAMCO expected Saudi production to increase in the coming year, and that the marketing of barter oil was limited and (given the U.S. import quota system) the oil would not be marketable in the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, PET 17 SAUD)

⁴ As reported in telegram 1054 from Dhahran, November 28, 1969. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 SAUD)

with him in detail para 4 CA–311.⁵ Stressed SAG should weigh carefully potential damage to its creditworthiness in return for only modest relief. I suggested that before responding, matter be discussed with MinFinance Prince Masa'ad and SAMA Governor Anwar Ali who best able assess possible damage to SAG's financial reputation. Perhaps even King should be consulted. I recalled it was under HM's aegis that previously badly tarnished Saudi financial image had been changed to one of high reliability. Any such excellent credit image should not be cast aside lightly. Nevertheless, if SAG wished, State/DOD willing pursue equalization schedule with other interested USG agencies and see what might be worked out. Speaking personally and as friend, I hoped SAG will not go this route. Fahd was clearly impressed with creditworthiness risk which he had probably not heretofore considered. He requested copy of illustrative table to permit study by his colleagues. Pursuant State/DOD 11738⁶ I had to tell him not authorized do so since figures set forth therein not firm, but I permitted him take some notes on clear understanding tables represent no definitive commitment. They could change considerably as result intra-USG consultation. He professed understand situation and seemed appreciative effort that had been made. He indicated might be in touch with us again on this matter after consultation with his cabinet colleagues.

3. Coast Guard/Frontier Force (CG/FF): Told Fahd I had few days earlier sent to him and to Prince Sultan, through FonOff, copies of Arabic translation DA survey report which should be read in conjunction overall AID/OPS survey report.⁷ English texts of both reports and Arabic translation of AID/OPS report had been sent to him earlier. We assume SAG will now study reports and advise us of how it plans to proceed on CG/FF development. While no commitment possible, I thought USG would be willing study with SAG how it might be able help. Fahd said he had not seen my letter or DA report, but expressed appreciation for USG interest as evidenced by AID/OPS–DA surveys. He was particularly grateful that survey reports had been translated into Arabic. He reiterated SAG's determination strengthen CG/FF and

⁵ In airgram CA–311 to Jidda, January 19, the Department stated that in light of Fahd's request for a stretch out of payments, it and the Defense Department had examined the Hawk, SAMP, and RAMP repayment schedules and enclosed a table indicating the resulting reduction in payments per year. (Ibid., DEF 19–8 US–SAUD)

⁶ In telegram 11738 to Dhahran, January 24, the Departments of State and Defense stated that negotiations over repayments might not produce the optimum figures expected by the Saudis. (Ibid.)

⁷ As reported in telegram 249 from Jidda, January 22. (Ibid., DEF 1 SAUD) The report was officially presented to Saudi Arabia in a letter from Laird to Prince Sultan, January 28. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–067, Box 83, Saudi Arabia, 1970)

said he will wish discuss reports with CG/FF Commander General Malik. Thereafter SAG will make firm decision how to proceed.

4. Navy: I recalled that shortly after my return to SA last Nov, MODA Prince Sultan sent word that SAG accepted US naval survey presented early 1969 "with only minor modifications." When I had actually seen Saudi naval concept,⁸ I had to tell Prince Sultan that my preliminary review suggested more than "minor modifications" involved and in all frankness concept seemed a bit grandiose given Saudi manpower and financial limitations. I had pointed out Saudi ideas will have to be studied by USG to see what, if anything, we can do to help and such study currently underway in DOD. I had also suggested to Sultan that Saudis might be well advised take force goals outlined in US naval survey as first bite. If such goals achieved there no reason why Saudis cannot proceed with further naval development if they feel additional requirement exists. In meantime, however, it is a mistake to establish unrealistic goals. Sultan had in fact told me Saudi naval force goals could be subject for discussion and modification. I also referred to Sultan's recent request to Secretary Laird for four senior military evaluators, including one naval person, to assess existing and proposed Saudi military programs in terms of Saudi economic situation and plans.⁹ While USG still studying request, I could only applaud this wise idea and had commended it to Washington.¹⁰ Fahd agreed real need exists for such overall evaluation and seemed pleased with my remarks on subject.

5. *Comment:* Fahd expressed his deep appreciation for Secretary's and Assistant Secretary Sisco's continuing interest in Saudi problems. He noted our discussion had been "between friends" and frank evaluations we had given helpful. Fahd is no financial nor economic expert and some of points probably over his head. Told him I would also mention defense payments matter to Sultan when I meet with him again Jan 27¹¹ and he agreed this desirable. Interest payments (para 2 SecState 11738) did not arise. We have now replied to all of Fahd's questions to Secretary and, while further discussions may develop on one or more of these subjects, our immediate obligations arising from Fahd's October visit to US may be considered as completed.

Eilts

⁸ In telegram 3832 from Jidda, November 19, 1969, Eilts reported that Prince Sultan would ask the United States for assistance in expanding the Saudi Navy beyond the limits suggested in the naval survey. Eilts cautioned that the United States should try to scale down Saudi thinking and determine the degree to which the United States was willing to assist in terms of vessels and training in keeping with the naval survey. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 6-2 SAUD)

⁹ This request was sent in the form of a letter from Prince Sultan to Laird, December 26, 1969, delivered January 6, 1970. (Ibid., DEF 1 SAUD)

¹⁰ Reported in telegram 139 from Jidda, January 13. (Ibid.)

¹¹ See footnote 4, Document 137.

137. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Departments of State and Defense¹

Jidda, January 27, 1970, 1300Z.

305. Following from Ambassador in Riyadh. Subject: Phantoms. Ref: Jidda 219.²

1. When General Dunlop and I met with MODA Prince Sultan Jan 25, he spoke at some length of current Saudi estimate growing threat of external aggression exists from PRSY, YAR, Syria and/or Iraq. Threat could even develop through Dhofar. Claimed Saudi intelligence based on agents and radio intercepts suggests increasing number of Soviet military advisors being deployed to PRSY (septel).³ Saudis believe that eventually PRSY, with Soviet advisory support, will launch another military attack on Saudi territory similar to Wadia aggression.

2. On contingency basis SAG is actively preparing for this possibility. It is planning construction of several new airfields and upgrading of two existing strips in southern area and is considering acquisition additional ground support capability to meet such threat. All of this is further burden on SAG's already hard pressed finances.

3. Sultan then launched into long, bitter criticism of inadequacies British consortium and Lightning aircraft. He referred to Saudi air defense contracts with British as "greatest mistake I ever made." He recounted at length background of British involvement in joint air defense effort, including Dunlap mission to dissuade Saudis from buying 104G's, former Secretary McNamara's alleged effort persuade Saudis buy Lightnings by getting British offer very attractive terms, last minute McNamara message that if Saudis did not wish Lightnings 104G's might be available and final conclusion contract. Only half jocularly he argued USG largely responsible for Saudi purchase of Lightnings which have proven to be inadequate in capability and performance.

4. While in Paris recently, Sultan continued, Dupre had broached possibility SAG purchasing Mirage III's. When Sultan reported this to King, Faisal instructed him do nothing about French approach. If French formally raised subject, he was to parry query by indicating

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 SAUD. Secret; Exdis.

² In telegram 219 from Jidda, January 19, Eilts noted a developing Saudi interest in F–4 Phantoms in connection with contingency planning for what the Saudis referred to as their "southern threat" (Yemen), and in connection with their dissatisfaction with the British Lightnings. (Ibid.)

³ Apparently a reference to telegram 211261 to Tehran; see footnote 2, Document 135.

SAG still studying matter. Faisal, according to Sultan, had also asked him query me, informally, if USG would be willing to sell SAG "one or two squadrons of Phantoms" which would obviate need for expensive additional airfields and aircraft. Recognizing sensitivity of subject, Saudis do not wish to raise matter formally lest they receive a turn-down, but Sultan wanted my personal view likely of USG reaction to such request.

5. I pointed out to Sultan that even with Phantoms, SAG would still require emergency airfields in outlying areas. I could give him no official reply, but he should know in all frankness that any such request would be very awkward and difficult. Apart from high level of technical expertise which sophisticated aircraft such as Phantom requires and high costs, any such sale coming at time when Arab-Israel problem unresolved and showing signs of further deterioration could arouse domestic and international storm. In circumstances, I would not wish to give him any encouragement. Phantom sale likely and suggested instead RSAF focus on improving Lightning program. Though obviously disappointed, Sultan seemed to expect this answer.

6. *Comment:* This is highest level Saudi approach on Phantoms that we have had to date. We sought to discourage Sultan, though his interest may be expected to continue and we may not have heard last of subject. In one sense no further response is needed, though if we have anything more positive to say this would be helpful. As devil's advocate for a moment, case could be made that selling Phantoms to Saudis could be (A) evidence of US evenhandedness, and (B) hardly change balance of air power in area. Saudis have requirement for long range aircraft in connection with threat to its southern frontiers. Lack of Saudi technical skills, finances, manpower shortages and likely international repercussions any such sale clearly weigh heavily against any such early sale. Will continue to discourage any such requests.⁴

7. Dept please repeat CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA and CHUSMTM.

Eilts

⁴ In telegram 349 from Jidda, January 29, Eilts reported that Prince Sultan asked the United States on January 27 to "think about" selling "two or three squadrons" of F-4s to Saudi Arabia to offset Nixon's promise to sell them to Israel. According to Eilts, Sultan argued: "It will take Saudis at least two years to have trained personnel and no aircraft deliveries necessary for at least that period. Thus, such offer to sell Saudis would in no way threaten Israel which will in any case know limited Saudi capability." Eilts hoped that the Saudis would not attempt to make the sale of Phantoms a test of U.S.-Saudi friendship. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 SAUD)

138. Telegram From the Departments of State and Defense to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

Washington, March 7, 1970, 0017Z.

33933. Subj: Saudi Naval Request. Refs: Jidda A-368; Jidda 607.² Joint State/Defense Message.

1. Saudi naval request presented us in December 1969³ goes well beyond recommendations of February 1969 USN Survey Team report⁴ and includes items of considerable sophistication which we believe will for some years exceed capabilities RSNF to operate and maintain without sizeable and expensive foreign support. In some cases items requested, e.g., surface-to-surface missiles, are not presently in USN inventory and are unavailable from U.S. sources. Naval force of size envisioned in SAG requests would appear clearly beyond current financial capabilities of SAG, particularly view current and anticipated SAG investment in other defense and security programs. Before it would be possible for USG give commitment to sell specific items and services to RSNF, we would need further clarify SAG priorities for vessels, equipment, and training desired and to learn time frame over which SAG would expect this expansion effort take place. In this connection we concur para 2 refel that something like USN Survey Team recommended force goals is realistic first step upon which RSNF could later expand if need requires.

2. We nevertheless concur with basic Country Team recommendation (para 4 refair) that it in overall U.S. interest to seek insofar as possible play primary role in RSNF expansion effort in view: (a) great importance King Faisal and SAG attach to USG support as evidenced by our responsiveness to Saudi arms requests; (b) continuing Saudi concern over potential threats from the Soviet-backed radical regime in Southern Yemen; (c) our hope that SAG will be able contribute, in conjunction with Iran, to maintenance stability in Persian Gulf following UK military withdrawal in 1971; and (d) our desire preserve and strengthen role of U.S. as principal all-around military advisor to SAG.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 SAUD. Secret. Drafted on March 6 by Wrampelmeier; cleared in PM/MAS, OSD/ISA/ NESA, NEA/ARP, NEA/RA, and by Davies; and approved by Sisco. It was repeated to the Consulate General in Dhahran, CHUSMTM Dhahran, CINCSRIKE, COE MEDDIV Livorno, and CHNAVOPS.

² Airgram A-368 was not found. Telegram 607 from Jidda, February 18, reiterates Eilts's concern that the Saudi naval buildup proceed at a measured pace. (Ibid.) The Saudis had repeatedly pressured for a response to their naval request. (Telegram 742 from Jidda, March 1; telegram 763 from Jidda, March 2; and telegram 803 from Jidda, March 5; all *ibid.*)

³ See footnote 8, Document 136.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 131.

3. You therefore authorized inform SAG that USG prepared in principle assist it in development of a naval force of reasonable size and military strength. In our view 1969 USN Survey Report recommendations, which were prepared following careful study of SAG requirements, if implemented, will provide Saudi Arabia by end of 10-year period covered by report with force which can be operated and maintained with minimum costly foreign technical assistance. USG prepared assist SAG meet force goals recommended in that report through cash sales of material and services.

4. We recognize there are major differences between USN Survey Report recommendations and December 1969 SAG naval requests. While SAG is, of course, final judge its own legitimate naval requirements, we concerned lest Saudi request to us insufficiently reflect currently limited Saudi financial and manpower resources. Naval forces of size indicated by SAG request would require considerable investment of financial resources and skilled personnel and would probably be impossible to achieve without serious adverse impact on other desirable military and general development objectives. As SAG itself recognizes in calling for special DOD evaluation mission, proposed expansion programs, such as RSNF, must be carefully considered in relation other priority SAG military projects, current and projected. Decision to implement as first step more modest RSNF expansion program along lines recommended in USN Survey Report would not, of course, preclude SAG from later deciding to purchase additional vessels and equipment once basic naval force established and SAG has had benefit this experience to assess its further naval requirements. It would, however, make it easier for SAG absorb requisite later expansion.

5. We hope senior officials will discuss SAG naval requests frankly with naval member of DOD Evaluation Team now being organized. On basis these discussions we would then be able develop more detailed and specific info re Saudi priority needs as well as those portions of SAG request USG would be able to support and those which unavailable from US sources.⁵

6. In light of foregoing paragraph and Country Team recommendations contained Jidda's 542,⁶ we are seeking obtain services of broadly experienced USN captain, if possible with missile background,

⁵ Based on this telegram, Eilts sent the Department a draft aide-mémoire to be presented to King Faisal. (Telegram 936 from Jidda, March 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 SAUD)

⁶ In telegram 542 from Jidda, February 12, the Embassy enumerated the various requirements, skills, and tasks appropriate for the team of experts that would evaluate the Saudi military establishment. (Ibid., DEF 1 SAUD)

to serve as Naval member of DOD Evaluation Team. We will make every effort see that this officer, after his selection, is thoroughly briefed on USN Survey Report recommendations as well as on SAG naval requests.

Rogers

139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

Washington, March 24, 1970, 2210Z.

42979. Subj: USG/Saudi Relations. Ref: Jidda 744; Jidda 763.²

1. Reftels report King Faisal and MinState FonAffs Saqqaf concerned at what they regard as unwelcome implications for USG/SAG relations of Nixon doctrine enunciated at Guam. While this attitude no doubt reflects increasing disappointment over what they see as unbalanced USG policy on Mid East issue, you may find it helpful draw on following numbered paragraphs in future talks with top SAG officials re basic USG policy in effort combat their current gloom.

2. Nixon doctrine should not be construed as retreating from long-standing relationships which USG, and, we believe Saudis, have found mutually beneficial. President himself, in his Special Report to Congress of February 18, 1970,³ made this clear in saying:

“As I said at the United Nations, ‘It is not my belief that the way to peace is by giving up our friends or letting down our allies.’” USG remains alert to threat of Communist inroads and will continue participate appropriately in defense and development of its allies and friends. However, we simply not in position to carry entire burden alone.

3. This new emphasis on partnership and mutual effort is typified by the many joint programs on which we continue cooperate with Saudi Arabia in defense field, both on govt/govt basis and in facilitating

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL SAUD–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on March 16 by Brewer; cleared by Davies, Sisco, and Spiers; and approved by Sisco.

² Telegram 744 from Jidda, March 1 (ibid., POL 15–1 SAUD); and telegram 763 from Jidda, March 2. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 SAUD)

³ “First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s,” *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 115–190.

private transactions. These include long-standing military training mission and Corps of Engineers activities, recent surveys of Saudi naval and CG/FF requirements, favorable action on selected Saudi arms requests (e.g. artillery), and active SAMP/RAMP programs. Our policies do not preclude further activities of this type to assist Saudi Arabia's legitimate self-defense.

4. Five U.S. Administrations of both parties have expressed interest in territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. President on assuming office wrote King Faisal on February 24, 1969,⁴ that "You may be assured of our continuing understanding and support for the integrity of your country and the prosperity and progress of all its citizens." These assurances reflect long-standing and continuing USG interest in Saudi Arabia's well-being and development which we believe clearly in our mutual interest.

5. In last decade many states, Saudi Arabia included, have achieved rapid development in variety fields, including self-defense. We believe SAG will agree that time is past when major power must be expected intervene directly in every local disturbance, or that any such action would necessarily be helpful to our friends. But this development bespeaks greater capacity and self-reliance on part our friends rather than any lessening of constructive interest by ourselves. Latter most recently illustrated by our willingness undertake major military/economic survey of Saudi defense establishment and assist in expansion Saudi naval force in effort further help SAG develop its own defense capabilities. SAG may be assured we envision no change in our settled policy of support for Saudi Arabia and willingness continue do what we can to counsel and assist our Saudi friends in addressing new defense and development problems.

Rogers

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 127.

140. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 36–6–70

Washington, April 7, 1970.

[Omitted here are a cover sheet, the Table of Contents, and a map.]

THE OUTLOOK FOR SAUDI ARABIA

Note

This estimate examines trends in Saudi Arabia, the prospects for the Saudi regime over the next two or three years, and the implications of these matters within the area and for the US.

Conclusions

A. After years of increasing prosperity and social change, the growing educated element in Saudi Arabia is pressing for a share in the political power now concentrated in King Feisal's hands. If Feisal remains active, the regime can probably cope with domestic discontent for at least a few more years, thanks to broad support by the religious and conservative majority, tight internal security measures, and the geographical separation of the main population centers. Two contingencies would reduce the regime's chances of survival—the departure of Feisal or another Arab-Israeli War. Either one might prompt dissidents within the military to attempt a coup.²

B. Feisal probably will be able to carry out his duties for some time to come, but in the event of his death or incapacity, there is likely to be less unity and firmness in the House of Saud. Any foreseeable royal successor would probably be more inclined to accommodate to radical trends in Arab politics and less capable of suppressing dissi-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-044, Senior Review Group Meetings, Review Group NSSM 90. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A note on the cover sheet indicates this estimate supersedes NIE 36–6–66. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the AEC and the FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction. For text of the earlier estimate, NIE 36–6–66, "The Role of Saudi Arabia," December 8, 1966, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 283.

² The finished NIE did not reflect a March 10 CIA assessment that a renewed offensive by South Yemen would increase the dangers of a military coup because "it would put the Saudi regular army and air force in a better position in terms of ammunition, transport and battle-readiness to execute a coup. If Saudi forces were defeated in the south it would also increase chances of their turning against the regime on the grounds that they had not been adequately equipped and supported by their own government." Such considerations, according to the CIA, had led Feisal to renew help to the Yemeni Royalists in order to provide a buffer on Saudi Arabia's southern border. (Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A, Box 388)

dents. If the ruling family were overthrown, the successor regime almost certainly would be radical, militantly anti-Israeli, and markedly anti-American.

C. Feeling increasingly isolated in the Arab world, Feisal will seek to oppose radical and revolutionary influences—especially in the two Yemens—and to maintain the present *modus vivendi* with Nasser—who needs the \$100 million annual subsidy that Egypt receives from the Saudis. Feisal sees the need to cooperate with the Shah to maintain stability in the Persian Gulf after the British withdrawal in 1971, but any number of forces could upset the fragile situation there, inviting a clash of interests between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

D. Cordial relations with the US, long a cornerstone of Saudi foreign policy, have been weakened by US support for Israel, especially since 1967. Growing anti-American sentiment in Saudi Arabia and in the Arab world generally will cause Feisal more and more to de-emphasize his ties with the US. This process would be accelerated by another round of Arab-Israeli hostilities. Whatever the state of relations between the US and Saudi Governments, the latter will press the oil companies for more revenues.

Discussion

I. Saudi Society and the Saudi Regime

1. King Feisal rules over a country of sharp contrasts between the traditional and the modern. Its four million or so people are spread over an area of nearly 900,000 square miles; many of them are still bedouin, and even more of them retain traditional tribal ties. The great bulk are still rigidly orthodox Muslims. Yet increasing numbers of Saudis are affected by the economic and social changes which have occurred in the Kingdom. This is true of all the major areas: the Eastern Province, where the enormously productive oil fields provide the financial underpinnings of the state; the Najd, base of the Saud family and center of traditional religious fundamentalism; and the Hejaz, the western area along the Red Sea, the site of Islam's two holiest cities—Mecca and Medina. In these areas a new middle class has emerged, with regular and substantial contacts with the outside and more sophisticated world.

2. In the years ahead, Feisal is likely to face increasingly difficult foreign and domestic problems. He has long been a principal Arab advocate of maintaining close relations with the US, but this policy is becoming less tenable as the US becomes increasingly identified in Arab eyes as the principal political prop and arms supplier of Israel. At the same time, social and economic changes are not only affecting the nature of Saudi society but are also working to make Feisal's position and that of the ruling family less secure. The recent, sudden overthrow of the monarchy in Libya has doubtless heartened the regime's domestic opponents.

3. Feisal has been the dominant figure in Saudi Arabia for the past 10 years. Within the ruling family, he stands above all factions. The strong point of Feisal's rule has been a combination of conservative fiscal policies and orderly government; he has successfully reversed the waste both of money and of energies which plagued the country under his incompetent brother Saud. For the past several years the Kingdom has had balanced budgets, even while spending substantial amounts of money on roads and other infrastructure projects, on extensive increases in educational and medical facilities, and on military equipment.

4. Yet Feisal's talents are more appropriate to the problems of the past than to those of the present and future. He is deeply religious in the context of the rigid Muslim orthodoxy which still characterizes many Saudis, and in large measure he is attuned to the desires of the traditional elements of the society. However, the traditional solidarity stemming from religious zeal is eroding. Increasing bureaucratic centralization has replaced the former system of local governors enjoying considerable latitude. Now, most issues must be referred to the capital, where the proclivity of Feisal or his top ministers for personal involvement often results in long delays or even no decision on important questions. Much of the inherently egalitarian aspect of the earlier tribally-oriented social structure has been smothered by administrative centralization and diminished access to the ruler. Feisal's personal style of government involves reliance on a coterie of conservative advisors, some of whom are not in tune with the times. He also tends to emphasize loyalty more than competence in appointments to many influential positions, a practice which has increased the frustration of younger, often better educated, civil servants.

5. The traditional sources of Feisal's power—his control of Saudi wealth, widespread loyalty to the Saud family, and religious custom—are also the aspects of Saudi Arabia which a growing number of its influential citizens resent. Indeed, influential Saudi subjects, particularly in the Hejaz, have always resented alien rule by the Najd-based Saud family. Yet the King has resisted political innovation which might make the government more responsive to local demands. In the past year or so, he has taken steps which indicate growing concern for the regime's security, including the arrest of several hundred people on charges of subversion. This has had the effect of increasing resentment of the government among certain important groups.

6. Social liberalization has made considerable progress during the past decade. Many new schools have been opened, the public's participation in the economic benefits deriving from oil income has greatly broadened, and the power of the ultraconservative religious leaders has declined. Desires for participation in the political process have been greatly stimulated by the expansion of education, of communications,

and of foreign travel—as well as by frustration over the increasing inaccessibility of those in power. Many Saudis, even though they recognize their country's prosperity and stability, contrast the regime's autocratic structure and family possessiveness with other seemingly more socially-oriented regimes in the Arab world. A more rapid rate of social and political progress is increasingly demanded by the younger and better educated elements of the population, even including a few members of the ruling family. But Feisal has tended to restrict political power to a narrow circle which—though it has been expanded beyond the royal family—includes only a relative handful of trusted officials. He has occasionally shown some awareness of the desirability of broadening participation in the government, but he finds the prospect too difficult to undertake with confidence—especially with the growing complexity of the government.

7. There is little prospect, however, of Feisal or the Saud family being overthrown by any mass public uprising. As in other Arab countries, the principal challenge to the conservative regime would come from the military, chiefly from those in the officer corps who are of middle class origins, relatively sophisticated and modern minded, and hostile to the monarchy. Many in this group tend to identify with officers who overthrew the traditional monarchies in Egypt, Iraq, and Libya; they favor the sort of program instituted in those countries—especially destruction of the powers of the old ruling class, the attempt at some type of “socialist” reform, and the adoption of a strongly hostile attitude toward the US as Israel's protector.

8. [1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

9. [1 line not declassified] At present the Saudi Army consists of 28,000 officers and men. [4 lines not declassified] Units of the army are widely scattered away from the main cities—in southern Jordan facing the Israelis, in the border areas near Yemen and Southern Yemen, and in garrisons in the northwest. The great distances between principal cities and the difficulties of communication make a coordinated coup attempt much more difficult than in most Arab countries. [2 lines not declassified]

10. In addition, the regime relies heavily on its own paramilitary force, the National Guard (also known as the “White Army”). This force, roughly the same size as the regular army, is recruited from tribes traditionally regarded as loyal to the Saudi monarchs and, unlike the army, is stationed near the principal cities. The National Guard is probably loyal to the regime, but its ability to protect the government, particularly if it came to a clash with the army, is less certain. It has been effective in performing its primary mission of maintaining internal security and has demonstrated its ability to suppress civil disturbances in the Kingdom. It is, however, hampered in its operations by a short-

age of trained personnel, particularly officers, and extremely ineffective administrative and logistic systems. It is not equipped with heavy armaments, such as tanks and artillery.

11. [2 lines not declassified] Antimonarchical forces would be encouraged if a neighboring conservative regime, notably Jordan, were toppled. On the whole, however, we believe that the regime would be most likely to face serious threats in the following contingencies: (a) a new round of major Arab-Israeli hostilities, or (b) the death or incapacity of Feisal.

12. As to the first of these, the regime's policy with regard to the Arab confrontation with Israel is regarded by many Saudis as lacking sincerity. While Feisal has adopted a tough posture on the question of Jerusalem and has strongly supported the Fatah fedayeen organization, this limited stance has not satisfied the country's younger elements. The close Saudi relationship with the US in the face of growing anti-Americanism in the Arab world has increased public dissatisfaction with the ruling family. While the stationing of Saudi troops in southern Jordan has given the military some sense of participation in the struggle with Israel, many officers realize that this participation is chiefly symbolic. Another Arab defeat at the hands of the Israelis, especially if it involved Saudi forces in Jordan, would probably shake the Saudi regime. Public sentiment would be aroused, disorders probably would break out in Jidda or at the oil complex in the Dhahran area and could occasion anti-American activities throughout the Kingdom; in such a time of high emotion, military officers might seize the opportunity to move against the House of Saud.

13. King Feisal appears healthy enough to carry out his duties for some time to come, but he is 64 and has mild arteriosclerosis. Moreover, he is so much the linchpin of the government in Saudi Arabia that an examination of the succession problem is advisable. While the chances favor the royal family closing ranks upon Feisal's death, there are sufficient rivalries within the family, as well as a "generation gap" between the younger princes and the elders now holding the reins of power, that a smooth transfer cannot be assured. Feisal's designated successor, Crown Prince Khalid, is noted neither for his leadership qualities [less than 1 line not declassified]. While he could probably take over as a figurehead King, with executive power in other hands—possibly those of his more talented half-brother Fahd, others in the family have recently talked critically of such an arrangement. The circumstances of Feisal's demise would certainly be of critical importance. Were he able, for example, to arrange the succession and to extract promises of cooperation from his various brothers, serious infighting might be avoided. On the other hand, his sudden death or total incapacitation might prompt one or another faction to grab for power.

14. With Feisal's death there is likely to be less unity and firmness on the part of the House of Saud and thus more vacillation in the governing of the country. This would tempt discontented elements, both civil and military, to take advantage of the situation and thrust for power. Should the House of Saud be overthrown, a successor regime would almost certainly be radical, militantly anti-Israel, and markedly anti-American.

Economic Considerations

15. For all its large oil revenues Saudi Arabia is facing some financial constraints.³ Oil revenues, source of about 85 percent of the government's income, will not rise as fast as anticipated governmental expenditures. Since the Khartoum Conference of November 1967, foreign exchange reserves have been tapped to help pay the \$140 million annual subsidies to Egypt and Jordan. Foreign exchange reserves (including government investments abroad) have dropped from almost \$950 million in late 1967 to about \$750 million. Although reserves are adequate to permit continued drawdown for several years without serious problems, the regime is extremely anxious to keep these funds intact, since \$550 million represent full currency cover and deposits for pension funds. The government probably can secure agreement from the oil companies for an advance against future tax payments and thus improve its financial position on a one-time basis. Given the world oil surplus, there is little prospect of getting the companies to increase production more than 6–8 percent annually; similarly, income per barrel is not likely to be increased much. Thus, the Saudi Government will be forced to establish more strict priorities for expenditures, since it is determined not to rely on heavy foreign borrowing.

16. Some indication of revised priorities is already evident. The 1969–1970 defense and internal security budget amounts to \$515 million—a 20 percent rise from the previous year and almost 40 percent of the current budget. The budget allocates \$357 million to development, a decline of 7 percent over last year. The rapidly increasing defense expenditures reflect the regime's uneasiness regarding both external and internal security threats, which have been heightened by the border friction with Southern Yemen and the forthcoming British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Past and projected defense purchases include sophisticated missiles and aircraft and naval vessels which the country can maintain and use only with outside assistance.

³ In telegram 1499 from Jidda, April 16, the Embassy reported that Anwar Ali continued to be concerned that military spending would result in distortions in the Saudi economy at the expense of development projects and that this would worsen considerably if Saudi Arabia embarked on major projects for a new Navy and Coast Guard/Frontier Force. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, E 2–4 SAUD)

17. Saudi Arabian social and economic development will continue to be hampered by a scarcity of technicians, teachers, and workers. There is little prospect that manpower efficiency can be increased enough to help significantly in the next few years. Although increasing numbers of graduates from the rapidly expanding Saudi educational system are entering the job market, this will not do much to satisfy the large demands for skilled hands. The country will continue to depend to a large extent on imported skilled personnel in almost all categories.

II. Foreign Relations

In the Arab World Generally

18. The Saudi regime sees itself as increasingly encircled by hostile forces. Several Arab regimes with similar conservative domestic and foreign attitudes have gone under in recent years. In Feisal's view, neighboring revolutionary regimes—the Baathist governments of Iraq and Syria and the regimes in both Yemen and the Peoples Republic of Southern Yemen—are working actively against him and his regime or intend to do so at their earliest opportunity. Only two of Feisal's important Arab neighbors, Hussein of Jordan and the Amir of Kuwait, share his political outlook.

19. The Saudi regime will take the steps it thinks necessary to keep radical and revolutionary influences as far away as possible. It will continue to extend political and occasionally financial support to fellow conservatives. Thus, Saudi Arabia will continue to maintain good relations with Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait, and Jordan. It will probably help King Hussein from time to time with money over and above the \$40 million annual Khartoum subsidy. Saudi Arabia is also likely to support conservative non-governmental groups in the Arab world, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and possibly antiregime organizations in the Sudan.

20. Feisal probably views his present relations with Nasser as about the best he can hope for. For years, these two leaders were at loggerheads—each possessed of a profound personal and political antagonism for the other. Nasser encouraged and gave various kinds of support to radical nationalist elements in Saudi Arabia and around its periphery—out of broad sympathy for their cause and as a means of cutting down Saudi influence. Egyptian radio propaganda was particularly offensive to the Saudi Government. Saudi Arabia, for its part, extended support to many of Nasser's Arab adversaries.

21. Much of that pattern changed in the aftermath of the 1967 war. Nasser ended his campaign against Saudi Arabia and withdrew from Yemen. This was partly in return for the \$100 million annual Saudi subsidy agreed to at Khartoum. Moreover, Nasser has been so immersed

in the confrontation with the Israelis that he has neither the time nor resources for involvement in the affairs of states in the Arabian Peninsula or Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, Feisal probably will remain alert to limit any resurgence of Nasser's influence or any resumption of his interference. Thus, Feisal is likely to seek to improve relations even with revolutionary and socialist Algeria—which has an antipathy to Nasser, but which has displayed no aspirations to become involved in the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi efforts to support antiregime forces in the Sudan could run afoul of Egyptian support for the regime there. In sum, the current *modus vivendi* between Feisal and Nasser is subject to many strains, though each side has reasons to avoid a renewal of the feud.

The Yemens

22. Feisal has been extremely sensitive about the radical regimes in Yemen and Southern Yemen. He supported the Royalist cause in Yemen against the Egyptian-dominated republican regime for five years, stopping only after the Egyptians withdrew their forces from Yemen as a result of the defeat by Israel in 1967. For reasons which are not altogether clear, the Saudis resumed support of the Yemeni Royalists in the fall of 1969 at a time when the civil war had virtually ceased. Feisal may have been influenced by his more conservative advisors to conclude that the regime in Yemen posed a renewed danger to him, or he might have been greatly influenced by the governor of the Saudi province bordering on Yemen, who apparently has profited by diverting to his own pocket funds earmarked for the Yemeni Royalists. The Saudis will probably continue efforts to get the republican government to include members of the Yemeni royal family. The republicans will probably not go far enough to satisfy the Saudis, and relations between Saudi Arabia and Yemen are likely to be touchy, if not actively hostile, for the foreseeable future.

23. In regard to Southern Yemen, Feisal was stunned that the British allowed the federation to collapse in 1967 and intensely dislikes the radical orientation of the Southern Yemen regime. The Saudis have since given some support to conservative elements in futile efforts to stir up trouble against the Southern Yemen Government. In fighting over an unmarked border in late 1969, Saudi Arabia scored a signal military success against a Southern Yemen incursion. There will probably be more clashes along this desert border, but they are not likely to pose any serious threat to the Saudis.

The Persian Gulf

24. The planned withdrawal of the British from the Persian Gulf in 1971 poses a number of problems for Saudi Arabia. Dealing directly with the small sheikdoms without the interposition of the British will raise some new problems. For example, Saudi Arabia's long-standing

territorial dispute with Abu Dhabi over the Buraimi oasis might become active again. While the mini-states of this region have less than a half million people, they are divided among 9 sheikdoms with populations running from a high of 200,000 people (Bahrein) down to 4,000 (Ajman and Umm al-Qaiwain), all of them with tribally based societies. Age-old rivalries and disputes among them have been heightened by quarrels and jealousies arising from the presence of oil along the shores of the Gulf, and by the prospect that Britain's restraining hand will soon be lifted.⁴ Further complicating the efforts of these mini-states to maintain their independence, perhaps by combining in the proposed Federation of Arab Amirates, are the aspirations and designs of their larger neighbors, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq.

25. The Shah of Iran's ambition to succeed Britain as the "power" in the Gulf is a potential source of trouble, especially in view of Iranian territorial claims there. The means by which the Shah seeks to make Iranian power felt in the Gulf could bring about an Arab-Iranian confrontation, facing Feisal with a situation in which he would be forced to line up on the Arab side almost regardless of the issue. If, for example, radical turmoil should break out in one of the shakier mini-states of the Gulf and the Shah were to intervene, Arab-Persian antagonisms would probably compel Feisal to oppose Iranian intrusion—even though his sympathies might be against the radicals. At present, the Shah and Feisal seem determined to cooperate, but the two together cannot guarantee stability in the Persian Gulf; too much depends on forces within the Gulf sheikdoms and on the policies of Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, either Saudi Arabia or Iran could upset the fragile equilibrium there. For some time Iraq has been giving clandestine assistance and military aid to subversive elements in the Gulf sheikdoms and will continue this, at least on a small scale.

26. Feisal will continue to emphasize his role as guardian of the Muslim world's holiest cities in order to increase Saudi Arabia's influence. But this role will give him only limited leverage, as radical Arab regimes depend less and less on religion for support. Between Iran and Saudi Arabia, religious ties will be invoked from time to time, but the two countries are of rival Muslim sects. Moreover, relations with Iran will be clouded by that country's various ties with Israel.

27. With the British withdrawal, the Soviet presence in the Gulf will probably increase. Moscow will seek diplomatic representation in the new states and will offer them military and economic aid—though such offers may well be declined. Increased Soviet naval activity in the

⁴ Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai have oil revenues totalling over \$500 million annually. In other sheikdoms, commercial quantities of oil have not yet been exploited. [Footnote is in the original.]

Indian Ocean seems likely and will probably be reflected in the Gulf. Feisal and the Shah are both wary of Soviet influence in this area; if they prove unable to cooperate in matters concerning the Gulf, Soviet opportunities will be enhanced.

The United States

28. A cordial relationship with the US has been a cornerstone of Saudi foreign policy for over a generation. The Saudi regime continues to look to the US for evidence of support against domestic enemies and regional rivals. Especially since the 1967 war, however, Feisal has become progressively more embarrassed at home and in the Arab world by the difficulty of reconciling his close ties with the US with prevailing bitter Arab criticism of US support for Israel. As long as active confrontation between the Arabs and Israelis continues and the latter continue to occupy territory taken in 1967, relations with the US are unlikely to improve and may deteriorate further. In public, at any rate, Feisal will be compelled to adopt increasingly negative stances toward the US.

29. In the event of renewed major hostilities, Saudi relations with the US would be severely compromised; [3½ lines not declassified] But the government, mindful of anti-US disorders in 1967 and after, would probably step up security measures against such contingencies. The Saudis might also halt American oil operations—though probably not for long because of the extreme Saudi dependence on oil revenues. [1½ lines not declassified] In normal circumstances, however, Saudi Government pressures for increased oil production and greater oil revenue will grow, regardless of the Arab-Israeli situation and the state of Saudi Arabia's relations with the US Government.

30. We believe that Feisal, especially in view of growing anti-American sentiment in Saudi Arabia, will seek to de-emphasize his ties with the US. The Saudis are likely to turn more toward others—e.g., France and Japan—for more of the imports now supplied by the US. More likely than not this cooling of relations will be a gradual process for some time to come. For all Feisal's disagreement with much of US policy in the Middle East, it is doubtful that he sees any satisfactory alternative to a degree of reliance on the US for certain purposes. When he leaves the scene, however, US relations with his successor are likely to become increasingly difficult.

141. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, May 21, 1970, 1355Z.

1982. Subject: Saudi Reaction to Further U.S. Arms Supply to Israel. Ref: State 74125.²

1. Some months ago, we reported anticipated likely adverse Saudi reaction to additional Phantom or arms sale to Israel (Jidda 556).³ We have no reason to believe that such sales are likely to be any more palatable now. If anything, after Israeli deep penetration raids in UAR, massive attack on Lebanon, Abu Zabal school bombing, attack on UAR naval vessels at Ras Banyas, etc., Saudi reaction like that of Arabs elsewhere is certain be emotionally bitter. Fact that such additional sales might be in response to Soviet involvement in UAR defense does not impress Saudis. They regret such further Soviet involvement, but blame what they regard as USG public passivity to earlier Israeli deep penetration raids as having brought about this development. In any case, they argue Soviets are in UAR for defense purposes. Despite Israeli claims, Saudis argue there no evidence thus far that Soviet personnel have been engaged in combat missions.

2. SAG—read Faisal and Saudi establishment—frustrated and bitter about what it continues to regard as USG pro-Israel posture. Same time, if at all possible SAG wants to continue have close relations with US and indeed, as one prominent Saudi official recently quaintly told us, “you are the evil we cannot live without.” In this context, Faisal may be expected try resist to extent possible pressures that might result from additional Phantom sales to Israel. Capability to resist such pressures is questionable and probably decreasing. Isolated as he is, and without much real hope of USG support in the event of external or internal attack, he may increasingly have to trim his sails to prevailing winds. Many of his advisors—including Nawwaf and Dawwalibi—are reportedly making this point too. What punitive action he takes against US will

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 ISR. Secret. It was repeated to Dhahran, Beirut, and Kuwait.

² Telegram 74125 to Jidda and Dhahran, May 15, reported that ARAMCO officials predicted that Libya, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait and possibly Morocco and Tunisia would break diplomatic relations with the United States should it sell more arms to Israel, that a boycott of U.S. goods and services was also likely, that U.S. companies might be denied the use of facilities for air and sea transport, that the Arabs might convert their dollar reserves and shift deposits from the United States to Europe, and that U.S. firms would be denied new concessions while European, Japanese, and Soviet firms would gain service contracts. (Ibid.)

³ Telegram 556 from Jidda, February 13. (Ibid.)

depend in large measure on intensive broader Arab and Saudi domestic pressures on him.

3. While we doubt he would break diplomatic relations with USG, and have been told by Saqqaf present Saudi regime will not take any such step (Jidda 1782),⁴ he might in certain circumstances send away Chief of Mission. If 1967 precedent is any example, he might also be forced to restrict oil imports to US. Boycott of replaceable goods and services and denial of overflight, sea transport and communications facilities, are also possible steps. If he could possibly avoid it, we believe he would not convert massive dollar reserves and shift deposits from US, though some such movement might take place. He is of course dependent to considerable extent on US citizens working in this country and would, we believe, hope that they would remain.

4. We think ARAMCO estimate contained reftel somewhat overdrawn. It was written by senior ARAMCO govt relations official Majid al-Oss. When Amb asked Jungers May 20 whether ARAMCO estimate, including statement that SAG would also break diplomatic relations with USG is attributable to Yamani or other Saudi Cabinet ministers, it developed that it was not. Instead, assessment based on general comments made to ARAMCANS and on estimate of ARAMCO Riyadh rep, Mike Ameen. Latter is extremely well clued in, but on occasion is given to over dramatization.

5. We fully share ARAMCO's concern re possibility that additional arms sale to Israel could loosen spate of violence against Americans in S.A. SAG would doubtless want to do everything feasible to prevent this, but its deterrent capability is limited. When Amb asked Jungers about possible "massive evacuation US personnel from oil installations," in event USG announcement of more arms to Israel, he was assured that ARAMCO would keep us informed before taking any such step. Recalling unnecessary near panic which ARAMCO evacuation of some civilians had caused in June, 1967, Amb urged that ARAMCO not take any precipitous evacuation action. Doing so could trigger mass exodus of bulk of American community and could seriously harm our interests. If major security breakdown develops, we would of course be in an E&E situation which would require such an action.

6. We hope USG will not agree to sell additional arms to Israel. Damage to our interests in Arab world, including S.A., could be irreparable. If it does, however, request Embassy be informed sufficiently

⁴ On May 8, Saqqaf conveyed Faisal's belief that any additional U.S. weapons to Israel at this time would be "catastrophic" to all Arabs trying to maintain ties with the United States. (Telegram 1782 from Jidda, May 8; *ibid.*)

far in advance to enable us try to alert American official and private personnel scattered throughout this vast country. As Dept aware, our communications with these remote areas are limited and some time is needed to warn Americans.

Eilts

**142. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the
Departments of State and Defense¹**

Jidda, July 20, 1970, 0645Z.

2803. Subj: Leahy Team Draft Report. Ref: Jidda 2725.²

1. Leahy team deserves commendation for excellent overall contribution to one of most important USG efforts in Saudi Arabia in recent years—the attempt to rationalize SAG defense spending and development, which is cement of official US–Saudi relationship at very difficult period in our relations. Draft report reflects much hard, expert effort. Because of importance Leahy team’s task and fact that report itself will be to SAG visible end-product of team’s endeavor, we wish comment frankly and in detail on draft. Also because of time factor we are submitting comments telegraphically.

2. Re “sanitizing” report we assume that all items marked in copy of draft we received by vertical line in right hand margin are to be deleted from version presented to SAG. We concur. In addition suggest that first three sentences section 6 para 3–A of Annex H (page H–14) and paras 5(C) and (D) and 6(H) in Annex I (pages I–7 and I–10) be deleted or rewritten in view their sensitive nature.

3. Re substance of report we generally concur, with following observations:

(A) Threat Analysis: While most of “threat analysis” will presumably be eliminated in version presented to SAG, we find it significant insofar as it may bear on conclusions/recommendations that report

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 SAUD. Confidential. It was repeated to USMTM Dhahran and CINCSTRIKE–USCINCEAFSA.

² In telegram 2725 from Jidda, July 14, Eilts noted receipt of the draft of the Leahy Report. (Ibid.) The Leahy Report as presented to Saudi Arabia is attached to Document 144 but is not printed. The unsanitized text was pouched to Jidda on September 21, but no copy has been found. (Telegram 154861 to Jidda; *ibid.*)

generally underestimates ability and will of external enemies to threaten internal stability of Saudi Arabia. First, advantages of Suez closure and Nasser's preoccupation with Israel notwithstanding, continuation of Arab-Israel conflict does not relieve pressure on SAG but rather increases it. SAG's only real foe, at home and abroad, is Arab revolution. Arab-Israeli conflict may not be revolution's parent, but it certainly is the midwife. To imply as report does that Israeli pressure on UAR and others is somehow a protection to Saudi Arabia is serious misreading of dynamics security situation in Arabian Peninsula. (We must keep in mind that through Leahy mission SAG is seeking to strengthen US commitment to Saudi defense development and is aware USG not interested in building up Saudi armed forces to permit them engage Israel. Therefore when SAG tells official mission that its "northwestern" defense posture is low priority, we should keep in mind that Saudi public statements and privately expressed fears as well as Tabuk buildup³ and presence SAG in Jordan all belie this statement.) While Khartoum payments, which at moment face doubtful future, may keep UAR appeased, SAG has virtually no leverage on increasingly hostile Iraqi and Syrian regimes or on more radical fedayeen groups, all of which presently active on propaganda and subversive fronts in effort to bring down Saudi regime. (In this connection, suggest that proper focus for report re Jordan is not whether Jordanian army presents external threat to SAG but rather if SAA may some day find itself engaged alongside Jordanian army in picking up pieces after Iraqi/Syrian-backed fedayeen overthrow of Hashemite regime.)

(B) Para-Military/Regular Military Priorities: We belabor above point because we suggest final version report omit emphasis on regular military having recruitment priority over "para-military" forces. Whether "para-military" refers to Fahd's Interior Ministry forces or Abdullah's National Guard, both are more closely related to gut task of preserving Saudi regime than are SAA and RSAF. We have never determined whether regime really wants fully staffed and efficient SAA and RSAF, and suspect top regime leaders also are equivocal on this point in view their apparent policy of maintaining National Guard/public security forces as check-mate to SAA/RSAF. Believe therefore we should not in report take sides on this delicate issue which we have no way of either fully assessing or finally determining. Immediate problem is that report's emphasis on building up regular military at expense para-military conflicts with USG recommendation in AID/

³ Tabuk is the site of an air base in northwest Saudi Arabia, approximately 150 kilometers from Israel.

Dept army survey report now under active SAG review to build up Saudi Frontier Force/Coast Guard.⁴

(C) Economic Considerations: A major underlying US purpose behind Leahy mission was to impress on SAG that it is poorer than its military planners realize. We would prefer to see report bear down a bit harder on seriousness SAG's present, and foreseeable, financial plight. Specifically, we think 1969 drop in Saudi foreign exchange reserves was serious, particularly in view it will probably continue in 1970. Also report may be unduly optimistic about future Saudi oil revenues since it completed prior to latest, and possibly permanent, closure of Tapline.⁵ We would like to see stress on fact that SAG 1969/70 budget is in effect in deficit, particularly when subsidies to UAR and Jordan considered as de facto part of budget. (In this connection suggest review Table Appendix 5, Annex E re question whether UAR/Jordan subsidies are or are not in FY 69/70 budget. It our understanding payments to UAR and Jordan extra budgetary in FY 68/69 and 69/70.) Report correctly suggests rather severe whittling down of Saudi military expansion appetites. This recommendation, and hands of those top SAG figures who agree with it, would be strengthened if report laid more stress on bleaker aspects Saudi financial outlook.

(D) MODA Reorganization: As laymen we probably do not appreciate refinements of proposals for MODA reorganization, and thus defer in final analysis to Leahy mission's judgement. Would, however, like to note for consideration following points:

(1) In view Saudi military's critical lack of talented top level management skills and demonstrated tendency Saudi military (or civilian) entities to compete rather than cooperate, we question efficacy of recommending "co-equal" military services. In first place equality between 52,000 man SAA and 900 man RSNF seems impractical, as does concept of rotating planning responsibility among Vice Chiefs of Staff of Services. Frankly RSNF would do well to produce number two man capable of bringing patrol boat alongside pier without loss of life and limb and should leave additional task of staffing desk jobs in MODA largely to SAA. We question whether, in absence co-equal organizational status, RSAF and RSNF will be at mercy SAA partisans in MODA. For foreseeable future SAG will still function more on strength, or weakness, personalities than by dictates organization chart. Under

⁴ See Document 136 and footnote 7 thereto.

⁵ The Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline), which carried Saudi oil to the Lebanese port of Sidon, ruptured May 3 when struck by a tractor in western Syria. Syria halted repairs the next day and Saudi Arabia determined not to reopen the pipeline despite the loss in revenue.

leadership BG Hashim, backed by liberal sprinkling of “flying princes” in Lightning squadron, RSAF already has ample clout where it counts in MODA—with Prince Sultan. Scope of past and future RSAF expansion plans tends bear this out. For its part RSNF seems to be current royal pet. Given difficulty developing any kind of competent Saudi staff officers, we wonder whether SAG should not be prodded toward single “general staff” representing and controlling all services rather than urged to create headquarters staffs for each service. Creating single “general staff” may also foster prospects of one of report’s most meritorious suggestions, creation of separate air defense administration.

(2) We also somewhat skeptical re practicality and acceptability “civilian control” concept implemented through MODA Directors General, Under Minister and Deputy. With all their warts, senior Saudi military officers are best defense establishment managers available. Across SAG, DG level is one of weakest manpower links. Even if Sultan and Turki could find competent civilian DG’s to fill slots suggested in proposed MODA reorganization, we question whether they would want to have potentially powerful civilian commoners imposed between them and “their” officer corps. We must remember that al-Saud is but generation removed from desert, and what may look like conventional defense ministry relationship to us may look more like the “shaikh-bodyguard” relationship to Sultan. Alternative approach would be suggesting developing adequate legal/financial/organizational advisory staff in Minister’s office. In final analysis “civilian control” is democratic concept having limited applicability in the Saudi Arabia of foreseeable future. So long as al-Saud survives, senior princes such as Sultan will maintain tight control on MODA and virtually every other SAG agency. If al-Saud goes, military officer corps is likely to be running country.

4. Impact of Report: Our greatest concern is whether report as currently presented will have all the impact it could and should have on Sultan and his senior aides. Frankly, report proper does not live up to promise of its generally excellent annexes, and Sultan is not noted as habitual reader of annexes. We strongly urge that “report proper” be redrafted for clearer, stronger impact on top Saudi readership. Particularly report as presented to SAG should make clearer link between Saudi financial/manpower resources and military expansion recommendations. Essentially it should say:

(1) That SAG faces a number of security problems and that ability of SAA/RSAF/RSNF to fulfill its mission against external threats is only one of them. (It should of course say this not so clearly.)

(2) SAG has only so much money coming and by King Faisal’s own public admission it is regrettable that such a high proportion of it must be spent by MODA.

(3) Thus defense spending, as a percentage of budget, should be held to present levels. (Report could project, for example, budgets for FY 70/71 through 74/75 on basis 5 percent increase per year in oil and other revenues from likely FY 69/70 level. Assumption could be made that budgets for these years would be balanced, including subsidies to UAR/Jordan, and that should subsidies and resultant savings would go to replenish reserves or fund badly-needed civil development projects.)

(4) First priority in defense spending must go to paying current and deferred payment costs (spelled out) of existing expansion commitments (without rescheduling).

(5) Second priority must go to meeting Chapter I, II and III costs of present and DOD-suggested future defense force (spelled out) with liberal cost factor thrown in for various reenlistment/morale incentives which report recommends, as well as proposed troop buildup for all services.

(6) Balance, spelled out by years, is what SAG may have left to fund extension existing services contracts beyond scheduled completion dates or to acquire new hardware or programs. In this connection believe it unrealistic to suggest to imaginative and sometimes personally motivated shoppers in MODA that they stop somewhat short of where they now are in dreaming up new expansion plans. As presently drafted, annexes establish, as SAG requested, priorities for modernization/expansion schemes for each service. Would be desirable if "report proper" could pick this up and even integrate priorities to recommend combined SAA/RSAP/RSNF priority list. Further desirable feature would be breakdown on how much MODA should allocate for each recommended project in each of coming five years.

5. *Comment:* In reiterating praise for work of Leahy mission, urge that above comments be considered in spirit of capping this undertaking with finest possible final presentation to SAG. Overall effort of survey team has been excellent. Believe some revision along lines suggested above would insure better end product of long standing utility in our dealings with SAG in military matters.

Eilts

143. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 8, 1970, 12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Nicholas G. Thacher, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff

After an exchange of pleasantries about Ambassador Thacher's previous assignments during a picture-taking session, the President opened the conversation by saying that he wanted the Ambassador to convey a personal message to King Faisal. The President said he had seen the King on a number of occasions over the years. The most recent was at the Waldorf in New York when the President was out of the office and the King was in New York in connection with a state visit. New York, under pressure from some elements of the Jewish community, had withdrawn an invitation for official entertainment. The President said he had gone to see Faisal because of his personal respect. He, of course, also remembered the King's brother during a state visit during the 1950's.

The President said that the Ambassador should tell the King—if he felt it useful—that the United States is not making its foreign policy in the Middle East or anywhere else on the basis of domestic politics. The King is sophisticated and is aware of the political realities in the United States. The President knows that the question is often put: How many votes do the Arabs have in the United States? The President said that the Ambassador could tell the King that whatever these realities might be, the responsible Arabs have a friend in the Washington.

The President, in summary, asked the Ambassador to make clear that the President has a great deal of personal respect for King Faisal. To be sure, we Americans do not go along with the authoritarian way of running a society, but that suits Saudi Arabia at this stage, and we understand that.

Ambassador Thacher confirmed that this message was the most useful kind of word that he could take to the King.

The conversation then turned to more general matters—that both the President and the Ambassador had been in the Navy in the Pacific during World War II and that Ambassador Thacher had had the pleasure of being host to the President during his 1967 visit to Tehran.

H.S.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. II. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

**144. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to
Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense and Aviation Prince
Sultan ibn Abd al-Aziz al Saud¹**

Washington, September 11, 1970.

Your Royal Highness:

With reference to Secretary Laird's letter of January 28,² I am pleased to inform Your Highness that the United States Department of Defense has completed its review of the Evaluation Team's study of Saudi Arabian current and projected defense plans and programs. The team's report, with its findings and recommendations, is enclosed.³ For Your Highness' convenience, and to facilitate the dissemination of the conclusions of this report within your government, I include an Arabic translation of the team's principal findings and recommendations.

In their report General Leahy and his associates stress the need for careful planning and for a thorough continuing scrutiny of all projects and expenditures in the light both of the Kingdom's overall security requirements and from the standpoint of maintaining within the Saudi Arabian Government budget a careful balance between expenditures for military and for civilian development purposes. In particular, the report focuses on the importance of giving highest priority, in terms of investment of scarce funds and manpower, to those ongoing military projects in which considerable investment has already been made by your government. The report further recommends that in times of financial stringency serious consideration might well be given to postponement or scaling down of any major projects.

Specific, detailed suggestions regarding budget and manpower ceilings and orders of priorities are outlined by General Leahy and the members of his team in their report with its several supporting Annexes. I concur with these suggestions and urge that they be given careful study by Your Highness and by the members of your staff. If found acceptable and adopted by your government, I am convinced that these proposals can make a significant contribution to the modernization and strengthening of the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces along sound and economical lines.

One of the future programs to which the evaluation team addressed itself was the proposal for expansion of the Royal Saudi Navy

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC: 330-76-067, Box 83, Saudi Arabia 1970. Confidential. No drafting information.

² See footnote 7, Document 136.

³ Attached but not printed.

from its present strength to a force of nineteen ships. I am informed that His Majesty the King and his government have assigned a very high priority to this program. I am also aware that you have requested the United States to play a major role in assisting with its implementation through the sale of ships and related military equipment, supervision of the design and construction of shore facilities, and the training of Saudi naval personnel. In view of the high priority which your government has given this program, and in light of the evaluation team's finding that an expansion to nineteen ships over a ten-year period is both feasible and desirable, I am instructing General Dunlop, Chief of our Military Training Mission, to seek an early meeting with you and the members of your staff to determine more precisely those vessels, equipment and training that can be provided from United States sources. With respect to the surface-to-surface missile system specified for the six high-speed craft, these missiles are not manufactured by the United States and it would probably not be economically feasible to do so. In the opinion of United States Navy experts, considerable study and experimentation would be needed to integrate this type of weaponry into the projected Saudi Navy. In the event these and other items may prove unavailable from US sources, we are prepared to consider further with your staff possible alternative sources of procurement.

As Your Highness is aware, the United States remains deeply interested in the continued security and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. For that reason we have worked closely with the Saudi Arabian military for the past twenty years to develop to the greatest extent possible their capability to preserve the sovereignty and independence of your country. We are proud of the accomplishments that have been achieved during this period. I wish to assure Your Highness that we intend wherever possible to continue to respond favorably to reasonable requests for advisory and technical assistance and for the sale of military equipment to Saudi Arabia for purposes of legitimate self-defense.

With sincere best wishes for your continued health and happiness.
Sincerely yours,

David Packard

145. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the President of the Export-Import Bank (Kearns)¹

Washington, October 28, 1970.

Dear Henry,

I am sure that you are aware from your visit to Saudi Arabia last January of the political as well as the economic importance of this Middle Eastern country to the United States. I know that the Export-Import Bank is involved with a number of worthwhile projects in Saudi Arabia, and we are grateful for the keen interest which you personally have taken in expanding the Bank's credit facilities to that country.

For some time now, the Saudi Government has been planning to modernize its Coast Guard and Frontier Force, a law enforcement body subordinate to the Ministry of Interior and responsible for patrolling Saudi Arabia's extensive land and maritime borders. At the invitation of the Saudi Arabian Government, the AID Office of Public Safety conducted a survey in 1969 of the Coast Guard/Frontier Force's needs and requirements. The survey team's recommendations were contained in a report presented to Saudi Minister of Interior Prince Fahd in January 1970. A copy of that report is enclosed.²

During his October 1969 visit to Washington as the guest of the Secretary of State, Prince Fahd raised with the Secretary and myself the issue of possible U.S. Government assistance to Saudi Arabia in carrying out this modernization program.³ We made no commitment to do so but did express to Prince Fahd our willingness to provide whatever help we could once he and his staff had had an opportunity to study the recommendations of the survey team report. While the question of U.S. Government financing for this modernization program was not raised specifically during Fahd's visit, the Prince has since made a strong plea to Ambassador Thatcher in Jidda for credit assistance in carrying out the recommendations of the AID survey team report.⁴ He was quite upset when informed that, because of Congressional difficulties involving the Foreign Military Sales bill, no credits from this source could be made available to Saudi Arabia at this time. Prince Fahd noted that this modernization program has a high priority within the Saudi Government and asserted that failure of the USG to assist its Saudi friends in its implementation

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 SAUD. Secret. Drafted by Wrampelmeier and cleared in NEA/RA, NEA, AID/OPS, and PM/MAS.

² Not enclosed.

³ See Document 131.

⁴ Reported in telegram 3877 from Jidda, October 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 SAUD)

might be misunderstood by the King and by the Saudi public. He strongly urged that we consider alternative ways in which we might provide some credit assistance for this program, and he specifically mentioned the possibility of ExIm Bank help.

I recognize that the Bank normally prefers to consider specific proposals from U.S. exporters rather than give a judgment in principle about its willingness to support a given project. Under the circumstances, however, we believe it would be most helpful were your staff to review the recommendations of the AID survey team to determine whether or not there are aspects of this program which might be suitable for ExIm Bank financing for export of U.S. equipment and contractor services. I am aware, of course, of the strict ceiling placed on the Bank's ability to offer credit for sales of military equipment to developed countries. While no clear USG decision has been made regarding Saudi Arabia's status as "developed" or "less developed," we understand that in practice the Bank has long treated Saudi Arabia as "developed" for purposes of export credits.

Another possibility would be to examine which components of the recommended modernization program could appropriately be regarded as "non-military" for purposes of ExIm Bank financing. For example, it strikes me that certain equipment for the force, including boats, vehicles, transport aircraft, and communications equipment, is required for anti-smuggling control, maritime safety, and other civil police functions rather than for para-military purposes. The proposed program also includes construction projects presently estimated at \$50 million and maintenance and training contracts potentially worth approximately \$30 million. The total price tag currently placed on this program is about \$190 million, of which about \$43 million are costs of equipment procurement.

I would appreciate very much your taking a look at this program and letting me know as soon as feasible whether there is any way in which the Bank can be helpful. If you wish, I will be pleased to have members of my staff sit down with officers from the Bank to discuss this matter in further detail.⁵

Sincerely yours,

Joseph J. Sisco⁶

⁵ In telegram 4062 from Jidda, November 7, Thatcher reported that he told Fahd that the Export-Import Bank agreed to extend credit assistance to Saudi Arabia to offset some of the costs of modernizing the CG/FF. (Ibid.) In a December 2 letter to Sisco, Thatcher wrote that he was "grateful" for Sisco's "personal intervention with Henry Kearns which made it possible for Prince Fahd to go off to London in a much happier frame of mind toward the USG." (Ibid., POL 3 UAE)

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears Sisco's typed signature with an indication that he signed the original.

146. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 14, 1971.

SUBJECT

Potential Problems Which Might Affect U.S. Interests in Certain Countries Abroad

1. At the beginning of the year, I want to share with you some views we have about potentially fragile political situations in certain countries in Latin America, the Near East and Africa. Let me suggest that if you find these capsule assessments of sufficient interest, you may wish to have your staff make additional studies to determine whether certain diplomatic measures or other activity should be undertaken by the U.S. Government.

[Omitted here is material on Africa.]

7. *Near East*

Saudi Arabia represents the primary American strategic and economic interest in the Arab world today. Its foreign policy is consistently anti-communist. It grants the U.S. military overflight and landing privileges as well as bunkering facilities for naval vessels. The U.S. receives more than one-half billion dollars yearly in balance of payments from American oil earnings and export sales in Saudi Arabia, and some \$150 million in Saudi funds are in medium and long-term American investments. In addition, American forces in Southeast Asia obtain approximately 85% of their refined oil from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf State of Bahrain. Finally, Saudi Arabia is a critical factor in protecting the major oil reserves of the Arabian Peninsula which total 48% of the Free World's known reserves.

Anti-regime social and political dissidence in Saudi Arabia is widespread and growing, and there is little chance this trend can be reversed. Despite extensive arrests, known dissidents, particularly military officers, are still active both inside and outside Saudi Arabia.

[6½ lines not declassified] We have not identified a specific plot to overthrow the Saudi regime during 1971, but we would not discount the possibility of a military coup d'état during this period, particularly should King Faysal die or become too ill to rule.

[Omitted here is material on Latin America.]

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1277, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia. Secret; Sensitive.

147. Letter From the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (Thacher) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

Jidda, January 25, 1971.

Dear Joe:

I have put off answering your letters of December 10 and December 24 until I could have the benefit of Saqqaf's reaction to our assessment of conditions prevailing in Syria, Iraq, and South Yemen.² Our telegram 0234³ reports this in the first talk I had been able to have with him for some time. The material sent with your letter was most useful and if more can be supplied from time to time, it can do a good deal to help keep up a useful dialogue. I delayed writing also until I had experienced some more contact with the King and had tried to develop more perspective on his attitudes, which are so all important here.

Your first letter has an appended PS noting your concern with the increasingly unrealistic attitudes of the King. I share this concern and have tried to assess those aspects of Saudi policy likely to be affected. The King's renowned theory on the ties between Communism and Zionism is a framework in his own mind to which he accretes wherever he can find them such facts as may tend to strengthen his hypothesis. But perhaps we can be thankful that Faisal does not, as many Arabs do, turn to the Soviets as the only possible counterweight they can see to Zionism, but rather regards both philosophies as dangerous. Faisal is bitterly critical of our policies towards Israel, but I detect a feeling also that the US may not be quite responsible for what it is doing since without realizing it we have lost control of our Middle East policies to Zionist influence. What he is trying to say, I suppose, is that however illogical it may seem to us, we are playing the Communist game by allowing ourselves to be "controlled" by the Zionists.

What is more important than this involuted reasoning is, of course, the impact of Faisal's attitude on Saudi policy toward the Arab-Israel question. Faisal's policies on Arab-Israel are built on political as well as emotional considerations. A policy of negative and hostile aloofness

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 3 UAE. Secret.

² Sisco's letter of December 10, 1970, is printed as Document 181. In Sisco's attached December 24 letter, he acknowledged Faisal's concern about "growing Communist influence in surrounding states."

³ Telegram 234 from Jidda, January 22, reported that Saqqaf was "mildly optimistic" about the Middle East, particularly Jordan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

tends to buffer him against radical Arab critics and the hostility of his own Palestinian populations, some 30,000 strong. I suspect he knows instinctively too that neither he nor Saudi Arabia have the ability to influence the situation significantly and therefore he had best not try. He has told us, as you know, that if the day comes when the powers bordering Israel are prepared to accept a settlement, he will not object to the terms except with regard to the fate of Jerusalem. On that issue he might be unhelpful, and perhaps the time would come when we would have to think how best we could persuade him not to announce his opposition publicly. In such circumstances we might want to seek the help of the Shah whom the King respects. But in the meantime, the King's basic outlook, while certainly not helpful, does not particularly obstruct the progress of Arab-Israel negotiations. I should add, too, that I still have a great deal of respect for the King's firmness and acuteness of judgment in many internal matters and the general management of the Kingdom.

The King's other great preoccupation, Communist-radical encirclement, is perhaps of greater significance to us. Recent trends in Iraq and Syria, if they continue, may help abate some of his fears, though the King does not easily abandon apprehensions once fixed in his mind. The threat from South Yemen remains for him an even more critical concern. It would be a difficult task to persuade the King and his advisors to abandon their present plans for action against the PDRY. Over the years, Faisal has been exceptionally tenacious in clinging to *his* interpretation of the significance of events in Yemen (when it differs from ours) and in adhering to what he considers the right course. Whether we should even try to warn him of the risks of offering the Soviets an excuse to establish a stronger foothold in Aden is a question which Dick Murphy told me is now under consideration in Washington. I have no particular eagerness for the task, but I am still inclined to think we ought to get through to the King via Saqqaf our assessment of the dangers he is running and perhaps speaks to Sultan also. I will be interested in Washington's views on this, though I recognize it is a difficult situation to assess and time is needed for analysis.

The proposed project against PDRY [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is the major Saudi manifestation in reaction against the sense of encirclement. But there is mixed in with this a gnawing fear also that the world expects to see Saudi Arabia next on the list of toppled monarchical regimes, and that perhaps the world is right. A lessening of national self-confidence may tend to undermine initiative and determination and to erode judgment too.

Consideration of the foregoing does not, I'm afraid, lead to any important new revelations. It does affirm the need for continuation of our efforts quietly to reassure the Saudis. Hopefully we can continue

where we think circumstances justify responding favorably to their requests for military and other technical assistance. Dialogue can help as well, and we will do what we can to keep up Saqqaf's present relatively optimistic assessment of the Middle East scene in the hope that he will communicate some of it to the King. We must avoid giving them the idea we accept their slowness in modernization, but we must find opportunities also to compliment them on their achievements, i.e. such things as their recent show of much greater activity with regard to Gulf affairs.

In a nice congratulatory note on my appointment Bill Brewer wrote me some time ago saying he thought I was the man to "do the handholding job in Saudi Arabia" but that I should be sure "when the grip gets clammy, not to let go." Obviously we have many more tasks here than just handholding but that is one of them and the spirit of Bill's remark makes good sense.

With every good wish,
Sincerely,

Nick

148. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

ER IM 71-70

Washington, April 1971.

SAUDI ARABIA'S CHANGED FINANCIAL OUTLOOK

Introduction

1. Like other Middle East oil producers, Saudi Arabia will receive markedly larger earnings during the next several years as a result of recent agreements signed with the major petroleum companies. These windfalls will end Saudi Arabia's concern over the strain recently put on its revenues and foreign exchange holdings by outlays on defense, economic development, and foreign aid. Indeed, there will be considerable scope for increased spending on old and new programs and an enormous addition to the country's foreign reserves. This memorandum examines the government's finances before the new oil agree-

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ORR Files, Job 79-T00935A, Box 57. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Economic Research and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.

ments, the prospective gains in revenues, and the possible magnitude and composition of spending increases.

Discussion

Financial Position in 1970

2. Prior to the recent oil agreements, Saudi officials were deeply concerned with what they saw as a growing financial problem. They were alarmed by three consecutive years of small budget deficits—the first deficits since 1959—and even more, by the associated 17% drop in the country’s traditionally large foreign exchange holdings² from 1967 to 1969. End-of-year reserves had fallen from \$944 million to \$785 million because of sharply increased imports for development and defense, expanded payments on military debt, and aid to Egypt and Jordan induced by the Arab-Israeli War. Outflows for aid and arms alone increased from about \$175 million in 1967 to \$370 million in 1969 (see Table 1). Faced with continued large foreign exchange obligations, the financially conservative Saudis became increasingly apprehensive about their reserves. Although enormous by normal international standards—well above the amount legally required to fully cover the currency—reserves by early 1970 were substantially below the level of one and one-half times annual imports that the Saudis consider desirable.

Table 1
Government Expenditures on Arms and Aid

	Million US \$				
	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
Khartoum aid to UAR and Jordan	0	35	140	140	140
Arms purchases for Jordan	0	0	8	7	7
Other grant aid and loans	11	26	28	18	14
Arms payments	38	114	181	205	189
<i>Total</i>	49	175	357	370	350

3. In response to financial difficulties, the government took several steps to strengthen the budget in fiscal year 1970/71.³ To bolster revenues, it introduced a personal income tax. On the expenditure side,

² Foreign exchange holdings include gold and foreign currency held by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) and SAMA investments abroad, which generally are highly liquid. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ From 2 September 1970 to 21 August 1971. The Saudi “Hijra” fiscal year is shorter than the Gregorian year, hence its Gregorian equivalent changes each year. [Footnote is in the original.]

the government planned to reduce foreign exchange outlays by making half of its Khartoum aid⁴ payments to the UAR and Jordan in oil rather than hard currency. By this move, the Saudis hoped to save about \$70 million in cash. In addition, Riyadh pressed Washington for a slight reduction in repayments on arms credits over the next two years. No significant efforts were made, however, to curb military purchases and other defense costs, which were budgeted at 40% of total outlays in FY 1970/71, compared with 28% in FY 1965/66.

4. At the same time, development expenditures were budgeted at \$276 million—some \$78 million less than in FY 1969/70 and less than half of planned defense spending. Only \$22 million was allotted to new developmental projects, compared with an estimated \$100 million the year before. This cut, in particular, promised to reduce foreign exchange drawdowns, since most Saudi development projects rely heavily on imported equipment and technical assistance. Some projects such as the Petromin/Occidental sulfur plant and the Riyadh airport were canceled or postponed indefinitely, and work was slowed on the Jidda airport project and on Bedouin housing and job programs at the Faysal Model Settlement Project.

5. Lowered development expenditures caused economic growth to slow in the second half of 1970. Real GNP rose only about 4.5% in 1970 compared with an 8.5% average during the previous decade. The slackening economic tempo was reflected in a one-third reduction in import growth and an immediate improvement in balance of payments. Foreign exchange holdings climbed by \$65 million, to about \$850 million, by the end of 1970.

The Oil Agreements of 1970–71

6. In late December 1970, Riyadh completed the first of a series of negotiations for increased oil revenues from the foreign producers. Following the successful Libyan accord with foreign oil firms in September 1970, the Saudis obtained an agreement that boosted oil revenues by about 8%. The agreement, retroactive to 14 November 1970, raised posted prices (the prices used in calculating revenues) by 9 cents per barrel for medium and heavy crudes and increased the government's take from 50% to 55% of profits. This agreement alone will provide the government with estimated revenue increases of \$145 million in 1971 (including \$15 million in retroactive payments for 1970) and about \$250 million by 1975 (see Table 2).

[Omitted here is Table 2: "Saudi Arabian Government Oil Revenues"]

⁴ In September 1967, Saudi Arabia agreed at the Khartoum conference to extend annually \$41 million to Jordan and \$99 million to Egypt until "the effects of the Israeli aggression are eliminated." [Footnote is in the original.]

7. Further oil revenue increases occurred in late 1970 and early 1971, when the posted price of Mediterranean oil was increased at Libya's instigation and transit fees were raised on oil passing through the 540-mile Saudi portion of Tapline to the Mediterranean. The increase in posted price will bring Saudi Arabia an extra \$18–\$21 million annually from Tapline shipments in 1971–75. The oil companies' settlement with Syria in February 1971, providing higher transit fees in exchange for reopening the damaged Tapline pipeline, was immediately extended to Saudi Arabia. Increased transit fees will provide the Saudis with an additional \$12–\$13 million annually in 1971–75. Saudi Arabia will also receive a cash payment of \$9 million to cover retroactive Tapline claims, two-thirds of which will be paid in 1971 and the remainder in small installments through 1973. In all, Saudi Arabia will receive at least \$52 million in additional revenues from its oil deliveries to the Mediterranean in 1971.⁵

8. By far the largest revenue increase will come from the 14 February OPEC⁶ agreement with the major companies, covering oil produced in all the Persian Gulf countries. Under this agreement, Saudi Arabia will receive about \$400 million in additional oil revenues in 1971. In addition, the 14 February agreement calls for escalation of revenues each year through 1975, when Saudi Arabia will receive an extra \$1.4 billion. Beyond the increases already agreed to, Saudi Arabia should receive gains rising at least from \$60 million to \$112 million during 1971–75 from other agreements currently being negotiated on Mediterranean oil exports.⁷

9. Saudi Arabia not only will gain major revenue increases from each barrel of oil produced under their agreements, but also total revenues will be greatly enhanced by rapidly rising output. On the basis of present Aramco plans,⁸ oil production during 1970–75 is expected to grow about 15.5% a year. At present, Aramco is rapidly expanding production facilities in anticipation of increasing output. This planned output growth apparently is based on company estimates that demand, especially in Western Europe and Japan, will continue to rise sharply⁹

⁵ Includes \$16 million for Mediterranean oil obtained under 30 December 1970 agreement. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁶ The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries consists of Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Indonesia, Venezuela, Libya, Kuwait, and Algeria, which together account for 90% of the Free World's oil exports. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁷ Agreement already has been reached with Libya, but final arrangements between the oil companies and Saudi Arabia have not been settled. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁸ Aramco (Arabian-American Oil Company) produces 94% of Saudi Arabia's oil output. Other companies also plan to raise output significantly. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁹ During the past few years, demand for oil in Western Europe has grown by about 10% annually and in Japan by about 18%. [Footnote is in the original.]

and that Libya will hold production levels constant as it has in the recent past. It is also influenced by Saudi Arabia's political stability.

Post-Agreement Financial Situation

10. As a result of these agreements and the increase in production, the Saudi financial position has been considerably strengthened for 1971 and has exceptionally favorable prospects through 1975. The added oil revenues will total some \$6 billion in 1971–75. Revenues in 1971 from the agreements alone will be about \$620 million—or 44%—larger than previously anticipated, and a further gain of 115% in total revenues is in view for the next four years. By 1975, oil revenues will be nearly two-thirds larger than they would have been under the old agreements. Because of the extraordinary rise in oil revenues, the government will be able to carry out existing development and defense programs, to initiate new ones, and to raise Khartoum aid payments to Egypt and Jordan (if desired)—at the same time registering budget surpluses and greatly enlarging foreign exchange holdings.

11. So far, the government seems to have proceeded cautiously with its spending, letting foreign reserves accumulate. Although the economy remains sluggish, indications of a quickening pulse are beginning to appear. Some spending expansion is apparent on the municipal level. The business community expects major increases in government spending under the FY 1971/72 budget, and private investment is beginning to rise, especially in the Eastern Province, in anticipation of heightened economic activity. The expected relaxation of import controls likewise should stimulate the economy. With the oil industry also experiencing rapid expansion, the annual growth of GNP could easily recover by 1972 to the 10% average of the mid-1960s and may go even higher.

Probable Financial Developments

12. A major policy question for the Saudis during the next several years will be what to do with their vastly increased oil revenues. The way is clear for moving ahead decisively with existing economic development programs. The military should be able to get some equipment that it has wanted but has been unable to afford. Increased aid for Egypt, Jordan, and other Arab states will pose no problem. Even so, the prospective spending increases arising from programs suggested in the past by Saudi officials will absorb only a fraction of the additional revenues. At this point, it is difficult to say how much and what kind of additional expenditures will be undertaken during 1971–75.

13. Cut back in recent years because of heavy foreign aid and defense outlays, economic development expenditures probably will be raised at least \$900 million above the \$2.5 billion allocation in the

1971–75 development budget. The resulting amount is the optimum initially sought by Saudi planners. Although planning delays and other administrative problems may hold back spending for a year or two, part of the windfall from the oil revenues probably will be flowing into development projects by the mid-1970s. Saudi Arabia apparently is willing to import the skilled labor (its principal resource limitation) that it needs for accelerated development spending. Most of the additional spending would be used to resume currently suspended and deferred projects and to implement new projects, most likely in transportation and the petrochemical industry.

14. Increases in defense spending beyond the \$3.1 billion previously proposed for 1971–75 are nearly inevitable under the strong pressure of special interest groups within and outside the government—most particularly the hierarchy’s “5% men” and the foreign munitions salesmen. The \$3.1 billion program was conceived during a time of financial difficulties and was designed to meet only so-called “basic military needs.” Saudi Arabian officials, however, have expressed keen interest in a considerably expanded military development program that would include a much larger navy, more aircraft, additional tanks (a purchase presently is being negotiated with France), miscellaneous vehicles, and substantial investment in cantonments, airfields, and modern aircraft maintenance facilities. Should the Saudis opt for the total package, they could spend an additional \$100 million or so on the air force and \$500 million on the other items. It is doubtful whether the Saudis have the technical capacity to maintain and operate all this equipment, but they may well buy it anyway.

15. Saudi Arabia is likely to be pressed for increased foreign aid in view of its improved foreign exchange situation. Riyadh already has yielded to repeated Jordanian pleas for full payment of Khartoum aid in hard currency. In addition to giving Jordan and possibly Egypt more financial support, the Saudis could also increase aid to Yemen in its campaign against their mutual antagonist, Southern Yemen. Other neighboring Persian Gulf States also might receive more assistance as the Saudis compete with the Shah for influence in this area while the British withdraw. In all, some \$200 million in additional aid might be disbursed during 1971–75. Even if Saudi Arabia makes all the additional expenditures outlined above for economic development, defense, and foreign aid in 1971–75, it still will have several billion dollars in oil revenues to spend for new programs or add to reserves (see the chart).

[Omitted here is a chart showing estimated budget trends for Saudi fiscal years 1966–1975.]

16. Of the aforementioned projected increase in Saudi spending of about \$1.7 billion during 1971–75, most will consist of foreign exchange. Because the country must import nearly all its capital goods

and because foreigners constitute about half of the industrial labor force, perhaps 60%–70% of all development spending would consist of foreign exchange. Similarly, military expenditures would be largely in foreign exchange as all weaponry must be imported and foreign firms would have to construct the new bases, cantonments, and other facilities. Again, much of the labor for these projects would have to be imported. All foreign aid presumably would consist of foreign exchange. Saudi Arabia will be able, however, to meet all these exchange requirements with ease. Taking into account the new oil agreements, the prospective increase in oil export volume, and projected increase in government expenditure requiring foreign exchange, it still would be in a position to raise foreign exchange reserves from an estimated \$850 million in 1970 to a whopping \$7.8 billion in 1975 (see Table 3). Even if major new expenditure programs are initiated, the country's finances still promise to be very strong during the next several years. Indeed, Saudi Arabia will be a financial power to be reckoned with.

[Omitted here is Table 3: "Saudi Arabia: Projection of Major Balance-of-Payments Items."]

Conclusions

17. Revenue increases generated by recent oil pacts between Saudi Arabia and private oil firms will improve Riyadh's financial situation enormously. In contrast to the earlier concern over funding, Saudi officials now face the happy prospect of having considerably larger revenues than they can possibly spend during 1971–75. Expectations are that total government revenues during the period will be about \$17 billion, or 55% more than originally anticipated.

18. Considering the new revenue outlook, the Saudis almost certainly will reinvigorate spending on economic development, which recently has been somewhat neglected. More money probably also will be devoted to defense, despite the hefty sums already programmed for the armed forces. Foreign aid increases probably will also absorb some of the additional revenue. No longer will the Saudis be able to claim economic hardship as a reason for cutbacks in the level of hard currency payments to Jordan and the UAR.

19. Even though projected expenditures will require large foreign exchange outlays, this spending will pose no problem for the Saudis. In fact, at the maximum level of spending suggested by past Saudi desires, they will accumulate about \$7 billion in additional reserves during 1971–75. With such financial resources available, the only real limit on Saudi spending is its ability to absorb development imports and additional military hardware.

20. As Saudi Arabia's prime supplier, the United States stands to benefit significantly from additional procurement as well as from the

trade indirectly generated by increased public investment and accelerated economic growth. Moreover, a large part of the increased reserves—both public and private—probably will be invested in the United States and other Western countries.

21. Although the Saudis may increase spending above the totals projected above, they almost certainly will build reserves to at least \$6–\$7 billion by 1975. So long as King Faysal remains at the helm or is succeeded by a government of similar attitudes, these large sums are not likely to be recklessly spent. In the unlikely event a radical regime took over, the Saudi potential for mischief beyond its borders would be very large. Saudi Arabia could finance insurgencies abroad; could suddenly unload large portfolios of European money or securities, causing havoc in international financial markets; or could demand conversion of large amounts of foreign exchange into gold in the United States. Such actions would be especially serious if they were coordinated with other rich Arab states, such as Libya, which is expected to have reserves of its own of perhaps \$6 billion by 1973.

149. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 5, 1971.

SUBJECT

Secretary Rogers' Visit to Saudi Arabia

We now have Secretary Rogers' complete report on what he describes as his "whirlwind" 24-hour stay in Saudi Arabia.² He reports that he is reassured about the "steadfast friendship" of King Faisal, despite his obsessive preoccupation with the "Zionist-Communist conspiracy" and his "understandable" concern that he will be vulnerable to Arab criticism on his friendship for the US as long as the Arab-Israeli dispute festers. The Secretary also makes the following observations:

—Despite the anachronism of the Saudi monarchy, progress is being made in Defense, education and other fields and there is evidence of some modernization. The Secretary was especially impressed with the "young, vigorous and handsome" court ministers who are seeking to bridge the gap between old and new but in ways that can assure internal security.

—The Saudis appeared to be generally satisfied with our bilateral relations.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A notation on the first page indicates the President saw it. Rogers met with Nixon on May 10 to discuss his trip. According to a transcript of the tape recording of this meeting, Rogers discussed Faisal's health, his interest in Jerusalem, and his "absolute obsession" with Zionism. According to Rogers, Faisal thought that "Zionism is the cause of all evil in the world," and that it was "the father of Communism." Nixon replied that Faisal's obsession was "kind of like Hitler with the Jews." Rogers also discussed Faisal's innate intelligence, Fahd, the summer arrests, and Saudi Arabia's "total support" for the United States "under all circumstances." Paraphrasing Faisal's remarks, Rogers continued, "Whatever we do on the Middle East—whether he likes it or doesn't like it—he will support us." Rogers was likewise impressed by the young Saudi government ministers and said, "Although they are related, they are strong looking, vigorous fellows, and a lot of them are quite interested in social improvement," to which Nixon added, "A lot of them are training in the West." The editors transcribed the portions printed here specifically for this volume. (Ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation 496–13)

² Rogers's report is in telegram Secto 95/3675 from Beirut, May 3. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S) Rogers was in Saudi Arabia May 1–2 during a trip to Western Europe and the Middle East from April 26 to May 8.

In his substantive talks, four hours of which were with King Faisal,³ the Secretary discussed the following areas:

—On the Arab-Israeli conflict, Faisal continues to accept any peace settlement agreed to by Israel, Jordan and Egypt and claims a direct substantive interest only in Jerusalem. Faisal favors a strong US presence in the Middle East and believes that a peace settlement will lead to the Egyptians telling the Soviets to get out. He felt prolonged absence of a settlement would benefit the Soviets. He regrets that Israel has created the impression that the US will support Israel no matter what it does.

—In reply the Secretary stressed your determination to maintain a steady course and called attention to your statements on “insubstantial” border changes. He said we have stressed to Israel that time is working against them but there is a limit to what we can do with friendly countries—we can only persuade.

—On the Persian Gulf, the Secretary urged greater Saudi direct contact with the Sheiks in order to help bring about an early federation of the Trucial States and close cooperation with the Shah.

—On North Yemen, which is anxious to improve relations with the US, the Secretary made clear we are ready to move to full diplomatic relations whenever conditions make it possible. The Saudis see our presence there as a counter to the Maoist and Soviet activity in South Yemen. At Faisal’s urging, the Secretary says he will take another look at providing some additional small amount of economic assistance to North Yemen.

The Secretary extended to King Faisal your invitation for an informal visit here in late May. He was clearly pleased and “wants to accept” but feels that in the absence of some demonstrable progress toward a peace settlement, such a visit would only open him up to attack by the more radical Arabs. He appears to want to wait to assess the atmosphere following the rest of the Secretary’s trip before replying definitively.⁴

³ As reported in telegrams Secto 98/3678 and Secto 99/3679 from Beirut, May 3. (Ibid.) Talking points for Rogers were transmitted in telegram 1346 from Jidda, April 27. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. II)

⁴ According to Thacher, Faisal accepted the invitation because of “his conviction that it could be of very great value and importance for President Nixon to hear from King Faisal directly central points of the Arab case,” recalling the “favorable impact” he had had on Kennedy in their 1962 meeting. (Telegram 1610 from Jidda, May 15; *ibid.*)

150. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 26, 1971.

SUBJECT

Recommended Discussion with King Faisal, May 28, 1971

I understand King Faisal will be visiting you on a brief, official visit beginning May 28th.²

Because of the recent oil settlement, Saudi Arabia will receive huge oil revenue increases in the coming years. They will spend a large percentage of these revenues in the areas of aircraft, telecommunications, transportation facilities, desalination programs, and other national infrastructure projects. The Saudis will be purchasing from foreign suppliers well over \$1 billion annually in goods and services during this period; these future purchases represent a tremendous opportunity for U.S. exporters.

The importance which the U.S. Government attaches to Saudi Arabia's development program is manifest by our assistance on a government-to-government basis. King Faisal's country has greatly benefited from the significant research program which the Department of Interior has undertaken on water desalination and other programs for national development; for instance, a Federal Aviation team, partly funded by Commerce, is presently in Saudi Arabia assisting in the formulation of an air traffic control program. U.S. firms currently are interested in selling to Saudi Arabia, a national telecommunications system, an air traffic control system, desalination plants, petroleum and petrochemical plants, a new international airport for Jidda, and airplanes and ships for their military services. One major decision awaiting immediate resolution is the purchase of 50, F-5 aircraft by Saudi Arabia.³ This would be a very substantial transaction for Northrop Corporation and would obviously be most helpful to them at this particular time. It would be particularly helpful if you could mention this item to King Faisal.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 937, VIP Visits, Saudi Arabia King Faisal Visit, May 1971. Limited Official Use.

² See Document 151.

³ Saunders noted that the Saudis had already expressed their intent to purchase F-5s and he thought the President should not engage in "special pleading." (Memorandum for record, June 2; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 937, VIP Visits, Saudi Arabia King Faisal Visit, May 1971) Prince Sultan signed a letter of offer, July 28, for F-5Bs Northrop. (Telegram 2644 from Jidda, July 29; *ibid.*, Box 1277, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia)

Stiff competition for all these projects is coming from other developed countries, particularly Japan, France and the U.K.

I recommend you point out to King Faisal that the U.S. has great interest in all of these Saudi Arabian development projects. We would, therefore, be most appreciative of any special consideration which can be given to the highly qualified U.S. firms which are prepared to assist in Saudi Arabia's development programs through providing the highest levels of technology and expertise.⁴

Maurice H. Stans

⁴ A handwritten postscript by Stans reads: "The 50 F-5 aircraft order would help employment in California, immediately."

151. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 27, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
King Faisal
Camille Nowfel, Interpreter
Isa Sabbaugh, Interpreter

[*Note:* The following record represents the gist of each party's remarks from interpreter's notes, not a verbatim transcript.]

President: We're interested in seeing to it that the relations between our two countries continue to be as friendly as they have been and to grow stronger and closer in the future. I would be interested in Your Majesty's views on matters relating, not only to the Middle East, but to other areas of the world. We wish to listen to Your Majesty's opinions and wise counsel.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL SAUD-US. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. All brackets are in the original. King Faisal was in Washington for an official visit May 27-30. Kissinger sent the President briefing papers on May 26 for his meeting with Faisal. (Ibid, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 937, VIP Visits, Saudi Arabia King Faisal Visit, May 1971) The President and King Faisal met over lunch. (Memorandum of conversation, May 27; *ibid.*) Eliot handed a copy of the memorandum of conversation to Faisal before his departure. (Memorandum from Davis to Eliot, May 29; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL SAUD-US)

King: I am grateful for Your Excellency's reference to the good relations between our two countries and for your desire that these relations be strengthened in the days ahead. We share this hope with you not only because it is in our mutual interest that the bond of friendship between us be strengthened, but also because that would be in the interest of other countries and peoples. We do believe, however, that further strengthening our relations is of primary importance to us.

President: Does His Majesty wish to discuss any matters pertaining to our bilateral relations, or does he feel that such matters can be taken up at other levels of our governments, such as the Department of Defense or the State Department?

King: I would like to say that the relations and the cooperation between us are most gratifying. Of course, there are certain matters with respect to which we would hope to have US assistance, but I would not want us to impose on you, Mr. President.

We are accused in the area of being the agents and lackeys of the US. In fact, we are accused of even actually conspiring with the US against the other countries of the area. This kind of accusation, however, is really inspired by both Communism and Zionism, which we consider as twins. I mentioned to Secretary Rogers during our meeting in Saudi Arabia² that I believe that Communism is the child, the offspring of Zionism. Zionism is in collusion with Communism for the destruction of the world. I would like to repeat what I said to Secretary Rogers in Saudi Arabia—that we are in fact worried about what Zionism is seeking to bring about in the US. It is trying to shatter the high principles and values held so dearly in the US. God forbid that such attempts be successful, but they may be unless we heed the warning. All these things we read and hear about—disturbances among labor, student demonstrations, civil unrest, anti-war marches, etc.—are the result of clever calculation on the part of Zionism and Communism in order to bring about a social and political upheaval in the US and to weaken the US in its struggle against Communism.

By seeking to bring the US to throw in its lot with Israel, Zionism hopes to bring about an irreparable estrangement between the US and the Arab world. Of course, we in Saudi Arabia would not permit such an attempt to affect our relationship with the US. Even if greater and more serious accusations are leveled against us, we will not allow that or anything else to influence our relations with the United States.

Unfortunately, world Zionism is in alliance with Communism, and it has sought to portray the US as the Arabs' arch enemy. By insisting and publicizing the notion that Israel is the only ally the US has in the area

² See Document 149.

and that therefore the US is helping Israel to defeat the Arabs, Zionism is only helping Communism achieve its objectives in the Middle East.

What I have said to Secretary Rogers and am repeating now—namely, that Israel should disappear as a political entity, as a name—does not mean that we are advocating the destruction of the Jews. We're talking only about the Zionist state.

From what we read and hear, we get the impression that much of the turmoil in the US (civil disturbances and anti-war demonstrations) is the result of Zionist activity in the US, and this extends to the government, to labor, and to business. We appreciate the difficulties you face, Mr. President, in having to cope with these pressures and influences.

As far as the Palestinian question is concerned, our ultimate aim is that there be established the State of Palestine, which is neither Arab/Moslem nor Jewish nor anything else, but a state where the Palestinians will be able to live on equal footing with everybody else, where there will be no discrimination between Muslim, Christian or Jew. Such a state would make it possible for the Palestinians who are strewn all over to be brought back together. The Palestinians, both Muslims and Christians, could coexist with the Jews within such a state.

In response to Secretary Rogers' inquiry as to whether or not I thought that Communism was deeply entrenched in the UAR, I replied—and would like to repeat here—that we believe that the resolution of the Arab-Israeli problem in a just and right way would be the most effective and surest step toward the removal of Communist presence in the UAR. I should like to emphasize, Mr. President, that now is precisely the time to render help and support to the Egyptian leadership.

President: Does His Majesty believe President Sadat will continue in power?

King: This would depend on what develops as far as the Arab-Israeli conflict is concerned. If Sadat is given the needed assistance and support at this juncture in such a way as to expedite the settlement of the problem, then he would have the necessary strength to stand up against any counter-revolution and to stem the tide of any movement that might rise for his overthrow. Otherwise he will be vulnerable. The army is on his side. He should be given the support he needs to ward off any threat that may be directed against him.

President: Is it His Majesty's opinion that the same thing is true of King Hussein?

King: Precisely so. Communism is striving to bring down King Hussein.

President: Let me talk very candidly about our policy. I am sure His Majesty is aware of the fact that this is a very emotional issue. Before Secretary Rogers took his trip and throughout my administration,

I have insisted that our decisions in this respect should not be politically motivated. I have told the members of my administration that our purpose should be the establishment of good relations with all the countries of the Middle East. We shall continue to stand by our commitment—that Israel has the right to exist and have secure borders. But we in this office—as I have told all my advisers—we shall follow a policy that is fair to all concerned and not tilted in a direction in favor of one country. This is difficult, but I believe His Majesty should know that we have an administration which is fair and even-handed and interested in reaching a settlement as soon as possible. I supported Secretary Rogers' plan and have directed Secretary Rogers to seek a settlement quickly. We want to normalize our relations with the UAR, with Sudan, and with other countries in the area. Also we want His Majesty to know that we believe it is important that he is pursuing a policy which aims at preventing the radical elements from having their way in the Gulf area. Also we support the Shah's effort in this respect. We realize that both China and the USSR are trying to infiltrate this area. We want you to know that we support your efforts also. Which of the two influences does His Majesty consider the more dangerous in the area—the Chinese or the Russian?

King: The source is one and the same. Communism is Communism, irrespective of the means it uses. It is unfortunate that such countries as Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, the Philippines, Greece, Italy, and others, which were once very closely allied with the US' policy, are now establishing relations with mainland China. I should be candid enough to say in this connection that there are those who say that this is being done at the behest of the US. There is an increasing advocacy for the establishment of relations with Communist China. Lebanon, South Arabia and others are now leaning in this direction. It seems that the Chinese are concentrating their efforts now on South Arabia so as to make it a jumping board for increased activity in other parts of the area. We are trying, and we need your help, to stem this tide and eradicate this unwanted influence. We have helped the Yemen Arab Republic to combat Communist influence. I would urge the US to extend help in this respect—to lend your helping hand to the Yemen Arab Republic, even in the absence of diplomatic relations with that country.

As to the domestic factors with which you have to cope in the US, I do appreciate your problem, Mr. President, and realize that in your decisions you seek not to be influenced by internal political considerations. I wish the American people could understand the predicament which their President is in when he has to make decisions in the interest of the US without regard to domestic political pressures. This is a fact I always mention to Americans who visit me.

As for your observation regarding Israel, Mr. President, I should like to point out that Israel was the aggressor. It was Israel that started

the war. And Israel must withdraw from the territories it occupied. We believe in the principle that no profit should accrue from military aggression. If this principle is followed, then the results of the 1967 aggression can be eradicated. This does not mean that I will recognize Israel. But we have no objection to a settlement which is acceptable to the contiguous Arab countries. I believe that an expeditious settlement could deal a fatal blow to Communist influence in the area. If a settlement is not reached quickly, I believe it will be impossible to deal successfully with Communism later. Unless a solution of the problem is found soon, the pro-Soviet elements in the Arab countries will have their hand strengthened. These are the observations I wanted to bring to your attention, Mr. President.

President: Your Majesty and I have a good understanding of our respective positions. We will, at the highest levels of our governments, support progress in our mutual interest. As for the Middle East as a whole, we here want to pursue all efforts in the direction of peace in that area.

King: I would like to express my best wishes for Your Excellency's success in your endeavors.

[At this point Prince Nawwaf, Amb. Suwayel, Dr. Pharaon, Mr. Sisco, and General Haig were invited to join the discussion.]

President: His Majesty and I have had a very good discussion. We find that our bilateral relations could not be more friendly. We discussed the more difficult problem of the broad area of the Middle East and Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area. I have found the discussion very profitable. This administration is committed to a policy of seeking the normalization of the situation there. His Majesty understands our internal problems, but Secretary Rogers, Mr. Sisco and all of us shall continue to strive toward the settlement of the problem in the interest of peace and justice in the area.

King: I do appreciate the President's problems and difficulties, but hope that further efforts can be made so that we may not have to continue to live under the Communist threat. Otherwise it will be too late. If things are allowed to drag on, then the Communist influence in the area will become too strong for us to cope with.

President: I share His Majesty's concern about the danger of letting things drag on and the need for expeditious progress. The State Department is proceeding on this basis.

King: I would like to talk about Israel's demand for secure borders and the Israeli insistence on the retention of the Golan Heights, Sharm el-Sheikh, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. What, in fact, are secure borders? As far as Jerusalem is concerned, we will never agree that it continue to be under Israeli domination. Israel occupied these

territories by aggression. We demand that Israel go back to the pre-1967 borders. Then the details of secure borders can be discussed.

As for the Suez Canal, it would be in our selfish interest to have it reopened. If the Canal is reopened, trade between us and other nations will be facilitated and our financial aid to Egypt will be discontinued. The advantages of reopening the Suez Canal are plentiful, as far as we are concerned. But the Communists are advocating the reopening of the canal because that will facilitate their entry into the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas. It will be easier for them to spread their influence throughout that area.

Mr. Sisco: The reopening of the Suez Canal will benefit the USSR and give access to the US. But we feel that an interim agreement cannot be a substitute for the overall solution. It does not touch other vital matters which are part of the problem—Jerusalem, the Palestinians, etc. But we are interested in keeping the initiative going. The political efforts of the President, bulwarked by US power, can create the kind of political condition (climate) which would be favorable to our interests and where Soviet influence can be reduced.

King: The reopening of the Suez Canal will not check the Soviet danger. Israel will continue in occupation of Arab territory, no telling for how long. The danger I have talked about will therefore continue to loom high in the interim.

President: There is no disagreement between us on the urgency of reaching a settlement. I am sure that Your Majesty and we are going to continue working on an urgent basis. We shall have the chance to talk further at the luncheon.

King: One more point I would like to make. Should Israel be made to feel that if she continues to spurn all efforts for peace she will lose the US' support, then she might become more flexible. But on the other hand, if she feels that, no matter what position she takes, she can nevertheless count on US support, then she will do nothing to help the cause of peace. It seems to me that Israel is more representative of the Communist world than she is of the free world, although the general impression is that Israel is the bulwark of democracy in the Middle East. The Soviets were more ardent in their support for the creation of Israel than the US was. Should a miracle occur and the US discontinue its support of Israel, I predict that the Soviets and all Communists will make a roundabout turn in their stand vis-à-vis Israel and rush to her help and preservation. It is advantageous for the Communists to have Israel remain as a thorn in US-Arab relations. Golda Meir is now on her way to Finland to attend a Socialist convention. The Socialists meeting in Finland are the same as Communists.

152. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, June 11, 1971, 1014Z.

1973. No Distribution Outside Department. For NEA/ARP Director Murphy and NEA/RA Director Schiff from Ambassador. Subj: PARA Paper on Saudi Arabia.

We forward herewith description of those elements which, pursuant to Ambassador's recent consultations, it is our understanding Bureau would view as principal ones for inclusion in PARA paper on Saudi Arabia.² Thus policies and courses of action covered are only those which we believe would need top-level Bureau attention to assure their implementation and success.

1. (A) Military assistance programs for Saudi Arabia: Saudis desire maximum degree of US support and supervision in connection with development of Saudi Navy. My conversation with Prince Sultan, Minister of Defense, June 9, revealed Saudi desire also for active USG role in assisting Saudis with acquisition of F-5 aircraft and in development of Saudi abilities to fly and maintain these planes.³ All of this will put new burdens on USMTM, Embassy and all Washington agencies involved, including particularly military services, although we can expect almost complete Saudi financial reimbursement for USG expenses incurred in these programs.

(B) Saudis regard with greatest seriousness long-standing ties of US-Saudi friendship, occasion for whose sincere and convincing reaffirmation was provided by King's recent visit to Washington.⁴ They are well aware of nature and extent our military aid to Israel and to Jordan. They will be strongly inclined expect maximum performance in these two new spheres of Saudi-US military collaboration in a manner consistent with our traditional friendship and our help to other Middle Eastern friends of US.

(C) We believe US policy should be, insofar as possible, to encourage Saudi military and defense officials undertake maximum decision-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL SAUD-US. Secret; Limdis.

² The Policy Analysis and Recommended Action Paper was not found.

³ Thacher met with Sultan on June 9 and presented him with a letter that had been worked out among the Office of International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and Northrop during Thacher's consultation meetings in Washington. Sultan indicated his desire for a government-to-government transaction. (Telegram 1955 from Jidda, June 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 SAUD)

⁴ See Document 151.

making responsibility to assume as rapidly as possible full burdens of command and planning for new programs. Nevertheless, Dept and DOD should be aware that it may be necessary to supply comprehensive planning as well as personnel (located both in Washington and Saudi Arabia) to assure success of what Saudis consider are vital elements for their defense. While it may appear to us USG is assuming disproportionate load, we should keep in mind Saudis are drawing heavily also for expertise they need on US private sector. For example, Raytheon-Hawk program has recently been renewed, Saudis continue depend on Lockheed for maintenance of C-130's and are now developing with Lockheed project whereby Lockheed personnel will play integral role with Saudi Air Force in creating completely coordinated air defense system. In sum, though we can understand how there may be DOD and military service resistance to heavy degree US involvement in Navy and F-5 program, Saudi expectations for US assistance are high and must be met if we are to maintain military tie as binding aspect of US-Saudi relations.

2. Increased reimbursable US technical assistance for Saudi economic development: (A) We have had indications from Saudis in key positions, and it is our own conclusion as well, that USG role and image in Saudi Arabia would benefit by counter-balancing heavy preponderance our present activities in military sphere by greater help for Saudi economic development. US has performed well with US Geological Survey team and as agent for Jidda desalting plant. Moreover, we have responded helpfully to requests for special short-term assistance, such as for advisor in establishment of social insurance system, experts for design of airways control system, etc. Nevertheless, we convinced there will be expanded future opportunities for supply of technical assistance, reimbursable by Saudis, on long and short-term basis.

(B) Thus, we would propose to be alert and perhaps to some degree search out opportunities where we feel reimbursable US technical assistance might be most advantageously offered in terms our relations with Saudis. Embassy makes this suggestion with full awareness that current US policy is not to seek leading position with regard to programming and guidance of developing country economic plans. But we believe we should be somewhat more active here than we have in past in looking for opportunities to render technical aid in key areas of Saudi economic expansion. Obviously too we can hope in many instances for profitable commercial by-product as in case of present airways control study by FAA team from which we hope will emerge plan utilizing American specifications and guiding Saudis toward US suppliers. AID has expressed general sympathy for some expansion of reimbursed technical assistance but top-level Bureau support may be required to assure full and effective implementation.

3. Addition to Embassy staff of operations officer: Considerations supporting this recommendation are included in Embassy's response

to inspectors' report.⁵ Latter noted large portion of officer time now being devoted to USG military and technical assistance programs in Saudi Arabia. Inspectors' suggestion was that Embassy requires kind of "Aid Director," but we suggest somewhat different alternative: addition capable FSO-3, "military-economic operations" officer to serve under direction of Political-Economic Counselor. There is steady growth in Embassy workload stemming from operational aid type programs: for example, just announced Saudi desire for help with F-5 aircraft program and request just received from FonMinistry for USG to run survey on need for sensor system to protect oil installation in Eastern Province. Embassy hopes that further Departmental review will result in decision add to our staff desired officer and secretary to assist him.

4. (A) Strengthening Saudi Arabia against hostile forces on Arabian Peninsula: Last couple of years have seen Communists develop foothold on Arabian Peninsula. These are strongest in PDRY where USSR and Chicoms are providing variety of assistance to Communist dominated govt. Communist trained guerrillas continue campaign in Dhofar against Muscat-Oman regime of Sultan Qabus. Saudis have moved to suppress PDRY threat through various forms of aid to anti-PDRY forces operating from bases now primarily located in Yemen Arab Republic. US should continue its present posture of aloofness and refrain from encouragement these Saudi endeavors. Fortunately Saudis seem disinclined so far to seek our assistance. Currently anti-PDRY campaign is sputtering along providing relatively little threat to Saudi security or that of YAR.

(B) More logical course, however, is one aimed at reinforcing development and defenses of two friendly neighboring states, YAR and Muscat-Oman. Thus, US aid to YAR is required as best means creating a stable, developing, friendly North Yemen as needed buffer between Saudi Arabia and dangerous PDRY.

(C) US aid to YAR can have additional utility as lever to persuade Saudis step up their own assistance to Yemen which so far rather meager. We should maintain continuing dialogue with Saudis with object encouraging their contributions to Yemen welfare and coordinating it with ours. Bureau may have maintain steady persuasive discussion with AID convince it of need for enlarging US assistance to YAR.

5. Saudi role vis-à-vis Gulf states and Muscat-Oman: Effective and helpful Saudi role vis-à-vis emerging political development of Gulf states and Muscat-Oman can have significant impact on security and stability this region and important Free World and US interests there. US should remain alert for opportunities endeavor persuade Saudis to pursue most fruitful courses of action.

⁵ Not further identified.

6. (A) Role of Corps of Engineers: Long-range role of Corps in Saudi Arabia may well come up for consideration over next year or so. Pressures from COE for rapid scaling down of Corps presence seem abated somewhat as additional tasks in Mediterranean area have been found for MedDiv Headquarters in Livorno, Italy, which hitherto had been becoming excessively dependent on Saudi Arabian district. Engineers must, of course, remain for two- to three-year period required assure successful completion SAMP program and Tabuk cantonment. Now pending is Saudi request for Corps assistance with construction naval facilities on Gulf and Red Sea coasts. Corps proposes use as much as possible cantonment designs developed for Tabuk and Khamis Mushayt.⁶ Believe we should respond positively to this request. There seems possibility of one or two small \$3-4 million jobs on which Saudis may seek engineer assistance within next few months, and these too could properly be included in Corps operation.

(B) We should, however, begin to project the phaseout of COE from Saudi Arabia over next several years. Best means of assuring this is commence work with Saudis now enlarge and strengthen training program whereby promising Saudi officers learn COE functions so that Saudi Armed Forces can assume many of these in foreseeable future. Corps should accordingly be given every encouragement strengthen its programs for training Saudi officers to assume COE functions.

7. (A) Improvement of USMTM: Embassy recommends increased attention to means for heightening effectiveness of USMTM. Principal problem is one-year tenure of 145-man training mission, all of whom, with exception dozen top officers who serve for two years, find their advisory impact sharply limited by present policy of assigning mission personnel for only one year. Hitherto US services have found it difficult recruit officers for two-year assignments partly because of lack of facilities for families in Saudi Arabia and partly also, as far as we can discover from informal soundings, because officers find USMTM assignment unattractive in terms of career progress. With development of American schools, improved housing and shopping facilities, Saudi Arabia, particularly as to billets in Jidda and Riyadh, has become a more attractive assignment. Perhaps following Vietnam withdrawal ratio of officers to billets may shift so that Saudi Arabia will appear a more attractive career opportunity. Embassy is conscious also that endeavors will have to be made persuade SAG provide housing for larger number accompanied US military personnel, which Saudis have been reluctant hitherto to provide. As first step, however, there should be Washington policy decision that USMTM personnel assignments will be for two years and will permit families to accompany insofar as practicable.

Thacher

⁶ Khamis Mushayt is the site of King Khalid Air Base, in southwestern Saudi Arabia.

153. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, July 15, 1971.

SUBJECT

Saudi Arabia: Feisal—and Then?²

NOTE

The House of Saud may well continue to rule Saudi Arabia for years to come, but this is far from assured. Beyond the question of King Feisal's own health and advancing age and that of dissension within the royal family over the succession, there is at work an inexorable process of transformation in Saudi society. The process results from rapidly growing wealth, the spread of education and communication, and increasing awareness of the outside world. The inherent incompatibilities between this impetus for modernization and the still archaic Saudi political structure will be central to future developments in the kingdom. This memorandum assesses the present state of affairs and the outlook.

[Omitted here are a Table of Contents, Section I: The Setting, and Section II: The Challenge of Modernity.]

III. The Security Situation and Military Plotting

9. It is military conspirators, not civilian opposition, that have the greatest potential to threaten the Saudi monarchy. The regular army's officer corps, mostly of middle class origins, doubtless contains many who do not identify with the royal house. [15 lines not declassified]

10. Feisal recognizes the potential threat from his military establishment and has always suspected its loyalty.³ [3 lines not declassified] The government has taken elaborate precautions to separate various military components and to remove them from the cities and other strategic areas. The bulk of the army is stationed in the border areas, some units even being posted inside Jordan. No regular army effectives are allowed near the capital. [3 lines not declassified]

11. As a check against the regular military establishment, the regime relies heavily on the paramilitary National Guard (the so-called "White Army"), a force recruited from tribes traditionally regarded as

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1277, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia. Secret.

² This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated within CIA. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ See footnote 5, Document 133.

loyal to the monarchy. Elements of the Guard are stationed in positions that would allow them to intercept an army move against the government. While the Guard is roughly the same size as the regular army, it is not heavily armed. It lacks tanks and artillery, and has not been well trained for the mission of blocking an army move. As a force to maintain internal security, it has demonstrated its effectiveness in warfare against tribesmen, for example, but its capability against regular military units is unproven. It would be defenseless against air attack, even of the most rudimentary sort.

12. In an important sense, moreover, the National Guard's reliability may be declining. For reasons of efficiency, many of the old formations have been fundamentally reorganized. In these units tribal forces fighting under their own officers have been replaced by elements drawn from various tribes. Further, non-tribal officers from the regular army have been assigned command of these mixed units. This reorganization has thus diluted the distinction between the Guard and the regular army and has called into question the ultimate loyalty of these converted units.

13. Other aspects of the security situation also appear to be changing. Live ammunition is probably more generally available now in Saudi Arabia than in the past. This increase is associated with the effort sponsored by Riyadh to unseat the South Yemeni regime, an endeavor that entailed arming and equipping numerous forces for combat. Also the unit stationed in Jordan has been provided munitions to use in the event of Israeli attack. Moreover, in the past year or so there have been alerts of various units including the air force, during which fuel and supplies necessary for combat were issued. These circumstances have improved the chances that plotters would be able to find sufficient ammunition to carry out their plans.

14. Nonetheless, it remains a difficult task to overturn the Saudi monarchy. [2½ lines not declassified] Speed would be essential to this operation, for if any of the central figures of the Saudi family were able to broadcast appeals for help, some units of the National Guard and perhaps other tribal elements would be likely to rally to the support of the family in numbers. [6 lines not declassified]

IV. Outside Factors

15. The death of Nasser last fall removed a perennial threat to Feisal's regime. Nasser had at times past encouraged dissidents inside Saudi Arabia. Although the Egyptians had not sponsored subversion against Feisal since the latter agreed in 1967 to provide a \$100 million yearly subsidy as long as the Suez Canal should remain shut, Nasser continued to be a powerful magnet or inspiration for Saudi dissidents. With the advent of Sadat in Egypt, on the other hand, Egyptian-Saudi Arabian relations have been positively cordial. Sadat's recent reception

of Feisal in Cairo lent the aura of Egyptian blessing to the Saudi regime—something it had not enjoyed for many years. Moreover, the Saudi successful mediation of Jordanian King Hussein's differences with Cairo gave new lustre to the image of the Saudi regime as working constructively for the Arab cause. All this has probably served to boost Feisal's prestige at home, even within his armed forces.

16. Feisal's image could be considerably tarnished, however, if he fails to appear effective in defending Arab interests in the Persian Gulf—most immediately if Iran were to move to take the three small islands it claims near the mouth of the Persian Gulf. While the British ruled in the Gulf, the UK enforced the claims of the small sheikhdoms of the Arab coast to these islands. The Shah is now pressing his ownership and threatens to take possession of the islands as soon as the British leave later this year. He has sufficient force to do so and can quickly make good his threat. He would prefer to work out an accommodation with Feisal to whom the Gulf sheikhs look to protect Arab interests, and he regards Feisal's position as unnecessarily obstinate. Seizure of the islands by the Shah could among other things damage Feisal's standing in the eyes of the Saudi military.

17. The unsuccessful coup attempt in Morocco⁴ will also have an impact on attitudes within Saudi Arabia. Undoubtedly it will incline Feisal to be even more cautious. It may increase the determination of the royal family in Saudi Arabia to act decisively if faced with a similar challenge—a factor which could turn the tide in a closely contested situation. At the same time, the failure of the Moroccan army to join in the revolt may give conspirators inside Saudi Arabia pause, [2½ lines not declassified].

18. The foreign factor which could have perhaps the most weight in stimulating Saudi dissidents to overthrow the dynasty would be a new round of major Arab-Israeli hostilities. Feisal's policy toward the Arab confrontation with Israel is regarded by many Saudis as lacking sincerity. While Feisal feels strongly on the question of Jerusalem, has adopted a tough posture concerning it, and given support to the Palestinian cause, this limited stance has not satisfied the country's younger elements. The close Saudi relationship with the US in the face of growing anti-Americanism in the Arab world has increased public dissatisfaction with the ruling family. Although the stationing of Saudi troops in southern Jordan has given the military some sense of participation in the struggle against Israel, many officers realize that this gesture is chiefly symbolic. Another Arab defeat at the hands of the Israelis, especially if it involved Saudi forces in Jordan, would probably shake the

⁴ Documentation is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E-5, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972.

Saudi regime. Public sentiment would be aroused, disorders probably would break out in Jidda or at the oil complex in the Dhahran area and could occasion anti-American activities throughout the kingdom. In such a time of high emotion, military officers might seize the opportunity to move against the House of Saud.

V. The Succession Question

19. The matter inside Saudi Arabia which may have the greatest bearing on the possibility of a coup is the succession problem. The royal house appears increasingly divided over the question of who should succeed Feisal. Though the King is still in reasonably good health, he suffers from mild arteriosclerosis and has had serious stomach troubles in the past. Jockeying for position in the succession struggle has been underway for some time. As the senior eligible half-brother of Feisal, Prince Khalid, now himself nearly 60, was named heir in 1965. Popular with many tribal and religious leaders, the pious Khalid has, however, shown little interest in the governing process. Moreover, in the past few years he has undergone a series of heart attacks. He now performs only ceremonial tasks; it is questionable whether he will be physically able to assume the active direction of Saudi affairs after Feisal leaves the scene. Nonetheless, Khalid is strongly backed by the commander of the National Guard, chiefly because he opposes the rival Sudairi faction. The Minister of Finance also has been attempting to use his budgetary power to clip the wings of Khalid's opponents. Most important of all, Feisal himself has not withdrawn endorsement of existing succession arrangements.

20. Next in line is Prince Fahd, 49-year old leader of the so-called "Sudairi Seven"—half-brothers of King Feisal by a single mother. The Sudairis are a tightly knit clique of able and ambitious princes; they dominate the Council of Ministers, a body which Fahd increasingly chairs in his capacity as Second Deputy Prime Minister. These brothers are unwilling to see [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Khalid try to run the country and would probably mount a formidable challenge if he were to attempt to take command. Some compromise might be possible, however, in which Khalid was accorded the title of King, but left the Prime Ministry and actual rule to his half-brother Fahd.

21. Fahd has sought in guarded fashion to appeal to the middle classes. In an unusual press interview in April 1970 he espoused an accelerated reform program, including the enactment of "basic regulations"—which many Saudis interpreted to mean a constitution. He proposed numerous social welfare measures, from low-income public housing to low-cost water and electricity. At the same time, he called for higher expenditures for Saudi military and security forces, organizations in which middle class elements play a major role. While he barely mentioned King Feisal and the regime's efforts to carry out some reforms, he denounced corruption and influence-peddling within the

Saudi government. Fahd may be all the more interested in advertising an interest in progressive reform in Saudi Arabia precisely because the repressive security policies he has carried out in his capacity as Minister of Interior probably have alienated reformist elements.

22. Though reportedly unhappy at Fahd's assertiveness, including his tendency to bid for support outside the royal family, Feisal himself now clearly recognizes that Khalid's succession has serious drawbacks and believes that a strong King is needed. In the past year or so, therefore, Feisal has let Fahd play an increasingly prominent role in government. Fahd, not Khalid, has acted in the King's name when Feisal has been out of the country. More unambiguous steps to favor Fahd's succession may be in the offing. Feisal is said to be considering convening a royal conclave to effect a family reconciliation to settle the issue. The King believes that the greatest danger to the dynasty would be indecision and bickering at the time of the succession. Nonetheless, this is a painful matter for Feisal, and he may continue to temporize.

VI. A Post-Feisal Regime

23. In this situation the death or incapacity of Feisal would offer a promising opportunity for a move against the regime. If it appeared that the key princes had become more unified, however, this might deter a coup. It is also very possible that in the face of an active threat, the princes would close ranks and put down opposition quite quickly. Although it would inevitably take some time for a princely successor to consolidate his control, the monarchy is deeply embedded in the fabric of Saudi Arabian society and stands a good chance of survival.

24. A new king would very likely follow much in the pattern of Feisal: gradually modernizing the mechanism of government and promoting especially economic but also some social change. If strong rivalries continue to divide the top princes, the progress of Saudi Arabia along this path would be slowed. Fahd's succession by consensus of the family, on the other hand, could add to the efficiency of the government and also speed up the process of modernization somewhat. In any event no princely successor would be likely to attempt basic changes in the nature of the regime, say to give elements outside the royal family an important voice in ruling the country.

25. Pressures against the monarchy, therefore, are likely to continue to build. Should the House of Saud be overthrown, the successor regime would almost certainly be highly nationalistic and anti-Israeli. It would probably be exceedingly difficult for the US to deal with, and its attitude toward the major oil companies would be appreciably tougher than that of the present Saudi government. This does not mean that it would quickly seek to nationalize—rather that it would press for a larger share of profits and perhaps gradual steps to obtain greater control of the country's oil resources.

154. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, August 17, 1971.

SUBJECT

Letter to You from King Faisal

In early July King Faisal made a trip to Cairo where he talked with President Sadat. He thereafter wrote you a letter [Tab B]² on his impressions from Cairo:

—There are a “firm intention and a determined resolve” both in the armed forces and among the majority of the Egyptian people to “begin the battle with Israel” to recover their lands and holy places and to wipe out the “shame” of 1967.

—There is also a body of opinion which is striving for peaceful settlement. This viewpoint is “supported by the group which holds the reins of government in Egypt at present.”

—Both groups reprove the US for its silence in the face of Israeli obstinance. Both are convinced that Israel does not want peace and stability which would be contrary to its “expansionist policy.” Both believe that if the US sincerely wanted peace, it could achieve that goal. If Israel rejected US advice, the US could withhold aid.

The King notes that the US has clearly defined its position regarding a peaceful settlement and “the nations involved have concurred in it.” But the King asks, what has the US done to bring this solution about—“what is it waiting for?”

The King urges that now—after the “bold” steps of Anwar Sadat—is the opportune time to establish peace. He feels that if the situation in the area should explode again, it will not be possible to calm it quickly. He urges you to move quickly. In closing, he notes the tide of “destructive forces” which may come to dominate the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea areas unless necessary preparations are made.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 761, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1971, Saudi Arabia: King Faisal ibn Abdal-Aziz Al Saud, 1971. Secret. Sent for action.

² Attached but not printed at Tab B is King Faisal’s June 30 letter to Nixon. All brackets are in the original.

The draft reply at Tab A thanks the King for his views and states that we continue to seek ways toward a settlement.³ [Mr. Price has cleared the text.]

Recommendation:

That you sign the reply at Tab A.

³ Attached but not printed at Tab A is Nixon's August 18 letter to Faisal.

155. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 21, 1971, 4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz al Sa'ud, Saudi Arabia
Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State
Emil Mosbacher, US Chief of Protocol
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff
Camille Nowfel, Department of State, Interpreter

Prince Fahd began by expressing his gratitude for the opportunity to see the President despite the President's busy schedule. King Faisal cherishes his personal relationship with the President and instructed Fahd to seek a meeting with the President so there could be a frank exchange of views on the current situation in the Middle East. The King had asked the Prince to bring a written letter as well as to state orally the King's views on that situation.

The President responded by saying that he welcomed the Prince because of the personal friendship he feels toward King Faisal and toward the prince and because of the warm reception which the Saudis had given

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL SAUD–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. In a September 17 memorandum, Eliot provided Kissinger with briefing material for the meeting. (Ibid., POL 7 SAUD) Kissinger provided Nixon with Talking Points in a September 20 memorandum. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1277, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia) During his visit, Fahd also met with Rogers and Sisco. (Telegram 174902 to Jidda, Dhahran, and Bahrain; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 SAUD)

the Vice President.² He felt it is important to stay in close personal touch. He had received personal reports from Secretary Rogers, Mr. Sisco and then later in the summer from the Vice President himself.³

Prince Fahd gave the President a copy of King Faisal's letter (translation attached).⁴ Then in supplement he made the following points:

—King Faisal sees a very difficult time ahead in the Middle East if there is no solution to the Arab-Israeli problem this fall.

—The pressures on President Sadat are great. He could be overturned if there is no solution in the near future.

—President Sadat is genuinely interested in an interim settlement around the Suez Canal. Were the King not convinced of Sadat's sincerity in this respect he would not have sent Fahd to Washington. King Faisal believes that such a settlement would also be in the interest of Israel, as would an overall peace settlement.

—President Sadat would be willing to reduce his relationship with the Communist countries if there could be a settlement. He wants a stronger relationship with the United States.

—Communist forces have suffered a setback in the Middle East this summer, notably in the Sudan and in Egypt. But King Faisal fears that if President Sadat is thrust aside the Communist forces will regain ground. He reiterated President Sadat's willingness to reduce the Egyptian relationship with the Communist nations and King Faisal's judgment that it is important to the West to create a situation in which that reduction could take place.

—Saudi policy has been to try to convince the other Arab leaders that the United States is genuinely interested in serving the interests of the Arabs but that because of American domestic considerations we Arabs should not expect the U.S. to show immediate results. The King hopes that the situation within the Arab world will not deteriorate to the point it becomes impossible for America's friends, such as the King, to keep defending the United States.

—The Prince concluded with an earnest appeal to the President for a major effort to bring about a solution this fall. He felt that such a solution is in the hands of the United States.

² Agnew met with King Faisal on July 8. Agnew visited Korea, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Spain, and Portugal June 26–July 28. Telegram 3205 from Addis Ababa, July 11, summarizes Agnew's talk with Faisal. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 951, VIP Visits, Vice President's Trip, June–July 71) Agnew's own account is in an undated memorandum to Nixon. (*Ibid.*)

³ For Rogers's report, see Document 149. The reference to Sisco's report is presumably to a record of his meeting with Faisal on May 27 during the King's visit to Washington. (Memorandum of conversation, May 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 SAUD)

⁴ Attached but not printed.

The President replied agreeing that friends should talk frankly and expressing his appreciation that King Faisal had sent the Prince all the way to the United States for such a talk. He knew that the Prince would be having more detailed discussions with Secretary Rogers and Mr. Sisco.⁵

The President assured the Prince that he would give most careful consideration to the written message that King Faisal had sent and to the oral presentation that Prince Fahd had made. The President assured the Prince that this problem receives his constant personal attention. Nevertheless, it is a good thing to have a friend like Prince Fahd come and underline the urgency and the importance which the Saudis feel the situation deserves.

The President said that this problem is of a personal importance to him for several reasons. First of all, the US and the President himself have personal friends in the Arab world like King Faisal and Prince Fahd. For their sake and for ours, we have an interest in limiting Communist intrigue, and we recognize that the longer there is no Arab-Israeli situation [*settlement*] the greater will be the likelihood of such intrigue. As Prince Fahd himself had said, we also believe that a peace settlement is in the interest of Israel. Moreover, we also see the importance of cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran for the sake of stability in the Gulf against radical forces in that area.

The President went on, saying that we are going to continue to give this problem our most serious attention. Secretary Rogers in New York would be holding discussions on the subject. We do not promise results, but we are going to try very hard to achieve forward movement.

The President said that he recognized from his private visit in 1963 to Egypt that the Egyptians are a great people. They like the Saudis will make an important contribution to the world. The US wants normal diplomatic relations with Egypt. We do not believe we have an interest in the continuation of the unusual situation that had followed the break of relations in 1967.

The President said he had not met President Sadat, but Secretary Rogers feels that he is sincere in his efforts to achieve peace.⁶

The meeting concluded with Prince Fahd again expressing his appreciation for the opportunity to meet with the President. The President reiterated his pleasure in seeing the Prince again and escorted the Prince to his car.

⁵ According to telegram 177287 to Jidda, September 27, Prince Fahd's September 22 meeting with Sisco focused on the current Arab political situation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 SAUD) Fahd's meeting with Rogers focused on Persian Gulf issues. (Telegram 177026 to Jidda, September 25; *ibid.*)

⁶ Rogers was in Egypt May 4–6 to discuss Arab-Israeli issues.

156. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter)¹

Washington, November 4, 1971.

Dear Warren:

As you know, Saudi Arabian National Guard Commander Prince Abdullah has requested through Ambassador Thatcher that the U.S. assist in implementation of a major reorganization and reequipment of that force along lines proposed by a British Advisory Mission. Abdullah has stated that he would like to purchase U.S. equipment in place of that recommended by the British. Ultimately, Abdullah indicated, he intends to phase out his British advisers and to bring the National Guard "close to the Americans." Abdullah has pressed for an early positive response to his request.²

Raytheon Corporation has also been in contact with Prince Abdullah regarding its interest in carrying out this program. Raytheon on October 27 submitted to Abdullah a proposal to undertake a definition of the proposed program, including budget estimates and work schedules. According to Raytheon sources, Abdullah expressed considerable interest in the Raytheon proposal but declined to accept it pending confirmation that the U.S. Government will support National Guard reequipment. Raytheon has appealed to the Department for U.S. Government support for its efforts to win this potentially valuable program for American industry.

We perceive important political and commercial advantages in supporting a bid by American industry to obtain this project. The National Guard plays a key role in preserving internal security and public order in Saudi Arabia. It also acts as a reinforcement for the Frontier Force and for the regular army in defending Saudi borders from outside aggression. The National Guard is administratively separate from the Ministry of Defense and Aviation and it has relied hitherto on British rather than American advisers. With the exception of a modest purchase of U.S. small arms and training through FMS in 1966, we have had few contacts with the Guard. Award of the reequipment program to an American firm would enable us to develop a closer relationship with this important organization and to monitor its activities and ca-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 SAUD. Secret. Drafted on November 3 by Wrampelmeier and concurred in in NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/RA, and PM/MAS.

² As reported in telegram 3651 from Jidda, October 19. (Ibid.)

pabilities. It might also give us some leverage to guide the National Guard's development in a way wherein it will contribute to maintenance of political stability in the Kingdom and not to creation of an imbalance between it and the regular armed forces—a danger inherent in the equipment purchases recommended by the British Advisory Mission.

The potential advantages to the U.S. balance of payments from American implementation of this program are also considerable. In addition to the purchase of vehicles, communications equipment, and other hardware, the National Guard would require contractor services for the management of the overall reequipment program, maintenance, training, and logistics support. The cost of this program is estimated at between \$150 and \$200 million.

Moreover, we are reliably informed that King Faisal and other leading Royal Family members would prefer that this program be undertaken by American rather than by British interests. We understand that the use of an American contractor has been particularly urged on Abdullah by Minister of Defense and Aviation Prince Sultan. The reason is Sultan's own low estimate of British capabilities in this field and, no doubt, concern in some quarters of the Royal Family that the British recommendations contain excessive amounts of armored vehicles and artillery. The British are likely to oppose strenuously this threat to their hitherto predominant role with the National Guard. However, it is our impression that a Saudi decision to seek American help for this program has already been taken—provided, of course, that Prince Abdullah is satisfied that the U.S. Government will in fact support his reequipment efforts.

In light of the above developments and considerations, we consider it desirable that an early decision be taken to assure Prince Abdullah that the U.S. will support this program. We see two alternative approaches:

a) inform Abdullah that we are prepared in principle to meet his reasonable requirements on a government-to-government basis through FMS procedures.

b) support Raytheon's bid for a contract to define the program in terms of American equipment and services. We would of course expect Raytheon to work closely with our military services in order to permit presentation to Abdullah of a final program that we could support through licensing of commercial exports and, where necessary, through supplementary Foreign Military Sales cases for equipment or services not available through commercial sources.

Our preference is that this program be carried out to the extent possible on a government-to-industry basis. We would therefore urge the second alternative. This approach would keep responsibility for this program primarily in the hands of private industry while enabling us to influence both the types and numbers of equipment that would

be furnished to the National Guard. We especially wish to avoid assumption by the U.S. Government of the major implementing role in this program at a time when our plate is already full with SAMP, Naval Expansion, and the F-5 program. We therefore want to keep private industry out in front.

It is entirely possible, of course, that Prince Abdullah may prefer implementation of this program on a government-to-government basis. This would present some problems for us in light both of our involvement in other Saudi military programs and of Abdullah's past unwillingness to deal with our Military Training Mission—which Abdullah regards as too closely associated with the Ministry of Defense and Aviation. Should Abdullah insist upon a government-to-government arrangement, I recommend that we agree to do so provided it is understood that a separate advisory mission for the National Guard could not be established. To the maximum extent possible actual implementation of the program, including in-country training, will be contracted to U.S. private industry in accordance with standard DOD procedures.

Should the Department of Defense concur with this approach, our Arabian Peninsula Directorate and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs are prepared to work directly with DOD/ISA and the concerned military service to draft appropriate instructions for Ambassador Thatcher.

Sincerely,

Joseph J. Sisco³

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

157. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Selden) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹

Washington, November 10, 1971.

SUBJECT

Saudi Arabian Naval Expansion Program

Since early in 1968, the U.S. has been assisting Saudi Arabia to develop a limited naval force in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Initially, we were asked to review Saudi requirements for naval equipment and shore facilities. That review concluded that an effective naval force should be developed to safeguard and protect the seacoasts and harbors of the Kingdom against a seaborne threat, to protect Saudi vessels in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, and to provide a sea/air rescue capability. In December 1969 the Saudis formally requested U.S. Government assistance in expanding their six-ship naval force by an additional 19 vessels, constructing and equipping associated shore facilities, and training of Saudi naval personnel. This concept was approved by King Faisal and is understood to have a very high priority in Saudi defense planning. In light of the recommendations of a second Department of Defense evaluation team, the Deputy Secretary of Defense—with Department of State concurrence—informed the Saudis in September 1970 (Tab A)² that we were prepared to discuss with them more precisely their requirements. These discussions have now been completed.

The expansion program contemplated will involve virtually a complete reconstruction of the Saudi naval force. Ship acquisition, base construction, and training will be phased over an eight to ten year period. All ships and training are to be purchased from the United States. Prince Sultan, the Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense and Aviation, has requested that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, currently engaged in several military construction projects for the Saudi Arabian Army, also undertake supervision of the shore facilities construction effort. The program costs are estimated at \$200 million, all of which will be borne by Saudi Arabia. U.S. financial assistance, if any, would be limited to Foreign Military Credits, principally DoD guarantees of commercial loans.

The Saudis have indicated that they prefer a government-to-government arrangement using Foreign Military Sales procedures

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330-4-083, Box 25, Saudi Arabia 1971. Confidential.

² Document 144.

rather than having to deal directly with one or more industrial contractors. Under this arrangement we visualize that the United States Navy would be tasked to serve as overall manager and contracting agent for plans and programs relating to ship procurement and training. The United States Army Corps of Engineers, in coordination with the Navy, would supervise design and construction of shore facilities.

The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), has developed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)—Tab B³—through interagency consultation with the Department of State, our country team in Saudi Arabia, the Joint Staff and the Departments of Army and Navy. The Memorandum sets forth the nature of the technical and advisory assistance to be provided by the Department of Defense. It stipulates the Saudi Arabian Government's responsibilities for planning, programming, management, and implementation of this program including funding, staffing, and support services. Procurement, as mutually agreed, of individual vessels, associated equipment, training and other services will be the subject of separate Defense Letters of Offer. These will be negotiated on a case-by-case basis and will remain subject to the same kind of joint State-Defense screening applied to all Foreign Military Sales cases. The Memorandum of Understanding, however, acts as the umbrella under which ongoing actions would be taken and defines the parameters of the United States Assistance under this program.

The MOU has been revised by Ambassador Thacher and his Country Team and Secretary Rogers has granted authority to our Ambassador to sign the MOU. Once final USG approval is given, the Ambassador will present the draft MOU to the Saudis, refer any Saudi proposed changes to State/DoD and, when agreement is reached, sign the MOU for the U.S. Government. Before the MOU is signed, State will give its customary notification to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee. OSD(LA) will inform the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.

All these steps are consistent with the undertaking spelled out to the Saudis in Mr. Packard's letter to Prince Sultan in September 1970. Nevertheless, I want to apprise you of the current status of the program and to ensure that the proposed actions meet your full approval before we commence negotiations with the Saudis.⁴

Armistead I. Selden, Jr.

³ Not attached and not found.

⁴ Laird approved on November 13. Telegram 34 from Jidda, March 21, reported that Saudi Arabia had accepted the MOU. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 6-2 SAUD)

158. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, May 18, 1972.

Saudi Arabian Role as a Factor in U.S. Policy in the
Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf

In response to your request for a review, prior to the Moscow Summit, of the situation in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf and the more active role which the Saudis are playing, the following is a summary.

Situation in the Area. The Communist states and their radical Arab followers have had limited success in expanding their influence along the fringes of the Arabian Peninsula. Both the Soviet Union and the Chinese have close relations with the ruling radical National Front regime in Southern Yemen giving them a foothold in the Peninsula.² Chinese diplomats and road builders remain quietly active in the neighboring Yemen Arab Republic but Soviet influence there has waned in the past two years with the renewal of Yemen's ties to several Western and moderate Arab states and with the growth of tension between the two Yemens. Soviet involvement in the Gulf which so far has been held to naval visits to Iraq and Iran and to a diplomatic presence in Kuwait, has had little success outside of Iraq. Even the UAE may be dragging its feet despite Shaykh Zayid's February 1972 agreement to establish diplomatic relations with Moscow. The PRC, which for years has made a determined effort to establish a commercial presence in the Gulf, has had even less success than the Soviet Union in establishing itself there politically. The Chinese support the Dhofari insurgency in Oman but Sultan Qaboos' pacification program (with British help) in former guerrilla strongholds in Dhofar seems to be taking hold.

More Active Saudi Role. Over the past 18 months, the Saudis have slowly begun to move away from their isolationism of the Sixties. The

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 SAUD. Confidential. Drafted by Wrampelmeier and Dickman and concurred in by Atherton.

² Additional information on Soviet interest in the Gulf is in Intelligence Memorandum, "Moscow and the Persian Gulf," May 12 (*ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 479, President's Trip Files, Briefing Book, Visit of Nixon to Iran, May 1972), and in Research Study RESS–15, "Moscow Moves in the Persian Gulf," February 28. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 NEAR E) Chinese involvement in the Dhofar rebellion is analyzed in Intelligence Memorandum, "The Mountain and the Plain: The Rebellion in Oman," May 19. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 79–T00832A, Box 8)

wider political latitude given Faisal following the death of Nasser, awareness of the Kingdom's growing financial reserves, concern over the Communist-supported Dhofar rebellion coupled with Soviet and PRC support for the radical Southern Yemen regime, Saudi realization of the security implications in the Gulf with the departure of the British, and the continued Saudi-US dialogue on Peninsular matters have all been contributing factors. As a result, the Saudis have undertaken a more active role in regional affairs:

In *Yemen*, they helped bring Royalist and Republican leaders together in the spring of 1970, thus contributing to the end of the eight-year old civil war; recognized the Yemen Arab Republic Government in July 1970; and have extended since recognition \$18 million in loans (which will probably not be repaid) with a further loan of \$12 million expected soon. The Saudis have also provided aid in kind such as scholarships, educational supplies, food, trucks, and two DC-6 aircraft (for the Yemen Airlines); obligated \$9 million for project aid (schools, mosques, hospitals, and construction of roads from the Saudi border to the Yemen towns of Hodeidah and Sa'ada); and supplied arms to the Yemeni armed forces. They have been slow, however, to establish a diplomatic presence in Sanaa commensurate with their interests and responsibilities. Happily, an Ambassador has now been nominated. The Saudis also plan to establish a project aid office in Sanaa, but finding qualified Saudis to staff it may prove difficult.

Southern Yemen (PDRY-Aden) has never been recognized by the Saudis who regard the Communist-dominated National Front regime as a threat to themselves and the rest of the Peninsula. Saudi hostility deepened following the November 1969 border incursion at Sharaura by South Yemeni regular forces. Even before that event, however, the Saudis had been financing and arming insurgent tribesmen in the south. These efforts have continued but with a noticeable lack of success. Saudi leaders now seem to be rethinking their approach to the problem of Southern Yemen. It is unlikely, however, that they will abandon entirely their goal of overthrowing the Aden regime.

With Oman there has been a dramatic improvement in relations following the December 1971 visit of Sultan Qaboos to Riyadh when King Faisal agreed to establish diplomatic relations. The Saudis are considering how they can strengthen Qaboos in containing Dhofar insurgents supported by the Chinese and South Yemenis. A three-man Saudi military delegation visited Muscat in May, returning with requests for over \$60 million to purchase military equipment. Favorable Saudi action on at least a portion of this request is expected. Qaboos has also requested financial aid for several development projects that have been initiated and for civic action programs in the liberated areas.

In *Qatar*, the Saudis have supported Shaykh Khalifa, who, last February, took control away from his normally absent and dilettante

cousin, Shaykh Ahmad, by deploying National Guard units near the Qatar–UAE border.³

In the *United Arab Emirates*, the Saudis have been slow in bringing their influence to bear. Some Saudi aid has been given in recent years to some of the poorer Trucial States (i.e., the construction of a 121-mile highway between Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah) and there is a Saudi Government office in Dubai. The Saudis, however, were too late to head off the collapse of efforts to form a nine-member federation. While Faisal strongly preferred this federation, he accepted the decision of Bahrain and Qatar last summer to become independent. Faisal has not, however, formally recognized the recently established seven-member United Arab Emirates because of his unresolved boundary dispute with Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi. Saudi-Abu Dhabi relations were further soured when Zayid disregarded Saudi advice against agreeing to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviets.

U.S. Efforts to Encourage Saudis. Because of Saudi Arabia's geographical location, its economic strength, and its relative political stability, USG efforts have emphasized Saudi cooperation with the Iranians on the security of the Gulf, financial aid to Yemen and Oman, and a resolution of the Abu Dhabi border dispute. We have neither supported nor directly opposed Saudi initiatives in Southern Yemen. We have pointed out that we believe the best answer to South Yemeni threats is to build up the economic and political strength of the North Yemeni regime rather than subsidize Yemeni tribes of doubtful loyalty to conduct hit-and-run campaigns in the South. As you know, the President sent a letter last September to King Faisal⁴ in response to his appeal that we help Yemen and we have set forth several projects which might be drawn up by U.S.G. technicians or contractors but implemented with Saudi funding. Unfortunately, the Yemen Government's decision to defer reestablishing diplomatic relations with the U.S. has inhibited further progress in this direction. However, the Saudis are moving ahead by themselves on some of these projects, engaging an American contractor to do the basic design work for two highways south from the Yemen-Saudi border.

We are currently reviewing in the context of the Saudi PARA⁵ how we can urge the Saudis to do more in the Peninsula. Their willingness to do more may be accelerated by their assessment of the implications of the recent Soviet-Iraq friendship treaty and growing concern over Iraqi subversive efforts in the lower Gulf. Given Saudi military

³ See Document 113.

⁴ Document 185.

⁵ See Document 152.

deficiencies and dependence on foreign (especially U.S.) advisory and contract support, we do not want to encourage them to play the role of "policeman" in the Peninsula. What we believe is feasible is:

- a) to allow Saudi transfers of unsophisticated surplus U.S.-made military equipment to Yemen;
 - b) to offer to the Saudis for their consideration technical appraisals by U.S. experts of potential projects worked out by the Yemeni or Omani governments;
 - c) to offer U.S. advisors on a reimbursable basis to help the Saudis establish a project aid office in Yemen;
 - d) to encourage the Saudis to provide more scholarships to their schools to students from Peninsular countries;
 - e) to urge stronger Saudi diplomatic representation in the lower Gulf; and
 - f) to stimulate King Faisal to establish relations with the UAE, possibly by putting the Abu Dhabi boundary issue on ice for the time being.
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159. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Departments of State and Defense¹

Jidda, May 22, 1972, 1450Z.

1637. Subj: Issues for Meetings with Prince Sultan: Political.

1. Prince Sultan's visit to US promises to be most important symbolic happening of 1972 for Saudi-US relations,² particularly when seen against events of banner 1971 which brought Vice President, Secretary Rogers and USIS Director Shakespeare to Saudi Arabia while King and Minister Interior Prince Fah'd traveled to US. Recent months have seen important new programs in cooperative US-Saudi endeavors for strengthening Saudi defenses. Highly appropriate, therefore, that Minister of Defense Sultan, third most influential figure in SAG, should be guest of Secretary Laird this year.³

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 SAUD. Secret. It was repeated to CNO, CSA, CSAF, UNCINCEUR, and CHUSMTM Dhahran.

² On his copy of the telegram, Saunders wrote: "he *should* see Pres." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1287, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia)

³ The Defense Department had a strong interest in Sultan's visit, believing it would be an "important gesture in our effort to check the decline of U.S.-Arab relations and would give the lie to allegations that the U.S. has been 'dragging its feet' on programs of great importance to Saudi military planners." (Letter from Nutter to Laird, March 8; Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330-75-0125, Box 16, Saudi Arabia)

2. Charged with both Kingdom's defense and commercial aviation affairs, Sultan has had uninterrupted tenure for almost ten years. Given his seniority in family, his vigor and devotion to country's interests, he promises to be an important voice in SAG policy for number years to come. He acknowledges fully dominant role of King Faisal, but has great influence with King and other key figures, particularly Minister of Finance with whom he generally wins set-tos over money. His views carry weight not only on defense matters but regarding all major aspects Saudi foreign relations as well. He and his older brother Prince Fah'd are strongly pro-American.

3. US objectives with regard to visit may perhaps be seen as threefold.

A. Sultan's presence will provide tangible proof for world to see of closeness US–Saudi ties at time when many other Arab states unwilling tolerate even diplomatic relations. Sultan will become stronger than ever voice at highest Saudi levels supporting friendship and dependence on US.

B. Discussions with Sultan both political and military will provide useful dialogue with alert, highly articulate Saudi spokesman so that in political sphere we can expect useful review each other's viewpoints. Specific suggestions on political topics below.

C. We should seize opportunity to have highest levels US defense establishment stress to Sultan our concern certain operational aspects our cooperative military endeavors. Comments this regard via separate message.⁴

4. It would seem helpful keep in mind also Saudi objectives with regard to visit. While Sultan himself is pleased and flattered by invitation, it clear as well he taking business-like approach, intending discuss specific military topics and desirous seeing certain types equipment and installations (comments on schedule also by separate message).⁵ More important is fact King has agreed to the visit as another important opportunity get across to top USG leadership deep, continuing concerns of Arab govts with Middle East situation and Saudi Arabian security. (Visit has been billed publicly here as mission for the Arab cause.)

5. Sultan will be bearing letter from King to President. Sultan has several times indicated to Amb his warm hope presidential appointment can be arranged at any time during his ten days stay. Amb has,

⁴ In telegram 1641 from Jidda, May 27, Thacher discussed the lack of trained Saudi manpower, which he regarded as "the most serious single issue facing Saudi defense establishment." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 SAUD)

⁵ Telegram 1642 from Jidda, May 24. (Ibid.)

each time, reminded His Highness firmly of very exceptional burdens President will be facing upon his return from Moscow in addition to regular heavy demands on his time. King Faisal has not directly requested meeting for Sultan with President, but implication is strong that he very much hopes for it.⁶ We aware fully difficulties finding space on President's schedule, yet our best assessment of situation impels us conclude inability of Sultan to see President would be very considerable disappointment to King.

6. As Defense Minister focusing on military and subversive threats to Saudi territory, Sultan personally, we believe, more concerned with Arabian Peninsula affairs than Arab-Israel. However, on King's instructions, he will probably give priority in his comments to latter topic and his oral presentation may follow line of letter he bears to President (contents as yet unknown). Central appeal will be for vigorous US action compel Israel give up Arab territory, particularly Jerusalem. It will be interesting observe whether Sultan reflects any shift in customary cautious Saudi posture with which Dept well acquainted. Believe (and sincerely hope) Sultan will abjure reiteration King's Zionist-Communist demon-conspiracy preoccupations. We certain his comments will reflect Faisal's high personal regard and confidence in President, motif we have had played back to us through number of sources over past year.

7. Second most important subject Sultan will broach is that of overall security Arabian Peninsula. Here Saudis continue be deeply preoccupied with long-range aggressive and subversive potential PDRY. Attacks launched on YAR, on Saudis' own territory and Oman are matters greatest concern as is Saudi apprehension Communist elements in PDRY will soon make their disruptive influence felt among weak Gulf states.

8. As regards YAR, Prince Sultan recognizes need for economic growth and social improvement, but he has been much more preoccupied with military means containing PDRY threat. He pressed this point vigorously in recent conversations with Ambassador and may well propose in Washington adoption by US of policy replacing USSR as YAR's principal military supplier, using Saudi Arabia perhaps as channel. While we would endorse concept SAG transferring its own excess military equipment to YAR, seems desirable Saudis continue be encouraged focus their attention on stepped-up economic aid. Given fervid Saudi anti-Communist convictions they tend understandably maximize long-range dangerous potential of PDRY. Embassy does not suggest we should argue this point with Sultan, but he might benefit

⁶ On his copy, Saunders noted: "We will have to check on action item this week." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1287, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia)

from up-to-date US intelligence assessment current strengths, weaknesses, intentions PDRY regime. Sultan might be informed we applaud Saudi decision aid YAR economically and hope aid programs may be expedited.

9. Re Oman, we should express warm appreciation recent signs Saudi intention to intensify assistance, military and perhaps economic, for Oman Sultan's beleaguered regime. Saudi assistance to Oman helps protect Strait of Hormuz which commands world's petroleum lifeline as it passes from Gulf. British have carried heavy and helpful load, and Saudi aid to Omanis can have important impact in accelerating present process eliminating Dhofari rebels. We certain Omanis welcome this, and Saudi cooperation this regard is clear mark statesmanlike approach towards problems of Peninsula defense.

10. With regard UAE and other Gulf states, we should seek Sultan's views on their political future emphasizing our conviction tremendous scope in region for exercise constructive Saudi influence. Latter was pivotal force deterring Gulf states from establishment relations with USSR and Saudi action this case proof its capacity successfully block Baathis, Communist or any other destabilizing groups from exploiting situation.

11. We would hope such action could rank high in Saudi priorities and might encourage re-examination possible settlement troublesome boundary dispute with Abu Dhabi.⁷ We have no specific suggestions as to means or terms of settlement and are aware important and generous concessions King Faisal has already made. We note Saudi Arabia has conceded important Buraimi Oasis region and Abu Dhabi has agreed give Saudis access to sea above Sab Khat Matti. Thus, two major steps toward settlement have been taken. Is there not some means by which remaining and less significant differences might be resolved?

12. Believe Saudis should be thanked and encouraged with regard their consistent and very generous support for Jordan, and likewise, Prince Sultan should be brought up-to-date on continuation our own heavy support there. Subject is obviously delicate one, but Dept might wish sound out Prince on Saudi attitude toward Jordan's military assistance for Gulf states. He should be reminded also our conviction Saudi-Iranian cooperation vital to Gulf security and stability with question raised perhaps whether exchanges at ministerial level might not be considered in near future.

⁷ On his copy, Saunders noted: "hmmmm. King probably shaking old maid finger at Sultan telling him not to talk about it!" (Ibid.)

13. King Faisal will, we think, be looking forward with particular eagerness to information Sultan will bring from Washington re Moscow summit meeting. He will be specially interested, of course, in any results touching on Middle East as well as impact on overall US and free world relations with Soviet bloc.

Thatcher

160. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 15, 1972.

SUBJECT

Saudi Arabian Thoughts on US-Saudi Relations—Your Meeting Today with Prince Sultan

Last night the Saudis passed [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the attached policy paper on closer cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the US² which they would like you to be aware of prior to your talk with Sultan today. *Sultan will pass you the original of this paper during the meeting.*³ The paper is a formal Saudi policy paper approved by King Faisal. *This is in addition to a letter from Faisal which he will give you.*⁴

The attached paper discusses ways by which the US and Saudi Arabia can cooperate more closely. Its conclusions have already been summarized in my briefing memorandum to you.⁵ It is organized to (a) review our mutual interests; (b) note dangers to these interests; and

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 630, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. III. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² Attached but not printed. A translation of the undated policy paper, "Toward Closer Cooperation Between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America," is *ibid.*

³ Nixon placed a large checkmark in the left-hand margin. The original referred to here, with an undated and unattributed cover letter from the Saudi Foreign Ministry, is *ibid.*, Box 761, Presidential Correspondence 1969–74, Saudi Arabia: King Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, 1972.

⁴ Nixon placed a checkmark next to this sentence. Faisal's June 5 letter is attached but not printed.

⁵ Dated June 15. Saunders also sent briefing material to Kissinger on June 13. Both are *ibid.*, Box 630, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. III.

(c) cite ways in which we can move more closely together. *This is an unusually well-reasoned paper.*⁶ It reflects the first significant Saudi effort, growing out of discussions with American friends, to relate to us in terms of a broad common strategy rather than in terms of parochial Saudi interests in the Arabian Peninsula.

A. Mutual Interests

—Saudi Arabia is in a very strategic position and sits on the largest proven oil reserves in the world. It is stable and conservative.

—The US has interest in containing the Soviet threat and continuing the flow of oil. The latter will be increasingly important to the US, which is becoming more dependent on foreign oil.

—The US and Saudi Arabia, therefore, have a common interest in strong regional security and stability and joint cooperation in this task.

B. Dangers to Mutual Interests

—The *Soviets* have long-term objectives in the area and are able to absorb short-term setbacks with the Arabs. They have made great headway. The US has not exploited similar situations. That some Arabs have not gone Communist is not the result of American foreign policy but results from the fact that some Arabs can withstand Communism. The fact that Western interests have not yet been decisively threatened does not mean the Soviet threat is not real. The USSR already has several alliances and treaties in the area.

—The *Iraqis* seek expansion in the Gulf, even paying the price of a treaty with the Soviets.

—The *South Yemen* regime at the tip of the Gulf is infiltrated by both Soviets and Chinese and is active against North Yemen and Oman.

—Though *China* has not penetrated the area, they support rebels in Oman, the regime of South Yemen and Palestinian guerrillas. They will use these forces to establish themselves.

C. US-Saudi Deterrents

—It is in the interests of Saudi Arabia and the US to work together to meet these dangers. This does not imply a treaty or a pact, but simply means cooperation in the protection and defense of Arabia, the Red Sea area and Persian Gulf.

—*Political* deterrents would include the collaboration of friendly states ready to resist Soviet dangers. Saudi Arabia should cooperate with the Gulf states, Iran, Jordan and give support to North Yemen and Oman. The US should play a positive role.

⁶ Nixon placed a checkmark next to this sentence.

—Saudi Arabia must have the *military* capability to develop defense belts to protect its own frontiers and those of neighboring friendly states.

Saudi Arabia concludes that [these points were covered in your brief]:⁷

—Saudi Arabia cannot find security only within its own borders; the existence on its borders of friendly states is the only basis for planning long-range security of Saudi Arabia. Further, cooperation with Iran and with Jordan and the maintenance of the Jordanian regime is highly important. Likewise, neighboring states of North Yemen and Oman must be stable and viable.

—Saudi Arabian cooperation with Iran takes effort by both sides. The Shah must recognize that, although Iran is stronger, cooperation with Saudi Arabia is necessary.

—Saudi Arabia and Iran must work together to create good circumstances in the new Union of Emirates.

—Saudi Arabia, in modernizing its armed forces, is aware that a new strategic concept taking into account the situation in the western Indian Ocean and Mid-East must guide its development.

—Saudi relations with Egypt under Sadat are a great improvement after years of conflict with Nasser. The Saudis would like to *reduce Soviet influence in Egypt* and the Egyptians would like to reassert their own independence from the USSR. This must be *the principal regional strategic goal for all of us*. Saudi Arabia is using its relationship with Iran to create circumstances in which Sadat may disengage from Moscow.

—The US should work for that disengagement by putting pressure on Israel to arrive at an Arab-Israeli settlement.

*Suggested response: You can say that you found this paper very thoughtful and an excellent basis for our continued cooperation.*⁸ [Your talking points already address the specific points.]⁹

⁷ Brackets are in the original.

⁸ Nixon placed a checkmark next to this sentence.

⁹ Brackets are in the original.

161. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 15, 1972, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Saudi–United States Relations

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, Minister of Defense and Aviation of
Saudi Arabia

Ambassador Ibrahim al-Sowayel, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia

Secretary of Defense Hon. Melvin R. Laird

General Haig, NSC Staff

Mr. Camille Nowfel, Department of State, Interpreter

The President welcomed Prince Sultan and said that Secretary Laird had informed him of his talks with the Prince.² The President said he realized the dangers that threaten the Middle East and appreciated this opportunity to talk with the Prince particularly as he had recently held discussions with the Shah of Iran. Referring to recent developments in Iraq, the President said that the strength and stability of our friends in the area such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Jordan is very important to preservation of security in the region. He was pleased to note that Saudi Arabia has been giving support to Jordan and has been cooperating with Iran in this respect. The President described King Hussein of Jordan as a truly courageous man worthy of support and assistance.

Prince Sultan thanked the President for receiving him and conveyed to the President the greetings and respects of His Majesty, King Faisal. Saudi Arabia considers the United States to be the champion and the defender of peace throughout the world. Whenever the name of President Nixon is mentioned, people immediately equate it with

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL SAUD–US. Secret; Exdis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Sultan met with Rogers on June 14. At this meeting, the two men discussed the Moscow Summit, the radical Arab threat, North Yemen, and the Saudi concern for Sadat. (Telegram 109890 to Jidda, June 16; *ibid.*, POL 7 SAUD) In his June 15 meeting with Sultan, Sisco discussed the Arab-Israeli conflict and other items in the talking points in detail. (Memorandum of conversation; *ibid.*) See also Document 191.

² In his June 13 meeting with Laird, Sultan reviewed the two major political trends in the Middle East, the “continuing aggression against the Palestinians” and the “great concern in the Middle East, particularly among religious leaders, regarding the growth of pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese elements.” (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–75–0125, Box 16, Saudi Arabia 000.1—1972)

peace and service to the cause of peace. The Prince especially appreciated the President's remarks about the security situation in the area since this reflected the President's complete understanding of the Saudi Arabian situation. He wished to assure the President of Saudi friendship for the Shah of Iran, of its good relations with Jordan, Kuwait and with most of its neighbors. In fact, Saudi Arabia is friendly with every country in the area except those countries which do not wish its friendship.

The President sought Prince Sultan's opinion regarding the possibility of a brief stop in the Persian Gulf area by Secretary Rogers following the SEATO meeting in Australia.³

The Prince warmly welcomed Secretary Rogers visit to the Gulf saying it is always good to have a friend visit us.

The President asked about the military situation in Saudi Arabia.

Secretary Laird explained that he and the Prince had discussed this subject and had talked about training programs, the modernization of the Saudi Armed Forces and the need of Saudi Arabia for naval craft. He described the relationship between the United States Department of Defense and the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense and Aviation as excellent.

The Prince expressed his gratitude to Secretary Laird and to each of the three military service Secretaries for the extensive discussions he held with them at the Pentagon on Tuesday, June 13. The meetings had been pleasant, inspiring and encouraging and the Prince was hopeful that Saudi Arabia will have from the United States the cooperation needed to improve its military posture and to modernize its Armed Forces.

Secretary Laird added that the discussions had covered the F-5 aircraft being purchased by Saudi Arabia from the United States as well as spare parts and other military equipment. These matters are going to be looked into further.

The President expressed his hope that there will be close cooperation between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran in light of recent developments in Iraq.

Prince Sultan agreed stating that King Faisal has improved relations with Iran to the point where today Saudi Arabia has an excellent relationship with that country, despite the fact that there once had been boundary problems with Iran. The same is true of Saudi relations with Kuwait. Both on-shore and off-shore, difficulties with Kuwait had been

³ Rogers was scheduled to attend the SEATO and ANZUS Council Meetings June 24-25 in Canberra, Australia. Following this conversation, however, Sisco told Sultan that Rogers planned to stop in Bahrain to indicate U.S. interest in the Gulf but would not have time for a stop in Saudi Arabia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 SAUD)

overcome and, in fact, King Faisal had given to Kuwait Port Saud in an effort to improve relations. The Prince said that Saudi Arabia wishes to assure everyone that it is a peace loving nation that believes in construction and opposes destruction.

The President asked about the loyalty of the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces to the King and to the Prince saying that he recognized that this was a very sensitive question.

The Prince expressed his appreciation for the concern for Saudi Arabia that lay behind this question. He explained that in 1960 the Saudi Government had discovered that some of its Armed Forces personnel had become involved with women of ill repute and were being blackmailed by agents of Egyptian President Nasser. These young men were enticed to undertake a revolt by promises that they would, if successful, be given positions of high authority. This had happened prior to 1962 when conditions in Saudi Arabia were bad, particularly because of the misrule of the late King Saud. There was instability and confusion and then Crown Prince Faisal was deprived of authority to do anything to help improve that deplorable situation. Later, however, when King Faisal assumed the reins of government, the authorities had begun to gather information about certain elements within the Armed Forces. Nothing drastic was done at that time (1962) but it was realized that these young men had direct relations with Egypt and that Egypt was behind their subversive activity.

The Prince continued that in 1964 President Nasser air-dropped arms and ammunition to these men to carry out their subversive role. These weapons were to be dropped at a point between Jidda and Medina and some tribes in that area were to be recruited to use these arms to overthrow the Government in Jidda, seize power and bring about a division of the country between the Hijaz and Najd. However, the tribes and a number of Armed Forces personnel being trained in that area had taken possession of these arms and brought them to the Government. The arms were of Egyptian origin and stamped "made in Egypt." The Saudi Government announced this incident to members of the diplomatic community and to all the world so that they might know that Egypt was trying to stir up subversion within the Saudi Armed Forces.

The President asked if there were any Communist subversive activities in Saudi Arabia today.

The Prince said that two Communist-connected cells have been discovered: one 20-man cell in the Hijaz and another 12-man cell in Dhahran. The Saudis have looked for others but have not found any. Those involved were arrested and brought to trial. Assuring the President that the Saudi Armed Forces were absolutely loyal to King, country and religion, the Prince said that many members of the military had

insisted upon execution of those of their colleagues arrested for subversive activity. However, the King had ordered them court martialed. The legal proceedings in this case were concluded about one month ago and all have been sentenced to prison terms. None will be executed. It is the Government's desire that instead they be rehabilitated and become again good citizens of their country. The Prince cited as the best evidence of the loyalty of the Armed Forces to the King what happened during the Yemen Civil war. At that time President Nasser had made great efforts to overthrow the Saudi Arabian Government sending 80,000 Egyptian troops to Yemen to help achieve that aim. Added to this were the problems created by the late King Saud and his efforts to undermine King Faisal. All of these efforts, however, were of no avail, proving beyond any doubt that Saudi Arabia's Armed Forces are loyal to the King, dedicated to the service of their country, and opposed to all subversive elements.

The President said that he was pleased to hear this. He wished to assure the Prince that he would keep in touch with him through Secretary Laird. It is in the United States interest that Saudi Arabia remain strong and independent.

The Prince thanked the President for giving him so much of his valuable time. At this point, he asked Mr. Nowfel to translate into English a note from King Faisal to the President. When Mr. Nowfel had done so, the President asked that a written translation be made and delivered to General Haig so that a reply to it might be prepared.⁴ The Prince also delivered to the President a note, with an English translation prepared by the Saudis, itemizing points of mutual concern.⁵

The meeting concluded with the Prince conveying to the President the greetings and best wishes of his brother, Prince Fahd. The President in turn asked that his greetings be conveyed to Prince Fahd and to His Majesty, King Faisal. The President also thanked Prince Sultan for the gifts which had been delivered that afternoon to the White House.

⁴ Nixon's letter to Faisal, July 21, is *ibid*.

⁵ Apparently a reference to the policy paper summarized in Document 160.

162. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, July 13, 1972, 1530Z.

2329. No Distribution Outside Department. For NEA. Subject: Next Steps re National Guard Program. Ref: (A) State 119605; (B) Jidda 2255.²

Summary: Embassy finds King opposed to companies and still wishing full government-to-government relationship for National Guard program. While we continue believe there is strong general sentiment that project go to US sources, yet British and French are busily pushing their proposals and we not certain how much longer US can delay without enhancing prospects for other governments. Complexity of Guard project may have been exaggerated and we believe it probably less difficult to carry out than F-5 or Navy programs. Perhaps no more than 20–25 US personnel required supervise implementation govt-to-govt contract for hard and soft ware. Accordingly, Embassy urges decision in favor of govt-to-govt offer as best means assuring substantial sale of goods and services, strengthening of Saudi ties of dependence and close association with US and because direct US involvement is best means assuring that Guard project is run in manner to safeguard long-run prospects for Saudi internal security. *End summary.* Following is our assessment present situation:

1. King's attitude: While King was close-mouthed in discussion reported ref tel (B) yet his posture quite consistent reports we have had from other sources. He is opposed to private companies, does not want them to "get between USG and SAG" in implementation of project, i.e. he wishes full govt-to-govt relationship for all aspects of program. One aspect King's view is patently unacceptable to USG: concept that no company at all should be involved and that entire project be carried out by US military.

2. Preference for US: Our estimate there is general sentiment throughout top levels Saudi Government, including (as reported to us

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6–4 SAUD. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

² Telegram 119605 to Jidda, June 30, authorized Thacher to tell Faisal that the Saudi decision to drop Raytheon was a "complete surprise," and that the United States believed contracting directly with a private firm for National Guard modernization was problematic given the sensitive nature of the National Guard's role. Thacher could offer the services of experienced U.S. personnel to develop a realistic proposal, although not U.S. implementation of this proposal. In telegram 2255 from Jidda, July 9, Thacher reported that during his authorized talk with Faisal, he was unable to overcome Faisal's "strong antipathy" toward private firms such as Raytheon due to "their willingness pay large commission to Khashoggi and like." (Both *ibid.*)

earlier by Kamal Adham) King himself, for US to carry out project because of political-military considerations as well as on basis superior US performance.

3. Competition: US has taken two months before making known its views following information received from Prince Abdullah that Raytheon proposal not satisfactory. We have left field open for British and French pursue vigorously their efforts secure National Guard program. British are, of course, well situated with their advisory mission at Riyadh which is in daily contact with senior National Guard officials. Newly arrived British Ambassador had hardly presented credentials before he rushed off call on top levels of Guard. Raytheon reps here inform us French are gleefully stating they have inside track and that Raytheon and USG no longer in running. Both UK and French will, we believe, be happy tailor their proposals (or appear to tailor them) any way necessary overcome King's objections. We cannot guess how much longer Prince Abdullah will wait for proposals from US which King might accept. While Abdullah is being exhorted to "go American" he may soon be able to point to US delays as reasons for urging acceptance either French or UK proposals in order get on with matter which we know Abdullah most anxious to do.

4. We believe it would not be helpful for us to urge again further consideration of Raytheon at this stage in view of King's desire company not handle National Guard contract because of association with Kashoggi. (While King did not say this specifically, it has reached us from so many sources that we certain this correct.) Yet in its predicament, Raytheon enjoys widespread respect in Saudi Arabia for its fine record as a performer on Hawk project. All may not be lost for Raytheon but company will have to be patient. Embassy will remain alert for any possible opportunity give company renewed chance, consistent with interest of other US firms who might legitimately wish obtain contract.

5. Believe State and Defense should recognize clearly nature of Guard program and what it might involve for USG were we to play role on following lines: survey team to work out precise character of a practical National Guard program, hardware to be sold SAG on govt-to-govt basis, govt-to-govt contract under which USG would employ private contractor to implement maintenance and training for National Guard. Our understanding first two aspects poses no special difficulties for USG. We concur fully in need of survey team to draw up proposal and that this first step is sine qua non of any further USG involvement. However, complexity of Guard project may have been, we believe, exaggerated. It is not nearly as complex task as Raytheon has undertaken in training Saudi Hawk battalions in Saudi Arabia. (Guard is more homogeneous and considerably less sophisticated organization

than Saudi Army.) Point is National Guard should not be difficult organization to guide once a program is formulated nor will it be impossible task provide improved weapons and simple training procedures that can upgrade guard without making it serious competitor to Saudi Army. Army Attaché here was intimately involved in development Raytheon proposals and it his belief program is not unmanageable and that with competent company performing main tasks, US might have to supply perhaps no more than 20 personnel to supervise. We assess National Guard project as far less complex with less risk of failure than either F-5 or Navy programs.

6. King's obsession with "no companies": We think King can be convinced a company must be employed if we will offer govt-to-govt contract, since this would eliminate agency fees and assure King of reliable performance. Prince Abdullah, Prince Sultan, others in government, would urge King to accept US-SAG govt-to-govt contract.

7. Accordingly, Embassy urges it be authorized to offer full govt-to-govt arrangement to King on lines described para 5 above for following reasons: (A) sale of some \$300 million worth of US goods and services to cash customer, (B) strengthening of Saudi sense of dependence and intimate association and trust with USG, with consequent reinforcement Saudi-US ties (with Arab governments these days we have far too few opportunities forge significant links of kind National Guard program provides), (C) there will be distinct sense Saudi disappointment if we fail come forward to meet their desires, (D) long-run prospects Saudi internal security best assured by USG (rather than French or British) having central role National Guard program implementation. (It certainly seems to be King's view that he wants sensitive Guard project entrusted to USG.)

8. Disadvantages are that we will have to field supervisory team, thereby increasing number of US military personnel in Saudi Arabia. Yet our best estimate is that if Navy supervisory, G-5 and possible guard in-country personnel requirements added to present USMTM personnel, total would be less than what US military had in this country several years ago.

9. Enormous significance of Saudi Arabia to US is often reiterated. Active willingness take on National Guard program constitutes important USG step by which we can further strengthen our role here, demonstrate support for King Faisal's government and actively pursue our objectives of insuring internal security and close Saudi-US relations.

10. In order learn of possible further aspects Saudi thinking Amb will be seeing Acting Guard Commander Prince Badr afternoon July 14 and will try convince him accept proposals set out reftel (A).

11. Would appreciate whenever possible guidance on what we might say to Raytheon here (para 12, reftel (B)),³ otherwise distorted info on Amb's meeting with King may percolate back to Raytheon head Adams.

Thacher

³ In paragraph 12 of telegram 2255, Thacher noted that it was desirable to coordinate statements to Raytheon both in Jidda and in the United States, and that Raytheon should be given a generalized account of Thacher's meeting with Faisal along with assurances of continued U.S. support. Thacher was informed in telegram 128308 to Jidda, July 15, that there was "no advantage in continuing to press the company's case" at this time. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 6-4 SAUD)

163. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank (Kearns)¹

Washington, September 1, 1972.

Dear Mr. Kearns:

We are reviewing with the Department of Defense our requirements for security assistance to various NEA countries over the FY 74-78 time frame. Present projections are that Foreign Military Sales credits will become increasingly tight during this period. Several major recipients of grant military aid are expected to switch in whole or in part to credit assistance programs. The outlook for a corresponding increase in Congressional appropriations under the Foreign Military Sales Act is not encouraging. We are, therefore, facing the painful decision of how to apportion a static or even declining amount of credit money among a growing number of claimants.

After careful review, we have concluded that the most feasible option is to move Saudi Arabia from Foreign Military Sales to EXIM financing to meet its military credit needs in FY 74 and subsequent years. Saudi Arabia has used only a small amount (about \$1 million) of Foreign Military Sales credit guarantee money during the past several fiscal years. We have no outstanding Saudi requests for credit assistance for projected major military programs nor any indications that the Saudis will approach us for credit during the next four years. The expected continued rapid growth of the Saudi economy, moreover, should

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 NEAR E. No classification marking. Drafted on August 31 by Wrampelmeier and concurred in in PM/MAS, PM/PA, NEA/RA, NEA/ARP, E/IFD/ODF, OSD/ISA/NESA, and NEA.

provide sufficient funds for both military and civilian expenditures during this time frame.

It is, therefore, difficult to gauge Saudi requirements for military sales credits in the post-FY 73 period. It is quite possible that the Saudis will not desire any credit assistance. There are, however, two contingencies for which we believe it prudent to be prepared. As implementation of planned Saudi Arabian economic development projects goes into high gear, the Saudis may find it desirable in any given year to stretch out payments for new military hardware and services in order to avoid deferring initiation of important economic and social projects. We would also like to be able to offer credit or credit guarantee facilities if necessary to enable American suppliers to compete effectively with foreign government-subsidized arms suppliers or to arrange for payment terms convenient for the Saudis. For the above reasons, we want to preserve our ability to respond positively to Saudi Arabian credit requests should they arise during the FY 74–78 period.

I am aware that EXIM Bank feels constrained to stay within certain overall limits each year for all military credit purposes. I am also aware that EXIM policy is to avoid providing more military than commercial credits to any one foreign country. Nevertheless, requests for credits or credit guarantees for purchases of military hardware and services would give us increased flexibility to meet the military credit needs of important allies in the NEA region while remaining capable of helping the Saudis to meet any legitimate military credit requirements that may arise.

A somewhat similar situation exists for the newly independent Persian Gulf states of Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Given our policy preference that sales of military equipment and services to these states be handled to the extent possible through commercial sources, EXIM would also seem to be the appropriate source for any financing required. Kuwait, the largest of the Arab Gulf states, is already eligible for EXIM military credit financing.

I urge, therefore, that you give serious consideration to the case of Saudi Arabia and let me know, were we not to request Foreign Military Sales credits for Saudi Arabia in FY 74–78, whether we could count on EXIM Bank to give favorable consideration to requests for military credits/credit guarantees from Saudi Arabia and from the three other aforementioned Gulf states even in circumstances where the Bank may not have an equivalent amount of commercial loans outstanding.

Sincerely,

Joseph J. Sisco²

² Printed from a copy with this typed signature and an indication that Sisco signed the original.

164. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 29, 1972.

SUBJECT

Participation and Saudi-U.S. Oil Relations

PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral
Resources of Saudi Arabia

His Excellency Ibrahim al-Sowayel, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the U.S.

Honorable John N. Irwin, Acting Secretary

Honorable Rodger P. Davies, Acting Assistant Secretary for NEA

Mr. James Akins, Director, Office of Fuels and Energy

Mr. Nicholas Veliotos, Special Assistant, U

Mr. Francois M. Dickman, Director, NEA/ARP

Summary: Yamani saw few obstacles remaining before reaching final agreement with the oil companies on participation. He did not believe other oil producing countries could disrupt this agreement if he could show that it is fair and advantageous. Once participation is achieved, Saudi Arabia wants to invest in downstream oil operations. Otherwise, it will soon no longer be in Saudi Arabia's economic interest to increase oil exports and accumulate surplus cash reserves in depreciating currencies. He hoped the U.S. would give Saudi oil special treatment. If an early start is made, the end result would be to have a huge Saudi investment in downstream facilities in the U.S. with an obligation by the Saudis to move their oil to these facilities in future years. Not only would this assure future energy supplies to the U.S. but would also benefit the U.S. balance of payments. *End Summary*

Responding to Mr. Irwin's question about the status of negotiations on participation with the oil companies, Minister Yamani said a few obstacles remain but he believed these could be resolved. What is important now is what will happen once the participation negotiations are concluded. This will be the starting point of a new relationship between the oil companies, the producer governments, and the consumers. Full cooperation among all three parties will be needed to achieve stability in the energy field.

Mr. Irwin hoped that the agreement the Minister was negotiating would assure future stability but what concerned the U.S. was the at-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET SAUD. Confidential. Drafted by Dickman and approved on October 3 by Nicholas Veliotos.

titude of other OPEC members. Given OPEC's support for the "law of changing circumstances," Mr. Irwin hoped that other OPEC members would accept the results of these negotiations and not try to disrupt them.

Yamani recognized that this was an important consideration but noted that the bulk of the oil that is exported now comes from the Gulf. Moreover, Saudi Arabia will be producing in the near future almost as much oil as all the other Gulf countries combined. The Kingdom's oil reserves also are almost as large as the other Gulf countries combined, and may be much larger if anticipated new reserves are added. Therefore, if these are serious negotiations and a satisfactory agreement is worked out, Saudi Arabia will take the lead and other countries will not be in a position to dictate a different settlement.

Minister Yamani admitted that he did not know if he could sell what he was negotiating to other oil producing countries. He had been working hard to convince the Kuwaitis. He did not expect support from Iraq, Libya, or Algeria, although the latter's attitude had been more pragmatic than the others. Therefore, it was important for him to be able to show OPEC that the agreement for participation which he had negotiated was the best and most successful choice. If this could be done, Yamani believed that the attraction in producer countries to nationalize or take unilateral actions against the oil companies would diminish.

Proving that participation was different from and more beneficial than nationalization would not be possible, however, unless the national oil companies of producing governments invest in downstream operations. This Yamani said would establish an economic interest for the producer government and allow its national oil company to play an important role in the world energy field, just as the major oil companies have done up to now. Downstream investment would encourage stability of supply. Consumer nations which established a relationship with the national oil companies would guarantee for themselves a good amount of crude in the future when the world's oil is in short supply.

The Minister observed that given the present growth in Saudi oil production, the Kingdom's oil revenues will soon exceed its spending capacity. There will no longer be any need to accumulate any more surplus foreign exchange to deposit in foreign banks since the appreciation of oil left under ground will be greater than the return on foreign exchange assets. This problem could be avoided if national oil companies of producer nations can go downstream. Otherwise, if no outlets for this surplus cash are available, pressures to implement a production control program would be inevitable and this would have a serious and adverse effect on the consumer.

Yamani noted that Saudi Arabia was the only country opposing a production control program at the present time. In 1964, Venezuela had tried to get OPEC support for production controls but Saudi Arabia had vetoed this. At that time Saudi Arabia had Kuwait and Libya on its side but this has changed. Kuwait has now established production controls and is in fact thinking of decreasing production in the future. Libya has already decreased its production. While Abu Dhabi's production is rising, it doesn't really count as a replacement source.

Mr. Irwin agreed that close cooperation will be needed by all parties. If a satisfactory agreement is reached, the new investments which Minister Yamani had spoken of should strengthen the bonds of cooperation among all the parties—producers, consumers and oil companies.

Minister Yamani said he was glad to hear this but he thought it would require some action by the United States Government. Perhaps a treaty or bilateral agreement would be needed to give Saudi oil special treatment in the U.S. markets. He believed that one day a large percent of U.S. energy requirements would come from Saudi Arabia. As the United States' energy requirements continue to grow and more of it comes from the outside, Saudi Arabia could become the number one foreign oil supplier to the United States. While no one could depend on a piece of paper to assure energy supply over the next 20 to 30 years, Yamani believed that Saudi policy toward world energy requirements was a friendly one. This had recently been reiterated in a Royal statement early in August that Saudi Arabia had a moral commitment to sell its oil to consumer countries and not to impose an embargo for political reasons. Nevertheless, it might be in Saudi Arabia's economic interest to restrict production if adequate downstream investment outlets are not provided for PETROMIN (the national oil company). Such investment in the U.S. would effectively guarantee Saudi interest in the continued growth of production and would help the U.S. balance of payments.

Mr. Irwin remarked that mutual interests always provided the best guarantees and he hoped that something could be worked out. What the Minister had said raised a lot of questions. Mr. Akins interjected to say that he did not think a treaty would be needed to assure Saudi investments in the U.S. Moreover, he expected that the whole U.S. import program will be changed. The Acting Secretary noted that the U.S. would be looking especially hard at its whole energy policy in the next year. Mr. Irwin agreed that a piece of paper would not guide us over the next 20 to 30 years but as the Minister knew from his legal training in the U.S., U.S. (and Western) business was based on the sanctity of contract. That is why we were pleased that the Minister and the oil companies seemed to be moving toward an agreement that both sides could live with.

Mr. Irwin said he could appreciate the Saudis' interest in investing funds in downstream operations but wondered whether investment might not profitably be made outside the oil industry. The American people have vast investments all over the world. European and Japanese investment in diverse sectors of the American economy is growing. While recognizing that there is a difference between private and government investments, there would be opportunities for Saudi investment in other fields as well.

Minister Yamani insisted that the most logical outlet for Saudi investment funds would be in downstream oil operations. He recognized that private investors looked for the highest return. In the case of government companies, however, national pride plays a role. While investment in such activities as steel might be more profitable, he believed that the Saudis would want to invest in a product with which they are identified. The extent of Saudi investment in downstream oil operations would of course depend on the attitude of the consumer countries. If Saudi investment is welcomed in downstream operations in a particular country, the Saudis will have an interest in supplying markets to that country for their share of oil obtained from participation. If a start could be made with the United States at an early stage, the end result would be to have a huge Saudi investment in the United States with an obligation on the part of the Saudi national oil company to move its oil to the United States in future years. This would assure the US a continued source of energy in the period 10 to 15 years from now when oil is expected to be in short supply in the world.

Turning to the negotiations now underway with the oil companies, Yamani said these are to be resumed on Sunday, September 30. He was optimistic that a settlement could be reached soon provided that the companies were willing to move on compensation which remained the principal stumbling block. Arrangements for marketing Saudi Arabia's future crude oil share were virtually completed. Yamani was particularly pleased that the oil companies now seemed to acknowledge that participation was not partial nationalization but realized that it was the basis for a new and permanent partnership. He affirmed that the Saudis were serious about being partners and wanted strong links with the oil companies.

Mr. Irwin thanked the Minister for his presentation. He appreciated the responsible nature of the negotiations which Yamani had conducted and hoped that the investments that he had spoken of would assure stability of supply for all consumer countries. He was also encouraged to hear Yamani's description of where negotiations stood. From the US point of view, the most difficult issue was compensation. As the Minister well knew, the American Congress had passed several laws calling for sanctions in the event of inadequate compensation. The

USG did not wish to get involved in the details of compensation but only to be sure that compensation was recognized by both sides as fair and equitable.

Yamani reiterated that all he was looking for was “a fair deal.” It was important to work out something that was acceptable so that Saudi Arabia would not stand alone. He would hate to present an agreement to OPEC and have it turned down. This would be bad for everyone including the oil industry. Yamani added that he had agreed not to use net book value as basis for compensation even though he had received a strong letter to the contrary from the Secretary General of OPEC. He thought that OPEC’s position would have to be changed and he was endeavoring to do so. Yamani added that a move was afoot now to have a high level meeting in Tripoli to review what he had been negotiating. Hence there was all the more urgent reason to reach a fair settlement.

165. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 16, 1972.

SUBJECT

Saudi Arabian National Guard Program

PARTICIPANTS

The Honorable Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary, NEA
The Honorable Nicholas G. Thacher, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
The Honorable James H. Noyes, DOD/ISA
Colonel George Maloney, DOD/ISA
Mr. Francois M. Dickman, Country Director, NEA/ARP
Mr. Brooks Wrampelmeier, Country Officer for Saudi Arabia, NEA/ARP

Mr. Sisco invited Colonel Maloney to outline his findings on the Saudi National Guard. Colonel Maloney said that as the National Guard has no Saudi officers and its personnel are 99% illiterate in Arabic, 10–20 years are estimated to be needed to carry out the program envisioned by the Guard leadership. Commercial dictates, however, obliged both the UKG and Raytheon to agree to National Guard Com-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6–4 SAUD. Confidential. Drafted by Wrampelmeier.

mander Prince Abdullah's requests to do the job in five years. Observers in Saudi Arabia believe that Abdullah is seeking to develop a force with a wallop in as short a time as possible so as to have some say in the succession when King Faisal passes from the scene.

Mr. Sisco asked if we want to give Prince Abdullah this capability. Ambassador Thacher observed that the King feels a need to reward Abdullah for past loyalty, especially for the role played by the National Guard during the March 1964 confrontation between Faisal and then King Saud. Mr. Sisco wondered what alternative options to U.S. help existed for Abdullah. The Ambassador thought that, if rebuffed by the USG, Abdullah would return to the King and say that he wants the British. The Ambassador doubted that the King would agree and was positive that Minister of Defense Prince Sultan would oppose a British role. Colonel Maloney remarked that Abdullah has threatened to go to either the UK or to the French if turned down by us.² He felt, however, that the King rather than Abdullah would make the final decision.

Asked how we should proceed, Colonel Maloney noted that the King wants to move promptly on National Guard reorganization to satisfy Abdullah. He suggested that the USG might offer to start with organizing two, rather than four, battle groups with the option to add more later on. No finite time limit for this program should be set. Complex or sensitive items, like artillery, should be supplied much later. Mr. Sisco agreed that for political reasons he would prefer to see artillery be a later add-on to the program. Continuing, Colonel Maloney suggested that the National Guard be given as much communications equipment as it wants and that its trucks be replaced with armored cars (armed initially with machine guns) and APC's. The Guard already has 103 × 106 mm recoilless rifles on order from Spain.

Mr. Sisco asked who would handle the software portions of the program. Colonel Maloney said that this could be Raytheon or any other qualified American commercial firm. The American business community in Saudi Arabia is aware of the National Guard project but no companies other than Raytheon have expressed active interest in obtaining this contract. Mr. Dickman and Mr. Wrampelmeier confirmed that there have been no approaches from other companies here.

Mr. Sisco then asked about the possibility of a government-to-government arrangement. Mr. Noyes said that DOD/ISA has studied

² In an October 17 meeting with Thacher and Wrampelmeier, Defense Department representatives pointed out the potential problems associated with U.S. arming and advising of two potentially conflicting Saudi forces, the regular army and the National Guard. Thacher countered that it was better for the United States to arm both sides than to allow for Britain or France to arm and advise them as "that could lead to a situation in which different foreign governments backed rival forces." He thought a double U.S. role could mitigate the rivalry. (*Ibid.*)

this question carefully and sees no alternative if the National Guard project is to be carried out by U.S. sources. He cautioned, however, that Secretary Laird's approval still needs to be obtained before a USG commitment can be given to the Saudis. Mr. Sisco said that he had talked to Secretary Rogers about this project and could state categorically that Mr. Noyes has the Department of State's clearance to proceed on a government-to-government basis. Mr. Sisco added that if need be, he could ask the Secretary to speak to Secretary Laird.³ Mr. Noyes said that DOD/ISA will begin promptly to draft a paper to Secretary Laird recommending his approval for negotiation of a government-to-government agreement with the Saudis for the National Guard.⁴

³ On November 28 Rogers wrote Laird that a favorable response would be sent to Faisal concerning a government-to-government agreement for modernization of the National Guard, making "maximum use of American contractors with supervision exercised by a modest Department of Defense contract administration element." (Ibid., AID(US) 8-7 SAUD)

⁴ A meeting between State and Defense Department representatives took place on October 19 at which they discussed practical steps for proceeding with the negotiation of a government-to-government agreement, once Laird gave the green light. See Document 167.

166. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, October 17, 1972, 1433Z.

3347. Dept pass Cairo. Kuwait pass Muscat. Subject: Saudi-US Oil Relations: Implications of Yamani's proposed "special relationship." Ref: Yamani-Irwin Memcon Sept 29.²

Summary: Special oil relationship proposed by Saudi Minister Petroleum another of constructive developments made possible by reduced tensions in area; it dramatically illustrates King Faisal's continued gift for creative and independent statecraft. Saudis may see Yamani's proposal partly as opportunity to increase their prestige at home and abroad. We believe, however, that primary object of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 1 SAUD-US. Confidential; Limdis. It was repeated to Abu Dhabi, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Brussels, Caracas, CINCEUR for POLAD, Dhahran, Djakarta, Kuwait, Lagos, London, Manama, Rome, Tehran, Tripoli, Tunis, Vienna, and the Mission to OECD in Paris.

² Document 164.

proposal—and of other Saudi initiatives in economic and military fields—is to improve their long-term security prospects by strengthening and expanding ties with US. US dependence on any Arab nation for significant percentage of its future energy needs obviously undesirable—but since some such dependence appears inevitable by start of 1980's best assurance of uninterrupted oil supply lies in evident and mutual self-interest. In case of SAG, most effective inducement we could offer for it to continue producing oil at levels we will require may not be purely economic (i.e. access for US investment market) but take form of closer, stronger relations across the board. *End Summary.*

1. MinPet Yamani's offer of SAG investment in US energy sector in return for preferential treatment for Saudi oil has wide-ranging implications for both countries. Based upon info in ref memcon, we have outlined some of political and economic considerations that may underlie Yamani's offer, and considered its impact on US–Saudi relations.

2. Favorable atmosphere in area. Minister Yamani's offer, as well as negotiations with oil companies that precede it, are made possible by diminished tension that has prevailed throughout area since 1970 when cease-fire came into effect along Canal and fedayeen eliminated from East Jordan. It is thus latest in series of steps taken by Arabs—including expulsion of Russians from Egypt—which exploit potential of détente and perhaps even add to its momentum.

3. Faisal's independence and creativity. Offer is dramatic evidence that King, despite deep hostility to Zionism and misgivings about our Middle East policy, is still capable of creative and independent statecraft where his nation's bilateral interests are concerned. Yamani offer, we note, put forward when Cairo press (Cairo 2768)³ once again urging Arabs to use oil as political weapon in struggle against Israel—a demand which King previously rejected in *Al Musawwar* interview August 4. We consider it immaterial whether idea of special oil relationship originated with Yamani or Faisal himself. What matters is that given King's remarkable capability for hard work and his known concern for even minor administrative decisions, all Saudis assume Yamani has King's full support—just as he did on previous issue of participation.

4. Opportunity for image polishing. There no doubt SAG also aware of possibilities in this dramatic proposal of useful public relations for itself. What King and Princes have long needed, at home as well as abroad, is more dynamic and progressive image. Present oil initiatives, in which Saudis act as trail blazers for “all oil producing

³ Telegram 2768 from Cairo, October 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PPB 9 EGY)

nations" (per local press), appeal to Saudis' instinctive feelings of religious and cultural superiority. Conclusion of preferential oil relationship would help give wider credence to SAG's assertion that its responsible approach to modernization produces better results than does flashy stick-handling of revolutionary Arabs—who often fall on their faces.

5. Saudi Arabia's long-term security considerations. For most of last 40 years, since oil agreement signed with ARAMCO, close ties with USG have been bedrock of SAG security policy. As Chief of State whose experience in international politics dates back to Versailles Conference, King Faisal has long memory. Two conclusions he drew early were that USG had no designs of imposing its political influence on Saudi Arabia and that USG support for Saudi external security was essential for oil-rich and people-poor country. USG, in Faisal's eyes, has proved itself in time of need, most notably by Lend-Lease shipments in 1943–45 and by providing squadron of USAF (Operation Hardstand) when Saudi Arabia was being bombed by UAR in early days of Yemeni civil war.

6. While SAG reassured by USG performance and by expressions of concern for Saudi external security by every US President since FDR, SAG has long had nagging worry about asymmetrical nature this relationship. Notwithstanding large American investment in ARAMCO and important USG interest in uninterrupted flow of crude oil to its allies, it has been obvious to SAG that USG in Middle East has until very recently been far more occupied by Arab-Israel issue. If there ever direct conflict between two interests, SAG has feared it might be left in lurch or be driven by regional pressures to pursue policies harmful to its own interests—as well as of US.

7. In purely economic terms, SAG may also have been somewhat concerned that as SAG's participation in ARAMCO concession increased, US direct economic interest in Saudi Arabia could somewhat diminish.

8. Embassy has pointed out in last annual political assessment (A-42, Apr 18, 1972)⁴ that this relationship is becoming somewhat more symmetrical as SAG grows stronger and more self-confident, and US becomes more interested in assured access to increasing quantities of Saudi oil. Nonetheless, SAG still concerned over its continuing vulnerability to external aggression, and perhaps also to unsettling side effects of new Arab-Israeli clashes. Thus, we believe that Yamani's request that Saudi oil be given special status in US market is latest manifestation of SAG's intent to further improve its long-term prospects for security and stability by progressively strengthening bilateral ties with US.

⁴ Airgram A-42, April 18. (Ibid., POL 1 SAUD-US.)

9. Economics of Yamani's proposal: Yamani's offer cannot by any means be panacea for \$30-billion-a-year oil bill which some predict for US in mid-eighties. Nor can it furnish any more than one-fourth to one-third of outlet for massive Saudi investments downstream aimed at keeping oil flowing to its technical limits. It is not likely, moreover, that SAG's developing expertise in investment finance would lead her to place more than 50 percent of her surplus funds in one economy, even in that of the favored US. (We would have to assume that USG would not agree to more than 50 percent of its imports coming from one source, which means six million b/d at most by 1980, only about one-third of Saudi production.) Nevertheless, without carefully analyzing US side of equation (which we in field cannot do) it seems safe to conclude that magnitudes of investments on both sides would be great enough to insure a real intertwining of economic interests.

10. Some tentative assessments. It is worth noting that an increased identification with USG via preferential oil deal could carry real risk for Saudis. Should inter-Arab disputes erupt again in context of deteriorating Middle East situation, SAG would be liable to more violent attack than before from radicals as being "in league with US-Zionist imperialism." SAG would be juicy target for anarchical Palestinian terrorists. Reply, however, could be made that oil deal would not be a unique, unprecedented phenomenon but only one case out of many, all pointing to a drawing together of US-Saudi interests which has been going on for several years and which will continue into future. SAG, moreover, by allowing offer to be put forward obviously feels benefits are worth whatever future risks may be involved.

11. From our standpoint, it clear that acceptance of Yamani-type offer would have far reaching implications for our national security policy toward Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf during next 20 years; as that question is debated in Washington, it clear that an increased US dependence on any Middle East country obviously undesirable in itself. But it can be argued that if US must satisfy perhaps a quarter of its energy demands over next 20 years via imports from Arabian Peninsula, then steps should be taken so that benefits we receive are balanced as much as possible by those we confer. Only in this manner can our oil supplies be assured, or at least made less vulnerable to foreign political pressures.

12. Most effective inducements we could offer SAG to continue producing oil at levels required by our growing needs—despite probable unwieldy increase in Saudi monetary reserves—might not be purely economic. Instead, a more desirable quid pro quo in Saudi eyes could be their consciousness of enhanced security and stability as a result of closer, stronger relations with US across the board.

Horan

167. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Rush) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, December 5, 1972.

Dear Bill:

We appreciated receiving your letter of 28 November regarding King Faisal's request that the U.S. Government undertake to support the modernization of the Saudi Arabian National Guard.² Your assessment of the political importance of acceding to the King's request has been helpful to me in reaching a decision on the subject.

Given the nature of the project, we are likely to be involved in it—and with American military and civilian personnel in country—for an undetermined number of years. Also, as you know, the political ramifications of modernizing the Guard are complex, involving as they do factions within the Royal Family and even touching upon rivalries as regards the succession to the throne.³

I agree with you that it is important to safeguard U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia, especially as the fuel supply problem looms ever larger for the U.S. Accordingly, I have approved a recommendation that the U.S. Government agree to support modernization of the Saudi Arabian National Guard.

I have taken this decision, however, far more on political than on military grounds in view of the high priority King Faisal attaches to the project and the political importance which you have emphasized of acceding to his wishes.

This will permit Ambassador Thacher to convey a favorable response to King Faisal and to undertake preliminary consultations leading to a government-to-government understanding. We visualize U.S. support as including the following:

- a. Sale of hardware through the FMS program;
- b. Military/DoD civilian advisors to oversee contract personnel in the performance of their contractual responsibilities;
- c. All costs to be borne by the Saudi Arabian Government.⁴

Subsequent to acceptance by King Faisal of the general principles involved concerning selection of a contracting firm and in the U.S. sup-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 6-4 SAUD. Secret.

² See footnote 3, Document 165.

³ Telegram 2862 from Jidda, September 4, expanded on this issue. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 6-4 SAUD)

⁴ As reported in telegram 4266 from Jidda, December 27, Thacher passed on to Faisal the basis on which the United States would undertake a government-to-government contract for modernization of the National Guard. (Ibid.)

port of this program, I envisage that we would enter into a Memorandum of Understanding which would delineate responsibilities and scope of the work to be done.

I understand that our two staffs will work out the details of any additional guidance required at this time by Ambassador Thacher.

Sincerely,

Kenneth Rush

168. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

State Department Draft Letter from the President to King Faisal re Saudi Proposal for a Special Relationship in Oil

Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Yamani recently proposed, in conversation with Deputy Secretary Irwin and later in a public speech,² a special relationship between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. for the future supply of Saudi Arabian oil, coupled with sharply increased Saudi investments in the U.S. to offset the balance of payments drain.

In effect, the Saudis are probing the possibility of a bilateral agreement with the U.S. which would give their oil and capital investments preferred access to U.S. markets. Because of surging demand for Mideast oil by all Free World developed nations, and because of the successful cartelization of Arab oil supplies by OPEC, the Saudis have little need to make bilateral economic concessions to market their oil. Hence, it is likely that the Yamani proposal reflects a Saudi desire for the political protection which would inevitably result from a "special relationship" with the U.S. in oil.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1287, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia, 1972. No classification marking.

² See Document 164. Information on Yamani's September 30 address to the annual Middle East Institute meeting is in circular telegram 179548, October 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 17 US–SAUD)

From the U.S. standpoint, since Saudi Arabia is the one nation in the world with practically unlimited supplies of cheap oil, the Yamani proposal raises the question whether we should modify our traditional multilateral approach to foreign oil supplies, and our limited preferences for Western Hemisphere imports, in order to seek assured, long-term energy supplies from the most abundant sources of foreign oil. On balance, we think not. Any move toward the Saudis would upset the domestic oil industry, and it might complicate the difficulties of the U.S.-dominated international oil companies. More important, we do not believe the U.S. could afford from a foreign policy standpoint to give Saudi Arabia a preferred status over allies such as Iran and Kuwait, to say nothing of Canada and Venezuela, and we do not believe it is in our long range interests to trigger a race with the developed countries of Europe and Japan for bilateral preference arrangements in oil.

We believe a largely negative response to the Yamani proposal is appropriate, and State agrees.³ We also suggest a letter from you to the King which puts the USG response to the Yamani proposal in a broader context of your ongoing relationship with the King and his Nation (Tab B).⁴

Finally, we plan to pursue with the relevant investment agencies a more detailed analysis of how Saudi investments in the U.S. might be facilitated.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

³ Rogers suggested that the response to Yamani's proposal be a letter from Nixon to Faisal, but not a government-to-government agreement. (Memorandum from Rogers to Nixon with draft letter to Faisal, November 4; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1287; Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia, 1972) Saunders recommended that Rogers's proposed draft letter not be sent since it was too negative, particularly if the Yamani proposal was a feeler designed to elicit U.S. political protection. (Memorandum from Saunders and Loken to Flanigan and Kissinger, November 10; *ibid.*, Box 761, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Saudi Arabia: King Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, 1972) An attachment noted that, as written, Rogers's draft was "such a waffle on the real substance of the issues that are being addressed, that it is nothing more than a polite turn-off." This was "highly inappropriate" given the U.S. dialogue with Saudi Arabia "on their role in a strategy for strengthening our moderate friends" in the Middle East.

⁴ Tab A is not attached. However, Eliot submitted a second State Department draft on December 12, which included a response to the Yamani proposal within a reply to a November 12 letter from Faisal. Faisal's letter focused on his hopes for Nixon's second term in office, Middle Eastern regional issues, and recent oil negotiations. Eliot's draft became the basis for a December 26 letter to Faisal, which stated that the United States looked forward to strengthened cooperation between the two countries, to increased imports of Saudi Arabian oil, and to increased Saudi investments in the United States to help offset the U.S. balance of payment burden "just as Your Majesty's Government has welcomed American private investment in your country." (*Ibid.*)

169. Briefing Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, December 14, 1972.

SAUDI ARABIA

The following is a basic reference package on Saudi Arabia. It is not comprehensive but does concentrate on those aspects that might be of most interest to you and which could come up in the course of your conversations with King Faisal and other Saudi officials. Recent correspondence between the President and King Faisal is also included for your background. Ambassador Nick Thacher will be prepared to provide you any additional background information you may require.

General Background

There are two basic facts about Saudi Arabia that stand out above all others—its wealth and its backwardness (see economic fact sheet at Tab A).

The basis for Saudi Arabia's wealth is, of course, its gigantic petroleum reserves, which are by far the world's largest, and the increasing world demand for petroleum products. Just to cite a few illustrative figures, Saudi petroleum reserves are conservatively estimated at 130–140 billion barrels and some geologists think that they are at least twice or thrice this figure. This compares to a total of an estimated 530 billion barrels in the world—450 billion barrels in the Eastern Hemisphere (350 in the Arab world) and perhaps 80 billion barrels in the Western Hemisphere (40 in the US). By 1980, unless there are dramatic, new and unexpected discoveries elsewhere in the world, only Saudi Arabia and Iraq for sure will still be able to look forward to increases in their production. Even more significantly, given the continuation of present trends, the US will be importing about 20% of its petroleum requirements from Saudi Arabia by 1980. Natural gas also exists in vast quantities in Saudi Arabia but only a small fraction of it is being exported.

With the recent revenue and "participation" settlement, Saudi Arabia has also emerged as a potential money power in international finance. The OPEC "participation" agreement concluded in October and in the process of final approval by the Arab governments in the Persian Gulf, provides for 25% control of the equity, oil production and profits of the companies now and up to 51% control by 1983. The

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1287, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia. No classification marking. All tabs, with the exception of Tab F, are attached but not printed. Tab F is not attached. A handwritten note by Saunders reads: "for Connally in preparation for Saudi Arabian trip."

compensation issue, which held up the negotiations for so long, was finally settled by an agreement on a formula compensating the companies on the basis of the "updated book value" of their investments, an amount over twice as much as OPEC originally offered.

Saudi reserves presently stand at about \$2.5 billion, are rising by about \$100 million a month and, by a projection of present trends, would reach a total of \$100 billion in the early 1990s. The Saudis may already, however, have reached the point where they have more revenue than they can constructively spend. Many believe that if the oil is to continue to flow uninterrupted, the Western world in general and the US in particular are going to have to give the Saudis better alternatives to leaving the oil in the ground.

Despite this great wealth, Saudi social and political life is still very conservative and traditional. King Faisal's rule, though benevolent, is highly personalized and authoritarian. Many of the country's approximately 5.5 million people still lack a sense of common nationality and lead a primitive life in the desert. Conservative Islamic values permeate the society, even to the point where some Saudis will not accept interest payments on investments.

US-Saudi Relations

US interests in Saudi Arabia are chiefly economic and center principally on Saudi oil—on maintaining access to oil sources and ensuring a continuing supply of oil to the US, Europe and Japan. ARAMCO—which is owned by Standard Oil of California (30%), Standard Oil of New Jersey (30%), Texaco (30%) and Mobil (10%)—is our largest single investment abroad and a major contributor to our balance of payments. The US is the chief supplier of goods to the Saudi market.

The US is heavily committed to improving Saudi Arabia's defense capability. The Saudis look to us as their principal source of military equipment and in recent years have spent an average of over \$30 million annually for weapons. A US Military Training Mission has been in Saudi Arabia for years. We have built a modern transportation system for the Saudi Army and during the last year agreements have been concluded under which the US will assist the Saudis in further expanding and modernizing their air force, navy and national guard. We have just approved an extensive modernization program for the Saudi National Guard which will probably be done by Raytheon under a government-to-government agreement.

Over the last year or so our relations with the Saudis have also begun to broaden and deepen on the political level. King Faisal paid an official state visit to Washington in May of 1971² and in the course of

² See Document 151.

his talks with the President a good rapport was established. Since then the President and the King have carried on a fairly extensive correspondence which seems to have extended the understanding on both sides and there have been a series of high-level Saudi visits to Washington. The most recent in this series includes:

—In June King Faisal's brother, and Defense Minister Prince Sultan came to the US as a guest of Secretary of Defense Laird.³ The highlight of that visit was a call which Sultan paid on the President during which he presented a paper with an unusually good statement of Saudi strategy for enhancing its security (see Tab B).⁴ Among other things, this paper for the first time indicated that the Saudis are beginning to develop a realistic strategic view of their region that regards a strong Jordan as crucial, cooperation with Iran as imperative and Saudi moderating influence on the Egyptians as useful. In response, the President wrote Faisal a letter intended to encourage the Saudis to develop their policies along these lines.⁵ [*Comment: Unfortunately, the Saudis have not lived up fully to their emerging strategy, and anything you might conveniently say to encourage them on Jordan would be most useful. We would especially like to see them contribute more financial assistance to King Hussein of Jordan.*]⁶

—During a visit here by Faisal's son, Prince Sa'ud—whom you met—King Faisal wrote the President in July asking him to use his good offices with the parent companies of ARAMCO to encourage their flexibility in the then on-going OPEC "participation" negotiations (see Tab C). The President's response was friendly but also supportive in a general way of the companies' position and they feel it contributed to a more satisfactory outcome. The main point was that our two countries and the Free World generally had a strong interest in a settlement that could be viewed as fair by both parties and provide for a lasting relationship. Flexibility was crucial and there was a need to balance short-term financial advantage against long-term security interests in strengthening the forces of moderation in the world. [*Comment: The OPEC "participation" settlement is viewed as being about the best possible the companies could have obtained under the circumstances. It would be appropriate for you to note the relative Saudi moderation on the participation issue and our common interests in responsible actions in this area in the future. Any emphasis you put on the potential the Saudis have to show the other more radical Arabs a successful but reasonable alternative will reinforce the points the President has been trying to get across to the Saudis.*]

³ See Documents 159–161.

⁴ See Document 160 and footnote 2 thereto.

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 161.

⁶ All brackets are in the original.

—The President currently has another letter on his desk from King Faisal which will be answered soon (see Tab D) which sets forth the Saudi view on the need for early US action to achieve Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory and urgent US assistance to the Yemen Arab Republic. This is always a difficult subject with an Arab and Faisal feels strongly about it, especially the Jerusalem question. [*Comment:* Because of your relationship with the President, Faisal may also make a strong pitch to you on these topics. You can safely pass on the Yemen subject by simply promising to inform the President. On the peace settlement effort, you could point out that the President has said that he intends to give this a “very high priority” during his second term and that you know he wants nothing more than a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.]

Yamani Proposal

In late September of this year Saudi Oil Minister Yamani during a visit to Washington made an official and public proposal that Saudi oil be let in to the United States on a preferential basis without duty and that large Saudi investments in the US oil industry be permitted.⁷ In return for this, Saudi Arabia would direct its oil exports to the growing US market. The Saudi motives behind this proposal actually seem to be more political than economic in that they would obviously like us to become a powerful protector for them against the Soviets (whom they greatly fear) and other governments in the area who pose a potential threat to them (presumably Iran and Israel as well as radical Arab regimes). Through an arrangement like the Yamani proposal, the Saudis probably hope to create a self-reinforcing link which would guarantee our oil supplies and their security.

The Yamani proposal is still under active consideration by the Administration. It is obviously very attractive since it would assure that a large part of the increased balance of payments drain that will be caused by increased oil imports in the future would be offset by Saudi investments in the US. Moreover, if this investment went mainly into oil refining and distribution ventures, the Saudis would have an incentive to protect their investment by ensuring the continued and stable supply of oil. On the negative side, the extension of either quota or tariff preferences to the Saudis would conflict with our GATT obligations and would probably impel the Shah, the Kuwaitis and other oil exporters to demand similar treatment. Such an agreement would also lead our OECD partners to seek similar arrangements thereby driving up prices and eliminating the oil industry's flexibility to respond to supply emergencies.

⁷ See Document 164.

Some positive response to the Saudi initiative is required. The only thing holding us up at this point is a debate within the Administration about how far it is desirable to go down the Yamani track at this point and what might be equally attractive alternative approaches that the Saudis would accept and which would present fewer difficulties for us.

Given your relationship with the President and deep involvement in international economic affairs, the Saudis will probably bring this proposal up with you at some level. In any response, you can above all reassure the Saudis of our strong desire for close cooperation in petroleum and financial affairs and, of course, welcome large Saudi investments in the US.

Biographic sketches of the leading cast of Saudi characters are at Tab E.

A detailed map is at Tab F.

170. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Connally and Lincoln Visits to Saudi Arabia

As you know, John Connally and Frank Lincoln have recently paid separate private visits to Saudi Arabia as the guests of King Faisal. Both will probably wish to report to you directly.

Frank Lincoln has cabled you a full report of his meetings with King Faisal and other Saudi officials. His summary memo for you is attached (Tab A).² The highlights of his talks were:

—King Faisal said that there could be no further development of mutual Saudi-US economic interests or any further expansion of oil production without a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Faisal said that he was coming under increasing pressure from the radical Arabs to cut off the oil supply now and, “with tears in his eyes,” urged that you force Israel to abide by Security Council resolution 242.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1287, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia, 1972. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information.

² Tab A is attached but not printed.

(This is the strongest statement yet by Faisal and his first direct linkage of the Arab-Israeli problem with oil.)

—Faisal's intelligence chief suggested that it might be useful for Lincoln to see Sadat on an unofficial visit to Cairo as a private citizen but a friend of yours. Several Saudi ministers also suggested that you assign me to assist in finding and negotiating a solution to the Middle East problem.

—Lincoln floated with several Saudi ministers an idea of setting up a semi-public board of Saudi and American businessmen which, among other things, would work on channeling Saudi investment money here. Those Saudis seemed generally favorable to this idea, although the King's remarks would seem to inhibit implementation soon if he is serious.

—Saudi Oil Minister Zaki Yamani said that in the future there would have to be a two-way street, both economically and politically, between the US and other industrialized countries and Saudi Arabia. For instance, currently he was considering developing a vast petrochemical and related industrial program in Saudi Arabia in conjunction with the countries to which the Saudis are now selling their oil. Yamani seemed to best sum up an emerging Saudi attitude when he said: "You, the United States, need us more than we need you."

John Connally's experience with the Saudis was apparently about the same as Lincoln's.³ Before he departed Saudi Arabia, Connally informed our ambassador that:

—King Faisal virtually monopolized their one hour and forty-five minute meeting talking about Zionism, Communism and Israel.

—As with Lincoln, Faisal forcefully stated and restated his belief that unless the US could achieve political progress on the Arab-Israeli dispute all other aspects of Saudi-US relations are likely to be adversely affected. The King listened to Connally's statement regarding your continued active concern with the Middle East problem, but asserted that visible signs of progress are now of particular concern to Saudi Arabia. Connally attempted to raise other topics (such as Saudi leadership role in area and use of their growing monetary reserves) but the King could not be distracted from this central theme.

—Connally found Prince Fahd firm on the question of Israel also but more temperate than the King. He found particularly noteworthy, Fahd's judgment that, despite present appearances, an indefinite continuation of the present Arab-Israeli impasse could not be accepted by any Arab state for very long.

³ Connally's report is in telegram 4175 from Jidda, December 19. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1287, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia, 1972)

—To other Saudi officials, Connally indicated that the US would probably be sympathetic to increased oil imports from Saudi Arabia but at the same time vigorously urged greater Saudi (and also ARAMCO) imports of US manufactured goods.

It seems clear from the Connally and Lincoln talks that King Faisal is considering the idea of somehow bringing economic pressure to bear on the US to impose a peace settlement on Israel favorable to Arab interests. He may give us some time, but Faisal's remarks seem to indicate that he will no longer remain in a passive wholly friendly posture indefinitely awaiting favorable US action to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Prince Fahd—the powerful and friendly Interior Minister who will most likely succeed Faisal—is coming to the US in February on a private visit and has asked to see you. This would probably be especially useful given this new and harder Saudi position.

The Two Yemens

171. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the People's Republic of Southern Yemen¹

Washington, February 27, 1969, 1710Z.

30762. Subj: US-PRSY Relations.

1. PRSY UN Perm Rep Nu'man,² who currently in Washington as PRSYG observer at INTELSAT Conference, had frank but cordial talk with ARP Country Director Brewer February 26.

2. In analyzing causes existing coolness in USG-PRSYG relations, Ambassador Nu'man claimed USG failure offer substantial aid at time of independence and subsequent seizure of American arms with clasped hands insignia³ in possession of anti-PRSYG dissidents had led Aden to "natural" conclusion that USG distrusts PRSYG. He speculated this due to close US relationship with Saudis whom Nu'man alleged, somewhat vaguely, had privately conveyed threats to overthrow NLF regime, claiming USG support. Nu'man asserted PRSYG desired good relations with USG and hoped USG would reciprocate.

3. Recalling history of USG attempts to develop good relations with PRSYG, Brewer underlined our feeling it was PRSYG which had not reciprocated. He reviewed our position re non-interference PRSY internal affairs, regretting publicity anti-USG charges (e.g. re arms) without first seeking our explanation. Brewer noted USG seeks maintain friendly relations with Saudi Arabia as well as PRSYG but we not responsible for foreign policy of either.

4. Nu'man reiterated SAG responsible poor state Saudi-PRSY contacts. Brewer demurred, noting SAG had good reasons be concerned over hostile attitude PRSYG leaders. President al-Shaabi's February 11 speech laying claim on behalf of greater Yemen to Jizan and Najran hardly likely provide reassurance.⁴ We hoped neighborly relations

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SYEMEN-US. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer and Wrampelmeier and approved by Brewer. It was repeated to Jidda, Addis Ababa, London, and USUN.

² Isma'il Sa'id Nu'man.

³ The "clasped hands" insignia was stamped on boxes of U.S. AID material.

⁴ Telegram 128 from Aden, February 12, relayed President Qahtan al-Shaabi's February 11 speech. Al-Shaabi blasted American imperialism, identified an ongoing U.S.-Saudi-Iranian anti-PRSY campaign, pledged support for those who fought against Israel, and stated a desire for unity with North Yemen, including claims to Jizan and to Najran, Kuria, and Muria Islands (currently held by Saudi Arabia). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 SYEMEN)

could in due course be established. For our part, budgetary stringencies limited our ability assist PRSYG but this represented no political decision or reflection our attitude towards new government. On contrary, USG continues hope for good relations with PRSYG. We welcomed PRSYG representative's call and hoped this forecast more frequent contacts.

5. Ambassador Nu'man now scheduled see Asst Sec Sisco afternoon March 3.⁵

Richardson

⁵ Nu'man and Sisco's discussion focused on domestic PRSY needs and future development. Nu'man stated that his discussion with Brewer covered the main bilateral problems. (Memorandum of conversation, March 3; *ibid.*, POL US-YEMEN)

172. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

492

Washington, June 25, 1969.

SUBJECT

Southern Yemen: Extreme Leftists Seize the Reins

Leftist extremists ousted President Qahtan al-Shaabi and Premier Faisal al-Shaabi in a bloodless coup June 22, using the General Command of the ruling National Liberation Front (NLF) as their vehicle. The new regime, headed by a five-man Presidential Council,² is dominated by the extreme left segment of the radical NLF. Moderate army leaders, who would be expected to oppose the new regime, have been unable to mount effective resistance because the army is split over whether to support the new leadership, but the regime's narrow base may hold the seeds of future trouble. In foreign policy, the new government will probably seek to move closer to the Soviet Union and will have even worse relations with neighboring states than its predecessor.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 SYEMEN. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.

² See telegram 103042 to Addis Ababa, June 23. (*Ibid.*, POL 12 SYEMEN)

Extreme Leftists Predominate. The new Presidential Council and cabinet are both dominated by extremists. Most of these extremists had been removed from positions of power at army insistence in the spring of 1968, and many went into exile. They were permitted to return in early 1969. Three of the five Presidential Council members—Chairman Salim Rubayya', Abdul Fattah Ismail, and Ali al-Bishi (Ali Antar)—are extremist leftists, and the other two—Premier Muhammad Ali Haytham and Defense Minister Muhammad Salih Awlaqi—are considered Arab nationalist opportunists. Six of the eleven Cabinet members are extreme leftists. Two or three members of the new leadership are reportedly Communists, and the extreme leftists as a group have a Castro-like flavor.

Abdul Fattah Ismail, leader of the NLF extremist faction and perhaps the most intellectual member of the new regime, is probably the organizing genius behind the coup. He will probably function as a de facto party secretary-general to spark the organizational effort that will be needed to keep the regime alive. He is likely to control the situation from behind the scenes, and if the extremist regime lasts, he may eventually emerge as the overt leader.

Regime has Narrow Base. The NLF regime in Aden has always represented only a small minority of the country's 1,300,000 inhabitants, and the seizure of power by the extreme left has produced a regime with an even narrower base of support. The new regime is strongest among party intellectuals, labor unions, NLF youth, and the NLF commandos (ex-terrorists and ex-guerrillas from preindependence days). It can be expected also to draw support from the Chinese-style People's Guards, a paramilitary force which was disbanded in 1968 at army insistence but re-created in May 1969 to help put down tribal dissidence. The new regime is weakest in the army, the small educated class, business groups, and the more conservative residents of the hinterland.

Army Split Appears to Assure Survival in Short Run. The army, so far a relatively moderate political force, is divided between opponents and supporters of the new regime. Moderate army leaders, who might have attempted a counter-coup, appear to have been neutralized as a result of their own disorganization, the division in army ranks, the reported detention of some senior officers, and the absence of major units upcountry. The new government appears to control most military and police forces in the Aden area, and its short term survival prospects are good.

Friction with Neighboring States to Rise. The new regime would probably like to increase Southern Yemeni efforts to export revolution to other countries in the Arabian Peninsula, despite its limited capabilities. This desire will heighten tension between Southern Yemen and the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR), Saudi Arabia, Muscat and Oman, and the Persian Gulf shaikhdoms. Saudi Arabia and the YAR have not yet reacted to the coup in Aden; because of their fear of NLF revolutionary efforts, Saudi

Arabia and the YAR may separately support a major effort by anti-NLF elements to overthrow the new Southern Yemeni regime.

Regime Will Cozy up to Soviets. The new regime will probably seek to move closer to the Soviet Union. Earlier this spring, Abdul Fattah Ismail reportedly hoped to have the NLF announce its membership in the Socialist Bloc led by the Soviet Union; and a statement by the NLF General Command immediately after the coup said that “relations with the friendly socialist states, and the Soviet Union in particular, are to be bolstered.” The Soviets, desirous of maintaining their position in Southern Yemen, will allow themselves to be embraced by the new regime but will avoid supporting Southern Yemeni efforts to stir up trouble in nearby Arab states. They also may be reluctant to increase their economic and military assistance beyond the moderate levels already projected.

173. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

New York, October 1, 1969, 2308Z.

Secto 98/3349. Secretary’s Bilateral with Yemen FonMin 1 October. Following summary based on uncleared memcon, Nofoin and FYI only subject to revision upon review:

1. *Summary:* In relaxed, amiable conversation, Yemen FonMin Barakat told Secretary how peaceful Yemen now was, how relations with neighbors have improved and Yemen wished normalize relations with developed countries, especially US. Secretary said US not now in position change policy on recognition, but that it was under active consideration. He urged maintenance of active informal contacts, assured Barakat we would watch situation carefully.

2. Barakat made general presentation along lines his UNGA speech, noting country now completely quiet with last resistance to Republican govt cleared out, all tribes have sworn allegiance, democratic govt installed and at work on new constitution. He said relations with neighbors now good, neighbors to south no longer introducing subversive elements. Yemen wishes good relations with all countries, especially developed countries.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1245, Saunders Files, Yemen. Confidential. It was repeated to Jidda and Aden.

3. Barakat explained break in relations with US occurred under former govt that did not represent will Yemeni people. Urged US look at recognition Yemen as special case not tied to general ME situation. Regretted that due conditions beyond control present govt, entire US Mission had been withdrawn.

4. Secretary said US not now in position change our recognition policy but that we have the situation under active study. He urged continuation of contacts in New York and assured Barakat we would watch developments.

Rogers

174. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 24, 1969.

SUBJECT

South Yemen Breaks Relations with the USG

The Government of the Peoples Republic of Southern Yemen (PRSYG) informed our Chargé in Aden today that PRSY was severing relations with the United States.² The Foreign Minister cited alleged U.S. material help "to people working against the Arabs and PRSYG," as well as the presence of Americans in the Israeli armed forces, as reasons for this sudden step.³ He added that there was a question of how long the PRSYG could guarantee the safety of American personnel in Aden and requested that all be withdrawn within forty-eight hours.

We are complying with the PRSYG request. Our Chargé, who was given twenty-four hours to leave, will be departing commercially on

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1245, Saunders Files, South Yemen. Confidential. A typed notation on the memorandum states: "Used in October 29, 1969 President Briefing for Oct. 30 Kissinger to President memo." The October 30 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon repeated material contained in Rogers's memorandum. (Ibid., Box 12, President's Daily Briefing Files, October 29–31, 1969)

² As reported in telegram 779 from Aden, October 24. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1245, Saunders Files, South Yemen.)

³ According to telegram 655 from Aden, September 8, the government was then split on maintaining relations with the United States over the issue of U.S. sale of Phantoms to Israel. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL SYEMEN-US)

October 25. The remaining staff of 34 Americans, including dependents, is scheduled to go to Asmara by chartered Ethiopian aircraft on October 26. The U.K. has agreed to serve as protecting power and is so notifying the PRSYG.

Our relations with this extremist Arab regime have long been strained, but there seem three reasons for its sudden action: (1) the PRSYG continues to imagine that we are assisting Saudi Arabia in supporting efforts on the part of PRSY exiles to foment trouble within Southern Yemen; (2) Southern Yemenis reacted strongly to increasing tensions on the Arab/Israeli issues, notably allegations of American citizen service in Israeli armed forces; and (3) beset by domestic problems reflected in one coup already this year, Southern Yemeni radicals may well fear that public opinion in Aden could get out of hand unless some dramatic step were taken. In this connection, there was rioting in Aden immediately prior to the PRSY action.

Our interests in PRSY have been marginal. It is not represented in the United States, other than at the UN. This action will, however, make it more difficult for us to keep track of the growing Soviet presence⁴ in the strategic port of Aden and brings to eight the number of Arab countries who have broken relations with us since May, 1967. Relations are unlikely to be resumed until other Arab countries show the way or there is some change in the composition and orientation of the PRSYG itself.

WPR

⁴ As reported in telegrams 424 from Moscow, January 30, and 23100 to Aden, February 13, PRSY President Al-Shaabi visited Moscow January 28. (Ibid.) Airgram A-52 from Aden, March 18, reported continuing pro-Soviet public statements by government officials. (Ibid., POL 2 SYEMEN). According to airgram A-58 from Aden, April 1, the Soviets agreed to train South Yemeni aviation cadets. (Ibid., DEF 19-6 SYEMEN) Aden was also part of general U.S. concerns over Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. See Documents 2 and 13.

175. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, November 28, 1969.

SUBJECT

Saudi-Southern Yemen Border Fighting—Information Memorandum

Peoples Republic of Southern Yemen (PRSY) forces have engaged Saudi border guards at a remote location (al-Wuday'ah) east of Yemen in the undemarcated frontier area between Saudi Arabia and South Yemen on the edge of the Empty Quarter. Our information indicates that the PRSY 30 Brigade attacked and occupied the Saudi post, causing a number of Saudi casualties. The Saudis are now flying reinforcements to the area. The Foreign Ministry has informed our Embassy in Jidda that Saudi Arabia will, of course, have to retaliate.²

PRSYG Cabinet members and public media are having a field day. They are alleging that Saudi Arabia has committed aggression, that "American imperialism and intelligence backed the Saudi strike," that the attack was instigated by "oil companies operating inside Saudi Arabia," and that Saudi aircraft are being flown by "mercenaries" since Saudi pilots have themselves been jailed by their own government because of suspected dissident activities. The PRSYG has called the incident to the attention of the Arab League and the UN.³ The Saudi radio said on November 26 that PRSY troops had attacked without provocation and that Saudi forces had counter-attacked.

While this is likely to be a war of words rather than a major military confrontation,⁴ it will pose additional embarrassment to Saudi Arabia at a time when that government is increasingly regarded in Arab circles as domestically unpopular and identified with the United States. If asked by the press, we plan to limit our comments to the statement that we have seen reports of the incident, including the Saudi statement that PRSY forces attacked without provocation.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 SAUD-SYEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer and cleared by Davies. A copy was sent to INR/RNA, IO/UNP, U, J, and C.

² As reported in telegram 3902 from Jidda, November 27. (Ibid.)

³ Apparently PRSY lodged a complaint before the UN, but the complaint did not result in any resolutions.

⁴ A fuller account of the Wadia incident is in airgram A-365 from Jidda, December 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 SAUD-SYEMEN) See also Document 176.

176. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

847

Washington, December 4, 1969.

SUBJECT

Saudi Arabia–Southern Yemen: Conflict in the Sands

The border war between Saudi Arabia and the People's Republic of Southern Yemen (PRSY) continues, and both states are endeavoring to move reinforcements to the front. The affair began on November 26, when Southern Yemeni forces seized a Saudi outpost. The attack appears primarily designed to strengthen the PRSY regime's domestic position by turning attention toward the "external threat" posed by imperialism and its "stooge," Saudi Arabia. Despite the incident, Saudi King Faisal still plans to attend the Arab Summit meeting beginning December 20, and he will probably use the incident as ammunition against the radical Arab states. Allegations that both sides are using mercenary pilots are unproven, but Saudi Arabia has a few British contract pilots available, and Soviet pilots are training the PRSY Air Force.

The Wudai'a Incident. A sizeable Southern Yemeni force crossed the undemarcated border into Saudi Arabia on November 26 and seized the Saudi border post at Wudai'a (see map),² killing several of the 26-man Frontier Force garrison and capturing the remainder. Saudi Arabia hastily deployed ground units toward the area, reinforcing the Saudi army garrison at Sharawra, some 30 miles north of Wudai'a. F-86 fighters, temporarily based on Khamis Mushait, are supporting the Saudi effort. Both sides have used aircraft to attack ground forces starting November 29, but there has apparently been no air-to-air combat. Saudi forces pushed the Southern Yemenis out of Wudai'a on November 30, and the Saudis claim to have reoccupied that locality. Each side asserts that it has inflicted heavy damage on the other's forces. Southern Yemen also claims to have shot down four Saudi planes; this claim appears false, but there is an unconfirmed report of two Saudi helicopters being downed. Fighting continues, and Saudi Arabia will probably be the victor when it succeeds in bringing its superior military strength to bear on this remote area.

Wudai'a is Saudi Territory. Wudai'a has been outside the territory of Southern Yemen and its predecessor states since the boundary of the Aden Protectorate was first agreed on in the Anglo-Turkish Convention

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 SAUD–SYEMEN. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.

² Attached but not printed.

of 1914. Saudi Arabia has for decades claimed that its border was considerably farther *south* than the 1914 line. The British successfully rebuffed Saudi efforts to give effect to their claim in the 1950's, and the line recognized by the British became the *de facto* border. This line is indicated on maps published by PRSY in 1968, with the Wudai'a area shown as Saudi territory. The nearby boundary between Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni Arab Republic has never been delimited, but the Yemen Arab Republic and its predecessor, the Yemeni Kingdom, have not tried to occupy the Wudai'a area.

Why Did Southern Yemen Attack? Southern Yemeni motives are not clear. PRSY leaders apparently feel that the Wudai'a-Sharawra area ought to be part of Southern Yemen, for PRSY forces made an incursion into the area and blew up a Saudi marker at Sharawra a year ago. Southern Yemeni statements during the first few days after the attack simply alleged that the area was in Southern Yemen and lambasted the Saudis for having "attempted to occupy" it. On December 1, apparently shifting ground, Southern Yemeni President Rubayya' asserted that the area had historically been part of Southern Yemen, but that the British turned it over illegally to Saudi Arabia on the eve of PRSY independence in 1967.

Other factors apparently contributed to the decision to attack. The National Front (NF) regime in Southern Yemen is dominated by a small group with a narrow base, and signs of a split within the regime became apparent during the meeting of the NF General Command which began November 17. The regime needed a popular cause—a "rally-round the flag" issue—with which to galvanize support. With the anniversary of independence coming on November 30, what better step than to strike a blow at the forces of reaction and imperialism as personified by Saudi Arabia?

Possible Saudi Internal Repercussions. Besides their domestic reasons for attacking, PRSY's radical leaders may have hoped that a successful action would encourage rebellion inside Saudi Arabia by showing that the Saudi regime was weak. They may have felt that the widespread arrests of Saudis for dissident activity last summer proved that extensive discontent existed. (Perhaps 300 persons, including some 80 military and police officers, have been rounded up in Saudi Arabia during the past six months.)

A similar assessment actually played a major role in the nature of the Saudi response to the PRSY attack. Saudi officials felt that Saudi Arabia must act promptly, forcefully, and successfully. Otherwise, in their view, the Saudi regime would appear weak, which would encourage potential dissidents.

Saudis may use Incident at Arab Summit. On December 3, Saudi Arabia announced that King Faisal would attend the December 20 Arab summit meeting in Rabat, dispelling earlier reports that he might stay

away if the fighting continued. Since Faisal expects to be on the defensive at the meeting against radical Arab demands for increased financial contributions and for various anti-American measures, the Wudai'a incident gives him a much-needed opportunity to seize the offensive. Faisal can now claim that it is the Arab radicals who are sabotaging the common Arab effort against Israel by fomenting inter-Arab clashes. He can point out that the incident forced him to transfer troops away from northwestern Saudi Arabia, where they had been backstopping the Saudi troops in Jordan. The Saudis and their supporters in the Lebanese press are already beginning to attack the UAR in connection with the Wudai'a incident, and the UAR, which strongly favors holding the summit meeting, is embarrassed.

Propaganda Includes Allegations of Mercenary Involvement. Southern Yemen claims that it is responding to external conspiracies, declaring that the incident was an aggression planned by the US and carried out by its Saudi "stooges." Charges in support of this line include allegations that oil is the issue, and that "mercenary" pilots have been fighting with the Saudi forces since November 26 (when the Saudi Air Force was not yet in action). The implication in the mercenary issue has generally been that Americans were involved, although one report in the Aden press mentioned "Iranian pilots." (PRSY has not yet focused on the British and Pakistani advisors to the Saudi Air Force.) Saudi Arabia has privately asserted that Syrian pilots are flying Southern Yemeni planes, but has not charged that PRSY's Soviet advisors are involved.

But no Confirmation Mercenary Pilots in Combat Yet. The mutual allegations that mercenaries are participating in combat operations seem premature. Saudi Arabia is using F-86 aircraft for ground support because it has eight Saudi pilots to fly them. It has an additional seven qualified Saudi pilots for its Lightning aircraft, including three royal princes. There is no clear evidence that non-Saudi pilots are being used in combat, but the Saudis have asked the British Airworks Company (holder of the Lightning training contract) to provide three combat pilots for the Wudai'a operations. The British Government has replied that it opposed the employment of Airworks instructor pilots for combat, but that it had no objection to combat missions by British pilots who were already on direct Saudi contracts. The number of these pilots, who may have flown in combat, is not known. A Pakistani pilot ferried an F-86 to Khamis Mushait on November 30, but whether any of the Pakistani advisors is flying combat missions is unknown.

Southern Yemen has three Arab pilots for its MIG-17's—two Southern Yemenis and one Syrian expatriate. The Syrian is not believed to be connected with the present Syrian regime. The Soviet advisors with the PRSY Air Force do not appear to have engaged in combat, but they may have participated in other missions. Despite Saudi allegations, the USSR does not appear to have played any role in instigating the PRSY action,

although Soviet media belatedly supported the Southern Yemeni side of the dispute on December 2 and replayed an allegation that RAF aircraft based in Salalah in Muscat had conducted reconnaissance missions before the incidents on November 26.

177. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 19, 1969.

SUBJECT

U.S. Aid Program in Yemen

You have asked about the circumstances under which the US maintained its aid program in Yemen after the Republican coup of September 1962. The following is the sequence of events at that time:

—The US aid program began under the monarchy in 1959. Our aid people were involved in village water projects and road building.

—Between the coup in September 1962 and US recognition of the new regime in December, our aid people stayed on and went about their work. The UAR had sent troops to Yemen to back the new Republican regime, and the Saudis had sent help to the Royalists. During that period before recognition, the US was engaged in trying to establish conditions under which both sides could agree to withdraw. During that effort, it did not seem wise to cut ourselves off from the scene by pulling our people out.

—Between December 1962 and April 1963, Ambassador Bunker worked to achieve a disengagement agreement between the UAR and Saudi Arabia. Again, there was argument during that period for leaving our people in place.

—In the months after that agreement, the UAR and Saudis traded recriminations. The long and short of this extended story was that the UAR did not withdraw until after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, but Nasser and Faisal met twice to try to reach accommodation. As long as those efforts were going on it seemed wise not to cut ourselves off from Yemen, even though between July and December 1963 we had

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, Yemen, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. A handwritten notation by Kissinger reads: "The major point is that we slightly leaned towards Republicans."

US Air Force planes in Saudi Arabia to deter Egyptian air attacks on Saudi territory from Republican bases in Yemen.

One of the overriding reasons for U.S. involvement was to give King Faisal, who had just assumed power, time to get on his feet. This meant helping him withstand UAR pressure via the Yemeni Republic while recognizing that Nasser was the leading political force in the Arab world and Republican forces were here to stay in Yemen. The main argument while we were so deeply involved was to maintain a relationship with all parties involved, and that was the reasoning behind leaving our aid mission active in Yemen.

178. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 31, 1969.

SUBJECT

Improving Diplomatic Contacts with Yemen Arab Republic

The Yemen Arab Republic Government—which broke relations with the U.S. in June 1967—has approached us on the issue of resuming diplomatic relations. Secretary Rogers is now asking you (attached)² to approve the establishment of a U.S. Interests Section in the Italian Embassy in Yemen.

Background: Since breaking relations with the U.S., the Yemeni Government has periodically approached us to renew diplomatic relations. We have avoided this because of King Faisal's opposition.

However, the Yemeni Foreign Minister made overtures to Secretary Rogers in New York on October 1 to resume ties.³ Ambassador Eilts raised the issue with King Faisal on November 24; the King reiterated his opposition but said that a U.S. Interests Section at the Italian Embassy in Yemen would not be an embarrassment to him.⁴

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, Yemen, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for action.

² Not attached. A copy of this December 6 memorandum from Richardson to the President is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US–YEMEN.

³ See Document 173.

⁴ As reported in telegram 1043 from Dhahran, November 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–YEMEN)

What this means is putting a couple of officers in the Italian Embassy to improve our knowledge of what is going on there. Since Southern Yemen broke relations with us on October 24,⁵ we have had no one in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula. This would be consistent with our position of trying to broaden our ties with the Arabs without being very visible or committing us to any significant involvement.

Recommendation: That you approve the establishment of a U.S. Interests Section in the Italian Embassy in Yemen and authorize State to take the necessary steps to execute this.⁶

⁵ See Document 174.

⁶ Nixon approved the recommendation and wrote: "But *only* if Faisal has no objection." The opening of the Interests Section was postponed due to a Yemeni raid on Najran, Saudi Arabia. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, January 14, 1970; *ibid.*) The Interests Section opened in April 1970.

179. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, August 2, 1970, 1355Z.

2980. Subj: SAG/YAR Campaign Against PRSY. Ref: Sanaa 91.²

1. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] during recent SAG-YAR talks SAG expressed interest in supporting efforts to overthrow PRSY regime so long as flosy not involved in these efforts. Further informed that YAR delegation suggested weakening PRSY on economic front by gradually diverting all North Yemeni imports from Aden to Saudi ports and that SAG sufficiently interested in this proposal to offer Saudi subsidy to offset added transportation costs resulting from use of Saudi ports for this purpose.

2. Our information on activities former SAL Sultans and extent of Saudi support for them at moment sketchy. As addressees aware, SAG until early 1969 was actively supporting dissident activities centering on ex-Sultans and tribes loyal to them against PRSY regime. Since these undertakings aborted, our impression is that Saudis have been "keep-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL SAUD-YEMEN. Secret. It was repeated to Sanaa.

² Telegram 91 from Sanaa, July 31, passed on the rumors that Saudi Arabia was financing a new FLOSY operation, noting "Ironical indeed that FLOS, once Nasser's weapon against UK in Aden, might serve Saudis against NLF." (*Ibid.*, POL 33 SYEMEN)

ing” some ex-Sultans but not giving them sufficient support to permit their playing active dissident political role. Situation could well have changed in last few days. Will seek to gather harder information.

3. *Comment:* SAG/PRSY hostility matter of public record and Saudis would no doubt welcome any opportunity to undermine present South Yemen regime. We agree, however, with U.S. Interests Section, Sanaa, that YAR would do well to tend to internal problems at this moment and further feel that SAG would be well advised to concentrate on more pressing and promising matters such as solidifying newly established relations with YAR.³ PRSY regime most likely to fall from own weight, or lack of it, and Saudi-North Yemeni activities against it could well prolong its survival and boomerang to harm SAG and YAR.

Stoltzfus

³ Saudi Arabia recognized the Yemen Arab Republic on July 23.

180. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 20, 1970.

SUBJECT

Message to King Faisal re Yemen

You will recall that I sent you a memo recommending that the President send a message to King Faisal commending the reconciliation of Saudi Arabia and Yemen which resulted in Saudi recognition of the YARG on July 23.² You returned it to me, asking whether Yemen is very left-wing, and, if that is the case, we should pick some other occasion for a Presidential letter. The following should clarify:

The present Yemeni republican regime is actually fairly moderate in Arab terms. From 1962—when a civil war resulted in the overthrow of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 629, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. II. Confidential. Sent for action. All brackets are in the original. A handwritten notation by Kissinger, dated August 24, at the top of the memorandum, reads: “I still don’t think this is a good idea.”

² Memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, July 27. (Ibid.)

the Imamate and the installation of radical republicans—until 1967, Yemen was a virtual UAR protectorate and Saudi Arabia militarily supported the royalists. That radical power structure was the one that broke relations with the U.S. in 1967 following the June war; however, at the same time, Nasser was forced to withdraw his troops, thus abandoning the regime. In November 1967 the extremists were overthrown by a more moderate—albeit republican—tribally-oriented group which has since remained in power. Despite intermittent royalist-republican fighting, King Faisal found himself dealing with a Yemeni government more of his own persuasion and less radical in ideology than in the pre-1967 YARG.

With Faisal's approval (and the President's), earlier this year the U.S. established an Interests Section in care of the Italian Embassy in Yemen.³ In March at the Jidda Islamic Summit, the Saudis and Yemenis worked out a compromise arrangement whereby a royalist faction was included in the republican government and King Faisal was apparently satisfied that the YARG was properly oriented in the direction of Islamic principles.⁴ Saudi recognition followed on July 23 and the governments are now engaged in discussions to increase ties, giving special priority to Yemen's urgent economic needs. [The Yemenis receive some economic aid from the Soviets and Chinese Communists.] The YARG has also expressed interest in increasing its ties with the West; the French have extended recognition.

From King Faisal's view, this could be considered an act of statesmanship on his part to come to terms with the republicans after eight years of Saudi-Yemeni warfare. Given his familiar and persistent theme of radical encirclement, no doubt his greater concern at the moment is with the extremists regime in South Yemen. Closer Saudi-YARG relations could be viewed as one—although small—step towards increasing the chances for stability in the Arabian peninsula.

Recommendation: That you seek the President's approval via the attached memo of a brief message to King Faisal. [Text cleared by Mr. Keogh.]⁵

³ See Document 178.

⁴ Discussed in the April 2 Intelligence Note RNAN-13, "Saudi Arabia-Yemen-Islamic States: Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference and a Yemeni Sub Plot." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 13-6)

⁵ Attached but not printed. There is no indication that the letter was sent. A handwritten note at the bottom of the first page of the memorandum indicates that the Department of State was notified on August 31 that Kissinger did not concur in the recommendation.

181. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (Thacher)¹

Washington, December 10, 1970.

Dear Nick,

As you are aware, Sayyid Umar Saqqaf expressed his concern to me in New York on October 21 about the radical regimes in Syria, Iraq, and Southern Yemen.² Indicating that he was speaking without instructions, Saqqaf wondered if the USG and Saudi Arabia could exchange views on developments in those countries. During our subsequent luncheon in the Department on October 26, I offered to provide Sayyid Umar through you with our current assessment of the political situation in the three countries. These assessments, prepared by INR, have now been completed and are enclosed.³ Their preparation took longer than I had hoped since it was necessary to wait for the dust to settle a bit in Damascus and Baghdad after the respective power shifts within these two regimes.

You may at your discretion review these assessments with Saqqaf on the understanding that they will be closely held within the Saudi Government and not conveyed to representatives of any other government. At the same time, you may wish to seek Saqqaf's own assessment of how recent developments in Syria and Iraq are likely to influence those two governments' relations with Saudi Arabia.

In sharing these assessments with Saqqaf, you should not give him any grounds to suspect that the USG is prepared to go beyond such exchanges to an exchange of views (which he seemed to be suggesting to me) on "doing something" about the radical regimes in these countries. In fact, when reviewing the situation in Southern Yemen, I hope you can especially stress our assessment that the National Front regime

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 3 UAE. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Wrampelmeier and cleared in NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/ARN, and INR/RNA.

² As reported in telegram 2645 from USUN, October 22. (Ibid., POL 15–1 SAUD)

³ All are attached but not printed. One of the reports, undated, entitled "People's Democratic Republic of Yemen," argued four points: (1) the Marxist PDRY Government followed a pro-Moscow line; (2) Soviet military and civilian advisers and technicians played a major role; (3) the USSR had the use of Aden port and Socotra Island but was not building a major base on the latter; and (4) the Soviets were unwilling to "increase their aid or their military presence in South Yemen under present circumstances." The report looked briefly at East German and Chinese activities. It concluded that the PDRY was unpopular but well entrenched.

in Aden, despite its unpopularity, seems very firmly in control of Aden and most of the hinterland as well. As recent reporting from USINT Sanaa (see specifically Sanaa cable 308)⁴ has pointed out, indigenous revolts within PDRY frontiers are likely to be a more serious threat to National Front control than poorly coordinated incursions by motley exile bands across the frontier.

At the same time, if SAG officials are seriously concerned about the possibility of new PDRY attacks in the south (Jidda's 3940),⁵ then they should seriously reconsider the policy of support for the National Union Front which can only give the Southern Yemenis a relatively plausible excuse for having another bash at the Saudis. Perhaps this would be a good occasion to remind Saqqaf how poorly other such acts of Saudi "assistance" have turned out.

Sincerely,

Joseph J. Sisco⁶

P.S. I am deeply concerned over what appears to be increasing unreality of Faisal.

⁴ Telegram 308 from Sanaa, November 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 13 SYEMEN)

⁵ Not found.

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears Sisco's typed signature and an indication that he signed the original.

182. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 36.7–71

Washington, February 11, 1971.

SOUTH YEMEN**Note**

This Estimate assesses the situation in South Yemen,² the prospects for Saudi-supported efforts to oust the present government there, and the likely consequences thereof. Its principal conclusions are in paragraph 26.

The Estimate*I. The Setting*

1. The British evacuated South Yemen in 1967, turning over the governing of the area to the radical National Front (NF), formerly the National Liberation Front. The Front originally derived from the left-wing Arab Nationalists Movement. Its South Yemen branch has an extremist flavor; some of its principal members are Marxists with a strong ideological affinity for the USSR; others are Maoists. Virtually all its leaders are of rural origin. The Front's policy has been to wipe out vestiges of colonial tutelage and of government by ruling families. In the past three years, it has nationalized most businesses, expropriated most privately owned land, and abolished the former petty states in favor of six large provinces. Although there has been one shakeup in the Front, which involved the ousting of its relatively moderate wing, the government has not faced serious domestic challenge.

2. The former rulers of the petty states of the hinterland, who were to have been the principal figures in the successor regime Britain had hoped to form, went into exile as the British left. Other South Yemeni

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A, Box 418. Secret. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of CIA submitted it with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the AEC and the FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction. The conclusions of the SNIE were passed on to Jidda in telegram 32516, February 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 YEMEN)

² The term South Yemen designates the country that formerly included the Crown Colony of Aden and the Aden Protectorate. In 1964 it was termed the Federation of South Arabia, on independence in 1967 became the People's Republic of South Yemen, and in 1970 changed its name to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. This state is not to be confused with the former Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen, since 1962 called the Yemen Arab Republic, and termed in this paper Yemen. [Footnote is in the original.]

exiles include members of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) and of the South Arabian League (SAL), both of which had opposed British control of the area. FLOSY lost out to the Front in a bitter struggle for power in 1967. Some of the Front's less extreme supporters are also in exile now, including the former head of the South Yemen Army. Most of the exiles are in Yemen.

3. The South Yemen regime is virtually without friends in the Arab world. Since Egypt pulled its forces out of Yemen following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Cairo has largely ignored political developments in the Arabian Peninsula. Neighboring Oman is hostile to South Yemen for supporting rebels in Dhofar. Most other Arab states, even those of a radical bent such as Libya and Algeria, which had extended some aid, have been repelled by the shrill extremism of the South Yemen Government. Syria has extended a little help, however, and Iraq, which until recently provided several air force fighter pilots, now furnishes some technicians and makes occasional statements of support.

4. South Yemen is an odd mixture of modern city and backward rural hinterland.³ Aden developed as a large port, living off business generated by shipping on the Suez Canal route, becoming a fairly prosperous place with a sizable middle class and a flourishing trade-union movement (the source of FLOSY's support). The hinterland had been largely left to its own devices under its traditional rulers until the 1950s. Dissidence in the rugged and arid mountain country was endemic; the present government experiences the same problem.

5. South Yemen and Yemen are linked by past history, family ties, and a tradition of migration in both directions across the border, and both governments have publicly espoused the concept of Yemeni unity.⁴ However, there has also been sporadic fighting along the border for generations. The two present governments are enemies: Aden sees the reconciliation of San'a with Saudi Arabia and the northern Yemeni tribes as a reactionary move, and San'a is bitterly resentful at the challenge from upstart National Front revolutionaries.

6. The South Yemeni Government is beset by serious economic and financial problems. Before independence, South Yemen lived off payments from the UK and the transit trade through the port of Aden. UK subsidies and the expenditures by British military forces based in Aden stopped in 1967. The UK made payments totalling \$29 million after independence, but this assistance ceased after 1968. With the Suez

³ Current population estimates: Aden, 200,000 (down significantly since 1967); hinterland, 1,250,000. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁴ The Hadramaut—the present fifth and sixth provinces of South Yemen—is not considered by its own people or by most other people in the area as being part of a greater Yemen. [Footnote is in the original.]

Canal closed, Aden's bunkering and transit trade has dropped to about a quarter of its 1966 level. Despite rigorous austerity—civil and military salaries are now less than half the pre-independence level—the South Yemen Government is chronically short of money.

II. Soviet and Chinese Interests

7. The Soviets and the Chinese have both used the opening provided by the country's impoverishment and by the ideological bent of the South Yemen Government. After watching the new regime for about a year, the Soviets began to provide military hardware, mostly on credit, early in 1969. They have provided 10 Mig-15 and Mig-17 aircraft (flown first by Syrian and Iraqi and now by South Yemeni and Arab mercenary pilots), 5 AN-24 transport aircraft, 40-odd medium tanks, artillery, and other military equipment. About 150 Soviet military advisors and maintenance personnel are presently in South Yemen; 50 of these are with the Mig squadron and 10–15 with the AN-24 transport aircraft provided by the Soviets. Most of the remainder—plus some East Europeans—are with the ground forces. The USSR has also extended \$13 million in economic aid and East Germany has extended nearly twice as much. Moscow has, so far as we know, refused to replace the former British budget subsidies.

8. The Chinese have worked on a somewhat different basis. For the past two years, they have supplied arms and training to the South Yemen based Dhofar rebel movement operating against the Sultanate of Oman. They have also extended economic credits totalling \$55 million on liberal terms to the Aden government. The principal Chinese activity is the construction of a road from Aden to Mukalla. In practice Soviet and Chinese communist efforts in South Yemen are complementary, but this does not stem from any agreed division of effort. Indeed, there is a strong element of Moscow-Peking rivalry in South Yemen, and the USSR is concerned not to appear to be less helpful than China.

9. The Soviets almost certainly see access to South Yemen's air and maritime facilities as an option worth preserving in the framework of their broader area goals. To date, however, Soviet use of these facilities has been limited to infrequent port calls at Aden. The facilities consist chiefly of the port of Aden, with its bunkering and repair facilities (the latter include drydocks capable of holding vessels of destroyer size) and Khormaksar airfield, just outside the city. Rumors of extensive Soviet military-related construction on the island of Socotra are without foundation, although Soviet personnel apparently did assist in clearing one of the two dirt airstrips on the island to a length permitting AN-24s to land.

10. Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean would be facilitated by use of a local port with reliable provision and repair facilities. Aden,

as it happens, is one of the best and most convenient ports around the Indian Ocean. Its value to the Soviets would be enhanced if the Suez Canal were open. Khormaksar is a first-class airfield. Socotra, by contrast, has neither harbor nor aids to air navigation; its main attraction is its isolation. In view of the economic and military aid Moscow is providing, the South Yemen regime would almost certainly be willing to permit increased Soviet use of any of these facilities.

III. Saudi Interests and Policy

11. Saudi King Feisal feels that he has a mission to preserve the Arabian Peninsula from radical Arab and communist encroachment. He and his advisors view the Soviet presence in South Yemen with deep suspicion. They are inclined to accept extreme versions of stories about the extent of Soviet military assistance, the construction of Soviet bases, and the influence of the Soviets over South Yemeni Government policies. Feisal himself believes that a prime and near-term goal of the USSR is the overthrow of his monarchy. He is convinced that radical and extremist regimes on Saudi Arabia's borders are Soviet instruments to this end. The Saudis are aware that the extremist regime in South Yemen is active in promoting dissidence against the neighboring Sultan of Oman and is concerned that Aden may direct the same sort of activity against Saudi Arabia. The Saudis interpret the border clash at Wuday'ah in late 1969 as evidence of South Yemen's hostile intentions. The Saudis are likely to be encouraged in their efforts against South Yemen by other states, e.g., Iran and Oman.

12. Fear of the intentions of the National Front government in Aden has led the Saudis to aid South Yemeni exiles over the past three years. In 1968 they helped the former ruler of Bayhan move forces through Yemen, with that government's approval, into Bayhan. [2½ lines not declassified] As it became apparent that the sultans and their followers alone were having little success, the Saudis agreed to help the SAL, then FLOSY, and finally even former NF supporters who had fled South Yemen. Despite their various anti-monarchical attitudes, all have the virtue, in Saudi eyes, of being enemies of South Yemen's regime.

13. In order to eliminate some of the potential for confusion, the Saudis have encouraged the SAL, FLOSY, and the NF exiles in establishing a National Unity Front (NUF), with headquarters in Yemen. The NUF and other dissident tribal forces are reported to have about 6,000 supporters and hope to raise the number under arms to about 10,000. These figures, even if accurate, must be used with caution, because a force introduced into South Yemen is not likely to have military capabilities equivalent to its numbers. Many recruits will have joined for the opportunity to smuggle weapons, to enjoy the sport of tribal warfare, and to loot. Such recruits are likely to fade away when the fighting gets tough. The record of the dissidents in South Yemen in the past

year has not been impressive. They have denied several rugged mountain areas to government troops, but two sizable efforts by tribal forces fizzled out, one in the Hadramaut and one in an area 60–70 miles north of Aden, after the government brought its airpower and armed forces into action. The question is whether a greatly stepped up insurgent effort in the future will produce different results.

IV. Prospects for the Insurgency

14. The dissidents plan a two-pronged thrust at South Yemen in the next few weeks. One operation involves the movement of some groups into Bayhan, the Hadramaut, and Mahra from Saudi Arabia. This phase, [2 lines not declassified] aims at detaching the fifth and sixth provinces of South Yemen or at the least at forcing the South Yemeni Army to overextend itself. Other dissidents are to enter the second and third provinces from Yemen and advance toward Aden; their advance is supposed to be coupled with terrorism in Aden itself against the National Front and its Soviet advisors. [1 line not declassified] The programs are compatible, but we believe that they will not be adequately synchronized and that South Yemen's Army can deal with them one at a time.

15. The Saudis are not likely to stint in support to a variety of South Yemen dissidents in the coming year. Although some of their aid will be diverted for the benefit of various tribal economies, the dissidents will get enough for their needs. King Feisal has a personal interest in the endeavor, and so do Kamal Adham, Prince Sultan, and the Governor of Najran. The Saudis will, however, threaten to suspend their aid from time to time in an effort to compel cooperation among the various dissident groups.

16. In addition to augmented Saudi support, the dissident tribal forces will have the advantage of operating out of Yemen into areas where tribal rebellions have gone on for years. The Yemeni Government would no doubt prefer to avoid direct complicity in an insurgent drive against South Yemen, but its own bias against the National Front in Aden plus its dependence on Saudi money and goodwill will impel it to continue to support the dissidents—openly if need be. The Yemeni Government, however, is unlikely to commit its own forces.

17. On the other side, much will depend on the loyalty and efficiency of the South Yemeni Armed Forces, about which there is virtually no reliable information. The 10,000-man South Yemeni Army is tribally recruited; although the force is equipped with vehicles, its men and officers are not roadbound. South Yemen's small air force is capable of flying ground support strikes against tribal forces. Despite purges of the South Yemeni officer corps for political reasons in the three years since independence, the armed forces still appear to support the regime and have had reasonable success against tribal insurgents in the past

year. They have, however, been hampered in some instances by the conflicting tribal loyalties of their troops, and some of the latter might rally to the dissidents.

18. Though they will be taxed, the South Yemen Armed Forces should be able to prevent the overthrow of the government. They are unlikely, however, to be able to crush the insurgents. The latter will undoubtedly succeed in denying substantial parts of the hill country to the government; they might even establish effective control over one or more of the former Sultanates near the borders; and with great luck they might succeed in separating at least the inland parts of the fifth and sixth provinces—the Hadramaut Valley—from the rest of South Yemen. But the heart of the South Yemeni Government and regime is Aden and its environs (Aden, Little Aden, Shaikh Uthman). As long as it holds this region and a reasonably large part of the third and fourth provinces, including such towns as Abyan and other administrative centers, the National Front will be able to portray itself as the legitimate government of South Yemen.

19. In the struggle against the insurgents, it is unlikely that the South Yemen Government would need to call on major military assistance from outside, e.g., from the USSR. The Soviet advisors already there would almost certainly increase the maintenance and logistics support which they have been extending. They might in addition fly ground support missions within the boundaries of South Yemen, if Arab pilots are unable to fill the need, but we do not believe that the Soviets would commit their pilots to actions outside that country. In the not unlikely event that the insurgency turned out to be prolonged and inconclusive, the Aden government would need and probably get some additional financial assistance and military equipment from the Soviets. The Soviets would be willing to increase their air role to some extent, if they calculated that they could thereby establish their influence in Aden more firmly and that the risk of international complications would be slight. Moreover, the Soviets might fear that failure to respond to South Yemeni requests would give opportunities to the Communist Chinese.

20. With a view to their future in the Indian Ocean area, the Soviets wish to maintain their present position in South Yemen and continue their access to the air and maritime facilities. We do not believe, however, that the insurgency in South Yemen will develop in such a way as to appear to the Soviets to require a substantial commitment of their own forces. They would, of course, be reluctant to see the National Front government go under, but if its demise appeared imminent, they might decide that it would be advantageous to make a deal with some of the radical insurgent elements. The uncertainties and complications of the situation, the difficulties which they experienced in Yemen in the 1960s, and the prospect of other complications in

the Middle East would all militate against extensive direct Soviet involvement.

V. Implications for Saudi Arabia

21. Although Kamal Adham has asserted that the Saudis are prepared to continue their efforts to oust the South Yemen regime for as long as necessary and to use as much force as necessary, the Saudis probably have not looked far beyond currently planned operations. Probably they have not given much thought to the domestic political implications of support for a protracted insurgency. The Saudi leaders' attitudes suggest that they would not consider one setback, even a serious one, as a reason to suspend aid to South Yemen dissidents. Feisal is almost certain to believe that, if an initial effort failed, it would have been due to inadequate support or poor leadership among the dissidents. The Saudis might try using new dissident leaders, but are almost certain to try the strategy at least once or twice more. The odds therefore favor a prolonged struggle.

22. In the course of such a prolonged contest there are circumstances in which some Saudi Arabian forces might become directly involved in South Yemen. Saudi support of the dissidents is well known to the South Yemen Government, and the latter might try to strike at support bases within Saudi territory, say through air attacks. The logistic and technical limitations of the South Yemen Armed Forces would preclude efforts of any substantial magnitude. The Saudis would, of course, respond to such South Yemeni actions, probably using Saudi aircraft; some skirmishing in the border area could ensue. The Saudis could also employ small numbers of National Guard troops across the border in support of tribal insurgents.

23. The factors operating against a major Saudi commitment of military forces outweigh those in its favor. It is true that Feisal is aging and bitter. He has intense fear about a radical encirclement of his country and feels he must act to prevent it. Feisal apparently feels a need to demonstrate Saudi power in the Peninsula, and he may have been encouraged by the success of his forces in the 1969 border clash with South Yemen. Moreover, he is getting hawkish advice from some of those around him. But a large, direct military involvement is unlikely. In fact, the Saudi Armed Forces have severe limitations, which would rapidly become apparent if a major effort were started. Saudi logistic capabilities to support a sizable move into South Yemen by the regular army or National Guard are poor. There are 300 miles of thoroughly inhospitable terrain between Saudi staging areas and the Saudi-South Yemeni border. Beyond these considerations, the Saudi Government in like situations in the past has been cautious; for example, it refrained from committing regular armed forces in support of the Yemeni royalists in the 1960s, despite great provocations by the Egyptians.

24. Judging from the size of the insurgent force so far reported to have been equipped, the economic cost to Saudi Arabia probably has not been high. If Saudi support continues over an extended period and if the Saudis find it necessary to increase the scale of their activities, the drain on the Saudi treasury could run to several million dollars a year. Measured against the entire Saudi budget this is not a large sum. Over a period of time, however, such a drain probably would be exploited by elements within the country which are already unhappy at its social and political conservatism. If the Saudis were to undertake major military intervention in South Yemen, the economic costs and domestic political risks to the Feisal regime would be considerably larger. If Saudi forces were defeated, then consequences could be very serious for the monarchy.

25. A prolonged Saudi-sponsored insurgency in South Yemen could adversely affect the rather fragile political stability which has existed in Yemen since the Yemeni-Saudi rapprochement and end of the civil war in the spring of 1970. The San'a government, because of its distaste for the South Yemen regime and probably even more because of Saudi financial subsidies, has allowed the NUF to operate freely in Yemen and has served as a conduit of Saudi arms and financial assistance to NUF insurgent forces. There are Yemeni elements, both moderate and radical, however, who oppose Yemeni involvement in Saudi plans, either for fear of South Yemeni reprisals or for ideological reasons. Saudi pressures on San'a to support a continuing insurgency would probably bring these opposing factions into sharper conflict.

26. In sum: (a) the South Yemeni regime appears likely to survive the efforts of the insurgents to overthrow it, but it is unlikely to be able to crush the insurgents; (b) in the course of a prolonged insurgency, some Saudi forces might become directly involved in South Yemen, but factors operating against a major Saudi military commitment outweigh those favoring it; (c) if the Saudis did become involved militarily, the domestic political risks to Feisal's regime would rise; and (d) the Soviets, interested in South Yemen's air and maritime facilities, probably will continue maintenance and logistic support to South Yemeni forces. We do not believe, however, that the insurgency in South Yemen will develop in such a way as to appear to the Soviets to require a substantial commitment of their own forces.

[Omitted here is a map of North and South Yemen. See Appendix B.]

183. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

Washington, May 8, 1971, 0114Z.

80353. Subj: Anti-PDRY Campaign. Ref: Sanaa 277; Jidda 1470.²

1. Report cited para 1 Sanaa reftel based on personal observation of source who has reported accurately in past. We recall that when approached by us following PDRYG forces' seizure in summer of 1968 of war materiel in cases marked with distinctive US clasped hands symbol from Southern Yemeni insurgents, Saudis responded that they not responsible for use that might be made of discarded US ammo boxes. Thus Department cannot rule out possibility that Saudis may be permitting use of old MAP-furnished crates to transfer non-MAP munitions to YAR/PDRY border. While PDRY charges of alleged US–Saudi plotting against Aden are by now old hat, publication by it of photos of any handclasp boxes it might seize is as predictable as it is unwelcome to us.

2. Department appreciates that Saudis likely be more incensed than contrite if confronted with USG protest against alleged delivery of USAID-marked boxes to southern dissidents. However, at Ambassador's discretion, suggest that you find low key way to get across following to ranking Saudi officials: USINT Sanaa recently received information that ammo boxes with US clasped hands insignia have been delivered to NUF elements. While provenance these crates is unknown, USG nevertheless disturbed that use of such boxes to transfer war materiel whatever its origin is likely to create false impression that USG involved in aiding or sponsoring NUF operation. To extent this belief spreads in Yemen and PDRY, it could undermine claim of NUF and other anti-NF dissidents to be patriots acting without foreign direction to expel unwelcome radical regime under Soviet and Chicom influence. If PDRYG forces continue to capture and exhibit quantities of arms and ammo ostensibly provided by USG to insurgents this could also excite Soviet suspicion. It clearly undesirable that Soviets be

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 SYEMEN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted on May 7 by Ransom and Wrampelmeier; cleared in NEA/ARP and EUR/SOV; and approved by Davies. It was repeated to USINT Sanaa and CHUSMTM Dhahran.

² Telegram 277 from Sanaa was not found. Telegram 1470 from Jidda, May 6, stated that Saudi Arabia did not ship weapons to foreign forces packed in crates marked with the U.S. AID clasped hands insignia and that the Saudis would resent any U.S. approach that implied the Saudis were trying to implicate the United States in "SAG supported operations in the south." (Ibid.)

encouraged assume that anti-PDRY campaign may not just be quarrel between different factions of South Yemenis but effort by US, with Saudi and dissident southern Yemeni help, to oust radical regime that has allowed USSR to develop foothold in strategic Aden outpost. Soviet reaction to what it likely regard as open US support for NUF cannot be accurately predicted but could well be increase in its own military aid to PDRY. This development if it occurs would be in neither USG nor SAG interest.

3. Defer to Ambassador's judgment of best level in SAG at which these points can be most effectively made but hope that Sultan will be included in this approach. Peg might be in context of tour d'horizon with Sultan of general threats to USG/SAG mutual interests in Peninsula. This might also be suitable opportunity for Ambassador to draw upon guidance previously provided for use with Saqqaf to share with Sultan US views of situation in PDRY and our estimate probabilities of insurgents' success in toppling Adeni regime. Discussions with Sultan would in our opinion usefully supplement our contacts with Saqqaf and Kamal Adham on this subject.³

Irwin

³ Thacher met with Saqqaf on May 21 and Sultan on June 9. (Telegrams 1731 from Jidda, May 23, and 1964 from Jidda, June 10, respectively; *ibid.*)

184. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, May 12, 1971.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward Yemen—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Background

In Riyadh May 2 you told King Faisal you would take another look at American policy toward the Yemen Arab Republic.²

Resumption of Relations

For the past year we have had a small U.S. Interests Section in Sanaa. We expect a Yemeni initiative to elevate this office to an Embassy shortly. The previous Prime Minister, Muhsin al-Ayni, whom you met in New York,³ geared the initiative to elections, which have just ended and brought to office a new Prime Minister, Ahmad Mohammad Numan, who is favorably disposed toward the West. The Yemeni initiative was also tied to improved chances of success in the Jarring mission.

We have repeatedly made it clear that we would welcome such Yemeni initiative to renew relations. We will have to agree on ways to settle our claims for damages resulting from our expulsion in 1967 and must also demand the Yemenis drop charges against former AID officials in Yemen. We are confident we can quickly reach agreement on both problems.

U.S. Assistance to Yemen, 1970–71

1. *With U.S.G. Funds*

Given the cut in our diplomatic relations, Amendment 620(t) of the Foreign Assistance Act has prohibited any U.S. aid to Yemen other than famine relief. In 1970 we provided over \$2 million of food donations to the Catholic Relief Services and WFP for distribution during a famine in Yemen and paid another \$300,000 for transportation of some

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1276, Saunders Files, Persian Gulf. Confidential. Drafted by Ransom and cleared by Atherton and in NEA/ARP and AID/NESA.

² See Document 149.

³ At Rogers's October 17 meeting with al-Ayni, al-Ayni expressed keen interest in resuming diplomatic relations. He emphasized, however, the YARG economic and political obstacles to such resumption without some tangible benefit to balance it out. (Telegram 2534 from USUN, October 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 YEMEN)

of this food to Yemen. In addition, the Peace Corps, which is not subject to 620(t), has sent a first Volunteer to Yemen to work in a UN project and up to twenty more Volunteers may follow. Furthermore, CU has granted to the American Friends of the Middle East (AFME) \$45,000, part of which will be used to finance Yemeni students in Cairo and the U.S. AFME, which has uncovered a number of well-qualified Yemeni students, has requested \$42,000 more from CU this fiscal year; this additional grant is still under consideration.

2. *Without U.S.G. Funds*

With no expenditure of U.S. funds, the Department has been able to perform the following helpful tasks for Yemen, in each case responding to Yemeni requests.

—Experimental seeds were procured for a UN agronomist working in the Yemeni Ministry of Agriculture.

—We requested The Ford Foundation to fund an engineer to survey the Taiz water system, an AID project which has fallen into disrepair. Ford provided \$6,000, and an engineer from a private firm will arrive in Yemen in mid-May.

—We also cooperated in finding a U.S. citizen with extensive AID experience in Yemen to head a UN project which will revive a former AID road equipment workshop.

—We have endorsed YAR projects under study by the UNDP.

—We have brought aid projects for Yemen to Saudi attention; some of these projects the Saudis have already agreed to undertake. Given the YAR's importance to Saudi Arabia, we do not accept the King's statement that Saudi Arabia cannot aid Yemen significantly more than it already has.

3. *Aid Prospects After Renewal of Relations*

Developing any aid program for Yemen will task our ingenuity since, in the short run at least, direct USG bilateral aid will be limited. We tentatively hope, however,

—using AID funds, to make feasibility and engineering studies for Yemeni roads, which might subsequently be built with Saudi funds. American companies could provide the technical know-how and management for such road projects.

—to launch a program of geologic mapping and resource inventory in Yemen, extending southward the work of the 20-year old U.S. Geological Survey mission in Saudi Arabia. USGS will probably pick up part of the tab, and we will look to the Saudis for the remainder for work which will include \$500,000 of aerial photos essential to Yemen's first cadastral and agricultural censuses and surveys of communications.

—to resume AID funding for Yemeni students at AUB and also make available funds for Yemenis to study in the U.S.

—to provide new donations of food to Catholic Relief Services. These donations, which are tentatively projected up to \$2.5 million, will be used both in child feeding and food for work projects in the populous Yemeni highlands.

In addition, we will:

—urge the UNDP to restore and enlarge the Taiz water project, which AID built with such acclaim during the sixties. UNDP's Yemen Director has shown some interest informally in this undertaking.

—play the role of “a broker for Yemen” in the IBRD and IDA; the latter is currently considering other road and infrastructure prospects for Yemen.

As we plan to establish a minimum diplomatic presence in Yemen, our aid efforts have been conceived to minimize staffing. Similarly, we do not anticipate any security assistance or MAP for Yemen, and may not post a defense attaché to our Embassy when it reopens.

185. Letter From President Nixon to King Faisal¹

Washington, September 22, 1971.

Your Majesty:

Since our meeting in Washington,² my government has carefully reviewed the question of how the United States might help the Yemen Arab Republic in response to Your Majesty's request. The importance of Yemeni economic progress under moderate leadership to the security of the Arabian Peninsula is clear to us, as are the many problems of reconstruction and development which face the Yemen Arab Republic at this time. We have been pleased to learn that the Government of Yemen may be interested in resuming diplomatic relations with the United States.³

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's determination to assume primary responsibility for assuring sound progress in the Arabian Peninsula is

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 761, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Saudi Arabia: King Faisal ibn Abdal-Aziz Al Saud, 1971. No classification marking.

² See Document 151.

³ Reported in telegram 625 from Sanaa, September 12. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, Yemen, Vol. I)

something that we warmly welcome.⁴ The surest defense against Communist and radical activity in the Peninsula is a strong Saudi role in fostering regional cooperation to achieve prosperity and orderly development throughout the area.

In the case of Yemen, my government wishes to support this Saudi role. In response to your request, I am prepared to authorize a modest new American aid program for Yemen if diplomatic relations with the United States are restored. Ambassador Thacher can explain our thoughts to Your Majesty in more detail,⁵ but I would like to note that our proposals are all designed to provide opportunities for a primary Saudi investment role in projects which will serve the Saudi interest in Yemen. It is my earnest hope that our countries can cooperate in this manner.

The Government of Yemen is being informed of our readiness to provide assistance to certain economic development projects there at such time as relations are resumed.⁶ As I have indicated to Your Majesty before, we would welcome the restoration of diplomatic relations with all Arab countries and the closest possible cooperation with them in the future.

Your Majesty and the people of Saudi Arabia have my very best wishes for the blessings of health, prosperity and peace.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

⁴ Telegram 3240 from Jidda, September 13, detailed the Saudi economic initiative to Yemen. (Ibid., Box 630, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. III)

⁵ Thacher delivered Nixon's letter to Faisal on October 6. Thacher also asked the King to encourage the Egyptians to show restraint should Yemen decide to re-establish relations with the United States. (Telegram 3535 from Jidda, October 7; *ibid.*)

⁶ Instructions were sent in telegram 170101 to Jidda, September 16. (Ibid.)

186. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

RNAN–26

Washington, September 27, 1971.

YEMEN: NEW CABINET, OLD PROBLEMS

The third cabinet under the 1971 Yemeni constitution came into office on September 18, 1971, under Prime Minister Muhsin al-Ayni. The cabinet, which is a mixed bag of old and new faces and of left- and right-of-center politicians, reflects the political compromises al-Ayni must achieve in order to survive. His chances for remaining in office at least over the next year appear to be fairly good, but the basic divisiveness of Yemeni politics and the desperate economic situation could shorten his tenure. Though not anti-American, al-Ayni will probably be more cautious about renewing diplomatic relations with the US than either his predecessor, Hassan al-Amri, or President al-Iryani.

Al-Ayni Resigned Just in Time. Al-Ayni has served as Prime Minister before, but, after a year in office, resigned in May 1971 just prior to the start of the Yemen's first constitutional system of government. During this tenure, he presided over the successful conclusion of the civil war, which had lasted eight years, and despite his earlier Ba'athi leanings, he managed to win the confidence of the Saudi government. In the view of many observers, al-Ayni quit while he was still ahead. He apparently intended to wait in the wings while the first Premier under the new constitution, Ahmad Nu'man, struggled with the new system, an economic crisis, and the machinations of a powerful political rival, Army Commander Lt. General Hassan Al-Amri.

As was generally expected, these problems were too much for Nu'man, who resigned after less than two months in office. Following extended negotiations with General al-Amri, President Iryani finally appointed him as Prime Minister in late August. Al-Amri immediately challenged the President in a struggle for power. Meanwhile, al-Ayni served quietly as Ambassador in Paris, biding his time far from the stormy Yemeni political scene.

Al-Amri's Ouster Opened Way for al-Ayni's Return. Al-Ayni's sudden recall as Prime Minister was the result of chance rather than calculation on his part. On August 29, al-Amri, after scarcely a week in office, became involved in an incident with a Sanaa photographer whom he

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 YEMEN. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared on September 24 by David E. Long (INR) and approved by Curtis F. Jones (INR).

then shot and killed. President al-Iryani saw his chance to oust al-Amri by taking advantage of the adverse local reaction to al-Amri's lack of self-control. Al-Amri was stripped of all his posts (Premier, Army Commander, and member of the Presidential Council) and went into exile in Beirut.

Iryani thereupon called on al-Ayni, who, after having received the blessing of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, formed a new government on September 19. The relative speed with which al-Ayni was designated can be attributed in part to the Yemeni President's desire to have a government in office on September 26 when Libya's Prime Minister Qadhafi had been scheduled (before last-minute cancellation) to visit Yemen for the Revolution Day ceremonies.

Al-Ayni's Prospects Fair to Middling. Al-Ayni has assumed the premiership during a period of political stability, by Yemeni standards. The new constitutional system appears to be operating reasonably well; the departure of al-Amri has removed a major source of political controversy; and after two cabinet crises in three months, the Yemeni body politic is probably ready for a period of relative calm.

On the other hand, the critical economic and political problems that al-Ayni passed to his successors when he resigned six months ago have become worse. The Yemen is nearly bankrupt. Promised Saudi aid has not yet materialized. Moreover, although al-Ayni removed an irritant to relations with South Yemen by shifting the exiled South Yemeni dissident leader, Abdullah al-Asnaj, from Foreign Minister to Economics Minister, relations with South Yemen are still poor. They are not likely to improve as long as Yemen continues to court, as it must, Saudi political and financial support. Adding to the new government's problems is the pressure the Soviets could exert, as the Yemeni Army's principal source of military equipment, to halt Yemen's drift to the right.

A Balancing Act. Al-Ayni will have to contend with a variety of external factors—Saudis, Soviets, South Yemenis, Americans—as well as internal pressures from both extremes of the political spectrum. His government can be expected to pursue Yemen's post-civil war "opening to the right," but very cautiously. Al-Ayni's nostalgia for leftism and neutralism, coupled with the removal of the most effective check on Yemeni leftists—al-Amri—will probably lead him to be slightly to the left of what al-Amri's government would have been and what President al-Iryani may personally desire. Relations with the US are not likely to worsen, but al-Ayni will probably move slowly in the matter of resuming formal diplomatic ties to the US.

187. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

RSEN–5

Washington, January 18, 1972.

SOVIET–YEMENI RELATIONS: KEEPING THE DOOR OPEN

Allegedly succumbing to a long-standing official Soviet invitation to visit the USSR, Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) President al Iryani, accompanied by Foreign Minister al Ayni and a group of other senior military and civilian officials, toured Moscow and the provinces December 7–18. Coming at a crucial period when bilateral relations were deteriorating, al Iryani's trip conceivably could have stemmed the downward trend, further exacerbated the existing situation, or paved the way for an improvement. In the event, bilateral relations were apparently put on "hold."

The Issues. Politically the YAR has become a liability in Moscow's relations with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), which boasts better port facilities and a radical regime more hospitable to Soviet presence and influence. Nevertheless, the Soviet investment (economic: \$98 million extended, \$63 million drawn through 1970; military: \$77 million extended and drawn) is of such a magnitude and Soviet prestige is involved to such an extent that the Kremlin is apparently unwilling to write off the YAR, leave the field to Peking and the US, and concentrate wholly on the strategically more important PDRY.

Perhaps reflecting their own preferences, the Soviets anticipated that the talks with al Iryani would largely concern economic questions, such as debt repayment. At the same time, they would have liked to dissuade the YAR from harboring Saudi-backed, dissident anti-PDRY elements, principally the National Unity Front, which have made repeated incursions into PDRY territory. For their part, the Yemenis would have been pleased to be able to accomplish the reverse—modify the Soviet tilt in favor of the PDRY, particularly in the matter of arms supply, and discourage the Soviet military from masterminding (as the Yemenis suspect) cross-border punitive forays from the PDRY. Considering the strong military flavor of their delegation, the Yemenis also probably put pressure on the Soviets to regularize a more sophisticated arms resupply (what they have is antiquated) and spare parts flow. In view of their disastrous financial position, it is certain that the Yemenis also pressed vigorously for budgetary support and debt rescheduling.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 YEMEN. Secret. Prepared by James M. Ealum (INR/RSE) and approved by Irwin M. Tobin (INR/RSE).

The Answers. The concluding joint communiqué was a study in blandness that gave no insights into what transpired, but suggested that unresolved differences remained. The Yemenis apparently saw only Podgorny² of the ruling triumvirate, not Kosygin, a fact which allegedly caused al Ayni in particular to be unhappy. There were no military references in the communiqué, and it is unlikely that either side moved on questions related to the major military and political obstacle to improved relations—the PDRY. On economic questions the communiqué was ambivalent. It implied that no new aid was agreed upon, but that there would be movement on existing aid projects.

Al Ayni filled in some of the blanks when the returning delegation stopped off in Cairo on December 19. He told MENA that the Soviets would participate in the completion of the Bajil cement plant; construction of silos, grain storage facilities, bakeries, and the Hodeida fish canning factory; and the expansion and deepening of Hodeida port. He implied that new projects and credits were involved. He enigmatically added that the USSR had given the YAR a \$14.4 million “gift.” When the delegation returned to Sanaa on December 21, al Iryani told the press his Soviet visit had been “positive” and that there had been “complete understanding” on matters of bilateral cooperation. He expanded the projects listed by al Ayni in Cairo to include fishing vessels and artesian wells and stated that “some weapons have been presented as a gift to the armed forces.” Once back in Sanaa, al Ayni reportedly admitted that they had failed in their quest for budgetary support and had been pressured (presumably unsuccessfully) on the question of debt repayment. Al Ayni also claimed he had successfully resisted a Soviet effort to draw up a new friendship-cooperation treaty on the Egyptian model; in the end both sides merely reaffirming their 1935 treaty.

Conclusions. The Yemenis appear to have given nothing and received little in the way of significant concessions. On the economic side, the Soviets apparently only unbent enough to free some of the frozen, unused portions of earlier Soviet aid extensions. In other words, the Soviets probably agreed that, in lieu of new credits, work could go forward under previous extensions. In fact, the “new” projects were all included in the 1964 line of credit and apparently will be funded from this source. In this connection, al Ayni’s statement regarding the improvement of Hodeida port may be overdrawn since a full-scale effort would be an extremely expensive project probably requiring additional aid commitments. On military matters, the Soviets were equally restrained. It is likely that al Ayni’s claim of a \$14.4 million “gift” can be

² Nikolai Victorovich Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium.

equated with al Iryani's acknowledgement of a "gift" for his military forces. If so, this would be consistent with the grant or discount basis of the bulk of the \$77 million in military aid the Yemenis have received heretofore. Compared with this figure, the new "gift" would appear to have been the minimum gesture the Soviets thought would placate the Yemeni supplicants. There are no indications, however, that the problems of orderly resupply and spare parts flow were resolved or that the Soviets responded favorably to Yemeni pleas for more sophisticated equipment.

The overall result seems to have been that at a very modest cost the Soviets have managed to maintain the integrity of their pro-PDRY policy without completely shutting the door on the possibility of improved relations with the YAR. Although the Yemenis cannot have been ecstatic over the results of their Moscow pilgrimage, tokenism—for the time being at least—has prevailed.

188. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia and the Interests Section in the Yemen Arab Republic¹

Washington, March 25, 1972, 2037Z.

51603. Subject: YAR–PDRY Conflict. Ref: Jidda 964, Sanaa 197, State 43595 and 37575.²

1. *For Jidda*. Department commends your proposals para 7 Jidda reftel.³ Department reassured hear Saqqaf say Saudi forces would not be directly involved in anti-PDRY effort. Saudis however may be

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL SYEMEN–YEMEN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Ransom; cleared by Dickman and Atherton; and approved by Davies.

² Telegram 964 from Jidda, March 24, relayed Saqqaf's belief that the PDRY could be overthrown and that Faisal could have "finished off" South Yemen in 1969, but chose not to. Saqqaf also emphasized that Saudi Arabia would not be sending troops into Yemen. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 630, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. III) Telegram 197 from Sanaa, March 23, expressed Stein's view that war between the two Yemens, while not inevitable, might be hard to stop. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL SYEMEN–YEMEN) Telegram 43595 to Sanaa, March 14, is *ibid.*, POL US–YEMEN. Telegram 37575 was not found.

³ In paragraph 7 of telegram 964, Thatcher wrote that he would suggest to Fahd and Sultan that Saudi Arabia carefully consider before committing itself too deeply to tribal-military means as the only method to oppose the PDRY threat.

tempted intervene directly in some form if battle, now apparently joined, does not go well for YAR tribes.⁴ Believe therefore you took exactly right line in trying temper official optimism of Saqqaf in toppling Aden regime. When you see Fahd and Sultan,⁵ believe you should reiterate USG belief in value of alternative anti-PDRY strategy along lines outlined in State 43595. Appreciate we cannot usefully advise Saudis abandon tribal insurrection strategy but we can continue warn of dangers involvement of Saudi forces against Soviet-backed PDRY.

2. *For Sanaa:* Maswari query in Sanaa 139 focused on "security and political backing."⁶ Relations could then easily be resumed, according to Maswari. Our response in State 37575 took rather different position that resumption would enable U.S. carry out development assistance which Saudis could easily complement and expand. Under present circumstances Maswari likely to be even more interested now than before in discussing "security backing" rather than resumption. If he raises latter question, response along lines State 37575 continues to be valid in view of Department. Department agrees, however, your remark para 4 Sanaa 197 that YAR should clearly understand USG not potential source of military support in current situation. If Maswari should press you this subject, believe way would be open for your suggestion US word of caution about too great YAR jump into dark.⁷

⁴ This is a reference to the escalating tension that resulted from the assassination of a prominent Shaykh in South Yemen in February. (Telegram 43988 to Sanaa, March 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL SYEMEN-YEMEN) Intelligence Note RNAN-10, "Yemen-South Yemen: War Clouds Gathering Over Southern Arabia," March 17, contains information on the Yemeni movement to war. (Ibid.)

⁵ According to telegram 1060 from Jidda, March 30, Thacher met with Fahd on March 28. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 630, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. III) He met with Sultan on April 7. (Telegram 1147 from Jidda, April 7; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL SYEMEN-YEMEN)

⁶ Chief of Staff Brigadier Husayn al-Maswari said Yemen faced many threats and wanted to know what kind of political and security backing the United States could offer. A positive answer would facilitate resumption of relations. Stein thought a U.S. offer of the previously arranged \$3 million aid package after resumption of ties and greater Saudi involvement in the short term would be helpful. (Telegram 139 from Sanaa, March 1; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, Yemen, Vol. I)

⁷ Printed from an unsigned copy.

**189. Paper Prepared by Samuel Hoskinson and Harold Saunders
of the National Security Council Staff¹**

Washington, May 11, 1972.

PRESIDENT'S FRIDAY BRIEFING

Arabian Peninsula Affairs: Kamal Adham, the highly regarded Saudi intelligence chief, has informed us about the most recent developments in the budding security arrangements between the Saudis, Jordanians, and Iranians. His main points were:

—He was going to Iran to discuss joint Saudi-Iranian military aid to northern Yemen. The idea was that the Iranians would start off by providing an alternate source of military supply since they had Soviet equipment and spares needed by the Soviet-oriented Yemen military machine. Then after the Iranians had reoriented the Yemenis toward Western arms the Saudis would join in an assistance role. He asked that the U.S. cooperate in the release of equipment of U.S. origin.²

—Adham also intends to discuss with the Shah the possibility of a coordinated area policy between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt aimed at the “neutralization” of the entire area through the elimination of all foreign military presence. The Arab and Iranian forces would then maintain regional security themselves.

—Adham said that Saudi-Omani relations were developing extremely well. With the full knowledge and backing of the Saudis, the Jordanians were sending “500 Army commandos” to fight in Dhofar, and the Saudis had told Sultan Qaboos not to worry about the costs of this operation.

—The Saudis, according to Adham, also support defense and security assistance to the Persian Gulf states by Jordan, particularly in

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1287, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia. Secret. A typed notation reads: “For HAK.” This paper was not included in the President’s Friday (May 12) briefing. (Ibid., Box 41, President’s Daily Briefing Files, May 1–May 16, 1972)

² The Department notified the Embassy in Jidda that it was investigating the legal problems involved in the transfer of U.S. military equipment to Yemen by Saudi Arabia or Iran. (Telegram 82456 to Jidda and Tehran, May 11; *ibid.*, Box 630, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. III) In telegram 89421 to Jidda, Tehran, Kuwait, and Sanaa, May 20, the Department noted that it was willing to review on a case-by-case basis requests from Iran or Saudi Arabia to transfer FMS items to Yemen, but the absence of diplomatic relations with Yemen meant only weaponry purchased by Saudi Arabia or Iran on a cash basis could be legally transferred to Yemen. Thus no MAP items or items bought on credit under FMS could be transferred. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19 IRAN–YEMEN)

the form of expertise. They would take a dim view, however, of the Jordanians providing any surplus arms at this particular stage.

Some of this may well be reflected in the President's talk with the Shah³ since the latter thinks very highly of Adham who has been one of the prime behind-the-scenes movers of the security relationship beginning to develop between Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iran. Adham, interestingly enough, also has a close personal relationship with Sadat and has been instrumental in the considerable improvement in relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt since Nasser's death.⁴

³ Nixon visited Tehran May 30 and 31 on his return from the Moscow Summit. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E–4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972, Documents 200 and 201.

⁴ Attached but not printed is telegram 839 from Kuwait, May 10. The Yemeni intention to shift its entire military procurement from Soviet to Western sources, with the help of Saudi Arabia and Iran, had been affirmed as early as March 30. Maswari had met with Iranian officials as had the Saudis who broached the topic of surplus Iranian F–5s replacing Yemen's obsolescent MiG–17s. (Letter from Helms to Kissinger, Rogers, and Laird, April 7; Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–B01086A, Box 3)

190. Telegram From the Interests Section in the Yemen Arab Republic to the Department of State¹

Sanaa, May 19, 1972, 0610Z.

338. Subj: Need for Economic Aid as well as Military Transfers.
Ref: State 83466.²

1. Decision to consider Saudi and Iranian requests for transfer of military equipment to YARG will give us some needed latitude in furthering US interests here. Sooner or later Yemenis will learn of this positive step we are taking, and it would be helpful if Chargé could speak to high level YARG official about it at appropriate moment, perhaps at such time as first transfer might be approved.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 IRAN–YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. It was repeated to Tehran (Priority), Jidda, and Kuwait.

² In telegram 83466 to Jidda and Tehran, May 12, the Department authorized the embassies to inform their respective host governments that the United States would consider requests for transfer of FMS equipment from either Saudi Arabia or Iran to Yemen on a case-by-case basis. (Ibid.)

2. At same time favorable as effect of above might be—especially on professional warrior elements in and out of uniform—it is highly important we build approach to Yemenis which emphasizes our genuine interest in their economic rather than their military development. In our opinion most promising route to reach this goal is also through our Saudi, Iranian and Kuwaiti friends.

3. More specifically, there is one potential project which seems particularly suited to type of multilateral assistance we are seeking, i.e., the badly needed renovation and expansion of Kennedy Memorial water project in Taiz. As Dept aware, this USAID project of 10 years ago sparked Taiz's impressive rate of growth. After departure of American technicians, there was unsuccessful effort by UAR to Egyptianize operation. Following Egypt's retreat, YARG ran project for a while before turning it over to present private management, Taiz cooperative organization. Chargé visited project last week and found 100 per cent Yemeni management doing admirable job of nursing along limping but vital operation, using American procedures in which they had been trained. Project is now serving 7,000 customers, up from original 4,000 and has to refuse continuing flow of new requests for service. Two of three original Fairbanks Morse generators are functioning, third being idle for lack of \$40,000 in spare parts. If there are further breakdowns, system itself will come to halt.

4. Technical survey last year by Ford Foundation of what is needed and how much it would cost to renovate and expand project is, of course, immediately available. There certainly should be capable American companies ready to undertake such a job. For all-important funding, we suggest concerted effort be made at this time in Jidda, Tehran and Kuwait to persuade one, two or all three of those govts to participate in joint project. Such cooperation would help offset widely held impression here that only aim of some of YARG's neighbors is to fight to the last Yemeni to defeat PDRY regime in Aden. Even in background US could eventually become similarly regarded if we are associated only with military side of things.

Stein

191. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 15, 1972.

SUBJECT

Sultan–Sisco Talks—Arabian Peninsula Part I of IV

PARTICIPANTS

His Royal Highness Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, Minister of Defense
and Aviation of Saudi Arabia

His Excellency Ibrahim al-Sowayel, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia

The Honorable Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary, NEA

Mr. Francois M. Dickman, Director, NEA/ARP

Mr. Camille Nowfel, OPR/LS (Interpreter)

Mr. Sisco appreciated the opportunity to meet with Prince Sultan to have further discussions on several points that had been raised in the meeting with the Secretary the previous day.²

Yemen:

Mr. Sisco said we were pleasantly surprised at what Prince Sultan had reported to the Secretary about YAR intentions to resume diplomatic relations with the U.S. This was somewhat different from indications we had received in recent conversations with YAR officials including YAR President Iryani. Speaking very frankly, Sisco said that it was our understanding that while the YAR wished to establish relations, it felt it was not yet able to do so given Egypt's public criticism of the US.³

Prince Sultan replied that he had had a meeting with the YAR Premier (al-Ayni) about two months ago following the Premier's recent visit to Moscow.⁴ Sultan had told al-Ayni that YAR–US relations would be beneficial and that Sultan saw no gain for Egypt in opposing their resumption. He thought this argument had made an impression. He said that YAR President Iryani had recently sent messages to Egypt and other Arab countries to advise them that the YAR is considering resuming relations with the US because of increased Communist activity in the area, the YAR's serious economic situation, the fact that Arab countries have recently reestablished relations with other Western

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 SAUD. Secret. Drafted by Dickman. The meeting took place at the Watergate Hotel in Washington. See Document 161 for other parts of Sultan's meetings in Washington on regional affairs.

² See footnote 1, Document 161.

³ As reported in telegram 204 from Sanaa, March 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL SYEMEN–YEMEN)

⁴ See Document 187.

countries, and the desire of the YAR military to rid themselves of their Communist advisors.

Mr. Sisco said it would be helpful if Sultan could convey, in whatever way he deemed appropriate, two points to the YAR Premier. First, that the US is ready to resume diplomatic relations at any time, now or two months from now. Second, if the YAR were able to resume relations, the USG would be in a position to offer the kind of economic assistance that we had previously described to the YAR leadership.⁵ This could include about \$3 million in grant aid from supporting assistance funds, donations of food for child feeding and food-for-work projects which could amount to \$2.5 million, scholarships, and collaboration with the Saudis in recruiting American technicians for projects funded by Saudi Arabia. Sultan recalled that a year ago there had been some thought of a US firm doing a topographic survey and he wondered if this was the type of project the US had in mind. Mr. Sisco indicated it might be but because of Congressional requirements, it is impossible to discuss any projects in detail before relations are reestablished. In response to Prince Sultan's question whether the US could discuss YAR projects with the Saudis before the YAR establishes diplomatic relations, Mr. Sisco replied that preliminary talks on an illustrative basis would be possible. Before the US could be specific, however, diplomatic relations would have to be established.

Later in the conversation, Prince Sultan returned to the subject of aid for the YAR. While he appreciated requirements of Congress concerning economic assistance, he nevertheless believed that US assistance to the YAR would be very important as a means to contain Communist in-roads from South Yemen. He urged that the US consider offering the YAR \$20 million in project aid. Prince Sultan believed that the amounts alluded to by Mr. Sisco would be insufficient. Saudi Arabia had already provided Yemen with \$40 million in aid and \$20 million from the US would not be large in terms of its own resources. His Highness recalled that the subject of aid to Yemen had been raised when Vice-President Agnew met with King Faisal last year and he hoped that favorable consideration could be given to this proposal.⁶

Mr. Sisco said he appreciated that the sum mentioned is not great in terms of the YAR's needs and perhaps more could be done eventually. The problem, however is that the USG's hands are tied in the absence of diplomatic relations. Prince Sultan commented that we both

⁵ As reported in telegram 3500 from USUN, October 14 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 YEMEN); telegram 703, October 11; and telegram 717 from Sanaa, October 17. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, Yemen, Vol. I)

⁶ Agnew met with Faisal July 8, 1971. See footnote 2, Document 155.

agree on one thing—that economic assistance for the YAR should be looked into carefully. He hoped that his views concerning the desirability of an important US aid commitment to the YAR, even if it were provided over a period of time in stages, would be conveyed to higher authorities including President Nixon. The Saudis were not urging budget support but financing projects to help build up the YAR infrastructure.

Oman:

Mr. Sisco said that the US was very sensitive to what was going on in South Yemen. We thought one of the best ways to counter South Yemen's radical influence would be to help build up the YAR economy and society. The same policy applied in Oman where the US is shortly going to open an Embassy in Muscat. We will be looking at projects in the technical field in which we can participate. Sisco noted Jordanian and Iranian interest in providing advisory assistance to Oman and that he was encouraged to learn that SAG was also considering providing economic and military assistance to the Sultanate. He thought that the help provided by these four countries would serve to insulate this area of the Peninsula from Communist penetration.

Prince Sultan replied that SAG is ready and eager to provide economic assistance to Oman. However, as far as military assistance is concerned, the Saudis have limitations. About all they could offer would be training Omanis in Saudi military schools and perhaps sending a few military experts. Saudi Arabia did not have ammunition it could spare. With respect to a joint effort including Iran, Jordan, US, and Saudi Arabia, Prince Sultan thought this would be very helpful but a cooperative action of this kind required a US initiative. Only under the leadership of the US could such an effort be started immediately.

Mr. Sisco remarked that the subject has already been discussed by the US with the Iranians and Jordanians and we had encouraged them to work closely with the Saudis. Sisco noted that Jordan's Gulf specialist, General Khammash, was presently in Saudi Arabia to discuss ways in which each nation would help. Sisco believed that there was also a need to decide the means of coordinating our actions since all four countries shared a common objective. Sultan indicated his awareness of the mission of General Khammash who had arrived in Saudi Arabia just as Sultan departed for the US.

UAE

Referring to the previous day's meeting with the Secretary, Mr. Sisco reiterated that the US sees Saudi-Iranian cooperation as of crucial importance to the stability of the Persian Gulf. In this regard, the US would like to see an increase in Saudi-Iranian influence in the UAE. We were aware of the Abu Dhabi boundary question and of King Faisal's generous proposal for settlement. Shaykh Zayid had recently

indicated to Ambassador Stoltzfus that he would welcome an early improvement in relations with Saudi Arabia. We hoped that a close contact might be established since it would allow the Saudis and the UAE to discuss not only mutual security concerns but also outstanding boundary problems.

Prince Sultan appreciated Mr. Sisco's understanding of the Saudi Government's position concerning the UAE. He noted that SAG had played a very positive role to help establish the Federation. It had offered to assist in projects to raise the standard of living in the Federation and to work on defense matters of mutual interest. However, there is a problem related to the question of sovereignty. The UAE still occupies part of Saudi Arabia. While SAG might be able to give up part of this territory, it could not relinquish everything. To do so would shake the confidence of the Saudi people in King Faisal's leadership. Sultan pointed out that Saudi Arabia has had its differences with other countries such as Egypt, Yemen, Kuwait, Jordan and even Qatar, but in time the situation had changed and Saudi Arabia was now friends with all these countries. While Saudi Arabia has the capability to re-occupy overnight those disputed territories originally occupied by the British and now by the UAE, King Faisal wished to settle the issue peacefully. He hoped the US could impress on the UAE the importance of a boundary settlement.

192. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rogers in Perth, the Interests Section in Sanaa, and the Embassy in Japan¹

Washington, June 29, 1972, 0130Z.

Tosec 123/117268. Tokyo eyes only for Asst Secy Sisco. Ref: Sanaa 466.

1. You are authorized to seek YARG agreement to scenario proposed in State 116176.²

2. Re para 2 reftel,³ we would like to receive written communication from YARG to effect that charges pending against Liapis and Hartman at time of their departure from Yemen in 1967 have been dropped or withdrawn for lack of evidence of illegal conduct on their part. It would be even more desirable if in addition YARG would include in communication to US statement that Liapis and Hartman have been cleared of all suspicion of engaging in illegal activities. While it would not be necessary for YARG to make public announcement or statement on this matter, we would expect it to follow usual procedure for dismissal or withdrawal of criminal charges including appropriate entry in formal public records of court and/or prosecutors office where charges were originally recorded.

3. Concur in desirability of your suggestion in para 3 reftel as to form of compensation.⁴ We must reserve judgment on appropriateness of USG accepting this type of payment in kind for full value of compensation pending results of negotiations on amount of compensation to be paid.

Irwin

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 953, VIP Visits, Secretary of State's Visit to the Mid-East and European Countries, June 28–July 7, 1972. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted on June 28 by Stephen M. Boyd (L/NEA); cleared in L/C, L/M/SCA, and NEA/ARP; and approved by Atherton.

² In telegram 466 from Sanaa, June 28, Stein wrote that Yemen would cooperate with the United States on all points contained in telegram 116176 to Sanaa, June 28. Telegram 116176 noted that resumption of relations required that the charges levied against AID officials Stephen Liapis and Harold Hartman at the time diplomatic relations were broken be withdrawn, and that Yemen publicly state there was no truth to the story that U.S. forces were involved in the June 1967 attack on Arab states. Issues related to compensation could be negotiated later. (Both *ibid.*)

³ Paragraph 2 of telegram 466 stated that Yemen preferred not to make a public statement on the charges against the AID workers. Stein suggested that the Department give him a text of what it would like to receive and that any letter on the issue wait until after Rogers's visit.

⁴ Paragraph 3 of telegram 466 stated the best compensation would be for Yemen to make rent-free land available to the United States for the eventual construction of its Embassy.

193. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

Manama, July 3, 1972, 0718Z.

Secto 133/629. For the President from the Secretary. I have just completed a successful 24-hour visit to the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) capped by a resumption of diplomatic relations.²

Yemen has a larger population than Saudi Arabia. Its strategic location at the tip of the Arabian Peninsula makes it an important country in this part of the world. They are particularly concerned about two things: (A) the Soviet and Chinese Communist toehold in South Yemen which gives them a stepping stone to other parts of the Peninsula, particularly into North Yemen and Saudi Arabia; B) primitive character of their society, in dire need of development, but lacking in any appreciable outside investment.

They welcomed resumption of relations; leading officials and the crowds were warm and friendly; and it was clear we have a lot of friends in this country. Both the Saudis and Libyans who are concerned over Communist inroads in the Peninsula have committed themselves to help North Yemen develop a defense force in case the Communist supported regime of South Yemen decides on some military adventure. We have been and intend to continue encouraging the Saudis to be more helpful to North Yemen and just a few days ago Faisal gave them an additional 10 million dollars. As to our small 3 million dollar aid commitment, we and the Yemenis will canvass priority projects such as water and a survey to determine whether there is oil and copper or other minerals which can eventually become foreign exchange earners. This will be money well spent because the leadership seems to be a good one, particularly Prime Minister al-Ayni. We are also going to help interest the foundations, the World Bank, and the UN Development Program to try to meet some of their main needs more promptly. We will want to follow up promptly in such areas now that we have resumed relations.

Our hope is that the Yemen decision to resume relations might stimulate others such as Sudan and Algeria to follow suit.

Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 953, VIP Visits, Secretary of State's Visit to the Mid-East and European Countries, June 28–July 7, 1972. Secret; Exdis. Another copy, marked "Eyes Only," is *ibid*.

² The Yemen Arab Republic resumed diplomatic relations with the United States on July 1.

**194. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the
Department of State¹**

Jidda, July 12, 1972, 1430Z.

2319. Subj: PDRY Feelers on Relations. Ref: State 124289.²

1. We appreciate there are advantages to possible resumption USG-PDRY relations, especially in terms of affecting attitudes other radical Arab states towards like resumption.

2. At same time, believe we must anticipate extremely adverse reaction from King Faisal and senior levels SAG when they become aware we even discussing subject with PDRYG, a government they feel is dedicated to overthrow SAG and to spread of Marxism/Maoism throughout Peninsula. We wonder if, to a lesser extent, this applies to YAR and Omani reactions.

3. Our impression is that major reason PDRY broke relations in first place was realization no major aid program forthcoming from USG. Absence possibility such a program in future may thus render question resumption academic in any case.

4. Should, however, discussions with PDRY become distinct possibility, believe it important that SAG be briefed at earliest possible moment.

Thacher

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 630, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. III. Secret; Exdis. It was repeated to London, Sanaa, and Kuwait.

² Telegram 124289 to London, July 11, noted that if the PDRY was serious in its recent approach on resuming diplomatic relations, then they use the British Embassy in Aden. (Ibid., Box 729, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VII)

195. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, September 17, 1972, 1423Z.

3018. Subj: Sultan again Discusses F-86's to Yemen. Ref: A. Jidda 2749, B. State 144097.²

Summary: Prince Sultan again seeks our views on transferral of Saudis F-86's to YAR. Embassy recommends we inform Prince we do not believe transfer such aircraft militarily advisable. *End summary.*

1. At conclusion of Chargé's meeting with Prince Sultan Sept 17 (see septel) latter asked Chargé if Emb had received response to Sultan's earlier request for approval, per ref (A), to train Yemenis on F-86's at Dhahran preparatory to giving planes to Yemen.³ Chargé replied that no reaction had been received from Dept but that he would inform Sultan as soon as he had word. Sultan expressed hope that reply could be made to him in Riyadh toward end of month.

2. *Comment:* With arrival of first F-5B's imminent, matter of F-86's once more becoming prominent concern of Sultan's. Recommend therefore that Chargé be authorized, in future meeting with Sultan, to inform him DOD/State consider plan proposed by Sultan in Aug 22 meeting inadvisable militarily. Chargé could refer once again to Ambassador Thacher's points that F-86's are old planes and that Yemenis are not trained in their operation. Chargé could further point out USG reluctance, conveyed to Sultan on other occasions to get involved in any way militarily in struggle between Sanaa and Aden. Chargé could expand remarks to emphasize once more USG believes most important contribution SAG and USG could jointly make to YAR would be in economic development fields. He could conclude that, in any case, delivery of F-86's to YAR could conceivably provoke PDRY and could lead to just kind of escalating tension USG hopes avoid.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1287, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia. Secret; Exdis. It was repeated to Sanaa and Tehran.

² Telegram 2749 from Jidda, August 23, reported that, during an August 22 meeting with Thacher, Sultan pleaded for the United States to directly assist Yemen in securing aircraft, especially F-86s. Thacher had explained that military aircraft were not considered among "excess items available for transfer," and that the F-86s were unsuitable for Yemen. Sultan asked that his views be passed to Laird. (Ibid., Box 630, Country Files, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Vol. III) Telegram 144097 to Sanaa, Jidda, and Tehran, August 9, had laid out guidelines for the transfer of equipment among Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Yemen. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (IRAN) YEMEN)

³ Not further identified.

3. Embassy believes on balance it better to present case against F-86's on basis military/political considerations than attempt come up with barrier of legal technicalities.⁴

Horan

⁴ The legal technicalities were laid out in telegram 160496 to Sanaa, September 1. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, Yemen, Vol. I)

196. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

RNAN-36

Washington, October 13, 1972.

YAR-PDRY: WAR CLOUDS DARKEN

Full-scale war between the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) seems to be increasingly more imminent. Although both sides still seem to be hoping to avoid a major clash, they are preparing for the worst.

No Apparent Let-Up in Skirmishing. PDRY forces, which took and then relinquished the YAR border town of Qa'tabah on October 1-2, have continued to shell the town. PDRY aircraft reportedly bombed Qa'tabah and also the Harib area to the northeast on October 12. (See map.)² The YAR, for its part, appears to be moving troops south toward the PDRY border. On the same day, PDRY accused the YAR of massing troops near Perim Island, located in the entrance to the Red Sea. A subsequent report indicated that the YAR had actually begun to shell Perim on October 11 from the YAR mountains overlooking the island. YAR Prime Minister al 'Ayni, the most dovish figure in the YAR government, told a French newsman that both Perim and Kamaran Island, which the YAR had seized October 6, belonged to the YAR.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only; Department of State Use Only. Prepared by David E. Long (INR) and approved by Curtis F. Jones (INR/NEA). The fighting in Yemen generated other Intelligence Notes, including RNAN-33, "YAR-PDRY: When is a War Not a War?", October 5 (ibid.), RNAN-34, "YAR: Throwing Down the Gauntlet to PDRY?", October 11 (ibid., POL SYEMEN-YEMEN), and RNAN-38, "YAR/PDRY: Intensity of Border Fighting Increases," October 20. (Ibid.)

² Attached but not printed.

President al Iryani has also made this claim. In the meantime, there were indications that the insurgents, collectively termed the National Unity Front (NUF), hoped to persuade the PDRY troops on Perim to surrender in the same manner as did those on Kamaran.

Elsewhere, YAR tribal forces, army units, and insurgent forces have been gathering at several major points along the YAR–PDRY border: a large tribal force funded and equipped by the Saudis is gathering at Harib; a 600-man force of regular YAR troops arrived in Baydah on October 12; and about 15,000 troops, commanded by the YAR's best officers, are gathering south of Ta'iz on the Ta'iz–Aden road.

YAR Frantically Shaping Up Its Forces. In the last few weeks, the YAR has been busily trying to upgrade its poorly trained and under-equipped armed forces. On October 11, IL–28 bombers and MIG–17 fighters, together with a large quantity of spare parts, reportedly arrived in the YAR, presumably from Egypt and possibly at Libyan urging. (Egypt promised some IL–28s to the YAR some time ago.) The spare parts were to make operational YAR aircraft that had been grounded for lack of spare parts. Only two of the YAR's eight IL–28s and four of its 12 MIG–17s were flyable prior to the airlift. Another report stated that there was a feverish effort by the YAR to overhaul several of its IL–28s and MIG–17s that had been rendered useless by long neglect. In the meantime, Saudi air force transports have been stepping up arms shipments to the YAR and the insurgents, and there are also indications that the Egyptians are sending in military equipment.

Extent of Outside Assistance Unclear. It seems doubtful that President al Iryani would have committed the YAR to full support of the insurgents and thereby risk all-out war with PDRY unless he had outside assurances of assistance in the event of hostilities. The Saudis have been urging the YAR to take this step for some time and have indicated their willingness to help. There has been no evidence, however, of a quantum jump in Saudi military and financial assistance, which heretofore has been insufficient to persuade al Iryani actively to support the insurgents. It is possible that Libya has also offered support. If so, when added to pressure from the Saudis and the YAR warhawks, it could have tipped the balance. Libya has been critical of the Marxist PDRY regime and has been mildly interested in the NUF, but there have been no previous signs that it wished to become heavily involved. Nevertheless, Colonel Qadhafi may have offered assistance to the YAR in the event that it moved decisively against PDRY, possibly in an effort to dilute the YAR's heavy dependence on the Saudis and the West. If the Libyans prompted Egypt to send aircraft and spare parts to the YAR, this could also have been a form of Libyan assistance. As tension has built up, the YAR has called on several Arab states for assistance in the face of the PDRY threat, and it has asked the US for an emergency food airlift.

PDRY, because of its general isolation in the Arab world, has little choice but to turn to the Soviet Union. The Soviets are doubtlessly loath to commit themselves to the PDRY side, for even though their stock is currently low in the YAR, they probably do not want to put all their eggs in the PDRY basket. As a sign of their ambivalence, Soviet technicians are maintaining Soviet-supplied aircraft in the YAR, and the Soviet Ambassador to the YAR denied to Prime Minister al 'Ayni on October 10 that the USSR was committed to PDRY in the present confrontation.

Possibility of Successful Mediation Dim. A Reuters dispatch announced on October 13 that the Arab League mediators had obtained another ceasefire, with both sides pulling back six miles from the border. Over the long run, however, the chances for a negotiated settlement are poor. With the insurgents occupying Kamaran Island and the YAR publicly pressing its claim to both Kamaran and Perim, it seems unlikely that the YAR will settle for terms acceptable to PDRY.

197. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, November 7, 1972, 1115Z.

3621. Subject: Military Assistance for YAR. Ref: Jidda 3568.²

Summary: Saudi entreaties delivered through Sultan and more recently by Saqqaf (reftel) should be considered in light fact SAG regards threat from PDRY as by far gravest foreign policy issue it faces and that persistently negative USG response may have in time some impact on King's view of value of tie with US or on his willingness respond in other situations where we seek constructive Saudi help. We have hitherto given Saudis number reasons for our adverse responses to their pleas for help to YAR but these seem to have made little impression. For important reasons, therefore, of Saudi-US bilateral relations, as well as to add weight to our voice re Saudi policy toward Yemen, we suggest consideration be given to making available some type of military transport aircraft for YAR Govt under RSAF auspices.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL SYEMEN-YEMEN. Secret; Exdis. It was repeated to Sanaa.

² Telegram 3568 from Jidda, November 2. (Ibid.)

In interim response Amb might be instructed point out need for Saudi Arabia doing everything possible assist YAR preserve its most important asset: existing, almost universal, support by other Arab govts. Later, if decision made to help YAR with transport planes, other valid suggestions could be placed before Saudis, particularly need for unifying all foreign aid efforts through YAR Govt and preserving cease-fire. *End summary.*

1. In recent months Defense Minister Prince Sultan has on several occasions conveyed urgently to us Saudi hope that USG could play significant role in supplying arms to YAR. This request has now been repeated with further emphasis and as coming from King in Saqqaf's discussion with Ambassador reported ref message.

2. Clearly prospect of unity between two Yemens³ has sharply accentuated Saudi fear that Communist cancer in southwest Arabia will further expand its destructive influence. Dread of Communist regime in South Yemen is in many ways most compelling single consideration affecting determination of Saudi foreign policy. Even if, as seems likely, YAR-PDRY unification endeavor fizzles out, yet Saudi fears of PDRY potential have been brought to new high-water mark of intensity from which they will not readily recede.

3. Saudis' "forward policy" which has encouraged aggressive tactics by tribes and NUF may have been unwise, but reflects depth Saudi determination protect themselves against spread of Communist influence from south. Central fact is that US attitude toward military supplies for YAR seems to be becoming steadily more significant issue in US-Saudi relations. In King's mind US and Saudi Arabia share one great common interest: opposition to Communist expansion. This is bedrock of King's determination maintain, despite various other differences, closest ties with USG. We see strong possibility of both North and South Yemen taking advantage current ceasefire to regroup and return vigorously to hostilities. As we press Saudis to be more forthcoming regarding economic aid for Jordan, we may find their response on that issue affected by ours toward supply of arms for YAR (despite

³ North and South Yemen signed a "Unity Agreement" in Cairo on October 28. This agreement provided for the withdrawal of their respective forces, the reopening of their common border, the repatriation of refugees, a ban on all hostile activities, and the establishment of a unified state within one year's time. The two sides also agreed to meet in Libya on November 25, to discuss unity and begin the process of drafting a constitution. According to "Yemen Unity Talks," a paper prepared in NEA, the odds were against the agreement actually resulting in the unity of the two states. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, Yemen, Vol. I) This paper was transmitted to Kissinger under a November 3 covering memorandum from Eliot. (Ibid.)

our best efforts explain wholly separate considerations affecting two situations). If we prepared approve sale of C-130's to King's dependable neighbor, Sheikh Zayid, he may wonder why we unwilling help with similar type equipment for severely threatened YAR.

4. To date we have justified our negative position toward Saudi requests by stressing US determination concentrate on badly needed economic assistance for war-torn YAR, by our belief that others (Saudis and Iranians) should assume burdens of military aid. We have said we wanted to avoid also possible adverse implications of East-West confrontation which significant US contribution of arms to YAR might imply. But Saudis have remained unconvinced. It would seem desirable we advise them do all possible maintain YAR-PDRY ceasefire and seek means strengthening YAR Government.

5. At present we have little locus stand to urge such policies on King Faisal. Both to demonstrate helpful USG attitude toward what Saudis regard as most acute threat to their security and to add weight to expression of our views on Yemen situation, we suggest consideration be given to selling Saudi Govt two used C-130 aircraft with understanding Saudi Air Force would then arrange make these available for use by YAR. Perhaps ExIm or MAP credit could be offered as further proof our desire be helpful. It would be made clear that once planes delivered their effective operation solely matter for RSAF and YAR, which presumably would have to depend on maintenance facilities available in Jidda. C-130's could be useful not only for military but humanitarian purposes, i.e. emergency distribution of food. We recognize world shortage of this type aircraft, but believe importance our relations with Saudi Arabia and desirability proposing some positive response to current request could justify intense search for planes in good condition which could be made promptly available.

6. We suggest C-130's as flexible, highly useful equipment, particularly appropriate in view of Saudis' reiterated claims that YAR suffers more than anything else from inability to carry on military and civilian supply operations to remote quarters of country. We recognize, that there are other types aircraft nearly as useful such as Caribou or C-123, which USG might perhaps be able make available more easily than scarce C-130's. Any of these aircraft could, we think, be properly operated by RSAF and YAR jointly with Saudi maintenance back up. Point is that if we are to make positive response, it best to do so with some significant piece of equipment which has considerable civilian as well as military use and which Saudis and YAR could not obtain without USG assistance. To define at outset positively and precisely type of equipment we are prepared to offer is by far best means keeping under control Saudi expectations and exhortations with regard to what they would like to have us do now and in the future.

7. Most significant suggestion we can offer Saudis at this stage re Yemen is that Saudi Arabia manipulate its own actions so as above all to retain, and not to dissipate, most important asset now possessed by YAR: namely, widespread support it enjoys among other Arab govts. We could note that Saudi Arabia (which so often believes itself pursuing courses that tend separate it from fellow Arabs) is in present instance apparently at one with other Arab countries in effort shore up YAR.

8. Suggest, therefore, as form of interim response and because point about unified Arab support is so important that Amb be instructed see Saqqaf as soon as possible after present holiday hiatus stating message re aid to Yemen now under consideration in Washington. Meanwhile, we note, as hopefully helpful observation, great desirability preserving and encouraging at all costs existing common Arab support behind YAR.

9. If decision made offer some US aid on lines described above, believe we could at later time put forward other positive suggestions re Saudi policy toward YAR, particularly urgent need for funneling all aid through YAR Govt as best means assuring ultimately development coordinated effective defense and general strengthening of YAR against threat from PDRY. We could in addition, of course, give vigorous support to beneficial advantages of maintaining ceasefire.

10. Accordingly, positive response to Saudi entreaties will, we think give us some leverage express views re developments in Yemen. More fundamentally, however, we think need for constructive reply springs from exigencies of US–Saudi relations: by reiterated negative response to Saudi request for help with threat they consider most urgent one facing them we risk over period of time some erosion in Saudi attachment fundamental relationship with US as well as perhaps diminishing responsiveness to our requests for Saudi support in spheres of special importance to US.

Thacher

198. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 15, 1972.

SUBJECT

Yemen

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
John Moberly, Counselor, British Embassy
Stephen W. Buck, NEA/ARP

Mr. Moberly said he was calling on Mr. Davies as a result of a letter from London concerning the November visit there of YAR Prime Minister al-Ayni. Moberly said that in discussions with the British, al-Ayni had gone into some detail on the needs of the YAR's military. Al-Ayni complained that the YAR had not received weapons, spare parts or adequate maintenance support from the USSR, its principal military supplier, in years. The YARG now found itself virtually unable to maintain its military establishment and was looking for alternate sources of supply. It could not afford to pay for military equipment. Al-Ayni indicated that anything the British could do for the YAR in the military field, including weighing in with friendly parties such as the Gulf rulers and Saudi Arabia, would be appreciated.

Moberly said his Government studied the matter and came to the conclusion that in the Peninsula, their first commitment was to Oman; they could not become involved in helping the YAR militarily. On the other hand they were concerned that a negative reply might lead the Yemenis to the conclusion the West was uninterested in providing support. Moberly asked whether the US might be considering providing some sort of military assistance to the YAR.

Mr. Davies replied that he would not rule out some sort of US role. However, we made it crystal clear to the YAR at resumption of relations and have since then that our assistance would be economic and not military. In strict confidence Mr. Davies told Mr. Moberly that he had talked with the Saudis about their being helpful militarily. Under certain circumstances and provided various legislative requirements were met, we might be willing to authorize Saudi transfers of surplus US equipment to the YAR. However, we would not become a direct

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted on December 18 by Buck. Sisco sent talking points to Davies in a December 15 memorandum. (Ibid., POL UK-US)

military supplier of the YAR because of the likelihood that this would only result in the USSR increasing its arms supply to PDRY and introduce a cold war flavor in YAR/PDRY relations.

Mr. Davies noted that we did not feel particularly well informed on the YAR's military capabilities and needs. We had asked our embassy in Tehran to obtain an Iranian assessment, but unfortunately the recent breakdown in Iranian-YAR relations over language in the Tripoli communiqué had intervened. Summarizing, Mr. Davies said that we are interested in the Sanaa government's being provided with the military essentials. But we hope to avoid direct US supply because of obvious problems. We hope that regional cooperation, with possible US encouragement, will provide the answer to the YAR's military needs. Mr. Moberly noted that the US and UK positions appeared to be the same.

Mr. Davies pointed out that US economic assistance to the YAR would probably free at least some YAR budgetary resources for defense/security expenditures. He then reviewed US activities and plans for the Yemen, noting that our first resident Ambassador would present his credentials on December 19, the tenth anniversary of US recognition of the YAR.² Our aid program, while modest, would be responsive to Yemeni development needs. A second team of AID experts was in Sanaa developing various assistance projects proposed by the YAR following a visit by an earlier team. We planned to have a very modest AID office operating in Sanaa by February. Its director, Aldelmo Ruiz, was very capable and well-qualified, having served in Yemen from 1962 through 1967 as Director of the Kennedy water project in Taiz. Likely American assistance projects included a temporary water system for Sanaa, rehabilitation and expansion of the Taiz water system, completing Taiz airport, rural water supply, a geological/hydrological survey of Yemen by satellite, extension/agricultural work (small projects in dairy farming, poultry and tobacco), education (fifteen Yemenis already studying at AUB on AID grants) and a Peace Corps-staffed English language training program. We would plan to develop the latter program in close collaboration with the British Council, which Mr. Davies understood was already working in the Yemen.

Turning to Yemen-Iranian relations, Mr. Davies said we were as discomfited as the British by the overly sharp Iranian reaction to the reference to the "Arab Gulf" in the Yemen Unity Summit communiqué from Tripoli. Like London, we are anxious to prevent a break between Yemen and Iran but also anxious not to get in the middle. Mr. Moberly said his Embassy had received a cable that afternoon from the British

² William R. Crawford, Jr. was appointed on October 12.

Ambassador at Tehran saying the Shah had indicated through Foreign Minister Khalatlari that if after 3–4 weeks the YAR wished to send an Emissary, he would be received and in due course aid to the YAR would be resumed.

Mr. Davies asked Mr. Moberly to pass on our appreciation for the productive discussions Ambassador Crawford had had in London and for the FCO's briefing on their recent talks with Prime Minister al-Ayni.³ Mr. Davies said that like the British, we feel that it is unlikely that unity between the two Yemens will fast materialize. It appeared the British in November saw a danger of the better-organized PDRY taking advantage of any unity arrangement, while our assessment was that in any union the four times more populous YAR would have the upper hand. Moberly replied that he had not followed the matter closely, but perhaps the danger of the PDRY tail wagging the YAR dog was now less.

On YAR–Saudi relations, Mr. Davies said that while the Saudis continue to view Yemen unity with great trepidation and reserve, YAR roving Ambassador Numan had at least gained Saudi acquiescence to it during his recent talks in Jidda. The Saudis apparently expect that Prime Minister al-Ayni would be dropped in return for their tolerance of recent unity efforts.⁴

Turning to Iran, Mr. Moberly said that the British had recently been informed that the Shah had become alarmed by a report from an Iranian military source that a party of 250 Dhofari rebels had moved into the Musandam Peninsula near the Strait of Hormuz. According to the Iranians this information came from a British military officer in Oman. The Shah indicated that Iran would be happy to help the Omanis against the Dhofari rebels. Moberly said the British checked out the story and could find no basis for it.

Referring to Moberly's statement about Oman's security having priority for the British, Mr. Davies remarked that Chinese aid to the Dhofar rebels might become minimal. The Chinese seemed to be in a good position in the YAR and the Russians in PDRY, leaving less scope for PRC support for the Dhofari rebels through the PDRY/Dhofar border.

³ Transmitted in telegram 11154 from London, November 20. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL YEMEN)

⁴ Al-Ayni resigned December 15. According to telegram 1112 from Sanaa, December 16, al-Ayni's departure was a result of "cumulative disenchantment with his administration, suspicion of the way in which he handled Cairo Unity Declaration, and King Faisal's caveat that he had to go as price for SAG permissiveness toward YAR–PDRY unity." (Ibid., POL 15–1 YEMEN)

Referring to the Peninsula as a whole, Mr. Davies remarked that there was a good deal of high level interest, emphasized by the Secretary's trip last summer.⁵ We had a dynamic Ambassador in the Yemen and we seemed to be getting off to a good start there even with only a modest aid program.⁶ If we could play a discreet role in softening differences between Sanaa, Riyadh and Tehran, this would be all to the good. However, we did not wish to get in the middle, especially if this made the Saudis and Iranians think they could rely on us to meet the YAR's economic and military needs. We continue to believe that the best way to assist the YAR is through regional cooperation. On the other hand the US does not wish the YAR to become so deprived of military equipment as to have to turn back to the Soviets, their original suppliers.

⁵ A reference to Secretary of State Rogers's July trip to the Middle East and Europe.

⁶ Crawford prepared a detailed memorandum on November 10 on the various aid and developmental programs he thought possible, including the Kennedy Taiz Water System, PL-480, USIA language training, Peace Corps volunteers, CU assistance to Yemenis knowledgeable in English, police training, coordination of UNDP and IBRD activity, grants from the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, poultry production through the Near East Foundation, agricultural programs through International Volunteer Services, military assistance, tourism, and logistics for the American presence. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 761, Presidential Correspondence 1969–74, Saudi Arabia: King Faisal ibn Abdal-Aziz Al Saud, 1972)

Jordan, September 1970

199. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, September 6, 1970, 1712Z.

146336. Three US airliners have been hijacked by Palestinian groups.² You should contact Foreign Ministry soonest and ask for Soviet intervention should any of the flights land in Baghdad to the end that passenger, plane and crew are promptly released. Flights involved are TWA 741, Pan American 093 and Pan American 3.

Johnson

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Confidential; Limited Official Use; Flash. Drafted and approved by Davies.

² A fourth plane, El Al flight 219 flying from Amsterdam to New York City, was also hijacked by two people, but El Al crew members shot and killed one hijacker and wounded the other. (Memorandum for the Record, September 6; *ibid.*) For additional documentation on this and subsequent hijackings on September 6, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Documents 45 ff.

200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Italy¹

Washington, September 6, 1970, 1756Z.

146338. Subject: Hijackings

1. We have asked British Embassy to request London to pass urgent message to British Embassy Baghdad re possible arrival in Baghdad of hijacked TWA or Pan American aircraft. We are asking that British Embassy Baghdad do what it can to assure that Iraqi government

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12 US. Unclassified; Flash. Drafted by Seelye, cleared in AV, and approved by Davies. It was repeated to Beirut, USINT Cairo, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

releases passengers and plane promptly in accordance Tokyo Convention² and, in addition, apprehend hijackers.

2. In addition, Embassy London, as well as Foreign Ministry Rome and Brussels, should be made aware of fact that should Pan Am 747 aircraft land in either Damascus or Baghdad there will be no equipment available at either airport to offload passengers. Only way for passengers to disembark would be by escape slide. Therefore we request that addressees pass this information to host governments to assure that they understand situation and to urge that respective airport personnel be patient until Pan American is able to fly from Beirut equipment necessary to allow passengers to disembark. This could take several hours depending on clearances, etc. Pan American hesitant use escape route since it could result in broken ankles, etc.

Johnson

² The Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft was signed in Tokyo on September 14, 1963, and entered into force for the United States on December 4, 1969. In Article 11, Section 2, the Convention requires contracting states to allow aircraft passengers and crew who have been forced to land in their country by hijackers "to continue their journey as soon as practicable." In Article 13, Section 2, the Convention requires contracting states to take custody of hijackers. (20 UST 2941)

201. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon¹

Washington, September 6, 1970, 1937Z.

146343. Subject: Hijacking.

1. Pan Am informs us that Lebanese are refusing to allow Pan Am aircraft to land at Beirut Airport. We consider it extremely important that permission for such landing be granted. Embassy instructed to do everything possible to persuade Lebanese Government to allow aircraft to land.

2. We have just seen ticker item quoting Amman "airport sources" to effect that airports at Amman, Damascus and Baghdad have refused

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12 US. Unclassified; Flash. Drafted by Seelye and approved by Davies. It was repeated Immediate to Amman, USINT Cairo, Brussels, London, Paris, and Rome.

landing permission to two aircraft. Aside from political desirability plane and passengers land at Beirut, safety of planes and passengers is jeopardized by continued inability aircraft find place to land.

Johnson

202. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, September 6, 1970, 2300 EDT.

SUBJECT

Aircraft Hijackings

REFERENCE

NMCC MFR 061700 EDT SEP 70, same subject²

1. Updated information concerning the aircraft reported hijacked in the referenced MFR indicates:

a. TWA Flight 741 landed at Dawsons Field (25 miles east of Zarka, Jordan).

b. Swissair Flight 100 also landed at Dawsons Field in Jordan.

Both aircraft and passengers are reported safe and Jordanian forces are on the scene and reinforcing their cordon of the area. The Fedayeen have announced they would blow up themselves and the aircraft if any attempt was made to storm the aircraft or otherwise checkmate the hijacking effort. Red Cross has determined that the passengers have enough to eat and drink, and ICRC will visit the passengers tomorrow, 7 September.

c. Further information on El Al Flight 219 has not been received.

d. Pan Am Flight 93 (vice 293 as previously reported) landed at Beirut at 061637 EDT. The aircraft was refueled and took off at approximately 061950 with original passengers, crew, and hijackers aboard and landed at Cairo at 062107 EDT. Press releases indicate that upon landing in Cairo, passengers were led to safety and the aircraft was blown up.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. For Official Use Only. Received in the White House Situation Room at 12:28 a.m. September 7. Copies were sent to Saunders and Dunn.

² See footnote 2, Document 199.

2. American Embassy Beirut has received a call that the Pan Am, TWA, and Swissair aircraft will be blown up unless a payment of one million dollars is made.

3. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has issued a 72-hour ultimatum to the Swiss Government to release three Palestinian Commandos currently serving 12 year sentences in Switzerland for attacking an Israeli airliner in Zurich in 1969. Responsible Palestinian leaders have said the TWA and Swissair aircraft will be released upon arrival of the three Palestinians in Amman.

E.O. Martin

Brigadier General, USAF

Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC

**203. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon¹**

Washington, September 6, 1970.

SUBJECT

Middle East Developments

[Omitted here is material on the Arab-Israeli conflict unrelated to the Jordan crisis.]

In addition to the foregoing there have been four highjackings reported this morning involving American, Swiss and Israeli airlines:

—A TWA flight from Tel Aviv to New York via Athens and Frankfurt was hijacked shortly after takeoff from Frankfurt. There were approximately 142 passengers and crew members on board. Latest reports indicate that the plane is heading for Damascus.

—A Swiss Air DC-8 aircraft enroute to New York from Zurich was hijacked over Paris with 143 passengers and crew on board. A Swiss Air spokesman said the plane was seized by Palestinians with destination Cairo.

—A third incident involved an El Al 707 with 148 passengers and two armed guards. Enroute to Tel Aviv via Amsterdam an abortive highjacking attempt was made shortly after takeoff from Amsterdam. The plane then landed at London. The London police report that the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 646, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East General, Vol. VII. No classification marking. Haig wrote on the first page: "Given orally by Haig to Pres. 6 Sept."

male hijacker was killed, his female accomplice wounded and the pilot and a steward also wounded.

—A Pan American 747 jumbo jet enroute from Amsterdam to New York with 151 passengers and 18 crew members has also been reported hijacked. Fragmentary information indicates that the pilot has asked flight clearance to Beirut.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in Amman has now claimed credit for the first three hijackings, saying that the passengers on the Swiss Air flight will be held for the release of three fedayeens being held in Switzerland. The hijackings are apparently all being carried out by male-female teams.

Both the White House and State have been called by Rabbi Rubin in New York who has notified us that the TWA 707 from Tel Aviv to New York carries one of the senior American Jewish rabbis who is ill and who would probably not survive a lengthy internment. Rabbi Rubin has been pressing for a strong condemnatory statement from you. We have delayed recommending such a statement until the situation with respect to all of the flights clarifies. In the interim, however, State has been in contact with each of the possible destination countries urging strongly that they adhere to established international practice and immediately release the aircraft and passengers. I believe it is preferable to withhold strong condemnatory statements until the diplomatic channels have been played out. In this way we will not put recipient Arab Governments in a position of having to side with the PFLP prematurely.

204. Paper Prepared by the NEA Working Group in the Department of State Operations Center¹

Washington, September 7, 1970.

Situation Report as of 0600 Hours EST, September 7, 1970

Two of the jet airliners (TWA 741 and Swissair 100) hijacked on September 6 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) are at an airstrip about 30 miles east of Amman, Jordan, while the third (Panam 93), a Boeing 747 jumbojet, was blown up after landing at Cairo.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Confidential. The NEA Working Group was formed to coordinate information and responses to the hijacking crisis. (Ibid.)

Status of TWA and Swissair Passengers Unclear. A high Jordanian official informed our Embassy that the 145 passengers aboard TWA 741 “were being released” and would be transported to Amman by Army units. However, a PFLP spokesman reportedly told the local TWA agent in Amman that American, British, Israeli, West German, and Swiss nationals would be held. It can not be immediately determined how many of the 145 TWA and 155 Swissair passengers are of these nationalities, but it is believed that about 90 Americans and perhaps as many as 50 Israelis are among the Swissair passengers.

Panam Boeing 747 Destroyed. Panam 93 was blown up after the 170 persons aboard were evacuated. All are believed safe, although five or six were hospitalized with undetermined injuries. Panam has dispatched a Boeing 707 to Cairo to transport the passengers to New York. UAR authorities have apprehended three of the hijackers and are seeking a fourth.

PFLP Demands Release of Fedayeen. According to news reports, the PFLP has made three demands for release of the aircraft and passengers: 1) release and return to Amman of three PFLP commandos imprisoned in Switzerland; 2) return to Amman of the commando killed in the abortive El Al hijacking and release of his female accomplice; and 3) release of three fedayeen being held in West Germany. A fourth demand, relayed by the PFLP office in Beirut, calls for the release of all fedayeen held in Israel.

205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Israel, and West Germany¹

Washington, September 7, 1970, 1448Z.

146375. You should inform Government to which you accredited immediately of PFLP demands as reported in Amman 4372.² In view linkage of demands, it important that any response to PFLP be made

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12 US. Secret; Flash. Drafted and approved by Sisco and cleared by U. Alexis Johnson. It was repeated to Beirut and USINT Cairo.

² Telegram 4372 from Amman, September 7, 1125Z, reported that the PFLP made five key demands focused on releasing passengers in exchange for the release of Palestinian prisoners held in Switzerland, Britain, West Germany, the United States, and Israel. (Ibid.)

only after closest possible consultation between governments principally concerned. We are in touch with representatives of respective governments here in Washington, and important that matter of any response be concerted here in Washington. Would appreciate your requesting government to which you accredited to instruct their respective Embassy to keep in closest concert with State Department so that this matter can be considered.

Rogers

206. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, September 7, 1970, 1815Z.

7096. Dept pass Cairo Immediate. Ref: London's 7095.²

1. Greenhill has just told DCM following meeting at Prime Minister's office, that instructions are going to British Embassy Washington to suggest earliest possible meeting (hopefully Monday) of reps there of all governments concerned to concert next steps. HMG favors Security Council meeting at earliest possible moment to adopt resolution (exact nature of which unclear to us).³ Foreign Office also suggests Foreign Secretary call in reps in London of all Arab states on Tuesday to try to get them to persuade PFLP to stand down. Greenhill said facts are not all in yet so HMG cannot, repeat, not decide about release of Leila Khaled.

2. In reply to question, Greenhill said HMG not considering engaging ICRC into affair but anyone could throw that suggestion into meeting they are proposing.

Annenberg

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Secret; Immediate. It was repeated to Geneva (Immediate), Bern, Tel Aviv, Bonn, Beirut, and Amman.

² In telegram 7095 from London, September 7, 1619Z, the Embassy notified the Department that British Ministers would be meeting shortly to discuss options. British officials reported that the Ministers were divided between those who wanted to hold firm and those who wanted to find a way out of the crisis. (Ibid.)

³ In telegram 147016 to Bern, the Department informed Embassy officials that the United States supported the U.K. suggestion for a Security Council meeting, and that the United States was prepared to act together with the United Kingdom or separately. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12)

207. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 7, 1970, as of 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East Hijacking Status Report

Secretary Rogers has met with the Ambassadors of Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland. All have agreed to release prisoners they hold. These include: Switzerland, three Fedayeen; Federal Republic of Germany, three Fedayeen; United Kingdom, the girl hijacker captured yesterday.

State now hopes to announce through the Red Cross a concerted four power offer to the Fedayeen to the effect that the four powers will be willing to make this exchange *if all* prisoners and both aircraft are turned over to the International Red Cross. This varies from what the Fedayeen have demanded. The Fedayeen demand provides that only non Israeli nationals and non dual passport personnel will be released in return for the foregoing exchange. They would continue to hold Israeli prisoners and dual passport prisoners. (We believe there are ten U.S. personnel holding dual passports in this group.) These would only be released in return for all Fedayeen held by the Israelis.

If the Fedayeen holds to its original demand we could be placed in the untenable position of being isolated with Israel in negotiating the release of Israeli and dual-citizenship personnel. State will attempt to avoid this predicament through the proposal cited above. State has adopted this proposal because they feel that since the Swiss have already agreed to ransom their nationals and aircraft, it will be difficult if not impossible to hold them in line except by such an offer.

I believe if we do make this proposal it will likely be rejected. Then we will be faced with the same problem of holding the other three nations in line—a rather dim prospect. If we do not make this proposal we will probably lose the other powers and find ourselves isolated in either event. In going this route we should decide to remain firm in this position for as long as we can even if the other nations collapse. We are thus in effect buying time and providing a vehicle for the Red Cross to begin negotiating. In the past the Red Cross has been the only successful route for gaining the release of hijacked prisoners or other hostages.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The time is handwritten at the top of the page.

**208. Paper Prepared by the NEA Working Group in the
Department of State Operations Center¹**

No. 2

Washington, September 7, 1970.

Situation Report as of 1800 Hours EST, September 7, 1970

Some SwissAir and TWA Passengers Released. By mid afternoon today, at least 60 (including 45 Americans) SwissAir and more than 25 TWA passengers had been released. The former hostages were taken to the Intercontinental Hotel in Amman, and, according to a spokesman of the hijacking-group, "were free to leave." No details on departure plans from Amman are yet available.

German sources in Amman allege that only women and children were being released and that adult male passengers would be held until all fedayeen demands are met.

Amman Security Situation Unstable. Embassy Amman, meanwhile, paints a gloomy picture of the security situation in the capital. It reports a near-anarchical condition in most areas of the city, with instances of shooting, auto theft, and persons subjected to search at fedayeen roadblocks. Some clashes between Palestinian commandos and the Jordan Army have apparently occurred outside Amman.

American Sergeant Detained. Staff Sergeant Irvin Graham, attached to USDAO/MAP, was abducted on September 5 and is still in fedayeen custody at the Wahdaat Refugee Camp near Amman. The circumstances of his capture and detention are not available. His release is being sought by the Jordan Army officials, who are negotiating with the PFLP.

Initiatives to Release Hostages. The Secretary called in the British Ambassador, Chargés of Switzerland and Germany, and the Israel Ambassador for purpose of an exchange of views regarding the current situation. The Secretary reviewed the demands made by the PFLP to our Embassy in Amman. The German and Swiss representatives indicated that their governments had agreed to the fedayeen demands. The Israeli Ambassador said that his government would refuse to acquiesce in any blackmail. The British Ambassador said that his Government was then meeting on the subject. It was agreed to continue to exchange views but the Israeli Ambassador objected to the use of the word "coordination."

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Secret. Drafted by Albert A. Vaccaro (INR/RNA/NE) and Peter A. Sutherland (NEA/ARN) and cleared by Seelye.

209. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 8, 1970.

SUBJECT

Your 4:30 Meeting on the Hijackings

At your call, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, and I will meet in your office at 4:30 p.m. to discuss the hijacking situation.² Secretary Rogers will bring Assistant Secretary Joe Sisco to the meeting.

The latest report on the hijacking situation is as follows:

—Embassy Amman now accounts for 137 persons from the TWA plane; of these, 37 have been released and 100 are presumably on the plane. The Embassy accounts for 136 persons on SwissAir, of which 86 have been released and 50 are presumably on the plane. These figures are not firm.

—According to Embassy Berne, the British Government is prepared to coordinate in Berne to work through the International Red Cross (ICRC) and to release the female hijacker and the body of her companion hijacker.

—Embassy Amman reports that the TWA plane is capable of take-off with the possible exception of the need for a battery change.

—The deadline for expiration of the 72-hour limit set by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) for meeting its demands for release of the hijacked planes and passengers is 10:00 p.m. EDT, September 9.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Top Secret; Sensitive.

² According to a 1973 memorandum that summarized the events and meetings relating to the Jordan crisis of 1970, the 4:30 p.m. meeting with President Nixon included Kissinger, Rogers, Laird, Mitchell, Hoover, Sisco, Helms, and U. Alexis Johnson. At the meeting, Helms remarked, "Unless someone goes in and cleans up the situation, there is no chance of peace in the Middle East." Laird noted that the United States would have to send in ground forces to help Hussein if he decided to fight the fedayeen. Nixon then asked what Jordan would do if Israel assisted it. Sisco responded that an Israeli intervention would "be a cause of death for Hussein" and that it would lead to a united Arab front against Israel and the United States. Nixon concluded that "U.S. intervention is better than Israeli intervention." Rogers also warned that "we'd pay an enormous price, and it is essentially useless." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, TS 31, Geopolitical Files—Jordan, Jordan Crisis—September 1970 Notebook, 1970–73)

—The International Red Cross envoy who worked effectively during the Jordanian crisis last spring arrived in Amman today to contact the PFLP and the Jordanian authorities in an effort to arrange for a departure of the two planes and the passengers.

—Damascus Radio announced at 3:45 that the PFLP stated in Amman today that the Front has accepted the Swiss Government's decision to release the Front's three Fedayeen now in Swiss prisons. It added that the Swiss plane and its passengers will be released as soon as the three Fedayeen arrive at a place to be determined by the Front under guarantees to be agreed on with the International Red Cross. All women, children and men, other than Israeli, American, British, Swiss and West German Nationals have already been released according to the spokesman. The Front will continue to detain the other passengers and provide them with all care until the governments concerned respond to the Front's ultimatum. The spokesman also said that the German passengers will continue to be detained until the West German Government reports officially through the Red Cross that it has released the Fedayeen detained in German prisons. He added that investigations of the U.S. Nationals are being conducted to determine who among them holds dual citizenship.

At a meeting held in the Secretary of State's office today at 11:00 a.m. possible actions related to the hijacking situation were held. In attendance were Secretary Rogers, Under Secretary Johnson, Assistant Secretary Sisco, Secretary Laird, Director Helms and myself. You may wish to call on Secretary Rogers at today's meeting to summarize the results of this discussion.³

In addition to the specific situation surrounding the Middle East Fedayeen hijackings, an effort under the aegis of the Secretary of Transportation has been under way since February 27 to investigate sophisticated surveillance equipment which might be used to detect explosives and other materials which could be used by airplane saboteurs. The Secretary's most recent report dated July 21 suggested that it would probably be impossible to develop any system that would give 100% certainty against conceivable sabotage.

³ According to Kissinger's memoirs, Rogers concluded at the meeting that the use of U.S. forces would be impractical and that Israeli intervention on Hussein's behalf would result in his death by fellow Arabs. (*White House Years*, p. 602)

210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, September 8, 1970, 2336Z.

147006. Although it is impossible now to foresee the course of events with respect to the hijacked aircraft during the next 36 hours, and although given their fanatical attitudes it may have none or minimal deterrent effect, it seems to us here that there might be some value, if the King is willing, for the commander of the Jordanian forces surrounding the site of the aircraft to get across to the PFLP personnel at the aircraft a warning that if they carry out their threat to destroy the aircraft and passengers, the Jordanian forces will do their utmost to assure that none of the PFLP personnel escape from the scene alive. We would hope that if matters do come to such a tragic pass the Jordanian forces would in fact implement such a threat for whatever value it may have in deterring future such tragedies.

Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared by Sisco and Eliot.

211. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, September 9, 1970, 0211Z.

147024. Subj: Secretary's Appeal re Hijacked Passengers.

Summary: On September 8 Secretary called in all Arab Chiefs-of-Mission in Washington in order to make to them humanitarian appeal concerning safety of passengers now being held by the Popular Front

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12 US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Scotese on September 8, cleared by Seelye and Eliot, and approved by Sisco. It was sent to Amman, Beirut, USINT Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, Addis Ababa, USINT Algiers, Tripoli, Rabat, Tunis, USINT Khartoum, London, Paris, Rome, Geneva, Bern, Athens, Rawalpindi, Ankara, Bonn, New Delhi, Tel Aviv, Vienna, Belgrade, and Moscow.

for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in Jordan.² Secretary emphasized that USG does not hold any Arab government responsible for this inhumane act but expressed his hope that these governments might be able in some way to convey to perpetrators this act desire of civilized world that they release these innocent air passengers unharmed and at once. Secretary also stressed that USG does not in any way relate his humanitarian appeal to implementation of US peace initiative. Speaking on behalf of Arab Ambassadors, Kuwaiti Ambassador Ghoussein assured Secretary that Arab governments share US concern and they would do all in their power to convey Secretary's humanitarian appeal. He noted, however, that PFLP is not beholden to any Arab government or to more moderate Palestinians. Jordanian Ambassador Sharaf said his government doing everything in its power to obtain early and safe release of passengers. *End summary.*

1. On September 8 Secretary called in all Arab Chiefs-of-Mission in order make appeal re passengers on planes hijacked to Jordan. Present included representatives from Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAR, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, and Algeria.

2. Secretary emphasized purpose of meeting was to make appeal solely on humanitarian grounds re safety of passengers now being held by PFLP in Jordan. Secretary acknowledged that Arab governments could do little but wished to convey to respective governments his personal hope that all might be done to assure safety and immediate release of passengers. Specifically, Secretary requested that if Arab governments able they should transmit his humanitarian appeal to perpetrators of hijackings and emphasize to them that such actions can in no way benefit their cause.

3. Secretary pointed out if these passengers killed or harmed in any way, public outrage around the world would be great. While we have had similar instances of this kind of action in past, passengers have never been held for blackmail purposes, as in this case. Such threats to innocent and uninvolved air passengers threatens air traffic for entire civilized world. It could well set in train series of retaliations which could escalate problem and result in air traffic chaos around world. In addition, it would have immediately negative effect on Arab countries for reasons already being commented on by Arab press itself which has pointed out in last few days that world public opinion does not distinguish between Arabs and Arab governments and those outside of governments belonging to these radical groups.

² Another record of the meeting is in a memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, September 8. (Ibid., President's Evening Reading: Lot 74 D 164) For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972, Document 48.

4. To emphasize international nature of continued detention these passengers, Secretary indicated that among 123 passengers now being detained in Amman hotels and 150 still being held on the planes themselves are some 72 Americans as well as Germans, Swiss, Pakistanis, Greeks, Turks, Yugoslavs, Austrians, Ethiopians and others. While PFLP has made no demands on US, we nonetheless involved in terms of safety of our citizens and aircraft. Secretary reiterated his hope that Arab Ambassadors convey his humanitarian appeal to their governments and, if possible, through them to PFLP to release these people unharmed and promptly.

5. Dean of Arab Diplomatic Corps, Kuwaiti Ambassador Ghoussein, replied on behalf of Arab Ambassadors and expressed his appreciation for Secretary's invitation to discuss this problem. Ghoussein noted that Secretary rightly understands that this radical group not controlled by any Arab Government or even by moderate fedayeen organizations. PFLP radical group acting on basis its own ideology and often against wishes of other Arab governments and peoples. Ghoussein assured Secretary that Arab Ambassadors would convey his appeal to their respective governments and added his personal hope that Arab efforts together with those of US might be successful. He expressed wish he could guarantee results but hoped Secretary would appreciate position of Arab Governments. In meantime, Ghoussein expressed hope that all involved in area would continue work together that peace might soon be achieved there because if something can be done in that regard other problems would also be solved. Ghoussein added that he would certainly not advance one word of defense on behalf of act of PFLP but he did wish to make some defense of ultimate purpose of the act which was to bring to world attention plight of Palestinians who after 20 years have reached point of desperation. In this regard Ghoussein quoted Arab proverb, "Fool can throw stone in well but it takes 100 wise men to get it out." In conclusion Ghoussein hoped that USG would continue its efforts to implement its peace initiative.

6. Secretary emphasized he did not wish in any way to relate peace initiative to his humanitarian appeal regarding safety of detained passengers. Secretary noted this appeal not relevant to initiative except in terms of public opinion. In any case, USG in no way relates them and he wished it clearly understood by Arab Ambassadors that nothing he had said here concerning his humanitarian appeal would in any way diminish USG efforts on peace initiative. Secretary added that in addition he did not wish imply by this humanitarian appeal that USG held respective governments responsible for acts by group such as PFLP, which US also fully appreciates is not even under control of more moderate fedayeen. In this connection, Secretary noted that we have also publicly made clear need to take into account wishes of Palestini-

ans in any final Near East peace settlement. With regard to peace initiative, USG will continue to do everything it can to be fair and balanced as it pursues implementation peace initiative. Secretary reiterated that this kind of lawless, irrational act can only render grave disservice to Palestinian cause in long run. Moreover, such acts would: (1) seriously jeopardize future of air travel in civilized world, resulting in unwillingness of people to fly and (2) make it impossible to capture and hold perpetrators these crimes if these groups continue hijack aircraft in order obtain release those involved in earlier attempts.

7. Jordanian Ambassador Sharaf stated his Government feels special responsibility given fact hijacked planes in Jordan. He noted Secretary had placed his appeal in proper humanitarian perspective and assured Secretary GOJ would do all in its power to obtain eventual release passengers. GOJ now trying achieve all this through understanding with parties involved which is based on reason as much as possible. GOJ would continue trying do its best settle this problem promptly.

8. Secretary expressed his appreciation for Sharaf's response and again stated that he making his appeal solely on humanitarian grounds, noting that USG had recently made strong appeal to Israelis concerning detention Algerians. Continued detention of innocent men, women and children under adverse desert conditions might result in sickness and even death. For this reason Secretary wished make his humanitarian appeal because this problem for all civilized people everywhere.

9. Secretary asked Sharaf if Jordanian military people in contact with any fedayeen. Sharaf replied the Jordan Chief of Staff as well as other senior Jordanian officials have been on airstrip since arrival of planes. GOJ has organized airlift of necessary supplies for passengers and is in constant consultation with Palestinian Armed Struggle Command to obtain release these people. Sharaf concluded that there apparently have been differences of views during negotiations as well as some confusion. In any event he again assured Secretary GOJ would do all in its power obtain early release passengers.

10. Secretary assured Ambassadors that in any public statement the State Department would emphasize humanitarian nature his appeal and in no way indicate that USG holds any Arab Governments responsible for these hijackings.

Rogers

212. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, September 9, 1970, 0720 EDT.

SUBJECT

Aircraft Hijackings

REFERENCE

NMCC MFR 062300 EDT Sep 70, same subject
NMCC MFR 061700 EDT Sep 70, same subject
NMCC MFR 071125 EDT Sep 70, same subject
NMCC MFR 071530 EDT Sep 70, same subject
NMCC MFR 072215 EDT Sep 70, same subject
NMCC MFR 081257 EDT Sep 70, same subject
NMCC MFR 082354 EDT Sep 70, same subject²

1. The following readiness actions have been taken to prepare U.S. forces to support possible military air evacuation of U.S. citizens held as hijacking hostages in Jordan:

a. At 082129 EDT, JCS requested USCINCEUR move the USS *Independence* (CVA-62) to a position approximately 100 nautical miles from the Israel/Lebanon coast (see attached map). The *Independence* is accompanied by four destroyers and one oiler and will be joined by two more destroyers. Estimated time of arrival on station is 100030 EDT.

b. At 082340 EDT, USCINCEUR reported that six C-130 aircraft are being prepositioned at Incirlik, Turkey (see attached map). Estimated time of arrival is 090800 EDT. Flight time from Incirlik to Amman is 1 hour and 20 minutes, and from Incirlik to Dawson Field is 1 hour and 30 minutes.

2. No alert to ground troops or tactical air support units has been given. Appropriate contingency plans for Europe and the Middle East are currently being reviewed. USCINC-STRIKE has activated his Battle Staff to monitor the situation and place himself in a more responsive posture.

Raymond O. Miller

Brigadier General, USA

Deputy Director for Operations (NMCC)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Top Secret. An attached map is not printed.

² Regarding the memorandum for the record, September 6, 1700 EDT, see footnote 2, Document 199. The memorandum for the record, September 7, 2300 EDT, is Document 202. Memoranda for the record, September 7, 2215 EDT; September 8, 1257 EDT; and September 8, 2354 EDT are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Memoranda for the record, September 7, 1125 EDT and 1530 EDT were not found.

213. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 9, 1970, 9 a.m.

SUBJECT

Hijacking Status

Where the Passengers Are

No confirmed list of the hostages is available. A few more than 300 passengers have been involved altogether. Over half are U.S. citizens. Israelis and dual nationals have been estimated at 30–50. About 125 of these passengers, mostly women and children, have been brought to the Hotel Intercontinental in Amman. However, the Red Cross representative, after talking to Palestinian leaders, says these passengers are not free to leave Amman, even though the hotel itself is surrounded by Jordanian Government forces. He reports that the hostages are being well treated.

The Diplomatic Situation

You will recall that Monday night, the U.S. agreed to participate in a concerted U.S.–U.K.–Swiss–West German effort through the Red Cross. At a meeting Tuesday in Bern, the British, Swiss and West German representatives confirmed their governments' agreement that the Red Cross might offer release of the seven fedayeen prisoners they hold if the guerrillas turned over *all* passengers and the two planes to the Red Cross. Meanwhile, Red Cross representatives had arrived in Amman. Following are the main developments since the foregoing:

1. Below are the *main points made by Red Cross representative Andre Rochat* in a report to British, West German, Swiss representatives in Amman *following his first round of talks* (two meetings with Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai and a long discussion with the Palestinians):

—The situation is “extremely serious.” He is “not at all convinced it will end successfully. . . . We may face a tragedy. . . . There is perhaps one chance in two we will get everyone out.”

—He intends to be “extremely firm” in sticking to the terms of his mandate. He warned that if any attempt is made to move away from the multi-national approach as outlined in that mandate, the Red Cross representatives “will withdraw completely and leave the place.”

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for information. The time is handwritten at the top of the page. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. All brackets are in the original. An attached map is not printed.

—He concludes that the Jordanian Government fully supports the Red Cross position. As for the Palestinians, “The first meeting seems to be the beginning of something positive.” Rochat planned further meetings today, including meeting with the hostages.

—The guerrillas’ position on release of guerrilla prisoners in Israeli hands is that “not one person will leave the planes if the Palestinians are not satisfied” on this point. [*Comment:* The meaning of this point is not clear since the official Palestinian demands stated that all but the Israeli and dual national passengers would be released in return for the seven fedayeen prisoners in Europe.]

—The Red Cross has a plane (capacity 90) at its disposal for as many trips as necessary for as long as necessary to evacuate released hostages. “We do not need help in this regard.”

—He is “100 percent sure that the deadline will be postponed for at least 72 hours” after initial expiration. He later said he did not have assurances to this effect and revised his statement to say he is positive that “no one will be killed tomorrow afternoon unless by accident.”

—He does not want yet to deal separately with the hostages already released from the planes, but he conceded this might be brought up again if the internal security deteriorates seriously.

2. *Secretary Rogers yesterday called in all Arab Chiefs-of-Mission in Washington* to make an appeal solely on humanitarian grounds for the safety of the passengers.² He emphasized that, while we do not hold Arab governments responsible, public outcry around the world would be great if innocent passengers were harmed.

3. Under Secretary Johnson last night sent a message to the U.S. Chargé in Amman saying “it seems to us here that there might be some value, if King Hussein is willing, for the commander of the Jordanian troops surrounding the site of the aircraft to get across to the PFLP personnel at the aircraft *a warning* that if they carry out their threat to destroy the aircraft and passengers, the Jordanian forces will do their utmost to assure that none of the PFLP personnel escape from the scene alive.”³

4. An approach has been made in Bonn urging the West German government not to release their fedayeen prisoners unilaterally. They appear, as do the Swiss, to have received separate approaches from the fedayeen setting a separate deadline for exchange of their prisoners for their passengers. The West Germans appear to be increasingly nervous over the approaching deadline, and the Cabinet is meeting this morn-

² See Document 211.

³ Document 210.

ing. They have been informed of Rochat's insistence that the multinational approach be maintained.

5. According to Jerusalem radio this morning, *Israel intends to ask the British government today to detain the woman hijacker* in its hands until Israel can submit a request for her extradition. The British informed us yesterday that they are willing to release her as part of the U.S.-U.K.-German-Swiss response to the fedayeen demands. Israel continues to insist that nothing be done that will result in partial release of those detained—leaving only the Israelis (and presumably American Jews) in fedayeen hands. There is no indication Israel may be willing to release any fedayeen in its hands.

6. The British have proposed to the U.S., Swiss and Germans a *UN Security Council meeting* to consider the hijacking problem. We and the Swiss have reacted favorably.⁴

U.S. Military Actions

I have arranged for the following actions by U.S. military forces:

—Six C-130 aircraft are being moved to Incirlik, Turkey to be available for evacuation purposes. They will be one hour and 30 minutes flying time from the field in Jordan where the hijacked aircraft are being held. (See attached map.) They are expected to be in place by 11:30 a.m. EDT.

—The attack aircraft carrier *Independence*, accompanied by four destroyers and an oiler, is southeast of Crete and steaming toward the Lebanon-Israel coast. It will reach a position 100 miles off the coast by shortly after midnight tonight. This force will be joined by two additional destroyers. (See attached map.)

—The battle staff of the U.S. Strike Command at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida has been activated to monitor the situation.

—Appropriate contingency plans for Europe and the Middle East are currently being reviewed.

—I am convening a senior WSAG meeting at 11:30 this morning to complete alternative politico-military contingency scenarios for the crises.⁵

How Events May Evolve

1. A major factor will be whether Rochat has indeed succeeded in slipping the deadline.

2. Whatever the timing, it seems likely that Rochat in his negotiations will be confronted with a Fedayeen demand that Israel release

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 206.

⁵ See Document 214.

some of the Fedayeen prisoners it holds. At that point pressures will develop in two directions:

—There will be pressure on the British, Swiss and Germans to break the multi-national front and bargain for the release of their passengers. The U.S. would be under pressure not to jeopardize the lives of some passengers for the sake of others.

—There will be pressure on Israel (to some degree from the three European governments and presumably from the U.S.). Rochat may be able to suggest to Israel some broadening of the exchange. [You will recall that this was the eventual solution in the TWA hijacking case a year ago.]⁶

⁶ TWA flight 840 flying from Rome to Tel Aviv was hijacked on August 29, 1969. For documentation on the U.S. and international response, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Documents 7–44.

214. Minutes of a Combined Washington Special Actions Group and Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 9, 1970, 11:40 a.m.–12:35 p.m.

SUBJECTS

Middle East and Hijacking

PARTICIPATION

State
U. Alexis Johnson
Rodger P. Davies
Joseph J. Sisco
Defense
David Packard
Robert J. Pranger
JCS
Adm. Thomas Moorer
Lt. Gen. Melvin Zais

CIA
Richard Helms
NSC Staff
Col. Kennedy
Hal Saunders
Jeanne W. Davis

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Nodis. This meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Kissinger is not listed as a participant but he chaired the meeting.

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

1. It is not feasible to attempt to rescue the passengers in the hijacked aircraft through the use of US military force, except as a move of desperation if we became convinced planes and passengers were to be blown up;

2. We have a plan for a military evacuation of American civilians from Jordan, and would prefer to use a US brigade from Europe, rather than forces from the US;

3. This military evacuation plan is essentially the same as that required to secure the airfield where the hijacked planes have landed, if it should be decided to attempt this move;

4. Mr. Saunders will prepare a status report on the hijacking situation and on Rochat's efforts to negotiate an extension of the deadline and extricate the passengers;²

5. While we would prefer to use US troops for a military evacuation if Jordanian troops were not adequate, Israeli troops would be preferable to US troops for an operation in support of King Hussein against the Fedayeen and possibly the Iraqis;

6. The JCS will investigate ways in which we might put the US brigade in Germany on semi-alert for a military evacuation operation with the minimum possibility of its leaking;

7. The JCS will prepare by tomorrow:

... an analysis of what we would need to mount and sustain an operation to prop up King Hussein against the Fedayeen and possibly the Iraqis;

... an estimate of the kind of arms package we would have to provide Israel if it should undertake the operation to prop up King Hussein;

... a package of what Lebanon would need to defend itself against a Fedayeen attack.

8. We should improve our public affairs coordination, with State taking the lead.

Mr. Packard: The Israelis have requested delivery of our equipment by ship by September 22. We could get it there by air in five days, but they have asked for it by ship, in case we should be accused of being unresponsive on quick deliveries.

Mr. Johnson: I just talked with UK Ambassador Freeman who said the British had lost contact with their Embassy in Amman.

² Saunders's report was finalized as a memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, September 9, 3:30 p.m. The memorandum notes that the PFLP provided an extension on its ultimatum, although it gave no time limit for the ultimatum. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings)

Mr. Helms: There is heavy firing in the city.

Mr. Packard: Do we have other communications?

Mr. Johnson: Our communications are no problem. I told Freeman of our conversation with Rochat who said he expected the BOAC plane to land at the desert airfield at any minute.

Dr. Kissinger: How many passengers are on board?

Mr. Saunders: One report says 63.

Mr. Johnson: [*2½ lines not declassified*] The plane has 104 passengers and 10 crew abroad. A phone call from our Embassy in Amman indicated they had talked with Zaid Rifai who said the Jordanian Army has not moved into Amman. The battalion that was already there is doing the fighting. A radio broadcast was interrupted with an announcement that the King had met with the Prime Minister and Chief of Staff and that the King was instructing General Haditha, in view of the regrettable developments in Irbid, to take steps to guarantee peace.

Mr. Blee: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Johnson: The statement said the General has been instructed to look into the Irbid situation and take whatever steps were required to ensure peace. This announcement came at 10:25 this morning, our time.

Dr. Kissinger: If the King is apologizing for shelling Irbid, doesn't this mean that he has lost control?

Mr. Davies: I interpret this announcement to mean that Hussein has asked the Army to take over the country. This is what we had hoped he would do.

Dr. Kissinger: He's isn't telling the General to prevent a repetition?

Mr. Davies: I think he is entrusting the Army with the task of restoring order—I hope so, at least.

Admiral Moorer: Isn't this the first time he has done this? Hasn't he been holding the Army off?

Dr. Kissinger: What does he mean by "taking the necessary steps to prevent a recurrence"?

Mr. Davies: He has to assure the Palestinians that they won't be attacked in their camps by the Jordanian Army.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree that is one interpretation. The Army would take over Amman and the Palestinians should stay in their camps. We had a September 8 report saying that Hussein had lost control and that the First Brigade had defied the King and moved into Amman.³

Mr. Helms: That is the brigade doing the shelling now.

Admiral Moorer: (producing map) They are shelling this road.

³ CIA Intelligence Information Cable TDCS DB-315/04645-70, September 8, 1806Z. (Ibid., Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V)

Mr. Johnson: Where is the British Embassy? Where are the hotels?

Mr. Davies and Admiral Moorer: The hotels are far out the road. The British Embassy is out of the sight line from the shelling.

Dr. Kissinger: Has the deadline been extended?

Mr. Johnson: Yes, but the exact length of time has not been determined. Rochat is negotiating how much additional time has been granted.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Hal Saunders) Will you do a wrap-up of this?

Mr. Helms: (passing a paper to Saunders)⁴ This may help.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's wait until Joe Sisco arrives to discuss the diplomatic side. In the meantime, I believe we should review our military contingency planning for Jordan. I understood our discussion yesterday as rejecting any attempt to extricate the passengers from the planes for the time being.⁵ Is that correct?

Mr. Packard: (to Admiral Moorer) Has anyone come up with any idea as to what we might do for the passengers without running the risk that the guerrillas would blow up the planes?

Admiral Moorer: No. We couldn't save these passengers in that circumstance, but we could do something to save others in the future. This is another *Pueblo*.

Dr. Kissinger: It was agreed that we would use force only as a move of desperation if we become convinced that the planes are about to be blown up with the passengers aboard. If a judgement is made that this is likely, how much would it take to secure that airfield?

Admiral Moorer: The Jordanian Army is already surrounding the airfield. That is not the problem.

Dr. Kissinger: But the Jordanian Army might not move at our direction. Are there any US forces we could use? How many would it take?

Admiral Moorer: We could do it with one brigade,⁶ flying out of Europe. The speed with which they could move would be affected by the time they received an alert. I believe we should alert them now and publicize the fact that we are doing it.

Mr. Johnson: No—I feel very strongly we should not alert now. We can't put them on alert without a leak, and the minute it becomes public it could stop the efforts of Rochat and the ICRC. It could make the situation worse.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree on the desirability of an alert, but not on publicity. How much time would an alert save?

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ Presumably the morning meeting in Secretary Rogers's office; see footnote 3, Document 209.

⁶ A handwritten notation replaced "battalion" with "brigade."

Admiral Moorer: About 24 hours.

Dr. Kissinger: Is there nothing we can do in between without a leak?

Mr. Packard: There isn't anything we can do in the US without its leaking. It might be possible to do something with troops in Germany.

Dr. Kissinger: Could we mount some sort of NATO exercise to cover an alert?

(Mr. Sisco arrived)

Mr. Packard: The last time we already had forces on an exercise in Versailles and it was easier.

Dr. Kissinger: How fast could US troops get there from Europe?

Admiral Moorer: From 40 to 48 hours.

Dr. Kissinger: Suppose the Fedayeen say they will blow up the planes unless Israel agrees in principle to designate some prisoners for release. Suppose, contrary to our expectation, Israel is determined not to yield. What do we do?

Mr. Johnson: It is not feasible to think in terms of using American forces. The Jordanians are there. And the Israelis are closer, could move faster, and are better than our troops at this sort of thing.

Dr. Kissinger: The President would be very reluctant to use Israeli forces.

Admiral Moorer: The cease-fire would go out the window if Israeli forces were used.

Mr. Johnson: Not necessarily, if they were used only in a limited operation to rescue the passengers.

Mr. Sisco: Jordanian forces would be preferable, with US forces second and Israeli forces third. Reports from Amman in the last hour and a half indicate the situation is serious. We have been looking at our plans for evacuating our people from Amman. Alongside the contingency raised by Dr. Kissinger, we have to look at the possibility that there may be a need for US forces to go in to evacuate Americans. The two things are linked.

Dr. Kissinger: Let us put aside for now a rescue operation for the passengers. I see that as a last resort and can't now see a situation in which we would be that desperate. Let's look at the other contingency—use of US forces to evacuate American civilians from Amman—to see if there might be some fallout which would be applicable to the airfield situation. I see three possible situations: (1) if the planes were blown up, we might have to do something for domestic reasons.

Mr. Johnson: We have already pre-positioned the C-130s with medical supplies. If the planes are blown, we assume the Jordanian Army would secure the airfield. We would then go in with our medical supplies. Last night I sent a message to Amman suggesting that

the King make it clear that, if the planes were blown, the guerrillas would all be killed. Our Embassy has replied saying the Jordanian Army would need no encouragement to do just that.⁷

Mr. Sisco: If the planes are blown up, the Jordan Army will take action. They are reluctant to make any such announcement now, however. From the point of view of the Jordan Government, the situation in Amman is the more serious one. Such an announcement might be the flashpoint which Hussein has been trying to avoid. We have just sent a telegram to our Embassies, pointing out that with each successive tiny crisis, the King's position becomes a little weaker.⁸ We have asked their judgement as to whether we should encourage the King to come to a showdown with the Fedayeen at this point. If he delays longer, he will be weaker. At least now he still has the Army.

Dr. Kissinger: In the present situation in Jordan, the peace initiative doesn't have a prayer. We can't ask the Israelis to negotiate a border arrangement with a government that isn't in control of its country.

Mr. Packard: If the planes are blown, we can then alert US forces.

Mr. Johnson: I agree—there is no problem of alerting after the planes are blown.

Dr. Kissinger: I personally don't think it is likely that they will blow the planes. To recap, the three situations are:

- 1) if the planes are blown up and we have to do something for domestic reasons;
- 2) if the situation in Jordan breaks down and we have to mount a military evacuation of American citizens;
- 3) possible US assistance to Hussein in a showdown with the Fedayeen, either provoked by the Fedayeen or provoked by the King with our encouragement.

Could a military evacuation plan for Amman be adapted to the airfield situation?

Admiral Moorer: Let me review our plan for evacuation of Americans from Amman. There are two possible situations: (1) where friendly forces would be in control of the airfield; and (2) where we would have to seize the airfield. We are planning on a brigade force either all landed by aircraft if the airfield is secure, or with the 1st battalion dropped by parachute to secure the airfield and the rest landed by aircraft.

⁷ Telegram 4495 from Amman, September 9, 1305Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12) For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972, Document 53.

⁸ Not further identified.

Dr. Kissinger: How long would it take them to get there after the executed order?

Admiral Moorer: 40 to 48 hours.

Dr. Kissinger: From the US?

Admiral Moorer: From Europe. The flight time from Europe is 7-1/2 hours in a C-130 and 4-1/2 hours in a C-141, so the troops would arrive rested. Flying time from the US would be 18-1/2 and 14-1/2 hours, respectively. This is from a non-alert status. If the forces used were from the 82nd Airborne at Fort Bragg, they would have to be staged either through Greece or Incirlik.

Mr. Sisco: Or through the British base on Cyprus. I don't think we could get approval for staging either through Greece or Turkey.

Mr. Johnson: And, of course, no staging would be required for forces from Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: Why not Greece? Because of our military assistance embroglio?

Mr. Sisco: Greece might possibly agree for a limited evacuation operation.

Dr. Kissinger: If Greece would not agree, why would Cyprus?

Mr. Sisco: Makarios has been pretty good about these things. Also, he sees the base as a British sovereign base, and if the British agreed he would go along.

Dr. Kissinger: Once the forces begin to move through the staging areas, it will be known.

Admiral Moorer: Once they start to load the planes, it will become known.

Mr. Johnson: All the evidence argues for use of forces from Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: Do we have the airlift capability?

Admiral Moorer: Planes are no problem; they can get there faster than the troops can be ready. If we should be required to put forces into Jordan for any reason, the first step would be to get American civilians out. So, any operation would begin in the same way. We do have a well-thought-out plan and have made some preliminary moves, but we have not alerted anyone yet.

Mr. Johnson: Assuming a brigade operation, how would you follow it up in support of Hussein?

Admiral Moorer: By using the 82nd Airborne. We would then have four brigades: one brigade from Europe and a division from the US. We should look carefully at the second phase, however—examine our staying power, which is limited.

Dr. Kissinger: Will you look at our staying power and tell us about it?

Admiral Moorer: We may be faced with the possibility of Syria and Iraq mounting an attack on Lebanon and Jordan.

Mr. Sisco: On the political side, in the context of a limited American operation, limited to the evacuation of Americans, it would be entirely feasible militarily and, with no question of staying power, could be justified as a short-lived action appropriate to the circumstances. If, however, we should move into Option 3 or slip from Option 2 into Option 3, where we would be using US forces to prop up Hussein, the very fact that we had had to do this, could only mean a temporary prop for the King. We would have to stay for some time, and, even then, the moment we got out, the King would be in a much weaker position politically. We must lay out the political considerations along with the military.

Admiral Moorer: I am not recommending such action. I agree it would be a very tenuous situation with no end in sight.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Sisco) Are you saying it shouldn't be done?

Mr. Sisco: Only that it could be considered only as a temporary prop for the King.

Admiral Moorer: Is there a paper which lays out options?

(The State Department paper was passed around the table)⁹

Mr. Packard: I think it most important that we get some public affairs coordination.

Dr. Kissinger: Absolutely. (to Mr. Johnson) Will you take the lead on this?

Mr. Sisco: Ron Ziegler and Bob McCloskey had a long talk this morning before Ron went on at 11:20. Dan Henkin and McCloskey are also in touch. There was a slight hiatus because the decision on the C-130s with the medical teams was made yesterday when I was out of the room and I was not aware of it. Also, we were not aware of the fleet movements.

Mr. Packard: The State people are not getting the information they need.

Mr. Johnson: I forgot to tell Joe about the C-130s—I didn't realize he wasn't in the room. In this matter, Abshire (State's Congressional liaison) was told last night by the Defense Congressional man that Secretary Laird wanted to say something to the Congressional leadership about the C-130s. I cautioned against this.

⁹ Department of State paper entitled "Contingencies for Hijacking Crisis." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-077, Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, WSAG & SRG Meetings, Middle East and Hijacking 9/9/70)

Dr. Kissinger: The President yesterday ordered that the carrier be moved into approximately the same position as in the June Jordan crisis.¹⁰

Mr. Johnson: We didn't know that.

Dr. Kissinger: That is my fault.

Mr. Johnson: I will ask Bob McCloskey to take the lead.

Admiral Moorer: I want to make it clear that we do have an evacuation plan, and a good one, for evacuating American citizens from Amman.

Mr. Johnson: I understand it takes 40–48 hours to bring troops in from Europe from a non-alert status, and 6–8 hours from an alert status.

(Mr. Packard left the meeting)

Admiral Moorer: The time of the alert has some bearing on this—whether it is 2:00 a.m. or 2:00 p.m.

General Zais: The first company could be there in 20 hours, with the rest of the brigade following.

Dr. Kissinger: Could one company survive?

General Zais: We would make this judgement at the time. Someone has to go in first.

Dr. Kissinger: The most realistic contingency would be military evacuation of American civilians. But this would be essentially the same as taking Dawson field. Would not the plan be interchangeable?

Admiral Moorer: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: So that if we get in a fix, we have a plan. If we are questioned, we could say we had a plan. If we are talking about a military evacuation it is generally agreed we should use the brigade in Germany. If we use troops out of the US we would have to stage across the Atlantic, and the warning time would be greater. Is there any exercise we could send the European brigade on, without any apparent connection with the Middle East, so that they could be on alert? Could General Goodpaster do anything? Could we look at the possibility of ginning up some exercise to keep the brigade on alert?

Admiral Moorer: I will look into it.

General Zais: One problem is that the European brigade is a dual-purpose brigade, with both an air-borne and a ground capability. The

¹⁰ Throughout the first half of 1970, sporadic fighting broke out between King Hussein's forces and the fedayeen. In June 1970, 2 weeks of intense fighting erupted, which led U.S. policymakers to consider sending U.S. forces into Jordan. Documentation on this is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

minute you start packing parachutes and readying planes you have given a signal.

Dr. Kissinger: I was thinking of things like cancelling leaves and getting troops together.

Admiral Moorer: You are talking in terms of a semi-alert.

Mr. Sisco: You could always send a General out there and call for a special inspection.

Mr. Johnson: Our first hope, of course, is that Rochat can pull a rabbit out of the hat as he did before.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Even if we put the unit on alert, 24 hours would be too long.

Mr. Johnson: Rochat might be helpful even in the event of a civilian evacuation of Amman. He has good contacts.

Dr. Kissinger: I see the weight of Sisco's political argument. Even if we should win a civil war in Jordan, there would be nothing left behind to sustain it. However, if the President should order such a move, are we in a position to do it?

Admiral Moorer: In terms of bolstering the King, we could do it from airheads.

Dr. Kissinger: If we do not get the Fedayeen in Jordan under control, the peace initiative will go by the board. Israel has to have a government to deal with that can fulfill its obligations. The President's instincts are to crush the Fedayeen now. Although he may reconsider, we must make sure such a move doesn't fail because we didn't have a good plan. Could we sustain an action to prop up Hussein? How long would we have to stay?

Admiral Moorer: We have a plan to mount such an operation. The question would be if it should spread. Given our Vietnam requirements, we might be in some difficulty with ammunition and other things. We always have to consider the next possible step.

Dr. Kissinger: Could we count on the Iraqis and Syrians becoming involved?

Admiral Moorer: It would be prudent to do so.

Dr. Kissinger: Then what?

Admiral Moorer: We would put the four brigades into Jordan to handle the situation.

Mr. Helms: Would that mean we had no strategic reserve left in the US? That scares the hell out of me.

Admiral Moorer: That's right. That would be everything we've got.

General Zais: There is no other existing unit in the US. We would have to reforge a unit to go to Europe to replace the brigade. Also, the

82nd is not in great shape. It is C-2, meaning it is at about 85 percent personnel strength.

Admiral Moorer: We would send it anyway.

Dr. Kissinger: How would the battle develop?

Mr. Sisco: We would land at the airport, and move out, I assume assisting the Jordanian Army, to clean out the city. We assume the Jordanian Army could establish and sustain certain positions. The Iraqis are outside the city. If both Iraq and Syria should move, I can't believe Israel would stand idly by. This would mean, basically, a US-Israeli operation to sustain Hussein against the Palestinians, Iraqis, and Syrians. The whole Arab world would have to come out in support of Iraq and Syria.

Dr. Kissinger: Suppose the King moves against the Fedayeen without US support. Would the Iraqis intervene?

Mr. Sisco: If they did, the Israelis would intervene, at Jordanian request, with ground forces.

Dr. Kissinger: That would finish the King.

Mr. Sisco: Yes, but better Israeli forces than US forces. The Israelis and Jordanians have already talked about this.

Admiral Moorer: We could always give Jordan air support from our carriers.

Dr. Kissinger: As a preliminary judgement, then, we can undertake a military evacuation, and would prefer to use US forces for this purpose if Jordanian forces are not adequate. For a defense of the King against the Fedayeen and Iraq, however, we would prefer to use Israeli forces. Is that a fair statement?

All agreed.

Dr. Kissinger: I assume if Israel moved in support of Hussein, it would be with our approval.

Mr. Sisco: At least our tacit approval. We could never convince anyone that it was done without our approval.

Dr. Kissinger: But if the Soviets or Egyptians prepare a move, we should be in a position to keep the Soviets out.

Mr. Sisco: And we should be prepared to supply Israel with considerable additional wherewithal, since Israel would be expending materiel very rapidly.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Admiral Moorer) Could you get us an estimate on that overnight?

Mr. Helms: The JCS will have an awful time backstopping an operation which eliminates our strategic reserve. Anything involving four brigades would be out politically.

Dr. Kissinger: That is why Israeli forces are preferable. The missing ingredient would be enough US show of force to keep the Soviets and Egyptians out.

Mr. Helms: How big would that have to be?

Dr. Kissinger: That is the question I'm asking Admiral Moorer.

Mr. Sisco: I don't think the Egyptians would intervene. We would have to provide the ring so far as the Russians were concerned, however. Also, Israel would need more to sustain itself against the Iraqis in a Jordan situation.

Dr. Kissinger: Do we have a package that could serve this purpose? Could we pick one of the existing alternative packages?

Mr. Sisco: We could adapt one to suit the purpose—probably by including more planes and bombs.

Dr. Kissinger: We need an analysis of what it would take to hold the ring against Russia if Israel moves in support of Hussein at the King's request (which we would approve) against the Fedayeen alone, or against the Fedayeen and the Iraqis.

Mr. Sisco: On the Egyptian side, the Egyptians would probably move some of the SAMs closer to the Canal. Also, Russian pilots would likely become more involved. The Israeli tactic would probably be to keep the Canal area as quiet as possible. Nasser would have to step up his campaign against Israel in some way—probably by small, showy raids.

Mr. Helms: He might undertake a bombardment of the Bar Lev line.

Dr. Kissinger: We need to know: 1) what it would take to hold the ring against the Russians; and 2) what a new package to Israel would look like in terms of this objective. Can we have this by tomorrow?

Admiral Moorer: Yes.

Mr. Johnson: (to Mr. Helms) Do you feel the Jordanian Army can handle the Fedayeen by itself?

Mr. Helms: Yes, if they will do it. They don't need help to handle the Fedayeen.

Mr. Sisco: In these circumstances, the Fedayeen in Lebanon would feel they had to act. Without outside intervention, however, the Lebanese Army could do reasonably well against the Fedayeen. Lebanon would want additional military equipment, however—at least armored personnel carriers.

Dr. Kissinger: Then let's get a package together for that too. We may be forced when this crisis is over, to address the question of crushing the Fedayeen.

Mr. Sisco: I agree the outcome might have that effect. However, a political settlement is still the best tool in terms of the Fedayeen. A substantial portion of the Palestinians still prefer a political to a military solution. It might alter our attitude, however, as to the realistic elements of a settlement. For years we have told the Israelis that the

Allon plan is a non-starter.¹¹ We might look at it again in the light of changed circumstances.

Mr. Davies: After this crisis is over, and assuming Hussein is still in power, we might look [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to help get rid of the Fedayeen.

Dr. Kissinger: We need a plan to do it, or might decide to jiggle our notion of peace terms, depending on events. (To Mr. Johnson) Are we clear that we won't agree to treat dual US-Israel nationals on the planes as anything but US nationals?

Mr. Johnson: Absolutely—this is fundamental. Any other notion is out.

Dr. Kissinger: This group should meet again tomorrow.

¹¹ Conceived in July 1967 by Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, the Allon Plan called for Israel to maintain a row of fortified settlements along the Jordan River to provide Israel a security buffer from future Arab attacks but leaving the rest of the West Bank demilitarized.

215. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, September 9, 1970, 2241Z.

147517. 1. Sisco called Rabin 6:00 p.m. Sept 9 to bring him up to date on hijacking situation. Noted particularly deadline of tonight postponed and there now no specific expiration date. Also that Rochat has appointment very early tomorrow a.m. with PFLP rep and passengers on three aircraft safe.

2. Sisco informed Rabin we have prepositioned six C-130s at Incirlik. We request of GOI on contingency basis clearance overflight Israel these aircraft if need be in connection evacuation hostages. Rabin said there no question GOI would give clearance and that he would seek confirmation immediately.

Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Stackhouse and approved by Sisco.

216. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 9, 1970, 8 p.m.

SUBJECT

Evening Report on the Hijacking Situation

Below are described the main developments since my mid-day memorandum to you on the aircraft hijacking situation.²

Passengers, Aircraft and Negotiations

Red Cross representative Rochat reports that:

—The deadline on the ultimatum has now been “postponed” with no specific expiration. The negotiations are now considered to be open as far as time is concerned and he anticipates a very long negotiating process.

—The situation is “extremely serious.” He hopes that a clear position will emerge from the PFLP side by tomorrow morning, although he considers their demands to remain “extremely tough.” He will meet with them again “very early” tomorrow morning.

—The passengers on all three aircraft are safe and the Red Cross has a medical team permanently on the site. A second Red Cross plane with unspecified supplies has been requested.

—He may have reason to call on the U.S. for unspecified support on short notice.

Our embassy reports that things are now relatively quiet at the hotel where the passengers removed from the aircraft are staying.³ Morale seems to be reasonably good given the strain of the situation. Earlier in the day they had to take shelter in the basement when heavy fighting broke out in the vicinity.

With the addition of the hijacked BOAC aircraft today, there are now some 300 hostages at the airstrip where the planes are being held. The BOAC plane has some 105 passengers including 3 U.S. citizens and 24 unattached children.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for information. Haig initialed for Kissinger. The date and time are handwritten at the top of the page. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

² Kissinger's midday situation report on the hijacking situation is in a September 9 memorandum for the President. (Ibid.) For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 52.

³ Reported in telegram 4486 from Amman, September 9, 0855Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12 US)

Situation in Amman

The fighting in Amman seems to have died down this afternoon after the more moderate fedayeen leaders responded favorably to a call by Army Chief of Staff Haditha for all sides to observe a cease-fire. It seems quite possible, however, that this is only another overnight lull.

The embassy reports that so far there have been no injuries among local American residents. Three embassy personnel, however, are missing and presumably being held by the guerrillas.⁴

U.S. Actions

The UN Security Council is expected now to meet this evening. It was originally scheduled—at our request—to meet this afternoon but the pre-meeting consultations have dragged on longer than expected. We are working for a resolution calling for the immediate release of the passengers and crews and urging that all possible measures be taken to insure against further hijacking or interference with international aviation.

We are still working with the Swiss, Germans and British to maintain a common front against the fedayeen demands and efforts to split us. We have also informed the Israelis that we find the message they asked us to forward to King Hussein to be unnecessarily threatening (it held his government fully responsible) and suggest they use their own direct channels to the Jordanians.

⁴ Reported in telegram 4517 from Amman, September 9, 1966Z. (Ibid., POL 23 JORDAN)

217. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, September 9, 1970, 2032Z.

4521. Ref State 147107.² Following are our thoughts on questions raised Dept's reftel:

1. We are uncertain that Husain would be willing at this time—even at our instigation—to undertake final military confrontation with fedayeen. This suggested we believe by his lack of response to the many fedayeen provocations of past two weeks. Several of these could have furnished pretext for confrontation if this had been in his mind. More recently it suggested also by his commissioning Chief of Staff to establish cease-fire on basis previous much-abused agreements. King's unreceptiveness to such proposal from U.S. finally suggested by our having received no feelers from him this subject. If destruction of fedayeen were high on King's list of plans, we believe he would have raised matter with us by now.

2. Even if Husain were to imply to us that it now propitious time for strike against fedayeen, we would counsel restraint. Fedayeen have large number civilian hostages—including several U.S. officials—in their hands. If Husain were now to give army its head, it quite possible that many hostages would be killed and that former TWA/SwissAir passengers now at al-Urdun Hotel might be endangered. Our having given diplomatic support to GOJ strike at such inopportune time, moreover, would sooner or later become public knowledge.

3. If ICRC rescue operation fails, however, and hostages killed Embassy believes that we should then emphatically urge King to settle fedayeen hash once and for all. Safety of hostages in fact might be promoted if GOJ made it clear that harm to them would be signal for repression of entire fedayeen movement.

4. If Husain shows disposition—after encumbrance of aircraft passengers removed—to contemplate fedayeen roll-up we believe JAA adequate for job. This judgment would still hold even if Iraqis joined opposition, except that conflict would then be bloodier one.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 8:20 p.m. It was repeated to Tel Aviv.

² In telegram 147107 to Amman, September 9, Rogers solicited the Embassy's opinion on whether the U.S. Government should "press Hussein to provoke major confrontation" with the fedayeen and also asked if this could be done without Hussein requesting U.S. military intervention. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12 US)

5. If confrontation seemed advisable or in the offing, we would discourage Husain's request for direct military intervention as follows: we would point out that such assistance probably not needed, and that victory achieved even with token U.S. presence could be political suicide. Any direct U.S. participation would discredit King in Arab eyes and strike at base of political and social order for which King feels self deeply responsible. We could offer instead assurances of political and diplomatic support with international community and with some of Husain's Arab neighbors. (In former capacity we could seek obtain assurances of at least neutrality of USSR.) At same time we should caution King against launching one-man campaign against fedayeen. We should urge that he make any drive against them appear legitimate inter-Arab police action and seek participation of at least small units from Saudi Arabia and UAR. In aftermath recent PFLP successes and probable leftward shift of whole fedayeen movement, both these states might be prepared to come out more strongly against fedayeen than heretofore.

6. *Comment:* We realize that action suggested para three (above) differs from recommendation Amman's 4495.³ Past seven hours of violent confrontation, however, suggest to us that status of passengers is shifting from that of pawns in terrorist publicity game to that of instruments to be used by fedayeen in political struggle against GOJ. As passengers' political significance increases so do dangers to which they exposed. For this reason believe it now appropriate to ask GOJ to issue warning of most dire consequences if passengers or any other hostages are harmed.

Odell

³ See footnote 7, Document 214. Odell recommended against the Department urging King Hussein to threaten the PFLP with harm if anything happened to the hostages. Odell argued that such a threat might panic the PFLP into an act of desperation.

218. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 10, 1970, 8 a.m.

SUBJECT

Morning Report on Hijacking Situation

Below are described the main developments since yesterday evening on the hijacking situation.

Passengers, Aircraft and Negotiations

Red Cross representative Rochat reports that:

—The deadline on the ultimatum has been extended by the PFLP for an additional 72 hours. Presumably it would now expire at 10 p.m. EDT on Saturday.

—The number of Palestinians in Israeli hands whose release is being demanded by the PFLP is "very high indeed."

—He anticipates negotiations that may carry on for "several weeks."

—He is "most interested" in what the U.S. action might be in a "final crash."

For the first time, in a series of discussions with Rochat, an Embassy officer detected a note of real pessimism creeping into his attitude.

Although the deadline has been extended the lives of the passengers are still very much in danger. The fedayeen, apparently nervous over the possibility of outside intervention, have told Rochat that if there is any foreign military action in Jordan the three planes and all their occupants will be blown up. An attack on the hotel in Amman where some of the passengers are staying is also possible. Heavy fighting broke out in the vicinity of the hotel last night and the building took several direct hits, although apparently none of the guests were injured.² Our Embassy in Amman also points out that the status of the passengers is shifting from that of pawns in a terrorist publicity game to that of instruments being used by the fedayeen in a political struggle with the Jordanian Government.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The time is handwritten at the top of the page.

² As reported in the *Washington Post*, September 10.

³ See Document 217.

Situation in Amman

A pooled dispatch by several U.S. correspondents reflects continued fighting in Amman during the early morning hours.⁴ Guerrillas and the security forces were trading shots and fighting was going on in several areas of the city, including at the airport. Many houses are said to have been destroyed.

The Embassy reports that King Hussein still appears unwilling to take the final military confrontation with the fedayeen.⁵ They continue to believe, however, that the army would come out on top, even if the Iraqis joined the fedayeen.

Diplomatic Situation

The UN Security Council met for a short session last evening to approve, by consensus, a resolution expressing grave concern at the hijackings, and calling for the release of the passengers. The resolution also called for all possible legal steps to be taken to ensure against further hijackings and other interference with international travel. Ambassador Yost notes that the resolution puts both the Soviets and the Syrians squarely and unequivocally behind the appeal for the release of the hostages.⁶

⁴ Transmitted in telegram 4532 from Amman, September 10, 0731Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12 US)

⁵ Telegram 4571 from Amman, September 10, 2159Z. (Ibid., PS 23–10)

⁶ The resolution was transmitted in telegram 1857 from USUN, September 10, 0014Z. (Ibid., AV 12) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 58.

219. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, September 10, 1970, 1510Z.

147976. Ref.: State 147736; Amman 4521.² Subject: Hijacking.

1. You should proceed to suggest to King Hussein that he pass warning to PFLP of direst of consequences if any of hostages should be harmed.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Davies; cleared by U. Alexis Johnson and Curran (S/S); and approved by Sisco.

² Telegram 147736 to Amman, September 10, 0032Z. (Ibid.) Telegram 4521 is Document 217.

2. Unanimous decision of UNSC September 9 and expressions of outrage not only in West but also in East Bloc can be cited as indication of harm done overall Arab image by current detention hundreds of innocent travellers. Any harm to these could only heighten this feeling to detriment of overall Arab position.

Rogers

220. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, September 10, 1970, 1752Z.

148073. Ref: State 143328.² Subject: Soviet Approaches to Iraq and Jordan.

1. Soviet Chargé Vorontsov called at his request on Assistant Secretary Sisco September 9 to report that Soviet Government had made approaches in Amman and Baghdad regarding situation in Jordan. (These approaches presumably made in response to our request that Soviets intercede with Iraqis—reftel.)

2. Reading from Russian notes, Vorontsov said following representations had been made in Amman and Baghdad by Soviet representatives today: "Concern has been created in Moscow by information that the situation in Jordan has become aggravated in recent days. This concern is caused by the fact that a fratricidal fight among Arabs could cause heavy damage to their own interests, first of all, and, secondly, to the cause of establishing peace in the Middle East. In this case, advantages could only accrue to the enemies of the Arab nations, the Israeli aggressors and the imperialist forces behind them. The Soviet Government appeals to the Governments of Iraq and Jordan to demonstrate farsightedness and reasonable restraint so that an end can be brought to the dangerous developments in Jordan. A further aggravation of the situation should not be allowed since this would only worsen the general situation in the Middle East which is already complicated enough. The Soviet Government expresses the hope that ways will be

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on September 9 by Adolph Dubs (EUR/SOV); cleared by Davies; and approved by Sisco. It was sent to Amman, Beirut, USINT Cairo, London, Moscow, Paris, Tel Aviv, and USUN.

² Telegram 143328 to USUN, September 2, 1410Z. (Ibid.)

found to solve the problems which have arisen by peaceful means. This will be in the interest of the Arab nations and cause no damage to the unification of Arab states, the fight for liquidation of the consequences of Israeli aggression and the securing of the national rights and social progress by the Arab nations.”

3. Sisco replied that we continue to be concerned by the situation in Jordan. We are especially concerned by Iraqi support of the fedayeen. The presence of Iraqi troops in Jordan poses specter of their direct intervention in that country. U.S. hopes that this private Soviet message to Iraqis will help to underscore desirability of resolving situation in Jordan peacefully. We hope Soviet Government’s appeal will be helpful in this connection, despite use of some questionable language.

Rogers

221. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 10, 1970, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Mid-Day Report on the Hijacking Situation

The following are the major developments since my memorandum to you this morning on the hijacking situation.²

Negotiations

The PFLP has conveyed a provisional counter proposal to Rochat. You will recall that, with our encouragement, the British, Germans and Swiss all agreed to hand over the fedayeen in their custody *only if all* the passengers were released. The PFLP now proposes to permit the immediate evacuation of all the women, children and sick from the three aircraft (one report also says from the hotel) in return for the release of the fedayeen held by the British, Germans and Swiss (7 persons plus one corpse). The remaining male hostages would be released only

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for information. The time is handwritten at the top of the page.

² Document 218.

in exchange for a yet unspecified number of fedayeen held by the Israelis. This counter proposal is to be confirmed this afternoon after clearance by the PFLP with all the splinter groups of the fedayeen. The PFLP now confirms that the deadline on its ultimatum is 6:30 p.m. EDT Saturday.

Rochat thinks that such an initial evacuation would be a positive step and would perhaps even assist in the negotiations for the men. He points out, however, that this would mean that the remaining male hostages would be used to exact from the Israelis the release of probably about 600 Palestinians. Our embassy in Tel Aviv comments that the Israelis will not necessarily oppose the proposal because of its humanitarian aspect and lack of discrimination by nationality or religion.³ The most important factor, however, may be the precise commitment required by Israel in releasing the fedayeen prisoners.

The ambassadors of western states involved, including the U.S., are meeting in Bern this afternoon to consider the counter-proposal.⁴

Condition of Passengers

The condition of the hostages at the site of the aircraft has improved somewhat from yesterday with the arrival of further provisions and sanitation facilities. Health conditions are expected to improve further with the transport to the landing strip later today of additional Red Cross medical supplies and equipment. We are assured by the Red Cross that those passengers still on board the aircraft are physically well, although showing signs of strain and tension.

As for the passengers now in the hotel in Amman, their supply of comestibles is supposedly adequate for 10 more days and the utilities are still in operation. An earlier report that the hotel had fallen into the hands of the fedayeen has fortunately proved incorrect, although, of course, the fedayeen are still treating them as hostages for bargaining purposes. Some passengers from the BOAC plane that was hijacked yesterday have begun to arrive at the hotel.

Situation in Amman

Amman was reported by the embassy to be quiet and subdued this morning.⁵ Experience, however, has shown that if there is to be shooting it does not usually begin until middle or late afternoon. There was only the sparse and occasional shooting in Amman this morning.

³ Telegram 4945 from Tel Aviv, September 10, 0930Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12 US)

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 222.

⁵ Telegram from Amman, September 10, 1241Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23 JORDAN)

Two embassy officers are still missing and presumably in the hands of the fedayeen. A third officer, earlier reported missing, has turned up unharmed and was only unable to contact the embassy yesterday rather than having been picked up by the fedayeen.

222. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 10, 1970, 3:15–4 p.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East (See Part II for discussion of Cambodia)

PARTICIPANTS

State	JCS
U. Alexis Johnson	Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
Joseph J. Sisco	Lt. Gen. Melvin Zais
Rodger P. Davies	General John W. Vogt
Defense	NSC Staff
David Packard	Harold H. Saunders
Robert Pranger	Col. Kennedy
CIA	Mrs. Jeanne Davis
Richard Helms	
Thomas Karamessines	
David Blee	

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was decided:

1. that the WSAG Middle East Working Group would prepare;
 - a. a political-military scenario-contingency plan for deterring Soviet intervention in the event Israel were to employ its forces in support of King Hussein at his request against the Fedayeen² and;
 - b. alternate packages of equipment support for Israel based on alternative assumptions as to the level of hostilities and threat to Israel resulting from Israeli intervention in support of King Hussein at his request against Fedayeen in Jordan.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Kissinger is not listed as a participant but he chaired the meeting.

² Not found.

³ Not found.

2. that the political military Contingency plan for U.S. intervention in Jordan in support of King Hussein at his request against Fedayeen would be reviewed and revised as necessary for consideration by the WSAG.

Mr. Sisco: To bring us up to date on the hijacking situation, I have had a report from Bern that we have received a counter proposal from the PFLP: If the three governments will release the captured commandos (7 in all and the body of the one killed), the PFLP will release all the women, children and sick without any discrimination as to nationality—i.e. including Israelis. As a second stage, they would exchange all the rest of the passengers for the Fedayeen (numbers unspecified) held by Israel.⁴ This proposal has a certain amount of public appeal and we consider it a clever PFLP stratagem. It forces the four nations to decide to act together to turn down the proposal but put pressure on Israel; or, to act on a piece-meal basis and leave unresolved the most serious problem—the exchange of the balance of the passengers for the Israeli-held Fedayeen.

Dr. Kissinger: They are using the nationals of other countries as hostages for the Israeli prisoners.

Mr. Johnson: If Israel accepts, they accept the *principle* of hostages.

Mr. Sisco: Just before the Bern meeting,⁵ we are told, Eban sent a private message to Home to the effect that if the four countries acted together and held out for the release of all passengers and the aircraft, Israel would reconsider its position. At the meeting, the ICRC representative said the PFLP counterproposal was discriminatory and he would not proceed on that basis. He demanded the release of all passengers, without discrimination, and the aircraft; or the ICRC would pull out of the negotiations. The UK, German and Swiss representatives took the same position, and the proposal was rejected. The UK representative then asked for the Israeli position on the exchange of the prisoners. The U.S. representative, as instructed, let others take the lead. The Israelis took a very hard line—in effect “no deal”. The four asked that the Israeli representative go back for instructions and he

⁴ No report from Bern was found, but an NEA Working Group Situation Report, September 10, 1800 EDT, includes the PFLP counterproposal. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings)

⁵ The meeting of the Bern Group, comprised of representatives from the United States, West Germany, Great Britain, Switzerland, and Israel, commenced at 1715Z. The representatives unanimously rejected the PFLP counterproposal and the British asked the Israeli representative to contact his government regarding Israel's position on the release of fedayeen prisoners in Israeli prisons as part of a possible deal with the PFLP. (Telegram 2160 from Bern, September 10, 1905Z; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PS 7-6 JORDAN)

agreed to do so. Another meeting has been set for 6:00 p.m., EDT.⁶ I think this represents a bit of progress.

Ron Ziegler is having trouble with press reports about the possibility of military intervention. We should hold to a line which neither adds to the speculation nor is absolutely categorical that nothing is intended.

Mr. Johnson: We have said previously that we are relying on diplomatic channels and the ICRC efforts. We should stick with that.

All agreed.

(Mr. Sisco left the room at Mr. Ziegler's request)

Mr. Johnson: The situation in Amman has quieted down.

Admiral Moorer: The Ambassador has not made any recommendation for an evacuation.

Dr. Kissinger: Who is fighting whom and to what end?

Mr. Davies: The 1st Brigade of the Jordanian Army and the radical Fedayeen—possibly the PLO.

Mr. Helms: It is unclear just who is involved. The King has said for the ninetieth time that if this present cease-fire doesn't hold, he has had it.

Dr. Kissinger: The radio report we had yesterday meant that Hussein was leashing the Army, rather than unleashing it, didn't it?

Mr. Davies: Yes. He asked the Army to restore control.

Dr. Kissinger: What is his game?

Mr. Helms: He wants to avoid fighting.

Dr. Kissinger: But that means his end. There is no way for him to get back control without fighting.

Mr. Saunders: He may think there is a difference between fighting now and after the hijacking crisis is over.

Mr. Helms: I don't think that is a determining factor. He is simply not willing to take on the Palestinians in his Kingdom, with the possible help they would receive from the Iraqis, possibly the Syrians. We have reports that the Fedayeen are virtually out of ammunition—that they would have run out days ago if they had not been supplied by the Iraqis.

Mr. Johnson: What is their normal source of supply?

Mr. Helms: Various sources—at present, the Iraqis.

Admiral Moorer: They have been buying arms and stealing them from the Jordanian Army.

⁶ See Document 224.

Dr. Kissinger: How good is the Iraqi Army?

Mr. Helms: As an Army, no good; as bandits, all right.

Dr. Kissinger: Can the Jordanians handle them?

Mr. Helms: We don't know; probably.

Dr. Kissinger: But the Israelis could handle them easier.

Mr. Helms: No question.

Admiral Moorer: It would be no contest.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we discuss the additional assistance package for Israel which the President requested last Friday? Can we agree on a position that it shouldn't be done, but if it is done, this is a package that makes sense?

Mr. Packard: This package provides for 125 sorties. There is some dispute about the number of sites.

Dr. Kissinger: We can forward it to the President as the one making the most sense. We can tell him we have put together other packages for other contingencies.

Mr. Packard: This package includes the package already committed.

Dr. Kissinger: What will it lead to if the President sticks by his Friday decision to send additional material?

Mr. Johnson: The original package plus this add-on.

Mr. Packard: This will double the sortie capability of the original package.

Mr. Saunders: It doubles the expendable munitions.

Dr. Kissinger: Should the President hold this for his discussion with Mrs. Meir⁷ or should we offer it now?

Mr. Johnson: Hold it for Mrs. Meir, by all means. The President can decide whether or not he wants to relate it to the New York talks.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Last week the President was relating it to the Egyptian violations. (to Mr. Johnson) Will you include this item in your memorandum to the President for his meeting with Mrs. Meir?

Mr. Johnson: Yes. We will include our recommendation on this additional package.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Saunders) Will you do a memorandum to the President on the package?

Can we now review our hijacking contingency plans? We agreed yesterday on two categories: 1) a military evacuation of Jordan, and 2) a military campaign in support of Hussein. We agreed that, if Jordanian troops could not succeed alone and outside help was required, that

⁷ Documentation on Meir's visit is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972.

U.S. troops would be preferable for the first category and Israeli troops for the second. The forces required would be roughly the same. (to Admiral Moorer) Have you been able to review what we might do?

Admiral Moorer: It is clearly understood that whatever we do from Europe must be such that it will not leak. Generals Throckmorton and Goodpaster both understand this. It is agreed that there is nothing we could do from Fort Bragg without a leak. We do have one battalion on 22-hour continuous alert plus flight time at Bragg.

Dr. Kissinger: So one battalion would be ready to go in 22 hours. Could others follow in 48 hours or when?

Admiral Moorer: There are two determining factors: the time required to marry the aircraft and the troops and that required to prepare and load the planes and troops for paratroop.

In Europe we have the Crescent Cap exercise in which one company of paratroops is prepared to load out and move in four hours. One light infantry battalion can move in 8 hours; others in increased times.

Dr. Kissinger: Can one company do anything?

Admiral Moorer: That is 484 men. They could seize and hold an airfield.

Dr. Kissinger: For 4 hours?

General Zais: There could be some paratroop follow-up if necessary.

Admiral Moorer: This is the best we can do without the risk of its becoming public.

(Mr. Sisco returned)

Mr. Johnson: How long could they continue to hold?

Admiral Moorer: For several weeks. We would have the problem of readjusting our air assets. It takes 10–12 hours to get tactical aircraft to bases—Turkey or Cyprus if we use land-based air.

Dr. Kissinger: The Turks wouldn't let us in, would they?

Admiral Moorer: Probably not. With regard to the Navy, some ships could begin to move in four hours without any public awareness. We could move two submarines into the Mediterranean to keep track of what the Soviet ships are doing. We could put ASW patrol aircraft into the central Mediterranean. We also have an amphibious operation on Crete which is due to be backloaded on September 14. We have taken every action we can take now without signalling an increased alert. Goodpaster and Throckmorton are aware of the problem and there is nothing else we can do now without risking a leak.

Dr. Kissinger: To recap, we could have one company in within four hours plus flying time. We could have an infantry battalion in within eight hours plus flying time. The rest would follow—how soon?

Admiral Moorer: Within 24–28 hours, including alert time and flight time.

Dr. Kissinger: What gaps would there be after the battalion gets in? How long does the battalion have to hold?

Admiral Moorer: 24 hours alone; 48 hours before a brigade could get in. You understand that two battalions are understrength due to the general worldwide draw-down of the Army. In the meantime, we could start moving units of the 82nd Airborne.

Dr. Kissinger: Would it be possible to put this on a chart?

Admiral Moorer: Yes, but the situation changes by the minute. For example, some European units are now moving to training areas and would have to be brought back.

Dr. Kissinger: It's easier for you to visualize these things than for me. The President will be deciding this issue in a condition of stress. Can we give him an idea of the magnitude of the problem?

Admiral Moorer: I think this is as far as we can go now.

Dr. Kissinger: It sounds right to me.

Mr. Packard: I suggest, rather than supply a plan now, that the Chiefs keep the plan updated and when the President needs it he can call for it and get an updated plan.

Admiral Moorer: We could give you one to give you the feel of it. You should call us before you give it to the President, however.

Dr. Kissinger: I assure you no decision will be taken to implement any plan without the Chairman and Secretary Laird in the room. I was thinking of this for illustrative purposes.

Mr. Packard: (to Admiral Moorer) Your people should keep this updated.

Admiral Moorer: We have been keeping an updated plan since June.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we discuss the second operation—to support Hussein. I'm aware of the argument that it wouldn't do Hussein any permanent good and it would be better if the Israelis did it, but we had better have a plan on the off chance we have to do it. There is one additional alternative. The President wants us to consider using aircraft against the Fedayeen—not necessarily ground forces. If the King should ask for help, we should consider providing air support.

Admiral Moorer: Our first recommendation is that we should not get involved. If we do, our first preference would be for the use of air against ground units, LOC, etc. One problem is that the Fedayeen provide no discrete targets.

(Mr. Sisco left the room again at Ziegler's request)

If the Iraqis should come across, their LOC would be visible and could be attacked by air either from carriers or from Cyprus.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we have an operational plan?

Mr. Johnson: This would require a minimum of forward air controllers.

Admiral Moorer: It is a feasible option.

Dr. Kissinger: Can you work it out?

Admiral Moorer: Yes. The *Independence* is only 100 miles from the beach.

Mr. Packard: This would require only giving an order to the carrier.
(Mr. Sisco returned)

Admiral Moorer: One third preference would be a ground operation in Jordan. The principal problem here is logistics. Initially, at least, we would have no seaport. We would require overflight facilities, or a move across Israel, a base in Lebanon, etc. The main difficulty would be fuel. If we had to mount a sustained operation, we would need ground access to Jordan proper.

Dr. Kissinger: How?

Admiral Moorer: We would need clearance to move across Israel or Lebanon.

Mr. Packard: (to Admiral Moorer) You should emphasize your caveat that you recommend against the operation.

Admiral Moorer: Yes, I recommend against it. The problem is logistics. An air operation could be done, but a ground operation would be a real problem.

Mr. Packard: Not to mention what would happen if the Soviets intervened on the other side.

Admiral Moorer: The Soviets have good reaction capability. They are capable of moving from Black Sea ports in about 120 hours. They could have ground forces to Egypt or Syria within 15–16 days.

Dr. Kissinger: Once we put in our four brigades, that's it then, unless we bring in troops from Germany.

Admiral Moorer: No. We could take troops from Europe or from the US. We have a Marine Battalion in the Mediterranean, some Marine Battalions on the West Coast. We would be stripped clean, however. If this should happen, we are at a mobilization level. If we got in a situation where there were indications that the Soviets were coming in, we shouldn't monkey around. We should tell the Soviets we mean business and show them by augmenting the 6th Fleet, moving tactical fighter squadrons and putting SAC on alert.

Mr. Johnson: We may want to do those things as a deterrent before the Soviets move.

Mr. Helms: Yes. If you wait until they move you're finished.

Admiral Moorer: Yes, we should establish a deterrent. We should call for partial or full mobilization, ask for a budget supplemental, divert materiel from Southeast Asia. We can't do it half-way; we have to be convincing.

Dr. Kissinger: To do what?

Admiral Moorer: To take a posture to deter the Soviets.

Dr. Kissinger: Suppose the President decides to assist the Jordanians. Does he have to do all these things?

Admiral Moorer: He should be prepared to take some or all of the series of measures I described.

Dr. Kissinger: Can you write them down? We don't want to go this course, but if we have to, let's be sure we do it right.

Admiral Moorer: The movement of one ship or one squadron is a feeble gesture that won't serve the purpose.

Dr. Kissinger: If the Israelis go into Jordan with ground forces, possibly with US air support, would we necessarily take these actions against the Soviets?

Admiral Moorer: No.

Dr. Kissinger: If we commit US forces for a sustained operation in Jordan, can we put together a contingency plan including these measures? (to Kennedy and Saunders) Will you put together something next week?

Admiral Moorer: You should clearly indicate US resolve—and possibly establish a requirement for mobilization.

Dr. Kissinger: We must look at it from the point of view of what is politically bearable—from the foreign policy point of view. We should get the list of measures you describe, let everyone look at it in the Working Group and agree that this is what we want to do.

Admiral Moorer: I would want the opportunity to selectively recommend certain steps.

Dr. Kissinger: You will. I want to narrow these steps to those which are more likely.

Admiral Moorer: I agree.

Dr. Kissinger: What if there is a collapse of Royal authority and Hussein asks for help, the Iraqis intervene, and Israel enters Jordan? We may have to provide assistance for Israel and take measures to deter Soviet intervention.

Admiral Moorer: They would be the same as those I described if the US was prepared to stop the intervention.

Dr. Kissinger: We can't mobilize before the Soviets intervene.

Mr. Packard: We could move at a lower level.

Dr. Kissinger: I consider this not a remote possibility—I think it is quite possible.

Mr. Packard: The Israelis have all the capability they need to intervene now.

Dr. Kissinger: Not to overcome a Soviet intervention. We might have to hold the ring.

Mr. Sisco: Any Iraqi invasion would increase the amount of support Iraq is getting from the Soviets.

Mr. Packard: The Israelis have the capacity now, but the question is for how long. The US might have to step-up supplies to them later.

Dr. Kissinger: No one is talking about doing it now. If Israel wants to move into Jordan, what are we letting ourselves in for; and what measures must we be prepared to take against the Soviets? It is silly to close our eyes to the possible results of Israeli intervention.

Mr. Pranger: There are different contingencies depending on what the Israelis would want to do. We have broken it down by the scale of the intervention, what the Arabs would do, etc.

Dr. Kissinger: Having a contingency plan doesn't mean we would do it. I don't want the President to tell us to do something without our knowing: 1) what we must do for Israel and 2) what measures we should take to prevent Soviet intervention.

Mr. Sisco: What would Israel need in the face of a sustained Iraqi intervention in Jordan? What if the Egyptians step up their activities on the Canal? What would Lebanon need to face a Palestinian uprising there?

Mr. Johnson: What assumptions can we make about the Jordanian Army?

Dr. Kissinger: It is easier to discuss these things now than on the morning it happens.

Mr. Pranger: We have looked at the matter. A limited Israeli intervention would require no additional military gear. From there on we have estimated levels of intervention from the other side. Israel would probably not need anything except expendables. We have an estimate here.

(Mr. Pranger passed a paper to Mr. Saunders)⁸

Mr. Packard: Basically, they could do it with what they have—or we could go as high as \$100 million a month.

Dr. Kissinger: Is \$100 million a month the only alternative to doing nothing?

Mr. Packard: We could do anything in between on a graduated basis.

Dr. Kissinger: We should be able to make some realistic assumptions in between—what the Egyptians would do, what the Iraqis would do.

Admiral Moorer: Israel would in effect be fighting on two fronts. Against the Iraqis, they would be using 500-pound bombs and ground-

⁸ Not found.

type ammunition. They have a stockpile of these things, which we would probably have to replenish. The \$100 million a month would be for a sustained war of attrition including the missiles in Egypt. This would not necessarily happen right away.

Dr. Kissinger: I might put my Program Analysis people on it and pull something together, which you could critique.

Mr. Packard: This represents only 24 hours work. If we put it into a Working Group, we can have a contingency plan. We would have to work with the Israeli Defense people if it actually happened.

Admiral Moorer: I believe there are four components of a deterrent: 1) our military posture in Europe, which we could increase by deploying additional Army, Navy and Air units; 2) our strategic position, in which we should alert SAC and deploy our missile submarines.

All these actions should be vigorous and visible.

Dr. Kissinger: We would take these actions if Israeli forces became engaged in Jordan and before the Soviets move?

Admiral Moorer: We should take deterrent action before they move. What do you mean by move?

Dr. Kissinger: Suppose the King asks the Israelis (or the US) for help against the Fedayeen or Iraq and Israel gets involved. What do we need to hold the ring against the Soviets?

Admiral Moorer: If we receive a political warning we could establish an advanced position.

Mr. Packard: There are two ways the Soviets might become involved: 1) through unlimited support for Egypt, Iraq, etc; there is no way we can stop them from doing that; or 2) if they should intervene with their forces, we could do these other things.

Dr. Kissinger: We may want to prevent the second possibility by assuming an intimidating posture.

Mr. Sisco: If you assume a limited operation in Jordan could be done by air; and if, by unlimited support of Egypt and Iraq, the Soviets unleash the Egyptians to intensify the situation on the Canal; there would be a tremendous need for Israel to counter with air. Do the Israelis have enough air power to mount a campaign against an Egyptian attack and at the same time mount an aerial operation against Iraqi troops? Iraq also has an Air Force which must be taken into account.

Mr. Packard: That would mean essentially the \$100 million a month package. If things went that far, the Israelis wouldn't be satisfied in a defensive position. This would mean all-out Middle East war.

Dr. Kissinger: It would not necessarily be all-out Middle East war. It would be a campaign of attrition along the Canal plus the operation in Jordan.

Mr. Packard: But we could assume the Israelis would go on the offensive.

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe they won't. Maybe they would be satisfied to hold one area and clean up the other.

Mr. Helms: For how long?

Mr. Sisco: Lebanon has even less control over the Palestinians. What would be required on that end? That is probably the way it would evolve, but it would be not quite all-out war.

Mr. Pranger: The Israelis will have good tactical air capability. The A4s could easily interdict LOC.

Admiral Moorer: Israel would first destroy the Iraqi and Syrian aircraft; then shift to the A4s to interdict ground operations. They could then turn their more sophisticated aircraft to Egypt.

Dr. Kissinger: Would they have enough?

Admiral Moorer: Yes, but we should be prepared to replace their losses.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's ask the Working Group to give us the various levels of what it would look like.

Admiral Moorer: May I return to the four components of a deterrent posture toward the Soviets: In addition to the two I mentioned (our military posture in Europe and our strategic position), we would have to 3) establish lines of communication through a hostile ocean and 4) take action within the country, including calling up the reserves, changing current personnel rules, extending enlistments, etc.—some things which would require Congressional authorizations.

Dr. Kissinger: That looks like the \$100 million package. If the Israeli forces move into Jordan you wouldn't need all that. You would need some diplomatic action somewhere.

Mr. Johnson: Yes, we need a political-military scenario. The diplomatic side of preventing the Soviets from coming in would be most important. What support we could get in the area, for example.

Admiral Moorer: But you have to convince the Soviets you mean business.

Mr. Johnson: And have the capability to back it up. This would require the support of others.

Dr. Kissinger: We should get this in order—what we might do politically with the Soviets, with NATO, etc. Have the Working Group put something together.

223. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan and the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, September 11, 1970, 0027Z.

148727. Subject: British Idea of UN Presence in Jordan; British Evacuation from Jordan.

Summary. British Emb Counselor Moberly under instructions informed Dep Assist Secy Atherton Sept 10 that (1) UK sounding out U Thant on stationing of UN civilian presence at Dawson's Landing, and (2) London exploring possibility of evacuation under ICRC auspices of British and other foreign nationals from Jordan starting morning of Sept 12. Moberly said Iraqis informed British Sept 10 that Iraqi Govt has decided to work for release of passengers, crew, and hijacked aircraft in Jordan. Assist Secy Sisco later informed British Amb Freeman we do not consider the idea of a UN presence a good one and gave our reasons. Freeman said he agreed entirely and would make use of US analysis. *End summary.*

1. Moberly said British are taking soundings on following scheme with U Thant and Bern powers. UN civilian presence would be established at Dawson's Landing to (a) exert some restraint on PFLP, (b) focus world attention further on hostages, and (c) provide basis for further international action to obtain release of hostages if ICRC gives up. London considers GOJ and PFLP agreement would be needed and also that of Rochat. It especially important not to make his task more difficult.

2. Moberly continued London thinks Security Council directive to SYG may be necessary, assuming SYG agrees with scheme. Or perhaps SYG could bypass UNSC and send representatives to Jordan for humanitarian reasons on his own authority. UK UN has been instructed to seek SYG's views. Moberly did not know if this has been done yet. If SYG favorable, London would formally consult in Bern with all concerned. UK Ambassador in Bern has already been instructed to inform others of scheme.

3. Atherton said we would study British idea and would be interested in SYG's views, which Moberly undertook to pass on promptly.

4. Moberly said Embassy was instructed to inform USG of new development in UK evacuation plans from Jordan. London has agreed

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Confidential; Priority. Drafted on September 10 by Walter Smith (NEA/UAR) and approved by Atherton. It was repeated to London (Priority), Bern, Bonn, Geneva, Beirut, USINT Cairo, Tel Aviv, Moscow, and Paris.

with British Ambassador Amman to begin steps to obtain additional aircraft for removal of Britons under ICRC auspices. British have discussed matter with ICRC in Geneva. ICRC ready to accept responsibility, but said details should be worked out on spot. British have determined Middle East Airlines has charters available if needed.

5. Moberly continued British Ambassador Amman wondered if Red Cross reps in Jordan would want to involve themselves in evacuation before finishing with passengers and hijacked aircraft. London has sent fresh instructions to him to take any opportunity to reduce numbers of Britons in Jordan and has told Ambassador to request Red Cross reps to make arrangements with GOJ and also fedayeen, whose forbearance will be required. Ambassador is to consult his US and other colleagues and then approach Red Cross.

6. Moberly answered Atherton's question affirmatively that evacuation would be for any and all nationals who would want to join. Moberly said evacuation is to start not later than morning of September 12. UK will arrange additional charter aircraft for Red Cross.

7. Atherton thanked Moberly for information and said we would await judgment of US Chargé in Amman about situation on ground. Moberly suggested matter be further discussed between US and British sides in Bern and Amman.

8. Moberly said Embassy had just received telegram from British Chargé in Baghdad reporting his conversation Sept 10 with Iraqi Foreign Ministry official Jamali. He told Chargé that Revolutionary Command Council had been sitting and he had been authorized to say that Iraqi Government disapproved of hijackings on principle. They would, though not themselves involved, exert every effort with fedayeen to obtain release of all "civilians" detained in Jordan as a result of the hijackings. When Chargé sought clarification Jamali explained that this meant all passengers and crew irrespective of nationality. Iraqis would also work for release of the aircraft. Jamali said that he would be conveying same message to representatives in Baghdad of countries which were members of Security Council.

9. Subsequently Sisco called Ambassador Freeman to express our judgment that we did not consider idea of a UN presence, made up of two or so representatives of the SYG, as a good one. ICRC rep has non-political image, is an outstanding man, and doing a highly effective job. To introduce reps of the UN, which inevitably would bring with it background of the political debates in New York, would be to add both a superfluous and complicating factor to a situation which seems to be moving reasonably well. It would have to be explained to the ICRC, which in turn may misunderstand the situation as casting doubt on the excellent efforts it is making. Finally, as Ambassador Freeman knew Israeli position is key: injection of a UN element would

hardly encourage a positive reaction on part of Israelis. Freeman agreed wholeheartedly with this analysis, thanked Sisco for it, and said he would make very good use of it.

10. Later same evening, Moberly called Atherton to report that UKUN had raised UN presence idea with SYG whose reaction had been negative. Moberly assumed idea was now dead.

Rogers

224. Telegram From the Embassy in Switzerland to the Department of State¹

Bern, September 11, 1970, 0300Z.

2168. 1. In long meeting which broke up at 0200 Sep 11, following emerged:

A. We considered approved PFLP counterproposals transmitted by Rochat (Bern 2162).²

B. Drafted and transmitted agreed comments to Rochat (Bern 2163).³

C. Drafted and transmitted a separate telegram to Rochat at UK Prime Minister Heath's telephoned request asking for the immediate unconditional evacuation of all women and children (Bern 2164).⁴

2. Israeli Ambassador did not attend although invited and available. He communicated by telephone Israeli response to Bern Group request for a statement of position. The Israeli Government has discussed the matter, he said, the answer is negative. No one in the Israeli Government is prepared to liberate fedayeen.

3. Although there are a few hopeful elements in Rochat's last report, the Bern Group was seriously disturbed by the progressive escalation of PLFP demands. There was serious discussion, led by Swiss, of outright rejection of entire PLFP counterproposal. Agreement was reached on text transmitted Rochat (Bern 2163) only by restating what

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PS 7-6 JORDAN. Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to Amman (Immediate), Beirut, Bonn, London, Tel Aviv, and Geneva.

² Telegram 2162 from Bern, September 11, 0040Z. (Ibid.)

³ Telegram 2163 from Bern, September 11, 0140Z. (Ibid.)

⁴ Telegram 2164 from Bern, September 11, 0150Z. (Ibid.)

was not acceptable in order to leave Rochat some power of action. Recall that ICRC Geneva has made clear early on both to Rochat and to Bern Group that this counterproposal, even in earlier incarnation, was unacceptable to ICRC (para 2 Bern 2160).⁵

4. UK, on instructions British Cabinet, raised question of contingency planning in event ICRC was forced abandon its mission. They suggested UN civilian presence, perhaps personal representative of UN SecGen. We understand Washington has received details of this directly from UK.⁶

Thalmann, as former UN personal representative of SecGen did not favor. Lack of clear direction and low prestige of UN in area seemed to rule this out. He suggested quadripartite group on Middle East at UN in NY. Failure of Rochat mission could well lead to new dangerous and major crisis situation and representation by major powers could be stabilizing force. Coordination with Swiss and Germans as non-UN members posed no insurmountable problems. Important thing was to have someone waiting in the wings with real authority and prepared to step in immediately should ICRC mission fail. Otherwise there would be an immediate tendency to settle bilaterally with a potentially dangerous residue.

We agreed seek government views on these contingency thoughts. Thalmann's views represent Swiss Government thinking.

5. UK also announced British Cabinet decision to seek evacuation of British civilians from Jordan if ICRC agrees. They hoped begin not later than morning of September 12. Despite extended rationale, this announcement went over like a lead balloon.

6. In view major difficulties with text, accuracy and distribution of last two PFLP proposals through ICRC Geneva, Bern Group decided and arranged with ICRC for immediate telex transmission from Geneva to FPD with immediate distribution of written text to four powers and Israelis here. This will preclude some of the confusion arising today from different texts.

Davis

⁵ See footnote 5, Document 222.

⁶ See Document 223.

225. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 11, 1970.

SUBJECT

Mid-Day Report on Hijacking Situation

The following are the major developments since my memorandum to you this morning on the hijacking situation:²

Negotiations and Passengers

The negotiations for the release of the hostages seem to have reached a critical stage. The fedayeen leaders apparently began to panic when the rumors of military intervention reached them this morning and began taking a series of uncoordinated decisions. There is considerable confusion in Amman and the situation appears extremely fluid, but here is the latest report from Red Cross representative Rochat:

—"Fantastic tension" reigns at the PFLP headquarters and "we are seeing these people as they really are—angry and desperate." He is trying to calm them and has made an appeal to reestablish the previous negotiating position and avoid reacting to rumors.

—He fully anticipates that the PFLP will take some action to demonstrate the seriousness of their intent. The PFLP will give him certain "warning measures" this afternoon.

—The three aircraft have been wired for bombing, but the passengers have been removed from them. The passengers are still, however, at the landing strip. Rochat is "nearly convinced" that they will not come to immediate harm and hopes to learn more about what can be done this afternoon.

—The PFLP has sanctioned the evacuation from Jordan of the passengers presently at the hotel in Amman with "no conditions" attached. A first group of 66 has already been evacuated by air from Jordan and are headed for Cyprus.

—The deadline on the ultimatum has been cancelled and no new deadline has been announced.

The Germans are again showing some indications of breaking away from the multinational approach. A high official of Chancellor

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for information. The date followed by a question mark is handwritten. While Kissinger did not initial the memorandum, a handwritten note at the top of the first page reads: "K saw."

² The overnight developments on the highjacking situation are in an 8:30 a.m. memorandum for the President. (Ibid., Box 331, Subject Files, Hijackings)

Brandt's SPD is reportedly to be sent to Amman to make contact with the PFLP. We are making a forceful representation direct to Chancellor Brandt, if possible, urging the Germans to desist from making any special deal and to recall his emissary or at least instruct him to deal only with Red Cross representative Rochat.³

An earlier report of a further hijacking has proved false.⁴

Situation in Amman

The cease-fire reached yesterday appears to be holding up fairly well so far. The situation is still very tense, however, and new fighting could break out at any time.

³ Transmitted in telegram 148818 to Bonn, September 11, 1531Z. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12 US)

⁴ Not further identified.

226. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 11, 1970.

P: Anything new?

K: No.

P: Are you going to Camp David?

K: I thought I would keep in touch with the situation here. All the passengers are off the planes. It's not clear if they are going to Amman. The first Caravelle of passengers are in Nicosia. 40 of the passengers are Americans.

P: Maybe I should have played that sooner. Dead or alive. We would have a terrible thing on our hands, I guess. We will not play a soft game in the future.

K: And every time we use the hard line, it works. We have a cable in from ICRC fellow saying that they seem confused and worried at the top. So they are not world baiters.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. Although no exact time appears on the transcript, a notation indicates that the telephone call took place in the afternoon.

P: They are afraid they will move on other things. The trip thing is working.²

K: We have heard from the Italians but not the Yugoslavs.

P: Do you think that's because he's on a trip?

K: Saragat³ has invited you to stay at the Quirinale.

P: All right.

K: He has also offered you his Villa near Naples.

P: They are very generous. I just wish Saragat were their Prime Minister.

² President Nixon was scheduled to travel to Europe and the United Kingdom September 27–October 5.

³ Giuseppe Saragat was the President of the Republic of Italy 1964–1971.

227. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, September 11, 1970, 5:15 p.m.

K: Hi Bill.

R: Hi Henry. I was returning your call.

K: I was just checking with you. The President has mentioned a few times that cable.²

R: Well, . . . Arabs not planning military action but just warning them. It is drafted but does not sound right. We must think what message we are trying to convey.

K: I don't want to fall on my sword. There are a couple of arguments for this. . . . moderate Arabs to go back to the guerrillas and say that if behave badly that . . . two principal arguments for it. . . . and if, believes movement of Fleet would contribute. I recognize that both of these arguments could be turned around.

R: Well, when we thought about it . . . Movement of ships prevented from having passengers . . . Continued to say that we would not do

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. The date is handwritten and a typed note indicates the conversation was "paraphrased."

² Not further identified.

anything . . . Arabists in our shop say that when you are dealing with these highly emotional people if you use threats it is counterproductive. The Fedayeen–Syria–Iraq have done all they can to come out against PFLP. You think that is generally what they will do to pick off the passengers. That Red Cross fellow I think is damn good.

K: It's an operational question.

R: We did talk to the Ambassadors. The Arab Ambassadors are behaving pretty well. . . . [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Other Africans, even Syria are being good. There is a big question whether we should say to them this is what we are going to do so get a move on.

K: No! No, only if any passengers are harmed.

R: Any way you phrase it. We do not really hold you responsible but if anything happens . . . Jordanians have surrounded the PFLP . . . I just wonder and let's think about it. We can decide tomorrow. We still have time. They have released a few passengers. Do you have a guess as to how it will be played from now on?

K: You know the deadline has been turned off.

R: Has it? You get a cable saying it is off and a half hour later you find out it is back on.

K: Deadline is still on?

R: Hold up. Can always decide to do this. I don't think the Arabs have any doubt that we are serious. We can decide later tonight if it is necessary or in the morning.

228. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 11, 1970.

F: Apparently many airlines have recommended that their airplanes not land at Beirut and Damascus. PAA has one and they want to know what do. They think there's danger.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. Although no exact time appears on the transcript, a notation indicates that the telephone call took place in the evening.

K: My recommendation is not to land there but talk to Rogers.

F: Why?

K: A) I don't think they are tough as they pretend but the moderate Arab Govts need an excuse to attack them. If the moderate Arabs can prove it hurts them, then they can go to them in the name of the moderate Arabs and say you are hurting us more than them, I think it's ended soon.

F: You would recommend then that no American lines go into any Arab country?

K: That's my recommendation. We can wait.

F: There's a rumor that there will be an attack if planes land there.

K: That's nonsense. If they don't let prisoners go tomorrow, that's what I would do.

F: Transportation is brooking the question to State.

K: The State answer will be to land.

F: Then just let them make that recommendation and make them act on it.

K: I don't want to do it without consultation with the President. Wait until the deadline has passed. After Sunday we should do it.

F: I will tell them to take their instructions from State. We will move in when we have to but we will stay out now.

229. Intelligence Information Cable¹

TDCS 314/09358-70

Washington, September 12, 1970.

COUNTRY

Jordan/Iraq

DOI

6-11 September 1970

SUBJECT

Iraqi Complicity in Multi-Hijackings

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem. Received in the White House at 1400Z.

ACQ

[less than 1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[2½ lines not declassified]

1. When Jordanian troops arrived at Dawson's Landing following the arrival of the hijacked TWA and Swissair aircraft, they were surprised to find Iraqi troops already in the area. It was apparent that the Iraqis had been there for some time and had assisted the fedayeen in making arrangements to receive the hijacked aircraft.

2. There is no doubt in the minds of senior Jordanian Government officials, including King Husayn, that there was collusion between the Iraqis and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in carrying out the hijack operations. Senior officials also believe that the Iraqis misjudged the extent of world reaction to these hijackings and became particularly worried by the threat of foreign intervention. The Iraqis are now at the point where they are extremely concerned about their involvement and are doing their utmost to disassociate themselves from it.

3. Field Dissem: State, CINCMCAFSA *[1½ lines not declassified]*.

230. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, September 12, 1970, 1405Z.

4641. Dept pass Cairo Priority.

1. Rumors spreading at Intercontinental Hotel that all three planes have been blown up after removing all passengers. British Embassy intelligence officer states positively it is hard fact but has not revealed his source.

2. Rochat informed us 1535 local he had just received phone call that ICRC convoy on way to evacuate remaining group of male passengers had been halted by fedayeen three kilometers from planes and told they would not be allowed to proceed.

Brubeck

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12 US. Confidential; Flash. It was repeated to Athens (Immediate), Ankara, Beirut, Bonn, Bern, CINCSRIKE, DIA, Dhahran, Frankfurt, Nicosia, The Hague, London, Paris, Rome, Tel Aviv, Geneva, and Zurich.

231. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 12, 1970, 12:06 p.m.

R: On reflection, I don't think it's a good idea to send a threat. All the passengers are released and in a hotel. We have a cable.² I think the idea that—now that they are out of the plane the threat to their lives is lessened. The Jordanians also thought it bad to do a threat now because the moderates are fighting with the radicals in connection with the passengers. I don't see the point.

K: You don't think it would give the moderates ammunition?

R: When they take action that minimizes the risk to the passengers is not the time to tell them "be careful." They have already let them out of the plane.

K: OK.

R: Secondly, the radicals are fearful about an invasion from Israel, not the U.S. They are there and it's a possibility. Anything that seems equivocal would be bad. If we were conveying it directly, I would feel differently. We did that when I met with their representatives. I said this is serious but we know your government is not responsible but it reflects on the Arabs.³ All those things reflected on troops. The thing that frightened me about the planes was that they will explode them with passengers in them. Now they are under command of PFLP and the Jordanian Army and in different hotels. Now if we say we may invade it might cause these fanatics to react the wrong way.

K: It's just that we agreed to check this morning.

R: I would have checked earlier but I was testifying.

K: I wasn't criticizing.

R: We will keep you advised.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking.

² Telegram 4638 from Amman, September 12, 1245Z. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12 US)

³ See Document 211.

232. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 12, 1970, 12:32 p.m.

K: They have blown up the planes but without the passengers. The passengers and crew are in hotels in Amman. That removes some of the danger. They will have to kill them individually if they are stretched out.

P: They blew up the planes to prove themselves. To prove that they would have done it if we attacked them.

K: 60 have left and the remainder are in Amman. They haven't formulated any precise plans yet. State didn't want that cable and I didn't insist.

P: I don't suppose it's that big.

K: It's a question of whether one—.

P: What did Sisco think?

K: He was for it but others were against it. Frankly I didn't think you should insist on it. As it is the Arab (?) governments are in behind the scenes and are opposed if they say they are. If they are it would have given them something to work with. It's a tactical decision. I have been very loose about it and have not pressed anybody.

P: Nothing we can do now. If the passengers are out.

K: It might have [omission in the original] it up. The big problem today is Chile.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking.

233. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 12, 1970, 6:15 p.m.

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi Henry, anything new?

K: I just wanted to bring you up to date. All the passengers were off the plane when they blew it up.

P: I got this word earlier.

K: They are holding 40 hostages. 23 with dual citizenship, 6 Swiss, 6 German and 5 British.

P: They are holding the Israelis? Does this include any Americans? Not that it makes any difference. It is still the same thing. Are there people that do claim American citizenship? What about the action on the other side? —In terms of making a deal? What do they want for the hostages?

K: They are demanding that the Swiss release 3 fedayeen, the British the woman, the Germans 3 fedayeen.

P: And from the Israelis?

K: The 23. The 23 in return for an unspecified number of fedayeen. I doubt that the Israelis will agree. Pressure is not so bad on us.

P: No Americans?

K: Some claim that they have dual citizenship. If they have an American fighting in the Israeli army we would have a tough case. Nationalized . . . We are now trying to determine [citizenship questions].

P: What position are we taking? Problem for Israel to work out.

K: Ideal would be . . . not releasing prisoners . . . Germans have caved in. Swiss are willing to hold out.

P: What are the British going to do?

K: Probably will cave. Germans are . . . Brandt sent someone independently to Amman. He is very weak . . .

P: Well, released all the Americans. Do you think the Sixth Fleet had anything to do with this.

K: Definitely I do. In terms of time. The Sixth Fleet began to move—first they were hysterical and then they started releasing prisoners.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. All brackets are in the original.

P: I still feel that we have ready the contingency plans to go in there . . . support the King. He is not prepared to do anything. I think it is best for us to go in to support the King.

K: There are quite a few people who do not think it is a good idea. Only for evacuation purposes would be best for us to go in. Sisco feels that the King would not stand after we left if we went in and then pulled out.

P: Israel go in?

K: Yes. Israelis go in. If there is a war . . .

P: I guess it is pretty much up to the Israelis now.

K: If it comes out this way.

P: What do we say or do if anything about these planes being blown up?

K: We should get a plan started to start boycotting countries where planes are taken.

P: Of course, in the future . . .

K: . . . encourage King to move against Fedayeen. Helms . . .

P: Is he doing that? We want to do that. I am not concerned about the long occupation. . . . I still think it is better for us to go in and support the King.

K: It would strap us militarily. Use all our available military reserve. The JCS is not anxious to do this.

P: Well, that is all right. Evacuation is nothing.

K: This is not the problem anyway.

P: Problem is how we handle the Fedayeen. We cannot just let them go. Do we have anything to do about the Fedayeen.

K: We can urge Hussain to move against Fedayeen and we would militarily support it—with air support.

P: That is what I want to do. If the Israelis did it the ceasefire would go out the window. [Talking about the psychological impact. People thought Israelis bad after 6 Day war and now the Israelis were beginning to get sympathy again because of the Egyptian/Soviet violations of the ceasefire. Now people are siding with Israelis and are sympathetic to them.] Now feel that the Arabs are bad—if the Israelis went in the issue would become very confused.

K: Ideal would be if the King could clean up the Fedayeen with our air support.

P: With our help.

K: We have a brigade in Europe that we have put on maneuvers. The 82nd from the US to follow behind it.

P: Do not know what the Israelis are going to do?

K: Most of the Americans out. Otherwise it is between . . . problem for Fedayeen because Israelis may move. Ideal for them would have been . . .

P: I am surprised. What does Sisco think it had to do with it? (Sixth Fleet move) Haig?

K: General Haig reached the exact same conclusion I did quite independently—that the Sixth Fleet had a tremendous impact on the releasing of prisoners.

234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, September 13, 1970, 0053Z.

149919. 1. On September 12 Secretary asked Jordanian Ambassador Sharaf to call in order to (a) exchange information on general situation in Amman and (b) urge that GOJ do everything to assure safety of passengers. Sharaf indicated he had no information from Amman but assured Secretary that he certain GOJ doing everything in its power to protect passengers and to effect their safe departure from Amman. Sharaf promised to convey Secretary's request to his government. Sharaf noted that PFLP not beholden to any other Palestinian organization and had been expelled from PLO Central Committee earlier September 12. Sharaf stated that while GOJ had good liaison with more moderate Palestinian groups, it doubted GOJ could do much with PFLP.

2. Secretary informed Sharaf that most passengers presently in Amman and that problem now was to obtain their early release. He again hoped GOJ would do everything to assist in this effort.

3. In conclusion, Secretary emphasized that it now important for King and GOJ to demonstrate to all concerned that they are able take control of internal Jordanian situation. Secretary stressed he *not* suggesting confrontation with fedayeen in order to destroy them. He noted, however, that incidents of past week in particular have caused doubt re ability GOJ exercise clear-cut authority throughout kingdom. This growing doubt about GOJ's efficacy affects not only current

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12 US. Secret; Priority. Drafted on September 12 by Scotes; cleared by Seelye; and approved by Sisco. It was repeated to Beirut, Bern, Bonn, Jerusalem, London, Tel Aviv, and USUN.

situation but even more important possibility of achievement of fundamental peace settlement in Near East. Israelis have already been asking question with whom peace can be made in Jordan. Secretary said that we believe this is relevant question and hope that stronger stance on part GOJ over coming days will provide answer.

Rogers

235. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 13, 1970, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Hijacking Situation Report—10:30 a.m. Sunday Morning

This morning some 350 passengers were safely evacuated from Jordan leaving some 50–60 still in PFLP hands. What is the process this morning is the shaking out of a new and perhaps more difficult negotiating situation surrounding the remaining 50–60 hostages. At this point, the Red Cross may be re-engaging in Amman, but that is not yet clear. So far the Bern group is holding firm, though reports of a separate German deal continue.

The Passengers

All passengers released by the fedayeen have now left Jordan.

Some 50–60 passengers are not yet accounted for. Most of these are believed to be still in the hands of the PFLP as hostages.

Of those 50–60, 40 are American citizens.

Of those 40 Americans, 12 are dual nationals; 16–18 others are thought to be Jewish; 4 are U.S. Government employees.

Of the non-American hostages, 6 are Swiss; 6 are Germans; 6 or 7 are presumably British.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for information. Haig initialed the memorandum for Kissinger.

The Negotiations

The Red Cross last night reluctantly agreed to place its negotiating role in a state of "temporary suspension" until the Red Cross negotiators could return from Amman to Bern to meet with the five-nation group there. This morning, however, the negotiators sent a message saying that their departure from Amman would be delayed because of new developments. As of 10:30 a.m. EDT we do not know whether the Red Cross has been re-engaged in negotiations by the PFLP or not.

Following last night's meeting of the Bern group,² the focus has turned sharply to the question of a prisoner exchange between Israel and the PFLP. The PFLP has still not provided a list of the prisoners it wants from Israel, and Israel still adamantly refuses to agree to the principle of an exchange. Israel is, however, building counter pressures: It has informed the Algerian Government via the Swiss that it would release two Algerian officials it holds, and it has rounded up a large number of PFLP sympathizers who live on the occupied West Bank and in Gaza and who presumably have relatives in Jordan.

The British are still holding firm with the united insistence on a package deal but are pressing the Israelis hard to make a contribution to the prisoner exchange. There are press reports of a separate West German deal but no official confirmation.

The Situation in Amman

Amman remained relatively quiet this morning.

² Reported in telegram 2235 from Bern, September 13, 0130Z. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PS 7-6 JORDAN)

236. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, September 13, 1970, 1808Z.

149944. Subj: Hijacking.

1. It is time to take stock of where we stand on this problem. We have passed through Phase One when the possibility of a package deal involving all passengers and aircraft might have been feasible. Fact that all but 50 have been released, and split in fedayeen ranks, presents us with new situation. There is question of continuing ICRC role, possible role of GOJ in this situation, and possible eventual Israeli "contribution" to any solution.

2. The Palestinians seem still bent on moving towards a solution which splits the Europeans from the Israelis and Americans. The price for the European hostages has already been budgeted by the Europeans who will at early time recognize that their people are being used in an effort to obtain the release of Americans and Israelis. It will be increasingly more difficult to maintain a united front under these circumstances, though this is the all important and continuing objective of our policy as best way to secure release of all remaining hostages.

3. The U.S. [U.K.]² (Greenhill) has already indicated belief that the U.S. contribution to a solution would be to persuade the Israelis to give up Palestinian prisoners in order to complete the exchange.

4. It is evident that the Israelis recognize that they will have to participate (they have already indicated willingness to release two Algerians and some Israeli diplomats have hinted at something more). At the same time the GOI must maintain its stand on principle. It seems therefore that the Israelis will not act until (a) the Palestinians make precise demands, and in particular submit a specific list of fedayeen prisoners, and (b) they can cite overwhelming pressure (especially from U.S.) forcing them to take part in the exchange.

5. For the next day or so, we cannot know clearly how to proceed until some of the following elements clarify. In particular we need to know:

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Sisco and Beaudry (EUR), and approved by Sisco. It was also sent to Bern, Bonn, London, Geneva, Amman, Beirut, and Tel Aviv.

² Telegram 149950 to the same posts, September 13, 1953Z, made this correction. (Ibid.)

- a. Precisely which prisoners the PFLP wish returned to [from]³ Israel;
- b. The security situation in Amman and the capacity of GOJ to be helpful;
- c. The length of time the Europeans would be prepared to negotiate in common without breaking ranks;
- d. Whether the ICRC will send its top-flight negotiator back to Jordan.

6. We must continue the prudent, cool approach we have thus far followed successfully. Unity of group continues to be essential as we await concrete demands of PFLP, and we explore whether GOJ can play increasingly helpful role. We should apply maximum pressures on ICRC to stay in picture; they cannot leave as we approach crunch. We have succeeded in getting 90 percent of the prisoners; next phase is no more political, or no more "outside ICRC" humanitarian mandate than previous phase. There has been no criticism anywhere of ICRC role.

Rogers

³ Telegram 149950 made this correction.

237. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, September 13, 1970, 1855Z.

149947. Subj: Hijacking Situation.

1. We are relieved that thus far all passengers and crew on 3 hijacked aircraft have left Jordan, with exception of some 50 to 60 still being held. Before proceeding further, we need answers to number of questions:

- a) Precise identity of all hostages still held, which we should be able to derive here in Washington by process of elimination after following full examination manifest and lists of those who have departed Jordan.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12 US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Seelye, and cleared by Davies and Beaudry (EUR/AIS). It was sent to Amman, Beirut, Bern, Bonn, London, and Tel Aviv, and repeated to Geneva.

b) Precise location of hostages. We have had varying reports on this, including report that they are split up and incarcerated in several houses.

c) In whose custody they are. We assume remaining hostages are being held by PFLP but it possible that PLO security force and/or Jordanian security forces are also involved.

d) Which organizations are authorized to negotiate authoritatively for release of passengers. There seems to be divergence of view between PLO–Fatah and PFLP on this score, as well as perhaps divergence of views within PFLP itself.

e) Precise nature of fedayeen demands. In this connection, list of names of persons held by Israel whose release is being demanded by the fedayeen still awaited.

2. In summary, we cannot make further decisions until we have more facts. Thus far, we are fortunate in having done reasonably well. Overwhelming proportion of passengers have been released with no conditions and deadline has been lifted.

Rogers

238. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, September 13, 1970, 2220Z.

149954. 1. British Ambassador Freeman called on Secretary at urgent personal request British FonSec to make following points:

a) There was an apparent difference of opinion developing between London and Washington on need to press Israel for indication it ready to make contribution to overall settlement.

b) London was alarmed at the position of the FRG and feared it would move to separate deal.

c) The FonSec felt there would be no progress towards solution unless the Israelis could be brought to give a private assurance as to their readiness to accept principle of exchange.

2. Ambassador Freeman said that the following specific instructions had been sent to the British representative in Bern:

a) The objective is release of all passengers through five-power action.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12 US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Davies and Beaudry, and approved by Davies. It was sent to Amman, Bern, Bonn, Beirut, London, Tel Aviv, and Geneva.

b) It is imperative now to get alternate negotiator if ICRC not willing to continue negotiations.

c) Possible alternates might be Swiss Ambassador Dubois, Thalmann, or US Chargé Amman.

d) Colleagues in Bern must be urged as to need for Israeli agreement to principle of return of Palestinian prisoners.

3. As a personal suggestion Freeman said if Israelis reluctant to accept principle of exchange they might be willing to go along with notification through ICRC that it empowered to discuss release terms for hostages with PFLP or to acquiesce through silence. In this way, powers could get clear idea of what PFLP demands on Israelis would be.

4. The Secretary indicated we would have no difficulty in having this point raised.

5. The Secretary said he wanted to review his thinking in order to give the Ambassador the flavor of the U.S. position. The Secretary recalled that in the early hours when the hijacking occurred we had a situation where literally hundreds of people in aircraft wired to be blown up and we did not know which PFLP leaders were controlling the operation. It was then that we felt a sense of tremendous urgency. This was further intensified by a deadline for action. At that time the Swiss and German Governments made unilateral announcements of their readiness to release the Palestinian prisoners.

6. Let us recall, said the Secretary, what happened since those early hours. The five powers have established a basis of unity and engaged the ICRC as negotiator in Amman. Since the Bern group was organized, approximately 375 passengers have been released, thanks to the ICRC negotiators; unity of the four powers has been maintained and no concessions have been made to the Palestinians. On the other side, there has been a split among the fedayeen which created confusion on the ground over movement of passengers not to mention all kinds of alleged proposals. Clearly there was no one in charge on the fedayeen side.

7. In the past two days the passengers were first moved to Amman and then moved out of Jordan. Approximately 50 remain. All of this has resulted from our successful policy and has cost no concessions. Presently Al-Fatah has said no one would be harmed. The Secretary found it difficult to understand why we should be forced to make quick decisions today.

8. We do not know who has the hostages or who can speak about their release. We do not know what demands those people will make. The Secretary feels there is no new development which creates the urgency reflected in the British position.

9. With regard to the Israelis, the Secretary stated that it would be useless to ask them to accept in principle the need to release prisoners. We know they are prepared to release two Algerians under certain

circumstances and in the past have released other prisoners but it is not reasonable to expect them to make a promise in principle to release prisoners when we have no facts and no valid interlocutor on the Palestinian side.

10. Finally, the Secretary expressed his failure to understand why the ICRC which had been so successful thus far in negotiations wished to withdraw. The Secretary indicated that the ICRC had done a tremendous job and still had a serious humanitarian obligation to the innocent passengers who remained.

Rogers

239. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 14, 1970, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Hijacking Situation Report

There appears to have been little change in the situation since my memorandum to you yesterday morning.² We are still in a period of uncertainty following the destruction of the aircraft, the withdrawal of the Red Cross from a mediating role and the apparent continuing confusion within the ranks of the fedayeen.

The Negotiations

The Bern Group met late last night with the Red Cross representatives who had just returned from Amman.³ Red Cross Vice President Freymond made the following major points to the group:

—His departure from Amman was a tactical maneuver intentionally designed as a “shock tactic” to demonstrate to all concerned that the Red Cross would not accept the PFLP approach.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Secret. The time is handwritten at the top of the first page.

² Document 235.

³ As reported in telegram 2248 from Bern, September 14, 0620Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PS 7–6 JORDAN)

—The Red Cross would continue an active role in the situation. First, and on an urgent basis, it considered its task was to identify and trace the remaining hostages. The second major task is to clarify the conditions which the PFLP is demanding for the release of the hostages. In doing this, the Red Cross will use all pressure possible on the Jordanian Government as well as work with the PFLP and other fedayeen leaders. It will also work with the Palestinian Red Crescent organization.

—None of the demands—even those stated most explicitly—received from the fedayeen so far can be considered binding or basic for negotiations.

—The Red Cross will continue to transfer information between both sides and see what steps the governments would wish to take next. How it carries out this role, however, would depend upon its appreciation of the situation. For now at least, neither Freymond or Rochat will be returning to Amman and the mission of the Red Cross representative remaining in Amman consists solely of protecting the hostages and visiting them.

Our representative to the Bern Group comments that, although the Red Cross role is diminished, it is probably adequate for the job. Perhaps more importantly, Freymond's exposé has probably bought another 48 hours solidarity in the positions of the western powers.

The Israelis are still maintaining their hard line toward negotiating with the fedayeen. Last night Israeli Transportation Minister Peres went so far as to publicly state that if the remaining hostages are not released the use of force, in "the limited and more precise sense of the word," could not be excluded. On Sunday the Israelis rounded up some 450 Arabs within their borders suspected of having connections with the PFLP. According to press reports, the Israeli strategy is to increase the pressure on the PFLP to release the remaining hostages.

The Passengers

We have little further information on the remaining hostages. All of the some 55 hostages (38 now believed to be Americans) are still believed to be in Amman. There are reports that several more hostages will be released today.

The Situation in Jordan

There have been no reports of fighting inside Jordan this morning. Yesterday, however, there reportedly was a major clash between the fedayeen and security forces in the northern part of the country.

240. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 14, 1970, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Mid-Afternoon Report on the Hijacking Situation

There have been no major developments concerning the hijacked airline passengers held hostage by the fedayeen since my memorandum to you this morning.² We are still in a position of trying to consolidate an exact list of the hostages and a precise picture of fedayeen demands.

The Hostages

It now appears that the hostages—the number is now thought to be 55—are being held in several houses in Amman, although we have been unable so far to find out exactly where. They are apparently under the sole control of the PFLP.

The Negotiations

Negotiations for the release of the hostages are in a state of temporary suspension, although the Red Cross this afternoon seems to be easing back into a more active negotiating role. The main task, as the Red Cross sees it, is to establish the basis for a negotiation—principally, to find out exactly what the fedayeen want from Israel. For this purpose, the Red Cross is again picking up its contacts with the fedayeen leaders. The fedayeen, for their part, seem confused and disorganized at this stage and appear not to be absolutely sure and united on what they specifically want for the hostages. The Red Cross representative in Amman doubts that the PFLP yet knows which or how many fedayeen under arrest in Israel it wants released.

Meanwhile, there are continuing indications that the united front approach by the Western powers could soon break down. Our embassy in Bonn has evidence that both the Germans and the British may be moving toward a smaller European package settlement that would presumably exclude American and Israeli nationals among the hostages. However, for the moment the formal positions of both governments are holding.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 331, Subject Files, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for information. The time is handwritten at the top of the first page.

² Document 239.

The Israelis continue to hold the line on their "no deal" approach. There are even reports in the press, though not confirmed by our embassy, that three emissaries were sent by Israel to the PFLP over the weekend with threats against the lives of the 450 Arabs arrested over the weekend in Gaza and the West Bank. Our embassy in Amman reports that the stories about the Arab arrests in Israel may be further hardening the PFLP demands.

The Pope has sent a high Vatican official to Amman. He has reportedly had contacts with the PFLP, but the specific results of these talks are not yet available.

Situation in Amman

Our Defense Attaché in Amman reports that on the surface the city was beginning to return to normal this morning. The traffic flow, for instance, was at the normal level and almost all shops were open. Most of the fedayeen were also off the streets and some of their road blocks had been dismantled.

There are other indications, however, that the present lull in the fighting may only be temporary. Most fedayeen strongpoints in Amman have been reinforced and some army units are also digging in. The Defense Attaché reports that it appears to him that the army commander has partially lost control of some army units which are operating on their own initiative in fighting the fedayeen.

241. Paper Prepared by the NEA Working Group in the Department of State Operations Center¹

No. 19

Washington, September 15, 1970.

Situation Report as of 0700 hours EDT, September 15, 1970

Bern Talks. The UK representative has called for a meeting of the five power group in Bern at 11 A.M. local time (0600 EDT). We have informed the U.S. representative that we have no objection to passing substance of Jaquinet's views regarding the imminent publication by

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Secret. Received in the White House Situation Room at 8:45 a.m.

the PFLP of its demands regarding Fedayeen prisoners in Israeli hands. At the same time, we told our representative that if the consensus of the Bern Group is that the ICRC should approach the PFLP to keep the list confidential, we would have no objections.

The UK representatives informs us that he has instructions to insist that noon communiqué name Boisard as the principal ICRC representative. If ICRC will not accede to this, the British are prepared to consider withdrawing from the ICRC group.

We understand that the Swiss and German representatives are opposed to the British proposal and the Israelis are noncommittal, but probably favor continuing support for ICRC. We have instructed the U.S. representative to oppose the British proposal at this point and to continue to support Jacquinet's present role. If, however, a deadlock results from the British proposal we plan to attempt a compromise with the British position with a view to maintaining British participation in the ICRC effort.

Dual Nationality of the American Hostages. Bar-On, the special assistant to the Director General of the Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry, has informed us that Israeli records show that only two passengers now held as hostages (the Harari-Rafouls) have dual U.S.–Israeli nationality.

Uneasy Jordan Fedayeen Truce Continues to Hold. The fragile truce between Jordanian and Fedayeen forces has for the most part continued to hold throughout the night. There have been some unconfirmed press reports of attacks by Jordanian forces on guerilla units in northern Jordan.

Hostages Visited by ICRC. Mr. Vincent of TWA in New York has informed us that the recently-released TWA steward Rudolph Swinkel confirmed that the remaining 54 hostages are being held as a group in a private house near or in Amman. Swinkel stated that ICRC representatives visited captives on Monday, September 14th. The captives, Swinkel continued, are being well taken care of and are in good health.

242. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 15, 1970, 9 a.m.

SUBJECT

Hijacking Situation—Tuesday Morning

The principal development overnight is the Red Cross decision—against a background of growing British and German restiveness with the present situation—to return a senior representative to Amman. As head of the Red Cross permanent delegation in Cairo, he (Boisard) has successfully managed the Suez prisoner exchanges. (These covered the release of the hijacked Israeli TWA passengers last November.)

This decision was made known during a long—and, according to the U.S. representative, “depressing”—meeting of the Bern Group last night.² Both the British and German representatives pressed persistently for some sign of movement to placate public pressures for some sign of movement:

—The Britisher said the UK would feel obliged to move independently unless there is an announcement of Red Cross negotiations.

—The German pressed the Israeli to declare Israel's willingness to participate in a prisoner exchange.

The Red Cross insists on no announcement of Boisard's appointment until he is on his way to Amman, probably tomorrow. The Red Cross feels such an announcement would undercut the contacts of the team still in Amman. The Bern Group was called into session again this morning at UK request. London has sent “tough instructions” to insist on a Red Cross announcement this evening at the latest; if the Red Cross refuses, the British are prepared to end the Red Cross role.

There have been two statements by the PFLP overnight: (1) A spokesman said the front has closed the door to all mediation; their stand is simply the release of fedayeen detained by the states concerned. (2) At a press conference, commandos warned that any attempt to free hostages by force would endanger their lives. They demanded a prompt exchange; “we will not wait forever.”

There has been no serious fighting in Amman, though Jordanian forces and fedayeen have clashed in northern Jordan.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 331, Subject Files, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for information. The time is handwritten at the top of the first page. Another notation indicates the President saw the memorandum.

² As reported in telegram 2266 from Bern, September 15, 0040Z. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PS 7-6 JORDAN)

243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Switzerland and Jordan¹

Washington, September 15, 1970, 1710Z.

150859. 1. According to press reports, PFLP held news conference in Amman on September 15 during which unidentified spokesman listed set of PFLP demands which are to be met by “individual instead of concerted action by the governments concerned.” Excluded are names of prisoners being held by Israel being demanded by PFLP. Instead PFLP announcement continues to insist no such list can be released until Israel agrees to exchange “in principle.”

2. *For Amman*: Request you indicate whether in your judgment data in PFLP announcement represents “list” PFLP was expected to pose to ICRC (Amman 4744)² and, if not, whether ICRC still expects to receive this list in view of PFLP announcement. Further progress in negotiating process hinges on receipt these names.

3. *For Bern*: In view latest PFLP announcement, you should again express our hope in strong terms that British, Swiss and Germans do not permit themselves to be drawn into any individual negotiations with PFLP but rather will continue to channel all their efforts through ICRC. You should also stress to Bern group importance our obtaining promptly as possible PFLP list of prisoners in Israel they want released and urge that group get ICRC to press hard on this. We assume that Israelis will continue to refuse to agree to commit themselves in advance to release “in principle” and, therefore, every effort should be made by ICRC to induce PFLP to come forth with specific list of names. For Israelis to do so would be buying “pig in poke.” Therefore, what ICRC needs to focus on is obtaining definitive list.

Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12. Secret; Flash. Drafted by Seelye and Scotese; cleared by Beaudry (EUR); and approved by Sisco. It was repeated Immediate to Bonn, London, Tel Aviv, and Geneva, and also repeated to USUN.

² Telegram 4744 from Amman, September 14, 1720Z. (Ibid.)

244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland¹

Washington, September 15, 1970, 1757Z.

150884. Subj: ICRC Personnel Shifts. Ref: Geneva 3165.²

1. While we in no way wish to second guess ICRC handling of negotiations, we note with some concern the several key ICRC personnel shifts over past few days. It appears to us one important tenet of effective negotiations and certainly of negotiations with Arabs is early establishment and maintenance of mutual confidence between negotiating participants. This confidence can only be built up over time and maintained through continuity. At time we did not consider recall of Rochat as good move but deferred to ICRC. Now we observe that Freymond replacement is Boissard, who apparently does not intend arrive in Amman for several days. We believe these constant changes do not help establish necessary confidence between ICRC and PFLP.

2. We would wish observation re personnel changes be made known to ICRC. At same time you should urge in the next Bern group meeting that Boissard leave for Amman as soon as possible and that Jacquinet overlap as long as possible before departing.

Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PS 7-6 JORDAN. Confidential; Flash. Drafted by Scotes; cleared by Seelye and Beaudry (EUR); and approved by Sisco. It was repeated Immediate to Amman, Beirut, Bonn, London, Tel Aviv, and Geneva.

² Telegram 3165 from Geneva has not been found.

245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, September 15, 1970, 1801Z.

150885. Subject: British Position in Bern Group. Ref: State 150740.²

1. Asst. Secretary Sisco called Ambassador Freeman to make points contained reftel. He observed that HMG seems more nervous than any other government in this matter and expressed hope that Ambassador Freeman might be able to pass our message to London.

2. Sisco reviewed our understanding of HMG instructions to its delegate in Bern re insistence on immediate announcement of Boissard appointment. Inter alia, he described current activities in Amman of Jacqinet and Hocke and conveyed our view that ICRC momentum in Amman continues. Accordingly, we do not think the timing on announcement so urgent as to be required immediately, particularly since ICRC prefers delay announcement a little longer and also in view of consideration that we do not wish to seem to be undercutting Jacqinet's position. Sisco stressed that we have no objection to appointment of Boissard and believe that he is a good man, but we feel that we should defer to ICRC's judgment on timing of announcement and give ICRC maximum flexibility.

3. Sisco also noted that the Bern Group has put out announcement that ICRC still talking in Amman and he thought this would be helpful. Sisco again stressed importance our being guided by ICRC judgments and asked whether HMG impatience stemmed from distraught British public opinion. Ambassador Freeman said that he did not think that public pressures in England were that great and that British public opinion was divided.

4. Sisco reviewed the latest PFLP announcement of its demands and noted PFLP demand that Israel agree in principle to exchange of hostages before providing detailed list. Sisco said that Israelis unlikely accept principle, and that first step must be for ICRC to get entire list. In short, we have to know total PFLP demands, rather than face a sit-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Seelye; cleared by Beaudry; and approved by Sisco. It was repeated Immediate to Beirut, Tel Aviv, Bonn, Geneva, Bern, and Amman.

² In telegram 150740 to Bern and London, September 15, 1124Z, the Department instructed the Embassies to join the Swiss and Germans in opposing British insistence on issuing a communiqué regarding Boissard's appointment. Department officials expressed puzzlement over the British desire to release a communiqué supporting appointment of Boissard since it would undercut the ICRC's role. (Ibid.)

uation where we are asked to buy "pig in poke". Sisco said we did not preclude going to GOI once we know all demands and have full list. Then group of four can as a group ask GOI what its reaction to concrete PFLP proposal, once received.

5. Ambassador Freeman fully understood USG position as well as our assessment re what we should focus on from here on out. He said he was well aware of the situation and "would do his best."

6. *For Bern*: You should work to get agreement that ICRC next job is to get full list of fedayeen wanted by PFLP.

Rogers

246. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 15, 1970.

SUBJECT

Evening Report on the Hijacking Situation

There have been two major developments today: (1) King Hussein has decided to move tonight to an all or nothing showdown with the fedayeen and (2) the PFLP has presented another list of unacceptable demands for the release of the remaining hostages.

The Situation in Jordan:

King Hussein had advised our embassy he is moving tonight to an all or nothing showdown with the fedayeen in order to "establish law and order."² Having waited three days, he is determined now to compel fedayeen to implement the cease-fire agreement and remove their forces from Amman. During the early hours of tomorrow morning he will establish a military government. This will be announced at 7 a.m. in Amman (1 a.m. EDT). Army units will be pre-positioned around the city but Hussein will not force the issue unless the fedayeen do. The army will only enter the city against the fedayeen if necessary. The

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 331, Subject Files, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for information.

² As reported in telegram 4808 from Amman, September 15, 2040Z. (Ibid., Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V)

military government will take over communications and if necessary declare a curfew.

King Hussein urgently requested that the U.S. take steps to assure that the Israelis do nothing to prejudice or aggravate the situation. He also stressed that, depending on fedayeen reactions, he may need to call for U.S. and Israeli assistance.

If King Hussein carries through with his plans tonight the 54 hostages in the hands of the PFLP will be in grave danger. At our urging, Hussein has agreed to include in his announcement tomorrow morning a warning of most serious consequences should the fedayeen harm the hostages, but this may not be enough to stop them if they are desperate.

I am convening an emergency WSAG meeting to consider this situation.³

The Negotiations

The PFLP issued a press statement today giving its conditions for the release of the hostages. The statement began with the declaration that the PFLP “is itself” holding the hostages and considers itself “responsible” for them. The PFLP warns that any “stupid attempt by any party to try to retake these hostages would expose their lives to great danger.” The statement then lists the following demands:

—The PFLP will release the Swiss, Germans and British hostages in exchange for the six fedayeen in their hands plus Leila Khaled and the body of her companion.

—Announcement by the Israelis of the “acceptance of the principle of the return” of the two Algerian officials recently arrested at Lod Airport, of a Swiss youth arrested for belonging to the PFLP, of ten Lebanese soldiers and “likewise of the exchange of prisoners with the Palestine resistance.” Only then will the PFLP provide the names of the prisoners which “Israel must release” in exchange for the release of the “detained Israelis and those holding dual Israeli-American citizenship.” (No specific mention made of single passport American hostages.)

The PFLP statement concludes with a charge that the Red Cross is playing a “biased role” and “shirking its duty as a disinterested party.” The PFLP therefore considers that “direct responsibility” falls on the states concerned and that it is incumbent on them to announce their agreement to the PFLP’s demands.

³ A WSAG meeting took place on September 15 from approximately 10:30 to 11:30 p.m. No substantive record of the meeting has been found. The time of the meeting is drawn from a 1973 summary of events and meetings related to the Jordan crisis (see footnote 2, Document 209).

Our embassy in Amman opines that the PFLP statement seems designed to split the already strained unity of the Bern Group.⁴ The discriminatory terms presented to the members of the Bern Group, the call for bilateral talks and the denunciation of the Red Cross effort all seem designed to tempt the other Bern Powers to break ranks. Moreover, it now looks as if the PFLP is prepared to withhold the list of Israelis it wants—the crucial point in getting the Israelis to accept any package deal—and to dangle the temptations of its offers before the other four powers involved.

Our representative to the Bern Group has been instructed to express in strong terms our hope that the British, Swiss and Germans do not permit themselves to be drawn into any individual negotiations with the PFLP and will continue to channel all their efforts through the Red Cross. He is also to stress the importance of obtaining from the PFLP a list of the prisoners in Israel they want and urge the Red Cross to press hard on this.

⁴ Telegram 4806 from Amman, September 15, 1845Z. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 331, Subject Files, Hijackings) Ambassador L. Dean Brown arrived at the Embassy in Amman on September 15 after having been sworn in on September 9. (Ibid., Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V) He replaced Ambassador Harrison M. Symmes, who left post on May 7. Due to the crisis, Brown did not formally present his credentials to King Hussein until September 29. (Telegram 5421 from Amman, September 29, 1800Z; *ibid.*)

247. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 16, 1970.

SUBJECT

Options in Jordan

As you continue to think about the decisions we may face in Jordan, you may wish to consider some of the broader issues raised.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V. Top Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

The Broader Situation and U.S. Interests

Two issues are now being contested in Jordan: (1) Who is to control the Palestinian movement? (2) What balance of political forces is to control Jordan?

The two are related. Whereas the less ideological groups focus on Israel and could make common cause with the government, the radicals are at least as dedicated to the overthrow of traditional regimes as to the destruction of the Zionist state. Although it is difficult to know exactly what the balance within the collection of fedayeen movements is, it seems relatively clear that the most active challenge to Hussein's regime comes from the radical fringe—the elements, for instance, responsible for the hijacking.

The outcome will determine whether there is a stable base for peace negotiations. The future political nature of Jordan will determine whether a Palestine settlement is possible or continuing war is inevitable. There seem to be several ways in which Jordan's political base could evolve:

—Hussein and the army could suppress the fedayeen and bring the non-fedayeen Palestinians into a settlement. This would ideally provide the most solid base, but it is doubtful whether there will be an outcome this decisive.

—Elements of the army, the King and the less militant Palestinians could make common cause. This would make for a less orderly negotiation but might make for a more enforceable peace if there is one.

—Some combination of fedayeen elements could demonstrate the King's impotence and force on him a weak civilian government that would do its bidding. Negotiations would be out of the question.

It is the last outcome which seems most immediately at stake in the current crisis. Either of the first two could conceivably produce stability. The consequences of the third could include the following:

—Prospects for a Palestine settlement soon on terms Israel could consider would drop to almost zero. Attacks across Israel's eastern border would increase.

—Chances that Israel would at some point feel compelled to seize more territory in Jordan would increase sharply.

—Nasser's ability to negotiate a settlement with Israel and Soviet ability to support a negotiated settlement would be diminished sharply.

—There would be one more radical state in the Middle East where the U.S. is barred. A radical fedayeen base there would strengthen the movement against Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Persian Gulf states.

In short, while it is not clear how the main political elements in Jordan will sort themselves out, it does not seem in the U.S. interest that a fedayeen movement urged on by radicals be permitted to im-

pose its will on the government. It could not produce the stability that is necessary for peace.

The Three Principal Contingencies

A situation now exists in Jordan which may cause King Hussein to seek U.S. or other assistance in an all-out showdown with the fedayeen. These seem to be the main contingencies that will be faced:

1. *The King and army vs. the fedayeen alone.* It seems generally agreed in the intelligence community and in the U.S. Embassy in Amman that the Jordanian army can manage the situation as long as only the fedayeen—and not outside troops—are ranged against the regime. It is possible in this situation that Jordanian forces might need some materiel support. It has been our assumption that there would be no strong argument against supplying any reasonable support. Such assistance could be airlifted both as a demonstration and for prompt delivery.

The main issue to be considered in connection with this contingency is: *If the regime unexpectedly turns out to be too weak to win this battle with its own forces, should there be intervention to support it?*

A key judgment to be made is how much difference outside intervention might make in such a situation.

The principal *arguments for* such intervention are: It would prevent—at least as long as U.S. troops are present—dominance by a group that would offer almost no hope of a Palestine settlement. It might still be possible that stability could be rescued with the help of the army. It is also important for the U.S. to demonstrate its support for responsible regimes. In short, a risky intervention would be preferable to the certainty of radical control over the situation.

The argument against such intervention is that if Hussein is too weak to stand up against domestic opposition, outside intervention can only save his regime for a limited period of time. Attempting to bolster it in the absence of sufficient internal strength could put whoever intervenes into a position of supporting a minority cause against effective majority guerrilla opposition in a country without access to the Mediterranean where the U.S. would have a difficult time supporting sustained military operations. Intervention could cause a fedayeen reaction against U.S. installations elsewhere in the Mid-East.

In any case, there may not be much of a real choice since if the King appears about to fall, the Israelis may very well intervene on their own or at least seize the heights from which the fedayeen have been shelling Israeli settlements.

2. *The second contingency: King Hussein and the army vs. the fedayeen and Iraqi troops.* Even if one judged that Hussein should not be supported if he cannot control the fedayeen alone, one might judge intervention quite justified if the 17,000 Iraqi troops in Jordan stepped

in. Before considering the question of armed intervention, it would be prudent to look at the *possibilities for non-military action* that might precede armed intervention or perhaps even make it unnecessary. A request from Hussein for Soviet restraint on Iraq might help. Intelligence indicates that Nasser is prepared to give diplomatic and possibly military support in the event of Iraqi intervention. The Shah might mount a show of force on Iraq's border. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait might threaten to cut off financial support for the fedayeen. Finally, the greatest political assist to Hussein might well be the capacity to demonstrate hope for progress in peace negotiations.

If political actions fail, then a judgment must be made *whether armed intervention seems in the U.S. interest*.

The *argument for* is that—in addition to the basic objective of trying to save a regime that offers some hope of the stability necessary for peace—the U.S. would be supporting a responsible government against a threat from foreign forces. Such a stand is a necessary part of the U.S. posture. It would be possible to justify this as an in-and-out operation.

The main *arguments against* are the operational difficulty of sustaining such an operation and the possibility of a general Arab reaction. This operation would have to be sustained entirely by air (unless we used an overland route across Israel). It would require dipping into the reserve of strategic forces in the U.S.—leaving us little for other contingencies. Sustaining such an operation by air would be extremely difficult without a staging base in the eastern Mediterranean, and there is good reason to doubt their availability under these circumstances.

If political actions fail and if armed intervention of some sort in support of Hussein seems desirable, then there are two related questions:

a. *Would air attacks against Iraqi forces be sufficient?*

Pro. Iraqi forces are 60 miles northeast of Amman and, to be militarily effective would have to travel on an open road and would be vulnerable to air attacks which could presumably prevent their arrival in Amman. Also, air strikes are not likely to produce the same reactions either by other Arabs or by the Soviets as a major ground action would. Even Israeli air strikes would avoid the connotation of invasion and takeover.

Con. Air strikes are not operationally useful against the fedayeen. They are dispersed among the population and their concentrations and the fighting around them will be in such small areas as to make air targeting very difficult. If intervention had to reach beyond the Iraqis, air strikes would probably be inadequate.

b. *Should the U.S. or Israel intervene?* The minimal operational form which this question might take is: If the Israelis seem about to move,

should the U.S. make a special effort to head them off by moving first? Or should they be encouraged?

In answering this question, a distinction must be made between the ground and air attacks. Air attacks are likely to provoke less reaction because they do not have the connotation of invasion.

The *arguments for U.S.* as contrasted to Israeli, intervention are: While Israeli air attacks could probably be brought off with a minimum of sustained Arab reaction, Israeli ground action in Jordan would be taken as an invasion of Jordan and would tend to reunify the Arabs. The U.S. would be held responsible anyway. An Israeli ground action would almost inescapably be seen as a concerted U.S.-Israeli effort to put Israel in control of Jordan. It might even serve to unify forces in Jordan so that army and fedayeen alike would feel that they had to turn together against Israeli troops. A Hussein who had been saved by an Israeli invasion would probably not last long in Jordan.

The *arguments for Israeli intervention* are: It may be difficult to stop. Some believe the King already has clandestinely reached a tacit understanding with the Israelis that if the Iraqis intervene Israel will attack. If the U.S. were to intervene, the USSR would almost have to react in some way, even if not definitively. The USSR has no incentive to defend Jordan against Israeli attack. The Israelis have a great logistical advantage over the U.S. If we intervened and then had to bring supplies across Israel, we could have the worst of two worlds. Introduction of U.S. forces would put the U.S. in the middle of an intra-Arab war and we would still be viewed as collaborating with Israel.

If Israel intervened in Jordan, the U.S. would have to consider two kinds of support:

—It would be necessary to assure that Israel has the munitions and other supplies required to sustain the attack. It is the judgment of the group that Israel's war reserves would be sufficient to carry their operations through a prolonged operation. U.S. resupply could be provided within ample time.

—The more serious contingency would come about if the Soviets or Egyptians decided to take advantage of the situation by heating up the Suez front. The judgment was that their capability would be limited to re-opening artillery attacks, small harassing raids across the Canal and some air attacks. Support for Israel in this contingency would be developed from the same kinds of packages that have been worked out in the event the ceasefire breaks down.

3. *The third contingency: armed intervention for evacuation.*

If there is complete chaos in Amman and Jordanian forces lose control, it is probable that armed intervention could not with assurance save either the American community or the hijacking hostages.

If, however, the army remains in control of parts of the city and Americans can collect there, armed intervention could save them. Even in this situation, it seems unlikely that the hijacking hostages could be saved.

There is one other important aspect of this option: It is possible that an intervention primarily for evacuation could temporarily bolster Hussein's regime. It could, if well timed, amount to a U.S. show of force without the political onus of sustained intervention. It seems most likely that if intervention comes it would come this way.

248. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 16, 1970.

SUBJECT

Jordan/Hijacking Situation

Jordan

King Hussein appointed a new military government early this morning as planned. The fedayeen have not reacted yet. Amman is still quiet this morning.

Hussein charged the Prime Minister in the new military cabinet—Brigadier General Muhammad Daud—to insure security, restore order and impose the state's authority and protection. He called for the co-operation of all.

The central committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization is meeting in emergency session to decide its next step. Arafat is reported to have ordered the immediate unification of all Palestinian forces. He also reportedly sent a message to all Arab heads of state appealing to them to intervene immediately to end the bloodshed in Jordan. As a result of yesterday's fighting in two cities north of Amman and reports of impending action against them, fedayeen units throughout Jordan are on full combat alert.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 331, Subject Files, Hijackings. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

Hijacking

The German representative under urgent instructions convoked a midnight meeting of the Bern Group to ask that the Red Cross team in Amman be strengthened and that a "new, clear mandate" be drawn up by mid-day today with the participation of all governments concerned. If this was not done, the Germans would seek release of their hostages bilaterally.

The first German requirement was met by Red Cross announcement that two senior officers were being sent to Amman. The second was a clear effort to press the Israelis to make a further contribution to the bargaining.

One way Israel might engage now is to pick up yesterday's PFLP demands and expand an earlier offer to release two Algerians to include a few other specific individuals they hold. State's thinking is moving in this direction.

249. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's Chief of Staff (Haldeman)¹

Washington, September 16, 1970.

It is imperative that the President understand the circumstances under which last night's WSAG on the Middle East was convened:

—At approximately 9 PM, General Haig received a hot line call from 10 Downing Street initiated by the Prime Minister's Assistant, Mr. Greenhill.

—In behalf of the Prime Minister, Mr. Greenhill insisted on knowing U.S. intentions with respect to Jordan, stating that the Prime Minister was very concerned about King Hussein's decision to force a showdown with the Fedayeen.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Jordan 9/15/70. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. A handwritten notation on the top of the memorandum indicates the date of the memorandum to be September 14; however, it presumably was written on September 16 after the WSAG meeting from 10:30 to 11:30 p.m. on September 15. See footnote 3, Document 246.

—As General Haig told you last night on the phone, Mr. Greenhill indicated that the Prime Minister wished to discuss the situation personally with the President.

—Because of these circumstances, I judged it imperative to have all feasible courses of action prepared for the President's consideration in the event the call came through.

—As you know, Dave Packard, Admiral Moorer, Joe Sisco and I were at Airlie House when the situation developed and this group decided to return to the White House to prepare answers to specific questions posed by the Prime Minister and to make the necessary preparations for a possible head-to-head discussion between the President and the Prime Minister.

—The memorandum which I sent the President this morning was prepared jointly by Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard, Chairman of the JCS Moorer, Assistant Secretary of State Sisco and his assistant, Mr. Seelye.

I believe it is most important that you make the foregoing circumstances crystal clear to the President at the earliest possible moment so that he understands the context in which last night's meeting was convened and also understands the fact that the contents of the memorandum represent the view of the group.

250. Memorandum From Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 16, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Situation in Jordan

The situation in Jordan is still very uncertain. Amman was calm during the day but King Hussein may soon move against the fedayeen with full force and request our help. The negotiations for the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the first page of the memorandum.

release of the remaining hostages are still stalled but the hostages are safe.

Security Situation in Jordan

Amman was calm but tense during the day. The fedayeen made no apparent attempt to comply with the cease-fire agreement and talked big but they seemed eager not to directly provoke the army. There was even some speculation that they may be prepared to sit it out for now, or at least until such time as the army begins to physically enforce the agreement. By evening, however, there were press reports of fighting in Amman.

Today's situation may only be the calm before the storm. The embassy has learned that the Jordanian Cabinet is meeting tonight and that King Hussein is inclined to move vigorously against the fedayeen either at daybreak or twenty-four hours later.² The King's concern centers on possible intervention by Syria and the more remote possibility of intervention by the Iraqi forces. In this regard, the Jordanians are considering their contingency plans and wonder about possible air support from either the U.S. or the Israelis if their Arab neighbors intervene. Ambassador Brown does not consider this to be a formal request for U.S. military involvement at this time and will be meeting with King Hussein tomorrow morning. Such a formal request could, however, come out of his meeting with King Hussein.

The Hostages

The embassy in Amman believes that the danger to the hostages has not been appreciably increased by the present political crisis, but will be if an armed showdown between the army and the fedayeen occurs and widespread fighting breaks out. The embassy further believes that the hostages may be more valuable to the PFLP as an insurance policy against the government threat than as a bargaining counter for a prisoner exchange and that therefore the PFLP may have an incentive to assure their safety.³ On the other hand, the PFLP may not be able to ensure the safety of the hostages even if it wishes to do so if heavy fighting breaks out.

One of the remaining Red Cross representatives reports that he has good information that the hostages are safe. Some, however, may have been taken out of Amman. The Red Cross is still trying to get visitation rights as a first step toward a protective role.

² As reported in telegram 4844 from Amman, September 16, 2205Z. (Ibid.)

³ As reported in telegram 4822 from Amman, September 16, 1115Z. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12)

The Negotiations

The Bern Group met again this afternoon for another difficult session.⁴ The British took the lead in pressing the Israelis by insisting that the group agree to a mandate which included a contribution by the Israelis going beyond the release of the two Algerian officials they are holding. The British representative went so far as to threaten that if no such agreement were reached the UK would be taking a ministerial decision and “we all know what that means.” The Germans then joined the British in demanding an immediate response from the Israelis. Finally, our representative was able to save the situation securing agreement to consider a formula whereby the five powers would say they agree to consider the PFLP proposals at such time as the PFLP provides its total demands, including a specific list of the fedayeen it wants.

Once again we have bought some time within the Bern Group. If the Israelis buy our latest formula it may calm down the British some, although there are continuing indications from London that they are still very close to breaking away from the united front. The German attitude is even more problematical. At this point, it may be that only an unequivocal Israeli acceptance of the formula will hold the group together. The Israeli Ambassador has become increasingly engaged in the Bern discussions and it has seemed increasingly clear from the last several sessions that the element of solidarity has become a thing of value to Israel.

⁴ As reported in telegram 2319 from Bern, September 16, 2319Z. (Ibid., POL 23–9 JORDAN)

251. Airgram From the Consulate General in Jerusalem to the Department of State¹

A-129

Jerusalem, September 16, 1970.

SUBJECT

Israeli Detention on the West Bank

REF

Jerusalem's 423, 429, 431 and Amman's 4711²

Summary

Virtually all Arab contacts of the Consulate General believe that the Israeli detention of some 350 West Bank Arabs and 100 from Gaza over the weekend of September 11-14 was closely linked to the PFLP airplane hijackings and to their continued holding of upwards of 50 hostages believed to be largely Israeli citizens. Many apparently believe that the Israeli Government intends to use the detainees as bargaining counters in a more or less direct swap for the PFLP prisoners. None believe that the arrests had anything to do with a specific or even general security threat to Israel.

As of this writing the official Israeli explanation is that the arrests were for security reasons and that they were in no way connected with the PFLP hijack prisoners.

The Consulate General believes Israeli motives were probably mixed and somewhat more complicated than either explanation offered above. We think that a blend of domestic political considerations, and a desire to demonstrate to terrorists, particularly the PFLP that Israel can play it tough, too, were probably the central motives for the arrests.

With the notable exception of East Jerusalem itself, the Israeli arrests last weekend affected Arabs in most West Bank towns and many villages from Qalquiylia in the Northwest through Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron in the South-center. Although we have been able to obtain only a few specific names of detainees, a wide sampling of information among our Arab contacts has made the pattern of the arrests clear enough to hint at the motives behind them. We have first

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Drafted by John T. Wheelock (POL); cleared in ECON and POL; and approved in draft by Consul General Stephen J. Campbell. It was repeated to Amman, Beirut, and Tel Aviv.

² These telegrams are Consulate reports of arrests of Palestinians. Telegram 423 from Jerusalem, September 12; telegram 429 from Jerusalem, September 14; and telegram 431 from Jerusalem, September 15 are *ibid.* Telegram 4711 from Amman, September 14, is *ibid.*, AV 12.

hand or reliable second hand descriptions of four specific series of arrests in different communities, including two in suburbs of Ramallah, one in Bethlehem and one in the village of Battir near Hebron. In each case the pattern is similar. Two or more members of the same family or closely related families were arrested. The arrestees were fairly well-known and fairly prominent citizens; the brother of a secondary school principal, the politically active wife of an UNRWA official, a middle class merchant. Apparently young women were frequently included. The *Jerusalem Post* quoted security circles on September 14 as stating that 80 women were included in the total of 450 prisoners.

In every case described to Consulate General officers in detail, the people actually held were described by our Arab informants as respectable, above suspicion of personal involvement in terrorist activities. In every case, however, there was a son or reasonably close relative who is at present in prison or who had in the past been detained in connection with or suspicion of terrorist activities. Not all of these cases were identified as PFLP involved, merely Fedayeen. We have heard that a number of people named Habbash have been detained, mostly from the Ramallah area.

The official line to date, enunciated by Foreign Minister Eban at a press conference earlier this week, given to Consul General Campbell by a senior government official, and attributed to security authorities by the press is that the detentions are for security reasons and are unconnected with the PFLP hostages in Jordan. Special security foot patrols have indeed been highly visible in Jerusalem, particularly at and near the various gates to the old walled city since last weekend.

There have been persistent press reports that Israel has sent Arab emissaries to PFLP in Amman in recent days to warn the PFLP of Israeli reprisals against relatives and others connected with them if the Israeli prisoners of the PFLP are not released. Kol Israel's English language broadcast on Monday evening September 14 carried an interview with a Dr. Zahi Kamhawi of Nablus in which he stated that he had been rebuffed by PFLP leaders when he went to Amman over last weekend to deliver a warning on behalf of Israeli authorities. His mission, he said, had been to warn that Israel would jail all known relatives in Israeli controlled territory of PFLP leaders, houses of known activists would be blown up, and the death penalty would be reinstated for captured terrorists. Kamhawi said that he had been dismissed by PFLP leaders after only a few minutes interview.

Press reports quoting Israeli Security sources indicate that as of September 16, about 125 of the original 450 detainees from the West Bank and Gaza had been released after questioning, leaving some 325 in custody.

Comment: It is widely believed, we think correctly, that these measures were initiated by General Dayan and the Defense Ministry.

Despite the official line and visibly stepped up security measures in Jerusalem, we do not believe that the majority of those who have been arrested can be under serious suspicion of terrorist activity or even of active collaboration with terrorist elements.

Neither do we believe, as some Arab contacts claim, that Israeli Security Forces are naive enough to be adding fringe elements to their already sizable bag of hard core terrorist detainees simply with a view to having more bodies available to exchange against PFLP held Israeli prisoners.

Rather we think that these arrests are designed to show terrorists in Jordan and elsewhere, particularly the PFLP, that Israel can be ruthless, too. Probably it is hoped that these detentions will make the PFLP more careful in its treatment of Israeli detainees, and that they may even help in bringing about the ultimate release of these prisoners. For domestic Israeli consumption it shows the public that its security forces are alert and able to take prompt and effective counter-measures against Arab hijackers and terrorists.

Campbell

252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, September 17, 1970, 0523Z.

152449. Ref: Amman 4845.²

1. We concur in your assessment that no real threat exists from Syria and, while Iraqi intervention seems more likely, our judgment

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 ARA-ISR. Secret; Flash. Drafted and approved by Seelye; and cleared by Sisco, Atherton, and Kissinger.

² In telegram 4845 from Amman, September 16, 2315Z, Brown suggested that Hussein was overly concerned about possible Syrian intervention as Brown estimated Syria had only approximately 600 troops in Jordan and a Syrian-directed Palestinian force. In paragraph 3, Brown reported that he suspected Hussein wanted "his hand held." Brown proposed telling Hussein that the United States wanted a strong, stable Jordan, and that it was a Jordanian decision on how to restore central authority. Brown suggested disabusing the King of the possibility of U.S. involvement in interdicting the Syrians or Iraqis. In paragraph 4, Brown hoped not to receive instructions to discourage Hussein from "taking stern measures against fedayeen." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V)

continues to be that active Iraqi military intervention against King questionable.

2. Obviously King wants and needs his hand held. What you propose telling him (para 3 reftel) is entirely appropriate. You should not rpt not altogether preclude the possibility of direct USG involvement in form of interdicting Syrians and Iraqis, and you can be encouraging about the prospects for material assistance. You may inform King that Jordan situation is subject of high-level USG attention.

3. Re para 4 reftel, you should not discourage King from taking stern measures against fedayeen. This is course of action for him and him alone to decide. As you note, one cannot help but feel at this juncture that unless he asserts his authority more effectively the chances of his regime surviving are worse than if he were to continue to cater to fedayeen.

4. We agree that you should urge King to enlist all possible support from other Arab states. We recall Nasser's reported offer of assistance to King, made during latter's last visit to Cairo, in event King faced with critical internal situation. We take Nasser's assurances of material help with grain of salt but seems to us King should at this juncture at least test Nasser's earlier undertaking. Saudis, Moroccans, Tunisians and Lebanese are unable to be of any tangible assistance to King in current situation and their moral support would be of marginal value. Soviets cannot be expected to play useful role although it is our guess Soviets probably would like to see King win out over fedayeen in any confrontation. Best we can look for in this respect is avoidance of Soviet involvement.

5. We wish you the best of luck in your first meeting with King and believe your talk with him will be useful at this juncture. King, as you know, tends to be moody and at times somewhat headstrong. In recent months he has demonstrated lack of determination and consistency. Your advice and counsel could be important at this point.

Rogers

253. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 17, 1970, 7:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Jordanian Situation Report

Current Situation

The Jordanian army with armored cars, tanks, and at least one company of infantry moved into Amman early this morning in what has been described by DAO personnel as a picture book pincer movement. Fighting is reported to be heavy within the city and there have been mortar attacks in the area of the American and British Embassies and the Intercontinental Hotel. Although the Embassy has been hit with several rounds, as of 0400 EDT all official personnel are accounted for and well. There have been no injuries reported to private American citizens in the Jordan Hotel or elsewhere. (The Ambassador and his staff have locked themselves in the code room and other safe areas of the Chancery.) The Ambassador talked to the Jordanian Prime Minister shortly after the fighting began and found the Prime Minister optimistic and more self-assured than when he talked with him yesterday. The Prime Minister added that the security situation is improving.

Military Situation

We have received recent reports that there is Israeli air activity over Jordan and along the UAR border. These flights have not become actively involved in the situation as of yet. There are also reports that a meeting of senior Iraqi officials will take place shortly to decide on a course of action for the Saladin units. (The Saladin is the Iraqi guerilla force equivalent to the Fedayeen.) Three days ago the Iraqis transferred motor units to Fateh and there is a concentration of Syrian troops reported at Derra (located on the Syrian side of the border, northeast of Irbid).

Americans in Jordan

The Jordan Task Force at State reports that there are approximately 50 official Americans in Amman. All official U.S. dependents have been

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/17/70 AM. Secret; Sensitive. The time is handwritten at the top of the first page. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

evacuated. However there are approximately 250–300 American citizens scattered throughout the country. These would include American nationals married to Jordanians, missionaries, etc. Thus far the Ambassador has been unsuccessful in his attempts to contact the ICRC representative.

All agencies have been instructed to keep us informed as soon as they develop any information in addition to formal Embassy reporting.

Third Country Reaction

Damascus Radio called on Jordanian troops to revolt and fight with the Fedayeen. The Jordanian Ambassador was reportedly called in by the Syrian Foreign Office and informed that the Syrians would not stand idly by while the Fedayeen was “massacred.” A similar warning was made last night by the international leadership of the ruling Baath party in Baghdad.

254. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 17, 1970, 7:32–8:50 a.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State—

U. Alexis Johnson

Joseph P. Sisco

Rodger Davies

Defense—

David M. Packard

G. Warren Nutter

Robert Pranger

JCS—

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

General John Vogt

General Melvin Zais

CIA—

Richard Helms

NSC Staff—

Harold Saunders

Gen. Alexander Haig

Col. Richard Kennedy

Adm. R.C. Robinson

Jeanne W. Davis

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed:

1. to wait to see how the situation develops and to take no special measures with the Egyptians or the Russians at the present time;
2. CIA will issue its Sit Reps every four hours;
3. to amend Ambassador Brown's instructions to permit him to tell Hussein that, now that action has started, we would be sympathetic to a request for materiel assistance;²
4. to instruct our Chargé to get an Israeli assessment of the situation but not to ask what they intend to do;³
5. to instruct Ambassador MacArthur to see the Shah and to say that the President has asked him to give the Shah our thinking on the situation and get the benefit of his;⁴
6. to get the results of the Israeli reconnaissance flights and feed the information to the carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean;
7. Defense will prepare a package on what materiel Hussein might ask for;
8. Defense will identify planes for air shipment of materiel to Jordan;
9. we would not approach the Turks for overflight or base rights *unless* Egypt takes a public position in support of Hussein;
10. to explore the possibility of using Saudi Arabian C-130s for an Arab airlift of US materiel assistance from Iran;
11. to remove 5 of the 7 C-130s from Incirlik and position them in Europe or wherever seems best, and to increase the number of C-130's in Europe, a few at a time;
12. Defense will provide the best arguments for the use of US air in Jordan, for inclusion in the package to the President;
13. if US air operations begin in Jordan, we should insist that the Israelis stop any bombing in the country;
14. we must make it clear that any US air activity in Jordan is directed against the Iraqis and Syrians, not the Fedayeen;
15. it is too early to brief the Congress;
16. we should not go to the UN at present;
17. State will coordinate the press handling.

² Transmitted in telegram 152501 to Amman, September 17, 1458Z. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V)

³ Transmitted in telegram 152502 to Tel Aviv, September 17, 1459Z. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 JORDAN)

⁴ See Document 259.

Mr. Helms: I have distributed a Sit Rep as of 6:00 a.m. with an addendum.⁵ To summarize, the Jordanian Army has moved into Amman. There is some question as to who triggered the action. They have started off well, but the situation is unclear and it is difficult to know what one can do at the present time. The situation is still at issue.

Dr. Kissinger: Is there fighting anywhere else?

Mr. Helms: No—only in Amman and in little towns on the fringes of Amman. There is some lack of clarity as to what the Iraqis are up to. [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Admiral Moorer: The Iraqi troops in the area are the worst they have. Can Iran help?

Mr. Davies: (using map) The Jordanian Army, with armor, is moving from three directions and is expanding its perimeter. They have secured a sizeable area of the city, including the major hotel section. The crunch will come when they secure the heights and begin moving into the heavily populated areas. These areas include a large refugee camp where the hostages might be.

Dr. Kissinger: Do we assume the Jordanians will continue to move?

Mr. Davies: Yes. We understand the Jordanian Government is willing to take heavy losses and will not be particularly concerned over the lives of Westerners. There is some fighting at Zarqa, which is 15 miles out, and at Salt. This involves the road to the airport. There are Iraqi troops in Zarqa and [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Jordanian tanks have entered some Iraqi-held areas. There are also some Iraqi troops in Irbid and Mafraq. Irbid is in the hands of the Palestinians. The King is at Hummar some 12 kilometers outside Amman.

Dr. Kissinger: If the King secures Amman, will this break the back of the Fedayeen for the time being?

Mr. Davies: If the leaders escape, Habbash will probably go to Iraq and Arafat to Syria. The Jordanian Army will have ringed the city, however, and their chances of escape are small.

Mr. Helms: They have the capability to keep going for some time in house-to-house fighting in those narrow streets. I have no idea how long, but it would not be over in a day.

Admiral Moorer: We would have to expect sporadic fighting for some time; this is guerrilla strategy—mining roads, a grenade now and then.

Mr. Johnson: The Jordanian Army has still not come to grips with the main elements of the Fedayeen.

⁵ Not found.

Mr. Packard: It will take a while for the situation to shape up.

Dr. Kissinger: Are we agreed that victory for Hussein is essential from our point of view?

All agreed emphatically.

Mr. Johnson: Hussein hasn't asked us for anything yet.

Mr. Sisco: We have had no communication from Hussein since the action began. We have instructed our people to conduct a hand-holding operation—to be sympathetic. This group should make a decision as to whether we should take any initiative with Hussein.

Dr. Kissinger: Have we any indication of Israeli moves?

Admiral Moorer: They have sent over 8 recce flights.

Mr. Helms: They are watching the situation.

Mr. Johnson: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Helms: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Sisco: The fact of Israel recce will not be lost on the Iraqis. This is a good low-level signal.

Mr. Davies: [less than 1 line not declassified] Nasser is willing to support Hussein. This will have some influence in Damascus.

Mr. Kissinger: What about the diplomatic side?

Mr. Sisco: I agree with Mr. Helms' fundamental assessment. We have to wait to see how the situation evolves. We should take no special initiative with Israel now. There is no need for special measures with the Russians with regard to Iraq and Syria at present. I see no diplomatic steps at the moment, although this may change in the next few hours.

Dr. Kissinger: I called John Freeman at the President's request last night to give him what information we had.

Mr. Sisco: That was highly desirable. You recall that in the earlier situation Denis Greenhill had called the President at the Prime Minister's request with some questions.⁶ The UK was obviously suspicious of collusion.

Mr. Johnson: Would it be useful to have Zurhellen talk to the Israelis to get their assessment of the situation?

Mr. Sisco: Yes, but in a very careful way. He could say we are watching the situation carefully and ask for their assessment.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but don't ask what they intend to do. That is a good idea to get their assessment. State should instruct Zurhellen to do so.

⁶ See Document 249.

Mr. Helms: The JIC met yesterday and I'm sure you'll have no trouble getting an assessment from them.

Mr. Sisco: We are in a hand-holding position with Hussein. Should we take the initiative and offer help? I think we should wait. He has enough, and there are various things in the pipeline.

Dr. Kissinger: We might look at Brown's instructions. Should we let Brown say that, now that action has started, we would be sympathetic to a request for material assistance?

Mr. Packard: Yes; we should give Hussein some indication of moral support.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's amend Brown's instructions accordingly.

Mr. Pranger: We will know this morning how much ammunition they have.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Pranger) Can Defense prepare a package on what Hussein might ask for?

Mr. Pranger: Yes, we have several options with various packages already.

Dr. Kissinger: Can you do it by early afternoon? Would we be able to move fast? (to Packard) Could we get stand-by planes for material shipments to Jordan, or at least locate planes or earmark them?

Col. Kennedy: What about the psychological effect of using US aircraft?

Dr. Kissinger: Good point. Let's identify our choices. [*½ line not declassified*]

Mr. Helms: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Pranger: [*1 line not declassified*]

Dr. Kissinger: (to Admiral Moorer) What is our military situation?

Admiral Moorer: I spoke to General Goodpaster this morning. His assumptions are the same as ours: that we should maintain maximum readiness without any overt, alerting action. He understands this. Our forces are in the same state of readiness as they were earlier. The carrier *Saratoga* will join the *Independence* this afternoon south of Cyprus. It can commence air operations by noon if necessary. They will be accompanied by a cruiser and 12 destroyers.

Dr. Kissinger: How about the third carrier?

Admiral Moorer: There is no 3rd carrier. The *Kennedy* could get there in 9 days.

Dr. Kissinger: I thought a CVA was on its way to replace one of the carriers now there.

Admiral Moorer: No. The fleet south of Cyprus will soon be in launching position. In addition, there is an amphibious Task Force with one battalion embarked, but no helicopters, south of Crete which could

reach the coast within 36 hours. Also, the Fleet flagship is getting underway from Gaeta and will join the force. That means the entire 6th Fleet will be in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Mr. Johnson: This will surface publicly. We can say it is a normal precautionary measure.

Admiral Moorer: The *Saratoga* was already scheduled to operate in this general area.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we should say as little as possible about military moves.

Admiral Moorer: We can say it is a routine training operation. The Soviets have a guided missile carrier, a guided missile frigate, two guided missile destroyers and an old-style heavy cruiser in the general area.

Dr. Kissinger: How many sorties does this give us?

Admiral Moorer: We have a capability of 200 strike sorties (100 per ship) on a sustained effort. We could surge to a higher level.

Mr. Packard: It would be a highly sensitive question as to who shoots first.

Dr. Kissinger: I doubt that the Russians will sink any US ships.

Admiral Moorer: Also, the *Guam* and her Task Group has departed Norfolk to participate in an exercise in the Mediterranean. They will pick up their load of Marines at Camp LeJeune and sail in the next day or two. They have 15 helicopters, and were planning to go the area.

Dr. Kissinger: Could we get them there faster?

Admiral Moorer: They could probably sail tomorrow night—12 hours earlier than scheduled.

Dr. Kissinger: Tell them to sail as soon as possible.

(Dr. Kissinger left the room)⁷

Admiral Moorer: If we tell the *Guam* to sail earlier this will undoubtedly be a news item. I also want to talk about target identification. We need more information on the situation to give our pilots their targets. We should find out from the Israelis what they have learned from their recce.

Mr. Packard: We can't send any recce over.

Admiral Moorer: We will have to send recce in when we send our planes in.

Mr. Johnson: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Helms: [1 line not declassified]

Admiral Moorer: (to Mr. Helms) Also, can you issue your Sit Reps every four hours instead of every six hours?

⁷ Kissinger took a telephone call from Greenhill. See Document 255.

Mr. Helms: All right.

Admiral Moorer: The British have two frigates, a mine sweeper and a tanker in the vicinity of Malta. They would not be too much help but they could symbolically provide a joint force.

Mr. Johnson: And we have the U-2s there.

Mr. Helms: They could fly over in no time.

General Vogt: You don't get much tactical intelligence from U-2s.

Mr. Helms: They could sort out where the Iraqi and Syrian units are.

Admiral Moorer: We already know that. You can't identify Jordanian or Iraqi tanks from the air.

Also, in any military operation, we would have to think of over-flight rights and bases. If we could stage out of Turkey, it would facilitate operations by letting us move in closer and cut down our response time. If we fly in direct from Europe to Jordan, we would have to over-fly Austria and Israel. The longest way, overflying Iran and Saudi Arabia, would require refueling and would take time.

Mr. Johnson: (to Mr. Davies) Have we excluded the possibility of over-flying France? Is Austria likely to be sticky?

Mr. Davies: If Egypt should support Hussein, the Italians and French might cooperate. We could also possibly get rights in Greece and Turkey if Hussein appeals to them.

Admiral Moorer: Incirlik and Cyprus would be the best, with Athens as a fall-back.

Mr. Davies: I will see what Radio Cairo is saying about the action.

Mr. Pranger: Would the Turks let us use Incirlik for arms shipment?

Mr. Davies: There would be a real chance if Nasser supports Hussein. I think it is time now to begin to go to governments to see how our speculation as to their attitude stands up.

Mr. Packard: How about Cyprus for arms shipments.

Mr. Pranger: We would prefer Incirlik.

Mr. Davies: It might also be possible to gear up the Saudi Arabian C-130s and have them pick up our shipments from Iran in an Arab airlift.

Mr. Pranger: We could at least ask about Turkish airspace.

Mr. Davies: I recommend we go to the Turks.

Mr. Pranger: On both airspace and Incirlik.

Mr. Johnson: I agree (to Mr. Davies) let's do it.

Admiral Moorer: We can put it on the basis of an action to save Hussein, at his request. Let's be sure to ask our Embassy in Amman to keep us currently informed.

Mr. Pranger: We might get in touch with the Jordanian Army and see if we could use H-5 (an airfield) to land shipments.

(Dr. Kissinger returned)

Admiral Moorer: (to Dr. Kissinger) I think it is necessary to get as much information as possible.

Dr. Kissinger: Have we identified all the readiness measures we can take? What about the 82nd Airborne. Can we do anything to speed their readiness?

Admiral Moorer: Not without being obvious.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Johnson) Do you agree?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: So do I.

Mr. Packard: (to Dr. Kissinger) While you were gone we discussed the desirability of moving up the *Guam* sailing 12 hours and decided it was not worth the publicity it would bring.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Admiral Moorer: I have also recommended to Mr. Helms that we tighten up the Sit Rep timing and that the Embassy give us a status report on the airport.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's pull the readiness situation together for the President. Is there anything we can do with the 82nd Airborne to cut down their alert time?

Admiral Moorer: The officers at Fort Bragg are doing everything they can do without tipping their hand. They have formed a staff group which is watching the situation and have prepared a check-list. It would be 22 hours before they are flying and 18 hours flight time.

Dr. Kissinger: And we could get the German brigade in during this 40 hours.

Admiral Moorer: Yes, the first part. We should begin to explore with the Turks and others the availability of overflight rights and bases. We can get a reading from the Egyptians.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's go easy with the Egyptians.

Mr. Johnson: Only on what they are saying publicly.

Mr. Pranger: Would you go to the Turks on rights for intervention as well as for supply?

Mr. Johnson: No, only on supply.

Dr. Kissinger: Why go to the Turks on anything? Why not Cyprus? I am leery about the Turks.

Admiral Moorer: Turkey would be easiest, with Greece next.

Dr. Kissinger: Wouldn't it be politically less dangerous in Greece or Cyprus than in Turkey?

Mr. Davies: If Egypt supports Hussein, our problems with our allies will be reduced.

Dr. Kissinger: If that happens, then we can go to the Turks. But only if Egypt takes a *public* position in support of Hussein. We should not go to the Turks unless Egypt publicly supports Hussein. Cyprus and Greece could be alternatives.

Mr. Davies: If it is thought inadvisable to use US aircraft, we might get the Saudis to use their C-130s for an Arab airlift from Iran.

Dr. Kissinger: Good idea. Let's explore it.

Mr. Pranger: This would still require the use of Turkish airspace.

Adm. Moorer: It would also be helpful to move a few more C-130s into Europe, a few at a time.

Mr. Johnson: That would be no problem. You have moved some out of Incirlik, haven't you?

Adm. Moorer: There are still 7 in Incirlik. We didn't take any out since it was thought this might indicate a pull-back. If we took five of these back to Germany it would facilitate any evacuation.

Dr. Kissinger: We didn't want to indicate any lessening of our posture as long as the hostages were there. We can take them out now that our general posture is being strengthened. Keep two there and take the other five out.

Adm. Moorer: We will put those five in the best position for the purpose.

Dr. Kissinger: How quickly can the carrier planes begin to operate?

Adm. Moorer: After the execute, in 2 or 2½ hours. The problem is to get the targets.

Mr. Packard: We may have to send in recce to get the targets.

Mr. Johnson: [1 line not declassified]

Adm. Moore: And I will feed it to the ships.

Mr. Packard: Can't we get some information from the Jordanians?

Adm. Moorer: It depends on where the targets are.

Mr. Johnson: Do we have the technical capability for direct communication between the carriers and the Jordanians and the aircraft and the Jordanians?

Adm. Moorer: We have the technical capability but no people on the ground.

Dr. Kissinger: To return to the problem of US vs. Israel air operations and our capabilities. Assuming the Iraqis move, I believe all agree that one day's operation may not do it. What are we getting into once we start bombing?

Adm. Moorer: This depends on the success of the Jordanian Army in pushing back the Iraqis.

Mr. Packard: That's stretching out interdiction strategy a long way.

Mr. Pranger: Israel is already striking Fedayeen targets.

Dr. Kissinger: To recap, on a pure readiness basis, we can be ready in 2½ hours. Our shortage is intelligence. We can get the recce information from the Israelis and feed it to the ships. But we have to think in terms of continued operations.

Adm. Moorer: The carriers can stay several days.

Dr. Kissinger: Once we start bombing, won't we be in a situation of several days' duration?

Adm. Moorer: I think the Jordanians can handle the Iraqis with air assistance from either the US or Israel—possibly without it. I think we should watch the situation develop since we can act quickly. The duration of any action is tied to the success of the Jordanian Army in disposing of the Iraqis.

Dr. Kissinger: Are we in good shape to watch Iraqi movements?

General Vogt: The Israelis are doing a good job of this.

Dr. Kissinger: The question won't arise for several hours, will it?

Adm. Moorer: No, it will be dark soon.

General Vogt: These 19,000 Iraqi troops are a ragged bunch.

Adm. Moorer: They are the worst of the Iraqi forces. Many of the officers were sent there as a form of political exile.

Dr. Kissinger: Would there be a possibility of sending them on suicide missions?

General Vogt: I don't think they will be very responsive to orders.

Mr. Packard: Where are the Saladin?

General Vogt: Around Zarqa.

Dr. Kissinger: Are the Syrians any good?

General Vogt: They're not much better.

Mr. Helms: I have a report on the Cairo radio. They have made no statements on the Egyptian position. They are just saying that the US has said it has no plans to intervene.

Dr. Kissinger: Is it helpful for them to say that?

Mr. Helms: I think so.

Dr. Kissinger: What about diplomatic actions? Are we agreed we should not approach any other capital now, except possibly for Iran? We should not go to Cairo?

Mr. Sisco: No.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. How about Moscow?

Mr. Sisco: It is premature.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. I think we have said too much to the Russians recently. Let them come to us.

Mr. Sisco: The Russians did intervene last week by talking to the Iraqis in a generally cautionary way over the hostage situation. As a result the Iraqis pulled back a little. The Russians will take a look at the situation on the ground and will probably be in to see us today and will ask us to restrain the Israelis.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. What will our posture be?

Mr. Sisco: We should say “thank you very much; we will look at the situation.” I have given them no satisfaction in our recent talks. We must handle it very carefully, though, so they can’t accuse us of collusion. We should take the line that we have no interest in broadening the conflict. The presence of Iraqi and Syrian forces in Jordan is the problem. If Iraq should intervene, this would be the complicating factor.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s not nail ourselves to a position that we will not intervene. Don’t preclude US intervention.

General Vogt: The Soviet Military Attaché in Amman has been talking about a possible US–UK–Israel intervention.

Mr. Helms: This is the kind of thing they invent and float all the time.

Dr. Kissinger: How about Iran?

Mr. Sisco: If we see that the Iraqis are about to move, we might talk to the Iranians. We should be very careful though. There are ways in which they could help lift the pressure, but if it is done at the behest of the US, it takes on the aspect of a US strategy rather than a move by Hussein. We should take the greatest possible care in any approach.

Dr. Kissinger: How would anyone know it was done at US behest? Also, wouldn’t everyone claim that it was done at US behest, whether it was true or not?

Mr. Sisco: Iran has no interest in giving the impression that the US is running the show. We would have the Shah’s cooperation on this. Our Ambassador could go in on the basis of getting his assessment of the situation.

Dr. Kissinger: We could inform the Shah of our assessment and ask him for his. The Shah values his relationship with the President. This would also give us a basis for going back to him if we should need to.

Mr. Helms and Mr. Packard: I agree.

Mr. Saunders: Or we might ask Hussein to approach him.

Dr. Kissinger: Hussein has his hands full. MacArthur could say the President has asked him to give the Shah our thinking and get the benefit of his.

Mr. Sisco: My instinct tells me this is a few hours too early for that.

Mr. Helms: By the time our Ambassador has been instructed and he has been given the appointment, it may be time.

Dr. Kissinger: It is late afternoon. He wouldn't see him until tomorrow.

Mr. Sisco: The Shah is shrewd enough to see what we are doing.

Dr. Kissinger: That's exactly it. How about the United Nations?

Mr. Johnson: Forget it!

Mr. Sisco: If there should be substantial Iraqi or Syrian involvement we should preempt a possible move into the UN.

Dr. Kissinger: But no one will drag us into the UN. Should we talk to Congress?

Mr. Helms: I think Rodger Davies' appearance yesterday was enough for the time.

Mr. Davies: Senator Fulbright⁸ thought the Administration was doing the right thing. The Committee was badly split. Three Senators were very skeptical of the Soviet attitude—thought we were being led down the garden path. We took the position that, since the Soviets had taken the public attitude they had, we had to test their sincerity.

Dr. Kissinger: I think it's too early to brief the Congress. We're not really doing anything.

Mr. Helms: We're not doing anything and we don't know enough.

Dr. Kissinger: (to General Haig) Would you write down the readiness measures so I can take them to the President?

Can we reassess the relative preference for use of Israeli as against US air? I should tell you that the President leans toward use of US rather than Israeli air, although he hasn't precluded further discussion. I was persuaded in the other direction by our discussion the other day, but we should take another look at it in the light of the President's feeling. I have listed the pro-US and pro-Israel arguments,⁹ although we may not have a choice. Are we all agreed that if it appears Hussein is going under, an Israeli move is highly probable? Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Sisco: An Israeli movement in the air is highly probable. What is their situation on the ground to deal with the Iraqis on the ground?

Mr. Helms: Israel can take them on any day. They can mobilize in 24 hours.

Mr. Sisco: Would they have to augment their present dispositions?

Mr. Helms: It depends on whether they think Egypt would take some move against them.

⁸ Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

⁹ See Document 247.

General Vogt: They wouldn't have to fight their way in. There is no Fedayeen opposition between the Israeli border and Amman. They have armored units already there that they could send in.

Mr. Helms: They would first undertake such a massive aerial bombing of the Iraqi troops that there wouldn't be much left when the tanks arrived. [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Dr. Kissinger: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Helms: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Sisco: I am seeing Yariv today.

Mr. Helms: We'll hit them both.

Adm. Moorer: It is important that we don't use both US and Israeli air. If the President should decide to use US air, we shouldn't also use Israeli air.

Dr. Kissinger: If US aircraft go in and, for some reason, can't hack it in a sustained operation, and the Israelis come in, we are then in maximum danger of a charge of collusion.

Mr. Packard: And it would make the US look silly.

Dr. Kissinger: One of the arguments for using US air is that maybe the time has come to show US strength in the area, even in the context of our peace initiative. A US show of force might even fuel the peace initiative when things settle down. On the other hand, Israeli involvement has the danger of a reopening of general hostilities and the end of the cease-fire.

Mr. Sisco: Any Israeli show of force or a successful Israeli operation will be played as a US show of force, though not to the same degree.

Dr. Kissinger: The counter-argument is that once US forces intervene in support of Hussein and succeed, the King becomes a Western lackey and his long-term position will be weakened. An Israeli move would be more easily understood.

Mr. Sisco: An Israeli move would be taken as being in the Israeli national interest—not just as support of Hussein.

Dr. Kissinger: If a US effort should fail and the Israelis would have to bail us out, this would be a bitter pill.

Mr. Pranger: If the President decided to use US air, we could sustain the operation from the carriers. We wouldn't have to stop after 200 strikes.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand we could sustain the 200 sorties for a fairly indefinite period, but we must disabuse people of the idea that one strike would do it. The US would be bombing in Jordan for some period.

Adm. Moorer: We should bomb until we get a satisfactory result.

Mr. Helms: We should make it clear that we are striking against the Iraqis or the Syrians, not against the Fedayeen.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Pranger) If you favor the use of US air, give me your arguments.

Mr. Pranger: I don't want the US to appear to be a paper tiger.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Packard and Mr. Pranger) Give me your strongest arguments for the use of US air. I promise they will go to the President.

Mr. Helms: Let me repeat: if the US intervenes, we must make it crystal clear that it is against Iraq and Syria, not the Fedayeen. The Fedayeen are the darlings of the Arab world. If we put ourselves in the position of defending Hussein against the Fedayeen, that would tear it.

Dr. Kissinger: That is another argument for using the Israelis. They are in a better position to bomb the Fedayeen than we are. I would be extremely uncomfortable if the US and Israel were both bombing in Jordan simultaneously. If we go in, we must insist that Israel stop its bombing. We can't have a joint military operation with the Israelis.

All agreed.

Mr. Helms: We would lose the peace initiative.

Mr. Packard: I think the arguments lean strongly against the US going in.

Dr. Kissinger: Let us meet again at 3:00 p.m. today.¹⁰ The President is in Chicago, and I have recommended that he not come back until there is need for a decision.

All agreed.

Dr. Kissinger: On press guidance, Ziegler is on the road with the President. (to Mr. Johnson) Could you take the lead to see that we are all singing the same tune and that no one is talking?

Mr. Sisco: Bob McCloskey should be the only one saying anything. We will brief him.

Mr. Johnson: McCloskey will be in touch with Ziegler.

Dr. Kissinger: Absolutely. Should we say that we have had this meeting?

Mr. Helms: Yes, that is desirable. We are watching the situation but are not discussing US intervention.

Dr. Kissinger: Agreed. I understand Joe (Sisco) has had some exchange with the British on tactics for handling the noon meeting on the hostages, and we can discuss this later.

¹⁰ See Document 260.

255. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Among the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), and the Permanent Under Secretary in the British Foreign Office (Greenhill)¹

September 17, 1970, 8 a.m.

G: Can we discuss the present situation in Amman for a moment?

K: Yes.

G: What is the latest report you have from the city?

K: That the army has secured the western hills and is moving on the road past the Intercontinental Hotel into the city. It has secured the southern hills but hasn't yet gotten into the heart of the city.

G: Do you think the King's claim that he will have the hostages by tonight is valid?

K: We can't judge that. We do judge that the whole operation will take longer than a day. But it is also our judgment that he can defeat the Fedayeen by himself.

G: I don't know whether you have seen the text of what we have proposed Bern Group should put out this afternoon.²

K: No, I haven't seen it. I have Joe Sisco on the line also.

G: Have you seen it Joe?

S: No. I am up on all the wire traffic but haven't seen that.

G: We have proposed that the Bern Group should put out the following communiqué: "The five governments are ready to open negotiations upon the proposal of the PFLP as soon as the PFLP provides the Bern Group with all the demands including the release of the people the PFLP wants. We have furnished [omission in the original] on this basis. Meanwhile, we will hold the PFLP responsible for the hostages in Jordan."

S: Offhand my reaction is that sounds very good. It's the precise position we discussed with you and the others in yesterday's meeting.³ We will need to discuss it here with the others. We want to evaluate the im-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. Kissinger and Sisco were in Washington and Greenhill was in London. The conversation was on the "secure phone."

² See telegram 152282 to Bern, September 17, 0032Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12 US)

³ Presumably the September 16 meeting of the Bern Group; see Document 250 and footnote 4 thereto.

pact of such an announcement on the evolving situation on the ground. My own reaction is quite sympathetic and we will let you know.

G: Okay, secondly, have you received any representations from the Germans?

K: No, to what effect?

G: You will be receiving one to the same effect as one they sent to us. What it amounts to is that they are thinking if we can't keep the five-power basis, we could proceed by a four-power or a three-power one, or finally a two-power collective agreement for a unilateral agreement for each of us to do the best with our hostages.

K: If you have no other comments of a general nature I will return to the meeting I left for this conversation.⁴

G: Okay. Joe, we are of course very concerned with the hostages. There are three possible courses if you abandon the five-power approach: the four of us could say that the European prisoners would be exchanged for all the hostages except for the three Israelis.

S: But those there are also Americans.

G: They are not pure Israelis?

S: No, they are Americans.

G: Then that would only be feasible for you if *all* the hostages, period?

S: Right, this deal is not a deal for us. We're satisfied that those two or three have an American connection here, they carry American passports. That's the problem.

G: But theoretically it's a possible deal for all the European prisoners if *all* the hostages?

S: But how does that differ from the announcement you were talking about? If this deal were available . . . we've been trying to get it. But the other side is insisting on this exchange.

G: But in view of this situation they might agree. There is another deal, that in view of the danger, Germany, the Swiss and ourselves would swap our prisoners for our hostages, leaving you unprovided for. Finally, we could agree among ourselves that no one would approach the other.

S: I can tell you we have difficulties with all three. Moreover, your government would want to weigh carefully the outcry in this country against your taking this action. It would be strong and you should be sure that your ministers understand that.

G: But there would also be an outcry in this country. If we don't agree to bargain, our people get killed.

⁴ See Document 254.

S: But who knows whether a separate deal is really feasible?

G: That's true, but people would say "why didn't you try?"

S: As soon as I'm out of this meeting we will consider the first proposal, the communiqué. But you should know that we have now gone to the Israelis directly.

G: Saying what?

S: Saying basically that we want to act together.

G: Have you gone as far as to say that they must pitch in?

S: Yes, for the first time we have gone to them for concrete and unilateral contributions.

G: Well, Israel is saying to us that they can't agree to anything because they are waiting for you.

S: We've gone now, so let's see what we get on that and also get back to you on the communiqué.

G: Okay, let me recapitulate our conversation. You will consider the text of the communiqué, you will continue saying to Israel that they must make a contribution. And you will consider our other proposals.

S: Yes, but our interim reaction to them is negative. Let's not talk in terms of proposals—"Line of thought" is better.

G: Okay. The Bern meeting is at 2:30 this afternoon.

S: Okay, if we need an hour or two delay you'll understand.

256. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

September 17, 1970, 9 a.m.

K: Incidentally, that speech² played very well in all the Eastern papers.

P: Oh really. Good.

K: That wasn't what I was calling you about. During the night Jordan blew. The King moved troops into Amman; he has taken the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. The President was in Chicago and Kissinger was in Washington.

² Apparently a reference to a speech made by President Nixon on September 16 at Kansas State University; see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 757–763.

western and southern suburbs and is advancing into the city. He seems to be gaining the upper hand. The Fedayeen is asking for Iraqi and Syrian help but there is no indication that they are responding. During the night I talked at length to Bob.³ We are saying you were wakened and informed of the situation, but in light of the fact that there is nothing you could do we (Haldeman and Kissinger) thought it best not to waken you.

P: That's okay. I knew the King was planning it. We already had signed the paper.

K: Right. I talked to Bill, Sisco, Moorer and Packard—everyone is aboard.⁴ They all recognize that it is a crisis.

P: A crisis that's good.

K: If the King wins, the peace offensive has a real chance.

P: We've got to help him. How about the fleet?

K: It's up there. One thing, everyone agreed you must not come back. It would create a crisis atmosphere. We moved the second carrier into the Mediterranean. We've got almost the entire Sixth Fleet near Cyprus now. There's another force with helicopter capability on the *Guam*. It was going to go to the Mediterranean anyway and we are moving into that area.

P: But this becomes necessary only if the Iraqis or Syrians move?

K: Exactly.

P: If they move, my strong feeling at this time is that we should use American air and knock the bejesus out of them.

K: That's our feeling.

P: It would be a show of strength on our part.

K: Well, there are strong arguments on both sides but nothing on that will happen till you are back.

P: The fact that the Israelis move . . . has other effects. I think a move on our part shows guts, having to do with these hijackers also. I think the U.S. ought to do something if it's air. If it requires men that's another thing.

K: What we have done in this regard, we are acquiring the targets—getting information for these air strikes and feeding them to the [omission in the original] as fast as we can. We've got to know where to hit. Helms is putting maximum effort into finding where the Iraqi and Syrian forces are.

P: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] they are frantic?

K: That they are asking for help.

³ No record of this conversation was found, but see Document 249.

⁴ See Document 254.

P: The King's move is a result of our encouraging him, is it not? That's the thing I'm thinking about. He ought to be backed up.

K: We sent out a cable to that effect last night.⁵ We think the cable we put out Monday stiffened his back, the one saying we can't tolerate the taking of American hostages. We also authorized the Ambassador to tell the King that if he needs material support we will give it very sympathetic consideration.⁶

P: Where are the hostages?

K: We don't know. So they are in danger. I have talked to the British—they are prepared to put out a five-power statement which is in effect the same thing as you said on Monday, that we hold the guerrillas responsible for the safety of the hostages.

P: Yes, can't I say that now?

K: Yes, Ziegler can.

P: That we will hold the guerrillas responsible and have him quote the President directly.

K: Right. We also have a package of what we think the King needs.

P: On this one I am sure you are going to find Sisco would be all aboard and Bill will be because it's the only chance for his peace offensive.

K: Exactly. If it fails the cease-fire and the peace offensive are dead.

P: It would be worse than before we started; the Fedayeen would have the upper hand.

K: It would push Nasser in a radical direction and would push the Soviets that way and would make the Israelis unwilling to accept compromises.

P: I want you to push through the bureaucracy my feelings, having a landing team ready for evacuation. As far as their going in and fighting, that's another thing. This would get the Russians in, but that's another side of it. This will show whether we have any stake at all left in the Mediterranean.

K: I have talked to Alex and Bill. Bill is all on board on doing the maximum possible to strengthen the King. On the Israeli versus U.S. question I haven't talked to him in detail. I will get a reading on that.

P: I think U.S. air has a lot to say for itself. It would be good in the event they still have the hostages.

K: I think it would be a good idea if we told the Shah and gave him our approach. That would bring him into it and he could put troops on the Iraqi border.

⁵ Document 252.

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 254.

P: And we will back him.

K: Right. These are the measures we have taken. We will meet again at 3:00.⁷ It was a worse situation last week. Then everything was festering and we couldn't get a handle.

P: What this is is a civil war in Jordan with Iraq and Syria in on it. How about your calling Vorontsov and saying "lay off boys."

K: I think we should be enigmatic and say nothing. They will pick this up.

P: Okay, this will worry them. But we want the Sixth Fleet stuff in the open.

K: They'll catch it.

P: I want them to know we're moving. I want everything that can be done to be done in the open. The wear and tear on the nerves between the Syrians and Iraqis is very important.

K: We can move it 12 hours early and get it picked up.

P: Tell Helms to get it picked up immediately.

⁷ See Document 260.

257. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, September 17, 1970, 9:20 a.m.

K: I just wanted to review the situation with you. There is nothing really in addition to what we discussed last night. Alex and Sisco will tell you.

R: I've already talked with them.

K: The only thing I wanted to check out was between U.S. and Israeli air intervention, what is your judgment as to which would be preferable.

R: I am in favor of the Israelis doing it. In fact it's almost commanding the reasons are so strong. It would be in line with their national interests, it would help in preventing the Iraqis from having a

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking.

hand in the government of Jordan. The King can give as the reason the Israelis are on his soil is because of the acts of the Fedayeen. Third, if we are going to have any peace, Jordan and Israel will have to work together anyway.

K: That's right. No matter how we slice it the question would be what are we doing there.

R: I think the national interest argument is very strong. Also, what if we failed; for Israel to bail us out would be awful.

K: Yes. You and I have to stay closely in touch on this. The President's instincts are the other way, but he's not adamant.

R: If we play it right, we may be able to pull out the whole thing.

K: And if we pull it out the peace offensive has a real chance. It would be good for credibility with the Israelis and show the Arabs that moderation is the only course. And we would have a chance of getting a government there that can make peace. We may come out very well.

R: That's what I think. In terms of our personnel: there's a total of 47. Twenty-some are in a special room which is locked and the others are in a place protected by the Jordanian army. We also have a report—a TWA pilot to Beam (?) that all the hostages are in a safe place outside of the city.

K: Good. The President is very anxious for Ziegler to reaffirm the Monday statement about the hostages and that we hold the guerrillas responsible for their safety.²

² On September 14, Ziegler issued a statement at an afternoon news briefing in response to a PFLP announcement made that day stating that the PFLP considered dual U.S.-Israeli citizens as Israeli citizens only. Ziegler said that the U.S. government "rejects any attempt to establish distinctions among its citizens on any basis whatever." He continued that the PFLP's taking of U.S. citizens as hostages in a dispute with another country as "particularly reprehensible." (*New York Times*, September 15, 1970, p. 1)

258. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President's Chief of Staff (Haldeman)¹

Washington, September 17, 1970, 9:35 a.m.

K: I have been with the President² and everything seems to be OK. I have had a good talk with Bill and no problems.³ He knows that [we have to be strong.] I think it is a good break if we do it in a tough manly way. Of course, if we fall on our face . . . but we won't because we won't let it fail.

H: How is the President tracking on this? Is he all right?

K: The President is in good shape. He talked about the course he mentioned yesterday morning. I think he is softening though. After he has heard everybody [I think things will be fine.] I am having full plans made to implement it if he orders it—we can do it.

H: You know he is going to that newspaper at 11 o'clock.

K: That should be very low key.

H: Did you tell him that?

K: No, but I have a call in to him and I will. The Viet Cong have made a new peace proposal. It is still not acceptable but they are softening.

H: [omission in the original] move.

K: I am delighted with it. If we can do it and we will do it.

H: Bill is along with you on it? No problem there?

K: He is dead without it.

H: But you do not know if he knows that.

K: No, he knows. He does not want to be out in front on this. [He knows that we have to be firm on this. He knows if the King falls then this will be the biggest [omission in the original] in diplomatic history.] In fact he is urging us on. If it fails—no worse than before. But it cannot fail. We will not let it fail.

H: Will you need the President today?

K: Just make damn sure I can get to him on the telephone—wherever he is. You probably do that anyway but will you double check? We have a 3 p.m. meeting this afternoon.⁴

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. All brackets, except those that indicate an omission in the original transcript, are in the original.

² See Document 256.

³ See Document 257.

⁴ See Document 260.

259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, September 17, 1970, 1500Z.

152503. For Ambassador MacArthur.

1. You should seek appointment with Shah as soon as possible to request his assessment of the situation in Jordan.

2. You should make clear that knowing his interest in survival Hussein's regime we particularly interested in his assessment. Shah's judgment on how far Iraq may be prepared to intervene to aid fedayeen would be of particular interest.²

Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Davies, cleared in substance by Haig, and approved by Eliot. It was repeated to Amman and Tel Aviv.

² Telegram 4059 from Tehran, September 18, 1345Z, reported that the Shah stated that King Hussein had to act against the fedayeen or risk a de facto Palestinian state within Jordan. He also posited that Nasser's position would play a crucial role in the denouement of the Jordanian situation. The Shah concluded by speculating on various ways to help Hussein as well as possible outcomes to the crisis. (Ibid.)

260. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 17, 1970, 3:20–3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State—

U. Alexis Johnson

Joseph J. Sisco

Rodger P. Davies

Defense—

David Packard

Robert J. Pranger

NSC Staff—

Gen. Alexander Haig

Adm. R.C. Robinson

Col. Richard Kennedy

Harold H. Saunders

Jeanne W. Davis

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

CIA—

Gen. Robert Cushman

David H. Blee

JCS—

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed:

1. we would make no announcement of the departure of the *Kennedy*, and would consider whether or not to make any statement when the ship reaches Gibraltar;
2. the *Guam* will leave on its regular schedule (day after tomorrow) but once out of sight of land will advance its speed to make the crossing faster.

Gen. Cushman: Most of Amman is in Jordanian hands. There is some shooting between the hill on which our Embassy is located and the hill occupied by Jordanian Army troops. There is apparently still some activity in this no man's land, but the Jordanians are now preparing to cross the valley. We have reports that Zarqa has been taken, but we don't know about Irbid. We have no indication of Iraqi or Syrian movements.

Mr. Johnson: We have just received a message from a representative of Hussein that things are going well and they will have the situation under control by tomorrow morning. They have offered a cease-fire to the Fedayeen on the condition that the Fedayeen evacuate all towns and leave Jordan, and have offered to provide buses to take the Fedayeen to the frontier.²

Mr. Davies: Our latest Sit Rep reports that two Jordan tanks are now in the wadi between the two hills.³ This is significant.

Mr. Kissinger: Can they organize themselves in any other area of the country?

Gen. Cushman: Irbid is the only area in doubt. The Syrians have some troops nearby.

Mr. Kissinger: If Iraqi forces have to come from Iraq, how long would it take?

Gen. Cushman: Probably a day, particularly if there was any air activity against them. However, there are still 17,000 Iraqi troops inside Jordan. We think some of these have been attacked by the Jordanians, but we have no report from Mafraq or Irbid.

² Telegram 4887 from Amman, September 17, 1824Z. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V)

³ Apparently a reference to Intelligence Memorandum SC No. 02437/70, September 17, 1200 EDT. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-T00830A, Box 8)

Mr. Kissinger: How about the town near the Syrian border?

Mr. Davies: Ramtha, two kilometers south of the Syrian border. The Syrians could move there, but we have no indication that they are doing so.

Mr. Saunders: We have one report that in one town the Iraqi forces moved out of the way and stood by while the Jordanian Army mopped up.

(Mr. Sisco arrived.)

Mr. Sisco: I have just talked with Rabin. He said he knew what we wanted him to say—"If Hussein can pull it off, we will announce within 24 hours that we will resume participation in the talks with Jarring." Rabin has no more information than we do, but he thinks things look good. The quicker Hussein can finish it off the better since Nasser is temporizing. He obviously wants Hussein to win. Once he is sure of that, he will make some sort of mediating proposal. Daud⁴ has announced the Jordanian government is willing to have a cease-fire if the other side agrees, on the condition that the Palestinians get out of Jordan. He has offered buses to take them out. A representative of Hussein has told Brown that the situation is under control and Amman will be in Jordanian hands by tomorrow afternoon. Rabin also said that we no longer have to worry, because it is dark and he did not know any Arab who would fight at night. He did not have the report that Iraqi troops had stepped aside when the Jordanian Army moved in.

Mr. Kissinger: Secretary Rogers and I have talked to the President.⁵ He still has a bias for using U.S. planes rather than Israeli planes if Iraqi or Syrians move into Jordan, but he is more receptive to a counter-argument than he was yesterday. I think Secretary Rogers supported our argument.

Mr. Johnson: I think so.

Mr. Sisco: He too wonders, however, why Americans are not better than Israelis. He has reached the same conclusion about the President's bias in favor of American air.

Mr. Kissinger: It is not a question of who is better, the questions are: (1) who has the better reason for doing it—foreign intervention for the U.S. as opposed to a national security issue for the Israelis; (2) who can sustain it better there; (3) who has the deterrent force behind an

⁴ Brigadier General Mohammed Daud of the Jordanian Arab Army. On September 16, King Hussein declared martial law and appointed Daud to lead a cabinet comprised of army officers.

⁵ See Document 256. Rogers also talked to Nixon from 8:40 to 8:50 a.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) No other record of the conversation has been found.

initial strike? If things continue as they are, however, it may not be necessary.

On military actions, the President has ordered the *Kennedy* to the Mediterranean, on the understanding that the 3rd carrier would be rotated out in November if the situation quiets. He wants some beefing up of the Sixth Fleet, as well as a demonstration that we can do so.

Admiral Moorer: The *Kennedy* can leave in the morning.

Mr. Packard: Do we want high visibility by announcing that the *Kennedy* is leaving?

Mr. Sisco: I would rather not say anything. The situation on the ground is going well. Visibility will merely solidify the anti-Hussein forces.

Mr. Kissinger: We don't have to say anything.

Mr. Johnson: The Russians will know when the ship goes through Gibraltar.

Mr. Kissinger: The President also wanted the *Guam* to move earlier to get visibility. Do we want visibility? Have these orders been issued or can we delay the departure?

Admiral Moorer: They have not started loading the troops yet. On the regular schedule they would be leaving day after tomorrow. They could leave tomorrow night on an accelerated schedule and we would have visibility.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's cancel the order for an accelerated departure and have them leave on the regular schedule (day after tomorrow). I will take the responsibility. If things blow up tomorrow, we can still get visibility.

Mr. Packard: This is a good example of the problems with operations of this kind. Things just don't move quite that fast.

Admiral Moorer: We can let the *Guam* sail day after tomorrow with the other ships, but could give her a different speed of advance. Once she was out of sight of land, she could speed up and still get there faster.

Mr. Kissinger: That is a good solution. That achieves everything. Let's do it.

Admiral Moorer: All right.

Mr. Kissinger: We could still speed up her departure tomorrow, if we need some psychological movement.

Admiral Moorer: I am going to Norfolk right after this meeting and I will be sure that they understand.

Mr. Kissinger: About the *Kennedy* the President wants it to leave tomorrow morning.

Admiral Moorer: It was originally scheduled to leave in November. We have a few civilian technicians on board that we will have to take off.

Mr. Packard: This will have visibility.

Admiral Moorer: This will give us 3 carriers in the Mediterranean until November, when one is rotated out.

Mr. Kissinger: This will be good for NATO. We have wanted an opportunity to demonstrate our ability to move in this area.

Mr. Johnson: I heartily approve of this action. It speaks for itself and requires no noise.

Mr. Kissinger: The President wants the *Kennedy* there when he is there.

Admiral Moorer: If we keep the 3 carriers in the Mediterranean, I suggest we hold the *Kennedy* around Crete.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree—the *Kennedy* around Crete, a second carrier closer, and the third for the President.

Mr. Johnson: If these were nuclear powered they would not need refueling.

Mr. Kissinger: Which of these are nuclear powered?

Admiral Moorer: The *Kennedy* is not—none of them are.

Mr. Kissinger: Has Dean Brown talked with Hussein yet?

Mr. Sisco: No; our only contact is by ham radio.

Mr. Kissinger: Are we getting the Israeli assessment?

Mr. Sisco: Yes, regularly. Our best information is coming from them.⁶

Mr. Kissinger: Are we feeding it to the ships?

Admiral Moorer: Yes, we have worked out a procedure.

Mr. Kissinger: Has MacArthur been instructed to see the Shah?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.⁷

Mr. Kissinger: We have the Defense package on the materiel that Hussein might ask for.

(This was passed out at the table)⁸

Mr. Pranger: We are getting six hour updates on all MAC aircraft. They could be ready in 48–72 hours. We could have two C–171's re-loaded in 22 hours. We would hope to have overflight permission by that time.

Mr. Kissinger: Overflight of what?

⁶ According to Intelligence Memorandum OCI No. 0099/70, September 17, Iraqi forces in Jordan were making “administrative and logistical preparation for movement,” but there was no indication of any intervention in the fighting between the JAA and the fedayeen. (Ibid., NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-077, Washington Special Action Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East)

⁷ See Document 259.

⁸ Not attached and not found.

Mr. Davies: Austria, Greece.

Mr. Kissinger: Are we exploring the possibility of using the Saudi C-130's?

Mr. Davies: Not until Nasser takes some position.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Admiral Moorer) You are moving the five C-130's from Turkey?

Admiral Moorer: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: And we are getting the check list of arguments in favor of the use of U.S. planes?

Mr. Pranger: Yes, it is done and being cleared.

Mr. Kissinger: I want to list all the arguments for the use of American air and all the arguments for the use of Israeli air to short-cut the time needed to prepare such a paper if it should be needed. The Israelis, of course, may move whatever we decide to do. We are also agreed that if U.S. planes are used, the Israelis should not bomb concurrently. Our targets would be the Iraqi and Syrians, not the Fedayeen. We are agreed we need not go the Congress now and should not go to the UN. The press coordination is in hand and so far there have been no snafus. I suggest that this group meet again tomorrow morning.

(It was agreed to meet at 8:00 a.m., but this was subsequently changed to 8:30 a.m. at the request of Mr. Packard)⁹

Mr. Packard: I would like to suggest a small modification in our support tactics. We could probably use two C-5's for the supply mission.

Mr. Kissinger: We do not have to decide now whether to move openly or covertly on transportation for the material. We can face this when it happens.

Mr. Packard: We have the new aircraft and it would be a nice demonstration of their capabilities.

Mr. Pranger: They could land at H-5.

Admiral Moorer: To review the ship movements:

... The *Guam* will leave on schedule but will speed up once it is out of sight of land. There will be no public announcement since it was supposed to leave anyhow for the NATO exercise.

... The *Kennedy* will leave tomorrow morning after the discharge of the civilian technicians; we can think about a public announcement when it goes through Gibraltar.

Mr. Johnson: Are these civilian technicians going to come back and talk about having been booted off the ship?

⁹ See Document 264.

Admiral Moorer: It is possible. There are 8 or 10 of them, all with security clearances.

Mr. Johnson: Why don't we just tell them to keep quiet?

Mr. Kissinger: When the ship goes through Gibraltar, we can make a straight-faced announcement—part of normal rotation, etc.

Mr. Packard: Let's wait and see on the announcement.

Mr. Kissinger: When will it get to Gibraltar?

Admiral Moorer: In about a week.

Mr. Kissinger: We may want to play it up or play it down at that time. We don't have to explain the operations of our carriers in the Atlantic.

Admiral Moorer: We don't have to explain our carrier operations anywhere.

Mr. Kissinger: We can discuss it again as it nears Gibraltar. It will be in the Mediterranean when the President gets there?¹⁰

Admiral Moorer: Yes, it will.

¹⁰ Nixon arrived in Rome on September 27. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

261. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare)¹

Washington, September 17, 1970, 6:55 p.m.

K: At least you know how to get my attention.

S: Do you want me to read it to you—they have alerted all the wire services that at 6:00 Chicago time they will be coming out with a big story. This is what the President said to the editors and broadcasters—If the Syrians or Iraqis intervene in Jordan there are only two of us to stop

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking.

them, the Israelis or us.² It will be preferable for us to do it. The Russians are going to pay dearly for moving the missiles in. The Israelis are going to get five times as much as they would have if the missiles would not have moved. We are embarking on a tougher policy in the Middle East. The Sixth Fleet is going to be beefed up. I was having an argument with Kissinger who thinks we blew it in Jordan. We will intervene if the situation is such that our intervention will make a difference. *Chicago Sun Times* is saying as a lead that it was learned today from high sources that the U.S. will intervene in Jordan if the Syrians or Iraqis move. I know what the editors were told, but I don't know how they will write it.

K: What does he mean that I thought we blew it in Jordan. I have been raising hell with him along the lines that we have been behaving and that Jordan was about to blow.

S: This is a senior man's notes of what the President told them.

K: Was Lisagor there?³

S: I don't know. We will get this around the world in just a few minutes.

K: I think the Secretary of State is going to have a bloody heart attack.

S: We passed this along to State—Rogers and Sisco.

K: God help us. Those fools at State think I am putting him up to it. It doesn't give me any pain.

² See William Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993), p. 102. Quandt notes that Nixon met twice with editors of Chicago newspapers and expressed his willingness to commit U.S. forces in Jordan if Syria or Iraq intervened in the conflict to assist the fedayeen.

³ Peter Lisagor was the Washington Bureau Chief for the *Chicago Daily News*.

262. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 17, 1970, 9:30 p.m.

P: Anything new?

K: King seems to be in pretty good shape. It has been night there since about 2 o'clock.

P: They probably won't do anything at night. The Russians are really stewing right now. Wouldn't you say? As you probably heard I put in a little squibb today.²

K: The backgrounders are beginning to break in the East now.

P: The stakes are high and we are not looking at this as a little . . .

K: Might as well let them know what chips are in the pot.

P: I agree with you in how to handle the Soviets is with cool detachment. I was wrong before. You are completely right. Do not warn them. They think you are bluffing. Just move . . . I want Helms to know that I think he should get some confused traffic out about ship movements.

K: I must tell you Mr. President that moving the *Kennedy* we have had to cancel shore leave for most of the crew.

P: That's all right. Shore leave is not all that easy. We will give them double the leave next time.

K: When the Soviets see the *Kennedy* come through the Straits of Gibraltar and . . .

P: They will know that we are ready to do something. [omission in the original] Makes them think we might do something.

K: You have the events leading to the highjacking—they have been a net loss for the Soviets. Concentrating on other things.

P: King has been informed that we will support him?

K: Yes. By the way, Ambassador Brown has done a very good job.

P: That meeting with him helped him.

K: You told him he was going to where the action was. He has been very coolheaded.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. All brackets, except those that indicate omitted material, are in the original. The President returned to the White House at 9:11 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

² See Document 261.

P: Bureaucracy is all together on this one? Bill knows that the peace offensive is based on Jordan.

K: Yes, everyone is pulling together. I am more optimistic about the peace offensive—if it works. . . .

P: About this visit tomorrow.³ We have to handle it with resolve. Don't want Meir going out and saying that we will go into Jordan. I made it clear in my backgrounder. It would be fatal to the King if the Israelis came in and almost. . . . [Paraphrased the President said it wouldn't be very good if PM Meir walked out of the meeting and said that they were going to move into Jordan.] Jordan has to be strengthened to scare off Iraqis and Syrians.

K: It gave us an opportunity . . . I talked to Rabin for 2 minutes today and told him [to keep it cool].⁴

P: Who is sitting in tomorrow?

K: Sisco, Haig, Eban. I think it would be good if after the meeting you would let the others go and spend 20 minutes with Meir. At least then she could say that she had a private meeting with you.

P: Yes, you told me. The reception in Chicago was good today. We went around the streets . . . Quite a reaction to the speech.⁵

K: Yes, excellent. Comments and what I have read were good. The editors thing went well yesterday. Today was good too. Jordan thing good for us.

P: Appear like quite a crisis but we lanced the boil and now. . . . The King is doing well?

K: Yes. About relaunching the peace initiative. I think we should take a longer look at the scenario. I think we should know where we are going and not [be wishy washy] when we relaunch it. When you meet with Meir tomorrow do not urge any particular course of action.

P: The visit should not strengthen Hussein's enemy's position. I wish we could do something publicly in support of the King.

K: I do not think that he is eager for too much publicity. He knows that we have planes available.

P: For strikes?

K: To carry in weapons if he needs them.

³ The record of the meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Meir is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

⁴ No record of this conversation was found.

⁵ The President spoke at a Citizenship Day reception in Chicago; for text of his remarks, see *Public Papers: Nixon*, 1970, pp. 764–766.

P: We also have airplanes to strike. I want Europe mobilized in readiness. If we do I want (strike he is talking about) to hit massively. Not just little pinpricks. I want them to know we are hell bent for action.

K: If the King's military situation is as good as he thinks there is no problem. This afternoon they were hitting a commando unit in the middle of an Iraqi unit and the Iraqis did nothing. Nasser has not said anything. That is the most support he could give Hussain.

P: Are the Soviets saying anything?

K: Nothing.

P: I think this visit to the Sixth Fleet is good don't you?

K: The visit to the 6th Fleet is very good. Marvin Kalb⁶ says it is a master stroke. He is Jewish, but he thinks it was a very good move.

P: Well, that's all right. We want him with us. He thinks it was a master stroke? What did he say?

K: We are committed to the Middle East. [HAK went into long talk on our Middle East policy and what we wanted there.]

P: I gave a hard thrust. I told the editorial boards today. The Russians know that if they moved they had us to deal with.

K: Salutary. If some of this stuff leaks it will be fine. It is not an Arab/Israeli conflict. Israel should not be alone in this.

P: That is what I said yesterday . . .

K: [if the bureaucracy ever understands ——] [importance of Middle East.]

P: I said look where without support of Soviet Union to Syria/Iraq [omission in the original]. If you want to see if it matters why are they building up a Fleet?

K: And we have no reliable land bases there.

P: I know that. And did you hear about my statement on Greece and Spain? They may not like them but they are our people.

K: Very strong statement. But on this Jordan thing the bureaucracy was pulling together. I think this thing is coming out well.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and domestic politics unrelated to the Jordan crisis.]

⁶ Marvin Kalb was the diplomatic correspondent for CBS News in Washington.

263. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Situation in Jordan

The major change in the situation from yesterday seems to be that while the army still has the upper hand, it is proceeding methodically in Amman and is meeting fairly stiff resistance from the fedayeen. It also appears that the problem outside of Amman will require some time to resolve. This confirms that the struggle may turn out to be more protracted and the results less clear-cut than may have appeared from reporting yesterday afternoon.² It is even possible that Hussein could decide on some compromise settlement with the fedayeen when he feels that he has regained much of his status and authority and before he gets bogged down in a longer term campaign that could sap his army's strength and determination. He may, of course, opt to try to completely crush the fedayeen.

The following are the major developments since yesterday afternoon.

The Military Situation

During most of yesterday it appeared that the Jordanian army was gradually expanding its control of Amman in the face of stiff resistance from the fedayeen. The fighting fell off to occasional outbursts of small arms fire and artillery during the night but intensified again at dawn when the army went back on the offensive.

The situation is less clear outside of Amman, although apparently there has been some heavy fighting in some of the cities to the north. The central committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization has announced the creation of a "liberated area" in northern Jordan where it claims to be taking over the government of three districts. Northern Jordan has a history of separation going back to the late 1950's, although, as the embassy comments, the liberated area may have come too late to help the fedayeen cause. The Israelis say that fedayeen forces from Syria and Lebanon are moving into the "liberated area" presumably to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V. Secret; Sensitive.

² Telegram 4894 from Amman, September 17, 2230Z. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 JORDAN)

strengthen the fedayeen forces already there. The Israelis also report having seen some movement of Jordanian armor and infantry northward but are not sure how much progress has been made in this direction so far.

So far the Syrian and Iraqi forces have stayed out of the fighting. Units of the Iraqi expeditionary force in Jordan, however, have been put on full alert and are being centralized. Some move by the Jordanians, such as the surrounding of an Iraqi camp, could trigger Iraqi involvement in the fighting, if only in a limited way to demonstrate solidarity with the fedayeen. The Israelis, who are watching this situation very closely, believe that for the present there will be no Iraqi intervention nor do they think there will be intervention by Egypt and Syria, barring unexpected moves.

Arab mediation efforts are underway. Nasser and the leaders of Libya and Sudan have sent a carefully worded and balanced message to both King Hussein and PLO leader Arafat. They call on both sides to stop the fighting and provide a chance for fresh talks or consultations. The Arab League Council also met yesterday and called for an end to the senseless fighting, so that the recently established four-nation conciliation committee—composed of Egypt, Sudan, Libya and Algeria—could undertake new efforts to achieve a settlement.

The Negotiations for Hostages

The Bern Group is continuing its efforts to come up with an agreed mandate for the Red Cross to continue its negotiations with the PFLP for the release of the remaining hostages. We are pushing—so far without much apparent success—a formula whereby the five powers would authorize the Red Cross negotiators to say they will agree to consider the most recent PFLP proposals at such time as the PFLP provides its total demands, including a specific list of the fedayeen they want from the Israelis.

The Bern Group last night met to consider an acceptable British redraft of the language of our formula but no progress was made.³ The Israeli said that he thought his government would also find the British draft unacceptable and would prefer to wait for another report from the Red Cross representative in Amman, for further information on the general situation in Jordan and for the results of Mrs. Meir's trip to the U.S. The Germans were also opposed to the British draft saying that it

³ Telegram 2337 from Bern, September 17, 1925Z, relayed the British attempt to reformulate language from U.S. proposal made the previous day. British insistence on revising the text met with resistance from Israel, West Germany, and the United States, while Switzerland was willing to accept the British formula. (Ibid., PS 7–6 JORDAN) Regarding the September 16 Bern Group meeting, see Document 250 and footnote 4 thereto.

did not meet German demands specifically emphasizing an Israeli contribution to a package settlement.

It has become increasingly clear at recent sessions of the Bern Group that unless the Israelis soon join into the multilateral package approach there is a good chance that the British and Germans will break ranks and conclude unilateral deals with the PFLP. Our Chargé in Tel Aviv talked to Eban just before he left for the U.S. to urge favorable Israeli consideration of the formula being discussed in Bern.⁴ Eban again refused to go along with our approach on the grounds that Israel was being asked to write a blank check. The Chargé concludes that it will not be easy to bring Israel along and suggests that pressure be applied at as many points as possible—including with Mrs. Meir—to achieve the maximum impact.

The issue here, of course, is that the fedayeen are conditioning the release of our citizens on the performance of a third country—Israel. Israel is in fact being asked to ransom the nationals of third countries—although the situation is complicated by the fact that the fedayeen classify some of the American Jews as Israelis which raises another problem of discrimination on the basis of religion.

According to a spokesman for King Hussein the Jordanian army commanders have been given orders to look for and liberate the hostages as quickly as possible. We have no further information on the safety of the hostages although there are some indications that at least some of them may be held at locations where they could be exposed to the fighting.

U.S. Actions

The decisions taken at yesterday's WSAG meetings⁵ are being implemented. The WSAG is meeting again this morning.⁶

⁴ As reported in telegram 5120 from Tel Aviv, September 17, 0923Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12 US)

⁵ See Documents 254 and 260.

⁶ See Document 264.

264. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 18, 1970, 8:35–9:05 a.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State—

U. Alexis Johnson

Rodger P. Davies

Defense—

David Packard

Robert J. Pranger

CIA—

Richard Helms

David Blee

JCS—

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt

Lt. Gen. Melvin Zais

NSC Staff—

Harold H. Saunders

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

Adm. R.C. Robinson

Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

1. CIA, with State, will do a paper on the foreseeable outcomes of the Jordan situation, their impact in the area and their consequences for the US.²

2. Defense will do a paper spelling out what would be required by way of base rights, overflight rights, supplies, etc., if a decision should be made to use US aircraft based in Europe (as opposed to carrier aircraft) in support of Hussein.³

3. It would be better to let the airborne battalion in Europe move to the training area tomorrow at a cost of an additional six hours of alert time (from four to ten hours) than to convey an alerting signal by holding them.

Mr. Helms gave a briefing on the current situation, using a map, from the attached text.⁴ He noted also that *Pravda* has begun to take

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² The CIA/State Department paper on possible outcomes and implications of the Jordan situation, received in the White House on September 18, is *ibid.*, Box H-077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/19/70.

³ Not found.

⁴ Not attached and not found.

a harder line on US military movements and the possibility of US intervention. Cairo press (*Haikal*) is also warning against US movement and saying the Soviets will not retreat but will be in the area for generations.

Mr. Kissinger: Any movement on the diplomatic side?

Mr. Johnson: Nothing. We are a little disappointed that Nasser has not made any statement in support of Hussein.

Mr. Davies: The Egyptians are being very cautious, giving straight news. I anticipate before too long they will call for a stand-down by all parties and suggest a new effort at mediation. In Bern, all parties are beginning to feel that Israel should agree to accept part of the package in order to obtain release of the hostages. They are looking to Washington to convince Golda Meir of the necessity for this.

Mr. Kissinger: What is in it for Israel? Most of the passengers are Americans.

Mr. Johnson: They are American supporters of Israel.

Mr. Kissinger: But they are American citizens.

Mr. Packard: There is nothing in it for Israel.

Mr. Helms: [3 lines not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: In this circumstance guerrillas could grab any airliner with Jews on it.

Mr. Johnson: The Jewish community is beginning to pressure Israel.

Mr. Kissinger: Of course the guerrillas haven't said what they want.

Mr. Davies: No—they have made no specific demands.

Mr. Johnson: I am somewhat sympathetic to the Israelis in this. It is very hard for them to accept the principle of hostages in the absence of any specifics.

Mr. Davies: In discussion with Argov yesterday I agreed that Israel could not accept the principle of exchange in the abstract, but said they might be able to look at a specific package of names and numbers. He did not disagree.

Mr. Johnson: We might have a completely different situation if the fedayeen are defeated, assuming the hostages survive.

Mr. Davies: We also have a TASS report speculating that either US or Israeli forces might intervene and warning that the US should not inject itself into the situation in the guise of protecting American citizens.

Mr. Johnson: That was to be expected—I see nothing unusual in this. We have made no approach to the Russians and we have heard nothing from them.

Mr. Packard: This might be a signal as to Iraqi intentions.

Mr. Kissinger: I don't think the Russians are that well informed on the Iraqi.

Mr. Davies: I think this was more a reaction to the President's Chicago statements.⁵

Mr. Kissinger: So we believe the fighting is likely to continue; we don't expect it to deteriorate?

Mr. Helms: I think it will be slow.

Mr. Johnson: This street fighting is tough going.

Mr. Kissinger: Could we speculate on the possible outcomes? What probability is there that Hussein will win an unambiguous victory?

Mr. Packard: There is high probability unless he is pressured by other Arab states.

Mr. Kissinger: How long will it take?

Mr. Davies: Yesterday the Jordanians said it would be over today. I think this is overly sanguine. They will have a tough job mopping up.

Mr. Johnson: I would say ten days to two weeks.

Mr. Davies: They can probably get control of central Amman in 24 hours.

Mr. Packard: It will be longer if the Iraqis and Syrians come in.

Adm. Moorer: I think there will be conflict for several weeks.

Mr. Kissinger: Would the fedayeen then be broken for the time being?

Adm. Moorer: Yes, they would have expended most of their ammunition and equipment.

Mr. Johnson: The fedayeen are apparently fighting desperately. We have a report that the Jordanians are not taking any prisoners.

Mr. Helms: It depends to some extent on your judgment of Hussein. If he cleans out the fedayeen headquarters in Amman things will be quiet. He hasn't done that yet. In the past, he has moved to a certain point against the fedayeen and then, on the basis of a cease-fire or an agreement with the fedayeen, has stopped. I think this time, too, he will stop short of an unambiguous victory.

Mr. Kissinger: If he stops short of victory, either on his own initiative or under pressure from other Arab countries, then what?

Adm. Moorer: We then may face the problem all over again later.

Mr. Kissinger: What would be the relative positions of Hussein and the fedayeen?

Mr. Johnson: The King's position would be somewhat improved.

Mr. Packard: The King's position would be improved. He would have done enough damage to the fedayeen to slow them down for some time.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 261.

Mr. Kissinger: But he can't stop short of quelling the fedayeen and still maintain the morale and effectiveness of his troops.

Mr. Davies: It is significant that there have been no indications of Jordanian troops being anything but loyal and disciplined.

Mr. Kissinger: If the King persists, he is all right; if he doesn't persist, he is dead?

Mr. Davies: Not dead, but he is only buying time. In the long term he will lose control.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Helms) Will you and State do a paper for us on the foreseeable outcomes and how they would affect the situation in Jordan and in the Middle East generally; their impact on the peace initiative; what actions any of these might impose on us? Could we have the paper by tomorrow so that we could discuss it when we meet?

Mr. Helms: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: What is our military situation?

Adm. Moorer: We have two carriers, a cruiser, 14 destroyers, an ammunition ship and an oiler at the 33-33 location south of Cyprus. We have Task Force 61 with an embarked Marine battalion near Crete. The *Springfield*, the Sixth Fleet flagship, will join the Force on the 19th. We have issued orders to the amphibious group to sail on schedule. Once out of sight of land, the *Guam* will move on ahead and will enter the Gibraltar Straits on Saturday, September 26th. The *Kennedy* has been ordered to proceed to the Mediterranean and is on its way fully equipped with ammunition, although we may need to augment the Sparrow missiles. It will arrive in the Gibraltar Straits on Friday, September 25. It will be well into the Mediterranean when the President arrives.

Mr. Johnson: How big is the amphibious group?

Adm. Moorer: 1500 men, with a total of 16 helicopters, 4 of them the big ones.

Mr. Kissinger: The President has indicated that if air support becomes necessary, he does not want it to come only from the carriers. He wants to see what we could do from Europe.

Adm. Moorer: This would depend on the base situation.

Mr. Kissinger: Where?

Adm. Moorer: Preferably in Turkey.

Mr. Kissinger: But the Turkey won't let us do it.

Adm. Moorer: Or in Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Kissinger: The Saudis won't do it either.

Mr. Packard: We have some F-111s with a longer range. If we could carry in logistical supplies (bombs, fuel, etc.) we could operate from Cyprus.

Mr. Kissinger: (To Mr. Packard) Could you give us a paper on what would be involved if we should operate from Europe? I owe the President a response on this. The paper should indicate what the problems are; what would be needed if it were to be done.

Adm. Moorer: The problem is the base.

Mr. Kissinger: You could start by saying you need a base, outline what you would have to haul in to a base. I have had three requests from the President for this and have still not responded.

Mr. Packard: Turkey would be the only place for such an operation. Turkey (Incirlik) is the only place where things are already available.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Helms) You should include in your think piece the various contingencies of a Hussein victory, some sort of withdrawal, or a reverse. We don't expect a reverse, do we?

Mr. Helms: Not now. What you want is a reasonable bet as to the outcome.

Mr. Kissinger: And the consequences for us.

On press guidance, will we begin to get some stories on the sailing of the *Kennedy*?

Adm. Moorer: Not now.

Mr. Johnson: Only when it reaches Gibraltar a week from today.

Adm. Moorer: It will be evident in a day or two that she has changed her schedule, but the real impact will be when she enters the Straits.

Mr. Kissinger: We should have suggestions for press guidance before Friday.

Mr. Packard: As of this moment it should be reasonably low key.

Mr. Johnson: I think Bob McCloskey, Henkin and Ziegler should talk and we should give them contingency guidance today.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree. We should all say the same thing. I think any statements should come from Defense.

Adm. Moorer: I have one question pertaining to the readiness of the airborne battalion in Europe. They are scheduled to go to the training area today. If we hold them back, this will be a readiness indicator. If we let them go, it will cost us six hours. I think this six hours is acceptable.

Mr. Johnson: I agree. I think changing the time from four to six hours is acceptable.

Mr. Kissinger: They were primarily designated for an evacuation of Amman.

Adm. Moorer: They would be an advance element for whatever we do.

Mr. Kissinger: It would take us ten hours to make up our minds.

Mr. Packard: We have no indication on the status of Jordanian Army ammunition supplies.

Mr. Johnson: Hussein has been advised that we are ready to help them if they need help, but we have heard nothing from him.

Mr. Kissinger: And we have the standby air capability to move it, haven't we?

Mr. Pranger: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: Do we need any more communication with the Israelis?

Mr. Davies: We have had good exchanges.

Mr. Helms: [1 line not declassified] They are looking to the President's meeting with Golda Meir today.

Adm. Moorer: We have also readjusted our C-130s. We have moved the five from Turkey, are holding five in Germany and will have five more in the UK by midnight—a total increase of 15 aircraft.

Mr. Kissinger: We will meet tomorrow morning. We will let you know as to time. (It was subsequently agreed to meet at 9:00 a.m., Saturday, September 19.)⁶

⁶ See Document 267.

265. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Soviet Reaction to US Involvement in Jordan

The Soviet attitude toward the latest round between the King and the Army and the Fedayeen is probably mixed.

On the one hand, the King appears to be the preferable alternative to a radical guerrilla regime, which the Soviets have treated with

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive; Outside System. Urgent; sent for information. Kissinger's initials are on the first page.

some disdain, which could turn out to be sympathetic to the Maoist brand of revolution and more “spontaneous” than the Soviets like. The probable chaos resulting from the King’s overthrow and the psychological impetus that would give to the Iraqi and Syrian regimes cannot be something the Soviets would watch with much satisfaction or equanimity.

On the other hand, Jordan has never been of special concern to the Soviets except in that it reflected the basic policy toward the UAR. The disappearance of a regime influenced by, and sympathetic toward the US would also represent a gain of sorts for the USSR. In the end if faced with the new situation, the Soviets might convince themselves that they could work with Arafat, who, of course, has been in Moscow, and that the new pressures on Israel would strengthen the Soviet hand and weaken ours.

Whatever their theoretical ruminations, the practical matter is that the Soviets will not be happy to see US military power used in the area in any way. They will have to denounce it, harass us (including by horse play and close UAR-based reconnaissance against the 6th Fleet), and generally oppose us. The precedent is what will worry them most of all, and the demonstration that we could and will use our air power and naval presence will cast a shadow over their calculations about how far we might go in support of Israel at a later date in a new crisis, and our international posture generally. (This may be all to the good if our operations are, and are perceived to be successful.)

Israel and Iraq

1. Air strikes in support of Jordan against the fedayeen alone; this would be the least complicated for the Soviets and call for the least physical riposte; mostly propaganda and agitation, as long as the Arab states stood by.

2. Hussein vs. the fedayeen and Iraqi troops; if the conflict remains limited to these participants, no Soviet military action would be likely, especially if the US intervention was quick and effective; a more prolonged US air intervention, however, might produce some Soviet diplomatic actions, say in the UN, to castigate and condemn, to force the US to desist.

—If the Israelis became involved against the Iraqi troops, Soviet reaction could become more problematical and dangerous for two reasons: first, the Israelis might feel compelled to launch preemptive strikes against the air defense build-up along the canal, and second, the UAR might feel it had to activate that front.

—If this occurred, then the Soviets would be involved, and might shift to an entirely different diplomatic position and military calculation.

—It would be a situation in which the June war would be re-opening piecemeal; the Soviets would be concerned that the Israelis would launch a massive attack on the new air defense complex; in which case, the UAR would almost certainly want to begin using the TU-16s against the Bar-Lev line; Soviet pilots would probably be flying missions, etc.

—In this contingency the Soviets would still want to avoid a confrontation with the US, but might engage in a greater show of force in the Mediterranean.

—The main danger would be a de facto Soviet-American air battle in the entire area, with Soviet pilots flying out of the UAR, and Syria and perhaps Iraq.

3. *Armed Intervention for evacuation:* Soviet calculations might be similar to the first case; i.e., that our action could be tolerated, but they would be concerned that we leave the area; and permanent entrenchment of American forces in Jordan would be a radical change in the situation and might lead the Soviets into a tough threatening stand.

—One danger would be that the Soviets would begin putting in organized ground units in the UAR, if it looked as if the American forces were in to stay for some time to come.

—Again, the total Soviet reaction would also be affected by Israeli involvement; Israeli intervention, plus US landings of ground troops would look to the Soviets like a power play changing the ball game in a major way in Israel's favor.

—The Soviets and the UAR would then have to consider whether to put pressure on the canal front, ranging from raids to a full scale attack; the Soviets would probably not encourage such a course, but they also could not afford to veto such a decision; thus the Soviets themselves could become involved at this point.

In sum, the Soviets want, first of all, to protect their stake in the UAR. Their decisions and actions will be influenced by Nasser, and, in turn, the Soviets will be counseling him to think of his own security first and his prestige as an Arab leader second.

The secondary, but still important Soviet aim will be to limit and prevent American intrusion with any military action or presence. They are probably not prepared to take much of a risk to do this in the situation in Jordan but the critical factor is whether Israel becomes involved and the fighting erupts along the canal. Should it do so, a proxy war would be underway, and the Soviets might just figure that decisive action along the canal would be preferable to a war of attrition. This is the main danger.

One important area of uncertainty is the impact of a crisis on the top Soviet leadership, which was sharply criticized after the June war for being too soft, and for mismanaging the entire affair. In another major crisis, particularly one in which the US demonstrated it was free to act militarily, the Soviets might feel they had to justify themselves. On the other hand, they could not afford to open up charges of mismanaging a risky affair by imprudent actions.

On balance, it seems that the Soviets would probably conclude they had little choice but to let the US get away with a limited intervention, as long as Israeli forces were not involved in attacks against the forces of Arab governments.

266. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, September 18, 1970, 2252Z.

154000. Subject: Soviet Démarche re Jordan.

1. Soviet Chargé Vorontsov called urgently Sept 18 on Dep Asst Secy Davies (NEA) to present following Soviet Govt message to USG.

2. *Begin text.* The Soviet Government is concerned over the information coming in about the sharp aggravation of the situation in Jordan which has led to fierce and bloody clashes; the country stands on the precipice of a civil war. This turn of events complicates the entire situation in the Middle East and may adversely affect the continuing attempts to find ways of achieving a political settlement of the Middle East conflict.

The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government of the United States will agree with the Soviet Government's view that it is necessary for all states, including those not belonging to this region, to exercise prudence in their steps in connection with the prevailing complex situation in the Middle East.

We would like to draw special attention to the possible position of Israel in connection with the current events in Jordan, and hope that the US Govt will use its influence with the Govt of Israel in order to preclude the possibility of Israel's exploiting this situation for a still greater aggravation of the situation in the Middle East as a whole.

The Soviet Government for its part has deemed it necessary to urge the leaders of Jordan, Iraq, Syria and the United Arab Republic to take measures dictated by the situation in order at the earliest point to put an end to the fratricidal clashes in Jordan and to prevent the outbreak of civil war. We are searching for ways of bringing our viewpoint also to the attention of the leadership of the Palestine movement.

The Soviet Government as before stands for a settlement of the Middle East crisis by political means on the basis of the implementation of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 in all its parts, and is prepared to continue efforts together with other states toward the earliest attainment of this aim. *End text.*

3. At Davies' request Vorontsov confirmed USSR has already made démarches in Baghdad, Damascus, Amman, and Cairo. He added Soviets now seeking to contact Palestinians.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Walter Smith (NEA/UAR); cleared by Dubs (EUR/SOV); and approved by Davies. It was repeated to Amman (Priority), Beirut, USINT Cairo, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and USUN.

4. Davies said US too is anxious for ME settlement along lines Nov resolution. We are concerned about fate of hostages held in Jordan by PFLP and grave danger of situation in Amman. Situation in Jordan caused in part by GOJ acceptance of proposal for negotiations. Movement against GOJ is one of opposition to peaceful ME settlement.

5. Davies pointed out we would be particularly concerned if Syria or Iraq were to intervene in Jordan. There have been unconfirmed reports of Syrian involvement, which would only aggravate picture and make it more difficult to stabilize situation and get on with main objective of ME settlement.

6. Vorontsov said Gromyko wanted message brought to Secretary as soon as possible. Davies undertook to do so.

Rogers

267. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 19, 1970, 9:25–10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State—

U. Alexis Johnson

Rodger P. Davies

Defense—

David Packard

Robert J. Pranger

CIA—

Richard Helms

David Blee

JCS—

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt

NSC Staff—

Harold H. Saunders

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

Jeanne W. Davis

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 70. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

1. we should not rush to reply to the Soviet note;²
2. a summary paper will be prepared on what would be required to mount US air operations in Jordan from land (as opposed to carriers);³
3. we will stick to our present press guidance;
4. consideration of the paper on possible outcomes in Jordan⁴ will be deferred until Monday by which time the options might be narrowed;
5. a paper will be prepared on the possibilities for budgetary support for Jordan.⁵

Mr. Helms briefed from the attached notes.⁶

Mr. Helms: The Jordanian military commander has now issued a “final ultimatum” calling for the surrender of all fedayeen by 4:00 p.m.—a half-hour from now.

Mr. Kissinger: Does Nasser mean his cease-fire proposal?

Mr. Helms: Yes, he would like to see the fighting stopped.

Mr. Kissinger: Have there been a lot of casualties?

Mr. Helms: We have no figures.

Mr. Kissinger: How badly have the fedayeen been weakened?

Mr. Helms: You can’t fire into those refugee camps without killing a lot of people.

Mr. Johnson: The government claims they have taken 6,000 prisoners.

Mr. Helms: We have unconfirmed reports of Soviet ship movements in the Mediterranean and, as you know, the Soviets have been in touch with both Davies and Ambassador Beam.⁷

Mr. Kissinger: This was very low key, wasn’t it? Much more low key than their response to us on the missiles.

Mr. Johnson: Yes, very low key.

Mr. Helms: With regard to the hostages, the Red Cross delegate in Beirut has said he is not empowered to discuss them.

² See Document 266.

³ Not found.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 264.

⁵ Not found.

⁶ Not attached and not found.

⁷ See Document 266. Beam reported on his meeting with Kuznetsov in telegram 5445 from Moscow, September 19, 0747Z. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Files, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/19/70)

Mr. Davies: We now have a report of a proposal made by the PFLP representative in Beirut that in exchange for the 7 captured guerrillas, the PFLP would release all hostages except the dual nationals.⁸ From our count this would be all but two of the hostages, but we are not sure of the guerrillas' definition of dual nationals.

Mr. Kissinger: All but two would be within the range of what could be exchanged for the Algerians.

Mr. Davies: I think the PFLP would like the prestige of fulfilling this exchange. They must be under real pressure to release all the hostages.

Mr. Kissinger: Is there any reason why we couldn't agree to this proposal?

Mr. Davies: No, if there are no other conditions. Israel would agree if it were only the two Algerians.

Mr. Kissinger: The problem has been the principle that anyone of the Jewish religion could be held as hostage for anything Israel might do. This proposed arrangement sounds all right. Our diplomacy of the past two weeks would really have paid off. It would be a great achievement.

Mr. Saunders: It is so good, it doesn't sound real.

Mr. Davies: It could certainly be trumpeted abroad as a successful operation.

Mr. Johnson: If it is true, it is certainly an indication the PFLP is being pressed pretty hard. We must not count on it too much, however—just keep your fingers crossed.

Mr. Kissinger: Do the British know this?

Mr. Davies: They must have the same information; also, Joe Sisco is in touch with them.⁹ The British Ambassador had suggested a broadcast appeal indicating that the governments were willing to negotiate with the ICRC. We decided to wait until this morning to consider this idea.

Mr. Johnson: I was a little worried about the Germans but they have now firmed up their position very satisfactorily.

Mr. Davies: And the British are aboard.

Mr. Kissinger: How about the Swiss?

Mr. Davies: They are as solid as we are. I don't know where the story began that they were shaky.

⁸ In telegram 7901 from Beirut, September 18, 1635Z. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PS 7-6 JORDAN)

⁹ Apparently a reference to telegram 154363 to London, September 19, 0132Z. (Ibid., AV 12)

Mr. Kissinger: On the diplomatic side, we have the indirect Jordanian appeal. Has that not been overtaken by events?

Mr. Davies: Yes. If the Soviets have weighed in in Damascus and Baghdad, as they have indicated, this is as effective as anything they could do.

Mr. Kissinger: Have we thought about what we should do in response to the Soviet note?

Mr. Johnson: I see no need to rush a reply.

Mr. Kissinger: This is my instinct, too. They let us wait ten days for their reply to our approach on the missiles. (To Mr. Davies) What did you say to them?

Mr. Davies: I said we were seriously concerned for the lives of American citizens and that if Iraq or Syria should intervene, it would create a grave situation.¹⁰

Mr. Kissinger: Let's wait a few days to reply; I think the less said now the better, as long as the military situation is O.K. The Russians have appealed to Syria and Iraq, and I thought it interesting that they said they were trying to establish contact with the Palestinians.

Mr. Johnson: Very interesting.

Mr. Davies: The Russians were trying to be very correct. When I mentioned reports of incursions from the north, Vorontsov said "You don't mean we are involved."

Mr. Kissinger: So Nasser is urging a cease-fire. Have we heard from the Shah?

Mr. Johnson: Volumes. He gave MacArthur a tour d'horizon which ended up that he needs more equipment.¹¹

Mr. Kissinger: That was inevitable.

Mr. Johnson: He is pretty perceptive—he makes a good case.

Mr. Kissinger: What about the military side?

Adm. Moorer: As you requested, we have prepared a study of land-based aircraft operations. We have listed every field from which operations could be considered, with the advantages and disadvantages of each. Turkey is the only place from which we could commence operations on short notice. Cyprus, Greece, or any other would require us to fly in support.

Mr. Kissinger: How long would it take?

Adm. Moorer: Seven days for 3 squadrons—54 planes. We looked at 11 fields. Two of them have F-4 war reserve munitions and they are

¹⁰ See Document 266.

¹¹ See footnote 2, Document 259.

both in Turkey. There are only 18 aircraft in Incirlik, but Cigli would require some augmentation.

Mr. Kissinger: How much would this step up our sortie rate?

Gen. Vogt: We figure one sortie per airplane per day.

Mr. Kissinger: So 3 squadrons would only add 25 percent to our sortie rate?

Adm. Moorer: The carriers have 5 squadrons with 12 to 14 aircraft each. We could figure 1.6 or 1.8 sorties per plane since the shuttle would be only 150 miles. The distance from Turkey is not much greater. We should figure one sortie per plane per day since their supplies are not all in position yet.

Mr. Kissinger: So we could operate immediately from Turkey bases but only with 18 aircraft. Could they handle more?

Adm. Moorer: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: But our judgment was that there was no chance of Turkish approval of our use of these bases.

Adm. Moorer: We are left with Cyprus, Rhodes, Crete and Athens. All of these would require refueling by tanker. The closest fields are the two in Turkey and one in Cyprus. Cyprus would take 7 days to get 3 squadrons ready.

Mr. Kissinger: We would be in serious trouble if we were still bombing 7 days after we started. If we should need more than 200 sorties a day after 7 days something serious would be happening.

Adm. Moorer: If operations were confined to Jordan we have enough there on the carriers already.

Mr. Packard: And another carrier arrives soon.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes. In a few days, we could get 5 squadrons there by carrier faster than from the land. Two days from now we could reinforce quicker by carrier than by land.

Adm. Moorer: Would we have a chance of getting Cyprus?

Mr. Johnson: I think it is questionable; I am not sure of that at all.

Mr. Kissinger: Wasn't Makarios¹² cooperative over the U-2s?

Mr. Davies: He was willing to ignore the flights since there was no evidence of opposition from the UK or the Soviets.

Mr. Kissinger: That would not survive a week's operation in Jordan.

Mr. Johnson: Legally the British have the right to let us use the base in Cyprus.

¹² Archbishop Makarios was President of Cyprus.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Saunders) Would you do a summary paper on this, indicating the amount of time it would take; what the possible fields are in Turkey, which we can't get, Cyprus and Crete; that the latter two require in-flight refueling; that, with the third carrier coming, after Monday it would be faster to reinforce from carriers than from the land.

Gen. Vogt: Unless we could use Turkey; in that case we could have 3 more squadrons there in 36 hours.

Mr. Kissinger: I think it is inconceivable that we could use Turkey, but we should make the point in the summary.

Mr. Packard: The Shah might let us operate from Iran.

Mr. Kissinger: We would still have to pre-position equipment.

Adm. Moorer: We considered that but ruled it out.

Mr. Kissinger: We will summarize the situation.

Adm. Moorer (passing a paper to Mr. Saunders)¹³ It is all right here.

Adm. Moorer: We should send another tanker into the area. A tanker would normally be with the *Kennedy*, and it would permit better dispersal. It could come back when the *Saratoga* rotates out of the Mediterranean.

Mr. Kissinger: That is a military decision. You should do anything necessary to provide support for your carriers.

Adm. Moorer: All right. We will send 6 ASW aircraft and the tanker. They have also asked for a CVS group. We only have one and it would take a long time to get it ready. I would suggest we not do it.

Mr. Kissinger: Would the additional ships be noticed?

Adm. Moorer: They would be noticed here and the Russians would know it. When the *Saratoga* comes out, though, we will take the whole group out.

Mr. Kissinger: If the situation goes to pot we can send in the CVS group.

Mr. Packard: How about TC-3s?

Adm. Moorer: We have six.

Mr. Packard: They have some new equipment which gives them better capability.

Mr. Kissinger: As to press guidance, can we stick with our present position?

Mr. Johnson: Our low-key position? What would a high-key position look like? There are detailed press stories today, and 15 minutes

¹³ Not found.

of Walter Cronkite last night was devoted to marines boarding ships, ships sailing, etc.

Mr. Kissinger: Then we can say that we recommend continuing our present press guidance. Have we contingency guidance on the *Kennedy*.

Adm. Moorer: There has already been speculation about the *Kennedy*.

Mr. Helms: The only speculation was the name of the ship.

Adm. Moorer: The press is shooting from the hip. There is no difference between this speculation and the fact that they had US marines moving into Turkey, which is completely untrue.

Mr. Kissinger: Do we have contingency guidance?

Mr. Johnson: McCloskey, Henkin and Ziegler were all in touch yesterday.

Adm. Moorer: I think continuing speculation which turns out to be half right and half wrong dulls its impact.

Mr. Johnson: But it is 90 percent right.

Mr. Kissinger: Do we care?

Mr. Johnson and Mr. Packard: No, not particularly.

Mr. Kissinger: We also have the paper on possible outcomes in Jordan. It is an excellent paper but I suggest we defer consideration of it until Monday. By that time we may be able to eliminate one or more of the choices and concentrate on the ones that are more likely.

Mr. Davies: I think the outcomes were adumbrated by events this morning. The King will be in better shape but we will have to look at what we should do when the situation is stabilized. The King will probably need more from us.

Mr. Kissinger: More military assistance?

Mr. Davies: And funds.

Mr. Kissinger: Could we staff this problem over the weekend?

Mr. Saunders: Rodger is talking about replacement of budgetary support—there is no crash on this.

Mr. Kissinger: Can they operate with the military support they now have?

Mr. Pranger: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's get a paper on what our choices are in the area of budgetary support. My instinct is that the President would be prepared to entertain such a proposal. We should tell him what is involved and how it might operate under one or two choices.

Mr. Johnson: (to Mr. Davies) You might discuss this with Art Hartman. He has been working on my Operation Scrounge for Cambodia and his experience would be pertinent.

Mr. Kissinger: We have talked about tacking on a lot of supplements to the Israeli assistance package, but I doubt if the traffic would bear adding Jordan to that package.

Mr. Saunders: Every time we have concluded an arms deal with Jordan we have also concluded one with Israel.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's wait over the weekend. By Monday morning I think the options will have narrowed.

Mr. Davies: All indications are that the King will be in full control of Amman by then.

Mr. Kissinger: I think we can rule out Options E and F. Does this leave us a choice between C and D?¹⁴

Mr. Davies: Somewhere in that range.

Mr. Kissinger: Between A and C?

Mr. Davies: With two-thirds of his population made up of Palestinians, the King will have to reach some compromise at some time.

¹⁴ The options were laid out in the paper on possible outcomes in Jordan; see footnote 2, Document 264. Option C supposed a limited victory for King Hussein, leaving the fedayeen to operate primarily in the countryside. Option D supposed King Hussein compromising with the fedayeen and allowing them to function as they did before the fighting. Option E assumed successful resistance by the fedayeen, forcing the Jordanian Government to seek terms. Option F presumed a fedayeen victory and control of Jordan.

268. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland¹

Washington, September 19, 1970, 1554Z.

154331. Subject: Proposed Text Bern Group Message. Ref: Bern 2369; Beirut 7915, Beirut 7925.²

1. We are prepared support new UK formula for message with addition of sentence suggested by Swiss and your proposed amendment

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PS 7–6 JORDAN. Confidential; Flash. Drafted by Seelye and Frank Trinko (EUR/AIS), and approved by Seelye. It was repeated to Beirut (Flash), Amman, Bonn, London, Tel Aviv, and Geneva.

² Telegram 2369 from Bern, September 19, 1220Z, transmitted the British text of a proposed Bern Group message. In telegram 7915 from Beirut, September 19, 0935Z, and telegram 7925 from Beirut, September 19, 1333Z, the Embassy reported on discussions with ICRC officials. (All *ibid.*)

this sentence as well as further change in penultimate sentence (see below). Redraft takes into account comments made by Prime Minister Meir to Secretary.³ *FYI*: Our current assessment based on Meir's comments is that while GOI will probably agree to initial three PFLP demands made of them (release of Swiss, 2 Algerians and 10 Lebanese soldiers), Israelis very unlikely agree to release of Palestinian prisoners. *End FYI*.

2. Text would thus read as follows:

"The governments hold responsible for the safety of the hostages all those in whose hands they may be. The governments call upon those holding hostages to provide information on their whereabouts and wellbeing. They require that the hostages should be brought to a safe place which in the view of the governments is a prerequisite to an orderly transfer. The governments stand ready to consider at any time proposals for the release of all hostages. They also reaffirm their mandate to the ICRC."

If above not acceptable, do not concur. Request instructions.

3. Imperative that Bern group reaffirm as soon as possible mandate to ICRC in view Beirut 7915 which indicates ICRC reps cabling for instructions and requesting presence ICRC rep with authority to negotiate re hostages.

4. *For Beirut*: You should make absolutely clear to PFLP, as well as to ICRC reps in Beirut, that USG has in no way accepted PFLP conditions and continues to insist on package approach. This means that either all hostages must be released or none at all. Beirut 7926⁴ just received. You should emphasize to ICRC that USG cannot guarantee any Israeli undertaking in regard to release of hostages and, as indicated para 1 above, likelihood of Israel agreeing to release Palestinian prisoners is slim. We are disturbed at how Boissard and Boissier seem to be so unaware of what has gone on up to now. You should straighten them out.

5. *For Bern*: At today's meeting you should refer to conversation between Embassy Beirut and ICRC reps (Boissier and Boissard) and urge that Bern group assures that ICRC headquarters provide background information to their reps in Beirut re state of play in negotiations and positions of various parties up to now.

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³ The record of Meir's September 18 discussion of the hostages with Rogers is in telegram 154300 to Amman, Bern, Bonn, London, and Tel Aviv, September 19, 0311Z; see *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972, Document 73.

⁴ Telegram 7926 from Beirut, September 19, 1335Z, reported the view of the ICRC representatives that the U.S. Government and Israeli Government had "agreed in principle that Israel should release some Palestinians it holds." The PFLP sought a guarantee from the U.S. Government that Israel would release a specified number of prisoners. (*Ibid.*)

269. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

September 19, 1970, 11:05 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Jordan crisis.]

P: Still no word on the hostages?

K: Beirut representatives said would be released for 7 prisoners in Europe plus body plus 2 Israelis. We are trying to confirm that report. If it is true it will be a special achievement. We started off with 300 Israelis. Also what they interpret as dual citizens. Hold those against 2 Algerians. Israelis will let them go. We will know later this afternoon. Bern group is meeting now. More this afternoon. Fedayeen feel hard pressed.

P: Our moves certainly well covered. [talking about military moves.]² Press picks up all the ship movements which is just fine. [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

K: The *Guam* . . . The *Kennedy* has 4 destroyers with it. Also ASW planes moved in . . . Soviet note to us was very soft and much weaker than anything they said to us on missile violations.³

P: On the what?

K: Missile violations of the ceasefire. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that the Arabs thinks we are getting ready to intervene which is exactly what we want.

P: What is critical is the hostages they hold.

K: The last 2 weeks have shown. When we moved the 6th fleet, within 24 hours they screwed down demands. Every time we started reinforcing.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. The President was in Camp David, Maryland, and Kissinger was in Washington. (*Ibid.*, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

² Brackets are in the original.

³ See Document 266.

270. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)¹

Washington, September 19, 1970, 12:20 p.m.

J: Henry, have you seen this flash from Amman in which the King is asking for hospitals.² I think the nearest we have undoubtedly is Germany. I thought I would send a flash back and say of course we would do everything we could and ask has the King approached ICRC? We would like to get an ICRC umbrella in there.

K: Yes, I have seen it. Haig brought it in and he is going to call Sisco on it with the same ideas. Our minds are running along the same lines. I told Haig that we would like a multi-lateral umbrella but we should not hold up too long in order to organize it.

J: I'll tell them that we are taking all measures that we can.³

K: Yes, of course. Multi-laterally with the ICRC or with—jointly with Germany and France who I understand they also asked.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking.

² Telegram 4936 from Amman, September 19, 1509Z. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 10 JORDAN)

³ In telegram 4986 from Amman, September 21, 0013Z, the Embassy reported it had told Zaid Rifai that the United States planned to send two complete field hospitals, transported to Jordan by U.S. military aircraft, but under ICRC auspices. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 619, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan Crisis)

271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, September 19, 1970, 2316Z.

154391. For Ambassador MacArthur. Ref: State 152503; Tehran 4059.²

1. We have read with interest Shah's assessment of Jordanian situation. Please convey Department's sincere appreciation when you share with the Shah our own assessment of the current situation as given below:

2. Militarily King appears have upper hand in Amman, Zarqa and southern part of country. Situation around Irbid not clear, but GOJ assures us army intends reestablish control over that city in the near future. Thus far there has been no active interference on part of Syria and Iraq, although we have reports of fedayeen belonging to Saiqa and other unidentified Palestinian organizations entering Jordan from Lebanon and Syria. With particular reference to Iraq, Iraqi troops in Jordan have not involved themselves in current fighting. Moreover, they have reportedly stood by while Jordan Army moved against fedayeen in Mafraq area. In addition other reports indicate Iraqis have begun as yet unexplained withdrawal of Iraqi units from Irbid area back to Mafraq.

3. In sum, security situation in Amman appears somewhat better than yesterday, although no doubt some bitter fighting remains to be done before King's authority entirely reestablished at least over urban centers of his kingdom.

4. You might also discreetly probe Shah's thinking on possible Iranian moves should Iraq actively intervene in Jordan.³ You may inform him privately that we are prepared intervene if it becomes necessary to evacuate American citizens should there be complete breakdown of public order in Jordan and American lives are in serious

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted on September 18 by Scotese; cleared by Davies, Kissinger via Haig, Seelye, Childs (NEA/IRN), and Sterner (NEA/UAR); and approved by Sisco. It was repeated Immediate to Amman and Tel Aviv.

² Telegram 152503 is Document 259. For telegram 4059 from Tehran, September 17, 1345Z, see footnote 2 thereto.

³ Telegram 4113 from Tehran, September 21, 1315Z, conveyed the Shah's comments to MacArthur that there was little Iran could do to help King Hussein since Iran was not an Arab state. However, the Shah had sent a message to Nasser proposing that the UAR, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Turkey, and Lebanon formally urge all nations to avoid intervention in Jordan. The Shah intended the formal appeal to be aimed specifically at Iraq and Syria. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN)

danger. Beyond this, any other kind of intervention would obviously depend on future developments in Jordan situation. In the event of Iraqi and/or Syrian military intervention, which we consider unlikely, the King might request outside air support to interdict foreign forces moving against King. You may inform the Shah very confidentially that because of the importance we attach to the survival of the Hashemite regime and because of our previous commitments to him, we are considering how we might be responsive.

5. If the Shah should ask what the U.S. position would be re Israeli intervention, you should reply that we doubt such intervention would have positive effect except in connection air interdiction against Syria and Iraqi military forces at time King's regime seriously threatened. You may inform him that we are in close and continuing contact with Israelis re current situation in Jordan.

6. Re Nasser's position vis-à-vis Jordanian situation, we believe that Nasser would, all things considered, prefer to see Hussein stay in power, particularly in view of what we continue to believe to be Nasser's desire for some sort of Near East peace settlement. However, Nasser is aware of the growth of Palestinianism as a political force in the area, and he may rate the Hashemite dynasty's chances of long-term survival as slight. In the present crisis he appears to be trying to stay on the fence and in a position to deal with whatever forces emerge. He would probably prefer a situation of stability in Jordan with the King in control and the Palestinian guerrilla movement dominated by Yasir Arafat, the one among Palestinian leaders with whom Nasser has greatest rapport. He would probably have little problem with an attempt by the King to crush the extremist Palestinian guerrilla groups; however, the King's move against al-Fatah as well as the other groups probably aroused Nasser's concern. In general we can expect Nasser to play a moderating role. His recent appeal, in conjunction with Qhadafi and Numeiry, for a ceasefire and political solution of the crisis in Jordan can be seen in this light. We doubt whether Nasser will provide either Hussein or Arafat with any tangible assistance.

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272. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 19, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Situation in Jordan

After two days of fighting, the Jordanian army is still far from securing Amman. Although the army continues to have the upper hand, King Hussein apparently has been reluctant to apply the maximum force available to him for fear of causing numerous civilian casualties and reducing the city to a shambles. Some of his military strength is also being drawn off to cope with the stiff fedayeen resistance in the cities to the north. Hussein's problem now is that the longer the fighting drags on the greater will be the pressure from the other Arab states to accept a compromise solution.

Our Embassy in Amman comments that this is not a win-or-lose situation for Hussein.² The question is what kind of compromise Hussein will settle for. He appears to view his objective as restoring his authority in urban centers while not putting himself completely at odds with the Palestinians who form a large part of his population. Put another way, he seems to be seeking a solution which will still leave him with the support of the "silent majority" of moderate Palestinians. This objective and the pressures of other Arabs may cause him to stop short of completely suppressing the guerrillas, but our Embassy last night felt that unless the pace of his movement increased today he would not be in a strong position to force compromise on his terms.

The Military Situation

After another day of heavy fighting *in Amman* in which the army continued to make gradual progress in rooting out the fedayeen, the fighting slacked off again last night. The army opened up again, however, at dawn and may be pressing its attack more intensively than in the past two days. The embassy was repeatedly attacked last night by a small group of fedayeen who were finally driven off by the Beduin guard with the help of a tank. All embassy personnel are reported safe.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/19/70. Secret; Sensitive. An attached map is not printed.

² In telegram 4918 from Amman, September 18, 2000Z. (Ibid., Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V)

There are indications that the army is making some progress *in the north*, although it seems to be meeting fairly stiff resistance. Yesterday army troops were encircling Ramtha (see attached map), just south of the Syrian border. Ramtha is a key town, since Jordanian control there would cut off movement of fedayeen reinforcements and supplies coming in from Syria. According to the Israelis, the army is on the outskirts of Irbid, Jordan's second largest city and a fedayeen stronghold. The government, at least for now, seems to be in control of Zarka, just north of Amman. There are reports of fighting this morning in parts of the "liberated area."

The Syrians appear to have become at least marginally involved in the fighting near their border with Jordan. The Israelis yesterday spotted unidentified tanks moving in the area of the Syrian border in the direction of Ramtha and, according to the Jordanians, some Syrian tanks actually crossed the frontier near Dar'a and shelled Jordanian positions. The Jordanians say that, unopposed by Iraqi troops in the area, they have interposed a tank force to block further Syrian movement. It is by no means clear that the tanks in question belong to the regular Syrian army; they could well belong to a fedayeen organization, Saiqah.

The Iraqis from all indications continue to stand aside from the fighting. According to the Israelis, the Iraqi forces in Jordan continue to concentrate around Mafraq and the headquarters of the Iraqi First Division in Zarka is withdrawing to Iraq.

Arab Mediation

King Hussein met for three hours yesterday with Egyptian Chief of Staff Sadiq, the special envoy of the three Arab presidents—Numayri of Sudan, Qaddafi of Libya, and Nasser of Egypt—sent to discuss the situation. Sadiq, [1 line not declassified] expressed sympathy for Hussein's position but urged that "the time had come to stop the bloodshed." Hussein replied by stating the strict conditions he insists that the fedayeen must operate under in the future. Sadiq was unable to [apparent omission] Yasir Arafat.

The Hostages

A spokesman for the PFLP said yesterday that the 54 hostages from the hijacked aircraft are "in good condition." A senior PFLP official in Beirut, told our Embassy there that despite its previous statement, the PFLP is now prepared to negotiate the release of the hostages through the Red Cross.³ They insist, however, that these negotiations be held in

³ As reported in telegram 7913 from Beirut, September 18, 2125Z. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PS 7-6, JORDAN)

Beirut and quickly, today if possible. The spokesman claimed that this proposal was made not from weakness but for humanitarian reasons. He said that as of yesterday afternoon a number of the hostages required medical attention—not because they had been injured in the fighting, but because of their general health. He added that the hostages were housed in areas where there had been no fighting, but that there were no doctors available to treat them.

According to a CIA report,⁴ the hostages have been split into at least eight groups. Five of these are being held in Zarka near the refugee camp there; the others are reportedly in the Wahdat refugee camp in Amman and in other camps outside the city. The Wahdat camp has been and probably will continue to be the scene of some of the heaviest fighting between the army and fedayeen.

Reaction to U.S. Actions

The Soviets are apparently increasingly concerned at the possibility of U.S., British or Israeli intervention in Jordan. Soviet chargé Vorontsov yesterday called “urgently” on Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies to ask that Secretary Rogers be informed of the following:

—The Soviets are concerned about the situation in Jordan which “complicates” the entire situation in the Middle East and may “adversely affect” attempts to achieve a peace settlement.

—The Soviets “hope” that the U.S. agrees that it is necessary for “all states, including those not belonging to this region,” to “exercise prudence” in their steps concerning the Middle East situation. They draw “special attention” to Israel and “hope” that the U.S. will use its influence to preclude the possibility of Israel’s exploiting the situation. The Soviets, for their part, have already urged the leaders of Jordan, Iraq, Syria and the UAR to take measures to put an end to the fighting in Jordan.

—The Soviet Government “as before, stands for a settlement of the Middle East crisis based on the November 1967 U.N. Security Council resolution.”⁵

Ambassador Beam also reports that he met last evening with Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov at a diplomatic reception who said that he hoped the U.S. had no intention of intervening in Jordan.⁶ Such an action, Kuznetsov said, would make a bad situation worse, would risk widening hostilities, and would create serious difficulties for all nations with interests in Jordan.

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ See Document 266.

⁶ Telegram 5445 from Moscow, September 19, 0747Z. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/19/70)

Soviet propaganda is also reflecting the apparent concern over possible outside intervention in Jordan. Tass, for instance, yesterday warned that any attempt at intervention in Jordan would "entail a new worsening of the conflict" which could "overstep the borders of that country."

The Egyptians are also alarmed and apparently are trying to discourage U.S. intervention. An official UAR spokesman this morning issued a statement which makes the following points:

—The movement of U.S. forces and fleet in the eastern Mediterranean and statements from the White House and State Department not ruling out intervention "constitute a grave dimension . . . that would escalate and expand the conflict to engulf the whole area."

—These movements "harm the whole Arab nation" because they exploit the situation in Jordan to create an opportunity for foreign intervention and for Israeli aggression.

—Any "implicit or explicit U.S. pressure is a threat to the security and peace of the Middle East," results in further military ventures and encourages Israeli aggression. "The UAR warns against the consequences of such movements and holds the U.S. responsible for the serious consequences that would result from them."

The Soviet and Egyptian diplomatic efforts seem directed at achieving a cease-fire in Jordan. This would work to the fedayeen advantage if it took place before Hussein is in a strong position to enforce his terms.

273. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 19, 1970.

SUBJECT

Additional Comments on the Soviet Position on Jordan

The approach made by Vorontsov to Davies bears out the main point in my earlier memo on Soviet reactions;² namely, that the Soviets vastly prefer to insulate the Jordanian crisis, even if the fedayeen are defeated, but are especially worried over Israeli intervention. Indeed, if Vorontsov's statement can be accepted at face value the Soviets are at least using some of their political capital to restrain Syria and Iraq and the UAR, and in effect are virtually appealing to us for restraint.

Israel

As to the prospect of our involvement, the Soviet approach in Washington as well as the remarks by Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov to Beam in Moscow and public output also tend to bear out what we said in yesterday's memo; that is, that the Soviets would not intervene militarily but would not stand by without raising a major campaign against us. As Beam pointed out the Soviets probably feel that Kuznetsov has passed a warning to reinforce the more formal diplomatic demands of Vorontsov, who really did not touch directly on our possible intervention.

Again, there are two aspects that deeply concern the Soviets as Kuznetsov mentioned. First, outside intervention risks "widening hostilities." Second, it creates difficulties for all nations which have "interests in the area." The Soviet interests are plain. They want to forestall situations which could force them into the unpalatable decision of going to the defense of the Arab states with their own personnel. This means primarily to avoid Israeli involvement, and a resumption of fighting along the canal (at least until they are ready for it). Second, they want to demonstrate to us, to the Arabs, and to the world at large that the Middle East is a Soviet preserve where the US can no longer

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V. Secret; Sensitive; Outside System. Urgent; Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the top of the first page.

² See Documents 265 and 266.

act with impunity. But the situation in Jordan and our possible intervention might force the Russians to choose between protecting their clients at considerable new risks to themselves and accepting the fact that they cannot yet dictate American policy in the area.

I understand that at the WSAG the consensus was if any intervention is necessary, it should be done by Israel rather than the US.³ While not arguing the relative effectiveness of Israeli vs. US intervention, I want to stress that from the *Soviet* viewpoint American intervention is more tolerable than Israeli. American intervention could be dealt with in the Great Power context, and, from the Soviet viewpoint, somehow managed. But Israeli intervention raises new questions and above all, the risks that the whole area will lapse into unrestrained warfare, bringing into play Soviet commitments and the probable involvement of Soviet personnel in the UAR.

One further aspect of this crisis is that it may be bringing home to the Soviets the risks they have run lately in upsetting the ceasefire standstill. As I noted in my memo of a few days ago,⁴ there was some sign of Soviet apprehension in the Vinogradov-Beam talk,⁵ and a hint of willingness to talk about rectification. The latest *démarche* on Jordan suggests that the Soviets may believe that some gesture on the UAR-Israeli front may be necessary to limit the chances of our or Israeli intervention in Jordan.

In Sum: the type of intervention that might be most dramatic but *least* effective in terms of controlling the situation on the ground in Jordan may be *least* likely to produce direct Soviet intervention; whereas the intervention *most* likely in the short run, at least, to be effective in controlling the situation on the ground (Israeli) may be *most* likely to produce Soviet intervention because it is most likely to reopen general Arab-Israeli hostilities and hence involve Soviet commitments and personnel.

The Soviets clearly prefer neither form of intervention even though, on balance, they would probably prefer to see the King remain in power.

³ See Document 267.

⁴ Apparently a reference to Sonnenfeldt's September 16 memorandum; see *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969-October 1970, Document 205.

⁵ Beam reported on his meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Vinogradov on September 3 to discuss violation of the UAR-Israeli cease-fire in telegram 5076 from Moscow, September 3, 2000Z. See *ibid.*, Document 201.

274. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 19, 1970.

SUBJECT

WSAG Actions—Jordan

The following actions have been taken:

Diplomatic

—*Jordan*—We advised King Hussein that we would look promptly and with sympathy on requests for materiel assistance.²

—*Iran*—Ambassador MacArthur has seen the Shah and has exchanged views on the situation with him.³

—*Israel*—We are getting regular Israeli assessment of the situation and are obtaining reconnaissance and intelligence data from the Israelis.

—*USSR and UAR*—We have made no approaches to either government—the Soviets have approached us indicating that they believe all states both within and outside the region should avoid intervention and seek to bring an end of the fighting. The USSR made this point to Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo and the Fedayeen. We do not plan to reply immediately.

—*The U.N.*—We will not go to the U.N. now but be prepared to make an approach there if Syria or Iraq intervenes.

Military Supply

—Defense has prepared a package of materiel which Hussein might need; the materiel has been identified and can be shipped quickly.

—Defense [*less than 1 line not declassified*] developed plans for air shipment of materiel to Jordan if this is needed.

—Plans for shipment of materiel using staging through Turkey, Greece or Cyprus have been prepared. We will now [*not*] approach Turkey unless Nasser makes a public statement of support for Hussein.

—Defense is sounding out Saudi Arabia for possible use of their C-130s for delivery of materiel to Jordan which we would preposition for them.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/19/70. Top Secret; Sensitive.

² Not found.

³ See footnote 2, Document 259.

Military Measures

—*Airlift*—Five C-130s have been moved from Incirlik to preposition them for evacuation; ten additional C-130s have been moved to Europe.

—*The Fleet*—The entire Sixth Fleet has been positioned in the Eastern Mediterranean.

—The *Saratoga* and *Independence* are south of Cyprus along with the amphibious force with one Marine battalion landing team embarked.

—The *Guam* with another Marine unit embarked and with helicopters will pass through Gibraltar Straits on Saturday, 26 September.

—The Carrier *Kennedy* is enroute to the Mediterranean and will pass through Gibraltar Straits on 25 September.

—An additional tanker and four destroyers are being ordered to the Mediterranean to support the *Kennedy*.

—Six additional land-based ASW aircraft are being ordered to the Mediterranean—they will arrive in about 48 hours.

—*Army Forces*

—Airborne Brigade is on alert in Germany, one battalion could be in Jordan in about 10 hours. (That battalion is on immediate alert but on a training exercise—we let the training exercise go ahead in order that security could be maintained.)

—The 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg is on the maximum alert which can be maintained with security.

—Defense has completed a study specifying requirements for the use of U.S. land-based air over Jordan (availability of bases and fuel and ammo supply are critical factors.)

—*Other Steps*

—CIA/State have completed a study of likely outcomes of the situation in Jordan, the impact on the Middle East peace initiative and the implications for U.S. policy and action. This paper is being further refined over the weekend.⁴

—Press guidance is being coordinated with State and Defense.

—Sitreps are being issued every four hours.

—Detailed scenarios for materiel support for Jordan, U.S. intervention for purposes of evacuation, U.S. intervention for support of the same either by air strikes or air and ground action, Israeli armed intervention and related supply requirements, and for deterrence of Soviet intervention have been completed.⁵

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 264.

⁵ No scenario papers have been found.

275. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 20, 1970, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Situation in Jordan

Military Situation

After repulsing two earlier Syrian tank attacks and reportedly inflicting heavy losses on a Syrian armored brigade, the Jordanians have been attacked by two Syrian armored brigades along a broad front in northern Jordan. According to information provided by the Israelis on the progress of the battle after more than five hours of fighting (11:00 a.m. EDT), both sides have suffered casualties. The Syrians reportedly have artillery and about 150 tanks in the area, some 70 of which are actually in Jordan. The Jordanians consider the situation serious due to the Syrian numerical advantage. Some Jordanian aircraft were used in the fighting but have ceased operations because of darkness.

An Iraqi armored brigade has reportedly begun moving from Syria into Jordan, but appears to be avoiding involvement in the fighting.

Actions Taken

On three occasions today King Hussein has asked our Ambassador for U.S. assistance.² In response to his request we have thus far:

—made a public statement of concern over the Syrian actions (Tab A).³

—Given the Soviet Chargé a strong démarche (Tab B).⁴

—Taken further steps to determine whether we can safely provide medical assistance to Amman.

—Called for an updating of contingency plans in light of the new situation.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The time is handwritten at the top of the first page.

² As reported in telegram 4959 from Amman, September 20, 1030Z; telegram 4969 from Amman, September 20, 1534Z; and telegram 4970 from Amman, September 20, 1639Z. The King specifically asked for aerial reconnaissance in telegram 4969 and for general assistance in telegrams 4959 and 4970. (All are *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN)

³ The attached statement by Secretary Rogers condemned the Syrian intervention and warned of a widening conflict if Syrian forces did not withdraw immediately. It is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 12, 1970, p. 412.

⁴ The note verbale handed to the Soviet Chargé is attached but not printed. See footnote 2, Document 276.

—Called a WSAG meeting for 7:00 p.m. this evening to review the situation.⁵

—Authorized the increased alert of our Army Brigade in Europe.

—Directed Defense to prepare, on a contingency basis, a plan for a punitive retaliatory air strike against the Fedayeen should they harm U.S. hostages.

—Stepped-up efforts to enhance the acquisition of intelligence from the Israeli armed forces on the military situation in Jordan.

—Asked our Ambassador in Amman to reassure King Hussein without making any commitments.⁶

I will be sending you a more detailed assessment of the situation around 6:00 p.m. this evening.⁷

⁵ See Document 281.

⁶ Document 276.

⁷ See Document 280.

276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, September 20, 1970, 1553Z.

154413. 1. In view of developments re Syrian involvement, we are proceeding as follows:

A. We are calling in Soviets immediately and making a strong oral démarche warning against Syrian intervention in Jordan and insisting upon an immediate withdrawal of Syrian forces that have invaded Jordan with tanks in the north.²

B. We will put out a brief public statement focusing on the Syrian intervention and calling for withdrawal of its forces.³

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 JORDAN. Secret; Flash. Drafted and approved by Sisco; and cleared by Rogers, Curran, and Kissinger. It was repeated Flash to Tel Aviv, Cairo, USUN, Beirut, London, Paris, and Moscow.

² Telegram 154417 to Moscow, September 20, 1742Z, transmitted the text of the note verbale. The note responded to the Soviet note of September 18. It condemned the Syrian intervention in Jordan and called upon the Soviet Union to insist that the Syrians withdraw. The note also warned "of the serious consequences which could ensue from a broadening of the conflict." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 619, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan Crisis) For the Soviet note of September 18, see Document 266.

³ See footnote 3, Document 275.

C. For the time being we wish to keep in abeyance any call for SC meeting.⁴ For a SC meeting to be helpful to the Jordanians two conditions must be fulfilled: (1) situation on the ground must be such that an unconditional ceasefire would be favorable to the Jordanians; and (2) Jordanians themselves should request such a meeting. *FYI*. Our own thinking is that perhaps GOJ at this stage would still be reluctant to take such an initiative for fear of being accused taking this matter out of Arab context. If SC were convened, immediate focus would be on a ceasefire. Finally, there would be strong feeling in the Council for a call on all concerned not to intervene which would tend to preclude our own option in this regard. *End FYI*.

2. You may inform GOJ of the above.

Rogers

⁴ Telegram 154420 to Amman, September 20, 1015Z, instructed Ambassador Brown to call Rifai and explain to him that the United States did not want the Security Council to meet until after a Soviet response to the U.S. note verbale. Additionally, the U.S. Government believed the Security Council would call for a conditional cease-fire, which it assumed would be to the disadvantage of the Jordanian Government at that time. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN)

277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon¹

Washington, September 20, 1970, 1854Z.

154423. Ref: Beirut 7937.² Subject: PFLP Hostages.

1. Department entirely agrees that Embassy has scrupulously avoided giving Zayn and PFLP any valid reason for assuming that Embassy agreement to pass on PFLP terms for release of hostages somehow implies USG acceptance of those terms. Yet they appear to

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PS 7–6 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Killgore; cleared in NEA/ARN; and approved by Sisco. It was repeated Immediate to Amman, and to Bern, Bonn, Geneva, London, and Tel Aviv.

² Telegram 7937 from Beirut, September 21, included six demands made by the PFLP regarding the hostage situation. The Embassy informed Zayn, who served as an intermediary with the PFLP, that he should pass on to ICRC all information he wished to send to the U.S. Government. Additionally, the Embassy told Zayn that the U.S. Government had not accepted any PFLP proposals. (*Ibid.*)

be making this assumption, probably without being honestly convinced of USG acceptance but rather as a negotiating tactic which they reason might serve to split five-power united front.

2. We believe time has now rpt now come to break off contact with Zayn in matter of hostages. You may be as diplomatic as you wish with him consistent with his fully understanding that Embassy wishes no rpt. no longer receive or transmit PFLP conditions.

3. Embassy's contacts with Zayn served a useful purpose during period when movement on hostages in Amman was frozen because of civil war in city. However, security situation there has improved, ICRC representatives have proceeded to Amman and negotiations on spot may be expected to resume. In these circumstances, Amman is proper place and ICRC is proper forum for receiving information from and carrying on negotiations with the PFLP.

Rogers

278. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State and the Embassy in Jordan¹

Tel Aviv, September 20, 1970, 1910Z.

5181. This message sent Exdis because Amman has no Nodis capability. Dept handle as Nodis for distribution purposes. Subject: Syrian threat. Ref: Amman 4973.²

1. Agree with Amman view on utility spooking Syrians. To some extent assume this is what we are trying to do with oral note to Sovs, UNSC meeting, moves of US forces, etc. For US to try to get Israelis into act, however, would add a dimension that should be viewed with caution. Most important question, to us, is whether GOJ can survive and hopefully win out on its own or with whatever moral or material support US can give. If it can, then outcome of present Jordan situation may still be a plus in fundamental problem of getting Mideast settlement,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 3:49 p.m. A note at the end of the telegram indicates it was passed to the White House.

² In telegram 4973 from Amman, September 20, the Embassy suggested "spooking" the Syrians by massing Israeli forces at the Syrian border and flying low-level Israeli reconnaissance over Damascus. (Ibid.)

since it will tend to convince UAR and USSR of dangers in continuation present impasse and need to take steps required to permit negotiations to resume.

2. If Israel is brought into present Jordan situation, however, we fear this would have fallout in terms of providing a point for Arabs, including fedayeen and moderates, to rally round, and turn fight from one between GOJ on one side and fedayeen plus Syria on other into one between Arabs and Israelis. Even if IDF massing of forces opposite Syria had desired effect on Syrian forces and caused them to pull back, it might also provoke some reaction from USSR that would complicate situation. If IDF had to [garble—go?] further and actually move into Syria to objective of turning Syrian armor around, then we would surely have opened a new situation.

3. As Dept will recall, Dayan has previously (April) given us some ideas which are applicable now, principally one that in situation like present one GOI would move to buttress King only if we asked them to. If it appears that this is going to be only way of saving GOJ, then that would appear to us to take precedence over any other doubts expressed above, and we think GOJ would be responsive.

4. Have just seen Amman 4976 and agree with para four thereof that most meaningful thing we could do at this stage would be to leak that plan right away.³

Zurhellen

³ In paragraph 4 of telegram 4976 from Amman, September 20, the Embassy suggested leaking a U.S. contingency plan to evacuate U.S. citizens from Amman in the hopes of deterring the Syrians. (Ibid., POL 23–9 JORDAN)

279. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, September 20, 1970, 2235Z.

154431. 1. The British Ambassador has called urgently to state that his understanding of appeal which King has made to HMG is that UK

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Seelye. It was repeated Flash to London.

undertake airstrike against invading Syrian forces.² From your reporting we had not repeat not been aware that King had made such request of British nor is it clear that King in his appeal to us for USG assistance³ had specifically in mind a US airstrike.

2. Please clarify this urgently.

Rogers

² Telegram 7568 from London, September 20, 1242Z, reported that the King contacted the British Embassy in Amman to request assistance. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 619, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan Crisis)

³ Reported in telegram 4951 from Amman, September 20, 0720Z. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 JORDAN)

280. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 20, 1970, 6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Jordan Situation—6:30 P.M. Sunday, September 20

The Military Situation

After armored engagements last night, Syrian and Jordanian tanks have been fighting again since late morning (Jordan time) in an area apparently about 8 km. inside northern Jordan. According to the Israelis, the Syrians have about 150 tanks and artillery in the area—about 70 tanks in Jordanian territory. There were reports that Jordanian aircraft were used this afternoon. As of now, the status of the fight was not clear; both sides had taken losses, but nightfall may have brought a temporary pause. It is still not known whether the Syrians will limit their action or press ahead to occupy an area in northern Jordan.

In Amman, the army continues mopping up, but it still had not secured the area around the U.S. embassy—a fact that limits U.S. diplomatic activity.² Most of our communications from King Hussein come

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/20/70. Top Secret.

² As reported in telegram 4972 from Amman, September 20, 1700Z. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 JORDAN)

through an aide. Ambassador Brown is unable to either assess the King's real state of mind—his aide may have a greater tendency to panic—or by face-to-face contact take maximum advantage of some of the steps taken today to reassure him of U.S. support.

The King's Requests

Earlier in the day, the King through a messenger asked whether we could help.³ At that time, he sent a specific request for:

—a statement condemning invasion from Syria;

—a declaration that the intrusion of an outside power into Jordan cannot be tolerated and will necessitate international action.

At the end of the afternoon (6:15 P.M. Amman time), Hussein's aide phoned Ambassador Brown to say that the Syrians were attacking on a broad front and the Jordanians believed their objective was Irbid, Jordan's second largest city located about 20 km. from the Syrian border.⁴ The Jordanian air force had attacked but was grounded by nightfall. He said the King requested the USG to take action.

The implication is that perhaps the King is hoping for U.S. (or Israeli) air attacks against the Syrian armor, but that has not been precisely specified. The Jordanians have, however, asked for aerial reconnaissance over the area which Syrian tanks have invaded. Arrangements have been made to pass the results of Israeli reconnaissance.

What the U.S. Has Done Today

1. The statement requested by the King was issued by Secretary Rogers at mid-day (text sent you earlier)⁵—but without the mention of “international action.”

2. Assistant Secretary Sisco at 1:00 P.M. transmitted the oral note to the Soviet Chargé.⁶

3. A U.S. brigade on maneuvers in Germany has been returned to base and put on full alert. There has been no alert yet of forces at Fort Bragg.

4. The Defense Department has been ordered to accelerate collection of target information through the Israelis and to prepare (a) a plan for U.S. aerial reconnaissance and (b) a plan for U.S. air strikes against Syrian forces in Jordan.

³ See footnote 3, Document 279.

⁴ As reported in telegram 4970 from Amman, September 20, 1969Z. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 619, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan Crisis)

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 275.

⁶ See footnote 4, Document 275.

5. The U.S. Command in Europe is prepared to send two U.S. military field hospitals to Jordan under a Red Cross umbrella. The British are also prepared to send a medical team. The order to move, however, will not be given until the Jordanian government can assure adequate security.

Other Developments

1. The UAR Foreign Ministry has told Minister Bergus in Cairo that the UAR told President Atassi of Syria it "does not agree with" Syrian intervention. Atassi answered that there is no intervention on the part of Syria. The Ministry official said the UAR wants to end the crisis as soon as possible and not extend it.

2. Libya, Sudan, Yemen, Kuwait and Tunisia have come out in favor of an Arab summit meeting originally proposed by Libya. Hussein has agreed to attend. Jordan has also requested an urgent meeting of the Arab League Council to debate its complaints of armed intervention by Syria.

3. Libya's Qaddafi warned Jordan today that Libya would assist the Fedayeen. Nasser has advised him to hold off flying Libyan forces to Jordan.

4. Three Soviet missile ships entered the Mediterranean from the Black Sea early on 20 September. The addition of these missile ships to the Soviet Mediterranean squadron may be in response to the deployment of additional U.S. forces to the Mediterranean, but the Soviet squadron remains at average strength for this time of year. Soviet warships have thus far not gone beyond non-aggressive operations such as surveillance of U.S. forces in the eastern Mediterranean.

281. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 20, 1970, 7:10–9:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman: Henry A. Kissinger

State—

Joseph Sisco

Alfred Atherton

Talcott Seelye

Defense—

David Packard

Robert Pranger

CIA—

Richard Helms

David Blee

JCS—

Adm. Thomas Moorer

Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt

NSC Staff—

Gen. Alexander Haig

Col. Richard Kennedy

Harold H. Saunders

Jeanne W. Davis

Ronald Ziegler

(for Helms briefing only)

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was decided:

1. that, once Israeli approval has been received, a carrier plane should fly into Tel Aviv to get their latest intelligence on the situation on the ground and discuss certain operational questions with the Israeli pilots;

2. we should a) convey to the Israelis in New York the Jordanian request for an air strike;² b) ask them to confirm the facts and the seriousness of the situation; c) tell them if their intelligence confirms the facts, we would have no objection if they decided to make an air strike, but that they should discuss their findings with us before they undertake the air strike.

Mr. Helms briefed from the attached notes.³

Mr. Kissinger: Can we say the King controls Amman if he does not control the refugee camps?

Mr. Helms: Yes, the camps are at some distance and can be isolated.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² See Document 279.

³ Not attached and not found.

Mr. Seelye: With regard to Ambassador Brown's concern that the Egyptians may be planning to intervene, I think he really meant he was concerned that the Egyptians might be backing off from their support of Hussein.

Mr. Kissinger: How can we say the King controls Amman when the US and Egyptian Embassies are cut off?

Mr. Helms: This relates to the ability to circulate.

Mr. Blee: There is heavy sniper fire.

Mr. Helms: The fighting is not over, but the Jordanian Army is in the town and controls it.

Admiral Moorer: They can enforce a curfew.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Admiral Moorer) What is your military assessment?

Admiral Moorer: It's nip and tuck whether the Jordanian forces in the north can handle the Syrians. Their numbers are about the same. The Syrians have more tanks: 100 in Jordan now and 60 more just inside Syria. Jordan has 100 or 120. Tank for Tank, the Jordanians are superior. They have our tanks and Centurions; the Syrians have Russian T-54s and T-55s, with Russian 100mm guns. The Syrians didn't do too well this morning, losing about 30 tanks. All together Jordan has about 500 tanks and Syria about 700.

General Vogt: Syrian operational readiness rates are low.

Admiral Moorer: Syria uses some of its tanks as fixed artillery.

Mr. Kissinger: How far inside the country are the Syrian tanks?

General Vogt: 15 to 18 miles.

Mr. Kissinger: How many tanks did the Jordanians lose?

General Vogt: We don't know. The Israelis think the Syrians are heading for Irbid.

Mr. Kissinger: Aren't the Iraqis there?

Mr. Helms: The Iraqis are near Mafraq.

Admiral Moorer: We have authority to send a carrier plane into Tel Aviv to look at the latest Israeli reconnaissance pictures. We're just waiting for the Military Attaché in Tel Aviv to clear this with the Israelis.

Mr. Packard: Does the carrier have the necessary processing equipment for pictures?

Admiral Moorer: I don't know; I'll check.

General Vogt: The balance is about equal in numbers. The Jordanians are superior in performance. This morning's battle was a decisive defeat for the Syrians.

Mr. Kissinger: It can't have been a defeat; they came back.

Mr. Sisco: (to Vogt) What do you think will happen tomorrow morning?

General Vogt: Fighting will resume, depending on how many tanks were knocked out.

Admiral Moorer: There are two possibilities: either the Syrians withdraw or the battle is resumed.

Mr. Packard: Either the Syrians will win or the Jordanians will win.

Admiral Moorer: Not necessarily.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Admiral Moorer) What is your judgment as to the outcome if the fighting resumes with the present forces?

Admiral Moorer: I think it is highly likely the Jordanians will inflict casualties of the order that they did today.

Mr. Kissinger: If the Syrians commit new forces, then what?

Admiral Moorer: The Jordanians are having some problems getting ammunition for their tanks. It's primarily a problem of distribution; they have the ammo.

Mr. Kissinger: Don't the Syrians have the same problem?

Admiral Moorer: They don't have as far to go.

Mr. Sisco: Do the Jordanians have some tanks in reserve?

General Vogt: Yes, they have a total of 3 brigades. One brigade is involved now.

Mr. Kissinger: If Syria wins, is the road open to Amman?

Admiral Moorer: No, the Jordanians hold Zarqa.

(Mr. Kissinger left the room)

Admiral Moorer: The Syrians have turned west. They will try to take Irbid.

General Vogt: The Israelis will be nervous if they get close to their border.

Mr. Seelye: The Israelis will shell Irbid.

Admiral Moorer: The Israelis could cream the Syrians.

Mr. Blee: Just with aircraft alone.

Admiral Moorer: They've been in the territory before.

(Mr. Kissinger returned.)

Mr. Sisco: I think we should look at the assumption we have been making that the Israelis may jump into this fast. They don't seem at all anxious.

Admiral Moorer: It depends on how much the action moves toward their border.

Mr. Packard: They won't jump in until they think Hussein is losing.

Mr. Sisco: The British Ambassador in Amman has said that the King desires either UK, US or Israeli intervention. Ambassador Freeman has called me. I told him we would be having this meeting and

would discuss this, and would be in touch with him.⁴ There have been several telegrams reporting that Zaid Rifai is asking us to "do something."⁵ The Jordanian Cabinet is meeting now, and we will know later precisely what they want.

Mr. Kissinger: What diplomatic steps have we taken?

Mr. Sisco: In addition to the Secretary's public statement at 1:00 p.m. we have called the Russians in and delivered a verbal note, asking them to approach the Syrians to convince them of the danger of their course and tell them to desist, pointing out the "serious consequences" in a broadening of the conflict.

Mr. Helms: Did you tell them to get their guys in hand or else?

Mr. Sisco: It was not friendly but not that categorical. We have informed the British and French of what we did. The French want to try to organize a four-power statement. Tactically, I think we should tell the French that we have put out a statement. We would be agreeable to a four-power statement along the lines of our statement. If the French want to raise the idea with the Russians, that is okay. The only kind of statement we would approve, however, would be along the lines of ours—no call for a cease fire, no "even-handedness." This is better than giving them the back of our hand, which they deserve.

Mr. Helms: Did we ask the Russians to get Damascus to withdraw?

Mr. Sisco: Precisely.

Mr. Kissinger: What about the airborne brigade in Europe?

Admiral Moorer: We have asked them about their reaction time—when they can get back from the training area and when they can be ready. They have been ordered to prepare one battalion for airdrop. State's problem now is to pacify our Ambassador in Germany. He is worried about what to tell the Germans.

Mr. Kissinger: Tell them we are pursuing Ostpolitik.

Mr. Sisco: Tell them this is a precautionary move. We may have to evacuate Americans from Amman; possibly even a couple of German hostages.

Mr. Kissinger: And we'll do nothing about the 82nd Airborne until we are further down the road.

Admiral Moorer: There's still 22 hours. You recall we decided to let the European brigade go to ten hours alert time by letting them go to the training area. We are bringing them back now to a four-hour time. That's not transportation, but the time it takes to get them assembled.

General Vogt: And to get their parachutes rigged.

⁴ See Document 288.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 270.

Mr. Kissinger: How about target collection?

Admiral Moorer: We have asked for and received authority to send an airplane from the carrier to Tel Aviv to pick up their latest intelligence and discuss it with them. We're awaiting confirmation from our DATT in Tel Aviv that the plane can go in. We hope to go in and out tonight under cover of darkness.

Mr. Kissinger: We need up to date intelligence for the carrier?

Admiral Moorer: Yes, they need operational information—entry routes, IFF, etc.

Mr. Kissinger: Is that necessary?

Mr. Helms: No question about it. [*1 line not declassified*]

Admiral Moorer: We need intelligence more than we need contingency plans.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree, we don't want to bomb Jordanian tanks.

Mr. Sisco: I'm concerned over the impact of this on the Israelis. The Israelis want us to intervene. If they see we're this interested, they may think we are going to go ahead and they don't have to do anything. If we want to nudge them, this doesn't help. Is there no other way to get the intelligence? I understand the need, and I'm not worried about it's becoming known. I am worried about the Israelis getting the idea we are going in.

Mr. Kissinger: There is a difference between their moving automatically, with its advantages and disadvantages, and our telling them to move. If they think we are going to move, they may wait. If not, they may move. I'm not really sure the Israelis would mind it if Hussein should topple. They would have no more West Bank problem.

Admiral Moorer: I thought there was a tacit understanding between Israel and the King.

Mr. Helms: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Sisco: There have been some indications of such, but they have never been confirmed.

Mr. Helms: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Packard: It would make a four-hour difference in our time of movement if we have to get the recce ourselves. Also, we would need overflight approval.

Mr. Sisco: Let's take the chance if there is no other alternative.

Mr. Kissinger: We may reach a point about this time tomorrow when we have to decide who goes. If we want to keep up the credibility of our planning we ought to do it.

Mr. Sisco: OK. Do it tonight.

Mr. Kissinger: OK, let's go ahead.

Admiral Moorer: We have already directed the ship and they will go as soon as they get the Israeli okay. Our DATT will notify the carrier directly when he has the approval and the plane will take off.

General Vogt: It's only a 30-minute flight.

Mr. Kissinger: What about medical assistance?

Admiral Moorer: The ICRC is making some unreasonable demands. They want us to repaint all the aircraft and remove the US labels from the surgical equipment. It would take 20 days to do this. Also, we have no assurance from the Jordanians that the airfield will be secure. We don't want to paint the aircraft; we may have to use them for evacuation or some other purpose. It's easier for the British—they have only 2 or 3 aircraft; we have 18. And their aircraft are not part of their regular forces.

Mr. Sisco: How would the British aircraft get there?

General Vogt: They're in London now. They would need overflight rights.

Mr. Kissinger: How would we bring the European brigade in?

General Vogt: Hopefully, over Austria.

Mr. Kissinger: Do we have to get clearance? Can't we just fly over and then apologize? Didn't we do that in 1958?

General Vogt: Yes, and they've never let us forget it.

Mr. Kissinger: They won't let us fly over their country with troop-carrying planes.

Gen. Vogt: We might link it to the hospital equipment. We could say that the situation was deteriorating and it was necessary to provide support for this humanitarian effort.

Mr. Kissinger: How long would it take if they had to go the long way around?

Gen. Vogt: Another day. They would have to stop to refuel.

Mr. Kissinger: And everyone would know about it.

Gen. Vogt: Yes, they would have to land in several countries. Even our hospital planes would have to go across Austria and land in Athens.

Mr. Sisco: Have we got clearance from Austria for our hospital planes?

Gen. Vogt: Yes, we have an unofficial response but no official response yet.

Adm. Moorer: If there were an emergency, we should just go.

Mr. Kissinger: Why don't you talk about the moves we might have to make tomorrow.

(Mr. Kissinger left the room.)⁶

Mr. Sisco: I'm still concerned about our people going in in uniform. I know the problem, the Geneva Convention, etc. But a uniform just increases the probability of someone taking a shot at them, even with a Red Cross armband, particularly when the British are going in in civilian clothes. In the present circumstances, an American uniform would be a lightning rod.

Mr. Packard: They will not be in a US uniform. They will be in fatigues with no identification. Most of the time they will be in medical clothes.

Gen. Vogt: They will wear Red Cross armbands and carry no outside identification or rank insignia.

Mr. Seelye: (to Sisco) That is a new development. It makes it more manageable.

Mr. Sisco: Yes, that's better.

Mr. Packard: They will carry their identification and their dog tags in their pocket; nothing outside. I've discussed this with Alex Johnson and Secretary Laird. There will be some military in uniform with the planes, of course.

Mr. Sisco: Okay.

Adm. Moorer: If the Red Cross demands are so unreasonable that we can't comply, then what?

Mr. Sisco: What are their demands?

Mr. Seelye: That all aircraft be painted white; all military in civilian clothes and carrying Red Cross identification; all markings on medical equipment to be obliterated. Alex Johnson has sent them a message saying these are obviously unreasonable. He has asked General Burchinal to work it out with the Red Cross.

Gen. Vogt: We have called Burchinal and told him to work it out.

Adm. Moorer: This is all academic without Jordanian assurance about the airfields.

Mr. Packard: If the Red Cross insists on civilian clothes, we can do it. The problem is painting the aircraft.

Mr. Sisco: Just paint a big red cross on the side.

Gen. Vogt: We will do that.

Mr. Packard: Burchinal won't bring the aircraft in unless the airport is secure.

⁶ The President's Daily Diary indicates that Kissinger met alone with President Nixon at 7:55 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

Adm. Moorer: Our Ambassador will have to get assurances from the King.

Mr. Seelye: We have sent a cable asking him to get those assurances.⁷

(The group was summoned to the President's office at 7:50 and returned at 8:35, without Mr. Kissinger.)⁸

Mr. Sisco: I have talked to Secretary Rogers about the message from the British passing a message from the Jordanians asking for an air strike. I suggest we go to the Israelis in New York immediately, and pass the message we have received. We should tell them that, at the moment, we are in no position to advise them since we don't know the situation on the ground. We should ask them to give us their judgment on the situation and on the necessity for this kind of action.

Mr. Packard: I think that's the best step.

Mr. Sisco: We should ask them to consult with us as soon as they have the facts. Israel won't make an air strike without our blessing.

Mr. Atherton: Israel isn't itching to get in this.

Mr. Packard: As an alternative, we could encourage them to move. Sisco's course could be the first step.

Mr. Sisco: We wouldn't be saying "don't do it." I think it would be fairly obvious.

Mr. Helms: From the Golan Heights the Israelis have an easy run to cut off the area. Would the Syrians be so hell-bent to put tanks into Jordan?

Mr. Sisco: Where is the next Jordanian strong point? If Syria takes Irbid, what next?

Mr. Seelye: Possibly Mafraq.

Adm. Moorer: I think it is significant that they turned west.

Mr. Seelye: I think their primary objective is to control Irbid and the area in the north. This area has historical connections with Syria.

Mr. Sisco: We also have a message suggesting an approach to the Security Council. We can say we will give them our full support politically.

(Mr. Kissinger returned.)

Mr. Sisco: (to Kissinger) Regarding the British message, I have recommended that we call Rabin and tell him what we think the situation is on the ground. We should convey the Jordanian request for an

⁷ Telegram 154418 to Amman, September 20, 1751Z. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 619, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan Crisis)

⁸ The President's Daily Diary indicates President Nixon met with the rest of the WSAG members at 8 p.m. The WSAG members left the President at 8:40 p.m., but Kissinger stayed until 9:07 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

air strike; say we can't advise them now because we don't know the situation on the ground. Say we hope they will look at the situation, make a judgment as to its seriousness, and if they find it serious, we could (a) say we would have no objection if they saw fit to mount an air strike, or (b) say that, after they have surveyed the situation, come back to us with their judgment and we will consult as to the action to be taken.

Mr. Kissinger: We must assume the information is correct. Why would the King say the Syrians are in Irbid if they aren't?

Mr. Sisco: We could tell the Israelis we have no reason to doubt the information and ask them to confirm. I want the Israelis to check this out. We have many people in Amman under great tension. Zaid Rifai has passed us some very alarming things from time to time, and I don't know how good his judgment is under fire.

Adm. Moorer: All our information from the north has been second-hand. Confirmation would be highly desirable. We know the Israelis are up to date.

Mr. Kissinger: So we would pass the message to the Israelis; say we have no further information, and can they confirm.

Mr. Sisco: We would pass on the request, saying we want their judgment of the facts and of how serious the situation is. Then either say, after you have confirmed the facts, you and we should discuss the situation; or, say we have no objection if you want to go ahead with the strike.

Mr. Kissinger: So we have two choices: (1) ask the Israelis to come back to us after they have confirmed the facts and adjudged their seriousness; or (2) tell them that if they confirm that the facts are as they have been described, we will understand if they feel they should act independently.

Mr. Sisco: I prefer the first course. This is an extremely important step for the King from a political point of view. Israel should take this step only if it is absolutely necessary.

Mr. Saunders: Should we ask if they have an alternate way of frightening the Syrians short of an air attack?

Mr. Sisco: There may be a way.

Mr. Packard: But the situation is developing so much faster than we thought it would.

Mr. Kissinger: A half-hour ago we thought nothing would happen for six hours or so.

Mr. Helms: Of course we don't know the time frame of these developments.

Adm. Moorer: It may be that the intelligence is just catching up with the clock.

Mr. Helms: I think we should go with the first course. We can afford to wait for an independent appraisal. This is an extremely important step in every way.

Mr. Sisco: (to Kissinger) Let's you and I go call Rabin.⁹

Mr. Kissinger: The President's inclination is to make sure that the Syrians get stopped.

Mr. Sisco: Course 1 does not preclude Course 2.

Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Helms: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Helms: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Sisco: We will tell them to run a flight at dawn, although they probably will do it anyhow.

Mr. Kissinger: We might combine the two approaches. We could say "if your intelligence confirms this information and its seriousness, we would have no objection if you should decide to make an air strike. But discuss your intelligence with us before you undertake the strike."

Mr. Seelye: Should we do this before the King actually asks for it? We haven't had any request yet.

Mr. Kissinger: We will meet again at 8:30 tomorrow morning.¹⁰

⁹ See Document 283.

¹⁰ Because of the fast-moving crisis, the WSAG met at midnight September 20; see Document 290. The National Security Council met the morning of September 21; see Document 299.

282. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, September 20, 1970, 2355Z.

4984. Dept pass Flash info London Paris. Subject: Syrian Threat and Security Council Meeting. Ref: (A) State 154431; (B) State 154415; (C) State 154413; (D) Amman 4983.²

1. I have just finished talking to Rifai on telephone. I had ref (A) in hand. I asked him specifically if GOJ was requesting airstrike of British. He replied "not in those exact words." What he thought King had meant when he discussed matter with British Amb was that GOJ wanted to explore this possibility with UK. We, of course, in this Embassy had not known before that such a request had been made of British. We are not in touch with British Embassy. Rifai did not ask me on phone at this time for US airstrike. What he wants to know is what sort of assistance we can give him but it is evident from what he has said before that some sort of airstrike is what Jordanians are hoping for if situation gets out of hand.

2. He then told me that situation was considerably worsened. The Syrians are now in Irbid. Syrians columns are heading south; the King thinks they are heading for Amman.

3. I said that I wanted to read to him the Secretary's statement (ref (B)) to show the US condemnation of Syria's action. He said that the King was familiar with statement and appreciates it. I then gave him rundown of AsstSec Sisco's statement to the Soviet Chargé. (State 154417).³ He had not known of this and was very appreciative.

4. He expressed the hope that we could continue to put pressure on the Soviets and would make démarches to any other country we could which has some influence with Syria. I then told him that we did not believe it would be wise to schedule a Security Council meeting on this matter and that it would be better to await result of our démarches (ref (B)). I said I thought the SC meeting might only lead to a propaganda battle.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN. Secret; Flash; Exdis. It was repeated to Tel Aviv (Flash) and to USUN.

² Telegrams 154413 and 154431 are Documents 276 and 279, respectively. Telegram 154415 to Amman, September 20, transmitted the text of Secretary Rogers's public statement. In telegram 4983 from Amman, September 20, Ambassador Brown reported that he had received a letter from Hussein requesting four-power assistance to Jordan. (Both in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN) Regarding Rogers's statement, see footnote 4, Document 275.

³ See footnote 2, Document 276.

5. He said that the situation has changed since their earlier considerations of what to do in the SC. Now that the Syrians are in Irbid, something must be done. The King has already acted on this and has sent me a letter (ref (D)) which is to be delivered tonight to one of the American houses with which the Jordanians and the Embassy are in touch. (Now delivered, see septel).⁴ He said in view of the King's decision there was no turning back from a Security Council meeting.

Brown

⁴ See Document 284.

283. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Among the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), and the Israeli Ambassador (Rabin)¹

September 20, 1970, 10:10 p.m.

K: Mr. Ambassador, I have Joe Sisco here too. I just wanted to pass on some information to you. We have just got a request from the Jordanians via the British which requests an Israeli air strike on Syrian troops which allegedly have taken Irbid and are heading south and massing.²

R: I understand what was requested. I understand against whom. I didn't understand which area.

K: They have taken the town in the area of Irbid and there are Syrian troops massing there and heading south.

R: Heading south of Irbid?

K: Yes this is the request we want to pass on to you. We have no independent information of our own and we wanted to ask you whether it would be possible for you on an urgent basis to undertake some reconnaissance to confirm this and then just get in touch with us.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. Kissinger and Sisco were in Washington; Rabin was in New York with Prime Minister Meir.

² See Document 279.

R: Fine. I can assess when it comes to the reconnaissance. I don't see any problem. I just got a cable from our people talking about 200 Syrian tanks in the area of Irbid. The main thrust was against Irbid about 8 hours ago. According to what I got here they haven't yet reached Irbid but they were heading towards Irbid. That is what I got from Israel I think at about 4:00 o'clock there. I understand exactly what you ask us.

K: And could you do it on the most urgent basis?

R: First I will go to the Prime Minister here. She leaves tonight.

Sisco: When will she be back in Israel?

R: I think it will be evening there tomorrow.

Sisco: You will bear in mind that we got this from the British because our Embassy was out of touch with the King so the King asked the British to pass the request to you and the British in turn have asked us to pass the request to you. You ought to know another thing, namely that this request according to the British came first this morning to them and then it was reconfirmed again at 1830 Jordan time this evening.

R: Do you look favorably to this request? What is your position?

S: I think we want to exchange views with you on this as soon as you are able to give us a picture of how serious you think the situation is there.

R: It looks to be quite serious after I got the cable about 200 tanks and forces—quite a sizable force—if it is true and I sent a cable back and asked for more information, but now I will send another one. But I am sure that the first question that the Prime Minister will ask me . . . that the Government will ask.

(A copy of a cable was brought into Mr. Kissinger's office.)³

S: Wait a minute—we have just got something else.

K: You had better call us back in 10 minutes. Can you do that?

R: Yes.

S: Because we have a further message here that requires a further exchange with you.

³ Presumably telegram 4988, Document 284.

284. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, September 21, 1970, 0124Z.

4988. Dept pass info Flash London. (Treat as Nodis)

1. The King phoned me at three A.M. He said that he wanted me to pass the following most urgent message directly to the President. Message follows:

2. "Situation deteriorating dangerously following Syrian massive invasion. Northern forces disjointed. Irbid occupied. This having disastrous effect on tired troops in the capital and surroundings. After continuous action and shortage supplies Military Governor and Commander in Chief advise I request immediate physical intervention both air and land as per the authorization of government to safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Jordan. Immediate air strikes on invading forces from any quarter plus air cover are imperative. Wish earliest word on length of time it may require your forces to land when requested which might be very soon."

3. King said he unable to contact British and asked us to get this message to British Government most urgently.

Brown

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL JORDAN-US. Secret; Flash; Nodis. It was received at 9:37 p.m. and then passed to the White House.

285. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Among the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Secretary of State Rogers, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

Washington, September 20, 1970, 10:10 p.m.

K: We have a message here Joe should read to you.² We were talking to Rabin when that message came in and we told him we would talk to him shortly.³

S: Here is what came in Mr. Secretary, from the King at 3:00. "Situation deteriorating dangerously following Syrian massive invasion. Northern forces disbanded. [omission in the original—Irbid] occupied. Having disastrous effect. . . . I request immediate intervention, both air and land to safeguard independence of Jordan. Immediate airstrike from any quarter plus air cover are imperative. . . ." What I am not clear from this is whether he is asking for British intervention or not.

R: Intervention by us or Israel? By anybody?

S: It obviously leaves both options open, in my judgment.

K: The way I read it air strikes from any quarter and the ground forces from us.

S: And they would also like British intervention. In light of this my own feeling would be that we now amend what we were going to tell Rabin and obviously Henry will have to check this with the President. (1) Give Israelis essence of the information in this message and go beyond merely a request for reconnaissance but to say to them that we would look favorably if they took this action. In fact, as we were talking and this message came in Rabin said there was no difficulty, but the first question the Israelis would ask is would the Americans agree we should do this. And we fenced, but this is an understandable question on their part.

R: My view is that we should favor it because if the King goes down the drain then the GD thing is a total mess. This way it will be a mess, but if they can save the King there is some advantage.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. As implied in the first paragraph, this call probably took place at 10:20 p.m. Kissinger and Sisco were at the White House and Rogers was either at the State Department or at his home.

² Document 284.

³ See Document 283.

S: One would hope that whatever the Israelis did is sufficient.

R: I think the question of whether we should land troops is different. As long as we are sure the King is requesting Israeli air support.

S: Well Mr. Secretary here is a previous message—let me read it so you will feel completely confident. (Read the British message)⁴ So the request to Israel for the air strike precedes this second one.

R: We have a request to the British and to us both so there is no doubt about it.

K: And we were not giving Rabin any satisfaction. In fact, Joe was doing the talking when at the precise moment the other message came in. The fact seems to me to be that if there isn't an air strike the whole thing may come apart. I don't think we have any choice.

R: No, I don't think we have any choice. What it amounts to is Israel is just doing it now at the right time.

S: Bear in mind that the Russians are behind the Syrians.

R: I don't think we have any choice. Let's go ahead.

⁴ In telegram 7568 from London, September 20, 1242Z, the Embassy reported that King Hussein contacted the British Embassy in Amman asking for assistance "in coping with large Syrian armored force, even from Israelis." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 619, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan Crisis) See also Document 279.

286. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, undated.

K: Mr. President, I wanted to bring you up to date on the number of things that have developed since I last spoke to you.² First of all, Bill decided to put out the statement in his own name which was very good—it made it tougher.³

P: Um-hm. A statement—what?

K: First, we sent a note to the Russians which was very tough. I am sending the text over to you.⁴

P: Was that public?

K: No, that is private.

P: And what did Bill do?

K: Bill, in his own name, said we have had information that Syrian tanks have invaded Jordan; that the Jordanian Army is resisting—something to that effect.

P: Yes.

K: That the broadening of the conflict will have serious consequences—we demand immediate withdrawal of these forces and this is an intolerable act. It was a very strong statement.

P: Well, that is probably the right level for it to come from at this point.

K: Absolutely, it is premature for you.

P: It also gets State into the business, too.

K: And it is the first time he has engaged his own prestige which will affect his subsequent actions.

P: Yes. Yes. That is good. That is good.

K: The second thing is I don't know whether I have said this to you but they have come back in. They withdrew and now they are back in with tanks. The King has appealed to us again for immediate

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking.

² The President's Daily Diary indicates Kissinger last spoke with President Nixon in the Oval Office between 8:40 p.m. and 9:07 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) No other record of that conversation has been found.

³ See footnote 3, Document 275.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 276.

help but it is night there now. He has also asked us for reconnaissance.
[4 lines not declassified]

P: Okay.

K: We have put that unit in Germany on alert. It was on near alert anyway, and I just wanted to warn you that if this thing keeps up within the next 24 hours I would guess by tomorrow morning we may reach the decision point as between U.S. and Israeli action—that is if the King loses the tank battle. And there is nothing we can do now, except the things we are doing which are all pretty strong.

P: Well, what is the—well, on that contingency though, we have a choice there; we are prepared for our air action; is that right?

K: We are prepared for our air action, Mr. President. We can run two hundred sorties a day from the carriers. The land-based planes—we have had a full study made that looks pretty grim. The only fields we could use are in Turkey and the Turks almost certainly won't give us permission. The only other fields would be in Greece or Crete and for that we would have to use air refueling and it would take us 8 days to get them ready.

P: And that won't work.

K: But the third carrier is on the way and within 8 days that can add to it and that would increase it by . . .

P: What about the plan based on the carriers?

K: That is in SHAPE.

P: In SHAPE—and they could really do them in good?

K: Well, they could do a good job on them. Their handicap is that if that fails they can't follow it up with very much unless we want to get ground forces fighting the Syrians which is a rough decision to make.

P: Which we don't want to do, but which the Israelis would be delighted to do.

K: Right. The Israelis can fly 700 sorties a day, but we are in a position to do 200 sorties and we could do quite a job on them.

P: Well, has the King indicated that he would like the Israelis to come in?

K: The King at an earlier stage had asked the Israelis whether they would be willing to come in if he asked for it. That was a month ago. It was during the last crisis. Sisco thinks that he would if things got to that point.

P: Well, the difficulty there, Henry, though is that while that may cool the immediate situation, it certainly puts the other Arab countries (and not just Nasser) unjustly have to line up with Syria in that case, don't they?

K: That's right. On the other hand, if we come in, there are two problems from that point of view. There are two advantages to our coming in—the one you gave and the one that the Russians are less likely to take us on than the Israelis. That is the advantage of our going in. The advantage of the Israelis going in is that they can follow it up and they can escalate it more easily than we.

P: Oh yes, there is no question that the Israelis going in is good, due to the fact that they not only have the air but they have got a helluva good ground punch, they could just put them in there and clean them out.

K: That's right. They have more air and more ground and therefore they might deter a purely Arab response more easily than we; and, secondly, hated as they are, they are at least recognized to have a local interest in the thing while we, coming from thousands of miles away fighting the Syrians, have a serious problem and the Arabs might unite against us too. We would be the Imperialists coming in.

P: Well, they are more likely to reunite against the Israelis, than us though.

K: The hatred of the Israelis is undoubtedly greater.

P: That's what I mean. Of course, the point is that the Israelis start with an enormous disadvantage in that respect. That is the thing I am concerned about.

K: That's true.

P: And so—

K: But they decouple us a little bit while if we are in—it's a strong argument on either side. The problem we have is if we don't succeed and then the Israelis come in, that's the worst of everything.

P: And of course the other side is if we succeed it has considerable impact—cooling the whole situation and acting forcibly in a critical area. It is such a—frankly a surprise too—and the message to the Russians is a helluva lot more than if we come in than if the Israelis—

K: If we could do it with two or three strikes or two or three days' operations, I would favor our doing it. If it is a two-week sort of thing and if it is not decisive—

P: What is Sisco's reaction at this moment on this point?

K: Sisco prefers the Israelis. I am slightly more on your side on this than Sisco's.

P: What does Bill say?

K: The last time I talked to him he preferred the Israelis,⁵ but in the meantime you had talked to him.

⁵ See Document 285.

P: Well, I didn't get into anything except that we didn't want the Israelis. It is so easy to fall into that—to have them go in and they don't need any encouragement. They'd love to go in for other reasons.

K: You are absolutely right. And the Israelis would have the advantage that it is damned hard to get them out once they are in.

P: That's right. They would just occupy some more territory, wouldn't they?

K: Well, whether they do it vis-à-vis Syria, I'm not so sure.

P: Well, in any event, the Syrians would fear it.

K: The Syrians would fear it. Of course, there's a third problem that we may not have any choice about—I don't think the Israelis would hold still for very long if the Syrians seem to be winning. They seem already to have mobilized a bit, which is a good deterrent.

P: Yeah.

K: Incidentally, we picked up an intelligence report this morning—not very reliable—but interesting that the Russians gave the Syrians a *carte blanche* which proves when you told me Friday night they may be playing us, your instinct about the Russians is usually remarkable.⁶

P: In other words, that they gave you a note that they were . . . well, this note that they gave us over the weekend is . . .⁷

K: Just to keep us quiet.

P: To keep us quiet and threatened us and so forth. In the meantime, they say, "Stir it up, boys; give them trouble; give them trouble. Face them down." That's what they are going to do. Well, we may have to come to the Israelis, but I just want to be sure that at this point—that's why I've been so strong on it—we don't leave any impression we might come to them or they'll come in precipitately. We must not do it. It's got to be a very calculated thing.

K: No, it was absolutely right that we don't get anywhere near the situation where we seem to be egging on the Israelis, because they don't need any encouragement, and it should be at the . . .

P: As far as we are concerned, still the justification is we still have this refugee thing, haven't we, hanging over us.

K: Yeah, but that's tough to work against the Syrians.

P: That's right; that's right.

⁶ The President's Daily Diary indicates that Nixon spoke with Kissinger by phone on Friday, September 18, between 9:34 and 9:41 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) No other record of this conversation has been found.

⁷ See Document 266. A copy of the note is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/20/70.

K: But that's another that can work both ways, if we go in and then they get killed. And then I don't know what the Congressional reaction would be if we got involved. If we did it in a two or three-day operation, I think we'll be all right—or even a week.

P: How do we justify two or three days? Suppose we were to call the Congress in and say we are doing it for one purpose—to save Jordan?

K: To save Jordan and to prevent a general Mid-East war. But it's tougher if we do it.

P: Yeah.

K: And curiously enough, we might get more support if the Israelis do it. My major worry is if it doesn't work and another little country . . . It will work if we are determined enough, but these Syrians are the craziest of the lot.

P: Yeah, they might fight a long time. Well, when we are quite confident it will work with the Israelis . . .

K: Nobody has any question about that.

P: Because they are there.

K: Well, and they've beat them to a pulp once before and they haven't improved that much. Of course, it may still be that the Jordanian armor can defeat the Syrians. The original estimate of CIA was that the King could handle the Syrians and the Fedayeen simultaneously.⁸ The situation in Amman from the health point of view is very bad; many people killed and there seems to be a cholera epidemic.

P: Yeah, pretty miserable.

K: So, it's a miserable situation. It is night now, so nothing is going to be happening now for another 12 hours anyway. There isn't any decision needed. I only took the liberty of calling you to alert you that this may be coming up.

P: Yeah. Well, now the point is, you see, the Rogers' public statement—of course, the only public statement that I have made related to hostages only—his public statement relates to Syria intervening in Jordan.

K: That's right.

P: Well, that puts it right to us. If they do it, either we have to do something—we cannot let the Syrians get away with this—or we've got to support the Israelis in doing something. We cannot make a public statement and not back it up.

K: Right, but the . . .

⁸ Not further identified.

P: Do Rogers, Sisco and all those people understand that? They have put themselves out where we now have to back this up.

K: I didn't ask Rogers to make that statement. What we had recommended to them was just to send the note. But I have to say in their defense that the acts we undertook last week pretty much put us in that posture where it would have been hard not to do something.

P: Well, we . . . The position is absolutely correct.

K: Oh, I don't think they will give you any trouble.

P: The question is—it isn't a question of that—having taken the position, we must act one way or the other; either the Israelis or ourselves. That's the way it looks.

K: I agree with you.

P: It's too bad we don't have more land bases. Our action would have to be quick and surgical.

K: Well, our action would have to be overwhelming.

P: Yes, that's right.

K: We can't have another even three-months' war—trouble against these God-damned Syrians.

P: No; that's right. Okay.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Good-bye.

287. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Israeli Ambassador (Rabin)¹

September 20, 1970, 10:35 p.m.

K: We have had another message² and another conversation with the President.³ I will first give you the essence of the message and then the request of the President. Sisco and Haig are on the line. This is the message from our Ambassador who says he had a phone call from the King at 3:00 a.m. local time pointing out that the situation was

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington and Rabin was in New York.

² Document 284.

³ See Document 286.

deteriorating dangerously. A massive invasion. The northern forces were disbanded. Irbid occupied. That is the information we have from the King. This was having a disastrous effect on the troops in the capital. He therefore requests immediate physical intervention, both air and land. Especially he wants immediate air strikes on invading forces from any quarters. In light of your information we have discussed with the Secretary of State⁴ and the President and we can now assure you under these circumstances we would look favorably on your actions and the President has asked me to tell you if you undertake such action we would of course make good any materiel problems that might arise as a result of these actions and we are cognizant of the fact we would have to hold the situation under control vis-à-vis the Soviets.

R: I would like to make it clear that the President looks at it favorably.

K: That is correct.

R: Second, if there would be a question of materiel you would find ways to compensate what would be the outcome.

K: We promise that.

R: Third, if there would be certain problems with the Soviets we can rely on you.

K: That is exactly correct and we are taking some immediate precautionary measures to put ourselves into this position.

R: Give me two or three minutes and I will bring it to Prime Minister Meir and I will discuss it with her and be in a position to tell you.

K: And you will call me at the White House board. Just a second—I would like to talk to my associates who are on the phone to make sure I don't leave anything out, but this has been discussed with the Secretary of State and has the personal endorsement of the President. Hold on. (Discusses with people in room.) We will call the British and inform them also, Mr. Ambassador. We will inform the British of this conversation.

R: If you find it necessary to inform the British it is up to you, but once the decision will be taken by us I think it is only between you and us.

K: We will not tell them of your decision, we will tell them of our discussions with you.

R: Since the last I had an opportunity to talk to the Prime Minister—when it comes to the reconnaissance there is no problem. I can't say for the time being anything about the second part.

K: You will call us back about that?

R: Yes.

⁴ See Document 285.

288. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Among the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), and the British Ambassador (Freeman)¹

Washington, September 20, 1970, 10:45 p.m.

K: We have some news for you which confirms all you passed to us earlier. We had a message from Amman (reads message).² Passing on request of King Hussein. Asked us to pass it on to the British.

F: Which I think you have done.

K: We are doing it now. We have passed this message in substance to the Israeli Ambassador and he said he would take it under advisement.³ That is where the matter stands now.

F: Quite. Now I will pass that message. You are not thinking of ringing up Greenhill immediately.

K: I would be glad to.

S: We have flashed it to London and we could have our people there in the Embassy take a copy right over.

F: That would be helpful. I think they would like to see the text.

K: Joe, do you know how many British nationals in Jordan?

F: I think the figure is 160 unless there has been some change in the last few days.

K: Well we will be in close touch with you and keep you informed of any information that we might get.

F: You haven't yet got any information about how you are going to react to this?

K: No.

F: Are you considering this a matter of urgency? You have had this formidable request addressed to you and the next question is what are you going to answer.

K: We have not had a formal request to land troops. We have not made any decisions about how we will respond for ourselves.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking.

² Document 284.

³ See Document 287. In telegram 154448 to Amman, September 21, 0556Z, the Department instructed the Embassy to inform Hussein that his message was passed to the British and discussed with the Israelis. The Department also requested that Hussein keep the U.S. Government informed regarding all developments on the ground. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Files, Box 172, Geopolitical File, Jordan Crisis, Selected Exchanges)

F: One more question to make sure I understand the text. At the end he said this request may come to you very quickly for air strikes. I will pass the gist of it on.

K: And we will get the text of it right away.

289. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Israeli Ambassador (Rabin)¹

September 20, 1970, 11:30 p.m.

R: First, [omission in the original] leaving immediately to have reconnaissance over the area whenever possible in daylight.

K: That should be in a few hours.

R: Transfer the results of these to Washington. According to what she had from Israel the situation is quite unpleasant to put it mildly.

K: What do you mean?

R: There's a massive Syrian force in the area.

K: So you agree with us.

R: When it comes to the facts and implications, we don't agree. The people there are not sure if air alone will be sufficient at the present. Anyhow, she has instructed to look into the matter favorably your point of view but no decision before we know exactly what's going on.

K: Will you be in touch with me?

R: Yes. I have no air communication back to Washington. If Gen. Haig could help me.

K: We will get you back. Let's get through our business and he will take it up.

R: She has exchanged views with the Defense Minister and she is sending a cable detailing everything we talked about but we cannot promise you anything now. In the morning perhaps. Now it's 5:35 a.m. and after more light—

K: Our time or your time?

R: It's morning there. As soon as possible air reconnaissance will be carried out.

K: Stay in your hotel room. Or do you have to see her off?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington and Rabin was in New York.

R: It's not a question—it doesn't matter. The sooner back to Washington—

K: Stay there and we will tell you where to go and how to get back. Now I will sum it up. Reconnaissance is ordered. You will transfer results to us immediately. Your information is that there are massive forces in the Irbid area and therefore you confirm information from the other side. Your people are not convinced air alone is sufficient. They have been ordered to look into our proposition favorably but cannot give final views until they have studied what they have. You will be back in touch. We will get you back to Washington.

290. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 20–21, 1970, midnight–12:40 a.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State—

U. Alexis Johnson

Joseph Sisco

Alfred Atherton

Defense—

David M. Packard

G. Warren Nutter

Robert Pranger

JCS—

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt

CIA—

Gen. Robert Cushman

David Blee

[*name not declassified*]

NSC Staff—

Gen. Alexander Haig

Col. Richard Kennedy

Harold H. Saunders

Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was decided to:

1. prepare a diplomatic scenario of what to do when an Israeli strike comes;²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² "Issues in Diplomatic Scenarios," September 21. (Ibid., Box H-077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/20/70)

2. check on the various arms packages for Israel to be sure they have everything they need to protect their border and that everything is underway or can be started;

3. prepare for a Congressional briefing tomorrow after checking with the President;

4. prepare a military assistance package for Israel, similar to the one for Jordan, of what Israel would need to replace materiel expended against the Syrians;

5. prepare contingency plans for a possible Soviet response;³

6. outline in writing the principal points we would make to the Soviets, after an Israeli strike has taken place;⁴

7. hold the medical planes;

8. inform our Embassies in Amman and Tel Aviv of today's actions.

Mr. Kissinger: To bring you up to date on what we have done, Joe Sisco and I telephoned Rabin with Option A which had been approved by Secretary Rogers and the President.⁵ We asked him to run a recce and come back to us with their information. We would then give them our judgment as to the desirability of their mounting a strike. Rabin had just asked us whether we would look favorably on this, when we were handed the new telegram from Amman reporting that the King had said the situation was deteriorating and asking for help.⁶ We told Rabin we had new information and would call him back. We called Secretary Rogers, who said he thought we had no choice but to say, if the Israeli recce confirmed the reported situation, that we would look favorably on an Israeli strike.⁷ We told the President of the Secretary's judgment, with which Sisco and I agreed, and the President approved.⁸ He told us to tell the Israelis that if they decided to go ahead, we would make up any materiel losses they incurred and would protect them against the Soviets. The President also wanted us to take certain readiness measures in case we had to evacuate American citizens, including alerting the 82nd Airborne. Rabin called back.⁹ The President was

³ "Possible Soviet Intervention and U.S. Countermoves," undated. (Ibid., Box H-076, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/22/70)

⁴ "Talking Points for Use with Soviets in Event of Israeli Intervention against Syrians," undated. (Ibid.)

⁵ See Document 283.

⁶ Document 284.

⁷ See Document 285.

⁸ See Document 286.

⁹ See Document 287.

in the office during the call but we did not tell Rabin this. We gave him the substance of the Amman telegram but not the text, and told him if the information was corroborated by their recce, we would look favorably on a strike, would make good any of their material needs and would protect them against Soviet reprisals insofar as it was within our power. Rabin repeated these three points to be sure he understood and said he would report to his Prime Minister and call back. He called back in an hour (the President also heard this conversation) at 11:25 our time to say: 1) the recce had been ordered and would start as soon as it was light enough; 2) their own intelligence confirmed that there were massive Syrian forces and that the situation around Irbid was very bad for the Jordanians, but they would check this; 3) he could not say what they would do if this information was confirmed, but the Prime Minister had instructed Dayan to look favorably on the U.S. request. He commented that they were not sure air action would be enough.¹⁰

Mr. Sisco: They also said they were in general agreement with our views as to the facts and the implications of the facts. Their information agrees with ours and they have the same judgment of the seriousness of the situation.

Mr. Kissinger: I think it would be prudent to assume some Israeli military action tomorrow.

Mr. Packard: That is all right.

Mr. Kissinger: I should tell you that the President has no excessive reluctance to commit American forces. If the situation in Amman should come unstuck, he might want to put American forces in to protect and evacuate American citizens.

Mr. Sisco: He also wants very much to concert with the British and try to get them to go in with us. The British have 160 nationals involved, and it would be good if this were a US-UK operation.

Mr. Kissinger: We have passed the Amman message to the British; I have spoken to Freeman¹¹ and to Greenhill's assistant.

Mr. Johnson: Should we consider going back to the Soviets again?

Mr. Sisco: I think the most effective time to follow up with the Soviets is shortly after an Israeli air attack to give our approach some force. We should look at this though—whether to go back to the Russians now to ask what they have done about our Sunday afternoon approach.¹²

Mr. Johnson: Yes, I think we should.

¹⁰ See Document 289.

¹¹ See Document 288.

¹² September 20; see footnote 2, Document 276.

Mr. Packard: No, I think we should go ahead.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree, we should go ahead.

Mr. Johnson: We could tell the Russians, “this is our information; what about it?”

Mr. Kissinger: If they had any comments to make about our approach, they would have made them.

Mr. Sisco: If we approach the Russians now, we imply that we are acting from a position of weakness and are worried about what the Syrians might do. If we wait until after the Israelis have struck, they will be worrying about the Israelis. We would be in a better position.

Mr. Packard: I think we should do what needs to be done first.

Mr. Kissinger: We should prepare a diplomatic scenario of what to do when the news of an Israeli air strike hits.

Mr. Packard: We will do two things: we will check on all the various arms packages for Israel to be sure they have everything they need to protect their border and that everything is already on the way, or we will start it on its way.

Mr. Sisco: We haven’t had time to write it yet, but Golda Meir told the President they want more of everything, and also wanted some qualitative improvement in additional items.

Mr. Packard: There was some argument on the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] package, but we will resolve it and get it moving.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, let’s move what we can.

Mr. Packard: And we have to advise the Congress. The American public is not prepared for this. We have to have a Congressional briefing first thing in the morning or it will be worse than Cambodia.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree, but I want to check this with the President. We will do it as early as possible tomorrow.

Mr. Packard: We can talk to our committees, and State can talk to theirs.

Mr. Kissinger: But not before the President gives the okay. We need a military assistance package for Israel vis-à-vis the Suez Canal. We also need the same sort of package you did for Jordan—what Israel would need to replace materiel expended against the Syrians.

Mr. Johnson: I expect a frantic call for ammunition from Jordan.

Mr. Kissinger: Are we all set on the Jordan package?

Mr. Pranger: On expendables, yes.

Mr. Kissinger: How about tanks?

Mr. Packard: We would have a very hard time getting tanks there in time. Could we put some in a C-5?

Gen. Vogt: You could get four in a C-5.

Mr. Sisco: The President also asked if the Israelis go in and there are losses, and they have to continue a holding action on the Suez Canal, are we in a position to undertake a quick, massive supply of new aircraft—Phantoms and Skyhawks—if we had to?

Mr. Packard: Yes. I've just learned that we have 40 percent more aircraft than are shown on the list.

Admiral Moorer: We have 40 percent more than the UE. If we remove 40 percent, we reduce the UE.

Mr. Sisco: What is the UE?

Admiral Moorer: The unit of equipment; how many aircraft there are in a squadron.

Mr. Kissinger: So, we need assistance packages for Israel and Jordan. And we need contingency plans for any foreseeable Soviet response. Do the Soviets have the capability of attacking Israel directly?

Admiral Moorer: Yes, but with heavy losses.

Mr. Johnson: Without using Egyptian bases?

Mr. Packard: They have long-range bombers, but we could make it pretty hot for them.

Mr. Kissinger: Would we fly air cover for the Israelis?

Mr. Packard: If the Soviets attack Israel, we would have to protect Israel.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's get some plans for that. I think it highly unlikely that the Soviets will attack, but we should have some plans.

Mr. Johnson: If they attack from Soviet territory, they would have to overfly Iran or Turkey.

Mr. Packard: Or they could go from the other side of the Bosphorus.

Mr. Sisco: They have planes and pilots in Egypt they could use.

Mr. Packard: They could go over Romania and Bulgaria, with just a little tongue of Greece.

Mr. Johnson: If they attack from Egyptian territory, the ceasefire is finished.

Mr. Sisco: I think the ceasefire will blow anyhow.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Admiral Moorer) Can you get us some contingency plans?

Admiral Moorer: Yes. The most important thing is to get a communications plan established with Israel—IFF, coordination of air activity, etc.

Mr. Kissinger: Can you do it?

Admiral Moorer: Yes, we can do it with their people here in Washington.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's wait until we know whether the Israelis have decided to strike. Once we know, you can work out a communications plan without putting American equipment into Israel.

Admiral Moorer: It's just a matter of frequencies.

Mr. Johnson: Dayan once told us that the biggest mistake they made in the Palestine war was in not fighting off the Irbid Heights. Is Israel likely to move on the ground?

Mr. Packard: They said they doubted that air would be enough, so they will probably have to.

Mr. Kissinger: The President said we should not encourage Israeli ground action, but that they should do what they feel they have to do.

Mr. Packard: It will probably be better in terms of a long-term solution if Israel comes out in a better position from this exercise.

Mr. Moorer: It will also be better if Israel does what it thinks it has to do quickly.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes. The quicker it is over, the better possibility there is of handling the Russians.

Mr. Packard: And the better bargaining position Israel will have.

Mr. Kissinger: I'm not inclined to encourage Israel to take any more territory.

Mr. Atherton: It is very likely they will want to hold those Heights. They are full of fedayeen.

Adm. Moorer: They could be in Damascus in three days and we'll have trouble getting them out.

Mr. Kissinger: I don't think they're interested in going to Damascus. Can they handle 200 tanks with air alone?

Adm. Moorer: With a combination of Jordanian and Israeli forces, probably yes. You still may have some activity around Irbid. I wouldn't rule out Israeli ground movement.

Mr. Packard: How many tanks did they destroy with air in 1967?

Adm. Moorer: Six or seven hundred. They blocked them in the passes with their tanks.

Mr. Sisco: Should we raise with the British the possibility of their joining us?

Mr. Kissinger: It is premature. Let's let the President sleep on it. We were talking in general terms. Would one British battalion or company be worth all the wailing?

Mr. Sisco: It would be a great political advantage, but I don't think they'll agree.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's concentrate tonight on the things it would be good to have for tomorrow: (1) contingency plans for possible Soviet moves; (2) assistance packages for Israel and Jordan; (3) a Congress-

sional briefing; (4) a diplomatic scenario, with the understanding that we will talk to no one until the Israelis have struck.

Mr. Sisco: Assuming the Israelis have struck, what we should say to whom and when, what we should say publicly, etc. We can do a one-page check list.

Mr. Kissinger: When we call in the Soviets, what do we tell them?

Mr. Sisco: Tell them: (1) our efforts, as before the strike took place, continue to be directed toward ending the Syrian intervention; (2) we are still interested in seeing that there is no broadening of the conflict; (3) in order to accomplish this, we want to get the Syrians out.

Mr. Kissinger: Should we warn them against Soviet intervention?

Mr. Sisco: I'm not sure. That may be premature.

Mr. Johnson: They already said they were approaching the Syrians.

Mr. Sisco: We can say we have a responsibility. We are prepared to do what is necessary to see about stopping the Israelis if they get the Syrians out.

Mr. Kissinger: It seems to me the chief purpose would be to tell the Soviets to stay out.

Mr. Packard: We could tell them to get the Syrians out first.

Mr. Sisco: Yes, and we will get the Israelis out. The Soviets have been worried about the possibility of our intervention. They have warned us.

Mr. Kissinger: Then why shouldn't we warn them?

Mr. Packard: They are not taking any steps toward intervention. They are doing it by proxy.

Mr. Johnson: We're not sure the Soviets wanted the Syrians to intervene or how much control they have over the Syrians.

Mr. Kissinger: I'm not sure the Syrians could have moved 200 tanks without Soviet blessing.

Mr. Sisco: The Soviets have influence if they will exert it.

Mr. Kissinger: We have two objectives: (1) to get them to use their influence with the Syrians to get them to withdraw; and (2) to make sure they do not believe they can escape the dilemma of an Israeli move by putting the squeeze on Israel. Our major interest is with the Soviets in the light of some of our other problems. I think waffling now will give us more problems later. We need not be truculent. We could use the same language they did to us last Friday.¹³

Mr. Johnson: What if the Soviets do not intervene but continue to use the Syrians and we decide we want to go in?

¹³ September 18; see Document 266.

Mr. Kissinger: We are not saying we will intervene. We would only say that if they intervene, we will intervene. The basic problem is Syrian intervention. If they get the Syrians out, we will use our influence with Israel.

Mr. Packard: But there is no evidence of Soviet intention to intervene. We have given some evidence of our readiness. I think we should take one step at a time. Let's address the Syrian question first with the Russians.

Mr. Johnson: Their natural answer will be that they won't intervene if we won't.

Mr. Packard: So if we intervene, they can too.

Mr. Nutter: We shouldn't leave them with any doubt of what we will do.

Mr. Kissinger: That's my view.

Mr. Sisco: We will write down in the morning the principal points we would make to the Soviets.

Mr. Kissinger: Shall we meet at 8:00 a.m.? State can jot down the principal points. Won't someone go to the UN?

Mr. Sisco: Yes, and our attitude should be positive.

Mr. Kissinger: A request for a simple withdrawal would be the right line for the UN.

Mr. Johnson: Jordan will take the lead.

Mr. Kissinger: And we don't tell the British anything?

Mr. Packard: Be polite.

Mr. Kissinger: We should also probably be prepared to brief our NATO allies. We should give Ellsworth some sort of instruction. Also remember the Shah. Can we give him some little word? Are there any other diplomatic moves? So at 8:00, State will come in with a diplomatic scenario, and Admiral Moorer will come in with some contingency plans for a possible Soviet move. Are there any other readiness measures we should take?

Adm. Moorer: We will go out tonight to all Unified Commands, telling them to augment their intelligence watch since the situation may change quickly—a general heads-up message.

Mr. Johnson: Will the movement of the brigade in Europe surface?

Mr. Kissinger: We should probably hold the medical planes.

Adm. Moorer: We can do that. Our problem is to start movements, not to stop them.

Mr. Sisco: We should also send a telegram to Tel Aviv and Amman telling them what we have done.

291. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 21, 1970, 1:10 a.m.

K: I was told you were still up and I wanted to tell you. We have gone over everything at that meeting² and Alex Johnson is preparing a diplomatic scenario for first thing in the morning if the Israelis go. We will call in the Soviets. The second possibility that State favors is if [omission in the original—Syrians] withdraw, we would ask the Israelis to withdraw.

P: I think the best thing is to say nothing and let them come to us. No reason to tell them.

K: The only argument for that is to warn them to stay out. They know the Syrians have been bad boys.

P: Under no circumstances. But to warn them to stay out—

K: That might be useful.

P: This is happening because Syrians are there and we want you to stay out. All right.

K: We will report to our allies our general attitude but so no one's nose gets out of joint. Moorer is preparing for contingency. Soviets probably knew about this and they will have a starchier reply than we now have. They may attack the Israelis from the air and we may have to fly air cover over Israel against the Soviets.

P: We will see.

K: The major thing is to go in and come out—

P: I understand. We know it's a possibility. We will now find out.

K: Packard has been—we are getting together an assistance package for Jordan in case they need it and Israel for losses. We are telling the Jordanians that we have passed on messages to all people they wanted and question of assistance is being urgently and sympathetically considered. We are phrasing it constructively. As you said, the morale of the King is important.

P: He will tell his troops.

K: We will advise the Shah just to show him consideration.

P: What about the Arabs?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking.

² See Document 290.

K: We should keep quiet. They won't tell them. There's some feeling you might call in Congressional leaders tomorrow to advise them. If you want to consider evacuation scheme, you might want to inform them and it gives them flexibility.

P: We will consider it but late in the day.³

K: On the check list. If it breaks. Otherwise, everyone is tracking. We are meeting again in the morning and everyone will work down.

P: Russians flying with air strikes? I don't believe it.

K: Not normally but their behavior lately—they are either incompetent or forcing a showdown. If they are incompetent, we will have an easy victory.

P: We will see what's happening in the morning.

K: You pulled them together. Haig and I feel that. You're calm and got to the heart of it. When they heard the Commander in Chief say this.

P: In the office we hadn't had messages yet from the situation and they came in later and we were considering the contingency. Know we have told them there's no question. The Secy. of State has spoken and the U.S. is committed.

K: I called Bill—couldn't reach Laird—and he is content with everything. This time everyone is together.

P: We hope for the best. Thank you, Henry, and good night.

³ On September 22, President Nixon met with Senator Hugh Scott and Congressman Gerald Ford from 10:40 to 10:53 a.m., and with 13 Southern Democrats from 5:05 to 6:25 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

292. Transcript of Telephone Conversations Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, September 21, 1970, about 5:30 a.m.

Mr. Kissinger/The President

K: Mr. President, I'm sorry to disturb you. I just had a call from Rabin.² Their answer is as follows. They've made reconnaissance; they haven't fully analyzed it yet. It confirms our information. There is a massive Syrian force there, and it is in the town of Irbid. It hasn't apparently moved south of it yet. They believe that air alone won't do it and that if it's done, ground action will be necessary either at the beginning or shortly thereafter. And they wanted to know what our reaction to that would be. I didn't want to do that even in the light of our conversation yesterday³ off the top of my head, so I told him I'd discuss it. They need the answer in two or three hours.

P: Well, the problem we have here is that the message requested only—and it's specific as far as they were concerned—air action.⁴

K: Well, it is unambiguous about air action.

P: That's smart.

K: In the message to the British,⁵ it was indiscriminating and in the message to us . . . My suggestion, Mr. President, would be that rather than ask you to make this decision at this moment that perhaps we should schedule a meeting of the principals for, say 7:30 or 8:00—say 7:30.⁶

P: No, no, no. We'll make it now. The point is that they are saying that they can't take the action unless they have . . . He doesn't want to take the action unless they go in on the ground at this time now.

K: Right.

P: That's what he's really saying.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. The time is handwritten.

² Apparently a reference to their 11:30 p.m. conversation on September 20, see Document 289.

³ See Document 286.

⁴ Reference is to Hussein's message; see Document 284.

⁵ See Document 279.

⁶ See Document 299.

K: That's what it will boil down to—that's right, Mr. President. Last night, when Sisco and I spoke to Rogers about it,⁷ we told him that when we were talking in general terms, the implication seemed to be that the thinking was to do what was necessary, and it didn't bother him then, but it hadn't reached the point of decision.

P: Yeah, well I think they have to do . . . The concern I have is that—and I trust they're considering this adequately, too—ground action presents, in a maximum way, a much more difficult reaction point, you see. It's the ground action that . . .

K: There's no question . . .

P: . . . invasion and all that sort of thing. That's the whole point. It's that that they have to have in mind and, of course, you have the shades of [gray?] even though we don't think they will want to stay and all that sort of thing; that they're going in or occupying territory—that it would be rather than the air action, just from their standpoint, and ours, too—but rather than if you just hit in the air at the outset at least. That's one thing, but of course they wouldn't comprehend this, I suppose, but the idea of Israel invading Jordan—that's the point, see. That's the point I think they may be missing.

K: Right. Well, their view probably is that they want to be sure that if they move militarily at all, they better succeed and that they probably have . . .

P: That's true, too.

K: They probably have only a limited time to do it, and Haig said to me last night they won't move without ground and I said, "well, let's see."

P: Would it not be well to find out what the Jordanian reaction to that is? Is that something we could find out?

K: Well . . . to ground action?

P: We don't know for sure, do we, on their part.

K: My own instinct is that it presents two kind of problems: (1) it presents a massive security problem because we are communicating with the Jordanians on the open radio; and (2) even if it were secure, it presents a massive problem . . .

P: Yeah, well, we'll just have to guess what their reaction . . .

K: . . . of the King. The King's position, I think it's safe to say, for his own survival will have to be to disassociate himself from any action, but more even from the ground action, of course, than . . .

P: Okay, yeah. Well, that's the point.

⁷ See Document 285.

K: But in either event he will, to some extent, disassociate himself. But it's a decision that can hold, say, three or four hours—closer to three than to four, because it probably takes from 12 to 24 hours to get ready.

P: Well, I think it . . . The point is what is the decision, though? If the Israelis are putting it to us in terms where we don't do this. You understand?

K: That's right.

P: That's what they're saying.

K: No, they are saying . . . I asked that precise question and the precise answer was that "the possibility of a favorable response is greatly enhanced if we have your understanding."

P: Give Sisco a call and get his reaction and call me back.

K: Right, Mr. President.

Mr. Kissinger/General Haig

K: Hello.

H: Yes, sir.

K: Al, the reaction was pretty much as you expected. The last thing he wants is a meeting of the principals.

H: Right.

K: Because he might have to face some people. And you know, he is just not eager to do. He said it will . . . headlines will be Israeli invasion of Jordan. It's a better headline to say the Middle East is lost two months from now. So what he wants me to do is ask Sisco on a personal basis. But you know that son-of-a-bitch will be on the phone to the Secretary within two seconds after that.

H: That's correct.

K: So, you don't think if I call the Secretary myself . . . What do you think? Or I could call Sisco and then the Secretary. And then go back to the President.

H: Yeah, I would do that. I'd get Sisco lined up first.

K: Okay.

H: And then get the Secretary next.

K: Okay, but I better get you lined up for a conference call when I go back to the President. You should have been on that line, incidentally.

H: Okay, sir.

K: Good, hold on then.

Mr. Kissinger/The President

P: Yeah.

K: Mr. President.

P: The way we would do this is—before you tell me what it is—to call him back in these precise terms. Tell him these are the principles that I believe—no, that I consider imperative. (1) First, the operation must succeed; (2) success diplomatically as well as militarily must be considered; (3) if it is militarily feasible, they must lean in the direction of accomplishing a true air action alone in the first instance, having in mind the fact that that might have a psychological impact which is needed; (4) if, however, that proves to be militarily and overall inadequate, again what is necessary to achieve success would have our support; (5) the ground for the action on the ground as distinguished from the air must strictly be limited to Jordan. Invasion of Syria would be very difficult. Bombing in Syria is not difficult. How does that sound to you?

K: That sounds very good to me. Let me sum it up to make sure I . . . You still want me to check Sisco first.

P: No, that's all right. Go ahead. This is all right. He won't have anything else to add.

K: Right. As I understand it, you say that . . .

P: These are five principles which should guide them.

K: These five principles should guide them. The first I didn't quite get down.

P: The operation must succeed.

K: The operation must succeed. (2) . . .

P: . . . must succeed from a military and diplomatic and political point of view.

K: That if they go, they should lean in the first instance toward air. That if air is insufficient, (that's principle 4) then ground action would have our support. (5) That ground action, however, to be effective . . . that ground action must be strictly limited to Jordan. It cannot expand to Syria or, even less, into other countries. However, air action in Syria would be understood.

P: Yeah, they have our support. You missed one—the second there, where I said that the . . . State the first principle; then, the second one is . . .

K: The first principle is it must succeed. The second principle is it must succeed not only militarily but also politically and diplomatically.

P: That's right.

K: And then, the third is air action is preferred.

P: Air action alone is preferred from all standpoints, if it will work militarily.

K: Right; if that is not sufficient, ground action would be supported; and the fifth principle is that it should be . . .

P: . . . that ground action should be confined to Jordan alone.

K: Exactly.

P: See, this is the problem that I had with Joe Sisco's principle of where they just go up that road and cut off the bastards. See, that road involves an invasion of Syria, so . . .

K: Mr. President, I couldn't agree more.

P: You see, it puts Israel in the same position. Let me say, I just assume . . . these things I raised for you myself . . . they'd go to Damascus. For Christ's sake, if they start doing that, the Russians then have a real cause. They want this deserter to be Jordan to help . . .

K: . . . then resisting the invading army in Jordan.

P: Yeah, yeah. Now, I don't mean that we have a Yalu River concept or anything of that sort. And I understand the other, but in other words, this puts it all in the terms of what it is; the first principle—so give him that and five principles. I've decided it. Don't ask anybody else. Tell him "go."

K: Right. Mr. President, I think for your own protection it ought to be mentioned as your decision to give them a chance to protest to the others.

P: All right, all right. Call them.

K: I'll call them and then I'll call Rabin.

P: Yeah. Don't call me back though if you don't want to.

K: I won't call you back unless there is a protest.

P: In other words, I've . . . First, there may be a protest, but a protest . . . If they protest this [omission in the original], what the hell example do you have?

K: I'll tell them that they have to get in touch with you.

P: I won't be in the office until 8:30 or 8:45.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: All right, but I think this is the right decision.

K: There's no question.

P: Frankly, I don't think there's anything . . . I don't think they'll mainline us. We don't have much part in the position, and second, who knows, they are there. They have to do it. Now, of course, the reason . . . Another reason I suggest this is that the Israelis have mixed motives, and also they have their military bureaucracy which they now have to have the luxury and the burden of. Their mixed motives are that they'd like to go in there, you know, and fuck a little of the ground. And second . . .

K: They want to really tear up the Syrians for once, whom they've never had a crack at.

P: I hope to Christ they do! But the other thing is their military bureaucracy, you know—these ground guys say, "God, we've got to go in and do this, too." The only thing is I have just a hunch—an intuition—that if they go in with massive air . . . I'd even put it to air action should be . . . It should be limited air action for the first 24 hours.

K: I don't think they'll do that.

P: You can see my point. They could have air action. It could have a psychological effect and could turn this thing right around. The alternate ground action . . . I would say if air action went to ground action prepared as a threat to them. You see my point?

K: Absolutely.

P: I know just from their standpoint that they're going to have a hell of a lot bigger problem.

K: They probably figure they only have 24 hours.

293. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Among the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

Washington, September 21, 1970, about 5:45 a.m.

K: Al, the President called me back.² He's made a decision. He wants us to communicate to the Israelis the following: that we want the action to succeed (2) that it should succeed politically, diplomatically—God-damn it, hold on a second; I just ran out of ink at a crucial moment. Can you hold on?—He said he wants me to communicate this, and he'll . . . and if anyone wants to protest they've got to wake him. Now, what do I do? My suggestion is that I call Sisco on a conference call with you. Then we'll call Rogers on a conference call for all four of us; and then I call Rabin, together with Sisco.

H: How about Laird?

K: Then, I better call Laird. Isn't he clued in on everything?

H: He is, if his assistant called him. He said he would; I called him back again as you instructed.

K: Did you tell him I was trying to reach him?

H: Yes.

K: What explanation did he have?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. The time, "early a.m.—prob. about 5:45 am," is handwritten.

² Document 292.

H: He said he couldn't understand it, unless he was just sleeping very heavily. But I told him that he should get the word to him and to be sure that he knew that you have been trying to get him.

K: Should we get Sisco? Or should I go straight to Rogers? Well, Rogers will only go to Sisco.

H: I think you can—since you've got a decision—get them all on.

K: Right; okay.

H: Including Laird.

K: Right, but I better communicate it to Rabin by the time Sisco does it, it will be the God-damnedest garbage you've ever heard.

H: Oh, I would just say that the President had told me to communicate the following.

K: Yeah, well, you can be damned sure my heroes will not be eager to get into that one. This is not a peace initiative.

H: No, that's right.

K: They won't want to communicate this. Now, you stand by now and I'll get Sisco on a conference call.

H: All right, sir.

[Joe Sisco entered the conversation]³

K: Joe?

S: How are you?

K: Al, are you on?

H: Haig on, sir.

K: We've had a call from Rabin. I've talked twice to the President. Let me give you the sequence of events. Rabin called in here. I called the President with his answer. I then told the President I was going to call you. As I was placing the call to you, the President called back and said, well, of course, you should be informed; he'd made his decision. Now here is what Rabin said. Rabin said they have had preliminary reports from their pilot and it confirms our information with one proviso—that they have not, according to his preliminary readout—moved south from Irbid, but they are in Irbid in force . . . in substantial force. Their judgment is that air action alone is not enough to be decisive and that ground action is necessary. They believe that they . . . they would like to know our reaction if that were done. I told him nothing. I said this is something that we have to consider here, and he said he would have to have an answer within two to three hours at the latest, but preferably quicker. This was now . . . I talked to him also about getting out of there if they go in, and I stated our strong view on that, but I have to tell you in all candor, he was not unambiguous

³ Brackets are in the original.

in his reply. I then called the President and communicated this to him. His first reaction was that this is, of course, more difficult than air. This is, of course, obvious. And he said I should discuss it with you.

Al, . . . I just want to make sure that Al is aboard.

I then said let me check Sisco and call you back. I placed a call to you; since you are usually carousing around, you weren't reached within five minutes.

S: Since I've just gotten out of the shower and have just shaved and am putting on some presentable clothes.

K: Is that what you always do when you take a phone call from me?

S: Yes; but if I hadn't come down clean, I'd have been dirty all day.

K: Let me give you the President's reaction, so then you have the whole picture. He then called me back and said he wants me to pass the following information to Rabin. (1) The action must succeed; (2) It has to succeed diplomatically as well as politically, and as well as militarily. He's never explained exactly what he meant by that. I've asked him about three times. (3) Actually, the next sentence explains it. From that point of view, air action alone would be easier, but we would support ground action if they thought it necessary. But we believe that ground action should be confined to Jordan. He specifically mentioned that, as he'd thought over your plan—which he likes militarily, but not diplomatically—it should be confined to Jordan, though air action in Syria would be supported. I said, "Let's get the principals together first thing in the morning." He says he doesn't want that. And he says, as far as he's concerned, that the decision is made. Anyone who wants to protest it has to call him. He doesn't want me to call him.

S: You know what I would do, Henry.

K: What? Let's do it in two stages. What do you think of this?

S: On substance?

K: On substance.

S: On substance, I think we have no alternative in the situation, and I agree on substance.

K: Should I call Bill and tell him the same thing?

S: The Secretary is in his office to relieve me for a couple of hours while I change clothes. He is in his office, and I think you ought to put it to him. He may want to have a chat with a few of us since we've got an hour or so.

K: Well, look, if I talk to the Israelis, I want you to be on the conference call.

S: All right; look, Henry. You go ahead and call the Secretary.

K: I will not talk to the Israelis alone on this.

S: No, I agree with you. Why don't I do this? I'll go directly to the State Operations Center because I'm already half-dressed.

K: Where is the Secretary?

S: Right in his own office at the State Department.

K: Okay.

S: He gave me an opportunity to come home and change clothes.

K: Okay.

S: So, I will go directly to State Operations as soon as I . . .

K: Okay; can I tell the Secretary that I've talked to you?

S: Don't tell him that you talked to me first just now; don't do that. Just go ahead and . . . because I don't want him to know that you and I have talked ahead of time on this, Henry. No, just go ahead and tell him we've talked.

K: I'll tell him we've talked, but that you didn't give me your . . . just to inform you.

S: No, no—well, just tell him that . . . I think he is going to say the following, Henry: (1) Emphasize strongly with the Israelis to try to do it with air; (2) however, if, in fact, they find it necessary to use ground, okay. I think he'll just have you put a little greater emphasis on the air. You see, Henry, I think this is just . . . if this is the way they read it, I think the dice have been thrown myself, and that's it.

K: Well, that's what the President thinks.

S: That's my feeling, and I don't think you are going to find the Secretary difficult on this.

K: Right, well, you know, if he is, he is, and then we'll discuss it with the President. I'm no more . . .

S: He's perfectly free to call the President, and that's what you ought to do. But, as I say, I think you'll find that he will see also that there's no alternative. He will go right on in to the Operations Center and then, if you need me to come to the White House, you just let me know.

K: Okay; right. Let me talk to Haig for a minute. Can you hang up, Joe?

S: Good. Thank you.

K: Hello.

H: Right, sir.

K: How do you think that son-of-a-bitch of a field marshal is doing there? He's probably got television cameras on him.

H: Well, I think he's in the corner.

K: I bet you he wants to come in to the WSAG meeting tomorrow morning. I'll call him and I'll get you put on the conference call.

H: All right, sir.

K: But I won't necessarily tell him you are on—yeah, I'll tell him you are on there.

H: Sure, I'd tell him.

K: Okay, and then we'll get back. And then you and I talk, and then we decide. Good.

294. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), and Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, September 21, 1970, about 6 a.m.

K: Bill?

R: Yeah, Henry.

K: I've got Haig also on an extension because he was in on the conversations so that if you had any questions of nuances I might have missed, you can check with him. We had a call from Rabin, oh about half an hour or so ago, with the following information.² He said they've undertaken reconnaissance—they haven't had a full read-out yet—but their preliminary indication is that there is a substantial Syrian force in Irbid. It has not moved south as far as they can tell, but it is there and, otherwise, the situation is substantially as it's been described in these cables. Secondly, they believe that air action alone is not going to be enough under these circumstances, and that ground action would be necessary. Thirdly, they wanted to know what our reaction would be if they thought ground action was necessary to accomplish the objective. I told him that, of course, I would have to check; that I couldn't say. Last night, the President had said they should do what was necessary, as I told you. But I didn't want to do it when the issue was theoretical, and wanted to make sure it would be put to him again.

R: Did they give any indication of the size of the force?

K: They had said it confirmed their original estimate which was about 200 tanks, but they had not had the full read-out yet on the pictures. They said it was a substantial force. To bring you up to date, I then called the President . . .

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. The time is handwritten. All brackets are in the original.

² No other record of conversation has been found.

[The Signal Operator interrupted to say the President was calling Mr. Kissinger]

The President came on.

K: Mr. President.

P: It seems if they go in on the ground, I think they should announce that they will withdraw—whether they do it at the time they go in or—they shouldn't do it under pressure, but it's better to do it early—that they will withdraw when the Syrians withdraw from Jordan. Do you see the point?

K: Right.

P: They shouldn't leave the implication, which again will make it politically more difficult for them than to just go in and sit there. Don't you think so?

K: Right.

P: Don't you think so?

K: I think that would be very helpful. They'll be tough as hell on all these things.

P: I understand.

K: But that should certainly be our position.

P: Therefore, it's also a position that we're going to have to take with them later, and it's also in their interest. They look awful good here.

K: I, incidentally, asked him that point, and he said, "well this depends on how things develop in Jordan, if the whole thing comes apart" . . . but yours, of course, is on the assumption that it won't come apart.

P: I mean, that's a different ballgame. If the whole thing comes apart, they've changed their minds. But when they go in, they should say that.

K: Absolutely.

P: And break their word.

K: I completely agree with you.

P: Tell them they have to look good at the beginning, so that that will help things not coming apart in Jordan.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: That's the whole point of this. If things come apart, then they break their word and we understand.

K: Right.

P: Okay, that's going to help them.

K: Right, Mr. President.

[End of tape]

295. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Among the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), and Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, September 21, 1970, about 6:15 a.m.

H: Haig, sir.

K: The Secretary said he had to go to the Men's Room—he can't take the call right away. The President added another condition.² Did you hear it?

H: No, I did not.

K: They should announce if they go in on ground that they'd withdraw if the Syrians withdraw, and I think he's right—that if it gets unstuck, if the Jordanians collapse, then it's a new situation anyway.

H: That's correct.

K: I think that's right. You know, they can't act like maniacs. Should we have the WSAG meeting anyway?

H: Oh, I think you are going to have to.

K: Well, I hate to tell that many people so much. I think they should confine it to principals.

H: Yeah, I wouldn't tell them so much. One thing that's concerned me, Henry, is how this thing evolves, assuming that this all goes as outlined. The situation in Amman, the Sit Room tells me, is getting worse, and we may be faced with—concurrently—this U.S. citizen problem. Some thought in sorting that out should be applied; in other words, I gather they intend to react in the area involved.

K: That's right.

H: So this could possibly be a concurrent action. It was demanded in terms of our citizens, and I wonder if we shouldn't convey the possibility of that.

K: To whom? Rabin?

H: Yeah. I don't know that it's a good idea, but if they get in there—see, you just don't know broad a front they intend to move on. I wouldn't think they would want to get locked into that problem.

K: It is deteriorating in Amman?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. The time, "prob. about 6:15 am," is handwritten. All brackets are in the original.

² See Document 294.

H: Yes.

K: I thought they had the stinking town under control.

H: I think they probably did; I think they have sped some more people in there, too. This thing's been set up—this is a typical Soviet exercise.

K: What would have happened if the King hadn't moved? They would have moved against him.

H: Oh, he would have been overthrown within two or three months, I think, and decisively.

K: I think less than that—that's the only thing. I now see the game plan. They were going to use the peace talks to overthrow the King and in the meantime strengthen the Egyptians.

H: Sure.

K: And then really put the squeeze on the Israelis.

H: That's right.

K: That's the only thing that makes sense.

H: That's right. And, in the meantime, obviously they bilk the Syrians. They've just been active across the board.

K: You don't think . . .

[At this point, Secretary Rogers joined the conversation]

K: Hello.

R: Hi, Henry.

K: Let me continue where I was before. (1) Then I talked to the President and gave him those facts. He said that that, of course, made it more difficult obviously and that I should start calling around to people who had been in the meeting in the evening, starting with Sisco to get their views. I placed a call to Sisco and just as I got him, the President called me.³ He said he had thought about it. . . .

[The Signal Operator interrupted to say Assistant Secretary Sisco wanted to speak with General Haig]

K: No, just leave him on here now. No, leave this conversation uninterrupted except for the President.

K: (Cont'd) . . . and said that he had made the following decisions: First, that we should communicate to the Israelis: (1) the action must succeed; (2) it has to succeed diplomatically as well as militarily—for this purpose, our preference is for air in the first instance, but that if they believe ground forces are essential, we would support that also. Ground forces, however, should be used inside Jordan; this was

³ See Document 292.

in reference to when Joe was in the office and he came in and Joe said he thought the best thing for the Israelis would be to start attacking from the Golan Heights into Syria. The President says that is militarily good, but politically not good. Those were the five points he wanted me to communicate. I told him maybe we should have a meeting of everybody. He said no, that's what he wants to do, but of course, anyone who wants to protest can do so to him. Now, he added, when he interrupted before, a sixth point which is that they should be told that if they go in on the ground, they should announce that they will withdraw when the Syrians withdraw or if the Syrians withdraw. I said, "what if the situation gets completely unstuck in Jordan?" He said, "That's a different problem, but the correct diplomatic posture is to go in and say they'll withdraw as soon as the Syrians withdraw." So, this is where we stand. I haven't done anything else.

R: Have you told them?

K: No, no, no. I wouldn't do that without talking to you. But I got the call from Sisco that I had placed earlier. I just told him and told him I was going to call you immediately, and Sisco said he was coming in to the office. Those are the only people who have been contacted.

R: There are two things: (1) I gather from Al that he felt that the Israelis would not do anything until tomorrow. Is that right? Did they pass?

K: I would guess by tonight our time—uh, tomorrow night our time (Monday night our time) is our instinct. They didn't say.

R: Yeah, but in any event, we'd have . . . it's 1:00 in Amman.

K: I would think Tuesday morning Amman time.

R: Did you say that they wanted an answer right away?

K: Within two hours or so.

R: I wonder what the . . .

K: Well, I think they have to get their forces ready.

R: We have here a cryptic message which just came in. [*1½ lines not declassified*] the Israelis have landed forces from helicopters in Syria." What do you think of that?

K: I haven't. For all we know, they may be running around there already.

R: That's what I mean.

K: That's not my impression, though. I don't believe that. Al, you were in on that conversation. Was it your impression that they could be moving?

H: No, I think they could be feinting a little bit.

K: I don't believe it.

H: I don't believe it either.

K: Unless they are absolutely tricking us, and I don't see what advantage it is to them to trick us about asking our support for a move that they say they'll make later and then make it ahead of time. At any rate, they gave us no indication of that, though.

R: Well, it seems to me there are a couple of things we should be doing—certainly a couple have come to mind right away. (1) Once this happens, and the chances of saving the King are probably pretty slim anyway; I can't imagine any Arab can survive very long if he has to call upon the Israelis to save him.

K: Well, my guess would be that he would disassociate himself.

R: Uh-huh.

K: I don't think he can admit that he called them—that he asked for air strikes.

R: Yeah, probably not. If that is the case, and you are probably right, although I am never convinced that anything can be held in confidence though if they decide to leak—just because the British certainly know about it, too—but, in any event, assume it doesn't leak, then what if Eban(?) says to the Arabs that the Israelis have, without request from Jordan, invaded their land, which will probably mean an Arab-Israeli conflict. I don't see how Nasser can stand by and do nothing if it doesn't appear that this was done at the King's request.

K: Well, they've stood by before. Well, you do something.

R: When did they stand by before.

K: The Egyptians haven't, but all the other Arabs have stood by while the Egyptians were being . . .

R: Oh, yeah. I was trying to put it the other way around though.

K: No, no—the Egyptians haven't stood by; but the Egyptians have never had the choice of standing by.

R: No, but if Nasser's going to have to be standing with the Arabs, he can't . . .

K: No, I think it's reasonable that he'll do something, and I think Joe thinks he'll do something.

R: Which means really that we'll be faced with the problem if he does that if Israel doesn't succeed, that they'll call on us.

K: Succeed against the Egyptians?

R: Yeah, against whoever would be helping IF THEY are not . . . In other words, when the President lays down the pre-condition that they have to succeed, I suppose they'd say to themselves, "well, we agreed, too."

K: But, I think what the President's phrase, "action must succeed" means it's to lead into ground action. I think what we have to expect is this, IN MY judgment, Bill. There's no doubt that the action will

succeed and there's no doubt, I think, that the Israelis can handle the Egyptians together with the Syrians. The question that arises is, if the Soviets intervene and there we would be obliged to help support them, I don't think there is . . . I cannot conceive that the Israelis can't handle the Egyptians and Syrians combined. What do you think, Al?

H: I think that's so.

R: That certainly has been everyone's assessment.

H: I don't think there's too much the Egyptians could do although I think they would try to do something. I don't think they have much they can do other than to start the artillery falling, in which case the Israelis will act.

K: I think that's the only thing, myself, that can be done—that they can do. I think the realistic occasion for American intervention will arise when . . . if the Soviets were to intervene one way or the other. And we would have to be prepared to be very tough in warning them off. There is a corollary to this move. Within the area, I think it can be handled—with a lot of excitement, but I think it can be handled.

R: Well, it's awfully damned difficult to make these judgments. That certainly would be my judgment and I think it's the judgment of those over here. Well, the trouble with that is, so was everybody confident that the King could handle the Fedayeen and apparently can't. Leaving Syria out, we can't handle them in Amman 'cause that seems . . .

K: I was never so confident of that one.

R: Most people were, though.

K: Yeah, I know most people were, though.

R: I didn't hear anybody express any real reservations.

K: Well, I was . . . after the first few days' reports, I also saw that he could. But, be that as it may, if the Israelis can't handle the Arabs, they can't be bailed out by us. We won't have enough forces to bail them out. We only have one decision. But since all of our policy has been based on the assumption that the military balance hadn't turned against them and that they were still superior . . . that I don't think is going to happen.

R: In our weighing it, we were thinking about it in terms of Egypt and Jordan. I don't know as we were thinking about it in terms of Syria and Iraq, but, you know, I never heard anybody express any doubt about it including the Israelis. They've always thought they could.

K: And they repeated that again. And we checked yesterday with Moorer at the meetings. He thinks . . . but that's, of course, subject to the same theories (queries?) that you've put before. They also thought they probably could handle the Fedayeen.

R: Well, I think the question probably in my mind now is the time problem, whether we have to give them an answer so soon if they aren't actually going to invade. If this cryptic message is incorrect and they aren't going to actually invade until sometime tomorrow morning—in other words, if we have 24 hours, I wonder why they need so much advance. I can see how they can sort of get ready with it, but I don't see why they have to know for sure. Because the information we had was to the effect that [End of tape]

296. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Defense Laird¹

Washington, September 21, 1970, about 6:30 a.m.

[Beginning of new tape]

K: . . . felt that it was better to go this route than to go the other, though he is somewhat cautious about communicating this to Rabin now. I don't think he fully realizes that, for the Israelis to move, they'll have to mobilize some forces and that they will commit themselves once they mobilize forces. So that they have to get our word by 24 hours before they move.

L: Yeah, because it's going to stir up a lot of stuff. I'll tell you that, and because of the pressure from Egypt then on this thing and the pressure within country in Egypt and within country in Lebanon.

K: Well, look, Mel, the reason I'm calling you is even though the President has said this is his decision and that he wants to go, I think we all ought to be together on it.

L: Yeah, I think we should, too.

K: If anyone has serious reservations, I want to know them.

L: The only thing I wanted to give, Henry, was an update on that intelligence which we don't have right now, but we should have that soon. We are trying to get messages back from DIA on that, and you haven't gotten them yet either. I just want to know why the Jordanians haven't committed their forces, and that's the only outstanding question I have.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. The time, "prob. about 6:30 am," is handwritten. All brackets are in the original.

K: Yeah.

L: That hasn't been answered yet.

K: But even if they haven't, it doesn't change the facts, does it?

L: Well, it changes the facts inasmuch as it might be able to handle them in those pass areas up there where the Syrians are.

K: Well, have you seen the message from the King?² He doesn't seem to think so.

L: I've seen those. Yeah, he's a young sort of a guy. He gets a little panicky. I understand those messages loud and clear. Let me check . . . Are you going to be right there for a minute? Let me call DIA and find out the latest that they have. Are you going to be in your office?

K: I'm at home actually, but I've been on the phone the whole time; so you can reach me through the board.

L: Okay; I'll call you right back.³

² See Document 284.

³ Laird called Kissinger back at approximately 7 a.m. Laird reported that he was still trying to put the intelligence together, but that it was "spotty." He promised to have the intelligence ready for the 8:30 a.m. NSC meeting (the meeting did not begin until 8:45 a.m.). (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files)

297. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, September 21, 1970, about 6:45 a.m.

K: Mr. President.

P: Yes.

K: I have Haig on the line because he has listened in on most of the other conversations—in case you have any questions and in case I am not exactly accurate, he can correct me.

P: Okay.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. The time is handwritten.

K: I have been talking to the Secretary of State and to Mr. Laird.² Laird is basically with the decision. He just wanted to check some of the Defense Department Intelligence to make sure that the situation is as bad as we believe it is. Bill has two views: (1) he feels we ought to have a meeting of your principal advisers and (2) he raises a number of objections such as if the Israelis are not going to move before tomorrow morning anyway, why do they have to know now? Why don't we wait until during the day to make our final decision? Well, the answer to that is that they are committed once they start mobilizing. They have to mobilize in order to do this. And if we put it to them on this basis—of course if things happen during the day, we can always go back to them but—(interrupted by P)

P: That doesn't mean anything. It is alright for him to raise it. We can always go back to him. But I understand—that is just a delaying tactic.

K: Exactly. And (interrupted by P)

P: Just putting off until tomorrow what you have to decide today.

K: Then he says there is no evidence that the Syrians are moving south. This is true but the estimate now is 300 tanks. We just checked recent intelligence. There is also another indication and I don't know how reliable that intelligence is. Al, do you know how reliable this information is?

H: This is an Israeli report.

K: That the Iraqis are getting ready to move and we have had a new appeal from the King which says that we have his advice and authority to land if the situation in Amman deteriorates and in order to protect our people. One of the problems we will face, Mr. President, is that we may come up within 24 hours to the decision to implement our evacuation plan.

P: Yes.

K: And we should not get the Israeli moves and ours confused, if we implement our evacuation plan. In my judgment, we will be forced to ask the Israelis to help then anyway. But at any rate, the first (interrupted by P)

P: Yes, I get the point. Now what is the question?

K: The question is do you want to have a meeting.

P: I have no objection to a meeting.

K: I think given all the leaks that will occur if you refuse a meeting, it is (interrupted by P)

² See Documents 295 and 296.

P: He hasn't changed about the necessity for it? What is the trouble? He hasn't changed his view about approving it—he approved it last night.

K: He approved it last night but then—well, what seems to be new in his mind is that the Syrians are moving south. Al, can you make out?

H: And the fact that they have come back and want to use ground operations.

P: Yes, well, a ground operation does pose a problem.

H: Now Sisco said that in his view the die is cast and that we should support the Israelis' proposal unless it is changed but that is what he said before.³

P: Okay, yes, yes. Why don't you have a meeting at 9 o'clock. How is that?

K: Well, Mr. President, we have got to get back to the Israelis. It is already getting close to the time we said we would. Could we do it a little earlier?

P: Well, yes, I suppose.

K: Because everyone is up anyway.

P: Well, yes, alright. Have you got them all together? 8 o'clock is alright with me. Who the hell does he want to have on that meeting?

K: I think it should be just you, Laird. I guess we might as well have the Chairman.

P: Moorer, sure.

K: And I guess we could have Cushman.

P: We don't need him.

K: That's all we need.

P: We should also have Sisco and Haig there.

K: Yes, and Packard was in on some of the other meetings.

P: He should be there.

K: I will get them all lined up.

P: The ones that have been working on it all the time.

K: Right, Mr. President. I will get it lined up. If there is any delay—maybe we should make it 8:30 so that you don't have to wait unnecessarily.

P: Just so we make sure they are all there, why don't you make it 8:30?⁴

K: Right, Mr. President.

³ See Document 293.

⁴ See Document 299.

298. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, September 21, 1970, about 7:30 a.m.

K: Al, I think you ought to call Rabin. Or should I do it?

H: No, I can do it.

K: And tell him this is a matter of such importance that we have decided to get the senior people together so that they could be sure that they had a united government backing them.

H: Yes.

K: Put it in a positive way.

H: Absolutely.

K: And that I have asked you to communicate that to him.

H: Right.

K: And that otherwise we didn't want to go through the Cambodian exercise again.

H: Right.

K: So that the meeting is at 8:30 and they won't get the answer much before 10:00.

H: Okay, sir. I think that is alright. He said they would hope to have an answer in two or three hours so we will make it alright.

K: We won't make it because he called you at 5:00 am.

H: Yes.

K: They will decide not to decide.

H: Well, that could happen but—

K: Let him hear his goddamned Secretary of State. I have called Laird and Rogers² and that is aboard.

H: Good. Everyone else is being called right now.

K: Now do something about Moorer for Christ's sake. And tell him this is the goddamned ball game. We are going to be dead. This is worse than Cambodia.

H: Oh, by far. Especially in the light of the other thing.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. The time is handwritten.

² See Documents 295 and 296.

K: We will be dead—if we decide to do nothing and the Israelis go, we will be worse off. The only hope we have of preventing a disaster is to let them go and be tough as nails.

H: That's right.

K: If there is a collapse and the Israelis do not go and then our world position is finished because they will be finished, don't you think?

H: Right. Oh, I think they'll go. They know in their own minds they have a couple of days because they can clean that thing out. So I'm not too concerned about that.

K: Frankly, I think they want the King to fall and then they will clean it up.

H: Yes. They want it to deteriorate a little more. And I think in either event they have control of that no matter what position we take.

K: Right.

H: Okay.

K: Okay. I'll get a car. What time is it?

H: It is about 7:10.

K: Okay, I will come in as quickly as possible and I suppose you will too.

H: Yes.

K: Good. But talk to Robbie,³ will you?

H: Yes.

K: I don't know what I'd do without you. We will be snapping at each other all afternoon we'll be so tired.

H: Chuckle.

K: Except that we don't snap on big things. It takes little ones.

H: Right.

K: Okay. Goodbye.

³ Not further identified.

299. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, September 21, 1970, 8:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Secretary of State William Rogers
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
Deputy Secretary of Defense David M. Packard
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs General
Alexander M. Haig
Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs Joseph Sisco

The President opened the meeting by asking Dr. Kissinger to review the situation as it had developed over the past 24 hours with the reported entry of Syrian forces into Jordan and the decisions made during the night.

Dr. Kissinger stated that at 5:15 that morning Ambassador Rabin had called and reported that Irbid had fallen to the Syrian forces, that the Israeli Government did not believe their intervention should be limited to air action alone, and that they had posed a series of questions and conditions on which they would like a response within three hours. Later, at about 6:45 a.m. Ambassador Rabin had called again and stated that Israeli reconnaissance had observed Syrian units south of Irbid but they were not sure whether the units represented security forces or were the vanguard for a move south. The Israelis stated that the King could maintain his position for at least another day or more. The Israelis had no territorial ambitions vis-à-vis Jordan, however, they did believe that an attack in support of the King must have some "political cause" and that some adjustment of a technical nature would have to be made as a result of their attack to preclude future technical difficulties. Among Israeli conditions were assurances that the U.S. would protect Israel against Soviet counteraction.² Following this call, Dr. Kissinger then called the President.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.

² No other record of either of Rabin's calls has been found.

³ See Document 297.

Admiral Moorer then reviewed the military situation with emphasis on the ambivalent position taken by Iraqi forces on the eastern flank of the Jordanian army.

Assistant Secretary Sisco stated that it appeared the Israelis had determined that air action alone would not be adequate in view of the deteriorating military situation. Sisco added that we could not assess the time of possible Israeli intervention, that we would not know the hour and that we would probably not have advance notice, although he did not believe that the Israelis could launch attacks prior to Tuesday morning.⁴ The question at hand was at what point our coordinating with the Israelis would make their action irreversible. This morning, he stated, it would be necessary to arrive at a new decision on the issue posed by Israel to combine both ground and air action in any intervention which they might undertake.

Secretary Rogers then stated that the important issue was whether or not the Syrians were actually moving south with the view toward taking Amman or whether they intended merely to carve out an enclave in northern Jordan. Admiral Moorer stated that his intelligence suggested that a spearhead of 40 Syrian tanks was indeed moving south. Secretary Laird confirmed that military intelligence suggested that the spearhead was on a route which led to Amman.

Sisco then stated that before the Israelis move one of the conditions listed by them early that morning was the requirement that the King know what they were doing and be in full agreement with it. For this reason, State had sent a message to Embassy Amman to confirm that the King in fact does wish to have Israeli air and ground support.⁵ A second issue which must be resolved rapidly is the fact that the Israeli Government apparently insists on establishing liaison with the Jordanian Government before taking any military action. Finally, they have made it clear, as Dr. Kissinger pointed out, that they have no territorial designs in Jordan, although this certainly remains to be seen.

Secretary Laird stated: "At this point, my main concern before any intervention by Israel or the United States is the Congressional attitude and the lack of public understanding of this problem. Whatever we do we should make it clear that Jordan has been attacked and that the survival of the King is crucial from the U.S. interest, especially the long-term perspective. Finally, if there is to be intervention, it must be done quickly with intervening forces moving in rapidly and pulling out rapidly."

⁴ In September 22.

⁵ In telegram 154462 to Amman, September 21, 1233Z. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 172, Geopolitical Files, Jordan Crisis, Selected Exchanges–Jordan, September 1970)

The President then stated that the question at hand is what we do. This depends on whether the Syrians are moving south towards Amman. The question is not necessarily whether the Israelis can win. The question, rather, is what effect will Israeli intervention have on the King. Secondly, what effect will Israeli intervention have on the Soviets. It is difficult to believe that the Soviets are not aware of what the Syrians have been doing. If the Soviets were to move in the face of our messages, both public and private, then I suspect further delay on our part would be dangerous. From the King's perspective also it should be kept in mind it is not so much a question of whether the Syrians intend to take over Amman, but rather the impact that any Syrian action is having on his morale.

Secretary Rogers stated that he agreed with the overall assessment of the situation and was relieved to learn, as the Israeli Ambassador pointed out, that we have some additional time. Secretary Rogers added that although the King thought that the Syrians were moving on Amman, this was not the case in his view. Therefore, it was necessary to find out again what the King's feelings were with respect to Israeli intervention. In light of the possibility that the Syrians were not moving on Amman, obviously, Rogers stated, Israel was playing it cool. They wanted liaison with the Jordanians, perhaps even a common staff for the conduct of their operations in Jordan. On balance, Rogers insisted, it would be far better if the King could do the job himself. If he had to call on Israel, it was likely that he would be doomed in any event. Secretary Rogers also raised the question of U.S. motivations for encouraging Israeli intervention and asked whether this was not really benefitting the Israelis more than anyone else. He judged that Israel had probably not made up its own mind yet with respect to intervention. Finally, he cautioned, it was most important that we know exactly what course of action the U.S. should pursue with respect to the Soviets. He stated: "I am relaxed about the situation, but for God's sake, let's know what we are going to do. I am relieved to learn that we have a little more time."

Secretary Laird stated that we should not give the Israelis a go-ahead at this time, but that we should tell them to be prepared to move. The President commented that it would be necessary to investigate what the consequences would be of too long a delay. We have considered carefully, he stated, what the effect of our own intervention might be and the possibility of Soviet counteraction. The U.S. has also made it clear to all parties that this Government considers the Syrian action most grave. If the King falls and we take no action, then we still will have to face the possibility of a requirement to intervene to evacuate our people. The President stated that if he were the King, he would take a rather dim view of the prospect of Israeli intervention in his country. On the other hand, the King can ask himself, who will help.

Without air or air and ground assistance in the present circumstances, the King will probably fall. The worst thing the U.S. could do would be to delay too long in deference to either the Soviets or the King's own inhibitions. Both are grim prospects. Intervening now has its risks, but the other consequence is to let the King fall and then to have to intervene to evacuate our people. At the same time our warning to the Soviets and the Syrians would be permitted to go unheeded.

Assistant Secretary Sisco suggested we might again consider the United Nations. President Nixon stated firmly that he wanted no more exchanges of notes between Governments and no more references to the United Nations. Secretary Rogers interjected that he was not asking for a delay but rather extreme caution before moving so that we do not get into an inflexible position. The President commented that the Administration would take a severe beating domestically. He added that the King must make his own position clear and that we must know this position. Above all, it was essential that he know that we are supporting him so that his morale and own determination would be strengthened at this critical time. Secretary Rogers again made the point that previous requests for assistance from the King were based on his assumption that Syrian tanks were moving on Amman.

The President then noted that one option might be for the Israelis to move into Syria. Secretary Laird added that they might strike Syrian air fields. Secretary Rogers commented that in his view militarily Syria was the best target, but politically Jordan was preferable.

Assistant Secretary Sisco cautioned that another twenty-four hour delay might be too much for the King's morale. Perhaps it would be better, he suggested, to inform the King and the Israelis that we agreed in principle to air and ground intervention, subject to final review sometime later that day. It was obvious that the King would agree with Israeli air strikes and perhaps we might urge them to initiate at least the air strikes that day. Secretary Sisco then stated that while there would be no further diplomatic move toward the Soviets, he hoped that the President would keep an open mind on a further approach in the event the signal was given to Israel to initiate air strikes so that the Soviets would know our position on the situation. The President agreed but cautioned that another note to the Soviets without any action on our part or on the part of Israel was not a practical course of action.

Secretary Rogers then said that he had some severe reservations about telling Israel how to conduct their operation. It would be difficult for the United States to dictate to the Israelis in this regard. Perhaps all we should do was tell them to go ahead in principle, get an answer from the King with respect to his desires, and then suggest to Israel that they do it in such a way as to achieve maximum results and a quick solution. In any event, it would be a terrible diplomatic mess.

The President indicated that first, he wanted whatever action was taken to be taken with the view toward maximum success. The operations, he stated, must succeed militarily. Second, with respect to political and diplomatic considerations, it was obvious that air action alone would be preferable. Third, if it was Israeli military judgment, however, that ground action must be taken as well, then indeed we should support both air and ground operations.

The President then asked the group to consider the Syrian invasion problem, and questioned whether or not an Israeli invasion of Syria did not in effect constitute a more difficult problem. If the Israelis moved into Syria, the Soviet involvement certainly would be more likely. Secretary Rogers asked if Israeli action against Syria was the only alternative. The President replied that it might be possible that they would feel impelled to strike Egypt. Secretary Rogers then recalled that Allon had stated Sunday that action against Egypt was not necessary. The President stated that in any event, air action alone would be preferable. Dr. Kissinger agreed but noted it might not be sufficient to do the job. The President then commented that obviously the surest solution was to favor both air and ground action by the Israelis. If they go they will obviously, as they have already told us, want to do both.

Secretary Rogers asked if it might not be possible to start close air reconnaissance that day. Assistant Secretary Sisco stated that he would suggest air action today and if that proved to be defective, we would have bought at least some time before having to decide on full intervention. At the same time, we could tell the Israelis that we agree to both actions in principle. The President stated that on balance he felt that it would be preferable not to tell the Israelis how to do the job. They were in control of their own military and they had their own political motives. We should use the Israeli message as a pretext to check once and for all whether or not the King would agree with Israeli intervention. The President confirmed that it was important to know the King's feeling as to the present situation. Admiral Moorer commented that the Israelis may not be in too much of a hurry to act since they might prefer to let the Arabs deplete each other's strength before actually moving, out of purely military and political considerations.

Secretary Rogers then asked, if the King falls, what will the Israelis have achieved? Admiral Moorer replied that the situation would be changed little, but that the Israeli military task would be considerably easier with both sides depleted. Secretary Rogers referred to the message received on Sunday from the Israelis in which they expressed a desire to establish liaison with the Jordanians. Dr. Kissinger stated that those conditions established yesterday by Israel occurred before the exchange with the Israelis the previous night. Assistant Secretary Sisco commented that in any event, the Israeli communication of early Mon-

day morning would be a good vehicle for inquiring again as to the King's view.⁶

The President stated that we should get a message off immediately to the King and asked how long it would take to get a response. Secretary Rogers stated that this would be difficult to judge since we would have some difficulty on the ground in Amman communicating with the King and that we had used a combination of radio and telephone. The President stated that in the meantime, we should inform the Israelis that we are checking with the Jordanians.⁷ Tell them we are favorable in principle to their intervention pending final receipt of the King's reaction. In either event, the Israelis must know that they have a free hand. If we do tell them this, we are, of course, bringing the whole thing to a head.

The President then asked if our evacuation plans were ready to go if required. Admiral Moorer stated that they had intensified readiness measures and thereby lowered essential lead times for military action by U.S. forces. The President asked how long specifically it would take. Admiral Moorer stated that our forces were on a four-hour alert which when added to 4½ hours flight time would total roughly 8½ hours to get the force of first U.S. elements on the ground. He also added that the need to obtain overflight clearances from the Austrians was still outstanding. The President commented that we could just move and not worry about the clearances.

The President then asked Mr. Sisco whether or not we had coordinated possible action with the British and what the British plans were. Sisco replied that they have no forces that could assist and that Mr. Hume had suggested that they would do nothing. Secretary Laird stated that they have personnel also in Jordan and should certainly feel an obligation.

Assistant Secretary Sisco stated that we have not really put it to the British in these terms. Secretary Rogers asked whether or not we should tell the United Kingdom about our plans if we decide to support Israeli intervention. Dr. Kissinger stated that the only thing the British know at this point is that we have conveyed the message they received from the King requesting intervention.⁸ The President stated

⁶ Telegram 5211 from Tel Aviv, September 21, 1138Z, reported the Israeli Government's continued desire to create an operational and political liaison with Jordan to coordinate an attack on Syrian forces. The Israelis wanted information from the Jordanians to assist them in identifying Syrian forces from Jordanian forces as well as other intelligence to aid them in launching an operation. (Ibid.)

⁷ The instructions to inform the Israelis were transmitted in telegram 154501 to Tel Aviv, September 21, 1630Z. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 619, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan Crisis)

⁸ See Document 279.

that he could see no objection to letting the British know. Secretary Laird commented that we should make our contacts now in the event of a possible need to intervene by U.S. forces for the evacuation of U.S. citizens. The President concluded the discussion of this point by stating it was important that the British know what we are going to do but only at that point in time in which we are sure of what we are going to do ourselves.

Secretary Rogers asked how we should play Israeli intervention. Should we suggest that the Israelis initiated this action on their own with U.S. knowledge or in fact with U.S. encouragement? The President responded that this would have to be resolved and that it was equally important that we know precisely how we would act with the Congress and that the Congress was even a more important consideration. Perhaps it would be better not to do any consultations that morning but to tell them later that we are ready to move to evacuate U.S. citizens. In this way, they would know that some military action was imminent.

Secretary Laird suggested that we also consider giving to the Congressional leadership the military facts of life right now, perhaps through a military briefing. We could tell them that we have prepared evacuation contingency plans but that nothing has been decided. The President asked if anyone had an objection to this course of action. Secretary Rogers stated that what we are really talking about, however, is Israeli intervention. This could lead to a new Middle East war. If we are to give the Israelis a go-ahead, the results could be most serious. Congress, Secretary Rogers stated, must know the consequences of these actions. The Soviets also must know. The Soviets have to be aware of what is being done and why, if we are to avoid another confrontation with the Soviet Union. We also have the problem, Secretary Rogers stated, that everyone will suspect that we plotted with the Israelis for the action. Thus, we will need very careful and detailed Congressional coordination if we are to acquiesce in Israeli intervention.

The President then asked Dr. Kissinger how he thought the situation should be played. Dr. Kissinger stated that it would be most difficult to specifically inform the Congress that we were working in collaboration with the Israelis. On the other hand, we might keep our consultation in the most general terms with some emphasis on the fact that it might be necessary to use U.S. military forces short of intervention and that before using these forces we would consult. The President reaffirmed that the U.S. should inform the Congress that we would indeed consult before intervening. Secretary Rogers stated that this was well and good but that with respect to Israeli intervention, we cannot lie to the Hill. Would it not be possible to just inform the leaders that we have discussed this with the Israeli Government but have

made no decision? Secretary Laird commented that he did not think that the Congressmen would press us that hard. The President stated that we should just discuss the military situation with them.

Secretary Rogers then asked what we would tell Congress if we decided to go ahead with Israeli intervention. Certainly it would become public quite soon and if it comes out in the newspapers that we have worked in collaboration with the Israelis, then what. For all these reasons, Secretary Rogers strongly suggested that we should consult with the Congress specifically about Israeli intervention. The President stated that it might be that we would not wish to make the King's request public because it would certainly be damaging to him. Therefore, opening up the whole issue of Israeli intervention with the Congress posed great difficulties. Assistant Secretary Sisco said that if we say "yes, we have consulted with the Israelis", this is tantamount to collusion. Maybe we would be much better off just suggesting benevolent acquiescence. The President stated that should the question arise, we should state that we were aware of the possibility of Israeli intervention, but deny that we were working with them actively on this possibility. And finally, we should add that we understand the reasons for their action.

Secretary Rogers then stated that certainly the Soviets should know where we stand on this issue. Dr. Kissinger commented that the Israelis will not want us to inform the Soviets for purely military reasons and they certainly would not want us to go to the Soviets in the role of negotiating Israeli military action. The President stated that this was obviously a correct conclusion. The facts are that the Israelis are moving, that the Secretary warned the Soviets of this possibility,⁹ that we understand the reasons for the Israeli action, and that we want to caution all other states not to further complicate the situation.

Secretary Rogers stated that we will need Congressional support if the going gets rough, and certainly it is necessary that we consider notifying key members of the Congress. The President stated this may be so but that he thought that Secretary Laird's idea of a briefing was preferable.

Secretary Rogers said that he was talking about the situation that would come next after the Israelis move in. It was likely, he stated, that Senator Russell¹⁰ would insist that the U.S. not intervene if and when the Israelis decide to move. Then we could say that we would move only if the super powers get involved. The President stated, just tell the Congressional leaders that we would not intervene without consultation.

⁹ See footnote 2, Document 276.

¹⁰ Senator Richard Russell (D-GA) was Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

Dr. Kissinger then commented that he believed the first thing that must be done is to provide them with a military briefing, as Mr. Laird has suggested. Secondly, we can tell the leaders that we will not intervene without consultation but we must be careful not to deflate the balloon. One of the operative pressures on the other side is their fear of a unilateral U.S. move. The President indicated that Dr. Kissinger was correct and that he saw this point. He added that Ziegler should say nothing beyond the fact that we have stated our position, that the Secretary of State's statement of yesterday¹¹ stands on its own, and that we are watching the situation most carefully. It is important that we do consult with the Congress before the Israelis move so that we achieve their cooperation. Dr. Kissinger confirmed that he favored the action as outlined by Secretary Laird and elaborated further in the conversation.

The President then stated that he wanted the WSAG to put a precise scenario together. Dr. Kissinger replied that there would be a meeting of the WSAG at noon.¹² Secretary Rogers again stated that he believed we should tell the Congressmen what we know about Israeli actions and that we have been in consultation with them. We should tell them that while we will not intervene, we won't discourage Israel from doing so, and that if they move, it is with the King's blessing. Dr. Kissinger added that it was very important that no one suspect that we have been moving jointly with the Israelis on this issue. The President agreed stating that all we need say is that we were aware of the Israeli plans and had discussed them but nothing further.

Secretary Rogers then commented that on the question of the use of U.S. forces, we need merely tell the leaders that we are making preparations in the event it is necessary to evacuate U.S. personnel. The President stated that we should limit this consultation to Russell and Stennis and not a whole number of others. Secretary Laird asked about Senator Mansfield. The President agreed that Mansfield should be consulted. The President added that Mansfield had told him that he would support action if it were required.

The President then directed that the WSAG work out a precise scenario and that it get a message to the King to obtain a precise feeling for his most current view of Israeli intervention, especially on the ground. Secretary Rogers suggested that the group meet again before the day ended. The President agreed that they should meet as soon as the King's reply was received. Dr. Kissinger suggested late in the afternoon. The President then concluded the meeting by informing the group that they would reconvene at 6:00 p.m.¹³ The meeting adjourned.

¹¹ See footnote 3, Document 275.

¹² See Document 303.

¹³ See Document 307.

300. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Among the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Secretary of State Rogers, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

Washington, September 21, 1970, 10:22 a.m.

R: Joe's on the line too. We have to touch base on how we will do this discussion with Rabin.

K: I think State should do it. Joe, so you will not—

R: He will do it and he will ask him to come in now. He will tell you exactly what we will say.

S: What do you think we should say?

K: What the Secy. proposes—we agree in principle and would like to review later in the day. We have passed it to the King and if he disagrees, we would want to consider that. It must succeed and we have preference for air action but if it must be coupled we will go with that. And confine it to Jordan.

S: That's all the points I have.

R: We haven't conveyed it to the King. We are conveying it.

K: Bill, you may not have seen it. We have a flash from Brown which says that in the King's mind, ground action is different.² We need the King's thinking exactly.

R: We will pass this message right away³ and it should take care of it.

K: Send out the flash and try to get the King's thinking. By the meeting this afternoon.

R: We will if we can reach the King. I can't believe the King will [omission in the original] without knowing the intentions of the troops.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking.

² Telegram 5008 from Amman, September 21, 1345Z. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 619, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan Crisis)

³ In telegram 154488 to Amman, September 21, 1545Z, the Department asked Brown to ascertain Hussein's reaction to Israeli ground intervention. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 ARAB–ISR)

301. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Israeli Ambassador (Rabin)¹

Washington, September 21, 1970, 10:25 a.m.

K: We have asked Sisco to talk to you in a few minutes and you will be getting a call from him. He will give you a reply which in principle is yes but I would like to make the following suggestion. The less you say in reply, the better. Just say you will communicate with your government and then come in and see me. It's terribly important that we know who says what to whom and I will give you guidelines on that.

R: In the meantime I have instructions too. More detailed.

K: Can you give them to me?

R: The gist after the decision that took place estimates that our military activity to prevent Syrian and Iraqi taking over in Jordan would require activation and operation of a relatively large force on our part. Second, we have to assume that as a result there might be resumption of hostilities even along the Suez Canal. It would be a clear cut Israeli intervention against another intervention in Jordan. As a result even though the attitude is positive as a result of our experience of the last few months I have been instructed to make clear certain points. The first, will the U.S. approach Israel formally in this matter? Second, will the King agree to request our assistance and undertake methods of communication and coordination? Third, a little more clarification—how will U.S. prevent Soviet participation? Fourth, is it understood that the U.S. will side with us in the international political arena including U.N. veto on grounds that Syria threatens Israel and not only Jordan? We might find ourselves in and they will order our withdrawal immediately. The fifth question, is it clear that Israel will not be held responsible for the fate of the hostages? And 6th, I think this on the political side any public statement made by U.S. in regard to this question we hope to know about it beforehand. I know it's—

K: Is it possible for you to separate these questions in your meeting with Sisco or can you wait until after?

R: I have put them to you. I can get Sisco's answer and communicate it back and then wait.

K: And then communicate back to Sisco?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking.

R: No, get Sisco and then in the meantime if I get clarification from you, I will be able to know what to do else.

K: I cannot work—just get Sisco's answer and we will discuss—make the first point to him. That's been our great contention here and it's important they hear it from you.

R: Fine.

K: You will have to follow my recommendations. I may ask you to put them into channels. Receive communications and make the first point. Then call Haig and make an appointment here. You will have to assume what I tell you is in the interest of everybody. The questions will get to the President. On the basis of his answer I may ask you to give the list to Sisco.

R: I have a cable that says if we have positive answers the tendency of the Cabinet is to respond positively.

K: That's second. What's the first point?

R: This is not a question. It's a statement. Any military activity—

K: That's what I want you to communicate. Just that much, no more.

R: I will do it.

K: Then come in and go back to him. I will decide how to handle it.

R: I will come when you are free.

K: You see Sisco and then come over here.

302. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

Washington, September 21, 1970, 11:50 a.m.

K: Have you had Rabin in?

S: He is on his way in.

K: The President just asked me.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking.

S: We called him 15 mins. ago. He must be at the Secy's office. I think the Secy. will have me do it.

K: That's better.

S: I think that's how it will work out.

K: Freeman is on his way in to see the Secy.² Did you get that flash out?

S: Yes. We agree in principle air and ground subject to review later in the day. We have passed the message to the King and urged the King to get in touch with the Israelis. We have asked the King what he thinks of Israeli ground action.³ Air action [omission in the original]. If he disagrees we would want to take that into account. Governing principles which must succeed. How do we define the objective? To force Syria from Jordan.

K: Exactly.

S: We prefer air action but we defer to Israel's judgment. We strongly prefer in Jordan which is the source rather than in Syria. I will get a cable out reporting it. To Tel Aviv and Amman.⁴

K: Are you coming to the WSAG?

S: Eventually.

K: What about 5015?⁵

S: Sit tight. We have two cables in 1 and half hours and they are diametrically opposed.⁶

K: OK. I will wait.

² A report on the meeting is in telegram 154587 to London, September 21, 1919Z. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 727, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. III)

³ See footnote 3, Document 300.

⁴ Telegram 154558 to Amman and Tel Aviv, September 21, 1824Z. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 619, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan Crisis)

⁵ In telegram 5015 from Amman, September 21, 1435Z, the Embassy reported that the Syrians had occupied all of Irbid and had moved into surrounding villages. The King called for an immediate air strike to alleviate the pressure on the JAA and accepted the possibility of an Israeli air strike against the Syrians, even though he preferred a U.S. air strike. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

⁶ Sisco is referring to telegrams 5015 and 5007 from Amman. Telegram 5007, September 21, 1310Z, preceded telegram 5015 by one hour and 25 minutes. It reported that the situation in Jordan was "better than it was this morning," with Syrian forces not moving and reports of Syrian tanks withdrawing from Jordan and returning to Syria. (Ibid.)

303. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 21, 1970, noon–1 p.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State—

U. Alexis Johnson

Talcott Seelye

Defense—

David Packard

G. Warren Nutter

James Noyes

JCS—

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt

CIA—

Lt. Gen. R.E. Cushman

David Blee

NSC Staff—

Gen. Alexander Haig

Col. Richard Kennedy

Harold H. Saunders

Samuel Hoskinson

Adm. R.C. Robinson

Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

1. State will prepare two versions of a draft public statement we might make after an Israeli move: one confined to the local situation in the area and one in the general context of the peace initiative;

2. the NSC staff will collect the various aid packages for Israel into one package;

3. State will prepare a scenario including:

—what we might say to the Soviets, the NAC, the Security Council

—a UN strategy

4. NSC staff to put together a book of all the contingency plans, with the readiness times.

Mr. Johnson: Cairo radio has announced that there will be a summit meeting in Cairo and that Hussein has agreed to attend.²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² On September 22, a meeting of Arab leaders convened in Cairo to find a solution to the fighting between the JAA and fedayeen. The conference sent a mediation mission to Amman that day, led by Sudanese President Numeiri, in an attempt to talk with King Hussein and make contact with Arafat. The mission returned to Cairo to report on the

Mr. Kissinger: (referring to the recent flurry of telegrams from Amman) You pick your telegram and you take your choice.³ Do you believe the Cairo announcement?

Mr. Johnson: We have no reason to doubt it.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's review the situation. The Jordanians still want an air strike—if necessary, an Israeli air strike. It is our Ambassador's judgment that their request for assistance does not include Israeli ground action. We are asking him to get a clear-cut answer on this from the Palace. We also have an Israeli request for staff contacts. The King wants the U.S. and the British to prepare for ground intervention. If the Syrians withdrew, do we think the Jordanians might be able to handle the remaining problem?

Mr. Seelye: If the Syrians localize their activity in the Irbid area and the Iraqis do not intervene, there is a chance the King could take care of it. He could deploy his armor in the north. It would depend on whether or not he has secured the cities. There are two critical factors: whether the Syrians move south and Iraqi intervention.

Admiral Moorer: The King has made reasonable progress in Amman. Assuming he succeeds there, the Syrians withdraw, the Iraqis do not move, and Hussein takes the cities he would be okay.

Mr. Kissinger: He has been making reasonable progress in Amman for four days. Is he moving fast enough to cope with the situation?

Mr. Packard: He will still need some armor in Amman.

Admiral Moorer: Yes, but not as much.

Mr. Kissinger: If the Syrians withdraw and the Iraqis do not intervene, is it our judgment that Hussein could handle the Fedayeen?

General Cushman: It depends whether or not the Fedayeen continue their present tactics.

Mr. Packard: He probably could not put them out, but they could not put him out.

Admiral Moorer: He could handle them in the cities, but guerrilla activity and sniping would continue for an indeterminate period.

General Cushman: Particularly if their leadership remains intact.

Mr. Johnson: If the Syrians don't move south and the King effects a reasonably stable situation in Amman, he could turn to them later. What the Syrians have done so far has had no catastrophic effect on

conditions in Jordan, and then traveled again to Amman on September 24. The mission met with Arafat and abetted his escape to Cairo by providing him a disguise. Ultimately, King Hussein flew to Cairo, and on September 27, he and Arafat signed a cease-fire agreement at the Cairo Hilton.

³ See footnotes 5 and 6, Document 302.

the Jordanian forces except for the psychological effect. It has had not real military effect.

Admiral Moorer: It has had an effect on the morale of the troops. Here, we are talking about the King's will.

Mr. Johnson: The last message indicated that the Syrians are moving into the villages around Irbid, not necessarily driving south.⁴

Mr. Kissinger: What conclusion do you draw from this?

Mr. Johnson: That we have more time—that the urgency of the action is somewhat reduced.

Mr. Kissinger: That is true if we assume that the only threat to Amman is the Syrian tanks moving on Amman. In some cables, the King has said that the presence of Syrian forces in Irbid has demoralized his troops.

Mr. Johnson: I read that as meaning the threat represented by the Syrian troops—not merely their presence.

Admiral Moorer: But the threat exists as long as they are present.

Mr. Kissinger: (to General Cushman) Would you like to update the situation for us?

General Cushman: We have a report [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that some tanks are moving from Irbid toward Mafraq. We have no hard confirmation but are watching this movement. We also have a Reuters report of an Amman radio announcement that the King has ordered a cease-fire. We don't know what conditions he may have attached or what he actually said.

Mr. Johnson: Didn't I see a report that some Syrian tanks had moved back?

General Cushman: Yes. The bulk of the force is digging-in in Irbid. But some tanks are moving to the southeast and some have gone home. This situation is unclear.

The Iraqis have still not fired a shot, although they have brought their forces together in the Mafraq area. They have asked the Jordanians to get their aircraft out of the field there and move them to H-5 so that the Iraqis would not be affected on the ground by any air combat. In Amman, fighting is still going on around the Embassy. The Jordanian Army does not have control. We have conflicting reports of what has happened in the refugee camps. The Jordanian Army holds parts of them. The Embassy area is still full of snipers, some commando re-infiltration has been reported, but we don't know how serious this is. There have been some flights by the Jordanian Air Force Hawker Hunters—they have 18 of them. The 104s have not been used so far.

⁴ Telegram 5007 from Amman; see footnote 6, Document 302.

There has been heavy Israeli air recce, with reports of helicopters being used. Israel has increased its alert measures and has moved two mechanized infantry brigades into the Golan Heights area.

Mr. Kissinger: Does this mean they have called up their reserves?

General Cushman: Yes. They have called some reserves, but we have no details.

Admiral Moorer: It doesn't take them long to mobilize.

Mr. Kissinger: I understand from 48 to 72 hours.

Admiral Moorer: They have both regular and reserve personnel in the same units. They only have to call up the reserves to fill up the cadres.

Mr. Kissinger: Any further movement on the diplomatic side?

Mr. Johnson: No.

Mr. Kissinger: In the meeting of the principals this morning with the President,⁵ it was agreed to ask Amman to find out exactly what the King thinks about Israeli ground activity. Also, State has told Rabin: (1) that we agree in principle to their intervention; (2) that we would prefer an air strike but would understand if they feel ground action is essential; (3) we prefer they not enter Syria; (4) our agreement is contingent on the King's acquiescence; and (5) we reserve the right to reconsider our position in the light of changes in the situation during the day.⁶ We don't know what the Israelis will reply, but we need to plan on the assumption that the operation will take place, even though we hope it will not be necessary. We have two major problems: our diplomatic posture and our public posture.

The President has asked this group to talk about Congressional consultations. What should we say? Everyone agreed in the meeting of the principals that Congress should be briefed today if possible on the factual situation, but not on anyone's intentions. They also agreed we should make no commitment at that briefing as to what we would or would not do. The more difficult question is what we tell Congress if Israeli action becomes inevitable.

Mr. Packard: In the factual briefing, we should stick to the line that our alerting actions are precautionary moves in the event we have to evacuate American citizens—nothing beyond.

Mr. Kissinger: I didn't understand that. I thought we were to leave this hanging in the posture of last week, saying only that we were planning for contingencies.

Mr. Packard: The contingencies include the possibility of an evacuation to save Americans.

⁵ See Document 299.

⁶ See footnote 4, Document 302.

Mr. Kissinger: For today, we should brief on the military situation, and say that all planning is contingency planning without saying for what. Tomorrow, if the Israelis take action, we can say our planning is for the purpose of evacuation. We can promise to consult with the Congress if we go beyond that. Today I think it is important not to defuse our possible actions too much. We should say nothing about Israeli actions and say nothing one way or another about our own actions.

Mr. Johnson: Can't we say we have been in touch with the Israelis?

Mr. Kissinger: We are talking about the President or Secretary Laird briefing the Congressional leadership?

Mr. Packard: We are sending Dick (?) up to see Senator Russell and Stennis and Congressman Mahan to give them the facts. He will say our actions are preparing for the possibility of evacuating Americans. This is no more than Secretary Laird said on Saturday.⁷

Admiral Moorer: There is a newspaper story today that the 82nd Airborne has been alerted. After we brief them on the military situation, we can say we are taking normal precautions to protect Americans.

Mr. Kissinger: Ron Ziegler last week, on the instruction of the President, left it open to what we might do.⁸ I don't see what we gain by foreclosing the situation.

General Haig: Ziegler thinks that, if he is asked whether or not we intend to intervene, an attempt to stone wall would bring on a massive scare story. If asked about our planning, he would like to say that there are many Americans in the area and we are taking precautionary measures.

Mr. Packard: Our reports to Congress will be limited to two or three people the President can trust. That is why we are going to Stennis and Russell.

Mr. Johnson: What about Senator Mansfield?

Mr. Packard: Yes, but Defense is not going to Mansfield.

Mr. Johnson: We are working on a master fact sheet⁹ to provide the basis for further briefing. It will be available within the next hour, we hope, and we will circulate it.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Saunders) Make sure everyone gets it.

Mr. Johnson: We are starting with the peace initiative, saying that all of these recent actions are directed toward sabotaging that peace effort.

⁷ September 19.

⁸ See footnote 2, Document 257.

⁹ Paper prepared by the NEA Working Group, entitled, "Fact Sheet on Events Leading Up to Syrian Invasion of Jordan." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/21/70)

Mr. Packard: With regard to our relations with Israel, we can say we are exchanging information but no more.

Mr. Johnson: Yes, that would be the natural thing to do. I will check on consulting with Senator Mansfield.

Mr. Seelye: The Jordanian Government instructed their man in New York to request a Security Council meeting. His Arab colleagues all objected, and he has gone back to Amman for further instructions. This means the Jordanians won't call for a meeting soon, but the British are now gung ho to do so. The Secretary is going to the British to try to cool them off.

Admiral Moorer: Are we also trying to coordinate our evacuation plans with the British?

Mr. Kissinger: Is the Secretary discussing that with the British too?

Mr. Seelye: I don't know.

Mr. Kissinger: Can you give a read-out on the Secretary's conversation with Freeman so all are informed.¹⁰

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: In the Congressional briefings, if the Israeli attacks take place, the Secretary of State feels strongly, and I agree, that we must talk to the Congressional leaders ahead of time. There are two problems: (1) the degree to which we want to indicate our advance knowledge of Israel's plans; and (2) the degree to which we indicate the limitations we have put on the action. From the point of view of honesty, we should of course tell them as much as possible. From the diplomatic point of view, both Israel and the US might prefer not to be so closely coupled. It is not in our or Israel's interest for Israel to appear as an agent of American imperialism. It would be better for Israel to act to protect its national security. Although this is unpalatable to the Arabs, they have lived with it for twenty years. If Israel is protecting its own security and also running errands for the US, it would be most unpleasant. We should have minimal formal association with Israel from the point of view of the Arab world. Also, we would not be needed with the Arabs if Israel goes in in a major effort. We would be needed to keep the Soviets out. We don't have to couple our intentions with those of Israel. We could take the position that Israel is acting in its own interest, and we will prevent Soviet military intervention in the Middle East. We have a ticklish problem, though. One could argue that a show of US toughness will assure that the Soviets won't intervene. What can we tell Congress ahead of time? Consultation with Congressional leaders would be okay, but putting the issue to a vote might weaken the deterrent. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Johnson and Mr. Packard: Yes.

¹⁰ See footnote 2, Document 302.

Mr. Kissinger: Does anyone think we should publicly avow joint planning with Israel? If no one does, what degree of prior knowledge can we admit?

Mr. Packard: We have been thinking about this and we might get Israel to make a statement along the following lines: (Reading)

“The invasion of Soviet supplied tanks from Syria against the Government of Jordan, for whose people Prime Minister Meir has expressed concern, poses an intolerable threat to the security of Israel. Therefore, action is being taken to meet this threat. The Government of Israel has stated that it could not tolerate any shift of military forces in the Middle East which could threaten the safety of the citizens of Israel. For this reason, Israeli aircraft and ground force units are attacking the forces from Syria which have invaded Jordan and their support elements. No further details are available at this time.”

Then, the US response could be to refer to the Israeli statement.

Mr. Johnson: We could add that Israel has said it is not interested in occupation.

Mr. Kissinger: Do we say we agree with the Israeli statement? Or understand the statement?

Mr. Packard: We could just refer to it with no further comment.

Mr. Kissinger: Remember we would probably be in the UN within 24 hours. Are we prepared to veto a resolution condemning Israel's actions?

Mr. Johnson: From the UN side, obviously the best situation would be to preempt on the withdrawal of Syrian forces. Then Israel can be in the holy position of helping support the UN.

Mr. Kissinger: The Soviets wouldn't agree to condemn Syria.

Mr. Johnson: No, but we would be in the best position.

Mr. Kissinger: With regard to public posture, in the meeting of the principals this afternoon, I intend to sum up our general philosophy, but we have left open what we should say about Israel's actions. Should we say we knew beforehand? That we were generally informed?

Mr. Packard: It would be hard not to say at least that.

Mr. Seelye: The Arabs will assume collusion. We have to give them the least possible justification.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the least possible justification?

Mr. Seelye: That we didn't know.

Mr. Johnson: Israel won't let us get away with that.

Admiral Moorer: And no one would believe it.

Mr. Johnson: We could say we knew of their concern over the situation.

Mr. Kissinger: We could say we knew in a general way if things got to a certain stage, the Israelis would probably feel compelled to move.

This is why we have been urgently pleading with others to stay out; why we told the Soviets they should try to get the Syrians to withdraw. After three days of a Syrian advance, we understand why Israel felt it had to take action.

Mr. Seelye: Could we say we couldn't hold off the Israelis any longer?

Adm. Moorer: The Israeli position would be consistent with the statement we are proposing they make—they would say they could not tolerate any shift of military forces in the Middle East which could threaten their citizens.

Mr. Johnson: We will try to work out some language. I would like to get back to the point that all this is designed to sabotage the peace initiative, and we are trying to get a restoration of the situation.

Mr. Kissinger: Israel won't buy that.

Mr. Johnson: But we can and should say it.

Mr. Kissinger: (to State) Could you bring us two versions of a draft statement: one confined to the local situation in the area and one in the general context of the peace initiative. The question is first what we tell the Congressional leaders, which has to be consistent with what we plan to tell the public. Can we follow the line "you brought this on by expanding the conflict in the area, but we will not intervene unless powers outside the area intervene?"

Mr. Johnson: What can we say to Congress if powers outside the area do intervene?

Mr. Kissinger: We are committed to Israel.

Mr. Johnson: But what can we say publicly?

Mr. Kissinger: We can say that, if there is outside intervention, we will confer with Congressional leaders before considering US intervention. Would that be enough for the Israelis? More important, would it be enough for the Russians?

Mr. Seelye: Yes, I think so.

Mr. Johnson: It depends on the degree to which it backfires and we get statements from the Hill denouncing it.

Mr. Kissinger: If we have any hope of getting this over quickly, it will be by overwhelming the Soviets.

Mr. Johnson: I don't think the Soviets will overtly intervene.

Mr. Kissinger: Then there is no problem. We would then get to the various aid packages for Israel if the Egyptians, with Soviet help, move against them. Are we getting these together? (to Saunders and Kennedy) Can you get all these things in one package?

Mr. Packard: I would like Bob Pranger to work directly with the Israeli Attaché on this. We are ready to go but we need some details.

Mr. Kissinger: Go ahead and do it, and feed it to Saunders and Kennedy so we will have it all in one place. All the principals will get copies.

Mr. Packard: We need some feedback on what the Israelis need.

Mr. Kissinger: This would not go into effect unless they need it and without our concurrence in what they do.

Adm. Moorer: The DIA assessment concludes that the Soviets will not intervene, but we can't give the impression publicly that we accept this and are ignoring the Soviets. That is the most likely outcome, but we should keep looking over our shoulders.

Mr. Packard: We must be prudent.

Mr. Nutter: They might be thinking the same way we are about an initial show of force.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's get a draft statement of exactly what we should say.

Mr. Johnson: We shouldn't publicly say that we don't think they will intervene.

Mr. Kissinger: But we should warn against anyone outside the area going in.

Mr. Johnson: In effect, yes. We will let Israel deal with the Arabs, just as we were willing to let the Jordanians deal with their own conflict. But we are against broadening the conflict. We have two problems: we have to say something to the Congressional leaders about what we will do. This may be close to what we have to tell the Soviets. Congress will ask what an Israeli attack means so far as US action is concerned. We will say we have no plans for intervention unless the Soviets intervene. This will leak, but I think that's the only kind of public statement to make. We can't have Ziegler and Henkin and McCloskey stand up and say that. How about the diplomatic scenario?

Mr. Johnson [*Seelye?*]: We just have a checklist at the moment.

Mr. Kissinger: We need an outline of what to say to the Soviets.

Mr. Johnson: Yes, to the Soviets, to NAC, to the Security Council, etc.

Mr. Kissinger: We need a checklist, the content of an approach, a UN strategy—whether to veto or not. I assume we would veto.

Mr. Seelye: If we did not, we would get the best of both worlds.

Mr. Kissinger: How can we tell the Israelis, at the President's request, that they should do something, and then let them be condemned at the UN?

Mr. Johnson: They would not understand.

Mr. Saunders: As a variant, we might try for a resolution calling for a balanced withdrawal?

Mr. Kissinger: We might recommend a balanced withdrawal.

Mr. Saunders: Then Syria, Iraq and Israel would all withdraw.

Mr. Seelye: How about the hostages?

Mr. Johnson: If we say we will not intervene if the Soviets don't intervene, doesn't this lead to our saying that we will intervene if the Soviets intervene? Won't this create problems with Congress and the public?

Adm. Moorer: We could make a flat statement that we would not intervene if the Soviets did not intervene. We could say if they do, we would consider positive counteraction, or some such phrase. We would evaluate the situation and reach a decision.

Mr. Johnson: We would be making a commitment to Israel.

Mr. Kissinger: We made a commitment yesterday. Israel believes we have promised to protect them against Soviet retaliation. We are committed. The question is whether we say it.

Mr. Johnson: If we say the first, we strongly imply the second.

Mr. Kissinger: We would say that, before our forces were committed, we would consult Congressional leaders. This is desirable from a domestic point of view, but what does it do to us from the deterrent point of view?

Mr. Johnson: It depends on the Congressional reaction.

Mr. Kissinger: Soviet actions are inexplicable from many points of view. To put missiles into the standstill zone before the negotiations even started doesn't make sense. It would have been understandable if they had done it later, when the negotiations were stalemated. Their actions are very hard to understand unless we think they see the possibility of a showdown. It is particularly hard to understand in view of other problems we are having. If we see a 10% possibility that they merely want to get even with us for 1962 and are saying "to hell with international repercussions," then they may be trying to push us against the wall. Their behavior is hard to understand.

Mr. Johnson: It is hard to draw any other conclusion.

Mr. Packard: It is possible that they think they have to move the missiles every day because the Israelis are flying over every day.

Mr. Kissinger: When we got the first reports of missile activity, I told the President their action was insane; why do it on the first day of the cease-fire?

Mr. Johnson: I thought the activity would level off after the first week.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, for the first week you could argue that they had them in the pipeline and didn't know what else to do with them. But we should keep open the possibility that we might have to be fairly stern with the Soviets. Let us meet again this afternoon before the principals

meet. Can we get some things down on paper? Just talking points—enough to help us get the issues down. Can we meet at 4:00 p.m.?¹¹

All agreed.

Adm. Moorer: The 82nd Airborne will attain readiness at 8:00 p.m. tonight. The first reaction force was ready at noon. The brigade in Germany is being rigged for airborne operations. The first battalion was ready at 12:12 and the second will be ready at 5:30 p.m.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Kennedy) Can you get together a book of all these contingency things, with the readiness times.

Adm. Moorer: We can do that. The carrier aircraft that went to Tel Aviv has returned. Our people met with the Israelis, reviewed their intelligence, discussed overflight rights, established procedures for communications, IFF, flight corridors, diverting airfields, etc. It was a very fruitful discussion.

¹¹ See Document 304.

304. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 21, 1970, 4:25–5 p.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State—
U. Alexis Johnson
Talcott Seelye
Defense—
David Packard
G. Warren Nutter
James Noyes
JCS—
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt

CIA—
Lt. Gen. R.E. Cushman
David Blee
NSC Staff—
Gen. Alexander Haig
Col. Richard Kennedy
Harold H. Saunders
Samuel Hoskinson
Adm. R.C. Robinson
Peter Rodman
Jeanne W. Davis

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, Washington Special Action Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed:

1. State will prepare new drafts of the proposed public statements for use if Israel should move into Syria rather than Jordan;
2. State will concert with the British with a view to briefing our NATO allies on the situation;
3. to review overnight the list of readiness measures the US might take vis-à-vis the Soviets, and select the most likely actions for discussion at the next meeting.

Mr. Johnson: Here is the package you asked us for.² It was produced in haste and represents only the views of the authors, but it is something to focus on. With regard to Senator Mansfield, the Secretary thinks the President spoke to him at breakfast this morning.

Mr. Kissinger: I think he did talk to him about the possibility of an evacuation. I will check this with the President. Could we have the latest on the situation?

General Cushman: There is some fighting reported between Jordanians and Syrians in the Irbid area. Eighty tanks are moving up from Amman to reinforce the 90 the Jordanians had there originally. We have nothing different from Amman.

Mr. Kissinger: Have you all seen the latest Israel assessment Rabin has given Sisco?³

General Cushman: The Arab summit meeting is apparently on. The Tunisians and Libyans have arrived, and the Sudanese is on his way. Others have indicated they are coming.

Mr. Johnson: We have an Amman telegram, saying Jordan will be represented by their Ambassador in Cairo.⁴

General Cushman: [2½ lines not declassified]

Admiral Moorer: That may not be so bad.

General Cushman: There has been no change in the Soviet position.

² Reference to the "Fact Sheet," see footnote 9, Document 303.

³ Telegram 154557 to Tel Aviv, September 21, 1824Z, reported that Rabin told Sisco that at noon EDT Israeli intelligence detected the JAA inflicting "substantial losses" on Syrian forces and that the Syrians appeared to be constructing defensive fortifications in Irbid. Sisco asked Rabin if he thought the Syrians would attempt to attack Amman, but Rabin believed this would require the Syrians to commit more tanks. Overall, Rabin reported the JAA's military situation in Amman as "reasonably good" and improving in Jerash, Salt, and Ajlun. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 619, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan Crisis)

⁴ Telegram 5026 from Amman, September 21, 1800Z. (Ibid.)

Mr. Johnson: We have a telegram from Moscow saying that TASS is carrying the Jordanian line in a fairly straightforward fashion.⁵

General Cushman: Yesterday three Soviet destroyers came into the Mediterranean from the Black Sea, but there has been no rapid move to gear up.

Mr. Kissinger: With regard to the Congressional briefing, are there any comments on the State paper?

Admiral Moorer: It covers all the points that were mentioned this morning.

General Cushman: I agree it covers everything.

Mr. Packard: It is okay in general, but we haven't had a chance to digest it.

Mr. Kissinger: I have one question. We are informing the Soviets we have no plans of our own to intervene, and we are warning them against intervening, but we are not giving them any indication of the consequences if they should.

Mr. Johnson: We are not saying this to the Soviets; we are saying it publicly. Tab B is our proposed public statement.⁶

Mr. Kissinger: This is a very elegant way of putting it: "It is essential that the conflict not be further extended by participation of outside powers. So long as the conflict is limited to the countries of the area, the United States intends to pursue its objective of a just peace in the area through diplomatic means."

Mr. Johnson: Now we need to work out exactly what to say to the Soviets.

Mr. Seelye: We have a draft in the Department.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's find an equally elegant way of saying it to the Soviets. I recognize we might want to be a bit blander to Congress than to the Soviets.

Mr. Johnson: We can draw from the Fact Sheet for all kinds of uses.

Mr. Seelye: We have done the two alternative statements: one pegged to the peace initiative and one to the local situation.

Mr. Kissinger: The last sentence of the second version seems a little sharper.

Mr. Seelye: We can use it in both versions.

Mr. Nutter: Not to the Soviets.

⁵ Telegram 5470 from Moscow, September 21, 1320Z. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN)

⁶ Attached to the Department of State Fact Sheet.

Mr. Johnson: No, to the public.

Mr. Kissinger: Have you all seen Amman's 5023.⁷ In this connection, the President has ordered that we explore with Rabin the possibility of encouraging the Israelis to move into Syria after all—the course which we rejected yesterday. I realize we were all united against this yesterday on political grounds, but I would like to present some of the President's reasoning. Israeli ground intervention will be very tough on Hussein. An attack on Syria will be less dangerous to him than if it were directed against his territory. Also, it would be easier to get Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory than from Jordanian territory. If the situation unravels in Jordan, Israel could use it as a pretext to stay in. Also, it might give some help to the moderates, if there are any left in the Arab world, who could blame the Syrians for having brought on the fighting. Sisco is exploring this with Rabin. State might look at its draft texts to see how they might be changed if Israel went into Syria. It may be easier to reposition things in the event of a move on Syria even though our original judgement was in the opposite direction.

Mr. Johnson: I have no judgement of the move in a military sense.

Admiral Moorer: There is a real bottle-neck at the Syrian border. Once they seal them up, they can't get out. Also, the Israelis could get in behind them and cut them off.

Mr. Kissinger: We all rebelled against the notion of involving another state, but the impact would be easier on the King.

General Vogt: What would be the impact on the Soviets?

Admiral Moorer: The Soviets may react very differently to an attack on Syria.

Mr. Kissinger: One of the purposes of this exercise is to face them down. They will scream, and it will have to be over in 72 hours. I doubted at first the desirability of pegging the statement to the peace effort, but now that I see it, I like it. (to Mr. Seelye) Can you consider what to say on the same general theme if Syria were invaded rather than Jordan? The second version lends itself well to this.

Mr. Seelye: The suggested Israeli statement is Mr. Packard's with one slight change in the second sentence.

Mr. Kissinger: That is almost dual purpose—it's equally suited for a move against Syria. The Fact Sheet is just historical.

⁷ Telegram 5023 from Amman, September 21, 1719Z, reported that Rifai told Brown that Hussein would accept Israeli ground forces attacking the Syrians, but only if the Israelis engaged the Syrians outside of the Jordanian border. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 619, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan Crisis)

Mr. Johnson: We haven't had a chance to discuss possible Security Council action yet. That will require more careful consideration.

Mr. Seelye: This is consistent with the idea that we should seek parallel action.

Mr. Kissinger: If Israel moves into Syria, can we condemn Israel in the SC?

Mr. Seelye: We wouldn't have to. We would just say everyone should get back to his own territory.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we go over the Issues?⁸ The President has already rejected another approach to the USSR before an Israeli strike.⁹ And we have pretty well decided to do 2 and 3 under the USSR. Under Near Eastern Nations, we can't take a position based on a call for immediate Israeli withdrawal in the face of what we've done. We can't single out Israel after we put them up to it.

Mr. Packard: We will ask everyone to get out. What is the difference between 2 and 3?

Mr. Saunders: That's an error. They are the same.

Mr. Kissinger: On the fourth issue, we can't deny having some prior knowledge—Israel won't let us. On the other hand, if we go too far, it will produce the charge of collusion with all its consequences. We must strike a line between.

Mr. Seelye: We can say Israel decided independently to move and, in the light of the circumstances, we view the move sympathetically.

Mr. Kissinger: The UN issues are dealt with in the UN paper.¹⁰ Can we do something to brief our NATO allies before they jump out of their skins? Can we give Ellsworth a few facts?

Mr. Johnson: Yes. We should probably concert with the British on this.

Mr. Kissinger: Shall we review the diplomatic actions. Obtaining the King's concurrence is in train. Establishing communication between Israel and Jordan is in train. The Secretary of State has briefed the British.¹¹

Mr. Johnson: He discussed joint planning of an evacuation. General Vogt and Mr. Nutter are briefing Ambassador Freeman at 6:00 on the military situation.

⁸ Reference to the paper "Issues in Diplomatic Scenarios"; see footnote 2, Document 290.

⁹ See Document 299.

¹⁰ Paper prepared in the Department of State entitled "Possible UN Security Council Action In Event of Israeli Military Action in Jordan." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 619, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan Crisis)

¹¹ See footnote 2, Document 302.

Mr. Kissinger: We will brief the French, less fully. We are preparing our approach to the Soviets. State is preparing instructions for our Ambassadors in the Arab capitals.

Mr. Johnson: Do we see any serious danger to our people in the Arab capitals from an Israeli air strike?

Mr. Seelye: Yes, there will be heightened tensions. We plan to warn them once the decision is made to give them a few hours advance notice of the strike so they can batten down the hatches.

Mr. Kissinger: Could we plan it so the warning reaches them as the strike is commencing?

Mr. Seelye: It depends on the time of day.

Mr. Kissinger: The various contingency plans seem to be in good shape.¹² Col. Kennedy will get them together for the contingency planning book. On the assumption that one of our objectives is to convince the Soviets that if they move, we will take action, what measures can we take to indicate we are stepping up our readiness?

Mr. Johnson: We have done some preliminary work on this. There is a paper in the red book.

Mr. Kissinger: We have been talking about moving an additional ASW group to the Mediterranean.

Admiral Moorer: There is a whole list of actions the US could take, and a list of the existing plans the actions would be related to.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's go over the list tonight and pick out the ones for discussion tomorrow that seem the most likely. We have already done some of them.

Admiral Moorer: We are continuously refining this list.

Mr. Kissinger: I think it would save time if we reviewed it tonight and picked out the most likely candidates.

Admiral Moorer: This is a list of all the things that should be considered. I have given Col. Kennedy the table on response times you asked for.

Mr. Seelye: We also have a draft study of short-range and mid-term assistance packages.

¹² The contingency plans, prepared pursuant to the WSAG and NSC meetings of September 20–21 (see Documents 290, 299, and 303), included various moves in the event of an Israeli strike on Syrian forces. These consisted of possible UN Security Council action, various public statements, and talking points for briefing selected members of Congress. Papers and public statements not cited previously include "Suggested Israeli Public Statement" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 619, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan Crisis); and "Talking Points for Briefing Selected Members of Congress." (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-029, Special NSC Meeting, Jordan 9/21/70)

Mr. Johnson: We need to do more work on the economic paper. It concludes that if we provide additional help, we would have to take it away from other high-priority projects, but doesn't say which ones.

Mr. Kissinger: Let us meet at 8:30 a.m. tomorrow.¹³

¹³ See Document 312.

305. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 21, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Situation in Jordan

According to the Israelis, the Syrians took Irbid without a fight and are digging in.² It is not clear whether they intend now to advance on Amman. There are indications of Iraqi involvement in the conflict and they could well cast their lot with whatever side seems to have the upper hand during the day. Meanwhile, King Hussein has clarified his earlier message to include the landing of troops if he loses control. It is premature to predict where this situation is heading. However, it seems possible to say that, on the basis of this morning's report, it appears from the massing of Syrian equipment around Irbid that the immediate Syrian interest may be to consolidate a position in the north. If they continue to dig in, it will be understandable that the Israelis feel that air strikes may not be decisive.

Message From King Hussein

King Hussein has sent this follow-up message to you via his close confidant Zaid Rafai:³

"The King believes that (an) air strike will tip the balance but if communications between us break as a result of a complete breakdown

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/21/70. Secret; Sensitive.

² See footnote 3, Document 304.

³ Transmitted in telegram 4989 from Amman, September 21, 0510Z. (Ibid., Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V)

of authority in Amman then you have my advice and authority to land.”

Ambassador Brown says that he does not know what the King means when he talks about a breakdown. He imagines, however, that going through Hussein’s mind is the possibility that defeat of his northern army by an overwhelming Syrian force would so demoralize his tired and confused troops in Amman that they would cease to function as an effective force.⁴

The Military Situation

We do not yet have the full results of the most recent Israeli reconnaissance of northern Jordan. The Israelis, however, are able to confirm that Irbid fell to the Syrians last night without a fight as the Jordanians withdrew. The Israelis also report that the Syrians have reinforced their strength in the Ramtha–Irbid area to about 300 tanks and appear to be digging in. They caution that they have no way of knowing the Syrian intentions but that for the time being at least they are standing still in Irbid.

The Israelis report that the Iraqis are ready to intervene or have already intervened on the side of the fedayeen. They are reportedly deploying tanks moved in from Syria and, according to the Israelis have already taken a Jordanian radar station.

⁴ In telegram 4993 from Amman, September 21, 0547Z. (Ibid.)

306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, September 22, 1970, 0017Z.

155165. SANDSTORM. Hold for action officer opening of business Sept 22. Subject: Syrian Intervention in Jordan.

1. Sisco met with Rabin late afternoon Sept 21. Read him King’s answer to Allon (Amman 5023)² and Rifai comments³ (Sisco cautioned Rabin re Rifai fluctuations from euphoria to depression and back.)

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted on September 21 by Stackhouse; cleared by Atherton; and approved by Sisco. It was repeated to Amman. Passed to the White House.

² See footnote 7, Document 304.

³ See footnote 3, Document 305.

2. Sisco said he wanted to explore with Rabin another possible option in addition to those discussed this morning, i.e., an Israeli operation from Golan Heights to relieve pressure on Jordanians. This would be an operation in Syria rather than in Jordan.

3. Rabin said as he had said to Sisco earlier it would be quite an operation to undertake in Jordan since 300 Syrian tanks was quite a considerable number. This was why an air strike just was not sufficient. Sisco said he had reported this. Rabin said such an operation ran the risk not only of Syrian reaction but also Iraqi, and possibly Egyptian reaction. Nothing of small size, Rabin said, would take care of 300 Syrian tanks. Rabin said he was opposed in principle to diversionary move if it was not aimed ultimately at source of problem, namely Syrian tanks in Irbid/Ramtha area.

4. Rabin noted Sisco had earlier today said that strike into Syria would be risky politically.⁴ Sisco said that he had reference to this being riskier vis-à-vis Soviets in light of their special interest in Syria. From Jordanian angle, operation outside its country more politically attractive and less injurious to King's position. Sisco said any move outside Jordan would be less problem for King. Rabin asked whether this was an estimate. Sisco answered in affirmative. Rabin agreed with this judgment. Rabin then discussed topography and strategy, noting that perhaps best route would be direct across Jordan River south of Lake Tiberius. It was possible a strike to the north from Golan Heights would by threatening Syrian supply lines force Syrian units to withdraw from Jordan, but he doubted this. If this did not result in Syrian withdrawal, then Israelis would have to go south to strike at them.

5. At end of conversation after discussing other subjects, Rabin commented there really three options; i.e., direct thrust at Irbid/Ramtha, or sweeping movement from north out of Golan or combination of two. Pursuant to Sisco's request, Rabin agreed to query Jerusalem re alternative option calling for Israeli move into Syria. Chargé should follow up.

Rogers

⁴ See Document 302.

307. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, September 21, 1970, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Secretary of State William Rogers
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
Deputy Secretary of Defense David M. Packard
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs General
Alexander M. Haig
Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs Joseph Sisco

Dr. Kissinger opened the meeting by reviewing the military situation as it had evolved since the morning meeting.² He noted that we had received a note from Vorontsov which urged no intervention by outside powers but which was on balance a soft note on the issue.³

The President then asked what the latest situation was on the ground. Secretary Rogers stated that the situation had improved somewhat since the critical reports we had had late Sunday night. He stated that we had one good report that the Jordanians had effectively turned and defeated Syrian forces,⁴ and that there was a report of an Arab summit meeting to be held in Cairo the next morning.⁵

Dr. Kissinger then read the latest intelligence message which indicated that while the situation had improved somewhat on the ground that the King was nevertheless still concerned about having immediate air support.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

² See Document 299.

³ Transmitted in telegram 155169 to Moscow, September 22, 0024Z. The Soviet note, a response to the September 20 U.S. note verbale, expressed a shared concern with the United States over the Jordan situation and questioned U.S. motives in the region considering the military preparations being performed, especially the concentration of the Sixth Fleet in the immediate vicinity. According to the telegram, Vorontsov told Sisco that the Soviet Union was using all its influence in contacts with Syria. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 JORDAN) For the U.S. note verbale, see footnote 2, Document 276.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 304.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 303.

The President stated that the situation on the ground was of course important but not nearly as critical as the King's attitude. It is obvious, from the latest reports, that the King remains very upset and psychologically shaken and what matters at this point is whether he will continue to resist, whether or not he as an individual can hang on. [2 lines not declassified]

Admiral Moorer then noted that the Jordanian forces were now moving armored units to the North where they can better meet the Syrian threat, and suggested that perhaps the Israelis were watching this very carefully before taking precipitous action on their own. The President asked whether or not the group felt that Israel might not be too keen on going in. Dr. Kissinger stated that it was obvious that the Israelis were playing the situation very cool and would not move precipitously. Secretary Laird suggested that it was actually to Israel's advantage to move slowly. Dr. Kissinger confirmed this judgment, stating that it would be to Israel's advantage to keep out of Jordan until the King fell. Then, both the Jordanians and the Syrians would be weaker, their move would be somewhat simplified, and they would have a freer hand in the post-hostility situation.

Secretary Rogers then stated that Assistant Secretary Sisco had talked to Ambassador Rabin about the desirability of Israeli action against Syria within Syrian territory and the Israelis had responded very unenthusiastically about action against Syria.⁶ According to Secretary Rogers the Israelis felt that it would be better politically to move against Syria but not militarily. Admiral Moorer stated that this puzzled him since action against Syria would be tantamount to cutting the rear of the enemy forces. Secretary Rogers stated that this may be the fact since Dayan had always regretted not doing this in the area of conflict. The President asked whether or not it might not be better to approach the Israelis separately again on this issue.

Assistant Secretary Sisco then stated that Soviet Chargé Vorontsov had left a Note Verbale with him that day which made four points: first, that the Soviet Union hoped the United States would prevent Israel from moving; second, that the Soviets for their part will continue their efforts to get the Syrians to discontinue their military action; third, that the Soviets will take the same line with the Syrians that they hoped we will take with the Israelis and will use all possible influence to quiet the situation down; fourth, that any intervention by outside powers would complicate the situation.⁷ Mr. Sisco stated that he interpreted the Soviet note as a positive one and one that was not especially polemic.

⁶ See footnote 3, Document 304.

⁷ See footnote 3 above.

The President stated this may be true but if they are true to form it could well be a lie. Assistant Secretary Sisco replied that he agreed and that he had told Vorontsov that we would be looking for results, not words, and that it was of the utmost importance that the Syrians withdraw immediately from Jordan.

The President asked Mr. Sisco whether or not he had told Vorontsov that the Israelis may move. Assistant Secretary Sisco replied, "I did not give him any assurances that they would not." The President commented that without this fear they would have no incentive to hold the Syrians. Mr. Sisco assured the President that he had given the Soviets no satisfaction in this regard. Secretary Rogers stated that he did not believe that the Soviets were under any illusions with respect to the seriousness of the situation and the possibility of Israeli action. The U.S., he commented, has promulgated some of the strongest statements in recent history. The President's statements in Chicago,⁸ the military actions taken within the framework of the WSAG, the movement of our fleet elements, the forthcoming visit to the Mediterranean all conveyed the seriousness of the situation and U.S. determination to move if necessary.

Mr. Sisco stated that the Soviets are also concerned about the press reports to the effect that Jordan has asked for help. The President commented that it was remarkable that the Jordanians had their own problems with leaks. Assistant Secretary Sisco stated that the Jordanian Ambassador had tried to deny this leak.

The President cautioned Mr. Sisco that when he interprets the Soviet reaction as positive, that he keep in mind that he is only talking to a Soviet clerk and that it is difficult to know whether they are double-crossing us on this issue or whether they are actually sincere about getting the Syrians to withdraw. In either event, past experience confirms that the Soviets will sing from the same sheet of music. It is difficult to know; we should respond in a non-polemic way, perhaps very quickly.

Secretary Rogers stated that what these conversations with the Soviets confirm is that they alone are useless and that you have to draw your conclusions based on other facts. The President stated in either event speed is important. We should give our response in a way which is designed to cool the situation. Actually the Soviets may be very worried and concerned. Assistant Secretary Sisco stated it was significant not so much in terms of what the Soviets did say but in terms of what they did not say. For example, they did not repeat the same kind of threatening [language] used by the Secretary yesterday⁹ and merely

⁸ See footnote 2, Document 261.

⁹ See footnote 3, Document 275.

reiterated what they were doing with respect to the Syrians. Secretary Rogers stated that analysis of these conversations with the Soviet emissary are not especially helpful. It's just impossible to judge what their true thinking really is. The President agreed that we must assume a skeptical stance and observe carefully what they do rather than what they say.

The President asked what the U.S. should do next. Would it be preferable, for example, to wait until tomorrow morning before responding? Secretary Rogers stated that we should answer the Israeli note and answer their questions.¹⁰ Dr. Kissinger drew everyone's attention to the exchange between Rafai and Allon which suggested that the Jordanians were still anxious to obtain support from Israel.¹¹ Secretary Rogers stated that the important thing to know now is how the U.S. would act if the Israelis move even at this late date. It is obvious that we are taking certain readiness measures, some of which are evident, some of which are not. Beyond this we should continue to sharpen up our contingency plan.

The President stated that we should tell the Israelis exactly what the problem is rather than answer their note at this point. Dr. Kissinger commented that it should not be necessary for us not to accept the Israeli memorandum of understanding, but that it should not be necessary for us to have a specific piece of paper giving specific assurances to the Israelis. Dr. Kissinger then reviewed the specific questions and specific responses raised in the Israeli Note Verbale. He noted that questions 4, 5, and 6 had already been answered and that question 7, the key issue, with respect to our actions vis-à-vis the Soviets should be responded to in a general way on the basis of mutual trust and not through the provision of a specific check list to the Israelis. Secretary Rogers stated that the fact is that the Israelis want to know precisely what we'll do if the Soviets come in. The President asked what would be wrong with telling them what we'll do. Secretary Rogers indicated that he agreed with Dr. Kissinger that it should not be necessary for a

¹⁰ The Israeli note verbale, delivered to Sisco by Ambassador Rabin the morning of September 21, explicated the Israeli military plan and posed several questions about the consequences of possible Israeli intervention in Jordan, including U.S. actions in the event of condemnation in the UN, U.S. actions to prevent Soviet participation, and a secret U.S.-Israeli memorandum of conversation. The note stated that Israel intended to act first by air attack and, if the Syrians failed to withdraw, to follow with a ground assault. Israel made it clear that the Israeli military would attack Syrian forces in Jordan and make no attacks against Syrians in Syrian territory. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-076, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/21/70) For the U.S. response to the Israeli questions, see Document 311.

¹¹ Rather than a direct exchange between Rafai and Allon as implied by Kissinger, this is apparently a reference to the indirect conduit of messages through the Embassies in Amman and Tel Aviv and the Department of State, allowing communication between Jordan and Israel.

specific understanding in this regard. Dr. Kissinger stated that we would be in a sorry state of affairs if the Israelis do not now trust what we've done and said up 'til now.

The President stated that if the Israelis are to move it is obvious that they must move on the ground in Jordan. Then what would be the consequences? Would we not be actually spelling the end of the King himself? What, for example, will we do if the King refuses to accept Israeli intervention? In the face of their insistence on air and ground action, what should be our position with respect to Israeli intervention which is not wanted by King Hussein?

Secretary Rogers responded that if the King does not want the Israelis to move except in the air and they actually refuse Israeli intervention, then our position is untenable; furthermore, if the King is unable to get control of Amman, he's probably not worth saving anyway. A move by the Israelis without his permission would only be self-serving from the Israeli point of view.

Dr. Kissinger then stated that all of this discussion is somewhat academic because if the King falls it is probable that the Israelis will move with or without our agreement. Secretary Rogers commented that he agreed with that assessment.

The President noted that that was the same point made earlier today by Dr. Kissinger and asked whether or not it was the best judgement of all concerned that the Israelis would in fact move in any event. Dr. Kissinger replied, yes, if the situation continues to deteriorate it is probable that the Israelis will move and that, in either event, we have the same problem. Secretary Rogers stated then if we feel that the King is about to fall it is probably better to let the Israelis move.

The President continued by stating that the main problem here is that we are damned if we do and damned if we don't. If we encourage the King and he fails, then the Israelis will probably move with or without our encouragement; and in the event they do, I am pessimistic about the survivability of the King in the face of Israeli intervention. Assistant Secretary Sisco stated that it is probable that the Israelis would move if the King falls in either event. This is what they regretted not doing during the '67 war. I think they would like to get some corrections along their borders.

The President then asked in view of all of this then, is it in our interests at this particular point to attempt to get the Israelis to move? Should we actually try to do this? Secretary Rogers replied, only in the event that the King specifically requests it and agrees to it. Secretary Laird then asked, well why have we not been able to find out what the King wants? The President stated let's find out once and for all. In the meantime we can conduct a further dialogue with Ambassador Rabin. Give him the answers to the questions as outlined by Dr. Kissinger.

The President then asked if the Embassy had conveyed the question again to the King. Assistant Secretary Sisco stated he believed that the message had gotten through.¹²

Secretary Laird then raised the problem of medical assistance, stating that the two surgical hospitals had not yet been moved into Jordan but that they were on the ground in Europe and ready to move. He added that the question now was whether or not we should unload the aircraft which would add some time for reloading in the event we have to move forward. All of the participants agreed that the aircraft should be unloaded in the event they were needed for rapid troop deployments.

The President then stated that we should have further consultations with Ambassador Rabin, and observe the intelligence situation on the ground very, very carefully. In the event we get into a hard place overnight there are additional actions that can be taken. For example, we could use U.S. air although this would probably not be to our advantage since it might not be decisive. With respect to Israeli action we are somewhat stymied until we are certain that the King wants this action. It's essential that we find out now exactly where the King stands. If the King wants both air and ground support, it appears to me that it is an acceptable course of action. As far as I'm concerned, we have warned the Soviets and the U.S. word is the important thing at this point.

Dr. Kissinger stated, then we must get the answer to the questions, give the Jordanians the facts and let them make up their own minds. If the King feels he needs the assistance, then we should go. If not, perhaps we should consider encouraging the Israelis to hold back somewhat.

The President stated that he felt that Israeli action against Syria would give King Hussein the best break. It would be easy for the Israelis to move in and act quickly, cut off the Syrian rear, and accomplish the same thing without jeopardizing the King's position in the Arab world as a result of his having brought Israeli forces into Jordan. For all these reasons, the President stated, I believe it would be best to have the Israelis attack Syria. If we are unsuccessful in doing that, in light of Israeli reservations, then air action alone would probably be best.

Dr. Kissinger stated that he agreed with this analysis, but that it might be difficult to get the Israelis to stick to air action alone. However, in light of the improving military situation on the ground, they might feel otherwise at this point in time.

¹² See footnote 3, Document 300.

Secretary Rogers asked the President what position the U.S. should take in the UN. Should we try to prevent a condemnation of the Syrian intervention or call for a cease-fire? The President stated that he had no problem with UN action but he did not want it to be interpreted as a substitute for positive action by the U.S. It does no good to take diplomatic initiatives or to move within the United Nations; these are merely stalling tactics which could be tantamount to insuring the fall of the King. Secretary Rogers replied that it may be that the United Nations will call for an immediate cease-fire, and if that were to happen it might result in the fall of the King.

Assistant Secretary Sisco then stated that the Egyptians had indicated that they have talked to the Syrians about withdrawing and that they would support a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all sides.

The President remarked that he did not want any resolutions which called for non-intervention, that this was not what was wanted and it is contrary to U.S. interests to support such a resolution. The important thing to get was simple condemnation of the Syrian actions. Dr. Kissinger pointed out that this is also probably what the Jordanians want, since they have asked for notes to the Four Powers rather than a UN Security Council action. Secretary Rogers then suggested that we continue to work behind the scenes.

The President closed the meeting by indicating that the group should reconvene again at noon the next day.¹³ He stated that in the interim, we can get the answer from the King and we could give some responses to the Israeli questions, especially question two. We can also find out again whether or not the Israelis would support or be willing to undertake an attack against Syria rather than intervening in Jordan.

¹³ See Document 313.

308. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Israeli Ambassador (Rabin)¹

Washington, September 21, 1970, 7:05 p.m.

K: There is a point of clarification I want to raise with you. What did you tell Sisco this afternoon² about the alternate plan we mentioned to you this afternoon, the alternate courses of operations?³

R: He raised the question. He said they estimated that Jordan didn't want ground operations in Jordan and he asked about the possibility of carrying out diversionary action in Syria. He asked my opinion. I made it very clear that diversionary operations cannot achieve anything unless the purpose is to eliminate the forces in Jordan.

K: I want to get one thing clear. Did I understand you correctly when we talked this afternoon that if a major operation was carried out in Syria, from a military point of view this was a feasible operation? You and I have to be meticulous in our understandings for this reason. What you tell me I report to the President. When another version is reported, my version must be the correct one. Otherwise there is no sense in my talking to you. I reported my understanding of the conversation this afternoon—from a purely military point of view you expressed the thought that this might be an effective and probably the effective way of doing it.

R: Exactly.

K: We were told this evening that it was your judgment that from a military point of view it was not feasible.⁴

R: This time it is recorded. He talked about diversionary tactics. I went into detail and explained to him. I said to him you don't have diversionary . . .

K: You don't have to explain any more than that.

R: It is unbelievable.

K: The only essential thing is that any time you deviate, even in the slightest—which you didn't do . . . I want to know when I say in a meeting "It is my belief that this is the Israeli point of view," I want to be exactly right.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. All brackets are in the original.

² See Document 307.

³ Presumably a reference to their conversation of 10:25, see Document 301.

⁴ See Document 307.

R: I didn't deviate. He doesn't understand the difference between diversionary and military (?) actions.

K: I understand, Mr. Ambassador, Yes he does, but I understand.

R: It's really unbelievable.

K: I'll straighten it out. You should be getting your answers this evening. But when you get them, check them with me, will you?

R: When I asked Joe "If the Jordanians don't want ground operations in Jordan is it your estimate or have you information? . . ." He said "we don't have information; it's just our estimate."

K: He didn't give you the note to Allon?

R: He gave me the note but without the part about the Jordanians preferring not to have it on their own grounds. Since he started to talk about diversionary . . .

K: It is perfectly plain to me.

R: I said "what do you mean by diversionary?"

K: I understand.

R: I said nonsense. They have decided to move that force because they have a reason to do so. They are willing to take the risk. I don't believe in diversionary.

K: I fully understand.

R: There were at least two people on their part and one on our part, and he came to me and said . . .

K: But they were not at the meeting with the President.

R: It becomes something that's impossible to work.

K: It will be straightened out.

R: I tried to find out to Haig after I came back. I wanted to explain the concept of diversion.

K: You should have done that.

R: I couldn't reach him.

K: Then you should have left word.

R: I did and was told he would call me back.

K: It doesn't matter; no one is blaming you. Relax Mr. Ambassador. We will be back to you tonight.

R: Very strange. I didn't write it down—someone else did.

K: We'll confuse everybody if we keep this up. Someone has just come in. Goodbye. [The President had walked into Mr. Kissinger's office with Mr. Haldeman.]

7:20 p.m. [After the President left Mr. Kissinger's office.]

K: The President wants, on an urgent basis, the assessment of your government of the plan of a major attack in that region and on a diversionary attack.

R: Fine.

K: On your seven questions, it would make the second irrelevant. Isn't that true?

R: I don't understand.

K: Because you have been asked for air, and you would now have to be asked for ground under these conditions. Your second question is whether the Jordanian government will ask you.

R: I would have to send it back to my country, to my government.

K: Of course, you are being asked by the President to produce it. Tonight you will get the answers to the seven questions.⁵ Most of them will be unambiguously positive; the ones that are not are not because of us. I will get you the answers.

R: When?

K: Well, you aren't the only one who has to deal with Sisco. It will be within an hour or so.

R: All right. Otherwise it would not be practical to put the first one.

K: Okay. I'll get the answers to you. But keep in mind some of the advice I gave you this afternoon—about cleverness.

R: Okay.

⁵ See Document 311.

309. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

Washington, September 21, 1970, 7:20 p.m.

K: The first thing you should get to me is the answer to these questions which the President would like to get out tonight.

S: I have done a preliminary draft of the answer to these questions. There is a problem—I have done a companion piece re Question #2, Will the king agree to request our assistance and undertake to institute methods of communications between us? I feel simultaneously with drafting

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking.

these answers we could get a flash to Amman right away on this question. Here is what I have drafted: "As you have been previously informed, the Israelis have under active consideration the question of air and ground action in Jordan. We have informed them, the Israelis, as previously reported to you that the 'US agrees in principle to the Israeli operation by air . . . in Jordan subsequent to the review of this matter.' The Israelis have not taken any decision and are awaiting a reply to the seven questions put to you. One question is as follows: Will the king agree to request our assistance and undertake to institute methods of communications between us? We know the exchange of messages between Allon and the King leaves the matter of liaison in abeyance for the moment. We note also revised [omission in the original] that Government of Jordan would recommend (?) ground action outside of Jordan, meaning Syria. We have not taken this refined statement as considered Jordanian judgment because we are not clear from your report as to whether you have put to the king what his view is with respect to a ground operation by the Israelis in Jordan. Since the Israelis have posed the question, we ask that you ascertain views of the king on this precisely."

K: No! I just will not hold up answer to the Israelis any longer.

S: Tell me what you want me to say. You should make it clear to the king that Israelis have this matter under active consideration and that no decision has been made by them.

K: What was this in response to?

S: In a previous telegram we sent to them, asked the king what his attitude was with respect to a ground operation in Jordan since the Israelis felt the air strike was insufficient.² My judgment is that Brown has not put the thing precisely and that this was a quick discussion between Rifai and Brown. He said Israelis were thinking of taking action in this area and they believed it necessary to conduct both air and ground action—he does not say in Jordan.

K: What area do you think he was talking about?

S: I hope he was talking about Jordan, but he may have been talking about Syria. He said ground operations are fine in the area as long as they are not here in Jordan. Tell me what you want?

K: We want an answer to those seven questions to go out in the next hour and a half.³

² See footnote 3, Document 300.

³ Kissinger called Rabin at 9:15 p.m. to tell him that the answers to the Israeli questions would be delivered by 10:30 that night. (Transcript of telephone conversation, September 21; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files)

310. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 21, 1970, 9:10 p.m.

P: Henry, I am going to bed early—I am meeting with Congress in the morning.

K: Think it is going to be quiet tonight. I won't disturb you unless—

P: If you hear anything, let me know.

K: Haven't given them the answers. When I talked to Rabin² there were so many conflicting signals—I think by tomorrow morning we will have answers.

P: We will have additional intelligence on where it all stands.

K: Think noon tomorrow is a good time for this group to meet.³ I think the Jordanian psychological end is stronger, more than their physical strength.

P: More than they are showing on their nerve.

K: They might still pull it out.

P: I hope so but whatever, if the thing quiets down, this trip⁴ would be a reinforcement.

K: If the Israelis don't move by Thursday,⁵ the thing will settle down.

P: Okay Henry.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking.

² See Document 308.

³ See Document 313.

⁴ President Nixon left Washington on September 27 for a trip to Europe and the United Kingdom.

⁵ September 24.

311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Jordan and Israel¹

Washington, September 22, 1970, 0338Z.

155203. Ref: State 155166. Following is text of questions and answers delivered to Israeli Minister Argov at 10:30 EDT September 21:

“Q. Will the U.S. agree to approach Israel formally in this matter?

A. We have indicated in our conversations our agreement in principle to the operation under discussion. If decisions are taken to conduct such an operation, they should be on the basis of those conversations and the fact that our common interests would be served.

Q. Will the King agree to request our assistance and to undertake to institute methods of communication and coordination between us?

A. We do not know the answer to this question. Israel is aware of the informal exchange of messages between Deputy Prime Minister Allon and the King which we conveyed. With respect to ground operations, the only indication we have of the Jordan attitude on this question was a statement by Zaid Rifai to our Ambassador that Israeli ‘ground operations are fine in the area as long as they are not here in Jordan.’² We are seeking clarification on this question from the King. Israeli air strikes have been requested or approved on several occasions by the King.

Q. How will the U.S. act to prevent Soviet participation or involvement?

A. On September 20 the U.S. Government called upon the Soviet Government to take appropriate steps in Damascus to bring about withdrawal of Syrian forces from Jordan. Secretary Rogers made a public statement to this effect on September 20.³ We have and will continue to make clear to the Soviets our support for Israel’s security and integrity and its right to live within defensible borders. In the present crisis, the U.S. has augmented the Sixth Fleet; it has also taken other readiness measures. These clearly imply a decision not to permit Soviet intervention against Israel in the conditions under discussion. As for specific measures the U.S. may take to prevent Soviet intervention, these would depend on the circumstances and the situation that exists at the time. We have contingency plans for these eventualities.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis (Treat as Nodis). Drafted on September 21 by Atherton; cleared by Kissinger; and approved by Davies. Passed to the White House.

² See footnote 7, Document 304.

³ See footnote 2, Document 276 and footnote 3, Document 275, respectively.

Q. Is it understood that U.S. will side with us in the international political arena including the use of the veto in the Security Council on the grounds that the Syrian invasion of Jordan not only violates Jordan's integrity but also threatens Israel's security and therefore entitles Israel to take actions in her defense?

A. We would be prepared to take the position publicly, including in the Security Council, that such action by Israel represented legitimate self-defense since the Syrian invasion of Jordan threatened Israel's security. While we cannot state precisely how we would vote in the Security Council on any particular resolution in the absence of precise knowledge of terms of that resolution, we would be prepared to veto a resolution which condemned Israel for this act of self-defense.

Q. Is it clear that Israel shall not be held responsible for the fate of the hostages?

A. The U.S. shall not hold Israel responsible for the fate of the hostages resulting from Israeli action against Syrian forces in Jordan.

Q. Is it understood that U.S. public statements on all matters pertaining to above questions shall be made on highest levels and not lower than Secretary of State?

A. We agree that major U.S. policy statements on this matter would be made at the highest levels.

Q. Answers to above questions should be in the form of a secret memorandum of understanding.

A. We believe that the oral answers to the above questions are clear and should not be in the form of a secret memorandum of understanding."

Rogers

312. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 22, 1970, 8:30–9:05 a.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State—

U. Alexis Johnson

John N. Irwin II

(briefly at beginning of meeting)

Talcott Seelye

Defense—

David Packard

G. Warren Nutter

James H. Noyes

CIA—

Richard Helms

David Blee

JCS—

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

LTG John W. Vogt

NSC Staff—

LTG Alexander M. Haig

R/Adm. R.C. Robinson

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

Harold H. Saunders

Samuel M. Hoskinson

Peter W. Rodman

Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

1. State would modify the diplomatic scenario to take into account the Soviet response to our approach and the question and answer exchange with the Israelis, as well as the possibility of an Israeli move against Syria;

2. Defense would provide today an aid package for Israel that we might use to augment their capability if they should become involved in military action;

3. JCS will prepare a list of actions we might take, in the Middle East and worldwide, in two sets of circumstances: (a) if the Israelis intervene, and (b) if the Soviets make threatening moves.

Mr. Helms briefed orally from the attached notes.²

Mr. Kissinger: How do you explain that the Israelis are more confident at the same time we are getting hysterical appeals from the King?

Mr. Seelye: The Jordanians are just more emotional, giving to blowing hot and cold.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² Not attached and not found.

Mr. Helms: The Israelis are more objective about the situation.
[3 lines not declassified]

Mr. Packard: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Johnson: Their intelligence is better. [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: The Iraqis say they will stay in their own area and are moving merely to protect their flank but a move to Jarash would be stretching their flank considerably. The King would not be paranoid if he saw a real threat in an Iraqi movement toward Jarash.

Can we have a rundown on the diplomatic side?

Mr. Johnson: Rabin gave us a note verbale yesterday asking us various questions.³ We have replied to these questions. (Mr. Johnson read aloud the questions and answers from an outgoing State Department telegram, which is attached.)⁴

We have also received the Soviet reply to our representations of Sunday⁵ (telegram attached).⁶ The response contains virtually no polemics. There is no assertion that the Syrians are not involved. They did note the buildup of the Sixth Fleet.

Mr. Kissinger: I thought it was very mild. Either they are tricking us or they are sincere.

Mr. Johnson: We have independent information that seems to confirm what they are saying.

Mr. Helms: Yes, they are making some effort with the Syrians.

Mr. Kissinger: It is not in the Soviet interest to trigger an action here unless they are looking for a pretext for a showdown.

Mr. Johnson: It is very tough dealing with the Syrians.

Mr. Helms: There is no worse government than the Syrian government.

Mr. Kissinger: But the Soviets have advisors with Syrian units. They must have known Syrian intentions.

Mr. Seelye: Their advisors do not go as far down in the command structure as in the UAR—they are at the higher levels. Of course, they might still have known what Syria intended to do.

Mr. Johnson: We had advisors in Vietnam and we still did not know some of their intentions, or at least could not control them.

Mr. Kissinger: They are two separate things—knowing about them and controlling them.

³ See footnote 10, Document 307.

⁴ Document 311.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 276.

⁶ See footnote 3, Document 307.

Mr. Johnson: We did not know. I am not trying to justify the Soviets. I am merely pointing out they do not have absolute control of the Syrians. At least the situation in Amman looks more stable.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the likely outcome of the Arab summit meeting?⁷

Mr. Seelye: Words; nothing very conclusive. It will give a face-saving opportunity for the parties to come to some resolution in Arab fashion. I don't really expect them to resolve the problem, but it is possible.

Mr. Johnson: The Tunisians took the lead.

Mr. Seelye: They might get a North African mediation group which could get the Syrians to withdraw for some quid pro quo.

Mr. Kissinger: Some aspects of our diplomatic scenario have been modified by the answers to the Israeli questions. For example, the fact that we are now committed to a veto should be cranked into the UN scenario.⁸

Mr. Johnson: We will also have to redirect our approach to the Soviets in the light of their response.

Mr. Seelye: These are being done. We are also redoing the public statements to take care of a possible Israeli move in Syria rather than in Jordan. They don't require much change.⁹

Mr. Kissinger: Have we the two aid packages ready—for Jordan and Israel? Do we have the directive ready on the anti-SAM package? It should go out today.

Mr. Saunders: We have the Jordanian aid package but we still need the Israeli package.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we have it today?

Mr. Noyes: Depends on what the Israelis are asking for.

Mr. Kissinger: We put a package together for Jordan last week, without a Jordanian request, to give us an idea as to what they might need in various contingencies. We need the same thing for Israel today. We won't show it to anybody. I thought Mr. Pranger and the Israelis were supposed to get together on this. We have two separate problems here: one, to put together an anti-SAM package in response to Mrs. Meir's conversations with the President; the second, to get a package for Israel if their military activity should make it necessary for us to move to augment their capability. This second package was to be discussed by Mr. Pranger with the Israelis. I would have no objection if we want to do it unilaterally. Can we get it today?

⁷ See footnote 2, Document 303.

⁸ See footnote 10, Document 304.

⁹ See footnotes 6 and 7, Document 304.

Mr. Packard: Yes.

Mr. Seelye: We have a disturbing rumor that the Kuwaitis have decided to withhold their contribution to Jordan. The Libyans are withholding their \$60 million, and if the Kuwaitis withhold their \$105 million, it will cut Jordan about in half.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we make it up?

Mr. Johnson: No, not without a separate supplemental appropriation.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we get an appropriation?

Mr. Johnson: I have asked our people to discuss the question of a supplemental with ISA. (to Packard) Secretary Laird was less firm on the fact of a Presidential decision on a supplemental when he discussed this with Secretary Rogers than I had understood from you yesterday.

Mr. Kissinger: I think the President will be willing to do it. After the package has been put together, and if Secretary Laird recommends it, the President will probably do it.

Mr. Johnson: So the next stage is to get the package ready.

Mr. Packard: It is practically ready.

Mr. Seelye: We have a draft of an economic package for Jordan but it still needs some work.

Mr. Johnson: It does not set out clearly the trade-offs. It says assistance for Jordan would have to be at the expense of other high priority programs, but it does not tell the President specifically which other programs.

Mr. Kissinger: I am sure he would be sympathetic to an economic assistance package for Jordan.

Mr. Johnson: It is a question of finding the money.

Mr. Nutter: Is this supporting assistance?

Mr. Seelye: Yes, grant aid for budgetary support.

Mr. Kissinger: Could we look at our contingency actions—our answers to ourselves on what readiness measures might be needed?

Adm. Moorer: Within our fiscal and political restraints, we have done about everything we can now. Our forces are on the alert, including the 82nd Airborne; we have augmented the Sixth Fleet; we have stepped up the alert in Europe.

Mr. Kissinger: But only of one brigade in Europe?

Adm. Moorer: Yes, but we have also moved additional aircraft to Europe.

Mr. Kissinger: Has this been noticed?

Adm. Moorer: Yes. We have put all unified commands on increased intelligence alert.

Mr. Kissinger: Is this likely to be noticed?

Adm. Moorer: Probably. In addition, we have outlined the actions we might have to take with increasing tension, including the deployment of additional forces. We would also have to do some things in the U.S.: reserves; changes in personnel policy; obtain a supplemental appropriation; increase the draft; increase SIOP readiness.

Mr. Kissinger: We need a list of things, in the first place, when things get tense, and in the second, in response to Soviet moves.

Mr. Packard: I agree—we should put some priorities on these things.

Mr. Johnson: We have two situations: what do we do if the Israelis move, and what do we do if the Soviets move.

Adm. Moorer: We have two categories of actions: those associated with the Middle East and those in other parts of the world.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's get these broken down. We might want to make it clear when the Israelis move that the Soviets won't get a free shot at them. This might be the time to move that ASW group to the Mediterranean.

Mr. Packard: We could move the ASW group, possibly put more fighters into Turkey.

Mr. Johnson: If the Turks agree.

Adm. Moorer: We can move up to 36 fighters into Incirlik under our present agreement; we have 18 there now.

Mr. Nutter: Are these part of our NATO forces?

Adm. Moorer: In one sense.

Mr. Johnson: I would like to have Rodger Davies sit down with the JCS staff and go over the list.

Mr. Kissinger: Could we have today (1) those measures we should take in the Mediterranean and worldwide if the Israelis intervene; and (2) the measures we might take in the Mediterranean and worldwide if the Soviets make threatening moves.

Adm. Moorer: Yes. We can get the military moves within our current capabilities. As things build up, however, it would take domestic action in fiscal augmentation, personnel policy changes, obtaining overflight and base rights, etc.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's get your checklist broken down in relation to the two contingencies. (to Adm. Moorer) We are not trying to second-guess your contingency planning; we are trying to see what we could do in the form of signals to the other side. Could we meet later today, possibly at 4:30 p.m. to go over these?¹⁰

All agreed.

¹⁰ The next WSAG meeting did not take place until the next day; see Document 317.

313. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, September 22, 1970, noon.

SUBJECT

Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Secretary of State William P. Rogers
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird
Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms
Deputy Secretary of Defense David M. Packard
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer
Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs Joseph J. Sisco
Henry A. Kissinger
General Alexander M. Haig

The President opened the meeting by describing the kind of press guidance he wanted followed in dealing with the Jordanian crisis. He stated that he wanted it understood that these meetings of a select group of principals were to be conveyed as regular meetings of the President's chief security advisors and were in effect National Security Council meetings. He wanted it pointed out that Congressional leaders had been given information on the situation and that a number of problems associated with the crisis in Jordan had been discussed by the National Security Council. He added that he wanted it stated that the U.S. Government had taken certain steps to protect its interests. The U.S. posture throughout was to be one of cool, deliberate actions. He stated that he did not believe bombastic or flamboyant public statements were the solution to the situation. Rather, he preferred to let U.S. actions speak for themselves. He wanted to convey an impression of confidence and cool determination on the part of the United States. It was important that the country be aware that the President and his top security advisors were completely on top of the situation.

The President then asked Director Helms to give the group a report on the latest intelligence information. Director Helms stated that despite the fact that another cease-fire had been called, the situation in Amman was still uncertain and fighting was continuing. He mentioned specifically that there had been firing in the area just southeast of our Embassy. Director Helms also stated that Arafat had claimed there had

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.

been over 7,000 casualties in the Fedayeen camp within Amman and that the situation was most serious. In the North, Director Helms stated, the Syrians had already lost in the neighborhood of 120 tanks, between 60 and 90 due to Jordanian military action and the balance due to maintenance breakdown. The Jordanians, on the other hand, had reinforced their units in the North so that the overall balance now was something like 170 Jordanian tanks against 300 Syrian tanks. Additional Jordanian tanks enroute to the North would bring the balance to 200 versus 300. The Jordanians had successfully turned back each Syrian attack, and it was apparent that the Jordanian attitude was somewhat more optimistic about the outcome than it had been up to now. The Jordanian military action has been professional and constituted well-coordinated tank, artillery and air operations.

The President then asked what kind of planes the Jordanians were using. Admiral Moorer replied that they flew a British Hunter aircraft, which was a conventional prop plane perhaps better designed for a close support role than a more sophisticated version would be.

The President asked if there were anything that the U.S. could do to help the King by way of supplies, munitions or equipment. Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard stated that the Defense Department had ready emergency shipments of ammunition and was prepared to move, but the Jordanians had not specifically asked for any assistance yet.

Secretary Rogers then asked how many tanks the Syrians had actually lost. Assistant Secretary Sisco responded that the latest message he had read suggested they had already lost some 50 in combat. Admiral Moorer stated that all told 120 Syrian tanks were now inoperative due to both battle losses and maintenance breakdowns. The President asked which side had better tanks. In response, Admiral Moorer stated that he felt the Syrian tanks might be technically somewhat better and that their gun was of a slightly higher caliber, but that their training was far inferior to that of the Jordanian tank forces.

Assistant Secretary Sisco then stated that Ambassador Rabin had informed him that morning that in view of the Syrian losses it would be necessary for Syria to reinforce if they were to continue in Jordan. Israeli intelligence had noted a large convoy in Syria last night heading south towards Jordan. He also stated that the Israeli cabinet had met and was preparing to give the United States an answer with respect to Israeli intervention. The President noted that we had sent out a response to the Israeli questions and an assessment of the issue of the Syrian option.² He asked whether or not we had had a response

² See Document 311.

from Hussein. Secretary Rogers stated that we had not, but that we had received a message from Ambassador Brown.³

Director Helms then remarked that the Israelis were now in a high state of alert and that they had moved many forces north to the Golan Heights. The Fedayeen had already claimed they had come under Israeli artillery fire from Israeli positions on the Heights. Helms stated that the broadcasts coming from Damascus suggested that indeed the Syrians were very concerned about Israeli intervention. Assistant Secretary Sisco stated that all of the actions had been taken within tight security without a huge public outcry and that it, in effect, constituted a cool, controlled U.S. response to events.

The President stated that he had talked to the Leadership earlier that morning and had pointed out the following:

(1) The U.S. fleet was in position to act but that we were not taking a provocative stance.

(2) The Israeli Government has a great interest in the outcome of events in Jordan but the U.S. could not speak for them.

Assistant Secretary Sisco stated concerning a possible Israeli offensive action that they appeared to be in no hurry, although there seemed to be no doubt that they would move if they had to. He also suggested that the Israelis might want a further compensation in the event that they did decide to move.

The President then asked Dr. Kissinger what the state of play was within the WSAG framework. Dr. Kissinger replied that the group had met earlier that morning, that there was nothing new on the status of the hijacking hostages, and that the group had completed most of the contingency planning necessary for U.S. intervention to evacuate U.S. personnel if required.⁴ The President next asked about the status of the surgical hospitals. Admiral Moorer answered by reporting that we still needed security assurances before we could move them into Jordan, and that we were awaiting specific word from the Jordanians. He added that the aircraft had been unloaded for fear that they would be immobilized in the event they were needed for the movement of troops.

Secretary Rogers stated that Mr. Yost had informed him there would be no Security Council meeting for a few days. He stated fur-

³ In telegram 5049 from Amman, September 22, 1452Z, Brown offered a seven-point critical assessment of an Israeli intervention in Jordan. He noted the various risks involved with an Israeli ground assault against the Syrians and stressed numerous concerns regarding Israeli intentions. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V)

⁴ See Document 312.

ther that Alex Scheel was coming to Washington the next day and that the situation could be discussed with him then.⁵

Dr. Kissinger then summarized the state of preparations by reporting that essentially all planning had been completed, contingency plans were ready, public statements were ready, notes were ready, Congressional consultation had been initiated and that the U.S. Government was prepared for whatever direction in which the President decided to move. The President stated that being ready was the best possible posture we could be in and that beyond that we should wait and see. He was very pleased with the statements that had been written.

Dr. Kissinger remarked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had completed a full scenario for all contingencies. The President then asked whether or not we could do anything at this point to further shore the King's morale. Should we, for example, give him a note advising him that we will replace his losses. His psychology, the President emphasized, is the key point. While we may not now be in a position to opt for military support, he will certainly benefit from our assurances. Secretary Rogers stated that we could prepare such a message that day. The President indicated that the message should pursue the following line: that it is being sent on a personal basis from him, and that he wants to assure the King of U.S. support for all of his military needs. The President continued by stating that he wanted to assure the King that we will make up his losses and to express the President's personal admiration for the King's staunch action in this period of crisis. Finally, the President wanted to assure him of full U.S. political support against international outlaws who have been trying to destroy his government.⁶

Dr. Kissinger stated that the situation that morning looked quite good, but that it was important to watch the actions of the Iraqi forces who are moving in an ambivalent fashion along the Jordanian flank. It was also important that we keep a constant eye on the Egyptians who may be driven to extreme action in light of the most recent turn of events. The President confirmed that this was an essential requirement. The President asked whether or not Secretary Rogers' warning had been specific only with respect to Syria.⁷ Assistant Secretary Sisco

⁵ Alex Scheel is not further identified.

⁶ The message was sent in telegram 156092 to Amman, September 23, 0251Z. In it, Brown was instructed to inform King Hussein verbally that the President wanted to give him "this personal word saying how much I admire what you are doing to preserve Jordan's integrity in the face of both internal and external threats. Your courageous stand has impressed the entire free world. I am confident that you will not waver in your determined effort to restore peace and stability to your kingdom." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V)

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 275.

replied that indeed it was and that the Iraqi issue was treated in a very fuzzy fashion. The President stated that we must continue to be ready for any turn in events and that we would have to watch especially Israeli [*Iraqi?*] action. In the interim we should exchange views via telephone and cancel the afternoon's 6:00 p.m. meeting of the Security Council unless events dictated otherwise.

The President then turned to the need to maintain a strong U.S. presence, remarking that these events confirmed the importance of maintaining a strong U.S. presence in the Mediterranean and that we should investigate with Greece and Turkey the possibility of putting some new U.S. installation or weaponry in the Mediterranean. He remarked that perhaps what was needed was an additional facility in both countries, not for the purpose of waging war but to underline our determination to maintain a U.S. presence and to strengthen our credibility with respect to the Soviets, especially in light of Soviet actions in Cuba. The President asked what facilities we had in Greece at the present time, and Admiral Moorer responded that we used Suda Bay and the regular Greek harbor. The President then asked about U.S. facilities on Cyprus, and Admiral Moorer stated that the British are the only ones with facilities on Cyprus. Finally, the President suggested that it might be advantageous to attempt to get something there, perhaps something which would permit our aircraft to utilize Cyprus.

Dr. Kissinger stated that with the loss of Wheelus, Cyprus and Turkey became important assets. The President commented that at this critical juncture when it looked like the Soviets were again moving aggressively worldwide we needed something more in the Mediterranean. The withdrawal of our Jupiters from Italy and Turkey during the Cuban missile crisis indicated the advantage of having additional assets with the situation developing as it is in Cuba. The President stated that he did not want this considered in a negative way, but to look at it positively and to see what could be done.

The meeting was adjourned.

314. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

Washington, September 22, 1970, 9:50 p.m.

K: —possibility of a reply.

S: What's your thoughts?

K: I asked you first.

S: I think that we ought to go back in the course of tomorrow and first we ought to make a judgment that we give to them—before I say what we say, let me tell you what the problem is. The Jordanian point of view and from our point of view, we are trying to get the King to do this by himself. If not by himself, in order for the Israelis to be responsive in order to be helpful to the King and yet with the least possible adverse repercussions to him. If the situation warrants our presence, will be nothing there on down but the Israelis or if they need help from the Jordanian point of view, minimal air strikes as a way to help Hussein do the job himself. Now from the Israeli point of view, Israelis getting the Syrians out and if need be hold on to a certain chunk of territory for a certain period of time as the best way to assure [omission in the original] against Israel/Iraq [omission in the original]. The Jordanians are thinking much more in terms of an Israeli strike in areas. The Israelis are thinking much more in terms [omission in the original] as a way of achieving the withdrawal of forces. I have overstated both positions for obvious reasons for purposes of clarifying our own thinking. [omission in the original] have said that looking at the situation tomorrow morning and if we [omission in the original] to the Jordanians. We should continue the dialogue with the Israelis.

K: How do you continue the dialogue?

S: Answer their questions, keep the option and try to facilitate a get together between the Israelis and the Jordanians. We agree in principles but we ought to know before they go and we ought to know [the results].² Ought to be responsive to the Jordanian request.

K: How much more clear can they be than air request?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking.

² Brackets are in the original.

S: Read the Annenberg cable about Hussein's complaint about the fedayeen.³

K: It is conceivable . . .

S: It is conceivable but not certain. Are you sure in your own mind . . .

K: I am sure in my own mind that we are going one way or the other. Hussein is going to collapse.

S: I don't at the moment think the facts sustain that.

K: I am not talking about tomorrow, how are you going to keep the Israelis in play by answering their questions?

S: I am not quarrelling with that.

K: You can't give it to them *carte blanche*.

S: They ought to go to them but then say before you do, we want to be consulted. Don't suggest that you don't answer their questions. If you don't respond positively in principle, you lose your option.

K: How do we answer their questions?

S: Don't know. Got this paper and want to reflect on it.⁴ Think we say the Jordanians are obviously trying to do this job by their own means. Very anxious to have the two of you to get together because both of you obviously feel there has got to be coordination and think one of two ways the Jordanians indicate that the grounds [omission in the original]. The Israelis are ready to go or give a yes and pass along that contact between the two regardless of what the discussions are, we want an opportunity to consult before the final move is made.

K: What did you say, either want an opportunity to consult or the other come . . .

S: If we go along, we then ought to send a message to the Jordanians, make the [omission in the original] response and let them send the message to indicate to the Jordanians what we are prepared to do and if we say this is what we are prepared to do, we would still say to the Israelis, after you talk to the Jordanians, we would still want you to come back and talk to us. I may have some further thoughts as I reflect on this tonight. Frankly, I haven't consulted anyone.

K: I have scheduled a WSAG for 8:00 in the morning just to bring ourselves up-to-date.⁵

S: Okay Henry, see you in the morning.

³ In telegram 7681 from London, September 22, 2050Z, the Embassy reported that Hussein was complaining that the fedayeen were only continuing to fight because the U.S. Government had not persuaded the Israelis to act. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 727, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. III)

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ See Document 317.

315. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 22, 1970.

SUBJECT

Meeting on Jordan

The Situation

1. This morning's reports indicate that the military situation for the moment seems to have stabilized. The Jordanians have turned back a southern Syrian thrust and inflicted losses.

2. Following last night's meeting, our replies to the Israeli questions were given to the Israeli minister here.² [Text at *Tab A.*] In two related further moves:

—We asked the Israelis for their view of an attack on the Syrian rear from the Golan Heights.

—We asked Ambassador Brown for direct clarification of King Hussein's personal view on an Israeli ground attack in Jordan as contrasted to an attack in Syria. We have no reply yet.

3. The Soviet Chargé yesterday delivered a note to Assistant Secretary Sisco replying to the U.S. request Sunday that the USSR press the Syrians to pull back from Jordan. It is non-polemical, urges prevention of Israeli attack and asks about concentration of U.S. Forces. [Text at *Tab B.*]

4. There are some straws in the wind this morning that suggest discussing the possibility that the Jordan problem may be resolved in an Arab context. The Israeli military believe Syria will have serious logistical difficulty within 3–4 days. The Arab summit could—although we should not count on it—produce a face-saving compromise under which the Syrians would withdraw.

Public and Diplomatic Posture in the Event of Israeli Intervention

1. *Congressional Briefings*—We have drafted talking points for briefings which include background on the situation and notes (1) that we are informing the Soviets that we have no plans to intervene and warning them not to do so, (2) that we are doing contingency planning for evacuation, and (3) that, if contrary to our expectations, the situation

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of Thomas Moorer, Box 114, Work File (Middle East). Top Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. The tabs are not printed. All brackets are in the original.

² See Document 311.

should require a larger direct role we will consult Congress in advance.

2. *Public Statements*—We have drafted a public statement which reviews the background of the situation and notes (1) that Syria's invasion of Jordan is understandably considered by Israel as a threat to Israel's security and (2) that we have no intention of embarking on other than diplomatic steps in order to end the fighting unless powers outside the area become involved.

3. *United Nations*—We are drafting a contingency statement supporting a veto of any motion condemning Israel. This supports our agreement with Israel.

4. *Diplomatic Scenario*—Messages for our approaches to the USSR, Middle East Nations and our NATO allies have been drafted for this contingency.

Military Readiness

1. *Navy*—Two Carrier Task Groups (*Saratoga* and *Independence* with Cruiser *Springfield*, 14 destroyers, and 140 aircraft remain off the coast of Lebanon.

An amphibious task force with 1,200 Marines is ready and in position 35 hours off the coast.

A third Carrier Task Group (*John F. Kennedy* with two guided missile frigates) will enter the Mediterranean early Friday morning, September 25.

A second amphibious task force (*Guam*, additional ships, 17 helos, and a reinforced battalion of 2,814 Marines) has split into fast and slow groups. Will enter Mediterranean on September 27 and 30.

Five Navy P-3 ASW-patrol aircraft are now at Rota.

Two additional attack submarines will enter Mediterranean on September 25 and September 29.

Four additional destroyers will depart the US tomorrow for the Mediterranean.

2. Army

One Airborne battalion and one Infantry battalion ready in Europe. Another airborne battalion will be ready at noon today. Transit and load time is 4 hours for first rifle company, 8 hours for the rest. Total force is 1,600 troops. Initial company and battalion air drop; other battalions airland.

82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg has the initial ready force of one airborne company rigged for drop on 6-hour alert. One battalion also is ready on 6-hour alert; an additional battalion will be on same alert by 2:00 p.m. today. Remainder of division on 84-hour alert.

3. *Air Force*

18 F-4s and 4 C-130s are at Incirlik, Turkey. (Turkey has *not* authorized us to use the base to launch these aircraft in strikes over Jordan.)

3. *Medical Assistance Units*

Two hospital units (one in the UK and one in Germany) are loaded and ready to move in one hour. First elements can arrive Amman in 10–11 hours, closing entire unit in 18 hours.

The situation in Amman is such that a medical effort (under the umbrella of the ICRC) may become the most urgent action as soon as the security situation will permit entry of the medical units.

The foregoing military measures will put us in a position to conduct evacuation or intervention operations. They also have a deterrent effect on Soviet intervention.

Military Equipment Packages for Israel and Jordan

—A package is ready to replace materiel expended by Jordan. Transport plans are complete.

—Packages of equipment for Israel, in the event of an Israeli move, to (1) replace that expended in the attack and (2) improve defensive posture in the Suez area will be completed today.

Actions to Deter or Counter Soviet Intervention

In addition to the military measures already taken, scenarios of additional military and diplomatic steps to deter or, if necessary, counter Soviet intervention are being refined by the WSAG.

316. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 23, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Situation in Jordan

The military situation remains about the same this morning with sporadic fighting continuing in Amman and the Jordanians beating back repeated attempts by the Syrians to drive south from the Irbid area. In short, the Jordanians are holding their own against both the fedayeen and the Syrian tanks. It could be that—as long as the Iraqis continue to stay out—a stand-off is developing around present positions at the present level of hostilities. If this is true, and if Hussein has little hope of driving the Syrians out with his own forces, then his choice is among (a) risking the disadvantages of outside intervention, (b) continuing the war with the added disadvantage of a consolidating Syrian-fedayeen position in the north and (c) some sort of compromise settlement, which—given the above—would probably further reduce his authority.

An Israeli note responding to our answers to their questions was delivered to State last night. The text is at Tab A and a fuller analysis is being provided for the 9:30 a.m. meeting.²

Israeli Reaction

The Israelis have responded to our answers to their questions concerning intervention in Jordan with a request for more assurances and clarifications of our position. Text at Tab A [Analysis is included in your book for this morning's meeting.] Meanwhile, they are apparently continuing to mobilize their armed forces for possible actions.

According to our Defense Attaché in Tel Aviv there is a continuing state of high military alert in the Israeli Bet Shean region opposite the Irbid Heights, a substantial reserve mobilization is in process and there is considerable military movement on the roads including troops in battle gear. The Defense Attaché believes that the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-076, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/23/70. Secret; Nodis. The tabs are attached but not printed. All brackets are in the original.

² See Document 318.

present positioning of Israeli forces would permit military intervention at almost any point in the Jordan Valley or even from the Golan Heights area.

King Hussein's Position

Ambassador Brown finally was able to get in touch with the palace last night concerning our request for a clarification of King Hussein's thoughts on Israeli ground intervention in Jordan and coordination directly with the Israelis. He had to double talk again with Zaid Rifai who said that the King "prefers action from up high" and that "if anything is to be done low it should not be here but away." Rifai added that "we agree it is important to discuss details" and will do so "as soon as possible but do not know how long it will be." Rifai also said that it is important for the U.S. to keep up the pressures it has already asserted and that the principal aim must be to get the Syrians withdrawn so that the Iraqi do not also get the idea they can get away with something. [Tab B]

Your personal message to King Hussein has been called to our embassy in Amman but because of the continued fighting it apparently has not yet been delivered.³ [Tab C]

The Military Situation

There is no significant change in the military situation this morning. Zaid Rifai, the King's confidant, does, however, report that if the Syrians do not move up reinforcements and if Iraq does not intervene, he thinks that the Jordanians can handle the situation. Rifai may be right but it should be noted that in the past there have been sharp ups and downs in his assessment. His comment is noted so you will be aware of it—not because it is worthy of confidence. [Cable at Tab D]

The Israelis report [Tab E] that the fighting between the Jordanians and Syrians in the Irbid area continues along the same lines but that it is "not a big battle." The Jordanians remain in defensive positions with the Syrians attacking though apparently not in a very determined way. According to Zaid Rifai, the Jordanians now have tank parity with the Syrians—resulting from the number of Syrian tanks they have knocked out and, according to the Israelis, from logistical problems.

The Iraqi forces have made some small moves in the last 24 hours, but the Israelis still are not clear about their intentions. Zaid Rifai,

³ See footnote 6, Document 313.

however, says that the Iraqis have promised not to let the Syrians through the Mafrak area—are on the main invasion routes to Amman and where most of the Iraqi forces are now located. It is hard to say at this point how much faith can be placed in Iraqi promises.

The Israelis report that a Libyan force has arrived in Damascus but they have no information on its size or what it will do.

The War with the Fedayeen

King Hussein and the number two man of the Palestine Liberation Organization announced this morning an agreement providing for the movement of the fedayeen out of the cities and back to the borders with Israel. This was then followed up by an order from the military governor lifting the curfew in some parts of Amman for several hours and providing that military units cease firing during this period. It seems doubtful, however, that these moves really signal the end of the fighting, since the PLO leader involved was captured several days ago and the organization's leader, Yasir Arafat, is still at large and calling for continuation of the fighting. It is more likely that this is simply a tactical response by Hussein to increasing pressure from the other Arab states that he stop the fighting. In any case, heavy artillery started at dawn in Amman and lasted for about a half hour and considerable machine gun and small arms fire continues in the streets.

The CIA morning Situation Report is at Tab F.

317. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 23, 1970, 8:10–8:40 a.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State—

U. Alexis Johnson

Talcott Seelye

Defense—

David M. Packard

Robert Pranger

James Noyes

JCS—

Thomas H. Moorer

Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt

CIA—

Richard Helms

David Blee

[*name not declassified*]

NSC Staff—

Harold H. Saunders

Adm. R.C. Robinson

Jeanne W. Davis

Samuel Hoskinson

Peter Rodman

Gen. Alexander Haig

Col. Richard Kennedy

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

1. State and the NSC Staff would vet the JCS checklist of possible US actions from the point of view of things that might trigger a Soviet response and provoke the thing we are trying to prevent.

Mr. Helms briefed from the attached notes (Tab A).

Mr. Kissinger: What is the Palestinian infantry you referred to—is that the Fedayeen?

Mr. Seelye: That is the Palestine Liberation Army. It is a cross between the Fedayeen and paramilitary units.

Mr. Kissinger: Has it been stationed in Syria?

Mr. Helms: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: If this “agreement” is valid, what does it mean?

Mr. Helms: Victory for the King.

Mr. Johnson: Seventy-five percent victory for the King.

Mr. Kissinger: What does it mean in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict? Does it sharpen it? Does it push the PLO against Israel?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The tabs are not attached and not found.

Mr. Seelye: It might. If the Fedayeen get out of the cities, they can focus more of their attention on the border.

Mr. Johnson: This “agreement” is with a captured Fedayeen, not with Arafat.

Mr. Kissinger: It could be a face-saver.

Mr. Helms: I think it is cosmetics.

Mr. Kissinger: With regard to the Syrian withdrawal, Vorontsov jumped me at the UAR Embassy last night, asking why we had not answered their note.² He claimed the Soviets were trying desperately to get the Syrians out of Jordan, and asked if we would settle if they would just stop. I replied it was not up to us. Vorontsov said we may not believe them, but they were trying very hard with the Syrians and also trying to get in touch with the Palestinians.

Of course, their record for veracity is not overwhelming.

Mr. Helms: We know nothing inconsistent with his claim. They usually lie at high levels.

Mr. Johnson: We are working on a reply to the Soviets.

Mr. Kissinger: Will we see it before the meeting?

Mr. Johnson: We will bring it to the meeting. I note Dobrynin is coming back today, arriving in New York at 6:30 this evening.

Mr. Kissinger: Is he coming directly here?

Mr. Johnson: Apparently; they have asked permission for his car to go up to get him.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Johnson) Do you have the check list?

Mr. Johnson: Yes, we have a check list (attached at Tab B) and talking points for us with the Soviets (attached at Tab C). These are only first drafts. We are feeding information to Ellsworth, who is keeping NAC fairly well informed. The NATO Military Committee wants more Defense reporting, and we are having trouble shaking it loose.

Admiral Moorer: That is DIA. I will check on it.

Mr. Kissinger: Are there any comments on the check list or the talking points?

Mr. Seelye: We have also modified public statements (Tab D), the suggested Israeli statement (Tab E) and the suggested UN action (Tab F) to take into account Israeli action against Syria.

Mr. Johnson: We have received the list of JCS actions vis-à-vis the Soviets and they seem very consistent with the work done previously. (to Admiral Moorer) I would like Rodger Davies to go over the list with your people.

² See footnote 3, Document 307.

Admiral Moorer: (handed a paper to Mr. Kissinger—attached at Tab G) I would like to explain this paper. On the first page, we have assumed Israeli intervention has taken place, have shown the actions already taken, our posture now, and stated the purpose of additional actions. There is an index on page 2, with the idea that if the Israelis intervene, we would want to take early action to deter the Soviets. We assume they would respond and we would then counteract. This would be the sequence. The actions are in two categories: those in the Middle East and those in other areas, either inspired by a third country or a direct Soviet response. We then list the series of actions. On the last page, we list the enabling actions that would be required as the tempo increased, principally in the U.S., and also the initiating agency. We have indicated with asterisks the things we can do now and the things which would take additional enabling action. I must emphasize that we have real limitations with regard to resources. We have gone as far as we can go without additional resources and additional authority.

Mr. Johnson: There is a conceptual problem that we should discuss. To what degree are the actions we would take in the name of deterrent likely to be read by the Soviets as an intention to intervene, and thereby provoke the very thing we are trying to prevent?

Mr. Kissinger: Vorontsov also asked last night if we are going to intervene in Jordan. I mumbled a reply, and Vorontsov said, "It is not in our vital interest so we don't care, but you would be getting into terrible difficulties in the Arab world." I replied, "Then you would win either way."

(to Mr. Johnson) Is it your judgement that, if the Israelis intervene, and we would do the things we are talking about, the Soviets are more likely to intervene against us? Possibly in Egypt, yes, but in Jordan?

Mr. Johnson: I do not necessarily think they are *more likely* to intervene. I think, however, we must guard against the sequence in which Israel intervenes; we make a lot of moves, publicized and unpublicized; the Arabs conclude we are preparing to intervene, with all the consequences for our relations with the Arabs, and call on the Soviets for help to deter us from coming in. This is tricky business. We may think our motives are pure, but others may not.

Mr. Packard: But if Israel intervenes, we probably wouldn't have to. In this case, I think there is nothing the Soviets are likely to do.

Mr. Helms: We will get a blast from them, saying "Get them out—they are going to do what they did in '67." The Soviets would probably move a unit to Damascus to show the flag, but I think that is as far as they will go. We shouldn't slide over Vorontsov's point. If anything happens, American institutions and American citizens in the Arab world will "have their hats taken off." We should give all our people in the area maximum warning, if the Israelis intervene, to save their skins.

Mr. Packard: We should get them out.

Mr. Johnson: That, in itself, is a problem.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Johnson) Would you vet Admiral Moorer's list of actions? If Rodger Davies meets with a JCS staffer, I would like a member of my staff present.

Mr. Packard: There are lots of things we can do to deter the Soviets which would have no impact on the Middle East situation.

Mr. Kissinger: I find this a very useful paper.

Mr. Helms: It is the best of its kind that I have seen—the most complete.

Mr. Johnson: I agree.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's vet the JCS list from the point of view of anything that might trigger a Soviet response. We should also consider, in general, what would be more likely to deter the Soviets: a ferocious stance at first or a slow escalation.

Mr. Johnson: We should consider the Soviets on the one hand and the Arabs on the other.

Mr. Kissinger: We would not get much mileage with the Arabs by not doing it. The Arabs won't pick up much, but the Soviets will. But let's not prejudge the paper. Let's get everyone's views. (to Col. Kennedy) Let's get someone from our staff—possibly a Soviet expert. (to Admiral Moorer) The chief question is not the military moves but their impact on the Soviets.

Admiral Moorer: There is a definite interplay between the two check lists. I might note that the hospital planes are now on 24-hour notice.

318. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, September 23, 1970, 9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Jordan and Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Secretary of State William P. Rogers
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird
Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms
Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard
Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer
Henry A. Kissinger
General Alexander M. Haig

The President opened the meeting by stating that there would be two topics on the morning's agenda—the first a review of the situation in Jordan and the second a sensitive discussion of the latest intelligence on the situation in Cienfuegos Bay in Cuba.

Mr. Helms initiated the first agenda item by presenting an intelligence briefing. The highlight of this briefing was the confirmation that the Syrians had withdrawn their three armored brigades from Jordan—with two having been moved to their home stations and the third serving as a covering force along Syria's border with Jordan. He also reported that there were indications that Syrian armored forces were being replaced by Palestine Liberation army units from Syria.²

During Mr. Helms' briefing, the President commented that the Soviets appeared to be taking a soft line at the moment with respect to Syrian intervention and that they apparently were working officially to insure the withdrawal of the Syrian forces. The President noted that domestic press reports suggested that the United States was ready to intervene militarily. The President continued by reviewing his discussion in a meeting the previous afternoon with the Democratic Congressional

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.

² Helms's briefing was not attached, but CIA Intelligence Information Cable TDCS DB-315/04963-70, September 23, 0800 hours, reported the information. (Ibid., Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V)

members who support the Administration on the ABM.³ The President told them:

—They had performed more responsibly than some of the weak Republican Congressmen.

—It was his view that the King must survive and that the Syrians must withdraw since there could be no peace with a Jordanian non-government.

—The U.S. does not want to become involved and our military moves have been conveyed in a context of the need to intervene only to evacuate U.S. citizens. However, we wished to convey in more subtle terms that military intervention was a possibility on other grounds. The U.S. had, for this reason, maintained an ambivalent position on intervention while undertaking acts which suggested that it might intervene. These signals, the President told the Congressmen, created doubts and complicated the enemy's problems.

—President Eisenhower took a similar posture with respect to Quemoy and Matsu during the Chinese Straits crisis of the '50's. President Eisenhower maintained at that time that the U.S. could not tell the enemy that we would not fight and that it was essential that we keep the threat real even though it was recognized in our official councils that we would not act militarily.

—If the Syrians do, in fact, disengage, it will be because of the strong posture taken by the U.S.

Secretary Rogers stated that the previous evening's television had developed a real war scare as evidenced by references to the readiness of U.S. forces. Secretary Laird pointed out that the forthcoming NATO Exercise Reforger would involve some 11,000 additional U.S. forces and would further add credibility to U.S. seriousness. Secretary Rogers commented that this was an ideal time also to announce the resumption of military assistance to Greece. The President stated that he had, in fact, mentioned this to the friendly Democratic Congressmen the day before and agreed that the timing had been excellent. Secretary Rogers stated that announcing the resumption of military aid to Greece, the Spanish base agreement, and our South African aircraft sales were all moved gracefully under the mantle of the Middle Eastern crisis. The President agreed that this was an excellent tactic and suggested that in the future it might be well to hold controversial decisions of this type and to announce them during similar periods of crisis.

Secretary Rogers commented that an additional benefit of our handling of the Jordanian crisis was the fact that Syria had suffered massive casualties and that this would serve as a deterrent to their future aggressiveness. Further, the Palestinian extremists had been badly hurt

³ According to the President's Daily Diary, President Nixon met on September 22 with Southern Democratic Senators in the Map Room between 5:05 and 6:25 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

and no matter what the ultimate outcome of the situation in Jordan, the extremist elements would be weakened. Thus, Israel, in turn, had realized benefits from the actions in Jordan. The President added that all of this constituted a further drain on Soviet resources as well.

The President then turned to discussion of the U.S. response to the Israeli Note Verbale.⁴ Secretary Rogers stated that the U.S. response must insure that the Israelis do not believe that they have a *carte blanche* to act militarily in Jordan as a result of our earlier exchanges of notes. He stated that the U.S. should make it clear to Israel that we do not think that any move on their part is called for in the light of most recent events.

The Secretary expressed special concern about the earlier U.S. response⁵ which he felt constituted an open-ended commitment on the part of the United States to support Israel in the event they intervened. He stated that the U.S. language, in effect, constituted a treaty with Israel and that this situation should be straightened out now. The Israelis must know precisely what we are talking about. He strongly urged a response to the latest Israeli note which would make it clear that (1) Israel should not act on its own; and (2) should Israel do so, our commitments expressed earlier were no longer binding and that they related only to the circumstances of the moment.

The President stated that our exchange with the Israelis actually began with a note from Jordan⁶ which we, in turn, conveyed to the Israeli Government and that Israel was merely responding to our initiative. It was therefore important, he stated, that the U.S. reply recognize that the Israeli Government has acted responsibly and that they have, in effect, been responsive to a U.S. initiative. The President directed that the WSAG carefully review the language of the U.S. response to take cognizance of these facts, noting that the situation of the moment had improved, and it may be that King Hussein does not want Israeli or U.S. air support.⁷ If this is true, the United States will have finessed the problem. In effect, the U.S. response should suggest that we do not want unilateral Israeli action but, at the same time, make it clear that we are grateful for Israeli cooperation. The President added that it was the United States which took the initiative with the Israelis on this issue and it is the Government of Israel that was most helpful in response to our request. Secretary Rogers expressed his agreement with the President's analysis. The President cautioned that the situation in Jordan

⁴ For the Israeli note verbale, see footnote 10, Document 307.

⁵ Apparently a reference to the response in Document 311.

⁶ Apparently a reference to the message in Document 284.

⁷ See Document 326.

was still tense and that there could be a requirement ultimately for Israeli action. Therefore, our response should be carefully couched so as not to preclude future Israeli action if required.

Secretary Rogers asked how the President felt about a strong cautionary message against Israeli attack at this time and a strong expression that the U.S. does not want such an attack. Dr. Kissinger asked whether this would be a wise course without knowing the Jordanian position. The President stated that we should inform the Israelis that we do not want military action without further consultation with us. Then, we will have an opportunity to evaluate the situation. Secretary Rogers emphasized that our written communications and documents must reflect this view specifically. The President stated that the situation had changed and that the U.S. does not want the Israelis to move unilaterally, noting that Israeli interests differed from U.S. interests and that we did not want to be drawn into the conflict as a result of Israeli initiatives. On the other hand, the President added, if the Jordanians still want air support, then we should still withhold agreement pending Israeli consultation with the U.S. Government. At the same time, the U.S. must keep in mind that the Israelis are doing our work, that they moved in at our request, and that we have gotten the benefits from their action.

Director Helms added that on a secondary level, the Arabs would love to have an issue with which to get after the Israelis and that we therefore needed to keep a very cool stance. Secretary Rogers stated that if King Hussein can't, at this point, save himself, what is the value of assistance by us or Israel? Dr. Kissinger then indicated that he was in agreement with the thrust of the note as outlined by the President. He stated that the outcome of the situation in Jordan was not necessarily a victorious one. If, at this point, Jordanian forces faced Palestine Liberation forces or if Syrian forces remain in Jordan, the King may indeed fall. If he reacts forcefully in the north, he will be weak in the cities; if, on the other hand, he acts forcefully in the cities, he may lose the North. Thus, the situation is far from solved. And, in either event, the Israelis may decide to move at some point. Should they do so, much will depend on how the U.S. acts. We must avoid having a record which confirms that we put them up to it and then, when it occurs, be in a position in which the Russians can split us away from the Israelis and isolate them.

The President stated that this was a strong possibility. He pointed out that he wanted the WSAG to consider carefully what U.S. reactions should be in that event. Specifically, what should the U.S. posture be if the Israelis move in the future. He commented that if the Syrians remain in Jordan, it is obvious that the King's days are numbered; but if the only way to get the Syrians out is for Israel to take military action, then the King's position is also jeopardized. Therefore, we are faced with an insoluble problem. If the Israelis move, the U.S. must be prepared with contingencies.

Secretary Rogers stated that his concern was the fact that they believe now that we have given them a carte blanche to act. The President stated that this had to be clarified since, up till now, we have talked only in the context of Syrian armored brigades in Jordan. Secretary Sisco stated that was correct. Our exchanges were dictated by the presence of Syrian armor in Jordan. The situation has changed. For this reason, we must carefully review our response to Israel's Note Verbale and insure that our language takes careful note of the change in the situation. Certainly, we must give Israel credit for helping to ease the situation thus far. The President commented that the Israeli questions were good ones and deserve a serious response.

[Omitted here is discussion of Cuba; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 214.]

319. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, September 23, 1970, 1500Z.

5318. Subj: Hijacking Hostages.

1. Foreign Ministry (Baron) has asked us make urgent suggestion that Government of Jordan be urged to include release of hijacking hostages as part of any settlement made with fedayeen. Baron noted GOJ said to be holding number of important fedayeen prisoners, and should not let them go without getting hostages out.

2. Since, in a sense, hijacking and hostage situation was immediate cause of GOJ–fedayeen blowup, there would certainly seem to be logic in Israeli idea that settlement of hostages should be part of settlement of blowup. In this connection, we note Israeli radio broadcast noon today said four fedayeen leaders had been released by Jordanian Army.

Zurhellen

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12. Secret; Immediate. It was repeated to Amman (Immediate), Beirut, Bonn, Bern, London, and Geneva.

320. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, September 23, 1970, 1640Z.

12857. Subject: Highjack Hostages Reported Safe. According Quai, French Embassy Amman was informed September 22 by “good source” that highjack hostages all safe. Source told French that hostages were removed from Amman area prior to outbreak of fighting, and are being held elsewhere in Jordan in small groups of about six persons each. Hostages reportedly still under tight PFLP guard.

Culley

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12. Confidential; Priority. It was repeated to Amman (Priority), Beirut, Bern, Bonn, Geneva, London, and Tel Aviv.

321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, September 23, 1970, 1952Z.

156385. Ref: Tel Aviv 5318.² Subject: Hijacking Hostages. While we are confident GOJ has welfare of hostages very much in mind, Embassy should, unless it perceives objection, urge Jordanians to provide for release of hijack hostages in any settlement with Fedayeen as proposed reftel.

Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Seelye and Alfred D. White, and approved by Seelye. It was repeated Priority to Beirut, Bonn, Bern, London, Geneva, and Tel Aviv.

² Document 319.

322. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 23, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Situation in Jordan

At Tab A are the most important cables since this morning.

At Tab B is the noon Situation Report from CIA.

The following are the main new elements in the situation this afternoon.

1. The fighting continues in Amman but at a reduced level. A palace official claims that there is only one major pocket of resistance left in the city and that once it is cleared there will only be some snipers left in various parts of the town. This happens to be where our embassy is. The embassy is battenning down the hatches, however, for another night since there is still considerable fighting in the neighborhood.

2. The Jordanians are publicly claiming to have routed the retreating Syrians from the Irbid-Ramatha area. It is still not clear, however, whether the Syrians are just retreating across the border to regroup or whether they have disengaged for good. They seem also to be in the process of replacing their forces with units from the Palestine Liberation Army and in this way "legitimizing" the intervention. The PLA is the military arm of the Palestine Liberation Organization and is largely composed of regular units seconded by the Arab governments. The Syrians presumably could turn more of their regular units over to the PLA as could the Iraqis and others.

3. In the now familiar pattern, the day ended in Amman with another cease-fire. The only apparent difference today is that it was announced by the visiting Sudanese President² who also said that the principles announced this morning concerning the withdrawal of the fedayeen from the cites would be used as the basis for a settlement. The only hitch is that these were repudiated by the PLO central committee this morning and there is no reason yet to believe the captured fedayeen leaders have any more authority to speak for the PLO now than they did this morning.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-076, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meetings Middle East 9/23/70. Secret. The tabs are not attached.

² Sudanese President Numeiri was leading the mediation mission sent by the Arab leaders at their summit in Cairo; see footnote 2, Document 303.

4. Our embassy in Tel Aviv believes that an Israeli military move at this point would certainly meet with surprise, and perhaps even fairly sharp criticism in public. The embassy reports that there is no indication that the government is seeking to prepare the public for military action and much evidence to the contrary. This, of course, is in sharp contrast to the continuing indication of a military build up.

323. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¹

Washington, September 23, 1970, 2128Z.

156554. Subject: Jordan Situation. Ref: USNATO 3417.²

1. You may assure PermReps and Brosio of US understanding of their interest in and concern about military dispositions. You should state that actions taken have involved the moving of the carrier *J. F. Kennedy* from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean area along with a number of supporting ships.

2. Other than that we have taken certain measures as a series of precautionary actions to increase the readiness of Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force units to support an evacuation operation for Americans in Jordan should that be necessary.³

3. *Begin FYI:* We do not interpret any actions taken to date as requiring a report to the NAC under CM(55) 82. *End FYI.*

Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Colonel Earl L. Boyd (DOD/ISA); cleared in EUR/RPM, Jordan Working Group, and J–5; and approved by George Springsteen (EUR). It was repeated to USNMR SHAPE, USCINCEUR, USNAVEUR, USAF, and USAREUR.

² Telegram 3417 from USNATO, September 22, reported that the NATO Representatives discussed the issue of “U.S. readiness measures” relating to the Jordan situation and how these measures might impact NATO forces. (Ibid.)

³ In backchannel telegram 1217 from USNATO, September 23, Ellsworth urged Kissinger to have the Departments of State and Defense draft a report that Ellsworth could give to the NAC. Ellsworth believed this would allay concerns among NATO allies regarding possible U.S. intervention in Jordan. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Backchannel, Backchannel Messages, Europe, Middle East, and Latin America)

324. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, September 24, 1970, 1717Z.

157107. Refs: Bern's 2423, 2425, 2427.²

1. After careful consideration reftels, we are persuaded that fresh approach to problem is highly desirable. Situation on the ground in Middle East has evolved over past several days. We strongly doubt that PFLP interlocuter with whom Boissier has been talking represents those elements actually holding hostages. Indeed, Boissier himself recognizes this probability and has proposed course of action Bern's 2423 in order to smoke out valid negotiator on PFLP side.

2. We continue to hope that situation in Jordan will continue to improve and that Jordanian Government can play a larger role in obtaining the release of the hostages. Obviously, the GOJ must have numbers of PFLP members among prisoners currently held.

3. Boissier desires that the Bern Group powers undertake a more precise engagement. This is reasonable and we therefore propose for Group consideration a proposed letter to Boissier as set out below. In this connection we consider it essential that Israel participate and that the communication to Boissier be in the name of the five repeat five powers. *Begin text:*

"We have received your report on your efforts to obtain the release of the hostages held by the PFLP. The five governments are prepared to authorize you to discuss with your interlocutors on the following basis:

"(a) The United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, and Israel are prepared to release seven prisoners held in Europe plus two Algerians held by Israel in exchange for the release of all the hostages held by the PFLP.

"(b) The PFLP will gather all the hostages in a secure place so that they can be safe during the period when the modalities for their release are being arranged."

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PS 7-6 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Beaudry (EUR/AIS); cleared by Seelye, Sisco, and Johnson; and approved by Rogers. It was sent to Bern, Bonn, London, Beirut, Amman, Tel Aviv, and Geneva.

² In telegram 2423 from Bern, September 23, 1611Z; telegram 2425 from Bern, September 23, 1815Z; and telegram 2427 from Bern, September 23, 2300Z, the Embassy discussed Boissier's proposed letter to the PFLP, which sought the release all of the European and U.S. hostages not holding dual citizenship with Israel while moving the Israeli and Israeli dual citizens to a safe place. While the U.S. and Israeli Governments resisted the offer, the Swiss, West German, and British Governments considered the proposal the best opportunity to get some of the hostages out while securing the rest in a safe location during further negotiations. (Ibid.)

4. With respect to the covering confidential memorandum, we believe it could be changed as indicated in the revised text which is set out below:

“For your confidential guidance: Our main objective remains to liberate all hostages in a global solution. As a first step you should aim to bring all hostages to a safe place, where their number and conditions can be verified by a representative of the ICRC. We, of course, understand your difficulties.

“You may in your oral presentation to the PFLP representative indicate that the language of point (a) indicating willingness to exchange prisoners for hostages in effect accepts the principle of exchange. You are cautioned that the governments have serious doubt about the ability of your interlocutors to deliver hostages, but have agreed to this procedure as a means of continuing the dialogue in the hope that you may discover a valid interlocutor.” *End text*

We recognize that Embassy Bern will have problems negotiating the above, but we consider it essential that Israel be brought on board. Furthermore, in light of fluid situation in the area, other powers should have no objection to spending some additional time in trying to arrive at reasonable negotiating position and finding those PFLP who actually control the hostages.

Rogers

325. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

02452/70

Washington, September 24, 1970.

Jordan

(Supplement to 1200 Situation Report)

According to a sensitive State Department cable, Foreign Minister Eban told Ambassador Yost at the UN on September 23 that while Israel, on balance, favored Husayn as of this time, ‘the world would not

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only; Exdis. Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency. Received in the White House at 1:07 p.m. An unidentified handwritten note reads, “Interesting comment by Eban to effect that Israel could live with Palestinian regime in Jordan if Hussein were toppled.” Kissinger initialed the memorandum.

come to an end if he departed the scene.' Eban said the Palestinians would become more responsible when saddled with the day-to-day burdens of government, and the long-term trend in Jordan was toward greater recognition of the fact that Jordan was 70 percent Palestinian. Yost added that Eban seemed to imply that, sooner or later, Israel had to find an accommodation with the Palestinians and that it might in the long run be easier if they dominated the state of Jordan.

326. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 24, 1970, 3:10–3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State—

U. Alexis Johnson

Talcott Seelye

Defense—

David Packard

Robert J. Pranger

James H. Noyes

CIA—

Richard Helms

David Blee

[name not declassified]

JCS—

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

LTG John W. Vogt

NSC Staff—

Harold H. Saunders

B/Gen. Alexander M. Haig

Adm. R.C. Robinson

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

Samuel Hoskinson

Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed:

1. to examine the availability of tanks for Jordan;
2. to review the Lebanon contingency plans.

Mr. Helms briefed from the attached notes.²

Mr. Kissinger: Have we more on the diplomatic front?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² Not attached and not found.

Mr. Johnson: No, not particularly. With regard to the hostages, we have sent a telegram with instructions to try to keep the five countries together and to test whether the PFLP representative in Beirut has any validity as a channel.³ We have entered a new phase now, with Jordan becoming more important since they now hold a lot of prisoners. With regard to relief for Jordan, we have a disturbing report from London of a British conversation with an ICRC representative who said that they did not want any help, military or civilian, from either the UK or the US.⁴ We are baffled by this and have asked Geneva to reconcile this report with present planning.⁵ The first evacuation plane, containing some 24 Americans and 25 others, has arrived in Beirut. There will be another flight tomorrow.

Mr. Kissinger: Has Sisco seen Rabin yet?

Mr. Johnson: We are waiting for the message to be approved.

Adm. Moorer: Would it be advisable to ease off on some of these response times for the 82nd Airborne and the forces in Europe? We could put it right back up if we had to. On the one hand, it might give the impression that we think everything is over and we are relaxing. On the other, it might be reassuring to the American public. We might also ease the alert on the aircraft in Turkey from four to six hours.

Mr. Kissinger: I think easing the response time on the aircraft is all right.

Adm. Moorer: We might also return the 82nd Airborne to its normal 22-hour time. The first brigade is now at 8 hours.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's hold that for 24 hours.

Adm. Moorer: How about the forces in Europe?

Mr. Kissinger: Let's hold those for 24 hours, too. The planes in Turkey were originally for evacuation and I think it is all right to let them slip. I think we should look at the other elements every 24 hours.

Mr. Packard: I agree.

Mr. Johnson: You would keep the ships where they are?

Adm. Moorer: Yes, except for replacement of the *Saratoga*. I think we should look at this every day. Not only does it cost money but there is an effect on morale since the men are confined to their barracks and can't go anywhere.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree—we will look at it every day.

³ Document 324.

⁴ In telegram 7736 from London, September 24, 1324Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 JORDAN)

⁵ In telegram 157108 to Geneva, September 24, 1659Z. (Ibid.)

Mr. Johnson: Frank Sieverts⁶ has been made our coordinator of emergency relief operations, working with AID. He has good contacts with the ICRC.

Mr. Kissinger: What about the hospital planes? Does the ICRC edict mean they can't move?

Mr. Packard: They were being unloaded anyhow.

Adm. Moorer: They are on 24 hours notice.

Mr. Kissinger: How about economic assistance to Jordan?

Mr. Johnson: AID has enough money in its contingency fund for emergency relief for Jordan. The proposed supplemental package for Korea and Cambodia will include some MAP for Jordan. We have been discussing the amount and there is a good argument for \$15 million, which was the amount of FMS credit which they won't get now. I think inclusion of Jordan in this supplemental package will strengthen it. There appears to be no necessity for major economic assistance now. We have funds for emergency relief, and the Jordanian reserves are in pretty good shape. We do plan to go forward in the next budget on economic reconstruction.

Mr. Seelye: We are also weighing in with the Kuwaitis to get them to turn their support back on.

Mr. Pranger: We also have an ammunition replacement package ready to go.

Mr. Johnson: Fortuitously there is a ship arriving on October 10 which carries much of what they will need as replacement ammunition.

Mr. Pranger: Also, the first increment of the artillery package will dock soon.

Mr. Saunders: Have they asked for replacements? How could we do this?

Mr. Pranger: There are various ways: by MAP diversion requiring a Presidential Determination, or the Defense Secretary's contingency fund. We have identified these in the resupply paper.

Mr. Johnson: If we get \$15 million in the supplemental this will give us some flexibility. They will probably need replacements for the tanks they lost but these can come down the MAP road.

Mr. Kissinger: What do we do if the Syrians come back?

Adm. Moorer: We would be right back where we were on Sunday,⁷ although the Israelis might take them on right away. It would be

⁶ Frank Sieverts was the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for POW/MIA Affairs.

⁷ September 20.

a question of what Iraq would do, and we should probably see how the Jordanians are handling it. They are in a better position than before. If there should be a combination of the Syrians and the Iraqis, without any outside help, we should probably start talking to the Israelis again.

Mr. Helms: I have a hard time seeing a scenario where Iraq would be off-again-on-again, too-little-too-late again. If they team up, this would be a major situation. We would be back to Sunday, only worse.

Adm. Moorer: We would not have an evacuation problem.

Mr. Kissinger: Nor would we have the evacuation pretext.

Mr. Johnson: The evacuation pretext was never very relevant to action in the north.

Mr. Packard: There would still be Americans there.

Mr. Kissinger: When you start losing more men than you are taking out you lose the pretext.

Adm. Moorer: The Ambassador was not too eager about the air evacuation. He was thinking about wheels.

Mr. Johnson: The road to Aqaba looks better.

Mr. Kissinger: If the Syrians should come back, would this be the time for a quick strike? Or should we let them come in and out every five days?

Mr. Johnson: If they should, it would be best if Jordan could bloody their noses every time.

Mr. Packard: It would be preferable to let the Jordanians do it by themselves.

Adm. Moorer: If the Syrians strike again by themselves, they probably won't get back in. At least their losses would be much higher.

Mr. Packard: What do we know about Jordan tank losses?

Adm. Moorer: Very little—nothing like the Syrian losses.

Mr. Helms: The highest figure I have seen is 90.

Mr. Kissinger: How many were lost to breakdowns?

Mr. Helms: It's hard to know that.

Adm. Moorer: Israeli recce indicates 75 to 90 lost all told.

Mr. Packard: Is there any way to replace these tanks in a hurry?

Mr. Johnson: They haven't asked for anything yet. The King hasn't had a chance to take inventory. I expect we will be hearing from him in the next few days.

Mr. Kissinger: But we are ready to replace ammunition and small arms.

Mr. Johnson: A ship arrives October 10.

Mr. Packard: Any possibility of a trade deal on tanks with Iran?

Mr. Johnson: Or Saudi Arabia?

Gen. Vogt: Israel is trying to sell tanks.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's look at the availability of tanks for Jordan.

Mr. Packard: The best way to nail this thing is to keep Jordan's capability up. (to Pranger) Let's get on this tank availability question.

Adm. Moorer: Rabin mentioned the outstanding performance of Jordanian tanks.

Mr. Seelye: The Israelis consider that the crucial factor was the inter-Arab pressure on Syria.

Adm. Moorer: Let's first find out if the Jordanians need tanks. There are lots around the cities now. When they are no longer needed in the cities they could be moved north.

Mr. Johnson: Are Saudi tanks compatible with Jordanian tanks?

Mr. Pranger: Yes.

Mr. Packard, Adm. Moorer and Mr. Johnson agree to undertake a quick survey of the availability of tanks.

Mr. Kissinger: How about the Lebanese questions? What do we do if the same thing happens in Lebanon? Have we a draft cable?

Mr. Seelye: We have a cable.⁸

Adm. Moorer: What do you mean by the "same thing"?

Mr. Kissinger: If we have a civil war in Lebanon resulting from Palestinian action, and Lebanon asks for intervention, what would be our view?

Mr. Johnson: We can't repeat 1958.

Mr. Helms: The imagination boggles. It was bad enough in 1958, but now, with the fedayeen as a complicating factor!

Mr. Kissinger: If we don't do it, would we have the Israelis do it—or anyone do it? Let's review the existing papers on Lebanon.

Mr. Saunders: You recall we had an Israeli option.

Mr. Kissinger: Would nothing be better than the Israelis? Let's review these papers again.

⁸ Not further identified.

327. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 25, 1970.

SUBJECT

Points to be made to Israeli Ambassador Rabin

Events have overtaken the need for a precise response to the Israeli Note Verbale which was received on September 22 and which was related to the possible provision of Israeli air attacks on Syrian forces in Jordan.² As you know, on the afternoon of September 23 Ambassador Rabin suggested that the matter of Israeli military action in Jordan be held in abeyance in view of the withdrawal of Syrian regular forces from Jordan.³ In order to clear the record with respect to this and prior exchanges with the Israelis, State has proposed that Assistant Secretary Sisco deliver orally to Ambassador Rabin the message at Tab A. I do not believe that paragraph 4 of the proposed State text⁴ is acceptable for the following reasons:

(1) It would raise serious questions in the minds of the Israelis as to our fundamental willingness to defend Israel against Soviet attack.

(2) It is an especially abrasive and unnecessary affront to the Government of Israel in the light of the cooperative attitude they maintained throughout the recent crisis.

(3) Most importantly it could seriously hamper future cooperation with Israel at a time when the situation in Jordan remains tense and before we can be absolutely certain that it may not be necessary to call upon Israel again to take military action in Jordan.

I am informed that paragraph 4 was written personally by the Secretary of State because he believes that paragraph 3 of our earlier Note Verbale of September 21 to the Government of Israel constituted an open-ended commitment to protect Israel against Soviet attack (Tab B).⁵ I do not agree with this interpretation.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 336, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President, September 9–December 1970. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. Printed from an unsigned copy. All tabs are attached but not printed.

² See footnote 10, Document 307.

³ A summary of the meeting with Rabin was transmitted in telegram 156646 to Tel Aviv, September 23, 2215Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)

⁴ Paragraph 4 stated that "all aspects of our exchanges with Israel with regard to the Syrian invasion of Jordan, including those relating to the problem of possible Soviet military intervention, applied only to the situation which arose from the Syrian invasion and therefore no longer apply."

⁵ See Document 311.

Recommendation:

That you authorize a new and terser response to Israel which will clearly clean the slate with respect to commitments made this week but which will avoid an unnecessary irritant and would not jeopardize future cooperative action if required.

An alternate text for your approval is at Tab C.⁶

Approve alternate text.

Retain proposed State language.

⁶No action is indicated. In a September 25 memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, Saunders sought Kissinger's approval for an oral reply to Rabin, which included a modification to the text Kissinger objected to in paragraph 4 of the original draft. The new paragraph 4 opened with the U.S. Government's appreciation for "the prompt and positive Israeli response to our approach." It continued that since "circumstances will be different if there is another attack, we consider that all aspects of the exchanges between us with regard to this Syrian invasion of Jordan are no longer applicable, and we understand that Israel agrees." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-076, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/25/70)

**328. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon¹**

Washington, September 26, 1970, 9 a.m.

SUBJECT

The Situation in Jordan

The situation appears to have stabilized this morning. The cease-fire is holding up in both Amman and in the north. There has still, however, been no authoritative fedayeen agreement to King Hussein's terms and the other Arab leaders, especially Nasser, are growing increasingly impatient to end the conflict. Hussein appears to be holding out for a settlement on his terms and could decide to move again against the remaining fedayeen strongholds in the Irbid area if the commandos do not soon capitulate. Meanwhile, efforts are underway to mount an international medical and food relief effort to cope with the critical situation that has developed, especially in Amman.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis. The time is handwritten. A stamped notation indicates the President saw the memorandum.

The Military Situation

The latest cease-fire seems to have taken hold, at least for the time being. The Jordanian forces appear to be in effective control of most of Amman with the possible exceptions of the area where our Embassy is located and at least one of the refugee camps on the edge of the city. The fighting has apparently all but ceased in the north also. A newspaper man who toured the key northern towns of Ramtha, Irbid and Jarash yesterday with the permission of the commandos reported that all was quiet in these locations, with the fedayeen still in control. The towns, however, were all ringed by Jordanian troops and armor.

Despite the cease-fire, Sudanese President Numayri, accompanied by PLO leader Yasir Arafat, went back to Cairo with the rest of the Arab mediation delegation and charged the Jordanian army with violations. This news apparently then prompted Nasser to fire off a harsh cable to King Hussein alleging that "all the promises made to us have been completely ignored" and claiming that "there is a plan to liquidate the Palestinian resistance." Nasser further complained that the Arab mediating committee had been "unjustifiably subjected to evasiveness." Hussein responded this morning by denying that his forces had not broken the cease-fire and asserting that they would observe it in the face of "unceasing and unbearable provocations." He also said that a new cabinet will be announced shortly.

King Hussein is coming under fire from other Arab states as well. In addition to the usual verbal blasts emanating from Baghdad and Damascus, Libya has broken relations with Jordan.

The Hostages

There is no further word on the remaining hostages. As you know, the Jordanian army yesterday freed 16 of the 54 hostages held by the guerrillas—two Germans, 6 Swiss and eight British. (One more hostage turned up in the course of the day after the original group of 15 was found.) The whereabouts of the remaining 38 American and dual American-Israeli nationals is still unknown, although there are unconfirmed reports that they were moved out of Amman to the Irbid area when the fighting broke out. If the remaining hostages are being held in Irbid it may be some time before the army is able to free them and they could still be used as bargaining counters by the fedayeen.

The Relief Problem

The Embassy reports that the food situation in Amman is critical. Those who can are leaving the city for surrounding villages but most of the people are pinned down by curfews and continuing skirmishes. What food stocks people had are now exhausted and the stores for the most part have been looted and will require a considerable period to be replenished. The army's food supply is also dangerously low.

Following up on the contingency plans developed in the WSAG,² State has set up a new task force to report to Under Secretary Irwin to oversee the disaster relief effort.³ This is an interagency group. Most of our diplomatic and military posts in the area and in Europe have been instructed to take immediate action to obtain foodstuffs to be sent by air freight to Amman, drawing from PL-480 stocks as necessary. Defense has also tentatively authorized the use of the C-130's at Incirlik in Turkey for airlifting food into Amman, including C-rations. Plans with the International Red Cross to move U.S. army field hospitals from Europe into Jordan are on standby to be implemented when the Red Cross feels it is safe to do so.

² See Document 326.

³ In telegram 159077 to all diplomatic posts, September 26, 2223Z. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V)

329. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, September 26, 1970, 1941Z.

159035. For Chief of Mission.

1. We note that within Arab world Arab leadership and public media are taking the line that Hussein is responsible for the bloodshed in Jordan and that resulting deep feelings mean that there can be no reconciliation and that he is "finished".

2. From the history of the past months it is clear that Hussein exercised maximum restraint in attempting to avoid confrontation and to coexist with Palestinian movements on the basis of agreements which invariably were violated by uncontrolled elements within Palestinian complex. If there are villains in Jordan tragedy they are clearly George Habbash, Hawatmeh and others in leadership of extremist groups.

3. We hope that you can get across in your contacts with Arab leaders and representatives that while it is understandable that feelings are

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco and Davies; cleared by Seelye; and approved by Davies. It was sent Priority to Amman, and was also sent to Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, Tripoli, Benghazi, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, and USUN.

deep when such bloodshed has been involved, we believe Hussein forced into situation by Maoist-inclined forces among Palestinians, and that he is fully capable of putting his house in order and maintaining the broad support of his entire population.

4. Arab and western press has posed question in terms of loyal Bedouin forces versus the Palestinians. Fact of the matter is that Hussein's army is made up of 55 percent Palestinians. Moreover there is no evidence that PFLP and Fatah in fact reflect the broad consensus of the Palestinians. There are still many Palestinians who favor a political solution, though we recognize that when radicals take the lead it makes it hard for the more moderate elements not to follow.

5. In the days ahead we hope that you can help maintain this view. Jordan Ambassador here is convinced that in a week or so a more moderate approach to Jordan will develop among the Arabs.

6. We are particularly concerned at hard line Nasser and UAR media have taken toward Hussein. It is hard for us to conceive that UAR's interest would be served by replacement of Hussein by Baathi-supported radical Palestinian-dominated regime or regimes. This would have resulted in an indefinite postponement of further peace-making efforts since it is highly unlikely that there would have been anyone with whom peace could have been made in Jordan.

Rogers

330. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 28, 1970.

SUBJECT

Jordan Situation Report

A new cease-fire agreement was announced Sunday night in Cairo.² While it appears from the ambiguous language that Hussein may have made some concessions to Arafat, the test will be in the implementation.

Meanwhile, arrangements for the initial phase of the relief effort were completed Sunday, and planes were scheduled to begin arriving in Amman at daybreak today.

Cease-Fire Agreement

The Agreement to end the fighting in Jordan emerged from a meeting of Arab leaders attended by Hussein and Arafat. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Arafat passed the order to Fedayeen forces to cease all military operations as of 1925 GMT.

The test of the agreement seems to represent some concessions to Arafat's demands, but the Jordanians seem pleased. The terms include withdrawal of both army and Fedayeen forces from Amman, release of detainees, return of military and civilian conditions in other towns to what they were before the crisis, restoration of security responsibility to the police and an end to the military government. A follow-up committee headed by the Tunisian Premier³ with one government and one Fedayeen representative has been appointed.

Ambassador Brown in Amman reports his assumption that both Hussein and Arafat were under heavy pressure in Cairo to accept a cease-fire. He expresses reservations about the staying power of any agreement reached under this kind of duress.⁴

Hussein remains under heavy pressure from his own army to eradicate the last major elements of the guerrillas, and the Jordanian

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V. Top Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an unsigned copy.

² September 27; see footnote 2, Document 303.

³ Bahi Ladgham was the Tunisian Prime Minister.

⁴ In telegram 5334 from Amman, September 28, 1525Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 JORDAN)

Government is having difficulty holding back the army from continuing its attacks. The cease-fire held generally through Sunday in Amman, but Israeli sources reported fighting in the northern towns of Jerash, Ajlun and Ramtha. Irbid remained quiet with the Fedayeen controlling the city and the army surrounding.

Relief Effort

Four C-130s with food supplies and the first mobile hospital unit will arrive in Amman beginning at daybreak Monday. The second hospital will follow Tuesday.

Hostages

The 32 hostages released Saturday were flown to Cyprus Sunday.⁵ The remaining six are reported to be in the UAR Embassy in Amman.⁶ The UK informed the UAR Government that it is prepared to release the girl hijacker if the remaining hostages are turned over safely.⁷

U.S. Forces

The one 250-man infantry company in Germany that has been on alert since the beginning of the Jordan crisis was taken off alert Saturday as part of the general relaxation of alert status and then was returned to nine-hour alert for contingency use for protection of the hospital units.

⁵ As reported in telegram 1703 from Nicosia, September 27, 1050Z. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 619, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan Crisis) A debriefing of 2 hostages from the group of 32, which provides eyewitness accounts of the hostages' ordeal, is in telegram 1710 from Nicosia, September 27, 2120Z. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PS 7–6 JORDAN)

⁶ As reported in telegram 5292 from Amman, September 27, 1740Z. (Ibid., PS 7–6 JORDAN) According to telegram 159271 to Naples, September 28, 1557Z, the six hostages were apparently not at the UAR Embassy as of 11 a.m. EDT, but at an unknown location. (Ibid., POL 23–9 JORDAN)

⁷ As reported in telegram 159169 to Amman, September 27, 2149Z, the British agreed to release Leila Khaled. (Ibid.)

331. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 28, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Situation in Jordan—1700 GMT, September 28

There are no new specific developments to report on the situation within Jordan. The cease-fire appears to be still generally holding up; there apparently has been no change in the situation in northern Jordan; there is nothing new on the remaining hostages; and Arab efforts to forge a more permanent settlement between King Hussein and the fedayeen continue. You may, however, be interested in some of the Israeli reflections on the current situation and our latest moves in mounting the relief effort.

The Director of the Research Department of the Israeli Foreign Minister believes that the Cairo agreement signed yesterday by King Hussein simply brings the situation back to what it was prior to the outbreak of fighting.² He believes that Hussein's agreement to mutual withdrawal of the army and the fedayeen from Amman gives the fedayeen a clear advantage since they will re-enter the city clandestinely and rebuild their bases. Because of this he expects the army to resist the Cairo agreement and continue on its own way. CIA analysts are also not very optimistic that the Cairo agreement will prove to be anything more than a "stopgap".

The following are some of the more important measures we are taking on the relief effort:³

—All eight aircraft with the general purpose mobile hospital and four with food and medical supplies from Turkey have landed in Amman and unloaded. The hospital unit is awaiting arrival of Jordanian forces for escort to the hospital site. The aircraft have left Amman.

—Under Secretary Irwin held a special meeting this morning to coordinate our official relief efforts with those of private U.S. agencies.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² For a summary of the Cairo agreement, see Document 330.

³ In a September 27 memorandum to President Nixon, Haig explained the U.S. Government's numerous efforts to provide relief for Jordan. These included \$5 million in assistance, shipments of foodstuffs and medical supplies, and mobile hospitals. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V)

—There is a possibility that the second hospital unit may not be needed. Embassy Amman will make clear that it is ready to come but that Jordanian needs govern.

—Apart from the above flights, one has flown from Beirut each day Sunday and Monday with a total of 22 tons of perishable foods and canned goods.

332. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 29, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Situation in Jordan—0200 GMT, September 29, 1970

The tenuous cease-fire is still holding up in both Amman and in northern Jordan. Virtually no observers expect that this situation will continue for very long. There is little new to report on the six remaining hostages although we do have a fairly good report that they are safe. Our relief effort is continuing although some bottlenecks have been encountered in Amman and a temporary halt in the supply of foodstuffs may be necessary.

It is difficult to determine at this point what will be the effect of Nasser's death² on the Jordan crisis other than to say that it may bring a few days of relative quiet. It is worth noting, however, that Nasser played a generally moderating role, although he tried to straddle the fence between Hussein and the fedayeen.

The Cease-Fire

The cease-fire remains generally effective in Amman. There were some reports of limited clashes Monday³ morning but nothing serious. There are so far no indications, however, that either the army or the fedayeen are withdrawing yet from the city. There are reports that things are beginning to return to normal, although it will be some time before utilities and sanitation services are restored. Ambassador Brown reports that since it is obvious that the embassy area will not be cleared

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V. Top Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² Gamal Abdel Nasser died of a heart attack on September 28.

³ September 28.

of fedayeen for a long time, he and several embassy officers will soon establish a "branch embassy" in a more secure area.⁴

Attempts to enforce the cease-fire in northern Jordan appear to be running into more difficulty. Intercepted fedayeen messages indicate an intention to break the cease-fire and considerable bitterness. There are no reports of actual cease-fire violations however, although it is quite possible that there have been some.

Commenting on the Cairo agreement, our embassy in Amman states that the efforts of the special committee headed by Tunisia's Premier Bahi Ladgham and the observers sent to Amman may give the country a breathing spell, but that it is doubtful if they can keep the fedayeen and the army apart for any length of time.

The embassy thinks that while Ladgham may be acceptable to the government because of Tunisia's moderate stand, the fedayeen may denounce the chairman and the committee if they think it is favoring the government. The fact that the Syrians and Iraqis have also not supported the agreement could also encourage the fedayeen to resist the committee's decisions. Finally, the embassy seriously doubts that the fedayeen will ever leave Amman of their own free will or that the army can agree to continued fedayeen presence in Irbid since this amounts to a political defeat.⁵

The Hostages

The remaining six hostages are still in fedayeen hands, probably in Irbid, and negotiations for their release are continuing. A responsible Red Cross official reports that they are safe and there have been several reports that they may be released soon.

Relief Program

The following is the current status of our relief efforts:

—The Defense Department has announced in a press briefing that American relief aircraft have been using the Sinai-Aqaba route to Amman. Our embassy in Amman has stressed that, to placate the military in Jordan, King Hussein wants American relief planes to come in from Saudi Arabia.⁶ We have sought and received Saudi permission for these overflights and although we may only use Saudi air space minimally the relief flights will be publicly billed as coming from Saudi Arabia.

⁴ In telegram 5340 from Amman, September 28, 1615Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 JORDAN)

⁵ Reported in telegram 5334 from Amman; see footnote 4, Document 330.

⁶ In telegram 5348 from Amman, September 28, 1715Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 10 JORDAN)

State is also asking through the Italian embassy in Damascus for Syrian overflight rights.

—Some difficulty has arisen with respect to moving from Amman airport the general purpose mobile hospital and the food and medical supplies that were brought into Amman airport on Monday, the 28th. Because of these difficulties and uncertainty as to the extent of further needs, Amman Embassy has recommended a 24-hour pause in further relief flights from Turkey.

—Ambassador Brown thinks that the Mobile Army Surgical Hospital will be extremely useful and that it has been ordered from its base in Germany and is due in Amman at dawn on the 29th.

—A civilian aircraft has been chartered to fly from Beirut to Amman on the 29th with relief supplies (about 10 tons of food).

—Other major sources of relief supplies for Jordan have been the International Red Cross relief flights from Beirut (four per day) and shipments of food overland from Israel. A British medical unit is scheduled to arrive in Amman on September 29 and 30.

Military Aid

The Jordanians have sent us a long military aid shopping list. Defense estimates that to deliver all that the Jordanians have requested would cost at least \$10 million and that supplementary legislation would therefore be necessary after the election. Ambassador Brown is urging prompt delivery of the most urgently required items in order to maintain Jordanian morale and as a follow-on to your personal message to King Hussein.⁷ A sum for Jordan is tentatively included in the plans for the supplemental budget request.

⁷ In telegram 5357 from Amman, September 28, 1810Z. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 JORDAN) For President Nixon's message to King Hussein, see footnote 6, Document 313.

333. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 29, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Situation in Jordan—1800 GMT

The situation in Jordan remains about the same, although Nasser's death could ultimately remove one of the principal building blocks of the fragile cease-fire. Amman remains relatively calm but the fedayeen are not withdrawing and the situation in the north may be shaping up along classic guerrilla warfare lines. The international relief effort is continuing without any major problems but we may be approaching the point now that we have met the most urgent needs—to pause momentarily to take stock. Initial U.S. military resupply shipments to Jordan will begin in about three days.

The Cease-fire

Nasser's death may further undermine the shaky cease-fire agreement reached in Cairo. Our embassy in Amman thinks that for a short time it is likely that the hostility between the government and the fedayeen will be muted as the Arab world mourns Nasser's death, but that in the near future Nasser's passing may act as a solvent of the agreements reached in Cairo. Arab radicals such as Syria and Iraq might feel that with Nasser's moderating influence removed, there will be new opportunities for their leadership and the turmoil in Jordan could provide them with an ideal arena. Nasser, moreover, was probably the only Arab leader who might have marshaled Arab public opinion to restrain the fedayeen.²

Amman is relatively calm, although the fedayeen remain in semi-official and almost uncontested control of some areas. The city is taking on a more normal appearance, however, with considerable civilian foot traffic and firing diminished to occasional intense but brief exchanges. The embassy speculates that the slowdown may have resulted from fatigue on both sides, shortages of ammunition and the desire of both the King and the fedayeen not to weaken their case in the eyes of Arab public opinion. King Hussein, however, has told an embassy of-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² No such reporting cable from Amman has been found.

ficer that the army will not leave Amman and the other cities until the fedayeen depart first.³

The situation is still very fragile in northern Jordan. The British see the situation there developing along classic guerrilla lines. The army holds the center of most of the smaller towns in the north—although not the important towns of Irbid, Ramtha and Mafraq which they have surrounded but not entered—and are able to use most of the roads. The fedayeen, however, seem able to move with considerable freedom across the countryside, to harass army lines of communication, to re-infiltrate after they have been expelled from an area, and to launch attacks on army posts.

Hostages

A spokesman at the International Red Cross Headquarters in Geneva announced at 1715 GMT that the 6 remaining hostages have been turned over to delegates of the ICRC in Amman today.⁴

Relief Program

The following is the current status of our relief efforts:

—The general purpose mobile hospital is now in position and has received its first patients.

—The eighteen aircraft bringing in the Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) have all arrived at Amman Airport and have departed without incident. The MASH unit is now being moved into position at the site of the general purpose mobile hospital.

—The two U.S.-supplied hospitals will be supported by one C-130 supply flight per day from Germany.

—In addition to the two hospitals supplied by the United States and the British medical unit scheduled to arrive on September 29 and 30, a German 50-bed hospital (with a 12-man staff, including two surgeons) is scheduled to arrive by September 30. A French mobile hospital has already been moved into Jordan and has been operating since about September 26.

—The chartered food flight from Beirut to Amman on Tuesday, the 29th, has been cancelled because trucks carrying food were unable to reach the Beirut airport in time.

Military Aid

Preparations are being made to ship ammunition to Jordan as soon as possible. The first military flights will begin from Turkey in about

³ In telegram 5358 from Amman, September 28, 2120Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN)

⁴ Ambassador Brown met with the six hostages shortly after their release. An account of the hostages' ordeal, based on Brown's interview with them, is in telegram 5475 from Amman, September 30, 1430Z. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V)

three days. The initial 20 flights will enter Jordan from Saudi Arabia, where we already have the necessary clearance, and land at a military airfield in Jordan.

334. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rogers in Naples¹

Washington, September 30, 1970, 0639Z.

Tosec 39/160803. Naples pass Sisco. Subj: Jordan Sitrep No. 49 as of 0100 EDT Sept. 30, 1970.²

Part I—Relief and Supply Operations

1. Arms and Ammunition Shipments: We have notified Embassy Amman that we are ready to resume arms and ammunition shipments to Jordan, including an advance ammunition resupply package to be airlifted beginning October 1 or 2.³ The latter should provide the needed psychological and material lift for the Jordan army without imposing an undue burden.

2. Relief Operations: Distribution of relief food in Amman is proceeding under supervision of the eight-man Jordanian coordination committee in cooperation with ICRC. The Jordan Army appears to be doing most of the actual distributing. Attempts are also being made to bring drinking water to water-short areas of the city.

3. Fig Hill Medical Assistance: The Fig Hill Hospital is being rapidly set up although water remains a problem. The Ambassador reports that it is a first-class facility.⁴ The combined ATH and MASH will have nearly 100-bed capacity.

Part II—Political and Military Developments

4. Departure of the Six Remaining Hostages: Arrangements have been made for the six remaining hostages to leave Amman early this morning (2:00 a.m. EDT) via an ICRC-chartered MEA plane for Athens where we hope they can make connections with TWA flight

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Theodore A. Wahl (JTF). It was repeated Immediate to the White House.

² Not found.

³ In telegram 160537 to Amman, September 29, 2252Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 JORDAN)

⁴ In telegram 5420 from Amman, September 29, 1755Z. (Ibid., SOC 10 JORDAN)

881 scheduled to arrive in New York at 5:25 p.m. EDT. The Ambassador has visited them and we have passed messages from several members of the group to their families. All of the hostages said they were in good health.

5. Situation in Jordan: Embassy Amman reports that control of the city appears to rest with the five-nation Arab commission force, whose green-flagged cars are conspicuously circulating throughout Amman. As a result, the Jordan Government's internal political and military freedom of movement seems to be severely restricted. The city remains divided with the fedayeen to all appearances firmly entrenched in the areas they control, including the district around the Embassy. The Embassy questions whether the five-nation force will be able to induce the fedayeen to withdraw in accordance with the Cairo agreement.⁵

6. The separate three-man "follow-up" committee headed by Tunisian Premier Ladgham is pursuing its mediation efforts. Arafat is reported to be in the Irbid area.

7. In the quietest day since the fighting began, large numbers of people were in the streets and some shops were open. We have no reports indicating a change in the situation in northern Jordan since the last sitrep.

Part III—Situation Following Nasser's Death

8. Cairo Prepares for Nasser Funeral: Cairo and the rest of the Arab world appear to be in a state of suspended animation following the shock of Nasser's death. Crowds have gathered at Nasser's house and in the Cairo streets in a state of public mourning. The UAR armed forces, according to the Cairo press, have been placed on a state of alert against possible military initiatives, although the government is apparently preoccupied with the immediate problems of the succession and preparations for the funeral. To date, the following world leaders are expected to attend the funeral: Soviet Premier Kosygin, French Premier Chaban-Delmas, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Home, Yugoslav Federal Councilor Kardelj, Italian Foreign Minister Moro, and Turkish Prime Minister Demirel. Delegations from Communist China and North Korea are under the top rank.

9. Israel and Nasser's Death: Although most Israelis have long held that Nasser's departure from scene would be a boon to Israel, there is some ambivalence in initial reaction. While stressing Nasser's hostility to Israel, many newspapers and individuals recognize he was a powerful, stabilizing force whose passing opens the prospect of greater instability and uncertainty. The first reaction gives no repeat no hint that GOI's response for time being will be other than watchful waiting.

Irwin

⁵ In telegram 5431 from Amman, September 29, 2020Z. (Ibid., POL 23–9 JORDAN)

Appendix A



Sheik Isa
BAHRAIN



Sheik Ahmad
QATAR




Sheik Zayid
ABU DHABI



Sheik Rashid
DUBAI



Sheik Khalid
SHARJAH



Sheik Rashid
AJMAN



Sheik Ahmad
UMM AL QAIWAIN



Sheik Saqr
RAS AL KHAIMAH



Sheik Muhammad
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