Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976

Volume XXIX

Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

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Preface

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. The subseries presents in multiple volumes a comprehensive documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of both administrations. This specific volume documents the U.S. policy towards Eastern Europe and III


*Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX*

The coverage of this volume is split almost equally between Eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. The Eastern Europe section begins with a general chapter that covers the entire Soviet bloc region and deals almost exclusively with U.S. efforts to liberalize and expand trade with Eastern Europe. The second chapter is also a general one. It deals with U.S. Government policy and the bureaucratic debate about—and ultimately, the decision on how to fund—Radio Free Europe (the U.S.-directed—and clandestinely funded—broadcasting service aimed at Eastern Europe), and Radio Liberty (a similar service aimed at the Soviet Union). The remainder of the Eastern Europe section of the volume comprises eight chapters on U.S. bilateral relations with Soviet bloc Eastern European countries, as well as with Austria and Finland. Bilateral relations with Eastern Europe were limited and generally carried out at the Department of State level, but there was a considerable amount of interest by the White House—and on the part of President Nixon—in certain Eastern European countries. President Nixon developed a close relationship with Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu. As the most independent member of the Eastern bloc, Yugoslavia also interested the White House. Nixon visited Romania and Yugoslavia, and Ceausescu and Yugoslav President Josip Tito visited Washington, DC, during the period of the volume. President Urho Kekkonen of Finland had a close relationship with the Soviet leadership, which the Nixon administration found useful when the Finnish President visited Washington. Although not always prominently documented, there is evidence in this volume that the Nixon administration’s relations with Eastern Europe were motivated in part by politi-
cal considerations, essentially the voting power of Polish-American and other Eastern European ethnic Americans, who made up a significant part of the population of the Midwest.

The countries covered in the three chapters on the Eastern Mediterranean generally have a much higher profile than the countries covered in the chapters on Eastern Europe, and indicate a strong Presidential and White House interest in events and policies there. This is particularly true for Greece. When President Nixon took office in 1969, he ordered a review of U.S. policy, and he subsequently sent to Athens a new Ambassador, Henry Tasca, to reassess relations with Greece, an important NATO ally. Tasca reported that the military junta that ruled Greece was there to stay for the immediate future and that the symbolic U.S. suspension of military aid and sales was undermining Greece’s security. The result was a Presidential decision to lift the suspension on aid and an understanding that Tasca would use this concession to the junta to push it towards constitutional reform and eventual democratic elections. The role of Vice President Spiro Agnew and businessman Tom Pappas in helping to shape U.S. policy toward Greece is documented in this chapter, especially through use of the White House tapes.

The Cyprus chapter is a continuation of the Foreign Relations series’ longstanding coverage of the ongoing dispute on that island between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which was overlaid with tensions between the governments in Athens and Ankara. The basic policy, which the Department of State had been following for years, was to attempt to expedite an intercommunal solution that would remove the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots as a bone of contention between two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. When Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios purchased a substantial quantity of arms and ammunition from Czechoslovakia, Cyprus was plunged into a crisis, which pit Makarios against the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots who favored union with Greece. At that point, the mechanism for directing day-to-day policy toward Cyprus became the Washington Special Actions Group, an interagency National Security Council sub-group, chaired by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, which was charged with the coordination of U.S. policy towards crises. It would be Kissinger’s introduction to an international crisis that would be impervious to his considerable negotiating skills and eventually frustrate him greatly.

The final chapter of the volume is primarily about U.S. efforts to discourage Turkish narcotics production. President Nixon’s interest in suppressing the international trade in narcotics generated a high-level dialogue with Ankara about the country’s opium production. The U.S.-Turkish dialogue on Cyprus, as with the U.S.-Greek discussions about
the island nation, has been placed in the Cyprus chapter. In fact, these last three chapters on Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey should be read together, since they are closely interrelated.

Like all recent Foreign Relations volumes, the emphasis of this volume is on policy formulation and on important events in international relations, rather than on the implementation of that policy or the day-to-day diplomacy. President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, still dominate the policy process in some key areas, but the role of Secretary of State William Rogers, the Department of State bureaucracy, and, in the case of Greece, Vice President Agnew, are significant.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information.
This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes, as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 USC 2111 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA formally to notify the Nixon Estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon Estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal
Foreign Relations volumes that include materials from NARA’s Nixon Presidential Materials Staff are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

**Declassification Review**

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended, on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 1998 and was completed in 2006, resulted in the decision to withhold 2 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 9 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 37 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the record presented in this volume provides an accurate and comprehensive account of the U.S. foreign policy towards Eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean.

**Acknowledgments**

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), at College Park, Maryland. The editors wish to acknowledge the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing access to the Nixon presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access. Special thanks are due to Scott Koch, formerly of the Historical Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, who was extremely helpful in arranging full access to the files of the Central Intelligence Agency. John Haynes of the Library of Congress was responsible for expediting access to the Kissinger Papers. The editors were able to use the Kissinger Papers, including the transcripts of telephone conversations, with the kind permission of Henry Kissinger. The editors would like to also thank Sandy Meagher for her valuable assistance in expediting the use of files of the Department of Defense.

James E. Miller collected most of the documents, made the initial selections, and annotated the documents he chose. Upon his retirement,
Douglas Selvage continued the work on Eastern Europe and revised the general chapters on trade and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Poland. Laurie West Van Hook added documents and made revisions to the Eastern Mediterranean section. The volume was completed under the supervision of Edward C. Keefer, General Editor of the series. Susan C. Weetman coordinated the declassification review. Kristin L. Ahlberg and Aaron W. Marrs did the copy and technical editing. Max Franke prepared the index.

Bureau of Public Affairs
December 2007

Marc J. Susser
The Historian
# Contents

Preface ......................................................... III  
Sources ....................................................... XIII  
Abbreviations and Terms ................................ XXIII  
Persons ....................................................... XXXIII  

## Eastern Europe; Austria and Finland

- General Policy ............................................. 1  
- Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty .............. 81  
- Austria ..................................................... 166  
- Bulgaria ................................................... 190  
- Czechoslovakia .......................................... 203  
- Finland .................................................... 233  
- Hungary .................................................... 260  
- Poland ..................................................... 302  
- Romania ................................................... 425  
- Yugoslavia ............................................... 529

## Eastern Mediterranean

- Greece ..................................................... 605  
- Cyprus .................................................... 849  
- Turkey ..................................................... 1036  

Index ......................................................... 1133
Sources

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration. A few collections, mostly relating to intelligence matters or Henry Kissinger’s Papers at the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, remain closed to the public. They were available to the editors of this volume and the documents chosen for publication have been declassified.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. The Department’s indexed central files through December 1975 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Most of the Department’s decentralized office (or lot) files covering the 1969–1976 period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Nixon and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries and the Nixon Presidential Materials Project at Archives II include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies, including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Henry Kissinger has approved access to his papers at the Library of Congress.

Research for this volume was completed through special access to restricted documents at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the Library of Congress, and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The Nixon Presidential Materials staff is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication.

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX

Since this volume contains two distinct sections, this discussion on sources will treat the Eastern Europe and Eastern Mediterranean chapters separately. In preparing the ten chapters on Eastern Europe, Austria, and Finland, the editors made extensive use of the Nixon Presidential Materials at Archives II in College Park, Maryland. The most valuable records within the Nixon Presidential Materials for Eastern Europe are in the National Security Council (NSC) Files, Country Files, Europe, for each of the specific countries. There is also an Eastern Europe, General, subfile within the Country Files. These are the files that were maintained by the National Security Council Staff members responsible for the respective countries and they provide the day to day information on U.S. policy towards the specific country, as well as drafts and final versions of many of Henry Kissinger’s memoranda to the President. This file provides a basic context for presidential decisions.

Other files within the Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files are important sources for specific chapters. For General Policy the NSC Files, Subject Files, Port Security, contain records on the decision on whether or not to expand the number of U.S. ports that Eastern European flagged ships could enter. Also in the Subject Files is information on general Eastern European policy in the subfile, President’s Annual Review of Foreign Policy. For Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, the file by that same name in the NSC Files, Subject Files, is extremely valuable. Also the NSC Files, Country File, Europe, Germany, contains documentation on Radio Free Europe’s presence in West Germany. For President Nixon’s trips to Poland, Romania, Austria, and Yugoslavia, the Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files are an important source. For visits of Eastern European leaders Ceausescu of Romania, Tito of Yugoslavia and Kekkonen of Finland, the NSC Files, VIP Visits have valuable material. Key accounts of Nixon-Ceausescu discussions are in the Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President/Kissinger Memoranda of Conversation.

Also important in the NSC Files of the Nixon Presidential Materials are the NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) which are part of the NSC
Files, but not to be confused with the less complete NSC Institutional Matters Files. The former contains minutes of National Security Council Meetings, as well as minutes of such key NSC subgroups as the Review/Senior Review Group and the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG). For each set of meeting minutes there are corresponding meeting folders that contain the papers that Kissinger, who chaired all of these NSC groups, used in preparing for the meeting. The WSAG met several times during a period of demonstrations in Poland over price increases and shortages resulting in a change of leadership. Also in the H-Files are the complete set of National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM), National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM), and related studies and papers. The President used this NSSM/NSDM mechanism to generate policy options from the foreign affairs bureaucracy for U.S. trade with Eastern Europe and policy towards Poland. The Under Secretaries Group of the NSC, a second tier interdepartmental group also responsible for policy study and recommended decisions, was charged with re-evaluating U.S. policy towards Romania. Therefore the Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Institutional Files (H-Files), Under Secretaries Study Memorandum (U/SM) and Under Secretaries Decision Memorandum (U/DM) Files are valuable in this case.

President Nixon’s secret sound-activated taping system began in 1971. The volume contains conversations transcribed specifically by the Office of the Historian. Not surprisingly, the tapes presented relate to President Nixon’s main focus in Eastern Europe: Poland and Romania. Other collections among the Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, of secondary importance are the NSC Files, Presidential Correspondence with Polish and Romanian Presidents and Names Files, Staff Memos, Sonnenfeldt.

The Kissinger Papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress often duplicate documentation found in other collections, especially the NSC Files of the Nixon Presidential Materials, but have some documents unique to that collection. The best collections are in the Geopolitical File for the respective countries, the Memoranda of Conversation File, and the Memoranda to the President Files. The transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations are in this collection and a few conversations about Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Austria are included in the first section of the volume. While the original transcripts are not open to the public, Dr. Kissinger has allowed the National Archives to make available copies at College Park, Maryland.

The volume also draws heavily on the records of the Department of State because most of the day-to-day relations with Eastern Europe, Austria, and Finland can be found in the Department of State Central Files. The most useful subject-numeric Central Files by far are the basic POL general relations files: for Austria, POL AUS-US; for Bulgaria,
XVI Sources

POL BUG–US: for Czechoslovakia, POL CZECH–US; for Finland, POL FIN–US; for Poland, POL POL–US; for Romania, POL ROM–US, and for Yugoslavia, POL YUGO–US. Sometimes the indexers at the Department used POL 1 as a variant of this file. POL 7 (country abbreviation) related to visits to the respective countries and POL 15–1 (country abbreviation) related to relations with the chief of state or head of country. These files are useful. The problem of the German-Polish border was filed under POL 32–3 GER–POL. Documents on trade with Eastern Europe are in FT 1 EUR E–US and for trade with Poland, FT 3 POL–US. Documentation on Secretary of State Rogers’ visits to Eastern Europe was often filed under ORG 7 S. These are just the most cited files in the first part of the volume. A complete list of all Department of State Central Files cited in the volume follows this note on sources.

Intelligence related files for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are the INR/IL Historical Files, 303/40 Committee, at the Department of State.

The second part of the volume, Eastern Mediterranean, has three chapters, Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. Of all the topics in this volume, the Nixon White House staff, and the President himself, was most interested in Greece. This is reflected in the fact that the overwhelming majority of documents selected come from the Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Greece. Also of value in the NSC Files are the Saunders Chron/Subject File. NSC Staff member Harold Saunders was a prodigious record keeper and the topical portion of his files is of value for Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. The Backchannel Files of the NSC Files of the Nixon Presidential Materials are a factor in policy towards Greece. Backchannel messages were a way for the President to communicate directly with his ambassadors in the field without the rest of the bureaucracy’s knowledge. The NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) contain considerable documentation on the reexamination of U.S. policy towards Greece. The NSSM/NSDM files and the Senior Review Group Meetings and Minutes files are the best places to start. The White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Memoranda for the President, contain some key documents on Greece. There are two key Presidential tapes on Greece, one with Vice President Agnew and one with Greek-American industrialist Tom Pappas.

The Department of State Files are an important source with the usual POL GREECE-US (general relations) POL 7 GREECE (visits), POL 32–2 GREECE (exiles), and DEF 15 GREECE (U.S. bases and installation in GREECE) being the most cited files. A Department of State Lot File, Greek Desk Files, Lot 75 D 277, is particularly useful. Department of State INR/IL files contain some documents on intelligence related matters pertaining to Greece. Finally, files of the Secretary of Defense and Assistant Secretary of Defense have documentation on the mili-
tary relationship with Greece. See the list of them below in “Unpub-
lished Sources.”

The Cyprus chapter in this volume is different in that the file from
which the most selected documents originated was a Department of
State, Central File: POL 27 CYP (political affairs). This file became a
catch all file for the inter-communal tensions and negotiations between
the Greek and Turkish factions on Cyprus. Three Department of State
Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 72 D 475, Lot 74 D 139, and Lot 75 D 41 are of
value.

When researching the Cyprus issue in the Nixon Presidential Ma-
terials, NSC Files, Country Files, Middle East, it is crucial to look at
Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey since documents on the issue are in all
three files. When the Cyprus issue became a crisis, the WSAG took up
the issue. The files and minutes of the WSAG in the Nixon Presiden-
tial Materials (H-Files) are of great value for inter-departmental dis-
cussion in this forum.

For Turkey the vast majority of documents selected came from the
Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Middle East,
Turkey sub-file, making that the obvious best source. The best De-
partment of State Central File on Turkey was POL TUR–US. There are
Department of State desk files for Turkey in the list of sources below.
All are worth examination by any would be researcher. The chapter
presents Intelligence assessment and intelligence information cables on
Turkey from CIA files, which are not available to the public.

This is just a brief résumé of the most useful files used in the prepa-
ration of the volume. The extensive annotated list below and the cita-
tions in the source notes and footnotes to the volume should give those
interested in researching various topics raised in this volume a good
starting point and a roadmap to future research.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below.
Lot Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below.

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

Central Files

AID 15 (US) POL, aid to Turkey, food for peace program, PL 480
AID 15 (US) TUR, aid to Turkey, food for peace program, PL 480
ARAB–ISR, truce, cease-fire between Arabs and Israelis
DEF 1 YUGO, plans and policy toward Yugoslavia
XVIII Sources

DEF 4 EUR, collective defense pacts and alliances, Europe
DEF 6 NATO, armed forces, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
DEF 12–5 GREECE, armaments sales to Greece
DEF 15 GREECE, bases and installations, Greece
DEF 15 GREECE-US, bases and installations, US-Greece
DEF 18–6 GREECE, arms control and disarmament, control measures
DEF 19–6 CZECH-CYP, Communist bloc assistance, Czechoslovakia-Cyprus
DEF 12–5 YUGO, armaments sales to Yugoslavia
DEF POL GREECE-US, relations between Greece and US
FN 6–1 POL, credit, loans, Poland
FN 15–1 GREECE, budget plans, Greece
FT 1 EUR E-US, foreign trade, general policy, Eastern Europe-US
FT 3 POL-US, foreign trade, organizations and conferences, Poland-US
INCO DRUGS TUR, industries and commodities, drugs, Turkey
INCO DRUGS 17 US-TUR, industries and commodities, effect of drugs on US-Turkey trade
INCO 14 POL, industries and commodities, prices, Poland
LAB 6-1 CYP, labor disputes, strikes, Cyprus
LEG 7 LOWENSTEIN, Congressional delegations and individual visits
ORG 7 OSD, papers for official visits, Office of the Secretary of Defense
ORG 7 S, papers for official visits, Office of the Secretary of State
POL 7 AUS, visits, meetings, Austria
POL 15–1 AUS, head of state, Austria
POL AUS-US, political affairs, Austria-US relations
POL 15–1 AUS-US, head of state, executive branch, Austria-US
POL 17 AUS-US, diplomatic and consular representation, Austria-US
POL BUL-US, political affairs, Bulgaria-US relations
POL 17 BUL-US, diplomatic and consular representation, Bulgaria-US
POL 27–1 COMBLOC-CZECH, Communist Bloc's invasion of Czechoslovakia
POL 1 CYP, political affairs, general policy, Cyprus
POL 1–1 CYP-US, political affairs, US contingency planning for Cyprus
POL 2 CYP, political affairs, reports and statistics, Cyprus
POL 15–1 CYP, political affairs, head of state, Cyprus
POL 15–5 CYP, political affairs, constitution, Cyprus
POL 27 CYP, political affairs, military operations, Cyprus
POL 27–4 CYP/UN, political affairs, use of UN forces in Cyprus
POL 27–14 CYP, political affairs, truce, cease-fire, Cyprus
POL CYP-GR, political affairs, Cyprus-Greece relations
POL CYP-US, political affairs, Cyprus-US relations
POL CZECH, political affairs, Czechoslovakia
POL 1 CZECH, political affairs, general policy and background, Czechoslovakia
POL 7 CZECH, visits, meetings, Czechoslovakia
POL 15 CZECH, government, Czechoslovakia
POL CZECH-US, political affairs, Czechoslovak-US relations
POL 4 CZECH-US, political agreements, Czechoslovakia-US
POL 17–1 CZECH-US, diplomatic and consular representation, accreditation, Czechoslovakia-US
POL EUR E, political affairs, Eastern Europe
POL EUR E–EUR W, political affairs, Eastern Europe-Western Europe relations
POL FIN-US, political affairs, Finland-US relations
POL 7 FIN, visits, meetings, Finland
POL 32–3 GER–POL, partition of territory between Germany and Poland
POL GER W–US, political affairs, West Germany-US relations
POL GREECE, political affairs, Greece
POL GREECE–TUR, political affairs, Greece-Turkey relations
POL GREECE–US, political affairs, Greece-US relations
POL 1 GREECE, political affairs, general policy, Greece
POL 2 GREECE, political affairs, reports and statistics, Greece
POL 7 GREECE, political affairs, visits, Greece
POL 14 GREECE, political affairs, elections, Greece
POL 15 GREECE, government, Greece
POL 15–1 GREECE, political affairs, head of state, Greece
POL 17 GREECE–US, political affairs, diplomatic representation, Greece-US
POL 23–9 GREECE, political affairs, rebellions, coups, Greece
POL 29 GREECE, political affairs, political prisoners, Greece
POL 30 GREECE, political affairs, defectors and expellees, Greece
POL 30–2 GREECE, political affairs, exile political activities, Greece
POL 7 HUNG, political affairs, visits, Hungary
POL HUNG–US, political affairs, Hungary-US relations
POL 17 HUNG–US, political affairs, diplomatic representation, Hungary-US
POL 7 POL, political affairs, visits, Poland
POL POL–US, political affairs, Poland-US relations
POL 1 POL–US, political affairs, general policy, Poland-US
POL 5 ROM, political affairs, law, Romania
POL 7 ROM, political affairs, visits, Romania
POL ROM–US, political affairs, Romania-US relations
POL 17 ROM–US, political affairs, diplomatic representation, Romania-US
POL 7 TUR, political affairs, visits, Turkey
POL 15–1 TURKEY, political affairs, head of state, Turkey
POL TUR–US, political affairs, relations Turkey-US
POL 6–2 US/EISENHOWER, political affairs, condolences, Eisenhower
POL 7 US/INGERSOLL, political affairs, visits, Ingersoll
POL YUGO, political affairs, Yugoslavia
POL 15–1 YUGO, political affairs, head of state, Yugoslavia
POL 17 YUGO–US, political affairs, diplomatic representation, Yugoslavia-US
RAD RFE, Radio Free Europe
STR 7 POL, strategic trade control, shipment of U.S. goods to Poland
SOC 11–5 TUR, social conditions, traffic in narcotics, Turkey
SOC 12–1 GREECE, social conditions, churches, Greece
SOC 12–1 HUNG, social conditions, churches, Hungary
SOC 12–1 NEAR EAST, social conditions, churches, Near East
SOC 12 TUR, social conditions, religion, Turkey
SOC 12–1 TUR, social conditions, churches, Turkey

Lot Files

EUR/CE Files:
   Lot 85 D 330, Chrons (1969)—Letters (Outgoing)

Polish Desk Files:
   Lot 74 D 440, reports, memoranda, and correspondence, 1971

Romania Desk Files:
   Lot 72 D 406, reports, memoranda, and correspondence, 1969

S/S Files:
   Lot 82 D 307, Secretary’s correspondence, 1968–72
XX Sources

Yugoslav Desk Files:
Lot 79 D 230, general files, 1972

Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Archives II, College Park, Maryland

National Security Council Files
Agency Files: Commerce
Backchannel Files: Europe, Middle East, Latin America
Country Files, Europe: Austria; Bulgaria; Cyprus; Czechoslovakia; Europe, General; Eastern Europe; Finland; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Poland; Romania; Macovescu (Romania); Turkey; Yugoslavia
Name Files: Buckley, William; Sonnenfeldt, Helmet
President-HAK Memcons: President Nixon - President Ceausescu, President - Amb. Corneliu Bogdan, President - President Tito
Presidential Correspondence: Poland, Pres. Jablonski and PM Jaroszewicz; Romania, Ceausescu
President’s Daily Briefing
President’s Trip Files: Dobrynin-Kissinger; President’s Austrian Visit, May 1972; briefing books; President’s Moscow, Iran, Poland, Austria Trip, May–June 1972; President’s Poland Trip, 1 June 72; President’s Conversations in Salzburg, Moscow, Tehran and Warsaw, May 1972; President’s Trip to Romania, July–August 1969; President’s Visit to Romania, miscellaneous background material
Saunders Files: Chronological File; Subject Files: Cyprus, Greece, Greece Military Supply, Turkey, Turkey Economic, Turkey Military, Turkey Sitrep
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XXII Sources


Abbreviations and Terms

AA/NESA, Bureau for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development
ABM, Anti-ballistic Missile
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AFRTS, Armed Forces Radio and Television Service
AFSOUTH, Armed Forces South
AH, Alexander Haig
AID, Agency for International Development
AIS, Country Director, Austria, Italy and Switzerland, Bureau of European Affairs
AKEL, Anorthotikon Komma Ergazo Laou (Reform Party of the Working People), Cyprus
Amb., Ambassador
AMF, Allied Multilateral Force
AP, Associated Press
ASAP, as soon as possible
ASW, antisubmarine warfare

Backchannel, a method of communication outside normal bureaucratic procedure; the White House, for instance, used “backchannel” messages to bypass the Department of State
BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation
BCP, Bulgarian Communist Party
BNDD, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Department of Justice
BOB, Bureau of the Budget
BOP, Balance of Payments

C, Office of the Counselor of the Department of State
CA, circular airgram
CAB, Civil Aeronautics Board
CAP, Common Agricultural Policy
CC, Central Committee
CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation
CCMS, Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society
CDU, Christian Democratic Union (West Germany)
CEA, Council of Economic Advisers
CEMA, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CENTO, Central Treaty Organization
CES, Conference on European Security
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIA/ONE, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates
CIEP, Council for International Economic Policy
CIEPDM, Council for International Economic Policy Decision Memorandum
CIEPSM, Council for International Economic Policy Study Memorandum
CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Europe
CINCMIDEAFSA, Commander in Chief, Middle East, South Asia, and Africa South of the Sahara
CINCSOUTH, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Southern Europe
CINCSTRIKE, Commander in Chief, Strike Command
CINCUSNAVEUR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy, Europe
XXIV  Abbreviations and Terms

CIS, Cyprus Information (Intelligence) Service
CNO, Chief of Naval Operations
Cocom, Coordinating Committee on Export Controls
Codel, Congressional delegation
COE, Council of Europe
Col, Colonel
COMECON, Council on Mutual Economic Cooperation
Comite, committee
COMSIXTHFLT, Commander in Chief, Sixth Fleet, U.S. Navy
CONG, Congress or congressman
CONGEN, Consul General
CONUS, continental United States
CP, Communist party
CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSSR, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
CTF, Carrier Task Force; also Commander Task Force
CU, Center Union Party (Greece); also Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
CY, calendar year
D, Democrat; also Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State
DATT, defense attaché
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DDCI, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DDO, Deputy Directorate for Operations
DDP, Deputy Directorate for Plans
DefAtt, Defense Attaché
DefMin, Minister of Defense
DefSec, Secretary of Defence
Del, delegate; delegation
Dept, Department of State
Depcirtel, circular telegram from the Department of State
DepDirGen, Deputy Director General
DepFonMin, Deputy Foreign Minister
DepSecDef, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DirGen or DG, Director General
Dis or Dissem, dissemination
DLF, Development Loan Fund
DMZ, demilitarized zone
DOD, Department of Defense
DOD/ISA, Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
DOI, Department of the Interior
DOS, Department of State
DP, Democrat Party (Turkey)
DPC, Defense Planning Committee
DPM, Deputy Prime Minister
DRV, Democratic Republic of Vietnam
DTG, date/time/group
Abbreviations and Terms  XXV

E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
E/CBA, Commercial Affairs and Business Activities, Bureau of Economic Affairs
E/IMA, International Monetary Affairs, Bureau of Economic Affairs
E/ITP/EWT, Office of East West Trade, International Trade Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs
E/OT/GCP, General Commercial Policy Division, Office of International Trade, International Trade Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs
E/W, East/West
EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EA/VN, Office of Vietnam Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
EAM, Ethnikon Apeleftherikon Metron (National Liberation Front)
EC, European Community
ECE, Economic Commission for Europe
ECOSOC, United Nations Economic and Social Council
EDA, Ethniki Dimokratiki Aristera (Greek Democratic Left)
EE, Eastern Europe
ECC, European Economic Community (Common Market)
EFTA, European Free Trade Association
ELDYK, Elliniki Dynamh Kyprou (Greek Forces in Cyprus)
ELR, Elliot L. Richardson
Emb, Embassy
Emboff, Embassy officer
Emtel, Embassy telegram
enosis, union
EOB, Executive Office Building
EOKA, Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters)
ERE, Ethnik Rizopastos Enosis (National Radical Union - Greece)
ESC, European Security Conference
EST, Eastern Standard Time; also estimated
Eucom, European Command, U.S. Army
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/BRY, Country Director for Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania, Bureau of European Affairs
EUR/CAN, Country Director for Canada, Bureau of European Affairs
EUR/CHP, Country Director for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Baltic States, Bureau of European Affairs
EUR/EE, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs
EUR/NSE-IG, NSC Interdepartmental Group, Bureau of European Affairs
EUR/RPE, OECD, European Community, and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs
EUR/RPM, NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs
EUR/SCAN, Country Director for Scandinavia, Iceland, Finland, Bureau of European Affairs
EUR/SOV, Country Director for the Soviet Union, Bureau of European Affairs
Exdis, exclusive distribution
Ex-Im Bank, Export-Import Bank of the United States

F-4 (Phantom), twin engine turbo jet, all weather, supersonic tactical fighter bomber with two crew members
FAA, Foreign Assistance Act; also Federal Aviation Administration
FAM, Foreign Affairs Manual
FAS, Foreign Agricultural Service; also Foreign Area Student Program
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
XXVI Abbreviations and Terms

FBS, Foreign Broadcasting Service  
Fedrep, Federal Republic (of Germany)  
FEC, Federal Executive Council (Yugoslavia); also Free Europe Committee  
Flash, indicates message of highest priority requiring the attention of the Secretary of State  
FM, Foreign Minister; also from  
FMS, foreign military sales  
FonMin, Foreign Minister  
FonOff, Foreign Office  
FonSec, Foreign Secretary  
FR, France  
FRC, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland  
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany  
FSO, foreign service officer  
FY, fiscal year  
FYI, for your information  
G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
GAGS, Greek Army General Staff  
GA, United Nations General Assembly  
GAO, General Accounting Office  
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  
GDP, gross domestic product  
GDR, German Democratic Republic  
Gen, General  
GER, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
GMT, Greenwich Mean Time  
GNP, Gross National Product  
GOA, Government of Austria  
GOB, Government of Bulgaria  
GOC, Government of Cyprus; also Government of Czechoslovakia  
GOE, Government of Finland; also Government of France  
GOG, Government of Greece  
GOH, Government of Hungary  
GOI, Government of Israel; also Government of Italy; also Government of India  
GOP, Government of Pakistan  
GOT, Government of Turkey  
GOY, Government of Yugoslavia  
GOVT, government  
GPO, Government Printing Office  
GVN, Government of Vietnam  
GVR, Government of the Republic of Vietnam  
H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State  
HAK, Henry A. Kissinger  
H.E., His Excellency  
HEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare  
HFAC, House Foreign Affairs Committee  
HICOM, high commissioner  
HK, Henry Kissinger  
HMG, Her Majesty’s Government, United Kingdom  
HNDGS, Hellenic National Defense General Staff  
hq, headquarters  
HR, House Resolution  
HS, Harold Saunders; also Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Abbreviations and Terms

I, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency
IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank
ICMB, intercontinental ballistic missile
ICC, International Control and Supervision Commission (Vietnam)
ICJ, International Court of Justice
ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
IDA, International Development Association
IFI, international financial institution
IG, Interagency Group
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INFO, information
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/DDC, Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
INR/OD, Office of the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
INR/REA/NA, North Asia Division, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
INR/RNA/NE, Near East Division, Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
INR/RSE/EE, Eastern European Division, Office of Research and Analysis for USSR and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs
IOGA, industry organized, government approved
IQ, Important Question
IRBM, intermediate range ballistic missile
IRG, Interdepartmental Regional Group; also Interdepartmental Review Group
ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
IZT, Interzonal Trade

J, Office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State
JP/PM, Office of Politico-Military Affairs Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum
JP, Justice Party (Turkey)
JUSMMAT, Joint U.S. Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
JUSO, Jungsozialist

K, Kissinger
KYP, Kendriki Yperesia Pleroforion (Greek Intelligence Service)

L, Legal Adviser of the Department of State
L/EUR, Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs
LCC, League of Communists of Croatia
LCY, League of Communists of Yugoslavia
LDC, Less Developed Country
Limdis, limited distribution
LOC, lines of communication
LS & E, long supply and excess
LTG, Lieutenant General
XXVIII  Abbreviations and Terms

M, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management
MAAG, Military Advisory Assistance Group
MAC, Military Assistance Command
MAP, Mutual Assistance/Aid Program
MBFR, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MC, memorandum of conversation
ME, Middle East
Memcon, memorandum of conversation
MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFN, Most Favored Nation
MIL, military
MilAd, military adviser
MilAtt, military attaché
MilPers, military personnel
Min, minister
MinDef, minister of defense
MinEd, minister of education
MinInt, Minister of the Interior
MisOff, mission officer
MLE, multilateral force
mm, millimeter
MOD, Minister of Defense
MOFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MR, military region; also memorandum for the record
MRBM, medium-range ballistic missile
MSA, Mutual Security Agreement
MT, metric ton
MTG, meeting

NAC, North Atlantic Council
NARA, National Archives and Records Administration
NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NE, northeast
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/RA, Office of the Director for Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
NEA/CYP, Country Director for Cyprus, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
NEA/GRK, Country Director for Greece, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
NEA/TUR, Country Director for Turkey, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
NEM, New Economic Mechanism (Hungary)
NIC, National Intelligence Council
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NLF, National Liberation Front (Vietnam)
Nodis, no distribution (other than to persons indicated)
Noform, no foreign dissemination
NPT, Non Proliferation Treaty
NSA, National Security Agency
NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum
NSC, National Security Council
NSCIG, National Security Council Interagency Review Group
Abbreviations and Terms

NSCIG/NEA, National Security Council Interagency Review Group, Near Eastern Affairs
NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum
NSF, National Science Foundation
NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum
NVA/VC, North Vietnam/Viet Cong
NVN, North Vietnam

OAS, Organization of American States
OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
OBE, overtaken by events
OCI, Office of Current Intelligence
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
OPIC, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
OST, Office of Science and Technology
OUSD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State; also President
PA, purchase authorization
PanAm, Pan American Airways
PARA, paragraph; also Policy Analysis Resource Allocation
PAO, Public Affairs Officer
PD, presidential determination
PermRep, permanent representative
PFIA, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PKF, peacekeeping force
PL, Public Law
PL–480, Public Law 480 (Food for Peace)
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; also Prime Minister
PM/MAS, Office of Military Assistance and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
PMF, Peter M. Flanigan
PNG, persona non grata
Pol, political
Polad, political advisor
PolOff, political officer
PolSec, political secretary
Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
POW, prisoner of war
PRC, People’s Republic of China
PRES, the President
PriMin, Prime Minister
PRG, Provisional Revolutionary Government (Vietnam)
PZPR, Polish Communist Party

R, Republican
RC, Revolutionary Council (Greece)
XXX  Abbreviations and Terms

RCA, Radio Corporation of America
RCP, Romanian Communist Party
Ref, reference
Reftel, Reference telegram
rep, representative
res, resolution
RFE, Radio Free Europe
RFEE, Radio Free Europe Fund, Inc.
RL, Radio Liberty
RLC, Radio Liberty Committee, Inc.
RMN or RN, Richard Nixon
RNC, Republican National Committee
ROC, Republic of China
RPP, Republican People’s Party (Turkey)
rpt, repeat
RVN, Republic of Vietnam
RWP, Romanian political party

S, Office of the Secretary of State
S/AL, Ambassador at Large
S/NM, Office of the Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, Department of State
S/PC, Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat of the Department of State
S/S–O, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat of the Department of State
S/S–S, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat of the Department of State
S&T, science and technology
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SC, United Nations Security Council
SCI, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State
SE, southeast
SecDel, Secretary’s Delegation
Secdef, Secretary of Defense
SecGen, Secretary General
Secstate or Secy, Secretary of State
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while away from Washington
SEK, Synomospondia Ergation Kypron (Confederation of Labor of Cyprus/Confederation of Cypriot Workers)
Secy Gen, Secretary General
Septel, separate telegram
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SIG, Senior Interdepartmental Group (NSC)
SITREP, situations report
SOV, Office of Eastern Soviet Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs
SRG, Senior Review Group
Subj., subject
SVN, South Vietnam

TA, technical assistance
TAC, tactical; also tactical air command
TAF, Turkish Air Force
TCC, Troop Contributing (to Vietnam) Countries
TCPA, Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration TEA, Trade Expansion Act
Abbreviations and Terms  XXXI

Telcon, telephone conversation
TGS, Turkish General Staff
TLP, Turkish Labor Party (Marxist)
TMT, Turk Mukavemet Teskilati (Turkish Resistance Organization - Cyprus)
TMO, Turkish Soil Products Office
Toaid, series indicator for telegrams to the Agency for International Development
TOR, terms of reference
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams sent to the Secretary of State while outside of Washington
Tosit, to the White House Situation Room
TS, top secret
TURDYK, Turkish treaty contingent

U, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; also unclassified
U/DM, National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee Decision Memorandum
U/SM, National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee Study Memorandum
UAJ, U. Alexis Johnson
UAR, United Arab Republic
UCC, Universal Copyright Convention
UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNCD, United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs
UNCIVPOL, United Nations Civilian Police
UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNFICYP, United Nations Force in Cyprus
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNP, Office of United Nations Programs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs
UNPKF, United Nations Peacekeeping Force
UNSC, United Nations Security Council
UNSYG, United Nations Secretary General
UPI, United Press International
US, United States
USA, United States Army
USAFE, United States Air Force
USPKF, United States Air Force, Europe
USAID, United States Agency for International Development
USAREUR, U.S. Army, Europe
USARMA, U.S. Army Attaché
U.S.C., United State Code
USCINCEUR, U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe
USDA, United States Department of Agriculture
USDOCOSOUTH, United States Documents Officer, Allied Forces, Southeastern Europe
USEC, United States Enrichment Corporation
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIB, United States Intelligence Board
USINFO, United States Information Service
USIS, United States Information Service (overseas branches of USIA)
USMC, United States Marine Corps
USN, United States Navy
USNATO, series indicator for telegram from the Representative at the North Atlantic Council to the Department of State
USS, United States Ship
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
XXXII  Abbreviations and Terms

UYST, United States Treaty
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

VC, Vietcong
VIP, very important person
Vipto, series indicator for telegrams from Vice President Agnew
VN, Vietnam
VOA, Voice of America
VP, Vice President

Waldorf, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York
WB, World Bank
WEU, Western European Union
WH, White House
WHCF, White House Central Files
WHO, White House Office (series indicator for White House messages)
WP, Warsaw Pact
WPR, William P. Rogers
WSAG, Washington Special Actions Group

XMB, Export-Import Bank

Z, Zulu (Greenwich Mean Time)
Persons

Abshire, David M., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from April 8, 1970
Ackley, H. Gardner, Ambassador to Italy until April 1969
Agnew, Spiro T., Vice President of the United States from January 20, 1969
Ahlers, Conrad, Deputy Head of the West German Press and Information Office until October 22, 1969; thereafter, State Secretary and Head (government spokesman) of the Office until December 4, 1972
Allen, Richard, Member, National Security Council Staff, 1969–1970
Anastassiou, T.K., Cypriot Minister of the Interior
Anderson, Robert B., Secretary of the Treasury, 1957–1961
Androutsopoulos, Adamantios, Greek Minister of Finance until August 1971; thereafter, Minister of the Interior
Anghelis, Lt. Gen. Odysseus, Chief of Staff, Greek (Hellenic) Armed Forces since April 1967
Armitage, John A., Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Department of State
Ash, Russell B., Chairman of the President’s Advisory Council on Executive Organization, 1969–1971; thereafter, Assistant to the President
Athanagoras, Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople until July 1972
Bahrt, Egon (SPD), Special Ambassador and Chief of the Planning Staff in the West German Foreign Office until October 21, 1969; then State Secretary (Foreign, Defense, and German Policy) in the Federal Chancellery; also West German Minister for Special Tasks from December 15, 1972
Baker, John A., Jr., Director, Office of Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish Affairs, Bureau for European Affairs, Department of State from August 1970
Ball, George, former Under Secretary of State
Barnes, Harry, Ambassador to Romania
Barrett, Edward, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
Bartlett, Charles, journalist
Bashev, Ivan, Bulgarian Foreign Minister
Bayulk, Haluk, Turkish Foreign Minister from March 1971
Beam, Jacob D., Ambassador to Czechoslovakia until March 1969; thereafter Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Belcher, Taylor, Ambassador to Cyprus until June 1969
Bellmon, Henry, Senator (R–Oklahoma)
Ben Bella, Ahmed, former President of Algeria
Bergsten, C. Fred, member, NSC Operations Staff/International Economic Affairs, January 1969–June 1971
Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, Chairman of the Pakistan People’s Party; Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, 1971; thereafter, President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Defense for Pakistan
Blee, David, Chief, Near East and South Asia Division, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
Blood, Archer K., Counselor for Political Affairs, American Embassy in Greece from February 1970; Counsel General in Dacca until June 1971
Bogdan, Corneliu, Romanian Ambassador to the United States
Bohlen, Charles E., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until January 22, 1969
Boumediene, Houari, President of Algeria

XXXIII
XXXIV  Persons

Boyatt, Thomas, Political Officer, American Embassy in Cyprus until June 1970; Director, Office of Cypriot Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State from July 1971

Brandt, Willy, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany until October 21, 1969; thereafter, Chancellor

Bray, Charles W., III, Director, Office of Press Relations, Department of State after February 1971

Brett, Brig. Gen. Devol, USAF, Director, Near East and South Asia Region, Department of Defense

Brewster, H. Daniel, Director, Office of Greek Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State until June 1969

Brewster, Robert C., Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, July 1969–August 1971

Brezhnev, Leonid I., General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Brooke, Edward, Senator (R–Massachusetts)

Brosio, Manlio G., Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until October 1, 1971

Brown, Elizabeth Ann, Director, Office of United Nations-Political Affairs, Department of State; also, Counselor for Political Affairs, Embassy in Greece, 1971

Bull, Stephen, Staff Assistant, Chief of Staff’s Office

Bunche, Ralph, Under Secretary-General of the United Nations for Political Affairs

Bush, George H.W., Representative (R–Texas) until January 1970; U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations from February 16, 1971

Butterfield, Alexander P., Deputy Assistant to the President, January 1969–January 1973

Caglayangil, Ihsan Sabri, Turkish Foreign Minister until March 1971

Cargo, William L., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State from August 4, 1969

Case, Clifford P., Senator (R–New Jersey); Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Cash, Frank, Director, Office of Turkish Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State until May 1971

Ceausescu, Nicolae, Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party and President of Romania

Chapin, Dwight, Special Assistant to the President, 1969–1971; thereafter, Deputy Assistant to the President, 1971–1973

Chapin, Frank, member, National Security Council Staff and Staff Secretary to the 303/40 Committee


Chelli, Monsignor, Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations

Chhounpek, Bohuslav, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister from December 1971

Chou En-lai, Premier of the People’s Republic of China

Christophides, Ioannis, Cypriot Foreign Minister from June 1972

Churchill, George T., Director, Office of Cypriot Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State from March 1971

Clay, Lucius D., former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Clerides, Glaufkos, Speaker of the Cypriot Parliament; Chief Greek Cypriot Negotiator in Intercommunal talks

Cleveland, J. Harland, U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

Cline, Ray S., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from October 26, 1969

Coerr, Wymberley DeR., Deputy Director of Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Colson, Charles, Special Counsel to the President, November 1969–March 1973
Connally, John B., Jr., member, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 1970; Secretary of the Treasury, February 1971–June 1972
Constantine II (also Konstantine), exiled King of Greece
Crawford, William A., Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy in Cyprus until October 1972
Crnobrjna, Bogdan, Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States
Curran, Robert T., Deputy Executive Secretary, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, August 1970–September 1972; thereafter, Deputy Director of Personnel for Management
Cyrankiewicz, Jozef, Premier of the People’s Republic of Poland until 1970; thereafter, Polish head of state
David, Dr. Edward, Jr., Science Advisor to the President and Director of the Office of Science and Technology from September 1970
Davies, Richard T., Consul General in Calcutta until August 1969; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, August 1970–December 1972; Ambassador to Poland from December 2, 1972
Davies, Rodger P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Davis, Jeanne W., Director, National Security Council Staff Secretariat, 1970–1971; Staff Secretary, NSC Staff Secretariat, from 1971
Davis, Richard H., Ambassador to Romania until August 1969
Davis, Thomas W., Director, Office of Cypriot Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, January 1970–July 1971
Dean, Jonathan, Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy in West Germany until September 1972
De Gaulle, Charles, President of France until April 28, 1969
Demirel, Suleyman, Prime Minister of Turkey until March 1971
Denktash, Rauf, Cypriot Vice President; chief negotiator for the Turkish Cypriot Community in 1968 intercommunal talks
Dent, Harry, Special Counsel to the President, 1969–1972
De Palma, Samuel, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from February 7, 1969
Dillon, Robert, Director, Office of Turkish Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State from September 1971
Dobrowolski, Stanislaw, Deputy Director, Polish Foreign Ministry
Dobrynin, Anatoly F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States
Dole, Robert, Senator (R–Kansas)
Downey, Arthur T., Member, National Security Council Staff
Draper, Morris, Counselor for Political Affairs, Embassy in Turkey
Dubcek, Alexander, First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party until April 1969
Du Bridge, Dr. Lee A., President, California Institute of Technology until 1969; President’s Science Adviser, 1969–1970
Dubs, Adolph, Country Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Duckwitz, Georg Ferdinand, First State Secretary (Political and Administrative Affairs) in the West German Foreign Office until June 1970; lead FRG negotiator in talks with Poland
Duda, Karl, Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United States
Eagleburger, Lawrence S., member, National Security Council Staff, 1969–1970
Ecevit, Bulent, President of the (Turkish) Republican Peoples Party from May 1972
Ehmke, Horst, State Secretary in the West German Justice Ministry until March 26, 1969; then West German Justice Minister until October 1969; thereafter, State Secretary and Head of the Federal Chancellery, as well as Minister for Special Tasks, until December 15, 1972; thereafter Minister for Research and Technology
Ehrlichman, John D., Counsel to the President, January–November 1969; Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs from November 1969
Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States, 1953–1961
Eisenhower, Milton S., President Emeritus, Johns Hopkins University
Elekdag, Sukru, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State from August 10, 1969
Ellender, Allen J., Senator (D–Louisiana); Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations
Enckell, Ralph, former Finnish permanent representative to the United Nations
Enders, Thomas O., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Monetary Affairs, Bureau of Economic Affairs, until August 1969; Deputy Chief of Mission in Belgrade, August 1969–December 1971
Erim, Nihan, Turkish Prime Minister, April 1971–April 1972
Ensenbel, Melih, Turkish Ambassador to the United States
Evans, Rowland, journalist
Fascell, Dante, Representative (D–Florida)
Fessenden, Russell, Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Bonn until July 1971; thereafter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Findley, Paul, Representative (R–Illinois)
Finke-Ossiander, Renate, Deputy Director of East European Affairs, German Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Folsom, Robert S., Director, Office of Cypriot Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State until January 1970
Frackiewicz, Ryszard, Counselor of the Polish Embassy to the United States
Franco, Francisco, Spanish President
Fraser, Donald, Representative (D–Minnesota)
Fulbright, J. William, Senator (D–Arkansas); Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Gandhi, Indira, Prime Minister of India
Gardner, John, former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
Gierek, Edward, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ (Communist) Party from December 1970
Georkadjis, Polykarpos, former Cypriot Minister of Interior and Defense (anti-Makarios)
Gilpatric, Roswell, L., former Deputy Secretary of Defense
Gleysteen, William H., Jr., Director, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, September 1969–June 1971; thereafter, Deputy Chief of Mission in Taipei
Gomulka, Wladyslaw, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party (Communist party) until December 1970
Granfil, Toma, Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States
Grechko, Marshal Andrei Antonovich, Soviet Minister of Defense
Greenwald, Joseph A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, February–July 1969; Representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris, July 1969–October 1972; thereafter, Representative to the European Communities in Brussels
Grivas, Lieut. Gen. George, former chief of the Cyprus National Guard; after September 1971 leader of the EOKA-B terrorist group
Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs
Gronouski, John A., former Ambassador to Poland
Gruber, Karl, Austrian Ambassador to the United States from July 1969
Guerrassimov, Luben, Bulgarian Ambassador to the United States
Gullion, Edmond, former Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, Helsinki
Guthrie, Keith, member, National Security Council Staff, 1970–1972

Haig, Brig. Gen. Alexander M., Jr., USA, Senior Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs January 1969–June 1970; thereafter, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Haldeman, H.R., Assistant to the President (White House Chief of Staff)
Handler, William J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until May 1969; thereafter, Ambassador to Turkey
Hannah, John A., Director, Agency for International Development from March 28, 1969
Hardin, Dr. Clifford M., Secretary of Agriculture, January 1969–December 1971
Hare, Raymond A., former Ambassador to Turkey and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Harris, Fred, Senator (D–Oklahoma)
Hart, Parker T., former Ambassador to Turkey
Hartke, Vance, Senator (D–Indiana)
Hartman, Arthur, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State and Staff Director, Senior Interdepartmental Group
Hays, Wayne, Representative (D–Ohio)
Heinemann, Gustav W. (SPD), West German Minister of Justice until March 1969; SPD/FDP Candidate for President in the 1969 Bundesversammlung election; President of the Federal Republic of Germany from July 1969
Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence
Herz, Martin F., Political Counselor in Saigon until June 1970; thereafter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
Hillenbrand, Martin J., Ambassador to Hungary until February 1969; Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, February 7, 1969–April 30, 1972; Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from May 1, 1972
Hill, Robert C., Ambassador to Spain
Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Vietnamese Communist Party and President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam until his death on September 3, 1969
Holdridge, John Herbert, Director, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until July 1969; thereafter, member, National Security Council Operations Staff/East Asia
Hormats, Robert D., Member, NSC Operations Staff/International Economic Affairs, 1970–1972
Hoskinson, Samuel M., member, National Security Council Staff, 1970–1972
Hughes, Thomas L., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until July 1969
Humes, John Portner, Ambassador to Austria
Hussak, Gustav, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia from April 1969
Hylland, William G., member, NSC Operations Staff/Europe, from 1970
XXXVIII  Persons

Iakovos, Archbishop, Orthodox Archbishop of North and South America (former Turkish citizen)

Ingersoll, Jack R., Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

Inonu, Ismet, former Turkish Prime Minister; also President of the (Turkish) Republican People’s Party until May 1972

Ioannidis, Lt. Col. Dimitrios, Chief of Greek Military Security Police (ESA)

Irwin, John N., II, Under Secretary of State, September 1970–July 1972; Deputy Secretary of State from July 13, 1972

Jablonski, Henryk, Chairman, Polish Council of State from 1971

Jaroszewicz, Piotr, Polish Premier from 1971

Jarring, Gunnar, Swedish Ambassador to the Soviet Union, detailed to the United Nations to serve as Special Representative, United Nations Middle East Mission

Jaruzelski, Wojciech, Polish Minister of Defense

Javits, Jacob, Senator (R–New York)

Jedrychowski, Stefan, Polish Foreign Minister

Jessup, John, former Consul General at Thessaloniki

Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States, November 1963–January 1969

Johnson, U. Alexis, Ambassador to Japan until January 1969, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 7, 1969

Jones, Betty J., Officer in Charge, U.N. Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

Jones, Owen, former Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, Budapest

Jurich, Anthony J., Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security Affairs, Department of the Treasury

Kadar, Janos, First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party

Karamessines, Thomas H., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency

Karaosmanoglu, Attilla, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister, April 1971–April 1972

Karjalainen, Ahti, Finnish Foreign Minister

Katzenbach, Nicholas DeB., Under Secretary of State until January 20, 1969

Kekkonen, Urho, President of Finland


Kennedy, Col. Richard T., USA, Member, NSC Staff, 1970–1972; Director, NSC Planning Group, 1971–1972

Kenyatta, Jomo, President of Kenya

Khan, Agha Muhammad Yahya, President of Pakistan, March 31, 1969–December 20, 1971

Khrushchev, Nikita S., First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, 1953–1964

Kirschschlager, Rudolph, Austrian Foreign Minister from March 1971

Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Klaus, Josef, Austrian Chancellor until March 1971

Klein, Herbert G., White House Director of Communications


Knowles, Lt. Gen. Richard T., member, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Komer, Robert W., Ambassador to Turkey until May 1969

Komodromos, Epaminondas, Cypriot Minister of Defense until June 1972 and Minister of the Interior

Konstantine, see Constantine

Kosygin, Alexei N., Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers; also member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party
Kreisky, Bruno, Austrian Chancellor from March 1971
Krough, Egil, Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs
Krol, John, Cardinal, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Philadelphia
Kuchuk, Fazil, former Cypriot Vice President; Turkish Cypriot leader
Kyprianou, Spyros, Cypriot Foreign Minister until June 1972

Ladas, Lt. Col. Ioannis, Greek military conspirator
Laird, Melvin R., Secretary of Defense
Leddy, John M., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Department of State until February 1969
Lehman, John, Jr., member, NSC Planning Staff
Leonhart, William, Ambassador to Yugoslavia, May 1969–October 1971
Lindjord, Haakon, Director, Office of Emergency Planning
Lipscomb, Glenard P., Representative (R–California)
Livingston, Robert Gerald, member, NSC Staff
Lodge, Henry Cabot, President’s Personal Representative to Pope Paul VI
Lodge, John D., Ambassador to Argentina
Long, Roger, Staff Assistant, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, 1970–1971
Loomis, Henry, Deputy Director, United States Information Agency
Lopez Bravo de Castro, Gregorio, Spanish Foreign Minister
Lowenstein, James, Staff Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Luns, Joseph, Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from 1971
Lynn, Dr. Laurence E. Jr., Assistant for Programs, NSC Staff, 1969–1970; Director, Program Analysis Staff, NSC, 1970-1971
Lyssarides, Vassos, Cypriot Socialist Party leader and personal physician to Archbishop Makarios

MacDonald, Donald G., Assistant Administrator for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development
MacGregor, Clark, Counsel to the President for Congressional Relations, 1971–1972
Macovecsu, Gheorghie, Romanian First Deputy Prime Minister
Mahon, George H., Representative, (D–Texas); Chairman, House Appropriations Committee
Makarios III, Orthodox Archbishop of Cyprus; President of Cyprus
Makarezos, Nicholas, Greek Minister of Economic Coordination
Manescu, Cornelieu, Romanian Foreign Minister
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party and Politburo of the People’s Republic of China
Markezinis, Spiros, prominent Greek liberal politician who refused to take part in the 1967 coup
Marko, Jan, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister until December 1971
Martin, Graham, Ambassador to Italy from October 1969
Maurer, Ion Gheorghie, Romanian Prime Minister
Mazarakis, Michael-George, Counselor, Greek Embassy in the United States through 1969
McClelland, Roswell, Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy in Greece until June 1970
McCloskey, Robert J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Press Relations, Bureau of Public Affairs, and Special Assistant to the Secretary from July 1969; also, Ambassador at Large

McCracken, Paul W., Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors, January 1969–November 1971

McGee, Gale W., Senator (D–Wyoming)

McGinnis, John, Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury for National Security Affairs

McGovern, George S., Senator (D–South Dakota) and Democratic nominee for president in 1972

McNamara, Robert S., former Secretary of Defense; President, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank

McNaughton, John T., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

McSweeney, John M., Ambassador to Bulgaria until May 1970

Meeker, Leonard C., Legal Adviser, Department of State, until July 13, 1969; Ambassador to Romania from July 22, 1969

Melen, Ferit, Turkish Defense Minister, March 1971–April 1972; Prime Minister from May 1972


Meyer, Cord, Jr., Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency

Michalowski, Jerzy, Polish Ambassador to the United States until 1971

Mills, Wilbur D., Representative (D–Arkansas); Chairman, House Ways and Means Committee

Mindszenty, Joseph, Cardinal, Roman Catholic Primate of Hungary


Mitchell, Marion, Office of Greek Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, 1969–1970

Mitterer, Otto, Austrian Minister of Trade and Industry

Mladenov, Peter, Bulgarian Foreign Minister

Mondale, Walter, Senator (D–Minnesota)

Moorer, Admiral Thomas H., USN, Chief of Naval Operations until July 1970; thereafter, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff


Morse, John H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Affairs

Mosbacher, Emil, Jr., Chief of Protocol, Department of State, January 28, 1969–June 30, 1972

Moynihan, Daniel P., Assistant to the President for Urban Affairs, January 1969–December 1969; Counselor to the President, January 1970–January 1971

Murphy, Robert D., proposed envoy to Greece, September 1971; member, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Muskie, Edmund S., Senator (D–Maine)

Nagy, Imre, former Prime Minister of Hungary

Nagy, Janos, Hungarian Ambassador to the United States

Nehru, Jawaharlal, leader of India’s Congress Party and former Indian Prime Minister

Neubert, Joseph, member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, until June 1970; thereafter, Acting Deputy Director of Planning, Planning and Coordination Staff

Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States

Noyes, James H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Ogden, Geoffrey, Office of Turkish Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, 1970–1971

Okun, Herbert, Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Olcay, Osman, Turkish Foreign Minister until March 1971; thereafter, Turkish Ambassador to the U.N.

Oncken, Dirk, Minister at the West German Embassy in Washington; Chief of the Planning Staff in the West German Foreign Office from February 1970


Osorio-Tafall, Bibiano, U.N. Secretary General’s Special Representative to Cyprus

Packard, David M., Deputy Secretary of Defense, January 24, 1969–December 13, 1971

Palamas, Christos (Christian), Greek Ambassador to the United States until June 1969; thereafter, Deputy Foreign Minister

Palmby, Clarence, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture

Panaghoulis, Alexander, attempted assassin of Greek Prime Minister Papadopoulos, August 1968; thereafter a prisoner of the Greek Government

Panayotakis, Constantine, Greek Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe; then Ambassador to Cyprus; then Representative of Papadopoulos to Makarios, February–March 1972

Papadopoulos, Lt. Col. George, Greek Prime Minister and Defense Minister; also Foreign Minister from July 1970

Papagos, Leonidas, Marshal of the Court to King Constantine

Papandreou, Andreas, exiled Greek political leader (son of George Papandreou)

Papandreou, George, former Prime Minister of Greece

Pappas, Tom, Chairman, Esso-Pappas; Greek–American industrialist

Pasztor, Laszlo, Republican National Committee

Patiolos, Demetrios, Greek Second Deputy Prime Minister until June 1970

Patolichev, Nikolai S., Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade

Pattakos, Stylianos, Greek First Deputy Prime Minister; also Minister of the Interior until August 1971

Paul VI (Giovanni Battista Montini), Pope

Pauls, Rolf, Ambassador to the United States, Federal Republic of Germany

Pearson, Lester, former Canadian Prime Minister

Pederson, Richard, Counselor, Department of State

Pell, Claiborne, Senator (D–Rhode Island)

Peter, Janos, Hungarian Foreign Minister

Peterson, Peter G., Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs and Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy

Peterson, Peter, Consul General at the American Embassy in Greece until July 1970

Peterson, Frederick V.E., Ambassador to Finland from May 1969

Pipinellis, Panayotis, Greek Foreign Minister until July 1970

Platt, Nicholas, Chief, Asian Communist Areas Division, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, February 1969–January 1970; Chief, North Asian Division, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, January 1970–March 1970; Deputy Director, Executive Secretariat Staff, March 1971–June 1972; Director, Executive Secretariat from June 1972

Poage, W.R., Representative (D–Texas)

Podgorny, Nikolai V., Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet; also member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party

Pommerening, Horst, Director, Office for “Structural Questions of the East,” West German Foreign Office

Pompidou, Georges, President of France from June 20, 1969
XLII Persons

Popper, David, Ambassador to Cyprus from July 1969
Pranger, Robert J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia, 1970; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and NSC Affairs, 1971
Pribyl, Jaromir, First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Embassy to the United States
Price, Raymond K., Special Assistant to the President
Pugh, Robert, Turkish Desk Officer from May 1969; Political Officer, American Embassy in Greece from July 1972
Puhan, Alfred, Ambassador to Hungary from May 1969
Rahman, Mujibur, Prime Minister of Bangladesh from 1972
Reid, Ogden, Representative (R–New York)
Reuss, Henry, Representative (D–Wisconsin)
Richardson Elliot L., Under Secretary of State, Department of State, January 1969–June 1970; Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare from June 1970
Rockwell, Stuart W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until March 1970
Rodman, Peter W., member, National Security Council Staff, 1970–1972
Rogers, William P., Secretary of State
Rohal-Ilkiv, Ivan, Czech Ambassador to the United States from October 1969
Ronne, Torben, Danish Ambassador to the United States
Rossides, Zenon, Cypriot Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Rostow, Walt W., Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until January 1969
Roufogalis, Col. Michael, Deputy Chief of the Greek Central Intelligence Agency until June 1972; thereafter, Chief
Ruef, Hans, head of the Second Political Division in the West German Foreign Office; West German Ambassador to France from June 1970
Rumsfeld, Donald, Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity; May 1969–January 1971; Counselor to the President, January 1971–January 1973; also, U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State until January 20, 1969
Russell, Richard B., Senator (D–Georgia)
Safire, William, Special Assistant to the President, Speechwriter’s Office
Sahm, Ulrich, Director of Subdivision A (East-West Relations) in the Second Political Division of the West German Foreign Office until October 1969; then head of Division II (Foreign and Inner-German Relations and External Security) in the Federal Chancellery; West German Ambassador to the Soviet Union from April 1972
Samuels, Nathaniel, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, April 1969–April 1972
Savasci, Lt. Gen. Hayati, Chief of Staff, Turkish Ground Forces
Scali, John A., Chief Diplomatic Correspondent for ABC News until 1971; thereafter, Special Consultant to the President
Scheel, Walter, Vice Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Foreign Minister from October 22, 1969
Schlesinger, James R., Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget (renamed Office of Management and Budget), January 1969–August 1971; thereafter, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Schroeder, Gerhard, member, Bundestag, Federal Republic of Germany, Minister of Foreign Affairs or Minister of Defense during much of the 1960s
Scranton, William, former governor of Pennsylvania
Seaborg, Glen T., Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission until 1971
Selden, Armistead I., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Shakespeare, Frank M. Director, United States Information Agency from February 7, 1969
Sharp, Mitchell, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs
Shultz, George P., Secretary of Labor, January 20, 1969–June 10, 1970; Director, Office of Management and Budget, June 1970–May 1972; thereafter, Secretary of the Treasury and Assistant to the President
Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, Cambodian head of state until 1970; leader of government-in-exile in Beijing from 1970
Silva, Walter, Office of Greek Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until February 9, 1969; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Skoug, Kenneth N. Jr., Deputy Director, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State from July 1969
Smith, Gerard C., Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from February 7, 1969; also chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Sokolov, Oleg M., First Secretary, Soviet Embassy in the United States
Solomon, Anthony M., former Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Sonnefeldt, Helmut, member, NSC Operations Staff/Europe
Spacil, Dusan, Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United States from March 1972
Spain, James, U.S. Consul General in Istanbul, July 1970–August 1972, then Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy in Turkey
Spasowski, Romuald, Polish Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Spies, Ronald I., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, August 1969–September 1969; thereafter, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Stabler, Wells, Charge d’Affaires, Rome
Stans, Maurice H., Secretary of Commerce, January 20, 1969–January 27, 1972
Stein, Herbert, member, Council of Economic Advisers, January 1969–November 1971; chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, from January 1972
Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., Ambassador to Poland until August 5, 1972; thereafter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Strauss, Franz Josef, Chairman, Christian Social Union; member, Bundestag; West German Minister of Finance until October 1969
Streator, Edward, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Sukarno, former President of Indonesia
Sunay, Cevdet, President of Turkey
Sutterlin, James S., Director, Office of German Affairs, Bureau for European Affairs, Department of State from June 1969
Svoboda, Ludvik, President of Czechoslovakia
Swank, Emory C., Deputy Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in the Soviet Union until June 1969; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, June 1969–September 1970; Ambassador to Cambodia from September 3, 1970
Symington, Stuart W., Senator (D–Missouri)
Szabo, Karoly, Hungarian Ambassador to the United States from September 1971
Szilagyi, Bela, Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister
Tagmac, Memduh, Chief General, Turkish General Staff
Talbot, Phillips, Ambassador to Greece until January 1969
XLIV  Persons

Tasca, Henry, Ambassador to Greece from January 1970
Thant, U, Secretary General of the United Nations until December 1971
Thieu, Nguyen Van, President of the Republic of Vietnam
Tibbits, Margaret J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, June 1969–May 1971
Timmons, William, Deputy Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations, January 1969–February 1970; thereafter, Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations
Tito, Josip Broz, President of Yugoslavia
Todorov, Stanko, Bulgarian Prime Minister from July 1971
Toon, Malcolm S., Ambassador to Czechoslovakia from July 1969
Topaloglu, Ahmet, Turkish Minister of Defense until March 1971
Torbert, Horace Gates Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations until October 1970; thereafter, Ambassador to Bulgaria
Trampczynski, Witold, Polish Ambassador to the United States from March 1972
Trueheart, William C., Deputy Director of Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Van Hollen, Christopher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, May 1969–September 1972; Ambassador to Sri Lanka from September 21, 1972
Vigderman, Alfred G., Director, Office of Greek Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, May 1969–March 1971
Vitsaxis, Basil, Greek Ambassador to the United States from November 1969
Vogt, Lt. General John W., Director, Joint Staff Organization, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Volcker, Paul A., Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs
Volpe, John, Secretary of Transportation

Walsh, John, Acting Executive Secretary, Department of State until August 1969
Walter, Ralph, Director of Radio Free Europe’s Munich office
Walters, Lt. General Vernon, Military Attaché at the Embassy in Paris; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from May 1972
Waldheim Kurt, Austrian Foreign Minister until March 1971; Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1972
Weintal, Edward, Consultant to the Director and Deputy Director, U.S. Information Agency
Welander, Admiral Robert O., member, NSC Staff
Winiewicz, Jozef, Polish Deputy Foreign Minister
Wojtowicz, Andrzej, First Secretary of the Polish Embassy to the United States

Yegen, Avdin, Counselor, Turkish Embassy to the United States from January 1972
Young, Milton R., Senator (R–North Dakota)

Zablocki, Clement, Representative (D–Wisconsin)
Ziegler, Ronald L., Press Secretary
Zhivkov, Todor, Bulgarian Prime Minister until July 1971; First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party
Zoitakis, Lt. Gen. George, Regent of Greece until March 1972
Zumwalt, Admiral Elmo R., Jr., USN, Chief of Naval Operations from July 1, 1970
Eastern Europe; Austria and Finland

General Policy

1. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Posts

Washington, September 12, 1968, 0109Z.


1. This message outlines Department’s thinking and decisions taken thus far on U.S. economic policy toward Warsaw Five as well as consideration of possible economic help we might offer Romania.

2. Request action addressees make high-level approaches to Fonoffs to present U.S. ideas in this field and obtain Fonoffs reactions. In discussing U.S. approach Emb should make clear that U.S. has no intention to resort to economic sanctions or return to cold war measures. Our approach is to emphasize: (a) the need for keeping our guard up and maintaining the possibility of controlling economic transactions with the Communist countries; (b) avoiding extension of economic benefits to invading countries which western countries do not give each other; and (c) avoiding gestures of good will, friendship, and business-as-usual during current period.

3. Our review covered unilateral measures U.S. could take and the possibility for multilateral action. U.S. has decided for the time being on following measures: (a) discourage important new business by U.S. firms with the invaders, principally the USSR, (b) turn down or delay some major pending cases of high visibility for U.S. export licenses, and (c) delay proposed arrangements for verification and payment of annuities in USSR.

4. Emb. should describe scope of U.S. unilateral measures, and suggest possibility of similar unilateral action by Europeans, e.g. discouraging important new business and delaying some major pending new exports. Moreover, in view of greater economic involvement of western Europeans with invading countries, we believe it appropriate that they consider, on multilateral basis, greater restraint on credits to invading countries, such as temporary suspension of new long-term credits, limiting credits to Berne Union guidelines, and non-subsidization of interest payments.

Rusk

2. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts


SUBJECT
US Trade Policy Towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

REF
State 236888

1. Recent reporting from certain Eastern European missions suggests desirability of a restatement of US policy on trade with Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe in aftermath of invasion of Czechoslovakia.

2. (This message does not apply to trade with Yugoslavia which, although a Communist country, is not a Warsaw Pact member and is treated as a Western European country for US export control purposes.)

3. Existing US export controls are still more extensive than those exercised by our COCOM and NATO partners. 1968 ban in Export-Import Bank Act on Export-Import Bank participation in financing trade with Eastern Europe effectively places American firms well behind Western

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, FT 1 EUR E–US. Confidential. Drafted by Robert B. Wright (E/ITP/EWT), on March 22; cleared by Toon, Carl W. Schmidt (EUR/EE), James L. Colbert (EUR/SOV), David G. Shaw (EUR/RPE), Ralph H. Graner (E/OT/GCP), Stanley Nehmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Resources, and Mountain, Department of Defense; and approved by Joseph Greenwald (E).

2 Document 1.

European and Japanese firms in doing business with countries of Eastern Europe. Eastern European countries are still handicapped in competing on an equal basis with other suppliers to the US market because of US legislation denying most-favored-nation tariff treatment to all Communist countries other than Poland and Yugoslavia.

4. The foregoing restraints on trade by US with Eastern Europe, together with those applied by Eastern European countries themselves, make substantial expansion of US trade relations with these countries unlikely. The maintenance of additional restrictive measures or guidelines imposed to reflect US concern at role of Warsaw Pact countries in invasion of Czechoslovakia last year would seem to have little additional impact in absence of parallel restraints by our allies.

5. By this time it is clear that other Western countries are not curtailing their trade with Eastern Europe or significantly altering pre-invasion policies on extension of credits. Under these circumstances, we have concluded that existing US trade control procedures are adequate to cover US political or strategic interests respecting East-West trade. Important new business is therefore no longer being discouraged. Export license applications are being processed in accordance with established procedures. Proposed export transactions for which licenses are sought are considered on their individual merits and licensed or denied according to their implications for the national security and welfare. In assessing these implications, Department of Commerce, in conjunction with Departments of State and Defense and other interested agencies, takes into account prevailing security and foreign policy considerations as well as the government’s long range trade policy.

6. Businessmen who wish to trade with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe are being told that it is consistent with US policy to carry on such trade so long as it is conducted in accordance with applicable rules and regulations, but are cautioned that individual transactions are subjected to the consideration alluded to above. This policy is based on the view that trade can have a positive impact on Eastern European societies. It can also improve somewhat the climate of relations between Eastern European countries and the US, can help reduce their economic dependence on the USSR, and in turn lessen the economic integration of the Communist countries. In case of USSR, trade is one of the means available to us for the development of some useful non-official relations with that country.

7. To the extent that Czechoslovakia is able to maintain some independence and continues to seek to expand its trade with US, we believe we should respond as fully as possible.

8. With respect to Romania, its continuing independent foreign policy, including its non-involvement in the Czechoslovak invasion and its strong condemnation of this Warsaw Pact action, warrant continued
special treatment in trade matters where strategic considerations are not overriding.

9. Missions may draw as appropriate on the foregoing in responding to inquiries by government officials or businessmen. It should be borne in mind, however, that the USG is reviewing its East-West trade policy. Modifications, if any, will be communicated to Missions promptly. This instruction supersedes previous guidance.

Rogers

3. Editorial Note

On March 28, 1969, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger approved NSSM 35. “The President,” the NSSM reads, “has directed a review of U.S. Trade Policy toward Communist countries. . . . This study should examine policy towards COMC, U.S. differential controls, trade with Eastern Europe, Asian communist and Cuban trade embargoes, and extraterritorial effects of trade controls.”


After the study was completed, Kissinger forwarded a summary to President Richard Nixon in May in order to brief the President for an upcoming NSC meeting. Kissinger wrote: “All agencies agree that our present East-West trade policy hurts the Communist economies marginally, if at all; is a source of irritation between us and our allies and between us and our business community; and that increased trade could be of some help in improving East-West political relations.

“But there are three sharply different approaches to liberalizing our present policy:

“1. To seek political concessions before we take any forward steps, including requests for Congressional authority to liberalize (Defense view);

“2. To request Congressional authority prior to negotiations but then liberalize in the expectation that it will lead to improvement in the political climate (State view);

“3. To seek authority but then liberalize in return for purely economic concessions (Commerce view). . . .

“State advocates an immediate major legislative initiative to liberalize the Export Control Act, seek authority for the President to extend MFN treatment to the Communist community and remove the
proscriptions on Export-Import Bank lending. They see this approach as most clearly reflecting your desire to move into an ‘era of negotiations’ and to enhance your bargaining power with the USSR. . . .

“Commerce is firmly opposed to any major legislative initiative at this time, fearing Congressional rebuffs and hence a setback to the improvement in trade relations which they foresee under existing law.

“The other agencies are in between State and Commerce . . . but generally leaning more toward Commerce’s caution.

“I recommend that the Administration take no major legislative initiatives at this time but go along with Congressional liberalizing initiatives. My judgment is based largely on foreign policy considerations, however, and domestic political ramifications must be a major element in your decision.” For the full text of the memorandum, see ibid., Document 298.

On May 28 Kissinger signed NSDM 15, “East-West Trade,” which conveyed the following Presidential decisions concerning Eastern Europe:

“1. Present legislation provides an adequate basis for U.S. trade policy toward the USSR and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe at this time, in view of the status of our overall relations with them. There is thus no current need for the Administration to make any proposals, or support proposals of others, to change the Export Control Act or provide authority for the President to extend most-favored-nation treatment to these countries. Neither is there a need to try to facilitate sales by amendment of the regulations governing shipment to them of agricultural commodities. . . .

“3. We should be prepared to move generously to liberalize our trade policy toward the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries whenever there is sufficient improvement in our overall relations with them.

“4. The United States should continue to liberalize its export control list, within the framework of present legislation. As soon as possible, we should align our controls to the list agreed internationally by COCOM except where the United States can maintain effective unilateral control because the items are not available from non-U.S. sources. The United States should not place pressure on other countries not to pursue trade policies toward Eastern Europe more liberal than our own.” For the full text of NSDM 15, see ibid., Document 299.
Airgram From the Office of the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State


SUBJECT
Statement on US Trade Policy toward Eastern Europe and the USSR read in NATO Committee of Economic Advisers

REF
State CA–1888, March 26; 2 USNATO 1804; 3 State 62758

There is attached a copy of the statement on US policy on trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union which was read at a meeting of the NATO Committee of Economic Advisers on May 8, 1969. This statement is based on the text of the Department’s CA–1888 with editing provided by USNATO and the Department in the reference telegrams cited above. For distribution within NATO channels it is classified as NATO Confidential.

Cleveland

Enclosure

U.S. TRADE POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE AND THE USSR

At present US export controls for trade with Communist countries are more extensive than those imposed by many of our partners in


2 Document 2.

3 Telegram 1804 from USNATO, April 18, reads in part: “During the approximately eight months since Soviet troops entered Prague, we have made maximum effort . . . to measure the extent of allied economic response through some slowdown or interruption of trade and credits to the Warsaw Five group. We have noted only a very few slight interruptions, even when Western public reaction to Soviet intervention was strongest. And now . . . in the spring of 1969 we find that the situation is almost completely back to normal. The few restrictions which may have been imposed are removed and Western countries are not curtailing their trade, nor are their pre-invasion policies on extension of credits in any way altered.” The telegram also included a draft of airgram A–119. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, FT 1 EUR E-US)

4 Telegram 62758 to Brussels, April 23, suggested revisions to the draft statement provided in telegram 1804 from USNATO. (Ibid.)

NATO, as well as those established in COCOM. Furthermore, certain US legislation such as that prohibiting Export-Import Bank financing of trade with Eastern Europe\textsuperscript{6} and that denying most-favored-nation tariff treatment to all East European countries except Yugoslavia and Poland\textsuperscript{7} in addition to restraints applied by the East-European countries themselves, make substantial expansion of US trade with Eastern Europe and the USSR unlikely. To reflect US concern at the role of certain Warsaw Pact countries in last year’s invasion of Czechoslovakia, the US adopted certain measures to intensify its already highly restrictive policy regarding trade with these countries; however, in the absence of significant parallel restraints on trade and credit policy by other NATO members, these further restrictive measures have had little additional impact. Largely for that reason, their continuance did not appear to be indicated.

Against this background, the US Government believes that existing US trade control procedures are adequate to cover US political or strategic interests respecting East-West trade. Important new business is therefore no longer being discouraged. Export license applications are being processed in accordance with established procedures. Proposed export transactions for which licenses are sought are considered on their individual merits and licensed or denied according to their implications for the national security and welfare. In assessing these implications, the Department of Commerce, in conjunction with Departments of State and Defense and other interested agencies, takes into account prevailing security and foreign policy considerations as well as the government’s long range trade policy.

Businessmen who wish to trade with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe are being told that it is consistent with US policy to carry on such trade so long as it is conducted in accordance with applicable rules and regulations, but are cautioned that individual transactions are subjected to the consideration alluded to above. This policy is based on the view that trade can have a positive impact on Eastern European societies. It can also improve somewhat the climate of relations between Eastern European countries and the US, can help reduce their economic dependence on the USSR, and in turn lessen the economic integration of the Communist countries. In the case of the USSR, trade is one of the means available to us for the development of some useful non-official relations with that country.

\textsuperscript{6} The Fino Amendment of 1968 to the Export-Import Bank Act (P.L. 90–267, 82 Stat. 47) prohibited Export-Import Bank financing of trade with all Communist countries except Yugoslavia.

\textsuperscript{7} Section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (P.L. 87–794, 76 Stat. 872) denied MFN status to all Communist countries except Poland and Yugoslavia.
To the extent that Czechoslovakia is able to maintain some inde-
pendence and continue to seek to expand its trade with the US, we be-
lieve we should respond as fully as possible. With respect to Romania,
its continuing independent foreign policy, including its non-involvement
in the Czechoslovak invasion and its strong condemnation of this War-
saw Pact action, warrant continued special treatment in trade matters
where strategic considerations are not overriding.

This statement does not apply to US trade with Yugoslavia which,
though a Communist country, is not a member of the Warsaw Pact and
is treated as a West European country by the US Government for ex-
port control purposes.

In view of the continuing uncertainty of the situation in Eastern
Europe, the US hopes that its other allies concur in the need to keep
their own trade policies under continuing examination with a view to
taking appropriate prompt action in the event of any further aggres-
sion by Warsaw Pact members.

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5. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant
(Butterfield) to the President’s Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


The following account appeared, among others, in the Staff and
Department Briefs prepared for the President on May 24:

“Astronaut Frank Borman arrived in Prague on May 20 to attend
the May 12–24 International Committee on Space Research and pre-
sent a paper. NASA arranged his invitation with State concurrence. He
was welcomed by Czech officials and greeted tumultuously by airport
workers, and the arrival was well covered by Czech journalists and
radio-TV people. However, the TV program was not permitted to go
out over the Czech network. Although Borman has been recognized
everywhere, and enthusiastically welcomed in Prague, public refer-
cences to the visit have been limited and two TV shows which he taped
were not transmitted. Czech journalists report severe restrictions on
their coverage of the visit.”

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 672,
Country Files, Europe, Czechoslovakia, Vol. 1. No classification marking.
With reference to this news item the President directed these comments to you:

“Henry, I believe we could needle our Moscow friends by arranging more visits to the Eastern European countries. The people in those countries, if given a chance, will welcome our Cabinet officers and others with great enthusiasm. It is time we start causing *them* some trouble.”

Alex

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2 In a June 5 memorandum to Butterfield, Kissinger replied: “The President took up this subject at the Cabinet-NSC meeting on Tuesday, June 3. I think he has made his guidelines and desires clear, and thus I see no need for further comments.” (Ibid.)

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6. **Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon**


**SUBJECT**

Secretary Rogers’ Recommendation re Expansion of Scientific Exchanges with Eastern Europe

In a memorandum to you (Tab A), Secretary Rogers has recommended that you authorize steps toward an expansion of scientific and technical exchanges with Eastern Europe. The main points of his memorandum are:

1. Following their recent visits to Eastern Europe, both Chairman Seaborg and Dr. DuBridge have recommended expanding scientific and technical exchanges with Eastern European countries.

2. Expansion of these programs, consistent with export controls and other security considerations, could lend valuable substance to our policies toward these countries.

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2 Attached but not printed.
3. Eastern Europeans are interested in these exchanges not only to support industrialization and economic development, but also to decrease dependence on the Soviet Union.

4. Exchanges in science and technology are useful also as a trade-off against cultural exchanges, an activity in which we have greater interest than the Eastern Europeans.

5. Joint research and scientific cooperation could have not only scientific results, where Eastern Europeans can make a contribution, but also valuable political and psychological results.

6. Romania offers a particularly attractive possibility for expansion because of the highly favorable climate there for cooperation.

7. To give substance to possibilities and opportunities in Eastern Europe, State is prepared to undertake a coordinated effort with the National Science Foundation and other interested agencies to explore avenues of new or expanded activity.

8. The basic obstacle is that no meaningful program can be funded out of existing or promised budget allocations.

9. An expanded program would require new fiscal authority for both the Department of State and the National Science Foundation after a division of responsibilities has been worked out. A reasonable beginning could be made during FY 1971 with about $1 million in additional funds for such programs.

In response to this general proposal, I have written the Secretary stating that you have reviewed the proposal and requesting that a more detailed program outline be submitted for your consideration before seeking any new fiscal authority or program commitments. This outline would include reference to specific program activities and lines of responsibility, along with indications of actual costs, methods of funding and an evaluation of the political implications. (FYI: As a result of your trip to Romania and Dr. DuBridge’s trip thereafter, the National Science Foundation will be earmarking approximately $50,000 for exchanges necessary to implement our agreements with the Romanians on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.)
7. Editorial Note

In his “First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970’s” on February 18, 1970, President Richard Nixon made the following statement on Eastern Europe:

“The nations of Eastern Europe have a history with many tragic aspects. Astride the traditional invasion routes of the Continent, they have suffered long periods of foreign occupation and cultural suppression. . . .

“We are aware that the Soviet Union sees its own security as directly affected by developments in this region. Several times, over the centuries, Russia has been invaded through Central Europe; so this sensitivity is not novel, or purely the product of Communist dogma.

“It is not the intention of the United States to undermine the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. The time is certainly past, with the development of modern technology, when any power would seek to exploit Eastern Europe to obtain strategic advantage against the Soviet Union. It is clearly not part of our policy. Our pursuit of negotiation and détente is meant to reduce existing tensions, not to stir up new ones.

“By the same token, the United States views the countries of Eastern Europe as sovereign, not parts of a monolith. And we can accept no doctrine that abridges their right to seek reciprocal improvement of relations with us or others.

“We are prepared to enter into negotiations with the nations of Eastern Europe, looking to a gradual normalization of relations. We will adjust ourselves to whatever pace and extent of normalization these countries are willing to sustain.

“Progress in this direction has already been achieved in our relations with Romania. My visit to that country last summer—which will remain unforgettable for me in human terms—set in motion a series of cooperative programs in the economic, technical, scientific and cultural fields. We intend to pursue these with vigor. My talks with President Ceausescu also began the process of exchanging views on broader questions of mutual concern, which, in our view, will contribute to a general improvement of the communication between East and West. A similar relationship is open to any Communist country that wishes to enter it.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pages 180–181)
8. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

U.S. Port Security Policy

The following changes in U.S. port security policy applicable to Soviet and East European merchant vessels have been proposed by the Department of State and concurred in by other interested departments:

—Opening additional U.S. ports to Soviet bloc vessels.
—Eliminating the automatic requirement for continuous surveillance of Soviet bloc vessels while in U.S. ports.

At the present time, entry of Soviet bloc vessels is restricted to twelve coastal ports: Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Hampton Roads, New Orleans, Galveston–Houston, Corpus Christi, Miami, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland and Seattle. Congressmen from the Great Lakes region claim that ports in their area are suffering “economic discrimination.” Moreover, the Polish government is pressing particularly hard for admission of vessels from Poland to Great Lakes ports. The State Department believes that these changes will result in increased trade and a reciprocal relaxation in Soviet restrictions. The Soviets have repeatedly sought to improve maritime relations, and Foreign Minister Gromyko has made a direct approach to Secretary Rogers on this subject.

The opening of additional ports should not necessitate an increase in Coast Guard security personnel since elimination of the automatic requirement for continuous surveillance will free men for boarding and search operations in new ports who are presently assigned to in-port surveillance duties. It is considered that search of each vessel by the Coast Guard prior to admission to a port is an acceptable countermeasure to the threat of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons or other materials intended for use against the United States. Moreover, under the proposed system, continuous surveillance of Soviet bloc vessels would be instituted if available intelligence information indicated the desirability of such a precaution.

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The proposed new policy directive (Tab A), which supersedes NSAM 203 of November 7, 1962:

—assigns primary responsibility for port security to the Secretary of Transportation, reflecting the shift of the Coast Guard from Treasury to Transportation;
—requires the Secretary of Transportation to consult with the Departments of State, Defense and Justice and the Director of the CIA in determining the action to be taken with respect to each Soviet or East European merchant vessel seeking admission to a U.S. port.

The revised security measures appear to be adequate. There is some possibility that dockworkers may strike in protest against Communist cargoes in new ports. However, on balance the easing of current restrictions appears to be a sound move which is consistent with your efforts to develop an era of negotiations.

Recommendation

That you authorize the issuance of the attached National Security Decision Memorandum at Tab A.

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2 Attached but not printed is a draft National Security Decision Memorandum. The final, revised version, approved by the President on September 1, became NSDM 82 (Document 16).

3 Attached but not printed.

4 Nixon did not check either the approval or disapproval options. Instead, he wrote over the approval option: "No. Not unless & until there is direct Soviet reciprocity when we do it." A notation on the memorandum indicates the President made the decision on March 12.

SUBJECT

Proposed Elimination of Restrictions on PL 480 Transactions with Communist Countries

You decided on February 2 to seek changes in our PL 480 legislation to relax the restrictions on sales to Communist countries. These changes were submitted as part of the over-all farm bill now under consideration in the Congress.

The House Agriculture Committee opposes our proposals. Chairman Poage particularly feels strongly that inclusion of these provisions would jeopardize the over-all farm package on the House floor. He thus wishes to keep them out of the bill. The main argument is that there is no need to legislate such changes now, since the proscription on PL 480 sales to countries trading with North Vietnam—which we did not seek to remove—will continue to be overriding for the duration of the war.

Bill Timmons suggests that the changes might fare better if made part of your proposals for a new U.S. foreign assistance program, when they are submitted in legislative form early next year (Tab A). The timing would be better and the Foreign Affairs Committee, rather than the

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 368, PL–480. Sent for action.
2 Public Law 480, signed into law on July 10, 1954, was formally known as the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954.
3 In a February 2 discussion with Kissinger, Secretary of Agriculture Clifford Hardin, Ehrlichman, and others, the President “asked whether we could write language into the bill [PL–480] to provide Presidential authority to waive the present restrictions. He wished to get us into position to have something with which to bargain with the Communist countries. As a practical matter, we cannot make subsidized sales to countries trading with North Vietnam. The present prohibition will thus over-ride until that situation changes, but it certainly could change.” Kissinger responded that the prohibition was “helpful” because it allowed the administration “to blame Congress when the issue comes up, as it did with Romania.” For a fuller record of the conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 313.
4 W.R. Poage (D–Texas) Chair of the House Committee on Agriculture.
5 Attached but not printed.
Agriculture Committee, would have primary jurisdiction. Poage is also willing to contemplate an amendment at some later date, even later in this Congressional session after the over-all farm bill has passed.

Recommendation

That we not push these amendments now, but await a later opportunity when the Congressional situation for passing them appears more favorable.6

6 Neither the approval nor disapproval option was checked. A routing slip dated March 20 from John Brown III of the Chief of Staff’s Office, attached to the front of the memorandum, reads: “Per Mr. Ehrlichman’s office there is no need for this memo to go to the President. His office agrees with Dr. Kissinger not to push on the amendments.” On April 14 Bergsten followed up in a memorandum to Kissinger: “In the memorandum at Tab A, Bill Timmons informs you that the House Committee on Agriculture has rejected the President’s request that PL 480 local currency sales be allowed for Communist countries, and that the USSR and China no longer be wholly excluded from any PL 480 sales. We had expected this development. You sent a memo to the President on March 11, informing him that the Committee would probably turn down the proposals.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 368, Subject Files, PL–480)

10. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1


SUBJECT

Policy Toward Eastern Europe

In early March, after reading the CIA’s paper on “The World Situation in 1970,”2 the President asked whether we can do more to cause trouble in Eastern Europe. Responding by memorandum on March 11,3

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 667, Country Files—Europe, General through May 1970. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action. Attached to the memorandum is a routing tab that reads: “NOTE: This did not go thru Secretariat. The Log number is one given to the previous papers on this.”
2 Dated January 9. (Ibid., Box 207, Agency Files, CIA, Vol. 2)
3 Not further identified.
you noted the inherent limitations under which we must operate and suggested that the policy of offering the East Europeans a relationship similar to that which we have with Romania if and when they themselves are ready for it is the best available. You suggested that in time we could relax economic policies and, in consonance with the Allies, take other steps that tend to encourage greater autonomy in Eastern Europe. The President thereupon asked if we can do more to take advantage of the changing situation and commented that our present policy is too gradual and asked you to develop a more aggressive approach with a few bold and unexpected moves. General Haig on March 18 asked me to make recommendations to you “on how to go about developing this program for the President.”

Procedure

It is unlikely that the EUR/IG—the normal body if this is to go through the NSC process—would produce a useful effort. Even if a specific directive on what policies to flesh out were sent to the Under Secretaries Committee, the same people as are in the EUR/IG would be involved, and the result would be little more rewarding than if a regular NSSM were issued.

Moreover, since I take it from the President’s original comment his purpose is to cause a certain amount of “trouble” with a more active East European policy, I think it would be unwise to mount a formal exercise. It would be hard to convey that Presidential wish without risking leaks and bureaucratic resistance. On the other hand, failure to convey something of the underlying rationale would make the exercise even less responsive than it would turn out to be in any case.

Consequently, as regards procedure, there would appear to be two alternatives:

1. We could undertake an in-house project which could then either be put to the Review Group and NSC (questionable) or directly to the President in a memorandum from you; or
2. You could discuss the project with Elliot Richardson and ask him quietly to assign one or two of Cargo’s people (Neubert and/or Davies) to work with one or two NSC Staff officers on an informal memo to the President.

Substance

While there undoubtedly is scope and opportunity for more active US policies, we should be very conscious of the limitations. We have achieved what we have with Romania (and Yugoslavia) because it has suited it to take the risks and initiatives required. Except, conceivably, for Albania no other East European country today or in the foreseeable future is prepared to move as dramatically as these two. The reasons are numerous; and, in any event, the only two countries where
there may be some promise are Poland and Hungary. (Bulgaria is rigidly pro-Soviet and its leaders are of a most conservative stripe; Czechoslovakia is occupied and hog-tied and while eager to make certain limited arrangements with us on the long-stalled gold claims issue, hardly in a position to move; East Germany is inappropriate for obvious reasons.)

In the case of Poland, geopolitics, Gomulka's personal proclivities and the peculiar nature of the Polish political situation leave only relatively little room for effective movement. Hungary is somewhat more promising, but there are four Soviet divisions in the country, our Romanian policy creates certain inhibitions and Kadar is a cautious and complicated operator. In both cases, there is a fair chance of improving relations somewhat at our initiative (e.g. Great Lakes shipping for Poland, now stalled by the President's negative decision on Port Security; further normalization with Hungary), but this is not likely to have much impact on the near or medium-term political orientation of these two countries and their leaders; nor is it likely to bother the Soviets much. The recent episode with the Astronauts suggests the extreme caution with which both Warsaw and Budapest view anything very dramatic.

Without now attempting to do the actual study, I would think that the major areas for anything far-reaching will continue to be in our relations with Romania and Yugoslavia. In the former case, we could consider removing the anomaly of not having an MFN agreement (when we do have one with Poland) and of improving Romania’s status under the Export Control Act. (Both would be in the “unexpected” category.) In the case of Yugoslavia, the most dramatic move would be a Presidential visit. We could also institute more active political consultations with both. (Incidentally, it will be wise not to single out Romania entirely; hence the parallelism with Yugoslavia.)

The biggest thing we could do for Poland would be to offer to change our position on the Oder-Neisse. But there are many problems which would have to be examined, including French reluctance. Even if we did this, however, it is not clear exactly what would be the impact on Poland; it would, of course, clear the way for a German-Polish agreement but with highly ambiguous consequences.

**Recommendation**

In specific response to General Haig’s request for a recommendation on how we develop a program for the President, I recommend that you either

1. Consider an in-house paper which could then either be introduced into the NSC mechanism or sent directly to the President.

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4 None of the options below was checked.
Subsequently, after a Presidential decision, there could, if appropriate, be some follow-up by the Under Secretaries.

2. Or, talk to Elliot Richardson to get a small (two or four-man) NSC Staff–Cargo Staff group to develop a program which could then either go into the NSC machinery or directly to the President.

As regards the President’s further comment that we should review RFE for the Fiscal 72 budget and that he favors continuing rather than cutting it, I assume this is to be staffed by Frank Chapin.

11. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (DuBridge) to President Nixon

Washington, April 14, 1970.

SUBJECT

Scientific Cooperation with Eastern Europe

At your suggestion I have looked into the chances for new cooperative scientific initiatives toward Eastern Europe—specifically Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.

Initially, I considered the possibility of leading a science delegation to these countries this spring as I did to Romania, Yugoslavia and other countries last fall. I would recommend, however, that any visit involving the prestige of the Presidential office be postponed until we have “tested the water” with specific proposals or until concrete policy decisions or statements can be made on our side to set the stage for better cooperation. Otherwise, there is a danger that the Eastern Europeans may be unwilling or unable to upgrade their cooperation or that we will engender hopes with the visit which cannot be realized. Our cooperative scientific relations with these countries over the past several years have not gone smoothly and the unlikelihood of a sudden

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 667, Country Files—Europe, Eastern Europe. No classification marking.

2 DuBridge visited Bucharest September 24–27 and Belgrade September 27–October 1, during a September 18–October 7 trip to Europe. For text of a statement outlining the trip and its objectives, see Department of State Bulletin, October 20, 1969, pp. 338–339.
change for the better leads me to the conclusion that a gradual, persistent approach is best.

In general these Eastern European nations want help in industrial technology more than in science. This is an area of concern to U.S. commercial firms, who for the most part have not yet found attractive business opportunities in Eastern Europe. However, the collaboration in this area depends on decisions regarding trade and export control policy rather than on scientific considerations. Both Czechoslovakia and Hungary (like Romania) would like to have Most Favored Nation status (MFN) in order to increase their sales to this country and to earn the hard currency for making purchases of American equipment and processes. They also seek Export-Import Bank financing for purchases from the United States. Poland, of course, has MFN but seeks better financing opportunities. Both of these concessions would require legislative action and the time may not be right for that. However, the importance of these factors to the Eastern European countries must be borne in mind as one considers projects for better scientific and, particularly, technical cooperation.

Even independent of MFN and Ex-Im financing all three countries seek to purchase modern technology from the U.S. Presently, one of the hottest areas is petroleum cracking technology. During the recent preparation of recommendations to you on interpretation of the Export Administration Act, sharp differences of opinion among the agencies on refining technology were apparent. Without attempting to referee among those views, I can assert on the basis of our Romanian trip that the selective approval of certain export licenses can be a useful tactic in demonstrating a genuine U.S. desire to cooperate. Conversely, generous statements about scientific cooperation, in the face of denial of technologies deemed by these countries to be important and essential to their civilian economies, are not convincing evidence of our sincerity to Eastern European officials faced with sagging economies and lagging industries.

With regard to the areas of basic and applied sciences, a number of specific proposals are now under consideration by U.S. agencies, which could lead to more science cooperation with Eastern Europe. For instance, the State Department is assembling details of a generally expanded program of scientific exchanges for submission to Henry Kissinger. In Czechoslovakia there is some good work on water pollution control in which Interior may decide to participate. With Hungary, after four years of waiting, we are about to sign a scientific exchange agreement between the American and Hungarian Academies of Sciences. There are of course always funding problems.

Several agencies are preparing proposals for additional projects with Poland to be funded by U.S.-held excess currency under PL–480.
The Smithsonian is also exploring the possibility of locating a large surplus computer in Poland, in connection with the 500th anniversary of Copernicus’ birth, as a basis for cooperative work in astronomy and other fields requiring computational capacity.

As these efforts continue on the U.S. side, I would propose to show the U.S. interest in closer cooperation by arranging through my office for visits to Eastern Europe of distinguished American scientists to test the receptivity for closer ties. If the visitors are well-received and if U.S. preparations for the programs mentioned above are successful, then it would seem appropriate for you to announce your desire to send your Science Adviser to these countries to explore in more detail the opportunities for scientific and technical cooperation. Such a visit would take place in the fall of 1970 at the earliest or the spring of 1971.

If you agree with this general strategy I will move promptly to accelerate the U.S. preparations and to arrange for the initial visits of American scientists. I would plan to report our progress to you within three months and to present a recommendation for further action.

Lee A. DuBridge

12. Editorial Note

On April 23, 1970, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger sent a memorandum to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce on the issue of export controls. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The memorandum reads, in part, as follows:

“The President has made the following decisions on this subject [export controls] on the basis of several memoranda recently submitted by the Secretary of Commerce:

1. The list of items and data subject to control for export to the USSR and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe should henceforth be limited to:

   a. COCOM items
   b. Those non-COCOM commodities and technical data, which, in the judgment of the U.S., could contribute significantly to the development, production, or use of military hardware, or to the military-supporting industrial capability of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe, to the detriment of our national security, regardless of foreign availability. . . .
“3. Decisions on specific cases should take account of over-all U.S. policy toward the specific country for which the export is destined. At present, this would mean, for example, more liberal treatment for Romania than for other Eastern European states.”


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13. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

Port Security

In early January you sent a memo to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Transportation, the Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence seeking their concurrence in a revision of the U.S. Port Security Program originally proposed by State. Their comments and general concurrence were received before the end of January. You sent a memorandum to the President in mid-March (Tab C) noting that the basic suggested changes in the program were:

— the elimination of the automatic requirement for continuous Coast Guard surveillance of Soviet bloc vessels calling at U.S. ports, and
— removal of the blanket restrictions which currently permit Soviet bloc vessels to call at only 12 U.S. ports (no port on the Great Lakes).

The NSDM, which you recommended the President approve, also assigned to the Secretary of Transportation the responsibility to promulgate the detailed port security program, in close consultation with State, Defense, Justice and the CIA.

The President disapproved the recommendation, and noted that he would not approve “unless and until there is direct Soviet reciprocity

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2 Printed as Document 8.
when we do it." In recent months there has been increasing interest in resolving this issue: the Poles have been pressing for permission to enter the Great Lakes (the Ambassador has raised this with you).\(^3\) Congressmen from that area have strongly urged similar action, particularly as the St. Lawrence Seaway revenues are declining, and State has gently pressed for a response. I understand that during lunch on June 2, the Attorney General inquired about the status of this issue, and that you offered to provide him with a report.

In disapproving the NSDM, the President perhaps did not focus on the fact that the restrictions imposed by the Soviets on the entry of U.S. ships to their ports were instituted in retaliation for the restrictions we first placed on their port entry. The Soviets have repeatedly proposed improvements in our bilateral maritime relations, and Gromyko took this up directly with Secretary Rogers. In addition, the proposed NSDM did not provide for an automatic opening of new ports for the Soviets (or for the Eastern Europeans), but indicated that Defense and Justice should concur in the opening of any additional ports to ensure adequate protection of sensitive defense facilities.

To step up the momentum on this issue, and to respect the President’s instruction that reciprocity must prevail with respect to relaxing the restrictions on Soviet port entry, it would seem desirable to provide the President with a revised NSDM fully reflecting his wishes but which permits the agencies to implement the operation without further delay. A memo for the President containing such a revised NSDM is at Tab A.\(^4\) At Tab B is a memo for the Attorney General providing a status report on the general port security issue.\(^5\) Note: The memo for the Attorney General is written on the assumption that you will also sign the memo to the President.

**Recommendation**

That you sign the memo for the President at Tab A, and the memo for the Attorney General at Tab B.\(^6\)
14. Editorial Note

On August 20, 1970, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger submitted a memorandum to President Nixon on the sale of petroleum refining technology, including catalytic cracking plants, to Poland and Romania. Kissinger recommended that the President approve the sale of such technology to Romania because “whatever minimal strategic costs might exist seem clearly outweighed by your commitment to economic cooperation.” In the case of Poland, Kissinger recommended postponement of a decision. “The key is the signaling effect,” he wrote. “The Poles have made strong pleas for approval, describing the project as an important test case in our relations. It is clear that our decision on the license will be a major signal to them on two levels: (a) U.S. interest in participating in Poland’s new industrialization plans, and (b) our attitude toward overall U.S.-Polish relations. Approval of the license would give a positive signal on both counts. Refusal of the license would be negative on both, particularly if coupled with approval for Romania. Deferral of the decision would be a middle course, which would be read as negative on (a) but leaving (b) essentially open.

“As long as we base our relations with Poland largely on its attitude toward Vietnam, which has not changed, I do not believe that approval is justified. They could read approval as a relaxation of our concern about their attitude on Vietnam.”


15. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
U.S. Port Security Policy

Earlier this year I submitted to you a proposed NSDM reflecting suggested changes in our port security program which had been suggested by the State Department and concurred in by the other interested agencies. The changes related to:

—administrative matters (assignment of prime responsibility to the Secretary of Transportation);
— the elimination of the current automatic requirement for continuous surveillance of Soviet bloc vessels while in U.S. ports, and
— the prospect of opening additional ports to calls by Soviet and Eastern European shipping, currently restricted to 12, none of which are on the Great Lakes.

You decided not to approve the proposed NSDM, noting that there should be provision for direct Soviet reciprocity.

The Poles have expressed a very strong interest in securing permission for their vessels to call at our ports in the Great Lakes. In addition, members of Congress from the Lakes area have pressured to have the Great Lakes ports opened to Eastern European shipping, since they feel such a change would help the economy of that area. In late April the Soviets raised with the State Department the question of entry of two Soviet vessels at U.S. Great Lakes ports. The State Department reports that (1) prospects are good for reciprocal arrangements between the U.S. and the USSR regarding ports accessible to merchant shipping, and (2) ports of the East European countries are considered fully open to U.S. shipping.

In keeping with your comment on my earlier memorandum I have revised the proposed NSDM (Tab A) expressly to provide, in Paragraph 2, page 2, that requests for the entry of Soviet and East European vessels into U.S. ports must be considered on the basis of direct reciprocity insofar as the designation of accessible ports, advance notice of arrival and frequency of port calls are concerned, but without relaxation of the U.S. port security measures provided elsewhere in the NSDM. An unknown factor is the relative U.S./Soviet volume of shipping and numbers of port calls expected for the future. (U.S. merchant shipping to Russia has been nil since 1964, while Soviet vessels have visited U.S. ports at a modest but steady rate. At this rate the Soviets can pledge reciprocity without having to grant it, if U.S. merchant vessels do not have occasion to seek entry to Russian ports.) Another un-

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2 See Document 8.
3 See Document 133.
4 Reported in a memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, July 23. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–219, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 82)
5 Document 16.
known is the position which may be taken by some members of the International Longshoremen’s Association who on past occasions have refused to work Soviet ships calling at U.S. ports.

The security measures prescribed in the NSDM appear to satisfy national security requirements. There is provision for interdepartmental consultation of the security risk presented by the presence of a particular Soviet or East European vessel applying for entry into a particular U.S. port. Also, denial of entry is required if information indicates that presence of a vessel in a U.S. port would constitute an unacceptable risk to the national defense and security. Depending upon the risk factor involved, a vessel may be admitted subject to, or without, continuous surveillance by the Coast Guard.

The NSDM makes no change in the present policy which excludes from all U.S. ports the vessels of Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania, East Germany and Cuba.

Recommendation

That you authorize the issuance of the National Security Decision Memorandum (Tab A) revising the U.S. port security program. 6

6 According to the attached routing memorandum, Nixon initialed the approval option on August 29.


Washington, September 1, 1970.

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Transportation
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 369, Subject Files, U.S. Port Security Program. Confidential.
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT
Revision of the U.S. Port Security Program

The President has approved the following statement of policy on U.S. port security, which supersedes National Security Action Memorandum No. 203 dated November 7, 1962, and previous issuances of national security policy statements on the subject.

U.S. PORT SECURITY POLICY

National security interests require that measures be taken for the protection of vessels, harbors, ports and waterfront facilities of the United States from threats of espionage; sabotage; intelligence collection operations directed against sensitive U.S. defense facilities from foreign vessels; and, related subversive activities including the introduction into the United States of persons or materials in the pursuance of such activities. It is also in our national interest to insist that entries of Soviet and East European vessels into U.S. ports be permitted only in direct reciprocity for the admissions of U.S. vessels to ports of the Soviet bloc countries. With a view to fulfilling these national requirements, the Secretary of Transportation is hereby assigned the responsibility for the promulgation—in consultation with the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, and the Director of Central Intelligence—of a U.S. port security program meeting the following objectives:

1. The exclusion from U.S. ports of vessels known to be under the effective control of or bearing the flag of Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania, East Germany, and Cuba.

2. The requirement that requests for entry into U.S. ports by merchant vessels known to be under the effective control of or bearing the flag of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Poland are to be considered on the basis of direct reciprocity for actions taken by the Governments of those countries with respect to requests for the admissions of U.S. vessels to their ports. (In exercising primary responsibility for obtaining an understanding with the Soviet Union and East European Governments regarding this requirement, the Department of State will limit reciprocal arrangements to such non-security matters as the designation of accessible ports, advance notice of arrivals, and frequency of port calls. The U.S. port security measures prescribed in Paragraphs 3–b and 3–c of this policy statement are not subject to modification through reciprocal agreement and are therefore to be excluded from discussions of understandings reached with the USSR on the reciprocity issue.)

3. Application of the following port security measures in the case of requests for entry into U.S. ports on the part of vessels known to be
under the effective control of or bearing the flag of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Poland:

a. Each such vessel must submit an advance request for entry into a U.S. port and notification as to scheduled time of arrival.

b. The Secretary of Transportation—in consultation with the Departments of State, Defense and Justice, and the Director of Central Intelligence—shall determine the action to be taken with respect to each such vessel seeking admission to a U.S. port, including Great Lakes ports, as follows:

—denial of entry, if information indicates that the presence of a particular vessel in a U.S. port would constitute an unacceptable risk to the national defense and security; or
—depending upon the degree of security threat judged to be present, admission of the vessel subject to continuing dockside and seaside surveillance, or admission without the requirement for surveillance;
—when a vessel is admitted, timely notification to other U.S. Government departments and agencies having internal security responsibilities and programs associated with the arrivals of such vessels admitted to U.S. ports.

c. Each such vessel shall be boarded and searched by the United States Coast Guard prior to admission to a U.S. port.

Henry A. Kissinger

17. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Trade Relations with Communist Countries

Recommendation

As Europe evolves—especially in the aftermath of the Soviet-FRG treaty\(^2\)—we foresee closer and expanded economic relations between East and West. We believe that the Soviet-West German Treaty will probably give a marked impetus to the broadening and deepening of economic relations between Eastern and Western Europe. It is our concern that unless we have new foreign policy tools, we will not share in the commercial benefits, or the economic and political influence, that may emerge from this developing economic cooperation. Specifically, I propose that you seek from Congress the authority, for use at your discretion, to extend most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment and Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees to individual Communist countries with which we have diplomatic or trading relations in return for equivalent benefits to the United States. (Yugoslavia, as a recipient of MFN treatment and Export-Import Bank facilities, is not included in this discussion.)\(^3\)

Discussion

Your policy decision of May 28, 1969 (NSDM 15)\(^4\) was that we should not seek at that time authority to extend MFN tariff treatment to Communist countries, although, according to the NSDM, we should be prepared to move generously to liberalize our trade policy whenever there is sufficient improvement in our overall relations with those countries.

A new situation in East-West European relations is arising as a result of the Brandt Government’s initiatives. The USSR has responded positively to the German moves and the other East European Governments are echoing this response.

Whatever the degree of success enjoyed by Brandt’s Eastern policy, it seems certain to lead to closer economic relations between the FRG and its Eastern neighbors. Brandt recognizes that, with the completion of the Ostpolitik package, political influence in both directions will be more than ever directly linked to the degree of economic collaboration.

With East-West relations in a more fluid state than might have been predicted several months ago, the United States has few foreign pol-


\(^3\) Neither the approval nor disapproval option is initialed. For the result of Rogers’ recommendation, see Document 21.

\(^4\) See Document 3.
icy tools for advancing its own interests and taking advantage of the emerging possibilities.

The legislative prohibitions against MFN tariff treatment and Export-Import Bank export financing for the USSR and Eastern Europe, pose serious constraints on our commercial and diplomatic relations with those countries. (Section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act denies MFN to all Communist countries except Poland and Yugoslavia, and the Fino Amendment to the Export-Import Bank Act excludes all Communist countries except Yugoslavia.)

I believe that this legislation would have the following advantages for your Administration:

(1) it would permit practical steps following through on the most recent and effective demonstrations of continuing U.S. interest in the area—your 1969 trip to Bucharest and the 1970 flood aid; (2) it would advance the time when U.S. exporters can compete on an equal footing with their West European and Japanese competitors in making sales, and it would provide practical evidence of U.S. Government interest in Eastern Europe; (3) it would provide us additional leverage with which to increase our economic and cultural influence inside Eastern European countries; (4) it would help allay concern in Eastern Europe that the Bonn-Moscow Treaty was tantamount to Western recognition of a Soviet “sphere of influence” in Eastern Europe; and (5) in the longer perspective, our commercial and economic presence in Eastern Europe might provide a desirable balance and offset to what otherwise may become a preponderant West European and particularly West German presence there.

There are, of course, additional economic and structural barriers to expanded trade with Eastern European countries—such as their shortage of convertible currencies, their preference for bilateral and barter trading arrangements, and the existence of more restrictive U.S. export controls than those applied by other Western countries. Thus, in 1969, the USSR and Eastern Europe imported goods from the free world valued at more than $7 billion, of which only $250 million worth came from the United States. The Western Europeans, Canadians, and Japanese make full use of government export credits and extend MFN status to Communist countries.

It is difficult to predict the economic effect of MFN treatment and Export-Import Bank participation in export financing on United States trade with Eastern Europe. It can be assumed, however, that there would be some gradual increase in trade. For example, MFN treatment is partly responsible for the fact that Poland’s trade with the United States exceeds that of any other East European country and exceeds Soviet/United States trade in most years. In fact, however, the availability of Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees would have a considerably
greater trade impact than the extension of MFN treatment. For the short run at least, the main benefit the Soviets and the East Europeans would gain from MFN would be psychological—the removal of discrimination. Experience has shown that they will need far more market research, sophisticated sales techniques, and more competitive products to take full advantage of MFN status in the United States market.

Our purpose in seeking more flexible foreign policy tools would not be unilaterally to grant MFN or credit facilities, but to obtain flexibility through having these measures available for selective use in order to advance our own interests. When we decide to move forward with a given Communist country, we would expect to negotiate for equivalent benefits, with the framework of trade agreements, or in parallel economic and political agreements for the settlement of outstanding U.S. nationalization and defaulted bond claims (as well as Lend-Lease with the Soviet Union), and non-discriminatory treatment for the export of American products. We might also negotiate for commitments to purchase specified amounts of American goods. We would utilize these bargaining tools in an effort to reduce restrictions on U.S. information and cultural activities and to secure favorable resolution of pending bilateral issues such as consular conventions. Any agreements entered into could provide for periodic review and confrontation procedures covering not only commercial matters but other significant aspects of our bilateral relations.

Alternative Approaches to Congress

While the authority I recommend be requested would be discretionary, allowing the President to decide when and with what countries to negotiate, there are several possible approaches that we might take in preparing draft legislation for submission to Congress:

1. request authority to extend MFN and Export-Import Bank credit and guarantees to Communist countries with which we have diplomatic or trading relations;
2. request authority to extend MFN and Export-Import Bank credit and guarantees to all of Eastern Europe including the USSR;
3. request authority to extend MFN and Export-Import Bank credit and guarantees to all Eastern European countries, except the USSR;
4. request authority to extend MFN and Export-Import Bank credit and guarantees to Romania alone;
5. request authority to extend MFN, but not Export-Import Bank credit and guarantees, to the countries as grouped above.

The arguments pro and con these choices are as follows:

1. Coverage to Communist countries with which we have diplomatic or trading relations (authority would include Communist China as soon as direct trade is opened with U.S.)
Pro
—to request this general authority would be consistent with your policy of initiating an “era of negotiation”;
—would demonstrate to Moscow a further U.S. capacity to improve our relations with Peking, which could have a healthy effect on the Soviet attitude towards the U.S.;
—would be consistent with our desire to improve the climate of United States-Communist Chinese relations; there is fairly general Congressional and public agreement that improvement in our relations with Mainland China is in our long-term national interest.

Con
—it would be more difficult to obtain Congressional approval if Mainland China were included as a possible beneficiary.

2. Eastern Europe and the USSR
Pro
—would provide the Administration with the capability to make maximum use of actions to liberalize and promote trade in support of other objectives in our relations with the USSR;
—would not arouse Soviet suspicions about United States aims in Eastern Europe to the same extent as choices 3 or 4;
—would go far toward harmonizing United States East-West trade policy with that of its allies.

Con
—so long as major fighting continues in Vietnam, there is likely to be significant Congressional opposition to granting this authority with respect to the USSR, even if only on a stand-by basis.

3. All of Eastern Europe except the USSR
Pro
—would permit an expanded United States influence in these states and enable them to reduce their economic dependence on the USSR;
—in view of Vietnam, additional Congressional support might be forthcoming if the USSR were excluded.

Con
—excluding only the USSR might be even more irritating to Moscow than limiting these actions to Romania alone.

4. Limiting coverage to Romania
Pro
—the climate in Congress is particularly receptive to action benefiting Romania because of Romania’s relatively independent stance, the desirability of strengthening Romania against Soviet pressure, and Romania’s need for credit growing out of the floods earlier this year;
—urgent action is needed to permit MFN for Romania if the United States is to be able formally to participate in negotiating terms under which Romania may accede to the GATT;

—a request limited to Romania would not only fare better on the Hill than a broader proposal, but would be consistent with our continuing efforts to take actions favorable to United States-Romanian relations.

Con

—to single out Romania by specific legislation would be irritating to the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe. It might be embarrassing to Romania in its relations with its Warsaw Pact partners;

—would signal that we intend to remain out of step with other Western trading nations which accord MFN status to all European Communist countries.

5. MFN but not Export-Import Bank credit and guarantees

Pro

—since the prohibitions of the Fino Amendment to the Export-Import Bank Act were aimed at countries supplying goods by direct government action to North Vietnam, it may be difficult to persuade Congress to drop the Amendment as long as major fighting involving U.S. troops continues in Vietnam.

Con

—the offer of MFN without credit and guarantee facilities would have much less potency as a bargaining tool with Communist governments;

—the contribution to expanded U.S. exports would also be considerably less.

Conclusion

On balance I am inclined to think that the best approach would be to ask Congress for general authority to offer MFN status and Export-Import Bank export credit and guarantees, in return for equivalent concessions, to any Communist country with which we have diplomatic or trading relations. This authority would be a highly useful bargaining instrument. Moreover, if we are going to make the effort with Congress, we might as well ask for broad rather than limited authority. We would make it clear that the only action contemplated for the immediate future was with respect to Romania. Assuming that the recent improvement in relations continues, we might later take up the terms under which we might negotiate a trade agreement with Hungary. Negotiations with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, as with the USSR, might follow under the right conditions. We would not, however, begin negotiations with either the Soviet Union or Communist China without first sounding out Congressional leaders.

William P. Rogers
18. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers

Washington, November 6, 1970.

SUBJECT
Scientific and Technical Exchanges with Eastern Europe

With reference to your memoranda of December 24, 1969 and July 29, 1970, with President agrees that there is much scope for increased scientific exchanges and some cooperative technical projects in Eastern Europe. However, we should emphasize only those cooperative projects which do not exceed the limitations of current East-West trade legislation. In other words, we would not want to initiate scientific projects we can foresee leading to requests from the participating country that would require changes in our legislation or our refusal to implement a previously agreed program.

The President has noted with approval the proposed program for the National Science Foundation. He agrees, moreover, that an agency such as the Foundation should be equipped with funds for international scientific programs sufficient to respond effectively to initiatives and to use the leverage of the United States scientific and technical strength to serve foreign policy interests. (It is understood that the proposed increase of $500,000 for exchanges with Eastern Europe is within the Foundation’s FY 1972 budget ceiling.)

The President has noted that the additional funds in the range suggested will be directed primarily towards Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria in that order of priority, thereby introducing a new dimension in our scientific relations with these countries. The President has directed that cooperation with Yugoslavia continue to be pursued vigorously. This, of course, does not mean that useful initiatives involving Poland should be ignored.

The Department of State should continue to work closely with the National Science Foundation in allocating resources among the Eastern European countries. If the Romanians press for an expansion of scientific exchanges during negotiation of a new two-year exchanges agreement this autumn, we should respond positively.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 667, Country Files—Europe, Eastern Europe. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Directors of the National Science Foundation, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Office of Science and Technology.
2 Neither printed. (Ibid.)
3 Nixon initialed an October 22 memorandum from Kissinger, authorizing the instructions contained in the memorandum. (Ibid.)
Activities with respect to Eastern European programs should also be coordinated with my office and, in their scientific and technical aspects, with the Office of Science and Technology. Periodic progress reports should be forwarded for the President's information.

Henry A. Kissinger

19. Editorial Note

On November 19, 1970, Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans submitted a memorandum to President Richard Nixon on U.S. commercial relations with Eastern Europe. He wrote: “I am concerned over the rapid growth of Western Europe’s share of the Eastern Europe market. Japan, starting later, is also increasing its exports rapidly and is already ahead of the United States. Eastern Europe imported $8.5 billion from the free world in 1969. Western Europe’s share was $5.8 billion and Japan’s about $400 million. By contrast, U.S. exports were less than $250 million. . . . It should be possible for us to widen our business relationships with Eastern Europe, despite current difficulties in the broader political sphere, and by doing so strengthen the foundation for progress in political relationships. . . .

“We accordingly propose to increase our recently initiated drive to enlarge peaceful U.S. trade with East Europe and to encourage the development of joint venture arrangements between American and Eastern European enterprises.”

Having recommended “vigorous trade promotion and export decontrol measures,” Stans went on to advocate “early legislative action to authorize you [Nixon] to extend most-favored-nation tariff treatment to U.S. imports from, and Export-Import Bank financial support to U.S. exports to, Eastern Europe.” Such changes in the existing legislation, Stans concluded, “would enable you to remove two major obstacles still impeding expanded economic relationships. Any major long-term growth in our trade with Eastern Europe depends upon their removal.”

20. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT
Administration Initiatives on East-West Trade

Issue
At Tab I is a memo for the President on our basic East-West trade policy.² It was triggered by memos to the President from Secretaries Stans and Rogers,³ proposing that in the near future we seek Congressional authority to extend MFN treatment and Export-Import Bank credits to individual Communist countries.

I solicited memos from Secretary Laird⁴ and the various interested parties in the White House to round out the picture, which—along with the lack of policy urgency—explains the delay from the original Stans submission. I attach only the Stans, Rogers, Laird and Shultz memos to your memo for the President; I attach all of the others to this cover note to you, and list them at the bottom.⁵

Stans has also indicated that he wishes to see you as soon as possible on this issue (Tab 3),⁶ and has noted to the President that you

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 326, Subject Files, The President’s Annual Review of US Foreign Policy, Vol. II–part 2. Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Sonnenfeldt. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Handwritten notations at the top of the page, apparently in Sonnenfeldt’s hand, read: “until I see where we get,” and “Why held-up for 4 weeks[?]” At the bottom of the page a note in the same hand reads: “Must be rewritten & shortened. Pres needs 1 Recommendation. I want to hold-up MFN.”

² Not found, but presumably a draft of Document 21.

³ See Documents 19 and 17.


⁵ All attached but not printed. On October 1 Bergsten sent a memorandum to Schultz, Flanigan, Timmons, and McCracken. Bergsten’s memorandum and the responses to it are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 326, Subject Files, The President’s Annual Review of US Foreign Policy, Vol. II–part 2.

⁶ Stans forwarded to Kissinger a copy of his November 19 memorandum to the President (see Document 19). In the attached November 19 memorandum to Kissinger at Tab 3, Stans wrote: “I would like to discuss this with you as soon as you have a chance to read it.”
have held up his proposed trip to the USSR (Tab 4). I presume that
you would prefer to defer seeing him until after the President makes
his substantive decision, though Stans would of course like to see you
before then.

My memo to the President is longer than the usual effort. However,
it has to cover a number of issues and different viewpoints, and the sub-
ject is clearly of great interest to the President. In view of these factors,
you might also want to consider holding a meeting of the various in-
volved parties of the White House before sending the memo (Timmons,
Shultz, McCracken, Flanigan)—though I have gotten written viewpoints
from all of them and they all essentially defer to the foreign policy con-
siderations as dominant. I think a meeting of the agencies would be a
useless rehash of well known viewpoints, though we might consider an
NSC meeting to convey the President’s decisions if they are along the
fairly subtle lines which I recommend (or any other subtle lines).

Substance

In my view, our East-West trade policy is based on precisely the
right premise: that it should be determined by our overall foreign pol-
icy objectives toward the Communist countries. The economics of the
issue are marginal to us.

However, it is also my view that we have not used our East-West
trade policy effectively to pursue our foreign policy objectives toward
these countries. It is simply an error to think that we will extract sig-
nificant concessions from the Soviets in return for granting an export
license on particular cases, such as Gleason. We cannot pursue our Ro-
manian policies very far without additional policy tools, and MFN
 treatment and Export-Import Bank credits are precisely the concessions
which Romania wants—and others will want—in return for playing
our game in the broader sense.

I therefore think there is a strong substantive reason for us to try
to get the additional legislative authority proposed by Stans and

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7 Tab 4 was a November 23 memorandum to Kissinger, in which Flanigan wrote:
“At a recent meeting between Secretary Stans and the President, Secretary Stans urged
strongly a relaxation of the limitations on trade with Eastern Europe. He pointed out the
USSR wanted to buy $12 billion worth of goods and our U.S. industry is missing those
markets. He further said he had delayed his trip to Russia at your request. The Presi-
dent responded by saying the delay in the trip to Russia might well be temporary, per-
haps only until after the Party Congress. With regard to sales of U.S. products to coun-
tries in Eastern Europe other than the USSR, the President indicated that Stans was free
to encourage sales to any of these countries.”

8 Reference is to Gleason Works of Rochester, New York. See Foreign Relations,
Rogers. (Incidentally, both are interested quite personally in the issue and I have therefore used their names in the memo for the President rather than the names of the agencies which they head as per usual.)

It seems to me that the tricky issue is how to obtain the authority without signaling that we regard our overall relations with the Communist world as having undergone any significant improvement. My proposed recommendations attempt to do that, by playing on the action which Congress is likely to take on its own and separating into individual actions—rather than packaging—any other steps:

—There will be a Senate initiative to eliminate the Fino amendment from the Export-Import Bank Act, which has a high probability of success.
—We can seek the elimination of the PL–480 restrictions which the President has already decided to seek (and sought once before unsuccesssfully) in the new foreign aid legislation.
—We can seek the investment guarantee authority, which would be applied immediately only to Yugoslavia and Romania, in the separate OPIC legislation.
—We need no changes in the Export Administration Act to permit liberalization of our export controls so need take no initiative here, and could take a relaxed posture if the Senate tries to liberalize it on its own.
—The only place where we might need to take an initiative ourselves would be on MFN, and it could be submitted by State and Commerce instead of by the President. In addition, we might roll it into broader trade legislation either early in the year (if the Mills bill9 does not pass in this session) or later in the year after we get the report of the Williams Commission.10
—Hal Sonnenfeldt would prefer to defer any action at this time, mainly due to the present uncertainties surrounding U.S.-Soviet relations and the resultant acute likelihood that any new action, however mild, would be misread in Moscow. He also prefers not to imply to the Western Europeans any softening of the U.S. stance on the issue at this point, which he feels might encourage them to further step up their trade and extension of credits to the Soviets.

I am certainly in no hurry. The scenario which I recommend would stretch out over many months anyway, but there is not even any urgency in deciding to start down that path. The only problem is bureaucratic since Stans and Rogers are both eager to move and they deserve some answer in the next few weeks.

Sonnenfeldt would also prefer to clearly limit any new initiatives to Romania alone, but recognizes the bureaucratic and substantive difficulties—mainly to Romania itself, since this would single it out much too sharply.

He also has some sympathy for seeking new authority vis-à-vis only Eastern Europe and China, to avoid any possibility of a misleading signal toward the Soviets. Here too, however, the discrimination—in this case solely against Moscow, especially if China were included—would be so blatant as to produce the wrong result in the other direction. Nevertheless, I have included an option of supporting-seeking authority for Eastern Europe alone in the choices under recommendation 1 for the President.

Recommendations

1. That you sign the memo at Tab I for the President.
2. That your office inform Stans that you would be pleased to see him on East-West trade matters and set up a time for the meetings.

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21. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Administration Initiatives on East-West Trade Policy

Issue

Secretaries Stans and Rogers, in separate memoranda to you (Tab A and Tab B), have proposed that the Administration seek legislative authority sometime next year to extend most favored nation treatment (MFN) and Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees (XMB) to Communist countries in exchange for “equivalent benefits to the U.S.”
I have also solicited a memorandum on the issue from Secretary Laird (Tab C), who recommends that we make no Congressional requests until we have: (a) developed a broad plan of action to use the request for such trade authority to pursue our political objectives, (b) developed negotiating packages for individual Communist countries, and (c) determined which Communist countries have sufficiently improved their relations with us to warrant new trade liberalization toward them.

Background

In May 1969, you decided that present legislation provided an adequate basis for U.S. trade policy toward the Communist countries in view of our overall relations with them at that time. You also indicated that we should move generously to liberalize this policy “whenever there is sufficient improvement in our overall relations.” Adoption of the State/Commerce proposal would thus require either a determination that there has now been sufficient improvement in our relations with at least some of the Communist countries, or a shift from your earlier decision.

Whatever decision you make with regard to the Commerce/State proposals for new initiatives, we will probably have to have a position on the XMB issue in the new session of Congress. The Export-Import Bank must submit legislation to increase its borrowing authority, and, when it does, there is certain to be a Congressional effort to eliminate the Fino amendment, which prohibits XMB lending to countries trading with North Vietnam—a move which is likely to succeed at least in the Senate.

Secretary Stans recommends that we seek authority to extend MFN and XMB credits in order to expand U.S. exports to Eastern Europe. He is particularly concerned about the growing penetration there of the Western Europeans and Japanese, and feels that U.S. firms will be permanently frozen out unless we begin to compete more actively. He concludes that we must extend XMB credits to sell more now, and that we must enable the Eastern Europeans to export more to us—which is possible only if we give them MFN—if they are to buy more from us over the longer run.

Secretary Rogers shares Secretary Stans’ interest in expanding U.S. business in Eastern Europe. His primary emphasis, however, is on getting additional U.S. foreign policy tools to extend our influence there, especially in the era of expanded East-West economic relations which he foresees as a result of general European evolution and particularly the Soviet-German treaty. The Secretary also believes that our seeking more authority would help allay Eastern European fears that we have recognized Soviet hegemony over them. Over the long run, he feels

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3 See footnote 4, Document 20.
that increased U.S. trade with Eastern Europe would help offset a preponderant Western European, especially German, presence there.

Secretary Laird, on the other hand, sees no change in the political situation which justifies a change from your decisions of May 1969. He also feels that increased trade, especially financed by U.S. credits, could reduce the likelihood that the Eastern European countries would liberalize their regimes by reducing the economic pressures on them to do so. It should be added that any signs of U.S. relaxation on this issue will accelerate European willingness to trade with the Soviets and thus—especially since financed partly via credits—will increase the resource levels which the Soviets can devote to their military program.

All three Secretaries agree that any new authority to actively liberalize East-West trade should only be used on a country-by-country basis, in return for concessions to the U.S. Secretary Stans would seek concessions related to U.S. exports to the country involved. Secretary Rogers would seek broader liberalization of the Eastern European economies, both to benefit our trade and to open their societies increasingly to the West, and minor political concessions. Secretary Laird, on the other hand, recommends that we insist on major political concessions, such as a Soviet move to urge Hanoi to move toward release of U.S. prisoners of war, before we seek Congressional authority to liberalize trade. He would also require major changes in their economic systems as part of the bilateral packages which would be negotiated under the authority.

There does seem to be general agreement on three key points. The immediate gains to the U.S. from even the most liberalized conceivable East-West trade package would be small. The contribution of such expanded trade to the Eastern European economies would also be marginal, at least in the short run, and would have no impact on their strategic capabilities. But such steps would clearly be more important for the Eastern European countries than for the Soviet Union.

From an economic standpoint, the issue is thus quite minor to the U.S. and to the Soviet Union and more important to the Eastern Europeans. It thus seems unlikely that the Soviet Union would make major political concessions even to get MFN and XMB financing; they are clearly not going to do so to get our approval of export licenses on individual cases. On the other hand, some of the Eastern Europeans might make more significant political concessions. For example, our effort to find concrete steps to improve our relations with Romania, which has taken major political steps in our direction, has not yet been hampered by our inability to meet their most pressing requests—MFN and XMB credits—but it might well be in the future. Extension of MFN would appear to have a greater political and psychological impact in Eastern Europe, while XMB credits would have a greater concrete economic effect in at least the short run.
It would thus appear desirable for us to have additional legislative authorities to carry out a selective policy toward individual Communist countries, especially the Eastern Europeans, which gave you sufficient leverage to extract meaningful concessions from them. However, in view of the notorious uncertainties of Congress, it is highly unlikely that we could extract such concessions as a price for requesting such authorities; and there is always the question of whether we would require these prior concessions from all of the Communist countries, or only from the Soviets.

The issue thus remains one of timing. Any request for new legislative authority would of course have to be clearly portrayed only as seeking authority to position you to participate more fully in this era of negotiation, not as presaging any major actual steps at this time with the exception of Romania. Even so, I would prefer to hold off any Administration initiative until we see how our overall relations with the USSR develop this spring.

Bill Timmons feels that Congress would not now pass MFN or repeal Fino anyway, although a request for MFN would trigger hearings—which President Johnson’s proposed East-West Trade Act of 1966 failed even to do. Timmons recommends that we should first relax our export controls administratively if you want a liberalization of East-West trade, and then consider submitting MFN legislation if there is no public outcry. (Such liberalization has already been going on under the new law, however, and there has been no outcry at all.) He would withhold proposing XMB changes until the international situation improves significantly.

On the other hand, Congress significantly liberalized the Export Control Act only a year ago over our low-key opposition. They may try to liberalize it further when it comes up again this spring. As noted above, they may also strike the Fino amendment from the Export-Import Bank Act, whatever we do. So we may very well get some new authority without taking any initiative, and I think we should accept it with no fanfare.

Recommendation

That you defer at this time a decision on any new Administration initiatives to liberalize U.S. trade policy toward the Communist countries, as recommended by Secretary Laird, but that we not oppose Congressional initiatives in this direction which might develop in the new session.

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4 An October 6, 1970, memorandum from Timmons to Bergsten voicing these views is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 326, Subject Files, the President’s Annual Review of US Foreign Policy, Vol. II–part 2.
Approve\textsuperscript{5}

Disapprove, prefer to seek authority to extend MFN treatment and XMB credits to Communist countries (indicating that we would use them only for Romania at this time) as proposed by Secretary Rogers, Secretary Stans, and Paul McCracken

Other

\textsuperscript{5} Nixon initialed this option.

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22. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\textsuperscript{1}


\textbf{SUBJECT}

Stans’ Proposals for (a) Another Eastern European Trade Mission, and (b) His Own Trip to Europe and the Near East

\textit{Eastern Europe Trade Mission}

Secretary Stans has proposed that his Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Business, Harold B. Scott, lead a U.S. trade and investment mission to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania in June 1971. (Tab B)\textsuperscript{2} The mission would consist mainly of senior representatives of U.S. firms. Stans believes that the mission is justified in order to demonstrate continued U.S. government interest in expanding trade to Eastern Europe. He says that the State Department has offered planning and staffing support.

Scott led a similar mission to Eastern Europe last June, and he has strongly supported increased trade with the Communist European countries in a number of public statements. In fact, with the full backing of Stans, he has tread on the edge of pushing a policy line contrary to the President’s own decisions. For example, on February 4 he told


\textsuperscript{2} Attached but not printed.
a Boston business group that Commerce and State had suggested that the President seek Most-Favored-Nation treatment for Communist products; this could have been the source of Senator Brooke’s call to you on the subject. ³ Scott also told the group that the President’s decision might be revealed in the State of the World report, for which there was of course absolutely no basis in fact. And he actively agitated for opposition to the President’s policy by saying that “political awareness of the tariff problem can be heightened by agitation by the business community for even broader trade . . .”

Stans himself has often given the same impression. In recent testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, the *Journal of Commerce* reported that he said that the only area in the world with potential for expanded U.S. exports was Eastern Europe—the obvious implication of which was that the business community should lobby for USG help to do so.

The President told Secretary Stans orally sometime back that he would not stand in the way of increased trade with Eastern Europe—apart from the USSR. ⁴ However, I do not see how our present policy could condone a second trade mission within a year, with its strong implication that we favor expanded East-West trade, particularly in view of the President’s recent decision to defer any Administration initiatives in this area.⁵ (I held Stans’ memo until the President made this decision.)

Secretary Stans has not specifically asked your permission for Scott to go, but Commerce will undoubtedly follow up to find out if the trade mission can proceed. You could of course let it pass or you could object in the name of the President’s policy. An objection would make it clearer to Stans that Commerce should be more restrained in its East-West trade statement.

*Stans’ Trip to Europe and the Near East*

Secretary Stans has also (Tab C) ⁶ asked for comments on his own planned trip in April and May to Ireland, Spain, Greece, Romania, Iran and Turkey. The only problem is the reaction he can expect in Spain if the President decides to agree with Stans on the need to increase shoe duties in response to the Tariff Commission report. Nevertheless, I see no reason to discourage his trip at this time.

³ Not further identified.
⁴ See footnote 7, Document 20.
⁵ See Document 21.
⁶ Attached but not printed.
Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum for Secretary Stans at Tab A, approving his trip in April and May but suggesting a delay before another trade mission to Eastern Europe (except of course to Romania and Yugoslavia).7

7 Haig responded to Bergsten in an undated memorandum: “I have discussed this with Henry and he would like your memo rewritten as a memo for the President; also, he wants you to be sure and get Peterson’s attitude and incorporate it in the memo for the President.” With Peterson’s concurrence, Bergsten prepared a shortened memorandum from Kissinger to the President expressing similar views. Kissinger approved the revised text on Nixon’s behalf and followed up on March 15 with a memorandum to Stans, in which he wrote: “The President fully approves your trip to Europe and the Near East during the period April 17 through May 3, 1971. He is particularly pleased at your intention to include Romania in your itinerary. There is doubt, however, about the need for a second trade and investment mission to Eastern Europe, which you raised in your earlier memorandum to me. I do not believe that the status of our relations with these countries, apart from Romania and Yugoslavia of course, justifies a second business mission within a year led by a Deputy-Assistant Secretary.” All three memoranda are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 213, Agency Files, Commerce (1971)–Vol. II.

23. Editorial Note

On March 1, 1971, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger sent to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce NSDM 99 on East-West trade, which reads as follows: “In response to the recent memoranda from the Secretaries of State, Defense and Commerce on possible measures to increase U.S. trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the President has decided to defer any decision on new Administration initiatives to liberalize U.S. trade policy toward the Communist countries in regard to most-favored-nation tariff treatment or Export-Import Bank transactions. The President has also decided, however, that Congressional initiatives in these areas should be opposed only in a very low key way.”

Regarding the referenced memoranda from the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce, see Document 20.
24. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, October 18, 1972.

SUBJECT
Relations with Eastern Europe

In the wake of the Moscow Summit, the East European countries are hastening to settle long-standing economic issues with us, indicating their willingness to conclude consular and Science and Technology Agreements, and showing great interest in economic concessions such as MFN. They obviously have Soviet approval for their approaches. Our economic negotiating package with the USSR serves as a model and a cover. The rush is on, with the Poles and Hungarians in the forefront and even the Czechoslovaks and Bulgarians proposing negotiations.

Secretary Rogers has been responsive to such approaches. As a result of discussions held during his trip to Budapest last July, the Hungarians came here and negotiated a claims settlement (see memo of October 13, Log 7335 at Tab C).\(^2\) At his October meeting with the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, he suggested that we are ready to negotiate on claims, an S&T agreement, and a consular convention.\(^3\) (We may expect soon the Secretary’s formal proposal to begin these negotiations.) State has also told the Bulgarians that we would welcome a high-ranking economic delegation. Our economic relationships with Poland and Romania are, of course, already well developed but several issues are currently hanging fire: We have supported MFN legislation for the Romanians and the debt rollover which the President promised the Poles for instance. State and Commerce are now also giving thought to concluding commercial agreements, mainly of a facilitative nature but also perhaps embodying MFN clauses, with all the East European countries.

You will find an overview of our current economic and other relations with the East European countries at Tab D. It shows that there are a number of agreements which we could negotiate soon if we wish.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–194, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 163. Confidential. Sent for action. Haig signed the memorandum, indicating that he saw it.

\(^2\) Document 129.

\(^3\) See Document 91.
To my mind, the State Department’s way of dealing with the East Europeans’ approaches lacks coherence. If we proceed ad hoc, as we seem to be starting to do, we run several risks:

— that the pace and scope of our relations with the East Europeans will be determined more by them than us;
— that we may lose some of the benefits of reciprocity;
— that differentiation in our policy disappears between those countries who have been helpful to us when it was dangerous to do so, such as Romania and Yugoslavia, and the latecomers; and
— that the undesirable impression is given that our policies toward individual East European countries are only a function of our rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

If you agree, there are two things to do now:

1. Request the Secretary of State to refrain for the moment from opening new negotiations with the East European countries until we have worked out a comprehensive plan.

   A vehicle is at hand to accomplish this: The Secretary has sent the President a memorandum with his proposal to begin negotiations with Czechoslovakia (Log 7333 at Tab B). If you agree, you should (a) ask the Secretary to delay these negotiations until we have developed a coherent approach for all of Eastern Europe; and (b) notify the President of this. These recommendations are included in my separate memorandum to you covering the Secretary’s report on Czechoslovakia (also at Tab B).

   Recommendation

   That you approve my recommendations on Secretary Rogers’ memorandum on Czechoslovakia (Tab B).

2. Request that the agencies undertake an urgent study of the issues involved in normalizing our economic relations with the Eastern European countries. The objective should be to develop a political and phased plan for our negotiations with these countries. Since initial negotiations are likely to be on economic matters, Peter Flanigan will want to participate in directing this study be carried out.

   The draft NSSM/CIEPSM, which Flanigan has approved, would ask that the Secretary of State organize such a study and submit it along with his policy recommendations by December 1.

   Recommendation

   That, with Peter Flanigan, you sign the proposed NSSM/CIEPSM at Tab A. Bob Hormats concurs, as does Dick Kennedy.
Comments

The outcome of our current economic negotiations with the Soviets will set certain parameters for our policy decisions regarding Eastern Europe. The NSSM/CIEPSM response will then permit us within that framework to formulate a comprehensive policy for all aspects, including the economic, of our relations with the individual East European countries.

Note that the proposed NSSM/CIEPSM requests that the GDR and Albania be studied along with the other countries. Policy decisions on the GDR are, as you know, pending separately in the response to NSSM 146. We have not addressed Albania in the NSSM context so far. This is a low-key way to begin.

Tab D

OUTSTANDING ECONOMIC AND OTHER ISSUES WITH THE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES—SURVEY

Romania

Economic: MFN—Administration supports. No Congressional action yet.

Agricultural Credits—Romanians want PL 480 type sales. We increased CCC line to $61 million last summer, but indicated no PL–480 possible under present legislation.

Government Loan—We told Romanians last summer we couldn’t arrange one under our system.


OPIC—Granted September 1972.

Private Bonded Indebtedness—Negotiations suspended. Romanians agree to negotiate when MFN received.

Joint projects in Africa—Romanians have approached us but we were negative.

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8 See Document 208.
9 See Document 193.
10 See Document 214.
Other:

*Cultural Exchanges*—Both sides want to expand under current Cultural and Scientific Exchanges Agreement. Negotiations begin in November for 1973–74.

*Civil Air Agreement*—No interest on either side.

**Poland**

Economic:

*MFN*—Provided in 1960.

*PL–480 Debt Deferral*—President promised deferral at two year tranches during Warsaw trip; negotiations interrupted over interest issue.13

*Agricultural Credits*—Poles have requested new long-term local currency sales agreement last June. We have not replied, but Poles told that there is little hope.

*EX–IM*—We have tied it to bond settlement.14

*Private Bonded Indebtedness*—Interim settlement ready for conclusion with Bondholders.15

Other:

*Science and Technology Agreement*—Ready for signature.16

*Civil Air Agreement*—Concluded in July 197217 but CAB permit still pending.

**Czechoslovakia**

Economic:

*MFN*—Do not have.

*Claims*—Czechs want to settle, link with our holding of Czechoslovak monetary gold, have suggested February 1973 as starting date.18

*EX–IM*—Not eligible.

*Private Bonded Indebtedness*—Czechs have refused to negotiate some $2.7 million in outstanding claims.19

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12 Regarding Nixon’s trip to Poland, see Documents 163–166.
13 See Document 173.
14 See Document 170.
15 See Document 173.
16 See Document 175.
17 For the agreement, see 23 UST 4269.
18 See Document 85.
19 See Document 90.
Blocked Accounts (both ways)—About $5 million.

Surplus Property Debt—Owed by Czechs in amount of $5 million.

Other:


S & T Agreement—Czechs want to negotiate, but we want broad, general agreement covering culture as well.

Consulates—Czechs want a Chicago consulate and will permit us to reopen in Bratislav.

Hungary

Economic:

MFN—Do not have but indicated interest.

Claims—Settlement initialled 10/12/72.20

EX–IM—Don’t have.

Private Bonded Indebtedness—Negotiations have begun.

Other:

Crown of Saint Stephen—We have custody. Hungarians want it; émigrés opposed to return.21

Culture, Science and Technology Exchanges Agreement—We have given a draft. Hungarians plan reply.

Civil Air Agreement—Concluded June 1972.

Bulgaria

Economic:

MFN—Do not have, indicated interest.

Claims—None.

EX–IM—Don’t have; Bulgarians have indicated interest in “credits.”22

Private Bonded Indebtedness—Outstanding claims of $6.5 million.

Other:

Consular Convention—Bulgarians have for several years delayed reply to our draft.

Status of Embassy—Harassment by Bulgarians.

20 See Document 129.
21 See Documents 116 and 126.
22 See Document 75.
Cultural Exchange—Bulgarians unresponsive until this month; now propose expansion.

Maritime Agreement—Bulgarians have proposed.

Arbitration Agreement—Bulgarians have proposed.

Civil Air Agreement—No interest on either side.

German Democratic Republic

Economic:

General—We have no agreements with the GDR and it is not eligible for MFN, EX–IM, or CCC credits. It is subject to more stringent export controls than the other East European countries.

Claims—U.S. claims exist. State Department is compiling updated list of amounts.

Other:

No relations. GDR has evinced some interest in privately-sponsored cultural exchanges.

Albania

Economic:

General—1926 Commercial Treaty (including MFN)\(^{23}\) whose validity Albanians won’t acknowledge.

Claims—Since 1946 we have had claims outstanding. We holding Albanian gold.

Other:

No relations. No Albanian interest shown so far. In 1946 we asked for confirmation of several previous agreements: Pre-war extradition, nationality, arbitration, and visa treaties whose validity Albanians won’t acknowledge.

Yugoslavia

Economic:

MFN—Have since before World War II.

EX–IM—Granted.

OPIC—Available.

Financial Claims—None, but Yugoslavia faces a repayment problem on previous credits.

\(^{23}\) On the commercial treaty with Albania, see *Foreign Relations, 1925*, volume I, p. 511.
PL–480 Credits—Potential U.S. sales restricted by Findley Amendment.24

Other:

Civil Air Agreement—No interest in bilateral. U.S. interest in charter agreement.

24 The Findley–Belcher Amendment to the Food for Peace Act (Section 103 (d) (3) of P.L.–480) forbade the sale of agricultural commodities on credit to “any nation which sells or furnishes or permits ships or aircraft under its registry to transport to or from Cuba or North Vietnam . . . any equipment, materials, or commodities so long as they are governed by a Communist regime.” (80 Stat. 1527)

25. National Security Study Memorandum 1631

Washington, October 27, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Economic Policies for the Eastern European Countries

The President has requested a comprehensive review of the issues involved in further normalizing our economic relations with the countries of Eastern Europe.

The study should encompass economic relations with: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. It should examine current and potential areas of economic interaction between these countries and the United States in light of our political and economic objectives in each country and in Eastern Europe as a whole. It should examine policy

options with respect to the individual countries of the area and to the area as a whole. Taking into account the policy options developed, the study also should provide time-phased negotiating scenarios which:

   a. pursue the various policy options in bilateral negotiations on economic and other issues with the individual countries, and
   b. establish priorities among the individual countries in respect to the pursuit of negotiations on the specific issues involved.

An illustrative list of topics for examination is included in the attachment to this memorandum. This list is not intended to be exhaustive. The report also may include country profiles and trade projections.

The study should be prepared by an Ad Hoc Group comprising representatives of the addressees and of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, and chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State. The study should be forwarded not later than December 1, 1972 for consideration by the NSC Senior Review Group and the CIEP Review Group.²

Henry A. Kissinger
Peter Flanigan

Attachment

STUDY OF ECONOMIC POLICIES FOR EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Suggested List of Topics

Overall Policy

1. What are the major implications for U.S. economic policy toward the Eastern European countries of our trade and financial negotiations with the USSR?

2. Should we seek comprehensive settlements of economic issues, including trade agreements, with individual East European countries, or deal with specific issues on a case-by-case basis?

3. Which outstanding issues should be handled on a bilateral basis? On a multilateral basis? How, if at all, do we deal with CEMA institutions?

4. What political, economic, and other quid pro quos should we seek in the East European countries in exchange for particular steps taken by us to normalize economic relations?

5. What conditions govern the timing of such moves?

6. A differentiation should be made between those policy moves that would require legislative action (e.g., Johnson Act, 3 Findley Amendment) and those that would not.

B. Specific Issues

Among those which might be considered country-by-country and regionally as appropriate are:

a. MFN
b. EXIM Bank credit facilities
c. Export Controls
d. Financial claims. For example, how should we approach nationalization and war damage claims, defaulted dollar bonds, public debts, blocked accounts, annuity payments and Czech and Danzig gold?
e. Capital control programs
f. PL-480 Debt
g. Agricultural credits and sales
h. Reciprocal business facilities and official commercial representation.
i. Taxes, royalties, patents and copyrights
j. Joint ventures
k. Insurance, such as OPIC
l. Participation in multilateral trade and payments institutions such as the IMF, IBRD, and the GATT. Role of the ECE?
m. Should any East European countries be made eligible for U.S. generalized tariff preferences?

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3 The Johnson Debt Default Act, approved April 13, 1934, prohibited the purchase or sale of bonds, securities, or other obligations of any foreign government in default on the payment of its debts to the U.S. Government. See 48 Stat. 574.

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[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–194, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 163. Confidential. This response was submitted to Kissinger and Flanigan under a covering memorandum from Stoessel, the Acting Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group on Economic Policies Toward Eastern Europe. NSSM 163 is Document 25.
I. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Introduction

In National Security Study Memorandum 163 and Council on International Economic Policy Study Memorandum 24, the President requested from the Secretary of State, Treasury, Defense, Agriculture and Commerce, the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, and the Director of Central Intelligence “a comprehensive review of the issues involved in further normalizing our economic relations with the countries of Eastern Europe,” defined as including all Eastern European Warsaw Pact members plus Yugoslavia and Albania. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) is included in the terms of this study.

As requested, an Ad Hoc Group of representatives of these organizations and of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State, has prepared the attached study.

The principal recommendations of the study are as follows:

1. Negotiations should begin without delay with Romania and Hungary to reach agreements on commercial practices and facilities so that agreements embodying MFN can be implemented quickly after Congress has granted the President authority to negotiate MFN. Both nations should be informed that reaching satisfactory settlements of defaulted pre-war bonds will be prerequisite to receiving MFN and, in Hungary’s case, ExIm facilities. State and Defense favor telling the Hungarians that successful parallel negotiation of a cultural and scientific exchanges agreement will facilitate action on MFN and telling the Romanians that freer issuance of emigration visas to divided families and a reasonable price for a chancery site will facilitate MFN action.

2. Assuming the initiation of promising consular negotiations with Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, linked negotiations of commercial and financial issues should begin without delay with these two countries. State and Defense would prefer to have the financial negotiations begin first and reach a promising stage before initiating negotiation of commercial issues. They would also prefer that negotiations of appropriate agreements on cultural and scientific exchanges reach a promising stage before beginning either commercial or financial negotiations.

3. With regard to the GDR, efforts to improve trade should be continued and increased as circumstances permit, but there can be no formal negotiation of claims or comprehensive commercial agreements until diplomatic relations have been established.

4. No major negotiations on economic/commercial issues with Yugoslavia are now needed, while those with Poland have already been programmed by the Polish-American Commercial Commission. With
Albania, no negotiations are recommended until after diplomatic recognition which is not anticipated prior to the achievement of Presidential authority to negotiate MFN.

5. It is recommended that economic negotiations include the following issues: MFN (including where appropriate, market disruption), business facilitation, arbitration, individual property rights and copyrights, industrial cooperation, maritime issues, participation in East European trade fairs, export credits, and double taxation.

6. Recommendations emerging from consideration of NSDM 159 with regard to continuing review and reduction of the COCOM Export Control list and strengthening of the COCOM system should be promptly carried out. Except for Defense, it is also recommended that there be continued movement away from the present US export control level and towards the COCOM level.

7. Repeal of the Johnson Debt Default Act should be sought.

B. US Interests

Primary US interests in the area covered by this study include:

— a political and strategic interest in reducing the Soviet potential for action against US interests in Western Europe and, in some cases, other areas, (a) by sustaining a conviction on the part of the peoples and governments of Eastern Europe that the US, together with its Western European allies, sees them as a part of Europe and has not consigned them to a sphere of influence subject exclusively to Soviet definitions of sovereignty; (b) by favoring the gradual evolution of more independent external policies by states in this area to a degree which does not risk serious instability; (c) by nurturing the strong historical and cultural links the US has with many of the peoples of the area.

— an economic interest in developing normal commercial relationships with states in the area both through joint ventures and the expansion of trade in order to (a) contribute trade and financial benefits; (b) support the closer contact of economies of these states with the West; and (c) encourage gradual trends toward less monolithic economic and consequently political systems which are less subject to Soviet control.

— a military-strategic interest in maintaining the effectiveness of our deterrent strategy; providing the USSR with a continuing incentive for mutual balanced force reductions, and reducing US defense expenditures by restricting through the export control mechanism the export to close

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3 The DOD reservation is set forth in a footnote to export controls on page 17 in this summary. [Footnote in the original. Reference is to footnote 10 below.]
allies of the USSR in the area of certain types of strategic goods, services and advanced technology unobtainable elsewhere.

—special interests distinct from our interests elsewhere in the area, which affect our posture towards the GDR: e.g. quadripartite rights in Germany, our position in Berlin, and the special FRG–GDR relationship. (These interests are elaborated in Section V, p. 64.) We would not, for example, favor emphasizing GDR sovereignty vis-à-vis Soviet responsibilities as one of the four powers responsible for Germany.

C. Present Situation with Respect to the USSR

The Soviet Government like preceding Russian regimes has, in light of a series of invasions coming from the West, always regarded as particularly sensitive the zone lying between its major population and industrial concentrations in the Western regions of the USSR and the major centers of industrial and military power in Western Europe, Germany in particular. Since World War II it has been a primary Soviet interest to retain close control of this zone, particularly that part of it lying between the German-speaking Western states (FRG and Austria) and the USSR, i.e. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the GDR.

In 1968 in Czechoslovakia, the Soviets reiterated the lesson of Budapest 1956—when the USSR sees its security threatened by developments in Eastern Europe, it is prepared to use military power to restore what it regards as an adequate degree of control. The Soviets, however, continue to struggle with the problem of defining their relations with Eastern European countries. The pressures within the area, the highly negative consequences of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in the international Communist movement, and the acceleration of Moscow’s efforts toward détente in Europe has led the Soviets reluctantly to accept the markedly independent foreign policy of Romania (as well as that of Yugoslavia). They have also acquiesced in Hungary’s considerable departure from the Soviet economic model and adopted hands-off policy when Poland faced a serious workers’ strike in 1970. This range of tolerance apparently is deemed acceptable so long as the central authority of the national party apparatus in the country involved is not threatened.

The recent improvement in US–USSR relations leading to the US–USSR Commercial Agreement of October 18, 1972⁴ has important implications for the countries of Eastern Europe. These countries have the same basic interests in improved economic relations with the US that the USSR has—concern over the technological gap, respect for US technology and capital, fear of reduced markets in Western Europe as a result of the expansion of the European Economic Community, pressure from consumers, and a commitment to maintain high economic

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⁴ An agreement allowing the Soviet Union to purchase U.S. equipment for the Kama River truck complex, 25 UST 6.
growth rates. The countries of Eastern Europe are distinct from the Soviet Union in that trade is more important to them, consumer expectations are higher, they have stronger traditional links with Western Europe, and they are concerned about the maintenance of their assured market in the Soviet Union for products which are difficult to market in the West or in developing countries. As illustrated by the forward movement in economic relations with Poland in 1972 and the productive November 1972 meeting of the Joint Polish-American Commercial Commission, the US has an interest in improved relations with Eastern Europe similar to that which it has in the case of the Soviet Union. The main difference is that the broad, world-wide interests of the US are not affected in the same degree in the case of Eastern Europe and the possibility of securing new sources of energy which exists in the case of the Soviet Union does not exist in the case of Eastern Europe. One result of the improved US–USSR relations is that US economic policies are now more liberal toward the USSR than they are toward Eastern Europe. The countries of Eastern Europe are conscious of this fact and are currently attempting to achieve the same status now accorded to the Soviet Union. Since the Soviet Union has led the way, it is now easier for the countries of Eastern Europe to take a more forthcoming stance toward improved economic relations with the US.

It is likely that the Soviets, having signed their commercial agreement with us in 1972, expect that these Eastern European moves toward normalization of economic relations with the US will progress. It may be assumed that the Soviet Union has even stimulated or approved these overtures given the fact that the three most closely controlled Eastern European regimes, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the GDR, have all explicitly bid during the last quarter of 1972 for such normalization. By the same token it may be assumed that the Soviets, as illustrated by their negative reaction to the “human contacts” or “freedom of movement” element in the CSCE agenda and their renewed efforts to revive ideological defenses in Eastern Europe, will monitor closely the degree to which economic normalization is accompanied by cultural or even political normalization or a pace of internal reform which might threaten their very authoritarian view of the leading role of the Communist party in each country.

D. Eastern Europe and the US: Background

Although US interests in the area covered by this study have remained constant since World War II in view of the potential Soviet threat to Western Europe, the degree of emphasis on them has altered over time. In a period of essentially military confrontation dating from

5 Regarding the meeting of the Joint American-Polish Trade Commission November 4–8, 1972, see Document 175.
the Berlin blockade until Stalin’s death, denial of economic or technolog-ical potential to the Soviet military was dominant. In the period of essen-tially political confrontation and maneuver since that time, encouragement to other Eastern European states to follow the example of Yugoslavia’s independent posture has been a dominant interest, as illustrated most recently in the development of useful high-level con-tacts between the US and Romania. In the period ahead, while politi-cal confrontation and maneuver will continue, there is an opportunity to increase US influence throughout the area to some degree and to gain some modest trade and financial benefits by responding to what are apparently Soviet-authorized bids from the countries of the area for negotiation of normal economic relations. The normalization process can provide an opportunity to clear up long-standing claims and financial problems. The process can also facilitate negotiation where needed of an appropriate framework for consular and cultural relations which we have already with the USSR, Poland, Romania, and with the exception of certain consular problems, Yugoslavia.

There follows a chart showing how the countries of the area covered by this study rank with regard to certain key indices relevant to their present and potential significance to the US. The chart also lists the factors affecting bilateral economic relations with each country and the existence or non-existence of non-economic issues. These latter may be subject to resolution if, in the course of economic normalization, use is made of the increased economic leverage stemming from the interest in normalization of economic relations with the US recently expressed by all the countries not having MFN (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, GDR) except for Albania.

The following chart also illustrates graphically the state of development of US relations with the countries covered by this study. Further descriptive background explaining the substantial differences among the countries suggested by the chart is present at the end of this summary chapter just after I H—Recommendations on page 27.

E. Trade Patterns and Opportunities

1. Overall Trade

East European trade with the industrial West expanded rapidly from $4 billion in 1960 to $12.7 billion in 1971 and should grow to $17 billion in 1975. This growth has been led by East European purchase of billions of dollars of West European machinery and equipment, much of it on credit.

6 Not printed.
7 Page 69, below.
The states covered by the study are heavily dependent on trade—
with each other and the USSR (60–70% of their total except for Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania) for imports of raw materials and for export outlets for their manufactures. Trade (20–30% except for Romania and Yugoslavia) with the West provides for advanced technology and agricultural supplies, particularly in below par crop years. The vanguard industries such as petro-chemicals, synthetic fibers, electronics, and even automobiles are being fed not only by Western machinery and spare parts, but by intermediate goods as well, such as chemicals and high quality steels.

2. US Trade
The United States has not been a major participant in trade with East European countries and currently accounts for only 5% of their trade with the industrialized West or a little more than 1% of their overall trade. Turnover in 1971 was only $660 million, and will approximate $800 million in 1972. With exports at approximately $440 million in 1972 and imports at about $370 million, the United States is running a trade surplus with the area.

3. US Trade Projection
The United States market share and trade volume is low relative to other Western industrial states primarily because the United States has not taken the steps others have to normalize economic relations with the area. If the US Government were to undertake a policy of East-West trade promotion comparative to other countries, thus offering competitive credit facilities while liberalizing US export controls to the COCOM level and opening markets by commercial negotiations including Most-Favored-Nation treatment, in the short run (by 1975) we could anticipate at least a doubling in exports and a trade turnover of $1.2 to $1.4 billion. By 1977 US trade turnover with the area could hit the $2 billion mark with a trade balance in our favor.

4. Composition of US Trade
The commodity structure of trade between the US and Eastern Europe deviates from the overall East-West trade pattern, and the US trade pattern with other industrial countries. About half of US sales to Eastern Europe are of agricultural products and raw materials while only 10–15% of sales are machinery and equipment. US sales of chemicals are also small. A balanced approach under conditions of normalization would produce a shift in favor of industrial products. There is good potential, however, to expand the volume of agricultural exports as well.

5. Creditworthiness
The major limitation to overall East-West trade expansion is the limited capacity of East European countries to pay for their imports. They lack the Soviet Union’s raw material endowments, and are in no
position to sell off energy supplies and raw materials to finance trade. Payment for an increasing excess of imports over exports will instead require increased exports of manufactures, processed goods, and services, foreign borrowings, or large scale foreign investment.

The area already has borrowed heavily from Western Europe to finance the trade deficit. Only Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, however, at the moment are facing serious debt repayment pressures. The Romanians and the Yugoslavs have recently rolled over part of their large commercial debt to the West. They will probably be running into another pinch some time in the 1970’s and might have to resort to more rescheduling or sharp cutbacks in imports, or both. The Bulgarians, however, are only marginally dependent on the West. At the other end, Poland, having had trade surpluses with the West in 1970–71, and Hungary, with good exports and shrewd financial managers, have a good deal of room to raise imports and indebtedness in the 1970’s. Czechoslovakia and East Germany also have good credit prospects and can absorb more debt, particularly if some lengthening of average terms can be achieved.

There is a need to widen and refine the data available, and, subject to the requirement of constant revision, to project ahead expected debt service burdens, demands for credit, and the credit-worthiness of individual countries.

6. Investment

The credit constraint, the inefficiencies of domestic capital formation in certain sectors, and the need for Western technology are the primary causes of Eastern European interest in foreign investment in their countries. United States firms can take advantage of this by forming joint ventures in the area.

7. Trade Promotion Resource Allocation

Politically, the United States has been closest to Yugoslavia, Romania, and Poland, and bilateral economic relations are most developed with these countries. About 80% of our area wide trade turnover in 1971 was with this group.

When Eastern Europe is viewed from a trade potential rather than a historical basis, a different pattern emerges. The Northern Tier in-
Industrial countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR) provide larger markets and are better credit risks than the Southern Tier countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia). Hungary is a borderline case, with excellent creditworthiness but a relatively small market for US goods. From a purely commercial standpoint the Northern Tier countries would be more important to the United States than the Southern Tier countries, just as the overall market potential of the USSR makes it more important to us than Eastern Europe.

The trade potential of the North over the South will affect the allocation of trade promotion resources by the United States should a decision be reached to normalize economic relations with the entire area. At present, we are spending far more resources on trade development relative to trade potential in Yugoslavia and Romania, for example, than we are in Czechoslovakia and the GDR.

8. Economic Issues to be Resolved Bilaterally

The following are issues which, because of the absence of fully normalized economic relationships with most countries covered in this study, require resolution or negotiation:

a. MFN

Under present legislation, MFN treatment cannot be extended to any communist countries except Poland and Yugoslavia. The lack of MFN treatment is generally considered by the individual Eastern European countries to be the outstanding economic/commercial issue. It has considerable political significance as well.

b. Market Disruption

Two types of arrangements have been agreed to for safeguarding treatment of imports from communist countries in Europe—the Polish agreement refers to the special consultation obligations Poland assumed upon accession to the GATT, whereas the Soviet agreement authorizes each signatory to deal with actual or threatened market disruption as it sees fit. With Communist countries whose instruments of accession to the GATT include special consultation obligations, we prefer to rely on those provisions for a remedy.

c. Business Facilitation

Business facilitation includes the establishment of US private and government facilities in Eastern Europe as well as the terms and conditions under which they would operate. Permission for Eastern European countries’ foreign trade organizations to open or expand facilities in the US should be treated as a quid-pro-quo for permission for US firms to establish offices in Eastern Europe.

d. Arbitration

Agreements now exist with the USSR and Poland whereby each government would urge on its nationals third-party arbitration. Agreement
by other countries covered by the study to third-country arbitration is important to commercial confidence and to US trade promotion efforts.

e. Industrial Property Rights and Copyrights

The US adheres to the Universal Copyright Convention. Efforts should be made to encourage Bulgaria, Poland and Romania which are non-members, to adhere to the UCC.

f. Industrial Cooperation

Cooperative or joint equity industrial ventures have an appropriate place in our economic relations with Eastern European countries. Eastern European countries should be encouraged to make sufficiently attractive offers or provisions of law to interest American firms and to negotiate directly with those firms in such ventures.

g. Maritime Issues

Recent agreements negotiated with the USSR and Romania and the proposed agreement with Poland reflect an effort over the past three years to amend the port security program to provide equal treatment for all US ports and to facilitate commerce, commensurate with US national security requirements and consistent with reciprocity for US shipping. Similar changes in the program may be negotiated in the near future with other Warsaw Pact countries.

h. Financial Claims and Debts to USG

Claims agreements on behalf of US nationals or corporations with approved claims against Eastern European Governments have not been negotiated with Czechoslovakia, Albania or Eastern Germany. All of the countries except Albania have defaulted pre-war dollar bond obligations to the US citizens and only Yugoslavia and Poland have negotiated interim settlements. Aside from World War I debts, the only major delinquent debt to the USG is Czechoslovakia’s arrearage.

i. Export-Import Bank

The President has authority under the Export Expansion Finance Act of 1971\(^9\) to extend the facilities of the Export-Import Bank to communist countries if it is in the national interest. National interest determinations have been made under this authority for Romania, the USSR, and Poland.

j. Double Taxation

In addition, we should discuss double taxation questions with the Eastern Europeans. This problem will become increasingly important as US firms conclude more sophisticated arrangements with Eastern European enterprises.

9. Relevant Issues within the US Government

a. Export Controls

The issue of export controls is related to any study of normalization of economic relations. Nevertheless, it is clear that substantial increases in the levels of trade and investment can occur even if some export controls continue. The US commercial presence in the Eastern European countries can be strengthened without the need to abandon the US strategic control system or the cooperative control system of COCOM. With the exception of Defense, it is felt that further efforts to reduce the US export control list towards the COCOM level are desirable.\(^\text{10}\) The screening currently under way of the US control list, in line with the Congressional mandate of last August, will assist in the achievement of this objective. The question of possible modification to the COCOM system is being dealt with in detail in response to NSDM–159.

b. Johnson Act

The Johnson Act constitutes a disadvantage for American firms and if it were repealed the President would still retain authority necessary to control US-communist country economic and financial relations under existing legislation.

c. USG-financed Agricultural Sales Programs

The repeal or relaxation of legislative restrictions, including the Findley–Belcher Amendment, would give the President authority to use PL–480 programs in support of policy objectives in East Europe. Given, however, the availability of CCC sales on commercial terms, USG budgetary stringencies, and the priority of “national security” LDC’s in dividing up low commodity availabilities, the question is raised whether, even if the President had the necessary authority, he would use it in East Europe.

d. Generalized Tariff Preferences

NSDM 86 of October 14, 1971,\(^\text{11}\) provides that communist countries except Yugoslavia would be excluded from the generalized preference system. Preliminary draft legislation authorizing generalized preferences gives the President the power to grant generalized preferences to those nations receiving MFN treatment and this flexibility should be sought in the final legislation.

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\(^{10}\) Defense believes that we should bring the US and COCOM control lists into closer alignment but that we do not have enough confidence in where the COCOM level will be in the future to key our policy without qualifications to the COCOM standard. While every effort should be made to bring US and COCOM control lists into closer alignment, the degree to which this should be sought through a reduction of US controls has not yet been established. [Footnote in the original.]

e. US Government Participation in Eastern European Trade Fairs

There should be continued US Government participation in these trade fairs as well as in specialized industry fairs and that this participation should be commercially oriented.

10. Narcotics Controls

Treasury believes that among the non-economic issues which the United States should raise with Eastern European governments where appropriate is the institution of stricter enforcement measures to curtail narcotics smuggling and terrorism. The US should endeavor to assure the continued exchange of intelligence on narcotics and terrorism with the countries of this area.

F. Conclusions and Alternatives

In order to advance the US interests defined at the beginning of the summary in the present day context of US-Soviet relations, it is important to maintain communication with both peoples and governments in the area and to treat the states of the area not as an undifferentiated bloc, but to the degree possible as sovereign states having historical roots and present interests distinct from each other and from those of the Soviet Union. Responding to any inclination to reduce their dependency on the Soviet Union and increasing their economic and political ties with the West are at the heart of our East European policy.

The demonstrated need of the Eastern European states for Western technology has increased the West’s ability to advance its interests by economic means in an atmosphere of reduced tension provided it remains alert to the Soviet desire to obtain sensitive military-related technology. The US has not moved as far across the policy spectrum from economic confrontation to cooperation and engagement with Eastern Europe as have other Western countries largely because of the US-Soviet global adversary relationship. During the Korean and Vietnam Wars, US economic policy toward Eastern Europe was subordinated to other national priorities. Economic policy was in large part a function of US dissatisfaction with the state of its relations with the USSR as well as with other communist countries and their policies toward North Vietnam, North Korea, or Cuba.

The conditions which called for this policy have substantially altered in the last year (defused Vietnam War, US-Soviet agreements, Inner German treaty, broad public support for Nixon’s and Brandt’s eastern policies, developments in US–PRC relations, CSCE, etc.). This recent coalescing of events has opened new policy options for the US in Eastern Europe. Consequently the US should plan a more active participation in the steadily growing economic relations between the countries of the area and the West both for political reasons and for the purpose of getting a larger share of the market. In doing so, it should
maintain a modest profile in the area, working towards non-economic objectives of normalized consular and cultural relations and broader links to the West without undue fanfare. This requires seeking from Congress at an early date Presidential authority to negotiate MFN with all the countries covered by the study which do not have it.

There are at least three concepts within which this process can occur, given the fact that we exclude any thought of trying to deal with the area through its rather ineffective, Soviet-dominated, multilateral economic institution—Comecon. These three approaches give varying degrees of emphasis to the pursuit of our political and strategic as opposed to our economic interests.

1. **Selective Economic Normalization as a Political Reward**

   The concept of rewarding by means of trade and economic benefits those countries of Eastern Europe which demonstrate independence of Soviet guidance in ways useful to US objectives originated in a context of a restrictive US and Western attitude aimed at denial not only of strategic and military assets to Soviet dominated areas, but of economic potential as well in a period (Berlin blockade, Korean War) of military and political confrontation. This concept which originated in 1951 aid to Yugoslavia three years after the Tito–Stalin break also underlay the granting of MFN and the substantial PL–480 sales to a post-1956 Polish Government which in church and agricultural affairs had taken clear steps away from the Soviet model. It has underlain decisions to extend flood relief aid, ExIm Bank facilities, and OPIC facilities to the Romanians as they developed their independence of numerous Soviet foreign policies. Its impact, however, in this more recent period has been diminished by the change during the 1960s in Western attitudes toward trade with Eastern Europe. Most Western European countries have rapidly increased trade with Eastern Europe while the US has been alone in refraining from normalization, largely because of Congressional action inspired by the Vietnam situation.

   In light of the changed East-West trade attitudes in Europe, the question arises whether this concept may no longer be particularly useful in dealing with the more closely controlled Eastern European countries. These states can hope to mitigate Soviet controls only very gradually. It is basically not in our interest nor in the interest of stability in Europe, to stimulate them to any other course. These countries: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and the GDR are the ones which now will benefit most from the improved East-West trade climate, and with which the potential annual percentage trade growth is greatest in conditions of economic normalization. Given the fact that we are continuing our economic normalization with Poland, which at present hews closely to the Soviet foreign policy line, a policy of using economic normalization to reward the others for increased foreign policy independence of the USSR appears anomalous in a period of US–USSR
economic normalization. There are still ways, over and above economic
normalization—i.e. emergency relief, etc.—of giving particular en-
couragement to nations showing independence of the USSR. Furth-
more, the President has stated (1970 Report to Congress):¹²

“We are prepared to enter into negotiations with the nations of
Eastern Europe, looking to a gradual normalization of relations. We
will adjust ourselves to whatever pace and extent of normalization
these countries are willing to sustain.”

2. Economic Normalization Primarily for Economic Interests

This concept is based on the assumption that the best way to ex-
ert U.S. influence in the area is economic and that progress in negoti-
ating economic issues will ease the problems of negotiating non-
economic issues. Economic normalization should be broadly construed
to include bond settlements and nationalization claims, as well as con-
sular conventions. It should not include cultural and scientific exchange
agreements, which should ordinarily be negotiated separately and
should stand on their own merits. The concept of economic normal-
ization for its own sake suggests that whatever economic leverage we
have—and it should not be exaggerated—should be used to obtain re-
ciprocal economic advantages and not normally for bargaining on un-
related issues. It is assumed that the trade of the countries of the area
with the West can increase sharply during the 1970s—perhaps to $17
billion by 1975—and that the US has a chance to get a sufficient share
of this trade to warrant emphasis on our economic interests.

The concept is responsive to the expressions of interest in economic
normalization recently made by the countries covered by the study (ex-
cept for Albania) and therefore in line both with the President’s stated
policy (see end of F.1 above) and with the general Western pattern of
economic normalization with the East. It is consistent with the greater
weight now being accorded the economic aspects of our relations with
the USSR. The estimated doubling of US exports which could occur by
1975 ($400 to $800 million) under a vigorously pursued economic nor-
malization policy would further amplify a continuing surplus in such
trade and would reduce our overall trade deficit.

3. Economic Normalization as a Pursuit of the Full Range of US Interests

This concept, like Concept 2, also accepts the utility and timeliness
of responding to East European bids for economic normalization. It
aims to use the leverage provided by these bids to obtain not only the
financial settlements, commercial agreements, and consular pacts en-
visaged in the second approach, but also, where lacking, other non-

¹² For a fuller account of the President’s statement, see Document 7.
economic desiderata such as cultural and scientific exchanges agreements, better Embassy conditions, improved access to the host government, and an overall improvement in the climate of relations and movement of persons. This concept accepts some delay in reaching economic normalization agreements in the cases where non-economic issues are more numerous (i.e. Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Albania, and the GDR) and is perhaps closer, in these cases, to the “gradual normalization” cited in the President’s 1970 report, as an objective. It is based on the assumption that final normalization can occur only when MFN can be granted, that Presidential authority to negotiate MFN is probably at least seven or eight months away, and that during this seven or eight month period countries sincerely desirous of reaching economic normalization will meet us at least halfway on outstanding non-economic issues. Several of these are issues which, in the case of US–USSR relations, are already governed by agreements.

(Commerce and Treasury are doubtful that our economic leverage is great enough to achieve all these objectives and believe that such an approach might jeopardize the reciprocal economic advantages we hope to achieve. They believe that many of our non-economic objectives can be pursued separately with mutual benefit to both parties.)

G. Negotiating Options

Four options for such negotiations with each country under any of the above concepts were examined with a clear awareness that some options were more appropriate to one policy concept or to one or more countries than to others:

1. Comprehensive Package for Early 1973

   Immediate offer to negotiate a package settlement of all outstanding issues.

   **Pros**
   - EE eagerness for normalization.
   - More to show Congress.
   - Reach agreements roughly in order of political priority.
   - Non-economic benefits.
   - Takes maximum advantage of present opportunity.

   **Cons**
   - Legislative authority for MFN and thus comprehensive package in doubt.
   - One part can stall whole package.
   - Loss of political advantages of less obvious approaches than comprehensive package.
   - Possibly unfavorable EE reaction to linkage of economic and non-economic issues.
2. Separate Economic Package for Early 1973

This approach would give tactical priority to commercial negotiations, with negotiations on non-economic issues, such as cultural or scientific exchange agreements, to proceed in parallel or follow. Bond settlements and a consular convention would have to be concluded before Eximbank credits would be authorized or MFN extended.

**Pros**
- Earlier completion & achievement of economic benefits.
- Favorable EE reaction to US pursuit of economic relations for their own sake rather than with political strings attached.
- Clear signal to American business that USG favors trade with country concerned.
- Any economic benefits achieved might help expedite MFN legislation.

**Cons**
- Discarding economic leverage may jeopardize achievement of non-economic benefits.
- Congressional scrutiny of economic package may delay MFN legislation.
- Less to show Congress.

3. Two-Phase (Pre-MFN Authority) Strategy

Arrive at a promising stage in negotiations of agreements on financial claims and non-economic issues, in advance of negotiation of commercial arrangements including MFN.

**Pros**
- Quick start using leverage of heightened EE interest in better commercial relations with US.
- Resolution of earlier issues increases bargaining leverage on later commercial negotiations.
- Minimize effect of Congressional delay in authorizing MFN.
- Non-economic accords will strengthen Congressional support for MFN authority.

**Cons**
- Not taking on whole range of commercial issues at once shows reserve toward new EE trading partners.
- Delay in start of economic/commercial negotiations.
- With some countries, claims issues may not be subject to resolution except in broader economic package.
- Possibly unfavorable EE reaction to linkage of economic and non-economic issues.
4. **Two-Phase Strategy with Second Phase after MFN Authority Granted**

Settle financial issues and non-economic issues as soon as possible, but agree to negotiation of commercial issues, including MFN only after Congress grants MFN authority.

<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Pros</strong></th>
<th><strong>Cons</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Quick start on financial claims and non-economic matters.</td>
<td>Unnecessary delay of settlement of commercial issues at time when EEs are eager.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Illustrate for Congress that these negotiations can be facilitated by MFN authority.</td>
<td>Delay of commercial negotiations makes less favorable climate for pursuit of our non-economic objectives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commercial negotiations will conform to legislation.</td>
<td>Makes our relations with EE appear of lower priority than our relations with USSR.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Not taking on whole range of commercial issues at once shows reserve toward new EE trading partners.</td>
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<td>Delay in start of economic/commercial negotiations.</td>
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**H. Recommendations**

It is recommended that we begin negotiations at an early date to remove existing financial obstacles (defaulted bonds, claims) and reach agreement on commercial practices and facilities so that understandings embodying MFN could be implemented quickly after Congress has granted the President authority to negotiate MFN. Commerce, Treasury, and Agriculture recommend the application of the Option 2 economic package approach for countries with which we do not have normal economic relations. The negotiation of non-economic issues would proceed in parallel or subsequently.

Is is of course recognized that the authority to extend MFN will be a crucial determinant in achieving eventual full scale normalization with Eastern Europe. State and Defense, however, would prefer the initiation of negotiations promising satisfactory cultural and scientific agreements, as well as bond and claim settlements (in the cases where these are lacking), in advance of commercial negotiations (Option 3).

1. **Yugoslavia and Poland.** We have already made considerable progress in our economic relations with these countries. The pattern
for conduct of our economic relations with them is well established and not at issue in this paper.

2. Romania. There are few remaining irritants in our relations with Romania. We are already committed to seek authority to negotiate MFN for that country. It is recommended that commercial negotiations involving such matters as arbitration and market disruption procedures and business facilitation as well as MFN be initiated early in 1973, in parallel with negotiations for settlement of defaulted pre-war bonds ($15.5 million). Reaching a settlement should be a prior condition for extending MFN. It would also be useful to stress to the Romanians who are anxious to be the next country to gain MFN status that freer issuances of emigration permits would enhance the prospects.

3. Hungary. The procedure for Hungary should be similar to that for Romania. Settlement of certain outstanding financial issues now under negotiation (bonds, claims) and of the commercial issues Hungary has offered to negotiate in March 1973 should be a condition to the extension of MFN and ExIm Bank credit facilities. USIA favors making a satisfactory cultural and scientific exchanges agreement a prerequisite to granting MFN. The Department of State believes that there could be successful parallel negotiation of exchanges at the time commercial issues are under negotiation without making a specific linkage, and that we could use the pending visit to the US as early as February 1973 of Hungarian Deputy Premier Peter Valyi to initiate parallel negotiations. Commerce, Treasury, and Agriculture favor no linkage to an exchange agreement.

4. Czechoslovakia. Overall relations with Czechoslovakia are not as good as those with most other EE countries. Trade, although rising, is at a relatively low level. Economic and other irritants requiring negotiation are many. Czech leaders, however, have recently expressed a desire to improve relations, and Czechoslovakia is potentially the third largest market for US goods in the area.

Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture recommend the separate economic package (Option 2) approach under which linked trade and claims negotiations would begin immediately. State and Defense would prefer the initiation in sequence in early 1973 of negotiations promising a conclusion of a cultural and scientific exchange agreement and a gold/claims and bond settlement, to be followed by commercial negotiations.

5. Bulgaria. The Bulgarian leadership is anxious to normalize commercial relations with the US, but reluctant to move in other areas. Commerce, Treasury, and Agriculture note the revival of consular negotiations and recommend the immediate initiation of linked commercial and financial negotiations under Option 2. State and Defense wish to arrive at a promising stage in negotiating a consular conven-
tion, cultural exchanges, and an agreement on defaulted bonds ($6.5 million), and stimulate or create a more normal atmosphere before opening commercial negotiations along the lines of Option Three. Either approach could be initiated in anticipation of or during Deputy Premier Ivan Popov’s tentative visit to Washington in the summer.  

6. The German Democratic Republic. We are faced with an interesting market of unexplored potential, but there are numerous existing limitations on trade, some of which will require negotiation. Efforts to improve trade should be continued and increased as circumstances permit, but there can be no formal negotiation or claims or comprehensive commercial agreements or cultural and scientific exchanges before establishment of diplomatic relations.

7. Albania. Albania’s limited market potential gives it the lowest commercial priority of the countries under consideration. In addition Presidential authority to negotiate MFN might well be achieved before diplomatic recognition is accorded. A package approach to the whole range of issues could be undertaken shortly after establishment of diplomatic relations (Option 4).

8. Multilateral Organizations. The USG favors participation by these countries in the world monetary and financial community. Nevertheless, the Group concluded that overt encouragement was neither necessary, given the self-evident advantages of membership in the IMF–IBRD group and GATT, nor desirable, given Eastern European problems with Soviet resistance. In the case of GATT, the terms of accession of any Eastern European state are significant as precedents for eventual Soviet accession. Until Congress has granted authority for MFN, GATT provisions preclude the US from participating fully in the negotiation of further East European accessions. The group favored expansion of relevant activities of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), including business and trade facilitation and exchange of technology. Moreover, the EC would appear to offer a suitable framework for further work on appropriate economic cooperation projects. Such institutions can play an important role in bringing the Eastern European states into the international trade and payments system. Other organizations—principally UNCTAD and ECOSOC—are less significant.

I. Country-by-Country Background

1. Yugoslavia. The original Communist maverick since 1948, Yugoslavia has since 1950 developed good relations with the US while at the same time maintaining a non-aligned foreign policy. Having enjoyed fully normalized economic relations plus substantial PL-480 and other

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13 See Document 75.
US assistance during the past two decades, Yugoslavia at the present time is not a candidate for "normalization." Its current problems are of a different order, involving centrifugal tendencies of its ethnically based federalized republics whose growing authority in Yugoslavia’s decentralized economy has tended to revive ethnic rivalries and threaten disunity after Tito’s departure from the scene. US exports to Yugoslavia approximate $170 million (1972) and consist of agricultural products and some machinery. Imports of about $150 million in 1972 were primarily furniture, agricultural products and copper. In light of Yugoslav balance of payment problems and efforts to limit imports, the potential for US export is limited to perhaps 5% annually over the next few years.

The US remains interested in a continuation of the current Yugoslav trade orientation (75% West, 25% Comecon) particularly in light of evident Soviet economic courtship through long-term low interest credits to development projects.

Enactment of a system of generalized tariff preferences by the US that would include Yugoslavia among LDC beneficiaries, and efforts with the EC and others to tide the Yugoslavs over their balance-of-payments problems are the important bilateral and economic concerns.

The Yugoslavia drive against émigré-organized terrorism aimed at disruption of the Yugoslav state, is another important issue. To judge by Yugoslav focus on this issue and recent efforts to revive the Communist party’s role, concern for independence, unity, and economic viability in Yugoslavia is rising as the 80 year old Tito phases out.

2. Romania. From a tightly-controlled, exploited, and underdeveloped Soviet satellite in the 1950s, Romania emerged in the 1960s as the most independent member of the Warsaw Pact. Although its traditional ties to the US are substantially less than those of Yugoslavia, its vigorous assertion of its sovereignty vis-à-vis the Soviet Union has stimulated its interest in better relations with the US. Anxiety for its sovereignty produced by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia underlay the warm reception given President Nixon by President Ceaucescu and the Romanian people in 1969.14 The same anxiety plus a desire to force the pace of economic development has motivated the 54 year old Ceaucescu to maintain an authoritarian Communist regime under his increasingly personalized leadership. The economic problems of an underdeveloped country reorienting its trade away from the Soviet (50% West, 50% Comecon in 1971) have caused the Romanians to seek from the U.S. economic normalization and at various times since 1965, aid or soft credits. At present, however trade consists of US exports of about $70

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14 See Documents 183 and 184.
million in 1972 primarily of agricultural products and machinery, and imports of $432 million primarily of petroleum, clothing and furniture. The potential for trade growth, even when MFN is granted, is limited (30 to 35% of hard currency earnings used for debt service) by Romania’s debt load and its poor export prospects. With extension of MFN in 1973 US exports could increase about 30% by 1975, although such projections cannot be made with a high degree of reliability.

The major current issue with the Romanians is MFN which they have sought for seven years and for which the Administration has committed itself to seek authority from Congress. Although we have in 1972 extended the facilities of the ExIm Bank, the facilities of OPIC, and supported their successful application to IMF and IBRD, the achievement of MFN status prior to the USSR or other Eastern European countries not now having it remains for the Romanians the symbol of US interest in their independent posture vis-à-vis the USSR. Other issues include settlement of defaulted dollar bonds and business facilitation.

In a broader sense the US remains interested in encouraging Romanian trade and investment ties with the West in order to permit Romania to continue its development and service its hard currency debt.

3. **Poland.** The largest Soviet ally in Eastern Europe and the one with the longest contiguous border with the USSR, Poland is also a country with long-standing ties to the West. These links are reinforced through its strong Catholic Church (about 95% of the 33 million inhabitants), its large and politically active Polish community in the US, and a traditional and spirited popular hostility to Russian domination matched only by painful experiences with German invasions. The blossoming of US-Polish relations in the wake of the 1956 de-Stalinization under Gomulka gave way in the 1960s to the chills of an increasing Gomulka accommodation to the Soviets and the stagnation of Polish reform in the tails of the self-serving Polish Communist Party bureaucracy. Poland, nevertheless, retained the MFN status granted in 1960 in spite of the impact on Congress of Vietnam and of a 1968 spate of official Polish anti-Semitism.\(^{15}\) In addition $538 million of gradually convertible zlotys were generated from 1956–64 PL–480 sales and is being utilized to finance US programs in Poland.

With the increasing interest in technological modernization on the part of the new Polish leadership brought to power by the December, 1970 workers’ riots in Poland’s Baltic seaports,\(^{16}\) Poland was the first

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\(^{16}\) See Document 142.
of the five Warsaw Pact invaders of Czechoslovakia to bid for full economic normalization with the US. In the wake of the President’s visit to Warsaw in May 31–June 1, 1972, the Poles were the first to achieve it when the extension of ExIm Bank facilities in November, 1972 during a session of the US-Polish Trade Commission supplemented their existing MFN status. US 1972 exports of about $111 million were primarily in agricultural products, machinery, and technology. Imports from Poland totalled approximately $140 million, primarily in agricultural products, chemicals and some manufactured goods. The potential for expansion of US exports is at present the best in the area. Factors enhancing this potential include Poland’s good credit position, its desire to buy US industrial goods on long-term credit and agricultural goods on three-year credits, and its existing MFN status. The recently concluded trade agreement expresses the expectation that trade will triple during the next five years; most of the increase is likely to accrue to US exports.

The current Polish leadership, which claims to have a good standing with the Soviet leadership and some influence on Soviet European policy, clearly hopes to achieve internal stability and satisfaction of popular pressures by a combination of technological improvement and such elements of administrative reform as its own party bureaucracy and its sensitive Soviet neighbor permit. Active US efforts in this favorable climate can promote exports, facilitate joint ventures, and encourage US-zloty financed scientific and cultural cooperation. These programs marginally enhance Polish independence and simultaneously support the US political interest in better Polish relations with the West as well as gradual reform which further distinguishes the Polish model from the Soviet.

4. Hungary. Since the crushing of the Czechs’ euphoric rush toward reform in 1968, Hungary’s more cautious New Economic Mechanism also initiated in 1968 has become the most interesting, most successful, and most obvious example within the Warsaw Pact countries of internal modification of the basic Soviet politico-economic model. A combination in 1971 of over-investment, over-importing, resentment of a new class of entrepreneurial wealth, and desire to avoid Soviet anxiety have caused the Hungarians to pause in 1972 to readjust their re-

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17 Regarding Nixon’s visit to Poland, see Documents 163–166.
18 See Document 175.
19 On January 1, 1968, Hungary adopted the New Economic Mechanism, a program of economic reform authored by Finance Minister Rezső Nyers. It limited the power of central planning agencies; granted state enterprises greater power to find their own labor, supplies and markets; and encouraged private enterprise in agriculture and in the service industries.
form, not so much to destroy it as to preserve it in the face of internal and external pressures. The business minded and trade-oriented Hungarians (trade is 35% of GNP) have given a high priority to achieving more market oriented production through greater enterprise latitude and flexibility. In order to defend this policy they have appeared willing to accept a small nation (10 million pop.) role foregoing any pretensions to an independent policy on foreign political issues.

In spite of a limited historic connection with the US, Hungary has since 1967 showed a steadily increasing interest in normalization of relations with the US, particularly in the economic area. At present it is the most active among the states not having MFN status in preparing the way to obtain it. US exports to Hungary have risen sharply in recent years but leveled in 1972 at about $23 million primarily agricultural products and machinery. Imports, mainly of foodstuffs and clothing, were at the $13 million level. Although it is not possible to project with much reliability, it is possible that with the extension of MFN and ExIm facilities in 1973, US exports could triple by 1975.

Hungary quickly agreed to a consular convention in time for the Secretary’s July 1972 visit,20 initialled a satisfactory claims agreement in October, and began talks with US holders of defaulted pre-war bonds. It is currently considering the draft cultural and scientific exchanges agreements handed over by the US in July, preparing the visit of its economic Deputy Prime Minister to the US in February, and seeking talks in March on the substantive issues relevant to a Commercial Agreement.

The return of the Hungarian Crown, in US custody since 1945, would be seen by the Hungarians as the culmination of the normalization process. US pursuit of improved relations with Hungary in all areas with an emphasis on a greater US presence through joint ventures will serve to give modest encouragement to pluralistic trends in Hungary’s increasingly market oriented economy and to its growing links to Western markets with results which could encourage the Poles and Czechs to try a similar path. Outstanding economic issues with Hungary include MFN, the extension of Export-Import Bank facilities, a market disruption agreement, business facilitation as well as the settlement of prewar bonds.

5. Czechoslovakia. Next to the East Germans, the most economically and technologically advanced of the Eastern Europeans are the 9 million Czechs who see their post World War I return to statehood as a direct result of Wilsonian ideals carried by the American-oriented

20 See Document 128. For the text of the consular convention, signed on July 7, 1972, see 24 UST 1141.
humanist Thomas Masaryk. The 5 million Slovaks, less committed as
the perennial less developed junior partner in the 55-year old union,
are linked to the US mainly through a substantial early 20th century
wave of economically inspired emigration. The Nazi dismemberment
in 1938, the Communist minority takeover in 1948, and the Soviet re-
pression of 1968 are the main mileposts in the past 35 years of severe
authoritarian rule of a people with remarkable democratic instincts and
traditions.

Brief 1945–1948 and 1968–69 intervals were the only respite permit-
ting meaningful connections with the West in the post World War
II era. In spite of uninspired leadership throughout this period, Czech
skills have maintained a good living standard by Eastern European
standards, but have not been organized to keep pace with Western Eu-
ropean markets as they once did. A strong Czech identification with
the West has been restricted by an unconvinced and uninspired party
bureaucracy, but substantial skills remain present which could quickly
respond to stimulus, as 1968 events illustrated.

US exports to Czechoslovakia in 1972 reached $50 million pri-
marily in corn, fodder, and hides. Imports have not differed much from
the 1972 level of about $27 million featuring shoes, iron and steel bars,
and glassware. Although projections can only be considered broadly
indicative of possible increases, extension of MFN and ExIm facilities
in 1973 and Czechoslovakia’s good credit position could produce a
doubling of US exports by 1975 if Czechoslovakia gave her enterprises
more latitude on foreign markets and permitted joint ventures.

US-Czechoslovak relations stagnated from 1968 until 1972 as the
post-invasion Czechoslovak regime devoted its efforts to internal con-
solidation and felt constrained to establish complete identity with the
Soviet Union in foreign policy. In the fall of 1972, however, in the wake
of the final phases of the consolidation campaign, the Czechoslovak
Foreign Minister took the initiative of expressing to the Secretary of
State the desire of his government to improve relations with the US.21
Since that conversation the Czechoslovak Government has reiterated
this desire in exchanging draft texts with us for a consular agreement,
expressing a willingness to reopen claims negotiations, demonstrating
great interest in normalization of economic relations, receiving a US
Senatorial delegation at the highest level, and in accepting the idea of
a cultural and scientific exchanges agreement.

Other economic issues to be negotiated with Czechoslovakia are
business facilitation and a bond settlement.

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21 See Document 90.
6. The German Democratic Republic

US interests in the German Democratic Republic are quite distinct from US interests in the countries of Eastern Europe. The domination and overwhelming importance of US interests in and relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, the existence of Quadripartite (US, UK, France, USSR) rights and responsibilities in Germany as a whole and Berlin, and the position of Berlin as an enclave within the GDR underscore this distinction. The role of the US as one of the quadripartite governments in Germany, and the role of the Soviet Union in the GDR have been the determining factors in US policy toward the GDR. These factors will continue to shape our emerging bilateral relationship with the GDR as we proceed to establish formal diplomatic ties. Once US–GDR relations have been established, subject to the above considerations, it will be possible to support more effectively than before such normal objectives as expanded trade, consular protection and a cultural-informational program.

In economic affairs the inter-German relation is important because of the role of inter-German trade, the political importance attached to it by the Federal Republic, and the access it grants the GDR to the Common Market. Direct US interest in the GDR market is on the order of magnitude of US interest in the markets of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. There is perhaps greater long-term potential, but less magnitude in the short-term due to the need to resolve difficult financial issues stemming from World War II including GDR nationalization of private assets before MFN can be extended. US exports to the GDR totalled approximately $14.9 million in 1972 with the chief products corn, other agricultural products, and coal. In the same year GDR exports to the US were about $10.0 million, chiefly photograph equipment, glassware, radios and non-electric machinery. Although it is not possible to project with much reliability, it is conceivable that improvement this year in political relations accompanied by relaxation of restrictions on both sides could lead to a three-fold increase in US–GDR direct trade by 1975.

United States interests—always within the context of our relations with the FRG and our role as a quadripartite power—are in establishing the basis of normal diplomatic relations. The US must approach basic problems in the economic relations at the outset of this process—problems such as settlement of claims of US nationals for nationalized property. Once basic problems have been resolved, US policy will increasingly emphasize those issues which characterize economic relations with the countries of Eastern Europe such as Most-Favored Nation Treatment, and Export-Import Bank facilities. It is likely that the resolution of many of these issues will take place within the context of resolution of issues in the political, consular and cultural areas, but the
first issues which must be approached are the administrative ones connected with the establishment of diplomatic relations.

7. Bulgaria. Bulgaria, the most loyal ally of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, has over the years displayed little interest in improving its relations with the US. This situation is quite natural given the geographical location of the country, its cultural affinity with the Soviet Union, its history of reliance on the Soviet Union for preservation of its separate national identity, and the unifying factor of communist rule. The limited importance to other larger nations which cause these nations to adopt a policy of benign neglect towards their limited interests in Bulgaria is also a consideration. This last factor is particularly strong with regard to the US—geographically removed with minimal political, economic and cultural interests in Bulgaria.

The US has an interest in seeing that consular problems of US nationals are settled as humanely and expeditiously as possible and that the interests of US citizens are served through the conclusion of a consular convention. There is an interest in having Bulgaria perform as a responsible member of the international community on problems which affect all nations, such as suppression of narcotics traffic, where Bulgaria occupies an important strategic geographic location.

The US economic interest in Bulgaria is limited. US exports to Bulgaria in 1972 were about $3.0 million with the principal items being pesticides, other chemicals, and hides. The US imported $3.0 from Bulgaria in 1972, chiefly canned meats, and rose oil. Although it is not possible to project with much reliability, with normalization this year of commercial relations, including the granting of Most Favored Nation treatment and Export-Import Bank credits, US exports to Bulgaria could triple by 1975.

Bulgaria has recently expressed an interest in improving its relations with the US and has proposed sending a Deputy Prime Minister to the US to carry out talks on outstanding problems in the economic field. It has also expressed willingness to resume negotiations of a consular convention and to consider taking steps in other fields to accomplish the desired improvement. United States policy toward Bulgaria in the coming year is likely to be focused on how to meet this initiative and on the degree to which improved economic relations can be used to secure offsetting concessions from Bulgaria in non-economic fields, including amelioration of the disadvantageous operating conditions imposed on the US Embassy at Sofia.

8. Albania. Albania has assumed increased importance on the international scene because it is a leading example of resistance to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, an important pawn in the Sino-Soviet ideological struggle, and a potential Mediterranean naval base for the Soviet fleet. Although the US interest in Albania is primarily a nega-
The US economic interest in Albania is small, as can be seen from the 1972 export figures: about $300 thousand, chiefly scientific materials and machinery. Albanian exports to the US were also limited: approximately $450,000 in 1972, chiefly agricultural products and works of art.

[Omitted here are the remaining five parts of Section I, comprising 86 pages, and Section II, dated February 1, 1973.]

27. National Security Decision Memorandum 212


TO
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT
Economic Policies for the Eastern European Countries

The President has considered the recommendations of the NSSM 163/CIEPSM 24 study and decided that the following general guidelines be observed in negotiations with the countries of Eastern Europe:

—With regard to the East European countries generally, progress in the economic area should be made contingent on satisfactory political conduct on international issues involving our interests and on
a demonstrated willingness to solve outstanding bilateral political problems.

—In economic negotiations with those Eastern European countries not now benefitting from MFN, no commitments on MFN authority should be made until authorized by the President. This should not, however, preclude initiation at an appropriate time of negotiations on commercial and economic problems of interest to us.

—No legislation authorizing PL–480 agricultural sales for additional Eastern European countries will be sought at this time.

Within these guidelines, the following steps should be taken:

1. Expedite conclusion of consular conventions with Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, aiming to ensure the fullest possible protection for U.S. citizens in those countries.

2. Continue to urge Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria to initiate promptly or to conclude negotiations on U.S. claims for nationalized property and defaulted bonds. Where appropriate, satisfactory settlement of these issues should be made a prerequisite for authorization of Export-Import Bank facilities.

3. Initiate negotiations on a cultural and scientific exchange agreement with Hungary. After conclusion of an agreement, proceed, if appropriate, to similar negotiations with Czechoslovakia and then at a later date with Bulgaria. In these agreements particular care should be taken to ensure that an equitable balance exists between the United States and its partner in the scientific and technological exchanges planned.

4. Begin negotiation of a commercial agreement with Romania. When they are completed or well advanced, negotiations may begin with Hungary. Equivalent timing in relation to Hungary should be governing for commercial negotiations with Czechoslovakia and in relation to Czechoslovakia for negotiations with Bulgaria. Commercial agreements involving the extension of MFN will not be concluded until there is a satisfactory settlement on U.S. claims for defaulted bonds.

5. Submit recommendations at an early date on the substance and timing of negotiations with Czechoslovakia on a package of financial issues, including claims, blocked accounts, and the return of Czechoslovak gold.

6. Submit separate recommendations on the GDR when negotiations on the establishment of relations have begun.

7. On appropriate occasions, give public indication of our readiness to negotiate resumption of diplomatic relations with Albania.

Henry A. Kissinger
PMF
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

28. Memorandum for the 303 Committee


SUBJECT
Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL)

1. Summary

The aims of this paper are three-fold. It offers (a) a review of efforts made to resolve the status of the Radios since the press disclosures of CIA covert funding activities in 1967; (b) it describes the activities and effectiveness of Free Europe, Inc., and Radio Liberty Committee, Inc.; and (c) it discusses three basic alternatives for the Radios, and the consequences of each.

This paper concludes that the only realistic hope of retaining the present benefits of the Radios is in continuing their status quo, and therefore recommends that the Committee endorse and recommend to higher authority their continued operation as CIA proprietary covert action projects, to be funded in amounts sufficient to keep them technologically competitive with comparable broadcasters.

2. Problem

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have been the oldest, largest, most costly, and probably most successful covert action projects aimed at the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. They represent an investment over almost 20 years of $350 million, and currently are undertakings that involve some [number not declassified] people and a cost of $32 million annually. Following the 1967 disclosures of CIA covert funding activities, and the enunciation of the Katzenbach guidelines proscribing such support to private voluntary organizations, repeated efforts were made to find a politically less vulnerable alternative means of supporting the

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1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, January–June 1969. Secret; Eyes Only. Tabs A–H, described below, are attached but not printed. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.
Radios. A one-time grant that assured their continuation through June 1969 was approved by higher authority in December 1967. The status and funding of the Radios beyond that date must be resolved at an early date.

3. Factors Bearing on the Problem

A. Origin of the Requirement

The requirement for a reappraisal of RFE and RL originated in the flood of publicity in early 1967, and in the policy guidelines laid down by the Katzenbach Committee to the effect that, “No Federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation’s educational or private voluntary organizations.”

Because RFE and RL did not represent a clear-cut case of CIA involvement with legitimate American private voluntary organizations, and because they have been of such importance to U.S. policy interests for so long, Secretary Rusk decided that the Radios fell outside the purview of the Rusk Committee, which had been appointed by President Johnson to review overt funding possibilities for the “CIA orphans.” Secretary Rusk requested instead that the Radios be handled as a special case, and that consideration of their future be undertaken by the 303 Committee.

On 29 June 1967, the 303 Committee considered nine alternatives submitted by CIA:

1. status quo
2. conversion from non-profit to profit-making corporations
3. reincorporation abroad
4. relocation abroad
5. support by an umbrella public-private mechanism as envisioned by the Katzenbach Report
6. support by a public-private mechanism specially intended to promote private international broadcasting
7. overt funding by USIA
8. transfer to USIA/VOA
9. termination

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2 On February 15, 1967, President Johnson appointed a committee composed of Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach (Chairman), Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare John W. Gardner, and Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms. The panel was established in response to press reports, particularly in Ramparts magazine (February 1967), of CIA secret funding over the years of the activities of private organizations, which became involved in confrontations with Communist-influenced groups at international gatherings. (The New York Times, February 16, 1967, pp. 1, 26) The Katzenbach Committee presented its report to the President on March 29, 1967; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 1214–1217. For text of President Johnson’s statement endorsing the report’s conclusions, see Public Papers: Johnson, 1967, Book 1, pp. 403–404. For relevant documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume X, National Security Policy, Documents 186, and 197 and ibid., volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations, Documents 26–29.
The 303 Committee reduced these to three possibilities—status quo, support by a public-private mechanism established by Congress, and transfer to USIA—and appointed an interagency Radio Study Group to further analyze the main stumbling blocks of these remaining alternatives. This Group consisted of representatives from State, Defense, Bureau of the Budget, USIA, CIA and the White House.

The Radio Study Group and its subcommittees conducted an exhaustive two-month study which included consultations with the Embassies in the Radios’ host and target countries. The Group’s study, presented to the 303 Committee on 20 September 1967, found only two realistic choices—continuation as constituted, or termination—and recommended that RFE and RL operations be continued on substantially their existing scale. The Bureau of the Budget registered a demurrer to these conclusions, recommending instead that RL be terminated and that RFE either be given a one-time terminal grant or an open appropriation by USIA until other arrangements could be made. The 303 Committee decided to summarize the problem and present it for the personal decision of the President on the advice of the Secretaries of State and Defense. (See Tab A for Radio Study Group Report.)

While the problem was under consideration by the three principals, the Director of Central Intelligence, on the authority of the President, canvassed key Congressional reactions to the various alternatives. The Congressional leaders consulted were: Senator Richard B. Russell, Senator Milton R. Young, Representative George M. Mahon, Representative Frank T. Bow, and Representative Glenard P. Lipscomb. They unanimously agreed to continued funding of these activities. The Director was also advised by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board that it was unanimous in its belief that the Agency should continue supporting the Radios, and that it wished these opinions made known to the President.

On the basis of these reactions, the Bureau of the Budget proposed in November 1967 that both Radios be surge-funded with one-time grants in amounts sufficient to sustain them through FY 1969. This course was considered by the 303 Committee and recommended to the President on 15 December 1967. Thus, in December 1967, RFE and RL were given lump sums totaling $49 million. This arrangement technically concluded CIA’s financial relationship with the Radios in compliance with the Katzenbach Committee stipulation that all covert aid to private voluntary or educational organizations should cease by 31 December 1967, but left open the way to future resumption of CIA covert financial responsibility should this be decided by a new Administration. In practice, and as requested by the 303 Committee, [1½ lines not declassified].
While no provision was made for their existence after 30 June 1969, the thrust of the 303 Committee’s recommendation in December 1967 leaned strongly toward their continuation.

In November 1968, facing the question of whether to include Radio funds in CIA’s FY 1970 budget, the Bureau of the Budget again reopened the question of the Radios’ future status in an independent analysis of the problem that outlined five alternative solutions:

1. resume CIA covert funding without public acknowledgement by determining that the Radios are in the “overriding national security interest” as defined by Katzenbach doctrine;
2. resume covert CIA funding, reincorporate the Radios abroad;
3. allocate $30 million to CIA’s FY 1970 contingency reserve and leave the ultimate decision to the new Administration;
4. commence overt funding through USIA or State Department;
5. provide for overt appropriations through a public-private mechanism established by Congress.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget, with the concurrence of State, USIA, CIA, and Mr. Walt Rostow, recommended the third alternative to the President. In December, however, the President wrote off the $30 million which was recommended for inclusion in the Agency’s contingency reserve in favor of leaving both the policy decision and the budgetary problem in the hands of the incoming Administration.

Whichever of the various alternatives is agreed upon, the decision must be made at the earliest possible date, so that either normal operations can be assured for FY 1970, or termination plans can be set in motion.

B. Activities

Originally intended as political action instruments to mobilize the post-war emigration from Eastern Europe and the USSR into an effective opposition, the parent organizations of the two Radios have long since turned virtually their entire efforts to broadcasting. In doing so, their broadcasts have evolved in step with the development of official U.S. policies toward these countries. For nearly 20 years, the two Radios have used the cover of privately financed, non-profit American corporations. But during that time funds have come largely from CIA, [1½ lines not declassified].

1. Radio Free Europe (RFE)

Radio Free Europe has been in operation since 1949, and currently broadcasts 19 hours a day to Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, 12 hours a day to Romania, and 8 hours a day to Bulgaria. It is the principal activity of an organizational parent body, Free Europe, Inc. (FE, Inc.), located in New York City, which also sponsors East Europe magazine and other publications, supports East European émigré groups,
conducts large-scale book-mailing programs into Eastern Europe, and facilitates diverse East-West contacts. General Lucius D. Clay is Chairman of the Board of Directors of Free Europe, Inc.; the President is William P. Durkee. Other members of the Board include Crawford H. Greenewalt, Roswell L. Gilpatric, Michael H. Haider, Livingston T. Merchant, and Robert D. Murphy. James M. Roche, Chairman of General Motors Corporation, has accepted the Chairmanship of Radio Free Europe Fund, Inc. (RFEF), the fund-raising arm of FE, Inc.

RFE’s programming headquarters are located in Munich, Germany, with transmitters in Biblis and Holzkirchen, Germany, and in Gloria, Portugal. The facilities are licensed by the host countries under agreements entered into directly by RFE as a private corporation, and without the intercession or official acknowledgement of support by the U.S. Government. RFE is operating in Portugal on the basis of a ten-year license renewed in 1963, and in Germany on a year-to-year, automatically renewable license.

FE, Inc., employs [number not declassified] people and has an FY 1969 budget of [dollar amount not declassified], of which $16,418,000 is for RFE. Of the total budget, [dollar amount not declassified] was raised by RFEF.

There is an abundance of testimony to RFE’s effectiveness as an important factor in the life of Eastern Europe. It comes to us from U.S. officials stationed in the target areas, as well as from regime officials who have remarked both publicly and privately on the success of the Radio in attracting listeners. This in turn is supported by audience research data gathered by USIA and by RFE itself, showing RFE to be the most widely listened to Western station in Eastern Europe. This would suggest that RFE satisfies urgent needs of the majority of the population of these countries which are not and, as the result of domestic political conditions, cannot be satisfied by their home radio stations and censored press. (See Tab B for audience research studies.)

During the historic spring and summer of 1968, RFE’s audience in Poland, Hungary, and Romania reached an all-time high, as people listened to the Radio for news of developments in Czechoslovakia, denied to them by their own media. In Czechoslovakia itself, primarily because of the freedom accorded domestic media by the Dubcek regime, the RFE audience declined temporarily. But after 21 August, and particularly after the clandestine Czech radios encountered difficulty in obtaining adequate information and maintaining consistent service, the population turned toward RFE, and its September 1968 audience research poll showed that listenership reached a record 71 per cent. (See Tab C for research poll.)

In this crisis period, RFE informed its Czechoslovak audience of the world’s indignation at the invasion, including the criticism expressed by Romania and Yugoslavia and by a majority of the Western
Communist Parties. The regular broadcasting schedule was extended to 24 hours a day, with news broadcasts every half-hour.

The impact of the Radio on the Czechoslovak people during the crisis impressed Ambassador Beam to such an extent that he said on 31 October, “They are doing a great job.” He also noted that Radio Prague had relied on RFE’s coverage of the Olympics in Mexico City rather than originate its own programming. (See Tab D for Czech statements.)

Former Ambassador Gronouski cabled from Warsaw in March 1968 during the student demonstrations that as much as 40–50 per cent of the student population followed RFE for news of the riots, particularly in quest of information from other parts of the country, and that the news broadcasts were “especially appreciated by the Polish audience.” Another Warsaw report stated that many Poles were full of praise for RFE’s coverage of the news, noting particularly that RFE broadcasts obliged the Polish media to react hastily in their own news treatment, with considerable fumbling as they attempted to present their version of the facts.

Ambassador Hillenbrand in Budapest reported that RFE has unquestionably furnished its Hungarian audience with more, and more timely, information on the Polish riots and the Czechoslovak situation than did the local media. Further information received from the Embassy in Budapest indicates that RFE’s appeal seems to be increasing in Hungary, and that despite the regime’s displeasure, Hungarian officials listen to it regularly and probably use it as a gauge of public sentiment and reactions.

One of the most valuable service that RFE performs for its target audience is that of cross-reporting news from other East European countries that is suppressed by regime media. Thus, RFE has been able to tell its Polish, Romanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian listeners about the Czechoslovak liberalization program from the fall of Novotny to the present day. Likewise, Czechoslovakians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, and Romanians heard details of the Polish student demonstration that they would not possibly have learned from regime organs. Yugoslav developments, the independent moves of Romania, all of these are immediately made available to the other Bloc countries by RFE.

Testimony to the efficacy of radio in general—and RFE in particular—came recently in response to Secretary Rusk’s request to all U.S. diplomatic missions for suggestions on specific ways for the United States to call attention to its efforts in the Paris talks with North Vietnam. Ambassador Hillenbrand replied that the official media of the countries of Eastern Europe are offset by widespread listening to foreign broadcasts and recommended that maximum feasible attention be given to publicizing the U.S. position on RFE and VOA. The Embassy in Warsaw reported that “with respect to the Polish public, we feel that
U.S. broadcast media—which are the most effective means of reaching broad elements of the Polish population—should continue full factual coverage of the Paris talks and other developments relating to Vietnam.” (See Tab E for official documents.)

2. Radio Liberty (RL)

Radio Liberty has been broadcasting to the Soviet Union since 1953, and transmits 24 hours a day in Russian, 14 hours a day in Ukrainian, and lesser amounts in 15 other languages of the USSR. Radio Liberty Committee, Inc. (RLC), the parent body located in New York City, also sponsors the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich, conducts the Agency’s largest book-mailing program to the USSR, and runs a program for providing Latin American press and radio with journalistic material on Communism developed by RL. The President of RLC is Howland H. Sargeant, and its Trustees include General Alfred Gruenther, Peter Grace, Jr., and Whitney Seymour.

RL’s programming headquarters are also situated in Munich, with transmitters in Lampertheim, Germany, in Pals, Spain, and Pa Li, Taiwan. RL’s license agreement with the West German Government is valid to 9 July 1971. Although the West Germans have the option of terminating the agreement earlier, their relations with RL are extremely good and it is not expected that they will exercise this option. The Radio’s Spanish license was granted for 12 years on 15 July 1959, and its Taiwan license does not expire until 30 July 1971.

The Radio Liberty Committee, Inc., currently employs [number not declassified] people and has an FY 1969 budget of $12,953,000, of which [dollar amount not declassified] is for RL.

Replying to a State Department request for an evaluation of Radio Liberty in July 1967, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson recommended that RL be continued in operation. Noting that RL broadcasts are heavily jammed, he said that despite this interference it has been able to hold on to an audience. He also pointed out that jamming operations tie up Soviet resources and entail costs which, together with the impact of the broadcasts on the population, might make it possible for the United States Government to use eventual cessation of RL broadcasts as an indirect bargaining counter at a later date. Ambassador Thompson said that the political climate at that time was not suitable for making a unilateral concession. (See Tab F for Ambassador Thompson’s cable.) Since July 1967, the atmosphere has deteriorated. The USSR has intensified its jamming of RL, resumed jamming of VOA and other Western broadcasters, rejected an official U.S. protest on this subject, and registered a protest of its own over the printing of a collection of Soviet protest documents in USIA’s Problems of Communism.

RL’s reaction to the nine-month Czechoslovak interlude and the subsequent invasion has been to encourage, prior to the invasion, a
crisis of confidence in the Soviet leadership’s judgment and intentions, and afterwards to arouse apprehension over the leadership’s misreading and brutal handling of the Czechoslovak situation, and to inculcate doubt as to the rationality of CPSU policy-making in times of stress. During the invasion, RL pressed into service its previously experimental one thousand kilowatt (megawatt) transmitter, and the Moscow Embassy has reported that its monitoring indicates that this signal can more than hold its own against the previously impenetrable groundwave jamming in the metropolitan Moscow area where the elite target audience lives. (See Tab G for monitoring and Embassy reports.)

In the USSR intellectual turmoil has begun to verge on political dissent, and RL has been particularly well suited to respond to this development. About 20 per cent of all output has focused on these sensitive areas. Among other things, it has broadcast the texts of virtually every one of the scores of Soviet protest documents, something VOA has been reluctant to do because of its official status, and frequently has read them at dictation speed so that they can be copied by listeners for further dissemination inside the USSR. In the fall and winter of 1967–68, RL concentrated heavily on reporting Soviet persecution of Ukrainian nationalist intellectuals, and serious youth problems in Georgia and Moldavia. Immediately afterward, in March 1968, the Ukrainian Party Secretary responsible for ideological and cultural affairs was demoted, and Radio Kiev was obliged to present a special interview with an official of the prosecutor’s office to answer queries which, according to the broadcast, stemmed from the “noisy sensation” created by foreign press and radio about the trials of Ukrainian intellectuals.

There has never existed a firm basis on which to estimate the size of RL’s audience. But several indicators of RL’s relative standing are available. It is known, for instance, that even without the megawatt transmitter, RL’s signal was capable of geographically covering, at various times, 90 per cent of the USSR’s territory. From RL’s analysis of its listener letters and from interviews with listeners who travel abroad, it is fairly clear that RL looms as one of the three or four most important stations broadcasting to the USSR, along with VOA and BBC, and that it probably ranks in popularity immediately behind these two stations. It is clear also that RL is recognized for what it is, a “political” station with a political message, and that therefore most of its audience is probably listening through preference rather than by accident. It is evident from this that RL is not so much in competition with VOA or BBC as it is complementary to their efforts, and that because RL offers a significantly distinctive product it is sought out for different reasons by many of the same people who also listen to other Western stations.
A number of indications of RL’s impact are derived from audience responses and regime reactions. Several mail tests have shown that only about one letter in thirty reaches RL from inside the USSR. Despite this censorship, RL annually receives between 500 and 1,000 listener letters, and additionally interviews about 500 listeners who arrive in the West as legal travelers and refugees. After a two-year slump in Soviet listener mail that affected all Western radios, the rate of mail flow to RL in 1968 was 43 per cent higher than the previous year and might suggest that a greater number of people were listening than ever before. Listener evidence also shows that in times of international crisis, RL’s audience size rises sharply. During the period of Polish student disturbances and Czechoslovak tensions in March 1968, RL was told by a Soviet literary critic that in Moscow “the streets were empty and quiet” because of people listening to foreign radio and that “Radio Liberty enjoyed the greatest success.” Evidently because of its coverage of East European developments and Soviet intellectual dissidence, RL was the object of more regime denunciations (78) in 1968 than in any previous year. Most of the attacks made reference to the Radio’s treatment of these two subjects. Finally, Soviet efforts to jam RL around the clock have continued unabated since 1953, whereas jamming of VOA was discontinued in 1963 and only resumed during the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

C. Pertinent U.S. Policy Considerations

The processes of fermentation and political adjustment which are now developing in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe can be expected to continue in the near future. Economic and social problems are likely to become more acute during the next few years. Intellectual ferment is likely to grow and expand to broader categories of the population. The Soviet military may become more clearly differentiated as a power group. Problems of nationalism and regionalism in various outlying areas of the USSR and in Eastern Europe may increase in overall importance.

The pervasiveness of these processes that have emerged during the last two years has exceeded expectations in this regard, and both Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe have played crucial roles in addressing themselves to these phenomena. We now would anticipate that in Eastern Europe the invasion of Czechoslovakia will prove only a stopgap measure toward containing pressures that will now be redirected into subtler forms of expression, and that in the USSR the current sporadic intellectual dissent will likely grow into the rudiments of a cohesive intellectual opposition to the regime if such dissidence is driven underground by the present repressions. These circumstances would make the Radios even more important than previously.
D. Alternative Courses of Action

A determination must now be made as to whether the Radios should be continued after 30 June 1969, and, if so, whether they should be funded [less than 1 line not declassified] by CIA. There is no reason to believe that additional staff review will make that decision any easier. The problem of what to do with RFE and RL has been studied exhaustively and almost continuously for the last three years by some of the most competent specialists in and outside the Government. The value of the Radios as irreplaceable assets has been affirmed over the years by every study group, official and private, that has addressed itself to the problem. Every reasonable alternative has been explored, and additional options from which to choose are not likely to be developed. What is required now is a policy decision based on value judgment.

1. Continuation

It has been recognized by each reviewing body that RFE and RL represent important U.S. assets in terms of rare talent, specialized organization, and base facilities which have taken nearly 20 years and $350 million to develop. Once dispersed, these assets could be recreated only with immense difficulty, if at all. In itself this represents a powerful argument for continuing the operations.

If the Radios are to retain their present status and functions, however, there is no satisfactory alternative to the resumption of covert financing by CIA. If the Radios were openly associated with the Government, either through a public-private mechanism or as a line item in the USIA budget, they would be vulnerable to extensive debate each year, and it would become necessary inter alia to publicly explain and defend the more politically-charged missions of RFE and RL as distinct from those of VOA. Such open affiliation with the Government would be a contradiction in terms for a gray radio. It would confirm that the Radios were official instruments of the U.S. Government, and the contracts and licenses under which they operate as private organizations would become null and void, with the transmitters in Spain and Portugal reverting to the governments of those countries.

Against this backdrop it should also be recognized as a fact of life about which little can be done that there exists a widespread assumption, entertained especially by U.S. media, that the Radios are indeed financed by CIA. For the most part this has caused the Radios only minor difficulties, probably because their objectives are generally considered laudable, and because their activities are mostly conducted outside the United States. Moreover, among the scholars and journalists who have taken the time to familiarize themselves with the work of RFE and RL, most have emerged true believers in their worth, genuinely impressed with their expertise, sophistication, and restraint.
RL and RFE were only minimally involved in the publicity that followed the *Ramparts* magazine disclosure in February 1967. The only fire drawn by either of the Radios was directed at RFE’s public fundraising campaigns. As a result, public solicitation of funds through mass media was dropped, but discreet fund-raising from corporate donors was permitted. To support the corporate solicitation, the Advertising Council resumed in November 1968 its annual campaign on behalf of RFE, but omitting appeals to the public for funds. Since the expiration of the Katzenbach deadline on December 31, 1967, neither Radio has attracted any sustained or seriously embarrassing publicity, although both have continued to receive occasional queries about their source of funds.

This low-key interest in the Radios themselves will certainly continue. Some sharp questioning to sound out the new Administration for the record on its arrangement with the Radios may also be expected fairly early in the year, and there will probably be continued inquiry along the lines of the recent Evans and Novak column, probing the status and funding of the Radios. Any criticism thus developing would undoubtedly focus on the Radios’ public profile and on the charge of deception of the American public implicit in their proclaimed status as private organizations.

As long as these institutions continue to function in the public domain without a plausible source of support commensurate with the size of the operation, the problem of credibility will remain with us. Explanations or disclaimers short of outright disclosure of Government support will be suspect in unsympathetic circles. If, on the other hand, Government support were acknowledged, it would become extremely difficult if not impossible for the organizations to continue their operations in Germany, Portugal, and Spain.

On balance, it is recognized that there is no easy solution to the problem of continuing the operation of the Radios under a cover story.

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3 In their column of December 5, 1968, journalists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak wrote: “One of the many loose ends left by the lame duck Johnson Administration for President-elect Nixon to tie up poses an acute problem of credibility . . . Clandestine financing of Radio Free Europe. There is scarcely any doubt that the Nixon Administration will maintain the hefty U.S. subsidy, size unknown, that is funneled through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to provide almost all the financing for Radio Free Europe’s massive propaganda effort . . . The question Nixon must decide is whether to maintain the subsidy under the table or to bring it out in the open . . . With some of Nixon’s financial supporters among Radio Free Europe’s sponsors, the subsidy will assuredly continue—in one of three forms: (1) as a secret CIA contribution not acknowledged by the government; (2) as a CIA contribution whose existence is announced but size not disclosed or subjected to congressional scrutiny; or (3) as a regular congressional appropriation subject to normal congressional procedures.” Evans and Novak, “Financing of Radio Free Europe Leaves Nixon Sensitive Problem,” *The Washington Post*, December 5, 1968, p. A21.
which is intrinsically plausible and yet compatible with U.S. Govern-
ment credibility. Ideally, the less that is said in response to press in-
quiry, the better.

In the last analysis it is believed that, if a determination is made
to continue the operation of the Radios [less than 1 line not declassified], a public position will have to be taken by the Government which in practical terms constitutes an evasion of the question of financial spon-
sorship of the Radios. (A suggested scenario to cover this eventuality
is attached as Tab H.)

In conclusion, it should be noted that a position taken with respect
to the Radios in the above context will necessarily be affected by what-
ever policy the Administration chooses to adopt toward the Katzen-
bach rulings as a whole.

2. Metamorphosis

The possibility of openly affiliating the Radios with USIA was
briefly considered in 1967 and was rejected as unsuitable for the fol-
lowing reasons. First of all, it is doubtful that Congress, faced with
requests for appropriations for RFE and RL as part of VOA, would ap-
propriate sufficient funds each year for RFE and RL. Moreover, the pub-
lic appropriation/budgetary process would expose RFE and RL to con-
flicting pressures of outside criticism and review. The specific qualities
that make RFE and RL broadcasts unique and allow them to foster U.S.
interests in ways denied to VOA would be lost; i.e., their flexibility and
hard-hitting commentary on internal affairs. The Radios would then
be subject to the same policy restrictions and impediments as VOA.

The transmission bases and broadcast facilities of RFE and RL
abroad would probably be lost since, as mentioned above, they are op-
erated under non-transferable license agreements. There is little chance
that the host countries would allow the U.S. Government to take over
these facilities without exacting a high diplomatic or financial price. As
for programs, they too would suffer from merger with VOA, in that
target audiences, formerly well disposed, would view them skeptically
because of their official sponsorship. Moreover, many members of the
staffs of RFE and RL, with all of their rare talents and skills, would
probably leave because of their reluctance to be associated with an of-
official propaganda arm of the U.S. Government.

3. Termination

If the risks of continued covert funding are deemed unacceptable,
and if, as indicated above, an autonomous affiliation with USIA is im-
practical, the only alternative for RFE and RL is termination. While it
might be possible to salvage and turn over to VOA certain technical
facilities, frequencies, and personnel, the unique element of RFE and
RL broadcasts—detailed reporting and hard-hitting commentary on in-
ternal developments—would unquestionably be lost.
Termination at this particular time, in the aftermath of the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia, would be a significant unilateral concession to the Soviet Union and to the hard-line East European regimes. The absence of a plausible explanation for the cessation of broadcasting would suggest to the radio audiences in the USSR and Eastern Europe that the United States had lost interest in them. It might also be interpreted by West Europeans as another sign of U.S. disengagement, possibly suggesting that a deal had been struck with the Soviets.

Within the United States there are many elements, including large ethnic groups with close ties to many of the countries to which the Radios broadcast, for whom cessation of broadcasting would seem a serious and incomprehensible decision, especially in light of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The attitudes of the ethnic groups would probably add significantly to the likelihood of adverse publicity attendant on termination, and would lend themselves to domestic political exploitation. Strongly negative Congressional reactions were encountered when the Director of Central Intelligence discussed the possibility of termination with key members of Congress in late 1967. A number of Congressmen are likely to show particular concern for the fate of RFE and RL because of their traditional responsiveness to the interests of domestic European ethnic groups, and because of their considerable knowledge of and belief in the work of the Radios.

Termination would be neither cheap nor swift. It is estimated that termination would require at least 12 months and approximately [dollar amount not declassified] for the two Radios.

4. Coordination

There has been close coordination with the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, and with the Bureau of the Budget over a two-year period on the question of the Radios’ future. Current operational and policy coordination is carried out on a regular basis with both the Department of State and USIA.

5. Recommendation

It is recommended that the 303 Committee:

a. Affirm the continued political relevance of the missions of Free Europe, Inc., and Radio Liberty;

b. Authorize the CIA to resume covert funding of Free Europe, Inc., and Radio Liberty, in FY 1970 as an exception in the overriding national interest as provided in the Katzenbach Report, but without public admission;

c. Agree that inasmuch as the broadcasting activities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are worth continuing, they should be maintained at a level sufficient to keep them on a qualitatively competitive footing with other international broadcasters to the same target areas.
The proposed FY 1970 budget for Free Europe is $20,900,000 \[1 \text{ line not declassified}\]; Radio Liberty Committee’s proposed budget is $12,900,000. There are, however, no funds budgeted in FY 1970 for the Radios as a consequence of the President’s decision in December. It will therefore be necessary to increase the Agency’s Fiscal Year 1970 budget in the amounts cited, which presumably could be done in the current review of the budget proposals placed before the Congress by the outgoing Administration.

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29. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

RFE and RL

At the meeting yesterday in the Secretary’s office, the only public stance on RFE and RL which seemed to offer a way out of the dilemma with which we are confronted was to dissociate the radios from the Katzenbach report. That is to say, the present administration would take the position that it had looked into the situation thoroughly and had concluded that RFE and RL are not “educational or private voluntary organizations” and hence the policy recommended by the Katzenbach Committee does not apply to them.

I talked to Cord Meyer about this solution and he in turn has spoken to the RFE/RL people in New York. He tells me that the latter believe that they can live with this solution, provided we do not go further and explicitly acknowledge that the radios are supported by the government. By this I believe they mean that the position of the radios in the host countries would not be jeopardized and that the prominent persons associated with the radios in this country would not be embarrassed. I gather also that CIA itself could accept this solution.

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\(^1\) Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, 303 Committee Files, January–June 1969. Secret sent through Hughes. Cleared by McCloskey and in substance by Toon. A notation alongside McCloskey’s clearance reads: “except for suggested leak, about which he [McCloskey] has serious doubts.”
The proposed solution is not different in principle from one cleared with the ranking Republican and Democratic members of the CIA watchdog committees in 1967, so there should be a good chance that Congress would go along with continued CIA funding.

The remaining question is whether the approach is feasible in terms of press relations. I am inclined to think that it is. I presume that we would volunteer nothing but await a specific question about the radios. However the question might be put, the reply would be that the new administration has looked into this matter very closely, has concluded that RFE and RL are not among the nation's private voluntary organizations and hence not in fact subject to the policy recommended by the Katzenbach Committee. Although not essential, the spokesman should also be authorized to say that the new administration endorses the Katzenbach policy, thus heading off a charge that the government has resumed funding more politically sensitive organizations such as the National Student Association. If asked whether the government was now acknowledging government or CIA support to the organizations the reply would be “no comment.” If asked whether the Katzenbach Committee itself regarded the radios as private voluntary organizations, the reply would be that we cannot speak for that Committee but this administration thinks that they are not. (If this approach is decided on it would be desirable to discuss it in advance with Mr. Katzenbach and possibly Mr. Gardiner.)

This approach, would, of course amount to a tacit admission that the radios are supported by CIA. However, this is not news to anyone and I should not think the press would be able to make much capital out of the fact that we refused to say so in so many words. Conceivably, the whole situation could be further defused by an advance leak (possibly to Evans and Novak, who could thus complete their exposé) explaining how the problem was to be handled. Such a leak could also make the point that public fund raising by RFE terminated some time ago.

I suggest you try this out on the 303 Committee tomorrow.

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2 Apparently, John Gardner of the Katzenbach Committee (see footnote 2, Document 28).
3 See footnote 3, Document 28.
4 See Document 30.

SUBJECT
Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 5 February 1969

PRESENT
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger (Chairman), Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Mr. David Packard, and Mr. Richard Helms
Mr. Robert P. Mayo and Mr. C. W. Fischer were present for Item 1.
Mr. Cord Meyer and Mr. Hugh Tovar were present for Items 1, 2, and 3.
Mr. William Trueheart was present for the entire meeting.

[Omitted here is a discussion of committee procedures.]

1. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

   a. Mr. Meyer briefed the Committee on the origins, operations, problems and present status of both Radio projects. There was considerable discussion including alternatives examined in previous exhaustive studies of the disposition to be made of the Radios. Particular attention was devoted to the possibility of VOA as an alternative, or successor or absorber of RFE.

   b. All agreed the Radios are valuable assets, and it was finally concluded that there were realistically only two choices—continuation of the Radios as presently constituted with covert CIA funding, or termination.

   c. All members opted for continuation of both Radios via covert CIA funding for FY-1970 at the budgetary and qualitative level recommended in the proposal paper before the Committee.²

   d. Mr. Mayo noted that none of these funds had been previously provided for in CIA’s FY-1970 budget and expressed the hope that some offsetting savings could be found elsewhere.

   e. The Chairman stated that he would send forward a memorandum to the President advising him of the Committee’s action and recommending that he approve the continuation of the Radios with covert CIA funding for FY-1970.

   f. The Chairman also stated that he wished the Committee to review these projects again, but no date was set for such review. Mr.

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Minutes. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on February 6 by Trueheart.
² Document 28.
Helms observed that this could be undertaken any time at the convenience of the Committee principals.

g. The question of obtaining appropriate Congressional support for continuing the Radios was raised. Mr. Helms noted that any steps in this direction would be inappropriate until Presidential approval is secured. It was agreed that this step would be held in abeyance.

h. A good deal of discussion ensued on the question of how to handle press inquiries which will inevitably arise. Mr. Johnson suggested a formula. He said that the State Department had devoted a great deal of study to this matter and felt that the Radios did not fall within the restrictions imposed by the Katzenbach report relating to domestic educational or private voluntary organizations. He observed that the Radios’ incorporation in New York was happenstance; they could just as well have been incorporated elsewhere and this should not be considered an overriding factor.

i. Mr. Johnson favored having an Administration spokesman, upon query from the press, respond that the new Administration had looked into the matter of the Radios very closely and had concluded that RFE and RL are not among the nation’s private voluntary organizations and hence are not in fact subject to the policy recommendations submitted by the Katzenbach Committee.

j. Since the Radios are not subject to the policy recommendations in the Katzenbach report, there is no question of making an exception for their continuation in the “overriding national security interests” as provided for in the report.

k. It would also be desirable to state that the new Administration endorses the policy enunciated in the Katzenbach report in order to head off press accusations that the Administration is abandoning these principles and resuming covert activities in the more sensitive youth and student field.

l. Mr. Johnson thought it desirable to contact Messrs. Katzenbach and John Gardner beforehand to review the above stance with them in order to obtain their agreement and support. It was agreed that this would be worthwhile.

m. It was noted by the members that the foregoing approach would leave an intimation of CIA support to the Radios but would at least maintain the “fig leaf” of non-U. S. Government official support so important to the retention of transmitting facilities located in various foreign countries under existing leases between those countries and RFE and RL as private entities. It was agreed that Mr. Johnson’s formula for handling press queries was probably as good as could be devised.

n. Mr. Mayo and Mr. Fischer raised the question of the feasibility of Radio Liberty soliciting private corporate funding support as does
A number of reasons were cited as to why this is not practical and the question was dropped. 3

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.]

3 Following up on the decision of the 303 Committee at its February 5 meeting, Kissinger sent an undated memorandum to President Nixon with the recommendation that he “approve the continued support of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty with covert CIA funding in the approximate amount of $32.3 million for FY 1970, subject to budgetary review, and the proposals for responding to press inquiries as they may arise.” The President checked his approval on Kissinger’s recommendation on February 22. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I) For the proposed responses to press inquiries, attached to Kissinger’s memorandum, see Document 31.

31. Paper Prepared for the President’s Press Secretary (Ziegler) 1

Washington, undated.

PUBLIC STANCE ON FUNDING OF RFE AND RL

Background

Following serious and sustained press and public attacks set off by the Ramparts disclosure that the National Student Association had received covert financial support from CIA, President Johnson on February 15, 1967 appointed a committee to review relationships between government agencies and “educational and private voluntary organizations” and to recommend “means to help assure that such organizations can play their proper and vital role abroad.” The Committee (made up of Under Secretary Katzenbach, HEW Secretary Gardner, 2

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper, which was sent to the President under cover of a memorandum from Kissinger (see footnote 3, Document 30). Attached to the paper is a note, February 22, from Haig to Ziegler. Haig wrote: “Ron: The President approved the Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty package this morning. I thought you should be armed with this press treatment package in the event the story breaks while you are in Europe. However, I anticipate that you would work closely with Henry [Kissinger] on any treatment of the issue.”

2 It would be advisable to consult Messrs. Katzenbach and Gardner before deciding finally on the press line suggested in this paper. [Footnote in the original.]
and CIA Director Helms) recommended that it should henceforth be “the policy of the United States Government that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation’s educational or private voluntary organizations.” This policy was accepted by the President and went into effect March 29, 1967. Its basic purposes, in the words of the Katzenbach Committee, were “to avoid any implication that governmental assistance, because it is given covertly, is used to affect the policies of private voluntary groups” and “to make it plain in all foreign countries that the activities of private American groups are, in fact, private.”

With the exception of the National Student Association, the Katzenbach Committee did not identify the organizations which had received covert support, although a number of them had been cited (correctly) in press reports, including RFE and RL. It had long been an open secret that the latter were covertly subsidized by CIA and the press probably assumed that the Katzenbach policy was meant to apply to them. The radios, however, were not a major target of Ramparts or the subsequent press campaign. The only aspect of their operations which came under fire was the public fund-raising activities of RFE (since discontinued). It was not argued that government support of the radios was improper; simply that private persons should have been put on notice of this before being asked to contribute.

The Katzenbach report stated that the Committee believed that the process of terminating support to organizations affected by the policy could be largely or entirely completed by December 31, 1967. In fact, the State Department spokesman announced on December 29 that this target would be met and that “covert financial support will in every instance be discontinued prior to December 31, 1967.” He added that “at the time of termination of support, some of the organizations received contributions to tide them over the period required to develop new sources of funds.”

The press appears to be well aware that funding of RFE and RL will require an early decision by the new Administration—the Evans–Novak column of December 5, 1968 laid out the issue explicitly—and press questions seem inevitable.

Discussion

A decision to continue CIA funding of RFE/RL will pose press and public relations problems. Government support for the radios cannot be officially acknowledged without (a) jeopardizing their operating

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3 In the case of RFE and RL, this amounted to $49 million, an amount calculated to keep them in operation through FY 1969. [Footnote in the original.]

4 See footnote 3, Document 28.
rights in the countries where they are based (Germany, Spain and Por-
tugal) and (b) increasing our diplomatic difficulties in dealing with
protests from the target countries regarding the content of the broad-
casts. On the other hand, government support cannot be credibly de-
nied. We are therefore obliged to reply noncommittally or evasively to
the questions which are almost certain to be raised.

Such a stance will of course be taken as a tacit acknowledgement
that covert funding is continuing. It is not believed, however, that this
will jeopardize the position of the radios abroad to anything like the
degree that an official acknowledgement would. Moreover, it is not ex-
pected that tacit acknowledgement would in itself open the Adminis-
tration to attack. The radios have never been seriously criticized by the
press except in connection with their public fund-raising operations
(which were discontinued some time ago).

The real risk involved in a response indicating continued funding
of the radios is that, in the context of the Katzenbach report, it could
provok charges that the government is resuming funding of domes-
tic educational and private voluntary organizations of a politically sen-
sitive sort, such as the National Student Association. Hence it is im-
portant to handle press questions in such a way as to make clear that
whatever the government may be doing about RFE and RL does not
affect basic policy regarding the latter.

Scenario

In line with the foregoing it is proposed that no statement be made
about funding of the radios until a question is received. The most likely
question will be a direct, “Is the U.S. government (or the CIA) pro-
viding funds to RFE and RL?” The response should be, “I have no com-
ment to make on that.”

This may well be followed by a question referring to the Katzen-
bach policy and asking if that policy does not prohibit the funding (or
covering funding) of RFE and RL. The response should be, “It is my un-
derstanding that the Katzenbach policy applies only to ‘educational or
private voluntary organizations’ and that all U.S. agencies are observ-
ing this policy.”

A further question might be, “If RFE and RL are not private vol-
untary organizations, what are they?” The reply should be, “I see no
reason for a discussion of what this is, or what that is—I have nothing
further to say.”
32. Memorandum From Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Termination of Radio Liberty

During a meeting on the CIA budget on December 17, the President reviewed the programs of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which are covertly funded by the CIA. He decided to retain Radio Free Europe and “improve it” but to terminate Radio Liberty.

The decision on Radio Free Europe, which is targeted on Eastern Europe, presents no problems. The $22 million currently allocated to it in the FY 71 budget includes modernization funds.

The termination of Radio Liberty, which is targeted on the Soviet Union, is, however, a delicate matter. The reasons for its termination include the following:

—Radio Liberty programming, which now concentrates on providing news and editorial interpretation of current events, no longer stresses the need to liberate the Soviet Union from Communism. Nevertheless, it is heavily jammed. As a result of jamming and other technical factors, its signal is not received in wide areas of the Soviet Union and is picked up erratically elsewhere in the USSR.

—There is a small possibility that the Voice of America could take over the very powerful Radio Liberty transmitters in Spain. (This would depend on the attitude of the Spanish Government toward reversion of part of the transmitting equipment.)

—There would be budgetary savings on the order of $15 million per year.

The principal problems involved in termination are:

—Radio Liberty has political support in the United States (although less than Radio Free Europe) which would generate some domestic pressure for its retention.

—Because of the intricacies of local labor laws, difficulties might be encountered in terminating Radio Liberty’s 871 overseas employees, the bulk of whom are in West Germany.

Given the sensitivity of this issue, the details of the termination of Radio Liberty should probably be handled by a special inter-agency task force which would work out:

—when exactly to shut down Radio Liberty facilities;
—whether Radio Liberty should be put off the air abruptly or phased out over a period of time;
—how to handle any labor or other problems arising with the Governments of Spain and West Germany and to a lesser extent that of Nationalist China (where the rest of Radio Liberty’s overseas facilities are located);
—what kind of public announcement, if any, to make in the United States;
—how to handle public and Congressional criticism of termination;
—whether to transfer a $700,000 a year book presentation program currently run by Radio Liberty to CIA or USIA.

Such a task force should be chaired by the State Department and include representatives from CIA, USIA, BOB, DOD and NSC.

Recommendation

That you sign the enclosed memorandum to Elliot Richardson (Tab A) asking him to set up a task force to implement the termination of Radio Liberty.3

2 Attached but not printed.
3 There is no indication that Kissinger approved or disapproved of the recommendation.

33. Memorandum From the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Cushman) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1


SUBJECT
Termination of Radio Liberty

1. We have just learned of the decision by higher authority to terminate the Radio Liberty project. We wish to appeal that decision at once for the reasons listed below.

2. Radio Liberty Committee (RLC), together with its counterpart Free Europe Committee (FEC), have been subjected to a series of exhaustive inter-agency reviews since mid-1967. In February of this year the 303 Committee examined fully and carefully the findings of previous studies, and endorsed the conclusions sustained by the latter.\(^2\) Subsequently and pursuant to the 303 Committee endorsement, the President on 22 February 1969 approved the continuation of Radio Liberty [less than 1 line not declassified] with CIA covert funding.\(^3\)

3. RLC operates Radio Liberty, a book distribution program to the USSR, and the Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR, under a current budget of [dollar amount not declassified]. Radio Liberty broadcasts 24 hours of the day in 18 languages of the Soviet Union with 1840 kilowatts of transmitter power from sites in Germany, Spain, and Taiwan. The main programming office is in Munich, Germany, and is supplemented by programming from a New York office. [6 lines not declassified]

4. While the size of Radio Liberty’s audience cannot be firmly established, technical measurements indicate that with favorable propagation conditions the radio can cover 90% of the territory of the USSR. Although mail tests show that only a fraction of letters from listeners reach the radio, Radio Liberty has received as many as 1,000 letters in a year, reflecting audience interest. Several hundred interviews with Soviet and Western travelers confirm extensive listening to Radio Liberty, and denunciations by Soviet media are frequent and strong. Finally, the jamming effort against Radio Liberty has never ceased since it went on the air in 1953. This represents a budgetary burden to the Soviet Government substantially in excess of the cost of operating the radio.

5. Since 1965, intellectual dissent in the USSR has grown from a small pressure group within the literary-artists circle to the level of political dissent involving other elements of Soviet society. Radio Liberty, in its role as a free voice from abroad, serves as a catalyst for the growing number of Soviet dissidents who strive for freedom to interpret their society, its purposes and goals. They actively seek information and ideas and turn to foreign radio outlets like Radio Liberty, which, unlike VOA, is almost exclusively concerned with intensive coverage of Soviet internal developments, and seeks to correct the distortions and omissions of Soviet domestic output.

\(^2\) See Document 30.
\(^3\) See footnote 3, Document 30.
6. Before the decision to continue was made, the 303 Committee considered other alternatives such as shifting to public funding and possible merger with USIA, as well as termination. It was felt that continuation under CIA [less than 1 line not declassified] covert funding was the only desirable solution.

7. Congressional attitudes elicited in October 1967, when the future of the radios was under scrutiny, showed a strong interest in the radios and a desire to see them continue in operation.

8. The Department of State has recently restated the U.S. Government’s recognition that the Soviet émigrés, especially those who work for Radio Liberty and other émigré activities, have a special contribution to make to United States information programs, both overt and covert, which are aimed at influencing the attitudes of the Soviet people and their leaders in directions which would make the Soviet Government a more constructive and responsible member of the world community. Ambassador Thompson, while still in Moscow, recommended against termination.

9. [7 lines not declassified]

10. Since 1950, over $132,000,000 has been spent in building up a smoothly running professional operation, which reaches its target effectively and is a source of concern to the Soviets. Once liquidated, an instrumentality of this type cannot be rebuilt.

11. Estimates of liquidation costs are roughly the equivalent of one year of normal operations, i.e., approximately [dollar amount not declassified]. Thus, Radio Liberty’s termination results in no budgetary saving in FY 1971.

12. Over and above the considerations summarized above, we would place maximum stress on the fact that unilateral termination of Radio Liberty would entail a major political concession to the USSR, with no quid pro quo. This would be both unfortunate and unnecessary. It could lead to miscalculation by the Soviets as to our intentions and strength of purpose. It would, we believe, call into serious question the survival of Radio Free Europe.

13. The Agency urges, in the strongest possible terms, that the decision to terminate be reconsidered.

R.E. Cushman, Jr.
Lieutenant General, USMC
34. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Disposition of Radio Liberty

On 22 February 1969 you approved the continuation of both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty with CIA covert funding. This decision was recommended to you by the 303 Committee and was based on previous exhaustive studies and evaluations by governmental and nongovernmental committees affirming the considerable value of both radios in support of U.S. policy objectives.

I am informed that in a budget discussion with Mr. Mayo on 17 December you expressed your intention of terminating Radio Liberty. CIA forwarded a memorandum on 19 December requesting that you reconsider this decision for the following reasons. This memorandum is attached at Tab A.2

1. Recent technical measurements reflect that with favorable propagation conditions Radio Liberty can cover 90% of the territory of the USSR. Extensive listening to the radio is confirmed by mail received and by interviews with Soviet and Western travelers. Soviet media denunciations are frequent and strong and the Soviet jamming effort costs substantially more than the operation of the radio.

2. Radio Liberty, as a free voice from abroad covering Soviet internal developments, serves as a catalyst for the growing number of Soviet dissidents striving to interpret their society, its purposes and goals.

3. The Department of State has recently restated its recognition that Soviet émigrés have a special contribution to make to U.S. information programs, both overt and covert, aimed at influencing the Soviet leaders toward making their government a more constructive and responsible member of the world community.

4. [4 lines not declassified]

5. Estimates of liquidation costs are [dollar amount not declassified] almost the equivalent of one year of normal operations; thus termination would result in little budgetary saving in FY 1971. Once liquidated an instrumentality of this type cannot be rebuilt.

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2 Printed as Document 33.
6. Unilateral termination of Radio Liberty would be a major political concession to the USSR with no quid pro quo and might result in the early demise of Radio Free Europe as well.

On 20 December the 303 Committee discussed this problem at length. The members were unanimous in their view that Radio Liberty is of considerable value in support of U.S. policy objectives vis-à-vis the USSR and should not be eliminated voluntarily at this time.

Since the principal operating bases of both Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe are located in West Germany, we agree that termination of Radio Liberty might well result in an early end to RFE because of political pressures brought to bear on the West German government in its newly developing relations with its Eastern European neighbors, against which RFE is targeted.

The 303 Committee believes that rather than unilaterally terminating Radio Liberty at this time, it would be prudent to continue it and watch developments during the next eight months or so in an effort to determine what quid pro quo might be obtainable from the USSR and/or West German governments should it then be considered desirable to terminate Radio Liberty. The State Department will make a study of the political implications involved in continuation or termination of Radio Liberty, and CIA will make a study of the administrative problems that would be involved in Radio Liberty’s termination.

Recommendation

That you approve the continuation of Radio Liberty for FY 1971 at the budget figure of $14,935,000 which was agreed upon between the CIA and the Bureau of the Budget.

Approve
Disapprove
Other

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3 The discussion is in a Memorandum for the Record, December 29, 1969. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files)

4 President Nixon initialed the approval line on December 23.
35. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 7, 1970.

SUBJECT
Polish Complaints to Germans About Radio Free Europe

During the second session of the FRG-Polish talks in Warsaw, the Poles in a side meeting forcefully raised the question of the operations of Radio Free Europe.² The Poles presented the Germans with a number of “extracts” from 1968–69 RFE broadcasts to Poland which allegedly attacked political figures in “harsh and scurrilous” terms. The Poles implied that continuation of such broadcasts would complicate Polish agreement to FRG requests for a softer Polish propaganda and cultural line. Subsequently, the FRG Foreign Office indicated that the Germans might make an approach to RFE. State then instructed RFE to be most responsive to any approach which might be made, in order to avert any FRG inclinations to raise basic questions about RFE operations in Germany.³ There have also been recent attacks on RFE operations from Romania.⁴

USIA Director Shakespeare has sent you a memo (Tab B)⁵ expressing concern that the Polish complaints might be the opening gun in a concerted campaign to liquidate RFE operations in Munich.


² The attached telegram 2984 from Bonn, March 25, noted: “Finke-Ossiander, who was again on Duckwitz’s delegation to the Polish talks, told EmbOff in course of conversation . . . that Dobrowolski (Polish MFA German Affairs) forcefully raised RFE issue in course of side-meeting with Finke. . . . Finke emphasized A) that FonOff had not yet decided whether or how to approach RFE regarding it; and B) that her own comments were therefore purely informal. Finke then did say, however, that on basis of glancing through material Dobrowolski had provided her, purely personal reaction was that, if genuine, it raised ‘question whether this sort of thing is still necessary in 1970, when problems in East-West relations are hardly the same as in the early Cold War years.’”

³ The attached telegram 3300 from Bonn, March 25, reported: “Finke-Ossiander . . . indicated to EmbOff March 25 that she would recommend a FonOff approach to RFE over the scripts the Poles had complained about . . . . She expects that the approach will be made by Pommerening (FonOff Eastern Structural Questions) to RFE Munich Chief Walters.” The Embassy suggested that State “discuss this background situation with RFE, urging it to take a most responsive line toward any eventual FonOff presentation.”

⁴ As reported in airgram A–113 from Bucharest, March 27. Attached but not printed.

⁵ Attached but not printed.
altogether. He reports that during his visit in Poland last summer, literally every Government official told him that RFE must go. Mr. Shakespeare believes that, if RFE is to become a bargaining counter in FRG-Polish deals, there should be full awareness that RFE is the most effective propaganda weapon in Eastern Europe. He thinks it should be carefully watched and the Germans made aware of our concern. A brief acknowledgment to Mr. Shakespeare is at Tab A if you wish to send one. (I think the Germans will before long turn the heat on RFE and RL.)

Recommendation

That you sign the memo at Tab A.

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6 On April 13 Kissinger signed the attached memorandum to Shakespeare, which reads: “I appreciated your memo on Polish complaints about Radio Free Europe operations, and agree that this should be watched with care.” He added a handwritten note at the bottom: “I think the Germans are likely to put the heat on us before too long. HK”

36. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, June 3, 1970, 1700Z.

6296. Subject: German reaction to RFE: Pommerening’s interview with RFE Director Walter.

1. In a move approved by FonMin Scheel, Pommerening and RFE Director Ralph Walter met in Bonn May 20 to discuss Polish and other Eastern European protests against RFE. On June 2, Pommerening gave the DCM the following frank evaluation of his talk with Walter.

2. Pommerening said that, speaking quite honestly, he did not find Walter’s response satisfactory. He said that a more cooperative response from RFE was necessary to head off what he feared could become a very serious problem. He said that RFE broadcasts confined to facts present no problem. The difficulty is that the tone of RFE broadcasts is at times unfortunate and inflammatory. He cited one particular case in a broadcast to Poland in which RFE urged voters in a local

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election not to vote for a certain candidate, known as a hard-line Stalinist. Pommerening made a sharp distinction between RFE and Radio Liberty, with which there was no problem.

3. Pommerening then said that protests from Eastern European countries are beginning to mount. They have now had protests in one form or another from Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. Recently they have received an official protest from the Hungarians. Furthermore, the Hungarians have let the FRG know that RFE might pose a threat to the Olympic Games. There could, for example, develop a common Eastern Bloc position boycotting the 1972 Olympics in Munich unless RFE was removed from Germany. Pommerening said he felt that such a development could lead to very unfortunate pressures in the FRG and especially in the Munich area, with irresistible public clamor to remove RFE so as not to jeopardize the 1972 Olympics. Pommerening said the FRG wanted at all costs to avoid this kind of situation.

4. He added that the situation was made even more difficult by the fact that the Poles over the last six months, based on the FRG’s analysis, have conspicuously toned down their propaganda attacks on the FRG. This makes it much more difficult for the FRG to counter Polish protests by saying that they after all are doing the same thing.

5. Pommerening said that the Foreign Office had prepared a paper for the Minister stressing the gravity of the RFE problem, particularly in the context of US-German relations. The paper pointed out that RFE was supported by private Americans, many of whom are very influential and play key behind-the-scenes role in the US Government. It would be most unfortunate if these people, many of whom are also strong friends of the FRG, were antagonized and given the impression that the FRG was “selling out” to the Communist Bloc. At the same time, the paper points out, mounting Bloc protests against RFE can, especially because of the Olympics, lead to irresistible pressures to remove RFE from Germany, with “VOA left to do the job” as he put it. The argument will be made that RFE is after all a private company with a questionable status which was acquired back in the occupation days. The paper therefore urges strongly that, to avoid a serious situation in US–FRG relations, RFE be urged to be cooperative in modifying its broadcasting to the maximum extent possible.

6. Comment: We consider the RFE situation to be serious. The paper Pommerening referred to is undoubtedly going to Brandt in the near future. We also know from his staff that Minister Ehmke is directly interested. The RFE problem is therefore likely to come to a head at the top levels of the German Government in the near future. It is urgent, in our view, that action be taken as soon as possible on our side. If the Germans are forced into a position where they feel they must demand the removal of RFE (which is the way things are now going), the
result can be a confrontation with resultant strains on US-German relations. We strongly hope this can be avoided and that RFE can continue to operate on German soil.

7. To deal with the problem, we believe that an appropriate high-level representative should be prepared to come to Bonn from the US as soon as possible. Such a representative should be empowered to give the Germans sufficient assurances of modifications in RFE’s approach to enable them to counter Eastern European pressures. We are convinced that there are forces on the German side (like Pommerening himself) who want to retain RFE; our job is to give these forces the necessary ammunition.

8. Department requested to repeat this message to other appropriate posts including Munich for Doherty and to make it available to all interested parties in the US, including Durkee in New York.

Rush

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37. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT

RFE Problem with Bonn is Getting More Serious

The attached message (Tab A)² from Bonn indicates that the crisis over Radio Free Europe is picking up. I understand that funding and other aspects have been considered in the 40 Committee recently.

The issue is the expected one: mounting Eastern European pressure to get rid of the Radio. There now apparently is a threat from several East European countries to boycott the Munich Olympics in 1972 if RFE is still there. The Germans want to avoid a confrontation with us (they say) and have apparently been trying to get RFE to do something to its scripts to remove any basis for charges that they are inflamm-

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² Printed as Document 36.
tory. It is far from clear, however, that even if RFE were to modify its scripts [1 line not declassified] the East Europeans would cease their pressure. There have been suggestions that the Germans should assign someone to Munich to pass on scripts and participate in operations generally, but it is highly unlikely that the Germans would want to be that much more identified with the Radio. If present trends hold, sooner or later the Germans, whatever is in the scripts, will be confronted with the choice of keeping the Radio and avoiding a problem with us or propitiating the East for the sake of “successes” in Ostpolitik.

Bureaucratically within the US Government, CIA had wanted to send Fred Valtin to Bonn today to see if a modus vivendi between RFE and the Germans could be found and also to determine whether RFE scripts are in fact offensive. (CIA says the Poles have in the past given the FRG doctored tapes to make RFE appear in a bad light.) State, however, has held up Valtin’s trip on the ground that whoever goes to negotiate with the Germans should be properly instructed. State and CIA have been meeting for the past week to consider the options. I gather they have guidance from you to the effect what we should not permit the Germans to bargain with our chips. However, it is not clear that there is any specific White House direction of the current State/CIA effort to develop a course of action or that any more basic thought is being given to the future of RFE or a possible alternative to it.

I take it there is a judgment in the Administration that both RFE and Radio Liberty can at some point be used by us for bargaining purposes with the East and that for this reason we should keep both operations functioning in Munich, whatever the Eastern pressures on the Germans to circumscribe or remove them. This also presupposes German unwillingness to antagonize us for the sake of relations with the East. This set of judgments may well be accurate; but if it has not already been subjected to analysis, it certainly should be.

Recommendation

That you pursue this matter further in the 40 Committee.³

Approve
Disapprove
Put on agenda for next meeting

³ At the bottom of the memorandum, Kissinger added by hand the options “Approve” and “Disapprove” and initialed “Approve.” The option, “Put on agenda for next meeting,” is also written by an unknown hand. The date of June 12, 1970, is stamped below the options.
Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Radio Free Europe

With reference to my memorandum of April 1 and your response of the 13th, I feel sure you have by now seen Bonn’s telegram No. 6296 regarding Radio Free Europe.

The message, shorn of diplomatic niceties, reports German demands for the neutralization and ultimate elimination of the RFE as an instrument of our propaganda in Eastern Europe. The reference in the telegram to “irresistible pressures” to eliminate the RFE from Germany with “VOA left to do the job” means to me just that.

While I endorse the Ambassador’s suggestion that a high level representative should ultimately come to Bonn prepared to discuss the subject with the Germans, I believe we might in the interim take some steps which should give the Germans pause before they finally decide to sacrifice RFE for the sake of some, as yet unknown, concessions from the comrades.

1. We should emphatically associate ourselves with the view of the Foreign Office paper warning against the reaction of private and influential Americans who are also “strong friends of the FRG” and emphasize their and our own concern. We should try to get individual statements of concern and transmit them to the FRG.

2. We should also point out that, with a great many RFE employees aware of the Polish pressures, the German reaction to such pressures cannot long remain secret and the FRG must be prepared to face hostile reaction of U.S. public opinion as well as their own which is already alarmed by the tempo and intensity of Brandt’s Ostpolitik.

3. Finally, we should point out that the closing down of the RFE which is of immense concern to millions of Americans of Eastern European origins might produce a political problem for President Nixon and might conceivably result in a demand of that influential and vocal segment of U.S. public opinion for our boycott of the Olympics.

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2 Document 35 summarizes Shakespeare’s April 1 memorandum, which is not printed. Regarding Kissinger’s April 13 response, see footnote 6, Document 35.

3 Document 36.
I suggest these as preliminary steps with further action depending on German reaction to the above.4

Frank

4 On July 6 Kissinger responded in a memorandum to Shakespeare: “I think your concerns about RFE, in your memo of June 5, were well covered in the conversations you and Bill Buckley had with the President. I have also followed up with State. I appreciate your keeping me advised of this problem, and presume it will be worked out with Bonn in light of the President’s strong endorsement.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I) Regarding the conversation among Shakespeare, Buckley, and President Nixon, see Document 40.

39. Editorial Note

President Richard Nixon met with journalist William F. Buckley, Jr., and USIA Director Frank Shakespeare on June 9, 1970, at 10:45 a.m. to discuss Buckley’s visit to Europe, including “some of the Iron Curtain countries,” in his capacity as a member of the USIA Advisory Commission. (Memorandum from Chapin to Kissinger, June 3, and memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, May 26; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 809, Name Files, Buckley, William) Although no record of the conversation has been found, on June 21 an article in the Washington Star by Charles Bartlett reported: “President Nixon has bluntly warned the West Germans against any deal with the Communists that involves the removal of the Radio Free Europe transmitted from Munich. The Bonn government, pressing for a pact with Poland has asked that the broadcasts at least be toned down, but Nixon has told the Germans that the Radio Free Europe broadcasts are not negotiable. . . . The President has told them that if the station is negotiated out of Munich, the U.S. forces also may leave German soil.”

In response to the article, Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff wrote to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger on June 22: “I gather that this is a slight garble of what the President said in the meeting with Shakespeare and Buckley, i.e., that the Munich radios stay as long as the troops.” Kissinger wrote by hand at the bottom of Sonnenfeldt’s memorandum: “That’s pretty accurate.” (Ibid., Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I)
40. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand)\(^1\)


K: He\(^2\) wants you to know he wants a tough line on that\(^3\) and he wants it part of our policy in Germany.

H: There’s a meeting\(^4\) going on—the problem is not abolition but re-programming.

K: He won’t have it. They will not bargain with our assets there.

H: There may be some high level [omission in transcript] on this in due course.

K: From Brandt? It should be discouraged.

H: We are doing that but it will come up in the discussion they are having. In fact, they have already raised it. We are having an interagency meeting and I will bring it up.

K: He wants a tough line.

H: No re-programming?

K: That’s how it was brought up by Shakespeare.\(^5\)

H: OK, I understand.

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\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 367, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

\(^2\) Apparent reference to Nixon.

\(^3\) Apparent reference to Radio Free Europe.

\(^4\) It is unclear to which meeting Hillenbrand is referring.

\(^5\) See Documents 35 and 38.
41. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Bonn, June 22, 1970.

Report From Valtin

"1. Pommerening, after expressing foreign office appreciation for Washington dispatch of special emissary, expounded for about fifteen minutes on problem, as seen by foreign office, as result of two Polish oral démarches (each accompanied by written bill of particulars).

"2. He emphasized that, while Poles appear persistent in their complaints, there is no indication they intend to make RFE an issue over which German/Polish negotiations are at all likely to break down. As a matter of fact, the Poles are handling the problem very cleverly in more-in-grief-than-in-anger manner, telling the Germans that they do not mind facts or even "objective analysis" and that they only object to "scurrilous attacks on leaders" and "intervention in Polish internal affairs." Also cleverly, the Poles keep telling the Germans that the latter’s own propaganda stations meet these criteria and that RFE is the only problem. Poles have not said so directly, but the implied intent of their comments boils down to: Is it not time that the FRG close down this foreign and out-of-step-with-the-time Cold War instrument operating on German soil?

"3. Pommerening advised that the second Polish démarche had requested a written German reply, to contain both reaction to specific charges and statement on FRG intentions vis-à-vis RFE. In reply to our question as to how they intend to handle this, Pommerening advised that he and his immediate superiors had recommended to Duckwitz (and felt quite certain this recommendation would be accepted) that there should be no written reply, and that an oral statement (a) not go into specific Polish charges and, instead simply assert that the matter is being looked into, and more important (b) advise Poles that both RFE’s status in Germany and its activities are entirely within the Federal Republic’s constitutional provisions of freedom of speech and freedom of political action, and that thus the FRG has no intention of changing RFE’s status or charter.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret. A June 24 cover memorandum reads: "Attached herewith are two copies of Mr. Valtin's detailed report on his initial 22 June conversation with Dr. Pommerening of the West German Foreign Office... As you will note in paragraph 14, Mr. Fessenden does not intend to forward this information separately and he requests that... [it be made] available to appropriate Department officials, Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Shakespeare." A typed note at the top of the page reads: "USC Attachment to CA–15, 24 June 1970."
"4. Pommerening advised that in this connection both the timing and the substance of DCM’s démarche of last week had been most welcome. He said that receipt of this expression of strong USG interest, and of support by influential private Americans, had been most important in shaping the opinions of the upper foreign office hierarchy on how to handle Polish complaints. In effect, Pommerening said the Fessenden démarche had led to a basic foreign office decision that the RFE problem should not be allowed to become an issue of real substance between the FRG and the USG.

"5. Pommerening also gave flat assurance that FRG was not planning to close down RFE. He said that there were and are a few officials who wish the problem would go away, i.e. that RFE move to some other country. We told him that this might hypothetically be possible from a strictly technical point of view, but that such a move (apart from the overwhelming logistical and political problems) would obviously result in a radically different type of RFE and would thus be contrary to USG interest in maintaining RFE as a viable and effective instrument of mutual interest to the USG and the FRG. Pommerening agreed and repeated his assurance re no FRG intention close down RFE.

"6. Pommerening then said that, despite the stance to be taken by FRG in reply to the Poles, there remained a problem to be worked out. He said specific Polish charges had been looked into and substantiated by the Federal Press Office, and that these broadcasts (involving scurrilously personalized attacks on individual Polish political leaders and one case of direct interference in Polish elections) were of such nature that the FRG would have to agree they should not be transmitted by any radio operating from German soil. After stating that presumably there is no FRG intention or desire turn RFE into a pure news station, and after obtaining explicit Pommerening statement that it is the FRG intention to allow RFE to continue broadcasting critical analysis and commentary, we asked him for a specific definition of German request for moderation. He said that this is not an altogether easy task but what it boiled down to was: (a) No scurrilous personalized attacks on individuals; (b) No direct interference in internal affairs (such as telling people whom to vote for or not); and (c) Avoidance of shrill and inflammatory language (in terms both of choice of words and tone of voice) in news and commentary, especially the latter. In this connection, Pommerening said, RFE should take Radio Liberty as a model.

"7. After assuring Pommerening that USG and management radio are not insensitive to the problem that operation of radios here might pose for the FRG, we expressed the hope that the FRG will in fact handle reply to Poles as described above with Pommerening agreeing that any substantially different handling would inevitably constitute encouragement of salami tactic. We then stated we felt sure of our
ground in being able to assure him that RFE management was completely responsible in its position on the problem areas raised by him and were doing everything possible to ensure compliance with its own already existing strictures along this line. In fact, if FRG request for modification did not go beyond the points raised by him (which he confirmed), then there is no problem. Pommerening expressed satisfaction but at the same time wondered whether RFE management, whose skill and good will he did not doubt, were always able to control its broadcast desks, especially members of the more recent emigration. We pointed to the [highly?] responsible RFE handling of the 1968 Czech crisis as evidence of what RFE management can do along this line even in an emotionally highly charged atmosphere. Pommerening acknowledged this, saying the FRG was very worried about RFE at the time but had found everything just right. We then made the point that in an undertaking of this type and magnitude, control could not be absolute and that the occasional exceptional slip has to be accepted as a fact of life. Pommerening agreed and said this presented no problem. On the other hand, what the FRG could not live with would be a situation wherein Poles (and other Bloc regimes with whom FRG has, or will establish, diplomatic relations) are able present the FRG with a steady stream of documented infractions of above strictures.

8. In reply to our query, Pommerening advised that it was his impression that the Polish complaints relate largely (and perhaps altogether) to the period prior January 1970. We said that this was not an unimportant factor, since it was our impression that RFE had made some adjustments in its broadcast policy since the advent of the FRG negotiations with Poles and Soviets. In fact, RFE had gone to great lengths to present FRG Ostpolitik along lines the FRG would find eminently satisfactory. Pommerening acknowledged that he had so far not had time to study RFE’s compilation on this subject.

9. After stating that the only way to address ourselves to Polish complaints is to know their precise nature, we requested that the FRG make the papers available. Pommerening acknowledged the validity of this request but, while undertaking to give it a try he could not guarantee it, as the entire file they had was with Duckwitz and it would take the latter’s authorization to turn over Polish material. It was in this connection that he advised that the FRG had gone all-out to prevent any leak on Polish complaints on FRG handling thereof, including making no copies of any papers relating thereto.

10. Pommerening then advised that the Poles had also complained on the detailed nature of the questionnaire used by organizations which on behalf of RFE question Polish visitors to the West. The Poles said such questions are clearly only within the sphere of intelligence and security services, not a radio station.
"11. After Pommerening had advised that RL presents no problem, we said that in USG opinion the two radios are inseparable, i.e. basic change in one will inevitably affect the other sooner or later. Pommerening agreed.

"12. The Olympics as a factor in FRG thinking on RFE was discussed. Pommerening agreed that Bloc threats on this angle are bluff on which the Bloc is not at all likely to follow through, unless there is a basic deterioration in FRG/Bloc relations for other (and more important) reasons. He expressed apprehension, however, about public reaction in Germany (and on the part of non-political Federal officials) if the Bloc undertakes a major overt campaign on the RFE issue in relation to Bloc participation in the Olympics. He felt this might produce strong pressure against continuation of RFE. Pommerening did not react to our comment that the volatility of such a reaction from the public would no doubt be very much dependent on how the FRG reacts to an overt Bloc campaign if in fact the Bloc mounts it.

"13. Walter briefed on above. We concluded that, as defined by Pommerening, meeting the FRG request for modification requires little (if anything) more than RFE closely adhering to its own (already existing) strictures. On the other hand, since it is clear the Pommerening (and others who figure in this equation) are not really aware what RFE represents today, both in terms of what it does and what political factor it truly represents in the evolving Bloc situation (and Pommerening acknowledged his own gaps of understanding), Walter agrees that RFE must devote considerably more time to an educational effort in the next few months vis-à-vis German officialdom.

"14. DCM Fessenden has read this report. Since none will be sent by the Embassy, he requests that it be made available soonest to Sutterlin and Coerr."
Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency


Report from Mr. Valtin

1. Valtin had a lengthy meeting with State Secretary Ahlers this afternoon. His information on subjects which are not directly related will be separately reported.

2. On Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty he was unequivocal in assuring us that there has been no West German decision to close them down. As a matter of fact, and while a number of ranking officials have concerned themselves with the problem of the Radios informally in recent months, the subject has not been on the agenda for the Cabinet or any other decision-making body, nor has any meeting been held of those officials who would have to be consulted on any basic decision on the Radios (and this would have to include Ahlers).

3. After we had told him that the question of the Radios’ future was one of the reasons for Mr. Valtin’s visit to Germany at this time, Ahlers (citing recent license renewal) said that he saw no problem. He asked whether the U.S. Government wanted the Radios to continue. We answered positively and then expounded at length, giving the essence of last week’s Fessenden démarche (without referring to it as such), describing in some detail the responsible manner in which the radio management handles broadcasts, and emphasizing the points made in the reference (CA–18, 26 June 70, paragraph 5–D). Ahlers then said that in the light of these factors he felt quite sure that the FRG would allow the Radios to continue to operate as at present. We then told Ahlers that we had just been told differently and briefed him in confidence on the meeting with Minister Ehmke and State Secretary Bahr. He exploded, called Bahr an “all-out appeaser” (his characterization of Ehmke was only slightly less harsh), and then advised us per paragraph two above.

4. The discussion brought out the following comments by Ahlers:

A. The Radios, as foreign owned and controlled propaganda instruments operating from German soil, clearly do present a problem to the FRG in terms of both sovereignty and its attempts at normalization with the Bloc which are now underway. The “appeasers” see

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret. A typed note at the top of the page reads: “USC Attachment to CA–19, 26 June 1970.” A covering memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger reads: “Attached is a paper for this morning’s 40 Committee meeting, which has just been delivered by CIA and should be distributed to the Committee members.”
it largely in the latter light, but there are also a number of important officials, otherwise firmly persuaded of the continued need for the ideological struggle with Communism, who see a real problem in the Radios from the sovereignty angle.

B. The number of officials who are concerned about the Radios, and who are inclined not to allow them to continue as now constituted and located, is increasing.

C. The German Press is becoming more concerned and pressure is gradually developing, at least in terms of questions being raised with the Federal Press Office, but also, even if it is yet less so, in editorials and the running of anti-radio articles.

D. The retention of the Radios as now constituted and located will thus not be an easy matter at best.

E. Moreover, in the light of the Ehmke/Bahr position and the manner in which at least Bahr can be depended upon to pursue it, there is really only one way to forestall a FRG decision against the Radios: To get to Chancellor Brandt and persuade him otherwise. That effort may not succeed but it is the only route that offers any chance for success.

F. To prevent this from becoming a matter of public controversy (which, according to Ahlers, it is certain to become if the problem is handled as a formal USG/FRG issue), the consultations/negotiations should be kept within an unofficial channel.

5. Ahlers promised to be of assistance, both in keeping us informed of developments and, at the right moment, by exerting influence on Chancellor Brandt and others who are still open to discussion on this problem.

6. He agreed that, in view of Ehmke’s “no hurry” posture (CA–18, 26 June 70, paragraph 7), there is no need for immediate action vis-à-vis Chancellor Brandt (but Ahlers also agreed to flash word to us in case unanticipated developments make a quick action essential after all). We told him that the next step would be for us to report our findings to Washington and that we would get in touch with him after the problem had been considered there.

7. DCM Fessenden has been briefed on the above.
Memorandum From Edward Weintal of the United States Information Agency to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare)

Washington, July 1, 1970.

RE

Radio Free Europe

Memorandum of conversation with Polish Ambassador, Jerzy Michalowski

I lunched today with Ambassador Michalowski at the International Club—at his invitation.

After an exchange of amenities, the Ambassador came right to the point and asked whether Charles Bartlett’s story describing the President’s “intervention” in the matter of RFE was accurate.2

I replied that I knew nothing of the President’s “intervention” but did know that the President, as well as the concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, felt very strongly about assuring the continued existence of RFE.

The Ambassador replied he understood our concern because once RFE was removed from Munich, it would be “dead.” “I am sure,” he said, “that neither Spain nor Turkey would have it.”

Michalowski then said that the Polish Government has not yet made the elimination of RFE a condition of the basic agreement with the Federal German Government. “We don’t want to do that at this stage, but as soon as the basic agreement is concluded, we shall certainly return to RFE.”

Following the basic agreement, Michalowski said, there will be another round of negotiations dealing with “Normalization of Relations.” This will include establishment of Embassies, Consulates, etc. It is at that stage that the Poles intend to make the elimination or at least sanitization of RFE as a condition sine qua non. The Ambassador made it clear that Gomulka himself and the top leadership of the Government and Party were involved in this.

“I feel certain,” the Ambassador continued, “that at that point we will be told by the FRG Government that they agree with us but that the ‘Americans won’t let us touch RFE.’”

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. V. Confidential. The memorandum was forwarded to Kissinger by USIA’s Acting Director, Henry Loomis, under a July 8 covering memorandum.

2 For the relevant excerpts from Bartlett’s article, see Document 39.
"In that case, we shall face a Polish-U.S. confrontation. This is the last thing I want."

"If there is a conflict between FRG and U.S.A. this does not concern me in the least," the Ambassador continued. "If as a result of the RFE, there should be a Polish-FRG conflict this may concern me a little more. But if I am faced with a Polish-U.S. conflict, I shall be directly concerned and I must try to avoid it at all costs."

I asked the Ambassador what he meant by confrontation.

He replied that obviously "there would be no war," but U.S.-Polish relations which he had tried hard to improve would deteriorate "and no one wants that."

I remarked that I have heard a lot about the wickedness of RFE, but have yet to see specific charges against it.

The Ambassador said that RFE really was nothing but a "gossip column" run by malicious but extremely able journalists. ("I wish I could hire them for the Polskie Radio," he said at one point.)

“They often goof, though. In one case they had to apologize to a woman writer whom they accused of being a U.B. agent. In another, they charged a prominent labor leader with being a collaborationist during the war. All the man did was to write a poem for a German-sponsored newspaper in Cracow. The man had already been tried in 1945 and exonerated.”

The Ambassador contrasted RFE policies with his own. When a Polish paper wrote an article abusive of Martha Mitchell, he said, he had personally written to Warsaw to have such attacks stopped. And, he says, they were stopped.

I then remarked that I had yet to hear from him what the Polish Government would be willing to offer as a quid pro quo in the unlikely case the Germans would agree to some sort of curbs on the RFE. He said there was very little the Poles could do, but mentioned compensation to holders of pre-war Polish bonds as one of the quids, i.e. "provided we would be given access to Exim Bank loans."  

At this point the conversation turned to Viet Nam, Cambodia, and the Middle East. The Ambassador contributed nothing of interest.

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3 Regarding Poland’s request for Export-Import Bank loans and the related issue of Poland’s debts to U.S. holders of pre-World War II bonds, see Documents 132, 152, 168, 169, 170, and 175.
44. Editorial Note

On July 9, 1970, Russell Fessenden, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Bonn, who was in Oberlin, Ohio wrote a personal letter to Ambassador Kenneth Rush in which he discussed, among other topics, strategy for dealing with the Brandt government’s objections to Radio Free Europe’s continued operation in West Germany. Fessenden wrote:

“RFE. The current plan is to send Bob Murphy, as a member of the RFE Board in New York and an old German hand, to see Brandt personally. The purpose would be to let Brandt learn directly of the President’s strong personal interest and to try to get him to leave RFE alone in order to avoid a major U.S.-German confrontation. A confrontation seems inevitable; the position at the top in the U.S. Government is indeed very hard. The President is reported to be very negative about the Bahr–Ehmke reaction. I also reported on the Duckwitz ‘démarche’ to me at your Third of July party. (I had no chance to write this up before I left Bonn, but did so in Washington. Duckwitz brought the subject up, saying that the Poles had put it on the agenda for the next meeting. He characterized RFE as a ‘nuisance’ which is ‘not in tune with the times.’ He asked whether it couldn’t be moved out of the country. He obviously is even softer on this subject than Bahr and Ehmke, who at least do not believe RFE should be used as a bargaining counter in the Polish negotiations. In the face of this Duckwitz comment, I felt I had no alternative but to give him the full U.S. position, as set forth in our instruction. I stressed the inevitability of a major U.S.-German confrontation unless something is done. This seemed to have some impact on Duckwitz. However, he no doubt will be the most difficult on this question because of his strong personal commitment to the success of the Polish negotiations.)

“In addition to the Murphy visit to Brandt, EUR has in mind a second action designed to soften the blow. This would be a discreet approach to someone like Ehmke saying in effect that this is not a propitious time to push the RFE issue when the Administration is preoccupied with the troops issue, as well as many difficult East-West issues. (The feeling in Washington on RFE is so strong that there is a tendency to equate RFE with the US troop presence in Germany.) There may be no formal instructions on this second, informal and discreet approach.

“One other RFE issue I was asked about was Strauss’s view. You may recall that Ehmke and Bahr said that Strauss shared their views on RFE for the same reason: infringement of German sovereignty. There was some skepticism in Washington as to whether Strauss really felt this way, and we were asked to try to ascertain his real views. You might ask Jock [Jonathan Dean] to look into this. One note of caution
here: I think we should be very careful in approaching Strauss (maybe we shouldn’t do it at all). It would be very bad if RFE became a political football between the Opposition and the Government. There is a danger that someone like Strauss would seize on the issue as another indicator of the Government’s ‘appeasement’ policy.” (Department of State, Files: Lot 74 D 430, Box 4, Personal Correspondence File)

45. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT

Scheel Visit—Radio Free Europe

Although it is unlikely that this subject will come up, you may want to consider pulling Scheel aside at some point to impress on him the President’s personal interest in the radios and our strong hope that this will not become a bone of contention between us.

Background

As you know, Fred Valtin of CIA has been in Germany and has had a round of talks with various Germans.

It is very clear that Bahr and Ehmke want to get the radios out. It isn’t clear yet whether they have talked to Brandt and if so what his view is. But it takes very little imagination to believe that he can be persuaded that over time the existence of the radios is incompatible with his policy of reconciliation with the East.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. V. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Urgent; sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it. Handwritten markings at the top read: “Scheel Talks—Keep for HAK info” and “Scheel Visit.” Scheel visited the United States from July 17 to 18. No documentation has been found to suggest that Radio Free Europe was discussed during his visit. For documentation on the Scheel visit, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 101. Also see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. II, pp. 1196–98, 1201–02.
The fact that Ahlers and Spangenberg (Heinemann’s chef de cabinet) oppose Bahr and Ehmke gives us little to lean on. Ahlers himself is a very ambivalent character as regards his attitude toward us and Spangenberg is a decent enough but rather opaque type. Heinemann in any case is a superdove. In any event, it is Bahr and Ehmke who sit at the Palais Schaumburg and have direct access to Brandt.

The Foreign Office, whose influence is negligible, except to the extent that Brandt needs Scheel to preserve the viability of his coalition, wants to avoid a confrontation with us. They also accept, as indeed do Bahr and Ehmke, that the radios should not be made a bargaining element between the FRG and the Poles in any explicit way. Duckwitz, although now retired but still in charge of the negotiations with the Poles, recently assured Fessenden that the Germans will not entertain any Polish effort to put RFE on the agenda for the next round of the Polish-German negotiations. Evidently, judging from the attached talk between Ambassador Michalowski and Ted Weintal (Tab A), the Poles do not intend to do so either. But what they do intend to do is to make removal of RFE a precondition for the next round, after the Oder-Neisse is settled, for a “genuine” normalization of relations.

My hunch is that what Bahr will do is to whisper to his Eastern friends that if they do not raise the question formally, he will take care of it in his own way.

The problem with linking the radios to our troop presence is this: in order to maintain the fiction that the radios are private organizations, we gave the Germans the right to license them as private broadcasting institutions on their soil. This happens every June (or maybe July) but with the understanding that three months before, in April, the Germans can notify the radios that the license will not be renewed. This may well be what Ehmke was implying when he told Valtin that there was no immediate hurry in dealing with the radios. Valtin thinks the Germans may be thinking of April 1971 or 1972. (The latter date may be related to Hungarian hints that Eastern participation in the Olympics may be jeopardized if RFE is still in business in 1972. I think this is pure bluff.)

Consequently, any explicit linkage of the radios to the troops is going to undermine the whole elaborate structure we have erected over the years (including private boards of trustees and fund-raising drives) to give the radios private character and, incidentally, greater freedom of operation than the official radios.

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2 See Document 43.
3 See Document 39.
Whatever internal re-examination of this entire question you may want to undertake—whether a further independent study of the radios’ effectiveness, or exploration of combining them with other existing radios—it seems to me that the most important thing to avoid is a unilateral German decision not to renew the licenses, be it as part of an explicit deal with the Eastern countries or as a gesture of “reconciliation.” If the radios go it should be because we want them to go, whatever our reasons may be. I would strongly warn you against the notion of making their removal a part of some bargain between ourselves and the Eastern countries. We should do it only if (a) we decided the money was no longer worth spending, (b) we concluded that the East had available the sources of information now provided by the radios, i.e., the radios had become an anachronism (about the year 2000), or (c) we cannot afford a crunch with the Germans.

If the matter should be raised with Scheel at all it should be wholly privately and the utmost stress should be placed on the fact that the President personally regards the operations as essential. If Scheel then leaks it to others than Brandt, they will at least know that the President is directly involved. Ultimately, however, I think the matter should be taken up directly with Brandt—and the sooner the better. Once Bahr and Ehmke get his position frozen, his prestige becomes involved and we will get into a first-class confrontation.

46. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)¹


SUBJECT

Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL)—Status of Negotiations with FRG

When our “special emissary,” Fred Valtin of CIA, went to Germany in June he encountered high-level objections to the continuance of RFE

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Minutes, August 7, 1970. Secret. Sent through Coerr. Drafted by A.E. Wellons (INR/DDC) and Skoug and cleared by Sutterlin and Cline (INR).
and RL. Minister Ehmke and State Secretary Bahr of the FRG Chancery, who are leading foreign policy advisors to Chancellor Brandt, told Valtin on June 25 that both Radios must be removed from Germany within the next year or two. This signal that some top West German officials favor closing down RFE and RL, probably before the Olympic Games begin in Munich in 1972, calls for a further US approach in the interest of discouraging such an action.

After considerable discussion, the Department and CIA officers concerned concluded that the next stage in our discussion of the subject with the FRG should be an explanation to Chancellor Brandt of the importance the USG attaches to the continuance of RFE and RL. Since the Radios are ostensibly non-official, and since we do not know the degree to which Brandt may be aware of or share the views of Ehmke and Bahr, we believe it would be wise to avoid using an official channel (e.g. Embassy) or high-level intercession (e.g. Robert Murphy) at this stage. Such approaches should be retained, however, as possible future options if it appears that a representation by a high-level U.S. personage is required.

We have accepted CIA's recommendation that it would be best at this stage for Valtin, who handled the problem previously and is well-known to key German officials including Brandt, to return to Germany to see Brandt personally and privately. Valtin would try to ascertain whether a firm FRG decision has been taken to have RFE and RL leave Germany by the summer of 1972. It should be highly useful to the USG to obtain a first-hand reading of Brandt’s attitude, regardless of whether the German Government has made a decision, and using Valtin now has the advantage of preserving maximum flexibility for future U.S. moves.

**Recommendation:** If the oral report of the CIA representative in the 40 Committee includes a proposal that Valtin discuss the Radios with Brandt as outlined above, that you support the proposal.

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2 See Documents 41 and 42.

3 See Document 44.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 7 August 1970

The minutes of the meeting of the 40 Committee, dated 10 August 1970, contained the following items:


In bringing the Committee up to date on the status of RFE and RL relations with the Bonn Government, Mr. Valtin’s marching orders to see Chancellor Willy Brandt were confirmed. Mr. Kissinger said it would be appropriate for Mr. Valtin to indicate higher authority’s known strong feelings on the subject.”

[Omitted here is item 3.]

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1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Files. Secret; Eyes Only.

2 According to a July 30 memorandum from Hillenbrand to Johnson, Valtin met with senior German officials in June and was told that the radios had to be closed down prior to the 1972 Munich Olympics. “After considerable discussion,” the CIA and Department of State agreed to send Valtin back for a direct presentation of the issue to Chancellor Brandt. (Ibid.) On August 20 Valtin met once again with Ehmke and Bahr; the planned meeting with Brandt was postponed. See Document 48.

3 According to the minutes of the 40 Committee’s June 29 meeting: “The Chairman, Mr. Kissinger, stated that higher authority took a very dim view of certain reported German attitudes.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Files)
48. **Telegram From Fred Valtin to the Central Intelligence Agency**

Bonn, August 20, 1970.

1. Had hour and a half meeting with Minister Ehmke on 19 August, with State Secretary Bahr participating for first half. Atmosphere, while somewhat tense during period our initial presentation, was otherwise cordial throughout, and meeting ended on note that talks in informal channel should continue in next few months to seek agreement on mutually acceptable solution in effort to avoid, if at all possible, an official USG/FRG confrontation on the Radio problem.

2. We opened meeting by stating that position they had taken in June (i.e. that Radios “must go”) had created a potentially very serious situation. The matter had been carefully considered at highest level as a problem of inter-agency interest (i.e. not just by CIA) and conclusion had been reached that FRG’s position is not acceptable. Bahr (who at very beginning of meeting had been in euphoric mood due “the marvelous way” in which his trip to Washington had worked out) asked whether “highest level” included the President. We advised them (per Dr. Kissinger’s instructions at 40 Committee meeting) that the President is aware of the problem and, while obviously not involved in details, feels strongly that Radios constitute effective instruments and must be preserved. We then advised them that USG, while reserving the right to fall back into an official confrontation posture, has deliberately chosen to continue these talks in the informal channel, hoping thereby to be able to avoid a confrontation. They should clearly understand, however, that we were speaking to them on USG instructions and that, to repeat, the situation is potentially very serious.

3. Ehmke/Bahr obviously had expected to hear something quite different and seemed to be stunned that USG should take this issue so seriously. They both expressed some dismay, but both (and particularly Ehmke) stated that strong USG feeling would naturally be fully taken

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 684, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. VII. Secret. Repeated to Munich. The telegram was attached to a memorandum from Helms to Kissinger, August 25. Helms wrote: “Attached is a copy of Fred Valtin’s cable from Bonn. . . . You will note that discussions with Chancellor Brandt are proposed for late September or early October. Prior to that meeting we will request further reviews with your office and with the State Department on the line to be taken.” Also attached was an NSC routing memorandum that reads as follows: “Ed—orig sent to Sonnenfeldt/Jessup (cy) for action. 8/26/70.” Copies were sent to Lord, Kissinger, and Haig.

2 See Document 47.
into account in further FRG deliberations on this subject. Ehmke then advised that position they had taken with us in June had been discussed with Brandt in interim and that Brandt had agreed. What we had told them today, said Ehmke, would of course also be made known to Brandt and would no doubt be most carefully weighed by Brandt. In this connection, Ehmke relayed Brandt’s regret at not having been able to meet us at this time, and Brandt’s assurances that he would do so on our next visit.

4. Ehmke asked for explanation of reasons for USG hard position. This given to him in considerable detail along lines familiar to Headquarters. Essence: The Radios constitute uniquely effective instruments, represent no anomaly in the 1970’s or in an era of détente (and, to contrary, are even more essential in the more complex ideological struggle in such an era), and cannot be replaced once terminated, nor can any USG or Fedrep communication media substitute for them. Ehmke/Bahr said they agreed on all points made by us, and they reiterated their position that FRG does not desire the termination of the Radios, only that they no longer operate from German soil. We countered by saying that that request amounted to termination, because none of the alternatives cited by them in June is feasible and because, after careful study of relocation possibilities, USG had concluded this cannot be done, if at all, without radically affecting the nature and effectiveness of the Radios.

5. We also advised them that, apart from USG position on this issue, they should give most careful thought to effect negative decision would have on Fedrep image, both in terms of reaction by peoples in Bloc countries and in terms of reaction in U.S. (and on latter we specifically referred to Congress, American industrial leaders who back RFE with contributions, influential private Americans who old friends of Germany and who sit on RFE Board, and sizable minority population elements in U.S.). Both Ehmke/Bahr acknowledged validity of this point and said it, too would have to be carefully weighed.

6. Ehmke said that in light non-feasibility relocation and other alternatives (Bahr chimed in that these findings showed that Fedrep in effect was being asked to carry the burden no other country was willing to even share), he might personally reach conclusion not to push the issue, if it were not for one inescapable factor: The certainty that sooner or later (and surely no later than in the months prior to 1972 Olympics when Bloc can be depended upon to mount its non-participation bluff), FRG will come under intense pressure from both the radical left and right on the sovereignty issue and, if tied to Olympic problem, from highly influential Sports/Athletics Lobby and every other non-governmental organization, including business interests. If so (and Ehmke is certain such or similar situation will arise at some point), the two Radios will become a political football in Germany—
and Ehmke feels that no German Government (no matter how then constituted) would be able to resist the pressures that will then develop. This then, according to Ehmke, would result in worst of all possible worlds, i.e. termination of Radios under public pressure and, if related to Olympics, as result successful ploy by Bloc. In light of these considerations, Ehmke said, he had to come to the conclusion that indefinite status quo not feasible from FRG point of view, nor in his opinion in terms USG interest in Radios and larger equities. Consequently, it is essential that USG and FRG continue to talk about this problem to see whether some mutually acceptable solution can be found. Ehmke emphasized that there was no hurry since current license year had just started, and he also reiterated FRG desire that these talks continue to be conducted quietly in the informal channel.

7. Bahr asked whether USG was thinking in terms any specific time frame, such as two and five years. We answered in the negative, advising them that this position based on impossibility to foretell the course of world events with any accuracy and that Radios might be considered even more essential in two or five years than now. Bahr said this would make it more difficult to reach agreement.

8. After saying that we had not thought of this before and that our question did not imply any sort of commitment, we asked whether the FRG position against the indefinite continuation of the Radios pertained to the entire complex of both Radios, or did they feel more strongly on either the continued presence of the transmitter facilities or the editorial and programming headquarters. This query caused quite a discussion between Ehmke and Bahr, but they finally agreed (while also emphasizing that they could not make a commitment) that the transmitter facilities were the real problem. Both felt that, if these were removed or in the process of being replaced outside Fedrep, FRG could cope with domestic and Bloc pressures against Radios, i.e. they could and would defend continued operations of headquarters of both Radios in Munich. We reiterated we not in position to make any commitment and emphasized had no way of knowing whether relocation of transmitter facilities is technically or politically feasible, but we assured them that their differentiated approach to these two aspects of Radios would be reported to Washington.

9. After stating that we under strong impression that current nature of Radios, and their immense importance to Bloc developments, not fully understood or appreciated by FRG officialdom, we passed Ehmke the background briefing folders on RFE and RL prepared by Headquarters. He expressed appreciation and promised to study carefully.

3 Not further identified.
10. We questioned Ehmke quite closely on 9 August *Stern* article. He maintained that it was not leaked by Chancellery and that, in fact, he had made effort kill the article when *Stern* called him on it prior publication. He said leak might have come from someone else who participated in cabinet meeting at which it decided that RFE license abrogation clause not to be used. (*Comment: This was first word that this question had been discussed at Cabinet level.*) Ehmke would not promise anything when we asked that Chancellery issue dementi on *Stern* article.

11. Ehmke lodged mild complaint re what he believes our (CIA) and/or RFE action in getting Springer Press recently to come out with articles attacking FRG for being soft on Radios. We gave him unequivocal assurances that CIA and Radios not involved.

12. It was agreed that next round of talks, including meeting with Brandt, should take place late September/early October.

13. DCM Fessenden has read this report.

49. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)\(^1\)


**SUBJECT**

Discussion with Chancellor Brandt on RFE and RL

1. Attached is a résumé of Fred Valtin’s meeting in Bonn with Chancellor Brandt on the presence of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in the Federal Republic. Minister Ehmke was also present.

2. Mr. Valtin’s cabled report reflects that the conversation was cordial throughout and that the Chancellor stated categorically that he does not want the problems presented by the Radios to become a matter of controversy between the Federal Republic and the U.S. Government. The Chancellor further indicated that if an earnest examination of all potential compromise solutions reveals that these are not feasible, he would be prepared to permit a continuation of the status quo.

It appears, however, that the Chancellor is especially concerned about domestic pressures on the government if the Eastern Bloc threatens not to participate in the 1972 Olympic Games at Munich because of the presence of the Radios.

3. Another meeting is planned between Minister Ehmke (or Chancellor Brandt, if appropriate) and Mr. Valtin when the U.S. study of possible alternatives is completed.

TH Karamessines

Attachment

Mr. Valtin described the evolution of the Radios into highly sophisticated instruments capable of influencing developments in the Soviet Bloc and their effectiveness was described in detail. In response to the Chancellor’s query, Mr. Valtin confirmed that the American management controls the content and tone of the broadcasts and he described how [less than 1 line not declassified] the State Department exercise policy supervision over the Radios. Mr. Valtin summed up his presentation by emphasizing that the U.S. Government places a very high value on the Radios. They are seen as uniquely effective instruments, which are not an anomaly in the 70’s; even in an era of détente the Radios are essential factors in the ideological struggle.

Chancellor Brandt agreed with all of the points made and stated that he did not question either the effectiveness of the Radios or their continued validity. Moreover, neither he nor his Government wanted to terminate the Radio operations. He expressed the hope that there was no misunderstanding in Washington regarding his position on the need to continue the ideological struggle with communism, particularly in an era of “negotiation rather than confrontation.” The Chancellor said he had made it clear to Brezhnev during his visit to Moscow that their treaty concerned inter-governmental relations only and not ideological differences. Brezhnev replied that “the last thing we want is ideological fraternization.”

Mr. Valtin referred to State Secretary Bahr’s statement in June 1970 that “the Radios must go” and commented that should the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) persist in this view, it would lead to the Radios’ liquidation. The position expressed by Bahr, therefore, created a potentially serious situation. The issue, which is considered to be a problem of inter-Agency interest, has been thoroughly discussed and the conclusion reached that the FRG’s position, as enunciated by Bahr,

2 No record of this meeting was found.
is not acceptable since relocation appeared impossible and, even if technically feasible, this would affect the nature of the operations so radically as to make their continuation almost certainly not worthwhile. The Chancellor was advised, moreover, that the President had personally reviewed the problem and he feels strongly that the Radios must be preserved.

The Chancellor, while reiterating his positive view of the Radios’ role and effectiveness, said they do present a problem in the context of the FRG’s attempt to establish more normal relations with the USSR and the Bloc countries. Therefore, the Radios are and will probably continue to be a problem since they provide a convenient peg for the Bloc to continue their accusations of the FRG’s alleged revanchist attitudes. He acknowledged that it was unlikely that either the USSR or individual Bloc countries, all of whom have their own rationale for wanting more normal relations with the FRG, would permit negotiations to break down solely on the issue of the Radios and, in any event, the FRG will be able to deal with actual or anticipated Bloc pressures regarding the Radios. All appropriate German officials had been advised that it is Government policy that the Radios are not negotiable and any démarches on this question are to be rejected. The recent official announcement concerning the license renewal for the Radios was designed to reduce speculation on the status of the Radios and, more importantly, to indicate to the Bloc that the FRG position on this matter is firm.

The sovereignty aspect, as raised earlier by Bahr, did not appear to bother Brandt who said that he does not attach as much importance to this aspect as do some of his advisers. He did remark, however, that the operation of foreign owned and controlled propaganda media on German soil does constitute an anomaly so many years after the end of the occupation.

The Chancellor fully accepted the U.S. Government position that a relocation of the Radios in their entirety is tantamount to termination and thus out of the question. Nevertheless, he said the FRG seemed to carry the entire political burden of the Radios and he asked whether some degree of “burden sharing,” such as a possible relocation of the transmitters, might be feasible. The central problem is the emission of propaganda broadcasts, under German license, from German soil; the FRG is most vulnerable to attack because it can grant or withhold the licenses. The programming/editorial/research activities in Munich are not licensed and are comparable to any other journalistic activity, whose freedom to exist and function is guaranteed under the German constitution. In response to Mr. Valtin’s comment that if a relocation of the transmitters was feasible and agreed to, we might later be asked to move the Munich Headquarters, the Chancellor unequivocally
stated that as long as he had anything to say he would not ask that the two Munich Headquarters be removed.

The Chancellor, in response to his question, was told that a study on transmitter relocation is in process but far from completed; it is already apparent, however, that the chances of relocation appear to be slim. The reasons for this include such factors as the paucity of locations which are feasible from the technical standpoint, the uncertainty of the outcome of negotiations with Spain and Portugal regarding augmentation of current facilities, the financial costs involved and the two-year lead time which is necessary for the installation of equipment. Even if an immediate decision to relocate were made, the transmitters located in Germany would be needed through the 1972 Olympic Games. The Chancellor appeared to be dismayed at these findings although he made no specific comments.

The Chancellor wondered whether some other solution, such as a contractual U.S. Government/FRG arrangement on the Radios, might be feasible as the FRG would be able to deal with Bloc complaints on that basis. (In a subsequent discussion between Mr. Valtin and Ehmke, it was agreed that this particular proposal would, among other factors, radically change the Radios’ image and was not, therefore, a desirable solution.)

The Chancellor also suggested that, as one possible alternative, it would be helpful if only a portion of both Radios’ transmitters or all of the transmitters of one of the Radios were moved from Germany. Mr. Valtin did not comment on this proposal other than to say that it would be included in his report of the meeting.

The Chancellor stated that he was especially concerned about the intensive domestic problems which will result from Soviet Bloc pressures in connection with the Olympic Games. He agreed with Mr. Valtin’s analysis that the threatened Soviet and Eastern European boycott of the Olympics was a bluff; nevertheless, he feels that sport, business and political groups will fall for the bluff and he is apprehensive over the Government’s ability to cope with such a situation. Mr. Valtin said public reaction to such a Bloc ploy is directly related to how the FRG handles it. The Chancellor agreed but said there are situations wherein public opinion is dominant no matter what the Government does and emotions are likely to be so intense on this issue as to make it impossible for any German Government to contain them.

The Chancellor emphasized that he does not want the Radio problem, serious as it is, to become a matter of controversy between the FRG and the United States. He hoped that some mutually agreeable formula could be found to reduce the political burden on the FRG and he urged that all possible alternatives be examined by Washington in
good faith. However, should such potential alternatives be found technically or politically impossible, “things will remain as they are.”

It was agreed that another meeting between Mr. Valtin and Ehmke (and, if appropriate, with the Chancellor) should take place once the U.S. Government has completed its study of possible alternative solutions.

50. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Senator Case’s Proposed Legislation Re Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

1. Yesterday we learned by chance of a press statement issued by the office of Senator Clifford Case for release on Sunday, 24 January, stating that the Senator plans to introduce legislation on Monday, 25 January to bring Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty under the authorization and appropriation process of the Congress. The statement also notes that similar legislation is to be introduced in the House by Representative Ogden R. Reid. The text of this release is attached as Tab A.²

2. We first learned of Senator Case’s interest in these Radios last October, when the State Department informed us of a letter from Senator Case to Secretary Rogers of 8 October asking several questions about these Radios. A copy of Senator Case’s letter is attached as Tab B.³ At that time Agency and State Department representatives agreed that some of Senator Case’s questions could not be answered fully on an unclassified basis and that the matter had best be handled by an oral briefing by Assistant Secretary Abshire. It was further agreed that the Agency stood ready to participate if this appeared desirable.

3. We understand that State Department representatives have on a number of occasions attempted, in conversations with Senator Case

² Attached but not printed.
³ Attached but not printed.
and members of his staff, to schedule such a briefing but without success.

4. Needless to say, the effectiveness of these radios would be seriously damaged by the introduction of such legislation or the publication of the attached release.4

Dick

4 In an attached January 22 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig wrote that Helms’s submission was “proof positive of the kind of lax interdepartmental discipline which is creeping upon us... [Helms] points out that at least State was aware that Case was boring into the RFE/RL issue. Since that time, State has been unable to collar Case and brief him on the problem and no one, Rogers or Helms, had enough foresight to ask the White House to intervene. The cost of this bureaucratic fiasco is obvious. Our first exposure to the issue was yesterday when we learned of the Case press release, embargoed until Sunday’s newspaper. Everyone involved must have known the President’s view on this which has been articulated both through the 40 Committee and within the context of our recent difficulties with the SPD.” Haig recommended that Kissinger follow up with formal inquiries to “the Secretary of State and the Director of CIA asking why appropriate action was not taken to at least attempt to preclude this action both at the departmental level and then subsequently through the use of whatever White House leverage could be mustered.”

51. Minutes of the 40 Committee Meeting1

San Clemente, California, March 31, 1971, 10:26–11:55 a.m.

SUBJECT
Various—see summary of conclusions

PARTICIPATION
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Defense
Mr. David Packard
JCS
Lt. Gen. Richard T. Knowles

1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Files. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Nodis. The meeting took place in the conference room of the Western White House.
CIA
Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
Mr. Thomas Karamessines
Mr. William Nelson²
[name not declassified]²
Mr. David Blee²
NSC Staff
Mr. Frank M. Chapin
Col. Richard T. Kennedy
Mr. Keith Guthrie

[Omitted here is the summary of conclusions and sections unrelated to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.]

Dr. Kissinger: Now we can turn to Radio Free Europe.
(Mr. Nelson left and Mr. [name not declassified] joined the meeting at this point)

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. [name not declassified]) Do you want to present your findings?

Gen. Cushman: The paper was prepared by the State Department.³

Mr. Johnson: This is a monumental piece of work. It is a very fundamental question that we face. In 1961 we had a task force on this that came out almost in the same place. At that time nobody listened to the task force.

Mr. Karamessines: In 1967 there was another task force.⁴

Mr. Johnson: There are two issues. First, do we think that RFE and RL are worth preserving? Second, what do we have to do to preserve them? Do we want to move away from CIA funding as matter of preference or only so far as we are forced to do so? The third question is what direction we go if we are forced to drop CIA funding.

Dr. Kissinger: Another problem is the question of relocation and modernization. This is an issue between us and the Germans.

Mr. Johnson: On Question 1, we would say that RFE and RL are worth preserving. On Question 2 we would prefer things to remain as they are. The existing system has worked well. Whether we have to answer question 3 depends on whether we are forced to make changes by Senator Case. We have been made unable to change his position. He professes to be in favor of maintaining RFE, and he also says he is willing to consider various means to provide overt funding. He has a new bill which represents some movement on his part, but it still has lots of bugs. In addition Senator Fulbright has called hearings for April

² Not present for entire meeting. [Footnote in the original.]
³ Not found.
⁴ Apparent reference to the Katzenbach Committee (see footnote 2, Document 28).
28, and we will need a position by that time. The first alternative for [new types of funding] is something on the order of what Case is proposing. This would involve a mixed public and private corporation for which Congress would appropriate the money. The corporation would pass this along to RFE and RL. The second proposal is to set up RFE and RL as a public corporation and make a direct appropriation to them.

Dr. Kissinger: Would this be a one-time appropriation?

Mr. Johnson: No, appropriations would be made annually. A third proposal is a direct appropriation to one of the existing agencies for example, the State Department. We object to this because it would make these radio stations a government institution. It would not be possible to separate them from VOA.

Dr. Kissinger: We would be stuck with responsibility if RFE and RL took a more aggressive line.

Mr. Johnson: Yes. This would give us problems diplomatically.

Dr. Kissinger: This defeats the purpose of RFE and RL.

Mr. Johnson: I am getting some information about the Public Broadcasting Corporation. It may provide a useful precedent. My own feeling is that we can’t make a decision without further exploration with Congress. We have never talked about this with them, except with Senator Case and Rep. Ogden Reid. If we want to explore overt funding, we would have to talk with the leadership to see if anything is feasible. If there appears to be no feasible alternative, we can go back to Senator Case and say: “Overt funding means the death of RFE. Yet, you say you want to keep RFE, so let’s stay where we are.”

Alternatively, we can say to him that we have found a possible feasible course which we are prepared to support.

There are two real alternatives: a cut-out corporation and one supported by direct appropriations. Secretary Rogers made the point that since it is well known that RFE is being funded by the U.S. Government, why not turn it into a public broadcasting corporation with funds appropriated directly? Marty Hillenbrand thinks this would create difficulty for Germany, Spain and Portugal. They like a cut-out arrangement.

Mr. [name not declassified]: This is easier for them. It helps if there is no line item in the budget.

Mr. Karamessines: In creating a corporation we need not confine its responsibilities to the two radio stations. It could also handle other activities.

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5 Brackets in the original.
6 Brackets in the original.
Dr. Kissinger: A single corporation could also reduce the number of pressure points against the U.S. Government. I know the line between the two alternatives is a thin one.

Mr. Johnson: I am inclined to think that this thin line is important.

Mr. [name not declassified]: The radios themselves opt for direct funding.

Dr. Kissinger: Why do they prefer that?

Mr. [name not declassified]: No one would be looking over their shoulders.

Mr. Johnson: What about the problems with the host governments?

Dr. Kissinger: [With direct funding] how would we distinguish the two radios from VOA? What is the rationale?

Mr. [name not declassified]: We can point out to the boards of directors the problems involved in keeping RFE and RL separate from VOA. As for a rationale, the boards are looking at the precedent of the Public Broadcasting Corporation.

Mr. Packard: How much private funding does Radio Free Europe receive?

Mr. [name not declassified]: One million dollars.

Dr. Kissinger: If there is an item in the budget, how do we avoid getting stuck with responsibilities for the broadcast? If the Russians raise hell and Dobrynin comes to see the Secretary, the mere fact that the station is not administered by the State Department will not help.

Mr. Johnson: A cut-out would remove the radios one more step from the State Department.

Mr. [name not declassified]: We don’t favor direct appropriations. However, the boards of directors do.

Dr. Kissinger: I think they just want people off their backs.

Mr. Johnson: I am not clear in my own mind as to how the boards are appointed. Ostensibly, how is it done?

Mr. [name not declassified]: The RFE Corporation selects the directors.

Mr. Johnson: Who is the Corporation?

Mr. [name not declassified]: Gen. Clay.

Mr. Packard: It is a self-perpetuating corporation.

Dr. Kissinger: Does Radio Liberty have a different board?

Mr. [name not declassified]: Yes, it does. There is no overlapping. The Radio Liberty board is less active.

Mr. Johnson: [1½ lines not declassified]

7 Brackets in the original.
Mr. [name not declassified]: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Johnson: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. [name not declassified]: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Johnson: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Karamessines: [1 line not declassified]
Gen. Cushman: (to Mr. Johnson) [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Johnson: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Mr. Karamessines: [1 line not declassified]
Gen. Cushman: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Johnson: [2 lines not declassified]
Mr. [name not declassified]: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Dr. Kissinger: The new proposal calls for fifteen directors of whom only three would be appointed by the President.
Mr. Johnson: That is the Case proposal.8 That is not what we are suggesting.
Dr. Kissinger: Are we all agreed that the present situation can’t be maintained?
Mr. Johnson: We won’t be certain until we take soundings on the Hill.
Gen. Cushman: However, I wouldn’t make any bets on being able to keep the status quo.
Mr. Johnson: If the present situation continues, CIA will maintain its links with the organization.
Gen. Cushman: Senator Case seems determined to blow that arrangement out of the water.
Mr. Karamessines: Fulbright is also. In addition there are the problems with the Germans.
Dr. Kissinger: We would have the German problem in any event.
Mr. Karamessines: They prefer a non-CIA fig leaf.
Mr. [name not declassified]: But they insist on a fig leaf.
Dr. Kissinger: The only thing that would help the Germans—and then only slightly—would be a cut-out. This would be better for them than State Department or public control. My own feeling is that in any event this will only hold for one to two years. They won’t let RFE and RL stand in the way of Ostpolitik. (to Mr. Karamessines) Do you think that CIA involvement is particularly a problem for the Germans?

8 See Document 50.
Mr. Karamessines: Yes, now that it has been the subject of a public statement by a U.S. Senator. However, Brandt has said that he won’t let these pressures keep us from working out a solution.

Mr. Packard: What is the budget?

Mr. Karamessines: $36 million for the two organizations.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Johnson) I agree that we should undertake extensive consultations to see if there is support for the existing arrangement or any alternatives.

Mr. Karamessines: Do you want this to be done jointly by the State Department and the White House?

Mr. Johnson: Why have the White House involved at this stage?

Mr. [name not declassified]: We can’t carry the ball on this.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Johnson) I think you should do it. If a Presidential call at the right moment will help, that can be arranged.

Mr. [name not declassified]: Should Clark McGregor be involved at some point?

Dr. Kissinger: Clark can help. However, I don’t want to get involved.

Mr. Johnson: Senator Russell’s passing has complicated the situation. He kept the dogs off for many years.

Dr. Kissinger: Who handles this now?

Mr. Johnson: Senator Ellender.

Dr. Kissinger: He is mad at me because I haven’t looked at his home movies. We have now set a time, but he wants to check the list himself to see that all the senior personnel are there.

Mr. Karamessines: Do we need a cut-off date?

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t think we can settle this before the new fiscal year. We need another year under the present management. This is the first point we should get across to Senator Case.

Therefore, we conclude that the status quo can probably not be maintained, though we will take soundings to see if it might be possible. Management by the State Department is rejected. A direct appropriation is not what is wanted. The real choice is between a cut-out and the status quo.

(to Mr. Johnson) You will make some inquiries on the Hill?

Mr. Johnson: In talking about this I will need to be clear on how the board is to be appointed.

Dr. Kissinger: I suggest that the State and CIA have their legal people develop some ideas on how a new corporation would look. Then we should meet before a proposal is made on the Hill. What is needed is an alternative to the Case bill.

Mr. Karamessines: Is Senator Case holding up hearings expecting an answer from us on his bill?
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

Mr. [name not declassified]: He told Marty [Hillenbrand] that he wants an answer by April 1.

Mr. Karamessines: If we are responsive, perhaps we can fend off his proposal.

Dr. Kissinger: Why not get this done by this time next week? As soon as it is approved, State can start Congressional consultations.

I don’t think we need to raise the relocation and modernization question at this time.

Mr. [name not declassified]: The only thing is that we are on the hook to Brandt. We talked rather vaguely to him in October about needing at least two years.10

Dr. Kissinger: You could tell him that we are committed to getting some work done on the legal status of the stations.

Mr. Karamessines: He will hold for that.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.]

52. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Nixon


The purpose of this memorandum is to alert you to the funding problem faced by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

As you are well aware, the Central Intelligence Agency has funded these Radios for about 20 years, and I know you agree that they have proved their worth to our national interest over this period.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive. In a covering memorandum of the same date, Helms wrote Kissinger: “Even though the 40 Committee will consider the problem of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty at its meeting on the 13th, there is a great deal to be done in a short space of time if the Radios are to avoid being without funds on 1 July. Therefore, I would appreciate your seeing that the President is made promptly aware of this since it may be necessary for him to become personally involved if the situation is to be salvaged in time.”
The Agency’s role was to provide funding and liaison techniques of such nature that any Government direction or control of the Radios could be plausibly denied. These arrangements were successful in the initial period, but in recent years more and more allegations of CIA backing have appeared in the press. The circumstances are such, therefore, that plausible denial has been increasingly difficult.

On several occasions we have looked for alternative means of giving the necessary financial support (programmed at 36.2 million for FY 1972) without success. Recently, as you know, Senator Case, without prior consultation with this Agency or any other component of the Executive Branch, introduced a bill to provide for public annual appropriations for the Radios. The Department of State, with our assistance, has proposed a revised version of this bill, which would create an American Council for Private International Communications, Inc., which would be funded from congressional appropriations. In turn, the Council would be authorized to provide the necessary financial support for the Radios. In this manner, the Radios would keep their independent, private corporation nature, which is essential not only for their effectiveness but also to maintain the necessary foreign licenses. We believe this revised bill presents a satisfactory solution, and we are working with the Department of State in an attempt to assure the enactment of the bill.

There is considerable doubt that the bill will become law before 30 June 1971, the end of this fiscal year, and an appropriation for the support of the Radios might be delayed until well into Fiscal Year 1972. We have explored possibilities for interim funding to cope with this situation if it occurs but have been informed by the Chairmen of our Appropriations Subcommittees of the Senate and the House, Senator Ellender and Representative Mahon, that they are strongly opposed to any continuing financial support by CIA beyond 30 June 1971 by appropriation, transfer of funds from other agencies, or continuing resolution, as any such action might encourage inquiry and publicity concerning other sensitive and important appropriations.

The Office of Management and Budget is aware of this dilemma and has tried to be helpful. As of now, however, no satisfactory alternative has been developed.

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2 See Document 50.
3 Helms informed Kissinger of the views of Representative Mahon and Senator Ellender in an April 16 memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. 1)
This problem will be discussed by the 40 Committee at its meeting scheduled for 13 May. Without wishing to anticipate these deliberations, I believe that the continuation of the Radios is of sufficient importance to our foreign policy goals to warrant alerting you to the difficult problem which they now face.

Dick

4 See Document 53 and footnote 9 thereto.

53. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the 40 Committee


SUBJECT
Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL)

Background
At its meeting of March 31, 1971, the 40 Committee agreed that the concept of creating an independent agency or other public-private mechanism for channelling publicly appropriated funds to RFE and RL should be examined. The Committee asked for a draft Bill and on April 7, 1971, was given a draft designed to create an “American Council for Private International Communications.” The draft Bill was modelled on the “Public Broadcasting Act of 1967” (PL 90–129).

As its meeting of April 14, 1971, the Committee approved the State/CIA recommendation that preliminary soundings of Congressional opinion be undertaken “in order to obtain a reading on whether the proposal should be presented officially to the Senate.” In light of this decision, the Department of State 1) submitted the draft Bill to OMB so that the appropriate clearance process could be undertaken

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1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Files. Secret; Exdis. Tabs A–E to this memorandum are attached but not printed.
2 See Document 51.
4 The minutes are in the Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Files.
The Bill readied for prompt submission to the Senate should the Committee so decide; 2) requested and obtained from Senator Case a change in the proposed date for hearings on RFE/RL in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee\(^5\) from April 28 to May 24; 3) conducted explorations, jointly with CIA, of Congressional opinion in accordance with the plan presented to the Committee with its memorandum of April 7, 1971 (Tab A).

**Results of Consultations**

**A. Prospects for Continued Funding of RFE/RL through the CIA Budget**

In accordance with the expressed desire of the Committee, consultations included examination of continued covert funding of RFE/RL through the CIA budget. During the course of the Congressional soundings, the Chairmen of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees expressed strong opposition to funding the Radios through CIA beyond June 30, 1971. The Chairmen are unwilling to include an appropriation for the Radios as they maintain that this would probably jeopardize the individual appropriations not only of CIA but other Executive agencies as well. In their view, this could come about as certain Committee members apparently intend to use the Radio funding question to expose, and attempt to discredit, sensitive activities carried out by the Executive branch. It was the judgment of the CIA and State Department offices for Congressional Relations that Senator Ellender and Representative Mahon would “under no circumstances” ask their Committees to include funds for the Radios in the CIA budget for FY 1972.

**B. Prospects for Interim Funding of RFE/RL through the CIA Budget until a New Mechanism is Established**

In view of the attitude of the Chairmen of the Appropriations Committees with regard to continuation of the status quo, their views were sought on the feasibility of funding the Radios through the CIA budget on the basis of a continuing resolution until such time as a new, public mechanism had been authorized and granted funds by Congress. The Chairmen somewhat reluctantly indicated this could be done for a few months—perhaps until the August recess, by which time the DOD FY 1972 budget is expected to be approved. This solution would provide funds for an additional 30 to 60 days, but no longer. Apart from the fact that the two Chairmen appear reluctant to use a continuing resolution, such a course is not deemed advisable for two reasons:

1. If there has been a hearing on CIA’s “black budget” prior to June 30, as is expected, and if CIA has been formally advised that its FY 1972 budget cannot include funds for the Radios, the legality of using funds for this purpose under a continuing resolution is open to question.

2. Even if interim funds for the Radios could be secured on the basis of a continuing resolution for the DOD budget, a budgetary hiatus would occur if the Department of Defense budget is appropriated prior to action on appropriations for the proposed Council.

CIA has explored alternative methods of securing funds for the Radios to cover the period until an appropriation is made under the terms of the draft Bill creating the American Council for Private International Communications, Incorporated. It is not feasible to provide money from CIA reserves since the constraints imposed by the Appropriations Committee Chairmen in refusing covert appropriations in FY 1972 would be equally applicable to the use of reserve funds. Moreover, current requirements against the reserve funds are of such a priority nature that CIA cannot allow their use for the Radios unless assured that they would be replenished in full. CIA has also inquired of OMB whether transfer in FY 1971 of the required funds (CIA programmed $36.2 million for the Radios in FY 1972) from the Department of Defense to CIA is feasible. OMB advises that such DOD funds are not available unless higher authority orders them released. OMB also feels that such funds, if available, could not be used for this purpose without Congressional concurrence.

As of now, therefore, no satisfactory method for interim funding has been developed, and there is a real possibility that the Radios will be without financial support at the beginning of FY 1972. Should this occur, liquidation procedures would have to be promptly initiated, and it is estimated that these costs are likely to exceed the combined annual budgets of the two organizations. However, in the above situation, funds are not available even for this purpose.

In light of these circumstances, it would appear that the only conceivable method of ensuring the orderly funding of the Radios until they come under the supervision of the proposed Council is to fund them for FY 1972 out of overall year-end FY 1971 savings. This would be tantamount to channelling unused, publicly appropriated, non-CIA funds to a use which would, for the interim, still be under CIA control (although the May 24 Senate Hearings will have, by the end of FY 1971, yielded a clear government acknowledgment that it funds the Radios).

C. Prospects for passage in Senate and House of the Authorization Bill in its present form

OMB anticipates clearing the draft Bill with minor technical changes within the next few days during which time it will discuss Treasury’s reluctance to be used as a funding channel for the Council.
As the result of our review of the concepts in the draft Bill with Senator Case, he has indicated general agreement with it and expressed a willingness to act as its sponsor in its present form possibly with some modifications regarding the appointment of members of the Board of Directors. As a result, we believe the Bill’s prospects in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are good. In addition, Congressman Reid has also indicated his support, which should aid our testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee whose chairman, Representative Morgan, has also been briefed on the draft Bill. Other Senators and Congressmen, during the consultations, initially questioned the need for a new government entity in lieu of funding the Radios through State or USIA, but subsequently agreed with the approach in the draft Bill. Presently there is no known opposition.

We believe that there are reasonably good prospects for passage of an authorizing Bill of the type envisaged (Tab B)\(^6\) in the Senate and House with the support of a liberal-conservative coalition with Case and Reid heading up the liberal side.

**D. Prospects of Appropriations being Approved once Authorizing Bill is passed**

Chairman Ellender, after some discussion, indicated that he would not actively support the Bill but that he would not obstruct it. He indicated his strong intention of having his appropriations bills pass the Senate prior to the August recess, although Chairman Mahon had indicated his belief that the Defense Appropriations Bill will carry over in the House until after the August recess. In other consultations, questions were raised concerning the Radios’ funding levels in view of the dollar crisis and moves to retrench on our foreign expenditures.

**Conclusions**

The exploratory consultations have, unfortunately, produced more clarity on the impossibility of maintaining the present method of funding RFE/RL than on the possibility of funding the Radios reliably through a new publicly funded entity. Furthermore, they have revealed that the question of creating a new entity and obtaining funds for it is urgent in view of the strong reluctance of the Appropriations Committee chairmen to continue the present funding system into FY 1972.

The limited explorations of Congressional views suggest that there are “reasonably good prospects” of getting adequate support for an authorizing bill establishing an American Council on Private International Communications.

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\(^6\) Attached at Tab B but not printed is the administration’s draft bill, which provided for the establishment of a non-profit corporation, the “American Council for Private International Communications, Inc.,” that would receive funding from Congress and private sources to provide for the operation of RFE and RL.
Communications. However, in view of the current inclination in Congress to cut foreign expenditures, it will take a strong effort by the Administration if funding for the Radios is to be maintained at the present level.

It is therefore concluded that virtually the only choice open to the Administration on the problem of funding RFE/RL is to proceed with the draft Bill. It is further concluded that personal involvement by the President will be required in order to get across to key Congressional leaders 1) the need to give the Bill priority in order to get it considered prior to or early in FY 1972; 2) the importance of continuing to fund the Radios at the present level.

Recommendations

1. The 40 Committee is asked to recommend to the President that he approve the draft Bill (Tab B) for submission to Congress prior to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the Radios now scheduled for May 24.

2. The 40 Committee is asked to recommend that the President, during the period prior to the Senate hearings, emphasize to the Congressional leadership the importance of expediting this legislation and of continuing the present level of funding of the Radios.

3. The 40 Committee is asked to recommend to the President that, until a new entity can be created and granted appropriations to fund the Radios, he authorize, with the concurrence of Congressional leaders: (a) the funding of the Radios at the present level out of overall FY 1971 US budgetary savings since there are no FY 1972 funds available to CIA for this purpose; and (b) the recognition of this interim funding by the State Department press officer, or other appropriate officers, if asked.

4. The 40 Committee is asked to approve the continuation of consultation by State and CIA with key members of Congress (Tab C) to obtain additional support on a broader basis prior to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings scheduled for May 24. Some of the present members of RFE/RL Boards (Tab D) might be used to contact members of Congress with whom they have personal contact. Outstanding public witnesses should be contacted for the hearings.

5. The 40 Committee is asked to recommend that the Treasury, as a department which disburses funds to a wide variety of independent entities and is not involved in the direct conduct of diplomacy or programs in the Communist countries, be designated as the channel for

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7 Attached at Tab C but not printed is a list of key Congressmen and Senators on the Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate.

8 Attached at Tab D but not printed is a list of board members of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
disbursing publicly appropriated funds to the new entity to be created to fund the Radios. (A copy of the letter from Treasury to OMB giving its position on this is at Tab E.)

6. The attention of the 40 Committee is invited to the subject of recommending a Chairman of the Board of the American Council for Private International Communications, Incorporated in order to provide during Congressional consultations an idea as to the caliber of the Board envisaged for the Council. Names such as those of Dr. Milton Eisenhower, Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, and Governor William Scranton, suggest themselves.\(^9\)

U.A.J.\(^10\)

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\(^9\) The minutes of the 40 Committee meeting of May 14 reported: “The State Department paper dated 12 May 1971 reported on results of the preliminary Congressional soundings on the legislative proposal to create an American Council for Private International Communications, Inc., for channeling publicly appropriated funds to support RFE and RL. The Committee granted approval for the formal presentation of the draft bill to Sen. Case and Congressman Reid as Administration-supported legislation. The Chairman and Mr. Schlesinger agreed to direct the Treasury to assume the responsibility of acting as the direct disbursing agent for funding to the proposed Council, which will in turn fund RFE and RL.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Files)

\(^10\) Initialed by Coerr for Johnson.

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54. **Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State**\(^1\)

Warsaw, May 26, 1971, 1550Z.

1607. Subject: Polish Aide-Mémoire on RFE.\(^2\)

1. I saw Vice Minister Foreign Affairs Winiewicz at his request morning of May 26. First question which he took up was RFE. Following lengthy oral presentation, which he said was made on instruc-

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\(^2\) On June 6 Eliot wrote Kissinger that in the wake of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on public funding for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (see footnote 5, Document 53), “the Polish Foreign Ministry on May 26 handed our Ambassador in Warsaw and later described in the press an aide-mémoire . . . calling for the termination of Radio Free Europe. The aide-mémoire accused Radio Free Europe of conducting ‘subversive’ operations and organizing ‘a network of informants’ in Poland. The
tions his government, he handed me aide-mémoire criticizing RFE in severe terms (text by septel). Winiewicz said Polish Embassy Washington would not be approaching Department on this subject, although he would plan to mention it in his conversations which he hoped to have at Department June 4. After noting that RFE maintains sizeable offices in London, Vienna, and Copenhagen, Winiewicz said Poles planned approach governments in those capitals to protest RFE activities. When I inquired if Bonn would also be contacted, Winiewicz did not give direct response although he said problem had been raised frequently in past with FRG and had been one of first subjects he had mentioned to Duckwitz in Polish-FRG talks leading to treaty. Winiewicz commented that he felt FRG was becoming “uneasy” about activities of RFE on FRG territory.

2. Winiewicz stated that RFE constituted one of “thorniest” problems in Polish-US relations. Polish leadership has found RFE broadcasts deeply objectionable for years and has often said so, but to no effect. New leaders of Poland since December, although more open-minded than predecessors and sincerely desirous of better relations with US, also consider RFE a hostile operation which is a real block to improved relationships. Every step regarding US is made more difficult by RFE broadcasts, which are not confined to straight information but are deliberately slanted to focus on Polish failures and shortcomings, to criticize personalities and to sow distrust. Winiewicz mentioned that morning of May 26 Prime Minister Jaroszewicz had telephoned him in high temper to ask him to read latest summary of RFE broadcasts which he found infuriating. Winiewicz acknowledged that Poland had more than enough shortcomings, but it had some successes, too. While RFE broadcasts often had some truth to them, they were always distorted and twisted in unpleasant and unfair manner.

3. Winiewicz noted that Polish Government now had ample information about details of RFE operations (a reference to reports of Captain Chechowicz). RFE Munich was filled with Polish émigrés who were bitter because people’s Poland was succeeding, and their venomous attitude was reflected in RFE broadcasts. Winiewicz hoped that Polish Embassy described this aide-mémoire a few days later in the press and also presented an aide-mémoire to the Federal Republic of Germany of similar substance. The Federal Republic’s press spokesman responded on June 1 that Radio Free Europe’s transmitter licenses had been extended for another year, until the summer of 1972. He stated that the Polish aide-mémoire would be examined. The Poles also made a démarche to the British Embassy in Warsaw about the activities of the London office of Radio Free Europe.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I)

3 Telegram 1608 from Warsaw, May 26, contains the text of the Polish aide-mémoire on RFE. (Ibid., RG 39, Central Files 1970–73, RAD RFE)
US Government was aware of this situation, which seemed cut across stated US intentions of improving relations with Poland and other countries in Eastern Europe. Winiewicz added that in past, when RFE was allegedly private organization (although everyone knew it was financed by CIA), it might have been easier to overlook its operations. Now, however, when US had introduced bill in Congress to authorize appropriated funds for RFE, situation was different and even more intolerable. Winiewicz asked me to transmit aide-mémoire to my government and to report his remarks faithfully.

4. In reply, I said that RFE was private organization which did not speak for US Government. I could not comment on its activities nor on substance of its broadcasts. So far as aide-mémoire was concerned, I would transmit it to my government as an official statement of Polish Government, although I could not accept any of allegations contained therein. I also said that I would report fully on what Winiewicz had told me. I added that US was sincere in its desire for better relations with Poland and Eastern Europe, as often stated by President and by Secretary. In field of international broadcasting, VOA was official voice of US Government.

5. With regard to new legislation introduced in Congress for RFE and Radio Liberty, I described proposed organizational relationships and noted that there is ample precedent in US practice for private organizations to receive federal funds, citing poverty and refugee programs as well as private TV and radio stations assisted by public broadcasting company. New set-up would not alter private character of RFE or Radio Liberty, and their broadcasts, as stated by Asst. Secretary Hillebrand in his testimony, would be used to convey news and analysis normally available in a free society.

6. Winiewicz concluded this part of our conversation by emphasizing impediment placed on US-Polish relations by RFE activities and requesting me to report his views to Washington.

7. Comment: Winiewicz approach and aide-mémoire represent intensification and formalization of long-standing Polish complaints against RFE. This is logical follow-up to revelations of Captain Cechowicz, recently-surfaced Polish undercover agent in RFE Munich. Polish stand also takes into account proposed legislation to fund RFE and RL by open Congressional appropriations. Polish media reporting on hearings in Washington emphasizes line that this will cast even more doubt on private character of radio stations, and this point is reflected in Winiewicz’s comments as well as in aide-mémoire.

8. Department repeat as desired.

Stoessel

Dear George:

I am writing to bring to your attention the very acute dilemma which we now face with regard to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and to request your guidance with regard to the responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency after 30 June 1971. I believe you are familiar with my memorandum of 11 May 1971 to the President on this subject. I attach a copy for your ready reference. Your staff has been good enough to provide me with a copy of your letter of 9 June 1971 to Senator Ellender, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations and his reply thereto of 10 June 1971.

As I understand the situation, Senator Case’s bill to establish a new funding mechanism seems to have no chance of passage prior to the end of this fiscal year. It is also my understanding that the Central Intelligence Agency is precluded from any further funding of the radios after that date, either for continued operation or termination.

The Radios are United States Government proprietaries. I therefore believe the Government is both morally and legally obliged to take some action to continue them, at least on an interim basis, or to terminate them as of 1 July 1971. The funds the Radios now have on hand would permit continued operation for no more than 30 to 45 days in the new fiscal year. Both will need guidance within the next few days in order to plan for the first weeks of Fiscal Year 1972. In the event that termination is to take place, costs associated with such action are estimated by the radios to be [dollar amount not declassified] for Radio Free

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Kissinger.

2 Document 52.

3 The letter of June 9 was not found. In his June 10 letter, Ellender wrote Shultz that he opposed continued funding of RFE and RL through the CIA even as an interim measure. “I want to stress the point that funds for the Government’s support of these organizations must, in my opinion, be handled as an open appropriation… This cannot be done if the interim funding is routed through the Central Intelligence Agency’s authority under the Continuing Resolution. In the event the Government’s support of these organizations is terminated, I recognize that substantial funds will be required to cover termination costs, and I will be glad to consider proposals for providing such costs.” He added a postscript: “PS I want to make it clear that the Committee would consider a request for an ‘open’ appropriation for the required interim funding, pending the enactment and implementation of open funding legislation.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I)
Europe and [dollar amount not declassified] for Radio Liberty. However realistic these estimates may be, it is clear that a substantial amount of money would be involved. Reserves available for liquidation are only [dollar amount not declassified] for Radio Free Europe and [dollar amount not declassified] for Radio Liberty.

I should like to request that you advise me as early as possible as to what the Administration desires that the Central Intelligence Agency do about the funding and the management of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, effective 1 July 1971.

Sincerely,

Dick

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56. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 17, 1971, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
RFE and RL (Part III of III)

PARTICIPANTS
German
Egon Bahr—State Secretary, Chancellor’s Office
Guenther van Well—Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office

American
Henry A. Kissinger—Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmuth Sonnenfeldt—Senior Member, National Security Council
James S. Sutterlin—Director, Office of German Affairs

As the final of three subjects covered in the conversation, State Secretary Bahr referred to RFE and RL and asked whether there was a special White House interest in the radio stations. Mr. Kissinger said that there was. Bahr then noted that the Federal Government was under a bit of pressure on the subject from the Poles who had recently sent an official letter raising this issue. The Czechs have also made

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sutterlin on June 18. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office.
3 See Document 54.
public complaints but have not approached Bonn officially. Bahr did not think that the Eastern European threats to boycott the Olympics should be taken seriously. He added that the Federal Government would withstand Polish pressure. The fact was, however, that the Federal Republic and Poland were only surrogates in this dispute. The two radios were really an element in East/West relations in which the U.S. and the USSR were the main players. He did not know exactly how the United States could introduce this issue in the American/Soviet dialogue. It should be understood, however, that the Federal Government could not solve the problem. It could only ensure that the programs broadcast were in line with the policies of the U.S. and the FRG. This could not and should not be achieved through a system of pre-censorship of broadcasts. It could only be accomplished by clear guidelines to those who prepared the programs.

Bahr said that insofar as the Polish letter was concerned he had proposed that the Federal Government take its time in responding. We could be sure that the reply would be coordinated with Washington.

Mr. Kissinger asked what precisely Bahr was suggesting that the United States should do. Bahr replied that Washington should take up the radio question with the Russians directly. If this were done then the FRG could forget about giving notice on the stations for another year. Bahr mentioned in this connection that the contracts would come up for renewal in August or September. He was told by the others present that the contracts had in fact already been extended and that the next occasion on which notice could be given would be in April 1972. Bahr then commented that in this case the radios would have to continue through the Olympics in any event. Herr van Well interjected that this was not necessarily so, since the Olympics would not take place until the summer of 1972. Moreover, there was a secret letter in connection with the radio contracts which permitted the FRG to give notice at any time if circumstances warranted. Mr. Sutterlin said that in his understanding there were differences in the FRG’s contractual relationship with RFE and RL.

Mr. Kissinger then stated, on a personal basis, that a unilateral action by the FRG on the radios would not be well received in Washington. We are interested in their continued operation, although we have to be realistic about the problems they entail. He asked what it was that the United States should raise with the Soviets. Should we ask what the Soviet Union would offer us for removing the radios? Bahr said that this was what he had in mind. Mr. Kissinger proposed that we look into the question. We could consider whether it might be possible within some broader context to raise the radio subject with Moscow.
Memorandum for the Record


Subj ect
Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 22 June 1971

Present
Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Packard, Mr. Johnson, Admiral Moorer, and General Cushman
Mr. Richard E. Davies and Mr. James R. Schlesinger were present for Item 1.
Mr. John Holdridge was present for Item 2.
Mr. William Broe was present for Items 3 and 4.
Mr. Thomas Karamessines, Mr. Wymberley Coerr, and Colonel Richard Kennedy were present for all items.

1. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Alexis Johnson explained that he had Richard E. Davies along because the RFE/RL matter was getting down to the wire on interim funding.

Mr. Kissinger said that higher authority had just said that he would call Senator Ellender tomorrow if those concerned felt it would do any good. Mr. Kissinger offered to call Representative Mahon on the continuing resolution. (A call was placed and contact made before the conclusion of the meeting; Rep. Mahon said he would first have to talk with his staff.)

Mr. Packard observed that Senator Ellender had said he was going to knock $500,000,000 from the intelligence budget and that intervention by higher authority might be needed again.

Mr. Kissinger again asked who thought a call to Ellender would work.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Minutes. Secret; Eyes Only. Presumably drafted by Kennedy on June 25.

According to a memorandum from Haig to MacGregor, June 25, Mahon and the House Appropriations Committee supported continued funding for RFE and RL through CIA as part of the continuing budget resolution. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Liberty & Radio Free Europe, Vol. 1)

On the same day as the 40 Committee meeting, June 22, Kissinger sent a memorandum to the President urging him to call Chairman Ellender. He wrote: "You agreed yesterday to call Chairman Ellender of the Senate Appropriations Committee to try to persuade him to acquiesce in the continued funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty via the CIA appropriation as an interim arrangement under the continuing resolution. Congressman Mahon, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, agreed yesterday to such an arrangement. Senator Ellender, however, now reportedly wants to introduce legislation specifically prohibiting continued funding under the CIA
Mr. Schlesinger said we needed all the help we could get. The USIA budget was currently under examination and to lay on the continuing resolution of funding through USIA was about the only option left. 4

Mr. Karamessines was sure it was worth trying.

Mr. Schlesinger said it could be done by stretching the law; there was some precedent and there existed a general authority for assistance to “private parties.”

Mr. Karamessines pointed out that the continuing resolution might make it more difficult for the Case proposal: If you can fund things for short periods via continuing resolution, why would there be a need for this new bill?, or so the negative argument might go.

Mr. Johnson said on the émigré support problem—an ancillary to the Radios, for which no resolution would account—it had been determined that it was technically and legally possible for State to cope, except for the funds [less than 1 line not declassified].

Mr. Schlesinger said that could be solved by a budget amendment. 5

appropriation. Nevertheless, I believe there is a 50–50 chance that Senator Ellender will change his mind if you intercede. Because of the complications of USIA funding or other ‘open’ alternatives, it is important to employ Presidential pressure even though the outcome is uncertain.” On the memorandum are two notations by an unknown hand. The first reads: “P. will not call unless he is assured that the call will cause Ellender to acquiesce.” The second note reads: “Will not call.” (Ibid.)

4 In another June 22 memorandum to the President, Kissinger wrote: “An arrangement which might meet Senator Ellender’s objections would be to fund the Radios under USIA’s appropriation. Director Shultz feels this is the only viable alternative for obtaining temporary funding. However, this ‘open’ arrangement has a number of shortcomings.” (Ibid.) On June 25 the Senate Appropriations Committee voted as part of a continuing budget resolution to fund RFE and RL through USIA for fiscal year 1972. Congress approved the joint resolution, P.L. 92–38, on July 1. On June 25 Haig wrote to MacGregor: “[W]e had to accede to the USIA ‘open’ funding route in order to save the radios.” (Ibid.)

5 On October 27 Rogers wrote to Nixon: “Over the past 22 years selected exiles from eastern Europe who have rendered valuable services to the United States have been supported indirectly by the Central Intelligence Agency through Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL). This support will end in FY-1972 when covert funding of the Radios ceases. The Administration’s proposal (Case Bill) and other bills being considered by Congress which would provide overt, appropriated funds for broadcasting by RFE/RL would not authorize payments to these selected émigrés. . . . The Department and other agencies concerned in the 40 Committee . . . have concluded that the United States should continue its support of selected East European émigrés, who now number only 55. . . . The Department of State is prepared to assume responsibility for this activity by arranging personal stipends to be paid overtly under authority granted by the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 (PL 87–510). . . . As most of the exiles are well over 60 years of age, it is proposed to arrange for the purchase of annuities from a private insurance company. . . . The cost of this one-time program would be $1,850,000, which could be obtained through a Presidential Determination Order under Section 2(c) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act.” In response, Nixon signed Presidential Determination 72–6 on November 1, which provided the requested $1,850,000 for use by the Secretary of State under the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, RAD RFE)
Mr. Johnson raised the name of the President of Campbell Soup Corporation, William Beverly Murphy, as a likely man for the American Council for International Communications, Inc., should that concept be enacted.

Mr. Mitchell said he knew the man favorably and that he was actually upstairs in the White House at the moment. Mr. Karamessines said he had the endorsement of CIA. Mr. Kissinger said he would check on him promptly.

[Omitted here is discussion of items 2–4.]

58. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon

Washington, September 13, 1971.

SUBJECT
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

Our efforts to obtain a satisfactory public mechanism for funding Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) are reaching a crucial point. At the beginning of August, the Senate passed a bill authorizing an appropriation of $35 million to the Department for FY 1972 to fund the radios “under such terms and conditions as the Secretary considers appropriate.” The bill is intended by Senator Fulbright to be a “stopgap” to keep the radios barely alive so that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee can decide next year, on the basis of studies now being done by the GAO and the Congressional Research Service, whether or not to terminate them.

The Senate bill, which is Senator Case’s original S. 18 amending P.L. 402 (the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act), has a number of disadvantages. The principal one is that, by making the De-
partment the channel for the grants, it makes it considerably more difficult for our Embassies in Eastern Europe when presented with complaints about the radios to argue that the stations are independent and that we have no means of controlling their program content. A second disadvantage is that the radios’ image of independence will be damaged by a direct funding link to the Department and their actual independence may well be eroded if we are obliged to press them to tailor their broadcasts in response to diplomatic pressures. A third disadvantage is that, if they become linked to a Federal agency such as State, the radios may have greater difficulty in claiming the independent status upon which their current transmitter licenses in Germany are based. A fourth disadvantage is the increased difficulty in getting annual appropriations for grants to the radios if they are considered within the State budget.

In view of these disadvantages, we feel it is important to obtain legislation from Congress distancing the radios from either the Department or USIA. This could be achieved by passage of a bill to create an American Council for Private International Communications, Incorporated, which was drafted in the State Department and introduced July 7, 1971 as H.R. 9637 in the House of Representatives by Representative Morgan, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Our contacts with members of the House Committee, however, convince us that it is extremely doubtful, in view of Senator Fulbright’s attitude and in the light of growing resistance in Congress to the establishment of government corporations, that H.R. 9637 could pass the House and be accepted by Senate conferees. Consequently, upon the advice of friendly members of the Committee, we have considered a proposal more likely to receive Congressional approval. This would be a bill providing for the establishment of a two-year commission charged with the responsibility for preparing a study of overseas broadcasting activities by the United States Government. The commission would be composed of a majority of Executive Branch officers and private citizens, appointed by you, plus Senators and Representatives.

During the life of the Commission, its Chairman, whom you would designate from among the private citizens you appointed, would be given the responsibility for making grants of US funds to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty for fiscal years 1972 and 1973. By limiting that responsibility to your appointee, we would hope to avoid the problem of having members of the Legislative Branch in the position of exercising executive authority, an arrangement which might set a disadvantageous precedent.

The establishment of the study commission as a funding vehicle, however, raises questions as to how broad a study the Executive Branch would be willing to accept in its efforts to solve the funding difficulties. A commission studying all overseas broadcasting by the United
States Government would have authority to investigate—in addition to RFE and RL—the Voice of America and the American Forces Radio and Television Service. It is possible that a study of such broad scope could lead to recommendations for the consolidation of all American-supported radios into one agency, resulting in the loss by the Defense Department of the AFRTS whose mission is troop information. It would, therefore, seem desirable to try to focus the study on international broadcasting directed toward audiences in the Warsaw Pact countries as well as international broadcasting activities originating in those countries. Particular emphasis could be given to the role of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in that context. If a commission with this type of mandate were to be voted by the House, we could hope to avoid an examination of AFRTS or that part of VOA which is not concerned with broadcasting to Soviet Bloc audiences.

At the hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee scheduled for September 14, Under Secretary Johnson will testify in favor of the establishment of an American Council for International Communications, Incorporated, the vehicle which is our first choice. In view of the Congressional sentiment described above, however, he will, if you concur, be prepared to indicate in response to a question from Chairman Morgan, our willingness to accept a commission of the type described above—if that appears to be the best chance for separating the State Department and USIA from the administration of the grants to the radios. In taking this course, we would recognize that, in the mark-up process, the commission could emerge with a wider scope than we and USIA desire.3

Our main problem is to get strong support in the House and Senate for our bill or for the study commission alternative, which USIA regards as acceptable in the form described. If you consider that the alternative of a commission, even one in which your appointees have a majority, has too many disadvantages, we will need to have even greater involvement of the Congressional leadership to get our bill (H.R. 9637) through the House and the Conference Committee. In either event, I hope you can indicate to the Congressional leadership, as

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3 Telegram 181533 to Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, and Munich, October 2, reads in part: “House Foreign Affairs Committee voted September 30 to report out Fascell proposal for two-year Study Commission ‘to review and evaluate international radio broadcasting and related activities’ of RFE/RL. Commission Chairman would also administer grants for continuing operations during two-year period. $36 million authorized for this purpose for FY 1972 (compared with $35 million authorized by Senate bill). . . . While Department would have preferred legislation establishing permanent basis for radio operations, we have been convinced Fascell proposal has best chance for passage in present situation and provides best hope for acceptable outcome of Senate–House conference. Therefore, Department plans to urge support for it.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, RAD RFE)
soon as possible after Labor Day, the importance you attach to preserving the radios through a mechanism which will reflect their independence from the Department and USIA.

General Lucius Clay, Board Chairman of Radio Free Europe, is anxious to see you and present his view that RFE’s role would be steadily eroded unless Congress creates some structure such as a council or commission distancing the radios from the Department of State or USIA.4

William P. Rogers

4 In his November 1 letter replying to Rogers, Kissinger wrote: “The President has reviewed your memorandum of September 13, 1971, on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and agrees with your views on the importance of obtaining a satisfactory mechanism for funding of the Radios. . . . The President particularly appreciates the yeoman efforts you and your colleagues have made with the Congress to enact some form of legislation to permit continuance of the Radios, and prefers that you continue to take the lead in this endeavor rather than his raising it in a Leadership meeting.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, RAD RFE)

59. Editorial Note

On December 30, 1971, Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson reported in a memorandum to the Chairman of the 40 Committee that Congress had adjourned “without taking action on authorizing legislation for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.” “Although both the House and Senate have passed bills,” he continued, “the Joint Committee never met to reconcile them. We now hope that the Joint Committee will meet and take action shortly after Congress reconvenes on January 18, since the Continuing Resolution providing temporary financing for the radios expires February 22, 1972. It should be noted, however, that again on December 15 Senator Fulbright referred to the radios as a ‘product of the cold war’ which ‘should be terminated.’ ” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, RAD RFE)

On March 2, 1972, Theodore L. Eliot, Executive Secretary of the Department of State, wrote in a memorandum to Kissinger that “the problem of obtaining satisfactory authorizing legislation for grants to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty is at a crucial point. . . . Some involvement by the President, in the form of a discussion with or a letter to key Congressional leaders may be required in order to achieve this.” (Ibid.)
On March 11 President Richard Nixon stated in a White House press release that he was “deeply concerned at the imminent prospect that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty may be compelled to shut down. . . . It would be a tragedy if their light should now be extinguished because of a parliamentary impasse between the two Houses.” (Department of State Bulletin, April 10, 1972, page 544)

On March 24 the Senate passed a revised version of S. 18, P.L. 92–264 (86 Stat. 114), which became law a week later. It authorized a grant of $36 million for fiscal year 1972 for RFE and RL, to be provided directly to the radios by the Department of State.

60. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State (Johnson) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Study Commission for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

The passage of legislation (Tab A) providing for grants by the Department of State to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty through the end of the current fiscal year does not provide the permanent legal framework which we had originally sought nor the two-year authorization and Study Commission which the House of Representatives favored. It does, however, provide an authorization for which we propose to seek renewal, with a slight revision (Tab B) for fiscal year 1973, while further consideration is given to the sources and methods of future support for these valuable radio operations.

To provide for this further consideration and to avoid the possibility of prolonged House-Senate disagreement over the composition of a study group, I recommend that you appoint a Presidential Commission charged with responsibility for (1) examining the need for the radios and their value in the context of United States foreign policy and

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 380, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. II. Confidential. Tabs A–D are attached but not printed.


3 Tab B is a draft bill, modeled after P.L.–92–264, which provided for the appropriation of $38,520,000 through the Secretary of State for funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
of international broadcasting in Europe, (2) considering the implications of the reports on the radios prepared at the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the Congressional Research Service and by the General Accounting Office, and (3) making recommendations as to the future method and sources for their financial support. While the ideal time for announcement of the Commission’s appointment would have been when the bill at Tab B was introduced, time constraints make that impractical. Therefore, I believe the bill should be submitted immediately with the announcement of the appointment of the Commission to be made as soon thereafter as possible.

Appointment of such a Commission would serve several purposes: (1) Its report should provide the basis for a feasible legislative proposal for the radios for FY 1974; (2) The fact of the Commission’s existence would assist our friends on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to inhibit prior discussion of legislation for termination of the radios, which we believe Senator Fulbright may plan to introduce; (3) The suggestion that the Commission will be looking into sources of financial support for the radios would permit these friends to argue that Senator Fulbright’s idea of obtaining European support is being pursued and that the radios should not be terminated in the interim; (4) The prestige of the Commission would be committed to its findings; and (5) In order to maintain the radios in existence pending their findings, these prestigious Commission members would presumably also be willing to work for the interim FY 1973 authorization.

The Commission would have a limited life and its costs for operations would be about $75,000. It should be directed to submit its report to you for transmission to the Congress by February 28, 1973. It would consist of a Chairman and four members, to be appointed by you. The members would receive no pay but those resident outside Washington would receive per diem and travel expenses. The only paid employee would be the Executive Vice Chairman. By your direction, the working staff of the Commission would be drawn on loan from the various U.S. Government agencies which have been connected with the problems of the two radios (State Department, USIA, and, if desired, the CIA). Money for the operation of this Commission would be allotted from your discretionary funds.

A draft statement announcing the introduction of legislation and your intention to name such a Commission is at Tab C. \(^4\)

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\(^4\) The White House released a slightly revised version of the draft statement at Tab C to the press on May 10 (see Document 61).
A list of persons from among whom members of this Commission might be drawn is attached at Tab D.\(^5\)

**Recommendation**

That you approve the submission of the draft legislation (Tab B) at the earliest possible time,\(^6\) approve the draft statement to be issued at the time the legislation is submitted, and approve the idea of selecting, and clearing for appointment as soon as possible, a suitably composed Presidential Commission.

**U. Alexis Johnson**

\(^5\) On June 12 Kissinger, based on the list at Tab D, recommended the four commission members whom Nixon eventually appointed (see Document 61).

\(^6\) An attached transmittal slip reads: “OBE: State decided to send up legislation itself and have White House issue a statement. A subsequent memo to Pres from State will follow.” See Document 61.

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**61. Editorial Note**

On May 10, 1972, President Richard Nixon released a statement to the press regarding the future of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: “I have . . . asked the Secretary of State to submit today a bill which would continue government support to the radios through fiscal year 1973. As with the fiscal year 1972 authorization, this bill would make the grants to the radios through the Secretary of State under such terms and conditions as he deems appropriate.

“A number of different views have been expressed in Congress as to how the radios might best be funded for the future. . . . To this end, I plan to appoint a Presidential Study Commission with instructions to render its report and recommendations by February 28, 1973, so that the administration and Congress can take them into consideration in formulating authorizing legislation for fiscal year 1974. . . . The Commission will render a great service by undertaking a critical examination of this subject and by providing the best possible basis for determining the methods by which support for these valuable organizations can be maintained without impairment to the professional independence upon which their present effectiveness depends.” (Department of State Bulletin, June 12, 1972, pages 816-17)

On August 10 Nixon announced the membership of the study commission, renamed the Commission on International Radio Broad-
casting: Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, President Emeritus, Johns Hopkins University (Chair); John A. Gronouski, former Ambassador to Poland; Edmond A. Gullion, former Ambassador to the Congo; John P. Roche, Professor of Politics, Brandeis University; and Edward Barrett, Director of the Communications Institute Division, Academy for Educational Development. For the text of the announcement, see ibid., September 11, 1972, page 293. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger had recommended the four members to Nixon based on a longer list provided by State (see footnote 5, Document 60). Kissinger explained his recommendation to Nixon in a memorandum dated June 12: “All the proposed Commission members were also members of the ad hoc Citizens Committee for Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, which was set up by George Ball last winter when the radios were under the severest attack by Senator Fulbright. I am sure that they will do an outstanding job of considering the financing options.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 380, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. II)

On May 7, 1973, the Commission released its report, which “concluded that the radios were still performing a worthwhile function and recommended the creation of a Board for International Broadcasting to take over the State Department’s role of administering funds” for RFE and RL. On October 2 Congress approved S. 1914 (P.L.–93–129), which established such a seven-member board. The law also approved $50,209,000 in funding for the two radios for fiscal year 1974. (Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, volume IV, 1973–1976, page 856) For the text of P.L.–93–129, see 87 Stat. 456.
Austria

62. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 31, 1969, 8 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Chancellor Klaus
Henry A. Kissinger
Harry Obst (Interpreter)

The Chancellor expressed his gratitude that the President had found it possible to meet with him on this very busy day. He said it was clear to him that the President could not find the time, during his initial months in office, to pay a visit to any of the smaller countries. He would hope, however, that later on the President might find an opportunity to include Austria and maybe Switzerland on his itinerary of foreign visits. He congratulated the President on his successful European trip.²

The President replied, he was looking forward to a visit to Austria some time in the future. He fondly recalled his visits to Austria in 1956 and 1963.³ He had been greatly impressed by the generous assistance given by the Austrian people to the Hungarian refugees in 1956.

A country’s importance could not be judged by its size. Austria’s location in the heart of Europe and its mediating role between the communist bloc and the free countries made it an important nation.

The Chancellor said, he had told Secretary Rogers earlier that Austria was determined to continue its efforts toward East-West détente despite the grave setback suffered as a result of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of 1968.⁴

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL AUS–US, Confidential; Exdis. The meeting took place at the White House. Drafted by Harry Obst, staff interpreter in Language Services. Approved by Walsh on April 17. Klaus was in Washington to attend funeral services for former President Eisenhower.

² President Nixon visited Europe February 23–March 2.

³ As Vice President, Nixon visited the camps set up for Hungarian refugees in the wake of the unsuccessful 1956 revolution. Documentation relating to this December 18–24, 1956, mission is in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, volume XXV, Eastern Europe, pp. 534–539. Nixon’s 1963 visit was made as a private citizen.

⁴ A memorandum of this March 31 conversation is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL AUS–US.
The President stated that the United States were also interested in reducing tension and attached importance to all détente efforts. It was important, however, to ground such efforts on a basis of reality and not on just hope. It would be cruel to lift up the hopes of the people to unwarranted heights and then have to dash them.

It may seem easy for the US and the Soviet Union to just sit down together and think they could settle all the problems of the world. Prior to any settlement with the Soviet Union, two preconditions had to be met. First, the interests of all the free countries would have to be considered. Secondly, it would have to be assured that any settlement would preserve the chance for freedom in the future.

He was continuing to negotiate on disarmament and to try to increase trade and mutual contacts. But a more solid basis of reality would have to be found.

(Mr. Kissinger leaves the room)

The Chancellor remarked that though the “policy of small steps” was useful, the key to creating a calmer and better world was to be found in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Could he make a suggestion to the President? As it was not likely that Mr. Nixon would be able to come to Austria in the near future and as it might not be easy for Secretary Rogers to get away soon, how about sending Mr. Kissinger to Austria to continue political talks? Mr. Kissinger had many friends in Austria and a tremendous reputation. The Chancellor would be seeing a number of East European leaders this year and it might be appropriate to talk about some matters. It may work just as well on the second or third level.

The President welcomed the idea and promised to arrange for Mr. Kissinger and others to come to Austria. Talking to Mr. Kissinger would be as good as talking on the first level. He assured the Chancellor that Austria would not be overlooked.

The Chancellor expressed his and his country’s very best wishes for the enormous task the President was faced with. He assured the President that he could count on the assistance of the Austrian Chancellor at any time.
New York, September 23, 1969, 2110Z.

Secto 24/3160. Secretary’s Bilateral with Austrian FonMin, Sep 22.

1. Secretary raised topic of SALT. He said we did not know whether Gromyko would raise matter in meeting this evening. If there was favorable response on SALT from Soviet side, Secretary would push for Vienna as site for talks. Waldheim said it would be important for his government to get agreement by Soviets on Vienna site because of implications for that city as an international meeting place. He said Soviets had not responded when Austrians raised question of Vienna as site. Waldheim said he had discussed matter with Karjalainen and Finns were not campaigning to hold meeting in Helsinki. Unfortunately, Soviets might feel they owed something to Finns for their invitation to hold ESC in Helsinki. Austrians had been more “reticent” because ESC proposal had appeared so vague. Unfortunately, Austrians had incurred certain amount of Soviet ill-feeling because of (a) recent Sudeten-German meeting in Vienna and (b) Austrian mass media’s harsh criticism of Soviets at time of anniversary invasion of Czechoslovakia. Waldheim was agreeable to our making proposal to Soviet, if they pushed for Helsinki site, for compromise on location for climatic reasons: six months in Vienna, six months in Helsinki. Secretary said we also wanted to check out our own physical plant at Embassy Helsinki.

2. Waldheim said Austrians were convinced set-up in Czechoslovakia will stabilize as Soviets want. Czechs no longer have independent policy. As a result Austrian state visit to Romania, Waldheim was certain Soviets would not move against Romania at any time in near future. Domestic political scheme in Romania was under tight control of Romanian CP. Romanians only want certain amount of independence in foreign policy. Rumors of Soviet invasion of Romania have no basis in fact. Secretary asked Waldheim if he had expected Soviets to invade Czechoslovakia. Waldheim said no, but situation there had been different. Dubcek had, from Soviet standpoint, lost control of internal situation. Soviets had feared 1968 situation was leading to neutralist government in Prague. Soviets do not want to “go beyond” events in Czechoslovakia and indeed now want to redeem themselves. Secretary

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 AUS. Secret; Lindis. Repeated to Bonn, Bucharest, London, Moscow, Paris, Vienna, Helsinki, USEC, and Prague. Rogers and Waldheim were in New York attending the UN General Assembly meeting.
commented he was certain Soviets did not make decisions in field of power politics on basis of public opinion. Waldheim agreed, but insisted Soviets want to keep status quo, at least in Europe. He thought that “almost Stalinistic” monolith which was Romanian regime could not be assailed by Soviets.

3. Subject of ESC was raised. Secretary said we had expressed our views at last NATO meeting. Waldheim believed it was important for us to know agenda and clear items to be discussed at any such conference. He felt that subject matter could not in any case be limited to German problem.

4. Waldheim raised subject of European integration. Problem for Austrians was how to continue their efforts to join Common Market. Their exports to Common Market countries were up. He appreciated US position on European unity and Austrian EC association. He said Schumann had told him France could accept Austria as special case. There was even possibility Italians would allow Austria to take up their case again in Brussels, despite earlier Italian veto,2 once they settle South Tyrol problem (which had greatly improved in last two years). Secretary said US would continue policy of supporting, although not with public statements, UK bid for EC entry.

Rogers

2 Italy had opposed admission of Austria prior to a settlement of the Alto-Adige issue. Austria initially sought an association agreement with the EEC, and in 1972 negotiated a special economic arrangement with the Community.

64. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1


SUBJECT

The Austrian State Treaty and the Acquisition of Defensive Missiles

As a result of Foreign Minister Kirchschläger’s visit to Moscow earlier this year, the Austrians believe that the Soviets would now agree (unlike their 1964 position) to interpret the State Treaty so as to permit Austria to acquire short range defensive missiles. The British and French agree with us that Article 13 of the Treaty\(^2\) can legally be interpreted as permitting this acquisition. They also agree that some form of confirming written exchange among the signatories is necessary (though the French do not want to be too rigid). The Austrians, on the other hand, fear that an attempt to get the Soviets to confirm this positive interpretation in writing would be counterproductive, and so the Austrians would like some form of de facto approval procedure.

Our own consideration of this matter has been temporarily sidetracked because of Congressional considerations. As a matter of law, the Executive has the authority to “interpret” treaties without recourse to the Senate, and there is even some legal support for the Executive alone agreeing to a “modification” of a treaty in some cases. However, in State’s initial contact with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, it became apparent that more than mere notification to that Committee would be necessary. (In an April 3 speech at Yale, Senator Fulbright charged—in another context—that the Executive reduces commitments to a near nullity by the device of reinterpreting treaties.)

State is currently awaiting receipt from the Austrians of their missile “shopping list” which they have promised to send to all signatories of the Treaty. The Committee staff has indicated great interest in precisely what types of missiles Austria desires.

At this point at least, there does not seem to be anything for you to do. A memorandum from State on this is at Tab A.\(^3\)

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\(^2\) It prohibited “self-propelled or guided missiles.”

\(^3\) Attached but not printed.
65. **Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State**

Vienna, July 23, 1971, 1615Z.

4536. Subject: USG–USSR–PRC Relations. **Summary:** During Ambassador’s call on Foreign Minister Kirchschlaeger latter said deterioration of USG–USSR relations would be too high in price to pay for new USG–PRC policy and was afraid this might be the case. FonMin said he hoped SALT had been used as forum for preparation of Soviets for Kissinger trip to Peking. **End summary.**

1. This morning, accompanied by DCM, I called on FonMin Kirchschlaeger for pre-vacation tour d’horizon. Although the Minister confessed to being extremely tired, I found him in friendly and convivial mood throughout hour long conversation.

2. On behalf Secretary Rogers I thanked FonMin for GOA’s statement offering to intern Vietnam POWs. He accepted message affably and said GOA pleased to do it.

3. Kirchschlaeger asked me to comment on recent USG–PRC developments. I replied that not in a position to provide further information beyond what we both already knew and added that this would be the case until Secretary Rogers officially announces USG’s position, which I understood would happen in relatively near future.

4. Kirchschlaeger said he was concerned about the reaction of the USSR: that a climate of mutual confidence recently had been developing between Washington and Moscow and he fervently hoped this would continue to be the case. He believed that a deterioration of USG–USSR relations would be too high a price to pay for a new USG–PRC policy, but was afraid this might be the case. FonMin volunteered his assumption that SALT had been used as forum to prepare Soviets psychologically for new USG policy towards PRC. Said he feared if this were not the case Soviets may react unfavorably, jeopardizing SALT, since Soviets notoriously touchy regarding anything they might consider “encirclement” or affecting their national security.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 AUS. Confidential. Repeated to USDel SALT V. Smith was in Helsinki at the SALT talks.

2 Reference is to a July 15 announcement that meetings between Kissinger and Chinese officials had produced an agreement for a visit by President Nixon and the opening of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.

3 August 2. For text of the statement and the Secretary’s comments to the press, see Department of State Bulletin, August 23, 1971, pp. 193–196.
5. Kirchschlaeger made the point that just as in the 30’s there had
been a German trauma on this subject so is there today a Soviet trauma.
I did not comment on above other than to reiterate President’s state-
ment that our move vis-à-vis PRC was not directed against any nation.4

6. In answer to my question Kirchschlaeger said there was no de-
cision yet on selection of Austrian Ambassador to Peking although he
believes a man would be named in early September.

7. During meeting FonMin commented on his recent trip to Italy,
his plan to attend UNGA, status of Austrian hopes for association with
EC, Austria’s position on Law of the Sea, Austria-Czechoslovakia re-
lations and some aspects internal Austrian politics all of which sub-
jects septels.

8. At conclusion of meeting I inquired when Chancellor Kreisky
planned to leave on vacation since I had asked for appointment to make
courtesy call before we both left town. Kirchschlaeger said this was
Chancellor’s last day in his office, that he was extremely busy and that
my chances of seeing him were virtually nil unless I had important
subject to discuss. He mentioned that he himself had been trying to
reach him by telephone for last two hours without success. Upon re-
turn to Embassy I found that I had appointment to call on Kreisky later
this afternoon together with DCM.5

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5 In telegram 4549 from Vienna, July 26, Ambassador Humes reported: “Nothing
new came up during my call on Chancellor. Conversation covered much the same ground
as my earlier talk with ForMin Kirchschlaeger.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files
1970–73, POL 15–1 AUS)
190285. From the Secretary.

1. You should seek an early meeting with the Chancellor for the purpose of delivering an oral message of the greatest importance. It is essential that you see the Chancellor prior to the Cabinet meeting at which the Chinese Representation issue is to be decided. At the meeting you should read to the Chancellor the following message, and leave with him an aide-mémoire consisting of the text which you have delivered orally.

"I have been instructed to express to you, with the frankness appropriate between friends, the great importance which the United States Government attaches to the forthcoming votes in the United Nations on the issue of Chinese Representation.

"My government is aware, of course, that you recently established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China and that your government would not wish to take a position in the United Nations inconsistent with that fact. We are also appreciative of the care you took, when establishing those relations, not to commit yourself on voting in the United Nations.

"The President of the United States, too, is vitally interested in better relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. At the same time he is not prepared to sacrifice basic principles to that end. He also is convinced that continued representation of the Republic of China in the UN would be helpful in achieving a more secure and more peaceful Asia. The United States Government cannot, therefore, be indifferent to the expulsion of representatives of the Republic of China from the United Nations. Indeed, we believe such action will cause, in the United States, widespread popular and Congressional resentment and even anger. Such an action would, therefore, greatly harm our own ability to make the United Nations a more effective institution.

"My government is certain that it is not incompatible for a country to work for improved relations with the People’s Republic of China..."
and yet to vote for the Important Question and Dual Representation resolutions. That is what we are doing.

“If Austria could join with other countries to prevent the expulsion of the Republic of China, my government has no doubt that you would thereby contribute significantly to the development of a sounder and more realistic world community.

“The United States Government is aware of the concerns that Foreign Minister Kirschlaeger expressed to the Secretary of State about the name of the ‘Republic of China.’ We had carefully considered this matter and concluded that this was the best course to follow. Any other terminology would clearly have tended to create ‘Two Chinas,’ which we did not wish to do. On the other hand the texts were carefully phrased so that no one who supported them would have to commit themselves to the claims of the Republic of China. Indeed the decisive fact is that our proposal gives the seat in the Security Council to the People’s Republic of China.

“In view of the special considerations which make this issue one of particular concern to the United States Government, and to the future of the United Nations, we ask for your support of our proposals. My government particularly expresses the hope that you will vote yes on the Important Question resolution, which is designed solely to prevent the expulsion of the Republic of China.”

2. At the conclusion of your oral presentation (but not to be included in the aide-mémoire which you will leave with the Chancellor), you should add the following: “I have been instructed to inform you that these views have the full support of the President of the United States and that he places great stress upon your attitude on this issue.”

Rogers

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3 For text of the U.S. resolution, see UN doc. A/L 632 and Add. 1 and 2. The motion was rejected in the General Assembly by a vote of 55–59 on October 25.

4 In telegram 6753 from Vienna, October 22, Humes reported that despite assurances from the Chancellor’s office that no decision on Chinese representation would be made before he met with Kreisky, the Foreign Minister had announced Austria’s decision to vote for the Albanian resolution and abstain on the Important Question resolution. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 668, Country Files—Europe, Austria, Vol. I)
67. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Among the President’s Assistant (Haldeman), the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and President Nixon¹

Washington, April 11, 1972, 10:50 a.m.

K: Mr. President.

H: This is Bob. I’m in the President’s office. I was thinking of a stopping point on the way to Russia.² I was wondering whether Austria is a possibility and going to Salzburg, not Vienna. Spending two nights as originally planned to do which would destroy the idea of a rest stopover.

K: Well, if he wants to do that. I have no great objection to that.

H: He is just wondering if that isn’t better than going to Switzerland.

(At this point, the President came on.)

P: Hello.

K: Hello, Mr. President.

P: I don’t like the feeling of a Spanish base and I didn’t like the feeling of the Azores. Switzerland poses a problem which you are aware of. Let me say this for Austria. I have always had a very close relationship with Austria. The Ambassador is a good friend of mine and also it is a country which is not allied to us or the Russians and rather than going to Vienna, going to Salzburg which is a lovely town.

K: And the weather will be nice too. Can we land there?

P: We landed there in a Constellation last time. And I don’t mind doing the Austrian thing. What’s an hour’s conversation during the day.

K: I share your concern about Switzerland. And if you go there just over night you are going to have a tremendous operation there for one night’s rest and if you go for two nights it looks like a vacation so I think Austria . . .

P: You don’t mind our exploring it.

K: No.

P: This Ambassador Hans Gruber is a helluva guy. I know him extremely well. I got to know him at the [Hungarian] refugee period.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 21, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

² Reference is to Nixon’s planned summit meeting in Moscow May 22–30 with Brezhnev. Nixon stopped in Salzburg May 20–22 en route to Moscow.
K: And they certainly have the facilities there, Mr. President.
P: They do and the people will be friendly—that’s another thing.
We have no problem there of unfriendly people. They love Americans in Austria.

K: I think if you are willing to see them . . .
P: Right. I think we should see them, but only have an hour’s meeting.

K: A courtesy call.
P: Right, a courtesy call. We do need the two nights.
K: I think, Mr. President, that is a good idea.
P: I will have Bob check that out then. And do you want to check it with Gruber?

K: Gruber?
P: Yes.
K: I could do it easily enough or my office could do it quickly. I will get you an answer by tomorrow. I am sure they will be enthusiastic.
P: Fine, you go forward with Gruber.

68. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Your Stopover in Austria

I. Background and Your Objectives

Austria regards itself as neutral by treaty but not by choice, history or inclination. By all these she is firmly pro-Western. But Austrian Constitutional Law and the State Treaty of 1955, which ended the occupation, gave Austria back its independence and calls for its “perpetual” neutrality, make it difficult for Austria to give political form to

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this Western orientation. The Austrians have, however, sought to put
their neutrality to creative use in helping to better relations between
Eastern and Western European countries. They see in the present mil-
tary and political equilibrium in Central Europe the best guarantee of
their neutrality and security. Austria has stoutly defended its neutral-
ity and freedom against Soviet pressures and occasional threats, no-
tably at the time of the Hungarian revolution in 1956, when you vis-
ited the country, and during the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.2

Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, with whom you will meet in Salzburg,
is a close friend of Willy Brandt. He heads the Socialist Party. Biogra-
phies of Kreisky and other Austrian leaders are at Tab A.

The Socialists which took over the government in 1970 and
strengthened their position in national elections last fall, reject dog-
matic Marxism and are strongly anti-Communist. Their constituency
includes both workers and many white collar employees. They have
stressed full employment and expanding social welfare benefits. The
opposition is made up of the conservative People’s Party and a small
liberal party.

The United States, as one of the four occupying powers and sign-
natories of the State Treaty, has played a key role in Austria’s post-war
history. Yet no American President has ever paid a state visit (although
President Kennedy went to an unsuccessful Summit in Vienna with
Khrushchev in 1961). Your stopover will to some extent meet Austria’s
long-standing desire for a visit to the country as such. It will thus also
balance at last state visits paid to Austria by Khrushchev (1960) and

Your chief objectives—which are to a large degree accomplished by
the fact of your visit—are to underscore our support for Austria’s con-
structive neutrality, our respect for its determined and even-handed
defense of that policy, and our friendship for a small country, whose
strategic geographic location and influence in the UN and potentially
in Eastern Europe might one day make its support of substantial im-
portance to us. Chancellor Kreisky carries much prestige among Eu-
ropean socialists. Your meeting thus also presents a valuable opportu-
nity through him to make our Vietnam policies better understood
within the Socialist parties. Kreisky, who is intelligent, active and
experienced in foreign affairs, may also have some helpful insights into
Soviet interests and aims in Europe.

2 Documentation relating to the Austrian response to the Warsaw Pact invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968 is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XVII, Eastern Europe;
Austria; Finland, Documents 202–204.
Austria’s objectives parallel ours. Its chief interest in your visit is to get a sympathetic hearing for the problems which its neutrality entails, in particular those increasingly troublesome ones of adjusting its relationship to the European Community (EC). The Austrians will want particularly to acquaint you with their special perspective on European security matters, including the Conference on European Security and Cooperation (CSCE).

II. Issues and Talking Points

You should:

—review with Kreisky your expectations for the Moscow Summit and the prospects for a SALT agreement there;
—lay our your views on European security matters, in particular our policies on the CSCE and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR);
—note that there are no bilateral US-Austrian problems.³

In addition to these issues, Kreisky may want to:

—discuss his efforts to give Austria a more dynamic intermediary role in East-West relations;
—explain Austria’s vital interest in negotiating an industrial free trade area with the European Community and seek your support for these negotiations.

Since you will have only a brief time with Kreisky, your talks will of necessity cover only one or two of the main issues:

A. Summit

You may wish to indicate to Kreisky how you expect the Summit to be affected by the Vietnam situation and by Moscow’s response to our military actions there. You might list for him the kinds of bilateral US-Soviet agreements that are in the making (science, space, environment). Since Austria has provided a site for the SALT negotiations, Kreisky will want to have your judgment on the importance of an agreement for Summit success and on the likelihood of follow-on negotiations.

You should note that your decision to go on with the visit was not lightly taken, in view of Moscow’s support for the North Vietnamese invasion.⁴ However careful preparations have convinced us that the Soviets wish to come to concrete bilateral agreements that may open

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³ The President wrote next to this sentence: “SALT”.  
⁴ Launched on March 30 from bases in Laos. The offensive continued into May, eventually provoking a resumption of U.S. bombing attacks on North Vietnam.
the way to wider understandings. For that reason we decided to pro-
ceed to the Summit—without any illusion, however, that it will trans-
form the US-Soviet relationship or eliminate basic differences.

You should:

—emphasize our pragmatic, case-by-case approach in dealing with
the Soviets at the Summit;
—indicate that we see improvement of relations with Moscow as
a protracted process and point out the areas of difference that persist;
—initiate discussion of the Soviets’ European policy, which obvi-
ously is of primary interest to the Austrians, pointing out the impon-
derables that stem from the status of the German treaties and the Berlin
Protocol; and
—ask for Kreisky’s assessment of Soviet objectives and current
policies. (He is a shrewd and well-informed informer.)

B. European Security and the CSCE

We are generally sympathetic to Austrian efforts, revitalized by
Kreisky, to play a more active intermediary role in relations between
Eastern and Western Europe. As heir to an empire that once included
parts of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia,
Austria has a good understanding of politics in Eastern Europe and
an ability to put across the Western viewpoint to the political leader-
ship there. A working principle of Vienna’s foreign policy is to pro-
mote Austria as a site for East-West negotiations and international
conferences.

The Austrians hope that Vienna will be selected as one of the al-
ternate sites for a European Security Conference (CSCE). They want a
Conference mainly for the sake of détente atmospherics but hope that
it will not weaken NATO solidarity, on which the Central European
equilibrium is so dependent.

On European security generally, you should:

—express understanding and appreciation for Austria’s overall
contribution to the improvement of East-West relations:
—say that we prefer to focus on specific initiatives to overcome
the divisions of the continent and will judge each Austrian proposal to
this end on its merits.

On the CSCE, you should:

—explain that at present we see more advantages to the Soviets
than to the West in a European Conference or in any broad effort to
devise an all-European security system;
—note that we expect Brezhnev to push hard at the Summit for
an early CSCE;
—explain that we have never been opposed to the idea of a CSCE
in principle but consider that certain basic issues producing tension
should be examined and resolved first;
—reiterate our view that the Berlin agreement should be signed before we move onward toward a CSCE, recalling to Kreisky that we are ready to sign it now but the Soviets have so far stuck to the linkage with the German treaties which they earlier established;\(^5\)
—express our preference, assuming signature of the Berlin agreement, for exploratory discussions late in the year;  
—say that we can, under these conditions, agree to a Conference next year and preliminary discussions between East and West about it in the late fall of this year; and  
—ask Kreisky for his views on the Conference, in particular on how to bring the East Europeans to agree to the Western objective of bringing about freer movement of information, ideas, and people.

C. Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

The Austrians have been carefully watching NATO’s gropings toward a common position on this issue, for they are concerned about the effect which reductions might have on the military balance in Europe. Like other neutrals, Austria would like to play some role in MBFR negotiations and any ensuing reduction arrangements. Possibly Kreisky will suggest Vienna as an appropriate venue for negotiations.

*You should:*

—point out that we have been studying this complex issue for nearly four years and so far have been unable to see a negotiating outcome that could be both manifestly acceptable to the East and also clearly in our security interest; but we are continuing our efforts;  
—say that we have concluded that MBFR negotiations and the European Conference should be separate, although we do not want to foreclose the possibility of a general discussion of MBFR at the conference;  
—add that we do not now envisage participation by the neutrals in the negotiating process;  
—add that you hope that the present procedural impasse on how to start exploratory discussions with the East can be broken and hope this can begin more or less simultaneously with CSCE preparations.

D. Vietnam

Kreisky on May 2 stated that although he opposes the war he is “not prepared to hold any single state responsible for it.” He does not endorse the views of some European Socialists who favor diplomatic relations with Vietnam. Although he supports UN membership for all divided countries, he wants to postpone establishment of relations with North Vietnam until the question of the two Germanies is resolved.

*You may wish to:*

—acknowledge his generally helpful statement;  
—review our Vietnam actions since Hanoi’s all-out invasion began.

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\(^5\) For text of the September 3, 1971, Four Power agreement, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 1135–1143. The final Quadripartite agreement was signed in Berlin on June 3, 1972. For text, see ibid., pp. 1204–1206.
E. Austria’s Relationship with the European Community (EC)

This is a vital issue for the Austrians, and it is discussed in greater detail separately (Tab B). Briefly, Austria, and the other members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) are trying to negotiate an industrial free trade area with the EC. Forty percent of Austria’s exports go to the EC and 55% of its imports come from this area. Kreisky has been making the rounds of EC capitals to drum up support, negotiating for Austria’s position.

The main problem arises because the Soviets take the view, with which we agree, that the Austrian State Treaty prohibits full Austrian membership in the EC. Kreisky hopes to negotiate an economic agreement that would imply a tacit political link with the Community but one the Soviets could not protest. He argues that if Austria cannot soon negotiate such an agreement, it will be faced with progressive “Finlandization” and will have to consider an arrangement with the Soviet-dominated economic grouping, COMECON.

Kreisky may:

—seek your support for Austria’s negotiations;
—make the point that Moscow’s tolerance level in Europe is now high because of its interest in a CSCE, so that it might acquiesce to an Austrian-EC arrangement if made soon;
—explain that Austria wants a link with an enlarged EC as a whole to counterbalance growing German economic influence in Austria, which raises Soviet suspicions;
—ask for withdrawal of the US objections to EC tariff reductions for exports of paper, which is a major Austrian export.

You should:

—say that we recognize that Austria, because of the State Treaty, cannot become a full EC member and we consider it a special case;
—express sympathy for Austria’s need to reach some arrangement with the EC short of full membership;
—say that we hope that his arrangement will be compatible with the GATT and will do minimal damage to the trade interests of third countries, including the United States;
—reaffirm, if Kreisky raises this special issue, our position that we want equal access to the EC market for US paper and pulp.

III. Secretary Rogers’ Memorandum

A memorandum from the Secretary giving his assessment of the visit and our objectives is to be found in the attached book.6

6 Attached but not printed.
IV. Additional Talking Points

A. Salzburg Consulate

Conceivably the Austrians will allude to their hope that we will reopen our Consulate in Salzburg, which was closed nine years ago as an economy move.

A set of talking points on the Salzburg Consulate is to be found at Tab C.

B. Arab-Israeli Problem in European Security Conference

Kreisky believes that the Arab-Israeli problem should be on the Conference agenda. He may mention this. Austria, traditionally alert to developments in the Balkans, believes that Soviet activities in the Eastern Mediterranean deserve close attention and discussion at a Conference.

If this comes up, you should restate our Near Eastern position, with which the Austrians may not be fully familiar. You should say that:

—work on this crucial issue should not be postponed until the convening of a Conference, whose date is indefinite;
— the parties directly involved should negotiate settlement;
— the best avenue for progress lies in the “proximity talks” between Israel and Egypt, which we are ready to help arrange, on an interim agreement to reopen the Suez Canal.

V. Background Papers and Biographic Sketches

For consultation as required, background papers on the following points are to be found in the attached book:

— Austria’s Role in Central Europe
— Austrian Foreign Policy
— Austrian Internal Situation

Biographic sketches of all key Austrians whom you are likely to encounter as well as Ambassador Humes and his deputy are also to be found in the attached book.
69. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Austrian Ambassador (Gruber)\(^1\)

Washington, May 17, 1972, 12:07 p.m.

K: Hello.

G: Gruber speaking.

K: Hello Mr. Ambassador. How nice to hear from you. I’m calling you about some of the reports we are getting about large demonstrations in Salzburg and also the fact that these crowds are going to be let in on the airport when the President arrives. And I just want to say, you know, I know there are limitations on what you can do. But it would really have very unfortunate consequences here . . .\(^2\)

G: I don’t think this is in any way the case, but I will call them up in Vienna right away.

K: And you know, the President has very warm feelings towards Austria and it would be a pity to destroy them with this sort of thing.

G: No, no, I will talk to them right away and we’ll see that we get the true picture . . . the trouble is the news reports very often exaggerate it or are not quite . . .

K: Well, I know what . . . You know, I know it’s not the feeling of the Austrian government or the vast majority of the people.

G: Salzburg should be the ideal to settle then I would say; there should be no problem whatsoever.

K: Well that’s what I would have thought. But I just thought I should call you.

G: That was very fine. Thank you very much and I will get in touch with them immediately.

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\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 21, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

\(^2\) Telegram 3382 from Vienna, May 17, reported: “In press conference following yesterday’s (May 16) cabinet meeting Chancellor Kreisky placed expected ‘anti-Nixon demonstrations’ into pro-U.S. perspective in stating that Austrian Communist Party ‘which is most Moscow-servile CP will in fact demonstrate against Brezhnev and Kosygin since Pres. Nixon’s Salzburg stop-over came about as a result of their invitations to U.S. President to visit Moscow.’ He pointed out that demonstrations are permissible in a free society, but Austrian authorities will insist that Salzburg demonstrations remain strictly within the law.” Sonnenfeldt summarized the telegram in a May 18 memorandum to Kissinger. (Both are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 668, Country Files—Europe, Austria, Vol. I)
70. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT

Courtesy Call by Minister Luetgendorf

PARTICIPANTS

Austrian Side
Minister for National Defense—Karl Ferdinand Luetgendorf
Military & Air Attaché, Embassy of Austria—Brig. Ferdinand Folten

U.S. Side
Deputy Secretary of Defense—Kenneth Rush
Principal Deputy Asst Secretary of Defense (ISA)—Armistead I. Selden, Jr.
Deputy Asst Secretary of Defense (ISA)—John H. Morse
Military Asst to the DepSecDef—Colonel John G. Jones, USA
Austrian Desk Officer, EurReg/ISA—Charles T. Lloyd

1. Preliminary Discussion

Secretary Rush welcomed Minister Luetgendorf and noted that Austria was the only place in Europe which the Russians had left voluntarily. Minister Luetgendorf responded that in Austria the Communist Party holds no seats in Parliament and secures only 21/2% of the vote. The Secretary observed that this is unusual because one might expect the Russians to have thoroughly organized an effective party before leaving.

2. Soviet Policy

Secretary Rush referred to the change in Russian posture as demonstrated in Brandt’s “Ostpolitik,” the Berlin Agreement and the groundwork being laid for MBFR. He said that the Russians think their

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15-1 AUS. Secret; Sensitive; Exdis. Drafted by Lloyd and approved by Selden on July 31. The meeting took place in Rush’s office at the Pentagon.

2 See footnote 5, Document 68.
best interest is served at the present time by détente. However, this is not a change of Russian objectives but a change in means or tactics. Their objectives are to have the U.S. withdraw from Europe, to break up NATO and to spread their influence in Europe. Minister Luetgendorf said that the small countries in Europe particularly hope that the U.S. will keep its forces in Europe, because there will be great danger if troops are reduced. He agreed that Russia’s objectives remain the same and on the basis of his study he is not sure that its attitude of coexistence and appeasement will continue during the next 20 years.

3. SALT

Minister Luetgendorf expressed the view that it is necessary for the little countries to take part and that their military experts have the opportunity to discuss military potential in the area. He also expressed the hope that the so-called peace activists in the younger generation had not influenced the political representatives at the SALT conference.

4. Status of Russian Hierarchy

The Minister expressed the view that Brezhnev and Kosygin are now in a position similar to the one Khrushchev reached. He said the Army takes a position not in accord with that of the political leadership and this could lead to a change in government. The Secretary noted that we were aware of the difficulties faced by the political leadership in May after the North Vietnam attack when the President had taken firm action to mine North Vietnamese harbors and bomb military targets in the North. He noted that timely ratification of the Berlin agreement by the FRG had made it impossible for the Russians to cancel President Nixon’s trip. He said that he believes that the present Russian leaders have now suppressed the opposition and remain in command of the situation.

5. MBFR and CSCE

The Secretary said he expects the Russians to push for the CSCE for a number of reasons; that for them it would, in effect, be a World War II peace treaty because it recognizes political changes within Europe, would provide a calming period in the West to enable the Soviets to face the Chinese in the East and finally would enable the Russian Government to satisfy some of the economic pressures that exist. The Soviet game plan is to get the U.S. to reduce its presence in Europe and to split up NATO. The Secretary said the U.S. game plan is

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the reverse, to maintain U.S. presence and strengthen NATO as we seek a guarded détente based on MBFR.

The Secretary said he was confident that President Nixon will be re-elected and will maintain U.S. strength in Europe. He said that the stronger Western Europe remains the safer Austria is. Over a period of time, the U.S. would hope to attract Warsaw Pact countries such as the GDR, Poland and Romania, even Russia itself, to free hundreds of millions from the yoke of Stalinism. He noted that Soviet hardliners see this as an effort to corrupt and weaken Stalinism.

6. Military Equipment for Austria

The Minister expressed his appreciation for the great U.S. help which enabled Austria to build up its Army. He said that it has been ten years since Austria had a credit of $46 million and that it runs out this year. He reported that much of the Army’s equipment is old and needs replacing and asked whether it would be possible to get a new credit to buy material from the U.S. Army, especially communications and signal equipment. He also mentioned the need for heavy weapons including M–60, M–109 howitzer, 106mm recoilless cannon, anti-tank cannon ammunition and helicopters. He suggested that if this material were available as surplus as was the case between 1956–60 this would be good for Austria. Secretary Rush said that the U.S. would be glad to consider any Austrian request that the Minister might propose. He said that we have very friendly feelings for Austria and while she must be neutral we consider her a good friend of ours.

7. Reorganization of Austrian Army

The Minister said that the strategy of Austrian defense is moving toward that of Yugoslavia in which the Army will not engage in major battles but will utilize Austria’s mountains and confine defense efforts to small groups fighting behind enemy lines. For this, he said, they need good communications, anti-tank and small anti-aircraft weapons. He said that the Army would maintain one interceptor aircraft group in order to defend Austrian air-space. It would also be important to have helicopters for communication and to shift troops. Mr. Morse noted that the Yugoslavs are interested in the same type of equipment for similar purposes. Secretary Rush agreed that communications and mobility are vital in such operations.

8. Yugoslav Political Situation; Yugoslavs in Austria

The Minister noted the potential political difficulties in Yugoslavia. The Secretary commented that the presence of different races and rivalries presented an opportunity for promoting a civil war from outside. Mr. Rush noted that only this week Yugoslavia was taking action to control its factions. He suggested that the Russians might want to
let Yugoslavia break itself up rather than promote civil war or support an attack from without. However, he hopes that the present détente may be sufficiently interesting to the Russians to prevent them from pushing such a war. On the other hand, local power struggles could be stimulated.

The Minister said there are now 120,000 Yugoslav workers in Austria and he does not know what they would do if Tito dies. Last year when the Yugoslavs conducted maneuvers only 35% of its reserves called back from Austria and Germany actually returned. Secretary Rush agreed the Yugoslavia is a focal point of interest today and noted that the French are concerned and Minister of Defense Debré recently told him he has it uppermost in his mind. The Minister said that he is aware of one plan for Hungary to attack Yugoslavia through Austria and therefore Austria is now prepared to close the Hungarian border. He noted that the Russians would like a port on the Adriatic.

9. Left-Wing Youth

Secretary Rush asked the Minister whether the radical youth (JUSO) posed problems for him. Minister Luetgendorf stated that while he is independent of political matters he is helping the Socialist party control its own left-wing youth. Secretary Rush said that the situation is serious in Germany where Brandt may lose the December elections because of the youth vote. Minister Luetgendorf said that the situation in Austria is less troublesome because the students are less excited.

71. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State

New York, September 29, 1972, 2034Z.

Secto 27/3575. Memorandum of Conversation: FM Rudolf Kirchschlaeger (Austria) September 27, 1972; 11:45 a.m. Waldorf 30A.

1. Participants: Austria—FM Rudolf Kirchschlaeger, Ambassador Dr. Karl Gruber, Permanent Rep. Dr. Peter Jankowitsch, Dr. Schallenberg; US—The Secretary, Mr. Stoessel, Mr. Blankinship (reporting officer).

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL AUS–US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Vienna. Rogers and Kirchschlaeger were in New York attending the UN General Assembly meeting.
2. Summary: The FM said Austria soon will recognize North Vietnam but it will maintain same level of representation in Hanoi and Saigon. FM was noncommittal on whether action would be delayed in response Secretary’s suggestion that delay would be helpful. The Secretary reviewed the status of CSCE and MBFR and stressed need to act on terrorism.

3. Norwegian Referendum: The FM said that the Norwegian referendum on the EEC might have serious consequences—raise doubts in Denmark and lead the EEC to reject Finnish agreement. From the point of view of a united Europe, the outcome is serious.

4. US Consulate in Salzburg: The Secretary said that he hopes the Department of State will be able to reopen the Consulate at Salzburg as soon as some financial problems are worked out.

5. CSCE: The FM inquired about CSCE. The Secretary responded that the allies are discussing a date for beginning preparatory talks; Nov. 22 seems a likely date. He said that SALT talks may also resume in November in Geneva. He noted that shifting the location of SALT I between Vienna and Helsinki had caused some problems.

6. Recognition of Hanoi: FM said that in late October or early November the Austrian Government intended to contact Hanoi with a view of establishing relations with North Vietnam. The channel had not yet been determined, but the Austrians wished to follow the Swiss example of recognizing Hanoi. He said that he thought it was advisable to inform the US first before taking such action. The Secretary expressed regret about the decision particularly when peace negotiations are proceeding. He said that he hoped that the Austrians would find it possible to delay until at least the end of November.

7. Representation in East Germany: The FM said that the Austrians also intend to follow the Swiss example in opening up the commercial representation in East Germany by the end of the year.

8. Terrorism: The Secretary stressed the importance of acting against terrorism. The FM said that Austria would ratify the Hijack Convention but that Austrians were concerned about the problem which would arise if a hijacked plane flew into Austria from the Soviet Bloc with passengers claiming asylum. The Secretary said that the Hijack Convention made allowance for this situation; the country where the hijacker landed could prosecute him without returning him. The Secretary emphasized that commercial aviation is so important to

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2 In September a binding referendum on Norwegian accession to the EEC resulted in a 53 percent vote in favor of rejecting membership in the Community.

3 For text of the December 16, 1970, Hague agreement on suppression of air piracy, see 22 UST 1641.
everyone everywhere that hijacking a commercial aircraft could not be justified on any grounds.

9. 25 Percent Assessment: The Secretary expressed hope that Austria would help out on this problem.

10. MBFR: The FM inquired about negotiations on MBFR. The Secretary responded that the Soviets want no linkage and no parallelism. Hence, we do not use these words. However, we will carry on preparatory work for CSCE and MBFR in the same time frame. The negotiations will not necessarily occur at the same place for both subjects. The FM asked who would participate in MBFR. The Secretary responded “those primarily concerned.” As a practical matter those who have troops are the ones that should be primarily involved in the negotiations; others have only a peripheral interest—though they must be kept informed. He wished, however, to assure the FM that the US would make no decisions which would undermine Europe security. This is why the US has insisted upon the world “balanced.” FM inquired whether in CSCE the US anticipated negotiating a treaty or coming out with a declaration. The Secretary replied this is undecided. But he thought that a clause such as para 11 of the Moscow Declaration of Principles might well be included. We also intended, he said, to press for an undertaking on freedom of movement. The FM agreed to the usefulness of such a provision.

Rogers

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4 The United States paid 31 percent of the UN budget and was pressing to get other states, most notably the Soviet Union, to shoulder a greater share of the burden, while reducing its own percentage of the costs.

5 For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 633–635.
Bulgaria

72. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 8, 1969, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
US-Bulgarian Relations

PARTICIPANTS
Bulgaria
Dr. Luben Guerassimov, Ambassador
Mr. Vesselin Vassilev, Attaché

US
The Secretary
Martin A. Wenick, EUR/EE

Ambassador Guerassimov said that he was calling upon the Secretary on instructions from his Minister of Foreign Affairs with whom he had spoken during his recent consultations in Sofia. He told the Secretary that he carried a personal message of good wishes from the Minister and that he wished to inform us that Bulgaria stands ready to improve relations with the US in all areas.

The Ambassador said that there has been in recent years success in the development of US-Bulgarian commercial and cultural relations, and the Bulgarians wished to strengthen and to expand relations in these areas as well as in other fields. For example, he said that presently the Bulgarian Government is engaged in negotiations with American firms for the sale of two industrial complexes, the total cost of which would be approximately $50 million. Of course, he said, one of the obstacles is the fact that Bulgaria does not enjoy MFN which inhibits the expansion of Bulgarian trade with the US. This is an area where the Bulgarians would particularly like to see progress in the future.

With this introduction, the Ambassador asked the Secretary whether he would provide an assessment of bilateral relations and whether he would comment on the Budapest Appeal of the Warsaw Pact countries with which the Bulgarian Government was associated.

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2 Dated March 17; the significant portions of the statement are printed in Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1969–1970, p. 23261.
The Secretary first requested the Ambassador to convey to Foreign Minister Bashev his appreciation for the Minister’s message which the Ambassador had brought. He then told the Ambassador that it is US policy to seek to improve relations with all countries regardless of the obstacles which stand in the way. The advent of a new Administration, the Secretary observed, is a particularly good time to reexamine the course to be followed in seeking to improve relations.

The Secretary remarked that there is a tendency to be non-specific in conducting international relations. He wanted to tell the Ambassador very frankly and specifically, however, that he feels the process in improving our bilateral relations would be a slow one. Bulgaria’s willingness to participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, an action which aroused public opinion in the US, would be an obstacle in the path of efforts to improve relations. Additionally, the so-called Brezhnev doctrine3 has the US concerned because of its implications. The Secretary added that this concern goes beyond the US, since every leader with whom the President and he had spoken during the President’s recent European trip4 had expressed concern over the implications of the Soviet pronouncements about a socialist commonwealth.

The Ambassador interjected that a misunderstanding exists about Soviet policy. He feels, he said, that there is no so-called Brezhnev doctrine; however, there is the obligation of each socialist country to provide mutual assistance to other socialist countries in defense of the socialist order.

The Secretary then continued that despite the difficult hurdles that he foresees in improving relations, we would be seeking, within these limits, to have better relations with Bulgaria. He indicated there are areas, such as cultural exchanges and tourism, where progress would appear to be easier than in other areas.

The Secretary then asked the Ambassador whether he really considers the Budapest Appeal a practical solution to the question of European security. The Secretary observed that an effort to solve all the outstanding problems affecting European security at one time appears to be unrealistic from our point of view. He asked whether a conference such as that envisaged in the Appeal could really solve the

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4 The President visited Western Europe February 23–March 2.
major problems facing Europe when we have been unable in the past to eliminate a number of the minor problems which are outstanding.

The Ambassador expressed his Government’s belief that a European Security Conference would contribute to the consolidation of peace and security in Europe.

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73. Memorandum of Conversation

Sofia, November 30, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Todor Zhivkov
Foreign Minister Ivan Bashev
Bulgarian Interpreter
Ambassador H.G. Torbert, Jr.
DCM Robert B. Houston, Jr.

SUBJECT

Protocol Call on Prime Minister Zhivkov

Prime Minister Zhivkov welcomed me as a new Ambassador and wished success for my mission. He said that Bulgaria wished to have normal relations with the United States and wished that these relations would develop. In answer to my question about his recent trip to Hungary, where I said I had served in 1961–62, Prime Minister Zhivkov said that he shared the assessment of the Hungarian Party Congress which had been made by the Western press, namely, that there were no sensational developments. He gave as his personal impressions of the Party Congress that the development of friendship and cooperation between Hungary and the Soviet Union had been a major theme and that the Hungarian formulations about developing a socialized society coincided with Bulgarian views. He also said that expectations in certain Western circles that the Hungarian liberalization would turn

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out to be of a Western type were shown by the Congress to be ground-
less. Zhivkov then went on to charge that my question about his at-
tendance at the Hungarian Party Congress indicated a lack of interest
in the development of US-Bulgarian relations.

I assured the Prime Minister that US-Bulgarian relations were my
prime concern. I said that I felt it was necessary to become acquainted
before one could attempt to do serious business, and noted that by ask-
ing him about Hungary I felt we had become better acquainted. I said
that US-Bulgarian relations could not be changed overnight but would
have to be improved gradually over a period of time. I said that our
two countries, and the East and West generally, were moving away
from the cold war and hopefully into a period of increased mutual com-
munication and economic exchange. I noted that some countries in the
East as well as in the West had made good progress in moving away
from the period of confrontation but that regrettably US-Bulgarian re-
lations seem to be the last to change.

I said this immobility was no doubt connected with the lack of ac-
quaintance between our two countries. I noted that there had been
some recent steps towards overcoming such poor acquaintance. De-
partment of Commerce official Harold Scott had visited Bulgaria in
early summer, and two US Senators had come to Bulgaria in Septem-
ber and October respectively.2 First Deputy Foreign Minister Grozev
had visited Washington shortly before I came to Bulgaria.3 Furthermore,
agreement had just been reached for two groups of Bulgarian
administrators to go to the United States to exchange views on eco-
nomic management. Such contacts can only serve to improve our
understanding.

Zhivkov took up this theme of lack of understanding and said that
information about himself, both true and untrue, was well known in
the United States. Picking up a paper which Foreign Minister Bashev
had brought to the meeting, Zhivkov went on to say that he knew a
lot about me, too. He said, for example, that he knew we were born in
the same year and that I was only one month younger than he.

On a more serious note, Zhivkov said that his government felt that
Bulgaria was developing successfully. He said that while this might
not be true, his government nonetheless was satisfied that Bulgaria was

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2 Senator Henry Bellman (R–Oklahoma) represented the United States at the open-
ing of the Plovdiv Trade Fair in late September. The second senator has not been iden-
tified.

3 An October 9 memorandum of conversation between Grozev and Johnson is in
the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BUL–US.
on the right track. He noted that Bulgaria used to be the second poorest country in Europe, with only Albania being less well off. He complained that Bulgarians today do not remember how difficult life in Bulgaria used to be, but only wanted to have ever better living conditions. He noted that “Western centers” could perhaps take advantage of this desire of the Bulgarian people to live better.

I told Prime Minister Zhivkov that this revolution of rising expectations was known even in the United States. There, workers struck in the attempt to get ever higher living standards. I told him that I was impressed by Bulgaria’s evident progress in developing industry and by the relatively contented appearance of the people. I said that I had served in many countries in differing stages of economic development and considered myself a competent observer in such matters.

I then noted that the Bulgarian press indicated that changes were coming up in the next few months concerning the Bulgarian economy and the Bulgarian government. I asked the Prime Minister what we should be expecting on this score.

At this point, Zhivkov looked a little puzzled and turned to Foreign Minister Bashev. The Foreign Minister explained to Zhivkov that my questions referred to the forthcoming economic changes. (See Sofia’s 1092).4

Zhivkov then said that nothing sensational should be expected. His government was always carrying out steps to improve the economy. He said that a Council of Ministers meeting had been going on prior to my call to discuss carrying out the technical revolution on a broad front pursuant to the decisions of the September (1969) and April (1970) plenums. These had provided for automated management and the concentration and specialization of agriculture. He confirmed that what Bulgaria was doing in the field of concentration and specialization of agriculture was novel, and laughingly said, “We do not recommend that anyone else adopt this path. This is something specific for Bulgarian conditions.”

I then asked him specifically whether the new constitution would go into effect only after the Party Congress.

Zhivkov confirmed that it would probably go into effect after approval by the Party Congress and certainly only after approval by the National Assembly. He did say, however, that both the draft constitution and a discussion of it would be published for national consideration.

In conclusion, I told the Prime Minister that I had no sensational proposals to make. I said that major changes in certain US-Bulgarian

4 Dated November 24; it reported Zhivkov’s comments on Vietnam and the proposed Bulgarian economic reforms. (Ibid., E 1 BUL)
relationships would require Congressional action. Such action needs careful preparation and creation of a favorable atmosphere in the Congress. Creation of such an atmosphere is difficult if our countries are at each other’s throat. I hoped that these changes would come to pass. However, I noted that possibilities for small steps exist at present. I said I would do anything in my power to achieve such useful steps and expressed the hope that, with Prime Minister Zhivkov’s help and with the help of his government, our relations would improve.

Zhivkov then said that no barriers exist on the Bulgarian side to the improvement of US-Bulgarian relations. He alleged that the barriers exist on the US side in the form of US discrimination against Bulgaria. How long such discrimination would continue, he said, was US business. He said that Bulgaria could wait and could be as patient as were the Chinese in this regard. He noted that some Western experts charge that conditions are desperate in Bulgaria; that all Bulgarian export goods are sold through the year 1975; that Bulgaria is suffering from serious labor shortages. He said these Western assessments were false and simultaneously added that Bulgaria could find goods to sell to the United States.

I said that when I read the Bulgarian press and listened to Bulgarian radio and TV, I found it difficult to believe that only the United States was making difficulties for US-Bulgarian relations.

Zhivkov was quick to point out that the discrimination of which he had been speaking was trade discrimination. He said that Bulgaria knew its place and that Bulgaria felt the US laws could be changed if US policy changed.

I said that one could argue whether the chicken or the egg comes first, but it was true that policy could be changed only in an appropriate climate. I wanted the US and Bulgaria to be better friends and I said I would work to this end.

In an apparent effort to show his personal interest and knowledge about Bulgaria’s relations with the United States, he said that Ambassador Guerassimov was now in Sofia, although he had not yet seen him. He said that Ambassador Guerassimov was his personal friend. He implied that the latter had not been very industrious in Washington, but remarked, in a disarming fashion, that he would not say this to Ambassador Guerassimov’s face.
74. Telegram From the Embassy in Bulgaria to the Department of State

Sofia, July 3, 1971, 1028Z.

621. Subject: Review of bilateral relations with Foreign Minister—Policy. Ref: Sofia 542 (Notal). 2

Summary: In lengthy discussion of US-Bulgarian relations arranged at my request, FonMin Bashev strongly established cessation of our broadcasting in Bulgarian from non-American territory as well as end to discriminatory trade legislation as precondition for any real improvement in our bilateral relations. End summary.

1. I had an hour and a half free-swinging conversation with Bulgarian FonMin Bashev late afternoon July 2. After preliminary perfunctory discussion of visit of Greek DepFonMin Palamas, I expressed my interest in having first comprehensive bilateral discussion since Amb McSweeney’s meeting with First Deputy FonMin Grozev in November 1969, partly precipitated by report Bashev had told German Trade Commissioner improvement in US-Bulgarian relations inhibited because the U.S. had no Bulgarian policy. I too had the feeling our relations not improving as they should, but disagreed as to the cause. Noted that this was a personal initiative, approved but not directed by my government. 3 Presented him translation of sections on Eastern Europe and Bulgaria in Secretary’s March 26 foreign policy message to Congress 4 and invited him to compare conciliatory wording thereof with his own remarks about the United States in his foreign policy speech to the Party Congress 5 which was the only comparable document I could find. I then reviewed and left with him informal list of 21 U.S. actions to improve bilateral relations during past years, some of which successful and some frustrated by Bulgarian side. 6

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BUL–US, Confidential. Repeated to USIA, Belgrade, Athens, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Warsaw, and Munich. A memorandum of this conversation was transmitted as an attachment to airgram A–166 from Sofia, July 8. (Ibid.)

2 Dated June 12; it reported on the Foreign Minister’s comments to German trade representatives. (Ibid., POL BUL–W GERM)

3 Approval was given in telegram 106819 to Sofia, June 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BUL–US)


5 This speech is summarized and extracts are printed in Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1971–1972, pp. 24747–24748.

6 Not found.
2. With skillful histrionic display he launched into long statement that two countries would not have good relations until U.S. made up its mind to take a different attitude on some of the fundamental problems facing us. He was not talking now about world problems on which we had disagreements and could argue at great length, but primarily about the matter of broadcasting. The U.S. is building a powerful transmitting station less than 100 miles from Bulgaria’s border which cannot be considered as necessary to our proper concerns, as friendly or as a serious indication of our intention to improve relations. It is impossible to convince Bulgarian “ruling circles” that they should make any moves themselves as long as we were doing this sort of thing. It was as though they put an anti-American station in Canada or Cuba or helped to finance the Black Panther movement which, of course, they would not do because they did not sympathize with Black Panther tactics. He recognized difference between RFE and VOA but said it was only one of technique and sophistication; both were motivated by attitude antagonistic to Bulgaria.

3. After ten minutes of this, he turned for shorter attack to MFN question, saying that they could well understand lack of trade with America if it were based on unprofitability or mere disinclination, but when we have legislatively singled out Communist countries as enemies and, in effect, designated Bulgaria as a dangerous country, this set the tone for the attitudes of all U.S. businessmen and was totally incompatible with improved relations. Therefore, unless we made up our minds to take these fundamental steps as indicating our desire for improved relations, the latter would never occur no matter how much we did in the hopes that results would be obtained from the latter technique, but was now convinced it wouldn’t. He had twice had meetings with Secretary Rush designed to improve relations in which he had not raised these basic matters so strongly, but now realized they were fundamental.

4. I rebutted at some length noting we were not alone in foreign broadcasting field, including foreign broadcasting from other territory not one’s own. While I appreciated his view, I thought it important he visualize view from other side of fence where we too were concerned with world peace and saw it frustrated by complete control of access to the full facts of any situation and a steady flow of one-sided, vicious propaganda against the United States and its allies. It was this all pervasive propaganda which was the basic cause of most of the difficulties. The U.S. could not get to a fundamental change in its laws which required domestic political consensus unless both countries succeeded in lowering our voices a bit. The U.S. had accomplished this in great measure, but it seemed to me the Bulgarians had not. It might be somewhat of a chicken and egg proposition, but we were trying to break
the circle and improve the climate. I noted that if he could actually listen to a VOA broadcast, I thought he would have difficulty in telling me precisely what they objected to. International broadcasting is a general international practice, the right to which no country would wish to give up. Furthermore, if he had been following recent Pentagon Paper disclosure case in the United States, he might be aware of how fundamental freedom of information is in our outlook. Therefore, if he was saying that the only possibility for improved bilateral relations was the abolition of international broadcasting, I was afraid that I and my successors would have rather futile tours. On trade legislation, I thought there was more hope in the long run, but it would require patient effort to eliminate polemics.

5. Bashev concentrated thereafter on question of broadcasting from foreign territory. I rebutted that this was a matter of relations between allies and fact that we were among largest broadcasters was historical carry-over of our resource position at end of war. If we reduced our efforts, I felt sure others would carry them on. His climactic point was that stationing of transmitter in Greece was a poisoning element in Greek-Bulgarian bilateral relations in which we were thus interfering. Germany not specifically mentioned and RFE only incidentally.

6. Discussion got quite blunt and heated at times, but in end Bashev crawled off diplomatic limb to extent of saying that while he saw no prospects for improved relations, it should not follow that they would deteriorate further. Bulgaria was sincerely interested in maintaining present level and improving it once we took fundamental steps. He also assured me of his availability at any time for further discussions and I emphasized my reciprocal availability.

7. Comment: This was a forceful, histrionic performance delivered with all the fervor of a religious fanatic. It is notable that for the moment, foreign broadcasting has replaced MFN as a number one problem in Bulgarian eyes. It seems highly likely this is part of the orchestrated attack and that Bulgaria selected to emphasize point of extraterritorial transmitting stations since they neither have any, or as far as we know, host any. This probably means a continued period of chilly political weather here. It also well illustrates depth of Bulgarian concern to maintain ideological and cultural purity.

Torbert
75. **Telegram from Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State**

New York, September 29, 1972, 2055Z.

Secto 31/3579. Memorandum of Conversation: FonMin Mladenov (Bulgaria) September 27, 1972; 10:15 a.m. 30A Waldorf.

1. Participants: Bulgaria—FM Mladenov, Deputy FM and UN Perm Rep Grozev, Mr. Garvalov (Interpreter); US—The Secretary, Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Combs (Notetaker).

2. Summary: Mladenov proposed broad program for improving US-Bulgarian relations beginning with visit to US of official delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Popov. Delegation would study possibilities, primarily in economic field, and make specific proposals for further bilateral measures. Secretary Rogers responded favorably, but noted that as practical matter improved bilateral relations in specific fields such as trade and tourism required improvement in overall climate between two countries. Secretary mentioned consular convention and harassment of US Embassy employees in this regard. **Action requested:** Specific reply to Mladenov’s proposal be prepared for transmittal to Mladenov prior to his departure from US October 5.²

3. FM Mladenov led off by proposing major improvement in US-Bulgarian relations in all fields. In commercial area, Bulgaria has many exports to offer including cigarettes, wine and electric trucks. Mladenov suggested that all limitations on trade be lifted by each side and that trade agreement providing MFN be signed. He also suggested maritime agreement and arbitration agreement, to be following by discussion of mutual credit arrangements and joint economic ventures. Steps should also be taken to increase scientific and technical cooperation, tourism, exchanges of expert delegations and athletic teams.

4. As first step, Mladenov proposed that US receive official Bulgarian delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Machine Building Professor Ivan Popov. Delegation would study possibilities at first hand and then make further concrete proposals.

5. Secretary Rogers said US welcomed improved relations with Bulgaria, in line with President Nixon’s worldwide policy of building structure of peace and mutual understanding. Our experience showed that for meaningful improvement in specific fields, particularly in

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 BUL. Confidential. Repeated to Sofia. Rogers and Mladenov were in New York attending the UN General Assembly meeting.

² Not found.
commercial and tourism areas, it important to improve general politi-
cal climate. In principle we favored Bulgarian proposal to send ex-
ploratory delegation although we would have to look into timing of
delegation’s visit. We will give thought to how visit should best be set
up and will be back in touch with Bulgarian side.

6. We very much favored exchanges in scientific, cultural, athletic
and other fields and were prepared to discuss this further with Bul-
garians at any time, Secretary continued. We also favored increased
tourism, although this of course depended largely on individual US
tourists.

7. But in discussing improvement in political climate, specific
problems should be mentioned, Secretary noted. For example, US had
submitted proposal for US-Bulgarian consular convention and was
awaiting Bulgarian response. Agreement on consular convention
would in our view be important step toward enhanced commerce and
tourism. We had reports of harassment of US Embassy employees in
Sofia; this was unfortunate irritant in our relations that surely could be
rectified. So let us begin today with agreement to work for better cli-
mate, to eliminate irritations, to take concrete steps to improve mutual
relations.

8. Mladenov agreed fully. He undertook personally to look into
status of consular convention. He agreed that political climate should
be improved but noted that of course Bulgaria had its own view of
matter. He did not want to dwell on VOA broadcasts to Bulgaria or on
annual US campaign regarding enslaved nations. Main thing was to
start to improve situation; Bulgarian side evaluated today’s meeting in
that light and felt meeting was extremely useful. Secretary Rogers
agreed.

9. As meeting ended, Mladenov said this was his first visit to US
and unfortunately he would have to spend entire stay in New York.
He plans to leave October 5. Next year he hoped to visit Washington
and, if US agrees, he would like to travel to other parts of US.

10. After meeting, Secretary told McCloskey and Combs he
wished to give Mladenov specific answer regarding visit of Bulgarian
delegation prior to Mladenov’s October 5 departure. Public statement
could then be made concerning this development.

Rogers
76. Telegram From the Embassy in Bulgaria to the Department of State

Sofia, December 7, 1972, 0815Z.


1. Summary. In first informal encounter with FonMin Mladenov since his meeting with Secretary he was effusively friendly and pushed for progress toward commercial agreement.

2. Was cornered at Finnish reception Dec 6 by FonMin Mladenov whom I had till then successfully evaded since my return (he was in Moscow and Ankara part of the time). He was effusively cordial, referred with great pleasure to UN meeting with Secretary and said that in view of Secretary’s receptivity to his suggestions of various kinds of agreements we should not lose momentum but get along with preparation for visit by Ivan Popov. For example, now that we had U.S.-Soviet model we should be able to start drafting an economic and commercial agreement.

3. I replied that I was all for preparatory activity and had received a general verbal brief while at home to be receptive to any Bulgarian initiatives. As of the moment I had not received any detailed instructions. I had plenty of authority however to continue negotiating consular convention on which we were waiting their reply to our last proposal 18 months ago. On commercial matters there were so many technicalities involved that I suspected in the final analysis this might be better discussed in Washington perhaps by Deputy FonTrade Min Lukanov during January visit. Mladenov acknowledged such trip was a possibility. We were interrupted before I could pin him down further on consular agreement.

4. Just prior to above had somewhat similar conversation with First Deputy FonMin Grigorov. Latter inquiring as to Codel Symington reactions and expressing regret we had not accepted GOB offer for National Assembly to be official host which he had personally pushed for at policy level. I expressed appreciation for treatment of Codel and other indications of better working relations which I said we were noting carefully. Said (without firm commitment) Codel IPU in February
might be more appropriate for at least partial hosting by National Assembly.

5. Comment: Atmosphere was clearly changed here at least temporarily but it appears that tactic is to push for early reward in form of commercial progress while giving as little as possible on other fronts. Would appreciate early receipt Department’s scenario instructions after which I will seek appointment with Mladenov and try to sort out priorities.

Torbert
Czechoslovakia

77. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

Czechoslovakia

1. The situation in the aftermath of Palach’s self-immolation is obviously volatile, made the more so now by a second burning, this time of a worker. The student-worker alliance in acts of protest and defiance is potentially a most threatening development for the Prague regime and the Soviets. If it gathers steam, the regime will be under enormous pressure from the Soviets to crack down.

2. At that point the regime will have to decide whether to attempt to master the situation by itself or to let the Soviets do it. It will probably prefer the former course to minimize brutality, even at the risk of thereby making itself a Soviet tool. In the end, there is, however, a strong possibility that the Soviets will intervene anyway, not only using their troops but establishing some form of military rule. An added factor militating for Soviet intervention—or at the very least heavy Soviet pressure on Prague to do so—is the danger that acts of defiance will spread elsewhere in Eastern Europe; witness the further burning in Budapest.

3. I fear that our own options in this tragic situation are extremely limited. Almost anything we say as a government would be likely to encourage further acts of defiance or to stimulate a siege mentality in Moscow. I can think of nothing that we can say or do that could stay the Soviet hand if the Soviets see public order collapsing.

I nevertheless recommend the following:

1. That we privately, perhaps when Chip Bohlen sees the Soviet chargé at the latter’s request today, indicate to the Soviets our deep...

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2 On January 16 student Jan Palach set himself on fire in the center of Prague to protest the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.

3 J. Hlivaty, a brewery worker, on January 20.

4 On January 20 another protester set fire to himself in the Hungarian capital.
concern and a sense that a heavy new burden would be added to our relations if overt acts of repression should occur;

2. That the State-chaired Czechoslovak Task Force be promptly and quietly re-assembled to, inter alia,

(a) review contingency planning for the event of any spillover of disorders into the CSSR-FRG border region and across it;
(b) maintain utmost control over any public or other statements we may wish to make on the situation, including contingency guidance for the State Department spokesman should he receive questions. (Subject to review in the light of developments I recommend for the next 48 hours: “No comment; we are obviously watching the situation.”)
(c) prepare contingency statements for various kinds of overt repressive action or disorders;
(d) send guidance to our Ambassador at NATO where the subject undoubtedly commands high-priority attention; and seek to coordinate our public and diplomatic posture with major NATO allies.

Query: Do you want NSC participation in Task Forces of this kind? It has the advantage of keeping you currently informed; the disadvantage is that they are time-consuming.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

78. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State

Prague, February 3, 1969, 1455Z.


1. Longtime Embassy Czech source, self-styled progressive frequently well-informed about party affairs, made number of observations on current scene Feb. 1 which he characterized as adding up to “very bad” situation. His view reinforces other indications of declining elan and cohesion of progressives and growing assertiveness of
conservatives and “realists” in wake of emotional upsurge evoked by Palach suicide. Highlights follow.

2. Although public opinion overwhelmingly favors their views, progressives, while still overall majority in party, have lost cohesion and are baffled how to combat hardliners. Latter, boosted by Soviet support, increasingly confident events running in their favor and time on their side. Centrists share this appraisal and now tend at best to take noncommittal positions. Hardline comeback underway in some local party organizations, whose impending annual meetings will see attempt to change delegates to 14th Party Congress, elected before August and predominantly progressive. Extreme hardliners increasingly active; they held another meeting in Prague factory recently and, forming claque for Strougal, backed recent People’s Militia activity and influenced its results which very displeasing to many rank and file PM members.

3. In leadership, Dubček’s standing with public increasingly ambiguous: while he still highly regarded for integrity and object of widespread sympathy, doubts growing over his capacity to withstand heavy pressures or resume role as symbolic leader of reform. Smrkovsky very popular among workers but on shaky ground in party. (Recent anti-Smrkovsky pamphlet traced to extreme hardliner working through member of CC apparatus.) Husak and Strougal both thoroughgoing “careerists” who will use all means for personal advancement. Husak stronger and abler of two and, despite present bitter unpopularity in Czech lands, has better chance to reach top. Soviets working on leadership and party policies primarily through Strougal and Bilak.

4. Worsening development in security forces although progressive sympathizers still numerically stronger in both Defense and Interior Ministries. Situation especially confused and difficult in State Security where hardliners trying to push through repressive measures and progressives frequently “sabotaging” their efforts. Risks for latter growing, however, both because of party developments favoring conservatives and heightened direct Soviet influence on security forces. Soviets and Strougal want to restrict contacts between Czechs and Westerners; this one ground for recent expulsions of journalists which widely criticized in various party circles and generally assumed to have taken place at direct Soviet behest.

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2 Lubomir Strougal, Vice Prime Minister, a party official and defense expert.
3 Joseph Smrkovsky, President of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Deputies and a leading progressive.
5. Palach self-immolation was major setback for hardliners, arresting trend toward public apathy on which they count. Leadership’s seemingly exaggerated apprehension in Palach aftermath reflected fear (with grounds) that hardliners planning “putsch” if disorders developed.

6. Moves have been initiated against media workers, but implementation temporarily stymied in Czechoslovak television because Party Committee refusing to carry out ordered moves and has sent letter to Presidium so stating. Buck thus passed back to highest party level. However, not much confidence that personalities affected can continue as before, and some assignments as correspondents abroad being quickly prepared for them.

7. Sik 4 under heavy pressure from hardliners in party. At Jan. plenum he was saved from Jakes 5-promoted inquest into his post-August activities by Piller’s 6 intervention. Some fear Sik may be target for direct Soviet action to remove him from public scene.

8. Comment: We have regarded source as controlled for long time and on occasion he obviously has relayed information and viewpoints intended to reach US officials. In Saturday conversation he spoke at least in part more “personally” than usual, and his overall pessimism may reflect his individual view as well as that of more-or-less progressive circles in party and government (including security services).

Baker

4 Ota Sik, former Deputy Prime Minister and reformist economic planner.
5 Milos Jakes of the CSSR Communist Party Central Committee.
6 Jan Piller of the CSSR Communist Party Central Committee.
79. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State¹

Prague, February 14, 1969, 1655Z.


1. State 242273 (para 3) poses two conditions for further action on implementation of planned US export liberalization measures: (a) reasonable measure of Czech sovereignty and (b) convincing assurances on end use.

(A) We doubt that Czechs are less sovereign than for example Poland, which has Group W status. Vigorous domestic forces are actively struggling, with considerable courage, against Soviet influence. We believe proposed gesture of good will by US would be helpful to better side in this internal struggle.

(B) For reasons set out in references (C) and (D), Ministry of Foreign Trade is not itself prepared give assurances on end use and re-export requirements. It takes position that these assurances are up to end users themselves and not matter which MFT can decide. In their view, compliance with contractual obligations is up to importer and end-user, and they state there is no FAR to contracts calling for impartial arbitration.

2. Even though it is therefore not possible to give unqualified response to two conditions posed in ref (A), we believe case for proceeding as planned can be made of following points:

(A) Measure, which concedes Czechs only what Poles already enjoy, does not greatly loosen US export control program;

(B) Particularly since it was discussed prior to August 20, Czechs will regard liberalization in present circumstances as positive step—they have recently said as much, in contradistinction to Tabacek’s³ be-littling remarks of pre-August period—but would regard retreat as discouragement. We believe we should treat victims of aggression better than aggressors.

² Telegram 242273 to Prague, September 20, 1968, outlined policy for licensing agreements with Czechoslovakia. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, STR 7 CZECH) Telegram 23242 to Prague, February 13, requested information from the Embassy regarding changes in Czechoslovakia’s licensing status. (Ibid.) Telegram 312 from Prague, February 7, reported that the Czechoslovaks had signaled their interest in resuming licensing discussions. (Ibid.) Aigram A–54 from Prague, February 7, reported on initial discussions. (Ibid.)
³ Jan Tabacek, Minister of Foreign Trade.
(C) Without wishing to exaggerate, we believe that trade tends to encourage decentralization of Czech economy, with some positive political fallout, by bringing Czechs into more frequent and purposeful contact with US businessmen and high level of quality of US system. In long run, dynamic and expanding US economy represents positive factor which may offset to some extent current weight of Soviet military and political power.

(D) US exports are manifold boon to US economy, and it makes little sense to sacrifice sales to European competitors.

(E) US controls, including inspection of end-use of exports may be assumed to be effectively guaranteed by assurances of importers and end-users until we have proof that this is not case. In effect MFT guarantee is unlikely to be more assuring than that of an end-user which has reason to fear being deprived of future exports for failure to comply.

3. My call on Minister Tabacek is scheduled for 10:00 a.m. Tuesday, February 18 but can defer until later in the week. In view of our inability to proceed on larger economic questions we would like authority to act expeditiously and positively on above matter and would appreciate early reply.

Beam

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4 The meeting was postponed on instructions from the Department of State. (Telegram 407 from Prague, February 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, STR 7 CZECH) Instructions for negotiations with the Czechs together with authorization to initiate the talks were transmitted in telegram 30643 to Prague, February 27. (Ibid.) The talks resumed that day.

80. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT

Conversation with Jaromir Pribyl, First Secretary at the Czechoslovakian Embassy

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Pribyl came in to see me today; I had talked with him from time to time in my previous position at the State Department and he said he wanted to renew the contact.

His main purpose was obviously to enlist White House help for favorable US policy decisions on matters pending with Czechoslovakia.

On the question of monetary gold and claims, he said that his government knew it was unrealistic to expect these two issues to be separated. His government is willing to renegotiate the agreement previously reached between the US and Czechoslovakia. They knew of course that some proposals had been ready last August and that "events"\(^2\) at that time had delayed their submission to the Czechoslovaks. Thereafter the advent of the new Administration had further delayed matters. The Czechs would like to have new US proposals as soon as possible to see what they can do to solve this longstanding issue.

Turning to trade, Pribyl noted the importance to his country of having open and extensive relations with the US and other Western countries, especially in regard to trade. His Embassy had become aware of moves in the Congress for the granting of a partial form of MFN to Czechoslovakia. While this would not be fully satisfactory, the Czechs saw it as a move toward full MFN. They fear that the position of the State Department on this proposal is "ambiguous." The Czechoslovaks feel that the opportunity should be grasped lest the mood in Congress change or other events supervene.

I told Pribyl that I was of course familiar with his government's views on these matters. I pointed out that the new Administration had only been in office for two months and had not had an opportunity to examine these problems at a high level. He said he understood. I added that perhaps when a new American Ambassador is appointed to Prague\(^3\) there will be an opportunity to review the issues Pribyl had raised, although I could not of course give him any assurances that decisions fully satisfactory to him would be reached.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt\(^4\)

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\(^2\) Reference is to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

\(^3\) Beam departed his ambassadorial post on March 5. His successor, Malcolm Toon, was appointed May 13, and presented his credentials on July 31.

\(^4\) Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
907. Subj: Husak and Bilateral Relations.
1. Assume Dept pondering US attitude toward Husak-for-Dubcek change, particularly whether we should go forward with steps in bilateral relations (e.g. gold-claims proposal) which are now in the works.

2. Although it is obviously too early for meaningful assessment, particularly since as of now we do not even have official announcement about makeup of new party leadership and since other changes in personnel and policy will probably emerge gradually, preliminary contribution to Department’s thinking may be in order.

3. Change is of course in party rather than government, but seems little doubt that Husak will attempt to call tune in all policy questions, including foreign relations, to greater extent than did Dubcek. Husak regime may be considerably more prickly for US to deal with; his public remarks frequently are larded with references to hostile Western forces. Demonstrative delay in going forward with steps which Czechs are expecting could get US off on wrong foot with new leader who we gather is emotional and has nationalistic inclinations and apparently is already equipped with somewhat jaundiced view of US. This would be undesirable if it turns out that country as whole goes along with Husak as best bet under circumstances.

4. On other hand, if country were to be swept by strikes or other forms of active or passive resistance to Husak’s accession to power or to measures he may take (an eventuality which we think unlikely but not impossible), we presumably would not wish to appear to be underwriting him by going ahead with steps which we had refused to take throughout the Dubcek era.

5. Therefore if Department is preparing to present gold-claims proposal early next week we would suggest brief postponement (preferably attributed to problems on our side if explanation necessary) avoiding impression that any delay is related to political changes in CSSR.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15 CZECH. Confidential; Immediate.
2 On April 17 reform Communist leader Alexander Dubcek was ousted and replaced by the more conservative Gustav Husak.
6. Although relationship between Soviet pressure and yesterday’s change is obvious and will undoubtedly be stressed in US press, believe any official comment on nature of Husak leadership should be avoided at least for time being.

Baker

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82. **Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State**

Prague, April 24, 1969, 1600Z.


1. Acting Chief of Western Hemisphere Dept of MFA, Ambassador Hokes, summoned me to MFA this morning and stated that he regretted our meeting took place in circumstances which he would outline but that he been instructed to convey to me following:

2. Czechoslovak Govt regretted statement on Czechoslovakia made by President Nixon at his April 18 press conference and felt that it was not based on correct assessment of current situation in Czechoslovakia. Events were evolving in Czechoslovakia in direction desired by Czechoslovak Communist Party and statements which appeared to concern themselves with internal affairs of Czechoslovakia were not helpful to atmosphere necessary for good relations between USG and Govt of Czechoslovakia. Statements made by Secretary Rogers before Senate Foreign Relations Committee augured well for US-Czechoslovak relations. Therefore, was necessary express regret at President’s statement.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 672, Country Files—Europe, Czechoslovakia, Vol. I Jan 69–31 Jan 70. Confidential; Priority. Received in the Department at 1754Z.

2 In an April 18 press conference, President Nixon referred to Dubček’s replacement by Husak (see Document 81). The President stated: “The Soviet Union is aware of our disapproval of that action. All Americans, in fact all people of the free world, see this as perhaps the final chapter in the great tragedy of the Czechoslovak people under Communist rule. We hope it is not the final chapter. We hope that some vestiges of freedom will remain. Yet, the Soviet Union has acted there and acted quite decisively.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, p. 307)

2. American Section Chief Novotny then added remark that his
govt had to assume that President was basing his judgments of situa-
tion on reports supplied primarily by American Embassy although he
was also naturally informed through press. Novotny noted that Em-
bassy had included President’s press conference in its “widely circu-
lated” Daily News Bulletin and that therefore it had not been possible
for Czechoslovak Govt to ignore statement.

3. I commented that I would convey foregoing views to my govt
but that I personally believed that President’s remarks were not moti-
vated by any desire to interfere in internal Czechoslovak matters but on
contrary to express concern at any development which would keep Gov-
ernment and people of Czechoslovakia from marking their own course.

4. Comment: Embassy did distribute full text of President’s press
conference in its April 21 Bulletin. Preceding full text was separate story
on President’s references to Czechoslovakia based on April 18 Wireless
File Item No. EUF 128–SEF 82 but omitting any of interpolated refer-
ences to Husak. Somewhat curious that oral presentation clearly indi-
cated that matters going in direction desired by party with no refer-
ence to government. MFA officials’ manner made clear they acting
somewhat reluctantly under firm instructions.

Baker

83. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President
Nixon

Washington, June 20, 1969.

SUBJECT

Continuation of Negotiations on the US-Czechoslovak Gold/Claims Issue and
Other Outstanding Financial Problems

Recommendation

That we take the next step in our negotiations with the Czechoslo-
vak Government by presenting a new proposal for the settlement of
the gold/claims issue and other outstanding financial problems.2

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 672,
2 Nixon did not check either option. For the President’s decision, see Document 85.
Discussion

Since 1952 there have been intermittent negotiations between the US and the Czechoslovak Government on two separate problems which have become linked in the course of negotiations. One is our consent to the return by the Tripartite Gold Commission (US, UK, and France) of about $20 million of monetary gold looted from Czechoslovakia by the Nazis during World War II. The other is an equitable settlement by the Czechoslovak Government of claims arising from the nationalization of US private property valued at about $72 million by the US Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.

The UK and France were unwilling to release the Nazi-looted gold until Czechoslovakia concluded claims settlements with them. The US continues to link its agreement to release of the gold to a satisfactory claims settlement. Retention of the gold provides a measure of security for the eventual settlement of the claims.

The US has distributed to the claimants $9 million realized from the sale in 1954 of a steel mill purchased and paid for by the Czechoslovaks here, which we blocked and sold. In 1961, our Embassy at Prague, with the Department’s approval, signed a Statement of Principles setting forth the basis of an agreement. Subsequently, the agreement was drafted, and in 1964, initialed ad referendum. This agreement, in addition to settling various other financial issues, provided for US consent to the release of the gold in return for a final payment on the claims of $2 million. The total of $11 million would have amounted to only about 15 percent of the value of the properties as valued by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. On review, the Department decided not to conclude the agreement.

In 1967 we offered to consent to release of the gold for a payment by the Czechoslovaks on the claims of $2 million at time of settlement and an additional $21 million over a period of seven years. Our proposal was rejected by the Czechoslovaks. They argued the gold was theirs and improperly withheld by us, that our claims were inflated and that the US was morally obligated to conclude an agreement comparable to the ad referendum settlement reached in Prague in 1964. They asserted that they would be able to pay more than the $2 million contemplated in 1964 only if their trade with the US should substantially increase, and they believed that to be possible only if they were granted MFN. To meet this argument and to get the best possible settlement for the claimants we prepared a new proposal in the summer of 1968. Delivery was deferred as a result of the Soviet intervention of August 20, 1968. Soviet forces remain in occupation of Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, I feel the US Government is morally obligated to take initiatives to reach a settlement so long as we retain the gold as security.
We now propose that the Czechoslovak Government pay us a total of $44 million (negotiable down to not less than $36.6 million) in full settlement of the nationalization claims. On this sum we would credit the full $17 million they had paid for the steel mill, which we sold for $9 million. Czechoslovakia would pay $2 million at time of settlement and the remainder in seven annual payments to begin one year after the entry into force of a mutually beneficial commercial agreement providing, on our part, for extension of MFN to Czechoslovakia. Alternatively, annual payments would commence if for any reason Czechoslovak imports into the US, in any given year, exceed by 30 percent such imports in the year 1968 ($23.8 million). The US would agree to the immediate release of the gold to Czechoslovakia by the Tripartite Gold Commission. Other lesser financial issues would also be settled, including undertakings to negotiate for the funding of US-held dollar bonds and to fund payments on their Surplus Property debt. The latter would provide a net gain to the US Treasury of some $5 million.

If the Czechoslovaks should accept our proposal, they would be accepting an overall obligation on claims far beyond anything previously entertained by them. I feel that we cannot conceivably get any settlement going substantially beyond the $2 million, the amount in the 1961 Statement of Principles, unless payments beyond that amount are deferred and conditioned upon either a substantial increase in Czechoslovak imports into the US, always an uncertain possibility, or on the granting of MFN. However, we would not be committed to grant them MFN at any time before we felt the general situation warranted. The gold issue evokes wartime emotions in Czechoslovakia and has seriously burdened our relations. It has been a lever of very limited effectiveness in dealing with Czechoslovakia. The gold, held in tripartite custody, does us no good, was looted by the Nazis and does belong to the Czechoslovaks. So long as we assert the right to hold the gold as security for a claims settlement, we have an obligation to negotiate to settle both issues. We undertook to make a new proposal to the Government of Czechoslovakia many months ago and failure to do so now would suggest we are unwilling to negotiate reasonably on an important issue.

Periodically we are pressed to reach settlement by a number of Congressmen and significant elements of the American press and interested public and even by representatives of the Czechoslovak-American communities. The situation has potential elements of difficulties with the UK which does not recover under its claims settlement until the gold is returned. The UK Embassy calls on us frequently for reports on the progress of our efforts to settle the claims.

Each year of delay erodes for many claimants the value of a settlement, through inflation, the discount that most people apply to fu-
ture as opposed to current income, and the aging and death of many private creditors.

We have discussed this proposal with representatives of the claimants. The large corporate claimants wish to delay in the hope of a higher settlement at some time in the future, largely because of the precedent involved. The representatives of the small claimants, who are the numerical majority, indicate they would welcome any reasonable settlement so they, rather than their heirs, can enjoy the benefits.

In our discussions on the Hill, we found that members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee either indicated support or had no objections to our proposal. Some ranking members of the Senate Foreign Committee and the Ways and Means Committee reacted negatively (a detailed report of these consultations is enclosed). We have, at least in part, met Representative Mills’ objection by revising our proposal to include payment on the claims should Czechoslovak imports into the US for any reason increase by 30 percent over 1968 in any given year after agreement is reached, even if MFN should not be granted.

I am convinced that our proposal offers the best solution for the small claimants and the US Government. Failure to move forward at this time would further complicate the problem of ever getting a reasonable settlement for the claimants or of other outstanding financial issues and would be a further irritant in our relations with Czechoslovakia.

WPR

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84. Editorial Note

On July 31, 1969, Czechoslovak President Ludvik Svoboda accepted the credentials of the new United States Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Malcolm Toon, at the Hradcany Palace in Prague. Svoboda engaged Toon in conversation by recounting his visit to the United States as a young man and underlining his “fervent interest in maintaining the peace.”

Svoboda then turned to the Czechoslovak gold claims issue (see Document 83). According to Toon’s memorandum of conversation, “Svoboda wished me to inform President Nixon of his own deep concern that the gold problem had not been resolved. As I was aware the
gold which is now in the custody of the United States and other Western powers had been stolen from the Czechs by the Nazis during World War Two and was the rightful property of Czechoslovakia and should be returned. Svoboda knew of no single action that would do more to improve bilateral relations between Czechoslovakia and the United States and facilitate my own mission in Czechoslovakia than a decision to return the gold. As I was aware, next year would mark the 25th anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia from the Nazi yoke, and the President felt it would be a very appropriate gesture indeed if my government would find it possible to return the gold before the anniversary.

Toon responded: “With regard to the President’s [Svoboda’s] remarks concerning the gold problem, I could assure Svoboda that President Nixon was aware of the importance the Czechoslovaks attach to the return of the gold. I was hopeful that this problem could be resolved within the fairly near future and the President could be certain that I would do everything in my power to bring this about, taking into account the legitimate concerns, aspirations and objectives of all parties concerned. As Svoboda was aware, we had been prepared last summer to present to the Czechoslovaks a proposal which we felt was a reasonable one and which offered in our view a real chance for resolving the gold as well as the claims problem. Unfortunately for all concerned, on the very eve of the day when we had planned to present this proposal to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Washington, certain events took place in Central Europe which made the move inappropriate. We had recently revived consideration of our proposal, and we hoped soon to be able to move.” (Memorandum of conversation, July 31; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 672, Country Files—Europe, Czechoslovakia, Vol. I Jan 69–31 Jan 70)
85. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Settlement of Czech Gold/Claims Issue

The Issue

The United States is still holding Czech gold looted by the Nazis pending settlement of U.S. claims. The gold is worth about $24 million on the free market. Our remaining claims from property expropriation are estimated at about $63 million, and we have some small miscellaneous claims in addition.

State argues that we have a moral obligation to negotiate on the issue, since the gold legally belongs to Czechoslovakia and we are ostensibly holding it as collateral against a claims settlement. They propose (at Tab B) that we try to settle the matter by indicating our willingness to extend MFN treatment to Czechoslovakia, as well as give them the gold, if the Czechs agree to make payments of $19.6–$25 million in expropriation claims plus $5 million in the miscellaneous additional claims.

Attached at Tab C is a detailed analysis of the history of this issue and the State proposal.

Options

You have four basic options. Under each we would return the Czech gold.

1. Authorize negotiations involving claims payments by Czechoslovakia of $24.6–$30 million over seven years, starting when (a) we extend MFN treatment to Czechoslovakia or (b) Czech exports to the United States rise by 30%. This is the State proposal.

I see no logic in linking MFN treatment to the settlement. Czechoslovakia would already be getting about as much in financial terms—the gold, now worth about $24 million and which they would get immediately—than they would give up even if they accepted the maximum proposed payments of $30 million, over seven years, starting after we had extended MFN treatment or after Czech exports to the

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2 Printed as Document 83.

3 Attached but not printed.
U.S. had risen by 30%. It represents another effort by State to circumvent your decision not to seek MFN authority toward Eastern Europe at this time.

In addition, we made no improvement in our 1967 offer during the few months of the relatively liberal Dubcek government. A significantly better offer now, which this would be, might seem to reward a government which appears to be growing steadily more submissive to Moscow.

2. Authorize negotiations linking the Czech payments to an increase of Czech exports to us but dropping any link with MFN. This would be more accommodating than our 1967 offer from the Czech standpoint, because it accepts the principle that they can afford to pay us only with additional foreign exchange earnings. Conditioning the payments on export increases would make their timing very uncertain.

3. Authorize negotiations confined to gold and financial matters, excluding any reference to trade and thereby rejecting the Czech argument that they need increased exports to finance the claims payments. The deal would be about in balance, in financial terms, if you adopted the $24.6–$30 million claims settlement proposed by State.

4. Take no initiative and allow the irritant to stand. This issue is unlikely to be decisive in our relations with a country whose internal political system is regressing so rapidly. It would avoid the embarrassment of starting negotiations only to find that internal political changes had eliminated any rationale for them. We could, however, be subject to attack for holding the Czech gold without negotiating about it and reneging on an earlier “commitment” (by the Johnson Administration to the Dubcek regime) to make an offer.

Recommendation

That you authorize State to initiate negotiations with Czechoslovakia limited to gold and the financial claims. They should conduct the negotiations slowly and cautiously to see how the political situation develops before signing any agreement. We should (a) omit any link to MFN or other trade considerations and (b) refuse any settlement with
payments smaller than we sought in 1967. (A suggested memo by which I could convey this decision to State is attached at Tab A.)

7 The President wrote by hand beside the approval line: “Option 3 only (for consideration later)—but I actually believe option 4 is the best at this time.” In a note to Bergsten, attached to the memorandum, Haig wrote: “Fred—4 for a while then 3 only. Al”. The President’s decision was transmitted to Rogers in an August 16 memorandum from Kissinger, a copy of which is Tab A to this memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 672, Country Files—Europe, Czechoslovakia, Vol. I Jan 69–31 Jan 70)

86. Memorandum of Conversation

SecDel/MC/18 New York, September 26, 1969, 5:30 p.m.

SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER, 1969

SUBJECT Secretary’s Bilateral Meeting with Foreign Minister Marko of Czechoslovakia

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
The Secretary
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Swank
Ivan V. Matusék

Foreign
Foreign Minister Marko
Jaroslav Zantovsky, Chargé d’Affaires, a.i., Washington
Dusan Spacil, Interpreter

After a short exchange of amenities Foreign Minister Marko stated he was very glad to have this opportunity to meet the Secretary. This was his first trip to the United States. He said that by now he had already confirmed how much truth there was to a Slovak saying that it

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1969: Lot 70 D 387, CF 396. Secret. The discussion was held at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. Drafted on September 27 by Ivan V. Matusék (INR/RSE/EE) and approved on September 29 by R.L. Brown, Deputy Executive Secretary (S/S).
is better to see for yourself than to listen. By now he had spent close
to three weeks in New York. He did not think he would be going to
Washington or tour the country—the time he had left was too short to
allow for that. Mr. Marko stated he was glad to hear that the Secretary,
like himself, had some background in financial affairs. This indicated
to him that both of them were interested in concrete developments.

The Secretary responded that he was happy to welcome Mr. Marko
to the United States. Both countries have a long history of friendly mu-
tual relations. He commented that while in Mexico City during the
Olympic Games he was impressed by the performance of the
Czechoslovak team which was one of the most popular there. The Sec-
tary stated we were interested in developing mutual commercial re-
lations and cultural exchanges with Czechoslovakia. He inquired how
things stood. Mr. Marko responded that he had just visited a Czechoslo-
vak book exhibit at Columbia University which confirmed to him that
there was good progress in the cultural field.

The Secretary inquired as to the purpose of the Czechoslovak party
plenum, now underway. In his reply Mr. Marko followed the standard
Czechoslovak line: the plenum is judging and analyzing Czechoslovak
developments during 1968. This analysis, which will be very careful,
will be presented to the Party Congress. He referred to the distorted
reporting of Czechoslovak developments in the Western press and de-
nied that there was any truth to stories that Czechoslovak develop-
ments were returning to the period of the 1950’s (i.e. to Stalinism). The
1968 developments have been very complicated and one cannot make
superficial judgments. In the field of foreign policy, it is necessary to
address one-self to the question as to why Czechoslovakia did not at-
tend the July 1968 talks in Warsaw (i.e. the meeting of the Warsaw Pact
“five”). Mr. Marko stated “we believe that our nonattendance was a
serious political error.”

The Secretary inquired how long the Soviet troops were going to
stay in Czechoslovakia. Mr. Marko answered that, as is known, the stay
of Soviet troops is regulated by “our treaty.” To the Secretary’s query
whether he was referring to the Warsaw Pact Treaty, Mr. Marko stated
he was referring to the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of October 1968.2
He stressed that this treaty had the approval of the Czechoslovak Na-
tional Assembly. He added that the Czechoslovak government has not
raised the question of the Soviet troops’ departure with the U.S.S.R. As
a result, he cannot answer the Secretary’s question.

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2 On October 16, 1968, the CSSR and the Soviet Union signed a treaty on the “tem-
porary” stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia that permitted the Soviet forces
that had taken part in the Warsaw Pact invasion in August to remain on Czechoslovak
soil. The major provisions of the treaty are printed in Keesing’s Contemporary Archives,
1967–1968, p. 23025A.
The Secretary responded that he understood the realities of the situation but noted that the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia—against the wishes of the population—makes it difficult for the US and the West to deal with Czechoslovakia. Mr. Marko, referring to the Secretary's earlier remarks, stated that he shares and reciprocates the Secretary's sentiments about the long history of friendship between the people of the two countries. The US has become a second fatherland for Czech and Slovak grandfathers. The two countries were allies during World War II. The Czechoslovak government considers the concept of peaceful coexistence to be one of absolute necessity. Stating that he has come here without any prejudices, he wondered whether one could settle some of the outstanding economic and financial problems. He wanted to make the same appeal as he did at the time of Ambassador Beam's departure from Prague. What he has in mind are questions, some of which have been pending for a quarter of a century. In a long, rambling exposé, Mr. Marko specifically mentioned: the MFN (which Poland, Yugoslavia and West Germany have); the Nazi-looted gold; the agreement on the compensation for nationalized property (“where we nearly had an agreement”); and the fact that rather than trading directly with the US, Czechoslovakia currently has to utilize third-country intermediaries in both her exports and imports from the US (“our profit margins accrue to somebody else”).

Referring to his earlier comment about the detrimental effect of the presence of Soviet troops, the Secretary stated that under these circumstances it would be impossible to gain either popular backing, or Congressional support for any legislation in these areas. Mr. Marko responded by once again referring to distortions appearing about Czechoslovakia in the Western press. He added that once the discussion started to center on the presence of troops, he would rather terminate it since it was not in consonance with the spirit of discussing an improvement in relations. The Secretary stated that he did not comment in this vein in any contentious spirit, but simply wanted Mr. Marko to know why the US cannot at this time move in these areas. He suggested that cultural and educational exchanges meanwhile offer many opportunities. Mr. Marko replied that he appreciated the Secretary’s explanation but added that he was afraid that the fact that the important economic questions remained unsettled will unfavorably affect Czechoslovak attitudes toward cultural/scientific exchanges. Mr.

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3 An apparent reference to Beam’s discussion with Marko, reported in telegram 373 from Prague, February 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PS 9 US–CZECH, JORDAN, CHARLES)
Marko said he hoped that eventually things would move in a more favorable direction.⁴

⁴ Telegram 3274 from USUN, September 27, reported the same conversation between Rogers and Marko. The telegram ended with the comment: “Despite sensitivity of several of these topics, atmosphere of mtg was not unfriendly. Marko was clearly interested in focusing conversation on Czechoslovak economic and financial priorities . . .; Secretary was equally firm in underlining present political obstacles to any substantial movement forward.” (Ibid., POL 7 CZECH)

87. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT
Czechs Press for Return of Nazi-looted Gold

Czech President Svoboda, in a reply to the President’s letter transmitting the Foreign Policy Report,² obliquely urged that we return the Czech gold taken by the Nazis and held by a tripartite commission since the end of the war. Ambassador Rohal told State³ he would be able to deliver any message about the gold when he returns on May 24 for the Czech Party Congress. State will advise Rohal that it is not an appropriate time to take up this issue.

The question of the return of the Czech gold has been a perennial. We have not disputed that the gold rightfully belongs to Czechoslovakia, but we have linked its return with Czech willingness to resolve the outstanding financial claims against the Czech Government arising from the nationalization actions in the 1948–49 period. These claims have been assessed by the US Claims Commission at about $113 mil-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 672, Country Files—Europe, Czechoslovakia, Vol. II 01 Feb 70—. Confidential. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum to indicate he had seen it.
³ Reported in a May 13 letter from Eliot to Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 672, Country Files—Europe, Czechoslovakia, Vol. II, 01 Feb 70—).
lion; the value of the gold is about $20 million. In the mid-60’s, there was some movement on the claims question (the Czechs offered some 16¢ per dollar claim), but the matter was never resolved.

The Czechs have never accepted our linkage of the claims and the gold, though they have suggested over the years that they might be more forthcoming on the claims question once we had granted them MFN and returned the gold. It is not clear why the Czechs have now raised the gold issue in this way. It may simply have been a pro forma exercise. Or, they may believe that recent Congressional actions on the Fino Amendment and on MFN for Romania may indicate that the day is coming closer when they will have MFN in hand. If this is so, they may be anticipating that the gold/claims problems may be closer to resolution.

The memorandum from State containing the correspondence with Svoboda is at Tab A. There is no action you have to take, unless you wish to see us take an initiative. I personally think it is premature. Maybe if, as I suspect, some Russian troops get pulled out of Czechoslovakia, it may be worth looking at this issue.

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4 Attached but not printed.

1328_A15-A16.qxd 12/7/07 9:08 AM Page 223

88. Editorial Note

On October 19, 1971, the Czech Foreign Ministry informed the Embassy in Prague that it had decided to declare Samuel G. Wise, Chief of the Political-Economic Section of the Embassy, persona non grata. The Czech Government ordered Wise to leave Czechoslovakia within 48 hours. On October 20 the Department of State used its daily press briefing to deny Czech charges that Wise was engaged in espionage and protested his expulsion as “unwarranted.” On October 27 the United States ordered the expulsion of the Second Secretary of the Czech Embassy. In telegram 1957 to Prague, November 3, the Department of State informed the Embassy that it intended to delay informing the Czech Government of approval of its ambassadorial nominee, Dusan Spacil, “in light of [the Wise] affair, treatment of American citizens (arrests and refusals of admissions to travelers with valid visas), and the Department estimate that no immediate U.S. objectives in Czechoslovakia will suffer.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CZECH–US) Documentation relating to the Wise case is ibid. and ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 672, Country Files—Europe, Czechoslovakia, Vol. II 01 Feb 70—.
89. Editorial Note

On May 24, 1972, after 3 months of negotiations, the United States and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic signed an agreement to extend the existing bilateral Air Transport Agreement between the two countries until May 31, 1974. For the text of the treaty, see 23 UST 909.

The major point of contention in the negotiations had been U.S. efforts to improve the commercial conditions for the operations of Pan American Airlines in Czechoslovakia. On May 22 Robert Livingston and Robert Hormats of the National Security Council staff reported to President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Alexander Haig: “Since the Czechoslovaks were unable to improve conditions for PanAm in Prague, we insisted, as a condition for extending the Agreement, on subjecting the Czechoslovak airline to certain limitations in this country.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 672, Country Files—Europe, Czechoslovakia, Vol. II 01 Feb 70—)

90. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon

Washington, October 6, 1972.

SUBJECT
Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Proposes Improvement in Relations

When I met October 5 with Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek, he proposed that we negotiate on the outstanding issues between us and on other problems, with the goal of achieving a substantial improvement in our bilateral relations. He said such an improvement would correspond to the spirit expressed in the U.S.-Soviet Statement of Principles, agreed upon during your May visit to Moscow. I welcomed the Foreign Minister’s initiative and said that we

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CZECH-US. Confidential.
2 Chnoupek was in New York for the meeting of the UN General Assembly.
were prepared to undertake, through diplomatic channels, negotiations
on the problems raised by him.

1. The Foreign Minister referred to our negotiations in 1964, and
again in 1968, on Czechoslovak debts to the U.S., including U.S. claims
for nationalized property, and on Czechoslovak claims, including the
Czechoslovak monetary gold held in the West.³ His Government pro-
poses that we move to solve this whole complex of problems.

2. He suggested that we negotiate a science and technology agree-
ment, either on the governmental level or between the U.S. National
Academy of Sciences and the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.

3. He proposed the negotiation of a consular convention, to be fol-
lowed by a re-opening of the American Consulate at Bratislava and the
Czechoslovak Consulate at Chicago.

4. The Foreign Minister referred to the Czechoslovak Chamber of
Commerce delegation which has just completed an exploratory visit to
the U.S. He hoped that trade between the two countries could be raised
closer to the level at which it had been before World War II. Chnoupek
said he did not connect the question of Most-Favored-Nation treatment
with the proposed negotiations on our financial problems. However, he
hoped that success in our negotiations might create a climate in which
MFN treatment for Czechoslovakia would eventually be possible.

5. Finally, the Minister extended an invitation to me to visit
Prague. If a consular convention and other agreements were then ready
to be concluded, they could be signed at that time.

I replied that our interest in Czechoslovakia was not dependent
on the state of our relations with other countries, but rested on our de-
sire to respect the independence and sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. I
cited the historic friendship between our two peoples, which is
strengthened by the close ties between the many Americans of Czech
and Slovak origin and their relatives in Czechoslovakia. In that spirit,
we found the Minister’s presentation agreeable and accepted his sug-
gestion that we proceed to discuss the details through diplomatic chan-
nels. We were prepared to begin this process at any time and could set-
tle the modalities in subsequent diplomatic exchanges. Having
commented on some points of detail raised by the Minister, I thanked
him for his invitation to visit Prague to sign the consular convention
and any other agreements we might reach. I said I hoped our meeting
of today might mark the beginning of a new stage in U.S.-Czechoslo-
vak relations.

The Czechoslovaks are evidently concerned to move ahead now
in an effort to avoid being left behind the trend of improvement in U.S.

³ See footnote 4, Document 85.
relations with the Soviet Union, Poland and Hungary. I believe their interest provides us with a good opportunity both to reach settlements advantageous to us of longstanding bilateral problems and to encourage the Czechoslovak Government to begin to emerge from its shell following the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion. We intend to move vigorously to exploit this opening.

William P. Rogers

91. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 13, 1972, 2:30–3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Exploratory Discussion of Secretary Rogers’ Meeting with Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnoupek in New York on October 5, 1972

PARTICIPANTS

Czechoslovak Ambassador Dusan Spacil
Czechoslovak Minister Counselor Jaroslav Zantovsky
US Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Albert W. Sherer, Jr.
Director, EUR/EE, John A. Baker, Jr.

The exploratory discussion followed an informal and cordial luncheon given by Ambassador and Mrs. Spacil. The three subjects explored were 1) a Consular Convention, 2) a Scientific, Technical and Cultural Agreement and 3) the negotiation of outstanding economic and financial problems.

Consular Convention

All participants agreed informally and off the record that the best place to begin the normalization of US-Czechoslovak relations was with the negotiation of a Consular Agreement or Convention. As both the US and Czechoslovakia have signed and ratified the Vienna Consular Convention it appeared that the preliminary discussions might consider how that document could be supplemented to take into account the more specific interests of both sides. No specifics were mentioned by either side but it was generally agreed that a supplementary agreement

agreement or protocol would be necessary in order to take into account each side’s experience with the general language of the Vienna Convention. The Czechoslovaks were informed that Consular Conventions with Poland, Romania and Hungary would be sent to the Hill early in 1973 and if we could move quickly on the agreement with Czechoslovakia that might be included in the same package, thus easing and speeding its completion.

Scientific, Technical and Cultural Agreement

It was clear from the discussion that the Czechoslovaks were thinking in terms of a scientific and technology agreement only. An effort was made to convince them that any agreement should be broader in context. They were asked for example whether an exhibit such as Architecture USA was scientific, technical or cultural. The idea of including “culture” in a type of general language “umbrella” agreement was obviously distasteful to them but they were strongly encouraged to begin thinking along these lines. It was pointed out that we would also be prepared under such a broad umbrella agreement to negotiate specific research or exchange agreements such as NSF had recently concluded in Budapest.

Economic and Financial Agreement

The Czechoslovaks were interested in beginning the discussion of these matters as soon as possible but actually indicated February as a target date for delegations to address these issues. Ambassador Spacil indicated that it was his assumption that the negotiation of the economic and financial issues would be conducted by delegations of the “Vice Minister level.” He was informed that in our view these issues could be worked on primarily through normal diplomatic channels either in Washington or Prague. They appeared pleased to hear that the US representatives had no objection to beginning preliminary explorations and exchanges of view prior to February, perhaps while discussion of the other two agreements were in progress. Both sides agreed that the economic and financial discussions might be complex and protracted, but Ambassador Spacil said on two occasions that they might not be as difficult as we might assume.

Ambassador Spacil was obviously interested in the cosmetics as well as the substance of the negotiations and expressed the hope that a “very high level US representative” could visit Prague to sign any agreements that might be reached. There is little doubt that he had in mind a visit to Czechoslovakia by Secretary Rogers.

It was also agreed that the negotiations were in no sense a “package deal.” Each agreement would be signed separately and implemented as soon as mutually convenient.

SUBJECT
Secretary Rogers on US–Czechoslovakia

The Secretary has sent the President a memorandum about his October 5 meeting with the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister in New York City. The central point is the Secretary’s report that he welcomed his counterpart’s proposal to negotiate on several issues in US-Czechoslovak relations.

The Foreign Minister:
—proposed to solve the complex of US and Czechoslovak claims;
—suggested we sign a Science and Technology Agreement and a consular convention and reopen consulates in Chicago and Bratislava;
—wished for a better atmosphere so that Czechoslovakia might eventually obtain MFN; and
—invited the Secretary to visit Prague, perhaps to sign the consular convention.

Replying to this presentation, the Secretary agreed to discuss the details in diplomatic channels and thanked the Foreign Minister for his invitation.

The Secretary points out to the President that the Czechoslovaks are afraid of being left behind the Soviets, Poles, and Hungarians in the race to improve relations with us. He believes we have been given a good opportunity to settle bilateral problems advantageously and to coax the Czechoslovak government out of its shell.

The Secretary’s wish to move ahead with the Czechoslovaks again illustrates, I think, the pressing need for us to get our negotiating priorities straight in Eastern Europe.

I am recommending separately (my memorandum on this is forthcoming) that Secretary Rogers be asked to organize a NSSM/CIEPSM study that would recommend a coherent plan for conducting negotiations with the individual East European countries. Until this study has

2 Document 90.
3 See Documents 25 and 26.
been completed and analyzed, I think the Secretary should be requested
not to embark on new negotiations with Czechoslovakia and the other
East European countries.

If you agree, you should:

a. Sign the memorandum at Tab B to Secretary Rogers asking him
to delay negotiations with the Czechoslovaks pending completion of
the NSSM/CIEPSM study and issuance of policy decisions based upon
it. This memorandum should not go forward, however, until you and Peter
Flanigan have actually requested the study. 4

b. Sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A, which for-
wards the Secretary’s memorandum but notifies the President that the
Secretary has been asked not to commit us further on negotiations with
the Czechoslovaks until we have made policy decisions on how to treat
the East Europeans generally.5

Recommendation

1. That, after you and Flanigan have signed the NSSM/CIEPSM
to the Secretary of State requesting a study of our East European poli-
cies, you sign the memorandum to the Secretary of State at Tab B.

2. That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.6

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4 Attached but not printed. On October 27 Haig signed the memorandum for
Kissinger. It reads as follows: “The President would like to review the issues involved
in our relations with Czechoslovakia in light of a NSSM/CIEPSM study of our economic
and other relations with all the East European countries. This is being requested sepa-
rately. Negotiations with Czechoslovakia should await the outcome of this study.”
(National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files
(H-Files), Box H–194, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 163)

5 Attached but not printed. On October 16 Haig signed the memorandum to the
President for Kissinger. The memorandum informed Nixon that Kissinger had asked
Rogers to delay talks with Czechoslovakia pending the NSSM/CIEPSM study. It reads
in part: “It would probably be premature to begin negotiating with the Czechoslovaks
until we have developed a coherent plan for all the East European countries. (When we
do begin, I have serious doubts whether we should give priority to Czechoslovakia,
whose regime is among the most repressive in Eastern Europe and has been hostile to
our foreign policies.)” A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
(Ibid.)

6 This option is circled.

93.  Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon

Washington, November 6, 1972.

SUBJECT
Negotiations with Czechoslovakia

In view of your desire that relations with Czechoslovakia be reviewed in light of a forthcoming NSSM/CIEPSM on our economic and other relations with Eastern European countries, we are postponing plans to begin discussions with the Czechoslovaks on the question of US claims for properties nationalized after WWII and the return to Czechoslovakia of gold taken by the Nazis and now in the custody of the Tripartite Gold Commission (US-UK-France).

In the meantime, we plan to proceed with the negotiation of a consular agreement and an agreement to facilitate cultural and scientific exchanges. We are seeking discussions with the Czechoslovaks on these agreements to begin in mid-November. Both agreements would be to our advantage and would parallel agreements we already have concluded with, or proposed to, other Eastern European countries. We would hope to have a response from the Czechoslovak side to our draft agreements before the start of the gold/claims talks. Since the Czechoslovaks seem particularly interested in the gold/claims negotiations and their expected impact on our economic relations, a sequence of this nature would provide them with some incentive for accommodating us on the consular and exchanges agreements.

The draft consular agreement we are preparing will take the form of a protocol supplementing the Vienna Convention, to which the US and Czechoslovakia are both parties. The main content of the protocol involves notification and access rights with regard to arrested citizens of each country, an area which is inadequately covered in the Vienna Convention.

The draft exchanges agreement we propose to give the Czechoslovaks is a general one intended to provide a framework for a broad program of exchanges in culture, education, science, technology and other fields. Under the agreement, the parties agree to encourage and facilitate exchanges and to permit distribution of cultural materials and ac-

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 672, Country Files—Europe, Czechoslovakia, Vol. II 01 Feb 70——Confidential.
2 See footnote 4, Document 92.
cess to cultural centers and reading rooms. The agreement would re-
main in force for two years.

By the time the Czechoslovaks have responded to these drafts we
should have the NSSM/CIEPSM results. With the benefit of these we
will examine the position we are currently developing on the
gold/claims question and related economic matters and submit it to
you for your consideration before entering into negotiation with the
Czechoslovaks.

William P. Rogers

94. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National
Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 9, 1972.

SUBJECT
US-Czechoslovak Relations

On October 27 you requested Secretary Rogers (Tab B) to postpone
planned negotiations with Czechoslovakia on a range of issues pend-
ing the results of a NSSM/CIEPSM 163 study (Tab C) that is to develop
a time-phased negotiating scenario for normalizing our economic and
other relations with Czechoslovakia as well as the other East European
countries.²

Now the Secretary has come back with a new memorandum to the
President (Tab D) saying that State nevertheless plans to proceed with
two sets of negotiations before the NSSM/CIEPSM study is finished
and policy decisions taken upon it.³ These negotiations are for (a) a
consular agreement and (b) a cultural-scientific exchanges agreement.
State wants to begin in “mid-November.” We understand that the ne-
gotiating drafts are ready for the Secretary to approve but are being
held by State working levels pending a reaction from us.

¹Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 672,
Country Files, Europe, Czechoslovakia, Vol. II. Confidential. Sent for urgent action. Liv-
ingston initialed for Sonnenfeldt.
²Regarding Tabs B and C, see Document 92 and footnotes 3 and 4 thereto.
³Document 93.
The Secretary wants to push ahead with Czechoslovakia without waiting for a coherent plan approved by Presidential level, which might not call for priority attention to Czechoslovakia. There may be no harm in starting with the consular agreement, which will bring direct benefits to American citizens and should be relatively simple to negotiate. As the Secretary points out in his memorandum the Czechoslovaks’ interest in gold/claims negotiations, which the Secretary has agreed to hold off as the President requested, will induce them to accommodate us on the consular agreement.

It would be preferable to reiterate the President’s request for delay as far as the exchanges agreement is concerned, however. In this case, the balance of advantages is on the Czechoslovaks’ side. Moreover if we initiate the two negotiations simultaneously, as the Secretary wishes to do, we convey the cumulative impression of embarking on a new hyperactive policy with Czechoslovakia. It is doubtful that we want to do this, at least until we have considered that country in the overall East European context, which the response to NSSM/CIEPSM 163 will hopefully provide. Finally, the gold/claims incentive will continue to operate even after the consular convention.

If you agree, you should give the Secretary a green light for the consular convention negotiations but an amber one for the exchanges agreement negotiations. A memorandum to the Secretary at Tab A gives him these signals.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to the Secretary of State at Tab A.

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4 A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “AI—Do this by phone with Eliot. HK[issinger].” A second annotation by Haig reads “done.” The draft memorandum from Kissinger to Rogers on which the telephone message was based, read in part as follows: “With reference to your memorandum of November 6 . . . the President approves your opening negotiations on a consular agreement at your discretion. He prefers that you postpone negotiations on the proposed cultural and scientific agreement, where the direct advantages to the United States are less obvious, until completion of the NSSM/CIEPSM 163 study and policy decisions based upon it.” A notation on the memorandum reads: “given to Eliot by phone.”
Finland

95. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Your Meeting with Ambassador Peterson

The Ambassador has been in Washington since last week for a series of briefings, and plans to return to Hastings, Nebraska, on Saturday; he will embark for Finland on June 24.²

Background

Finland does not try to play a major role in international affairs, mainly because of its preoccupation with ensuring stable relations with the USSR, which retains certain military intervention rights under a 1948 treaty.³ Helsinki’s main objective is to promote international acceptance of its role as a neutral. Nevertheless, from time to time the Finns have taken initiatives in European affairs, generally to support Soviet proposals. The recent Finnish proposals (May 6) to host a European Security Conference is an example of an attempt to show support for the USSR but to cast Finnish support in a neutral mode.

Because of its dependence on trade the Finns are fairly active in Nordic affairs. They have joined the OECD, and in recent years have been more active in the UN. Finland is currently a member of the Security Council. It has been forced to remain outside most European organizations, and one of its important problems is how to protect its exports if other members of the European Free Trade Area eventually join the Common Market.

Another aspect of Finnish efforts to ward off potential Soviet pressures was the re-entry of the Finnish Communists into the governing

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² Frederick V.E. Peterson was appointed Ambassador to Finland on May 1. He presented his credentials on July 14. No record of the President’s conversation with Peterson has been found. Peterson’s state of residency was Nebraska.

³ For text of the 1948 Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, see 48 UNTS 149.
coalition. The Social Democrats had been anathema to the USSR but polled a majority in 1966, and in order to form a government acceptable to the USSR invited the Communists into the coalition. The Communists have played no major role however; in the last few months, the Party split at its Congress, with a moderate faction taking power, provoking a walk-out of the conservative faction. This dispute is still unresolved, but Moscow has advised the conservatives to patch up the dispute.

The main force in Finnish politics remains the 69 year old President Urho Kekkonen who is serving his third six year term. He has proved an adroit manipulator, managing to satisfy the Soviets without compromising Finnish independence. He frequently meets with the Soviet leaders, and apparently has their confidence.

Talking Points

Should you discuss substance with the Ambassador, you may wish to mention the following:

— you are interested in the latest Finnish initiative in offering to host a European Security Conference;
— you assume that the Finns stepped out in front on this issue to keep from being pressured into a more pro-Soviet proposal;
— thus, we want to be careful not to rebuff the Finns (the Finns have told us privately they expect no early movement on their proposal);
— our approach, however, was worked out at the recent NATO meeting to the effect that we should explore concrete issues before moving into a large conference;
— NATO is currently consulting on European security and examining specific issues that might be worth discussing with the USSR;
— meanwhile, we have strong doubts that a conference of thirty nations would be of any value.

In view of the close contacts between Finland and the USSR, you may also wish to review with the Ambassador the status of SALT discussions and the NPT ratification.
96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland

Washington, September 17, 1969, 1424Z.

157690. Subj: Secretary’s Conversation with Finnish Foreign Minister Sept 12. Ref: Helsinki 946. Following summary FYI only and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to revision upon review.

1. After Finnish Ambassador’s dinner Sept 12 honoring Secretary and Foreign Minister Karjalainen, they retired to library for informal conversation. Ambassador and small group of Foreign Ministry and Dept officers also present.

2. Main topics discussed were:
   (a) SALT: Secretary said we are thinking of proposing Helsinki as one of possible places for talks. Karjalainen replied Finland hopes for successful SALT talks and would be pleased if Helsinki is site, provided US and USSR want this. In response question, Karjalainen said Soviets “probably” really desire arms limitations, partly for economic reasons.

   (b) Sino-Soviet Split: In response question, Karjalainen said Finland had good contacts with both parties. He said China does not seem to expect war and situation is not bothering USSR leaders much either. The latter think China will be an “actual” problem in 10 or 20 years.

   (c) European Security Conference: Karjalainen reported that USSR leaders sincerely want an ESC. Finland’s May suggestion of bilateral discussions leading to preliminary conference and ESC in Helsinki was entirely its own initiative in attempt get some movement, according to Karjalainen. The Secretary said US interested in any kind of discussion with USSR, especially about Europe. While US favors ESC, in principle, we have reservations about intentions of USSR in conference. A conference, with many people dealing with complex problems, could exacerbate East-West relations. We want to find out what the USSR has in mind. We think USSR may want mainly to distract world attention from its actions in Czechoslovakia. When US knows what Soviets have in mind, and after NATO and bilateral discussions, we will consider participation in ESC. If conference agreed on, Helsinki would be acceptable to us as site.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL FIN–US. Confidential; Noforn; Limdis. Drafted by Paul Hughes (EUR/SCAN) on September 16; cleared by Ingram (EUR/SCAN), McGuire (EUR/RPM), Okun (S), Harbin (EA/VN), and Gleysteen (S/S); and approved by Hillenbrand.

2 Dated September 16, 1969. Ibid.
(d) Viet-Nam: Secretary emphasized that US position is reasonable; American people support Nixon administration 2 to 1 on conduct of war; US is open to any proposal which will allow South Viet-Nam choose own future except proposal that US unilaterally withdraw. If North Viet-Nam continues to refuse to negotiate seriously in Paris, we will gradually withdraw and turn over responsibility for defense to South Viet-Nam as soon as they are ready with trained manpower and equipment and weapons provided by US to assume self-defense burden. We hope that perhaps USSR will decide it is to its advantage to pressure NVN to negotiate, particularly in view of USSR difficulties with China. The US has no interest in invading NVN but will not leave SVN until the South can determine its own future. In response to question, the Secretary said that in short range Ho Chi Minh’s death\(^3\) would probably not change situation, but in longer run it would have effect. For one thing, there is no other NVN leader who has Ho’s charismatic appeal in South.

(e) Middle East: Secretary said we neither pro-Israel nor anti-Arab; present situation is discouraging because neither side interested in settlement now; US is still ready to talk to anyone about ME. UN discussion sometimes is useful as damper on activity in ME. The US willing to go on talking with USSR, UK and France but not optimistic of results at present. Foreign Minister said Finland considers ME problem serious one, especially as people of area are so demonstrative that there is danger of escalation of conflict.

3. Karjalainen thanked Secretary for opportunity, already almost a tradition, to discuss informally matters of mutual interest just prior to UNGA session. He expressed hope that contact between himself and Secretary might be maintained and expressed Finland’s willingness to be helpful in any way it can. The Secretary expressed pleasure at meeting with Foreign Minister and remarked that we consider Finland a neutral in the best sense. There are neutrals and neutrals. The US understands Finland’s position and approves of it. It is harder to understand Swedish sort of neutrality.

4. Cleared Memorandum will be air-pouched.\(^4\)

Rogers

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\(^3\) The North Vietnamese President died on September 3.

\(^4\) Memoranda of this conversation are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL FIN–US.
97. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State

Helsinki, April 9, 1970, 1500Z.

360. Subject: Conversation With Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen.

1. During course of two and one-half hour sauna with FonMin Ahti Karjalainen, we discussed numerous topics of mutual interest. Only other persons present at sauna were Director FonMin Political Office Hyvarinen and Chief Embassy PolSec Owens. Among topics covered were following:

   (a) Soviet Leadership—FonMin said that he had met repeatedly with top Soviet leaders and felt he knew them reasonably well. He considered Kosygin to be relatively reasonable person, but said Brezhnev impressed him as rather inflexible and that there was something “dark” in his nature. He pointed out that as far as he knew, Brezhnev had never visited West, which perhaps accounted to some degree for his rigidity and narrow outlook. Podgorny, he commented, seemed to carry very little weight in Soviet hierarchy. On other hand, he viewed M. Suslov as “extremely important” figure.

   (b) Soviet-Finnish relations—When I pointed out view often expressed both in Finland and abroad that Finnish foreign policy dominated by Moscow, Karjalainen emphatically denied this was case. (His denial impressed me as rather forced.) He acknowledged that Finns often “consulted” with Soviets re planned course of action but never asked for approval either before or after taking specific actions. He likened this consultation to what he assumed small neighbor of any super power would probably follow, and (after some groping for analogy) cited Mexico-US relations as parallel case. He asserted Finns often turned Moscow down flatly on specific requests, and listed as example of this Finnish rejection Soviet pressure for recognition of East German regime. He added that GOF had learned that best way to do business with Moscow was to refuse clearly Soviet requests rather than to equivocate and create misleading impression that request might be acceded to later when there was no intention of doing so.

   (c) Conference on European Security—I reiterated our position on CES (i.e., need for Soviets to demonstrate constructive approach on specific issues before consideration could be given to holding conference, etc.). FonMin said he understood US position but hoped Amb

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Enckell\textsuperscript{2} would be received in Washington to discuss conference. I replied it my understanding that this would be done, but pointed out dangers if Enckell moved from capital to capital disclosing views of one European state to another. Karjalainen assured me this would not be case, and that Enckell would not divulge positions of various European countries to other states. After Enckell had visited number of countries he would probably issue report on progress to date. He said British seemed to be most negative of major NATO nations towards CES. FonMin acknowledged that there seemed to be one insurmountable obstacle to success of CES, and that is Soviet insistence that conference recognize status quo in Europe and Western refusal to do so. I concurred that NATO nations would certainly not agree to ratify present division of Europe and added that Brezhnev Doctrine specifically was unacceptable to US.

(d) US-Finnish Relations—FonMin said he considered bilateral US-Finnish relations excellent, to which I fully agreed. I pointed out that there had been some minor irritations in past, which, however, had been largely cleared up. I mentioned specifically speech by Communist member of Cabinet attacking US Vietnam policy in rally last August. I reiterated statement I had made then, that while members of sovereign govt could criticize whomever they wished, by attacking one side in conflict they throw into question their neutral status. I also rejected contention that Cabinet member could speak as private citizen at public rally. FonMin said he agreed, and implied he considered speech unfortunate. However, he made point, which I accepted as valid, that there has been extremely little criticism of US Vietnam policy in Finland; Hyvarinen added that at meetings of Nordic nations, Finland was generally country least critical of US Vietnam policy. I also mentioned FonMin’s speech in UNGA in 1968\textsuperscript{3} calling for cessation of US bombing of North Vietnam as example of coming down on one side of dispute between two parties.

(e) Contract for Construction Atomic Power Plant—I cited awarding of contract to Soviet Union to build atomic power plant despite lower Western bids as kind of action which discredits Finnish assertions of neutrality. Somewhat to my surprise, Karjalainen agreed wholeheartedly, and said that key factor in contract award was that there were so many parties in govt and that so many different individuals in govt got into act on this question that it became hopelessly confused.

\textsuperscript{2} Ralph Enckell, Finnish permanent representative to the United Nations, 1959–1965; ambassador at large.

\textsuperscript{3} For the text of the October 7, 1968, speech, see UN doc. A/PV.1684.
2. Comment: I think our exchange of views, which was unusually friendly and frank for generally reserved FonMin, was valuable. Although Karjalainen may not be FonMin in next govt,\(^4\) he is considered good possibility for Prime Ministership position. I think result of our conversation was to clarify views of both govts and particularly to emphasize to Finns our close interest in actions and statements which affect US interests. One indication of this was initiative by Karjalainen directing Hyvarinen to seek closer consultation with US in future on matters of mutual interest.

**Peterson**

\(^4\) In the March 15–16 elections, the ruling coalition lost a total of 29 seats but was able to form a new coalition government.

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98. **Intelligence Information Cable**\(^1\)


COUNTRY

Finland/USSR

DOI

17–20 July 1970

SUBJECT


ACQ

[1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[5½ lines not declassified]

1. In return for agreement to extend the 1948 Fenno-Soviet Pact of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance for another twenty years beyond its scheduled expiration date of 1975, Finnish President Urho Kekkonen extracted two important concessions from the Soviet

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 673, Country Files—Europe, Finland, Vol. I. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Prepared in the CIA and sent to agencies in the Intelligence Community.
Union during his official visit to the USSR from 17–20 July 1970: (1) Acceptance of Finnish emphasis on the word “neutrality” to describe Finnish foreign policy and its obligations under the pact, and (2) Acceptance of Finland’s desire to seek its own best avenues for foreign trade. For its own part, Finland indicated its willingness to purchase natural gas and a second atomic power plant from the Soviet Union.

2. The unwritten agreement on Finnish foreign trade, which is interpreted by Kekkonen and other Finnish officials as tacit Soviet consent to Finland’s intention to make its own arrangements with the European Economic Community (EEC), was the subject of prolonged and difficulty negotiations. When Kekkonen left Moscow for a side trip to Kiev on 18 July, he gave Finnish Foreign Office Political Department Chief Dr. Risto Hyvarinen strict orders forbidding him from backing down on this point. As of 1220 hours on 20 July, it actually appeared that the Finns might not sign the joint communiqué because the Soviets had not yet acceded to the Finnish demand. However, they ultimately did so. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: It is apparent that Hyvarinen, rather than Foreign Minister Vaino Leskinen, was the key Finnish negotiator on the foreign trade question.) During his speech at a luncheon at the Finnish Embassy on 20 July, Kekkonen announced that Finland would seek its own arrangements for foreign trade. Present on this occasion among others were Premier Aleksey Kosygin, President Nikolay Podgorny, Foreign Trade Minister Nikolay Patolichev, Defense Minister Andrei Grechko, and Politburo members Kirill Mazurov, Aleksandr Shelepin, Petr Shelest, and Arvid Pelshe.

3. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: By way of background to the Finnish position during this visit, Finnish officials decided in February 1970, when Soviet Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev first raised with Kekkonen the question of extending the Fenno-Soviet Pact, that the Soviets were extraordinarily anxious to renew the Pact, apparently because of the USSR’s pending negotiations with West Germany in August 1970. Remembering Finnish President Paasikivi’s diplomatic success in 1955 when renewal of the Pact led to Soviet return of the Porkkala Naval Base, leading Finnish economic specialists advised Kekkonen that he should try to exploit the apparent Soviet concern by extracting as many concessions as possible from the Soviets in return for Finnish agreement to extend the Pact beyond 1975. Freedom of maneuver to negotiate with EEC was deemed to be the most important goal, along with the neutrality question. While the timing is not entirely clear, Finnish negotiations with EEC would probably begin only when the British negotiations have been completed. Six months to one year would be an educated guess.)

4. Kekkonen stated privately that he considers this trip his greatest victory in the entire history of his dealings with the Soviets.

5. [less than 1 line not declassified]
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Finnish President Kekkonen

You are scheduled to hold one session with President Kekkonen at 11:00 a.m. Thursday, July 23, for approximately one hour following the official arrival ceremony. You will also be with him at your black tie dinner that evening.

Points for your arrival statement and dinner toast will be sent to you separately.

Background and Setting

This will be your first meeting with President Kekkonen, and his second official visit to the US since becoming President in 1956. Only three days separate his arrival in Washington and the conclusion of his state visit to the USSR.

Kekkonen’s visit reflects his desire to establish with you a personal relationship not unlike the one he has with the leaders of the Soviet Union (although he has seen and will continue to see them much more often). The Finns will also wish to use this visit to demonstrate that Finnish neutrality is accepted by the US, that its delicate situation is understood, and that Finland may have powerful friends of choice as well as of necessity.

A 788 mile border separates 4.7 million Finns from 239 million Russians; during the course of their history, the Finns have been defeated in 42 wars with Russia, though not without displaying enormous courage in the process, as in 1939–40. These facts have a tremendous impact on virtually every facet of Finnish domestic and foreign relations. However, they in no way diminish and indeed enhance the genuine and particularly warm feeling the Finns have for the US and Americans. This sense of affinity may be largely a product of family and cultural connections, but it must also reflect the Finns’ awareness that the strength and vigor of the US are ultimately vital to Finland’s

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2 Kekkonen visited the United States in October 1961; see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 189.
survival as long as there is no real détente in Europe and Soviet Russia does not change its character.

In foreign relations, Finland is committed to a special brand of neutrality, codified in the 1948 Peace Treaty with the USSR—which was just formally renewed and extended for 20 years at the conclusion of Kekkonen’s visit on July 20. By the Treaty, Finland is to “remain outside the conflicting interests of the Great Powers.” The Finns interpret this to include political as well as military conflicts. As a result, the Finns have not become emotional partisans as have the “neutral” Swedes, and have developed a general policy of non-recognition where states are divided such as Germany, Korea and Vietnam.

Clever as the Finns have been in developing and maintaining their neutrality, there is no doubt that their freedom of movement is tightly circumscribed. They know that to preserve Finnish independence, the Soviets must feel assured that Finnish actions will never constitute a threat to Soviet security. Keeping the Soviets convinced is an unending task for the Finns. There is a relatively large Communist Party in Finland, and the Soviets are prone to rather heavy-handed interference in Finnish domestic affairs.

One recent example of this type of Soviet impact relates to the abortive NORDEC arrangement. Lengthy negotiations had been held among Finland, Norway, Denmark and Sweden for the creation of a Nordic economic union, and a draft treaty was even approved by foreign ministers. One month later, in April, Kekkonen announced that Finland was rejecting the proposed treaty since it would have undermined the preservation of Finnish neutrality. Soviet displeasure caused Kekkonen to scuttle the NORDEC project.

The domestic political scene offers a second example of Soviet pressure on the Finns. In the mid-March parliamentary elections the conservative parties won dramatically and the local Communist-front party declined. This caused a political crisis, as efforts persisted to restore the former center-left coalition. The Soviets made it quite plain to Kekkonen that they wanted to see the formation of a coalition (like the pre-election one) before Kekkonen came to Moscow. Largely as a result of this pressure, a new Finnish Government—a center-left coalition—was installed on July 15, just two days before Kekkonen’s departure for his visit to the USSR.

To balance this pressure from the East, the Finns have associated themselves as much as possible with other Scandinavian countries, and

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3 The President underlined most of this sentence.
4 The President underlined: “relatively large Communist Party in Finland.”
5 In this paragraph the President underlined: “Nordic economic union” and “rejecting the proposed treaty.”
with Western and world organizations. For years, Finland has provided troops for UN peacekeeping missions, notably in Cyprus and along the Suez. The Finns believe that by such efforts on the world stage, the world will find it has a stake in Finland’s independence.6

President Kekkonen, for more than 15 years, has dominated Finnish domestic politics and foreign relations. He sees himself as the only Finn who possesses the necessary rapport with Soviet leaders to maintain their confidence. He has kept pace with all the twists and turns of Kremlin politics; he was a frequent companion of Khrushchev, and has maintained good relations with Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny. With his basic motive of preserving Finnish neutrality and independence, Kekkonen has visited the USSR no less than 16 times since he became President in 1956.7

Your Objectives8

In your discussions with Kekkonen, your goals will be to

—assure him that we accept and value Finnish neutrality, that we understand their need for friendly relations with the Soviets, and that we would be concerned only if Finland’s independence, neutrality and free institutions were endangered;

—allow him time and a feeling of confidence to talk about the USSR, and particularly his assessment of the Soviet leaders, their problems and motives;

—cultivate and establish a personal rapport with Kekkonen, and impress on him your seriousness in pursuing all serious efforts to achieve peace and stability.

(To the Soviets you want to demonstrate that you do not regard Finland as exclusively in their sphere.)

Particular Points to Emphasize

1. The Soviet Union.9 Particularly in the light of Kekkonen’s visit to the USSR, it will be useful to seek his assessment of Soviet developments

6 In this paragraph the President underlined: “associated” and “as much as possible with other Scandinavian countries” and “UN peacekeeping missions, notably Cyprus and along Suez.”

7 In this paragraph the President underlined “was a frequent companion of Khrushchev” and “Kekkonen has visited the USSR no less than 16 times since he became President in 1956.”

8 In the objectives the President underlined “we accept and value Finnish neutrality,” “understand their need for friendly relations with the Soviets,” “confidence to talk about the USSR, and particularly his assessment,” and “rapport with Kekkonen.”

9 In particular points to emphasize, Soviet Union, the President underlined: “assessment of Soviet developments,” “state of Soviet society and leadership,” and “Soviets have not adequately reciprocated our efforts to bridge the conflicts that hobble our bilateral relations.”
and to take this opportunity to explain your views of US-Soviet relations in relation to the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

You may wish to

—seek his assessment of the state of Soviet society and leadership, ask about postponement of the 24th CPSU Congress, and inquire whether he anticipates any changes in the near future (he may have some astute observations on Soviet leadership personalities);
—stress that the Soviets have not adequately reciprocated our efforts to bridge the conflicts that hobble our bilateral relations, except perhaps for the SALT talks;
—explain the considerable US restraint in the Middle East, as contrasted with the growing Soviet military involvement there which contains the seeds of grave and broad confrontation;
—refer to the lack of Soviet willingness to take effective steps to encourage its clients to make progress in the Paris peace talks; stress your desire for a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Southeast Asia and your hope that Ambassador Bruce’s mission will be successful; ask about the role of China.

2. SALT. The Finns were extremely pleased that the first session of the SALT talks was held in Helsinki for it dramatically underscored Finnish neutrality and assisted its independence. Kekkonen will be interested in your evaluation of these talks.

You may wish to

—stress your appreciation for the Finnish reception at the Helsinki phase, where you consider a good foundation was laid for the talks in Vienna;
—indicate the general trend in the talks, and point out that you hope there will be some definite and clear understanding reached before the conclusion of the Vienna phase, so that, as agreed, the talks can again return to Helsinki.

3. European Security Conference. In May 1969 the Finns proposed a Conference on European Security, and offered Helsinki as the site—when conditions are propitious. Several months ago, the Finns appointed one of their senior diplomats, Ralph Enckell, as a Roving Ambassador to solicit views of interested governments. Their approach on the Conference is generally similar to ours; indeed, it is closer than the position of some of our NATO allies.

You may wish to

—express your appreciation for Finnish efforts, and for the soundings made by Ambassador Enckell;

10 In particular points to emphasize, European Security Conference, the President underlined: “express your appreciation for Finnish efforts,” “only if,” and “it would achieve positive results.”
—stress your view that a Conference could be useful only if there were reasonable assurances it would achieve positive results, and if there had been some success in current negotiations, particularly the Four Power talks in Berlin, and the series of German negotiations with the East;
—explain that nevertheless we shall continue to pursue bilateral contacts in an effort to clarify the recent statements from the Warsaw Pact, especially on the issue of mutual and balanced force reductions.

4. Trade and European Communities. A principal concern of Finland is that its economy not be undermined by a European economic integration in which it has no part. Though Finland is an associate member of the European Free Trade Area, it recognizes the trade implications of the European Communities—60% of its total trade is with the Community and the four candidates for admission (plus Sweden). The Finns have asked for a trade agreement with the Community. If President Kekkonen raises this matter, you may wish to

—explain that we have no objection to arrangements between the neutral states and the European Community, though we would not wish to see any development which forecloses the further political development of the Community;
—while these issues have yet to emerge, you doubt whether any arrangement the Finns work out with the European Community could affect US support for those institutions;
—though the issue is one for the Europeans to decide among themselves, the US will review any Finnish arrangement in the light of its impact on our trade and compatibility with GATT, and with due respect for Finland’s special neutrality.

If time permits, you may wish to express confidence in Ambassador Peterson, our envoy in Helsinki; and appreciation for the efforts of the Finnish Ambassador in Washington, Ambassador Munkki.11

Secretary Rogers will be meeting concurrently in the Cabinet Room with Foreign Minister Leskinen and other members of Kekkonen’s party.12 Kekkonen will have his own interpreter; Navy Captain Minkkinen will serve as your interpreter.

More detailed talking points, a memorandum from Secretary Rogers and biographic information are included in a separate book if you wish to review them. Your schedule for the visit is at Tab A, and a biographic sketch of President Kekkonen is at Tab B.13

11 In this paragraph the President underlined: “express confidence in Ambassador Peterson, our envoy in Helsinki.”
12 Parts 1, 3, and 4 of the memorandum of conversation are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 FIN. Part 2 is Document 101.
13 Attached but not printed.
100. Record of Meeting

Washington, July 23, 1970, 10:45 a.m.

DISCUSSION BETWEEN PRESIDENT NIXON AND PRESIDENT KEKKONEN AT THE WHITE HOUSE AT 10:45 A.M. JULY 23, 1970

The President, Mr. Kissinger, and Captain Erkki Minkkinen, USN, DOD, Interpreter; President Kekkonen and Ambassador Max Jakobson, Finnish Permanent Representative to the UN, who served as interpreter, were present.

Conference on European Security

President Kekkonen said the Soviets are pushing a conference on European security because they want their western front to be secure in the face of Chinese pressures. However, they also are influenced by the economic situation within the Soviet Union. There has been much pressure recently to raise the Soviet standard of living. The stationing of troops indefinitely within the East Bloc is a severe drain on the Soviet economy. A third reason is pressure from the East Bloc satellites. The satellites strongly desire such a conference. History has shown that armed rebellion does not work, as evidenced in Hungary. It has also shown that quick economic change does not work, as evidenced in Czechoslovakia. The last resort for the East Bloc satellites is to get more individual freedom through the conference table.

President Kekkonen said that security talks should be held in Finland because Finland has representation (albeit non-diplomatic) from both Germanys. Furthermore, Finland is neutral. When questioned by President Nixon as to the Soviet approach to holding a security conference, President Kekkonen replied that, for the first time in all of his trips to Moscow, the Soviets had used the word “flexible” in explaining their desire to reach agreement through East-West talks.

President Kekkonen suggested that exploratory talks be held in Helsinki at the Ambassadorial level. President Nixon remarked that he has much faith in the United States Ambassador to Helsinki because Ambassador Peterson is a close personal friend and he had nominated him to that post. He requested President Kekkonen’s evaluation of the competence of other Ambassadors in Helsinki. President Kekkonen jokingly replied that an assessment such as this would be very difficult.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 915, VIP Visits, Finland, Pres of Finland, July 1970. Secret; Nodis.
Some of the Ambassadors are good, some are bad, and he doubted that any of them would be the type of person normally sent by their governments to negotiate international treaties. However, this would be a good place to start. Even the SALT talks perhaps started in the same fashion. President Nixon asked Mr. Kissinger whether such a suggestion had been made before. Mr. Kissinger said he was not familiar with the suggestion. President Kekkonen observed that this was only an extension of an earlier Belgian recommendation.

President Nixon said he did not believe we should enter a security conference unless there is reason to believe it would not be used for propaganda purposes, and that some agreement could be reached. He explained that the Glassboro talks\(^2\) are an example of what he does not want. During these talks the whole world was lifted to the point of believing that such talks could end the Cold War, but nothing came of them. For this reason he would like to look further into President Kekkonen’s suggestion. President Nixon reiterated that it would remain a requirement that some substantive solution would result from such talks before we entered into them.

**SALT**

President Nixon described the status of the SALT talks. He explained that the SALT talks will result in an agreement on two or three points. This is a good start. The talks would continue in Helsinki and perhaps the announcement of an agreement would be made there.

**Soviet Leadership**

President Nixon asked President Kekkonen for his assessment of the current leadership in the Soviet Union. Kekkonen replied that he believed the collective leadership is currently stable. Kosygin is strong. This is a change from last February when Kosygin had confided to Kekkonen that he had asked to be relieved of his duties for reasons of health. The collective leadership had denied his request. During his last week’s visit in the Soviet Union, Kosygin appeared to be his same old self. Each of the Soviet leaders has his own strong professionalism which is not challenged by the others.

Kosygin had told Kekkonen that he knows that the West always asks about the aging Russian generals. Kosygin advised Kekkonen to tell the West that behind each general is a younger man. President Nixon commented: “With a knife?”

The Middle East

President Nixon asked President Kekkonen about Nasser’s visit to the Soviet Union. Kekkonen replied that, although the climate did not appear disturbed and everybody said that Nasser’s visit was completely successful, he felt that the long communiqué resulting from the meeting indicated there were problems.

President Nixon explained the United States position on the Middle East. The entire population of the United States is agreed on our Middle East position. The Middle East is many times more dangerous than Viet-Nam has ever been. Any increase in aid to Egypt, particularly Soviet personnel, will increase this hazard. The first Soviet encounter with Israel will be extremely dangerous. Any increase in the size of the Soviet fleet will be considered as an escalation of the war.

President Kekkonen said that Nasser’s decision to come to the conference table resulted, without a doubt, from Soviet pressure, but he stressed that he had no message for President Nixon on the Middle East situation. Earlier Kosygin had given Kekkonen a message but withdrew it by saying that he, Kosygin, can communicate with Nixon directly.

Viet-Nam

President Nixon gave President Kekkonen a status report on Viet-Nam. He said he understands well that neither the Soviet Union nor China can reduce tensions in this area because it is the policy of each to export revolution. As such, neither could press to end the war. The Cambodian affair was significantly and strategically important to the war in Viet-Nam. Over a year’s supply of weapons and food were captured and destroyed.

President Nixon explained that the United States will pull out of Viet-Nam on schedule, and he suggested that it would be wise for North Viet-Nam to come to the conference table now, because after withdrawal negotiating with South Viet-Nam may not be as attractive as would be negotiations with the United States. Vietnamization is going well. These things sometimes change. However, even if Vietnamization does not go as well in the future, the United States can still withdraw its troops on schedule.

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3 June 29–July 17.
5 Reference is to the April 29 invasion of Cambodia by U.S. forces in an effort to cut off supply lines for North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops in South Vietnam.
China

President Kekkonen said that he had no direct knowledge about the situation in China. Moscow is not as concerned about China as it was in February. However, the China question would continue to linger on and be a basic consideration in Soviet foreign policy decisions for the foreseeable future. The China question would remain for some two to three years even after the death of Mao.

Economic Questions

President Kekkonen said he had two or three very important economic questions to raise with President Nixon which might not be important to a country like the United States but are vital to Finland. President Nixon suggested that these could be discussed later, but in any event President Kekkonen should discuss them with Secretary Rogers and Secretary Stans.

101. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
Finland-Soviet Trade

PARTICIPANTS

Finland
President Urho Kekkonen
Foreign Minister Vaino Leskinen
Olavi Munkki, Ambassador to the United States
Ambassador Max Jakobson, Permanent Representative to the UN
Major General Levo, Aide de Camp to President Kekkonen
Dr. Risto Hyvärinen, Director of Political Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Aarno Karhilo, Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Paavo Laitinen, Chief of Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Pauli Opas, First Secretary, Finnish Embassy

United States
The Secretary
Val Peterson, U.S. Ambassador to Finland

1Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 FIN. Secret. Drafted by Samps and approved in S on August 6. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office. The memorandum is part 2 of 4. The other parts are ibid.
President Kekkonen reported that, during his July 17–20 visit to Moscow, there had been a lengthy discussion of bilateral economic matters. The Soviet Union had earlier agreed to provide Finland with its first atomic reactor on favorable credit terms. The site of the first reactor is such as to make it desirable to construct the second atomic reactor next to it for reasons of economy. Agreement has now been reached on the purchase of a second Soviet reactor with repayment terms of 20 years at 2½ percent.

The Secretary asked whether commercial or other reasons motivated the Soviets. President Kekkonen replied that the Finns took the initiative. They did not know whether the Soviets were willing to sell a second reactor on the same terms as the first. An important consideration was the question of fuel.

Another subject discussed in Moscow, President Kekkonen said, was natural gas. Finland has the problem of rapidly increasing fuel consumption. Within the next few years, Finland will require the equivalent of an additional one to four million tons of oil. Finland’s balance of payments position would be severely affected if oil had to be purchased. The Soviets have agreed to bring a natural gas pipeline to the border. This will fulfill Finland’s energy needs.

One project discussed in Moscow, but not publicly mentioned, President Kekkonen said, was the construction in the Soviet Union by Finland of a large scale pulp and paper plant. If the project goes through, several thousand Finnish workers will be involved. He had discussed the plant with Kosygin earlier and it had been thought the plant would be in Siberia. Its construction near Archangel is now planned.

President Kekkonen explained that Finnish-Soviet trade is on a bilateral basis. Now that Finland is able to buy, the Soviets are unable to deliver. For several years, the Soviets have complained that Finland treats the USSR like an underdeveloped country in that Finland buys raw materials from it and sells it processed goods.

The Secretary asked whether renewal of the 1948 friendship treaty and trade matters were part of a package deal. President Kekkonen responded that the treaty and trade matters were handled at separate levels.
102. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State

Helsinki, March 10, 1971, 1604Z.

247. Subj: Discussion With President Kekkonen. Policy.

1. I called on Finnish President Urho Kekkonen this afternoon to discuss his recent two-day trip to the Soviet Union, where he had spent two full days hunting with Podgorny, Brezhnev, and Kosygin. I found the President relaxed, and the discussion, which lasted 45 minutes was conducted in a frank and amicable manner. The only other person present was a Finnish interpreter.

2. I told the President that I was calling on him to discuss in a general way his recent visit to Moscow. I said I did not intend to question him on specific issues, but rather wished to know his general impression of current Soviet thinking on major East-West issues. I pointed out that he had had a unique opportunity to gauge the attitude of the top leadership, having been in close contact for two days with the Soviet “troika.”

3. Observing that the most important questions in the world today hinge on US-Soviet relations, I asked the President, in view of his 15 years as Chief of State and his intimate association during these years with the Soviet leaders, whether he might have any suggestions for easing tensions between the two powers. I said I recognized that he would not presume to give unsolicited advice to the leaders of either super power, but in view of the tremendous importance of this question to all nations in the world, including the neutrals, his thoughts would be helpful. I concluded with the specific question: “What would you do if you were in President Nixon’s position today, faced with the great burden of seeking peace?”

4. Kekkonen replied that his advice would be for President Nixon to send a message to President Podgorny offering to visit the Soviet Union to meet with him and the other Soviet leaders to discuss problems of mutual interest. Such a proposed meeting, he added, should take place after the forthcoming Soviet Party Congress. Continuing, the President said that the Soviet leaders seem to “lack trust” in President Nixon; when I asked him why, he said he did not know. However, he said in his view, trust is something that could be built. Kekkonen said that from his association with them, he had found the Soviet leaders

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL FIN–US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, and USNATO.
to be “reasonable men” and a “summit meeting” would certainly not worsen the situation and might very well improve it. The Soviet leaders, he added, know the necessity for some kind of accommodation with the US and seem fully aware of the consequences if there is not.

5. Kosygin and Brezhnev. I asked the President his evaluation of the current Soviet leaders. He replied that he found Kosygin in a much better “physical condition and mental outlook” than on his last visit to the USSR (July 1970). Kosygin seemed much more vivacious than on the previous occasion. Kekkonen said he personally believes that Kosygin has a much better comprehension of world problems than the other Soviet leaders. On the other hand, he admitted that Brezhnev clearly seems to be the dominant figure among the Soviet leaders. He said it “is difficult to say why,” but he has some characteristics that differentiate him from the other two men. Perhaps, the President suggested, his strength is due to his secure party base. Kekkonen did not discuss Podgorny.

6. Vietnam. What, I asked, are the problems most preoccupying the Soviet leaders with regard to the West? The President replied that the two chief concerns are Vietnam and the Mid-East. On Vietnam, the Soviets charged that President Nixon had “expanded” the war in Indochina by the entrance into Laos;2 I challenged this, noting that the North Vietnamese had years ago “expanded” the war to Laos.

7. The Mid-East. Concerning the Mid-East, Kekkonen said the Soviets believed that the US and USSR have a mutual interest in seeing that problem settled peacefully. He said the Soviets expressed concern lest some “hothead” Egyptian army officers get out of Sadat’s control and ignite a conflict in the area.

8. Soviet Jews. The President said the Soviet leaders showed considerable sensitivity over the criticism directed at them for Soviet handling of Jews in the USSR. He said they went to considerable lengths to explain that there no “pogroms” against Jews in the USSR, and seemed quite upset at agitation in the US against their handling of the Jews.

9. Expansionism. I pointed out that one of our concerns was the growing Soviet expansionism throughout the world, as reflected by moving of the Soviet fleet into every major sea. Kekkonen laughed at this comment, and said that he had once discussed this question with General DeGaulle, when the latter was still President. DeGaulle, he continued, had observed that he was not worried by Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean; “great powers,” DeGaulle commented, “by

2 Reference is to U.S. support for the incursion of South Vietnamese forces into Laos.
their nature must make their presence felt everywhere.” Kekkonen added that while the Soviets had become more expansionist in recent years, the US too had demonstrated “expansionist” tendencies in the past.

10. SALT and CES. Regarding SALT, the President did not enlarge on his public comments that the Soviets are somewhat optimistic about a successful outcome of the talks. Concerning CES, I complimented him on the low-key, cautious approach recently assumed by the GOF on this question, and he observed that there was only limited discussion of this question in Moscow.

11. Finnish-Soviet Trade. The President said that there was a long discussion of Finnish-Soviet trade in Moscow, but the basic problem, Kekkonen observed, is the limited number of items the Finns can find to buy from the USSR. This problem, he added, has been facing the GOF for some 20 years, and will probably be around long after he (Kekkonen) leaves office. The President added that there were no major bilateral problems that had to be discussed during his visit.

12. Berlin. Although the President did not refer to the German question, he said the Soviets did mention Berlin, noting that they had made a proposal to the Western powers on Berlin but had not yet received a response.

13. Comment: Inasmuch as Kekkonen is probably on closer terms with the top Soviet leadership than any other non-Communist leader, his comments are worthy of careful study. He is a shrewd judge of character, and probably knows the Soviet leaders as well as any outsider can. Particularly interesting is his suggestion that President Nixon visit the Soviet Union; it obviously reflects the President’s personal belief in “summit” diplomacy as a way of dealing with Soviet leaders.

Peterson
103. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State

New York, October 7, 1971, 0143Z.


1. Participants: Finland–FM Leskinen, Ambassador Jakobson, Ambassador Munkki, Finnish Ambassador to Washington, Dr. Hyvarinen, Foreign Minister; US—The Secretary, Mr. De Palma, Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Waring (reporting officer).

2. Summary: At Leskinen’s request, the Secretary reviewed our position on the relationship between the Berlin Agreement and a CES. He also reviewed our thinking on a CES and MBFR, noting that the Soviets did not seem to have a clear picture of what they wanted. He also stated that we shied away from multilateral preparatory talks. Regarding the Finnish proposal to have a Finnish representative have bilateral talks separately with interested parties in Helsinki the Secretary said it was too early to pass judgment and moreover that NATO consultations were required. Leskinen noted that he had settled with Scheel the problem of recognition consultations with the two German states.

3. Congratulating the Secretary on the talk which he had delivered to the UNGA, “which was excellent in all respects and had even found a good reaction on the part of the Soviets,” Leskinen asked if he could have Mr. Rogers’ views on such matters as Berlin and a security conference. The Secretary replied that both we and the Soviets believe that the Berlin Agreement will be completed. He noted that our relations with the Soviet Union had made progress. There existed of course differences, but there were much less polemic in exchanges. As for a CES, nothing much could take place until the 4-Power Agreement on Berlin was implemented. He anticipated that this would be around the first of the year. Preparatory talks should be on a bilateral basis, the Secretary thought. We shy away from multilateral preparatory talks, as these have the tendency to take on a form of their own. However, we are not adamant in this respect. The Secretary added that we did not know exactly how the Soviets related MBFR with CES. Would be

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL FIN–US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Helsinki and USNATO, and priority to Bonn. Rogers was in New York attending the UN General Assembly meeting.

2 For text of the Berlin Agreement, signed September 3, 1971, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1135–1143.

3 October 4; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 25, 1971, pp. 437–444.
difficult without MBFR. Perhaps both could take place simultaneously, but in different forums. We had an open mind on the matter.

4. Leskinen asked the Secretary’s views about so-called multilateral-bilateral talks after the Berlin Agreement is implemented. He had in mind a Finnish official talking individually to the parties concerned. The Secretary replied that it was too early to pass judgment on such a procedure. In any event NATO consultations were required. Reverting to CES–MBFR, the Secretary observed that while neutral countries could and should be present at a CES, he did not see their place in a MBFR, as the Soviets seemed to wish. He asked Leskinen if Finland were interested in reducing its armed forces, and Leskinen observed that Finland just did not have enough to be interested in such a matter.

5. Leskinen then mentioned his conversation with FRG FonMin Scheel, noting that he had cleared up the difficulties with Scheel regarding eventual recognition of both German states. (Scheel had informed the Secretary about the same matter on October 1.) The Secretary remarked that he thought that this was a good idea.

Rogers

104. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State

Helsinki, March 22, 1972, 1405Z.


1. Summary. President Kekkonen told me during a private talk that Soviet leadership seemed sincere in its relief that US and USSR could reach accord on problems of mutual interest. Kekkonen also impressed by President Nixon’s imagination and courage in undertaking visits to Peking and Moscow. Kekkonen noted that there is an outstanding invitation to President Nixon to visit Finland and that Mrs. Nixon would be welcome alone if President were unable to come. End summary.

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2. On March 21 I made a call on Finnish President Urho Kekkonen. Our discussion, which lasted close to an hour, touched on a variety of subjects but, as could be expected, dwelt primarily on East-West and Sino-Soviet-US relations. Kekkonen was friendly, outgoing and affable and seemed to be frank in conversation.

3. I was principally interested in obtaining President Kekkonen’s assessment of the attitudes of the Soviet leadership on major world matters. Kekkonen is probably the Western head of state with the most frequent and intimate contacts with the Soviet leadership, having made 18 visits to the USSR since taking office in 1956 and having received Soviet leaders in Finland on a number of occasions. Most recently (February 26 and 27) he spent two days hunting with Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny at Zavidovo, some 70 miles outside of Moscow, with only his military aides and an interpreter accompanying him.

4. US-Soviet relations. Kekkonen said it was his clear impression after his visit with the Soviet triumvirate that the Soviet leaders, regardless of such differences as may exist between the US and the USSR, sincerely believe that they and we share a real common interest in negotiating a solution of problems of mutual concern to the benefit of both and to the world. Kekkonen added that he shares this view.

5. US-Chinese relations. Kekkonen said that the Soviet leaders were closely following the course of President Nixon’s visit to Peking which was going on during the hunting weekend. He said that his hosts had daily briefings on the Nixon visit at the hunting lodge. Although the Soviet leadership had obviously not yet arrived at a position on the Nixon trip to Peking, it was mentioned to Kekkonen by his hosts that the Soviets believe it is sometimes easier to deal with the United States than with the Chinese since we are more pragmatic.

6. Kekkonen commented to me that he was extremely impressed by the imagination and political courage of President Nixon evidenced by his trip to Peking and forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union. These initiatives of President Nixon, said Kekkonen, have already brought a significant and positive change in the world climate which has and should continue to have important ramifications for the future of all of us.

7. As our conversation drew to a close it turned to Kekkonen’s visit in 1970 to Washington, and he commented that he had then extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit Finland. I remarked that Mrs. Nixon had at that time said to me that she would like very much to come to Finland, and President Kekkonen replied that he would be delighted to have Mrs. Nixon visit even without the President.

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*Peterson*
1. Summary. In his initial call on Secretary Rogers tomorrow, August 9, new Finnish Ambassador to Washington, Leo Tuominen, will ask if “Finlandization” concept reflects change in US attitude toward Finland. Foreign Ministry today called in EmbOff to register concern of Government, whose curiosity aroused by use of term by US Ambassador to FRG Hillenbrand in West German radio interview August 6. We believe Ambassador Hillenbrand’s commentary is apt and no explanation is owed the Finns. End summary.

2. Finnish Foreign Ministry’s Chief of Political Section (Tuovinen) called in EmbOff today to register the Government’s “deep concern” about Ambassador to FRG Hillenbrand’s use of term “Finlandization” in radio interview with West German radio on August 6 and to inquire whether statement by such a high-level diplomat implied or reflected a change in US attitude toward Finland. Tuovinen said Finns had interpreted previous policy statements, including those of President Nixon in 1970, as stressing US understanding of Finnish neutrality. Tuovinen stated that the new Finnish Ambassador to Washington, Leo Tuominen, who will make his first call on Secretary Rogers tomorrow, August 9, will be instructed to make same query of Secretary as one of topics of discussion.

3. Tuovinen commented that the Finns had become accustomed to hearing the term “Finlandization” (or Finlandisierung in German), which the Finns regard as uncomplimentary, from such German politicians as Franz Josef Strauss, but the fact that it had found currency with such a prominent American diplomat as the former Assistant Secretary for European Affairs is of far greater concern to the Finns.

4. Ambassador Hillenbrand’s radio interview has been reported in Finland’s largest daily Helsingin Sanomat, and has already elicited editorial comment in one paper, the small leftist Socialist Paivan Sanomat, which wrote: “In fact ‘Finlandisierung’ means independence from the military and economic policy of the USA and the maintenance of good relations with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries;
in other words, giving up the positions of the Cold War. If the word were interpreted in this way, it would be a term of honor. But in Western language it means ‘coming under the influence of the Soviet Union and, before long, becoming its satellite.’ In the mouth of Hillenbrand the term is an attack against the Soviet Union and Finland and the active Finnish foreign policy which is approved by the people. It is no accident that the Ambassador in Bonn uses this word at a time when Finland has just started negotiation on diplomatic relations with the GDR. In our opinion it is high time that our country’s foreign policy leaders should quickly and with determination refute the attack by the US Government against our political leaders and the Finnish people.”

5. Informal English translation of the pertinent Hillenbrand remark, which was in response to interviewer’s question and reportedly made in German, and relayed to the Foreign Ministry in that language, follows: “Deutschlandfunk: Mr. Ambassador, it is a general opinion—an opinion which also has been adopted by the peoples in the border countries—that a return to the Cold War is out of the question. This is a philosophy, on which matter politicians and career diplomats may wish to have their say. But, must we not reckon with the fact that we in the next phase also are bound to encounter complications. One of the major themes of discussion, on which attention has been focused to a greater or lesser extent, is the zone of reduced preparedness in Central Europe. The term applied to this is the concept of Finlandization. If this were to be brought up at the European Security Conference, it would certainly affect American interests and therewith evidently also German-American relations.

“Hillenbrand: Yes, naturally, in life—also in diplomatic life—nothing is ever self-evident or completely certain. One must always take into consideration the fact that new developments may take place, developments that may be unexpected and perhaps not always positive. This is part of the normal expectations of a diplomat. One often speaks, as you said, of the so-called Finlandization of Europe. This signifies an aspiration to achieve a form of neutralization in Europe. Evidently, it is not an objective adopted by US in our policy; and I also assume that it is not a political objective for Western Europe. What we must strengthen is our NATO alliance. In my opinion, the strength of NATO is an unquestionable prerequisite for the future development of an expanded Ostpolitik and for US policy in general directed towards Eastern Europe. This was also emphasized by Chancellor Willy Brandt almost two years ago, when he said that without a strong Western policy a strong Eastern policy could not be thought of. For this reason, I believe it to be better that we do not speak of Finlandization. In the long range, one could naturally see it as a danger. But I cannot believe that it necessarily is an unavoidable development, we shall do everything
to prevent this. I mean that to speak of Finlandization of Europe, is to
speak of an improbable development.”

6. Embassy officer informed Tuovinen that Embassy would in-
form the Department of Ambassador Tuominen’s intention to bring up
the matter with the Secretary and added that, in his knowledge, Hil-
lenbrand statement did not represent a change in US policy toward
Finland.

7. Embassy comment. Considering the nature of the interview in
question, and Ambassador Hillenbrand’s comment that “Finlandiza-
tion” is better not spoken of, Finnish reaction seems to be dispropor-
tionately strong. However, Finns in recent years have tried to ignore
the term and its semantic negation of Finland’s independence. They
are today, if anything, even more sensitive to such commentary since
it reflects negatively on their cherished hope to establish international
understanding of their neutrality, something they have been notably
unsuccessful in achieving in Eastern Europe. Their immediate concern,
of course, relates to their hostship of the CSCE preparatory talks.

8. In my opinion the term Finlandization, applying to a country
which is not truly neutral but is in fact in many ways subject to Soviet
influence, is eminently correct. We do not use the term locally for ob-
vious reasons.

9. The Finns are not as careful in their language in speaking of the
United States as their thin skin in this instance might suggest. In re-
cent weeks President Kekkonen in an interview in a Stockholm daily
said, “The American warfare in Vietnam is so inhumane that we must
from the humanitarian point of view express our protest.” Also, Ulf
Sundquist, Minister of Education, speaking at Socialist International in
Vienna, said, “The position of small countries is not automatically
improved by rapprochement in great power relations. The war in
Vietnam is raging with the United States continuing her persistent
aggression against the Indochinese peoples. It is a shame to democratic
socialism if we cannot condemn this war and point out its real cause.”

10. Finland cannot expect and should not be permitted to embar-
rass a fine Ambassador, Hillenbrand, let alone presume to bother the
Secretary with this matter. It is time these people practice what they
piously preach.

Peterson
Hungary

106. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, April 5, 1969.

SUBJECT
Senator Hartke and Cardinal Mindszenty

What Senator Hartke Wants To Do

Dick Allen spoke with Senator Hartke concerning the Cardinal Mindszenty affair. Hartke feels that he, along with Cardinal Koenig of Vienna, can proceed to Budapest, meet with Cardinal Mindszenty and, if he is willing, escort him out of Hungary and to the United States.

Hartke has met with the Hungarians on this matter, and feels that there would be no objection to Mindszenty’s leaving Budapest. He is of the opinion that the transfer of the Cardinal from U.S. territory (i.e., the U.S. Embassy) to the United States proper would not constitute a legal problem. Hartke has broached this matter with the Soviets as well and is awaiting a reply. He is very pessimistic about State Department assistance in any attempt to secure Mindszenty’s release.

A Reluctant Cardinal

The problem with getting Mindszenty out of our Embassy rests with the Cardinal himself. The Vatican has been eager to bring him out for years, and the Hungarian authorities have been prepared to let him go provided two conditions are met:

1. that he gives up his claim that he remain Primate of Hungary and its formal head of state;

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2 Mindszenty had sought and received asylum in the United States Embassy in Budapest on November 4, 1956, in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Hungary. The Hungarian Government’s refusal during the ensuing years to grant him complete political rehabilitation led him to remain in the Embassy. Regarding Mindszenty’s receipt of asylum in 1956, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, volume XXV, Eastern Europe, Document 163. Puhan’s Cardinal in the Chancery, pp. 185–218, discusses the diplomacy surrounding the Cardinal’s potential departure from the Embassy.
2. that once out of the country he engages in no activities inimical to Hungarian state interests.

The Vatican accepts these conditions; the Cardinal categorically rejects them. The matter has been discussed with Martin Hillenbrand who, until recently, was our Ambassador in Budapest. It is his judgment, from innumerable conversations with the Cardinal, that he will never accept these conditions.

For this reason, the Hungarian regime has been quite content to leave Mindszenty in our mission where, whatever his claims, he remains silent.

All the evidence indicates that, if we tell the Cardinal he must leave our premises, he will walk into the street and have himself re-arrested. He may indeed almost prefer to be a martyr in a Hungarian jail than a guest in our Embassy.

I doubt that Senator Hartke will accomplish what Cardinal Koenig has failed to accomplish in his repeated efforts, in behalf of the Pope, to persuade Mindszenty that he should leave.

In the circumstances, I believe there is nothing we can do but accept the status quo.

3 Hillenbrand left Budapest on February 15. He entered on duty as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs on February 20.

107. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 23, 1969, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Hungarian Ambassador’s call: US Reply to Hungarian Note of May 22 (see Memcon, May 23, 1969)

PARTICIPANTS
Hungarian Ambassador Janos Nagy
Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Leslie C. Tihany, Hungarian Country Officer, EUR/EE

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL HUNG-US. Confidential. Drafted by Tihany. The meeting took place in Hillenbrand’s office.

2 Both the Hungarian note of May 22 and the memorandum of conversation of May 23 are ibid.
Ambassador Nagy called, at Mr. Hillenbrand’s invitation, to re-
ceive our reply to the Hungarian note of May 22, in which the
Hungarians had proposed a high-level review and negotiation of all
outstanding US-Hungarian bilateral problems. In handing the Ambas-
sador our note, Mr. Hillenbrand orally stated our agreement in essence
with the Hungarian proposal but suggested that we begin talks at once
in the existing ambassadorial channel at Budapest. After review and
discussion of our bilateral problems by Deputy Foreign Minister Szi-
lagyi and Ambassador Puhan, we could come to a decision regarding
the level and venue of the next phase. Mr. Hillenbrand mentioned, in
passing, that we continued to be interested in moving toward a solu-
tion of the claims problem. He also told the Ambassador that there
would have to be a delay in our submission of a negotiating draft of
the proposed US-Hungarian consular convention in view of the fact
that the Vienna Consular Convention of 1963, on which our draft is
based, may soon come up for hearings before the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee. We would wish to complete our draft in the light
of the Senate action on the Vienna convention.

On the related subject of amortization of the Hungarian surplus
property debt balance, Mr. Hillenbrand stressed to the Ambassador our
strong interest in moving ahead on this problem without further de-
lay. He explained that we would not like to have progress held up on
this matter, which has already been a subject of considerable discus-
sion between our Embassy and Messrs. Szilagyi and Reti. Specifically,
we would like to have an early answer from the Hungarians to our re-
quest for a more favorable (30 forints to $1) drawdown rate and also
an indication of what the Hungarians had in mind when they sug-
gested a “contemporary advantage” for this arrangement in a non-
financial area. An early resolution of this problem, Mr. Hillenbrand
noted, would assist in creating a helpful atmosphere for progress in
other, related matters.

In accepting the note, Ambassador Nagy expressed pleasure that
it contained “good news.” In response to a question from Mr. Hillen-
brand as to what kind of procedure the Hungarians envisaged for the
proposed review and examination of our bilateral problems, the Am-
bassador said that, in making its May 22 proposal, his Government had
one of three channels in mind: Deputy Foreign Minister Szilagyi with
Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand in Washington; Szilagyi with a State
Department delegation in Budapest; or Szilagyi with Ambassador

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3 The reply to the Hungarian note of May 22, dated June 23, is attached but not
printed.

4 For text of the agreement, which entered into force for the United States on De-
cember 24, 1969, see TIAS 6920.
Puhan, also in Budapest. He agreed with Mr. Hillenbrand that, in view of Mr. Szilagyi’s present poor state of health, the third of these three possibilities appeared most appropriate at least until autumn. At that time, he concurred, we could further assess the situation.

Mr. Hillenbrand replied in the negative to a question from Ambassador Nagy whether our note was being simultaneously delivered in Budapest to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He said that our Embassy did have the text.

The Ambassador’s call ended in a brief and informal tour d’horizon, in the course of which he and Mr. Hillenbrand ranged over a wide field, including the Suez, the Hungarian merchant marine, and Ambassador Dobrynin’s, as well as the Far East Soviet Ambassadors’, return to Moscow on consultation. Throughout the entire conversation the tone was cordial. In taking his leave, Ambassador Nagy expressed pleasure at Ambassador Puhan’s presentation of credentials speech on June 16, a copy of which he had received from Budapest.  

5 Not found.

108. Memorandum of Conversation

Budapest, June 26, 1969, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Bela Szilagyi

PARTICIPANTS
Deputy Foreign Minister Bela Szilagyi
American Desk Officer Jozsef Kerekes (part of the time)
Ambassador Alfred Puhan

REFERENCE
Budapest 871, 872 and 873

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL HUNG–US. Confidential. Drafted by Puhan on June 27 and approved by Tihany (EUR/EE). The meeting was held at the Foreign Ministry.

2 Telegrams 871 and 873 from Budapest, June 27, are ibid. Telegram 872, June 27, is ibid., FT 1 HUNG–US.
Minister Szilagyi met me promptly at 11:00 a.m., June 26. I expressed regret that he had been ill but was glad to see him back in his office. He told me that he had had several very severe attacks of asthma which had incapacitated him for work. He felt better now but would have to watch himself.

I told him that I was very pleased to be in Budapest, to assume a relationship with him which my predecessor had enjoyed. He made the remark, “several of your predecessors.” I told him that, as he probably knew, I had been present at the meeting with Ambassador Nagy on May 23 in the Department.³ As he knew, also, the Acting Secretary had welcomed the Hungarian initiative. He was also undoubtedly aware that Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand had handed over a reply to Ambassador Nagy on June 23.⁴ I asked him if he had a copy of the American note. He replied that he did but it was only in Hungarian, whereupon I presented him with a copy of the note in English for which he was grateful. I went on to say that I had indicated my Government’s and my intentions in my accreditation speech to work toward the objective of improving our relations.

I was sure he had noted that he, Minister Szilagyi, would always be welcome in Washington. This was meant sincerely. I could assure him that Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand would be delighted to see him and that he would find a positive reception in the Department of State. I did not regard any talks that we might have as a substitute for an eventual meeting between him and Mr. Hillenbrand. He nodded appreciatively.

Mr. Szilagyi took the initiative at this point and asked me if it would be agreeable to have Mr. Kerekes come in and join us. He said that he thought that in the discussions which we would have we each should have a note-taker. He said he was aware of this practice in the Department of State. He thought that it would be helpful in keeping the record.

I agreed and said that for my next meeting with him I would bring along a note-taker, someone who was a member of my staff, both to take notes and to participate in the discussion if required.

Szilagyi turned next to what he called lack of continuity in the American Embassy. He said he hoped that I would remain here at least three years. He said just as he got to know Owen Jones,⁵ the latter fell ill and was effectively removed from further discussions.

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³ See footnote 2, Document 107.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 107.

O'Shaughnessy had suffered an untimely death and my immediate predecessor, Mr. Hillenbrand, had been here too short a time. I told the Minister that my stay in Budapest was of course at the pleasure of the President, but I had this morning sent off a telegram accepting an offer to rent my house in Washington for three years.

Szilágyi said he wanted to return to my remarks regarding a possible meeting in Washington. He thought it was too early to make a decision on any possible change of venue, but was agreeable to leaving open the possibility that at some stage of the game Mr. Hillenbrand could journey to Budapest or he to Washington.

Szilágyi said next that he would ask me to keep the discussions we would have as strictly confidential. He said he had had some bad experiences on this point. He said that without blaming anyone it had come to his attention that journalists were occasionally filled in on conversations with him. He spoke of the pressure which journalists can exert on officials of governments. He said that specifically when I arrived in Budapest RFE in announcing my arrival had given a rather specific list of the issues which I proposed to discuss with the Hungarian Government. I assured him that such information had not come from me and he in turn assured me that he recognized that. I told him that insofar as this was possible, the discussions between him and me would be kept confidential. Obviously, he would have to realize that in order for these discussions to be useful I would have to report them to my Government. While I was sure the confidence would be respected, I could not be totally responsible for what happened after they left my Embassy. He seemed satisfied. He added that the talks which he had had with State Secretary Lahr of the German Foreign Office had been impaired by German inability to keep their mouths shut.

Szilágyi said he had learned that US diplomats were frank and direct. He wanted to talk with me in a free, frank way and hoped I would do the same with him. I told him that I could agree to that and that I would not hesitate to tell him the unpleasant as well as the pleasant if that was necessary.

Szilágyi asked me about a remark he said I had made during my Credentials presentation talk concerning model relations. I said I did not use that expression in my formal remarks but had said in a conversation between myself, President Losonczi and Acting Foreign Minister Puja that I saw no compelling reasons why we could not have better relations with Hungary. Indeed, why we could not have model relations with Hungary so far as the United States and Eastern European states were concerned.

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Szilagyi next suggested that we should prepare an agenda of all the items which each side believes ought to be discussed in upcoming meetings. He called these lists “non-committing lists.” He thought that at the first meeting we should compare them and reach agreement on what we were going to discuss in future meetings. I agreed to this procedure.

Szilagyi said he thought it would be impossible for the two of us to deal with every aspect of all questions, political, economic and cultural. He thought there might arise a need for expert advice. He thought we ought not to exclude the possibility of meetings between experts. He mentioned Reti in this connection and said he thought I might want to have Mr. Meehan or Mr. Wilgis meet with Reti but that was only a suggestion. He thought that we would want such experts to report back to him and me. I said we did not need to exclude the possibility of meetings between experts.

Szilagyi said the solution of our problems could be a slow and long procedure. There were problems that had been neglected or had remained unsolved for a long time. He did recognize that possibly five or six issues, without identifying them, could be solved by autumn but some would take much longer.

I took this occasion to call to his attention the fact that our note of June 23 had urged upon the Hungarian Government no further delay in the solution of the amortization of the Surplus Property debt. I said I was under instructions from my Government on this point to raise it with him and I was doing so.

Szilagyi looked at me and asked why the United States Government attached such great importance to this issue. I told him there were at least two good reasons: one was that our case was just; and two, that there had been a great deal of discussion of this matter and it seemed to us there wasn’t much need to have much more. I added that he would agree that to be successful in the solution of other problems we would have to have some movement early to produce the climate conducive to the solution of other problems. This was one problem which could be solved quickly and could produce motion on others.

He said that this had been originally part of the bigger claims issue. Without pursuing this point, however, he promised to take note of our views and to study the problem earliest.

Szilagyi thought that we were in agreement on procedure. I told him he could name the date for the next meeting. He said he had another question to ask. He wanted my opinion on Hungary’s chances of improving her trade relations with the United States. In this connection he referred to an alleged statement by the President two weeks ago, saying that the President was against East-West trade. I said I was unaware of such a statement: could he identify it for me? Kerekes said
that he didn’t think it was the President who had made that statement. I said I would be greatly surprised if this were an accurate statement but if he could supply further identification I would try to get him the correct version. I referred him to some testimony on the Export Control Act7 where the Administration had decided to proceed with the Act as it now stood. He asked about a report of a Banking Committee. I told him I had seen a report of a Subcommittee of the Banking Committee of the US Senate, favoring some changes in the Act.8 He asked me why the Administration took the position it did. I told the Minister that what I was about to say was my personal observation because much of what had happened on this subject had transpired while I was enroute to Budapest. I felt, however, that the question was one first of all whether the Act served our purposes at this time and the Administration felt that it did. I felt also that the question of trade with Eastern Europe depended somewhat upon the general international picture. In other words, if international tensions eased the prospects for changes in this area would improve.

Szilagyi said he thought it would take a long time before Hungary could improve her trade with the United States. I said that I did not wish to be optimistic in this regard for a variety of reasons. One reason was that Hungary did not have too many products in demand in the United States. I felt that although we had noted some progress had been made in trade that it would be wrong to predict an early upturn. Szilagyi said that even if the Hungarians settled the US claims issue he was doubtful that Hungary would get MFN. I told him that I could certainly not assure him that Hungary would get MFN in that case, but Hungary would never get MFN without settling the claims issue. He agreed. Szilagyi said it was a long, uphill struggle but he felt that we ought to work at it if nothing more than to lay the groundwork for an improvement in this field.

Szilagyi ended the conversation by assuring me of Hungary’s cooperation and willingness to examine all questions.

When leaving I asked him when he wanted to meet in our first official session. He said that perhaps next week or the week after, but

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8 Not found.
that he was inviting me to lunch next Wednesday and would set the date at that time.  

Their next formal meeting took place on July 25 when the two men exchanged lists of issues to be discussed. A memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL HUNG–US. In telegram 947 from Budapest, July 11, Puhan commented that he was “not dissatisfied with the progress we have made thus far,” but noted Szilagyi’s reputation as a hard bargainer who would demand “value” in return for concessions. (Ibid.)

109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Hungary

Washington, August 16, 1969, 0113Z.


1. Department agrees that we should explore with Hungarians what can be done to expand trade and economic relations even in absence MFN and has reviewed Embassy list of recommendations with this in mind. While prospects for significant trade growth are necessarily modest, we do feel we can make sufficiently positive responses to convince Hungarians of our serious intent to reduce obstacles to trade.

2. We wish to be careful, however, not to give Hungarians unduly optimistic impression of what can be achieved. While we may point out possible steps to expand trade, ultimate decisions and responsibility for results rest with them. We should not be in position of suggesting costly sales promotions, such as participation in US trade fairs, when we cannot judge whether they would be worthwhile in terms of current trade potential. These are business decisions which ought to be made by Hungarians in light of careful market research and planning.

3. Following is a recapitulation of status of various suggestions in ref tel.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL HUNG–US. Confidential. Drafted by J.R. Tartter (EUR/EE); cleared by McDonnell (E/CBA), Duncan (E/OMA), and Lisle (EE); cleared in substance by Lewis (Commerce); and approved by Swank.

2 Dated August 6; it reported the statement of goals of the Hungarian Foreign Trade Ministry presented to a U.S. representative on August 5. (Ibid.)
a. Bilateral tariff negotiations: as stated State 133913,\textsuperscript{3} this would be in conflict with US trade policy and require new legislative authority.

b. Credit limitations: Re Ex-Im Bank credit policy, as noted in State 133913 Fino Amendment precludes Ex-Im credits or guarantees as long as Hungary is supplying war material or peaceful goods to North Vietnam. Re application of Johnson Act to commercial credit, Attorney General's letter to Secretary of May 9, 1967 (enclosure to CA–4257, December 15, 1967)\textsuperscript{4} gives guidelines. Embassy may wish to give copy of letter to GOH officials.

c. Claims settlement: Status outlined State 132858.\textsuperscript{5}

d. Export control and Group W status for Hungary: Will be subject of separate message.

e. Partner for Hungarian Chamber of Commerce: Many national Chambers of Commerce, some with offices in US, are affiliated with US Chamber. However no Eastern European Chamber is now affiliated and probably could not qualify since US Chamber accepts only national Chambers which have no government subsidy or connection. Dept also checking possibility affiliation with NY Commerce and Industry Assn and will advise. However subject best pursued by Hungarian Embassy officials here. Dept will be glad to steer Embassy officials to knowledgeable sources such as German-American Chamber of Commerce in NY which we told carries on model trade promotion program.

f. Trade Missions: Commerce considers that, pending a change in US trade policy, another official Dept of Commerce trade mission would not now be justified in terms of amount of serious business it could undertake. Will however continue to encourage IOGA missions like Michigan State mission scheduled to visit Budapest in October.

g. Visit by Hungarian trade officials: We would be happy to facilitate visit by Veress and Lengyel who will in any event be in Canada. However we have no particular agenda in mind and would prefer to have visitors suggest topics in advance. It should be understood that on tariff and credit questions, we can do little more than reiterate positions already well-known to them. Whether visit would be worthwhile for Hungarians can probably be better assessed a little later. Meanwhile more aggressive activity by Hungarian Embassy trade officers would be desirable as providing possible basis for visit.

\textsuperscript{3} Dated August 11; it outlined trade policy and the availability of credits for Hungary. (Ibid., FT 7 HUNG–US)

\textsuperscript{4} The enclosure discussed the impact of the Johnson Act on trade with Soviet Bloc states. (Ibid., FN 6–11)

\textsuperscript{5} Dated August 3; it commented upon the status of claims against Hungary. (Ibid., PS 8–4 US–HUNG)
h. US trade fairs: These of course are privately organized and Commerce does not normally issue invitations. Since US fairs are listed semi-annually in *International Commerce*, Embassy can undertake to draw fairs to attention of GOH trade officials and provide information on how to participate.

i. Industrial cooperation and air agreement: Embassy has received preliminary US views and further guidance will be sent as talks progress.

Johnson

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110. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Hungary

Washington, September 20, 1969, 1922Z.

160353. Ref: Budapest 1400, 1404. From Acting Secretary to Ambassador.

1. The Hungarian rejection of our proffered visit by the astronauts, and particularly the tone and words in which it was conveyed, are source of concern to White House and to us.

2. It is inevitable that the course of US-Hungarian relations will be affected, and you should take steps to effect an appropriate cooling down. We do not intend to give publicity to these steps, but we expect them to be of character to reflect extent of our concern and it should be brought clearly home to Hungarians that they relate to cancellation of astronauts. Secretary, for example, will not receive Under Secretary Puja in New York (urtel 1431). So far as further bilateral talks, visits, and exchanges are concerned, you should await Hungarian initiative and seek specific instructions on whether and how to proceed. We intend to limit bilateral talks to issues involving clearcut, demonstrable and concrete advantage to the interests of the US.

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2 Telegrams 1400 and 1404 from Budapest, September 19, reported on Hungarian reaction to a projected visit by U.S. astronauts. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL HUNG–US)

3 Dated September 17; it reported on the membership of the Hungarian UNGA delegation. (Ibid., UN 3 GA)
3. We have also considered canceling visit of AEC Chairman Seaborg to Budapest September 29, but since he will spend only twelve hours in country and will confine his activity to conversation on scientific matters with Deputy Chief Central Institute of Physics Lenard, he will proceed as planned.\(^4\)

Richardson

\(^4\) In telegram 1478 from Budapest, September 23, Puhan expressed his “full” agreement with the tack the Department of State proposed to adopt and suggested a series of practical measures for implementing the policy. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 693, Country Files—Europe, Hungary, Vol. I) U.S. irritation at the Hungarian rejection of the astronaut visit was conveyed to Nagy by Hillenbrand during a September 25 meeting. (Telegram 163643 to Budapest, September 25; ibid.)

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111. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Relations with Hungary: Secretary Rogers Wants to Resume Efforts to Clean up Pending Bilateral Problems

State has been straining at the leash to pick up again the negotiations begun with Hungary last year to clean up a whole series of long-pending bilateral problems. You will recall that Ambassador Puhan, after he assumed his post last year, negotiated four essentially housekeeping settlements with the Hungarians. The White House has never been consulted and when he and State proposed to move on to a second group of problems we told them they should first seek Presidential approval.\(^2\)

Then the episode of the astronauts occurred. State felt that the Hungarians rejected the President’s offer at Soviet instigation and they also believed that the text of the Hungarian rejection was not as rude


\(^2\) An undated memorandum from Kissinger to Richardson ordering a delay in negotiation of new agreements is ibid.
in the original as it appeared in the English translation. State also feels that if we settle the next group of issues we will benefit at least as much as the Hungarians. More basically, State believes that Kadar has been attempting to play a moderating role vis-à-vis the Russians, for example as regards Czechoslovakia, and that, on the whole, his domestic policies have a liberating tendency. The argument is that improved US-Hungarian relations would tend to reinforce these trends.

Without necessarily accepting these propositions in toto, I think there is some merit in proceeding in a low-key and not making an issue with the Secretary of State. Moreover, since the President himself proposed the astronaut visit which, had it not been rejected, would have been a significant initiative toward Hungary, I don't really see how we can reasonably object to State's proposal. I think it probably is also true, as State notes, that the Hungarians have tried to make up to some extent for the astronaut episode with some limited gestures.

Recommendation

That you forward the memo at Tab A to the President and, following approval, inform the Secretary of State that he should proceed in a low-key manner and on the basis of reciprocity.

(Note: I will draft a memo to the Secretary as soon as the President returns the package. In the event you do not wish to bother the President, you may wish to send the attached memo (Tab B) right away.)
112. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State

Budapest, November 6, 1970, 1500Z.

1911. Subject: U.S.-Hungarian Bilateral Relations. Ref: State 178188.2

1. Dep FonMin Marjai invited me to meet with him for resumption discussion U.S.-Hungarian relations yesterday, November 5. Marjai accompanied by Bartha, Kovacs and Kerekes took initiative by proposing we continue our discussions along lines agreed upon by me and his predecessor, Szilagyi. Emphasized importance of continuing good atmosphere and expressed GOH hopes for success.

2. I replied we were prepared to continue discussions. I noted however that uncertainty had been created in Washington as to the desire of the Hungarian Government to improve its relations with us by FonMin Peter’s speech in the UN.3 I added that public official statements misrepresenting our intentions and policies were not conducive to the improvement of bilateral relations. I concluded that any check of US official statements concerning Hungary would show that we had been most careful.

3. Marjai replied both sides knew each other’s views on larger international issues and though problems existed, they should not deter us from continuing to develop our relations. He made no response to my reference to the Peter speech and the Secretary’s reaction to it. He asked if we could go to item by item review.

4. Rest of the meeting concerned item by item review of 1969 agenda, dropping items which had been resolved by August 1969 agreements.4 At my request announcing in/out procedure required by Hungarian authorities for holders of diplomatic and official passports added to agenda.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL HUNG–US. Confidential.
2 Dated October 25; it instructed the Embassy to delay resumption of talks in the wake of a variety of anti-American moves by the Hungarian Government. (Ibid.)
3 For text, see UN doc. A/PV.1868.
4 On August 15 the Department of State announced that as the result of talks between Puhan and Szilagyi in Budapest, the United States and Hungary had exchanged letters “reflecting understandings reached on the following points: the establishment of a Hungarian commercial office in New York City, means of payment of the Hungarian surplus property debt that was incurred following World War II, and staffing of the United States Embassy in Budapest and the Hungarian Embassy in Washington.” (Department of State Bulletin, September 8, 1969, p. 214) For the U.S. list of possible issues for discussion, see Document 109.
5. While making no concession on informational activities, Marjai said it was Hungarian turn to take next step—that is, remove restrictions on U.S. informational activities in Hungary.

6. We agreed to establish priorities on items by November 16.

7. Comment: Instruction ref tel carried out. Failure of Marjai to respond, or attempt to take issue with my remarks, appears to be clear evidence that Hungarians fully aware of magnitude of Peter’s gaffe in New York, or displeasure it aroused in Secretary’s mind, and of desire to forget it. On items in bilaterals, GOH seems genuinely willing to explore ways and means of improving relations.

Puhan

113. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

Hungarian Indication of Interest in Membership in the International Monetary Fund

Hungary has just renewed its indication of interest in the International Monetary Fund. The Hungarians had been pursuing the possibility of Fund membership prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia but ceased doing so immediately thereafter.

The specific Hungarian step is a request that the IMF send an official to Budapest, without specifying why. The Fund plans to send the head of its European department, a middle-level official in the Fund hierarchy. He will make the trip without fanfare in early May. Hungary has made no formal request for membership, and will presumably evaluate the discussions with the Fund official before making a decision on whether to do so.

Next to Yugoslavia, Hungary has gone much further in liberalizing its domestic economy than any other Communist country. It is par-

particularly anxious for economic contacts with the West, toward which IMF membership would be a giant step. As I informed you earlier, Romania has also repeatedly indicated an interest in Fund membership and plans to move in that direction as soon as it works out terms with the Soviets on which it will feel able to first join the Comecon Bank of Eastern Europe—of which Hungary is already a member.

IMF membership would be an extremely important step for any Eastern European country. (None is now a member, except Yugoslavia. Czechoslovakia was expelled in 1949—and Cuba in 1961.) Such membership would require disclosure of data and consultations with the Western world which could only have a dramatic effect in opening the economies—and therefore overall societies—of the countries in question, as in fact has happened in Yugoslavia. I therefore regard it as greatly in our interest to see these countries become members of the Fund.

Treasury and even State take a fairly hard-nosed position on the issue, however. They would require that any Communist country accept immediately all responsibilities of Fund membership, which might be very hard for some of them without unacceptable political repercussions from the Soviets. In addition, the agencies would even try to link settlement of some of our outstanding bilateral financial claims with these countries for our support of their IMF membership, which could easily kill the whole deal.

No action is needed now. At some point during the next six to twelve months, however, we may have to determine a U.S. position on IMF applications by Hungary and/or Romania. I will continue my efforts to soften the agencies’ positions on the issue, on the assumption that you agree that it would be in the U.S. interest for them to join the Fund (and the World Bank, which goes along with Fund membership). Please let me know if you have any views on the subject.

114. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State

Budapest, May 14, 1971, 0700Z.

785. Subject: Cardinal Mindszenty.

1Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 693, Country Files; Europe, Hungary, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis.
1. During my May 13 meeting with him, Foreign Minister Peter raised the subject of Cardinal Mindszenty on his own initiative. He said he was not at liberty to interpret or disclose what the Pope said during his conversation with him in Rome. He had been much impressed with the Pope as a man of great vision and high intelligence. Peter said, however, he was at liberty to say what he had said to the Pope, in confidence of course. He had told the Pope that the GOH was prepared for a real solution to the Mindszenty problem. He said his government acknowledged that it was a problem for Hungary and for the Vatican, as well as for the American Embassy, as long as the Cardinal was in the Embassy. He said he had told the Pope there are two conditions the Hungarians would have to insist upon for arriving at a solution of this problem. The first was that the Cardinal not be used to disturb relations between church and state in Hungary. The second was that the Cardinal not be used for cold war purposes against Hungary.

2. Peter asked me at this point whether I knew that Monsignor Cheli had recently been in Budapest. (By “recently” he appeared to mean within the last two weeks and in any case probably after Peter’s visit to Rome.) I replied in the negative. Peter said Cheli had come here to talk with Hungarian officials. He said he brought no new proposals but intended to present a solution of the Mindszenty problem to the Hungarian Government within two or three weeks.

3. I told the Foreign Minister I appreciated his frankness. I said I also appreciated the fact that he acknowledged something which I had not heard Hungarian officials acknowledge before, namely, that the Cardinal was a problem for the Hungarian Government and the Vatican as well as to us. In the past the Hungarian view had been he was a problem only to the American Embassy. I said I was glad to see that we were reaching some sort of agreement at least on the dimensions of the problem and whom it concerned. I said I wished to reciprocate the candor with which he had spoken. I frankly saw little hope of a solution because of the Cardinal’s strong feelings regarding his position as a Hungarian, as primate, and his concern over his place in history. I mentioned in this connection his memoirs and said I trusted the Hun-

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2 See Document 115.
3 Peter met with the Pope on April 16. In telegram 2569 from Rome, April 26, the Embassy reported that Pope Paul raised the Mindszenty situation and the Vatican’s desire to see it resolved in the context of a global solution of outstanding church-state issues. Peter replied that his government wanted the Vatican to impose “absolute silence” on the Cardinal as its price for settlement. Pope Paul replied that “it would be difficult to comply.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 HUNG)
4 Puhan discusses the problems created by Mindszenty’s presence in the U.S. Embassy in Cardinal in the Chancery, pp. 185–214.
garian Government was prepared at some date in the future for the appearance of his memoirs.

4. The Foreign Minister said that while he couldn’t interpret what the Pope had said he could tell me that the Pope was anxious for a solution of this problem. He urged the greatest confidence upon me, and said the Pope also had come to the conclusion that Cardinal Mindszenty should not spend his remaining days in Hungary. He added he also had had the impression from the Pope that Cardinal Mindszenty’s resistance to leaving the American Embassy and Hungary had diminished somewhat.

5. I said I could not confirm the latter statement in any way. Of course I may not have information which the Holy See has, but my own impression is that this is not accurate. I also said that as far as we were concerned, the Cardinal could remain in our Embassy. I was, however, concerned with the difficulties that might ensue if he should be the victim of a lingering illness which required medical assistance of the sort we could not render.

6. Peter acknowledged this potential difficulty. He concluded the conversation by saying he wished to repeat that his government was prepared for a workable solution but the two conditions he had mentioned earlier would have to be met. He had great confidence in the ability of the Vatican to assure the fulfillment of these conditions.

7. Comment: Peter is a slippery character, and what he told me should be looked at with caution. He certainly conveyed more movement on the Mindszenty problem than I have seen in the past two years with, if he can be believed, a fair amount of understanding between the Hungarian Government and the Vatican as to what is to be done. The Cheli visit to Budapest, apparently following closely on Peter’s visit to Rome, suggests desire on both sides to pursue the question actively. Peter talked quite firmly of the Vatican’s presenting a “solution” of the problem shortly, and his confidence in the Vatican’s ability to assure fulfillment of the Hungarian conditions is noteworthy. Our role at this stage is a passive one but it would be helpful at least to have some idea of what the Vatican has in mind. Department and Ambassador Lodge comments requested.5

Puhan

5 According to Puhan, Cardinal in the Chancery, p. 199, he received further instructions and the views of Lodge in Washington in June during his consultations following home leave.
115. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State

Budapest, May 14, 1971, 0740Z.

787. Subject: Meeting With FonMin Peter.

1. FonMin Janos Peter in one hour meeting with me May 13 prior to my departure on home leave and consultations made following points:

A) Hungary wants to improve its relations with U.S. Regretted impression created by Hungarian statements on international issues sometimes gave opposite effect. Said GOH willing to start new positive phase in bilaterals upon my return.

B) Without going into details our bilaterals, I nevertheless mentioned failure of GOH to reciprocate our unilateral lifting of restrictions on Hungarian information activities in U.S. Peter stated he aware of importance U.S. move and significance we attached to it. Said: Your move will be reciprocated.

C) Peter said he and EE colleagues had made great mistake in initial phases of CES campaign by not including U.S. and Canada in discussions at very beginning. Described Hungarian interest in CES as strictly device to construct European security system which would permit withdrawal of foreign forces from both West and East Europe, which is in interest of both and also of U.S. in helping U.S. with balance of payments problem. Acknowledged Berlin settlement crucial to European security but regretted, as he put it, it had been made pre-condition to preparations for CES. Felt earlier NATO formulation making it and settlement other questions pre-conditions to holding CES, as distinct from preparing for CES, not acceptable to EE’s but preferable to later formulation. Asked I see him again on CES after consultation in Washington.

2. Peter said Kadar regretted that my meeting with him had not materialized but would see me upon return.

3. Meeting cordial.

4. Memcon pouch.

Puhan

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL HUNG–US. Confidential.

2 Puhan reported on his latest meeting with Marjai in telegram 757 from Budapest, May 10. (Ibid.) In telegram 788 from Budapest, May 10, he analyzed the state of these talks. (Ibid.)
116. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
The Crown of St. Stephen: Should We Return It?

Background

The Crown is the property of the Hungarian nation and a Hungarian national treasure which came into U.S. custody toward the end of World War II. Unsettled conditions within Hungary and chronic strains in U.S.-Hungarian relations made consideration of the Crown’s return to Hungary inappropriate and it has therefore remained in U.S. safekeeping.

Our prolonged custody of the Crown and the question of its ultimate return to Hungary have many delicate aspects. We are mindful not only of the unique character of the Crown as an historic relic of great symbolic and constitutional significance to the Hungarian people but also of the political and emotional sensibilities with which Hungarian émigrés and many Hungarian Americans regard the Crown.

The Hungarian Government has raised the matter of the Crown’s return in recent years as relations have gradually improved between the United States and Hungary. It was last raised formally by the Hungarians in 1965, but has been mentioned in conversation from time to time since. The Hungarians are confident that we understand their concern about getting the Crown back “sometime.” They also understand that we know the Crown belongs to them, not us. However, they also understand our domestic émigré problem and are not pressing us.

Recent Developments

Last year the Hungarians celebrated the millennium of the birth of St. Stephen, and, not unexpectedly, there was press speculation here that the U.S. was giving very serious consideration to returning the Crown of St. Stephen which came into the possession of U.S. forces in Austria in May of 1945. This speculation, in turn, created a flood of inquiries from Hungarian-Americans who demanded that we not return the Crown. You corresponded with Mr. Pasztor (of the Heritage Groups

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Pros and Cons on Return

The traditional—and perhaps most telling—factor against a return of the Crown is the domestic U.S. impact. Mr. Pasztor last year indicated that if the Crown were returned, “we can write off the votes of the majority of Hungarian-Americans and those of a significant portion of other Captive Nations people.” There are essentially two reasons for this sort of negative reaction:

—the Crown has traditionally been regarded as the main symbol of governmental/constitutional power in Hungary; hence, to return the Crown to the Kadar regime would be a breach of the trust under which we have safeguarded the Crown since 1945 for a future legitimate Hungarian Government.

—the return of the Crown would in the eyes of some finalize our acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe more than any other form of action or declaration. This would symbolize a moral approbation of the legitimacy of the Kadar regime, in particular, and other Eastern regimes in general. (This effect would be more accentuated if Mindszenty were also leaving our Embassy refuge at some close point in time.)

Aside from the domestic implications, it has generally been thought that the Crown should not be returned until there had been an improvement in U.S.-Hungarian relations. In recent years, the Czech invasion, and the snub over the proposed astronaut visit, have ruled out any serious thought of returning the Crown. In addition, there was little sign of movement on a variety of bilateral issues—such as claims negotiations, consular relations, etc—to justify a major symbolic gesture on our part.

Those who would argue for the return of the Crown claim that the domestic problems can now—after 25 years—finally be managed. From the foreign relations standpoint, some symbolic gesture may be in order for the most liberal communist regime in Eastern Europe. In strictly bilateral terms, there has been some improvement: the Hungarians have finally indicated a willingness to proceed with claims talks; civil air agreement negotiations may begin in the fall; and we may soon proceed with negotiations on a consular convention.

Ambassador Puhan recommended at the beginning of the year that we consider, at an appropriate moment, turning the Crown over to the Vatican for safekeeping and eventual return. (The analogy to the question of Cardinal Mindszenty is clear.) An intermediate move of

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2 Documentation on this issue is ibid.
3 Not found.
this kind should reduce to a minimum the domestic problem, and would rid us of the Crown as a problem in our bilateral relations with Hungary. However no indication is available of how the Vatican would react to such a proposal; it might not want a hot potato of this sort while it is normalizing relations with the East Europeans.

117. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State

Budapest, June 8, 1971, 1400Z.

942. Subject: Cardinal Mindszenty. Ref: State 97483, Rome 3538.1

1. Appreciate the opportunity to comment.

2. Para 3 State 97483 contains the nub of the matter. The Cardinal’s whole instinct is to stay put, and it will take a well considered mix of pressure and inducement to move him. Obedience to Rome is a basic principle to him. Thus, the Vatican proposal should carry the force of a personal wish of the Pope to be fully effective. Anything short of this will give the Cardinal room to maneuver and temporize.

3. Publication of the memoirs is indeed a key factor (para 5, State 97483) and this issue and the question of silence loom as main negotiating areas. The Hungarian Government will exert heavy pressure to get a Vatican commitment on silence and against publication, even posthumously, and it probably feels the Vatican is not unwilling to pay the price in an effort to normalize the situation of the church in Hungary. It should be realized that the chances of getting the Cardinal out will be severely reduced in the absence of some arrangement for publication. The Vatican should be aware that in our judgment the Hungarians do not want the Cardinal to die in the Embassy, and are therefore not in as commanding a position as they will doubtless try to convey. There is room for negotiation, though the Hungarians will not give in easily or quickly. The proposed Koenig–Cheli–Zagon visit to the Cardinal is likely to be only the first stage in an extended process.


2 Telegram 97483 to Rome, June 4, instructed the Embassy to seek an appointment with Cardinal Casaroli as soon as possible to stress the U.S. concern for a rapid departure of Mindszenty for reasons of his health and to seek Vatican action to achieve this objective. Telegram 3538 from Rome, June 5, reported on discussions with Casaroli regarding Mindszenty’s departure. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 12–1 HUNG)
4. We take it that the Department is considering the question of press handling of the visit and will give us guidance. We must assume that the visit will be public knowledge. The most frequently asked question we get from diplomatic colleagues these days is when is Koenig coming to see the Cardinal with the Vatican proposals. Given his past performance Koenig for one will likely be prepared to talk to the press either here or in Vienna.

Meehan

118. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State

Budapest, June 29, 1971, 1225Z.

1123. Subject: Cardinal Mindszenty: Mindszenty Letters to President and Pope.2 Ref: Budapest 1110.3

1. Begin summary: Mindszenty has written two letters, one to the President, the other to the Pope. The letter to the President states that the Vatican wishes a change in his status, that this is a difficult decision, and he asks for the President’s advice. The letter to the Pope includes the statement that he has decided to leave the Embassy and, though he would prefer to remain in Hungary, is prepared to leave the country if this is considered in the best interest of the church. The letter to the Pope thus signifies a sudden and decisive change following the Cheli–Zagon visit. The Vatican should follow up quickly to sustain the momentum now achieved. End summary.

2. On my return to Budapest June 28 I found that there had been sudden new developments in the Mindszenty question since the end of the Cheli–Zagon visit (reftel). Mindszenty had told the DCM that he wished to send a letter to the President and another to the Pope. The complete texts of the letters will be transmitted in the two immediately succeeding telegrams.

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2 The letter to the President is summarized in paragraph 3 below. A translation of Mindszenty’s letter to the Pope is in telegram 119533 to Budapest, July 2. (Ibid.)
3 Dated June 27; it reported that Mindszenty had refused a request from Vatican officials to sign a document recording his agreement to leave Hungary and refused to set a date for a second visit from Vatican emissaries. (Ibid.)
3. The letter to the President is short and states essentially that the Vatican wants a change in his status, that this is a difficult decision, that his first obligation is to inform his host of the situation, and he would be grateful for the President’s advice. I am sending the original by pouch today to Assistant Secretary Davies (invoice no. C–51, pouch no. K5–694, registry no. 1198854).

4. Mindszenty did not give us the text of the letter to the Pope, which is in Latin. He asked that it be sent sealed to the Pope and we said we would do this. However, we have the text and, according to our translation—we are not expert Latinists and request the Department to furnish an official translation as soon as possible—the Cardinal states among other things that he has decided to leave the Embassy and, while preferring to spend the rest of his days in Hungary, he is also prepared to leave the country if this is considered in the best interests of the church.

5. We have not seen the actual contents of the sealed envelope, but we assume it is the June 28 letter of which we got a copy. It would clearly be important to verify the texts which we are transmitting (Budapest 1125) against the signed original. I assume Illing will be able to do this in his consultations with Vatican officials.

6. Since Mindszenty’s letter to the Pope is of high importance at the present juncture and should be given quick action in the Vatican, I am sending the original by pouch today (invoice no. C–1, pouch no. J–1193, registry no. 1198855) to Embassy Rome for Illing. I recommend that the Department instruct Illing to deliver the original as soon as possible to Casaroli. I also recommend that prior to the arrival of the letter in Rome, Casaroli be told that what we believe is an important message from Mindszenty to the Pope is on its way.

7. The Mindszenty letter to the Pope is a key development, and I urge that we make it clear to the Vatican that it should seize the opportunity to press ahead quickly and firmly for a resolution of the Mindszenty case. The next step is presumably a reply from the Pope accepting Mindszenty’s offer. No time should be lost in sustaining the momentum we have now achieved.

8. I believe the present letter to the President should, contrary to the usual practice, be given a Presidential reply. I recommend that this include the following elements: an expression of satisfaction that the U.S. was able to extend hospitality at a time of need; understanding that the Cardinal may wish to change his status; and a general offer to be of assistance to him in the event he decides to change his present status.

Puhan
Budapest, July 12, 1971, 1154Z.

1217. Subject: Cardinal Mindszenty.

1. Summary. In a short meeting I have had with him Mindszenty has indicated that he will tell Cheli and Zagon he cannot give them a definitive response in the absence of a reply to his letter to the President. I told Mindszenty that, while I could not presume to anticipate the President’s reply, I felt that the U.S. position was that the decision whether to leave could only be made by him. I recommend that I be authorized on an urgent basis to convey to him, as the official U.S. position, that we cannot presume to advise him on what must be a personal decision. In the absence of such a response on our part, Mindszenty will probably temporize further on his commitment to the Pope to leave. End summary.

2. I had a twenty-minute meeting with Cardinal Mindszenty at his request the morning of July 12. The Cardinal was tense and serious, clearly concerned about the decisions he will be facing with the new visit from Rome. He was scathing in his criticism of Vatican policy in Eastern Europe. He said the Vatican simply did not understand the situation in Eastern Europe and in Hungary in particular. He seems to be fighting the commitment given in his letter to the Pope to leave the Embassy and Hungary. I think he will continue to do so in the approaching Cheli–Zagon visit, which could be a very tough one.

3. One practical point of significance emerged which has a very direct bearing on the Cheli–Zagon visit. The Cardinal noted that he did not yet have a reply to his letter to the President. In the absence of a reply he would, he said, be obliged to tell Cheli and Zagon that one of the essential factors is missing and he could not give them a definitive response. I told Mindszenty that I could not of course presume to anticipate the President’s reaction to his letter. However, I felt I should in all candor give him my personal view of the situation. This was that on so highly personal and on so grave an issue as the decision whether to leave the Embassy and Hungary, the U.S. Government would not consider it appropriate for it to offer the Cardinal any advice. Rather, this was a matter which only he could decide. I stressed that the U.S. attitude concerning the Cardinal’s situation of refuge was unchanged,

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2 The reply was transmitted in telegram 127237 to Budapest, July 14. (Ibid.)
although there was increasing concern about his health and welfare as he grew older.

4. Mindszenty tried to summarize our conversation by saying that he understood me to say that he would not be getting a reply from the President. I corrected this immediately, saying that I did not presume to speak for the President, that I was sure his letter was being given the most careful consideration.

5. We are obviously in a very delicate phase with the Cardinal. He does not want to leave despite his letter to the Pope, and I think he is looking around for some means of avoiding or at least postponing a final decision. He evidently would like to be able to use a reply from the President in effect to negate the force of the Vatican’s urging that he should leave. In the absence of any response from Washington to his letter to the President I believe he will, as he indicated to me, tell Cheli and Zagon that he cannot give them a definitive response. I believe we should head off this possibility which, if it developed in fact, would have the effect of drawing out the process of decision. With this in view, I recommend that I be authorized on an urgent basis to convey to the Cardinal as a U.S. Government position essentially what I have already told him. That is, that with regard to his letter to the President, the U.S. Government does not presume to advise him on so grave and so personal a matter which must remain for his decision alone.3

Puhan

3 This position was outlined in the President’s letter to Mindszenty. In telegram 1248 from Budapest, July 14, Puhan reported that he had delivered this message and had informed the Vatican representatives of its contents. (Ibid.)

120. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State

Budapest, July 16, 1971, 1450Z.

1265. Subject: Cardinal Mindszenty. Ref: Budapest 1254.2


2 Dated July 15; it reported on negotiations between Vatican representatives and Mindszenty. (Ibid.)
1. Cardinal Mindszenty approved pro memoria stating he hopes to leave U.S. Embassy in September or at latest in October to reside in Vienna. After fourth meeting with Cardinal lasting more than one and a half hours, Zagon told me that after repeated attempts to alter his decision to depart, Mindszenty himself presented above formulation.

2. Mindszenty next asked Zagon to thank Ambassador for assuring safe conveyance of his memoirs to Vienna. I noted to Zagon they would be conveyed to Embassy Vienna and there held in safekeeping until Mindszenty was safely out of Hungary. Zagon added that he and Cheli would urge the Pope to pressure Cardinal Mindszenty to leave earlier than dates above to attend synod in Rome. Attempt will be made, Cheli suggested, to get Villot to send letter to Mindszenty welcoming his decision to leave and then setting date for audience with Pope in Rome.

3. Cheli and Zagon depart for Rome Saturday morning. Montalvo, however, who has not participated in discussions with Cardinal, apparently will remain over to consult with GOH officials. While negotiators apparently have reasonably firm commitment from Mindszenty, Cheli is first to admit that much now depends on GOH readiness to be flexible and not raise obstacles to Cardinal’s departure. Cheli agrees that delay and possible leakage to press at this critical juncture would encourage Mindszenty to procrastinate and possibly even change his mind.

Puhan

121. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State

Budapest, July 21, 1971, 1405Z.

1313. Subject: Foreign Minister Peter on Raising Level of Dialogue.

1. FonMin Peter said he had learned that I was interested in exploring on an entirely unofficial basis the possibility of raising the level of our dialogue. I replied that this was a thought I had raised unofficially in Washington but I had no instructions. Peter assured me his re-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL HUNG–US. Confidential. Puhan reported on other portions of his meeting with Peter in telegrams 1309, 1310, and 1314 from Budapest, July 21. (Ibid. and ibid., SOC 12–1 HUNG)
action was unofficial too but was certain that if he made it to his government it would be accepted. He asked me if I would explore the acceptability of Deputy Prime Minister Peter Valyi having conversations in Washington in the economic area. He noted Valyi had been highly successful Finance Minister, was highly regarded by the Hungarian Government, and had just been raised to the level of Deputy Prime Minister. He described him as an expert in international economic affairs who could talk knowledgeably with American officials.

2. Peter said if we found such a visit interesting he would like to extend an invitation to an American Cabinet official to come and visit Hungary. He would like to extend such an invitation through the Secretary of State whom he would like to meet in New York during the UNGA.

3. I asked Peter whom he had in mind. He replied he would be guided by any suggestions I was prepared to make but someone like Secretary of Commerce Stans would be most welcome.

4. I again told the Foreign Minister that my interest lay in exploring possibilities of this sort and that I would pass on his reaction to my government and let him know the answer. Obviously much preparatory work would have to be done before meetings of this kind could materialize. Also the general climate of our relations would be a factor in our reaction to this type of suggestion.

5. Comment: The Department will recall that I explored this suggestion of raising the level of our dialogue while on consultation. While our relations with Hungary are frequently troubled and exacerbated by irritants produced in inimitable fashion by the Hungarians, I believe we might find a dialogue of the sort envisioned here of use to us. Aside from the fact that conversations at the level of Cabinet official and Deputy Prime Minister could hasten a solution of bilateral problems which remain, they could move Hungary into a slightly more independent position within the Bloc than that which they now occupy. Hungary will continue to be exceedingly timid in taking any steps which could be interpreted as moving in the direction of Romania. However, I believe it could be useful to welcome whatever steps in our direction.

6. Valyi is excellent choice for trip to US. I know him and have found him to be likable, flexible, open-minded. He is an architect of the economic reform with what appears to be a bright future. He can be expected to constructively explore those areas in which relations can be improved, especially on the economic side. In return for his visit, I would welcome one by Secretary Stans to Hungary.

Puhan

SUBJECT
Cardinal Mindszenty: A Status Report

There now appears to be every reasonable prospect that Cardinal Mindszenty will leave our Embassy in Budapest by mid-October, but of course there is always the possibility that the project could still become unglued.

The President’s reply letter\(^2\) was delivered to the Cardinal exactly in time, during the July 15–16 meetings with Vatican officials. The general purport of the exchange of letters was also conveyed to the Vatican. As a result of the lengthy discussions between the Vatican officials and the Cardinal (assisted certainly by the President’s letter, as well as a letter from the Pope), the Cardinal finally agreed to leave the Embassy in September or in October at the latest. The final set of conditions posed by the Cardinal was that (a) his sister could visit him in Budapest before he leaves, (b) that the world understand his departure did not mean that the Church’s problems in Hungary were solved, and (c) his memoirs could safely be gotten to Austria before he arrives there.

The last condition involves us. Ambassador Puhan proposed that the Embassy utilize the diplomatic pouch to deliver the memoirs to our Embassy in Vienna as soon as feasible, and that they be surrendered to the Cardinal after he arrives in Vienna and after Vatican approval. State has now approved that proposal.\(^3\)

The present planning for the modalities of the Cardinal’s move is that he will travel on a Vatican passport in a car with the Apostolic Nuncio from Vienna and a Vatican official from Rome. With respect to press handling, State intends to have statements on the reasons for the departure come from the Vatican and the Cardinal himself once in Vi-


\(^2\) See footnote 3, Document 119.

\(^3\) Puhan’s recommendation was contained in telegram 1267 from Budapest, July 16. The Department of State approved in telegram 132785 to Budapest, July 22. (Both in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 693, Country Files—Europe, Hungary, Vol. 1.)
enna, aside from an expression of our pleasure at being able to have assisted him during these years of refuge.  

Ambassador Puhan met July 21 with Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter who raised the Mindszenty situation. He said he was aware from Vatican sources that the Cardinal was ready to leave the Embassy. Puhan expressed a hope that the arrangements still to be worked out between the Vatican and Hungary could be made without great delay so as to expedite the Cardinal’s departure. (Puhan noted that departure before the anniversary of the October 23, 1956 events would be desirable.) Peter understood, and remarked that he was awaiting detailed proposals from the Vatican which would be acted on swiftly.

Peter said that the Cardinal’s departure would be beneficial to the normalization of US-Hungarian relations.

4 The comments were forwarded to the Embassy in telegram 127281 to Budapest, July 14. (Ibid.)
5 See footnote 1, Document 121. Puhan reported on his July 21 discussion with Peter of Cardinal Mindszenty in telegram 1310 from Budapest, July 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 12–1 HUNG)

123. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State

Budapest, August 9, 1971, 1535Z.


1. We have been asked to comment on line in para 5 ref tel prior to its implementation by Rome.  

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2 Dated August 6. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 12–1 HUNG)
3 In paragraph 5 of telegram 144482 to Rome, August 6, the Department of State requested that the Embassy inform Cheli or Casanoli that the Department was planning to turn the Cardinal’s “memoirs over to him personally without conditions, since we believe this will provide him with incentive to make his move....We doubt whether we can move memoirs prior to giving him unconditional commitment to turn them over to him in Vienna, but we hope avoid commitment to turn them over to his designated agent....We would, of course, prefer handle matter in manner acceptable to Cardinal and to Vatican promptly in order expedite movement of memoirs. We therefore hope obtain prompt expression of Vatican’s views.” (Ibid.)
2. As we have stated from very beginning, principal motivation in Cardinal’s decision to leave Embassy and Hungary is hope that with this action he can ensure accurate publication of his memoirs to vindicate his conduct in past 23 years. Without assurances—possibly written assurances signed by President—that memoirs will be turned over to him in Vienna or to someone designated by him, Cardinal will not turn memoirs over to us for conveyance to Vienna or, for that matter, leave Embassy. I think it is equally true that conveyance of memoirs to Vienna with assurance that they will be turned over to him or his designated agent will expedite Cardinal’s departure.4

3. The question of publication of his memoirs, once the Cardinal is out of our Embassy, is of course an entirely different matter and one entirely between him and the Vatican. It is in my view not a question we ought to get into.

4. Agree fully with Department that we ought to handle matter in manner acceptable to Cardinal and to Vatican promptly.

5. Cardinal is not pressing me for reply to his request but is pressuring Embassy officers who deal with him for Presidential assurances. If after I have authority to seek to persuade Cardinal that cable to President not appropriate, and he remains unconvinced, I shall of course transmit cable as proposed reftel 6B.5

Puhan

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4 In telegram 151133 to Budapest, August 18, the Department of State authorized the Embassy to inform Mindszenty that it would transfer his memoirs to Vienna and then turn them over to him or a designated representative. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 693, Country Files—Europe, Hungary, Vol. I)

5 In telegram 1608 from Budapest, August 25, Puhan reported that he had delivered assurances to Mindszenty in the form of a letter drafted and signed by the Ambassador. The Cardinal, who had requested a personal letter of assurances from the President, was “mulling” whether this form of assurance was satisfactory. (Ibid.)
124. Memorandum From Arthur Downey of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Cardinal Mindszenty: Press Handling and Transportation

It appears that the Vatican’s tug of war with our Guest has reached the concluding stages. This past weekend, the Pope finally sent the Cardinal a personal telegram warmly but firmly informing the Cardinal that he expected to see him in Rome before the September 30 opening of the Synod of Bishops. The Cardinal indicated that he would be prepared to leave on September 28. He was assured that our Ambassador would move his memoirs out of Budapest and hold them for him in our Embassy in Vienna (the memoirs arrived in Vienna on September 23).\(^2\)

There are two points which now require your attention: the press handling and transportation.

1. Press guidance. State has prepared a telegram containing press guidance, for your approval (Tab A).\(^3\) The Vatican and the Hungarian Government have agreed to issue a joint communiqué stating that the Cardinal has “departed definitely” on the basis of an agreement between the Vatican and the Hungarian Government. For our part, State intends no statement until after the joint communiqué, and then will make a statement (no press release) in reply to questions. The statement (paragraph 6 of the telegram at Tab A) points out that the decision to leave was the Cardinal’s, and that we are pleased that the US was able to assist him during the years.

The guidance contained in the telegram seems unobjectionable. The question remains whether it is desired to have the initial US statement made by the White House, rather than the State Department. I am inclined to think that it should come from here, not State—but of course this question involves domestic considerations.

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\(^2\) Published in English as Memoirs (New York: Macmillan, 1974).

\(^3\) Attached but not printed.
Recommendation

That you approve the dispatch of the cable at Tab A containing press guidance, but altered to provide that the initial USG statement is made from the White House.

Approve

Disapprove, let State handle it (Cable cleared without change)\(^4\)

2. Transportation. A series of exchanges have taken place over the question of the mode of transportation for the Cardinal from Budapest to Vienna and on to Rome. The Hungarian Government offered to provide an official aircraft to carry him to Rome, or alternatively to provide him with an entire first class section of a regular Malev flight to Rome. The Cardinal refused. The present planning is that he will travel by car to Vienna.

The Vatican, however, asked us (prior to the Cardinal’s refusal of the Hungarian plane) if the USG could provide an aircraft, either Budapest/Vienna/Rome, or from Vienna to Rome. Subsequent comments by the Cardinal (with approval by the Vatican representative) indicate that he plans on being driven to Vienna, and then proceeding to Rome by air after a short rest.

The foreign relations impact of a decision to provide an aircraft would not appear to be significant. The Hungarians would probably grant landing permission for a US VIP aircraft under these circumstances. Providing an aircraft, of course, does link us rather closely to the episode and undercuts some of the emphasis on direct Vatican-Hungarian dealings. The question may have a significant domestic impact. And that seems to cut both ways: a warm gesture such as providing an aircraft would be very welcome by large segments domestically; but, others might very well use that as evidence that the US pressured the Cardinal to leave in order that we might improve relations with the Communist Government of Hungary. (Note: I assume you will wish to alert appropriate members of the White House staff to the Cardinal’s departure so that interested groups (e.g., Heritage Division) might be informed.)

State has proposed a course which appears to strike a mid-ground: (a) advise the Vatican that we would prefer not to provide the aircraft, and to leave the departure details a matter for the Vatican and Hungarian Government; (b) have DOD alert one of its VIP aircraft at Wiesbaden to stand by for possible Budapest/Vienna/Roma or Vienna/Rome flight; and (c) in the event that the Cardinal himself requests USG aircraft and if that appears to be the decisive factor in his on the spot decision to depart, then we should provide it.

\(^4\) Kissinger initialed this option.
State’s proposal is set out in the memorandum at Tab B and a proposed cable containing this instruction at Tab C.\(^5\)

I am inclined to suggest that we offer the Cardinal an aircraft from Budapest or Vienna to Rome, for the following reasons: (a) it would be a generous and fitting gesture to a man with whom we have been so closely linked for 15 years, (b) if he accepts a flight from Budapest, this would eliminate the risk of public demonstrations (by either the people or the Cardinal) along the road if he were to be driven to Vienna, and (c) our offer just might soften his views of the US, and this Administration, which otherwise might appear rather sharp in his memoirs and public statements. Of course, there is a distinct possibility that he will refuse an aircraft even if we offer it.

**Recommendation**

That the Cardinal be informed, in consultation with the Vatican representative, that the US would be prepared to provide him with an aircraft if he wishes for the flight from Budapest or Vienna to Rome.\(^6\)

\(^5\) Both attached but not printed.

\(^6\) Kissinger initialed the approval option. In telegram 1857 from Budapest, September 28, Puhan reported: “Joszef Cardinal Mindszenty left Embassy Budapest for Rome this morning at 0828.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 693, Country Files—Europe, Hungary, Vol. I)

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125. **Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)**\(^1\)


**SUBJECT**

The Crown of St. Stephen, Again

A delegation of Hungarian-Americans called on Harry Dent recently to express their concern over the possibility that the US might be

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 693, Country Files—Europe, Hungary, Vol. I. Limited Official Use. Sent for action. Haig initialed the memorandum to indicate he had seen it. Tabs A–D are attached but are not printed.
planning to return to the Government of Hungary the symbolic Crown of St. Stephen. One of the members, Dr. Eckhardt also delivered a letter from Cardinal Mindszenty for the President urging that the Crown not be returned. Mr. Dent has sent you a memorandum enclosing the letter and additional material left by the delegation (Tab B).

At the same time, Laszo Pasztor sent HAK a letter also urging that the Crown not be returned (Tab C). Pasztor was in the delegation that called on Dent. Mr. Dent asked you for your thoughts on the nature of the reply he must make to the delegation.

Your reply memorandum to Mr. Dent at Tab A suggests that he express the appreciation of the President for the letter, and that HAK has also received Mr. Pasztor’s letter. In addition, the memorandum contains talking points indicating that there are no present plans to return the Crown.

I am unaware of anything which has happened to change our standard position on this issue. However, in June, Henry was interested in it, and we provided him with a memorandum (Tab D) on the subject outlining the pro's and con's of returning the Crown (or placing it in the hands of the Vatican, à la Cardinal Mindszenty). As far as I know, he has not taken any decision that would alter the standard line set forth in your memorandum to Mr. Dent.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to Mr. Dent at Tab A.

P.S. Senator Dole’s man just called me (November 29) to say that Dole had gotten an earful at a recent meeting of ethnics and that any move on the Crown would cost the President 2 million votes. I told him there were no plans to change the position on the subject. He urged us not to move without consulting Dole. I said we would of course keep that in mind but in any case nothing is afoot.

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2 In a November 5 letter, Mindszenty wrote to Nixon: “From Western Press reports and from other serious sources we got the information that the present Administration in Washington intends to hand over the Holy Crown of St. Stephen to the atheistic, illegal Hungarian regime, or to that similar in Moscow. I don’t easily believe these rumors, spread by the Press, because Mr. President promised me in 1970 not to hand over to these followers of Satan our holiest and greatest national relic and pride.” (Ibid.)

3 Pasztor was director of the Heritage Groups Division of the Republican National Committee.

4 Haig signed the January 3, 1972, memorandum to Dent.

5 Document 116.
126. Editorial Note

On January 19, 1972, Charles Colson forwarded to President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Alexander Haig a letter to the editor published in the Washington Evening Star. In the letter, the writer complained that the Nixon administration had not denied the possibility that the Crown of St. Stephen would be returned to the Hungarian Government. Colson wrote Haig: “Please, please, tell me the attached is not so. Are we trying to blow the entire Eastern European vote or just turn off all Catholics? We may succeed in doing both if there is any truth to the attached [letter to the editor].” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 693, Country Files—Europe, Hungary, Vol. I)

Helmut Sonnenfeldt drafted a reply to Colson, which he forwarded to Haig on January 20. At the bottom of the routing memorandum, he wrote by hand: “Al—I am sick of this constant badgering we are getting on this subject. It would help if HAK could let one in on just what prompted his interest in this [the Crown of St. Stephen] last summer since this is what seems to have triggered the campaign against him and the Administration.” (Ibid.)

Haig forwarded a revised version of Sonnenfeldt’s draft memorandum to Colson on January 21. Haig wrote: “Re your memorandum of January 19, this is a non-issue on which busy people here have already had to spend far too much time. There are no plans to return the Crown of St. Stephen to the present Hungarian Government and this has been repeatedly stated by the Administration. A number of persons with axes of one kind or another to grind have chosen to hang sinister connotations on the phrase ‘there are no present plans’ [to return the Crown of St. Stephen] which has been used in answers to letters. I hope you will use your influence with your friends to get the canard killed and to get the campaign of imputations against the Administration stopped.” (Ibid.)
127. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Secretary Rogers’ Trip to Hungary

Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter on June 22 made a lengthy foreign policy speech in the course of which he termed the “American war” in Vietnam “despicable” and said the US “makes a mockery of the history of mankind.” State called Saturday to ask whether we thought this raises a question about the wisdom of the Secretary’s visit.\(^2\) Neither they nor Ambassador Puhan thought so since it is fairly routine for the Hungarians to speak this way and the rest of Peter’s speech was a not unsophisticated review of the current state of East-West relations with a good many positive comments about the US.

I had not heard of the Hungarian trip until five minutes before the public announcement which itself came some 24 hours after word on it had been leaked (while I was in London) and, of course, well after all the arrangements had been made. My judgment would have been that this trip is premature. There are many uncertainties in the Soviet-Hungarian relationship and in Hungarian domestic politics due to Kadar’s experimentation with the New Economic Mechanism\(^3\) and I would question the wisdom of our blundering into this situation at this time. Moreover, if our Eastern policy has demonstrated anything over the last three years, it is that we do far better picking off these countries one by one instead of rushing them all at once. We are still in process of digesting our Romanian,\(^4\) and now Polish,\(^5\) moves; why rush into the next one? And in domestic terms, the Hungarian-American community has quite different views of its ancestral home under Kadar than the Polish-American community has of Poland under Gierek (and the Cardinal).

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 953, VIP Visits, Secretary of State’s Visit to Mid-East and European Countries, 28 Jun–7 Jul 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Outside System. Sent for information. According to an attached routing slip, the memorandum was “noted” by Kissinger.

\(^2\) See Document 128.

\(^3\) See footnote 19, Document 26.

\(^4\) On Nixon’s visit to Romania, see Documents 183 and 184.

\(^5\) On Nixon’s visit to Poland, see Documents 163–166.
But a different judgment obviously prevailed and if it was right a week ago it must still be right today regardless of Mr. Peter’s obscenities. These may or may not have some profound domestic Hungarian political implication as Puhan suggests. More likely, they simply reflect the fact that, Protestant Bishop though he was in his former life, he is a slippery, utterly unreliable character who well deserves his German nickname Schwarzer Peter. But I am sure he will be the most graceful of hosts for the Secretary of State.

Unless you think differently, I will plan to say nothing further to State. I gather that Secretary Rogers, who has seen the traffic on this matter, is content to let things proceed as arranged.

128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Hungary

Washington, July 22, 1972, 1814Z.

133194. Subject: SecVisit—Budapest: Memorandum of Conversation.

1. Following is memorandum of conversation of the Secretary’s July 7 meeting with Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. Other participants were Ambassador Puhan, and, with Kadar, Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Peter and the Hungarian Ambassador to Washington, Karoly Szabo. There was also a Hungarian interpreter present.

2. Kadar extended cordial greetings to the Secretary and the Ambassador. He said he was glad that the Secretary had accepted the Hungarian invitation to visit Budapest. He was looking forward to an exchange of views. He called the Secretary’s visit a very significant event in U.S.-Hungarian relations. He wished to congratulate the two Ministers on signing the first agreement between the two countries in a long, long time. He expressed the hope that the exchange of views would be useful in improving our relations further.

[Omitted here is a further exchange of pleasantries between Rogers and Kadar, a tour d’horizon of the international situation by Rogers, and general comments on the international situation by Kadar.]

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Moscow. Drafted by Puhan on July 7 and approved by Rogers and Eliot.

2 Reference is to the consular convention signed on July 7; for text, see 24 UST 1141.
17. Turning to U.S.-Hungarian relations, Kadar said we must be realistic. You are aware, he said, turning to the Secretary, of the vast differences in size, geography, ideology and history between our two countries. Historically, Kadar said, U.S.-Hungarian relations were never of the greatest importance, nor was Hungary’s foreign policy of much significance in world affairs. This will probably be true in the future also. He asked the question, “What was Hungary to the United States?” Even expanded trade would be a drop in the bucket. He referred to Hungary’s location and at least by implication suggested no change in Hungary’s position was possible.

18. Kadar said this was not to discourage efforts to improve our relations. Indeed, he thought we should explore all possibilities. He said we genuinely want normal relations and consider greater cooperation with the United States important. But we should not have too high expectations.

19. Referring to trade, Kadar said Hungary can exist only if she can conduct foreign trade. Forty percent of Hungarian GNP is foreign trade. He noted the paucity in natural resources—hydroelectric power, minerals—in Hungary. He said that he thought Hungary’s foreign trade would expand and with it the percentage of Hungary’s trade with the West. In this regard Kadar said, however, it was relatively immaterial when it came to trading with the West who that partner was, whether it was the FRG, Italy or the United States. But he came back to his thesis that we must have no illusions, no fantasies, regarding the extent to which we can improve upon our trade. At the same time, he said that the United States would find the Hungarian side ready to cooperate and explore all avenues leading to improved relations. He agreed with the Secretary’s earlier remark that this normalization process should proceed with not too great speed but then with a chuckle said he saw no great danger in this. What he said he was primarily interested in was not to lose what we had already gained and go backward in our relations.

20. Kadar said that occasionally there are matters of prestige. In this connection, he said, we have our small prestige in Hungary which to us is as important as your great prestige in the United States. He said he wished to conclude by saying that the Hungarians tried to put themselves in the shoes of others to see what is possible and can be done. In this connection he did not wish to dig up the past, but he was reminded of irritants in the past which had poisoned relations between the two countries. The first of these was the so-called [Hungarian?] question in the UN which he readily admitted no longer existed. Another example was the case of Cardinal Mindszenty. He said that a solution to the dilemma Mindszenty had posed had been found, a solution in which his country had taken great risks, the Vatican had taken great risks, and the United States was left without taking any risks.
21. Kadar came back to emphasize that there was desire on the Hungarian side to move ahead, to take positive steps. He said he had received the impression that we had the same wish to seek a normalization of our relations, step by step. Kadar said he was a Communist and he didn’t think it was proper to debate ideology with the Secretary. He knew, however, that Hungarians as well as Americans all want normal relations. He noted in passing that the Secretary was in Central Committee headquarters and hoped that there would be no infection as a result. He concluded by thanking the Secretary for visiting Hungary and calling on him. He expressed the firm conviction that the Secretary’s trip would move forward the normalization of our relations. He proposed a toast to the health of the Secretary, to better relations between our two countries, and to peace for both nations.

22. The Secretary thanked Mr. Kadar for his presentation. He said he just wished to make one or two short observations, in view of the fact that time had run out and he was due in another office. The first was that he personally abhorred the term “super power” and found that it was usually used when some smaller state says “You are a super power, solve our problems.” The second brief observation was to agree with Mr. Kadar that we had no illusions about our relations. Since Mr. Kadar had, however, stressed the interdependence of nations the Secretary felt that better understanding of each country, even understanding by a large country like ours of Hungary or a small country like Hungary of the United States, would lead to better prospects for world peace. He noted in this connection how various peoples of different antecedents had come to live together in peace in the United States.

23. The Secretary concluded by responding to Mr. Kadar’s toast, by welcoming better relations between our two countries.

24. Comment: The meeting was cordial. Kadar appeared a little nervous at the outset but became more relaxed as the Secretary talked, and even made some sallies at humor.

SUBJECT
US-Hungarian Claims Settlement

Acting Secretary Irwin has sent the President a memorandum reporting that a claims settlement agreement between the United States and Hungary was initialed in Washington October 12. It was negotiated here last week.

Our claims against Hungary (for war damage to the property of US nationals, nationalization of US-owned private and corporate property, and for loss of a US aircraft over Hungary in 1951) came to about $65 million. The Hungarians have agreed to pay about $19 million in settlement, to waive their own claims against the United States, and to settle outstanding bonded indebtedness with the American holders of the defaulted Hungarian bonds. The Hungarians also let it be known beforehand that they hope to get MFN treatment but, contrary to the State Department’s expectations, their negotiators did not link it directly with their agreement to a claims settlement.

Mr. Irwin considers this settlement “satisfactory” and a major step forward in our relations with Hungary.

The State Department is particularly interested in calling the President’s attention to the agreement because it results from discussions which Secretary Rogers held in Budapest last July. State has also arranged for the story to get prominent press play as a “surprise” agreement. (See today’s Washington Post.) CIEP was kept abreast of the negotiations as were we, but no formal clearance was sought. The State Department is now anxious to press ahead in the economic field with the other eastern European countries. (A memorandum from the Secretary on Czechoslovakia has already arrived and is being staffed separately.) As far as I can see this is being done on an ad hoc basis when what we need is a carefully considered action plan tailored to both our

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2 The October 6 memorandum from Irwin to the President is attached but not printed.
3 See Document 128.
4 See Document 92.
economic and our political objectives with the separate East European countries. I will be making recommendations to you on this in the next few days.\(^5\) Meanwhile, I suggest that you forward Mr. Irwin’s memorandum to the President for his information by signing the memorandum to him at Tab A.\(^6\)

\textit{Recommendation}

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A, which forwards the Acting Secretary’s report on the Hungarian claims settlement.


\(^6\) An October 14 memorandum from Kissinger to the President, signed by Haig, transmitted Irwin’s memorandum and summarized Sonnenfeldt’s arguments. It concluded: “The State Department evidently wishes to press ahead to settle outstanding economic issues with other East European countries. I believe that we need to plan the pace and scope of this, weighing both our political and our economic interests in the individual countries. Peter Flanigan and I are directing the agencies to prepare a proposed plan as a basis for our policy decisions in this field.” A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 693, Country Files—Europe, Hungary, Vol. I)
Poland

130. Airgram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State


SUBJECT
United States Policy Assessment—Poland.

REF
II FAM 212.3–5

The past year was not a good one for U.S.-Polish relations. Poland’s image in the U.S., already damaged by the regime’s retreat in previous years from the atmosphere of liberalism and progress which characterized the period immediately following October 1956, was further blackened in 1968 by the harsh suppression of the student demonstrations in March, the increasing shrillness—at least for the first half of the year—of the “anti-Zionist” campaign, and, finally, by Poland’s participation in the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. These developments were sharply criticized in the United States, both on the official level as well as by the public at large, and the action against Czechoslovakia caused the U.S. to cancel several “high-visibility” cultural exchanges with Poland. Internally, the regime concentrated on such essentially negative concepts as anti-revisionism and hostility to the FRG, while asserting its unswerving allegiance to the U.S.S.R. “for better or worse.” The political climate became more oppressive and the Embassy found it more difficult to maintain productive contacts.

In the face of such a gloomy picture, questions naturally arise as to the desirability of attempting to seek better political and economic relations with Poland. More broadly, Poland’s conduct, like those of her partners in the action against Czechoslovakia, raises questions


2 This regulation in the Foreign Affairs Manual required ambassadors to provide annual reports on relations with the country to which they were assigned.

3 In October 1956 Gomulka returned to power as Poland’s Communist leader in the wake of a wave of strikes and popular protest. Gomulka implemented several major reforms that conflicted with the Soviet model of communism, including relative toleration of the Catholic Church, an end to collectivized agriculture, and limited freedom of expression.

302
about the validity of the concept of “building bridges” to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.⁴

With regard to the over-all policy of “bridge-building” (a label which incidentally has probably outlived its usefulness), it is perhaps pertinent to stress the obvious—that it should correctly be seen as a policy for the very long term. Also, at least in my view, it should not have been our expectation that, through expanding Western ties with the East European countries, a process of “osmosis” would occur in which liberalization in these countries (as apart from the U.S.S.R.) would make it possible to work out a resolution of the German problem and of European security.⁵ Surely, such fundamental alterations in the status quo can only be brought about through a change in the Soviet Union’s perception of its security interests. And to say this only underlines the long term nature of the process envisaged: While progress has been made in the period since World War II, the time frame is still measurable in terms of generations, not decades.

Of course, to achieve progress on general problems of European security, there must be change in the East European countries as well as in the Soviet Union. While the attitude of the latter is determinant, the process goes hand-in-hand and cannot be separated. We should work for constructive change and broader areas of agreement both in the Soviet Union and in the countries of Eastern Europe, seeking to build positive attitudes wherever and whenever this may be possible and always keeping in mind that the evolutionary process we wish to encourage is certain to be slow, difficult, and erratic. We must be patient—but also ready to exploit favorable opportunities as they appear in order to further the process.

It is helpful to see our own relations with Poland in the light of these considerations. While the negative phenomena mentioned in the first paragraph are real and discouraging, there are other aspects of the Polish scene which are more promising. The elements which have always distinguished the “Polish way,” and which were highlighted in October 1956, are still very much in evidence, i.e., a strong sense of nationalism, a powerful Catholic Church, and an agricultural system in which 85 per cent of the land is privately owned. Popular attitudes in Poland traditionally have been anti-Russian, and this sentiment has

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⁴ On July 8, 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson approved NSAM 352, entitled “Bridge Building,” which instructed U.S. Government agencies to “actively develop areas of peaceful cooperation with the nations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.” For the full text of the NSAM, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XVII, Eastern Europe, Document 15.

⁵ This seems to have been suggested in some recent NATO discussions. [Footnote in the original.]
probably been reinforced by the Czech events and the widespread feeling that the Soviet Union is tightening its controls. Gomulka may say that Poland is with the U.S.S.R. “for better or worse,” and the people must acquiesce, but they are not happy about it. Rather, their hopes and desires identify with the West, most immediately with the countries of Western Europe, but ultimately, and even more strongly, with the U.S., which is seen as a country where the individual can prosper in freedom and where technological progress has reached its zenith. The millions of Poles who have emigrated to the U.S. and done well there of course contribute to this image.

On the internal front, despite the efforts of the regime to tighten the ideological screws and bottle up the effervescence of youth and the intellectuals, there is a sense of repressed dynamism and a desire for change. The regime gives the impression of being on the defensive, and the tone of its recriminations against liberal policies and against the West is indicative of its weakness. Under the blanket of imposed orthodoxy, intense political maneuvering is taking place as Gomulka tries to keep on top of those forces demanding new political and economic policies which will be less dogmatic than the old and more keyed to Poland’s national interests.

In this situation, the U.S. should follow policies aimed at enhancing its influence in Poland and broadening the range of its contacts with those individuals in Poland who seem most likely to play significant roles in the changes which are certain to come in the future. Poland’s size (the largest of the Eastern European countries), the energy of her people, the possibilities of U.S.-Polish trade (already more than with any other East European country except Yugoslavia), the geographic position of Poland and the importance of her attitudes regarding the security of Central Europe, the family ties between millions of U.S. citizens and their relations in Poland—all of these factors argue for a positive U.S. policy. The unattractive features of the present regime are obvious and difficult. Some must simply be tolerated, such as the regime’s determination to stay closely aligned with the U.S.S.R.; others, such as anti-Semitism, cannot be passed over and should be the object of our concern, expressed at high levels as may be appropriate. This should not prevent us, however, from making the most of the many opportunities which remain open to us in Poland to promote in a discreet manner the evolution which is already in train.

The Embassy has outlined its specific proposals for action programs recently (Embtel 5366 of December 11, 1968)\(^6\) and will submit more detailed suggestions in a separate report. Briefly, we recommend

continued and expanded student, professor, and technical exchanges; expanded use of PL–480\(^7\) funds for English language teaching and scientific research projects (including increased contacts with the U.S.-sponsored Children's Hospital in Krakow); the revamping of VOA broadcasts to appeal more to youth, and the re-introduction of some form of a media guarantee program. As opportunities present themselves, we should also promote exchanges of the "highly-visible" variety, such as symphony orchestras, theatre groups, and jazz ensembles. In the trade field, we favor maintenance of Most Favorited Nation tariff treatment for Poland, participation in the Poznan Fair, competitive commercial credits, a reinstitution of Export-Import Bank credit guarantees, resumption of normal commercial promotion activities and discreet encouragement of meaningful Polish participation in international bodies such as GATT and the ECE, as well as increased contacts wherever feasible between Poland and other East European countries and the OECD.

Other areas of bilateral interest in which progress might be possible are (1) resumption of negotiations for conclusion of a Consular Agreement, in which the Poles recently have expressed a strong interest, and (2) reduction on a reciprocal basis of the travel restrictions for official personnel which grew out of our unilateral imposition of such controls in 1963.\(^8\)

Lastly, I believe it would be helpful if the U.S., in consultation with the FRG, could take a public position recognizing de facto the permanence of the present western boundaries of Poland.\(^9\) While this would

\(^7\) P.L.–480, signed into law on July 10, 1954, was formally known as the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. P.L.–480 became synonymous with the Food for Peace program during the Kennedy administration. The enactment of the Food for Peace Act of 1966 (P.L.–89–808) instituted sweeping changes, including the establishment of self-help criteria as a means of evaluating possible recipients. For the text of the Act of 1966, see Stat. 1526. For text as amended, see 7 U.S.C. 1721 et seq.

\(^8\) For further information on the restrictions placed upon Polish and other Soviet-bloc diplomats traveling in the United States in 1963, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Documents 83, 85, 86, and 87. For the text of the U.S. statement announcing the restrictions, see Department of State Bulletin, December 2, 1963, pp. 860–63.

\(^9\) At the Potsdam Conference, the Heads of Government of the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union agreed on August 1, 1945, that "pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including the portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany." (Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, p. 63) Based on the decisions at Potsdam, Poland declared that its border with Germany, the Oder-Neisse line, was permanent. In contrast, the United States, concurring with the FRG, argued that the final delimitation of the Polish-German border would have to await a German peace treaty.
admittedly be a far-reaching and complicated political move, requiring in particular some straightforward talk with Bonn as to our view of the European scene, it would be a step reflecting the realities of the situation and one which would not only be influential in lessening the impact of one major element of the communist propaganda line in Poland but which also could prepare the way for more rational Polish-FRG relations.

In sum, despite a difficult year in 1968, I believe it is in the best interests of the U.S. to follow a policy aimed at expanding our influence over the long term in Poland and encouraging those elements which are ready and even anxious to work with us. Regardless of adverse developments, we should never feel that the “game is up” in Poland. This is a lively country, inhabited by energetic and imaginative people who look to the West, not the East. The light cast by the U.S. is bright in Poland, and we should do everything we can to ensure that it is not permitted to dim. On the contrary, we should work so that its rays will become ever more penetrating.

WJS

131. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 9, 1969, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Conversation with the President Concerning Poland and other matters

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Mr. Henry Kissinger
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

1. At the President’s suggestion, I discussed the situation in Poland briefly, noting the relatively good opportunities the Embassy had for contacts and the wide-spread sympathy towards the U.S. on the part of the people. These factors, plus a strong feeling of nationalism in Poland, provided the U.S. with the possibility of exerting constructive influence in Poland. I said I had the impression that the Polish Gov-

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL POL-US. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Stoessel. The meeting took place at the White House.
ernment in recent months had indicated interest in improving its relations with Western Europe and with the U.S., in part because of economic pressures; the Poles realized that they could not get everything they needed from the Soviet Union and they were interested in trade and Western technology. In conclusion, I noted that, of course, the regime in Poland was thoroughly Communist and closely attached to the Soviet Union.

2. The President expressed himself in very friendly terms toward Poland and her people. He recalled with pleasure the warmth of the reception he had received in Warsaw when he visited there as Vice President. On the other hand, he knew that Gomulka was extremely tough; the President had found him cold as steel and harder in his attitudes than Khrushchev.

3. The President said he was very anxious for the U.S. to keep in contact and communication with the Polish people. He remarked that it was not within our capability, certainly in the short term, to pull Poland away from the Soviet Union. Also, there could be no thought on our part of stimulating revolutions in Poland or any of the other countries in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the President felt that we could be active in promoting contacts with Poland in cultural and other fields. In this context, he wondered if it would be appropriate to send a member of the Cabinet to Poland soon. I said I felt it probably would be too early for such a step, although it certainly should be kept in mind, if, as I hoped, relations between the U.S. and Poland improved. The President mentioned that, if it would not be appropriate to send a Cabinet member, we might keep in mind the possibility of other high-level officials from his staff. For example, Mr. Moynihan might visit Poland with a view to discussing urban problems with Polish experts.

4. The President favored trade with Poland and with the other East European countries. After Viet Nam is settled, the Administration will be prepared to take far ranging actions in this field. For the present, however, attitudes in Congress prevent any major moves in this direction since some of the East European countries are helping North Viet Nam. The President knew that Eastern Europe could not satisfy its requirements in the technological field by depending on the Soviet Union. In particular, he believed this was true in the computer field, and he thought that, in the future, we should give consideration to selling computers in Eastern Europe since such a step could be in our interest.

2 For documentation on Nixon’s August 2–4, 1959 visit to Poland as Vice President, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, volume X, Part 2, Eastern Europe Region; Poland; Greece; Turkey; Yugoslavia, pp. 190–223.
5. I mentioned my concern at the prospect that, because of budg-
etary problems, the U.S. would not be able to exhibit at the Poznan in-
ternational fair in June 1970. The President said he believed it was of
great importance that we exhibit at Poznan and the money to do so
could be found somehow. He asked Mr. Kissinger to be in touch with
Mr. Shakespeare of USIA on this subject. In speaking of Poznan, the
President mentioned the possibility that a Cabinet officer might be sent
to open our exhibit at the fair next year. On the general question of
trade fairs, the President commented that we should emphasize our
participation in fairs in Eastern Europe, where our presence is needed.
We should not be so concerned about other areas, such as Western Eu-
rope, where trade and contacts are good in any event.

6. After I had described, at the President’s request, the enthusi-
astic reception given in Poland to the Apollo 11 moon landing, the Pres-
ident suggested that, if Hungary declined to receive the astronauts on
their forthcoming tour, we should request Poland to accept their visit.3
The President remarked that Poland had been his first choice as a coun-
try in Eastern Europe for the astronauts to visit, but he had anticipated
that Gomulka would not be willing to accept them. However, in view
of the great public response in Poland to the moon shot, he now thought
that it might be difficult for Gomulka to turn down the prospect of
such a visit. The President noted that he did not feel it was appropri-
ate for the astronauts to tour all of the countries of Eastern Europe and
that it clearly would not be appropriate for them to go to Romania so
soon after his own enthusiastic welcome there.

7. The President then spoke about U.S. policy toward the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. If the Soviets now appear to be seeking dé-
tente and to want agreement with us on certain problems, this is be-
cause they see it as in their interest to do so. They approach these
matters with their heads, not with their hearts, which is quite under-
standable. We must aim at convincing the Soviets that they need our
cooperation in various areas in order to have peace and stability. One
area is in Eastern Europe; others are in the Middle East and Viet Nam.
The Soviets have some soft spots in Eastern Europe. We can work on
these to some extent with the view to stimulating constructive change,
but we must always bear in mind that we cannot go too far. The ex-
amples of Hungary and Czechoslovakia (although we had nothing to
do with the latter) are very fresh in our minds. All in all, it is a deli-
cate game which must be played with skill. The President encouraged
me to recommend ways in which we could expand our contacts in

3 The Hungarian Government turned down a visit by the Apollo 11 astronauts dur-
ing their September 29–November 5 worldwide tour; see Document 110. The astronauts
did not visit Poland.
Poland. He felt that for too long we have not been sufficiently active in our Polish policy.

8. The President referred to the problem of the Oder-Neisse frontier.\(^4\) He wondered how serious this question really was for the Poles, since there was no chance of changing this boundary in any case. Mr. Kissinger commented that recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier by the FRG was strictly an internal political problem in West Germany. The acuteness of this problem was lessening with time as the influence of the expellees declined. The President repeated again that changing the border was unthinkable.

9. The President questioned me concerning the problem of anti-Semitism in Poland, recalling that it seemed fairly bad when he had been there in the late ‘50’s. I said the situation had worsened following the Arab-Israeli war.\(^5\) Special procedures had been instituted by the regime under which Jews wishing to emigrate to Israel could do so by giving up their Polish citizenship. Around 6000 had taken advantage of this, leaving roughly 22,000 Jews in the country. It appeared that Gomulka himself had not favored the anti-Semitic campaign and in the last six months the situation seemed calmer. The President remarked that by their policy the Poles had lost some of their brightest people through emigration and he thought the anti-Semitic actions in Poland had been highly unfortunate. Mr. Kissinger noted that this problem was also related to internal domestic politics in Poland, since a number of Jews had occupied high posts in the Communist Party and the Government and had been targets of Moczar. Mr. Kissinger understood Jewish emigration would end as of September 1. I said the situation was not entirely clear on this point. We had received assurances from Polish officials that emigration of Jews in the future would be permitted under normal procedures, although probably on a more selective basis than in the past.

\(^4\) See footnote 9, Document 130.
\(^5\) Reference to the “Six Day War” of June 1967. Documentation on the U.S. concern regarding official anti-Semitism is in *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XVII, Eastern Europe; Austria; Finland, Documents 132, 134, and 135.
132. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State

New York, September 24, 1969, 1735Z.

Secto 41/3189. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting with Polish FonMin, Sept. 23.  

Following summary based on uncleared memcon, NoForN and FYI only subject to revision upon review.

Jedrychowski started by saying Polish policy was to improve relations with all nations. US-Polish relations were improving and were especially favorable in economic and cultural fields. He believed major difficulties had been eliminated in our talks on consular convention and said he hoped signature could take place soon. Jedrychowski termed certain financial problems which two countries had settled “too insignificant to mention here.” Poland intended to make more use of US technology, he said. In next two years Poland would not be able to afford purchases of industrial capital goods because of outstanding debts. Starting in 1971 Poland could increase purchases from US, particularly of complete industrial plants, as part of five-year plan now being formulated. Jedrychowski said total investment in period 1971–75 would be equivalent to investment of previous 19 years and total 1,250,000,000,000 zlotys or 30 to 35 billion dollars. Jedrychowski cited two obstacles to increased purchases from US: (a) US embargo—Poles never know which items will be turned down and (b) credit offered in US not comparable with that offered in Western Europe. He pointed to amendment to ExIm Bank charter which prevented Poles from making use of ExIm guarantees for purchases in US. Jedrychowski requested Secretary to look into possibility of modifying ExIm Bank policy so Poland could come into US market in bigger way in future.

2. Secretary assured Jedrychowski we also wished to improve relations. President still remembered warm reception he had received

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2 In telegram 2648 from Warsaw, August 20, Stoessel reported that Winiewicz had requested the scheduling of a meeting between Rogers and Jedrychowski, who would be attending the UN General Assembly in September. (Ibid.)

3 Memoranda of conversation are ibid., Conference Files, 1966–1972, Entry 3051B, CF 397–24th UNGA, Sept 1969, Memcons II.

4 Reference is to the Findley Amendment, adopted October 18, 1966, as a rider to the 1967 Export-Import Bank appropriations bill. It forbade the Bank to make loans to any Communist Bloc state without a Presidential determination that such action was in the national interest. For the text of the relevant portion of P.L. 89–691, approved October 15, 1966, see 80 Stat. 1024.
from Polish people when he was Vice President. He asked for reaction in Poland to Apollo 11 flight. M Jedrychowski said reaction was one of great appreciation and respect for US achievement. Polish people were well informed of all details of Apollo mission. Secretary commented: “Not as in some other Communist countries.” Jedrychowski said he didn’t know. He thought some Communist states were late in presenting TV transmission because of technical or financial reasons but that situation had been corrected later and coverage provided.

3. Secretary asked for report on Polish-Chinese relations. Jedrychowski pointed to one profitable joint enterprise: Polish-Chinese company of shipping brokers. Trade between two countries was down, however. Jedrychowski said China was one of those big powers which considered trade to be just a function of foreign policy. This was case with USG or at least with some US Congressmen. Poland tried to separate ideology from formal relations with other states. For example, Poland had correct trade relations with Albania.

4. Jedrychowski said ideological questions would be no problem between US and Poland but for shadow cast on our relations by war in Vietnam. Poland was interested in seeing Vietnam war come to peaceful settlement. Jedrychowski wanted to assure US both North Vietnam and “Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam” have necessary good will to bring war to end. Their own national interests and their geographic location declare this. NLF 10-point proposal\(^5\) has many elements which offer basis for negotiations. Many of points are formulated in general terms and are flexible. There are just two postulates on which US must agree: withdrawal of US troops and agreement that new Government South Vietnam be based on coalition of national “patriotic elements.”

5. Secretary welcomed FonMin’s comments on Poland but said he did not in least agree with his commentary on Vietnam. There was no sign from other side that they desire settlement or even to discuss settlement. We have made clear fact that we are prepared to discuss. Other side has made no proposal except that we get out and that they be able to provide government officials to run Government of South Vietnam. These proposals are clearly unacceptable. We are prepared to negotiate and would welcome opportunity to talk. We would be pleased to have officials from Communist governments take part in supervisory force during time of free elections in South Vietnam. Jedrychowski said

other side would agree to national elections but not under international supervision and not under “unilateral South Vietnamese Government.” There must be new coalition government with broad base of support, he maintained.

6. Secretary said this kind of talk tends to sour relations between our two countries. If North Vietnam wanted to discuss this question, that would be one thing. However, he did not welcome Polish presentation on behalf of North Vietnamese. Jedrychowski said that this was Poles’ own initiative; President Nixon in GA speech has asked for help in ending war. Secretary said he did not find Polish remarks helpful. Jedrychowski asked what was way out. Secretary said President had made answer quite clear. Polish FonMin said question of prestige on both sides made solution difficult. In case of small nation such as North Vietnam there was even more sensitivity than in case of great nation. North Vietnam was trying to find face-saving solution.

7. Jedrychowski turned to subject of Europe. Poland advocated policy of collective security which could assure Poland and other European nations opportunity for peaceful development. This policy was in tune with Budapest appeal for ESC. Secretary said we were curious to know how Poles envisaged ESC would work. Jedrychowski replied that ESC should draw up all-European agreement on security and cooperation. This would guarantee to all European nations respect for (a) their national independence, (b) their territorial integrity, (c) their national borders, and (d) their internal affairs. Secretary asked if that included Czechoslovakia; if it did, we might be interested.

Jedrychowski said it did. Czech “affair” arose from insecurity and instability in Europe. We should understand throughout Polish history Czechoslovakia had always been place from which attacks were launched on Poles. In 1939 Nazis had launched three-pronged attack on them. South prong came from Czechoslovakia. Secretary asked if Poland was expecting attack from Czechoslovakia in 1968. Polish FonMin said no, but Poles had serious apprehensions that Czechoslovakia could serve again as base for attacks. Secretary asked if this apprehension justified their first attacking Czechoslovakia. Jedrychowski said Poland and Czechoslovakia had been bound by close alliance. Perhaps if all countries in Europe had recognized existing boundaries and if revisionist tendencies inside Czechoslovakia had not been present,

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6 For text of the September 18 address, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 724–731.
7 Reference is to a communiqué issued by the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee at the conclusion of its March 17 meeting. For relevant portions, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1035–1037.
8 Reference is to Polish participation in the Warsaw Pact military invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.
situation might have been different. Despite 25 years since Potsdam Conference, Western boundaries of Poland were still questioned by some states. FRG maintains it has legal right to take up at any time question of Polish borders. Unfortunately, US and UK encourage this policy on part of Germans. Of major Western powers only France has clearly recognized Poland’s western boundaries as final.

8. Secretary said he would be glad to discuss any sensible plan for reduction of East-West tensions. We were still considering matter of ESC. Jedrychowski said that in course of preparations for ESC questions to be discussed will be clarified and agenda developed. ESC would reduce tensions and improve situation in Europe. As Polish contribution to European security considerations they had proposed to FRG an agreement which would recognize Polish western borders and in itself lead to normalization of relations with FRG. Jedrychowski said Poles were ready to discuss. He asked US use influence with FRG to obtain recognition of final character of western borders and to obtain German signature of NPT.

Rogers

133. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT
Polish Ambassador’s Conversation with Mr. Kissinger February 3

The Ambassador came in for a talk that had had to be rescheduled several times.

After some opening discussion of Polish attitudes toward Germany in which the Ambassador noted that it was hard to convince the older generation of the feasibility of good relations with Bonn, Mr. Kissinger asked why the Poles then placed so much faith in German renunciation of territorial claims. He\(^2\) said this was a political necessity and was

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\(^2\) Michalowski. [Footnote in the original.]
required to make establishment of relations possible. He said that the US could contribute by telling the FRG that we wanted an agreement settling the border. Mr. Kissinger said that we had made clear that we want reconciliation between Poland and the FRG. Michalowski said this was not enough. Mr. Kissinger said that we would present no obstacle to Polish-German understanding. He went on to comment that most border disputes these days seemed to be inside the Communist world. Michalowski agreed but said with a smile that these problems were not geographically close to Poland. As the saying went in Warsaw, there was a big buffer state between Poland and China.

Michalowski said that Mr. Kissinger’s remark about not presenting obstacles was important. German-Polish relations were very important for Europe generally and their improvement was a stepping stone to a European conference. Kissinger asked how the Soviets felt about the Polish-German talks. Michalowski said they were encouraging the Poles; but they were worried the US was not doing enough for Europe as a whole and for a conference. Mr. Kissinger responded that no one had really told us what a conference would accomplish. Why have a conference to restate the obvious? We were not hostile toward it, but what was it for? Michalowski said it was the best means to improve the situation. The Poles were working on additional agenda items. A system was needed to replace the division of Europe. Mr. Kissinger asked how.

Michalowski responded that cooperation was needed in every field. Both the US and the USSR belonged to Europe. What was needed was a regional security system with a range of measures on all aspects—non-use of force, assistance for victims of aggression, recognition of borders, etc. Two-power agreements were not enough. Czechoslovakia would never have happened if there was no division. (Mr. Kissinger had interjected how a problem like Czechoslovakia would be dealt with in the system Michalowski was describing.) A new Europe was needed and the process had to be started. There could either be one or several conferences. Mr. Kissinger concluded that we would watch developments and would not oppose a meaningful eventual conference. Michalowski rejoined that the US used to work actively against a conference.

Before ending the meeting because of another commitment, Mr. Kissinger noted that Michalowski presumably wanted to talk mostly

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3 Reference is to the Ussuri River boundary dispute between China and the Soviet Union. Armed clashes between the two states began in February. After further clashes and a military build-up, negotiations opened in Beijing in October.
about bilateral relations. Michalowski said these were favorable; there were no conflicts. The only problems were economic. It was agreed that at a future meeting, bilateral relations would be reviewed.

In leaving, Michalowski asked about the status of our review of Port Security regulations. He said he had heard the papers were on Mr. Kissinger’s desk. Mr. Kissinger said he would look into the status. Mr. Sonnenfeldt said the matter was moving along; while he could make no promises, he was hopeful that there would be a resolution that the Poles would find helpful. They would of course be informed as soon as the matter had been decided.

HS

4 Reference is to a Polish request for clearance to permit its ships to port in the Great Lakes. See Documents 8, 13, 15, and 16.

134. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT
Conversation with German Minister

Minister Oncken of the German Embassy came in to see me today at his request to show me an instruction from Bonn to the effect that the Poles had told the German negotiators in Bonn that a White House “personality,” though not the President himself, had told the Polish

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files—Europe, Germany, Vol. IV 12/69–9 Apr 70. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt. The original was sent to Kissinger. A typed notation indicates that Hillenbrand received a copy directly from Sonnenfeldt. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it on March 27.

2 Negotiators from the West German and Polish Foreign Ministries met in Warsaw February 4–7 for a first round of talks on the normalization of relations between their two countries. The main topic of discussion was potential FRG recognition (de facto or de jure) of the Oder-Neisse Line. For an account of the talks, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Bd. I, pp. 163–164, 166–169, and 175–179.
Ambassador that the US would have no objection if the FRG recognized the Oder-Neisse line as the permanent Western frontier of Poland.\footnote{Ambassador Rush reported from Bonn on February 13 that Finke-Ossiander “told EmbOff in strictest confidence, and without authorization to do so, that, in course Winiewicz–Duckwitz discussion on Oder-Neisse line, . . . , Winiewicz countered FRG point on four-power responsibility for final border settlement provisions, with accounts of ‘reports’ recently received from Polish Ambassadors in Paris and Washington. . . . Winiewicz said, according to his info, FRG ‘concern’ over four-power issue greatly over-drawn. . . . [P]olish Ambassador in Washington reported that he recently spoke, ‘not with the President personally, but with ‘somebody quite high up in the White House.’ He also said that Oder–Neisse issue would present ‘no problems to U.S.’ “ (Telegram 1577 from Bonn, February 12; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files—Europe, Germany, Vol. IV 12/69–9 Apr 70) Sonnenfeldt summarized the issue for Kissinger: “As was to be expected, the Germans, despite Oncken’s very confidential call on me, put the story the Poles told them about White House support for an Oder-Neisse settlement into regular State channels. Before the attached telegram . . . arrived from Bonn, I had already sent Hillenbrand the memoranda of your conversation with the Polish Ambassador and of mine with Oncken. Hillenbrand will write to Fessenden to make sure he will tell the Germans the same thing at his end as I told Oncken here. This should take care of this matter at least for now.” (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, February 13; ibid.)}

I told Oncken that this seemed to refer to a talk between Mr. Kissinger and the Polish Ambassador on February 3,\footnote{See Document 133.} in which Michalowski had said that the US should tell the Germans that we wanted them to make an agreement settling the border. Mr. Kissinger had responded that we had made clear that we wanted German-Polish reconciliation. Michalowski had then said that this was not enough, to which Mr. Kissinger had responded that we would present no obstacles to German-Polish understanding. I added that Mr. Kissinger had made no comments more specific than that and had not addressed the legal points involved at all. I also told Oncken that in talking with me before going in to see Mr. Kissinger, Michalowski had said that since the Germans settled their Western frontiers they should be able to do the same in the East. I had responded that these situations were legally and politically different.

Oncken said he appreciated the information and would report it home.

Dear Marty:

I am writing you in connection with the Oder-Neisse issue. I do so with some hesitation, since it is a subject deeply involved with our German policy, on which you are the expert; also, I realize that I probably am not fully aware of Washington’s current thinking on the problem and what may already have been passed to Bonn confidentially on this score. Nevertheless, I hope you will bear with me if I convey some of my own thoughts about the Oder-Neisse question, which is the key point in the Polish-FRG political talks.

In brief, I am concerned that in our attitude (expressed in some detail in State 017691 of February 5) we may be giving too much emphasis to the legal aspects of the frontier question—particularly the reservation of our own legal prerogatives—to the possible detriment of achieving a solution of this long-standing and important issue.

I appreciate, of course, that it is essential that we retain our rights in respect to Berlin, which stem from victory in World War II and the various post-war accords, notably the Potsdam Agreement. However, the status of the Oder-Neisse line does not appear to be of such vital importance to the U.S. interest, except as it may derive from Potsdam and its solution may affect Potsdam. I therefore feel we should approach the idea of an agreement settling the Oder-Neisse question with as positive an attitude as possible and demonstrate as much flexibility in handling it as we can.

From what I know of the current FRG attitude on the Oder-Neisse issue, it appears to coincide with ours, i.e., a “final solution” of the problem must await a peace treaty and the Four Powers must consent to any boundary settlement. However, my fear is that this may not—and probably will not—be sufficient to obtain an agreement with Poland, since I anticipate that the Poles will insist on a definitive agreement which does not mention any peace treaty to be held in the future.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 32–3 GER–POL, Secret; Limdis. A copy was sent to Fessenden at the Embassy in Bonn.

2 Telegram 017691 to Warsaw, February 5, is ibid., DEF 4 EUR.

3 See footnote 9, Document 130.
This situation could well lead to a deadlock and to the ultimate failure of the Polish-FRG talks. Such an outcome, I would imagine, would have an adverse impact on Brandt’s Ostpolitik and conceivably could be a serious blow to his political fortunes in the FRG, although I am in no position to pass judgment on that. So far as Poland is concerned, a failure of the Polish-FRG talks would clearly be a setback for Gomulka, and might be an important factor in causing him to lose his present position. While this at first glance might seem no great loss for the U.S., I think it is at least questionable whether a new Polish leadership, succeeding to power in the aftermath of a breakdown of the efforts aimed at normalizing Polish-FRG relations, would be better for our interests than a continuation of Gomulka’s reign.

A number of other aspects could also be cited, of course, in favor of an agreement on this issue, including its contribution to stability in this part of the world and the likelihood that over the long term an agreement would lessen Soviet influence over Poland. We have gone into these aspects in previous reporting, and I will not repeat the details here. In sum, however, I feel strongly that we have a stake in seeing a successful outcome of the Polish-FRG talks on the Oder-Neisse.

What I would like to suggest is that, if it comes to a point of impasse between Poland and the FRG over the form of an accord on the Oder-Neisse, we should be prepared in advance to use our influence with the FRG to help find a way out of the impasse.

For example, why couldn’t we in fact go along with a Polish-FRG treaty which—along the lines of the Belgian-FRG border agreement—would state that the Oder-Neisse border is considered as final between the two contracting parties? Such an agreement in itself would not make reference to an eventual peace treaty. However, as in the case of the Belgian treaty, the Allies would then come forward with notes of consent as required by the Bonn Conventions. (L in its Memorandum of December 10, 1969, page 10 and following pages, has described this procedure clearly.)\footnote{Not found.} This should establish for the record our continued view that the final determination of the boundaries of Germany as a whole must await a peace settlement. Brandt, of course, could make use of these Allied notes in securing Bundestag approval for a treaty, but he would not have to stress them to the Poles.

I am aware, of course, that the Oder-Neisse problem differs from the Belgian-FRG border question in many ways, not least in the political importance of the territory involved and the fact that the temporary nature of the Oder-Neisse line is specifically mentioned in the Potsdam Treaty. However, I wonder if, in the interests of obtaining
Polish-FRG agreement, which could bring so many benefits in its train, we should not try to overlook these differences and treat it in fact like the Belgian case.

I would imagine that we would find support from the British and French for this line of action. Indeed, I fear that if we are not prepared to move in a direction along these lines, we may find ourselves isolated in the future from our Allies. This could include, I believe, the FRG itself, for the time may come when Bonn may wish to give up strict adherence to legalities in an effort to reach a solution with Poland. I suggest that it would be well to prepare for such an eventuality and to take the lead in finding a solution which, while perhaps falling short of our ideal position, would still preserve the essentials of what we want.

In addition to the “Belgian route,” which would preserve for the legal record our Potsdam prerogatives, and after bilateral FRG-Polish agreement, another helpful move in promoting an Oder-Neisse solution would be to have the three Western powers declare (as they did at Potsdam with regard to the Soviet border in East Prussia) that they would support at a future peace conference the agreement reached between Poland and the FRG. This, I can imagine, would be even trickier from the legal standpoint than the Belgian formula, and would also require careful formulation and coordination with Britain and France; but it could be of real help as a specific step to relieve regional tensions, and I do not see that it would damage our interests.

In all aspects of the Polish-FRG negotiations, the influence of the Soviet position is undeniable, and at the same time difficult to define precisely with regard to the various areas of negotiation. I do feel, however, that a good possibility exists that, almost regardless of the outcome of the Soviet-FRG talks, the Poles probably have a relatively free hand to work out an agreement on the Oder-Neisse, so long as it can be described as “definitive.” The actual timing of signature of such an accord might well be subject to some delay in the event of a breakdown of the Soviet-FRG talks, but I believe it would eventually take place.

Forgive me for running on so long on this question, and also if I am belaboring a dead horse or am all wrong—perhaps because of a “parochial view”—on the policy involved. I do feel it is important to move soon, while the political conjuncture in Poland and the FRG appears propitious, to an Oder-Neisse accord. And I would hope that we would neglect no opportunity to make such an accord possible, sacrificing, if necessary, some of our legal desiderata in the process if they are not absolutely essential.

While the FRG seems to be moving along well at present, and I know we do not wish to press unnecessarily, it may be that the FRG will need some encouragement before long as to ways of finding an
Oder-Neisse accord, and I trust that Brandt, when he comes to Washington if not before, will receive such encouragement from us.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Russ Fessenden in Bonn for his information and possible comment. Elliot Richardson may also be interested in our views, but I will leave that to your discretion.5

With very best personal regards,

As ever,

Walt

5 On March 16 Fessenden responded in a letter to Stoessel: “The present phase [in the talks between the FRG and Poland] is one of exactlying fine work in developing formulas and exchanging language on the Oder-Neisse. I am almost more confident of the ability of both sides to come to an agreed formulation on this point than I am about the possibility of inclusion of wider points in the agreement like benefits for ethnic Germans in Poland. These are the issues in which the CDU [the opposition party] is now placing great stress. This, not the U.S. position, is the big problem for Brandt. . . . I don’t think . . . that there is any practical necessity for us to try to bring influence to bear on Brandt in this matter [i.e., the Oder-Neisse line]. Nor do I believe we should be in a position of appearing to force his hand. . . . For us to intervene could even run the risk of getting us involved in the middle of a hot German internal political issue.” (Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, Box 9, Chrons (1969)—Letters (Outgoing))
As I read it, your letter makes two basic proposals. First, the U.S. should be prepared to encourage the FRG, including Brandt himself, to be forthcoming in negotiating on this issue. We should use our influence with the Germans if an impasse were to develop in FRG-Polish talks. Second, the U.S. ought not overemphasize the legal aspects of the frontier question to the detriment of achieving a satisfactory political solution and should be prepared to sacrifice unessential legal desiderata to this end.

On the first point, the Department has made it clear that we hope the FRG-Polish talks will succeed in eliminating the Oder-Neisse issue as an impediment to improved relations. I assume that by encouraging the FRG, however, you mean something more than this. You will already have received [Emory] Coby Swank’s letter of February 26 (which crossed yours in the mail), in which he pointed out the importance of our not conveying any impression of undercutting the FRG in its bilateral negotiations. The Germans will have to make up their own minds on how to handle this issue and, except where our treaty rights and obligations are directly involved, I do not believe that we should try either to spur them or to restrain them. As you point out, the FRG seems to be moving along well at present. Should an impasse in FRG-Polish negotiations develop over this subject, we could review our thinking, but even in those circumstances I do not believe we should volunteer unsolicited advice. The effect of such advice on German domestic political considerations, once it became publicly known, could do serious harm to U.S.-German relations.

The considerations you set forth on the U.S. attitude towards any FRG-Polish agreement are well taken. I fully agree that we should not overemphasize legal aspects per se to the detriment of a satisfactory political solution. We hope that a way can be found which will satisfy the political requirements of both negotiating parties without doing violence to our own substantial interest in the continuing validity of wartime and postwar agreements on Germany. In general, I concur that we should show as much flexibility as is consonant with our own vital interests in dealing with any solution that may develop from the German-Polish negotiations.

You recommend specifically that we take the “Belgian route” in dealing with the problem, whereby the contracting parties would state that the border is final between themselves without referring to the eventual peace settlement as foreseen by the Potsdam Agreement. In this case you recommend that the Allies come forward with notes of consent, establishing for the record our view that the final determination of the

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3 Not printed. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 307, Correspondence, 1968–72)
boundaries of Germany must await a peace settlement. I would tend
to agree with you that if we were to treat a hypothetical FRG-Polish
agreement in the same manner as we did the FRG agreements with the
Benelux countries, we would not have sacrificed essential legal points.
From the political standpoint, however, I wonder if such an approach
would satisfy the Polish demand for a definitive agreement. Since our
reservations would become public, it seems quite plausible that the
Poles in such an event would be unhappy with us, though perhaps not
with the FRG. It is just for this reason that I agree with Coby’s point
that we should not now mislead the Poles into thinking we would au-
tomatically and unconditionally accept and support whatever agree-
ment the Germans and Poles might make.

Another variant, as suggested in L/EUR’s memorandum of De-
cember 10, 1969, might be to seek some Four Power agreement rec-
ommending that the eventual German peace settlement adopt the
Oder-Neisse Line as the final boundary between Germany and Poland.
While I do not believe we would wish to take any sort of initiative to
promote this point, we could respond favorably to some FRG-Polish
proposal to this effect,4 assuming of course that the Soviet Union would
be willing to endorse such a recommendation.

I hope that this letter will lead you to the conclusion that even
though unwilling to put pressure on the FRG, we are open-minded
about how we could support any solution the Germans and Poles might
reach, while at the same time safeguarding essential Allied legal rights
stemming from valid international agreements which have important
implications beyond the Polish border question.

Elliot Richardson is, as you surmised, very interested in this sub-
ject and I have sent him copies of your letter and this reply. You will
have noted State’s 245675 reporting his conversation with the German
Ambassador on the Polish-FRG talks.6

Sincerely,

Marty

4 A handwritten notation in the margin reads: “interesting.”
5 A comment in margin reads: “attached.” Telegram 24567 to Bonn, February 17, is
in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–US.
6 In a March 21 letter to Hillenbrand, Stoessel responded: “I appreciated your let-
ter of March 9, responding to mine of February 25 on the Oder-Neisse question. Your
comments are well-taken and do indeed lead me to the conclusion that our official po-
sition is open-minded and flexible.” (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 307, Cor-
respondence, 1968–72)
137. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT

Lunch with Mr. Ryszard Frackiewicz, Counselor at the Polish Embassy

At lunch yesterday, Frackiewicz spent the first 20 minutes summarizing the President’s foreign policy report, as he understood it (highlighting the references to normalization of relations with Eastern Europe), and wondering whether our economic policy toward Eastern Europe was not in contradiction with the basic thrust. He said he could not understand why we seemed to treat Eastern Europe the same way as the USSR (in contrast to the Johnson Administration’s different treatment of different Communists) and why we were not granting Romania MFN. I said the President’s view of East-West trade was outlined in the Report and that as a practical matter economic policies were in fact tailored to different situations. Basically, however, we doubted that economic contacts would lead to great political breakthroughs; more likely, political progress would lay a more solid foundation for greater commercial contact.

Frackiewicz then turned to Polish-German negotiations and stressed how important it was for the US and other allies to encourage the Germans to settle the Oder-Neisse, including necessary amendments to the Paris Agreements. I took occasion to tell him that the Poles would make a bad mistake if they tried to play the Western allies off against each other on this question. I had been very disturbed to learn that Mr. Kissinger’s general comments to the Polish Ambassador about our support for German-Polish reconciliation had been passed on to the Germans by Polish officials in a version that had us supporting the Polish interpretation of Potsdam. I also noted that an American journalist in Washington had told me that Mr. Kissinger’s alleged comments had also been passed to newspapermen by the Poles.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 834, Name Files, Sonnenfeldt, Helmut. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt. The original was sent to Kissinger and a copy was sent to Ash. Copies were also sent to Haig and Lord.
2 For the relevant excerpts from the President’s annual report on U.S. foreign policy, presented to Congress on February 18, 1970, see Document 7.
3 The Paris Agreements, signed on October 23, 1954, among other things, ended the postwar occupation of Germany. For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 424–436.
4 See Documents 133 and 134.
I said that this sort of thing made private conversations very difficult and could not help the cause of Polish-German agreement. Frackiewicz professed to be shocked by what I told him and said he could not imagine that any Polish official could have been guilty of an indiscretion. I said I hoped that no further attempts would be made to use us in order to undercut the German position in the Warsaw talks.

On the substance of the matter, I reiterated that we welcomed German-Polish reconciliation and, indeed, would consider it of historic significance. I personally hoped that the complex juridical questions involved could be settled although it seemed doubtful to me that the maximum Polish demands provided a suitable basis.

Frackiewicz then wondered whether we had cooled on the idea of normalization of German relations with the East. I said our position was as stated in the President's Report. He returned to the theme that we should press the Germans to move on the Oder-Neisse. I said a matter of this kind cannot be resolved by pressure but only in a natural way involving substantial acceptance by the parties concerned of what was being done. I added that if at some point the Germans and the allies considered it desirable to examine the juridical issues among themselves then this would presumably take place in the normal course of events. But pressure would not be likely to bring about such an examination.

I then briefly raised the question why the Poles, after all that had happened to them at the hands of the Germans and the Russians over the centuries placed so much faith in formal agreements about borders. Frackiewicz said that if the Poles let themselves become the prisoners of their history they might as well go out of existence. But he agreed that even without an agreement with the FRG, Poland had ample relations with that country in the economic, technical and cultural fields.

Toward the end of the lunch, Frackiewicz asked about the status of our decision on Polish shipping into the Great Lakes. I said it did not appear, contrary to earlier indications, that a favorable decision would be forthcoming soon.5

HS

5 See footnote 4, Document 133.
Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT

Conversation with Polish Ambassador, Michalowski, May 26

The Ambassador came in at his initiative prior to returning home for consultations. His main purpose was to complain about the poor state of bilateral relations. He cited our failure to grant the Poles access to Great Lakes ports for their shipping line and our delay in granting a license for a fluid catalytic cracking plant. He said that he had always been a strong advocate of better US-Polish economic relations but that these developments undermined his credibility in Warsaw.

I said that after careful consideration it had not proved possible to change our regulations with respect to the ports; this was of course not applicable just to Poland but to other East European countries as well. I told him that I was not informed about the cracking plant license but would try to find out where it stood. (Michalowski said he had heard it was being reviewed in the White House.) In general, I said that prospects for major changes in our legislation or in economic relations did not appear to me to be promising as long as the Vietnam war continued. I added that in any case Poland was pretty well off since it had MFN and other aspects of our relations (e.g. scientific and cultural exchanges) seemed to be progressing well.

Michalowski said that MFN was of course helpful but the Poles found that they could not spend the money they earned by their exports because of our refusal to license US exports of the type of industrial equipment the Poles wanted. He, Michalowski, had urged Polish economic planners to provide for cooperation with the US in the new five-year plan but that now it seemed this was an illusion.

Michalowski went on to say that Vietnam had already lasted five years.
and would probably last five years more; that was a long time to wait for better relations, especially since the Poles could do nothing to bring about peace in Vietnam. Michalowski professed to be especially pessimistic because recent US actions in Indochina would only serve to harden DRV and VC positions and probably rule out a negotiated settlement. Michalowski went on at some length about the importance of decoupling economic relations from political ones. Reverting to the cracking plant, Michalowski said that this was really the test case from which Poland would determine whether it could expect any significant economic assistance from the US. It wanted such assistance (at least many in Warsaw did) not as a gift or favor but on a purely commercial basis. He personally felt it important that the US be among Poland’s significant economic partners.

I said we felt on the whole that improved economic relations with the East would have the most solid basis if they flowed from better political relations. Soviet practice, certainly, had shown repeatedly how deteriorating political relations serve to disrupt economic ones (viz. what they did to Yugoslavia, Albania, China, Romania and Poland itself). This did not mean that we opposed a certain level of activity; on the contrary. But I did not see any prospect for major changes under present circumstances. Michalowski said that his return to Warsaw in these circumstances would be a rather sad one.

We briefly talked about the Rome NATO meeting at which I said there probably would be a statement on MBFR. Michalowski asked whether there would be anything on a conference, which the Poles still believed was a desirable goal. He also asked whether there would be specific proposal on MBFR. I said that MBFR was a complex subject on which a good deal of preparatory work still needed to be done; but NATO was probably ready to express more vigorously its interest in talks with the East on it. As regards a conference, I said there were different approaches among the NATO allies on this and I could not say at this point precisely how the NATO communiqué would deal with it. My own personal view continued to be that we should concentrate on issues rather than procedure. Michalowski said there ought to be active preparatory work for a conference.

As regards the Polish-German talks, Michalowski felt that a good deal of progress had been made and he felt there was now some prospect of success especially if at the right time the Germans received some encouragement from the US. He said the Poles were still not quite

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satisfied with the FRG formula on the Oder-Neisse since it still fell short of “final recognition.” There also was a hitch in Polish-German economic negotiations. All told, he felt that it would probably not be until the autumn that both these negotiations would be crowned with success. In his view, Brandt was unlikely to give more ground before the Land elections in June, although a Polish delegation would be going to Bonn for more talks before then.

I said we continued to be in favor of German-Polish reconciliation. I foresaw no serious problem for us if the Poles and Germans agreed on a frontier formula. We were not going to inject ourselves into the talks, however. I asked if diplomatic relations would be established once the agreement had been settled. Michalowski said not right away; there still were psychological inhibitions in Poland. Eventually, however, this would occur.

Michalowski asked if I was optimistic on SALT. I said I had tried to avoid using words like optimistic and pessimistic, but that in my 20-year experience with disarmament negotiations, I felt that SALT had gotten off to the best start. The problems were complex ones and much hard work was ahead. Michalowski said he was encouraged by the fact that SALT was progressing despite the bad international situation. I said disarmament talks over the years had occasionally made progress while the political climate was bad (e.g. the NPT and the test ban treaty shortly after the Cuban missile crisis); the pattern of interrelationships was not clear-cut. We had of course never put forward specific political preconditions for holding SALT but clearly on this crucial set of security issues there was bound to be a connection with the over-all US-Soviet relationship. Michalowski said we should treat economic relations the way we seemed to treat SALT—carry on regardless of political difficulties.

The conversation ended with Michalowski again bemoaning the unfortunate state of our relations and his “sadness” in returning to Warsaw with empty hands.

Note: The license application for the Polish cracking plant is being considered in the normal fashion. State, Commerce and DuBridge are evidently in favor; Interior and Defense have reservations. Mr. Downey of this office has informed the Polish Ambassador (May 27) that the application was under active consideration but that we are not in a position to indicate what the outcome will be. The Ambassador noted he had neglected to mention two points during his conversation with me: The Poles are ready to offer assurances that (a) the cracking plant would not be used to produce fuel for jets, but only for automobiles, and that (b) the technology of the plant will not be transferred to third countries. He expressed the hope that a favorable answer would await him on his return to Washington on June 9.
In a meeting with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Richard Davies on September 11, 1970, Polish Ambassador Jerzy Michalowski referred to the “‘unpleasant news’ he had heard an hour earlier from Commerce Secretary Stans on the recent U.S. Government action further postponing a decision on the catalytic cracker licensing case. He said that, while not unexpected, this would cause unfavorable consequences in U.S.-Polish relations.” Davies replied that “the decision might be reviewed in the future when further improvement in the atmosphere of U.S.-Polish relations had occurred.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL POL–US) On the decision to postpone a decision on the Polish request, see Document 14.

On September 19 Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff presented President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger with a memorandum in preparation for the latter’s upcoming meeting with Ambassador to Poland Walter J. Stoessel. Sonnenfeldt wrote: “Stoessel will probably be interested to hear from you a rationale for Polish-American relations, in view of the negative decision on the sale of petroleum technology to Poland. (We have told the Poles that it is deferred because of the ‘general political situation.’) You may wish to say that the President does not feel the time is ripe for any special moves toward Poland. Our main interest at present is demonstrating that the countries most friendly to us, Romania and Yugoslavia, benefit from their positions of independence, and that we, in fact, differentiate between the countries of Eastern Europe. Of course, Poland is not on a par with East Germany, Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria. We regard Poland and Hungary as a kind of middle ground, which means that various exchanges and so forth should proceed. Later we might reconsider the cracking plant.”

Sonnenfeldt continued: “He may mention that the Poles are taking this cracking plant decision as a touchstone of our relations, and reading a great deal into it. This, of course, makes life for Stoessel more difficult. You might point out that as long as the Poles play the North Vietnamese and Soviet game as members of the ICC we have to take this into account. On the other hand, we are not so unrealistic as to expect Poland, in light of its geographic position, to condemn the Brezhnev doctrine.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971) There is no record of Kissinger meeting with Stoessel in Kissinger’s Record of Schedule. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 428, Miscellany, 1968–1976) No other record of the meeting has been found.
On November 18, 1970, after nearly 10 months of negotiations, West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel and Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Jedrychowski concluded a treaty on normalizing relations between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany, popularly called the “Treaty of Warsaw.” Article 1, Paragraph 1, of the treaty reads: “The Federal Republic of Germany and the People’s Republic of Poland state in mutual agreement that the existing boundary line, the course of which is laid down in Chapter IX of the Decisions of the Potsdam Conference of August 2, 1945, as running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemünde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, constitutes the western state frontier of the People’s Republic of Poland.” For the full text of the treaty, see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1969–1970, page 24346.

In an unsigned memorandum to President Richard Nixon that morning, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger assessed the agreement as follows:

“The Polish-West German treaty, to be initialed in Warsaw this morning, will contain an agreement that the Oder-Neisse (as defined in the Potsdam agreement), ‘constitutes’ the Western border of Poland, and that neither side will raise territorial claims against the other ‘in the future.’ While the treaty disclaims any infringements on existing bilateral or multilateral agreements, it goes a long way to being the definitive settlement of the border issue. There is no mention in the exchange of notes between Bonn and the Three Western Powers, or between the Germans and Poles, of the German peace treaty. Attempts to make reference to the peace treaty in a note from Bonn to the Three Western Powers collapsed under strong Polish pressures. We plan to note the fact of the treaty with approval, and say little more in our note to the Germans. Brandt will probably go to Warsaw for the formal signing, but ratification procedures are still open to further talks. Presumably, the Poles will try to break the linkage of their treaty to the Moscow treaty, a linkage the Germans agreed to in Moscow.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 23, President’s Daily Briefs, November 17–30, 1970)

During a senior NSC staff meeting on November 18, Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt discussed the negotiations in Warsaw. According to a record of the meeting, the following exchange occurred:

“Mr. Kissinger: What did the Germans get from the Poles?

“Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Nothing. Incidentally, people are beginning to get very queasy about the Germans making treaties in Eastern Europe, especially with the Russians. As you know, Brandt decided that
[former West German Foreign Minister Gerhard] Schroeder had made a mistake in trying to circumvent Moscow and he has changed their priorities. Some Poles are now beginning to talk about the Germans getting together with the Soviets on frontier questions. They’re beginning to talk about a fifth partition of Poland.

“Mr. Kissinger: I have yet to meet a non-German who is happy about German approaches to Eastern Europe.

“Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Many people are schizophrenic about this. They wanted a détente, but are getting very queasy over a German-Soviet treaty, particularly when it is referred to as a non-aggression pact.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 314, National Security Council, 1969–77, Meetings, Staff, 1969–71)

In a press release issued the same day, the Department of State announced: “The United States has noted with satisfaction the initialling of a treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Polish People’s Republic in Warsaw today. These negotiations have been the subject of consultation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the three Western powers who, with the Soviet Union, share continuing responsibilities for Germany.

“The United States is confident that this development will promote improved relations between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany and help to eliminate sources of tension in Europe.” (Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, page 1112)

In an affirmative response to a diplomatic note from the Federal Republic of Germany on November 19, the United States noted that “it shares the position that the [Polish-West German] Treaty does not and cannot affect the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers as reflected in . . . known treaties and agreements.” (Ibid., pages 1112–1113)

On December 7 West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and Polish Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz signed the treaty in Warsaw. It was ratified by the West German Bundestag on May 19, 1972, along with the Moscow Treaty, and entered into force the same year.
141. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
US Attitude towards Polish-FRG Treaty

PARTICIPANTS
Jerzy Michalowski, Ambassador, Embassy of the Polish People’s Republic
Richard T. Davies, Assistant Secretary, EUR
John A. Baker, Jr., Director, EUR/CHP

Polish Ambassador Michalowski came in at the invitation of Mr. Davies who wished to clarify further for him the US attitude toward the signature of the FRG-Polish Treaty. Mr. Davies observed that for the time being the Department of State would, if asked at press briefings, stick by its position of November 18, 1970, stated after the initialing of the Treaty (i.e., “The United States notes with satisfaction the initialling of a treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Polish People’s Republic in Warsaw today. These negotiations have been the subject of consultations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the three Western powers who, with the Soviet Union, share continuing responsibilities for Germany. The United States is confident that this development will promote improved relations between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany and help to eliminate sources of tension in Europe”).

If pressed to clarify this position, the spokesman would have to point out that the US maintained its rights for Germany as a whole up until a peace settlement and that such a settlement would involve the final establishment of the borders. We were not especially anxious to stress this, Mr. Davies said, and we knew it would not be welcomed by the Poles. We were being more forthcoming about the Treaty in our replies to specific written queries from the US public and Congressmen and would include the sentence: “The United States welcomes the

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2 Michalowski met previously with Davies on December 5 to inquire about the U.S. attitude toward the treaty. Davies stated “that we plan in the near future to say in response to inquiries from our public that we welcome the treaty including the border provisions as a contribution to the lessering of tension in Europe.” In a subsequent conversation with Michalowski, Baker “said that, at the December 7 press briefing, the spokesman would stick to the substance of the statement made when the Treaty was initialled November 18… The more forthcoming language will, however, emerge in due course as a result of its use in reply to public inquiries.” (Memorandum of conversation, December 5; ibid.) For the Department’s statement of November 18, see Document 140.
treaty, including its border provisions, as a contribution to the improvement of German-Polish relations and to the elimination of sources of tension in Europe.”

Michalowski asked what we would do if such letters were published and Mr. Baker observed that normally the Department’s clearance for publication would be sought. We would not exclude, however, that this might occur. We did not feel this would be particularly helpful as it could stimulate questioning of the spokesman and perhaps the type of clarification mentioned above.

Michalowski observed that there was disappointment in Poland that the US appeared not to welcome the Treaty and genuine puzzlement as to our reluctance not to accept (sic) the Treaty, border provisions included, as the British had (Michalowski later referred more accurately to the British use of “welcome” rather than accept). Michalowski further remarked that the US position appeared to lend encouragement to expellees and others in Germany who were resisting the Treaty. Mr. Davies asked whether the US stance was really causing that much concern in Poland, expressing doubt that this was the case. Michalowski referred to Polish concern for “forces in the US administration” who, he alleged, appeared interested in braking the FRG’s Ostpolitik and were allegedly maintaining an unyielding position in the Berlin talks. He said he could not be sure that it would be possible to avoid criticism of the US in Poland unless a more forthcoming US public statement were made.

Mr. Baker observed that US media had given ample and favorable coverage to the signature of the Treaty and Chancellor Brandt’s reception in Poland. There had been little pressure for an official US statement on the Treaty and the favorable atmosphere would be impaired if any controversy were to be raised about it.

Mr. Davies observed that we had considered the matter carefully and, for a number of reasons, felt it advisable to avoid if possible stirring up either proponents or opponents of a more forthcoming posture. Perhaps at a future time a clearer welcome would be possible. Until then, we expected our friends in Poland to avoid criticism in the knowledge that we were not concealing anything by our reserve.

While departing, Ambassador Michalowski remarked to Mr. Baker that there was a certain lack of clarity in the US handling of the matter. Mr. Baker admitted that this observation had validity, but added that a certain lack of clarity was at certain times preferable to too much clarity.
Warsaw, December 16, 1970, 1430Z.

3501. Subject: Gdansk Riots. Ref: Warsaw 3477 (notal).2

1. Bitterness and anger came over wide segments of Polish population in wake of December 13 public announcement of price changes (both up and down) which Polish man in street generally regards as signifying 10 to 15 percent cut in purchasing power. Demonstrations and riots in Gdansk area as well as disturbances in other cities appear to issue directly from this untimely government action. With Christmas national holiday in offing, this action seems like slap in face to Poles.

2. Gdansk or Szczecin radio reports, on which Western European accounts apparently based, have not been heard here. Telephone, air and rail communications have been interrupted during past 48 hours. The information we have, however, tends to confirm those reports. Following is summary of info available to us:

A. Swedish Consul in Gdansk reports that 800 to 1000 workers demonstrated in Gdansk afternoon December 14 shouting “Down with Gomulka” and “Down with Karkoszka” (First Party Secretary, Gdansk Province).

B. Same source states Chairman Gdansk Province National Council Bejm went on local television that evening to urge demonstrators to go home, telling them not to endanger what they had already achieved, and not to let themselves be carried away by small handful of agitators.

C. Same source morning December 15 saw some 300 housewives demonstrating with placards and shouting slogans.

D. Unverified reports say demonstration grew to point where local party headquarters allegedly attacked. Several buildings apparently set on fire. Police curfew put into effect. Police and army said to patrol streets and guard party headquarters. Some 300 people including militia reported injured, but we cannot confirm reports of deaths from independent sources.

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2 Telegram 3477 from Warsaw, December 14, detailed the price increases that sparked the riots. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO 14 POL)
E. Telephone and air communications with Gdansk still cut out December 16.

F. Lesser disturbances reportedly have take place in Katowice area, where police or Army in force said to have discouraged incipient demonstrations, and in Lodz and Bydgoszcz.

G. Factory stoppages reported in Warsaw area.

3. Another source indicates police and militia received substantial wage boost several weeks ago to insure loyalty to regime. While we cannot confirm this specifically yet, we note that Sejm Commission for Internal Affairs, in reviewing Interior Ministry budget, “paid tribute . . . for self-sacrificial and even more effective activity.”

4. Source who claims to have read PAP News Bulletin for internal government use tells us it reports party headquarters for [and] police building and radio station in Gdansk as having been set on fire.

5. Prevailing mood of Poles is uglier than any encountered in last two years. While riots and demonstrations may not bring people any significant material benefits, they give regime another black eye and tend to reveal extent of lack of confidence between regime and people.

Stoessel

143. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Polish Situation—Wider Implications
Reference Intelligence Memorandum from CIA dated 18 December 1970


2 Attached but not printed. Also attached but not printed are Kissinger’s talking points for the December 18 meeting; telegram 4733 from USNATO, December 18; an East German message from December 18; and two CIA intelligence memoranda on the situation in Poland.
The CIA evaluation, coordinated with State/INR and DIA, is sound as far as it goes.

There are more serious questions that lurk in the background. The basic one is that it is once again proving extremely difficult to reform or even tinker with a Communist economy. Any rational economic measures if undertaken with any degree of speed, are bound to involve price increases for the consumer since Communist prices bear no resemblance to costs.

—In Poland there are the special additional points (1) huge amounts of zlotys have been piled up in large segments of the population, (2) wages were being lowered for some in the drive for greater productivity for profitability, (3) the regime was obviously concerned that the Christmas season would surface the zlotys hidden in stockings and bank accounts and quickly exhaust the limited supply of food etc., and (4) Gomulka was apparently persuaded that having just gotten the FRG to cede 40 thousand square miles of territory to Poland he had the political green light to clobber the workers with a price-wage squeeze. (In fact, the Polish population has long since thought this territory was theirs and in the end, even if it didn’t think so, is more interested in a full Christmas table.)

All Communist economies have built in inflation which weighs most heavily on the population at large. Thus, once the spark of popular dissatisfaction is really lit it can, as it now is in Poland, catch fire and explode.

Beyond that, of course, the issue is not merely one of prices and supply and demand. It is one of structure. Ironically enough, again, the explosion is occurring in a country which is already a maverick in that it never went along with the irrationality of agricultural collectivization. Nevertheless it is a Communist country, run by a clique of bureaucrats interested most of all in their own survival. Real reform, introducing elements of genuine spontaneity into the system, threatens their monopoly on power. It is quite true that through what can only be called a virtuoso performance, Kadar in Hungary has over a period of some ten years let some of this happen and seems reasonably well in the saddle nonetheless. But even that story is far from told to the end.

All of this is by way of suggesting that the rigidity of the Soviet leaders is bound to be reinforced by what is happening in Poland.

—Recent Soviet economic decisions make very clear that the yen for experimentation does not exist within the political leadership. It does exist among the economic managers and you thus have a basic contradiction between those who have the political power and those who make the country function in practice. Moreover, these latter, although despised for their bourgeois attitudes and manners by many Soviet intellectuals, artists and writers, have their tacit support because they are allied against the stifling regime of the political bureaucrats.
The foreign policy implications for the Soviets from all this are complex. As I have previously suggested, Soviet political leaders of the most orthodox stripe can be quite open to trading with the West (and to providing a political-formalistic base for that by a treaty with the Germans) because in this way they hope to avoid genuine economic reform. Such leaders could even be prepared to make some kind of a SALT agreement with us although they are extremely beholden for their hold on power to those who bear arms in the USSR and who are not noted to their devotion to SALT. But they will always be on guard against the domestic political spill-over effects of economic and technical relations with the West and of any accommodations that may be reached here or there on this or that critical issue with us. This is what limits the prospects of real détente.

There is a theory that in the tradition of Pilsudski, and not unlike de Gaulle, Gomulka is given to moods of resignation and would be quite capable of walking off the job.

The CIA paper notes the possibility of Gomulka’s stepping down and of Gierek taking his place. It is noteworthy that in the current crisis Gomulka has been nowhere seen or heard. I think it is worth noting on this score that Gierek has sometimes been identified as a representative of that wing of the Polish Party which combines an interest in greater managerial efficiency with a highly cultivated sense of Polish nationalism. In addition, he is one Pole near the top reaches who has genuine charisma. He has long run his Silesian fiefdom as a semi-autonomous province and has done so very effectively. His accession to power, if a coalition forms in Warsaw to elevate him, may or may not be acquiesced in by the Soviets. If they object, they may have to use major pressure to prevent his rise to the top and either save or persuade Gomulka to hang on or come up with an alternative. As regards the latter, no one can think of one.

But if Gierek does succeed, there may sooner or later be a blow-up with the Soviets because he simply does not share Gomulka’s passionate (and tragic) view that Poland can only be safe as a totally loyal ally of the USSR. (de Gaulle found out about Gomulka’s feelings when he tried to persuade him to “broaden Poland’s horizons.”) This aspect of Gierek should be qualified to some extent. Gierek was born in France of Polish parents and spent the war in Belgium. His attitudes are heavily influenced by the Thorez–Duclos wing of the French CP; he is thus conservative on Communist ideological issues and would therefore not consciously drive things to a clash with the Soviets. But sooner or later the dynamics of differing interests would produce in Poland what already happened there once before in 1956 and has since happened in every other East European country (except perhaps the GDR)—a conflict situation. Gierek, unlike Gomulka, might not exert himself to prevent this from occurring, especially since Poland’s Western frontier will
have been settled and a major source of Polish dependence on the USSR removed.

Thus, what the Polish events seem to demonstrate anew is the profound abnormality of the Soviet-imposed system in Eastern Europe and the fact that sooner or later, in one country after another though, of course, in quite different forms, there will be rebellion against this abnormality. This is the essence of the division of Europe; this is the essence of why the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe is ultimately untenable except by force (no matter how successful the Soviets may be in the short and medium term to disorient the West Europeans) and this is the basic reason why Western professors (and SPD politicians) who talk of “peaceful engagement” and glorious schemes for the “reunification” of Europe on the basis of technological convergence or whatever other vehicle they happen to make a fetish of, are romantics and adventurers who, if listened to, will produce massive frustration in the West and a defensive reaction in Moscow that could under some circumstances produce catastrophe.

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144. **Minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting**¹

Washington, December 18, 1970, 4:14–5:02 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Poland

**PARTICIPATION**

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Under Secretary John Irwin

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand

Mr. John A. Baker, Jr.

Defense

Mr. G. Warren Nutter

Mr. John Morse

CIA

Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman

Mr. Thomas Karamessines

¹Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. An inter-agency study will be prepared discussing political implications and possible US actions in the event of the following contingencies:

   a. Abatement of the riots in Poland.
   b. Suppression of the riots by the Polish armed forces.
   c. Soviet military intervention in Poland.
   d. Spread of disorders to East Germany and other East European countries.

   The analysis of political implications should discuss how the above contingencies may affect Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and the United States. With regard to possible US actions, the study should particularly consider the nature and timing of steps which the US might take to manifest its disapproval of Soviet intervention or repressive measures by East European governments.

   The study will be prepared by a Working Group chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Hillenbrand and including representatives of Defense, JCS, and CIA. The WSAG will meet on December 21 to discuss an initial report from the Working Group.2

2. CIA will continue to provide at least daily reports to the WSAG on the situation in Poland and related developments.

3. The WSAG noted the importance of continuing intensive efforts to obtain intelligence on Soviet troop movements.

   Dr. Kissinger: I thought we should get together in order to get ourselves up to speed on what the situation is in Poland. We need to see what implications might develop for us and what we should prepare for. (to Cushman) Can you give us a briefing?

   Lt. Gen. Cushman: Two areas have been affected in Poland. One is around Gdansk, Sopot, and Gdynia, where they are partial to complete strikes. The Polish Government is maintaining air and naval patrols along the Baltic coast. The other hot spot is Szczecin, where authorities have closed schools, cancelled afternoon work shifts, and imposed a 6:00 p.m. curfew. There are reports that some disturbances

2 See Document 147.
may have occurred in Silesia; at least, we have indications that army units are on the alert there. At Wroclaw and Katowice commercial flights have been cancelled, and local officials are reported on the way to Warsaw. Disturbances were also reported in other cities west of Warsaw, including Poznan and Slupsk.

Dr. Kissinger: What triggered the disturbances?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: Price increases, combined with shortages. The government was attempting to shift purchasing from food to appliances while holding the line on wages. The disorders were apparently spontaneous. There have been strikes, including some in Warsaw, for wage increases; but the regime says it will hold fast. Soviet forces are on a common-sense alert, but we have no firm evidence that troops are on the move, although there was a single report of a troop movement. The Poles have fifteen divisions; as long as these remain loyal, they have plenty of muscle to handle the situation.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the expectation about what the Polish Army will do?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: We think they will remain loyal. There has been no occasion to use troops yet although some tanks have been deployed. There has been some fighting, with about 100 wounded and 12 killed. That is the situation as of three o’clock today.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you giving us daily reports?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: Yes. (to Karamessines) Are these being prepared on a regular basis?

Mr. Karamessines: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Continue to do that for the next few days.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: The reports will probably be prepared more often—I imagine at least twice daily.

Dr. Kissinger: What is our assessment of the effect these riots are likely to have on the Polish regime? In one of these reports you say that Gomulka might withdraw and Gierek might take over.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: This speculation is not based on any evidence. However, a few years ago Gomulka had quite a fight to retain power, and if this happened again, he might withdraw if it looked like the country were going to be torn apart.

Dr. Kissinger: What is Gierek’s position?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: I don’t know.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Hillenbrand) What do you say?

Mr. Hillenbrand: He is not an entirely orthodox communist. He would probably put the interests of the workers as he sees them ahead of reform. The current problem is related to action by the economic reform group in the Polish Government. It will probably mean a setback
for reform. The Polish effort has been modeled somewhat after the Hungarian reform.

Mr. Baker: But the Poles have not gone nearly as far as the Hungarians.

Dr. Kissinger: I take it the Poles will stick to a more orthodox economic policy.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: How would the Soviets react to Gieriek? Would they like him?

Mr. Hillenbrand: He would be acceptable. On the other hand, he may not be able to come to grips with the longer range problems of the Polish economy.

Dr. Kissinger: That is their problem.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes. It is certainly not ours.

Dr. Kissinger: What is our assessment of the possibility that the situation will get out of hand?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: It is difficult to say. If the riots spread—and if a report we have had that something may be occurring in East Germany proves valid, then things could really get going. The key to the situation is to be found in the Polish forces.

Dr. Kissinger: So far they have not been used.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: There has been some fighting.

Mr. Hillenbrand: The Poles are basically relying on their security forces rather than on the army.

Mr. Karamessines: They have put troops in certain industrial areas.

Dr. Kissinger: I assume that the riots will either have to subside or spread—that the present situation won’t continue. Is that a fair judgment?

Mr. Hillenbrand: I think so.

Dr. Kissinger: What conclusions can we draw about the reaction in East Germany and the Soviet Union? Can we get an assessment? We don’t have to have it right now.

Mr. Hillenbrand: We have a tentative assessment. Even if the disturbances do not rise to a higher level than at present, we believe the cause of economic reform in Poland will be set back. The Polish disorders will also give the Hungarians pause in carrying out their far-reaching economic reform program, to which there is considerable domestic opposition. In the USSR the group that takes a passive attitude toward Ostpolitik may be led to reassess their position. One theory about the Polish price hikes is that they were implemented at this time because the Polish Government was feeling more confident as a result
of having settled its border with Germany.3 If the objective of Ostpolitik was greater Soviet permissiveness toward German intercourse with Eastern Europe, then the troubles in Poland may constitute a setback for Ostpolitik.

Dr. Kissinger: If I may be the devil’s advocate, couldn’t the riots be viewed as being not the fault of Ostpolitik but of the conclusions the East Europeans drew from Ostpolitik? That is, it is all right to go full speed ahead on Ostpolitik, but it is not correct to conclude that it is possible to raise prices just because a major international settlement has been arranged.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Possibly, although my judgment is that in the short run we will find the Soviets and the Poles taking a more conservative approach.

Dr. Kissinger: Then you estimate that if the riots subside, the domestic consequence in Poland will be a more conservative economic policy and that internationally the Poles will adopt a more cautious approach toward increased dealings with the West.

Mr. Irwin: These are possibilities, not predictions.

Mr. Baker: There will probably be a greater impact on the Soviet attitude toward Ostpolitik than on the Polish. Poland will still be looking for the benefits that Ostpolitik could bring. As Marty [Hillenbrand]4 has said, if the Soviets see that the situation is volatile in Poland, they may take another look at Ostpolitik.

Dr. Kissinger: The old approach to Ostpolitik, which the Germans tried in 1965, was to deal directly with the East European countries. When that didn’t work, they decided that the way was to go through Moscow. Now the Soviets may conclude that even that route is too dangerous. The Germans represent a magnet for the East Europeans. The conclusion the Soviets might draw is that rapport with Bonn is just not the right policy. If one carried this line of speculation one step further, it might be said that the Soviets will decide that it is better to seek détente with the US.

I believe that one of the foreign policy problems the Soviets have had in recent years is choosing between geopolitical and ideological considerations. They want to be sure that they are free to meet the Chinese threat; yet, if they get too close to us, they open the way for the Chinese to contest their leadership in the communist world. Ostpolitik seemed to offer the Soviets a way out by pacifying Europe. Now they may draw the conclusion that these benefits from Ostpolitik are only superficial. Am I speculating too wildly?

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3 See Document 140.
4 All brackets in the original.
Mr. Karamessines: The Polish disorders could be the greatest thing that ever came down the pike for Ulbricht.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Sonnenfeldt) What do you think?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Russians may be more cautious about German access to Eastern Europe, but they will still have a major problem. They want Western economic and technical assistance, and they know they can only get what they need from Germany. It is not going to be available from us, and the French and British can’t offer enough. The only way for the Soviets to avoid economic reforms is to get the margin of support that Germany can provide.

Dr. Kissinger: When Ambassador Pauls was in yesterday crying about Acheson, he said the Germans were not going to give credits to the Soviets. (to Hillenbrand) Do you believe that?

Mr. Hillenbrand: On the basis of recent talks I have had with various German bankers and industrialists, I would say that the Russians have illusions about the quantity of money that might be available from either private or governmental sources in Germany. Pauls’ statement is probably correct. People like Egon Bahr are economic illiterates. The money won’t be produced by the Chancellor’s office but by the industrialists and bankers, who are much more bearish about the possibilities.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: They also belong to a different party.

Dr. Kissinger: If neither the government nor the private bankers give the money, then the last incentive for Ostpolitik is removed.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Soviets may well draw the conclusion that they cannot derive the dividends from Ostpolitik that they had expected. The Soviets face the problem of deciding what to do to promote economic growth. If credits are unavailable, the pressures for economic reform will possibly be increased. There are three ways they can make the economy move. They can squeeze the people; that constitutes a return to Stalinism. They can try to get subsidies from the West. Or they can make reforms, but this is repugnant to the present leadership.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Irwin) What are your views?

Mr. Irwin: I tend to think that anything like what is happening in Poland tends to make the Soviets more cautious. However, if they recognize that the recent events are not the result of Ostpolitik but are due to the internal situation in Poland, they might conclude that Ostpolitik is still helpful to them.

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Dr. Kissinger: Let’s look at the next contingency. What if the riots spread and are bloodily suppressed by the Polish forces? Would we expect the consequences to be merely a magnification of what we have already discussed, or would there be additional elements that might come into play?

Mr. Hillenbrand: The quantitative difference would be such as to constitute almost a qualitative difference. The Ulbricht line will carry the day—that is, that it is dangerous to expose yourself to Western contamination.

Dr. Kissinger: I tend to agree with what John [Irwin] said, but if the Soviets did connect the troubles in Poland with German policy, what would happen?

Mr. Hillenbrand: I think the linkage is more complex. The Soviets might conclude that if the political systems in the Eastern European countries are so volatile that a price rise threatens their stability, how much more dangerous might it be if these countries are exposed to German influence.

Mr. Irwin: That makes considerable sense.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a good thesis. Then we can say that if there is a bloody revolt, the Soviets will clamp down. Will it be a general clampdown, or will they try to achieve friendlier relations with us, since we are not a threat in this situation?

Mr. Hillenbrand: SALT would probably be the least affected. There might be more fallout with regard to Berlin and Germany.

Dr. Kissinger: Is there anything that we can do in the event of these first two contingencies? I assume that anything we might say would only make matters more complicated.

Mr. Baker: If the Polish Government sheds a lot of blood, there will be an outcry in this country. Many groups will be demanding to know what our attitude is toward a repressive Polish regime.

Mr. Nutter: I don’t think the Polish military will respond if ordered to put down an internal revolt.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Polish Government can always repeal the price hike.

Dr. Kissinger: But such concessions often only make matters worse if they come late in a revolutionary process. (to Irwin) Could you prepare a list of measures we might take if we wanted to show our disapproval in the event of a bloody revolt?

Mr. Irwin: We are already working on it. Here is the list that is in preparation covering actions under certain contingencies.⁶

⁶ Not found.
Dr. Kissinger: What contingency?
Mr. Hillenbrand: Russian intervention.

Dr. Kissinger: Could you polish it up over the weekend, and then we can meet again. Are there any other inputs needed?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: The only input we might have would be Radio Free Europe broadcasts, for which we would want policy guidance.

Dr. Kissinger: (looking at the list provided by Irwin) What is this item about economic retaliation? Do we have the authority to take this action on the basis of administrative discretion? What other economic measures could we take? What about refusing to sell that oil plant?

Mr. Hyland: That has already been disapproved.

Mr. Hillenbrand: There are steps we could take to restrict credits and export licenses.

Mr. Irwin: With regard to the Soviet reaction to events in Poland, what the Soviets do could be affected by our own reaction, for example, whether we do anything in SALT.

Dr. Kissinger: In the contingency we are discussing, the Soviets have not yet done anything. We are talking about bloody repression by Polish forces. You are going to provide us a list of possible measures that we might take if this happens.

Now let’s take a third hypothesis. Suppose the disorders spread to East Germany. This is probably the only neighboring country where this might happen.

Mr. Hyland: Possibly the riots might also spread to Czechoslovakia.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you think that the Czechs are going to have more than one revolution every 400 years?

Mr. Baker: There could be slowdowns in Czechoslovakia.

Dr. Kissinger: Are they slowing down?

Mr. Baker: They have never really speeded up since 1968.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s leave open for now the question of specifying countries to which the disorders might spread. I assume we don’t expect any troubles in Hungary and Romania.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: If the Soviets clamp down, the Hungarian reform program will be affected.

Mr. Hillenbrand: The Hungarians are far out ahead on economic reforms. They will be afraid that the riots in Poland will strengthen the position of the Hungarian conservatives.

Mr. Baker: A sympathetic reaction in Hungary to what is happening in Poland could have an effect on whether the Soviets become involved.

Dr. Kissinger: I assume that the East German forces have the capability to put down an East German uprising.
Mr. Hillenbrand: That is the assumption. However, in 1956 in Hungary the troops went over to the people.

Mr. Nutter: I can’t see the Polish forces putting down a widespread revolt.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: To do so they will need more troops than they have in the north.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s leave aside temporarily the case of suppression of an East German revolt by East German troops. It is really just an extension of the case we have been discussing for Poland. I assume there will be no interruption of Berlin traffic if there is an uprising in East Germany.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Ground traffic might be stopped temporarily for internal security reasons. The East Germans might have to move troops across the Autobahn. But any blockage would not be for the purpose of harassing us.

Dr. Kissinger: Do we have contingency plans for supplying Berlin?

Mr. Hillenbrand: We have short-term stockpiles in Berlin.

Dr. Kissinger: How long would it be before a shortage began to be felt?

Mr. Hillenbrand: With the stockpiles and an airlift, we can go for six months. We could live through any short period of interrupted access without real dislocations in the city. The only problem might be that export orders could not be filled.

Dr. Kissinger: What about the case of Soviet intervention? You mentioned forces in East Germany. Do you mean Soviet forces?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We assume Soviet forces would come from East Germany or the Byelo-Russian Military District.

Dr. Kissinger: How long would it take them to get there?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Szczecin and Silesia are right across the border from East Germany.

Dr. Kissinger: But where are they deployed? (to Moorer) Tom?

Adm. Moorer: If they haven’t started making preparations now, I think it would take them about ten days to move.

Mr. Irwin: They will have to move more quickly than that.

Adm. Moorer: It all depends on whether they are making preparations now.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we tell whether they are?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: As yet we have no indication they are.

Adm. Moorer: It took all of ten days for them to get ready to move into Czechoslovakia.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we intensify our watch on Soviet troop movements?
Mr. Karamessines: We have already done so.

Dr. Kissinger: I assume we have better intelligence for Central Europe than for the Soviet Union.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: We will have to analyze the position of each division and its state of readiness.

Dr. Kissinger: I take it that none of this is going to happen this weekend.

Mr. Baker: I don’t think things will move that fast.

Dr. Kissinger: We need to put together a Working Group with Marty [Hillenbrand] as chairman and with representatives from all of your agencies. The Working Group should work out the details of each of the hypotheses we have discussed and should consider the political implications. You should consider what the effect will be on Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and the US. The Group should also take a look at measures the US should take. In the Hungarian and Czech cases there was criticism that had the US made its position clearer, we might have had a greater deterrent effect on what the Soviets did. I am not particularly a partisan of this line of thinking. However, the Working Group should address the question of what the President should do if he wants to take a firm stand right away. The Group should consider not only what he should do, but when he should do it.

(to Hillenbrand) Can you get that put together by Monday [December 21]?

Mr. Hillenbrand: I think we can get a report pretty well assembled by Monday.

Dr. Kissinger: It should be ready at least for an oral presentation.

Mr. Hillenbrand: With regard to the East German situation, there are quadripartitely agreed contingency plans dating from 1961 to cover an East German uprising. The plan is entitled “Western Attitude in the Event of an Uprising in East Germany or East Berlin.”

Dr. Kissinger: What does the plan involve?

Mr. Hillenbrand: The plan basically calls for doing nothing except to exert every effort to welcome refugees. There is to be no action on East German territory.

Dr. Kissinger: Could the West Germans go along with such a policy?

The contingencies that the Working Group should address are: if the riots at the present level die down, if the riots become more extensive and are suppressed by Polish forces, and if the riots become more extensive and lead to Soviet intervention. Then we should also consider the possibility of troubles in East Germany. This might be broken down into three contingencies parallel to those I have listed for Poland.
There is also a question whether the FRG could stand by if a massive revolt took place in East Germany. What impact would that have on West German domestic politics?

Mr. Hillenbrand: That is a separate question.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s right. We don’t need a contingency plan for that.

Adm. Moorer: If the Poles don’t put down the riots, the Soviets will have to make preparations before they can move. Soviet action won’t be necessary unless the Polish army refuses to suppress the riots. If the Polish troops refuse, they might turn and oppose the Soviets.

Dr. Kissinger: It’s possible they might do neither.


Dr. Kissinger: The Czech army did neither.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: There were no riots in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: If Gomulka can’t put down the revolt, he will call in the Soviets.

Dr. Kissinger: Can a Polish Government survive if it does that?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It’s really a question of whether it can survive one way or the other, unless, of course, it decided on a new leader who could quell the uprising.

Dr. Kissinger: Perhaps we ought to restudy our NATO exercise. These events in Poland could make the Soviets more reluctant to move troops outside of East European territory.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: If there is Soviet involvement, it will be at Polish request.

Dr. Kissinger: There was no request in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Soviets already have two divisions in Poland. They might act in self-defense.

Dr. Kissinger: I take it for granted that the Soviets will intervene if they see no alternative for preventing the establishment of an unacceptable regime in Poland. I agree with John [Irwin] that they would be reluctant to do so. We can meet again on Monday, [December 21]. We can call your offices to set up a time.
145. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Preliminary Comments on the Events in Poland

The Facts

Gomulka and four of his close associates have become the scapegoats for the major disorders that began last Monday. The new regime has already hinted at an increase in wages and a reexamination of the economic plan—both moves designed to pacify the workers. The new leadership appears to be a balance of various factions, including some, such as Moczar, who stands on the extreme conservative side, but will be dominated by Edward Gierek who succeeds Gomulka.

Gierek, 57, is a tough minded and dynamic leader of the party in the heavily industrialized areas of Silesia. He spent much of his early life abroad, in France and Belgium, and returned to Poland only in 1948. He has earned the reputation of an efficient and pragmatic administrator. Politically, he is conservative and has been influenced by the orthodoxy of the French pre-war communist leaders Duclos and Thorez. He is thought to be more nationalistic than Gomulka has been in recent years, and thus may be less inclined to depend heavily on the USSR.

Domestic Implications

The most immediate issue is whether the new regime can pacify the population, or whether the signs of weakness and instability in a crisis will embolden the population to press for more sweeping concessions. Gierek has a fairly good popular image. His initial speech suggests he will make some short-term economic concessions to restore

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I. 1969–1971. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. A memorandum attached to the original text reads: “Nancy, The attached was delivered to the President on Sunday evening at 8:00 p.m. Copies provided to HAK–Haig–Howe–Latimer–Hyland–Lord. The memo has not been logged. Kevin D.” Kissinger discussed this memorandum and the context in which it was drafted in White House Years, pp. 797–798.

2 Major General Mieczyslaw Moczar, former Minister of the Interior and leader of the ultra-nationalist “Partisan” faction of Poland’s Communist Party. He became a full member of the Polish Politburo on December 20.

3 Gierek succeeded Gomulka as First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party.
order and postpone the fundamental reforms—thus aggravating the longer term problem.

The real test will come early this week as the workers return to their jobs after the weekend. Thus far there is no evidence of Soviet military movement in reaction to the disorders this week or to the change in leadership.

Relations with Moscow

To what extent Moscow was consulted on the leadership change is not clear. It appears the changes were made too rapidly for the Soviets to be directly involved. On the face of it, however, the Soviets have no particular reason to oppose the new leaders, some of whom, such as the Minister of Defense, Wojciech Jaruzelski, are quite close to Moscow. At the same time, a sudden shift to relatively unknown leaders as Gierek may cause nervousness in the USSR. In his address to the public Gierek was careful to pledge a continuation in cooperation with Moscow as a “fundamental” requirement for Polish security.5

Foreign Policy

The change of leaders may lead to a slow down in the pace [of] normalization between Poland and West Germany. Gomulka had been heavily identified with the rapprochement with Bonn and the recent treaty. If only because of the tense internal situation, the new regime is not likely to make new moves in foreign policy. Gierek in his speech mentioned normalization with Bonn but perfunctorily. Moreover, the East German leadership will probably be able to claim that Gomulka’s foreign policy contributed to instability in Poland. Ulbricht immediately congratulated Gierek, suggesting he is satisfied with Gomulka’s removal.

Soviet Policy

As for Soviet foreign policy, the Soviet leaders may also be inclined to believe that Ostpolitik has an unsettling effect on Eastern Europe. For example, they may believe that the treaty with Germany led Gomulka to conclude he could press unpopular price increases on the population. Thus, Moscow may also want a pause in its relations with Bonn. One casualty of the Polish events could be the Berlin negotiations, where the Soviets may not wish to press the East Germans for concessions—thus compounding instability in Central Europe.

At the same time, with this détente with Bonn at least temporarily slowed down, the Soviet leaders, if they choose to maintain some

5 For relevant portions from Gierek’s address, see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1971–1972, p. 24391.
The prospect of détente, may be inclined to show some improvement in their relations with us.

We have checked with CIA and State who generally concur in this evaluation.6

6 A CIA analysis of the Polish events, “The Implications of Gomulka’s Ouster,” December 21, and an assessment by the Embassy contained in telegram 3540 from Warsaw, December 21, are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files, Europe, Poland, Vol. I.

146. Editorial Note

On January 15, 1971, Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff forwarded to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger a memorandum regarding the United States position on the Treaty of Warsaw. He wrote: “We had earlier recommended that you raise with Under Secretary Irwin (or dispatch an instruction to the USC) the question of the US position on the FRG-Polish treaty... [T]he Secretariat (on your instructions) informed State that it should come forward with a memo. Secretary Rogers has sent such a memo for the President.

“The Secretary’s memo unfortunately does not really consider our policy in the context of a ratified Polish treaty. He posed three options for our position in general:

“—continue in public statements to stand by the November 18 statement which expressed satisfaction at the initialing of the treaty, and pointing out that quadripartite rights and responsibilities are not affected;

“—state that we welcome the treaty, including its boundary provisions (this is essentially what the British said in November), and that our juridical position remains unchanged; or

“—state that we would respect the border and would support it at the time of a peace settlement; this statement could be unilateral, tripartite, or quadripartite.

“The Secretary recommends that our position should be to welcome the treaty, and if the FRG does not object, to consider specific comment welcoming the border provisions. Thus, the Secretary’s recommendation falls slightly between his first and second option.

“The first two options are virtually indistinguishable, while the third represents a significant modification of our position. The course recommended by the Secretary seems just fine for use, should the oc-
occasion arise, at any time prior to the ratification of the Polish treaty. (It is doubtful whether any occasion would arise in this period for the issuance of any sort of official USG statement, since the general public interest—very high when the treaty was signed in November—is rather low.) As the treaty is ratified, however, there will be occasion for a further enunciation of the American position.”

At the top of the memorandum, Kissinger wrote: “I have accepted Rec. 2.” National Security Council, NSSM Files, NSSM III.


147. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated.

Contingency Study for Poland

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

I. Summary

A. Contingencies

1. Termination or suppression of disorders without major involvement of Polish or Soviet Armed Forces.

2. Development of disorder in Poland into a nationwide wave of disorders constituting a national uprising against the regime or against its leadership.

3. The involvement or employment of Soviet armed forces to help Polish armed forces and security forces in suppressing the disorders. This could involve the two divisions of Soviet forces currently stationed in Poland and/or the use of Soviet forces brought in from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, or Eastern Germany.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Secret. The paper was an attachment to a January 8, 1971, memorandum from Elliot to Kissinger, not printed. In the memorandum, Eliot wrote in part: “The two contingency papers requested at the WSAG meeting you held December 18 are now in a final version and have been distributed to members of the Interdepartmental Task Force on Poland. (Copy enclosed.)” A second contingency paper on East Germany is not printed. For the minutes of the WSAG meeting, see Document 144.
B. U.S. Interests

1. In view of close historic ties with the Polish people and the large number (estimates range from 7 to 10 million) of American citizens of Polish origin, repression in Poland, even if carried out exclusively by Polish forces, could not be ignored by the US. Severe repression (Contingency 2) could cause a number of current activities—including Polish export trade, exchanges, present and planned exhibits, programs involving use of PL–480 zlotys and CCC credits—to be put into question. This could have an impact on US programs elsewhere in Eastern Europe, including the USSR.

2. As a major world power, the US in its own self-interest could not ignore the possible use of Soviet troops against the Polish population.

3. If Soviet troops were used against the Polish people, this action would put in serious jeopardy any negotiations we may be conducting or contemplating with the Soviet Union, in particular the SALT talks and the Berlin talks, which could hardly continue to the accompaniment of severe US condemnation of the Soviet action. For this reason, it would be in the US interest to deter, if possible, a Soviet involvement which could only destabilize the situation in Central Europe.

4. The Romanian and Yugoslav Governments would view the use or possible use of Soviet troops in Poland with renewed apprehension. This could produce pressures for some form of assurances regarding opposition to Warsaw Pact military action against either of those states and US support for their continued independence.

5. Use of Soviet troops in Poland would certainly have adverse effects on the development of Chancellor Brandt’s Eastern Policy. It could produce internal political changes in Western Germany and an FRG call for a renewed statement of the US military commitment.

6. The US military posture in Europe and the question of increased West European efforts on defense would be affected, the degree depending on the extent of involvement of the Soviet Armed Forces in Poland and the degree of popular reaction in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, or Eastern Germany.

7. US interests outside Europe (Middle East, Viet-Nam, Caribbean) might benefit from Soviet preoccupation in Central Europe.

C. Assumptions

Under Contingency 1

The contingency in which the demonstrations subside or are suppressed without further loss of life has, it would appear, now occurred. The principal proponent of the decision on the extent and timing of the price rises, Jaszczuk, has been held responsible by the Polish Central Committee and removed from the Politburo. Gomulka, who is reported ailing, has, as the top man, also accepted responsibility or been
held responsible along with three close associates, and has been re-
moved. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, especially in Hungary, those ad-
vocating economic reforms may become temporarily more cautious.

Moscow's most immediate concern in this contingency will be for
Warsaw to get matters firmly in hand. If the new regime appears to be
moving effectively to meet the situation, Moscow will probably be less in-
clined to meddle than to accept and support the Polish regime's decisions.

The USSR will be concerned nevertheless by the fact that violent
demonstrations have succeeded in producing rapid results on the top
leadership level. Increased attention to internal security and further
emphasis on ideological orthodoxy may result. Soviet propaganda may
play the theme of the role of Western influence, or even mischief mak-
ing, in the events.

In the foreign policy field, the most direct feedback may be on
East-West relations in Europe. The Polish disorders, demonstrating the
volatility of Eastern European populations, will already have strength-
ened the arguments of conservatives as to the potential risks of détente
policies. The most likely outcome would be continuation of Moscow's
European policy, but with greater caution on those items which create
greater direct contacts with the West. There may be a heightened ef-
fort, in seeking Western credits and technology, to avoid a concomitant
increase in Western presence or influence.

By and large, this contingency does not appear likely to produce
major changes in Soviet policy on more distant areas such as the Mid-
dle East, Viet-Nam, or SALT (the talks in any case being in recess).

Under Contingency 2

The use of Polish armed forces and security forces on a nation-
wide scale would generate major attention in world media and raise
questions in Poland about the viability of the new Polish leadership.
Unless the new leadership contained the situation promptly, military-
oriented figures might gain in stature. In the West, opponents of build-
ing bridges to Eastern European regimes would very probably gain
support for criticisms of current US programs in Poland in particular
and perhaps in Eastern Europe in general. In Germany, Chancellor
Brandt's efforts to normalize relations with Poland, and his entire East-
ern Policy, might come under stronger domestic criticism. East Ger-
many's opposition in Warsaw Pact councils to Brandt's initiatives
would be strengthened. If major loss of life, widespread casualties,
and/or a significant disruption of supplies occurred, the question of
US or international medical or food assistance in the wake of the sup-
pression of the uprising might arise.

As the situation in Poland continued to deteriorate, Moscow
would be increasingly troubled and increasingly insistent that the Pol-
ish communists put their house in order. The Soviets would be more
disposed to advise and ultimately demand that Wawsaw pursue
courses of action to resolve the situation.

The Soviets would be increasingly concerned over the possibility of
spillover into other Eastern European countries and into the USSR—
particularly if the spreading and duration of the demonstrations showed
signs of becoming an organized movement. Heightened internal secu-
rity measures and repression of dissidents in the Soviet Union and So-
viet urging of such measures in Eastern Europe would be likely.

In these circumstances, the anti-Western propaganda which ac-
companied heightened internal repression would begin to affect for-
eign policy. As the inconsistency between détente diplomacy and vig-
ilance propaganda became embarrassing, Moscow’s policy toward
Western Europe and then its policy in other areas would tend to stiffen,
especially as Western nations shrank from contacts with the Soviets.

Under Contingency 3

The use of Soviet forces to quell Polish disturbances would revive
the atmosphere prevailing in the wake of the Czechoslovak invasion.

Anxieties would rise sharply in Romania and Yugoslavia. The pos-
sibility of sympathy demonstrations in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or
East Germany, also conceivably leading to the use of Soviet troops,
could arise. It would become difficult, in a period in which Soviet
weapons were killing Poles, for US and other Western representatives
to sit across the negotiating table from Soviet representatives in Berlin—
and perhaps even in Vienna in March, when the SALT talks are sched-
uled to resume. The movement toward détente—now spearheaded by
Chancellor Brandt—would probably halt for a period of time. There
would, in such an atmosphere, be a heightening of concern about the
Western defense posture in Europe. The USSR’s preoccupation in Cen-
tral Europe might however cause it to reduce its military and military-
related involvements elsewhere in the world, i.e., the Middle East,
Cuba, Viet-Nam.

One of the motives for Soviet intervention would be concern over
potential spillover effects of continuing disturbances in Poland on East-
ern Europe and the Soviet Union. The trend toward greater internal
security precautions would continue, as would scapegoating anti-
Western propaganda. To the degree that some Soviet or East European
leaders might see the situation as one of the products of détente diplo-
macy or an added argument against allowing Western influence to
grow in Eastern Europe, they would feel the need for greater caution
in dealing with the West in the future.

The use of Soviet troops in Poland—especially if they should be
engaged in bloody incidents—could not but arouse widespread re-
vulsion in world opinion. Part of the task of the Soviet Foreign Min-
istry would probably be—as it was after the interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968)—to attempt to limit damage to Soviet interests abroad. Indeed, if this contingency were preceded by a period of Soviet anticipation of intervention, Moscow might even try to inhibit adverse reactions by making some quiet but positive diplomatic gestures in advance—perhaps hinting at some greater prospect of progress in the Berlin talks or SALT for the purpose.

Our choice of options under this contingency would have to be adjusted to take account of the nature of Soviet military involvement, i.e. whether it was at the specific request of the Polish Government or essentially on Soviet initiative; whether it involved Soviet troops standing by for effect as Polish forces did the job, or whether it involved direct confrontation and violence between Poles and Soviet forces; whether, in the latter instance, units of the Polish armed forces became active against Soviet troops. There would have to be a large number of draft Action Papers if each possible combination of the above factors were to be provided for.

D. Options

The following options are listed in relation to the three contingencies discussed. These options are not recommended courses of action but possible courses of action and therefore constitute a checklist rather than a set of proposals. A separate section itemizes possible US actions and could be taken in anticipation of a possible Soviet decision to use Soviet troops in Poland. These options should not be viewed as measures which would necessarily inhibit, delay or prevent a Soviet decision to intervene; they are unlikely to have that much effect. They are, however, measures which might, in this contingency, be worth taking in terms of establishing US concern for the consequences to the Polish nation and to the prospects for stability in Europe of a Soviet intervention.

(Under Contingency 1)

a) Make a statement at the next press conference by the Secretary and/or President giving briefly our understanding of the origins of the disturbances and expressing our sorrow at the loss of life, particularly in instances where this occurred as the result of ancillary actions by persons not acting on the basis of substantive economic or political grievances. State that we are prepared to continue efforts toward improved relations.

b) Determine broadcast policy for US and US-controlled media.

(Under Contingency 2)

a) Call in the Polish Ambassador and express concern at the loss of life involved in suppression of the uprising. At the same time, a public statement to this effect could be made by the President or the Secretary.
b) Suspend exchange programs underway with Poland and cancel the opening of Architecture exhibit in Warsaw (scheduled for mid-January 1971).

c) Review other US programs in Poland, involving the expenditure of US-held zlotys. (Those which are of direct benefit to the Polish people, such as the planned construction of a new wing at the American Hospital in Krakow, should be continued. Additionally, the Poles are servicing or repaying financial obligations to the US, arising from now-terminated PL–480 programs. We would not want to impel the Polish Government to stop these payments.)

d) Suspend US travel to Poland.

e) Recall our Ambassador from Warsaw on consultation.

f) Withdraw MFN tariff treatment from Polish exports to the US. (Although we can expect significant Congressional sentiment for withdrawal of MFN, doing so would be in violation of our GATT agreement. In addition, we undertook in 1960 to obtain MFN for Poland as part of a claims-settlement agreement. Removing it now could only result in Polish default on debt payments and a consequent long-term impact on trade and financial relations.)

g) Cancellation of the current $25-million unused CCC credit. (However, it would be self-defeating to refuse to allow Poland to buy agricultural products if we were at the same time mounting any sort of relief effort.)

h) By administrative decision, place Poland in a more restrictive category for export-licensing purposes. (Doing so, however, would run counter to our general policy of encouraging trade with Eastern Europe and probably not have a particularly significant impact.)

i) Offer spot medical or food assistance at points where local medical or food supplies are not meeting needs in the aftermath of suppression.

(Between Contingency 2 and 3)

a) Call in the Soviet Ambassador and warm him of the seriousness with which we would view any punitive Soviet action against the Polish population. At the same time, a public statement to this effect could be made by the President.

b) Use the Hot Line to convey our concern to the Soviets and couple this with a public statement by the President.

c) Stimulate preventive action in the UN Security Council; call an emergency NAC session.

(Under Contingency 3)

a) Immediately break off any negotiations under way with the Soviets and cancel all exchange programs.
b) Take such steps as (a), (b), or (c) above which have not already been taken.

c) Prohibit Pan-American flights to Moscow and Aeroflot flights to New York and discourage commercial activities.

d) Make a public statement expressing US condemnation and listing the actions taken or proposed.

e) Recall our Ambassador from Moscow for consultation.

f) Attempt to get parallel actions taken by other Western Governments.

g) In the event Soviet forces are used without a Polish request, take the matter to the United Nations Security Council in concert with other countries.

h) Avoid threats of military action but consider what stage of alert might be assumed in NATO.

E. Key Issues

The most important questions which will confront the US are:

Under Contingency 1:

1. Broadcast Policy.
2. US Public Reaction.

Under Contingency 2:

1. How far to cut back our relations with the Polish Government.
2. Whether to participate in or offer any spot medical or food assistance in the wake of the disorders.

Under Contingency 3:

1. How far to cut back our relations with the Soviets.
2. Whether negotiations on such important questions as Berlin or SALT should be broken off or only postponed.
3. The degree to which such action would be effective.
4. The number of US troops and amounts of matériel which might have to be moved to Europe in order to allay possible fears of our Allies.
5. The determination of the desired NATO alert status in concert with our Allies.

[Omitted here is Section II, a list of draft action documents.]

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Ambassador Michalowski, Monday, March 22

He is returning to Warsaw for home leave and consultations, and presumably wants a general discussion with you. As you know he is a slick operator, having survived through the Stalinist, Gomulka, and now the Gierek regimes. However, he and some in his Embassy have shown some signs of nervousness about their future. There was even a report in January that Michalowski was considering defection.

In this light he may reopen the question of the catalytic cracking process (an $8 million process to be sold by a Illinois firm). Our decision to turn it down last November was a setback for Michalowski, who had lobbied for it and enlisted the aid of Congressman Zablocki. The negative decision, however, left open the possibility of reopening it later.

Jan Kaczmarek, Chairman of the Polish Science and Technology Committee, who is coming here in April to visit with Ed David, mentioned continuing interest in obtaining the process, so Michalowski may hope to take a favorable signal home with him.

If he raises it you might say:

—naturally, if a formal request is made by the Chicago firm, and the Polish Government is still interested, we would review the case;
—what reason would the Ambassador cite for a favorable decision now compared to last November? (He will now argue that we should have a positive interest in helping the new government, and promoting stability in Eastern Europe.)
Note: If he does not mention it, there is no reason for you to take the initiative. (Defense is strongly opposed to the whole project.)

Conference on European Security. Even under Gierek, the Poles remain an active agitator for a European Conference; their latest scheme is for several conferences on the grounds that there is so much to discuss. He may ask about the Berlin talks and argue that they should not be a strict precondition. He might say that if Berlin is stalemated, a grand conference might improve the atmosphere for a Berlin settlement.

You might say:

— if Berlin cannot be settled, what meaning would a conference have that avoided all the difficult questions;
— even if there were a Berlin settlement, it is difficult to see what would be an acceptable agenda for a conference. MBFR is the only subject of conceivable interest, and a conference of all Europeans is not necessary for this;
— the Poles would do well to use their influence on Ulbricht and the Soviets to settle Berlin, rather than promoting a meaningless conference.

Indochina. I doubt that the Ambassador has anything special to raise, other than pumping you for whatever he can on Laos, etc. He might say something about the danger of Chinese intervention, etc. He remains personally very sensitive to allegations that the Polish role years ago was anything but honorable.

You might say:

that the Polish role in the ICC has been far from helpful, and it is surprising that the Poles would issue a special statement denouncing the South Vietnamese operation, after years of silence about North Vietnam’s role in Laos. Even Hanoi scarcely hides that its forces are fighting in the panhandle.

The Polish Internal Scene. You might say that you were surprised that the Poles reversed the price increases after resisting popular pressures. Is this a sign of weakness and instability? Will the new government be forced into increasing concessions now that the population has learned the secret of putting pressures on the central government?

You might ask in what way Gierek’s foreign policy will differ from Gomulka’s.

6 In a June 2 letter Nutter advised Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce Harold B. Scott of Department of Defense opposition to the sale of catalytic crackers to Poland and Czechoslovakia because of their “strategic significance.” The letter is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971.
The Poles are complaining on the one hand that we are obstructing the ratification of the *Polish-German treaty*, but on the other hand, they have indicated to Bonn they do not wish it ratified before the Soviet treaty. If Michalowski raises this with you again, *you might wish to comment:*

—We expressed our “satisfaction” with the treaty at the time of its signing, and you have said on many occasions we support a German-Polish reconciliation;
—The West Germans linked the treaties to the Berlin negotiations, not the United States, but we abide by their desires;
—The ratification issue and linkage is a highly charged issue inside West Germany, and we do not wish to inject ourselves in domestic politics;
—Together with the Allies we will consider an appropriate statement on the occasion of the ratification of the German-Polish treaty.

149. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Representative Roman C. Pucinski

Washington, March 24, 1971, 10:55 a.m.

K: I am terribly sorry I didn’t get back sooner. The message got lost. It’s as inefficient as any government office.

P: The Polish Govt. is trying to buy oil refining machinery from us. The company is based across the street from me. I understand it’s under review again in view of the fact we sold this kind of equipment to Romania. I understand it’s in your shop.

K: When a bureaucrat doesn’t want to make a decision he says I’m the bastard. While that may be true I am not to blame on this. There was a decision made on foreign policy grounds and nothing to do with the merits of the thing which we can review later this summer.

P: The people here to see me from Chicago say that the Polish Govt. has to be making a decision and will buy from the U.S. or Russia. You can imagine where they want the business. It’s for American dollars and exact same that went to Romania.

K: Yes but at the time the request came in the Polish Government had been difficult on other matters.

P: I am behind that decision. I am sure you didn’t see a note I wrote to the President in which I said if he kept his fingers crossed like everyone else on Gehrig [Gierek] it seems they are trying to move.

K: I will try to look at it again.

P: May I say that you are doing a good job? I am very much impressed with the way you are handling this. And I say that as a good Democrat.

K: Thank you very much. I appreciate that.

150. Note From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)

General Haig,

This is about the catcracking plant the Poles want and on which the President deferred a decision last August.

There has been some pressure around town to reopen the matter, including from Ed David who wants to be the bearer of happy tidings when his Polish counterpart visits this country in April. (There is a memo on this in your place, LOG 26246, in which HAK would tell David to cool it; we have not had a comeback on it so I don’t know where that memo stands.)

Defense remains opposed but most others in town think that the matter should be reopened both because it has commercial advantages for us and because, so the reasoning goes, it may help Gierek consolidate his position. While you were away, the Polish Ambassador was to see HAK but the appointment was canceled; the expectation was that he would ask to have the matter reopened. State is ready to send

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2 Haig sent Sonnenfeldt a copy of the transcript of Kissinger’s telephone conversation with Congressman Pucinski (Document 148) attached to an undated note that reads: “Hal, do you know what this is about?”
3 Not found.
over a memo requesting reopening but is holding up pending a signal that the President’s attitude has changed from last August. (I have taken the position that we cannot psychoanalyze the President and that agencies that have strong feelings about something should raise the matter on its merits.) Peterson has just launched an East-West trade study and my guess is that he and his staff will increasingly weigh in on the side of reducing restrictions and increasing trade.

Henry, I note, indicated to Pucinski that there would be a review “later this summer.” I don’t know why he picked that time, but if he really means it, I suggest that the USC be geared up “later this spring” to get all the arguments once more on the table so that the matter can be put again to the President whenever the time seems propitious and fits in with other things.

If HAK was just placating Pucinski and knows that the President will not change his mind, then this should be made clear to us, so we can turn off the mounting bureaucratic pressures.

Please let Fred Bergsten and me know how this is to be handled since we are getting a steady stream of phone calls on it.

HS

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151. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Exports of Catalytic Cracking Technology to Poland and Czechoslovakia

The Secretary of Commerce, with the concurrence of State and OST, proposes at Tab A that you agree to his approval of five licenses for the export of petroleum catalytic cracking technology, equipment and cat-

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alysts to Poland and Czechoslovakia. Defense opposes approval. Interior would approve the Polish, but not the Czech case, on grounds that other factors override the security consideration.

In September you decided to defer decision on the Polish case, and you approved a somewhat similar application for shipments to Romania.

Two U.S. companies have made competing applications to furnish U.S. technology for a Polish catalytic cracking plant with a capacity of 33,000 barrels a day. These companies estimate receipts from the transaction and additional follow-on supplies at about $15 million. Three competing U.S. companies have applied to furnish U.S. technology for a 12,000–22,000 barrel a day plant in Czechoslovakia. U.S. fees would be about $2 million plus $600 thousand annually.

The U.S. developed the catalytic cracking process in the early 1940s and has made considerable improvement in it in recent years. The British also have significant technology in this area.

The arguments in favor of approval are:

—The products of the plant would be used for motor gasoline, a civilian product, since the Soviet military tanks and trucks depend largely on diesel fuel, and aviation fuel is largely made by other processes.

—The Soviets have already built catalytic plants of these sizes. They are less efficient than our plants but produce similar products. There is no evidence the Soviets have even tried to obtain the technology of the similar 1965 U.S. sale to Romania.

—Even if the Soviets got the technology for these plants, they would not be able to use it to build larger plants before the process is obsolete in the United States. (Some U.S. plants are four times the size of the Polish project.) Dr. David has written at Tab B that the security significance is minimal since even if the whole Eastern bloc had free use of the U.S. processes, they would cut their operating costs only one percent by 1980.

—The USSR has a sufficient supply of petroleum products.

—Approval would provide a basis for trade relations to help the U.S. balance of payments. Denial would force these countries to depend on USSR for their petroleum plants and block our future trade opportunities in this field.

—The Poles have stressed the importance of this case. Approval would signal some recognition of their recent actions to improve U.S. relations such as their abatement of their support for North Vietnam, their recent high level visits to the United States, their granting of civil air permits to Pan Am, their decrease of hostile propaganda, their stepped-up approval of the U.S. cultural program and their recent stress on the need to shift resources to consumers.
The arguments against approval are:
—The products of the refinery would be useful in a conventional war.
—The U.S. still has effective control on the more advanced types of this refining technology.
—If it wishes, the USSR can get the technological data from the Poles and the Czechs and would be able to make their own refining capacity more efficient.
—The process is still sufficiently advanced over what the Soviets have that approval would make a contribution to their military industrial complex.

The difference between the Polish and Czech applications hinges on:
—The importance of the refinery to Polish plans to develop their civilian petroleum industry.
—The recent moves by Poland to improve relations with the United States.

In the light of the recent decisions to license new exports to the USSR, the minimal security consequences of this transaction and the U.S. commercial interest in being involved in future industrial development in Eastern Europe, I believe that the licenses should be approved for Poland.

However, the sad state of the internal Czech regime and the general state of its relations with us do not seem to me to justify approving the Czech licenses at this time. In fact, because of two late July cases of arrests of U.S. citizens, State is now trying to persuade Commerce to delay until the fall announcing approval of the Czech licenses even if you now approve their issuance.

Pete Peterson, on the other hand, believes that our balance of payments situation, the difficulty of defending differential treatment on security grounds, and lack of business sympathy for lost export opportunities argue for approving the Czech cases (Tab C).

Recommendation

That you authorize Secretary Stans to approve the catalytic cracker licenses for Poland but delay consideration of the licenses for Czechoslovakia.

Approve²

² Nixon initialed this option but also underlined "delaying announcement of the Czech decision until the arrest cases are settled this fall" in the second option. In a subsequent memorandum to Stans, August 23, Kissinger wrote: "The President has decided that you should approve the pending licenses for the export of petroleum catalytic
Disapprove, prefer to allow licenses for Czechoslovakia as well as Poland, though delaying announcement of the Czech decision until the arrest cases are settled this fall.

Disapprove, prefer to continue delaying all the catalytic cracker applications.

cracking technology, equipment, and catalysts to Poland. Announcement of the approvals should be made in the usual routine fashion without special fanfare. No decision has been reached on the applications for licenses for similar equipment for sale to Czechoslovakia.” (Ibid.)

152. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, August 18, 1971.

SUBJECT
U.S./Polish Relations

Background

State (Tab B)\(^2\) has sent you a telegram (Tab C)\(^3\) from Embassy Warsaw reporting that the Gierek regime is now in a position of recognized and unquestioned leadership in Poland. The new regime’s gestures toward the Church, workers, and farmers have been cautiously welcomed, and it is moving to meet consumer demands in a way its predecessor had never done. Also State points out (Tab D)\(^4\) that Poland has attempted to signal its good intentions to the U.S. by:

—informing us that it has significantly reduced its assistance to North Vietnam;

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\(^2\) Elliot’s letter to Kissinger is dated August 6.

\(^3\) Telegram 2210 from Warsaw, July 15.

\(^4\) Telegram 1546 from Warsaw, May 21.
—allowing Pan Am a unilateral permit to fly into Warsaw;
—avoiding criticism of the U.S.;
—allowing exhibits and films about the U.S. to circulate throughout Poland.

Polish Economic Requests

Poland has requested three major items from the U.S.:
—a short-term postponement of dollar payments on PL 480 debts (Tab E), i.e. the U.S. would not ask for immediate repayment of approximately $55 million owed to us over a period from 1971 to 1974;
—approval of an export license for catalytic cracking technology (Tab F);
—long-term USG credits to finance the sale of U.S. products to Poland.

State proposes to inform Poland that we see no economic reason to justify the debt rescheduling. Unless you conclude that political arguments are sufficiently strong that we should meet Poland’s request, I intend to clear State’s telegram (Tab A) which denies the Poles the debt rescheduling.

The catalytic cracking unit decision, as you know, has not yet been made although Sonnenfeldt and I continue to believe that a favorable decision should be taken as soon as possible. Long-term export credits through the Ex-Im Bank are available to Poland now that the Fino Amendment has been removed from the Ex-Im Bank bill (although no specific requests have as yet been received).

As this memo and past memoranda on Poland attest, decisions with regard to Poland are now being handled on an ad hoc basis—without benefit of an overall policy framework. Although this has proved only a minor problem, it will increase in magnitude now that the Fino Amendment has been removed from the Export-Import Bank bill (thereby allowing Ex-Im to finance commercial exports to Eastern European countries including Poland). Doubtless there will soon be requests for Ex-Im financing for a number of exports to Poland. We will then have to decide on a policy for handling these requests. You might, therefore, wish to consider issuing a NSSM on Poland which would examine our political relations and identify issues and options in future economic relations.

5 Kissinger wrote in the margin at this point: “It is made.” See Document 151.
1. That you authorize me to clear the telegram (Tab A) to Warsaw indicating that we do not feel that economic grounds justify the requested debt rescheduling.6

2. That you indicate whether Sonnenfeldt and I should draft a NSSM on future relations with Poland—which would take into account inter alia our future economic relationships.7

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6 Kissinger initialed his approval. In an attached August 26 memorandum to Eliot, Jeanne Davis of the NSC staff wrote: “Dr. Kissinger has approved the text of the draft cable to Warsaw. . . . However, paragraph 6 should be deleted since a decision on the catalytic cracker has already been made and communicated to the Poles.”

7 Kissinger initialed his approval.

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153. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, November 8, 1971, 1040Z.


1. In course Soviet Embassy reception November 6, new Polish Ambassador-designate to US Trampczynski arranged for me to speak with PZPR Chief Gierek. Latter was extremely warm in his comments, toasting the American people, US-Polish ties, and expressing hopes for success of Trampczynski’s mission. Gierek dwelt on his desire to expand trade between US and Poland said he was most grateful for President’s decision to grant license for catalytic cracker.2 He was pleased Secretary Volpe had visited Poland and said Prime Minister Jaroszewicz had told him of his extremely interesting talk with Volpe.3 Gierek commented that US and Poland had great historic traditions in common, but that he hoped “new and even better traditions” could be established in future.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL POL–US. Confidential.

2 See Document 151.

3 Volpe visited Poland for talks in November 1971. A memorandum of his November 3 conversation Jaroszewicz is in the Department of State, Polish Desk Files: Lot 74 D 440, Volpe Visit.
2. Observing Gierek and Trampczynski together, it seemed evident that, as we have heard, Trampczynski is well regarded by Gierek and has good personal relationship with him. Gierek stressed in his conversation that Trampczynski would have “direct, personal channel” in reporting to him on matters of special interest.

3. In other conversations during evening, I spoke with Politburo member Tejchma, who reportedly concentrates on foreign affairs field, and with Central Committee foreign affairs expert Ryszard Frelek. Tejchma was forthcoming on US-Polish relations and said he thought prospects were good for improvement in political as well as economic field. Frelek called catalytic cracker decision a “turning point” and forecast important favorable developments in US-Polish relations in next year. He mentioned in particular that visit by US astronauts would be welcome in 1972.4

4. Comment. Change in atmospherics is especially striking when compared with similar Soviet reception November 1970, when it was impossible to talk with top leaders and all one could get out of Gomulka was a glum handshake and no comment.

Stoessel

4 There was no visit by U.S. astronauts to Poland in 1972.

154. Editorial Note

On November 17, 1971, former Polish Ambassador to the United States Jerzy Michalowski told Ambassador Walter Stoessel in Warsaw “that he was sure a visit by the President following his Moscow trip would be welcomed by the Polish Government.” Subsequently, the Polish Embassy in Washington twice asked whether President Nixon might make other stops before or after his Moscow visit. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, November 24; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971) In response, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger wrote in a memorandum to Under Secretary of State John Irwin on January 6, 1972: “I received a report through State Secretariat...on Polish inquiries about a Presidential visit in connection with the Moscow summit. For now it would be best to discourage any speculation on this subject.” (Ibid.)
On March 1, 1972, Andrzej Wojtowicz, First Secretary of the Polish Embassy in Washington, mentioned during lunch with Robert Livingston of the National Security Council staff that President Richard Nixon had voiced an interest in visiting Warsaw during his initial meeting with the new Polish Ambassador, Witold Trampczynski. (Memorandum for the Record, March 8; ibid.) On March 20 Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski summoned Stoessel to the Foreign Ministry “to express official interest in knowing whether there was desire on part of President to stop in Poland on return from Moscow. If so, question would be studied in ‘friendly and constructive way.’” Stoessel concluded: “In view lack of reaction to informal, unofficial approach . . .on prospect for Presidential visit . . ., and spurred by announcement of date for Moscow visit, Poles have decided to broach matter officially at high level. Seems clear they do not wish to pressure President, but want it well understood that, if he would like to stop in Warsaw, he will be welcome to do so. I would assume that, if interest is expressed on our side, then official invitation would be forthcoming in short order.” (Telegram 1078 from Warsaw, March 20; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL POL–US)

155. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Pros and Cons of Stops in Poland and Turkey

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 481, President’s Trip Files, President’s Poland Trip 1 Jun 72. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Attached was a routing slip from Bruce Kehrli of the NSC staff to Kissinger, March 28, that reads: “Bob Haldeman covered this verbally with the President and General Haig.”

2 On March 20 at 6 p.m., Chapin wrote in a memorandum to Haldeman: “Secretary Rogers called and would like to speak to the President regarding a ‘telegram from Poland.’ Haig says that the Secretary may wish to raise the issue of a Presidential visit to Poland on the return from Moscow. If the Secretary raises this (a proposal was made today by the Polish Foreign Minister to Ambassador Stoessel) the President should definitely be non-committal. Such a visit could seriously hurt the Moscow Summit.” (Ibid., White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 80, EX TR 38–3 WARSAW, POLAND)
Poland

While there would be certain temporary advantages, due to what would undoubtedly be a warm public reception, there would be little if any lasting gain. The West Europeans would be quite upset if you stopped in Eastern Europe but not in the West.

A stop in Poland, however brief, would be a public success all around; the people will be turned out and the reception will be warm. On the Polish side, the Gierek regime would welcome this because, just as with Ceausescu in 1969, it would, as it were, be riding the coattails of the American President. Gierek almost certainly cleared the trial balloon with the Soviets who presumably do not object to a public demonstration for you. However, Poles are not as disciplined and subtle as Romanians, and there is always a possibility that demonstrations could become emotional (as in 1959) to the point of becoming an embarrassment for both the regime and the Soviets. We should not forget that the present leadership has been in office only about 15 months (after removing Gomulka) and there could always be an unexpected blow-up when emotions run high. But, barring this unpredictable element, the net effect of a visit, from the public standpoint, would be positive and it would come across well here at home and, with some exceptions, please the Polish-American community.

Also to some extent positive from our standpoint would be

— The reassurance to the Poles and others in Eastern Europe that your Moscow trip does not mean you accept Soviet hegemony in that part of the world.
— At least some boost for Brandt’s chances of getting his Eastern treaties ratified since he could use your interest in Poland against his CDU opponents; this almost certainly entered into Soviet and Polish calculation. On the other hand, however, many of our friends in the CDU would feel let down in view of your assurances that you regarded the German ratification debate an internal German matter. We have to remember that quite apart from the Eastern policy Brandt’s government is currently on weak ground and could be replaced this summer by the CDU.
— The Polish regime would probably draw some measure of increased strength, as noted above, and this in turn would increase its freedom of maneuver. But this is inherently limited by geography and other factors and the plus from our standpoint would only be minor.

The strong argument against going, apart from the possibility of public demonstrations, getting out of hand, is

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3 Regarding Nixon’s 1969 visit to Romania, see Documents 183 and 184.
4 Reference is to Nixon’s 1959 visit to Poland as Vice President. For documentation on the visit, August 2–5, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, volume X, Part 2, Eastern Europe Region; Poland; Greece; Turkey; Yugoslavia, pp. 190–221.
That you have declined to go to Western Europe and the NATO meeting in Bonn. In this context, a stop in Poland after you have gone all the way to Tehran would tend to accentuate our problems with the West Europeans. This would also be the case, though to a lesser extent, were you to stop in Warsaw before going to Moscow. Such a scenario would, however, be likely to irritate the Soviets. (The Polish Foreign Minister, no doubt for this reason, was quite specific in talking about a stop after Moscow.)

There is also a more basic point to consider. While it is true that there is something natural in special attention to Poland because of our large Polish-American community and your 1959 trip, our relations with Poland are in fact no better than they are with Hungary. In terms of the prospects of these relations over the next several years, there is no reason to single out the Poles for special treatment. Indeed, the constraints operating on them are basic and long-term and the payoffs in foreign policy terms of special attention are never likely to be very great. Thus, while a stop in Warsaw would put the Poles on the level of Romania and Yugoslavia, they would not be able to play the role of those two countries. Their position in the Indochina ICC would probably not be any more helpful to us than before.

Turkey

Here, again, while the public reception would be good (though not without some danger of disruption), and the Government would be strengthened, a stop in Turkey at the very time of the NATO meeting in Bonn would be badly received in Western Europe.

Moreover, the Soviets, whom Henry told that you would make no stop beyond Iran, would see a pattern in stops in both Iran and Turkey. They probably would assume that your purpose is to prevent these two adjacent states from going too far in improving their own relations with the USSR.

Nixon: The memorandum they want is self-explanatory about Poland and Turkey. Oh—Look, I want you to read over them with Haig, but I don’t want to have Henry take either of them.

Haldeman: Yeah.

Nixon: They view it both to the extremes. Let me—Let me come around to it another way—

Haldeman: Haig’s where you want it, right? [unclear]

Nixon: Let me come at it another way. Both Haig and Henry will come up with the wrong reasons insofar as our interests are concerned.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Poland.]

Now the sole purpose of our travels is Vietnam. The fact that Turkey is a NATO member is—doesn’t bother me one damn bit. We’re not going to make any decisions. We’re just going to stop by. The way I’ve read that memorandum is to go to Istanbul for maybe 4 hours. And we’ll then go to Warsaw and be received informally. On the [unclear] yesterday [unclear] presentation, we got returned and announced it. Last thing—actually, Henry—maybe we’ll see some dire plot evolve during the trip, which they, uh—on the other hand, we must try to examine, which I point out in the memo. We’ll look at the dire plot. Let [unclear] look and then look at what it will mean to us to go into Warsaw and with any kind of a break get a hell of a reception, which we’re likely to get. I mean we’ll get Radio Free Europe or what’s left of it. [Horrick?] and I must schedule it, and all that sort of thing. We’ll get that. Now the problems, that, so—we’ll play it off against the German thing. But the whole approach that—and I’ve been extremely good

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 324–22. No classification marking. According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met with Haldeman between 11:01 a.m. and 12:47 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) The editors transcribed the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. This is part of a larger conversation that covered multiple topics. Haldeman summarized this portion of the meeting in his diary: “He [Nixon] wants to be sure that I go to work on Haig and Henry [Kissinger], through him, to make the point that some of our decisions have got to be made on the basis of the effect they will have on the election. For example, [President] feels strongly we should go to Poland after the Russian trip, while Henry is equally strongly opposed to that, so we’ve got to convince Henry that his position isn’t right, which may be hard to do.” (The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)

2 See Document 155.
about this, Bob, with Henry—the NSC and the State Department people are gonna be disappointed—I’ve always put—well, what does the country require? I spent time with that jackass Smith yesterday. I spent 45 minutes, almost an hour, on that arms control bit. The whole thing, you know, he doesn’t hear himself babble along, and, he’ll go on and on and on and on. Now the whole purpose from now on—this is now March the 23d—The whole purpose of everything we do—

Haldeman: It means reelection.

Nixon: Is it going to affect our reelection? We’ve got to hammer that into their goddamned cottonpicker heads. They’ve got to get it. And they can tell [unclear] to take some risks on the other side. And give Henry your phone memorandum, which—


Nixon: I want to read Haig’s memo, and I don’t want to see Henry. But I do think it’s a matter that you can discuss with them. Come in [to unknown person].

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Poland.]

Nixon: Well, that should be a very—well, if you’ll get some—put the, put the [unclear] to Haig. I mean, tell Haig, so—Henry is—Haig will know better about this than Henry. You know, I think Henry won’t understand it, but you just tell Haig: “Now look here, be cold-blooded and political about every one of these things.” And, we’re not going to make a judgment on the basis of like, how’s this is going to affect this country 50 years from now, or how’s this going to affect German-Polish relations in the next 6 months or 8 months.

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3 Gerard Smith, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

4 Apparently a reference to a March 22 memorandum from Nixon to Haldeman. In the memorandum Nixon wrote: “I want you to have a frank talk with Haig with regard to the Polish invitation. Assuming for the moment that the invitation is a trap to get us involved in the German treaty ratification process, I think we should examine it to see if we can avoid the trap and still get the benefit. There is very little question in my mind that a visit to Poland, from the standpoint of its effect in the United States, would be an enormous plus. It would have more effect than all of our other visits put together from a strict political standpoint. This is something that neither Haig nor Henry understand and that they cannot be expected to consider. Take a hard look at it in any event and see what we can work out. On the other hand, I do not want to discuss this matter with Henry. You discuss it with him and then give me a recommendation.” For the full text of the memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 68.

5 Document 155.

6 On March 30 Sonnenfeldt wrote to Kissinger regarding a potential Presidential trip to Poland: “I don’t know where exactly this stands and whether you plan to take it
Haldeman: Well, it’s that simple. The answer is: Which is going to affect Germany more? Our going to Poland for a day, or the President getting—

Nixon: Reelected.

Haldeman: —being defeated in November—

Nixon: That’s right. You put it right to ‘em that way.

Haldeman: And I—You know, by—

Nixon: That’s right, that’s right.

Haldeman: —and we’ve got—

Nixon: Don’t—

Haldeman: —and look at this—

Nixon: The main thing is, the main thing is—

Haldeman: —if we can pull this off—

Nixon: The main thing is, I want you to tell Haig—and you can tell Henry: I do not want Henry to raise these things with them, ‘cause he’ll come in and he just gases interminably about McGovern.7 You see he’s great when he’s in his field, but when he’s out of his field, you know, he just goes on and on and on about stuff he knows about and it has no relevance. You see, that’s why he probably likes to talk about Pompidou.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Poland.]

Nixon: I mentioned Polish briefly—I asked for Poland briefly last night. [unclear] Right, but who the hell are they? I mean, of course, Rogers has been thinking of these arguments—arguments I’m sure. He

up with Dobrynin. If you do, you can assume that his response will be positive, or that he will refer the question home and then come back with a positive response. Although Gierek undoubtedly has particular objectives of his own in issuing the invitation, the idea was bound to have Soviet approval. It is almost certainly intended to help Brandt in the ratification debate [for the Warsaw Treaty] and, in the longer term, to deflate Romania’s special position. Both the Poles and the Soviets presumably are prepared to run the risk of emotional demonstrations in the streets of Warsaw. (For us the question is whether the undoubted short-term spectacular that will occur is worth the fact that there will be few short-term results and that we risk offending the West Europeans who have been told, via [NATO Secretary General Joseph] Luns, that the President cannot stop for schedule reasons.)7 For the full text of Sonnenfeldt’s memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 75.

7 Senator George McGovern (D–South Dakota), candidate for the Democratic Party nomination for President.
probably understands them more than I do, but—about the Polish Jews’
treatment and all the rest. But—

Haldeman: Well, Henry gets oversensitive. He’s like—in that kind
of thing he’s like a corporate lawyer always—he’s always afraid not to
do anything. That’s the easiest way to avoid trouble. You got to think
sometimes [unclear] and games and—

Nixon: How come?

Haldeman: This is one of them. A big reception—

Nixon: [unclear] about Romania.9

Haldeman: A big reception in Poland—

Nixon: You expect this result? [unclear] Chicago—

Haldeman: Much more than Romania. Much more than any coun-
try we’ve been in.

Nixon: Bob, a big reception in Romania [Poland] affects Pennsyl-
vania, it affects Ohio, it affects Illinois, and it affects Michigan.

Haldeman: How about New York?

Nixon: New York not so much.

Haldeman: [unclear]

Nixon: Well, yeah, Buffalo, you’re right. Buffalo, Buffalo, I agree.
But there’s so many other people in New York. I, I must say I agree—

Haldeman: That’s right, that’s right.

Nixon: It has some other, but I mean percentage-wise, Pennsylva-
nia is enormous, Ohio is pretty good country. Illinois is pretty good
country, and Michigan.

Haldeman: And Wisconsin.

Nixon: Yeah. If you want to go to a second-line state, there is no
question.

Haldeman: That’s a second-line state [unclear] where we got a
problem.

Nixon: That’s where we got to—we want to cover.

Haldeman: [unclear] Polish and Illinois is one that—

Nixon: It’s always the bomb.

Haldeman: You never know.

Nixon: [unclear] dying today.

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8 Documentation on the U.S. concern regarding official anti-Semitism in Poland
during the government’s “anti-Zionist” campaign of 1968 is in Foreign Relations,

9 Regarding Nixon’s visit to Romania, see Documents 183 and 184.
Haldeman: Especially if there’s something if we end up against Muskie, getting the Polish thing, we could blunt some of the [unclear].

[Omitted here is a discussion of Muskie.]

10 Senator Edmund Muskie (D–Maine), candidate for the Democratic Party nomination for President.

157. Editorial Note

On the morning of March 30, 1972, President Richard Nixon raised his proposed visit to Poland in an Oval Office conversation with his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger. He instructed Kissinger to discuss the matter with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin in his scheduled conversation that afternoon:

“Nixon: First of all, do your best to cut the deal on Poland.

“Kissinger: I think I can handle that.

“Nixon: But the second thing—And then say, and you can point out that, he can have, he need to be not concerned about what I say on Poland. He can be very sure. There’s no problem on that. That we’ll be totally discreet. But that I think we’re going to be in a terrible position if we turn it down.” A fuller account of the discussion is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 73.

Kissinger discussed the proposed visit during his luncheon meeting with Dobrynin. Kissinger reported on the meeting as follows: “I opened the conversation by discussing the possibility of a visit to Poland by the President. I told Dobrynin that I had mentioned the fact that the visit to Iran would be the last stop. However, we had now received a formal invitation to Poland; previously it had been only a feeler, but now it would be very difficult in an election year to turn it down. We would not go to Poland in order to embarrass the Soviet Union. When we went to Romania, we knew that it might create some difficulties but we were willing to pay the price, though it was not our intention even there deliberately to produce difficulties. In the case of Poland, our motives are quite different. Dobrynin replied that he was very moved by the fact that I bothered to check with him. He recognized that we did not have to check our movements in eastern Europe
with him, but it was an example of our goodwill. He was certain that
Moscow would not object, but it would make a very good impression
in Moscow if we could hold up our decision until we got a formal an-
swer.” For the full text of Kissinger’s memorandum of conversation,
see ibid., Document 76.

Kissinger reported to Nixon personally that afternoon:

“Kissinger: Well, I had a long talk with Dobrynin. And I put the
Polish proposition to him. And I said, ‘You know, the basic departure
that we are doing here is that we want to build policy on the recogni-
tion of we’re two superpowers and that we don’t want to interfere in
each other’s basic concerns.’ And I took—I showed him the cable we
had from Warsaw and the reply we gave. I said, ‘This is the spirit which
we would like to deal with you. We don’t need to ask you if we want
to go there but we want to show you the President is particularly con-
cerned in what your reaction is.’ So he was practically in tears. He said,
‘This is the most generous thing I’ve heard. You will, I cannot tell you,
Henry, how much this will impress Mr. Brezhnev.’

“Nixon: That we asked because he knew what we did on Rumania.

“Kissinger: Yeah. I said, ‘I want you to know, when we went to
Rumania, we knew it would annoy you. We’re going to Warsaw be-
cause, and if it raises any problems for you, we’ll look [unclear].’ And
he was practically in tears. He said, ‘Speaking informally and as a
member of the Central Committee, I am certain they will say yes. But
if you can wait ‘til Monday, he said—so that he is formally—‘so that
you get a formal reply from us, it would mean a great deal to us. But
I can tell you now that it will be yes. It will almost certainly be yes.’
But he was practically in tears.

“Nixon: You see, they, we have to realize we’ve got some chips to
play too here. . . . And you told him that I would not embarrass them
and that I—

“Kissinger: I said that you will say nothing that would embarrass.
And I said it [unclear] to our support in domestic considerations.

“Nixon: He understood that.” For a more complete text of the
taped conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, see ibid., Document
77.

As late as April 3, the Soviets apparently had not responded to
Kissinger’s feeler on Poland. In a telephone conversation with Nixon
that evening, Kissinger said: “I think if we don’t hear from them [the
Soviets] about Poland tomorrow we should just do it.” The conversa-
tion continued:

“P: That I am sure about. Why do you think they delayed on it?

“K: They may not have had a chance to have everyone together—
or they may just be cute. They may be going to Poland now.
“P: I don’t think our going to Poland will change anything. Tell them tomorrow. We can’t hold it any longer—it’s starting to leak.” For a more complete transcript of the telephone conversation, see ibid., Document 80.

On April 5 Ambassador to Poland Walter Stoessel reported from Warsaw: “I called on Vice Minister Spasowski today and informed him of President’s decision to accept Polish Government’s invitation; of his appreciation for this invitation and the opportunity to visit Poland; and of his proposal to arrive in Warsaw, after one-day visit to Tehran, in mid-afternoon on May 31 and to depart approximately 24 hours later directly for the US.” (Telegram 1316 from Warsaw, April 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL POL–US) On April 17 President Nixon received Polish Ambassador Witold Trampczynski, who delivered separate letters of invitation to the President to visit Poland from Poland’s President, Henryk Jablonski, and Polish Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz (see Document 158).

Even before Nixon received the official invitation, the White House staff had initiated plans to exploit the trip for the President’s re-election campaign in 1972. On April 15 at 1:15 p.m. Deputy Assistant to the President Dwight Chapin wrote David Parker of the White House staff: “This is just to remind you that you are to get the ethnic information regarding the Poles and where they’re located [in the United States] so that we can consider a Presidential trip there shortly after Russia [i.e., the Russian trip].” Immediately thereafter, Chapin followed up in a memorandum to Herbert Klein of the White House staff (1:20 p.m.): “We should put together a plan to start cultivating and feeding stories to the Polish newspapers. It is my understanding that there are some Polish newspapers scattered around the country and at least one in Chicago called the ‘Polish Alliance.’” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Dwight L. Chapin, Chronological, Box 16)

On May 9 Nixon accepted the Polish invitation in separate letters to Jablonski and Jaroszewicz. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence, Poland Pres: Jablonski and PM: Jaroszewicz)
158. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Polish Ambassador (Trampczynski)¹

Washington, April 17, 1972, 10:32–10:47 a.m.

Kissinger: My Soviet experts, incidentally, reading that Soviet note² say it’s the mildest thing they could have done. It gives them, it covers them with Hanoi.

Nixon: Can I ask a question about this fall? I don’t want this—are we supposed to announce today that we’re going to—I don’t want them to—I don’t want to announce and then have these little assholes³ pull the plug on us and cancel it.

Kissinger: They won’t pull the plug independent of Moscow.

Nixon: Okay.

Kissinger: Whatever they do we’ll become—

Nixon: One thing that, if I can poll you on this, what you had in mind, I remember what happened when the U–2⁴—you remember too, but I was here. And I know what happened and I know what an embarrassment it was to President Eisenhower. Henry, I’m not—we’ve got to play Moscow very carefully. If we ever get a feeling that they’re going to break off the summit, we’re going to break it off first.

Kissinger: No question.

Nixon: We have got to do it, see?

Kissinger: No question.

Nixon: You agree, don’t you?

Kissinger: Totally.

Nixon: In other words, so that’s—

Kissinger: Joe Kraft⁵ called their spook. He’s not at all sure of himself. He says he notices that the Russians are very mild in their response. He said, “Do you guys know what you’re doing? I said, “Joe, write anything you want.” He said—

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 709–10. No classification marking. The editors transcribed portions of this conversation specifically for this volume.


³ Reference is to the Polish Communists.


⁵ Syndicated columnist for the Washington Post.
Nixon: You can keep talking to [unclear].
Kissinger: He says why are you, he says why [unclear].

[Trampczynski enters and an initial exchange of pleasantries takes place.]

Nixon [to Trampczynski]: We will look forward to coming to, as you know we, as I have said, and as you are aware, we have differences in types of government, differences about certain areas of the world. But the United States seeks good relations with all countries. We particularly have a reason to seek good relations with Poland because there are so many Polish-Americans and they all want—

Trampczynski: One-third of the Polish nation is living in the United States.

Nixon: One-third?
Trampczynski: One-third, right. Yes.

Nixon: And we want to—we will do that, having full regard for your right to have any independent policy and for us to have an independent policy, but there are many areas where our two governments can work together and that’s what we try to seek—that’s what I was trying to do in China. That’s what I will be doing in the Soviet Union. That’s what we will be doing in Poland. But with Poland I will go with a little different feeling because I know so many Polish friends in Chicago, in Cleveland, in Pittsburgh, in New York, and in California. And they say, “You’ve got to go to Warsaw.”

Trampczynski: [laughter]


Trampczynski: Krol.

[Omitted here are Nixon’s discussion of his previous visit to Poland and Kissinger’s discussion of his own earlier visit.]

Nixon: I can assure you that we will, as I said, we want the visit to be one that will be, that will show the friendship between our two peoples, recognizing the differences that our governments may have, but trying to find areas of agreement, respecting each other. That’s the only basis for an East-West relationship. We understand that very much. And I think we can get that understanding with your government, that we can find parallel areas to work together, particularly the economic field.

Trampczynski: That will be very true of the visit. [Unclear] solve these problems of international [unclear].
Nixon: At least help.
Trampczynski: It will help us out with some of our bilateral relations.
Nixon: No problems can ever be solved. You can only start solving them.

Trampczynski: [Unclear]

Nixon: You know, the economists know that you can never solve economic problems. You just start.

Trampczynski: [Unclear]

Nixon: Well, it’s very good to see you. My best to you. We will see you then if not sooner.

[Omitted here is an exchange of pleasantries as Trampczynski leaves.]

Nixon: Let me tell you something, this is just bullshit.

Kissinger: If you were in Hanoi and you saw, you read the papers today 48 hours after the bombing of Haiphong, the Polish Ambassador can send such a warm invitation, can broach such a warm invitation.

Nixon: Of course, this invitation was written before the bombing, you know?

Kissinger: But he delivered it 48 hours after.

Nixon: You think they have that good of communication?

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Nixon: They probably went [unclear] before sending anything.

Kissinger: It means two things: it means the Russians didn’t stop them from sending it, and that they delivered it. No, also as far as our press is concerned, this announcement—what are they going to say, “The Communists are very mad at you”?
159. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 19, 1972.

**SUBJECT**

The Problem of the President’s Meeting with Cardinal Wyszynski²

As you asked, I have discussed this informally with the Polish Ambassador. His immediate reaction, which he said was of course personal, was that such a meeting would be undesirable. He said he recognized the pressures on the President and Cardinal Krol’s interest. But in his view there has been remarkable progress in State-Church relations and Polish-Vatican relations. The Soviets have tolerated this uniquely in Poland. Meanwhile, however, relations between Gierek and the Cardinal³ have not improved; it is still the problem that the Cardinal regards himself and in fact is something of a second head of state. A meeting with the President could only reinforce this problem especially when he is in the country for barely 24 hours. It could reverse the positive trend.

There is an additional problem. June 1 is Corpus Christi, one of the major Church holidays in Poland. People normally walk in the street with candles and the Cathedral will be crowded. (It is a day off for everyone.) The whole focus of the President’s visit, from the standpoint of the regime (and Moscow) could thus be changed into a religious demonstration with overtones of our recognizing the Cardinal’s secular role.

The Ambassadors also said that Gierek has agreed to the Cardinal’s accepting an invitation to the US from Cardinal Krol but has reserved a decision as to timing. This was a further sign of improving relations.


² In an April 10 memorandum to Chapin, Haldeman wrote: “In Poland, the President wants to visit the old Cardinal [Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski]. He talked to Cardinal Krol about this while he was in Philadelphia. Henry may have some problems with this, but it should be worked out if it can be done on a sound foreign policy basis.” (Ibid.)

³ Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, Primate of the Polish Catholic Church.
The Ambassador asked whether he should report our talk to Warsaw. I told him not to do this, though of course this can’t be controlled. (We obviously don’t want an official démarche from Gierek and Co.) I stressed I was merely asking his opinion to enable us to form a judgment. I stressed that he should not repeat our conversation within his Embassy (which is leaky as a sieve) or anywhere else. He said he understood, especially since he himself had been talking without instructions and as a “Pole” rather than a diplomat.

My own judgment now is that the President should be dissuaded from having a meeting. The coincidence with Corpus Christi, itself involving the risk of demonstrations, could still be used for some gesture to the Church, for example by reference in the departure statement at the airport.

Recommendation

1. That you urgently discuss this with the President.
2. That thereafter Haldeman send clear instructions to Chapin in Moscow.

Note: This all needs to be done today, before next Monday/Tuesday, lest Chapin raises the matter when he gets to Poland.5

5 An attached April 19 note by Sonnenfeldt reads: “A.H[aig]. 1. HAK says this is ‘turned off.’ 2. HAK says he will make sure Haldeman knows. 3. You should make sure. HS.”

160. Telegram From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)

Moscow, May 21, 1972, 1820Z.

Hakto 11. Call in the Polish Ambassador and make the following request on behalf of the President:

As he knows, there has been growing domestic pressure on the President to call on Cardinal Wyszynski.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 480, President’s Trip Files, President’s Moscow, Iran, Poland, Austria Trip, May–Jun 72, TOHAK. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
The President is aware of the sensitivity of this matter and wishes to suggest that Mrs. Nixon pay a courtesy call. You should be sure Ambassador understands this supersedes our previous approaches on this in various channels and comes from President personally.

161. Telegram From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


Tohak 39. Ref: Hakto 11. After some delay I was able to contact the Polish Ambassador who had spent the afternoon at Dulles Airport. When I informed him that I had a direct message from the President on the sensitive issue of Cardinal Wyszynski, he became quite concerned and agreed that this issue was indeed one of the greatest sensitivity in Poland. I explained that the President was under increasing domestic pressure to meet with the Cardinal during the President’s forthcoming trip to Poland. The President had been resisting these pressures due to his understanding of the sensitivity of this problem. I also understood that there had been some exploratory contacts made on the subject of the Cardinal through normal diplomatic channels. For this reason I had asked him to come in to meet with me personally in order to discuss a suggestion that President Nixon wished to make to his Government, recognizing of course that it was in the interest of both governments that the issue of Cardinal Wyszynski be handled with the greatest delicacy. I then stated that President Nixon wished to suggest the alternate solution of having Mrs. Nixon pay a brief, low-profile courtesy call on Cardinal Wyszynski during the forthcoming visit. The Ambassador reacted quite sharply, stating that on his own he could categorically state that this was an unacceptable course of action for his Government, reiterating that it was a matter of the greatest sensitivity. I, of course, avoided pressing and made it clear that this was merely a suggestion which the Ambassador might wish to propose to his Government, but in doing so it should be clearly portrayed as a suggestion. The Ambassador replied

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 480, President’s Trip Files, President’s Moscow, Iran, Poland, Austria Trip, May 1–Jun 72, TOHAK. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

2 Document 160.
that in his view it would even be an unnecessary irritant to ask his Government to consider the suggestion, but that he was willing to do so if that was the U.S. Government’s wish. At this point in the conversation you called and suggested to me that you wished to discuss it further with the President. After talking to you, I told the Ambassador that we were most anxious that the President’s visit proceed successfully and that until you had had an opportunity to discuss this with the President, he should not formally make the proposal to his Government. I am sure he will immediately report all that occurred, but he seemed very much relieved and stated that he was leaving here Wednesday night for Warsaw and could be used between now and then in any way we wished and also following his arrival in Poland. He remarked that he was perhaps the most understanding of our problem, and departed very amiably insisting that his Government was most anxious to have the most successful visit and was determined to receive President Nixon with the greatest warmth and hospitality.

I will await further word from you on this subject.³

³ On May 22 at 8:28 a.m. EST the White House Situation Room received Kissinger’s reply (Hakto 16) to Haig’s message: “Tell Polish Ambassador not to relay request for Mrs. Nixon call.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 480, President’s Trip Files, President’s Moscow, Iran, Poland, Austria Trip, May–June 1972, HAKTO)

162. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, May 23, 1972, 1019Z.

2130. Dept pass Moscow for Secretary. Subj: Contact With Cardinal Wyszynski. Ref: (A) State 89407; (B) Warsaw 2128.²

² In telegram 89407 to Warsaw, May 19, the Department of State reported that the Polish Embassy had expressed anxiety over Nixon’s May 16 meeting with Krol and had stressed its view of the “undesirability” of a meeting between the President and Cardinal Wyszynski, citing its ongoing Church-state problems. (Ibid.) In telegram 2128 from Warsaw, May 22, the Embassy reported that, acting under instructions, it had suggested that the President send a written greeting to the Cardinal during his visit. (Ibid.)
1. Vice Minister Spasowski summoned me to MFA at 7:30 pm May 22 on urgent basis. He said that he wished to advise me at once of strongly negative reaction to our proposal concerning Presidential greeting to Cardinal Wyszynski, which I had made to him earlier in the afternoon (ref B). In view of importance and sensitivity of subject, he wanted me to know of this reaction as soon as possible, and he wished to be very frank and clear in his statement so there could be no misunderstanding.

2. Spasowski stated that any contact—either personal or by message—with Cardinal at time of President’s visit was not acceptable to GOP. President’s visit was at highest level of state-to-state contacts, and this character should be preserved and no elements which could jeopardize visit should be introduced.

3. Speaking personally, Spasowski said he could understand “internal reasons” in US which would favor Presidential contact with Cardinal. However, GOP has its own reasons for not wishing such contact and he asked us to understand these reasons.

4. I reviewed presentation I had made previously (ref B), stressing that inability of President to have any contact with Cardinal might be subject to misunderstanding, could lead to criticism of GOP by prominent Polish-Americans and therefore would not help promote better US-Polish relations. Spasowski acknowledged there might be such criticism, but said criticism of some kind about something is unavoidable. It was more important to ensure success of President’s visit, and to this end GOP feels it is important that there be no speculation about visit by President to Cardinal or special message to him. Spasowski said he had deliberately restricted circulation of information within GOP about our proposal for Presidential message to Cardinal, since he thought such information would risk creating a bad atmosphere not conducive to success of visit. He concluded by saying that any effort to contact Cardinal would be extremely inadvisable.

5. I said I would report Spasowski’s remarks, although on personal basis I regretted rigidity of Polish stand and concerned at misunderstandings which might arise therefrom.

6. Comment: GOP position clearly is very firm against contacts with Cardinal and it seems evident that continued efforts on our part to counter this stand will be seen as affront and could risk damaging atmosphere President’s visit.³

³ In a May 23 memorandum to Haig, Livingston reported that the Polish Embassy was “putting out the story that the White House has given its assurances about a contact with Cardinal Wyszynski.” In a handwritten annotation, Haig responded: “State has been told to drop the issue—no Pres. visit w[ith] cardinal.”
7. If President tours Old Town on foot evening May 31 we have envisaged that he would make brief stop at entrance to Cathedral of St. John (visit inside Cathedral might not be appropriate since religious services will be in progress at that time). This could be seen as gesture of recognition to Polish Catholic Church. Any reference in oral remarks to Cardinal, however, would obviously not be well viewed by GOP.

Stoessel

163. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Your Discussions in Poland

Polish Objectives

The Polish leaders will be chiefly interested in showing some tangible results from your visit; the mere fact of your stop has already provided them with the psychological and political benefit of being given special recognition as an important East European nation. Gierek personally undoubtedly sees his meeting with you as adding to his own authority. He has obviously watched closely the style and procedures of the Moscow summit and seems eager to adapt them to his own purposes.

As regards the tangible goals the Poles seek, they are essentially two: (1) further recognition of their Western frontier, the Oder-Neisse line, and (2) access to US credits.

Your Objectives

Your own objective, from a foreign policy standpoint, is to give substance to our intention to treat the East European states as sovereign and independent without at the same time complicating their relations with Moscow or arousing Soviet suspicions excessively. This problem is less difficult for us in Poland, which is welded firmly into

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 481, President’s Trip Files, President’s Poland Trip, 1 Jun 72. Secret, Sensitive. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
the Soviet camp, than it was in Romania, which clearly resisted Soviet domination.

In Poland, you also confront the delicate Church/State problem. The Church retains a powerful hold on the people and in many ways is a parallel government to the secular regime.

The Polish people—and of course Americans of Polish descent—will feel themselves more directly addressed by you through a gesture to their religion than through the regime.

Your Approach in the Talks

Gierek will almost certainly have been briefed by the Soviets on the essence of your Moscow talks on Europe and Vietnam. It is doubtful that he was told much if anything on the Middle East and SALT. He will also be aware of the degree of progress made on economic issues, especially of the fact that you did not actually extend EX–IM facilities. The Poles will of course have examined in detail the “Basic Principles” and the final communiqué.

1. In the course of your meeting with Gierek you should be prepared to give him your evaluation of the Moscow summit.

—Many concrete accomplishments;
—Frank and detailed exchanges, perhaps for the first time since World War II, on all aspects of US-Soviet relations and on the international issues in which both the US and USSR have a stake as great powers;
—A set of ground rules (Basic Principles) for US-Soviet relations which, as they are translated into practice, should not only improve those relations but assist all countries to live in greater security. You should add the sensitive point that we believe the Principles set down a style of conduct by the superpowers which will permit smaller countries to realize their own aspirations and maintain their own identity;
—A general program of negotiations on Europe by all the countries concerned.

2. You should let Gierek raise Vietnam first. If he does so, he will take the straight DRV/PRG line and may make bitter comments about the mining, which affects Polish vessels. In your comments you should:

—Give a simple and blunt rationale for our policy;
—Assure the Poles that we will not deliberately harm Polish ships in DRV ports but our measures will stay in force on the terms you set on May 8.

Note: The Poles probably want the final communiqué to have a phrase that Vietnam was discussed and that the two sides expressed differing positions. Gierek probably needs this to keep his political purity and you should agree to a general formula of this kind if the Poles insist.
3. On Europe, the Poles want our blessing for their Western frontier.\(^2\) We cannot do this formally because it would impair our rights with regard to Germany. However,

—Our communiqué draft now picks up language from the Moscow communiqué referring to the principle of “inviolability of frontiers”;  
—We can also “welcome” the treaty between the FRG and Poland, “including its frontier provisions.”\(^3\)

Beyond that you should, if pressed, explain that:

—We do not, as a matter of principle, explicitly endorse international borders unless we are a party to the agreement establishing the border involved. (This will not happen in the case of Poland’s western border until we become a party to a German peace settlement.)  
—At the same time, we have no interest in seeing any particular boundary in Europe revised.

4. As regards the European Security Conference, the Poles feel that this is one of their special initiatives. (Although their formal position is identical to the Soviets, the Poles see the conference as an arena for displaying a certain individuality.)

You should:

—Reiterate the Moscow position that we will be ready for preparatory consultations later this year to ensure a carefully prepared agenda and conference procedures satisfactory to all countries involved;  
—We think that the actual conference had best wait till 1973;  
—We look forward to the Polish contribution, which we know will be constructive because of all European countries, Poland, the victim of brutal aggression in 1939, has a paramount stake in peace, security and cooperation in Europe.

5. On MBFR, you should note that:

—There was agreement in Moscow to begin preparatory consultations soon;  
—This should be done in a special forum of the countries directly involved (those with forces and territory in Central Europe, i.e., including Poland);

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\(^2\) On April 19 Wojtowicz had told Livingston that the Polish Government, in the wake of the Polish-West German treaty, was hoping for a “clear declaration on the Oder-Neisse Line” from President Nixon during his visit to Poland. (Memorandum for the Record, April 21; ibid., NSC Files, Box 1330, Unfiled Material, 1972, 2 of 8)

\(^3\) On May 22 Haig cabled Kissinger in Moscow: “Our Embassy in Bonn believes that the German government would understand the formulation that we ‘welcome’ the West German-Polish treaty, ‘including its border provisions.’ You may wish to consider, prior to the Warsaw stopover, how the West German government should be informed if the President does decide to make such a public statement in Warsaw, which the Poles will certainly want him to do.” (Tohak 71, May 22; ibid., Box 480, President’s Trip Files, President’s Moscow, Iran, Poland, Austria Trip, May–Jun 72, TOHAK)
We expect these consultations to run in parallel with those on the security conference.

6. On bilateral economic relations, your position is complicated by the fact that you did not grant EX–IM credits to the Soviets. It would arouse the Soviets if you now went ahead with Poland. You should say that:

—You are very favorably disposed toward granting Poland early EX–IM facilities;
—For domestic US reasons it is important that the Poles move to a settlement of their unfulfilled obligation to US dollar bondholders;
—When this occurs, you will review the matter promptly and sympathetically.

Note: The Poles have indicated a willingness to proceed on the bond issue by the end of June.

Note: The Poles have MFN; there is no issue here.

To sweeten the pot for the Poles, you can also indicate that you:

—Will sympathetically consider seeking legislation that would make Poland again eligible for PL–480 sales (the legislation involved would make all countries with MFN eligible for PL–480 sales).

On all other economic issues—Polish desire to postpone dollar debt repayment on past PL–480 sales, use of US-owned PL–480 Polish currency (zlotys) for development projects in Poland, joint ventures—you should say that:

—You are instructing Secretary Peterson to review them promptly and sympathetically;
—Meanwhile, you note the Poles last year had a 34 million dollar trade surplus with us out of total turnover of 180 million and which certainly can help in financing Poland’s debt obligations to us.

7. If the Poles raise Radio Free Europe you should:

—Reaffirm your support of it as an instrument for better communication;
—Express your conviction that its output is responsible and constructive.

8. You should note:

—Signature in Warsaw of the long-negotiated consular convention;
—Initialing in Washington of a new bilateral air agreement;
—The successful and extensive programs of cultural, educational, scientific and technical cooperation between the US and Poland all of which you support and which will get even more impetus from your visit.

9. You should invite the Polish leaders to the US.
President Richard Nixon, having completed the first three legs of his trip with a visit to Salzburg, the Moscow summit, and a visit to Iran, flew from Tehran to Warsaw on May 31, 1972. After the President and his entourage were greeted at the airport by Henryk Jablonski, Chairman of the Polish Council of State, and Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz, the President proceeded in a motorcade to the center of Warsaw to lay a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

Of great concern to the President’s White House staff had been the size of his potential reception in Warsaw. On May 4, H.R. Haldeman wrote to Herbert Klein, William Safire, John Scali, and Ronald Ziegler: “The four of you should be aware that it is going to be virtually impossible to insure a reception in Poland which can equal the spontaneous reception the President received in 1959. . . You should develop a plan for tempering any talk or discussion of big crowds in Poland. If we do end up with sizeable crowds we will be in a position to say that they were larger than we expected. Conversely, if we end up with small crowds, we will be in a position to say, ‘We told you so.’” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Dwight L. Chapin, Chronological, Box 16) On the day before his entourage’s arrival in Poland, May 30, Nixon had instructed Haldeman that “he wanted to be sure we find a way to get to the people when we get to Poland—and to use Brennan out in front, to use the Secret Service, and get the Polish police out of the way.” On May 31 Haldeman noted in his diary: “Arrival there [in Poland] was not as big as we thought it might be, but very big crowds [were] on the streets, and they surprisingly allowed them up pretty close. They didn’t get quite as emotional as they apparently had in ’59, but they were friendly, wanted to wave, and we did an extremely effective job of running the motorcade up through the planned part . . . He [the President] then got out and was completely engulfed by Poles. They started shouting ‘Neek-son, Neek-son, Neek-son’ . . . It all got quite emotional and was extremely impressive.” (The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)

After the wreath-laying, Nixon met with Poland’s Communist leader, Edward Gierek, at the Polish Parliament for one-on-one talks. The President spoke with Gierek alone, accompanied only by a Polish interpreter. Haldeman wrote in his diary: “[O]ur interpreter, supplied by State, was apparently no good, as a number of the Poles told me, so we had to change and used a Polish interpreter for the dinner, and we’ll use him for the rest of the activities here.” (Ibid.) On the same day, Secretary of State William Rogers, also in Warsaw, signed a consular convention between the United States and Poland. Later in the
evening, President and Mrs. Nixon attended a state dinner in their honor. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

The following day Nixon met with Gierek at the latter’s office at the Polish Sejm at 10:05 a.m. for a second round of talks. This time, the two leaders were accompanied by Jaroszewicz and President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger (see Document 165). At 10:45, a second meeting took place between the entire Polish and U.S. delegations at Jaroszewicz’s office at the Council of Ministers (see Document 166). After hosting a luncheon for Poland’s leaders at Wilanow Palace, the President and Mrs. Nixon, along with their entourage, flew home. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

In a joint U.S.-Polish communiqué, the two sides expressed their support for MBFR and a “carefully prepared” conference on European security. They also “expressed their interest in the conclusion of an intergovernmental agreement on comprehensive cooperation in science, technology, and culture” and announced their expectation that they would “sign in the near future an air transport agreement” and “establish mutual and regular air conventions.” (Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, pages 914–915) With regard to scientific cooperation, see Document 175. On July 19 Poland and the United States signed a bilateral Air Transport Agreement. For the text of the agreement, see 23 UST 4269.

For the text of the President’s public remarks during his visit to Poland, along with the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the talks, see Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, pages 909–915.

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165. Memorandum of Conversation

Warsaw, June 1, 1972.

PARTICIPANTS

Edward Gierek, First Secretary, Polish United Workers’ Party
Piotr Jaroszewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People’s Republic

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 487, President’s Trip Files, The President’s Conversations in Salzburg, Moscow, Tehran and Warsaw, May 1972 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the First Secretary’s Office in the Parliament building.
The President
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

First Secretary Gierek welcomed the President to Poland. All the newspapers and media of Poland were giving the most extensive coverage to the President’s visit. His talks in Warsaw were considered an extension of his Moscow talks. The whole world attached great significance to these talks. The First Secretary then asked his friend the Prime Minister to present Poland’s views on concrete matters.

Chairman Jaroszewicz greeted the President and Dr. Kissinger warmly. It was his profound conviction that the President’s visit would be most useful. The rise of living standards of the Polish people was their most important task. Per capita income in Poland was only $1100; the government wanted to increase the national income. There had been a 3% increase in wages; production had also increased. They would keep the economic balance of the country, especially the balance of payments. Despite great expenditures they had kept the economy stable. Poland was now embarked on a vast program to develop and modernize its economy. As part of this, Poland was now reaching for the most advanced technology, and that was why they attached so much importance to relations with the United States.

The Polish Government had sent us four aides-mémoires last year on these matters. Poland was particularly interested in the consumer goods industries: foodstuffs, agriculture, light industry, chemicals. They would like to purchase several plants containing the most advanced technology, for textiles especially. Some of their plants had machinery dating back to the last century. Food processing plants were highly desired. They needed highly processed products. They also wanted to enter negotiations to bring about a new agreement for the long-term purchase of grain, especially soybeans. They were prepared to make a five to seven-year agreement for a 10-year credit at not-too-high a credit rate.

Poland had a large engineering industry due to Soviet assistance. They regretted the absence of participation by U.S. technology. They had no engineering plant. In order to raise agricultural production and use tractors to replace $2.7 million in houses they wanted an entire truck factory—to produce 100 thousand tractors a year. They wanted the assistance of the U.S. to develop an electronics industry. They had a program for heavy industry. In this regard Chairman Jaroszewicz particularly wanted to thank the President on behalf of the Polish Government for the catalytic cracking plant and the transforming of the sheet metal industry. It helped Poland enormously. Both projects were

\[\text{2 See Document 151.}\]
now being implemented. Their conversations with American firms proved our interest in developing their copper and zinc industries. Poland had the metals but needed the technology to develop them further. American firms were expecting the President’s decision. Poland also hoped for $140 million for cinematography and television and wanted to work out a five-to-six-year program of scientific cooperation.

EX–IM credit the Chairman recognized was essential. Poland needed $3.3 billion over five years. This depended on the President. Poland was one of the most reliable debtors. “We pay back everything.” If Poland got a ten-year credit she could pay back $250 million a year. This would lead to $500 million in trade—the same level as Poland had with West Germany. This credit would represent only 3 percent of the total trade turnover and ten percent of that with the Communist world.

On P.L. 480, Poland was requesting a postponement of payments for five years. Poland would like to use this money to make purchases in the U.S. markets for machinery. They wanted to use the counterpart funds of zlotys for social programs, for example, hospitals and water reservoirs for farmers. The Prime Minister envisaged a program for a skyway using counterpart funds. Poland also wanted to build a center for Copernicus and to expand East-West tourist visits.

On fishing, there were a number of agreements. Poland would like to settle this issue in a comprehensive agreement. They had marked out a full program. If this was not realized, the U.S. trade share would decline. This program would have a spectacular significance as cooperation between a big country and a medium-sized country which stood for peace, restraint and stability in Europe. U.S. machinery in Krakow was a good advertisement vis-à-vis Soviet machinery.

Finally, Chairman Jaroszewicz said he could recommend a permanent joint organ of some kind to foster economic cooperation between the U.S. and Poland.

The President in reply thanked the Prime Minister for the sweep of his ideas. We were in the position where the President agreed to the goals the Chairman had outlined, but Congress implemented. The President nevertheless could make a few commitments now—for example on the Polish request for postponement of P.L. 480 repayments, which he now agreed to. Once the bond problem was solved, we could move more easily on EX–IM credits. Once that was worked out we could go ahead. First Secretary Gierek remarked that Poland was ready for a settlement. The President then stated that we could agree in principle to a joint economic commission as well as a joint scientific body. He recommended that the commission on our side include also representatives of U.S. private industry.
Dr. Kissinger commented that the Poles always thought in big terms. History gives us no other choice, Chairman Jaroszewicz replied.

The President noted that economic cooperation between us of course also required the participation of private industry. He asked how much of Poland’s trade was with socialist countries and how much was with Western Europe and Japan. The Chairman gave the figures: Poland’s trade was 63 percent with all the socialist countries, 35 percent with the USSR, 4 percent with Japan, 8 percent with West Germany, 14 percent with East Germany, and 2.5 percent with the United States. Poland wanted to get the latter figure up to 8 percent. Why do you want so much trade with the U.S., the President asked. Mainly for the advanced technology, the Chairman answered. First Secretary Gierek pointed out another problem: Some technology that Poland acquired from Western Europe, e.g., France, was indirectly from us [integrated circuits]. Why not get it directly?

The Chairman explained his government’s program for developing and modernizing the economy. Poland would like to be reliable about repayment of loans. Of course if the U.S. refused credit they would have to get credit elsewhere. The President said he wanted to discuss one problem. With the war in Vietnam going on, there was resistance in the U.S. Congress to extending credit to countries which have given aid to North Vietnam. We would be forthcoming on all these problems. But a settlement in Vietnam would remove a difficult irritant in our relations.

First Secretary Gierek then summed up the conversation. The two sides had discussed all the problems before them. He wanted to repeat one thing following what the President had said. If the U.S. really meant to help Poland, what was needed was actions and not words. The U.S. should not reproach Poland too much and should not say too many nice things about Poland either.

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Warsaw, June 1, 1972, 10:45 a.m.

SUBJECT
Polish-American Relations

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Side:
President Nixon
Secretary Rogers
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Asst. to the President
Ambassador Stoessel
Martin J. Hillenbrand, Asst. Secty., EUR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Senior Member, NSC Staff
Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secty. to President

Polish Side:
Edward Gierek, 1st. Secty, Polish United Workers’ Party
Piotr Jaroszewicz, Chairman Council of Ministers
Mieczyslaw Jagielski, Vice Chairman, Council of State
Jan Kaczmarek, Minister of Science, Higher Education and Technology
Stefan Olszowski, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Franciszek Szlachcic, Member, Politburo and Secretariat, Polish United Workers’ Party
Witold Trampczynski, Ambassador to the U.S.
Tadeusz Olechowski, Minister of Foreign Trade
Henryk Kisiel
Romuald Spasowski, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Wlodzimierz Janiurek, Under Secretary of State
Jan Szydlak, Secretary, Polish Workers’ Party

Gierek expressed the hope that the visit to Poland of President Nixon would serve to strengthen the traditional friendship of the Polish and American peoples. The program of the Polish Government is based on a realistic assessment of possibilities. Poland was devastated by the war and had to undergo a long process of recovery. Now it was among the ten leading industrial powers in the world. The Polish people had great talents and energy, and the Government wanted to avoid any ambiguities about its ambitions and prospects. For the immediate future, it would have to concentrate its efforts on agriculture and production of foodstuffs, market industries, municipal transport systems, housing, education and health. The Government’s ability to achieve its
objectives would be of decisive importance for socialism and democratic civil liberties in the country.

Expanding peace in the world would also favor the achievement of Polish goals. Gierek said he was one of those Poles who during World War II had fought in the Belgian Resistance Movement. The Polish divisions in Western Europe had fought under the command of General Eisenhower. He hoped that the list of great Americans linked with Polish history could be broadened and the tradition of friendship expanded. He was fully aware of the difficulties to be overcome. He noted that the President’s route to Warsaw had led through Moscow where there was a socialist power with which Poland had a defensive alliance and which had helped Poland economically. He was glad the President’s trip to Moscow had been so fruitful, and he could only congratulate him and Brezhnev. The route to Warsaw had also led through Tehran, Gierek continued. This was a place which also symbolized definite facts, such as the three-power meeting in Tehran during the war which had directed the shape of Polish frontiers and territory. Now, 27 years after the war, these frontiers have been recognized by the Federal Republic of Germany. The ratification of the German treaty and the signing of the final Quadripartite Berlin Protocol proved the soundness of Polish policy in its quest for peace which was convergent with that of the other socialist states. After the President’s meeting with the Soviet leaders, the security expectations for Europe were coming closer to realization. With respect to other “hot beds,” such as the Middle East, the Polish Government desired that the Arabs and Israelis live in peace. A separate problem is Viet-Nam, which he had discussed previously with the President. Poland believes in peace and is aware of the dangers of nuclear war which would leave no victors. Therefore the Poles hope for détente and lasting peace in the world.

The President said he could agree with most of what Gierek had said and with all of his goals. One of the benefits of summit meetings, such as he had had in Moscow, Warsaw and Peking, is not only that some agreements are reached but also that a personal “man-to-man relationship” can be developed so that, in the future, when we receive communications we think of them in terms of the specific men involved. This was important to him personally. It did not mean that all

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2 During the 1943–1945 military campaign in Italy.
3 See Document 140.
4 For texts of these agreements, December 7, 1970, and September 3, 1971, respectively, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1125–1127 and 1135–1144.
5 An apparent reference to the conversation between Nixon and Gierek on the evening of May 31, for which no record has been found. The only other person present was a Polish interpreter. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)
problems had vanished. While some understanding had been reached on this trip, it was more important that foundations had been built for cooperation in the future.

The President added that he wanted to say frankly that we know there are differences on the question of Viet-Nam. He hoped that this would in due time pass, preferably by the route of negotiations. As Gierek had recited what had happened to Poland, how it had been attacked from all sides and how it had suffered terribly from the war, the President had appreciated, as a realistic man, the position of Poland in a sensitive part of Europe. The Polish leaders had alliances which they expected to keep, and we would keep our alliances. As we develop a new relationship, Polish leaders can be our friends without being anyone else’s enemy. Poland has strong neighbors on both sides; it is essential that it maintain good relations with them. We understand this. We seek cooperation with Poland without any effort to embarrass its leaders. In speeches, communiqués and toasts we will talk about the real friendship of our people and how they are for peace. No one knows better than the leaders of Poland that there will never be a perfect world. In the Middle East the hatreds go back hundreds of years, and the most we can hope for there is a cease fire which will protect the integrity of both sides. We know that great powers and small powers will sometimes be rivals. The important new fact is that in the nuclear age such differences cannot be allowed to develop into armed confrontation. Some think that, if only the Soviet Union and the U.S., or the People’s Republic of China and the U.S., or the USSR and the People’s Republic of China could reach understanding, then there would be no problems. This is not true. While Gierek said that Poland was a medium-sized nation, there are many small and medium-sized countries. If they become involved in conflict, such conflagrations might spread and lead to a confrontation of the super-powers. We welcome an era of cooperation and welcome the opportunity to work with Poland towards a new relationship which will help security in Europe.

The President concluded by saying that he hoped this meeting will contribute towards these objectives. He could declare to our Polish friends that we believe in the importance of having good relations with all nations, large and small. We will make no arrangements at the expense of the small nations. We were a small nation at the time of Kosciusko and we heed the interest of small nations today.
Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT: Conversation with Polish Diplomat

On June 6, I had lunch with Andrzej Wojtowicz, First Secretary of the Polish Embassy, with whom I have lunched often before. We talked mostly about the President’s visit to Warsaw.

Presidential Visit

Wojtowicz disclosed that his Embassy had received a circular telegram from Warsaw several days before describing the visit as a success. He was awaiting the return of Ambassador Trampczynski on June 9 for further details. The circular had stressed that “particularly on Germany” in the communiqué had Poland achieved its goal. Other Polish gains were the formulations on the European Security Conference (CSCE) and MBFR, both of which represented considerable advances.

Wojtowicz said that the circular had skipped over the economic aspects of the visit, which Poland had originally regarded as key. Perhaps Trampczynski would have more to say when he got back. Wojtowicz himself thought that the communiqué passages on the economic and the scientific-technical commissions were inconsequential. Probably they came out of the meeting between President Nixon and Gierek. They looked to Wojtowicz like attempts to give the appearance of more substance on economic issues and to parallel economic passages in the US-Soviet communiqué. Frankly, agreement on the two commissions had caught the Polish Embassy by surprise.

Wojtowicz asked how the President has most benefitted from the visit. I thought that getting to know Poland’s new leaders personally and the publicized contact with Polish citizens had been the main gains.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Poland, Vol. II 1972. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted by Livingston. The original was sent to Kissinger, who initialed it. A copy was sent to Ash.

2 See Document 164. The joint communique contained the following language on the Polish-West German treaty: “Both sides welcomed the treaty between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany signed on December 7, 1970, including its border provisions.” (Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, p. 915)
for the President. It had been a pity, however, that the Polish authorities had at first tried so hard to keep the crowds away. Wojtowicz pointed out that contrary to the Feron story in the New York Times, Polish media had announced the President’s schedule well in advance.  

Germany

Wojtowicz strongly hoped that the United States would not reduce its presence in Europe as a result of post-Summit atmospherics. If the Americans left, the Germans would certainly be the strongest force in Central Europe. The danger in that was obvious. How could the US help Poland keep Germany under control? That was a major problem for Warsaw now. Wojtowicz was not sure that we were correct in ascribing to the Soviet Union the objective of diminishing the US presence in Europe. This was in any case no Polish objective.

I pointed out that Four Power Responsibility for Germany continued (Wojtowicz thought that was a good thing), indeed had been reinforced by the Berlin Protocol just signed. Brandt was correct in his observation in his June 5 speech at Harvard that it is too often forgotten that the Berlin Protocol assures a US presence in Central Europe—and one to which the Soviets have agreed.

CSCE and MBFR

Wojtowicz said that the Soviets had not solicited Polish views before signing onto the US-Soviet communiqué’s passages on these topics. He had the impression that neither the Soviets nor their Warsaw Pact allies had done much MBFR work yet, although Warsaw had some old schemes in the files which might be worth dusting off. On CSCE, more work had been done, of course. There had for example been a joint Polish-Hungarian study of the economic aspects of a Conference and also another joint study. Both joint studies had come out of the re-

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3 On July 6 at 2:30 p.m., Chapin wrote in a memorandum to Colson: “We have film of the President’s trip to Poland which was taken by our documentary crew. It would seem to me that this would make outstanding film to be used by some of the Polish leaders or by people who are visiting the various Polish wards around the country. Perhaps we should even consider making a TV commercial out of it to be run in the Polish areas. The other thing that would be good is to use the soundtrack for radio.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 80, EX TR 38–3 WARSAW, POLAND)

4 James Feron had reported on June 1: “President Nixon arrived in Warsaw today and succeeded in reaching the Polish people despite official attempts to avoid a repetition of the emotional welcome he received here in 1959, when he was Vice President. . . . Polish Communist party members had been told to stay home and watch the arrival on television. . . . There had been no publicity on either the President’s route into the city or his schedule.” Feron, “Nixon in Warsaw, Greets the Public and Meets Gierek,” New York Times, June 1, 1972, p. 1.

5 For the text of the Final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin, signed June 3, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1204–1206.
cent Budapest meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers. I told him that NATO had been doing a lot of preparatory work on both MBFR and on the CSCE.

**US Oil Company in Poland**

Saying that this was very secret, Wojtowicz related that six weeks ago the Polish government had asked Standard Oil of Indiana to send geologists to Poland to help their Polish counterparts explore for oil reserves off the Baltic coast. This invitation had come out of the high-level Polish trade/technical delegation’s visit to the US in early May. Standard’s geologists were now in Poland.

This was sensitive. Not only was the exploration going on near the Polish-GDR frontier, but, if oil were located and American engineers and technicians came in, they would be replacing Russians. The Soviet geologists’ exploration methods were outdated. That’s why the Poles had sought out an American company.

I asked what was in it for Standard of Indiana. Wojtowicz thought that if exploitable oil reserves should be found, Standard would be paid in crude, which it could profitably ship by sea to nearby refineries in Hamburg or Sweden and then market in Western Europe.

**Vietnam**

Wojtowicz asked whether the President and the Soviet leaders had come closer on Vietnam. I said that I had no knowledge beyond that in the communiqué. Shaking his head, Wojtowicz observed that the Soviet Union had hardly stood by its North Vietnamese friends. Shrugging his shoulders, he added that that was “politics.”

**Soviet-US Relations**

What had the US gotten out of the Summit, Wojtowicz asked. The major gains, I thought, had been the SALT agreement and the personal acquaintanceship with the Soviet leaders and their views, which the President had gained from his long and detailed talks.

What about the Pravda’s post-Summit criticism of “left-wingers” opposed to Brezhnev’s Western policy, I asked. Wojtowicz thought that this attack had been aimed at Maoist and New Left groupings in the Western European communist parties, rather than at an anti-Brezhnev faction within the CPSU.

Would the three Soviet leaders come to the United States together, I inquired. Not likely, Wojtowicz replied. He expected that Kosygin might like to come next fall, extending a visit to the UN General Assembly into a tour of the US.

Robert Gerald Livingston
Subject

Next Steps in US-Polish Economic Relations

As a result of the President’s discussions with the Polish leaders, we should now take action in three areas of Polish-US economic relations.

The Polish Ambassador has delivered two letters from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Jaroszewicz to the President (a) requesting for the second time postponement of PL–480 dollar debt repayment; and (b) proposing a new agreement on the sale of US agricultural products to Poland. The latter question, the sales agreement, will require extensive staffing by the agencies, should be handled separately, and will be treated in a separate memorandum.

The three areas in which we can and should act on soon are: 1) EX–IM Bank Credit Facilities, 2) Deferral of Polish PL–480 Debt Repayments, and 3) Polish-American Trade Commission.

A joint memorandum for signature by you and Mr. Flanigan to the President (Tab A) reviews these issues and requests his approval for implementing instructions to the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Commerce. The memorandum to the President also forwards a letter, coordinated with Ray Price’s office, for the President’s signature replying to Chairman Jaroszewicz.

Issues

1. EX–IM Bank Credit Facilities

During the Warsaw visit the President told Gierek that while he had the authority to grant EX–IM credits, any action on this score must await a “solution” of the problem of claims of American holders of dollar bonds issued by the pre-war Polish government. (The claims
amount to about $42 million.) Once the President’s condition has been met by the Poles, the Secretary of State should submit to the President a determination that granting EX–IM is in the national interest.

The language used by the President with Gierek makes the requirement for positive Polish action on the bond debt stricter than that proposed in a memorandum by Secretary Rogers to the President. The Secretary recommended that the Poles be told that we would be willing to extend them the facilities when we were satisfied that Poland had initiated negotiations which, in our judgment, show promise of a reasonable settlement of the dollar bond debt.\(^5\)

We must treat the precise wording of the President’s commitment with care,particularly in notifying the agencies of it, because the nature of the commitment will affect the negotiating position of the Bondholders Council. If the Council learns that the requirement for Polish action is in fact stricter than that proposed in Secretary Rogers’ memorandum, the Council will be encouraged to harden its terms for settlement, which—depending on the degree of hardening—could make a reasonable solution extremely difficult. (The Poles are now planning to send a delegation over in the near future to talk to the bondholders. They claim that the talks will move rapidly.)

We assume you still hold the view that the timing of a Presidential decision should be determined at least as much by the status of a decision on EX–IM for the USSR as on the status of the bond negotiations. For this reason, we presumably can afford to let the bond negotiations drag on a bit.

With these factors in mind, we have prepared a draft NSDM/ CIEPDM\(^6\) which will inform the agencies that a Presidential decision on EX–IM is tied to “solution” of the bondholders’ claims without specifying the nature of that tie or of the “solution.” (This should preserve flexibility for the President in making a final decision on EX–IM for Poland.)

2. Deferral of Polish PL–480 Debt Repayments

It is our understanding that during the Warsaw visit, the President also indicated to Gierek our willingness to defer repayment of the dollar tranches of the PL–480 debt falling due in the next few years. Jaroszewicz, in his letter to the President, committed Poland to purchase

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\(^5\) On May 18 Rogers made this recommendation in a memorandum to Nixon. The following day, Kissinger replied: “The President has considered your memorandum on this subject [Export-Import Bank facilities for Poland]. . . . He wishes to hold this matter in abeyance until his talks in Warsaw. He may at that time decide to take the step you propose.” Both memoranda are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972.

\(^6\) Not found; apparently a draft of Document 170.
in the US during the period 1972–1975 machinery and equipment in amounts equivalent to the total of repayments deferred. We assume that the President’s intention is to defer for the period requested by the Polish government.

3. Polish-American Trade Commission

The US-Polish communiqué7 states that: “In the interest of broadening and facilitating trade relations between the two countries and working out concrete steps toward that end the two sides decided to create a joint Polish-American Trade Commission.”

This can be dealt with separately from the EX–IM and PL–480 debt questions. And we can move rapidly to establish the Commission, which Secretary Peterson should chair.

Recommendations

1. That you and Mr. Flanigan sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A requesting his approval for the US-Polish economic steps outlined above and recommending that he sign the letter to Chairman Jaroszewicz.

2. With the President’s approval, that you and Mr. Flanigan sign the NSDM/CIEPDM transmitting the President’s decisions on EX–IM facilities and the PL–480 debt.

3. With the President’s approval, that you and Mr. Flanigan sign the memorandum to Secretary Peterson instructing him to work with the Poles to establish the Polish-American Trade Commission and to chair it for the US side.8

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7 See Document 164.
8 See footnote 5, Document 169.

SUBJECT
US-Polish Economic Relations

During your visit to Poland you indicated to the Polish leaders that, upon solution of problems relating to pre-war Polish government dollar bond debts to US holders, you would be prepared to exercise your authority to extend EX–IM Bank credit facilities to Poland. You also indicated our eventual willingness to postpone repayment of dollar tranches of Polish PL–480 debt to us.

On June 14, the Polish Ambassador delivered two messages to you from Chairman of the Council of Ministers Jaroszewicz (Tabs D and E), one on PL–480 indicating that the Poles want a five year postponement and the other on a proposed new agricultural agreement, which we are staffing separately. The joint US-Polish communiqué which you signed in Warsaw called for the creation of a joint Polish-American Trade Commission.

Gierek, when he paid an unusual personal visit to our trade exhibition at the Poznan Fair June 11, stressed that “time is money” and expansion of US-Polish relations need not wait until next year. He alluded to his conversations with you in this regard.

We recommend that the agencies be directed to follow through promptly on your discussions in Warsaw on EX–IM Bank Credits, PL–480 Debt Deferral, and the Joint Trade Commission.

—With regard to EX–IM Bank Credits, the NSDM/CIEPDM at Tab A would (a) inform the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Commerce, and heads of the other agencies involved, that your decision to exercise your authority to extend credit facilities is tied to a solution of the US bondholders’ claims; (b) instruct the Secretaries to inform the Polish government representatives, if they press the US on when these facilities will become available, that in accordance with what you said in


2 Attached but not printed.

3 Printed as Document 170.
Warsaw, you will make this decision in light of the status of the negotiations between the Polish government and the bondholders; and (c) instruct the Secretary of State to inform the bondholders’ representatives that we continue to favor a reasonable settlement of their claims within a reasonable time.

(You can determine the precise timing of any affirmative action on EX–IM for Poland later, taking into account the status of EX–IM facilities for the Soviets. At this stage the bondholders should not come to believe that we have established too tight a linkage between EX–IM facilities for Poland and settlement of their claims, for in this case they would harden their demands and gain undue influence over the timing of your final decision.)

—With regard to PL–480 Debt Deferral, the NSDM/CIEPDM would also direct the Secretary of State, after coordination with the Department of Commerce and other agencies, to inform the Polish government: (a) that we are prepared to postpone repayments of the annual tranches of the PL–480 dollar debt falling due in years 1973–1974 for five years, i.e., so that these annual tranche repayments would take place in 1978 and 1979; and (b) that toward the end of 1974, we will be prepared to give consideration to a deferral of further tranches. (The repayments average just over $16 million annually.)

—The Polish government’s request, made in an aide-mémoire handed Secretary Stans last year and repeated in Chairman Jaroszewicz’s message to you was for a five year deferral—i.e., until the period 1978–1982—of payments due in 1973–1977. We do not believe that it is economically sound or politically wise to commit ourselves formally to this extended period. The Poles’ main problem is with their short-range debt. Giving them a postponement and taking a look at their balance-of-payments position at the end of 1974 will give them the needed immediate relief. In terms of our relations with Poland and other PL–480 debtor countries, an undesirable precedent would be set by meeting precisely the Poles’ wish for a deferral of as much as five annual tranches.

—Polish-American Trade Commission

Secretary Peterson is ready to chair this Commission and is the right man. The memorandum at Tab B would designate him as Chairman of the US side and would instruct him to work with Polish officials to get the Commission functioning.

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4 Not found.
5 Attached but not printed. Signed by the President on July 7.
—Reply to Chairman Jaroszewicz

A proposed reply for your signature to Chairman Jaroszewicz’s letters is at Tab C, and has been coordinated with Ray Price’s office. It indicates your favorable attitude toward PL–480 deferral. (It should be noted that the reply does not commit you on the second agricultural proposal made by Chairman Jaroszewicz.)

Recommendations

1. That you approve the NSDM/CIEPDM at Tab A.
2. That you approve the memorandum to Secretary Peterson at Tab B.
3. That you sign the letter to Chairman Jaroszewicz at Tab C.

6 The draft letter to Jaroszewicz, signed by Nixon on July 8, reads in part: “Thank you for your letters of June 5. . . . After appropriate consultations between officials of our government, I anticipate that our two countries should soon be able to reach an agreement on a five year deferral of dollar installments due for payments in 1973 and 1974 in accordance with an earlier Public Law 480 agreement between Poland and the United States. I have also requested the responsible Departments of the United States Government to give prompt consideration to your request for conclusion of a new agricultural sales agreement. . . . Permit me to take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to thank you once again for the warm welcome and generous hospitality accorded Mrs. Nixon and me during our recent trip to Warsaw: We will long cherish our memory of that visit.”

7 The President initialed the approval option.
8 The President initialed the approval option.

170. National Security Decision Memorandum 173


TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT

Polish-US Economic Relations

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972. Confidential. Copies were also sent to the Secretary of Agriculture, the President’s Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, and the President of the Export-Import Bank. Also issued as CIEPDM 8.
1. Export-Import Bank Credit Facilities

Exercise of the President’s authority to extend these facilities is tied to a solution of the claims of US holders of dollar bonds issued by the pre-war Polish government. The Secretary of State should notify the Foreign Bondholders Council that the US Government continues to favor a reasonable settlement of US holders’ claims within a reasonable time. If Polish government representatives inquire when Export-Import Bank credit facilities can be made available to Poland, they should be informed that the President, in accordance with his discussions in Warsaw, will make this decision in light of the status of negotiations between the Polish government and the bondholders’ representatives.

2. Deferral of PL–480 Dollar Debt

In response to Chairman Jaroszewicz’s message on this subject to the President of June 5, 1972, the Department of State, after appropriate coordination with the Department of Commerce and other agencies, should inform the Polish government that we are willing to defer the dollar tranches under the PL–480 agreements which fall due in the years 1973–1974 for a period of five years, i.e., so that these payments will be made in the years 1977 and 1978. Toward the end of 1974 we would be prepared to consider deferral of further tranches. This is contingent, however, upon appropriate assurances from the Polish government, as proposed in the aide-mémoire of December 2, 1971, and Chairman Jaroszewicz’s letter of June 5, 1972, to the President, that Polish enterprises will purchase in the United States during the period 1972–1973 machinery and equipment for the amount equivalent to the total of deferred tranches.

Henry A. Kissinger

PMF

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2 See Document 169 and footnote 2 thereto. An unofficial translation of Jaroszewicz’s letter of June 5 is also attached to a June 16 memorandum from David to Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972)

3 Not found.
171. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

How Polish Officials Regard Your Warsaw Visit.

In the weeks since your Warsaw trip, we received several State Department cables and also intelligence reports on the views of Polish officials about the outcome of the visit. The reports all agree that Poland’s leaders regard your visit as a definite success, which reinforces their country’s prestige and influence and opens the door to improve US-Polish bilateral relations, particularly economic.

In late June, Polish diplomats sought out their US opposite numbers in several places with specific purpose of telling them about an official assessment of your visit cabled them from Warsaw. According to their assessment, as the diplomats described it, the Polish leaders were greatly impressed by your handling of the Warsaw talks and considered you a forward-looking leader with modern ideas. The assessment also reportedly said that they look forward to pursuing an “independent” policy in European affairs and had noted the strong residual friendship toward the US which exists among the Polish people.

Two separate intelligence reports are confirmatory. One, [1 line not declassified] says that these officials considered that:

—your signature of the communiqué with Gierek proves that you fully accept him as Poland’s leader.
—your coming to Warsaw via Tehran, rather than directly from Moscow, was good since it demonstrated that you regarded your Warsaw talks as separate from the Moscow Summit.
—you had recognized that the differences between the Moscow and the Warsaw communiqué stem from the independence of Polish policies.

A particularly sensitive intelligence report [1 line not declassified] confirmed that the Polish leadership was satisfied with the visit, which had increased Poland’s influence within the communist bloc and throughout Europe. The source of this particular report added that your visit had also heartened Polish intellectuals.

We have learned separately that the Polish government plans a special book on the visit. It will contain color photographs and appear in perhaps several hundred thousand copies.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 481, President’s Trip Files, President’s Poland Trip. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.
An additional sign of the Polish government’s favorable view of your visit is the unprecedentedly large number of high Polish officials, including the Foreign Minister, who attended Ambassador’s Stoessel’s Fourth of July reception.

It is noteworthy that not only the Polish government but also the intellectuals in Poland, who are not necessarily Gierek supporters, and the Polish-American community all consider the trip a success. It was to be expected that Gierek would use your visit to strengthen his domestic position, but non-government elements in Poland have also evidently benefited from it.

172. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Conversations in Poland

I talked on August 2 for about a total of three and a half hours alone with Szlachcic and Frelek, the senior Polish Party Secretary in charge of international affairs who had accompanied Gierek to the Communist summit in the Crimea.

The first talk was with Szlachcic who received me with enormous friendliness. He said he had just hung up talking to Gierek who was still in the Crimea and who wanted Szlachcic to convey his warmest regards to you. Gierek and the entire Polish leadership were still under the deep impression of the President’s visit but beyond that were totally convinced that the evolution in US-Soviet relations and in international affairs generally that was now underway was extremely favorable. The processes that had been set in train were, in the Polish view, wholly constructive because they promised the further democratization of Communist societies, including in a crucial way Soviet society. This could only occur under conditions of détente and the Poles...
were therefore delighted over the way the situation was developing. Szlachcic said that he was convinced that Soviet policy in this regard was firmly established and that Brezhnev was in a position to override opposition to it to the extent that it still existed. Szlachcic said that unlike some others the Poles were not concerned about US-Soviet dealings; these were essential to the whole process and the Poles could see no way in which Polish interests might be damaged by superpower agreements. On the contrary, these were required for things to keep moving forward as the Poles want.

I asked Szlachcic whether he really felt that the process of détente and democratization, as he had described it, could go forward without arousing Soviet misgivings about the implications for intra-Communist discipline and, in particular, whether the point might not come where once again the Soviets and some others, like the East Germans, felt the brakes had to be applied lest democratization proceeded too far and too fast. I said that in the past there seemed to be a dialectic pattern that operated: the more détente the greater the effort to control its effects with détente the victim.

Szlachcic said that if the process was carefully managed he thought this time the experiences of the past would not be repeated, even though there will still be some, like the East Germans and Castro who preferred tension. (He said in regard to Castro that he wanted you to know that the Poles and Soviets had agreed before Castro’s recent visit to Moscow and Warsaw that they would not sign any anti-American statement with him. The Soviets ended up signing what Szlachcic regarded a rather harmless joint statement but the Poles refused to issue a statement altogether because Castro had tried to inject anti-US themes. Szlachcic said the Poles wanted to make clear to Castro that he would be isolated if he continued to push anti-Americanism and Szlachcic thought that the lesson Castro learned in Moscow and Warsaw might produce some effects in his orientation that would permit the US to conduct a more flexible policy toward Cuba over time.) Szlachcic stressed that it was important that we operate through the Communist parties in Eastern Europe; any effort to achieve change by working outside the parties would immediately arouse intense Soviet reaction. This was why the Poles appreciated the President’s decision not to see the Cardinal [Wyszynski] in Warsaw, and, as he had told you, why they were so pleased at the way we played the December 1970 events in Poland. I said we felt that Soviet decisions in 1971 had in part been influenced by the Polish December events. Szlachcic said he agreed. He said the

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4 Fidel Castro was in Moscow for the COMECON economic summit June 10–12. A summary statement on the activities of the meeting is in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, July 5, 1972, p. 23.
Soviets move slowly and reluctantly but they are now moving, in part by conscious decision. The Poles had decided to give the Soviets full and loyal support because this was the best way to produce the fundamental changes in their system that we all wanted. To illustrate, he cited the automobile and Polish regulations on travel abroad. He said the Poles had opened their frontiers to the USSR and the GDR for the first time because they want their people to move around and stimulate the Soviets to do the same for theirs. Cars were going to help the process.

This took us onto a brief discussion of the impact of the automobile. I said I thought there were three sets of implications in the coming of larger number of cars: (1) they require an economic infrastructure that will require some change in economic priorities, (2) they will facilitate contacts among people over larger distances and across frontiers, and (3) they will reinforce the impulse toward privacy and toward individual decisions which Communist regimes have traditionally tried to smother. Szlachcic said the first two sets of implications were already clear and the Poles, at least, were taking the requisite economic decisions. He thought the Soviets would, too. The second was of course a prime motive for the Poles in promoting the automobile age. The third would be an interesting phenomenon to watch; the Poles were all in favor of greater individualism and were not afraid of it since it was a key ingredient in the process of democratization and humanization.

I asked Frelek, whom I have known for many years in his earlier capacity as head of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, how he accounted for the fact that a man of Brezhnev’s background had apparently become the driving force behind a rather dramatic shift in the Soviet approach to relations with us and the West generally. Without answering directly, Frelek said that the thing to remember about Brezhnev was that he knew the Party and the Party knew and trusted him. (Patolichiev in quite a different context had made the same point to us in Moscow.) The cadres trusted him as they did not trust Khrushchev who had constantly shaken them up with purges and reorganizations and the use of groups and devices that circumvented the apparat. Moreover, despite the high average age of the Politburo and Brezhnev’s own seniority, Brezhnev had succeeded in catching the imagination and enlisting the loyalty of that large proportion of Central Committee members who were only in their forties and below and who were truly the first post-revolutionary generation. Both Szlachcic and Frelek tended for these reasons to discount the likelihood that Brezhnev was in serious political trouble on any foreign policy issue. Frelek said that if there were disputes about any of the trade matters we had been in Moscow to discuss it would be about technical aspects rather than political ones. But he added that in the USSR as elsewhere the political fortunes of leaders rise and fall basically with domestic issues, especially economic ones. This was also true in Poland, even though the international
environment was crucial to Poland’s existence; Gierek’s strong position was in large degree due to his successful coping with economic problems, just as Gomulka’s downfall had been heavily influenced by economic failure. (Both Frelek and Szlachcic however stressed that Gierek’s personal qualities and his ability to work with and influence the Soviets had a great deal to do with his political strength.)

Frelek commented that since moving in as Party Secretary with Gierek he had come to know his Soviet counterparts Katushev and Rusakov—now Brezhnev’s personal assistants for intra-Bloc affairs—quite well. For the first time this year, he had been invited to their homes and had met their families. He had spent ten days with Katushev in Sochi. We were wrong to see these people as party hacks. They were bright, well informed and energetic. He said that the same was true of others in the Soviet higher apparat although the party does not always get the best people to work for it in career jobs. But in his own department of the Polish Central Committee he now had several of his former students and in a small way he thought it compared well with the NSC staff. He was still teaching part-time at the University and would be coming to the US again in December.

Szlachcic repeatedly reverted to his theme that American-Soviet and East-West détente was the most favorable feature of the current international situation. He said you were a hero in Poland because you were regarded as the architect of what was happening. The Poles were convinced that the reelection of the President was vital for the continuation of the process and they would do all they could to help although they were virtually certain that the President would be chosen again in any case. Szlachcic said the entire European bloc had reached the same conclusion and that it was confirmed at the Crimean summit. The Poles were working with Polish-American groups and would be sending a delegation to Chicago to “brief,” in a very matter of fact manner, the Polish-American organizations there about the President’s visit. Szlachcic said we could be sure that they would not overdo their support, recognizing that it could backfire if handled clumsily.

Szlachcic stressed Polish eagerness for good US-Polish relations within the overall process of détente. He said they were not aware of any Soviet fears in this regard, provided, of course, that it occurred within regular channels. Szlachcic said the Soviets had been instrumental in triggering the Polish initiative of inviting the President in part because they wanted the curse taken off their own reception of the President in the aftermath of the Vietnam mining operation.\footnote{On May 8 President Nixon announced the imposition of a blockade on North Vietnam. For text of his statement, see \textit{Public Papers: Nixon, 1972}, pp. 583–587. On May 10 the United States bombed Hanoi.}
Poles had kept the Soviets fully informed of their talks with the President, Szlachcic said, and the Soviets had reciprocated. (I did not probe.) It was in this context that Szlachcic said the Poles were happy to hear of your forthcoming visit to Moscow.6 (Frelek, on the other hand, said that the Soviets had been very reticent in talking to the Poles or others about SALT II.)

Szlachcic also said that the Poles had been deeply appreciative of our support of Brandt’s eastern policy. I said we had always made clear that we supported the normalization of the FRG’s relations with the East but we had had to be careful not to get caught up in German domestic politics. Moreover, many of us felt that the kinds of decisions involved in the FRG’s search for reconciliation and a modus vivendi with the East were so fundamental that they should be truly national decisions of the Germans. One should not have a situation where some years from now someone in Germany would claim that the eastern settlements had been externally imposed and a new stab-in-the-back legend would be manufactured. Szlachcic said he understood this but we should not be overly modest regarding our role; the Poles knew that given our influence in Bonn the Germans must have acted with our encouragement. Szlachcic went on to say that the Crimean summit had decided that Brandt’s re-election was a must and that everything should be done to help it along. Consequently, the Poles would move to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn in late September, although the complex citizenship issue still had to be settled by the lawyers somehow. (Bahr’s friend Sahm, the new German Ambassador in Moscow, had told me just two days earlier that the Soviets had put a total freeze on bloc relations with the FRG until the German election, in part, because they did not want to risk the defeat of any aspect of eastern policy that might have to go through the stalemated Bundestag. This applied particularly to the German application for UN membership.) I would judge the Crimean decision is related to Schroeder’s trip to China.

Frelek in confirming the Crimean decision said that for his part he was well aware that we had had our doubts about some of Brandt’s eastern policies. But, where Szlachcic had observed that even with a CDU government the basic lines of Brandt’s policy would continue because of objective factors, Frelek noted that we might find ourselves confronted with far more serious problems with a CDU-conducted eastern policy than with Brandt’s. The Poles, he said, would have distinct reservations about the kind of courtship of the Soviets which someone like Strauss would soon become engaged in were he in a position of power.

6 September 10–12.
Szlachcic got to talking about the European security conference and the Polish view that it was an important aspect of the détente process. I said we understood the Polish interest and respected it; our reservations had not related to that aspect but to our concern that any such venture deal with substance rather than atmosphere. I said that in my view countries like Poland were chiefly interested in the process of the conference whereas we were bound to be concerned with its results. This was why we had stressed the need for careful preparation. I then said that we of course also expected MBFR explorations to proceed in parallel with the conference preparations. I said we were doing serious homework on MBFR. Szlachcic said the Poles welcome MBFR negotiations but they were very concerned that any reductions encompass national forces—he pointed westward, implying that the Poles would not be comfortable with reduced US and Soviet forces while the East Germans and the West Germans remained at full strength. He said the Poles really did not worry so much about the reduction of US and Soviet forces. The presence of Soviet forces, including in Poland but also, for example, in Hungary, had permitted the process of reform and democratization to go forward in Eastern Europe without arousing Soviet security worries. (I commented that Kadar seemed to have achieved all of what the 1956 revolutionaries had aimed at as regards economic changes. Szlachcic said he has managed to go beyond what [Imre] Nagy had wanted but without allowing extra-Party forces to take over the process.) Szlachcic said the Poles want the US to remain strong in Europe and in the world as a whole; without such strength détente was doomed and with it the whole Polish policy concept. Consequently, the Poles oppose unilateral US reductions. I said that our effort to negotiate reciprocal reductions was importantly influenced by our need to keep our unilateral reducers from achieving their purposes. Szlachcic said he understood this and did not want our bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the Soviets undermined by unilateral cuts. But he stressed again that any agreement should include national forces. I said that because of our Congressional problem we would emphasize stationed forces initially but we certainly saw the weight of the arguments for also including national forces. Szlachcic reverted several times to the point that a strong US was prerequisite for peace and for democratization in Eastern Europe and the USSR. That was why the Poles want the President re-elected.

I said I could assure Szlachcic that maintenance of a strong US was also the President’s purpose, since it was equally clear to him that the

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7 Reference is to efforts by Congress to save money and achieve greater Western European involvement in its own defense by unilaterally reducing the size of U.S. forces stationed in Europe. The most recent effort to impose a troop cut, in May 1971, had been defeated on the floor of the Senate.
world’s peace depended on it. To that end we would continue to make
our domestic system work successfully, we would maintain our mili-
tary strength whatever the critics might say, and we would end the
Vietnam war in a way that did not shatter the internal cohesion of our
society nor raise questions about our will and capacity to play an ac-
tive and responsible role in international affairs. Szlachcic said he as-
sumed I was speaking on the assumption that the President would be
re-elected. I said that was the premise we had started with in our con-
versation. Szlachcic said that while the Poles obviously have to say
things about the US that are critical—as he had told you, the ideolog-
ical struggle would go on—they view us and the policies of the Pres-
ident and you are pursuing with the greatest admiration.

Szlachcic asked me how I felt about the prospects for a Vietnam
settlement. I said that there were many factors which led to the con-
clusion that Hanoi, acting rationally, should now grasp the oppor-
tunity to end the war. I said that if Hanoi was stalling because it hoped
a new Administration would give it better terms it should recognize
that a re-elected President Nixon could be much tougher to deal with
than he was now. I said I was not informed about developments in the
Paris talks and that perhaps Szlachcic could judge better than I whether
Hanoi had begun to draw the logical conclusions from developments
since May or whether it was still operating on the basis of its irrational
suspicions, fears and hopes. Szlachcic said that Hanoi tells the Poles
nothing and that if he had half the influence in Hanoi that we have
with Thieu he could assure me peace would be imminent. But he could
also assure me that the Soviets and the Poles have told Hanoi that the
time to settle was now and that indeed they had conducted their pol-
icy in such a way that Hanoi would be led to that conclusion. Szlach-
cic said he himself was more hopeful than ever before that the war
could be ended. In any case, that was what the Poles ardently wanted
and they could see that the President wanted it too. They had told
Hanoi so.

Szlachcic asked me whether I had any advice for the Poles. I said
that was a large question that I wouldn’t want to answer on the spur
of the moment. But I was impressed with the Polish view of the world
and with the impact of Polish attitudes on others. I said I did have one
specific suggestion: it related to the European conference and seemed
to fall in with what Szlachcic had earlier said about opening frontiers,
the role of the automobile, etc. In the West, one of the tests of what the
conference would accomplish would be whether it contributed to the
intensification and broadening of contacts across the dividing lines in
Europe. In fact, when we had signed our Statement of Principles with
the Soviets, we had been criticized by some in Western Europe for not
including a principle on freedom of movement, though this was un-
warranted since the whole document dealt with greater cooperation
and contact. But the criticism showed the feelings on the matter. I thought it would give the conference a more concrete character if it could develop ways to increase contacts, facilitate movement between peoples and stimulate the flow of ideas and information. I said I would hope that if were feasible the Poles might use their influence with their allies to have an item of this kind on the conference agenda. Szlachcic said he would consider the point.

Some other points: Frelek said the Crimean summit was fairly routine; these meetings have become regular summertime events. The Soviets never raised the Middle East but both Frelek and Szlachcic volunteered that they thought that what had happened there might make a settlement more possible or at any rate remove the problem as a US-Soviet issue. I did not comment.

I told both Szlachcic and Frelek that I thought our economic relations would proceed well once the essentially technical issues of the bonds had been resolved. I told them Peterson was speaking with the President’s full authority in stressing our desire for close economic relations.8

Frelek said that the Soviets had been very positive about the Peterson mission and that Brezhnev had been very pleased about his conversation with us at Oreanda. The Soviets apparently gave no hint of the difficulties which in fact are still in the way of a comprehensive trade settlement.

Frelek said the Poles have no information about what was going on in Romania but that Soviet-Romanian relations were fairly stable at present.

Both Szlachcic and Frelek stressed Polish concern with EEC trade policies. The point was also made in the official talks with Peterson. As Patolichev had done earlier in Moscow, they said that the US and the East Europeans had a common interest in fighting the trade practices of the Community. I said we had supported the formation of the EEC and its enlargement; clearly there were now some serious economic problems between it and us, but we hoped to be able to persuade the Community to join us in finding ways of reducing or managing them.

8 Peterson visited Poland in July, as the head of a U.S. commercial delegation.
Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, October 6, 1972.

SUBJECT
Deferral of Polish PL–480 Dollar Debt

The State Department has been conducting negotiations in Washington this week with the Poles on deferring the 1973 and 1974 dollar repayment tranches of PL–480. The President agreed in his July 8 letter to Prime Minister Jaroszewicz on these postponements.

The negotiations have revealed a wide difference in views between the Polish and US sides, and State is seeking guidance urgently (memorandum at Tab B)—in time for a meeting at 10:00 a.m. tomorrow, Saturday, October 7.

The issue is whether the Poles should pay interest on the amount to be deferred (i.e. about $30 million).

Our negotiators take the view:
— that a deferral is equivalent to a $30 million export credit, on which the Poles should pay a 6 percent interest rate. We are arguing that the law prohibits a concessionary rate, i.e. less than 6 percent. Treasury and Agriculture in particular want to stick by 6 percent, although they would accept a “political decision” to shave the rate.

The Poles argue:
— that since the deferral was agreed upon at the highest political level it cannot be treated as a normal commercial loan. They have, however, agreed to discuss a nominal interest charge and requested new instructions, which should be in by October 7. State believes they might pay 3 or 4 percent ultimately.

Two other factors are involved:
— the current negotiations in New York with the US Bondholders, where the two sides are also apart on the interest rate; State believes that an agreement on PL–480 debt deferral would help bring about a settlement with the Bondholders;
— the US-Polish Science and Technology Agreement, which will likely be ready for signature in a few days; a schedule proposal for a

2 See footnote 6, Document 169.
3 Attached but not printed.
high-visibility signature ceremony has already gone forward to the President (Log # 6886, Tab C).\textsuperscript{4}

State points out that the Poles are not likely to agree to 6 percent and that if we insist on it, they are likely to break off the negotiations this weekend. This might in turn jeopardize a Bondholders settlement and a S & T agreement signing ceremony in October, which Dr. David believes the President wants.

In seeking guidance, State has presented two options for the October 7 negotiating round:

1. Stick at 6 percent but make concessions on other aspects of an agreement, such as deferring five rather than two annual tranches, extending the grace period of deferral from five years to perhaps seven or eight. If no agreement can be reached on this basis, we would tell the Poles that we should resume the discussions at a later date.
2. Shave the interest rate.

Pros and Cons

If we select option 1, we risk a breakoff of negotiations. The Poles may interpret our insistence on 6% as a negation of the President’s generous offer during his Warsaw visit to postpone PL~480 debt repayment.

If we select option 2, there may be Congressional criticism that a concessionary rate of interest is in effect an exaggerated subsidization of Polish imports from the United States. Selection of this option will also make us more vulnerable to criticism on what will be seen as concessions on different rates in our current trade negotiations with the Soviet Union.

State recommends option 1.

However, Peter Flanigan is adamantly opposed to any efforts of flexibility on deferring more than two repayment tranches or increasing the grace period to more than five years.

On balance, it seems feasible at present only to accept that part of State’s option 1 which retains the 6% position, recommends that the Poles be told again that they should settle with the Bondholders (a hint that they might get EXIM Bank credit facilities in that case), and informed that we will reconsider the debt deferral later if they cannot meet the 6% interest rate.

This will be unpalatable to the Poles but on the other hand they may be taking a rigid position now because they think the President wants an agreement in this field before the election. In fact, we have several things going with the Poles as far as the President’s interests

\textsuperscript{4}Not printed. Regarding the U.S.-Polish science and technology agreement, see Document 175.
are concerned, including the Science and Technology Agreement and Cardinal Krol’s forthcoming trip to Poland. So there should be no undue harm in telling the Poles, if no agreement based on our present position is feasible, that it will be better for both sides to review their positions and resume these talks later.

Recommendation

That you authorize General Haig to sign the memorandum to Eliot at Tab A, which accepts option 1 but without the offers of concessions on tranches and grace period extension which State recommends.

5 On the evening of October 6, Haig signed the memorandum to Eliot regarding deferral of the Polish P.L.–480 debt. It reads as follows: “The recommendation in your memorandum of October 6, 1972, . . . that the US side retain the requirement for a 6% interest rate is approved. However, our negotiators should give no indication to the Poles that we are prepared either (a) to depart from our position that only two annual tranches will be deferred; or (b) to increase the grace period already offered.”

174. Memorandum for the Record1

Washington, October 10, 1972, 11:55 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between the President and Polish Ambassador Witold Trampczynski, Monday, October 10, 1972, 11:55 a.m., The Oval Office

The meeting began in the Oval Office at 11:55 a.m., with the President greeting the Ambassador and inviting him to stand in front of the flags for photographs. The President said the timing of the
Ambassador’s call was appropriate because Pulaski Day would be celebrated the next day. The Ambassador said it was also a big event in Poland and had already been observed there during the previous weekend. The President said this highlighted the role of Poles in our Revolution and history. During the picture-taking the President handed the Ambassador a movie of the President’s Polish visit, noting that it had been made by American cameramen. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation.

After the press had left the President began the private conversation by recalling the beautiful day he had spent with Mrs. Nixon in Warsaw. He said the palace in which he had stayed as the guest of the Polish Government had been lovely but above all it had been the talks that remained in his memory. They had been very good talks and the President had been most impressed with Mr. Gierek, the Prime Minister, and all the Polish leaders he had met. Mr. Gierek was a very strong man. And Mrs. Nixon had been very impressed with Mrs. Gierek. The President said that he had shaken hands with Gierek on a series of commitments for cooperation and he was pleased to see that these matters were being followed up and moving forward.

Trampczynski said there were three specific areas. The Science and Technology agreement was now completed and all that was needed was a formal signature. The President said Dr. David has kept him informed. Trampczynski then mentioned the bondholders negotiations in which he said the positions were very close. The talks had gone on for a month and he was hopeful they would be completed successfully because this would then open the way for EXIM facilities for Poland. The President said our talks with the Soviets had been going on for two years, so to be successful in one month was quite an accomplishment. The President said he had talked recently with Henry Kearns and we were looking into the EXIM question. The President said he wanted to be sure the Poles understood that we wanted to do as much with them as with the Soviets although what we did with the Soviets was of course very important, including for the Poles.

Trampczynski then said the third issue was the PL–480 debt rollover on which the Poles had one view and the US had another so that the talks that had been going on had just been adjourned. The President said that his commitment given to the Prime Minister stood. He well recalled the list of specific problems he had been shown in Warsaw on the last day and he has made sure that all the items would be followed up on. Of course in business questions there were always

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3 The talks were deadlocked over U.S. insistence that Poland pay a 6 percent interest rate. See Document 173.
some technical problems that took time to take care of. But the Ambassador could be sure that we wanted to move ahead on all the items. Even when Dr. Kissinger was not in town, the White House kept a close eye on our relations with Poland. The Ambassador said he knew this since the White House had been very helpful.

The President said perhaps we should get more Polish ham. The Ambassador said the Poles were exporting some $50 million worth. The President said this was very important because of our domestic meat prices. The Ambassador said there was a problem right now concerning certain health specifications that had to be met; it would take about two months for the Poles to comply.

As the meeting ended at about 12:10 p.m., the President said our relations were in a new era and were very good. The Ambassador said they were the best they had ever been.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

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4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

175. Editorial Note

In the fall of 1972, the Governments of the United States and Poland concluded a series of agreements based in part on the discussions between President Richard Nixon and First Secretary Edward Gierek in Warsaw on June 1 and the resulting National Security Decision Memorandum 173 (Document 170).

On October 31 Secretary of State William Rogers and Presidential Science Adviser Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., signed an “Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Polish People’s Republic on Cooperation in Science and Technology.” The agreement was initialed simultaneously in Warsaw by the Polish Minister for Science, Higher Education and Technology, Jan Kaczmarek. See Department of State Bulletin, November 27, 1972, page 642. For the text of the agreement, see 24 UST 7565. On June 19 President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, citing “the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the President’s visit to Poland,” had requested recommendations for such an agreement from the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972) The response of the Under Secretaries Committee,
From November 4–8 the Joint American-Polish Trade Commission, established pursuant to the Warsaw communiqué of June 1, met in Washington. Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson led the U.S. delegation; Minister of Foreign Trade Tadeusz Olechowski headed the Polish side. During the talks, Olechowski affirmed that Poland had reached an interim agreement with the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc., regarding compensation for U.S. dollar bonds issued by the Polish Government before World War II. In response, Nixon signed a Presidential Determination granting Poland access to Export-Import Bank credit facilities on November 8. The Presidential Determination, attached to a memorandum from Rogers to the President, October 19, is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 6–1 POL. At the November meeting, the two sides also agreed in principle that of Poland’s existing P.L.–480 debts, only the installments due in 1973 and 1974 would be deferred for a period of 4 years, and interest on the deferred amount would accrue at the rate of 6 percent per annum. During the discussions, the Polish negotiators presented a draft agreement on economic, industrial, and technological cooperation, to which the United States agreed to respond. The unpublished minutes from the talks are in telegram 204074 to Warsaw, November 9. (Ibid., FT 3 POL–US)

The Chargé in Warsaw, Boster, reported on the ensuing mood in Warsaw on November 18 in telegram 5235. “It will scarcely come as a surprise to Department,” he wrote, “but perhaps we should report that atmosphere in our contacts with Polish officialdom, increasily cordial over past several months, seems at a new high following Foreign Trade Minister Olechowski’s return last week.... Underlying this warmth is evident recognition that we have now been making good on promises, explicit or implicit, in President’s visit last summer and belief that our cooperative attitude will continue. Polish officials we have talked to have been unanimous in expressing pleasure at agreements reached or projected in Washington... Almost all sections of Embassy have commented this week that Polish doors seem a little wider open for them and, although we have never had particular problem in attracting Polish guests to our homes, we have had unusually good and friendly turnouts... at recent receptions.” (Ibid., POL POL–US)

On November 15 Polish Ambassador Witold Trampczynski delivered to the Department of State a letter from Gierek to President Nixon. The November 8 letter congratulated Nixon on his reelection. In a December 1 covering memorandum Kissinger told President Nixon: “The letter is unique in several respects. Never before has the head of the Polish Party sent a United States President a congratulatory message
of this sort. The letter also goes beyond the pleasantries usual on such occasions to mention (although in standard terms) several political matters, US-Polish relations, the Conference on European Security, and Vietnam. Moreover the letter is very warm in tone." Kissinger joined the Department of State in recommending that the President respond. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972)

On December 4 Nixon signed a letter to Gierek thanking him for his "cordial and thoughtful letter." "It is satisfying to know," he wrote, "that the talks which I had with you and your colleagues have been followed by some very concrete and useful steps in our bilateral relations. . . . We anticipate that Poland will play a helpful role in preparing for the current projects for promoting cooperation in Europe. . . . As you will recall from our talks last spring, there is no cause to which I am more dedicated than ending the war in Vietnam. It now appears we are close to that goal. We look to your cooperation and assistance in the demanding task of keeping the peace in that area once the ceasefire has been established." (Ibid.)
Romania

176. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Romanians Fish for High-Level US Visit

In the attached message (Bucharest 139), Ambassador Davis reports a conversation with Romanian party and state chief Ceausescu in which the latter urged that US-Romanian “political relations” be developed, referred to his meeting with President Nixon two years ago and expressed hope that the President might some time visit Romania. He also expressed the hope that President Johnson might visit Romania.

I doubt whether Ceausescu would expect this invitation to be taken up, at least any time soon and I think Dick Davis is right in supposing that the Romanians are fishing for a high-level but less than Presidential visit.

I believe this is well worth considering as is the possibility of more or less regular political consultations. This kind of activity, if carried on without excessive fanfare, would be in the category of deterrence diplomacy along the lines of what we have been doing with the Yugoslavs. There are of course pitfalls: if you overdo the deterrence you may bring on the thing you are trying to prevent; if we invest too much of our prestige in our relations we have more of it to lose if things go badly. But given skill and the built-in restraints, both here and in Bucharest, I think the State Department can be encouraged to pursue Ceausescu’s overture.

My candidate for a trip some time would be Governor Scranton.

HS

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2 Dated January 27; not printed.
3 Nixon discussed the visit in RN: Memoirs, pp. 281–282.
177. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 1, 1969, 5:30–6 p.m.

SUBJECT
Situation in Europe

PARTICIPANTS
Romania:
Gheorghe Macovescu, First Deputy Foreign Minister
Corneliu Bogdan, Ambassador to the United States

U.S.:
The Secretary
George R. Kaplan, EUR/EE, Romanian Affairs

Recalling that he had met both President Eisenhower and Secretary Rogers late in the Eisenhower administration when he was Minister here, Mr. Macovescu expressed his personal condolences as well as those of President Ceausescu. The Secretary replied that, as the youngest member of the Eisenhower Cabinet, he had had a special feeling toward the late President who had been something like a father to him.

Mr. Macovescu said that his government desired above all a better atmosphere and peace in Europe and was pursuing the avenues it considered appropriate toward this end. He noted that he would be visiting Dutch Foreign Minister Luns in The Hague immediately following his Washington trip.

The Secretary said that we, too, not only want peace but are willing to go halfway and more to achieve it. He said that a new administration has a certain initial advantage and can therefore take a fresh look at the important problems of achieving it. He noted, however, that Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and Mr. Brezhnev’s ideological justification had ominous overtones.

Mr. Macovescu said that the Brezhnev doctrine was not a justification but rather an explanation. The Romanian Government, he said, simply does not accept this doctrine and has stated its views repeat-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL EUR E. Confidential. Drafted by Kaplan and approved in S on April 4. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office. The memorandum is part 1 of 4; parts 2 through 4 are ibid.

2 Former President Eisenhower died on March 28. Macovescu attended the March 30 state funeral as the representative of his government.

3 See footnote 3, Document 72.
edly. The Secretary said that, while the Brezhnev doctrine may indeed be an explanation for one situation, it could as easily be construed as justification for all situations.

Mr. Macovescu said that the Romanian delegation had signed the Budapest declaration on March 17, in good faith, feeling that it provided an excellent starting point in the quest for an improved atmosphere in Europe. Romania wants to play a role in working toward the abolition of blocs and the prevention of Czechoslovakia-type situations. Equally important, of course, is to build something tangible for the future. In this connection, he emphasized that the military arrangements agreed to in Budapest were not directed against anyone. The Secretary asked how this could be the case. Mr. Macovescu replied that prior to these arrangements, the Warsaw Pact had no actual working regulations. The Soviets could do whatever they wished. Now, all members know their obligations. It would now be impossible, for example, for the Soviets to decide unilaterally that maneuvers would be held anywhere in the Warsaw Pact area. Mr. Macovescu stated categorically that the subject of maneuvers had not arisen in the Budapest meeting.

The Secretary asked if there had been any discussion in Budapest concerning Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. Mr. Macovescu replied that, although there had not, the Romanian Government takes every opportunity to inform the Soviets that they would be well-advised to remove their troops and renounce solutions to international problems by force.

Mr. Macovescu said that he had been instructed by President Ceausescu to emphasize that Romania did not want any special help from the United States but would on its own renounce any pressure to subscribe to any policy dictated from outside Romania. He reiterated that Romania intends to decide its own destiny by itself. The Secretary noted that it would probably be just as well in these circumstances for the United States to stay quiet. Mr. Macovescu agreed.

The Secretary said that we have already told the Soviets on a number of occasions that another Czechoslovakia would make any improvement in bilateral relations utterly impossible. Dobrynin knows this. The Secretary said that both he and the President respect the Romanian attitude and detect obvious concern over it on the part of the USSR. Mr. Macovescu said that President Ceausescu had been absolutely clear in his public statements and in his contacts with the Soviets that, while Soviet-Romanian friendship is desirable, Romania had

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4 For extracts of the relevant portions of the communiqué issued by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact appealing for a Conference on European Security, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1035–1037.
no intention of strewing flowers in the path of the Soviets should they decide to enter Romania. He added that his country’s policy was more realistic than courageous.

The Secretary asked if the Soviets had given any assurances to the Romanian leadership that they would not invade their country. Mr. Macovescu replied that the question had a certain academic quality inasmuch as the Soviets had given such assurances to the Czechoslovaks.

178. Editorial Note

On May 20, 1969, Ambassador to Romania Richard Davis reported that in the course of a discussion with Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu, the latter had extended an invitation for President Richard Nixon to visit Romania. Davis characterized the invitation as “hardly surprising,” and noted that the Romanians, “in pursuit their policy of develop[ing] good bilateral relations with all countries have increasingly used technique of visit exchanges.” He endorsed such a visit as promoting improved bilateral U.S.-Romanian relations. (Telegram 983 from Bucharest, May 20; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. 1—8/69)

The United States agreed to a visit in June and set the dates for August 1–3. The Romanian visit became the last stop on a Presidential trip to the Far East from July 23 to August 1. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger discussed the background and the visit in *White House Years*, pages 151–158.
179. **Intelligence Information Cable**

TDCS DB–315/02773–69


COUNTRY
Rumania/USSR/Eastern Europe

DOI
June–July 1969

SUBJECT
Comments of a Rumanian official abroad concerning Rumanian reaction to President Nixon’s projected visit to Rumania, and considerations affecting the Rumanian decision to invite the President

ACQ
July 1969

SOURCE
[9 lines not declassified]

1. In early July 1969 a Rumanian official stationed abroad commented concerning the Rumanian reaction to the announcement made on 28 June 1969 that President Richard M. Nixon planned to visit Rumania in early August, and the various considerations which had affected the decision of the Rumanian Government (GOR) to extend the invitation to the President. He stated that his remarks reflected the “official” views of the GOR. The Rumanian official said that the Rumanian leadership is very pleased that President Nixon made a positive response to the invitation. He commented that the President’s decision to visit Rumania in the immediate future and to stop in no other Eastern European country had exceeded the most optimistic expectations of the Rumanian leadership: the Bucharest regime had judged that in the event President Nixon decided to visit Rumania, the trip probably could not be arranged until the last quarter of 1969 at the earliest, and that the stop in Rumania undoubtedly would be within the context of a tour of the general Eastern European area. The Rumanian official said that the GOR had assumed that any visit to Rumania would almost certainly be accompanied by similar stops in Moscow and, probably, Belgrade; the fact that Rumania has now been singled out for special attention by the United States is source of major gratification for the GOR.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. I—8/69, Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Prepared in the CIA and sent to agencies in the Intelligence Community.
2. In response to a query as to whether the GOR had any fears that the President’s visit might adversely affect the delicate position Rumania occupies in Eastern Europe and its relations with the Soviet Union, the Rumanian official replied, “absolutely not.” With respect to Rumania’s relations with the Soviet Union the Rumanian official stated that before making the decision to invite President Nixon to Rumania, the GOR leadership had carefully weighed the risks involved. The GOR concluded that, should there be an adverse Soviet reaction, any retaliatory gesture from the Soviet Union would be outweighed by the “moral and psychological” benefits of the President’s visit. The GOR judges that the Soviet Union will not carry out any form of “retaliation” such as the cancellation of the projected visit of Soviet leaders to Rumania in the late July 1969, because this would only be construed by world public opinion as an admission of Soviet weakness. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: The Rumanian official stressed that there had been no such threat concerning the visit of Soviet officials, and that he had only cited it as an example.) The Rumanian official added that the GOR has no intention of “balancing” President Nixon’s visit by granting concessions to the Soviet Union, either within the framework of CEMA (Council of Economic Mutual Assistance) or the Warsaw Pact, e.g., agreeing to the holding of Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Rumanian territory.

3. In discussing the Rumanian thinking prior to the extension of an invitation to President Nixon the Rumanian official stated that once the GOR had decided that it was worthwhile to accept the risk of Soviet displeasure at the action, the GOR had attached little weight to the possible adverse reactions on the part of the other Warsaw Pact countries other than Czechoslovakia. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the GOR judged that on a whole the liberal cause in Czechoslovakia would be well served by the Rumanian invitation to Nixon, regardless of whether or not he accepted it. The GOR reasoned that the invitation might create difficulties for the pro-Soviet Husak regime in the CSSR, and this in turn would aid the liberal cause.

4. [less than 1 line not declassified]

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2 The Soviet leaders eventually visited Romania July 6–8, 1970, to sign a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance.

SUBJECT

The President’s Conversation with Romanian Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan
July 11, 1969, 12:30–12:55 p.m.

The Ambassador extended greetings from President Ceausescu, who wanted the President to know that he was very much looking forward to Mr. Nixon’s visit and was pleased to have had such a quick response to the Romanian invitation. The President told the Ambassador that he too was glad to be making the visit, that he had had good talks in Bucharest on his previous visit although he had not had a chance to see very much. He hoped this time to see something of the people. The President noted that great interest had been displayed in the press in connection with his forthcoming visit, although the implications mentioned in the newspaper articles were not always justified.

The President said he had three basic reasons for making the trip. First, we want good relations with all countries and do not wish to draw any lines between countries to which this applies and those to which it does not. Secondly, there were matters which deserved further discussion, including the question of trade in which the Romanians are interested. Thirdly, the President liked the people he had met in Bucharest and retained a warm impression of them. The President mentioned in this connection that in addition to the president and the Prime Minister, he had especially liked Foreign Minister Manescu. The President noted the symbolic effect of his visit, that he would be prepared to discuss bilateral matters and the friendly relations between us. Ambassador Bogdan expressed agreement.

The President then stated that when he met with President Ceausescu he wanted to see him alone in a face-to-face meeting with only Mr. Kissinger present on our side. The President added that our Ambassador would not participate in this discussion. The President continued that he was open on the subjects to be discussed and he was most interested in hearing Mr. Ceausescu’s views. The President observed that in the other places where he will stop during his forthcoming trip, he would likewise be listening to what the leaders have to say. The President noted that he recalled Mr. Ceausescu as a very

direct person and Mr. Bogdan interjected that Mr. Ceausescu said the same of Mr. Nixon. The President went on to say that there will be no record of the conversation and that nothing would leak out from it.

The Ambassador said that the Romanians for their part would do all they could along the same lines.

The Ambassador then informed the President that the Soviet leaders had postponed their scheduled visit to Bucharest on the 14th of July. He was instructed to tell the President that the Soviet leaders had recently informed the Romanian leaders that due to their schedule but in view of the great importance they attribute to the signing of the Soviet-Romanian friendship treaty, they (the Soviet leaders) propose to come to Bucharest in the fall.

There ensued a brief discussion of some of the arrangements for the President’s visit.²

The President then noted that this would be a most significant first in that he would be the first American President to go to Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union since President Roosevelt went to Yalta. The President added that he wanted it to go well and hoped it would set a pattern. At the same time we had no desire to embarrass the Romanians. The Ambassador commented that the Romanians, after all, had asked for it. The President noted that he himself had made the decision to go at the time his trip was first discussed. Mr. Kissinger commented that he had been startled when the President first mentioned it. The President concluded the conversation by reiterating that he considers the President a strong person and straight shooter.

Photographs were then taken of the President and the Ambassador.

Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Sonnenfeldt were present at this conversation.

² In a July 11 conversation with Bogdan, Kissinger underlined the importance the President’s staff attached to getting precise information and agreements on the schedule for the Nixon visit. (Memorandum for Record, July 12; ibid.) Kissinger reiterated this concern in a July 16 telephone call to the Romanian Ambassador. (Memorandum for Record, July 16; ibid.)
181. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Improving Relations with Romania

I. Introduction

At the request of the White House, the Under Secretaries Committee has examined the following eight propositions in the economic field for improving US-Romanian relations: accession to GATT; accession to IMF/IBRD; trade missions; port security regulations; Export-Import Bank loans and guarantees; agricultural credit sales; export controls; and trade agreements and MFN.

Each of these propositions is discussed in detail in the enclosed paper.

In addition we have looked at the civil air agreement (now in negotiation) and the possibility of certifying Romanian canned hams for import into the United States, to determine their possible utility in connection with your trip.

Consideration of all of these propositions has been in the context of the record since 1960, during which period we have concluded: (a) a comprehensive claims and financial settlement (1960); (b) broad-gauged arrangements for cultural, educational and scientific exchanges (1960–68); (c) an agreement to take specified steps to improve trade and economic relations (1964); (d) a joint undertaking to expand scientific cooperation (1968); and (e) arrangements for cooperation in...
peaceful uses of atomic energy (1968). Now in various stages of negotiation are a consular convention, the aforementioned civil air accord, the establishment of United States and Romanian cultural centers, and publication of an Amerika-type magazine.

Our examination indicates that the prospects for effective action on our part and impact on the Romanians vary markedly from item to item. Nevertheless, to obtain an overview of their potentiality and the possibility of developing a combined package of several items, we discuss them below in order of their importance.

II. Possible Items for Use with Romanians

*MFN.* The one action on our part that would demonstrate most clearly to the Romanian leadership that we mean to improve relations would be the granting of MFN status. Communist Romania has demonstrated by its increasingly independent foreign policy actions of the past five years that it merits special treatment in United States policy towards Eastern Europe. Despite Romanian assistance to North Vietnam, there is widespread admiration in the United States for its assertively independent posture and defiance of the USSR. Alone among the Soviet allies in Eastern Europe, Romania (a) has taken a neutral stand in the Arab-Israeli dispute, (b) recognized and exchanged ambassadors with the Federal Republic of Germany, (c) did not participate in and opposed the invasion of Czechoslovakia, (d) attacked the Brezhnev Doctrine, and (e) has taken a neutral stand in the Sino-Soviet confrontation.

Your decision to seek authority to grant MFN to Romania would represent a modification of NSDM 15 and would raise problems in Congress, where Chairman Mills has been unwilling to support full MFN for Eastern European countries. Although there is probably considerable sympathy for Romania on Capitol Hill, there is recognition that the Romanian communist state is run by a tightly centralized repressive regime. Widespread support for liberalized trade with Eastern Europe nevertheless exists, and your support for MFN for Romania would have an important effect on Congressional attitudes. Such a decision would raise the question whether to seek (a) broad authority to grant MFN treatment to Eastern Europe and the USSR while exercising it at this time only for Romania, and (b) authority to grant MFN to Romania alone.

In return for MFN, the Romanian Government should agree to (a) satisfactory arrangements for settlement of commercial disputes, (b) agreement for the establishment of sales and service organizations in

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6 See Document 3.
Romania by US firms, and (c) agreement on consultative procedures for problems that arise in the course of trade. Another important United States concern, although not of an economic nature, is to help dual nationals and others in Romania eligible for emigration to the United States to leave Romania. Despite Romanian pledges, progress has been slow. Only some 100 of approximately 2,500 individual cases have been favorably resolved. You might wish to couple an offer of MFN with the recommendation that Romania act to release these individuals, indicating that such action would increase Congressional receptivity. A clear undertaking to fulfill obligations to United States bondholders would also be a welcome Romanian commitment.

Export Controls. We can liberalize our export control treatment of Romania. Romania is now in Category W, which is more lenient than that for most Comecon countries (category Y) but more stringent than for NATO allies and Yugoslavia (category V).

It would be possible by Presidential directive to shift Romania to category V, provided Romania gave appropriate guarantees concerning re-export, trans-shipment, and disclosure of technical data. Alternatively, it would be possible, while retaining Romania in category W, for you to direct the Department of Commerce to expedite special licenses for the export of some or all of approximately 250 items that are available under general license to Yugoslavia and other V countries. The appropriate guarantees could be secured in each case. Such action would not require modification of NSDM 15.

Romania is aware that it is in category W and would probably prefer to be shifted to category V.

Canned Hams. Romania would like to export canned hams to the United States and has some prospect of building up a profitable market here. However, USDA has been unable on the basis of past inspections to certify that the Romanian plants meet the requirements of the Wholesome Meat Act. There have been recent informal reports that the Romanians have made substantial progress in meeting our standards. It would be possible to express gratification at these reports and state that a USDA Meat Inspection Team would be ready to visit Romania again as soon as the Romanians indicate that they feel they have met the requirements and are ready to receive them.

Civil Air Agreement. Negotiations for a Civil Air Agreement were recessed in December, 1968. Still at issue were provisions relating to PanAm’s right to conduct business in Romania such as sale of tickets and repatriation of earnings. The Romanians requested the recess to consider how their rules could be changed to permit a mutually satisfactory agreement. If the Romanians refer to the Civil Air negotiations, they might be told that we would welcome an agreement as a symbol of further normalization of our relations and are ready to resume dis-
discussion when they feel they are ready with proposals that would meet our minimum requirements.

*Trade Missions.* We could encourage whenever possible private US trade missions to Romania and, if the Romanians are interested, send another US Government trade promotion mission. We can continue to welcome and to facilitate contacts by any trade missions which Romania would like to send to the United States.

*Port-Security Regulations.* The White House now has for action an Executive Branch proposal to make considerably more flexible the restrictions on entry of merchant vessels of communist countries, including Romania, into United States ports. This is only of marginal interest to Romania.

*Accession to GATT.* Romania has applied to become a full contracting party to the GATT. The United States is supporting Romania’s application and, at Romania’s request to us, is a member of the Working Party considering it. Our role in the Working Party, however, is limited because we are unable to assume GATT obligations to extend MFN to Romania. We can do little to strengthen our general support for Romania’s accession unless we get authority to offer MFN treatment during the course of the next few months while the application is under consideration and unless Romania becomes more forthcoming than it has been on the obligations it is prepared to assume for accession.

*Accession to IMF/IBRD.* Romania has taken occasional soundings, none of them recent, with regard to IMF membership, a prerequisite of IBRD membership. We do not know how serious Romanian interest is or whether she is willing to meet the obligations of membership, even the elementary requirement to disclose her gold and foreign exchange holdings. We can express our willingness to support Romania’s application whenever the management and staff of the IMF are satisfied in their informal contacts that Romania would be able and willing to undertake the obligations of membership.

*Agricultural Credit Sales.* Romania has long been eligible for Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) credits for the purchase of agricultural products. However, as an agricultural exporting country, it has shown little interest in such purchases or credits even for non-food agricultural products.

*EXIM Bank Loans and Guarantees.* Under existing legislation Romania, as a direct supplier of North Viet-Nam, is not eligible for EXIM loans or guarantees so long as North Viet-Nam is engaged in armed conflict with armed forces of the United States. The Romanians are well aware of this prohibition. Although they put great weight on obtaining

7 See Document 8.
US credits, they would not consider stopping their supply of North Viet-Nam as the price for regaining eligibility for such credits.

III. Alternate Ways of Handling Items with Romanians

Depending on your judgment and the atmosphere and course of the talks, there are three alternative ways to handle the issues:

1. Discuss the issues with Romanians but make no commitments for further action.
2. Announce action commitments while in Bucharest on several items, such as MFN, civil air agreement, trade missions, and canned ham.
3. Hear Romanians out on these issues and, without commitment, indicate we wish to continue exploration of them with Ambassador Bogdan in Washington.

ELR

182. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh)


SUBJECT
Cooling Romanian Hopes for Economic Concessions

I noted that Bucharest’s 15672 reports that Romanian officials have begun to speak with great optimism about possible US economic concessions—particularly MFN—as a result of the President’s visit to Bucharest. I would appreciate your instructing Embassy Bucharest to try discreetly to cool down the Romanians a bit.

The Embassy should emphasize that the President’s discretion in the field of East-West trade is limited, and that the Romanians should not anticipate dramatic developments at the time of the visit. Rather, they should set their sights on gradual improvements as a result of the visit.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. I—8/69. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates it was sent on July 22.
2 Dated July 17; attached but not printed.
With regard to the encouragement reportedly given the Romanians by Dr. Emil Onaca mentioned in the same telegram, you should inform Embassy Bucharest that Onaca is one of the many well-meaning but obtrusive Romanian émigrés who have sought to press their services on the White House in connection with the Presidential trip. Onaca has no privileged relationship whatsoever at the White House and enjoys no special status; he is an American businessman of Romanian background who hopes to participate in expanding trade with Romania. He will not repeat not have a role in any aspect of the President’s trip.

Henry A. Kissinger

183. Memorandum of Conversation

Bucharest, August 2, 1969.

Private Meeting Between President Nixon and Ceausescu

PARTICIPANTS

President Nicolae Ceausescu
Ion Gheorghie Maurer
Interpreter
President Richard Nixon
Henry A. Kissinger
Colonel Burbec

Before entering the private talks, President Ceausescu invited President Nixon to stay over until Monday, to allow time for fuller discussions. President Nixon said he wished he could, but had to return to meet with Congressional leaders.

Private Meeting

Ceausescu: According to Romanian custom, we listen to our guest, although we could reverse this.

Nixon: Either way you wish. We should discuss a whole range of subjects, including both bilateral and broader issues. Bilateral issues...
would include: trade, cultural exchanges, and consular questions; we might consider these but leave more detailed matters involved to be worked out by the technicians. I would like to discuss with you such broad areas as world peace, east-west relations, Vietnam—where the Prime Minister was very helpful before—and other such problems. Do you have others?

Ceaucescu: We should start here.

Nixon: First, I want to tell you that I have examined these bilateral matters and have instructed my staff to try to work out programs to deal constructively with these; and if you want to go into these briefly, I will do so constructively. It may be we can make an announcement, for example, of the Cultural Agreement. I understand both sides are ready to sign. I’m for it and would like to see more exchange between us.

Ceaucescu: As far as problems are concerned, the relations between us have greatly improved. But by comparison with our verbal agreements, our formal agreements are small. Of course, I agree with the importance of the Cultural Agreement. It can be signed today or tomorrow, and may open other fields. But it represents only a portion. I attach great importance to cooperation in science and technology, because this field has a decisive part to play in the development of a country.

Nixon: I can have Dr. DuBridge arrange exchanges of views between our science advisers. I could send Dr. DuBridge on a mission to your country.

Ceaucescu: I would welcome this mission.

Nixon: Perhaps you are interested in a scientific mission because I understand you have a son studying atomic physics in England.

Ceaucescu: I have a chief of my home who is Director of Chemistry.

Nixon: Your wife.

Ceaucescu: Yes.

Nixon: Dr. Kissinger will work with your Ambassador to arrange such a mission.²

Ceaucescu: We are very much interested in exchanges in chemistry, as the U.S. is far ahead in this field. With regard to physics, we don’t want nuclear weapons, but would wish to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Nixon: We will help you.

Ceaucescu: The level of economic help we receive is low. First we can benefit from licenses to import equipment. This raises two prob-

² See Document 186.
lems. First, granting the license and finding banks to guarantee credits to cover the purchase. Second, the opportunity for Romanian exports to earn enough to pay for the imports. This brings us to MFN treatment or at least some other procedures to facilitate Romanian exports.

Nixon: I have studied the problem and have some new steps to present. MFN status would require our Congress to act. This is a difficult problem now because of the Vietnam war. We know that the amount of Romanian goods shipped to North Vietnam is small. But it is still a political problem to get MFN passage.

Kissinger: The same problem applies to Export/Import Bank loans and guarantees to Communist countries. This can be waived administratively. The Fino Amendment bars Export/Import bank credits to any country trading with North Vietnam.

Nixon: I want you to know I favor MFN treatment for Romania. Once the political problems of Vietnam war are gone, we will move expeditiously on this. I, that is the President, can now, without Congressional action, change the status of Romania on direct sales in several areas. I will do that. I will ease export licensing to Romania and Export/Import Bank questions where I can act administratively. Mr. Kissinger will follow up on this with the State and Commerce Departments. On MFN, the Fino Amendment, and the other questions, we’ll get to that when the Vietnam war is out of the way.

Ceausescu: I salute this declaration. Romania is interested in developing relations with the U.S. and others. We have an intensive program of development, including a great effort on the part of the people to give 30% of total national income for investment. Of course, to keep up the high rate of development requires great effort. We want to use the experience of other countries.

Nixon: Romania must look to its own interests to the extent that such assistance can be obtained from the Soviet Union, West Germany and U.S. I do not say that if you are a friend of the U.S. you have to be an enemy of someone else. What relations you have with other countries is your business.

Ceausescu: Romania’s foreign relations must include the Soviet Union, China, and capitalistic countries. These relations are conducive to the development of the country. We will talk later about relations with other socialist countries. We regard Romania’s relations with the

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3 It amended the operations authorization of the Export-Import Bank to block certain loans to Communist states. For the text of P.L.–90–267, approved January 2, 1968, see 81 Stat. 943.
U.S. as being between two countries which have different systems but which are willing to develop and expand their relations. We know what the U.S. is. Romania is a small country. If possible we shall be friends. We do not wish relations to be preconditioned. Our mutual interests will dictate our relations. We know no one wants to lose money in relations with Romania and we don’t want that. We are a Communist country but we want to benefit. We want to build on this. We believe this is possible. What we can find in U.S., we will take. What we cannot take because of conditions, we will not take. We want to buy know-how and a heavy water plant, to equip factories to make synthetic rubber, electronics, computers and some other similar things. We have received some things from you indirectly. But one of your exporters was punished eight years ago for exporting something. We want to be in a position to have business men sell to us directly, not indirectly. We are not seeking to obtain special conditions, unusual conditions. Our system in this country is ours and we don’t want to take over yours.

Nixon: My policy is: Any country can be our friend without being someone’s enemy. We understand that differences in systems can present problems in working out financial arrangements. We will explore every way to make progress—we have made much progress with Yugoslavia in this matter.

Ceausescu: And with Poland.

Nixon: Yes, but this fell down because of political problems. I personally made the decision to visit Romania and I wanted frank discussions to see how we can have better trade and other relations, with Romania and with other countries. Bluntly, developments in Czechoslovakia set back some progress which had begun in more communications and trade between the U.S. and other Eastern European countries. I hope this visit can be a starting point for new relations; it could conceivably be an example for our dealing with other countries.

Ceausescu: I would like to emphasize that we don’t conceive of our relations with the U.S. as being directed against others’ interests. We have proceeded from fact that our relations with some countries does not mean we have to give up relations with others and may I express my satisfaction that we share the same point of view.

Nixon: I have a question for you. We are trying to negotiate arms control and an easing Middle East crisis with the USSR; we want good relations with the Soviet Union. We don’t want to embarrass Romania. Do you consider that the Brezhnev Doctrine makes it difficult to have trade relations with us? We value Romanian friendship and do not want to put Romania in an embarrassing position with other neighboring countries. When this trip was announced, the Soviet Union did not approve. Tell me how far can our relations go without embarrassment to Romania or its President.
Ceausescu: Openly—without diplomacy—my answer: As far as Romania is concerned, relations with the U.S. cannot embarrass us in any way. I say this having in mind that our relations are based on non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. They should not be made contingent on what Romania does with other countries. We developed relations with the Federal Government of Germany, France, England, Italy and others. With France we concluded a long term agreement to produce cars (Renault). On the occasion of President De Gaulle’s visit, we concluded a long range agreement on electronics. All these did not cause or cannot cause embarrassment. The Soviet Union cannot object, as it has these relations with other countries as well—for example, the Fiat deal. Development of relations in this spirit cannot cause problems for the future of Romania. It may cause problems for the U.S. with the Soviet Union.

I am aware of the big negotiations on the Middle East and disarmament; we are in accord with these negotiations. We do understand their importance. We are interested in favorable results. Now my frank opinion and also the opinion of some friends of the U.S.: we do wish that your talks should not be detrimental to other countries but aid in their development. Some of your allies may have told you this, if not I’ll tell you, we are worried about the results of your negotiations with USSR. My opinion is not in a long-range perspective. People do not want settlements made behind their backs, but openly. Big country problems can be made beneficial to peace if made with the interest of other countries in mind. In this sense, the doctrine of limited sovereignty can’t have applicability. We have good relations with the Soviet Union and appreciate its role. We also have good relations with Peking and other countries. Our decisions are made here in Bucharest, not in Washington, Moscow, Peking, Paris or London.

Nixon: Do you run any risk in this policy?

Ceausescu: What can we risk?

Nixon: It depends on how one interprets the Russian statement on limited sovereignty and how Russia interprets it.

Ceausescu: Russia has denied an intention to limit sovereignty. I want to discuss this. In all our discussions with the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, you call it, Romania was frank and explained our position clearly. We reached acceptable results. We are determined to work along these lines. The problem of the independence of Romania is not to be questioned. As to the feeling of the people, that was expressed today.

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4 Congress had blocked an Export-Import Bank loan guarantee that would have supported the building of a Fiat automobile factory in Togliattigrad.
Nixon: That answers the question. The American press said this trip would embarrass Romania and be harmful. We do not want that. We want good relations with Romania and Russia. We do not want to break up the Warsaw Pact. We want good relations with all countries.

Ceausescu: I salute your answer. We knew you would say that for we never saw it in any other light. If we thought it would break up or weaken Romanian/Russian relations or bring pressures on our internal affairs, we would not have accepted the visit.

Nixon: If other Eastern European countries ask you about my policy, I hope you will tell them what it is. Our attitude towards them is the same.

Ceausescu: I want us to start from facts: relations with the U.S. cannot in any way impede relations with others. It is true that our Soviet friends were slightly disturbed with your visit. We advised them 36 hours before it was announced. They never commented officially. (Ceausescu then predicted that Russian predominance won’t last, based on historical analysis.) The Soviet comrades find this difficult to accept. The Soviet Union was first in space. U.S. was first on the moon. There are changes in other fields.

Nixon: First today, second tomorrow.

Ceausescu: If other leaders understand that peace of earth can be done only if all countries are left to evolve and develop. Not through the use of force—things can’t be changed by sheer force.

Nixon: I agree, others do not understand.

Kissinger: Yes. History indicates all things are not permanent. The post-war period shows many forces in action. A position of predominance is difficult to adjust to. President Nixon’s theme on this trip was to develop new relationships.

Nixon: I have two subjects. First, policy in Asia—China and the Soviet Union. Second, where Vietnam negotiations stand. I want to get Prime Minister Maurer’s view of this problem.

Maurer: On the question you put and the discussion which followed: I was reflecting that everything that has importance can give rise to apprehension, perhaps because of misunderstanding. No one takes stand against relations between states. The Russians were forced by world opinion to give up the limited sovereignty doctrine.

Ceausescu: I disagree with him. It is hard to accept the theory that they have abandoned limited sovereignty.

Nixon: The U.S. is a Pacific power and will continue to play a role in area. We have no interest in creating a bloc or other arrangements in Asia which can be interpreted as fencing off Communist China. We do not recognize Communist China and oppose its entry into the UN, not because of China’s internal policy but because of its policies toward its neighbors.
Regarding the relations of the Soviet Union with Asian countries: Mr. Brezhnev said in a speech that the time is here for a collective security pact in Asia and that they will participate. My answer to them—and it will be made public—is that what the Soviet Union does is its business. What we do is our business. It is wrong for the Soviet Union to arrange a cabal in Asia against China. In 25 years, China will have a billion people. If fenced off by others, it makes for a terribly explosive force that may destroy the peace of that time.

We know of the Soviet Union’s quarrel with China. That is one we will stay out of. Our policy is to have good relations with Soviet Union and eventually, when China changes its approach to other nations, we want to open communications channels with them to establish relations. One billion Chinese fenced in is a bomb about to explode.

Ceausescu: I’d like to express my view about what you said about good relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. We know that these relations have to be good to develop the cause of peace. From the point of view of Romania, good relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union can be welcomed only if they are not to the detriment of other states. We are lucky, we have no atomic bomb and are not an Asian country. We have no interest in Asia, it is far geographically. But I understand the interest of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. I know that the world is so small that if Asia does not have peace, this will affect Europe and the world at large.

One must understand that Asia cannot have peace or solve its problems without recognition of China’s existence and drawing China into negotiations. The sooner this is understood, the better for all. The U.S. must give up its attitude toward China, both with regard to admission into the UN and to recognition. In fact, you recognize it. Its population is 800 million, and in the 1980s it will be one billion. Asia also includes India, Japan and Pakistan. All these countries must cooperate if there is to be peace. You declared no reservation about the domestic system in China. Your doubts spring from international affairs.

Nixon: China’s attitude toward its neighbors.

Ceausescu: With India, the problem can easily be solved. For many generations, China has had no wars with its neighbors. Look only at the last 25 years.

Kissinger: I disagree on a historical point.

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5 Apparent reference to Brezhnev’s June 4 speech to the International Communist Party Conference in Moscow. For text, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, July 2, 1969, pp. 3–17.
Ceausescu: Go ahead.

Kissinger: If you look at Chinese history, independent of communism, it never had relations with others. It has no experience in dealing with others on an equal basis. This has nothing to do with its present internal policy.

Nixon: I can’t change our China policy now but in the long view, as President Ceausescu said, China is a reality and no real peace is possible without China’s playing a role. We won’t join in a bloc to fence off China.

Ceausescu: I have no argument on history. China after the second World War has not threatened anyone.

Nixon: Korea?

Ceausescu: You know what happened there and I won’t go into it. Anyway, China has withdrawn its troops—proof of its respect for the sovereignty of North Korea. I can tell you how leaders are thinking in China.

Nixon: That would be helpful and I’ll keep it confidential.

Ceausescu: Prime Minister Maurer knows about this from his 1967 trip there. They have no intention of threatening the sovereignty of other countries. They have enough key internal problems. A rational policy toward China is to recognize her as an equal and give her a place in international affairs.

We concede Taiwan presents an obstacle to relations between China and the U.S.

My views of relations between China and most other countries are as follows: I think a revision of thinking and looking at developments in these countries is needed. They are all backward—their systems are feudal—they contain strong remnants of the feudal type. There is internal turmoil not because of foreign interference but of their own making. You know that internal forces have in the past sought external support to maintain themselves. France came to the help of the U.S. on the War of Independence. Why do I stress this? Because we should not support or assist backward forces. This can bring no good to the U.S. or the cause of peace. What is old must go—nothing can stop this progress. No doctor can save a man who in the end dies. The doctor may prolong his life—and this is good for the man. But for a country it is bad for the people.

In Vietnam, all your spending and support did not help to preserve the existing system. You spent about 25–30 billion dollars on the war. If you spend 2 billion dollars in Vietnam peacefully, you will have more development and will have made a friend. Why be afraid of socialism? It’s an old concept. You must understand that each people will take that which helps them to better themselves.
Nixon: I agree there are many ways to get progress—many different approaches. There must be real economic progress. We have economic plans for Vietnam.

I would like to ask a question on the Soviet-China problem. We know they support Hanoi. Our intelligence tells us that there are two groups in Hanoi, one pro-Soviet and the other pro-Peking. We do not know this for we are not there. My question is, what is the reason for dispute? Is it ideological? National? Is there a chance of its ending? I ask because after Vietnam the U.S. may normalize relations with China; but we must ask whether the China-USSR problem is explosive enough to get us in a war.

Ceausescu: First, I would like for comments from Prime Minister Maurer on the preceding discussion.

Maurer: Very little is known about China, so much can be said. I believe that men who were there longer than I would still have difficulty in talking about it. I must mention one point, China is now developing; it has strong, powerful forces to raise mass living conditions. Chinese statistics on industrial development do not show much of course; in fact, no statutes are published. China should be helped. Our impression is that there are opportunities to do so. Courage is required. Ideas and actions concerning China should be revised. Maybe they were once justified, but changes in the situation make it necessary to reconsider, to find ways to draw China in. This is the most important problem today.

I would also like to say something about China’s aggressiveness. President Ceausescu clarified this. Asia has the greatest need for change economically and socially. Two continents, Africa and Asia, most need economic and social aid—they are very backwards. It is difficult for people today to go through all the stages we passed through. We must contain the problem of change and not let it develop into an international question.

The question of USSR-China relations is difficult to answer. They are clouded by violent polemics, differences in ideology. Both progress in different ways. There are a number of conflicts—problems which instead of cooling down were blown up. The U.S. policy of not getting involved is correct; interference can be justified only to stop conflict. The most serious danger to the world is USSR-China conflict.

Our impression is that as certain objectives have been attained, China is thinking of action to develop negotiations with other countries.

Nixon: When I became President I asked the Chinese to meet us in Warsaw, and they refused.6

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Maurer: Americans should know the Chinese better than that; they have a peculiar mentality. China’s orientation toward developing relations should be taken advantage of.

Ceausescu: China is a serious problem, but don’t forget that other than Japan, China alone has solved its problem of food for its people. One hundred dollars annually per capita are earmarked for development—this makes 17 billion dollars. A major problem has been to assure more rapid development and progress of the economy and industry. You saw India, even that government passed nationalization of banks. So these policies should not be an obstacle for you in developing relations with countries with different systems than yours.

The problem of ideology is not crucial in the USSR-China dispute. My observation is that the real issue is national—the Soviet reluctance to concede China its proper place in international affairs. Chinese will not play a second class role. We believe that Soviet Union’s thinking will come to understand reality. We think that there will not be a war. Of course, the unexpected can happen. We are in agreement with what you have stated. We should do nothing to sharpen the conflict. The U.S. would have nothing to gain from this development.

Nixon: I agree. I think you have played a proper role in this area by having relations with both; in the long run this is also our aim. With respect to our short run problems with China, we have taken actions like removing travel restrictions and allowing tourist purchases; we will take more in these areas. Frankly, if it serves your interest and the interest of your government, we would welcome your playing a mediating role between us and China.

Ceausescu: It is not only our impression; we are certain of the reality of China’s willingness to resume relations with other states. They have told us they will take actions to develop relations with other states. We must not look at public articles in the press but should take practical action. As to our willingness to mediate between the U.S. and China—the U.S. has every possibility to talk directly with the Chinese without mediation—I will say we shall tell our opinion to the Chinese, and of your opinion of this problem. We shall act to establish relations on the basis of mutual understanding.

Nixon: It is getting late. If you wish we can meet again tomorrow for an hour. I want to tell you first about our Vietnam position. I’ll put it in perspective by saying if the war in Vietnam is ended on the right basis it will open many doors for better relations for trade with Romania and relations with China as we discussed earlier. We look at Vietnam through different eyes but our aim is the same: to gain peace and end the war. The next three months will be critical; they will determine whether the war can be ended by peaceful negotiations.
Tomorrow I want to tell you confidentially what is going on, where we are, etc.

Ceausescu: This is an important problem; we have not discussed how we look at it. You and I talked about it in 1967 and our points seem the same. Our basic interest is a peaceful solution by negotiation. We will discuss this tomorrow.

Nixon: We can talk at dinner. My time is at your disposal. Tomorrow we can make it for an hour and a half.

Ceausescu: I agree and will make good use of dinner tonight.

184. Memorandum of Conversation

Bucharest, August 3, 1969.

Private Meeting Between President Nixon and Ceausescu

PARTICIPANTS
President Nicolae Ceausescu
Ion Gheorghe Maurer
Interpreter
President Richard Nixon
Henry A. Kissinger
Colonel Burbec

Ceausescu: I will listen to you, Mr. President, for according to our talks yesterday you have something to say about Vietnam.

Nixon: First, I appreciate the role the Prime Minister played in 1967 in trying to open channels of communications to resolve the Vietnam problem. I was not in the government at that time but I am current on this. The actions were responsible and helpful. As we recognized in 1967, the problem in Vietnam is very difficult. We must recognize that neither side can win or suffer defeat. Some believe that Hanoi and the VC should take over and that the U.S. should get out of Vietnam.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK MemCons, The President and President Ceausescu. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis.

Frankly, the U.S. can’t do that; it is not just a matter of national honor. Leaving aside emotion, the U.S. committed over 500,000 troops, suffered 35,000 deaths and 200,000 wounded. To withdraw and let Hanoi take over would be a defeat for the U.S. and this, as President, I can’t let happen. We can argue about whether we should have gone in or about how the war was conducted. The fact is we’re there now and committed. We can’t run away without giving the South Vietnamese the option to decide their own future. Hanoi says Thieu should get out and a peace cabinet should take over. We cannot accept that. You, Mr. President, suggest that the answer may be found in a coalition government. That would not be acceptable if it were imposed without giving the people of South Vietnam a chance to decide on it.

I have said what we can’t do, and these we do insist on. We do not, however, insist on:

—The defeat of Hanoi.
—Hanoi’s withdrawal without the opportunity to go to the people of South Vietnam and ask for support.

Look at what we have done:

—We stopped all bombing of North Vietnam.
—We withdrew 25,000 combat troops and an additional announcement on this subject will be made later this month.\(^3\)
—We offered to withdraw all troops within one year if North Vietnam does likewise.
—And we have offered that the future of South Vietnam be determined by internationally supervised elections. President Thieu has offered to accept the VC in supervisory bodies and this is acceptable to me.

The international group would see to it that all groups in the country including the VC have a chance to participate, and if they get the verdict of the people to hold office. We do not propose to stop there. I said on May 14 that we are open to suggestions from the North but that they should talk substantively. If they don’t like what proposals I have made, they should make suggestions. Look at our position: We stopped the bombing, have offered to negotiate seriously, will withdraw more troops, have offered elections in which the VC have an equal chance. Yet Hanoi has given absolutely no indication that they are willing to talk substance. True they have the 10 point program, but it simply tells the U.S. to get out and accept defeat. This we won’t do. I am concerned by reports from Paris that the North Vietnam leaders have concluded that their best tactics are to continue to talk in Paris with no

\(^3\) The announcement was postponed to mid-September. For text of the President’s September 16 statement, see Department of State Bulletin, October 6, 1969, pp. 302–303.
substance and to continue to fight in Vietnam, thinking that public opinion will force us to capitulate and get out.

I never make idle threats; I do say that we can’t indefinitely continue to have 200 deaths per week with no progress in Paris. On November 1 this year—one year after the halt of the bombing, after the withdrawal of troops, after reasonable offers for peaceful negotiation—if there is no progress, we must re-evaluate our policy.

Let me make one thing perfectly clear about North Vietnam. I don’t hate the North Vietnamese. While I disagree with their government, I admire the courage of the people, their willingness to sacrifice. We want an equal chance for both sides; we want justice and peace for both sides. All we get from them is a take it or leave it position. There is nothing more important to me than to end this war on a fair basis. It will make possible the many Romanian-U.S. actions we talked about, could make possible U.S.-Chinese relations, and would help relations with the Soviet Union. All this is possible.

I want peace, but I will never accept defeat and will not have the U.S. humiliated by Hanoi. What may be necessary here is to open another channel of communications. (Kissinger notes here: “Get any help in it.”)

Mr. President, you implied yesterday that they do want peace on reasonable terms. We have had no indication of this. This is our problem. Dr. Kissinger negotiated with the North Vietnamese during the Johnson Administration. He may have something to add. If we can find an answer it will be a breakthrough to finding peace all over the world.

Kissinger: Mr. President, I can add one or two things to what you said. We have no thought of humiliating Hanoi. We will not try to achieve at the conference table what was not achieved at the battlefield. A political solution must reflect the balance of political forces. We object to the other side’s position because they want us to destroy Thieu and thus destroy their enemy. They are asking us for a U.S. defeat. President Nixon said the other side will not negotiate seriously. I’ll give a brief example to you: The other side has offered the ten points. We agreed to talk about them together with other proposals. But at every meeting they treat us as if we are school boys taking examinations in their 10 points, and discuss nothing else. At last week’s private meeting, after every statement by us, they said we had no right to say it for we have said it before. They demand something new. What we are asking is that we both recognize the existing balance of polit-

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4 Not found.
ical forces. We would still have disagreements, but they could be resolved rapidly.

Nixon: I know you know the people of North Vietnam and you know me. I think that what is needed is a recognition of the fact that they are now making a grave mistake if they think they can wait us out. You can be assured we want nothing but a fair settlement, but it takes two to achieve this.

Ceausescu: Certainly the problem is serious, and as you said, it is a hindrance to the solution of other problems. In our view, a continuation of the war will lead to an unforeseeable situation with very grave consequences. It was good the bombing ceased but you need to go farther. I think here the problem is not the war with North Vietnam but the war which takes place in South Vietnam with internal forces of South Vietnam. A government has been created in South Vietnam by the NLF. We gather this government is ready to accept the creation of a new government to start ending the war, settling it through an understanding between all forces in South Vietnam. I will not discuss the history of how you got into Vietnam. If a political solution is wanted, it then appears that the idea of a government built on a wide base is acceptable and equitable. In our discussion with representatives of the NLF, they said they wish to arrive at an equitable solution and not in any way to humiliate the U.S. They wish to maintain relations with the U.S. after.

Nixon: When was your last discussion?

Ceausescu: About four weeks ago. About five days ago with their ambassador, the Front ambassador. They asked me, both the representative of the Front and the ambassador from the PRG, to use our relations with the U.S. to assist in reaching a solution as quickly as possible. In my opinion, they want a solution equitable and acceptable to both sides.

Nixon: How do we get them to talk? They won't talk to Lodge in Paris. We will not accept their negotiating on a take it or leave it basis. Maybe we need a very private channel.

Kissinger: They think they can make us lose without us noticing it.

Nixon: The least we can do for all people in South Vietnam is not to impose anything on them.

Kissinger: They refuse to talk to Thieu, which was the agreement at the time of the bombing halt. This makes it difficult to get a balance of forces, which is all we want.

Ceausescu: I want to ask two questions. If you don't want to answer, I understand. We will not convey your answers to anyone. First, is the U.S. ready to accept and favor a coalition government on an equal
basis with the government of South Vietnam to resolve the problem of South Vietnam?

Nixon: Only if the coalition is the result of elections and not negotiation. There could be a coalition in the sense of setting up the machinery for organizing an election.

Kissinger: I must explain this point. The other side says we have proposed elections run by the government of South Vietnam. We actually propose an electoral commission with both sides represented, and an international commission.

Ceausescu: Why not accept a coalition government which bears the responsibility to end the war immediately and prepares for elections, because these can be conducted only without fighting. Elections in time of war are of little value.

Nixon: In addition to an internationally supervised cease fire. You are absolutely right, no election is possible during fighting. I want to emphasize why we cannot agree to a coalition (a hard word for us) . . .

Ceausescu: Change the word . . .

Nixon: A coalition government to supervise setting up an election. We have said that we prefer a mixed commission. That’s a start.

Kissinger: The other side excludes our side by definition in a coalition government.

Nixon: We can’t dump our people.

Kissinger: We recognize that the NLF exists; we want them to recognize that the Thieu Government exists. We believe this commission makes possible the establishment of a balance of forces through elections which could produce a government to end the war. We do not want to destroy the balance of forces.

Nixon: We do not ask the Front to disappear. They must not ask that Thieu disappear. I think that if we can start there we can make a settlement.

Maurer: I would like to know if I have the correct understanding. The mixed commission, in the American point of view, should watch over a cease fire and organize under international supervision the elections. Then after the elections they will have a government elected representing South Vietnam.

Nixon: Correct.

Maurer: I want to make sure I understand a number of things as seen by the U.S. Will the elections take place while American troops are still in South Vietnam?

Kissinger: That depends on Hanoi. We offered an international commission to supervise the withdrawal of all outside forces, the U.S. as well as North Vietnamese. We believe it is best if all outside forces are withdrawn.
Nixon: I suggested this be done in one year, and that elections be held with all forces gone.

Maurer: The reason I asked for clarification was that the whole context of your discussions shows you know Romania wants the war to end. If Romania did something to help this solution it did it as a result of its interest, and this interest is stronger today because we may now see a new opening in relations between states. Of course, it is difficult to review the history, the rights and wrongs of the war. This is not useful. We must find a flexible, subtle solution. This requires an inventive spirit. President Ceausescu stressed one idea which you should consider. If you don’t arrive at a solution to end the war peacefully, what will you do then? We find in all this that the major interests get more involved—even interests not willing to get involved get involved. Therefore it appears flexibility is required from the stronger. President Ceausescu and I have talked with the heads of Vietnam. I have spoken with the leaders of North Vietnam, and a little with South Vietnamese leaders. I observed two very important things in these people. First, they must be masters of their own solutions and these must not be imposed from the outside. I’m thinking of those who support the effort. Secondly, they want to gain a solution without closing the door to future relations with the U.S. It is possible that the best idea is to find a man who could most appropriately provide the best flexibility and inventive spirit. I hope President Ceausescu also believes that talks can yield results. Patience is difficult for the U.S., but it is, in my opinion, advisable.

Nixon: I have one very frank question. Does North Vietnam believe they should talk in Paris and fight in Vietnam, figuring that the U.S. will quit in a year or so, or do you think they want a settlement?

Maurer: On this point, absolutely frankly, it appears possible they think the former. But this fighting is costing them. In our discussions they appear to want a solution. This is clearly my own idea and I cannot guarantee that they are the thoughts of the North Vietnamese. I think they are oriented towards finding a solution.

Ceausescu: I have two problems. It is certain that South Vietnam and the PRG want to reach a peaceful solution and not be tied to North Vietnam under present conditions. And North Vietnam and South Vietnam know that there is little chance for the war to end quickly in the present way. They stick to the position that a solution must have a finality conducive to self-determination. With a broadly based government composed of religious, cultural and other forces, one can’t think this will being unification with North Vietnam overnight. The commission as proposed by the U.S. is no solution. It leaves two governments in South Vietnam with the right to administer the territory under their control. This will not create conditions suit-
able for a solution. My idea is for a government coalition, maybe called by some other word, which may include all forces in South Vietnam. I know from what they told us that the PRG is not rigid in these matters. A broadly based government would facilitate a solution in a reasonable way.

   Nixon: Were they rigid about the exclusion of Thieu?
   Ceausescu: I asked them frankly if they were willing to accept members of the Thieu Government. They said this is a problem to be discussed. I think this problem must be looked at with more flexibility and in a practical way.

   Nixon: It takes two to be flexible. They say no.
   Ceausescu: I asked this for in a day or so they will come and ask your opinion on that point. I can’t see an encouraging thing in your reply on this point. Are you ready to withdraw all troops from South Vietnam?

   Nixon: If North Vietnam does also—tomorrow.
   Ceausescu: It is difficult to tell which troops are from the North.
   Nixon: Yes.
   Ceausescu: Half of the North Vietnamese government is from the South.

   Nixon: Some in the South were born in the North.
   Kissinger: Some say the easiest way is to change the Northern and Southern governments.

   Nixon: I want to sum up to be perfectly clear. We are flexible and willing to talk in another channel but only if they have an intention to settle. When you ask if we will dump Thieu and form a coalition government, the answer is no, and we are rigid on this. We do not ask the Front to eliminate people from their government. We will work to get a subtle peace. We cannot and will not just pull out. Second, we cannot and will not continue indefinitely to talk in Paris with no progress and while the fighting continues in Vietnam. I know the consequences referred to by the Prime Minister, but if it is necessary to end the war by that route it will be because we have no other choice. We would be willing to work out solutions having the Front represented on the government to the extent its popular support and its strength justify it. As you know, you can only win at the conference table what was won on the battlefield. Another point—one very delicate and not for publication, but for your use as you want: If we can end the war, my plan is for an economic assistance program for South Vietnam and to make it available to North Vietnam if they want, as North Vietnam recovers from the wounds of war. This is good for North Vietnam and peace in the area. You can see that we are flexible. I want you to realize that only on Thieu are we rigid.
Maurer: You also set a condition, the preservation of the Thieu Government. This is a blind alley; why not try some other way?

Nixon: We say that Thieu and the Viet Cong should submit their courses to the public.

Ceausescu: This is not a solution conducive to ending the war. I think in the long run there are two elements. Thieu on the one hand the PRG on the other—out of this a new government should emerge.

Nixon: No, not a government, but an instrument to conduct elections. Until elections, the Viet Cong have control over their land and Thieu over his.

Ceausescu: This is no solution.

Nixon: Let’s say this in conclusion. I’ve conducted negotiations over the years—labor negotiations, for example—very tough ones, I know we never settled until both sides were willing to talk. Time is running out. We appreciate President Ceausescu and the Prime Minister’s interest. Possibly as we mediate, you may have some ideas. We want to end the war and we will be reasonable. I want to establish a channel of communication with you on these matters. This can be done through the embassy but where they are matters of highest importance, they should be transmitted through Dr. Kissinger. What you said to me remains in this room. What you send me will be in confidence. I may contact you in that way.

Kissinger: If you want to communicate with me, you can do so through your embassy.

Ceausescu: On special problems, I’ll send someone.

185. Editorial Note

On his return from his visit to Romania with President Richard Nixon, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger stopped in Paris on August 4, 1969, for talks with French Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas and President Georges Pompidou. Among the topics discussed was Nixon’s visit to Romania. Kissinger characterized the public reaction to the President’s visit in his talks with Chaban-Delmas:

“The Romanian visit was characterized first by the overwhelming warmth of the reception accorded President Nixon. It was clear of course that this reception was in part inspired and staged by the government. But even if the reception had been a 100 per cent artificial one
created by the government, it would still remain an extraordinary sign of the independence of the Romanian government vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. However, a second element in the reception gave it an added dimension. The second element was the emotional, joyful, human quality of the reception. It is difficult if not impossible, as Dr. Kissinger pointed out, for any government to create an emotional response by thousands of people. Yet, in fact, the streets of Romania were lined with hundreds of thousands of people at all times waiting for a mere glimpse of the Presidential automobile. They did not merely line up along the boulevards coming in from the airport, nor only around the guest house where the President stayed, but they waited hour by hour for the mere appearance of the President anywhere. Thousands stood in the rain for hours. These manifestations seemed impossible for a government to create simply by fiat, so that the first impression of the Nixon entourage was the Romanian people welcomed in an emotional way this first chance to greet the President of a nation which for many of them still stands, as it did in the 19th century, as a symbol of democracy and freedom of the individual.”

After Kissinger described in general terms the various discussions in Romania, he asked Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff to “describe the conversations between the various advisors”:

“Sonnenfeldt said that a number of bilateral questions were discussed between the advisors. First of all the subject of a new consular convention. Secondly, there was discussion of the landing rights and connections for airlines serving the United States and Romania. And third, there was discussion of the Most Favored Nation treatment which the Romanians would like to receive from the United States. Sonnenfeldt said there was no agreement reached on any of these items but that the two governments did agree to continue talking on each of the three points.

“The second area of discussion among the advisors was the Middle East. Assistant Secretary Sisco outlined the American position for the Romanians and we found nothing new in the Romanian responses on the Middle East.

“Third, at the meeting of advisors there was a general review of the Nixon Administration’s approach to Asian policy, to the SALT talks, and to European issues in general. But there were no conclusions reached between the two groups on these points except that both agreed that results on specific issues were preferable to a large-scale conference on European problems.

“In general both Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt stated that there was nothing new in the Romanian positions expressed to the United States, however both Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt agreed that Romania believes that its ultimate protection against the USSR is helped most by a
progress of East-West conferences and negotiations because they feel that in a situation of détente the Soviets would be inhibited.” (Memorandum of conversation, August 4; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 675, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. III Jan 69–31 Oct)

The same day, Kissinger met with President Pompidou. After a brief discussion of Vietnam, Kissinger gave Pompidou his impressions from the President’s visit to Romania. He “started by observing that some critics who seemed to support the interest of the USSR more than even the USSR supports its own interests have repetitiously claimed that President Nixon’s trip would be an empty enterprise. They characterized the trip as a mere publicity stunt lacking in any substance whatsoever. Dr. Kissinger observed that this certainly was not true in light of the actual record of results. He then repeated for President Pompidou the presentation which he gave to Chaban-Delmas in which Dr. Kissinger described two separate meetings—one of principals and the other of advisors, and the agendas of both of those meetings. Dr. Kissinger described the Romanian leaders as tough, unsentimental, and nationalistic. The only point Dr. Kissinger made in addition to those told to Chaban-Delmas was the fact that in President Nixon’s discussions with the Romanians, European issues as such were never raised. NATO, for example, never came up. Pompidou asked whether President Nixon’s visit increased the prospects of a Russian invasion either in our minds or in the minds of the Romanians. Dr. Kissinger replied that that question had never been raised by the Romanians, but that the Romanians had volunteered the information that they would fight if a Czechoslovakian-type invasion were attempted. The Romanians, according to Dr. Kissinger, were uneasy about any potential US–USSR deal under which peace would be achieved in Eastern Europe at the expense of other European countries. On this point Dr. Kissinger said the Romanians and the US had no disagreement whatsoever. Therefore, the Romanians’ uneasiness was unfounded.

“Pompidou then asked whether we anticipated any relaxation on East-West trade, and he asked further whether there was any Nixon Administration position or principle concerning the Most-Favored-Nation doctrine. Dr. Kissinger responded that with respect to East-West trade the US wants to deal with each Eastern European country on the basis of their political acts vis-à-vis the US, i.e., we are not adopting generalized positions on East-West trade. Dr. Kissinger added with respect to the Most-Favored-Nation doctrine that the Nixon Administration is not in a position at this time to take any action because of the law which states that any nation trading with or helping North Vietnam cannot receive Most-Favored-Nation treatment. As long, therefore, as the war in Vietnam continues and the East European countries help North Vietnam, the Nixon Administration cannot take any actions with
respect to the Most-Favored-Nation doctrine in Eastern Europe. He added that with respect to Romania, we have agreed to review our policy on export licenses; we have agreed to send a scientific team to Romania to improve the exchange of scientific information and personnel. We have also agreed to review the applications already made by Romania to join certain international organizations.

“Pompidou then asked whether this Romanian trip will be followed by other Nixon trips to other Eastern European countries. Dr. Kissinger responded by saying that no trips outside the United States are planned for the remainder of this year. Secondly, Dr. Kissinger said that the only unequivocal Eastern European invitation now outstanding is one from Yugoslavia to which President Nixon has responded by agreeing to go there during his first term in office. The precise dates for such a visit have not been decided.

“Pompidou then stated that France approves of the Nixon visit to Romania, and that in his judgment the Romanians’ popular response is explained first of all because it was government inspired and government controlled, and secondly, because it demonstrates the Romanian taste for Western culture and their desire for economic freedom. Therefore, the warmth of the reception is most reassuring, but it is also very dangerous. Pompidou went on to say that he thinks the same change is taking place in Hungary. Dr. Kissinger then said that he agreed with President Pompidou and asked whether Pompidou thinks that the USSR might increase its friendliness with the US in Eastern Europe.

“President Pompidou then wondered why it is timely for the USSR, France, England and the United States to be talking about Berlin. Dr. Kissinger said we are not pushing hard.” (Memorandum of conversation, August 4; ibid.)

186. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1


On our trip we made a number of commitments as you may recall which involve following up. For example with Ceausescu, he

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK MemCons, The President and President Ceausescu. No classification marking.
wanted a group to come in and give him some advice on irrigation, also, I told him that we would have DuBridge come over with a scientific group. DuBridge, incidentally, is going to Yugoslavia in September and it might be that that would be the time that he could make this move. I think Hardin and possibly Hannah might go to Romania on the irrigation project. We don’t want to place too heavy a hand here, but this kind of visit will not get much publicity and would be enormously helpful in letting Ceausescu have some little goodies that he can tell his associates about as to how dealing with the U.S. really pays. This of course is only one example.2

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Romania.]

2 Kissinger relayed the President’s desires to Hardin in memoranda of August 11 and 29. Kissinger also sent a memorandum outlining the President’s interest in promoting trade with Romania to Stans on August 11. Copies of the memoranda are ibid., Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. 1—8/69.

187. Editorial Note

On August 20, 1969, at 11:10 a.m., President Richard Nixon met with a group of departing United States Ambassadors at the Western White House in San Clemente, California. After introductions, he spoke individually with each Ambassador, including Leonard C. Meeker, who was departing for Romania. According to a memorandum of conversation from the meeting:

“The President commented on his recent visit to Romania and pointed out that Ceausescu was a tough, hardline Stalinist Marxist who was both straightforward and unbending. He remarked that his discussions with Ceausescu in Romania were straight-from-the-shoulder exchanges without the usual platitudes associated with diplomatic intercourse. He commented that Maurer is more affable and soft-spoken than Ceausescu but nonetheless was also a wily Communist who probably lacked the charisma and toughness of Ceausescu. The President stated that he was interested in ensuring that we opened up as many channels of intercourse with the Romanians in the cultural, scientific and trade areas as appear practical in the overall context of relationships with Eastern Europe. He told Ambassador Meeker that he was sending Dr. DuBridge to Romania with the view toward broadening scientific and technological exchanges. He wished Meeker to keep a sensitive reign on Romanian attitudes towards the expansion...
of relationships with the United States. The President remarked that the Romanian people were warm and genuine in their reception of him and that during his visit they were not conducting staged responses. Rather they were involved in a spontaneous and genuine pro-Americanism. He said the Romanian people were warm-hearted, much like the people of Italy with perhaps many of the same characteristics. At the same time he cautioned that they are part of a disciplined, hard-line Communist system.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. I—8/69)

188. Editorial Note

On September 3, 1969, Richard Moose of the National Security Council staff commented on behalf of the National Security Council on several legislative referrals from the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) in a memorandum to J.F.C. Hyde, Assistant Director for Legislative Reference (BOB). With regard to the draft Romanian Trade Act of 1969, Moose noted: “The President has decided that for present he has sufficient latitude to pursue the goal of improved trade relations with the countries of Eastern Europe without seeking any change in the Export Control Act or further authority to extend MFN treatment.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971)

189. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 18, 1969, 4:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

President’s Meeting with Romanian Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL ROM–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Dubs. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger approved it on October 6. The meeting took place at the Waldorf Towers. Both the President and Manescu were participating in the UN General Assembly meeting.
PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
The President
Secretary Rogers
Dr. Kissinger
Mr. Adolph Dubs, EUR
Mr. Peter Sebastian, Interpreter

Romanian
Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu
Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan
Mr. Sergiu Celac, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Manescu said he was grateful for the opportunity of meeting with the President. President Ceausescu had asked him to convey to the President best wishes and also wishes for good health and happiness. President Nixon’s visit to Romania was still very fresh in the memory of the Romanian people. Romania continues to believe that the visit was very useful and that it contributed to a better understanding between the two countries. As the President knows, the Romanian people gave him a very warm welcome. This should be regarded as a token of the friendship between the two countries and the friendship of the Romanian people for the President personally.

President Nixon said that he has fresh and pleasant memories of his visit to Romania. He carries a special place in his heart for the Romanian people. Upon returning to the States, he was told by TV viewers of his welcome in Romania that many wished to go to Romania for a visit. The President recommends that they do. We are following up on the conversations with President Ceausescu, particularly in the fields of science and trade, as well as other fields. Some matters will take time to implement but they are being followed up. The visit to Romania was worthwhile because, in the first instance, it provided an opportunity to meet and to know one’s opposite numbers, as well as the Romanian people. The visit will be doubly useful if it can be followed up with cooperation in new fields. We believe that the follow up to the Romanian visit will prove to be an important example of how nations in Eastern Europe can have good relations with the United States, without harming their relations with other countries. This is also a Romanian principle. Now is the time to test it. Achieving our goals through visits of this kind could mean a great step forward—as has been noted in the UN speech today—to an open world and to open communications with different nations and peoples even though they have different economic and political systems.

2 See Documents 186 and 188.

3 For text of the President’s address, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 724–731.
Foreign Minister Manescu thanked the President for his remarks. Mr. Manescu said that from the very beginning both sides considered the President’s visit to be part of an honest effort to improve relations. Neither thought of directing the visit against others. Of course, comments of a different nature are not lacking.

President Nixon said that the whole world had speculated about the visit but that President Ceausescu and he knew what the visit was all about.

Secretary Rogers, noting that there were many rogues in the world, said that speculation was all the greater because the visit was an honest attempt to advance relations between the two countries.

Foreign Minister Manescu said that it often happens that truth arouses the most suspicion. He said that he had listened to the President’s speech today with great interest. Everybody had looked forward to it. In connection with the world’s problems, he would like to take the liberty to make two points. The United States should be open minded regarding the problems of the world today and seek to broaden opportunities for better relations with the Soviet Union. Romania hopes this will be achieved. However, such an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations should not be achieved at the expense of smaller states.

President Nixon agreed. He said that we believe that any U.S.-Soviet détente, or whatever one wished to call it, should not take place at the expense of other nations. The United States wants good relations with the Soviet Union but also the best possible relations with other nations. As the Foreign Minister knows, this matter was discussed frankly between President Ceausescu and himself and he wished to reiterate his views today. The President said he had today in the UN stated for the first time as an American President that the United States would be glad to exchange views even with Communist China if that country changed its policy of self-isolation. We are prepared to talk with the Chinese in the same spirit that we talk with the Soviets. Some will say that this statement is directed against the Soviets. This is not true. Romania of course has the same policy. It is now the position of the United States Government that the search for good relations should proceed with all nations on the basis of reciprocity.

Foreign Minister Manescu said that he now looked forward with great interest to Gromyko’s response tomorrow. With regard to China, bearing in mind the universality of the UN, and with regard to Vietnam, the world expects from the United States, from the new Administration, and from the President proposals that are not only acceptable but, indeed, proposals which cannot be rejected.

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4 For text, see UN doc. A/PV.1756.
President Nixon said that he and President Ceausescu had had a long and frank discussion on Viet Nam. We have one view, President Ceausescu another. The President said he wished to emphasize one point and that is that the United States over the past ten months had taken several important steps with regard to Viet Nam. The bombing of the North had been stopped. The decision had been announced to withdraw sixty thousand troops. The United States had further proposed internationally supervised elections in which all elements in South Viet Nam could participate, including the Viet Cong. Up to this point there has been no reaction or any little step whatsoever from the other side. A year ago people were saying that we should stop the bombing and that negotiations and peace would follow. Then they said that the United States should withdraw its forces and progress in the talks would be made. Then people said that the United States should make a positive offer and spell out its position. The United States had done all these things and nothing happened. Now the United States is being asked to withdraw all its forces and to impose a coalition government upon South Viet Nam without elections. We can disagree about what ought to happen in Viet Nam. We are not saying that we are altogether right and the other side altogether wrong. We believe, however, that we have gone as far as we can or should go. It is time for the other side to respond to our initiatives and to undertake meaningful negotiations toward a political settlement. We do not wish to ask the Romanian Government to become involved, although we recognize that it was very helpful in 1967 in connection with the negotiations. According to reports reaching him, said the President, the other side apparently believes that it can continue the talks in Paris without being responsive to United States’ initiatives. The other side also seems to believe that the talks can drag on and that the war will continue and that the United States will tire of the struggle. The other side appears to think that because of political weakness in the United States, the U.S. will make a political settlement which will give the other side what it wants, that is, the control of South Viet Nam.

The President said he could not emphasize one point too strongly. Such an assessment would constitute a grave misjudgment of his character. The President said he wants peace. He had insisted on every reasonable concession to move the negotiations toward peace. But if after all this we only get the back of the hand, a posture of talk and fight, that is a situation we cannot tolerate indefinitely. This does not mean that the United States will make threats or issue ultimatums. The President did not believe in them. But we have reached a point where the other side should respond to initiatives that the United States has undertaken in good faith. We realize that our views may differ from those held by the Romanian Government, but we also know that the
Romanians wish us to be honest so that our actions can be accurately appraised.

Foreign Minister Manescu said that the President should have no doubts about that. The President had had an opportunity to talk to President Ceausescu and therefore understands that there are differences of opinion on this issue. The President should know that Vietnam is the only problem between the two countries. Apart from this there are no outstanding issues.

The President said that this was right and if this problem could be removed the way could be opened to move forward on such matters as MFN, export controls, and other issues.

Foreign Minister Manescu expressed his emphatic agreement. He added President Ceausescu regarded the cessation of bombing, the talks in Paris and the withdrawal of United States troops as important steps towards world peace. The President should know that Romania had not discussed America’s views “in only one direction.” As is probably known, the Romanians conveyed these views to the Vietnamese, and this was not an easy job.

President Nixon said he appreciated this fact. He noted that we are now at a very critical juncture. The President said he believed that President Ceausescu, who has good relations with all parties, could be helpful in an effort to break the bottleneck.

Foreign Minister Manescu said he would convey the President’s views to President Ceausescu. The Foreign Minister said he hoped that the United States would do something which could not be rejected by the other side.

The President replied that the Romanians should talk to the other side and tell them to do something that could not be rejected by the United States. The United States has now taken significant steps but has received nothing in return.

The President then referred to the coming Davis Cup Tennis matches between Romania and the United States. He congratulated the Minister on Romania’s victory over the British team and noted that he was receiving the Davis Cup team on Monday at 10:30 and would be delighted if the Foreign Minister could attend if he happened to be in Washington.

Foreign Minister Manescu again thanked the President for the time given to him.
190. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 19, 1969, 12:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
C. Fred Bergsten

SUBJECT
Romanian Accession to GATT

Ambassador Bogdan called on Mr. Sonnenfeldt and Mr. Bergsten to emphasize Romania’s desire for early conclusion of its application for GATT membership. The issue had a great deal of political importance for Romania. His government appreciated the support already given the application by the United States and hoped that the issue could be decided at the meeting of the GATT working party next week.

The Ambassador understood the reasons why the United States was holding up approval over the Romanian “entry fee.” However, he was dubious that the European Community would agree to significantly relax its quantitative restrictions against Romanian exports. Under such circumstances, it would be impossible for Romania to commit itself to any specific rate of import growth. His government was willing to accept the language proposed by the Community to govern Romania’s accession. He thought this was a sufficient “entry fee.” It would not represent a precedent for other countries just as Poland’s terms of entry were not a precedent for Romania.

Mr. Bergsten replied that the U.S. strongly supported Romanian accession. Our present position was admittedly delaying the process. However, it was aimed at maximizing the real economic gains to Romania of GATT membership by using the occasion to attempt to persuade the EC to liberalize its quotas on Romanian goods. We could not promise success in that effort, but we felt that it justified some little delay.

The Ambassador was grateful for the consideration given his views and reiterated his government’s interest in early resolution of the issues.

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2 Romania joined the GATT on November 11, 1971, following 3 years of negotiations.
Financing Romanian Imports from the United States

This paper is an initial response to the directives of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee requesting a study of proposals to alleviate the financing problem involved in expanding Romanian imports from the United States.2

There are two ways in which Romania might finance increased imports from the United States: 1) by increased exports to this country, or 2) by freer access to export credits.

The prospects for export expansion are not good. Currently, Romanian exports to the United States are running about $4 million per year and, in fact, have been declining since 1967. (Romanian imports from us are roughly three times as large.) Romanian exports consist largely of food products, residual fuel oil, footwear, furniture and other wood products. The fact that Romanian exports to the United States are subject to the high Smoot–Hawley tariff of 1930 is one major impediment. It is difficult for them to compete against countries which enjoy the current MFN rates that have been reduced substantially over the last thirty-five years. In addition Romania does not produce the type and quality of goods which would have wide appeal in the United States. Moreover, some of their potential exports are in sensitive categories—e.g., footwear, textiles and oil. Their debt service requirements for the purchase of a catalytic cracking plant, a TV glass plant and other major equipment purchases in the United States are another obstacle to increased import financing.

1 Source: Department of State, Romanian Desk Files: Lot 72 D 406, FT-Foreign Trade. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the paper.

2 In an October 7 memorandum to Richardson, Kissinger tasked the NSC Under Secretaries Committee with studying proposals from the Department of Commerce and the Romanian Government for financing increased U.S. exports to Romania. “The Under Secretaries Committee,” he wrote Richardson, “should study these proposals, as well as any other methods, such as government action, government persuasion or private arrangements to facilitate the financing of Romanian imports from the United States within the framework of existing legislation. It should develop a course of action for the agencies involved and monitor its implementation. Periodic progress reports should be submitted for the President’s information.” Richardson informed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee of the White House’s request in an October 23 memorandum, NSC–U/SM–47. Both memoranda are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. II 9/69–Jun 70.
The possibilities for any kind of normal United States export financing are also very limited. The Export-Import Bank is prohibited by law from financing, guaranteeing or insuring credits with respect to U.S. exports to Romania, and this has the effect of discouraging private financing. Existing law also rules out the use of P.L. 480. Under present circumstances, the best possibility seems to be in the joint venture field, which might be pursued further.

With the above as general background, it is proposed that we consider acting for the present along the following lines:

1. **Long-term credits from private banks**

   If by long-term credits the Romanians mean loans having maturities over five years, there is little we can do to encourage United States commercial banks to undertake such financing without the customary governmental guarantee and participation. Commercial banks usually will not and in most cases cannot by the very nature of their liabilities extend export credit over five years. This is true whether the export is going to the United Kingdom (for example) or to Romania. Even export credits from three to five years are rarely without some type of United States Government guarantee and participation in the financing.

   It is possible that the Romanians would be interested in credits up to five years. We might indicate to them that the United States Government is prepared to encourage American banks to undertake this type of financing of Romanian projects, despite the lack of United States governmental guarantee, in important cases that the Romanian Government identifies to us. The role of the United States Government would necessarily be limited to providing specific reassurances as to the non-applicability of the Johnson Act[^4] and informal encouragement based on the official character of the Romanian Government sponsorship of the particular project.

   We might ask a group of American banks, say, ten, to form an informal consortium to finance Romanian imports from the United States. Each bank’s exposure would be limited to a modest amount, say, $1 million, for a total of perhaps $10 million. The formation of such a consortium would not result in any dramatic increase in U.S. exports to Romania, but, as the banks gained experience, they might be willing to increase their exposure. In the absence of the political risk guarantees,

[^3]: For text of the Tariff Act of 1930, approved June 17, 1930, see 71 Stat. 590.
[^4]: The Johnson Debt Default Act, signed April 13, 1934, prohibited financial transactions with any nation in default of its obligations to the United States. (18 U.S.C. 955) It was amended on July 31, 1945, to exempt foreign governments that were members of the IMF and the IBRD from some of its provisions. (59 Stat. 516)
the American banks would probably require higher rates of interest than European banks. Such lending would be subject to the ceilings of the Federal Reserve’s Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program.

In effect the United States Government would be asking the banks to view the financing of exports to Romania without the negative bias implied by existing legislative restraints, but the banks would still have to make their own estimate of the risk and profits involved in financing trade with Romania as against trade with industrialized free world countries.

2. **Joint Romanian-American Bank**

Such a project might make financing exports to Romania less unattractive but it would not get around the basic problem of loaning United States money without some type of United States Government guarantee and participation. A joint bank, on the other hand, might be useful in attracting United States capital for joint ventures. Much, however, would depend on the extent to which both sides, and especially the Romanians, are prepared to think in non-orthodox banking terms.

It is suggested that a subcommittee including Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, the Export-Import Bank and State develop as many specific financing patterns as possible, along the lines of this and the previous section, consulting informally with knowledgeable people in the private banks.

3. **Transactions of economic cooperation**

This area is, of course, closely related to the previous two. The customary position of the Government has been to tell the Romanians that they are free to explore joint ventures with American firms that may be interested. We might go a step beyond this, and say to the Romanians that if they will confirm their serious interest in the list of industrial areas they gave us, or in some modified list, the United States Government, perhaps through the Department of Commerce, will undertake to arrange a series of conferences in Washington or at appropriate points in the United States between Romanian representatives and American industry representatives to explore the extent to which joint ventures in these industries may be practical.

Attached is a study of the Romanian proposals on financing.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) Attached but not printed is the paper entitled “Study of Romanian Proposals for Financing Imports from the United States.”
192. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
US-Romanian Relations

PARTICIPANTS
Romania
First Deputy Foreign Minister Gheorghe Macovescu
Romanian Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan
Mr. Sergiu Celac, Interpreter

United States
The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, National Security Council Staff

Macovescu opened the conversation by expressing his thanks for having had the opportunity to talk at length with Dr. Kissinger.2

He then conveyed to the President and Mrs. Nixon the good wishes of President and Mrs. Ceausescu and of Premier and Mrs. Maurer. The Romanian leaders, he said, wished the President great success in the coming year.

The President expressed his appreciation and in turn extended good wishes to the Romanian leaders and their wives. The President said that he had the warmest memories of his trip to Romania and of the Romanian people.

Macovescu then handed the President a letter from President Ceausescu3 and said that he had also brought, as a gift, an album of photographs and moving pictures of the President’s visit to Romania.

The President expressed his gratitude and said he would respond to Ceausescu’s letter.4

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 704, Country Files—Europe, Macovescu (Romania). Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Red Room at the White House.
2 Kissinger and Macovescu held talks December 16–17. Memoranda of their conversation, together with a summary prepared for the President’s use, are ibid. Kissinger also held a telephone conversation with the President on the points regarding Vietnam and China that had been developed during his talks with Macovescu. (Ibid.)
3 Dated December 13; in it the Romanian President expressed his pleasure at the progress in bilateral relations, particularly in the area of economic cooperation. (Ibid.)
4 The December 29 letter was passed by hand to Ceausescu by the Ambassador following instructions contained in telegram 1934 to Bucharest, January 6. (Ibid., Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. I—8/69) No copy of the letter was found.
The President then went on to say that we were trying to cooperate at the highest level on the matters discussed between himself and President Ceausescu. Some of the matters take time, but we would do all we could within the inhibitions of our legislation. The President stressed that we did not like blocs and that we would deal with each country on an individual basis. Romania had been fair to us and we would act in the same way toward Romania. Wherever we can, we will be cooperative.

Macovescu responded that Romania acted in the same spirit and would do its best to develop its relations with the United States. He expressed his gratitude for the assistance that Dr. Kissinger had already given to him on several of the problems he had come to Washington to discuss.

Macovescu, who had been speaking in English, then changed to Romanian and spoke through the interpreter. He said in his discussions with Dr. Kissinger and also with others in Washington\(^5\) he had sensed the desire on our side to develop relations. Ceausescu’s message to the President was explicit in also stressing the desire of Romania to develop relations in all fields. It was also a personal message to convey the desire of Ceausescu for the best possible personal relations with the President. Macovescu said he had asked Mr. Kissinger’s assistance in certain specific fields and it had been promptly forthcoming. He was hopeful that in the future Romania could receive similar assistance. The Romanian Government wanted to have good relations based on concrete realities, relations which would not be disturbed by momentary circumstances.

Macovescu went on to say that the President’s visit had produced a great impression with the people and leaders of Romania and that prospects for the future of our relations were very good. Romania wished to develop such relations, as Ceausescu had told the President, with all states, including its neighbors. It was making constant efforts to develop its relations with the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, Macovescu went on, the course of relations with the Soviet Union was not always favorable. Lately the Romanians had noticed a certain Soviet reticence concerning Romania’s external policy. This was not dramatic but in day-to-day relations the Romanians noted that a certain reserve was particularly manifest in economic matters. Macovescu said that this situation explained Romania’s effort to obtain coke for its steel in-

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\(^{5}\) The Department of State reported on Macovescu’s conversations in telegram 210734 to Bucharest, December 19. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 ROM)
dustry in the U.S. [The President had noted in his opening remarks that we understood the importance of coke to Romania.]6

The President asked whether the Soviet reserve of which Macovescu had spoken had occurred since his visit and whether Romanians saw a connection between Soviet policy and the President’s visit. Macovescu replied that he could not say that the President’s visit marked a specific stage in the Soviet attitude since there had been evidence of it for a long period of time. In the last two months, however, it had become more accentuated. The attitude, Macovescu commented, was not aggressive but rather one of reticence and reservation. The President said he had asked the question because other countries might develop reserve toward us if they thought that their relations with the Soviet Union would be adversely affected by improved relations with us. We think of Romania as a test case. The President stressed that we wanted our friendship to help, not to hurt and we had no desire to make things more difficult for our friends.

Macovescu said that the Romanians were acting in the same spirit. They had no desire to cause difficulties in U.S.-Soviet relations through their relations with the U.S. He added that no representative of the Soviet Union had ever commented officially or unofficially at any level on the President’s visit. There had been rumors about the Soviet reaction but none of these had ever been substantiated. He repeated that no Soviet comment was ever received by the Romanians.

Continuing, Macovescu said that in the context of the previous point the Romanians had a general concern for security in Europe. The Romanian Government was extremely interested in European security because it had no desire to see a repetition of Czechoslovakia or the application of any doctrine like the Brezhnev Doctrine. Consequently the Romanians seize every opportunity to organize action on European security. This was not directed against anyone in Europe or outside. It was Romania’s constant concern to see that European security should not be directed against any power outside Europe, especially the U.S. To be more specific, Macovescu went on, when a socialist country started talking about the first session of a European security conference the Romanians supported from the very beginning the idea of U.S. and Canadian participation, assuming they were willing to participate. After the Prague Foreign Ministers’ Conference this position had now become a joint one of all socialist countries so that there is no point even in discussing this matter any further. The socialist countries had advanced certain specific proposals for the first session of a European

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security conference. Macovescu continued that there could of course be much talk about such matters as agenda, time and place, but his main point was to request that the U.S. Government give due attention to facilitating the eventual achievement of an organized system of security. Perhaps the process would be a long and tedious one but the Romanians’ hope and goal was to live in freedom and independence like any other nation. Romania wants the system to be the product of the participation and responsibility of all states and not a bloc to bloc arrangement. This, Macovescu said, was the second message which President Ceausescu had wanted him to convey.

The President said that we were open-minded. The real problem is what to discuss. At high levels, discussions are not useful unless there are serious problems on the table. Otherwise an illusion of security would be created when security does not really exist. It was dangerous for countries to think they have security when they do not. The President said we would examine any proposal that would lead to useful discussions.

Macovescu thanked the President and said that in behalf of President Ceausescu he wanted to reiterate once more the request for support for the Romanian economy, which is the basis of Romanian independence. The President reiterated that we wanted to help to the extent possible. He said we understood the difficulty of the Romanian position and did not want Romania to run risks like those which some of its neighbors had run. For this reason, the President said, we intended to be discreet in our relations with Romania.

The President then asked whether, since he had seen Ceausescu, relations between the Soviet Union and China had become more normal. He added that while we had to get our information on this subject from the newspapers, the Romanians could observe it more directly.

Macovescu said that since the President’s visit Premier Maurer had been in the Far East and twice met Chou En-lai on the way to and from Hanoi at the time of Ho’s funeral. In addition Ceausescu and Maurer had seen Brezhnev more recently and there have been other contacts with Soviet officials. As regards Sino-Soviet relations, one could not really speak of normalization; but certain changes were under way. The Chinese had indicated that they were willing to meet the Soviets half way but a thorough normalization was a long way off. The Romanians had urged similar statements on the part of the Soviets. It was clear that strong suspicions remained on both sides.

The President said that we wanted good relations with both countries. We did not want the Soviets to interpret our efforts to normalize

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7 North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh died September 2.
8 December 3–4, during the meeting of Communist Parties at Moscow.
relations with China as antagonizing policy, just as we did not want
time to see our policy toward Romania as hostile to them. He realized,
the President said, that this was contrary to what the press said. He
went on to say that blocs lined up against each other were very dan-
gerous. We viewed this matter differently after World War II. Of course
alliances were still important, but we were now in a different period.
We now seek normal relations with all countries on a case by case ba-
sis, although some relationships will be more normal than others. He
hoped this approach would be reciprocated.

Concluding, the President reiterated that he had the warmest
memories of his visit. He said that he himself would not be able to re-
turn to Bucharest very soon, but that his children certainly would. He
asked Macovescu to convey his good wishes to President Ceausescu.
Macovescu said he would do so and that the President’s family would
be received in Romania with the greatest pleasure and with the same
warmth as the President himself. In leaving he wished the President
good health which, he said, the job of President required.

(The conversation was cordial throughout. Macovescu’s substan-
tive points were made with the greatest care and precision. At the con-
clusion of the talk the President escorted the Romanian visitors into
the hall.)

HS

Memorandum 47B


TO

The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of Commerce
The Under Secretary of Agriculture
The President of the Export-Import Bank

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–252, U/SM 45–49, U/SM 47. Confidential.
SUBJECT

Financing Romanian Imports from the United States: Status Report

With reference to my memorandum of December 9, 1969 (NSC–U/SM 47a)\(^2\) the following is a summary of action taken on five proposals made by the Romanians to increase their ability to finance imports from the United States. It was found that two suggestions made by the Romanian Embassy, PL–480 assistance and Exim financing, are not possible under current legislation. The third proposal, credits from American banks of five years and longer duration, was found to be commercially infeasible for any nation for which no U.S. Government guarantee can be given.

Of the two remaining suggestions, we are actively working on the Romanian request for assistance in joint ventures. A list of American firms doing business in fields of interest to them has been prepared by the Department of Commerce and delivered to the Romanian Embassy.

The other, that of a joint Romanian-American Bank, is now under consideration in Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board. U.S. domestic law would limit the permissible scope of the latter proposal. The Johnson Act (18 U.S.C. 955) prohibits certain types of financial transactions, i.e., other than financing of normal export transactions, with countries such as Romania which are in default on debts to the USG and which are not members of the IMF and the World Bank. Also, the antitrust laws might limit the ability of two or more banks to form a consortium in connection with the establishment of a joint Romanian-American Bank. To clarify the legal issues, we have asked Justice to give us an opinion on the possible application of both the Johnson Act and the antitrust laws to the consortium formation of a joint Romanian-American Bank.

In addition to the legal problems, the commercial attractiveness of such a proposal to U.S. banks remains unclear. An informal sounding of Chase Manhattan, which has probably had the longest and most extensive financial connections with Eastern Europe, brought a skeptical and negative reaction to the proposal.

ELR
Chairman

\(^2\) Under cover of a December 9 memorandum, Richardson forwarded a copy of the Department of State paper (Document 191) to the listed recipients. (Ibid.)
194. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Disaster Relief for Romania

State and AID are working on providing emergency relief assistance to Romania in the wake of serious flooding in Moldavia and parts of Transylvania.\(^2\) In accordance with standing foreign service instructions Ambassador Meeker offered US emergency assistance to Romanian authorities, for which they expressed great gratitude. In response, the Romanians presented a long shopping list which (in addition to the usual items) includes large amounts of seeds and construction machinery. The total request would have a multi-million dollar price tag. Ambassador Meeker has supported the Romanian request and recommended that it be delivered by the US Air Force.

State and AID consider that the request is well out of proportion to the need, and wish to keep our assistance more within the normal range of disaster relief. To this end, the dispatch this evening of a large quantity of tents, blankets and basic cooking utensils has been authorized, by commercial carrier. The cost for this immediate assistance will be approximately $120,000. An additional donation of medical supplies ($65,000) is under urgent consideration.

The inclination not to accede to the much larger request is prompted by several factors:

— the US is the first (and so far the only) country to offer material assistance (the President’s message of sympathy was also the first received,\(^3\) and since then only Israel, Iran, the UK, Yugoslavia and Italy have sent similar messages);
— a response to the full request would involve a heavy expense;
— US flood relief in comparable disasters has never exceeded this amount, even in the case of more friendly countries, and this assistance is very generous even by those standards;

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\(^2\) Between May 12–25 torrential rains caused the Danube River to rise to its highest levels since 1840. The flooding inundated 248 communities, caused significant damage in another 853 communities, and left 144 dead in its wake.

\(^3\) Not found.
—finally, a much larger and more direct US involvement could arouse Soviet suspicions at a time when Soviet-Romanian relations are quite unclear. (Ceausescu was suddenly summoned to Moscow to confer with Brezhnev, apparently without resolving the acute issues that prompted the meeting.)

For these reasons, State/AID consider that our relief assistance to Romania should stay at the planned levels. In my judgment, the State/AID line is correct, and unless you wish to have more massive involvement considered, the relief program should proceed as now agreed.  

4 Kissinger initialed approval of the “Proceed as now agreed” option.

195. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT
Lunch with Romanian Ambassador Bogdan May 22

At an abbreviated luncheon, Bogdan said he had not had advance notice of Ceausescu’s recent trip to Moscow and, as usual, had first learned of it when the State Department called him to ask for his comment. However, that morning he had had some brief guidance from home, the upshot of which was that there was reason for cautious optimism about the prospects for bilateral Romanian-Soviet relations. Bogdan had no amplification except to express the view that the pending Soviet-Romanian friendship treaty (initiated but not so far signed) would not be modified to reflect the terms of the recent Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty.

I noted that Premier Maurer had seemed to indicate to Ambassador Meeker a certain uneasiness over Soviet intentions toward Romania in connection with US actions in Indochina. Bogdan said that

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. II 9/69–Jun 70. Confidential. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum indicating he had seen it. A copy was sent to Ash.

2 May 19.

3 Meeker reported on a May 7 discussion with Maurer regarding Vietnam in telegram 1081 from Bucharest, May 8. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. II 9/69–Jun 70)
his own candid opinion was that if the US had intended its move into Cambodia as a sign of strength, this had not been effective. The domestic US reaction and the limitations which the President had apparently imposed on the Cambodian operations in response to domestic pressures could be read by the Soviets and others as showing the inhibitions under which the President was now functioning in international affairs. This aspect of the situation did cause some uneasiness in Romania.

In the course of the conversation, Bogdan expressed appreciation for White House assistance with various commercial projects of interest to the Romanians. He also expressed gratitude for the President’s message in connection with the Romanian floods, which were extremely serious.

At another point, Bogdan intimated that Romanian recognition of Sihanouk should be seen in the context of Romanian-Chinese relations. Soviet failure to recognize Sihanouk should also be seen in the context of relations with China.

On European questions, Bogdan rehearsed the well-known Romanian arguments in favor of a security conference. He stressed that the Brezhnev doctrine should of course be raised at such a conference, though in broad terms of relations among sovereign states rather than simply as a stick with which to beat the Soviets. I noted that the Rome meeting of NATO\(^4\) would probably move further ahead on MBFR but that the conference idea would probably be treated as at the last NATO meeting.

Bogdan said his imminent return home is prompted by the forthcoming visit to Bucharest of Canadian External Affairs Secretary Sharp, Bogdan also being accredited to Ottawa. He would of course use the occasion for consultations.

\(^4\) May 26–27.
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, June 20, 1970.

SUBJECT
Additional Romanian Flood Relief

Secretary Rogers has submitted his recommendation for additional flood relief for Romania. He proposes the following package (Tab A):²

—$6 million in PL–480 Title II emergency aid to supply feed grains and dried milk;
—$1.5 million in additional Commodity Credit Corporation credits for purchase of urgently needed seeds;
—Up to $1 million in AID emergency contingency funds for medicines, seeds and other emergency purposes.

The Secretary states that this amount of $8.5 million will not create serious problems for Romania in its relations with the Soviet Union, which has been holding back on its assistance. We would, however, work out the timing and manner of announcement with the Romanians in light of the Brezhnev trip to Bucharest and the signing of a new Soviet-Romanian treaty.

Thus far we have provided $220,000 in blankets, cots, tents, and medicines and have helped finance transportation of goods by voluntary agencies. We will respond to a request from the multilateral World Food Program of the UN to supply $2.4 million in flour, dried milk and vegetable oils.

Preliminary estimates put the total damage thus far at over $300 million. Particularly damaging are the longer term effects on both agriculture and industry.

Our efforts thus far (we were the first country to respond) have gained us important political and popular credit in Romania, and the package suggested by Secretary Rogers, though well short of what the Romanians have asked for, seems highly worthwhile.

²Attached but not printed are Rogers’s recommendations for emergency relief.
Recommendation

That you approve the additional assistance package suggested by Secretary Rogers. (Tab A)\(^3\)

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\(^3\) The President initialed his approval of Rogers’s additional assistance package. A handwritten notation indicates he gave his approval on June 24. The Department of State notified the Embassy in Bucharest of the President’s decision in telegram 101714, June 26. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 702, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. II 9/69–Jun 70)

197. Telegram From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, July 30, 1970, 0024Z.

WH01228. Subject: Romanians Want a Better Deal on Flood Assistance.

1. We are facing an issue with the Romanians which turns on the conversation the President had with Foreign Minister Manescu during his San Clemente visit.\(^2\) The issue is the degree of generosity we should show the Romanians in connection with our offer of flood relief assistance.

2. Ambassador Bogdan came to see me on July 24 to urge that sympathetic attention be given to the Romanian request for some action to save the Romanians from having to pay some $2.3 million, mostly in hard currency, for transportation costs involved in getting the $6 million of PL480 emergency feed grains to Romania. Bogdan said he discussed this with you twice including on July 21,\(^3\) and that you told him to follow up with me. All I could do in the event was to listen to Bogdan without being able to give him more than general

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971. Confidential. Sent to Haig for Kissinger, who was in San Clemente. According to a typed notation the message was received in the Los Angeles command center at 7:37 p.m. July 29.

\(^2\) June 29. No memorandum of conversation was found. A June 28 briefing paper is ibid.

\(^3\) No record of a discussion has been found.
assurance that we would try to be helpful, which I gather from Bogdan you had done also.

3. In Bucharest, meanwhile, Manescu called in Meeker to make the same appeal which he said was based on his conversation with the President in San Clemente. The Romanians seriously need the greatest amount of feed grains, but are hard pressed to come up with the transportation costs. They reason that for them to pay these costs would effectively cut the $6 million assistance by one third. When the assistance had been considered earlier, no one focused on the transportation costs.

4. In fact, we have been quite generous in putting together the current assistance program. In calculating the $6 million figure, we had used a rate lower than the Commodity Credit Corporation rate, and thereby we assumed some $300,000 extra costs. In addition, we had already offered to assume the differential cost (some $1.2 million) on the 50 per cent of the tonnage that we require to be shipped on US bottoms (US flag carriers cost about double that of foreign carriers for these commodities). Thus, the $6 million grant in fact amounts to a budgetary cost of $7.5 million.

5. State has now come up with an option to present to the Romanians—reduce the amount of grains granted from $6 million to about $5.2 million, but pick up the full cost of the 50 per cent of the tonnage that must be carried in US ships. The total budgetary cost to us would remain roughly the same, but the costs to the Romanians would be reduced to half, most of which would be in soft currency. However, Romanians would then receive $0.8 million less feed grains. This alternative option is the best offer that the bureaucracy has been able to come up with. Agriculture particularly had balked at any greater budgetary costs in part because they could be accused by Congress of increasing what amounts to a subsidy for a potential grain export competitor.

6. The Romanians will probably consider this alternative inadequate because it would reduce the amount of the badly needed feed grains, but they would of course accept either this or the original proposal. The question therefore relates to the extent of the commitment to Manescu made by the President. But, the question is how generous we wish to be.

7. Bergsten’s office and I have investigated other alternatives which would be viable if White House pressure was applied to the

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5 Outlined in telegram 119058 to Bucharest, July 24. (Ibid.)
bureaucracy. We could continue the $6 million grain offer and pick up the entire cost of ocean transportation. This would mean an additional budgetary cost to us of some $3.5 million over either of plans offered by the bureaucracy. Under this, the Romanians would pay nothing.

8. The other possibility would have us pay the full transportation cost of the 50 per cent shipped in US bottoms (as under State’s alternative), but would retain the full $6 million grain offer (not reduced to $5.2 million as in State’s alternative). This would mean an additional budgetary cost to us of some $1.15 million over either of State’s proposals, the Romanians would still have to pay some $1.15 million, probably in soft currency, for the other half of the transportation.

9. Please instruct whether you consider State’s proposals (para 4 and 5) consistent with the President’s commitment to Manescu, or whether you wish White House pressure applied in order to increase the generosity along the lines of one of the alternatives in para 7 and 8. This is a matter of some urgency.6

6 Kissinger wrote on the message: “Take 4 & 5. It is something. HK”

198. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, September 1, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Visit to the U.S. of Romanian President Ceausescu

The Romanian Foreign Minister has advised us confidentially that President Ceausescu has decided to attend the U.N. General Assembly in New York, perhaps in time to address the G.A. on October 19 or 20. Following that, Ceausescu would like to confer with you in Washington, and then spend 4–5 days in a private visit to the U.S. Accompanied

by his wife and one of his children, Ceausescu would like to go to the West Coast, visit a leading university and one or more industrial plants.

It is significant that Ceausescu considers it an acceptable risk at this point in his balancing act to undertake an extended visit to the U.S. He has just recently returned from a Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow (related to the FRG-Soviet treaty) where he was able to give the impression of at least basic loyalty to the Soviets. He has also been careful to continue cultivation of the other half of the communist camp, for example, his Defense Minister has recently returned from an extremely cordial visit to Peking and Pyongyang. In the latter part of September, Ceausescu is scheduled to visit neutral Austria. In short, he may feel that, with this ground work, he can afford to make a foray into the U.S. as part of his efforts to further delineate Romania’s more symmetrical role.

In addition, Ceausescu probably considers that the attendance at the U.N. General Assembly of the heads of most of the Warsaw Pact governments provides him with adequate cover for his own visit. If Kosygin were to meet with you, this would offer Ceausescu even more protection. He can be expected in any event to underscore the “private” nature of the post-U.N. portion of his stay in the U.S.

In bilateral terms, Ceausescu’s visit is certainly intended clearly to signal his interest in continuing the enhancement of relations so dramatically advanced by your visit last year. (When informing us of Ceausescu’s decision, the Romanian Foreign Minister made special efforts to stress that the decision was taken independently of any decisions by Pact members, and we were being given advance and confidential information since the decision was not yet known to others in the Romanian establishment.) Though Ceausescu wishes expressly to confer with you on the Middle East and Asia (and will certainly press for a conference on European Security), his main emphasis will be on trade, economics and science. He will be seeking more tangible evidence of the direct and immediate benefits to Romania in return for the risk he is taking in these special dealings with the U.S. The Romanians have hinted lately that they expected higher levels of trade during the past year, and of course they continue to harbor hopes that some means will be found around the legislative restrictions which prevent credits and other incentives to greatly expanded trade opportunities.

This will be Ceausescu’s first visit to the U.S., and he has said that he wants to see capitalism in action. While the impressions he acquires will obviously not result in any dramatic shift in the Romanian sys-

\[^2\text{August 20.}\]
tem, he should be offered a good exposure to American institutions and society. Precautions will have to be taken to avoid potential incidents by Romanian émigrés and others, for Ceausescu is not the usual sort of foreign guest. (I have asked the State Department to prepare suggested itineraries.) Special care will have to be taken to ensure that his visit runs along the narrow route between over dramatization (which could cause him trouble, and arouse Soviet sensitivities) and inadequate exposure which would fail to exploit the visit for our own best interests.

You had earlier indicated that you wanted Ceausescu to come to Washington during the U.N. meeting and that you would host a small dinner for him. His very tentative schedule calls for him to deliver an address before the General Assembly on October 19 or 20, then come to Washington, and then spend 4–5 days touring the U.S. In informing us of this planning, the Foreign Minister asked for any suggestions we would make regarding this program.

I think it best to ask Ceausescu to come to Washington after the final U.N. ceremonies are completed on October 24 when most, if not all, of the heads of government have gone home. In any event, your meeting with him should follow a possible summit with the Soviets at a decent interval. Therefore, I recommend that we reply to the Romanians along the following lines:

—That you are delighted at the prospect of seeing Ceausescu in Washington;
—Due to the complications of the presence of so many heads of government in the U.S. during the week preceding the October 24 celebration, we would prefer to arrange Ceausescu’s visit to Washington after the ceremonies are completed;
—Assuming that he wishes to attend the final observances at the U.N. on October 24, you would be pleased to host a small black tie dinner for him on October 26 or 27.

Recommendation

That you approve a response to the Romanian inquiry along the above lines.  

3 The President initialed the approval option; in a handwritten comment he added: “But give us more leeway—Tell him we are in the middle of a campaign & will arrange a date before or after his trip around the country—we will give him a firm date sometime around Sept 20.”
199. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 26, 1970, 10:55 a.m.–12:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Nixon
Henry A. Kissinger
Harry G. Barnes, Jr., DCM, Bucharest, American Interpreter
President Nicolae Ceausescu
Dumitru Popescu, Member, Executive Committee, Romanian Communist Party
Sergiu Celac, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romanian Interpreter

The President began the talks by saying that he wanted to continue the discussion he had started with President Ceausescu a year ago. He was glad to note that some progress had been made in the field of economic relations. He was sorry, however, to have heard about the disastrous floods that had hit Romania. Today he hopes it would be possible to explore other areas of cooperation as well as discuss questions of foreign policy.

President Ceausescu responded by noting that indeed there had been some results attained in the economic field. Since the President had mentioned the floods, he wanted to take this occasion to express the thanks of the Romanian people for the help given by the American people, for the sentiment of friendship displayed in this connection. It was true that the floods had caused unprecedented damages, but, thanks to the recovery efforts, most of the damage has been overcome.

So far as economic questions are concerned, Ceausescu noted, as he had said in Bucharest, that further development is hindered by a series of obstacles in American legislation. During his visit he has had useful sessions with American financial and business leaders, which have shown the existence of possibilities for substantial development of economic relations and joint ventures between American and Romanian firms. He realizes that the President and other American officials are encouraging the development of these relations and he thanks the President for this.

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2 See Documents 183 and 184.
The President commented that since their meeting last August, as President Ceausescu was aware, instructions had been given to all agencies of the government—and Dr. Kissinger had concerned himself with this from the White House—to make decisions favorable to increasing economic cooperation with Romania whenever possible within the framework of existing legislation. “We shall continue to follow this policy. I believe,” the President said, “that as the war in Vietnam winds down to a close, the prospects of greater expansion of trade are very good. We think,” he continued, “that the area of credit is very important and have instructed the Export-Import Bank and the Secretary of Commerce to explore every area where through credit there could be increased trade.”

The point about MFN is one raised by President Ceausescu last year. This will come. It is a problem having to do with the Congress because of the Vietnam war. The President said he could assure President Ceausescu he would move in that direction since it was one of his objectives to get MFN as soon as he could be sure of getting the necessary support in the Congress.

Ceausescu then took up the question of MFN by noting that it was one he had discussed during his visit here and also with a group of members of Congress (the IPU delegation) in Bucharest not long ago. He noted that these members of the American Congress seemed to have a favorable opinion regarding the extension of MFN to Romania, a sentiment which he welcomed. He added that he would remember with satisfaction that the President had said this problem could be solved in the not too distant future.

So far as credits were concerned, Romania, in order to assure its continued rate of growth, has to seek foreign credits. Ceausescu said he would like to be very frank as well as brief because he realized this problem was being discussed here in the United States. At present Romania is running a balance of payments deficit of $300 million. Hopefully this can be liquidated over the next few years and a positive balance achieved. But in the meantime Romania would be interested in credits so as not to impose too many restrictions or too many demands on Romanian economic development. Romania would welcome credits from America under favorable terms, needless to say. Being a developing country, Romania should be accorded credit on a more advantageous basis. Credits are needed for industrial development as well as for starting the construction of dams and irrigation works.

The President inquired if road construction was also in view.

3 See Documents 186 and 188.
Ceausescu replied that Romania wants to concentrate on drainage and irrigation works and dams, particularly in view of the floods of last spring, at least for the next five years. To be sure, there are road construction plans as well, but the credits are needed especially for the fields mentioned earlier, although any credits could of course be used in a variety of fields.

The President explained that he had inquired about roads because, during his talks with President Tito, the latter had said how useful it would be if the countries of that area developed a system of roads to open up the countryside. What was President Ceausescu’s opinion of the idea of such a highway network, including such countries as Romania and Yugoslavia.

Ceausescu said the idea was definitely of interest, but Romania had to use its limited resources for its most urgent needs and this was giving priority to dams and irrigation works, for which a sum of about $3 billion equivalent had been budgeted over the next five years. In addition, he noted that a dam across the Danube is being constructed jointly with the Yugoslavs and one is being planned with Bulgaria, both dams thus serving as additional links with these two countries.

In addition, to a certain extent, it would be useful to have experienced American firms help develop tourist facilities in Romania, where there is already a beginning but still more could be done.

The President then addressed himself to Ceausescu’s point of whether Romania could be considered as a developing country. He said he believed this is something that could be done. He would look into the question but, since this status had just been granted to Yugoslavia, he saw no reason why it could not be accorded to Romania as well. “My decision,” the President continued, “is that we will do this, but no announcement will be made until the bureaucratic procedures are completed, but I will give the President my assurance on this point.”

Dr. Kissinger then noted that loans from the Export-Import Bank were excluded by the Fino Amendment, but White House influence has been used to put together a group of banks which could make private loans. In addition, CCC loans have been made to Romania. With the exception of Yugoslavia, Romania has the most favorable status here. For instance, some two hundred items have been taken off the export control list and recently sale of a hydrocracker was approved.

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4 See Document 221.

Ceausescu referred to the fact that discussions had been held with many American companies regarding joint ventures in third markets in such fields as mining and petroleum, but such ventures presuppose credits. What Romania is interested in would be ways of combining Romanian and American experience with the expectation that the American partners would handle the financing. In other words, there are various ways of making use of credits besides the direct way.

The President responded by saying that he would direct the Secretary of Commerce to follow up on President Ceausescu’s discussions with the business and financial community in New York and in other cities in order to see how appropriate action can be taken on the private side. Actually, the President noted, under our system the possibilities for credits and economic cooperation are greater in the private than in the public sector. In his opinion, it has been very useful that President Ceausescu should have talked with business and financial leaders. This will help direct investments to countries like Romania. In general, private companies have not invested in socialist countries, but if we can make a breakthrough this will be a new expanding type of cooperation which will be very helpful.

Ceausescu then turned to the problem of Romanian adherence to GATT. Romania has been holding discussion with GATT countries for two years and things have moved ahead. Actually the matter could be resolved if the United States would be more flexible. The question of a Romanian commitment to increase its imports from GATT member countries by a fixed annual quota is what has caused the difficulty. Although Romania’s economic ties with these countries have doubled, it still does not want to have to commit itself so rigidly. The United States is now the only country insisting on such a formula. For Romania, adherence to GATT would create very favorable conditions for trade with the United States and with other countries. Romania would like this obstacle removed.

The President replied that he would look into the matter, with which he was not too familiar. In general, his attitude was sympathetic so far as increased trade, cooperation and credits between the United States and Romania was concerned. “President Ceausescu,” he added, “can be assured that we will continue to explore ways to build on the progress already made.”

Ceausescu explained that after adherence to GATT, Romania had in mind entering into discussions with the IMF and the World Bank, but wanted to decide the GATT question first since this will contribute to developing relations with the United States and others. Romania is interested in developing relations over a broad scale. Once more he wanted to express his thanks to the President for his interest, and to voice the hope that the President shares his view that the relations be-
between the two countries could be a model of relations between large and small countries as well as between those with differing social systems.

The President responded by saying that this is what the United States has in mind with countries like Romania and Yugoslavia—that this kind of cooperation can be the basis for cooperation between countries with different systems, especially having in mind that this is a cooperation without strings, with no intention to influence the internal affairs of the other country.

The President then asked Ceausescu for his view of an important development that had occurred since their meeting, namely the Soviet-West German treaty.6

Ceausescu commented that the treaty needs to be looked at in terms of one’s assessment of the European security situation. Romania considers that conclusion of the treaty was a positive step in the sense of normalizing relations between the USSR and the German Federal Republic, especially since it was in keeping with the idea of solving problems through discussions. Although West German-Soviet relations represent the major problem in Europe, this treaty by itself does not solve everything. It must be followed by improving relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic and with other socialist countries on the part of the Federal Republic. At the same time, so that this tendency does not go too far in the other direction, Romania must insist on the participation of all concerned countries in assuring security in Europe. Thus, Romania believes that a European conference, in which the United States and Canada would take part, would give a new orientation to the situation in Europe. Romania would like the United States to be favorably disposed toward the realization of such a conference in Europe.

The President replied by stating that the United States had not indicated opposition to the idea of a conference as such. It did believe, however, that a conference should have a well considered agenda so that some definite progress could emerge. The matter is one which is under consideration. The President then said there was one point he would like to emphasize. After his talk to the UN,7 some observers in the press had speculated that he was committed to develop with the USSR a condominium to the detriment of other countries. The President continued by saying that he wished to state American policy quite

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6 Signed at Moscow August 12. For the text, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1103–1105.
directly. He had had a long talk with Gromyko.\(^8\) There would be other discussions in the future. The purpose of these discussions with the Soviets would be to explore areas where the United States and the Soviet Union could reduce the level of world conflict and the burden of arms. Under no circumstances will the direction of any discussions be toward a result where the independence of any country, especially any country in Eastern or Western Europe will be compromised. The future of each country in Europe must be determined by itself not by the USSR nor by the United States.

That is why we will continue, the President added, in the future to attempt to explore ways we can talk with the People’s Republic of China again because it is necessary to have avenues of communication with all nations in the world if we are going to have a world safe from the danger of a nuclear war.

Ceausescu remarked that the President had approached these problems in an open fashion. So far as a European security conference was concerned he would reply in the same frank spirit. Discussions with other States concerned had led Romania to conclude that it was very necessary to adopt an agreement renouncing the use of force. Similarly an engagement to develop freely economic, technical, scientific and cultural relations was also very urgent, as was the creation of a permanent organ of the conference, permitting thereby the establishment of a permanent base for the solution of European problems. Therefore Romania desires that the United States have not only a favorable attitude but that it actively contribute to the convocation of a conference as urgently as possible.

With reference to the President’s mention of comments about his speech to the UN, Ceausescu said he had had several exchanges of opinion with representatives of a certain number of States, especially in Europe. He added that he felt he must tell the President frankly that a certain concern exists in this regard. He himself did not know of course to what extent this concern might be well founded. The fact was that the President’s speech was directed more at the USSR rather than at all countries. The second notable aspect about the speech was that it did not contain any reference to future American relations with the People’s Republic of China. Ceausescu paused to say that he was only mentioning some of the remarks he had heard in passing from his various interlocutors in recent days.

Certainly, he added, we in Europe understand the necessity that there exist good relations between the United States and the Soviet

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\(^8\) A memorandum of the October 22 conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 713, Country Files—Europe, USSR, Vol. IX 1 Aug 70–31 Oct 70.
Union. He went on to say that he would like to inform the President that after their meeting of a year ago, Romanian relations with the USSR had improved. A treaty of friendship had been signed. In general, he could say that relations with the Soviets were much better than they were a year ago. The same goes for the other European socialist countries. In November, treaties will be signed with Bulgaria, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic. Certainly this does not mean that Romania is pursuing a policy contrary to the interests of its people or its interest in cooperating with all countries. This is a part of Romania’s entire active policy. Ceausescu added that he would particularly like to mention Romania’s relations with Yugoslavia which are especially good and which it is Romania’s intention to develop still further. These ties are such as to assure broad possibilities of having an exit to the Mediterranean and other areas.

While hoping for agreements, say on arms limitation between the United States and the Soviet Union, Romania would not want such solutions to have a detrimental effect on other countries. Therefore it is the feeling of countries like Romania—the small and middle sized ones—that in seeking solutions of these problems these countries not be consigned to one side but in some form or other be given a chance to participate therein and to have a chance to make their contribution.

The President stated that he agreed completely with Ceausescu’s sentiments. He added that one must recognize that relations between the United States and the USSR are necessary if it is to be possible to have solutions to other problems such as the Middle East and Europe. Without Soviet cooperation, it would be impossible.

The President assured Ceausescu, however, that under no circumstances would the United States cooperate with any country, including the USSR, at the expense of another country or American relations with that country. This would be contrary to American tradition. He could also assure Ceausescu that the American position was clear, namely that the United States wants good relations with all countries of Eastern Europe. It rejects the idea that two great powers should sit down at a summit meeting and determine the future of smaller countries. That is wrong and the United States will not proceed on such a course.

Ceausescu responded by saying that he could only welcome this declaration of the President’s. He went on to express his hope that the

9 Signed July 9 in Bucharest.
10 For texts of the treaties with Bulgaria, November 19; Poland, November 12; and the German Democratic Republic, December 22, see 855 UNTS 221, 71 POD 253, and 71 EGD 24, respectively.
United States, speaking of Europe again, would encourage Greece and Turkey to arrive at still better and more comprehensive understandings in the Balkans, because in his opinion and that of the Yugoslavs, this would help establish stability in that part of the world.

The President recalled that President Tito had emphasized this same point and had spoken very warmly about Yugoslavia’s relations with Romania and his own friendly and cooperative relationship with President Ceausescu.

Ceausescu noted that shortly after his return to Europe he was scheduled to see President Tito, on November 3 to be exact. The President mentioned that he had invited Tito to visit the United States some time next year.11

The discussion then moved to the question of relations with China. The President said that he wished to express appreciation for the fact that since his last meeting with Ceausescu the Romanian government had conveyed American views to the effect that the United States would like to start discussions with China. He added that the United States cannot begin by establishing diplomatic relations. That is a step for later on. Rather a beginning must be made by having some type of talks. Public talks in Warsaw, he realized, might be quite difficult for the Chinese because the Chinese and the Soviets have their differences and talks in Warsaw might come to the attention of the Soviets. The United States is ready to have discussions with representatives of the Chinese government in other channels, in other capitals for instance. What he was suggesting, the President explained, was simply that the United States is open to discussions in formal channels like Warsaw or in any other channels.

Ceausescu commented that the President had earlier said that two great powers should not make decisions for others. This was something very good. Yet a continuation of the current situation where the Chinese are left to one side in the discussion of major problems is not helpful in finding equitable solutions to these problems. Of course, the improvement of relations between the United States and China would have a favorable influence on international life. The first thing to bear in mind is the need for China to be present in the United Nations. This can take place before establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China.

The President responded by saying that, as Ceausescu knew, this was a problem which was very difficult for the United States because of our ties with the Chinese Nationalist government. The President

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stated his belief that there must be preliminary steps. One has to begin somewhere. A start cannot be made at the highest level of action. The United States is ready to have discussions on other subjects with the People’s Republic of China whenever they are ready.

Ceausescu remarked that Romania has especially cordial relations with China. Since his last meeting with the President, there have been several fairly high level delegations which have visited China and discussed many subjects including relations between China and the United States and China’s presence in the UN. It is important to note from these discussions the point that China desires to have improved relations with the United States and is ready at any moment to occupy its place in the UN, including this year. This morning, Ceausescu added, he had just received a message from Chou En-lai on behalf of the Chinese leadership, thanking him for the clear Romanian pronouncement at the UN in favor of China’s taking its place there. He believes that the United States should take the first steps in that direction, especially after the Cambodian events. Such steps could open the way to increased contacts with the Chinese. Ceausescu then said he must tell the President frankly that the Chinese have some of the same feelings of concern, some of the same doubts as those he had mentioned earlier regarding problems being solved by only two large countries.

The President commented that the other side of the coin was that the Soviets do not look with much sympathy on American moves to normalize relations with China.

Ceausescu replied why should they not. Otherwise things would be impossible. The Romanians have told the Soviets more than once that there should be good relations between China and the U.S. A lack of understanding of this problem will not help solve it. Ceausescu said he did not believe that an improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations would be directed against the USSR or others. He noted that he had had lots of discussions with Chinese leaders and knew how they thought. He was convinced that they are not pursuing such a goal.

The President stated that American policy is one of wanting friendly relations with both the USSR and eventually with Communist China. We do not intend to play one against another. Our desire is to have independent relations with each, not directed against the other. The President added that this seems to be President Ceausescu’s

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12 Reference is to the entry of U.S. forces into Cambodia in an effort to destroy North Vietnamese forces and logistics. The President made the announcement in an April 30 television address to the nation. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 405–410.
viewpoint as well. He then remarked that President Ceausescu’s continued role as a peacemaker is very useful in regard to U.S.-Chinese relations. He can talk to both parties which is very helpful and in the end, in the President’s opinion, this will produce results.

Ceausescu commented that Romania had been active in persuading the Chinese to improve their relations with Yugoslavia and now, after 15 years, those relations were good. To speak frankly, Romania particularly appreciates the Chinese policy in terms of its stress on the independent development of every country. So far as the future is concerned, Romania will greet any step toward improvement of relations with China and he will inform the Chinese leadership about his discussions with the President. He inquired if the President had some still more concrete suggestions regarding a real improvement in relations with China, adding at the same time that he agreed that a beginning is needed.

The President replied that a start could be made with the relaxation of trade barriers, with the relaxation, too, of restrictions on exchanges of people, and on travel. Of course, short of full diplomatic relations, there could be an exchange of high personal representatives. All this was open for discussion.

Ceausescu said as the discussion ended that he would like to take up during dinner the subjects of Vietnam and the Middle East, and even that of Korea.

After the advisers had joined the principals, the President informed them that he and President Ceausescu had had a very good talk, particularly on bilateral relations in the economic sphere. They also talked about European security and other world problems, having actually started where they left off last year. They had noted that considerable progress had been made as a result of the talks in Bucharest and hoped that more progress could be made along these same lines.

Ceausescu stated he was in agreement with what the President had said and noted the constructive spirit in which bilateral questions had been discussed, hopefully with good results.

The President commented further that in the matter of bilateral problems there are some areas where it is possible to take further steps as a result of today’s talks. In this discussion it was noted that as a result of last year’s talks, Romania had moved to a position next to Yugoslavia in terms of favorable economic relations with the United States. There is a lot left to be done; however, much progress has been made in a year and there are good possibilities to make progress in the future.

Ceausescu said he fully shared the President’s views. He and his advisers had discussions with over 30 American firms in the last two weeks, which he hoped would lead to good results in terms of mutual
cooperation. He expressed himself as being especially satisfied with his visit so far and most particularly with his discussions with the President.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{13} At an October 27 meeting with Ceausescu, Kissinger, acting on instructions from the President, attempted to clarify points made about U.S. policy in Vietnam and with regard to China. A memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703—Country Files, Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971.

\textbf{200. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)}\textsuperscript{1}


\textbf{SUBJECT}

Classification of Romania as a Developing Country

In response to the request that General Haig made on October 27, we are submitting the following report on the measures which can be taken to carry out the President’s commitment to classify Romania for certain purposes as a “developing country” (Less Developed Country or LDC).\textsuperscript{2}

We assume that the Romanians are primarily interested in being classified as an LDC in order to receive generalized tariff preferences from the US. Implementation of our preference scheme will require Congressional authorization. We expect to submit a legislative proposal early in the next year. It is unlikely that the scheme will actually go into effect before late 1971.

Since many of the exports of Romania are similar to those of other LDCs, Romania’s competitive position in the US market as well as in the markets of other donor countries would be adversely affected in the future if it is not a beneficiary of generalized preferences. The Romanian desire to be considered as an LDC is therefore understandable.

On purely economic grounds, Romania could be classified as a developing country for the purposes of generalized preferences since the

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–259, U/SM 87–89, U/SM 87. Confidential.

\textsuperscript{2} See Document 199.
stage of its economic development is roughly comparable to that of Yugoslavia and several other countries which are considered LDCs.

Section 231(a) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (TEA)\(^3\) denies the President authority to apply tariff concessions or MFN treatment to the products of Communist countries other than Yugoslavia and Poland (both of which enjoyed MFN status when the Act was passed). Unless Congress is prepared to amend this legislative restriction, it would be unlikely that Congress would agree to permit extension of the benefits of generalized preferences to Romania since such preferences offer far greater benefits than those resulting from the granting of MFN treatment.

The Under Secretaries Committee recommended, and the President concurred (NSDM 86 of October 14, 1970),\(^4\) that only Yugoslavia among the Communist countries should be granted beneficiary status in the proposed US preferences system, but that our position would be reviewed if additional Communist countries receive MFN treatment. We would expect to request Congress to give the President authority to add countries to the list of beneficiaries under certain conditions.

The Secretary has forwarded to the President recommendations to seek authority to negotiate MFN treatment for Romania and other Communist countries and to seek repeal of the Fino Amendment which prohibits Export-Import Bank lending to Communist countries which aid North Vietnam. With the President’s concurrence, authority to extend MFN treatment generally or specifically to Romania could be sought in the next legislative session. Once authority to extend MFN to Romania is granted and legislation on generalized preferences has been approved which would not specifically exclude it, the President could decide to include Romania as a beneficiary of generalized preferences. Alternatively, a specific provision could be written into the bill on generalized preferences giving Romania beneficiary status despite the provisions of Section 231(a) of the TEA.

While we believe the Romanian President raised the developing country issue because of its significance regarding generalized preferences, there are other potential advantages for Romania in being classified as a developing country. The US gives preferential treatment to developing countries under our capital controls (Interest Equalization Tax and Foreign Direct Investment Controls), untying of aid procurement, and tax treaties. In international forums, such as the GATT, IMF, and IBRD/IDA, classification as a developing country is also important.

Theodore L. Eliot Jr.

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201. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson)¹


SUBJECT

U.S. Economic Relations with Romania

On July 15, 1969, in preparation for the President’s trip to Romania, the Under Secretaries Committee reported on steps which the United States could take to improve its economic relations with Romania.² Some of these steps have now been taken.

In addition, the President has decided that we should seek elimination of the legislative restrictions on OPIC’s issuance of investment guarantees and insurance for projects in Romania. My memorandum of June 2 to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the President of the Export-Import Bank conveyed the President’s decision to seek such treatment for Yugoslavia.³ The legislation to implement that decision should also cover Romania. The Under Secretaries Committee should develop a scenario for presenting the legislative request early in the next session of Congress.

In addition, the President has now requested that the Under Secretaries Committee re-examine the whole question of our economic policies toward Romania, both in regard to the actions mentioned in its earlier memorandum and in regard to other possibilities such as:

—Public and private statements by U.S. officials to encourage U.S. investment and trade in Romania and to show Administration encouragement for it.
—Relaxing our position on Romania’s effort to enter GATT.
—Further liberalization of our export controls toward Romania.
—Any other appropriate and effective measures.

The Under Secretaries report should examine all those actions which the U.S. Government could take to give Romania treatment equal to that which we give, or plan in the future to give, to Yugoslavia. It should examine the implications of our defining Romania as a “developing country,” expanding on Mr. Eliot’s memorandum of

² See Document 181.
³ See Document 219 and footnote 4 thereto.
October 30. It should inter alia consider actions that require changes in, or new legislation, and make recommendations on both the substance and the timing of possible actions. The report by the Under Secretaries Committee should treat all possibilities solely in the Romanian context, even though some may be the subject of separate recommendations and work in progress in broader contexts:

The Under Secretaries Committee should submit this report by November 30.

Henry A. Kissinger

4 Document 200.

202. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Samuels) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
U.S. Economic Relations with Romania

The Under Secretaries Committee has reexamined U.S. economic relations with Romania and has made recommendations on actions to give Romania treatment more closely comparable to that which we give to Yugoslavia. Since the issues involved are primarily economic, the Chairman has asked that I chair the committee on this matter.

In preparing these recommendations, we have been guided by the intention, expressed in your report to the Congress of February 18, 1970, to “pursue . . . with vigor” those “cooperative programs in the economic, technical, scientific and cultural fields” set in motion during your visit to Romania last year and re-emphasized during your

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-270, Under Secretaries Study Memoranda, U/DM 1-19, U/DM 14A. Confidential. This NSC Under Secretaries Committee decision memorandum, NSC-U/DM 14A, was based on NSC Under Secretaries Committee Study Memorandum 87/D, November 27 (ibid.), requested by Kissinger on November 11 (see Document 201).
2 See Document 7.
conversations with President Ceausescu when he visited Washington this year.

Romania’s overriding concern is the preservation and enhancement of its relative independence from the Soviet Union, and to achieve this objective Romania has put great stress on trade and other economic relations with the West. Within legislative limitations we have taken several steps during the past year to improve and expand U.S.-Romanian economic relations, including liberalization of export control procedures, extension of CCC agricultural credits, encouragement of private bank export financing and promotion of joint ventures.

However, these initial steps have been modest in terms of actual impact on trade flow. The two overriding issues for expanding trade between our countries and providing Romania treatment roughly comparable to that of Yugoslavia are most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment and access to Export-Import Bank credits.

With regard to MFN tariff treatment, the Under Secretaries Committee recommends that it would be better to request general discretionary authority to negotiate MFN status with any Communist country with which we have diplomatic or trade relations rather than to seek legislation restricted to Romania alone. This broad approach is deemed desirable even though the recommendation is made in the context of initiatives for Romania alone. The more general question of MFN as it affects other Communist countries involves additional issues that have not been addressed by the Committee but which will have to be considered before seeking Congressional authorization. In addition, in the case of Romania alone, Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Interior recommend that, in order to convince Congress that a request for legislation on MFN should be granted, a more detailed plan should be developed in the form of potential negotiating packages that link our, and Romania’s interests and objectives, with practical moves on both sides.

Export-Import Bank credits are now unavailable to Romania because of the Fino Amendment which prohibits such credits to countries giving governmental assistance to North Viet-Nam. State, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, The Special Trade Representative, AID, Eximbank and USIA recommend the outright repeal of the Fino Amendment. If this does not prove feasible, amendment to provide Presidential discretionary powers should be considered. These agencies make this recommendation of a broad approach to the Fino Amendment, as in the case of MFN, only in the context of initiatives relating to Romania alone. Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Interior oppose repeal or amendment of the Fino provision and instead favor informing the Romanians that if they stop giving governmental assistance to North Viet-Nam, we would be prepared to offer Exim credits (in which case the Fino Amendment would be inapplicable).
Other recommendations agreed by the Committee but of secondary priority compared with MFN and Export-Import Bank credit, are that we:

—seek legislation separating OPIC from the Foreign Assistance Act and without the restrictive provisions of the Act in order to carry out the President’s decision to eliminate OPIC restrictions on investment insurance and guaranties for projects in Romania.

—continue to liberalize procedures for export control but not seek to change the export control category for Romania.

—consider beneficiary status for Romania as a developing country for purposes of generalized tariff preferences after the negotiation of MFN status.

—postpone relaxation of capital controls until it is more clearly dictated and desirable.

—not seek at the present time eligibility for Romania for the untying of aid among developing countries.

—support but not sponsor IMF and IBRD membership for Romania if we are assured that it is willing and able to meet the obligations of membership. Before we commit ourselves, we would want also to be assured that Romania has made reasonable progress in settling the defaulted dollar bond claims.

—not consider Congressional authorization of a sugar quota for Romania.

—resume negotiations with Romania for an air transport agreement when Romania indicates a willingness to negotiate seriously.

—seek Romanian (and Yugoslav) eligibility for PL-480 Title I but not for U.S. foreign aid.

—include in the State of the Union message and Foreign Policy Report references to your visits to Romania and Yugoslavia and President Ceausescu’s visit here, signaling our special relations and our desire to expand further our economic relations with them. Other high officials should also stress this policy when appropriate in their written and oral statements.

Since Romanian accession to the GATT seems close to resolution, the Committee does not see a need to make further decisions on this matter at this time.

After decisions have been made on individual issues we will be in a better position to develop a comprehensive legislative strategy for all matters affecting Romania.

Attached is a detailed report of the Committee with a separate discussion of each of the recommendations listed above. 3

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3 Attached but not printed.
203. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 15, 1971, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT
Secretary’s Meeting with Romanian Ambassador—U.S.-Romanian Bilateral Relations

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan, Embassy of Romania
Gheorghe Ionita, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Romania
The Secretary
Robert I. Owen, Country Director, EUR/BRY

Ambassador Bogdan had asked for the appointment to review various bilateral and international matters following his recent return from Bucharest where he had seen, among others, Romanian President Ceausescu. He conveyed President Ceausescu’s personal best wishes to the Secretary for the New Year.

Bogdan said President Ceausescu was very satisfied with his visit to the U.S. and is determined to follow up in expanding our bilateral relationships, most particularly our trade and economic relations. As evidence of this Romanian determination, Bogdan stated that a special Romanian task force under the chairmanship of First Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Nicolae had been established to coordinate measures for increasing trade and economic relations with the U.S. As current activities, he cited the present visit to the U.S. of the Romanian machine-building ministry’s delegation, discussions with RCA and Corning Glass on possible joint ventures, talks with Robert B. Anderson concerning possible cooperation in marketing and production, and a recent visit to the U.S. of the head of the Romanian Foreign Trade Bank.

In response to the Secretary’s inquiry concerning the potential for tourism in Romania, Bogdan noted that agreement had been reached for Pan American to begin service between New York and Bucharest this coming spring, and that an Intercontinental hotel in Bucharest should be completed in March or April. He said 20,000 Americans visited Romania in 1970 and that the Romanians were hoping to expand this to 60,000 in 1971. They plan to enlarge and improve their tourist

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL ROM-US. Confidential. Drafted by Owen and approved in S on January 22. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office. The memorandum is part I of II. Part II is ibid.
office activities here, feeling that a better public-relations effort is necessary. The Secretary noted the advantage in tourism advertising of focusing on one or more attractions unique to a given country rather than making general appeals which frequently are less competitive.

Bogdan said the Romanians hope to expand exchange visits, having in mind reciprocal visits by representatives of the Romanian Economic Council and of President Nixon’s Council of Economic Advisors, parliamentarians of the two countries, and regional officials (governors and mayors), to cite a few possibilities. Bogdan said he already had had an exploratory talk with Council of Economic Advisors Chairman McCracken.

Bogdan said there were two specific matters to which he would like to give a push, namely the Romanian interest in opening trade representation offices in Chicago and San Francisco, and in reaching early agreement on a U.S.-Romanian consular convention. He opined that remaining differences between the two negotiating sides were insignificant except for the questions of immunities and the taking of notarials and even these could be resolved readily if we both try a little harder. The Secretary agreed that we should move ahead promptly on the consular convention and assured the Ambassador of his personal support in this regard.2

To Bogdan’s inquiry as to prospects for early action in response to the Romanian interest in acquiring MFN treatment and EXIM Bank facilities, the Secretary observed that the Department has submitted appropriate recommendations to the White House, that he favors and believes that the President favors assisting Romania in this regard, but that much depends on an assessment of the next Congress which would have to take legislative action. Bogdan responded only that although he is aware of the various complications and considerations he still has great confidence in the powers of the President. He said that, in other words, the President can get what he wants.

2 An agreement was signed at Bucharest on July 5, 1972, and entered into force on July 6, 1973. For text, see TIAS 7643.
204. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

U.S. Economic Relations with Romania

The Under Secretaries Committee has examined a dozen steps we could take to give substance to your commitment to President Ceaucescu to increase U.S.-Romanian economic relations, which Ceaucescu emphasized in his last visit. The Committee believes there are two major issues which hold the key to whether we shall be able to do so—U.S. extension of most-favored-nation treatment (MFN) to Romania, and Export-Import Bank credits to Romania.

Romania has pushed very hard for most-favored-nation tariff treatment. It is also much interested in Export-Import Bank credits, which the Fino Amendment forbids to countries trading with North Vietnam. You have just decided in the broader East-West trade context that the Administration would not now take initiatives in these areas, however, and none of the agencies proposes seeking authority for Romania alone. They believe that singling out Romania via special legislation would irritate Eastern Europe and embarrass Romania, and I agree; the Romanians apparently share this view as well.

You also decided that we not vigorously oppose Congressional initiatives on these issues, however, so you may get an opportunity to do something on them for Romania anyway. Senator Mondale has already proposed a bill to drastically limit the Fino Amendment, and it could pass. When the Administration testifies on the bill on March 8, our spokesman could announce that, should the bill pass, we would plan to use the authority only for Romania. There is also a Javits/Mondale/Harris bill which would authorize you to extend MFN treatment to the Communist countries, but it is part of a larger trade bill which is unlikely to go anywhere in the near future.

3 See Document 23.
4 Senator Walter F. Mondale (D–Minnesota).
5 Senators Jacob K. Javits (R–New York) and Fred R. Harris (D–Oklahoma).
On the smaller actions, the Committee rejects several as either insignificant or too contradictory to our general policies to merit adoption:

— a further change in the export control category for Romania;
— granting of beneficiary status for Romania under our generalized preference scheme, when and if authorized by Congress, before we have given her MFN status;
— immediate relaxation of our balance of payments controls on U.S. capital flows to Romania, by categorizing her as a lower income country instead of a Communist country;
— establishing Romania as an eligible source for procurement under our limited untying of U.S. foreign aid, by treating her as a lower income country rather than as a European country;
— authorization of a sugar quota for Romania.

The Committee does propose some smaller measures:

— Our support, though not sponsorship, of Romanian efforts to enter the IMF and IBRD, provided Romania makes some progress in setting outstanding dollar bond claims;
— new Romanian air negotiations, provided Romania shows some sign of compromise;
— seeking Romanian eligibility for PL–480 Title I sales.

The first two of these are unexceptional, but require no decision by you now. The third could only be done by our seeking changes in legislation to eliminate the prohibition of sales to countries whose ships trade with Cuba; this would be good Romanian policy, but it would indicate a slackening of our Cuban embargo and I do not suggest it.

I agree with the Committee’s recommendation, except for this Cuba issue and its rejection of a change in the export control category for Romania, which is based upon a judgment that: the trade effects would be small since only 180 items are involved; we already accede to most requests for licenses for Romania; some of the items involved are of security interest; and, most importantly, the maintenance of our export controls on technical data are required to avoid significant security risks vis-à-vis the USSR.

I believe that the Committee’s recommendation under-emphasizes the favorable political effect of our placing Romania in the same export control category as Yugoslavia, which in fact you indicated to Ceausescu you would do in at least some areas, at least for goods. The Committee presents an option of treating Romania equal to Yugoslavia on exports of goods, but maintaining intact the data controls. The only objection to such a change is that it could allow some “strategic” goods to reach Romania—such as the hydro-cracking plant which you authorized late last year anyway. And, even with the change, we would

6 See Document 14.
still maintain controls on the same 600 items controlled by other COCOM countries and some 375 items which we control unilaterally. The strategic risk thus appears minimal, and offset by the foreign policy gain. The Romanians know we have this review under way, and will be quite disillusioned if it results in no new step at all—hence I recommend this modest step on export controls.

Recommendation

That you decide now on two new steps for Romania: (a) that Administration spokesmen, in testifying on Congressional initiatives to authorize Export-Import Bank transactions in Communist countries, indicate that the Administration would now use such authority only for Romania, and (b) that you decide to set up a new export control category to equate Romania with Yugoslavia for exports of U.S. goods, while maintaining the present controls on exports to Romania of U.S. data.

Approve

Disapprove

Other

7 The President initialed the approval option. Kissinger informed Richardson of the President’s decisions in a March 9 memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. III Jul 1970–Dec 1971)

205. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Most-Favored-Nation Treatment for Romania

In previous memoranda to the agencies (Tab A) I informed them that you had decided to oppose only in a very low key way legislative
initiatives to liberalize trade policy toward Communist countries in regard to Most-Favored-Nation treatment. You also decided that our position on Romania should be handled in the same fashion.

Senators Mondale and Brooke have now introduced a bill[^3] which would grant you *discretionary* authority to enter into a mutually beneficial commercial agreement with Romania providing Most-Favored-Nation treatment for that country alone.

I believe you should reconsider whether or not Administration response to this bill should continue to be opposition or whether in this case the Administration position should be no objection to this bill.

If the Administration does object to a Congressional grant of *discretionary* authority, it is likely to cause the Romanians to doubt your previous statements about wishing to improve economic relations. In addition, it would be very awkward and perhaps even impossible, under the legislation being proposed by the agencies, to grant Romania benefits of our tariff preferences scheme for developing countries unless we first grant Most-Favored-Nation status.

Romania is now nearing completion of its negotiations for accession to the GATT. Our opposition to this legislation would mean that our support for Romanian entry to the GATT would seem tepid, at best, despite our many statements in favor of increased cooperation with that country. Peter Peterson adds a further commercial consideration: our deteriorating export balance argues for using available alternatives, including carrots such as this, to promote a higher level of U.S. sales abroad.

There are good reasons not to change the current position. One depends upon your assessment of the domestic political effects so long as the Vietnam War continues. Another is to avoid legislation aimed at specific countries. We had at one point also been worried about the possibility of singling Romania out and thereby exacerbating her relations with the Soviet Union. However, I understand that Ambassador Bogdan does not consider this a danger.

On balance, I believe that our desire for improving relations with Romania argues for a change in the Administration position that would allow us to voice no opposition to a Congressional initiative conveying discretionary authority.

**Recommendation**

That you decide to allow the agencies to testify that the Administration has no opposition to Congressional initiatives to grant you dis-
cretion to enter an agreement giving Most-Favored-Nation status to Romania. (Pete Peterson concurs.)

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4 The President initialed the approval option.

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206. Memorandum of Conversation

San Clemente, California, August 31, 1971, 11:40 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan
Henry A. Kissinger
Peter W. Rodman, NSC (notetaker)

Dr. Kissinger opened the conversation by welcoming Ambassador Bogdan to California. He asked the Ambassador what was going on in Romania. “You shouldn’t keep threatening your big neighbors like you are doing,” he remarked. The Ambassador replied that sometimes it was necessary. He called Dr. Kissinger’s attention to the tactics a hedgehog uses against a bear: A hedgehog is really no competition for a bear, but when he’s in a fight he raises hell first, so that all the wood hears.

The Ambassador then stated that his President had instructed him to pass on to President Nixon the Romanian President’s considerations on the situation in Eastern Europe. But first of all, the Ambassador was to convey his President’s appreciation for the measures which the United States had taken on Romania’s behalf—on Most Favored Nation, EXIM–Bank, and GATT.

Dr. Kissinger then inquired if the Ambassador was going to announce his visit to San Clemente. The Ambassador replied that he had no strong feelings, but that he had thought it would have some publicity. Dr. Kissinger then suggested that they return to that question after the Ambassador finished his presentation.

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2 Reference is to Soviet reactions to President Ceausescu’s June visit to China that included announcement of early August military maneuvers near the Romanian border. In a July 15 memorandum to Kissinger, the Department of State outlined Soviet moves and predicted a further heightening of tensions. (Ibid.)
In general, Ambassador Bogdan resumed, President Ceausescu felt that the trends in the world today were positive. Reason was prevailing more and more. America’s normalization of relations with China, the Berlin agreement, and the possibility of a SALT agreement, were examples of this. Dr. Kissinger commented that there might be a Conference on European Security, too. Did Romania want a Conference on European Security? The Ambassador replied that it depended on how the Conference was organized; he suggested that perhaps there should be cooperation on that between the United States and Romania. Dr. Kissinger responded that he would be interested to talk with the Ambassador on some occasion about that.

At the same time, Ambassador Bogdan continued, President Ceausescu wished to invite President Nixon’s attention to certain negative developments in Eastern Europe and in Soviet-Romanian relations. He was referring specifically to the reaction of the Soviet Union to the visit of Romania’s state-party delegation to China. The Soviets made gestures and press attacks on them, directly and by proxy. The Romanian Government did not know what was discussed at the Crimean meeting, but it was safe to assume that they talked about Romania.3 The Romanians had met with them at COMECON shortly before.

Dr. Kissinger then asked a series of questions exploring whether there was a parallel with Czechoslovakia’s position in 1968. There were no pro-Soviet factions in Bucharest, the Ambassador indicated, and the Romanians would fight. Dr. Kissinger noted that the Hungarians were joining in the attacks on Romania; Ambassador Bogdan did not think it was of their own free will.

The Ambassador asked rhetorically why it was that Romania wished to direct the President’s attention to this situation, including the military maneuvers and press attacks. The first reason was that frankness was important to any relationship. And secondly, the Romanian President had been a little surprised to see the lack of reaction in the West to these developments. Perhaps, it was only due to lack of awareness, the Ambassador suggested. Dr. Kissinger thought that was the reason. “Do you think the Soviets will attack you?” Dr. Kissinger asked. It was difficult to say, the Ambassador replied, but he thought his country’s situation was basically better than 1968. Romania’s position was stronger and her international situation was better; Romania had better assets in the international situation. But they wanted to avoid complacency, and this was why they wished to talk with the President. Even if the United States and Romania differed in their respective views about military blocs and other questions, President Ceausescu believed that the United States and Romania shared an interest in a more

3 Reference is to an August 2 meeting of Communist Party leaders.
diversified world. Such a world is more stable, the Ambassador con-
tinued; it gives more freedom of action and room for maneuver for
smaller and middle-sized nations. President Ceausescu knew that Pres-
ident Nixon had sought to encourage this, but Romania nevertheless
had noted that at this juncture there was no response to these devel-
opments. Dr. Kissinger noted in reply that it would have been difficult
for the United States to criticize the Soviets for not inviting Romania
to the Crimea, and the military pressures (the maneuvers in Bulgaria)
had been called off. But the United States was aware of the Soviets’
other tactics, such as flying planes right up to the border and then turn-
ing. It looked like a war of nerves.

The Ambassador pointed out the necessity of taking precautions.
But there was no need for Romania to give the United States advice,
the Ambassador continued, because the President had already done a
number of things—such as his visit to Romania, and the economic
steps—which were a help to Romania. Other gestures were possible,
he noted. The United States had a variety of means at its disposal. The
U.S. was negotiating with the Soviets on many issues (Berlin, SALT,
CES), and the Soviets would not want to jeopardize these talks. Dr.
Kissinger indicated that the United States would make sure that the
Soviet Union was under no illusions about the fact that if they attacked
Romania, this would ruin détente for several years. “This is impor-
tant,” the Ambassador responded. There were other possibilities, too:
The United States could help by getting the true facts before the press.
The Soviets were accusing Romania of creating a Tirana–Belgrade–
Bucharest–Peking axis, and so forth. [Dr. Kissinger interjected that Ro-
amania was formidable enough by herself, but when she was in league
with the Albanians, too, that was serious! The Ambassador mentioned
that the Albanians have a slogan: “We and the Chinese are 800 million
strong!”]4 The Ambassador referred to President Nixon’s gesture of not
opposing the new trade legislation, and Dr. Kissinger indicated that
that had been a deliberate decision.

Dr. Kissinger asked the Ambassador what else the United States
could do concretely. The Ambassador replied that he would like, if pos-
sible, to be received by the President, perhaps in Washington. Dr.
Kissinger noted that a meeting in San Clemente was not possible, but
he told the Ambassador that he would recommend such a meeting to
the President. He could not commit the President, but his own esti-
mate was that the President would probably agree to it.5

Dr. Kissinger then informed the Ambassador that he could report
back to President Ceausescu the following (and at this point the Am-

4 Brackets in the original.
5 Bogdan met with the President on September 17. See Document 207.
bassador took out pencil and paper and took careful notes: (1) The United States has a major interest in the independence and autonomous policy of Romania. (2) The United States will do nothing directly or indirectly that amounts to collusion that would enable a great power to abrogate the independence of Romania. (3) The United States will make clear in its way that unilateral pressures or military action is not consistent with a relaxation of tensions.

Dr. Kissinger then added that he would discuss with the President what visible things the United States could do. In response to Dr. Kissinger’s question, the Ambassador characterized the Yugoslav attitude as close to the Romanian. Brezhnev’s visit to Yugoslavia⁶ the Romanians thought of as a response to a longstanding invitation.

The conversation then turned to the question of press treatment of Ambassador Bogdan’s meetings with Dr. Kissinger and the President. They first agreed that it was better not to announce at this point that the Ambassador had met with Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger then commented that, since the President almost never receives Ambassadors except for presentation of credentials, it was important to have some special reason to cite for a Presidential meeting with the Romanian Ambassador. Otherwise every other Ambassador in town would feel slighted, or would immediately ask to see the President. Dr. Kissinger suggested that the meeting be set up on the basis that the Ambassador was carrying a special message from President Ceausescu. The Ambassador replied that unfortunately he was not authorized to say he was carrying a personal message, but he could check back with Bucharest and correct that. Dr. Kissinger then noted that a personal message alone might not be enough to explain a Presidential meeting. He suggested, and Ambassador Bogdan agreed, that the White House could simply announce, after the meeting, that the President received a message. When we announce it, Ron Ziegler could say that the meeting was for an exchange of views, and that the President used the opportunity to show his feeling for Romania, etc. We would check with the Romanians on the precise language.

Ambassador Bogdan then turned the conversation to some other political issues. He congratulated Dr. Kissinger on his trip to Peking,⁷ noting that this would probably make it less interesting for Dr. Kissinger to hear about the Romanians’ visit to China. On the contrary, Dr. Kissinger replied. He noted that President Ceausescu had received a good reception there, and then asked the Ambassador a series of questions about the Romanians’ conversations and impressions. In reply,

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⁶ September 22–25.
⁷ Kissinger met with Chou En-lai and other Chinese officials in Beijing July 9–11.
the Ambassador indicated that President Ceausescu had met with Mao, and had the impression he was still in command. The Romanians and Chinese had talked about the U.S. on a constructive basis. President Ceausescu had stressed the necessity of a political solution in Vietnam privately and in his public statement, and he had also pressed for this in the communiqué.

The Ambassador continued by saying that in the Romanian view the North Vietnamese had made an important step, in that in their latest proposal the POW’s were not linked to a political settlement.8 Dr. Kissinger, asked by the Ambassador whether he agreed, commented that he was not sure whether a people who fought so heroically were really capable of making peace. Maybe not, the Ambassador said; the Romanians, too, had heard the North Vietnamese say that with all the sacrifices they had made, they could not give up. But their (imaginary) fears of U.S.–PRC collusion may be alleviated by a political settlement in Indochina, the Ambassador suggested. The Ambassador expressed the view, in all humility, that the United States had stressed too much the possibility of help from the USSR. Even if the Soviets wished to help, they could not. Dr. Kissinger said he was inclined to agree, and that the U.S. had not stressed this avenue since the early months of the Administration. He thought that nobody really had any influence over Hanoi. The only real issue remaining was Hanoi’s desire for us to put their people into power. We could not do that. Our position was a fair political process that left the outcome uncertain; but this was unacceptable to the North Vietnamese.

The only way to see is to discuss it with them, the Ambassador said. He asked Dr. Kissinger’s estimate of the situation, and Dr. Kissinger replied that he was less hopeful than he had been a few weeks previously, because Hanoi would probably now want to wait out the outcome of all the current political turmoil in Saigon. Ambassador Bogdan mentioned that the Chinese were not so sanguine about Hanoi’s prospects but it was difficult for them too, to do much about ending the war. Dr. Kissinger thought the Chinese knew what they were doing. The Chinese were disciplined, and thought in historical terms. To them, Indochina was not the main problem. The Ambassador thought that Japan might be, but Dr. Kissinger responded that the Chinese were more worried about “your ally,” the Soviet Union. The Chinese were not building air raid shelters in China against us or Japan! Japan had hardly any airplanes. The Chinese had not built such shelters 15 years

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ago at the height of U.S.–PRC hostility, and from that something could be deduced.

Ambassador Bogdan returned to the economic issues, reporting that the Romanians had spoken with Wilbur Mills on the MFN question, and Mills had told them that if the Administration told him it was interested in it, he would get it done. Dr. Kissinger promised to look into that, and said he would check with Peterson.

The Ambassador then mentioned that he would also soon be seeing the Secretary of State, as usual, for a tour d’horizon,9 and to tell him what he had told Dr. Kissinger. The Romanian Government was also thinking of inviting the Secretary to visit Romania. Dr. Kissinger urged the Ambassador to explore this with the Secretary. The Under Secretary of State might be able to come earlier, but the Ambassador should certainly not exclude a visit by the Secretary. The Ambassador added that in the second half of October, Paul McCracken would be visiting Romania to see his counterpart, who is a high party and state official. He might bring a message from the President. Dr. Kissinger replied noncommittally.

After some pleasantries about the prospects and possible symbolic implications of Dr. Kissinger’s visiting Romania for a vacation, the meeting ended.

9 Bogdan saw Rogers on September 3. Memoranda of conversation are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL ROM–US.

207. Memorandum for the President’s File1

Washington, September 17, 1971, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT
The President’s Meeting with Romanian Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan

OTHER PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Ambassador Bogdan had requested an appointment in order to convey President Ceausescu’s concerns at recent Soviet pressures against Romania. The President made an exception to his usual practice of not receiving foreign ambassadors, and met with Ambassador Bogdan in order to symbolize our interest in Romania.

The President opened the conversation by assuring Ambassador Bogdan of the United States’ strong interest in Romania and stating that he was always ready to hear the personal views of President Ceausescu.

The Ambassador began his presentation as follows: President Ceausescu felt that the general trends in the world today were positive. Reason seemed to be prevailing more and more. The President’s moves to normalize relations with China, the Berlin accord, and the possibility of a SALT agreement were examples. Romania welcomed this. But Romania also hoped that there would be no agreements at the expense of third countries.

“You need have no such fears,” the President said emphatically.

The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for this. While these positive trends were hopeful, President Ceausescu wanted at the same time to invite President Nixon’s personal attention to certain negative developments in Eastern Europe. Romania was very concerned at the campaign of threats and pressures which the USSR had been waging against her. This took the form of threats of Warsaw Pact military maneuvers in neighboring Bulgaria, press attacks on Ceausescu’s visit to Peking, the exclusion of Romania from a bloc gathering in the Crimea, and other harassments.

“What can we do?” the President asked the Ambassador. Any visible signs of the U.S. commitment to Romania’s support would be valuable, the Ambassador replied. Favorable action on Most-Favored-Nation treatment for Romanian trade, or steps by OPIC to encourage investment in Romania, were possibilities. In short, anything that let the Soviets know that détente with the U.S. was dependent on their restraint vis-à-vis Romania.

The President began his response by asking the Ambassador to convey his very good personal wishes to President Ceausescu. He assured the Ambassador that Romania had our promise on MFN, and indicated that Dr. Kissinger would ride herd on these economic matters to insure that our promises were carried out. The President then asked Dr. Kissinger to repeat, on the President’s behalf, the three principles of American policy which Dr. Kissinger had stated to Ambassador Bogdan in San Clemente on August 31.2 Dr. Kissinger stated the

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2 See Document 206.
following: (1) The United States has a major interest in the independence and autonomous policy of Romania. (2) The United States will do nothing directly or indirectly that amounts to collusion that would enable a great power to abrogate the independence of Romania. (3) The United States will make clear in its way to the Soviet Union that unilateral pressures or military actions are not consistent with a relaxation of tensions. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for this statement and promised to report it directly to President Ceausescu.

As the conversation moved on to other aspects of European security, the President indicated that the U.S. was inclined to go slow on the convening of a Conference on European Security because we were not clear what substantively it would accomplish. We were interested in concrete talks on substantive issues, such as MBFR, the President said. On this we were willing to negotiate.

Dr. Kissinger added that anything that Romania could do to help cool things in Vietnam would be of great benefit to U.S.-Romanian relations. Our economic measures on Romania’s behalf depended on there not being any increase in Romanian economic aid to North Vietnam. The President then emphasized that his patience with North Vietnam was running out. “Never underestimate what I will do when I am pressed.”

The Ambassador then characterized Romania’s position on Vietnam as being in favor of a political solution. President Ceausescu had made this point to the Chinese. At the same time, Romania thought that the NLF 7-point proposal had been a constructive step forward.

The conversation ended with the Ambassador’s thanking the President again for receiving him, and the President’s asking the Ambassador again to convey his personal greetings to President Ceausescu.

Press photographers were invited in at the close. Mr. Ziegler announced the meeting at his late morning press briefing.

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3 See footnote 8, Document 206.
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Commerce Stans


The President has considered your memoranda on the subject of Most Favored Nation treatment for Romania. He has decided that the Administration should indicate favorable disposition for legislation empowering the President to authorize negotiation of Most Favored Nation treatment for Romania alone, on the condition that actual extension of MFN be withheld until an agreement has been reached on Romanian repayment of dollar bond debts. In addition, he has authorized the Secretary of State to send the attached letter informing Chairman Mills of the Administration’s support for legislation giving the President authority to negotiate MFN with Romania.

With regard to requesting broader authority to negotiate MFN agreements with communist countries in general, the President has decided that further study is necessary and no action should be taken at this time.

Henry A. Kissinger

2 Not found.
3 Attached but not printed.

Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State

Bucharest, December 30, 1971, 1519Z.

3934. 1. Begin summary: At New Year reception today President Ceausescu asked me to transmit his ‘personal appeal to President

Nixon to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam.” 2 He also asked that his greetings be conveyed to President, and his thanks for recent affirmative actions on Ex–Im Bank and MFN. 3 Action requested: I recommend brief response from President to Ceausescu, in appropriate form, to keep open channel of communication between two Presidents and to exert whatever influence is possible on Romania in relation to Indochina. End summary.

2. At annual New Year reception today, President Ceausescu took me aside immediately after his remarks to the diplomatic corps and began conversation at asking: “Why has the United States begun again the bombing of North Viet-Nam?” I replied that every action of war is tragic for humanity and for the cause of peace. I said the United States particularly desired a cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and a peaceful settlement of the conflict through negotiations; in recent weeks, however, North Vietnamese forces have attacked Saigon, crossed the DMZ, and stepped up their military operations in Cambodia and Laos. I said current limited air strikes should be seen against this background, and assured President Ceausescu that they represented no change in US policy. Ceausescu then asked me to transmit his “personal appeal to President Nixon to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam.” He said that conflicts could not be settled by resort to force. I said that it would be salutary for all parties concerned to act on this basis; unfortunately, we had not yet been able to engage the North Vietnamese in real negotiations at the Paris talks.

3. President Ceausescu asked that his personal greetings be conveyed to President Nixon. He said he wished also to express his appreciation for the President’s action in authorizing Ex–Im Bank credit facilities for Romania, and to thank him for the affirmative declaration of the administration’s position to Congress concerning the MFN legislation.

4. I recommend Department and White House consider desirability of transmitting suitable brief message from President to Ceausescu, responding to latter’s communication. I believe it would be worthwhile to do this briefly in some appropriate form as maintenance of communications opened between two Presidents earlier and to make whatever helpful input we can on Southeast Asia. While Romania’s general stand on Indochina problems has often been stated for the

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2 The attacks were in retaliation for North Vietnamese shelling of Saigon and increased troop infiltration.

record—most recently in today’s *Scintea*—there is probably utility in our doing what we can to weigh in with Ceausescu in occasional high level communications designed to draw Romanian position back a little toward more neutral ground. Opportunities here are not large, but it remains true that Ceausescu sees himself in somewhat independent position from which he wishes to judge international issues on basis of Romanian “principles.”

Meeker

210. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 21, 1972, 4:15–4:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

President Nixon’s Meeting with Romanian Vice President Manescu

OTHER PARTICIPANTS

*Romania*
Vice President Manea Manescu
Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan
Mircea Mitran, First Secretary, Romanian Embassy (Romanian interpreter)

*United States*
President Nixon
General Alexander Haig, Jr.
Herbert Stein, Chairman, CEA
Charles Schaller, Department of State (United States interpreter)

Vice President Manescu began the conversation by extending cordial greetings and good wishes to President and Mrs. Nixon from President and Mrs. Ceausescu. President Ceausescu remembered with great pleasure his meetings with President Nixon in 1967, 1969 and 1970. He had asked the Vice President to convey his positive assessment of the state of United States-Romanian relations, and his appreciation to President Nixon for everything the President had done to further these
relations. President Ceausescu had also asked the Vice President to transmit a letter,\(^2\) which he now wished to do.

Vice President Manescu said that, especially since 1969, there has been a steady expansion in our bilateral relations in the political, economic, technical-scientific and cultural spheres. The large number of high-level visits between the two countries had done much to foster relations, and his delegation was a modest addition in this respect.

The Vice President stated that Romania particularly appreciated the way in which bilateral economic relations have progressed. The President’s determinations that Export-Import Bank facilities and Overseas Private Investment Corporation programs would be made available for trade with Romania were highly welcome. For these steps and many others, and for the President’s expression of “welcome and support” for MFN legislation for Romania, Romania was sincerely grateful.

Vice President Manescu said President Ceausescu very much hoped that matters could be speeded up where MFN legislation for Romania is concerned. It was important to Romania that this problem be resolved so as to enhance prospects for bilateral trade. Romanian public opinion is fully informed regarding the development of United States-Romanian relations. It heartily approves of our constantly improving relations but awaits resolution of the MFN question. The Vice President commented that he frequently visits factories and is asked by workers when Romania will receive MFN, adding that many of these same people were on hand to greet President Nixon warmly during his visit to Romania.

The Vice President said Romania wishes further expansion in its relations with the United States and with the West. As President Nixon knew, Romania’s trade was now roughly 50 percent with the West and 50 percent with the socialist countries. This alteration in Romania’s trade pattern from its previous orientation toward the East had not been easy, but had been deliberately undertaken as a contribution to East-West relations and détente. Romania’s principles of national sovereignty, non-interference, equal rights, non-recourse to force or the threat of force are sacred to the Romanian people. They are principles which should be paramount in international relations, in all dealings between states. President Ceausescu is convinced that all who share Romania’s attachment to these principles will support her.

Vice President Manescu said he wished to conclude with several observations on international issues. President Ceausescu is now in

\(^2\) See footnote 2, Document 211.
Africa and will visit eight countries. The purpose of the trip is to bear the message of friendship to these countries, to develop Romania’s relations with them, and to convey Romania’s sympathy for developing nations.

Romania supports every effort for détente and cooperation between nations. Romanian public opinion was fully informed on all aspects of President Nixon’s visit to the People’s Republic of China, including the complete text of the communiqué. President Ceausescu, the Romanian Government and the entire Romanian people judge this visit to be a great event of historic importance for international relations and détente. Realizing that the main purpose of the President’s visit was to improve Sino-American relations, Romania nonetheless considers it most important for the entire world that the United States and China had expressed attachment to the five cardinal principles which govern relations between states. It was also highly significant that these two great nations stated that they do not accept policies of hegemony. These are the reasons why Romania welcomed the President’s visit to the People’s Republic of China.

The Vice President said that President Nixon’s trip to the Soviet Union will also be of historic importance if it is concluded in the same spirit of cooperation on the basis of these same principles, equality and peaceful coexistence. In the context of today’s world, of increasing understanding between nations, it is important to eliminate through political means the various hotbeds of war such as Vietnam and the Middle East. President Ceausescu firmly believes that tensions in these areas can be resolved through negotiations.

Vice President Manescu stated that Romania is actively working for a conference on European security, believing that conditions now exist which suggest good prospects for a successful conference. President Ceausescu asked President Nixon’s support on this question. He also shares in full the President’s belief and hope that nations, working together, can progress toward a generation of peace.

The President thanked Vice President Manescu for his presentation. He asked that Manescu convey to President and Mrs. Ceausescu best personal regards from him and Mrs. Nixon. He well remembered the visit he and Mrs. Nixon made to Bucharest in 1969, and the warm reception accorded them by the Romanian people. History might record that the visit, the first by an American president to a socialist

3 Ceausescu left on March 12 for a 1-month visit.
4 February 17–28.
5 May 22–29.
country since World War II, marked the beginning of a new era in United States relations with socialist countries.

The President said President Ceausescu would remember that, during their talks in 1969 and 1970, the two presidents discussed United States relations with the Soviet Union and with the People’s Republic of China.\(^6\) The President added that, speaking quite frankly, the leaders of some socialist countries had not welcomed his visit to China. They had apparently professed the view that the visit was in some way directed against the Soviet Union. Romania, however, is in the unique position of having good relations with both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, and President Ceausescu had correctly evaluated the visit as one aimed at contributing toward world peace and directed against no one.

The President wished to assure President Ceausescu that, as the United States seeks better relations with large socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and China, it will continue to pursue development of relations with smaller socialist countries like Romania. His forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union was being undertaken to improve United States-Soviet relations. It would not, in any way, be at the expense of other countries.

The United States would move forward on the MFN question as rapidly as possible. Prospects for progress here have improved as the Vietnam problem has receded, and Romania has top priority where consideration for MFN is concerned. In the meantime, Romania can count on the continued friendship of the United States and on our abiding interest in further development of bilateral relations in economic and other areas.

The President said that the eyes of the world may now be on meetings between the United States and large socialist nations. The United States, however, does not forget for one moment the importance of its relations with smaller countries. We would always believe that nations have equal rights, including the right to have their own policy without foreign domination, and equally important contributions to make to world peace and progress. The President said that he and Mrs. Nixon would always remember their visit to Romania, and President and Mrs. Ceausescu’s visit to Washington. Romania would always have a special place in their hearts.

The President asked once again that Vice President Manescu transmit his best wishes to President Ceausescu, and his thanks for the letter which Manescu had brought. The President said he would be

\(^6\) See Documents 183, 184, and 199.
replying to the letter. In conclusion, he expressed pleasure at having been able to meet with Vice President Manescu and the hope that the Vice President’s visit to the United States would be pleasant and rewarding in every respect.

7 See Document 211.

211. Letter From President Nixon to Romanian President Ceausescu


Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your recent letter which was conveyed to me by Vice President Manescu on March 21. I very much appreciate your expression of greetings and good wishes, and reciprocate them most cordially.

I remember with pleasure our discussions in Bucharest and Washington, and fully share your view that the good relations which exist between the United States and Romania have been further strengthened since our last meeting in October 1970. The visit of Vice President Manescu is an important contribution to the further development of Romanian and American friendship and cooperation, and to our valuable exchange of views at all levels. I was happy for the opportunity


2 See Document 210. A rough translation of the letter from Ceausescu to Nixon reads in part: “Dear Mr. President, ... I am glad to note that since our last meeting, further progress has been recorded ... in Romanian-American relations, ... I have learned with satisfaction about the authorization given to the Export-Import Bank to ensure and guarantee the granting of credits to Romania to purchase goods and services from the U.S.A. ... Certainly, the increase of our imports from your country raises, of necessity, the problem of creating favourable grounds so that Romanian exports to the American market would also increase to a corresponding extent, thus ensuring ... [an equalization of the] balance of payments. I know and appreciate the efforts made by you, Mr. President, in this direction and also as regards the granting of the ‘most favoured nation clause’ to my country. I would be glad if these efforts would lead, within the shortest possible time, to the desired results.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 761, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Romania Ceausescu Corres).
to meet with the Vice President during his stay in Washington and pleased that he could talk with a number of high officials of our Government.

It is my hope and expectation that United States-Romanian relations will continue to expand—in the economic field—and in other areas as well. In this spirit I made the determination last November that Export-Import Bank facilities be made available for trade with Romania and—as we announced during Vice President Manescu’s visit—that Overseas Private Investment Corporation programs be made available for private United States investment in joint ventures in Romania and Yugoslavia.

It is also my desire that the United States Congress grant discretionary power enabling me to authorize negotiation of a commercial treaty with Romania including the power to extend Most Favored Nation tariff treatment. My views on this important matter were communicated to the Congress on December 14, 1971,3 and we have been doing everything possible to further this objective since that time. I earnestly hope that the Congress will pass such legislation in the near future.

The United States will continue to pursue actively the goal of expanded relations with Romania. We believe the achievement of this goal is in the best interests not only of our two countries but also of peace and understanding in the entire international community. I want to assure you of my personal interest in seeing that this goal is achieved.

Mrs. Nixon joins me in sending warm personal regards to you and to Mrs. Ceausescu.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

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3 See footnote 3, Document 208.
212. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

Ceausescu's Doubts about the Summit

Ambassador Meeker, when he delivered to Ceausescu the President’s letter about the Summit, had to listen (cable at Tab A) to the Romanian President’s “doubts” about the Moscow communiqué and US-Soviet basic principles. Ceausescu’s comments included:

— the SALT agreements did not take account of third state interests and offered no Soviet or US commitment not to use nuclear weapons;

—a resultant danger was that some third countries, for example India, would seek to acquire nuclear weapons and other cheap mass destruction weapons, such as lasers;

—the Moscow communiqué’s language about US and Soviet respect for each other’s interests implies a joint purpose to establish an “equilibrium” between the two powers. But such an equilibrium would be “fragile” and could be upset by third countries.

Ceausescu thought that international relations should be based on norms applicable to all countries and on international institutions with general participation. At the end of his discussion with our Ambassador, after asking that the President be thanked for his message,
Ceausescu did express the hope that the Summit would turn out to be a positive influence.

Ceausescu’s remarks reflect the Romanian unease, which will not be easily dispelled, that the Soviets may interpret some parts of the Moscow documents as a license to put more pressure on countries within their sphere of influence. The President’s trip to Warsaw\(^5\) demonstrated our opposition to any condominium concepts, and Secretary Rogers’ visit to Romania this week\(^6\) will also be helpful in that regard, perhaps easing some of Ceausescu’s worries.\(^7\)

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\(^5\) May 31–June 1. See Documents 163–166.
\(^6\) July 5–6. See Document 213.
\(^7\) Kissinger wrote a note at the top of the page: “Have we seen Rogers’ discussion?”

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213. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon\(^1\)

Belgrade, July 7, 1972, 1755Z.

Secto 198/3307. For the President from the Secretary. My visit to Romania reaffirmed the wisdom of your decision to visit there in 1969\(^2\) and to have Ceausescu come to Washington in 1970.\(^3\) The welcome of the President and the Foreign Minister was most warm and cordial and they seized upon this first visit by an American Secretary of State to further US-Romanian relations. We advanced that relationship by signing for the first time in 191 years a consular convention with Bucharest.\(^4\) We also took steps to ease entry requirements, to permit greater travel freedom to Romanian diplomats in the U.S., and to speed consideration of loans by the EX–IM Bank.

Both the Foreign Minister and the President stressed in strong terms their wish for action by the administration on MFN for Romania.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 953, VIP Visits, Secretary of State’s Visit to Mid-East and European Countries. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
\(^2\) See Documents 178, 183, and 184.
\(^3\) See Document 199.
\(^4\) For text of the convention, see 24 UST 1317.
They understand our difficulties but urged that receipt of MFN is essential to the further improvement of our relations.\(^5\)

I saw President Ceausescu for almost four hours. The first two with a small group of advisers present were spent on Vietnam.\(^6\) I will want to talk to you about this conversation when I return because I believe it may have considerable significance.\(^7\)

I then met privately with the President where I reviewed your Moscow trip and other matters.\(^8\)

The President and his government attach great importance to their relations with us and were appreciative that you took fully into account in Moscow their interest in maintaining equal sovereign power regardless of their social system or Pact membership.

Rogers

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\(^5\) Telegram 4011 from Rome, July 12, contained a memorandum of Rogers’s conversation with Manescu on July 6, in which the two discussed MFN in some detail. The telegram reads in part: “The Secretary . . . provided a detailed exposition of the status of MFN legislation for Romania, referring to his recent discussion of the matter with Ambassador Bogdan in Washington. As a consequence of that meeting, the Secretary had talked with Chairman Mills who thought the prospects were ‘dim’ in the period before the elections. . . . He explained that because of strong protectionist sentiment in an election year, riders of a protectionist nature would be attached making passage doubtful or the President’s veto necessary. The Secretary expressed his confidence that passage could be secured after the elections. . . . Manescu said that the Secretary’s presentation and the practical problems arising from our balance of payments difficulties and the closeness to elections were understood.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S)

\(^6\) Telegram 133193 to Bucharest, July 22, contains a memorandum of Rogers’s July 6 conversation with Ceausescu on Vietnam. (Ibid.)

\(^7\) Nixon, accompanied by Kissinger, met with Rogers on the morning of July 15. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

\(^8\) Telegram 2666 from Bucharest, July 31, contained an account of Rogers’s July 6 discussion with Ceausescu provided by Romanian interpreter Sergiu Celac. The telegram reads in part: “Secretary explained bilateral agreements reached in Moscow, and emphasized that they did not prejudice rights of other countries not represented at Moscow talks. He alluded to statement of basic principles and said that declarations included here should help promote U.S. and Romanian interest in equal rights for all states, respect for sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs. Ceausescu said he had read Moscow documents with care; he saw that U.S. and USSR had given each other certain undertakings in nuclear weapons field, but for middle and smaller powers there was no commitment by great powers not to use nuclear weapons against them. Secretary replied that perhaps something to take care of this concern could be worked into a declaration on use or threat of force to be considered at CSCE.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 703, Country Files—Europe, Romania, Vol. IV Jan 1972—)
214. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State¹

Bucharest, July 13, 1972, 0925Z.

2482. Subject: GOR Request for USG Assistance. Ref: State 098387.²

1. On evening July 10, I called on Manea Manescu in his Council of State office to convey Department’s reply to GOR’s three “packages” of requests for assistance.³ Making points enumerated in referenced instruction, I said USG had increased CCC line of credit by 40 million dollars to total of 61 million with 36-month repayment, but that sales of agricultural commodities with longer-term credit and with repayment in other than dollars was not authorized for Romania under existing legislation. I said that some interest has been expressed within Department of Agriculture in legislation that would authorize PL–480-type sales to Romania. However, it seemed not within realm of possibility that such legislation could be adopted this year, particularly in view of forthcoming US elections.

2. I told Manescu there was no existing legislative basis for government-to-government loan to Romania, and that any transaction of this nature would require action by Congress; it seemed to me that this would present many problems, and in any event could not be considered this year. In this connection I pointed out that EXIM Bank’s authorized and pending credits for transactions with Romania are in neighborhood of 100 million dollars, and also that US has made Romania—alone among CEMA countries—eligible for OPIC programs.

3. Regarding package three, USG–GOR cooperation in African economic development, I said I understood that President Ceausescu raised this possibility during his private conversation with Secretary on July 6.⁴ Pointing out that US economic activity abroad involves mainly US private corporations, I again urged Manescu to provide a list of specific projects or areas of special interest to permit Department of Commerce to bring them to attention of US private firms interested in such trade and investment opportunities. I went on to say that

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² Dated July 2; it instructed the Embassy to inform the Romanian Government that it was not eligible for PL–480 sales. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, INCO WHEAT 17 ROM-US)
³ In telegram 1396 from Bucharest, April 28, Meeker reported that Manescu had presented an “appeal” for assistance in three areas. (Ibid.)
⁴ See footnote 8, Document 213.
whereas present legislation would not permit USG–GOR joint financing of aid activities, it might be possible to participate in multi-donor projects in Africa in which GOR was a participant. Referring to Secretary’s conversation with President Ceausescu on July 6, I said that, if relations should be re-established between US and Sudan in near future, a US aid program might be resumed in that country and, if so, there might be possibility of some procurement from Romania in connection with such a program.

4. Manescu thanked me for presentation and said he would inform GOR leadership fully. He said he had hoped that I would be giving him a “more positive answer,” but did not dwell on this disappointment. Instead, he said he understood fully difficulties of obtaining new legislation, particularly during election period, and said he hoped proposals could be re-examined after elections.

5. Manescu indicated that GOR gave highest priority to securing of long-term, low-interest government credits (second package) by stating this was of “great importance.” He expressed appreciation for increase in CCC credits extended to Romania, but indicated that need for these was no longer pressing (“we will study our needs”). (Comment: Manescu did not refer to current agricultural situation, but we think in view of greatly improved weather conditions since mid-April that earlier pessimistic crop forecasts no longer appear warranted.) Finally, Manescu said GOR was currently working on a study of possible economic projects in Africa (specialists are now in field studying possibilities first-hand). When this study is completed, GOR will be in a better position to identify specific areas of possible cooperation with US—either on multi-donor government aid project or in joint ventures with US firms. Manescu also expressed interest in possibility of supplying goods and services for use in aid programs.

6. At conclusion of meeting, Manescu referred to Secretary’s recent visit and continuing development of good relations between our two countries. However, he urged that both sides strengthen their efforts to do more to promote economic relations. He said that development of economic relations and trade is key to further development of relations in all other areas. He therefore hoped that 1973 would bring MFN and related disinvocation of Article XXXV of GATT.5

7. Comment: Although Manescu has been principally in Mangalia over past few weeks, undoubtedly deeply involved in preparations for national party conference, he has also visited Bucharest periodically and presumably could have arranged to see me earlier to receive...
reply to requests for USG assistance. He attended Independence Day reception and was present at Ceausescu’s lunch for Secretary. Thus it would appear that Manescu preferred to postpone meeting until after Secretary’s visit, being no doubt already aware of probable tenor of our replies to his three “packages.”

Meeker

215. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Letter from President Ceausescu

President Ceausescu has written you expressing his “entire satisfaction” about the state of US-Romanian relations. He cites recent improvements, such as the US-Romanian Consular Convention, our extension of EX–IM credit, and increased exchanges of persons. He thanks you for your personal interest in relations with Romania. (Tab A)

Citing his talks with Secretary Rogers in Bucharest July 6, Ceausescu reiterates that he recognizes the “positive significance” of the agreements which you made in Moscow but says that they should be part of a “general trend” toward “new and fair” relations among all states based on “generally shared” principles of international law. He adds that he is thus particularly satisfied with your view, which is expressed in your letter of June 28 (Tab B) and lifted verbatim by Ceausescu in his response, that “. . . nations have equal rights, including the right to develop their own internal and external policies, and that all nations have important contributions to make to world peace.”

2 Nixon wrote “good” above “entire satisfaction.”
3 The letter is attached but not printed.
4 See Document 213.
5 See footnote 2, Document 212.
With this passage in his letter, President Ceausescu is in effect saying to you: “The ultimate test of the success of your Moscow Summit is whether the Soviets now leave us alone.”

Other, minor, points in the letter:

—Ceausescu believes that conditions are favorable to a quick settlement of Vietnam in the Paris negotiations;
—he feels it very important to make new efforts in the Middle East;
—he wants the establishment of a “lasting system” of security and cooperation in Europe and a CSCE to that end, which will be a “landmark.”

He looks forward to US-Romanian cooperation on a CSCE—an evident reference to plans for informal discussions this fall between our foreign ministries on the conference.

There is no need for any action on your part at this time. 6

6 Nixon wrote at the bottom of the second page: “K: Should reply to his letter—expressing ‘positive’ reaction to extent possible and warm personal comments re constructive role he has played in bringing about better East-West relations.” On September 20 Kissinger forwarded such a draft letter to Nixon. The President signed the letter, dated September 21. A note attached to the signed letter reads: “Letter delivered to Romanian Embassy. No copy of original to go to State.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 761, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Romania Ceausescu Corres.)
Yugoslavia

216. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Holding Yugoslav Hands in Connection with President’s Stop in Bucharest

In view of past correspondence and conversations, I think we need to say something to the Yugoslavs before the President’s Romanian trip\(^2\) is publicly announced. Tito will undoubtedly feel let down.

I would suggest that you call in the Yugoslav Ambassador (or, if you have schedule problems, I could talk to the DCM, whom I know well) on the day the President’s plans are to be announced to say the following:

—the President is visiting several countries after the Apollo splashdown, but his schedule is extremely tight;
—in response to a long-standing invitation he will be making a brief stop in Romania;
—the President gave thought to the possibility of visiting Yugoslavia on this occasion;
—he has always wanted to do so but had also wanted to be able to spend several days so that he could really acquaint himself with the country and its people;
—because of his extremely tight schedule he therefore did not on this occasion explore the possibility of a visit to Yugoslavia;
—the President still very much wants to make such a visit and hopes this will be possible under circumstances when he is under less time pressure.

In the event you wish to run this approach past the President (which I personally would not think necessary), there is attached a memorandum for your signature at Tab A.\(^3\)

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2 The trip was announced on June 28; see Documents 183 and 184.

3 Attached but not printed.
Recommendation

1. That you (or I) approach the Yugoslavs shortly before the announcement of the President’s trip to make the points set forth above.

   Approve\(^4\)
   Disapprove

Joan set up appointment with Yugoslav Ambassador Sonnenfeldt handle with DCM. Yes\(^5\)  No

2. That, if you first want to check with the President, you sign the attached memorandum.\(^6\)

\(^4\) Kissinger initialed this option.
\(^5\) Kissinger initialed this option.
\(^6\) Kissinger did not sign the attached memorandum. In telegram 1919 from Belgrade, July 4, the Embassy reported that Yugoslav senior officials “thoroughly endorsed” the President’s trip and its objectives. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 YUGO)

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217. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Secretary Rogers’ Meeting with Tito

The Secretary met with President Tito in Addis Ababa\(^2\) and discussed the Middle East situation and several other subjects. He has sent you a brief account which is attached.\(^3\) He was impressed with Tito’s vigor, humor and friendliness. After the Secretary expressed your

\(^2\) Rogers was in Ethiopia for meetings with Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie and his government. He addressed a meeting of the Organization of African Unity on February 12. Tito also addressed this meeting.
\(^3\) Attached but not printed.
active interest in visiting Yugoslavia and the problem of fixing a date, Tito said his invitation was open and was now renewed.

On the Middle East Tito stressed he had told Nasser since 1967 that the Arabs should recognize Israel’s right to live and send ships through the Canal. Though Tito finds the Israelis more at fault currently, the Secretary feels Tito is exerting a beneficial influence on Nasser.

Tito was somewhat critical at the slowness of U.S. firms in responding to projects for joint industrial ventures in Yugoslavia. 4

We have recently had reports of tension in Yugoslav-Soviet relations but Tito said that his relations with Moscow were now satisfactory. He continues to favor a European security conference, but agrees that it should be held only if it produces results.

4 The President underlined this sentence and added a handwritten note: “K—I am very much in favor of exploiting this in Yugoslavia fully. If it works there it might be the device by which we can work with Rumania & other E. European countries—Can we get a report from Stans & Kearns on this?—Get some steam behind it.” In a March 3 memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Commerce and the President of the Export-Import Bank, Kissinger noted the President’s “great interest” in encouraging private investment in Yugoslavia and requested a report on this issue. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 733, Country Files—Europe, Yugoslavia, Vol. I through Jul 70)

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218. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State1

Belgrade, March 13, 1970, 1540Z.


1. Yugoslav Chief of Staff Colonel General Bubanj, accompanied by Lt. Colonel General Bulovic (Ass Chief of Staff for Intelligence), and an aide came to dinner at residence March 8.

2. Occasion was social; wives were present; invitation prompted by my desire to know Bubanj better and to probe for ways of improving currently distant relations Yugoslav military maintain with US.

3. I found Bubanj tough-minded, shrewd, blunt. He has been twice Air Forces C/S, and since January Armed Forces C/S; looks like retired all-pro tackle; water colors as hobby; limited English. Bulovic silky, intellectual, oblique; very current on published literature US military doctrine and organization; fluent English (MilAtt Washington 1948–52).

4. During long after dinner conversation on service connections, Bubanj put direct question to me: What would US do in case of Soviet attack on Yugoslavia?

5. In reply I said prior question seemed to me: What would Yugoslav armed forces do? Would reaction in any way be conditioned by fact that over last decade Yugoslav armed forces had had much closer relations with Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries and had looked to them for most of their external training and advance equipment purchases?

6. Bubanj said mission of Yugoslav armed forces was to defend against attack from any direction; they would carry it out. Yugoslavia had always wanted to diversify its arms sources, as form of deterrent and to avoid over-dependence. But high costs, stiff terms in West and availability of clearing account mechanism in East had dictated sourcing. Yugoslavia now making intensive effort to diversify. Had already contacted Sweden, Italy, Switzerland, France, Britain. But if it had to fight, Yugoslavia would use all its resources, whatever their origin.

7. I then said that I thought direct attack on Yugoslavia least probable contingency. Intimidating or internal divisive action more likely, and presumably Yugoslav armed forces had contingency plans for that (Bubanj nodded agreement). But should situation be such that direct intervention possible, attitude of US would no doubt be as stated in NATO communiqué of November 1968.2 Added that, as Secretary Rogers had recently told Tito, US would not enter into any agreement with Soviets that would affect our friends.3

8. Bubanj expressed appreciation. Reverted to hope I had expressed for closer and warmer relations military our two countries, but feared that, in view mistrust and past local misunderstandings, this would take time to develop. Said he would like to have further discussion whole range of issues and that he also believed senior US and Yugoslav military should work toward informal, more frequent contacts. I agreed.

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2 For text, see Department of State Bulletin, December 6, 1968, pp. 595–597.
3 Reference is to the Rogers–Tito meeting at Addis Ababa; see Document 217.
9. Comments: Bubanj took initiative both in suggesting date to accept invitation extended some time ago and in turning conversation to fundamentals. His timing followed the Secretary’s Addis conversation with Tito (on which he said he had been well briefed), Ribicic talks in London on alternative procurement sourcing, and new strains below Soviet-Yugoslav surface.

10. I believe Bubanj operating under political guidance. I think he sees his military task as deterrence, and I have no doubt that he would fight if deterrence fails. In view present role of Yugoslav military in this decentralizing country and their potential role in succession period—psychology of which has now clearly set in—I gave him encouragement I could within existing policy framework. We have since heard from Yugoslav side that Bubanj was “satisfied that beginning was good,” that tone was frank, and that ice had been broken.

11. These would also be my views. I have thought about our conversation during succeeding three day Bosnian visit, and may have recommendations to make as contact develops. Meanwhile, Bubanj says he would like to talk again. I think best leave next move to him.

Leonhart

219. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Encouragement of U.S. Investment in Yugoslavia

You asked for a report on U.S. industrial investment in Yugoslavia, indicating that the U.S. Government should work harder to encourage it, particularly since this might be a device by which we could work with Romania and other East European countries.

The Secretaries of State and Commerce have submitted a joint report on the situation and prospects (Tab A), focusing on what the U.S. Government can do to increase U.S. private investment. Henry Kearns

has forwarded a separate report on the role of the Export-Import Bank (Tab B).

In July 1967, Yugoslavia passed legislation permitting minority holdings by foreign investors, with some restrictions on repatriation. Though the Yugoslavs have stressed their interest in foreign investment to Western officials and businessmen, the response has so far been small.

Only two arrangements with American firms have been concluded so far, totaling less than $2 million. However, four U.S. banks are participating in the International Investment Corporation of Yugoslavia, a joint effort by forty financial institutions under the aegis of the International Finance Corporation, the World Bank affiliate which promotes private investment. And U.S. firms—including Kaiser Aluminum, Ashland Oil, National Distillers and possibly Ford, Pan Am and U.S. Steel—are negotiating on new projects totaling perhaps $100 million of U.S. investment.

The reasons for the relatively slight investment success so far are:

—Lack of business confidence in such a new experiment.
—Yugoslav vagueness in seeking specific ventures and administrative red tape.

The agencies have already used a number of devices to encourage investment: articles in Commerce publications, talks with businessmen, and publicity about visits by U.S. officials to Yugoslavia. Commerce and State believe that the following additional actions by the U.S. Government would also be useful:

1. The Administration should seek changes in legislation to allow the new Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to issue insurance and guarantees on private U.S. investments in Yugoslavia. (These are now prohibited by our aid legislation.)
2. The Ex-Im Bank should finance as much of an investment project as it legally can.
3. We can assist the Yugoslavs in preparing and promoting competent investment proposals.
4. We can encourage the Yugoslavs to allow U.S. investors to make wider use of U.S.-owned excess currencies (Cooley loans);7
5. We should urge the Yugoslavs to cut their red tape.

Mr. Kearns points out that Yugoslavia’s large debt service burden means that Yugoslavia needs long-term development loans and equity investments, like many other developing countries, but that Yugoslav

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7 The Cooley Amendment to P.L.–480 (P.L. 85–128, approved August 13, 1957; 71 Stat. 345) authorized the U.S. Government to provide up to 25 percent of local currency proceeds for loans through the Export-Import Bank to U.S. private firms for business development and trade expansion and for activities supporting the sale of U.S. farm products.
limitations on capital investment are not particularly encouraging to capitalists. Consequently, private investors limit their equity investment and seek a maximum in loans. But lenders, noting Yugoslavia’s large debt and its frequent efforts to reschedule, are similarly loath to extend large new commercial credits. The Ex-Im Bank, despite these hindrances, issues guarantees and insurance on private loans. However, direct Ex-Im loans present bigger problems since they come in large chunks ($10 to $90 million each). In the last few months, inquiries have been made on a total of more than $200 million of possible new Ex-Im loans.

The Bank would find it easier to lend if U.S. companies participated in management of Yugoslav enterprises, and if additional development loans were forthcoming from other organizations. It proposes to continue its current program of encouraging U.S. exports to Yugoslavia, and it recommends that the U.S. Government consider investment guarantees and insurance facilities for private equity investments in Yugoslavia.

Both reports thus point toward an Administration effort to get legislation to allow OPIC to guarantee and insure U.S. investments in Yugoslavia.

Legislation forbids issuance of OPIC and AID guarantees and insurance to any Communist country except where “such assistance is vital to the security of the U.S.” (Yugoslavia is not affected by the Cuban and North Vietnam stipulations.) However, the agencies believe that a legislative proposal should be presented as part of a package of amendments affecting OPIC, perhaps as part of the over-all revision of the aid program, rather than by itself now. Mr. Timmons concurs.

Recommendations

1. That you approve the recommendation by State, Commerce and EX–IM to seek legislative changes at an appropriate time, allowing OPIC to extend investment guarantees and insurance to Yugoslavia.

2. That Ex-Im Bank be encouraged to step up its program in Yugoslavia.

3 Reference is to Section 620 (a) and (f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The prohibition on Cuba was introduced in 1961. For text, see 75 Stat. 424. The prohibition on trade with Vietnam was written into the law in 1966. For text, see 80 Stat. 806.

4 A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “See Tab A.” The President initialed his approval of the recommendations made in the report from Secretaries Rogers and Stans, which were the same as in Kissinger’s memorandum. Kissinger informed Rogers and Stans of the President’s decision in a June 2 memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 733, Country Files—Europe, Yugoslavia, Vol. I through Jul 1970)
220. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Your Visit to Yugoslavia, September 30–October 2, 1970

During this, your first visit to Yugoslavia, lasting somewhat less than two days, you will have substantial exposure to the populace in both Belgrade and the Croat capital of Zagreb; you will have one extended meeting with Tito plus two meals and a farewell call for conversations with him; your toast, as at Bucharest last year, at the first day’s dinner is to be a quite substantial statement of our approach to world affairs. Your other public statements will be much briefer. A detailed schedule and the themes for your public statements, as well as a proposed text for your major toast, are a part of your book.

Purposes, Game Plan, Themes

Before your arrival in Belgrade, most of the emphasis in public and governmental assessments of your trip will have revolved around the visit to the Fleet and its implications for our Middle Eastern, Mediterranean and even worldwide policy. Tito, although in effect having enjoyed substantial protection and assistance from us since he broke with the Soviets in 1948–49, nevertheless has been very clear in attempting to preserve a form of diplomatic neutrality as between East and West. He has publicly dissociated himself from our Vietnam policy and has been critical of our Middle Eastern actions and policies. The Yugoslavs, by insisting on delaying by a day the announcement of your visit, attempted to detach themselves from your visit to the Fleet (even though Tito knows its value to his own security).

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 468, President’s Trip Files, Visit of Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Briefing Book Yugoslavia. Secret; Nodis.

2 For text of the President’s toast and Tito’s reply at the October 1 dinner, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 788–794.

3 A copy of the President’s briefing book is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 468, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Visit of Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Briefing Book Yugoslavia.

4 On September 29 the President visited the U.S.S. Saratoga in the Mediterranean and delivered an address to the officers and men of the Sixth Fleet. He subsequently toured NATO naval command headquarters at Naples, where he made a statement on September 30. For the texts of his statements, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 782–783, 786–787.
Tito personally, and the path he has sought to map for his country, is in many ways full of paradoxes and ambiguities. Thus, he remains firmly a Communist and (despite all his troubles with Moscow has never quite rid himself of the magnetism it still vaguely exerts on Communists of all stripes); yet he is also a fierce nationalist and, though very conscious of Soviet physical proximity, rejects Soviet hegemony in his region. He has, indeed, occasionally nurtured dreams of playing a regional leadership role himself, always raising Soviet objections. Tito has tried to preserve his Communist credentials, yet he has quite consciously relied on Western aid of all kinds. He knows very well that his defiance of Moscow has largely rested on our holding up our end of the basic power balance; yet he has preached non-alignment. He has adapted economic, political, administrative and cultural patterns and practices from the West.

In dominating Yugoslav life and policies for 25 years he has frequently sought to give his country a role quite out of proportion with its size, location and potential. In some respects, he succeeded: he successfully broke with Moscow; he managed to make himself something of a model for other Communists (though less so than he hoped and Moscow feared); for a while his non-aligned world and its conference appeared to acquire some coherence and force, but now, apart from the tarnished Nasser, he remains the lone pillar (the likes of Nehru, Sukarno, Nkrumah, etc., having disappeared) and the movement itself lacks momentum, purpose and force. (He has just returned from the Lusaka conference on the non-aligned, which caused hardly a ripple.)

Historically, one of the greatest question marks that hangs over any assessment of Tito’s accomplishments is what happens after he is gone. At 78, the time is not far off and he has taken measures to provide for an orderly succession by collectivizing the Party leadership and, most recently, announcing a similar approach to the Government. (This effort at collectivization, and playing down his own role, may not be solely related to the succession but to some vague sense on Tito’s part that the era of the single, all-powerful leader may have run its course generally. Moreover, it would not be inconsistent with his ego for him to suppose that no single individual could replace him, anyway.)

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5 The President underlined most of the previous two sentences.
6 The Non-Aligned Conference was held September 6–14. The President underlined most of the previous two sentences, beginning with “apart from the tarnished Nasser,...”
7 In telegram 2014 from Belgrade, July 4, Leonhart wrote: “Basis number of indications, I believe (a) that Tito has now made decision to retire as President of the Republic when his four-year term expires in May 1971, and (b) that he intends to retire about same time as head of the Yugoslav Communist Party.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 733, Country Files—Europe, Yugoslavia, Vol. 1 through Jul 1970)
Beyond this, there remains the question whether the diverse, vigorous and proud nationalities that make up the Federation will hold together once Tito’s magnetism and unifying role are gone. Tito’s efforts to create stable governing institutions are undoubtedly in part designed to cope with this problem of cohesion. One aspect of it is the question of whether the Soviets would seek to inject themselves into a succession struggle. (Apart from occasional jitters about possible Soviet military action, as at the time of Czechoslovakia, Tito remains very alert to any Soviet efforts to build up connections among Yugoslav political groups.)

While you will get a warm and friendly popular reception, it is unlikely to expect the dramatic and moving character of last year’s demonstration in Bucharest. The occasion will be less emotion-packed for a people that has long since enjoyed extensive contact with the outside world; nor as dramatic an act of emancipation from Soviet overlordship. Tito, himself, will receive you with dignity and quiet satisfaction that the President of the United States has come to see him. Assured of his towering eminence, he will not, as Ceausescu did last year, regard and use your presence at his side as a means of consolidating his political position at home.

Tito likes along conversations and he likes to talk a great deal himself.8 At his age and with his background he will not be reluctant to give advice or express criticism (even when, with his sense of power realities, he comprehends that if his advice led to a decline in American power and maneuverability, the security of his own country could suffer).

Ham Armstrong9 talked with Tito in the last few days and believes that you should be prepared for some harsh talk from him, particularly on Vietnam and the Middle East. I have taken account in this memorandum of the points Ham thinks Tito will make.

Your Purposes

—establish effective personal contact with Tito;
—indicate our continued interest in Yugoslavia’s progress while accepting its idiosyncratic position;10
—convey the essence of your approach to international relations, including especially, your readiness to negotiate on a basis of reciprocal recognition of interests and your readiness to be tough and, if necessary, use force in circumstances when our interests and commitments are at stake;

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8 The President underlined this sentence.
9 Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of Foreign Affairs.
10 The President underlined this phrase.
—stress your non-acceptance of the Brezhnev doctrine or other rigid “spheres-of-influence” concepts but your recognition that nations have special security concerns and interests which cannot be ignored by others;  
—convey your interest in an evolution in Eastern Europe (and the USSR) which permits a genuine normalization of East-West relations in Europe.

Points to Avoid

There are no subjects, as such, that you need to avoid in what may be fairly rambling conversations with Tito.

But Tito would be sensitive to and you should avoid
—excessive reference to his person;
—any questioning of Yugoslavia’s professed non-aligned role (even though they know, and we know, that this is in part a luxury that depends on American power);
—any references to Yugoslavia’s “leadership” in a regional, geographic sense;
—references to American aid as distinct from cooperation and joint ventures.

Subjects and Issues for Discussion

Inevitably, the Middle East will be a preoccupying issue. Tito broke with Israel after the June War; he remains friendly with Nasser;  
he probably has even less political sympathy for the Palestinian guerrillas than Moscow, though he probably has some psychological identification with and certainly regards a solution of the Palestinian refugee problem as central to a Middle East solution. He does not like US-Soviet polarization.

Depending on developments in Jordan, you may wish to make the following points:

— the fall of the King of Jordan would be disastrous for all concerned;  
— we have no desire to intervene; we have urged the Soviets to use their influence toward restraint among their clients;  

11 The President underlined this phrase. See footnote 3, Document 72.
12 Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser died on September 28. In a September 30 memorandum to the President, Kissinger analyzed the impact of Nasser’s death on Tito’s policy and the reasons for the Yugoslav President’s decision to receive Nixon rather than attend the funeral. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 733, Country Files—Europe, Yugoslavia, Vol. 1 through Jul 1970)
13 The President underlined this point.
14 The President underlined most of this point and wrote in the margin: “Nasser cooperative.”
—anything the Yugoslavs can do along these lines through their connections would be welcome;
—Israel regards its vital interests at stake in what happens in Jordan; Tito himself will have an appreciation of what nations do when they believe their survival is at issue;
—the issue of survival also dominates Israel’s policy toward the ceasefire/standstill and the whole diplomacy of the Middle East;
—we are far from giving automatic support to Israel and have had many rough passages with its leaders; 15
—we have a genuine interest in a settlement, or short of that a modus vivendi that avoids periodic war and the danger of great power confrontation;
—Soviet policy is disturbing to us both because it has not exerted sufficient influence on the Arabs on diplomatic issues and because it is so clearly designed to promote unilateral Soviet interests in the entire region of the Mediterranean.

(Note: You should give Tito ample opportunity to expound his own view on these matters.)

Southeast Asia. Tito’s public position has not been in support of us, though criticism has been restrained. Tito recognized Sihanouk because of personal friendship. But Tito understands that American humiliation in Southeast Asia in the end would hurt him too. 16

You may wish to:

—review your twin approach of Vietnamization and negotiation, citing, as you proceed, the extent to which we have adopted the suggestions of our foreign and domestic critics;
—convey to him your determination to bring the war to an honorable close both because we want stability in the region and because the domestic repercussions in the US to a defeat would be damaging, perhaps even to a country like Yugoslavia; 17
—note that, having inherited the war, you are only too conscious of the burden it represents to you domestically (though far from the only one) and to international affairs (though, again, as the Middle East shows, far from the only one). Many steps may be feasible, especially in East-West relations, when this burden is overcome but many problems are intractable in their own right and even the end of the Vietnam war will not bring the millenium.

East-West Relations. Tito advocates a European security conference and East-West “détente.” 18 Partly this stems from his long-standing advocacy of compromise and negotiations; but, as in the case of Roma-
nia, he sees some protection from Soviet pressures against himself in a climate of East-West relaxation.

You may wish to:

—give him a special opportunity to set forth his ideas;
—note your own efforts to get moving into an era of negotiations with the USSR, particularly on so fundamental an issue as strategic arms limitation;
—as regards SALT, you may wish to express cautious hope that the Soviets will arrive at a concept of sufficiency, as we have, that will make at least a limited agreement possible;
—say, as regards the European conference, that you are not opposed but are concerned that it succeed and deal with concrete issues; failure or baseless euphoria could leave us all worse off;
—note that we are considering the possibility of mutual military reductions in central Europe but that the subject is complex;
—note that we support German efforts to normalize relations with the East but hope that this will occur on solid foundations and without excessive fanfare and illusion. (Yugoslavia has had its own problem with the FRG in years past when the latter broke relations after Tito recognized Ulbricht. Nevertheless, for years Tito has let Yugoslav workers work in the FRG—and earn hard currency.)

Other Topics of Interest

You may wish to give Tito an opportunity to expound on the following subjects, on which you may also give your views:

—the evolution and prospects in the USSR and in other East European countries. (Tito has a special relationship with Ceausescu and may have either just seen him or plan to see him);
—China. He has re-established relations after years of bitter animosity, preceded, in turn, by several years of good relations;
—the Lusaka non-aligned conference (dear to his heart but not very significant);
—Africa—once an area where Tito hoped to contest Soviet influence;
—the Yugoslav road to socialism;
—bilateral relations—see Tab A.19

(Note: As an elder statesman Tito may be inclined toward a sweeping review of the world situation. Should this develop you may wish to explain the Nixon Doctrine and your three-pronged policies of strength, negotiation and partnership.)20

19 Attached but not printed.
Belgrade, October 1, 1970, 9:45–11:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Yugoslav Side:
1. Josef Broz Tito, President of the Republic
2. Mitja Ribicic, President of the Federal Executive Council
3. Toma Granfil, Member of the Federal Executive Council
4. Marko Bulc, Member of the Federal Executive Council
5. Mirko Tapavac, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
6. Bogdan Crnobrnja, Yugoslav Ambassador to Washington
7. Ante Drndic, Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
8. Miroslav Kreacic, Director of the Office of American Affairs, Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs
9. Marko Vrhunec, Counselor to the President of the Republic for Economic Questions
10. Milos Melovski, Counselor to the President of the Republic for Foreign Policy Questions
11. Lela Tambacca, Interpreter

American Side:
1. Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States
2. William Rogers, Secretary of State
3. Ambassador William Leonhart
4. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
5. Ronald Ziegler, White House Press Secretary
6. Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
7. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, National Security Council Staff
8. Robert C. Mudd, Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs
9. Alexander Akalovsky, Interpreter

On October 1, 1970 (0945–1130) President Nixon and President Tito met for substantive talks in the latter’s office at the Federal Executive Council Building. The advisors listed above remained with the Presidents throughout the talks. The main topics covered were: 1) bilateral relations; 2) the ME; 3) Black Africa; 4) Algeria; and 5) Viet-Nam. Following are the highlights of that conversation:

Bilateral Relations. President Tito began by warmly welcoming President Nixon and the members of his party. He said he had looked forward to the opportunity to exchange views with President Nixon on bilateral relations and the international situation. He noted that President Nixon and he had already had one private conversation the preceding day and would be having others later on. This morning they

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Yugoslav Desk Files: Lot 79 D 230, POL 7 NIXON VISIT. Secret. Drafted by Mudd. The meeting took place in Tito’s office in the Federal Executive Council building.

2 No record of this discussion was found.
would start with the advisors present. Time was short so perhaps they should begin. It was the custom in Yugoslavia that the guest should have the opportunity to speak first. Was this procedure agreeable to President Nixon?

The President responded appreciatively. He said that yesterday’s talks with President Tito had been very useful in that they had agreed on expediting broader economic, technical, and scientific cooperation between the US and Yugoslavia. He thought these talks had struck the proper note because they illustrated the unique role Yugoslavia had played under Tito’s leadership in bridging the gap between the two blocs as well as the continuing US interest in good economic and political relations with Yugoslavia. He did not wish to go into technical matters in the talks this morning but did wish to say that if exchanges, such as a visit to Yugoslavia by the Secretary of Agriculture, would be useful, he would be glad to see that such visits were made. The US is willing to assist the GOY on financing through the Exim Bank and other financial institutions and instructions had been issued to the USG to explore sympathetically all possible areas of US-Yugoslav cooperation. Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger would be following this up.3

The President noted that US-Yugoslav trade so far this year was about $100 million each way. However, the US was still only fourth on the list of Yugoslavia’s trading partners. The US wishes to develop patterns of trade with EE countries because of its interest in all forms of communication with Yugoslavia and other EE countries. The US believes that the more trade there is with EE countries, the less tension there will be between these countries and the US. Trade thus can make a contribution to peace. Yugoslavia has shown the US the way in which the US can have profitable trading relations with socialist states despite the difference in social systems. US trade with other EE countries is not flourishing, primarily because of the set ways of doing business in the EE countries.

The GOY, however, has demonstrated flexibility and willingness to experiment and thus has been a pioneer in East-West trade. The US would like to go forward on a more imaginative basis and is now prepared to explore further possibilities which it believes will be significant for other countries as well.

President Tito remarked that on his side there would be no obstacles to expansion of cooperation between Yugoslavia and the US in the economic, scientific, and technical fields. The Presidents agreed that

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3 An October 9 report by the President of the Export-Import Bank on efforts to follow up on these issues is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 733, Country Files—Europe, Yugoslavia, Vol. II Aug 70–Aug 71.
their advisors should develop these bilateral forms of cooperation further in separate meetings.

The Middle East. The President said the ME was very much on our minds these days. The effects of recent events (e.g., civil war in Jordan and the death of Nasser) on the US peace proposal could not yet be determined. Very much depended in the near future on the attitudes of the UAR, the USSR, Jordan, and Israel. He and President Tito had already discussed the ME to some extent, but he felt sure that Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Rogers would be interested in President Tito’s assessment of how these events were likely to affect the prospects for peace in the area. The President wished to emphasize that the US sought to develop a ME policy not detrimental to any state. The US is not for or against any state in the area. It seeks only a just and durable peace in that area of the world. All states should have the right to exist free from pressure, threats, intimidation, and intervention from whatever source. The US believes in a live and let live policy. The US has been criticized in the past for leaning one way or the other. US interests in the ME are the same as those of the GOY, although there might be differences in approaches.

President Tito replied that the death of Nasser was a great blow to prospects for a peaceful settlement in the ME. Nasser was the Arabs’ outstanding leader. He was a man who thought before he took any decisive action. Yet he was flexible in his approach and eager to avoid confrontation and escalation. No one in the UAR can fully replace him. But, Tito opined, Nasser’s collaborators were likely to continue his policy of seeking a peaceful solution to Arab problems with Israel. He agreed that further development of the ME situation depended to a large extent on the attitudes of the UAR leadership, Soviet policy and reactions in the Arab world. The main problem, Tito said, is Israel’s insistence on retaining the occupied territories as compensation. The Israelis must demonstrate a more flexible attitude; if they continued to insist on territorial aggrandizement there was no real prospect for peace. No Arab leader could give up trying to recover territory seized by Israel. This is even more true now that Nasser is gone. Nasser himself had said that if he conceded any captured territory to Israel his prestige in the Arab world would be destroyed and he would be replaced as the UAR leader. In the aftermath of his death the great

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4 Military clashes erupted in Jordan in August 1970 between Palestinian and Jordanian forces. Subsequently, a coordinated series of airline hijackings by Palestinian terrorists and the landing of these aircraft with hostages in Jordan led to an escalation of the confrontation between the government of King Hussein and Palestinian and Syrian forces. By the end of September the Jordanian Army had forced the withdrawal of Syrian forces and imposed a settlement on the Palestinians.
powers should exercise restraint in the ME in an effort to bring about a peace equitable to both sides.

Tito went on to say that some Arabs, notably in Syria, Iraq and Algeria, favor a radical solution and, together with the younger generation in the UAR, wish to settle the issue with Israel by war, a tendency that has been strengthened by the most recent events. After his meeting with the Secretary earlier this year in Ethiopia, Tito had talked with Nasser at Aswan. On that occasion Nasser had told him that Israel’s use of napalm against a factory near Cairo which had resulted in over 100 casualties had put great pressure on him to retaliate. He had resisted this pressure but it had required all his prestige in the Arab world to do so. The bombing of the schools which killed many Egyptian children had so aroused young officers in the army that they too had demanded an Arab counter blow. Nasser had been able to resist this pressure also but the GOY wonders what will happen now if the Israelis repeat such mistakes.

Tito said that the US and the USSR should not hesitate to advance a new and realistic plan for a ME solution. In the GOY view this could open new prospects for solution to a situation which now looks hopeless. Such a plan should include provisions for all of the main problems. It should aim at voluntary agreement by the parties directly concerned through the persuasive powers of both the US and the USSR. An imposed solution would not contribute to stability in the area for sooner or later it would break down. It had been a mistake not to include the Palestinian problem in the Rogers Plan. Failure to do so had resulted in the violent action we have so recently seen.

Any new approach, Tito continued, must take into account the changes that have taken place in the Palestinian movement. It has an entirely different character now than it had earlier. This is a new generation of Palestinians with its own army and military resources, a generation which having lived under conditions of terrible privation for years is prepared to die to the last man to liberate Palestine. During his visits to the ME and Africa recently Tito had met with the leaders of the various Palestinian organizations. They had told him that they had lived peacefully side by side with Jews in the same territory for years and without problems. Today’s problems, according to the Palestinians, are the direct result of Zionism. Some time ago when Goldman visited Yugoslavia, he mentioned the need for: a) resettlement of some Palestinian Arabs in the present state of Israel; b) financial compensation to others. Not all Palestinians desire to settle in Israel—perhaps no more than 50,000—but others wish to be together in a more com-

5 See Document 217.
pact territorial unit than they have today scattered as they are all over the Mediterranean basin in Libya, Syria, in Lebanon and Algeria.

Tito said that the existence of Israel as a state is not in question. Nasser himself considered Israel a political reality. By judicious use of moderate policies Israel had a better opportunity than ever to achieve its goal of Arab recognition of its existence. Instead, however, its intemperate policies militate against its interests. Not only the US, but all other countries with which Israel had diplomatic relations, would never permit Israel to be pushed into the sea. The GOY had broken diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967 but is willing to re-establish them as soon as Israel changes its attitude, renounces its territorial claims and returns to the pre-1967 boundaries. There simply is no point in insisting on territorial compensation for use of force. An international guarantee could be given to its pre-1967 borders in which case Israel would have no cause for concern about its security.

**Algeria.** The President asked President Tito for his views on the attitudes and ambitions of the present Algerian Government, adding that we do not know these people very well. What did President Tito think of Algeria’s role in world affairs? Is Algiers, for instance, interested in a larger role in the Mediterranean and, if so, how did it expect to play such a role?

Tito replied that he had enjoyed good relations with Boumedienne as he had with his predecessor Ben Bella. Algeria is most interested in its economic development. In his extensive talks with both leaders this thread had consistently run through their conversations. The Algerians wished to consolidate their economic and political systems and, as one of the larger powers in the Mediterranean, to play an active and important role in that area. No doubt there has been some friction between Algiers and Cairo. Boumedienne is a strong man but flexible within the possibilities which other Arabs allow. He does not hasten to take positions and is concerned not to lose what prestige he has. He does not favor the Soviet side. Although on occasion he may appear to have adopted rigid positions, Yugoslavs believe he knows how to adjust himself to concrete situations and that he will shift according to the requirements of the situation he faces.

**Black Africa.** The President said he would be interested in Tito’s estimate of Sino-Soviet competition in Black Africa since US knows little of state of play between these two super-powers in that area. Tito replied that it was difficult to say. It was his impression that China is presently pursuing a very shrewd and flexible policy in Africa. They were spending a lot of money but were careful to avoid offending local sensibilities. They were constructing a 1000 kilometer railroad from Tanzania to Zambia; their construction workers were living very modestly. It appeared to be PRC policy to give much in way of economic assistance and to ask little in return. The long-term implications of this
are large. Although Soviet influence is greater in the Arab world, in Black Africa it is difficult to judge who has the advantage.

The President responded that on the basis of these comments he would conclude Chinese policy more clever and sophisticated than was Soviet. Tito commented Chinese have learned lesson from their own earlier expulsions. They profit from past mistakes and recognize that Africans have had bad experiences at hands former colonial powers and hence want no more of such domination. They want to be masters of their own houses and will not tolerate interference in their internal affairs by anyone. Chinese may also have learned from Yugoslav experience. On a modest scale Yugoslavia has supplied technical assistance to number of African countries but has carefully abstained from any kind of interference in their internal affairs, and their aid people have never been expelled anywhere.

The President asked Tito what he thought Black African attitude was toward US. Do Africans consider US imperialists, or US assistance a form of neo-colonialism?

Tito answered that his impression was that Black Africa is critical of US because most of its assistance goes to Southern Africa and US seems to seek closer relations with South Africa and Portuguese colonies than with Black Africa. They want US assistance but not at expense of interference in their internal affairs. (Secretary Tepavac intervened to say many African countries expect much of US during UN Second Development Decade.) Tito continued that one shouldn’t be too impatient about results. Changing attitudes these countries is long-term process. Aid without interference will end well. Country that gives assistance not in egoistic way in long run will have greatest influence. Most of these countries are aware that economic assistance is two-way partnership. Economic development eventually means equal economic relations which promotes trade to benefit of donor nation.

Tito said it is also quite unwise to regard any political change in Black Africa as move towards socialism or communism. These countries are quite far away from communism and socialism. They wish to make revolution in a constructive sense. They will deal with ideologies and systems in their own ways, adapting them to their needs. Kaunda of Zambia thinks that “Humanism” is highest form of progress. Nyerere of Tanzania is gifted and capable man who seeks friendly relations with all countries. Kenyatta of Kenya is another African leader who believes in peaceful coexistence. Experience has shown that interference in internal affairs of these states doesn’t pay very well and

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6 The years 1971–1980 were officially proclaimed Second UN Development Decade by the General Assembly, October 24, as part of the ceremonies to honor the 25th anniversary of the United Nations. For text of the proclamation, see GA Res. 2626 (XXV).
results never last very long. They are determined to be independent, but they require financial assistance. Concept of giving one percent of national income to developing countries has caught on with some European states, and there are better prospects of developing multilateral forms of assistance. Tito noted that USSR has not yet shown any interest in these proposals.

ME Again. At this juncture the President invited the Secretary’s comments. Secretary said he first wished to express his gratitude to President Tito for his help with Nasser. After their meeting in Addis Ababa, Tito had explained to Nasser our ME proposals and told him that US was sincere in advancing them. This had had significant impact on Nasser and had been helpful. He agreed with Tito that US should continue to keep peace initiative alive. Realistically, however, prospects for immediate talks were not very good given the situation in both the UAR and Jordan. The new UAR leaders will need time to come to grips with their problems and Hussein will also require more time to consolidate his situation. US thinks its peace initiative is just as valid now as the day it was presented. The US will try to extend the standstill cease-fire for another 90 days. The Israelis have indicated their willingness to accept and US sincerely hopes that Tito will use his influence with UAR to help in extending the cease-fire.

Tito said he fully agreed. This is the only way out. Otherwise, there would be a complete deadlock and little hope of ever getting agreement between Arabs and Israelis.

The President added that Tito’s influence could be very important with the new UAR leaders. Moderate, responsible influence should be exerted on them before the radical elements get to them. Such influence could have great bearing on the final resolution of the ME conflict. Tito responded that Kardelj and the Yugoslav delegation were now in Cairo and hoped to talk with the new UAR leaders. However, the Yugoslavs do not know whether this will be possible or not. If the Kardelj group returns home without having an opportunity for serious talks, the Yugoslavs will be in touch with the new UAR leaders in written form and in other ways.

The President observed that attitude of new UAR leaders will be strongly affected by attitude of Soviets. If UAR leaders continue to move in more missile sites in violation of cease-fire agreement, this could result in Israeli decision to escalate conflict. On other hand, if Soviets discourage such action, this could have great influence.

Tito commented he thought USSR had made its position known to UAR. Soviets are opposed to violation of cease-fire by either side. Tito said Yugoslavia has information UAR does not intend to escalate conflict. Moreover, violations of cease-fire are not at all as Israelis have presented them to US. UAR says alleged new missile sites were already
there before agreement but camouflaged by sand. UAR does not deny that there are some new sites but argues that sites under dispute were already there.

Secretary Rogers responded that UAR had clearly violated agreement. We have photographs of sites which we could show them. There is absolutely no doubt about it; evidence is conclusive. This clear-cut violation of cease-fire agreement by UAR raises question of good faith not only of UAR itself but of Soviet Union. This kind of deceit creates problems for US. Both Israelis and our own people ask what is use of an agreement if before ink is dry it is deliberately violated?

Tito replied that whether missiles moved or not is not important. What is important is whether they are offensive or defensive weapons. Clearly they are defensive in nature. All armies take defensive measures during cease-fires. He had been soldier in World Wars I and II and knew that every time shooting stopped, they tried to improve their positions or move them forward inconspicuously. UAR has moved some missiles. But GOI has also been fortifying its positions. On formal point, Secretary Rogers was right but this is not main issue.

The Secretary responded that US does not care whether missiles are offensive or defensive. The main issue is faith of agreements. Under those circumstances, how can we possibly trust any agreement with UAR? What we’re concerned about is that they lied to us. They broke their word the next day. Why make agreements if people who sign them do not keep their word. Tito asked whether terms of agreement were precise. Was it specifically forbidden in cease-fire agreement to move missiles into prohibited zones? The Secretary replied that the terms were clear and precise: any new missile construction was clearly forbidden in agreement. He could show Tito photographs of at least 30 clear violations of cease-fire agreement.

The Secretary said he also wished to go back to point raised earlier by Tito, namely, that US made mistake in not including Palestine in its peace initiative and that only about 50,000 Palestinian refugees would wish return to Israel. US had included Palestinian problem in its proposal, and Israel could easily accept that number of refugees. But problem is with whom do we negotiate? There are so many different factions we cannot tell who is in charge or who are their spokesmen. Tito thought Arafat is principal leader. There are radical elements of extreme left but Yugoslavs believe Arafat is strongest.

The Secretary said that despite recent setbacks we were not discouraged; would persevere with initiative; and try to get Jarring’s mission7 activated as soon as possible.

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7 The reactivation of UN Special Representative Jarring’s mission to the Middle East at the request of the United States was announced on June 25.
The President noted one further point in cooperation which could be extremely helpful—that was hijacking problem. Perhaps GOY could help with Palestinian leaders by pointing out to them that their extremist policies are courting disaster. Secretary Tepavac interjected that Yugoslavia had already sent note to Palestinians saying their terrorist and hijacking escapades were damaging their cause before world public opinion. President Nixon suggested also US and Yugoslavia might collaborate in getting international agreement designed to provide stiff penalties for hijackers. Continuation of Palestinian hijacking operations could have most serious implications for entire world, as we had just seen in Jordan. President Tito remarked that such activities should not be permitted to continue because they were criminal acts jeopardizing the lives of innocent people. He mentioned the recent case of a plane hijacked into Dubrovnik by Algerians. Said culprits would be tried in Yugoslav courts. After trial would be turned over to Algerian authorities.

The President inquired about Yugoslav views on Soviet ME policies. Does USSR wish to fish in troubled waters or is it seriously interested in cooling down situation? That could be key to entire situation. We would appreciate Tito’s assessment of Soviet policy.

Tito said he did not think Soviets wish to fish in troubled waters. As example Soviet concern that conflict in ME might escalate, he cited Jordan, and USSR role in Syrian withdrawal and in preventing Iraqis from intervening, even after those states had publicly pledged use their troops to prevent Palestine massacre. USSR interested in peaceful solution in ME crisis. However, Soviets find it difficult to separate themselves from Arab cause because their prestige is so heavily committed.

The President emphasized US would do all in its power to deal honestly with new UAR leaders in effort to improve ME situation. We are trying to be fair and balanced in our approach. Tito’s influence could be important in cooling down radical elements or those leaning toward radical solutions. If new UAR leaders will rectify situation, all may yet be all right. If it turns in another direction, then all are in danger. But we must trust in deeds, not words. We have saying in US that pictures don’t lie. That UAR has violated cease-fire agreement by moving in more missile sites is absolutely clear. These are the facts. And we must deal with the facts. But we are not discouraged and will continue to press every opportunity for peaceful solution to problem.

Tito said his country is also devoted to objective of bringing about a more stable peace in ME. It is a confused situation but of serious concern to Yugoslavia, as Mediterranean country and too near center of

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8 On August 30 three Algerians seized the aircraft, which landed in Yugoslavia after Albanian authorities refused to grant it landing permission.
conflict for comfort. Conflict in ME cannot be confined and would surely affect this part of world.

To which the President responded “and further.”

**Viet-Nam.** President Tito asked President Nixon for his assessment of situation in Far East, particularly Viet-Nam.

The President replied that there are two fronts in Viet-Nam, one diplomatic, the other military. On diplomatic front, there has been no progress. There had been some reformulation of terms but no real change in substance. On military front, there have been very significant changes. South Viet-Nam military have finally jelled into formidable fighting force. North Vietnam forces have been substantially weakened. Infiltration in the south is down. Ability of Vietcong to assume offensive has been greatly reduced. Casualty rates are lowest in last several years. US withdrawal is assured and will continue. South Vietnam military are now in position to defend against Vietcong or North Vietnam regulars to extent latter wish to continue conflict. US would prefer to end war earlier and on diplomatic front. But US will not compromise right of South Vietnamese people to decide their own future for themselves.

Tito thought there might be a third way. In PRG of South Vietnam, communists are a minority. Democratic elements from GVN and PRG could form a joint provisional government which could work out formula which would permit Vietnamese people decide their own future. Some years ago Tito had told Harriman that a prominent South Vietnam political figure had told him that South Vietnam was interested in such a solution. However, nothing came of it. People of South Vietnam long have been struggling for their independence and prize it highly. An independent South Vietnam Government aligned with none of big powers might provide acceptable solution and act as a kind of buffer between China and other powers. His recent conversations in Lusaka with Madame Binh had led him to believe such a solution could still work. Binh had said she was interested in a peaceful settlement on basis PRG eight points. She was willing form new government with any except three people in present GVN, whose names too hard for Tito to remember. Question of unification of North and South Vietnam could wait until much later. POW problem could be taken up immediately, and withdrawal US troops phased out over longer period.

The President said the two basic Viet Cong demands—unilateral US troop withdrawal and ouster of South Vietnam leadership—were unacceptable. Tito was realist and knew you just cannot say to one side get rid of your three principal government figures and get out, and then we will undertake to talk with you about withdrawal, POWs, etc. Secretary Rogers intervened to emphasize that Madame Binh was offering to negotiate with South Vietnam Government, but on condition
that its President, Vice President and Prime Minister resign. We might just as well demand that Madame Binh get out or the North Vietnamese get out before we talk.

The President said he wished to be very direct. This had been long and difficult war for US. US had no ambitions in Viet-Nam, no intention to stay in the country or to dominate it in any way. Realities of power are that you can only negotiate what you have won on the battlefield. South Vietnam is very much part of this war and has been for a long time. It insists on a major voice in any peace settlement. It will soon be able to carry its own defense and will be in even better shape a few months further on. North Vietnam position is going to deteriorate in comparison to the increasing strength of South Vietnam. GVN will be in future much more difficult to negotiate with. We are trying to be realistic. If North Vietnamese and Viet Cong will negotiate seriously as they said they would, then we could make progress at Paris. But if they will not, our course is set. We would prefer to have war end sooner and by negotiation. But if we cannot, then we will continue to withdraw our forces and GVN will assume responsibility for its own defense as long as Hanoi wishes maintain the war. There will be absolutely no change in our policy. We will see it through to the end.

The President continued that we fully realize Yugoslav position is different. We respect its position. We have no monopoly on wisdom, knowledge, or right. Forty thousand Americans are dead in this war which has lasted over five years. We wish to devote our energies and resources to other matters. But if US were to accept unconditional surrender in Viet-Nam it would not be helpful around world. We have a limited goal in Viet-Nam—to protect its right to select its own government. If we were to fail in this or surrender, American people would not then be very interested in playing role in the world that they should. Our friends would regard our capitulation as disaster and would wonder what help US prepared to give in their time of trouble. We are not in Viet-Nam to win war but to secure peace and to assure that the principle that all small nations have a right to decide their own fate is protected. Issues involved are much bigger than just what happens in Viet-Nam itself.

Tito replied that he fully understood US position. But he was deeply convinced that Viet-Nam war cannot be settled with victory for either side. He cited Algeria where France had had half-million troops for so many years. Because De Gaulle had courage to put end to conflict he was regarded as outstanding statesman even by those who opposed French withdrawal. Yugoslavia entirely understands both difficult position of President Nixon in his efforts to gain peace in Viet-Nam and reasons why capitulation out of question. He was grateful for President's frank exposé of US policies and problems, and their implications in this difficult situation.

Meeting adjourned at 1145 hours.
MEMORANDUM FROM HELMUT SONNEFELDT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT’S DEPUTY ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (HAIG)


SUBJECT
Military Cooperation with Yugoslavia

In his back-channel message to Mr. Kissinger, Ambassador Leonhart asks whether the subject of military cooperation/contacts was discussed during the President’s visit, and if so whether the Nutter comments should be modified. Leonhart will be seeing General Dolnicar in the next few days.

Unfortunately, I am not able to be helpful. Military cooperation/contacts was not discussed within my hearing in Yugoslavia, Henry has not mentioned hearing any discussion and I have not received the memcons from Akalovski, the interpreter, (these are overdue, and I have tried unsuccessfully to reach him by phone in Berlin, to see when we will get them).

Three of the four general areas for cooperation/contacts outlined in Nutter’s response seem relatively innocuous—billeting at US military schools, GI tourists visits, and ammunition supplies. The fourth area of contacts, involving reciprocal invitations from the services, is fairly extensive—up to chief of staff level and for as long as three weeks. This is probably the best way to accomplish Dolnicar’s request for further military contacts on strategy, planning, etc., and Ribicic told the Ambassador on October 6 that in the wake of the President’s visit, bilateral cooperation can now proceed on an all-round basis, including military.

In short, I would be surprised if the Presidential conversations would have restricted the Nutter proposals, though it is just possible...
that they might have indicated that the Nutter proposals should be expanded even further.\(^3\)

Telegrams returned at Tab A.\(^4\)

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\(^3\) In an unnumbered telegram to Leonhart, October 15, the White House responded: “Military cooperation/contacts were not discussed with Yugoslavs by the President or myself. State/Defense proposals contained in Warren Nutter’s message thus have not—repeat not—been modified.” (Ibid.)

\(^4\) Attached but not printed. In addition to telegram 52 from Belgrade, Tab A also included telegram 2411 from Belgrade, September 30, reporting the Yugoslav desire for clarification of certain points of the Nutter presentation.

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223. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State\(^1\)

Belgrade, February 17, 1971, 1207Z.

474. Subject: Yugoslav Succession: Trends and Conjectures.

1. This message signals a number of guesses. I believe there is a strong possibility that Tito’s succession planning has run into serious problems. I think these will almost certainly affect the timing and very probably the design of his arrangements.

2. In sum, I expect:

   (A) The new collective Presidium will not be approved by mid-April and will be delayed well beyond the end of Tito’s fourth term May 17, 1971. Tito will remain on as sole President, perhaps until September or longer.

   (B) The new constitutional amendments intended to produce a much decentralized Federation will similarly not be enacted by mid-April. Their passage will be deferred for some months, and their substance will be much diluted.

   (C) Before the powers of the new Federation and its institutions are decided, the GOY will apply to the IMF, the US, and Western Europe for additional credits and stand-by assistance, including very possibly some re-scheduling of external debt. It could do so before the end of April when present wage and price controls expire. If it does, its requests will be substantial.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 733, Country Files—Europe, Yugoslavia, Vol. II Aug 70–Aug 71. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
3. These are largely intuitive readings. They rest on internal assessments and bits and pieces in the wind. They may well be mistaken. I have tried to test them in a series of long conversations this past week with Marko Nikezic, President of the Serbian Communist League; Marko Bulc of the FEC (Cabinet); Foreign Secretary Tepavac; and Alex Bebler, Council of the Federation. These normally responsive seniors were unusually reticent. What they did not say in our talks was perhaps more significant than what they did.

4. The probability of delay well beyond the April/May schedules seems clearest. The mechanics of delay would not be difficult. GOY might announce, for example, more time needed for public discussion and national debate before new constitutional amendments approved. During this period Tito would remain on as President, either reelected under existing rules in mid-April; or extended in office by a special amendment until new Presidium appears.

5. There are, I think, three main reasons for delay:

   (A) Political overload in this complex and cumbersome Party/government structure. The leadership has tried to deal simultaneously with (a) Presidential succession for which no precedent in post-war Yugoslavia exists; (b) Restructuring of its federal system, bound to embroil regional rivalries and ethnic animosities; (c) An uncontrolled inflationary spiral and a continuing stabilization crisis. It is obviously behind in its work, and, according to Nikezic, has not yet begun amendment drafts affecting Republic’s assemblies, customs regime, or defense responsibilities and support.

   (B) Design of the new arrangements seems far from settled. While there is general agreement that a looser Federation may be necessary for the survival of Titoism without Tito, doubts seem increasing about the control of economic policy if federal budgetary and extrabudgetary operations are too sharply diminished. There seems to me a significant drive to slow the pace and reduce the extent of dismantling federal revenue and investment authority. New impulses appear to be at work to retain federal management of major inter-republic projects and central supervision of the wide range of internal subsidies and subventions. At political levels I think a recent undercurrent of preoccupation is to be sensed about the risks that excessive decentralization will pose in reviving regional strains and providing new openings for a hostile East. The institutional reflection of these propositions is a reconsideration of the roles the new Presidium and the new Federal Executive Council (FEC). There well may not be room in the system for both as originally envisioned. My guess would be that the new FEC will emerge, much reduced, less of a Cabinet, more of a management arm of the Presidium.

   (C) Desire to explore external economic assistance before the new decentralizing decisions are taken. We have had no direct approach on
the possibility of US capital or credit assistance, and have no present basis for estimating the sums the GOY may have in mind. We understand there is pending application for a new IMF stand-by arrangement, and that Governor Persisin of the National Bank recently discussed new credit lines in the US. We hear there have been recent probes in Germany and Italy, and some quiet explorations of debt structures. The state of reserves, continuing trade imbalances and the investments required for the new five-year plan argue that the GOY will make a very thorough probe of international assistance possibilities.

6. The net of these estimates is that prospects now seem clearly to favor delay, dilution of the original proposals for a drastically decentralized Federation, and an outcome with a significant retention of central economic authority.

7. We would appreciate any information Department has confirming or correcting these conjectures.

Leonhart

224. Editorial Note

On April 29–30, 1971, Presidential Counselors Robert Finch and Donald Rumsfeld, accompanied by Ambassador William Leonhart, met with senior Yugoslav officials for discussions on a range of issues of joint concern to the United States and Yugoslavia, particularly the illegal international narcotics trade. Copies of the memoranda of these conversations are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 733, Country Files—Europe, Yugoslavia, Vol. II Aug 70–Aug 71.
225. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Financial Assistance for Yugoslavia

Secretary Rogers (Tab A)\(^2\) recommends your approval of a $61 million debt rescheduling for Yugoslavia ($59 million of PL-480 and $2 million of Development Loan Fund principle and interest). The figure represents 44% of the $140 million Yugoslavian debt to U.S. government agencies coming due in 1971 and 1972. Equal payments on the postponed amounts would be stretched out over a 10-year period beginning in 1973. A 5% interest rate would be charged during the repayment period.

Yugoslavia is currently soliciting about $600 million in Western aid, of which 80% would come from Europe and 20% or $120 million from the U.S. over the next two years. Politically, our assistance would signal to the Yugoslavs, Eastern Europeans and the Soviets the importance we place on the success of Yugoslavia’s political and economic decentralization efforts and her moves toward an essentially open market economy. Economically, it would help Yugoslavia over a severe balance of payments crisis by increasing reserves from the present dangerously low level. This would, in turn, assist her economic stabilization program and thereby allow her to continue the economic reforms on which she has embarked. The rescheduling would be done in conjunction with an IMF standby agreement and in cooperation with other creditors.

We have also offered Yugoslavia a Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) credit line increase of $20 million, a new CCC barter program of $25 million, an increase in U.S. military procurement, and an increase in Ex-Im Bank lending. With these programs, the total 1971 U.S. government financial contribution to Yugoslavia would increase by $110 million, although only the $30 million debt rescheduling for the year represents the direct assistance for its reserve problem which the Yugoslavs consider their most important requirement. We cannot do

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\(^2\) Attached but not printed.
more simply because present legislation flatly bars any AID money for Yugoslavia, and there are no other available options.

**Recommendation**

That you approve Secretary Rogers’ recommendation of a $61 million debt rescheduling for Yugoslavia. Pete Peterson and Treasury concur. Agriculture has no objection.³

³ The President initialed the approval option on May 4.

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226. **Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon**¹


**SUBJECT**

U.S./Yugoslav Economic and Technical Cooperation

The Under Secretaries Committee has forwarded its quarterly report on measures taken by this government to promote U.S./Yugoslav economic and scientific technical cooperation.² You had requested these reports as a means of galvanizing the agencies into more activity in this field.

The current report contains a number of new steps taken in the past quarter:

—As a result of a visit of the Yugoslav Finance Minister to Washington in April, you authorized rescheduling of $61 million in Yugoslav debt.³ We are encouraging other governments to take equivalent steps to meet Yugoslavia’s severe payments crisis.

—The new aid legislation submitted to Congress includes provisions allowing you to permit the new aid organizations and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to operate in Yugoslavia. Since the


² The Under Secretaries Committee’s quarterly report, May 25, is attached but not printed.

³ See Document 225.
new aid legislation is temporarily stalled in the Congress, State and
AID will seek an amendment to existing legislation authorizing OPIC
to guarantee U.S. private investments in Yugoslavia.
—The Commodity Credit Corporation has relaxed its terms for an
annual $30 million in sales and barter transactions.
—Defense is increasing its meat purchases, and arranging for tours
of service men.
—The Export-Import Bank is substantially increasing its export
credit activities for Yugoslavia.
—HEW, the National Science Foundation, and other agencies are
planning to expand their research in Yugoslavia.\(^4\)

\(^4\) At the bottom of the memorandum Nixon wrote “good.”

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**227. National Security Study Memorandum 129\(^1\)**


TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

US Policy and Post-Tito Yugoslavia

The President has directed that a study be undertaken to evaluate
possible developments in Yugoslavia following President Tito’s de-
parture. The study should include the following elements:

1. An intelligence appraisal is required of the internal and exter-
nal factors that will be of major influence on the course of events after
President Tito’s departure. This evaluation should examine how the
situation might unfold under differing assumptions of internal develop-
ments. In each case attention should be given to the intentions and
actions of the USSR, countries of Eastern and Western Europe, and
where appropriate the United States. The purpose of this appraisal

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 YUGO. Secret.
Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant to the
President for International Economic Affairs.
should be to highlight those factors which could weaken Yugoslavia’s cohesion as a unitary state, cause a significant change in its foreign policy orientation, or lead to Soviet/Warsaw Pact pressures or military intervention.

This work should be undertaken by the CIA and the intelligence community and be completed by July 29, in order to serve as the base for a subsequent study of US policy options.

2. A policy study, drawing on the above analysis, should be undertaken of the various steps—political, economic and military—the US could take in the near term to strengthen Yugoslavia’s internal and external positions and relations with Western countries. In addition, there should be a discussion of policy options that the US might have in light of various crises that might arise after the departure of President Tito. This analysis and discussion should be undertaken by an Ad Hoc Group of interested agencies, including the NSC staff and the representative of the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, and chaired by the Department of State. It should be forwarded to the Senior Review Group no later than September 17.2

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group should ensure that the terms of reference for intelligence appraisal are suitable for preparing the policy study.

Henry A. Kissinger

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2 A 2-part paper, comprising an intelligence appraisal and a policy study, was forwarded from Hillenbrand to Irwin on September 15. A copy of the intelligence appraisal is ibid.; for the policy study, see Document 230.
228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization\(^1\)

Washington, June 21, 1971, 2259Z.

110720. Subject: POLADs/Yugoslav Developments. Reference: USNATO 2590.\(^2\)

1. Following INR assessment is forwarded in response to your request and may be drawn upon, at Mission’s discretion, in POLADs discussion:

2. While Belgrade’s ties with the West are at an all time high and closer collaboration with Peking is in prospect, there has been a conspicuous lack of success in mutual Yugoslav-Soviet attempts (e.g., Gromyko’s visit to Belgrade, September 1969; and the visits to Moscow of Premier Ribicic in June 1970 and Foreign Secretary Tepavac in February 1971) to effect a genuine reconciliation since the falling out over the Czechoslovak invasion. Soviet behavior and posture, particularly recurrent belaboring of the Brezhnev Doctrine, continue to confirm the Yugoslavs in their suspicions over long-term Soviet intentions toward their country. The Yugoslavs have apparently concluded that a genuine reconciliation is out of the picture for the foreseeable future. Tito himself—unlike in similar situations heretofore—appears to have oriented himself completely westward, as reflected in a number of his get-togethers with Western European leaders. Unlike the old dream he once entertained of becoming an independent associate of the East European socialist countries with an equal say in developments in this area, he now apparently wants no part of the “socialist commonwealth” because of the implications presented by the Brezhnev Doctrine. He has not met with Brezhnev and Kosygin since April 1968 while maintaining a heavy schedule of meetings with free world leaders.

3. The Soviets for their part see nothing but hostility in Yugoslavia’s stronger westward orientation and in Belgrade’s reconciliation with Peking, despite the Yugoslavs’ protestations that improved ties with the Chinese are not aimed against Moscow and would not be at the expense of “good ties” with the USSR.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL YUGO. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by S. Asterion (INR), cleared in EUR and INR, and approved by Ralph McGuire (EUR).

\(^2\) Dated June 17; it reported on the NATO Permanent Representatives’s discussion concerning the Yugoslav-Soviet confrontation. (Ibid., NATO 3)
4. An aspect of this hostility has been the constant pressure of various sorts exerted by the Soviets against Yugoslavia. For instance, the Soviets still refuse to give the Yugoslavs formal official assurance that they are not part of the “socialist commonwealth” and thus exempt from the provisions of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Soviet Embassy in Yugoslavia maintains an oversize information-propaganda program in Yugoslavia and has stalled on a formal information agreement by which the Yugoslav Government hoped to regulate and possibly cut down its size. While Yugoslav suspicions cannot be corroborated, Belgrade is convinced that Moscow supports the Bulgarians on the Macedonian question, which to the Yugoslavs is tantamount to support of Bulgarian claims on Yugoslav territory (e.g., Socialist Republic of Macedonia and three border enclaves in Serbia).

5. More recently Belgrade has come to believe that Moscow is promoting internal Yugoslav national discord and tensions accompanying Tito’s moves to pave a more orderly succession. The most notable—although not independently provable—were the indications that, over the past year, Soviets were subsidizing the émigré Branimir Jelic, head of the exile Croat National Committee centered in West Berlin, which carried on subversive agitation for an independent Croatia. Jelic was a member of the Ustashi (Croat fascists), who publicly claiming Soviet support for an independent Croatia, has scored an extraordinary diversionary success last spring by duping the Croat Party leadership into an open dispute with the Yugoslav secret police. Croat leader Bakaric (and possibly others) evidently compromised himself by an innocent correspondence with Jelic, which the latter evidently divulged. It required Tito’s intervention at the Brioni Presidium meeting in late April to settle the question to the satisfaction of both sides. (RSEN—27 of May 10: Yugoslavia—Leadership Meeting Lessens Tensions, Produces Agreement on Future Tasks may also be drawn upon.)

6. The Soviets have also been pressuring the Yugoslavs by evidently dusting off the old Cominformist exiles—those who fled Yugoslavia after the Yugoslav Party’s expulsion from the Cominform in June 1948 and now for the most part reside in the USSR. In the polemics following the Czechoslovak invasion, the Yugoslavs again raised the danger of “neo-Cominformism,” that is, those pro-Soviet and generally conservative elements who favored jettisoning Tito’s “self-managing” socialism in favor of a return to a centralist, more authoritarian government—although these elements have never been specifically identified. Last year the Soviets apparently resurrected the old Cominformist Vlado Dapcevic, a former colonel in the Yugoslav Army, who

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3 Not found.
Yugoslavia was reported operating in Western Europe, purportedly to set up an anti-Tito regime and/or party. One press report indicated that the Soviets had him coordinating subversive activities against Tito’s regime. The latest chapter revolved around the lectures by two Cominformists in the USSR, Blazo Raspopovic and Jova Elez, which the Yugoslav Government protested in early June because of alleged “slanders” against Yugoslavia and President Tito. The protest, coupled with the ensuing polemical exchange between the Belgrade Politika and the Moscow Izvestiya, brought already cool relations to a new low.

7. Given these developments Belgrade’s ties with Moscow are likely to remain troubled for the foreseeable future. The political and ideological differences dividing them remain well-nigh intractable, and the suspicions between them have been increasing. This state of affairs with Moscow is in notable contrast to Belgrade’s efforts to move closer to the West and China. There is no reason to suppose that the independent-minded Yugoslavs will diverge from the course that they have now charted for themselves.

Rogers

229. Intelligence Information Cable

TDCS DB–315/04377–71


COUNTRY
Yugoslavia/USSR

DOI
29 April–4 July 1971

SUBJECT
Appeal by President Tito for Croatian Party Unity in Face of Danger From the USSR

SOURCE
[5½ lines not declassified]

1Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 733, Country Files—Europe, Yugoslavia, Vol. II Aug 70–Aug 71. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad. Prepared in the CIA and sent to agencies in the Intelligence Community. A notation on the cable reads: “HAKed.”
1. On 4 July 1971, President Josip Broz Tito called a meeting of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC) at Villa Zagorje in Zagreb where he delivered a strong and angry appeal for LCC unity and emphasized that the country was in real danger from the USSR. As evidence, he described a personal telephone call he had received from CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev on 29 April 1971 at Brioni, during a closed meeting of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) Executive Bureau, the Republic Executive Bureaus, and the Republic Assembly Presidents. Tito said that Brezhnev had offered Soviet “assistance” in the event of serious trouble among rival national factions in Yugoslavia, but that he had declined the Soviet offer. (Headquarters comment: See also paragraph 2 of confidential Vienna telegram, Vienna 4580, dated 27 July 1971, in which the Yugoslav Ambassador to Austria mentioned Brezhnev’s offer of assistance to Tito, an offer the Ambassador said that Tito did not accept.)

2. Tito spoke only eight minutes, but in such an angry tone that he nearly lost control. He concluded with the statement that there was a genuine threat of Soviet invasion. He gave no details about Soviet invasion plans, but he said he was “ready to become a dictator again,” if the Soviet threat persisted.

3. The story of the Brezhnev telephone call had been circulating in Croatian party circles since early May. It apparently originated with two members of the LCC Central Committee present at Brioni; when Tito was called out to take an important telephone call, the two Croatian leaders accidently overheard part of Tito’s end of the conversation. During discussion of the telephone call during May and June, some LCC officials compared Brezhnev’s “offer” to the “assistance” which the USSR had given the Czechoslovak leadership in August 1968. However, other Croatian party officials claimed that the telephone call was a hoax perpetrated by Tito to promote national cohesiveness by exaggerating the Soviet threat. The latter action infuriated Tito, and he called the 4 July meeting at least in part to squelch the claim.

4. [less than 1 line not declassified]

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2 Intelligence Information Cable TDCS DB 315/04385–71, August 3, reported that Yugoslav military intelligence had information that six Soviet divisions had been moved to Central Asia for training in connection with a possible invasion of Yugoslavia. (Ibid.)

3 It transmitted a report on Soviet-Yugoslav relations provided by the Yugoslav Embassy in Vienna. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL USSR–YUGO)
230. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 129

Washington, September 13, 1971.

[Omitted here are the Table of Contents and Section I, “Statement of US Interest in Yugoslavia.”]

II. Near-Term Measures to Strengthen Yugoslavia

A. Political

1. What We Have Done and Are Doing

The general comments which follow apply to succeeding sections, and the measures discussed of a primarily political nature should be read in the context of those covered in the economic and military sections.

The improved climate in US-Yugoslav relations after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia significantly broadened the possibilities for meaningful bilateral exchange. Visitors both ways have increased sharply, the high point being President Nixon’s September 1970 visit to Yugoslavia. President Nixon’s on-the-record indication of US understanding and respect for Yugoslavia’s non-aligned policy was highly valued by his hosts.

Consultations on both bilateral and multilateral matters have increased in frequency and frankness. Cooperation and responsiveness on our part to Yugoslav needs in the economic area (discussed below) have been the avenue for concrete expression of the developing political relationship.

Our information program in Yugoslavia, the largest by far among the European communist countries and one of the largest in the world, continues to expand with few restrictions.

2. What We Can Do—Preventive Diplomacy

A number of steps of a primarily political nature could strengthen the Yugoslav situation in the near term. They include a) a clear statement of the US interest in Yugoslavia, b) action to dampen émigré extremism which works contrary to US goals in Yugoslavia, c) steps to...
assure, through bilateral consultations, that Yugoslavia has a role in discussions on European security, d) the setting up of channels for exchange of intelligence information, e) moves to broaden the US presence in Yugoslavia, and f) the use of military-psychological moves to increase US visibility.

[Omitted here is Section 2a, “Statement of US Interest,” except for one paragraph, which reads as follows:]

First, the occasion of the visit of President Tito could provide a forum for a statement by President Nixon. This statement could make clear that we regard continued Yugoslav independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity as being important to the security interests of the United States.

[Omitted here are Section 2b, “Emigré Activities”; Section 2c, “European Security”; Section 2d on intelligence matters; and Section 2e, “US Presence in Yugoslavia.”]

f. Military-Psychological Deterrence.

Peacetime actions of our military forces could be used to increase the psychological deterrent to Soviet intervention. To this end, the US could exploit opportunities for (1) expanded personal contact through an increase in exchanges and visits by military personnel and enlargement of the military student exchange program; (2) ship visits at Adriatic ports; (3) vacationing in Yugoslavia by American servicemen; and (4) participation by US military delegations in Yugoslav sponsored international events. The recent participation by the USAREUR Band in Sarajevo ceremonies marking the 30th anniversary of the uprising against Nazi Germany is an example of this policy. In the event of another earthquake disaster of the magnitude of Skopje, Debar or Banja Luka, should an assistance program be undertaken the US could be prepared to airlift relief supplies and airdrop relief packages to rural areas—assuming GOY concurrence.

[Omitted here is the remainder of Section 2f.]

II. Near-Term Measures to Strengthen Yugoslavia

B. Economic

1. What we have done and are doing

In response to the political and social challenges of modernization, the Yugoslavs are embarking on an extensive program to restructure their political system and decentralize an already unique, hybrid system of market socialism. In order not to risk upsetting the political ap-

3 Regarding Tito’s visit, see Document 232.
the Yugoslav Government has been cautious about imposing strict controls on imports and dampening inflation. A current account deficit of over $300 million is expected this year; inflation is currently running at 12–13% annually. We are ready to sign an agreement rescheduling $58 million in PL–480 and AID debts falling due this year and next; other Western major trading partners of Yugoslavia are following our lead. The IMF has authorized a standby to ease hard currency payment difficulties. We, other major creditors and the IMF have insisted on a tough stabilization policy. We will continue to press the Yugoslavs to take effective belt-tightening measures to overcome their international payments deficits.

Despite these measures, it is possible that Yugoslavia may need further such aid from its Western trading partners in about two years. We will continue to urge Yugoslavia’s major trading partners—primarily West Germany, Italy, the UK and France—to be forthcoming in helping Yugoslavia over its current balance of payments difficulties. We also plan to urge them to act jointly with us and the Yugoslavs in assessing and meeting future Yugoslav requests for assistance.

The success of President Tito’s federal solution will depend in large measure on a stable economy.

In most respects, Yugoslavia enjoys the status of a Western nation. It is not affected by most of the problems which impede the improvement of our economic relations with other Communist countries. Yugoslavia receives MFN and Exim services. It is treated as a Western nation for export control purposes. It belongs to the IMF, the World Bank, and the International Finance Corporation. The IBRD has approximately $248 million outstanding in development loans in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is a member of GATT and has special status at OECD.

Since President Nixon’s trip to Yugoslavia in September 1970, the US Government has had Yugoslav-American economic, scientific and technical relations under continuing review. The President has already approved important steps to widen and deepen these relations.4

Among them were recommendations: (a) to publicly and privately underscore our policy of desiring to expand economic, scientific and technical contacts with Yugoslavia; (b) to give high priority to trade missions, exhibits and an increased commercial presence in Yugoslavia,

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to give assistance where possible to the Yugoslav tourist industry, and to seek cooperative arrangements in the fields of marketing and management; (c) to seek language in legislative proposals on the establishment of the International Development Corporation and the International Development Institute that would not mandatorily exclude Yugoslavia; and (d) to continue efforts to expand military procurement in Yugoslavia on the basis of partial payment in US-owned dinars.

2. What we can do

We wish to continue our efforts to encourage Yugoslavia’s increasing economic ties with the West and support its internal progress towards a more open economic system.

The consequences for the West of not assisting Yugoslavia in its efforts to establish a decentralized form of market socialism could be profound. Yugoslavia sets an example for the political and economic reform movements in other Eastern European countries. Failure of its market-socialist, “middle-of-the-road” approach might mean a reversion in the direction of the command economy of the 1950’s. Soviet influence would be strengthened. Divisive strains between the richer and poorer sections of the country would be accentuated. Limited Western help now makes the need of a massive effort later less likely. The following steps could be taken to intensify and expand our influence on the economic situation in Yugoslavia. These steps would remove hindrances to the President’s ability to act if the situation warrants.

a. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). The Yugoslavs attach a high priority to attracting foreign investment. Accordingly, they have recently liberalized their foreign investment laws. For our part, legislation is currently before Congress to permit OPIC investment guarantees to US firms operating in these countries. Section 620(f) prevents OPIC from extending risk coverage for investment projects in Yugoslavia. A memorandum discussing US investments, the legislative restraints on them, and ways of overcoming them was sent to the President last year.5 If OPIC operations in Yugoslavia are approved, political risk insurance on equity investments and assistance in financing projects would be made available to US investors. Direct US investments in Yugoslavia could rise dramatically from their present level of $159,000.

In the absence of a Presidential determination to remove Section 620(f) restrictions placed on assistance to Yugoslavia, the President may wish to inform Congress of the importance of favorable action on OPIC legislation during the current session.

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5 Memorandum for the President from the Secretaries of State and Commerce, Measures to Promote Investment in Yugoslavia, April 2, 1970. [Footnote in the original.]
c. Scientific and Technical Cooperation.

Largely due to our excess currency availabilities, we have had for the past decade an extensive, varied and successful program of scientific and technical cooperation with Yugoslavia. USDA has sponsored over 100 research projects in Yugoslavia and both countries are pleased with the results. US Government agencies have requested approximately $22.5 million dinar equivalent in their FY 1972 budgets for a wide variety of research projects. As with the Cooley-type loans proposal above, we are currently prevented by Section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) from using the much larger fund of dinars available from Development Loan Fund (DLF) and Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) sources for these purposes.

f. Export-Import Bank Activities.

Exim’s present exposure in Yugoslavia stands at $166 million, most of it longer-term ($140 million). Outstanding and pending commitments, should they result in firm transactions, raise this figure to about $300 million. Authorization of long-term loans in FY 1971 was more than three times the combined figure for FY 1969 and 1970. Major long-term loans and guarantees authorized during FY 1971 were for aircraft (DC–9’s), a petrochemical plant, and oil field equipment. Exim expects the current high level of its activity to be maintained, contingent on Yugoslavia’s debt-servicing capabilities. The President may wish to continue to endorse Export-Import Bank support of US exports for sound transactions with Yugoslavia to the fullest extent possible.

g. PL–480 Title I Assistance.

Yugoslavia is virtually self-sufficient in agriculture except during poor harvests or periods of extreme economic distress. At such times, the possibility of buying foodstuffs from the United States on Title I terms would enable limited convertible currency resources to be used for economic development purposes. If it were available in 1971, Title I assistance would have been a major candidate for the US stabilization assistance program.

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Yugoslavia is currently barred from PL–480 Title I transactions because ships registered under its flag trade with Cuba (Section 103(d)(3)—the Findley–Belcher Amendment). Amending Findley–Belcher would provide the President with discretionary authority to make PL–480 concessional sales. Yugoslavia could also become eligible for Title I PL–480 sales in the event it a) stopped trading with Cuba or b) made a bilateral commitment to us they would stop trading with Cuba. Both are unlikely to take place in the near future because of Yugoslav sensitivity about its non-aligned status. There are no legislative restrictions on the President’s authority to make Title II (Disaster Relief) PL–480 supplies available to Yugoslavia in case of need. Title II shipments were made to Romania in the wake of disastrous floods there in 1970.

If our ability to provide the kinds of assistance barred by these legislative provisions becomes critical in terms of our attaining US policy objectives, consideration should be given to ways in which Yugoslavia might be exempted from the restrictions.

h. CCC Export Credit Sales.

CCC programs have partially replaced concessional sales previously made under PL–480. The level of sales varies from year to year depending on weather conditions and harvest results. Sales so far in 1971 exceed $35 million, up from $7.2 million in 1969 and $4.3 million in 1970. USDA expects future CCC sales to Yugoslavia to average about $25 million annually. The current CCC line of $35 million was increased to $55 million in July of this year to accommodate further potential sales in the remaining months of 1971. Yugoslavia benefits from the most liberal credit terms currently afforded any country under the CCC program. All payments have been made promptly and the program is working well. The President may wish to support continuation of the CCC Export Credit Sales Program in Yugoslavia at favorable credit terms and support Yugoslavia’s inclusion among the beneficiaries of any future liberalization of the CCC program.

i. Expanded Commercial Program.

Yugoslavia now represents a sizeable and expanding market for US products. United States trade with Yugoslavia has increased substantially in the past two years. 1970 US exports to Yugoslavia totalled $160 million; up 73% from 1969. US exports to Yugoslavia for the first six months of 1971 are running almost 100% ahead of figures for the first six months of 1970. To exploit this opportunity fully, we should expand our commercial program. An expanded program would include more frequent US trade and investment missions, increased presence in Yugoslav trade exhibits and fairs, a larger number of business development offices at Yugoslav trade shows and conferences, and an increase in the commercial staff at our Embassy in Belgrade and Consulate General in Zagreb.
We plan to strengthen our efforts to help the Yugoslavs expand their commercial activities in the United States. The Yugoslavs feel a psychological as well as an economic need to expand their commercial ties with the US and other Western countries. The President may wish to direct the Commerce Department to draw up plans to increase the level of our support for American commercial and investment endeavors in Yugoslavia.

II. Near-Term Measures to Strengthen Yugoslavia

C. Military

The United States has no purely military objectives in Yugoslavia. Our evolving and increasing military contacts are intended to strengthen Yugoslav independence and non-alignment.

Yugoslav independence is in our interest as well as that of the Yugoslavs. If controlled or used by Moscow, Yugoslav territory could be used to mount a threat to NATO. Political realignment of Belgrade with Moscow would be a major psychological setback with potentially serious strategic overtones.

We have indicated to the Yugoslavs that, in support of our national goals, we are prepared within limits to expand and increase military contacts, sales and activities between our countries. Since the Yugoslavs are best placed to evaluate their own circumstances, they should select the pace at which we move in this cooperative area.

1. What We Have Done and Are Doing

Current US military efforts in support of Yugoslavia emphasize expanded personal contact between the military officers of the two countries, e.g.:

a. The US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth now trains two Yugoslav military officers annually. The USAF Command and Staff College has agreed to accept one Yugoslav Air Force officer for the class convening in June 1972.

b. Under the Foreign Area Student (FAS) Program, one US Army officer accompanied by his family has arrived in Yugoslavia for a year’s study.

c. An exchange of visits by military officers of the two countries began on September 6, 1971, with the arrival of a Yugoslav Army major general and four field grade officers. A US Army delegation will then visit Yugoslavia. Reciprocal visits by other high ranking military officers in all services are envisaged.

d. The Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, visited Yugoslavia in 1970. A three-member service delegation attended and participated in the Yugoslavian observance of the 25th World War II victory celebration. The Under Secretary of the Navy and other high ranking military officers have subsequently visited Yugoslavia.
e. Periodic Sixth Fleet visits to Yugoslav ports promote military liaison and cooperation and provide an opportunity for mutual knowledge and understanding.7

f. A modicum of logistic support is currently provided.

g. The US Army purchases Yugoslav items for sale in European commissaries.

2. What We Can Do

In present circumstances, or in conditions following the departure of Tito in which the country remains stable and maintains its non-aligned policy, we judge it to be in the US interest to continue our program of military cooperation with Yugoslavia and to explore avenues for its possible expansion as mutual interests may dictate. However, we must at the beginning set the limits of our cooperation and clearly impress these limits on the Yugoslavs. They must be under no illusions that our actions imply any commitments beyond those agreed upon.

Any cooperation involving NATO would, of course, be undertaken only after full consultation and agreement within the Alliance.

Yugoslav interest in establishing a relationship in the military field with the Italian government was indicated in a proposal last spring for cooperation in joint defense planning, with the clear implication that the force to be defended against would be Soviet. More recently, however, they appear to have dropped the idea of a formal arrangement in favor of cooperation in military training and exchange of information. In any event, these approaches to Italy indicate a possible Yugoslav interest in a defense relationship with NATO, if only indirect.8

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7 A sentence reading “An average of four ship visits are conducted annually” was struck out.

8 Telegram 148201 to Rome, August 13, reported: “Ortona on instructions spoke with Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand August 12 to report Yugoslav approaches to Italy for ‘some sort of military cooperation.’ Ortona said that over past several months, Yugoslavs on several occasions have sounded out Italian Ambassador to Yugoslavia Trabulza.... These approaches were by Yugoslav Defense Minister. Concurrently in Rome, Yugoslav military attaché and a visiting staff officer raised subject with Italian military. Defense Minister proposed general cooperation on technical level, exchange of information, and contacts between the general staffs. Military attaché apparently went further, talking about use by Yugoslavs of Italian air bases and reciprocal use by Italian army of certain Yugoslav facilities. Apparently military attaché suggested this arrangement might be organized in secret military agreement which would become operative if the situation warranted.... When Ortona pressed Hillenbrand for reaction to information provided, Hillenbrand said middle course between rejection and formal treaty seemed to him a reasonable position for the Italians, but added that we would consider this information and might have further views at a later time.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–185, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 129)
Thus, it seems clear that the Yugoslavs are seeking assurance of some military support by the US and/or NATO which would permit them to reduce their present dependence on the Soviets in military procurement. The Soviet Union might view such military support to Yugoslavia strictly in the terms in which it is given, or it might interpret this as implying an even greater commitment. Either interpretation could act as a deterrent to overt Soviet military threat against Yugoslavia, or it could elicit over-reaction by the USSR.

Taking the foregoing into account and in an effort to define the extent of our military cooperation with Yugoslavia, the following options are available:

— The Department of Defense could continue and intensify the present program of broadening contacts with the Yugoslav military, with stress on exchanges which will provide the maximum opportunity for our senior officers to establish personal contacts with senior members of the Yugoslav military. These measures might include (a) increasing the number of Yugoslav trainees in training courses in the US, (b) increasing the number of military personnel studying in Yugoslavia, and (c) intensifying the program of exchange of visits by military officers of the two countries.

— In the area of logistics, the Department of Defense could undertake, in consultation with the Intelligence Community, a study of how logistic support might be expanded with the Yugoslav armed forces, including informal discussions with the Yugoslav military authorities regarding their needs, after Yugoslav approval has been obtained through normal diplomatic channels.

— The US could encourage continued study by NATO of the general situation in the Balkans, including possible measures of military cooperation with Yugoslavia. The ultimate objective would be to arrive at guidelines defining the extent and kind of cooperation which it might be desirable to undertake.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Washington, September 13, 1971.

SUBJECT
Conversation—Dr. Kissinger and Yugoslav Ambassador Crnобрнja, Friday, September 10

Crнобрнja began the conversation by informing Dr. Kissinger that he would be leaving Washington for good. Looking back over his five years, Crнобрнja said that he felt much had been accomplished in US-Yugoslav relations. Dr. Kissinger said he was sorry to see the Ambassador go and that he felt our relations were exceptionally good. Following a discussion of the Ambassador’s as yet undecided future plans, Crнобрнja noted that he would be leaving before the Tito visit. He denied that there was any connection between his departure and the departure of the American Ambassador from Belgrade and stressed that, in his own case, a successor had already been designated (Granfil). Later in the conversation, Crнобрнja asked whether the US would also nominate a new Ambassador before the Tito visit. Dr. Kissinger said he had just made a positive recommendation on this matter and that the Yugoslavs could be assured that Ambassador Leonhart’s replacement would be a top professional. Dr. Kissinger said he would see to it that the nomination would be speeded up.

Crнобрнja then turned to his main point, the problem of extremist émigré activities in the US. He said these activities would not stop the improvement of US-Yugoslav relations but progress would be faster if the irritant were removed. Dr. Kissinger agreed. Crнобрнja continued that the Yugoslav émigrés were more aggressive than those of the other Socialist countries, and he urged Dr. Kissinger to reappraise US policy with respect to them. Dr. Kissinger asked what we could do. Crнобрнja said we should make a public statement that the activities of the émigrés were contrary to the national interest. In response to Dr. Kissinger’s question, Crнобрнja described some of the activities of Yugoslav émigré groups. He handed Dr. Kissinger a note on the matter (see attachment at Tab A). Dr. Kissinger asked what the occasion for a statement might be. Crнобрнja said the fact that he had handed over a note. Dr. Kissinger said he would see what he could do before the Tito visit to find an occasion for a statement. Crнобрнja stressed how

sensitive Tito was on this whole subject. For example, because of a bad
day in New York when he was here to visit President Kennedy,
Tito had made clear he would not again go to New York City.³

There then ensued a brief discussion about the possibility of Tito
spending a night at Camp David. Dr. Kissinger said he would see what
could be done. He pointed out that only a few visiting heads of state or
government had been invited to Camp David but, of course, the Presi-
dent had exceptionally high regard for President Tito and regarded his
visit as an exceptional event. Crnobrnja said the Yugoslavs were not mak-
ing a formal request and recognized the exceptional honor involved.

Reverting to the previous subject, Crnobrnja said Tito was well
aware that Ceausescu had experienced no embarrassment while visiting
the United States. Dr. Kissinger commented that Romanians seemed to
be less heroic than Yugoslavs. Crnobrnja laughingly agreed. Dr.
Kissinger then said the problem should be separated into two parts:
one, what we do before the Tito visit to avoid incidents and, two, the
more general problem of émigré activities. He went on to say that we
would do our best to prevent demonstrations, including a public state-
ment to discourage them. He would talk to the Attorney General and
would give the Ambassador or his successor a precise description of
what might happen. In any case, we would do what we could to pre-
vent anything from happening. The Ambassador could be absolutely
sure that we would use our influence if we have any. In this connec-
tion, the Yugoslavs should not make the mistake of believing that if no
demonstrations occur, it proves that the Administration runs the
groups involved. Crnobrnja said he understood, and then asked about
a more lasting US policy to curb the émigré groups. Following an in-
terruption by a phone call, Dr. Kissinger said that in regard to the Am-
bassador’s last point, he would also talk to the Attorney General.

Dr. Kissinger then asked about the forthcoming Brezhnev visit to
Yugoslavia⁴ and whether any threats were involved. Crnobrnja said
that threats were not involved, that the visit was intended to be friendly
and private and had been pending for a long time. The Yugoslavs had
originally suggested an official visit but the Soviets said they preferred
it to be semi-official—whatever the distinction may be. In any event,
there would be talks and probably a joint statement; in other words, it
would be a working visit at least in part regardless of what it was
called. In response to Dr. Kissinger’s question about Brezhnev’s objec-
tive, Crnobrnja said that it was to secure Soviet influence in the Balkans

³ Tito and Kennedy met on October 17, 1963. For a memorandum of their conver-
sation, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece;
Turkey, Document 162. Tito then proceeded to New York where he faced hostile demon-
strations while attending the UN General Assembly.

⁴ September 22–25.
or at least to prevent it from decreasing. Dr. Kissinger asked why Brezhnev would go to Yugoslavia for this purpose. Crnobrnja speculated that it was because of Yugoslavia’s opening to China and its improved relations with the US, as well as the Romanians and Albanians. Crnobrnja went on that on the basis of his own involvement in previous Yugoslav-Soviet meetings, he would expect the discussions to deal principally with bilateral relations although the Soviets would seek to place the entire onus for improvement on the Yugoslavs. (Dr. Kissinger commented that this was standard Soviet practice.) Crnobrnja went on that the Soviets would probably demonstrate interest in better relations on specific issues, particularly economic ones. Basic differences would remain, e.g., in regard to Yugoslavia’s independent position. Tito would insist on reaffirming the 1955 and 1956 declarations. The Yugoslavs would never change their fundamental position. Dr. Kissinger interjected that we were quite sure of this. After noting that in the past Brezhnev had refused to go to Yugoslavia because of its position concerning the Czechoslovak events, Crnobrnja said that apart from bilateral relations the Yugoslavs would exchange assessments with Brezhnev on such matters as China and Europe.

Dr. Kissinger then turned the conversation to the forthcoming Tito visit. Crnobrnja said that Brezhnev’s prior visit to Yugoslavia would be one of the topics on the Yugoslav side. Dr. Kissinger welcomed this and said that he assumed that our China policy would be of interest to Tito. Crnobrnja said that he would be giving us a list of topics of interest to Tito ahead of time. Dr. Kissinger noted that the President considered Tito one of the few real statesmen in the world today, a man of vision. He had had one of his best talks with Tito last year. The President would always value Tito’s assessment on such questions as China, the Soviet Union and Europe. Dr. Kissinger agreed with Crnobrnja that the Middle East, in which Tito is personally interested, would also figure in the talks. There would be two meetings as well as an opportunity for talks during the State Dinner which the President would tender. Dr. Kissinger said he would tell the Ambassador specifically what the President would be interested in talking about. He then asked the Ambassador to let him know how Tito wishes to arrange the private meeting with the President. Dr. Kissinger could come into the meeting after the picture taking and Tito could have an adviser as well if this was agreeable. Crnobrnja said he would check.

Crnobrnja then noted that the Yugoslav-Italian frontier question remained unsettled. In the past the US role had been fairly objective

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as demonstrated by the fact that neither the Yugoslavs or the Italians were entirely happy with the situation. US policy had been very wise. Noting that he was not speaking from instructions, Crnobrnja said it would help if, in an appropriate way, the US could assist with the problem. The territory involved was very small. The attitude in Yugoslavia was that if the Germans and the Poles can get treaties settling their frontiers, why should not the Yugoslavs also. All that was required was a small legal touch. In response to Dr. Kissinger’s question, Crnobrnja said he felt that the Italian Government was quite capable of taking action at this time. Crnobrnja went on that the matter would not be raised at the Presidential level; he merely wanted to call it to our attention. Dr. Kissinger said he would look into it. Crnobrnja continued that it was important to clear it up because people in Yugoslavia otherwise would say that problems can only get solved if one is a member of the Warsaw Pact. Dr. Kissinger asked whether the Yugoslavs wanted us to raise the issue with the Italians without the Yugoslavs having raised it officially with us. Crnobrnja said he would check this out in Belgrade.

Crnobrnja than complained about the fact that Congressman Derwinski of Chicago continued to refer to Serbs and Croats as “Captive Nations” and asked whether we could not do something to have this stopped. Dr. Kissinger said he would try.

Crnobrnja, in conclusion, asked whether he could see the President before returning to Yugoslavia. Dr. Kissinger said he would do what he could. The President would be away for a few days later this month, but he thought it perhaps 98% sure that a meeting with the President could be arranged.6

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6 The President’s Daily Diary does not indicate a subsequent meeting between the President and Crnobrnja. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)
232. Memorandum for the President’s File

Washington, October 28, 1971, 11:30 a.m.–12:45 p.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting between President Nixon and President Tito

PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. Alexander Akalovsky, Department of State
Yugoslavia
President Tito
Mr. Vidoje Zarkovic, President of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Montenegro, and Member of the Presidium of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Miss Lijana Tambaca, Interpreter

President Tito opened the conversation by noting that there had been a number of developments since his last meeting with the President. The President commented that at that meeting President Tito and he had discussed some aspects of those developments, for example, China and the need for an even-handed policy towards the USSR and China. President Tito said that he would tell the President about Brezhnev’s visit to Yugoslavia. He also observed that, while attending the Iranian celebration at Persepolis, he had had a chance to talk to a number of heads of state, including Yahya Khan of Pakistan, and that he had visited Cairo.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK MemCons, The President and President Tito. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. A notation on the memorandum, which was drafted on November 1, reads “unsanitized.” The White House prepared two versions of the records of the conversations with Tito. According to an undated memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, attached to the source text, the “sanitized” version would be provided to the State Department and “relevant NSC staff members” on a “close hold basis.” The unsanitized version was sent to the President’s File. Kissinger approved distribution of the sanitized version to the Yugoslav Embassy. (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, November 16; ibid., Box 944, VIP Visits, Yugoslavia–Visit of Pres. Tito) Tito visited Washington October 28–30.

2 See Document 221.

3 The celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of the Persian monarchy, October 12–18.
Referring to Yahya Khan, the President said he thought he was a good man, with good motives. President Tito agreed but thought that Yahya Khan was a somewhat nervous man. The President said that the problem in Pakistan was a very difficult one and that the situation between India and Pakistan could be compared to that in the Middle East. President Tito noted that everyone in Persepolis had regarded the India-Pakistan situation as very serious and that there had been general concern there about the possibility of an outbreak of war. Therefore, everyone had sought to impress upon Yahya Khan the need for preventing such a development. Yahya Khan himself had said that he did not want war, especially since he knew that militarily Pakistan was much weaker than India, but he had also pointed out that Pakistan would defend itself if attacked. Yahya Khan had accused India of interfering in Pakistan’s internal affairs, especially in East Pakistan, and also of threatening Pakistan. The President asked if President Tito’s meeting with Mrs. Gandhi had been before or after his meeting with Yahya Khan. Tito replied that it had been after and that it had been very useful for him to have this opportunity of discussing the situation with both of them. He said he had told Yahya Khan that, in his view, the East Pakistani problem was internal and not one between India and Pakistan. He said he believed that the problem was primarily an economic one, and that he was basing this view on what he had seen and heard while visiting East Pakistan two and one half years ago. At that time, he had been told by East Pakistanis that they were dissatisfied with the economic policy of West Pakistan; for example, the jute produced in East Pakistan was shipped to West Pakistan for the benefit of the latter’s economy. Widespread dissatisfaction also existed because, as in all of Pakistan, the military were in power, and some of the military governors from West Pakistan were very rough. President Tito said he had told Yahya Khan that he should look for a different solution to the problem. Yahya Khan had responded that he had tried to do everything possible and he had even allowed elections in East Pakistan. Those elections, of course, had been won by Mujib Rahman, and Yahya Khan had thought that Rahman should form his government and then seek a solution within the framework of Pakistan. Rahman, on the other hand, had wanted autonomy. Rahman was now under arrest but, according to Yahya Khan, East Pakistani refugees had been amnestied. Also according to Yahya Khan, the number of refugees was two million but the fact was that there were nine million

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4 General Yahya Khan assumed power on March 31, 1969, as martial law administrator and subsequently assumed the office of President of Pakistan. His efforts to control secessionist sentiment in East Pakistan set the stage for the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. Following Pakistan’s defeat, President Yahya Khan was forced from office on December 20.
refugees in India. The discrepancy between these figures was due to
the fact that Yahya Khan did not count non-Muslim refugees. The
refugee situation continued to be very serious, with 40,000 of them
coming to India every day and the Indians having difficulty in pro-
viding food and care for them. While Yahya Khan maintained that the
Indians did not allow the refugees to return, Mrs. Gandhi stated the
contrary, pointing out that India was overpopulated as it was. Fur-
thermore, while Yahya Khan said that amnesty had been granted, the
Indians said that five million refugees had fled after the amnesty. All
this demonstrated the complexity of this problem. President Tito also
noted that while Yahya Khan maintained that India did not wish to ac-
cept international control, the Indians claimed that Yahya Khan wanted
international control only on the Indian side of the border.

President Tito continued that he had told Yahya Khan that a con-
lict should be avoided; there were too many conflicts in the world al-
ready, although some of them were on the way to solution. As regards
amnesty, President Tito said he had pointed out to Yahya Khan that
the first returnees had been killed, but that Yahya Khan had maintained
that this was an Indian lie. President Tito noted that while he had not
wished to tell Yahya Khan what to do, he had pointed out to him that
Yugoslavia had had an even more difficult problem because of its multi-
national composition and the disparity in the economic development
of the various regions, but that it had managed to solve it. Yahya Khan
had listened carefully to these remarks, and one should hope that they
had an effect on him. As regards the Indians, President Tito said they
had been nervous and tense. He had tried to influence them against
war, pointing out that even a military victory would be a serious po-
litical loss for India. Mrs. Gandhi had said that she was against war
but that there was a pro-war faction that was putting pressure on her.
She was greatly interested in obtaining international assistance, in-
cluding from the UN, that would enable India to take care of the
refugees. As things stood now, India would be able to provide for the
refugees only until the end of the year, and there also was the fact that
troops were massing on both sides of the border. President Tito said
that in those talks he had thought of the President and the U.S. gen-
erally, and that he believed that the U.S. involvement in this problem
should be increased. To illustrate the Indian difficulties, he observed
that while the Indians had laid irrigation pipes in order to improve
their crops, these pipes were now being used as shelter by the refugees
and were thus out of commission. President Tito then noted that he
had also discussed the Pakistan situation with Podgorny, and that the
latter was also convinced that everything should be done to prevent
war. In sum, this was a very neuralgic area of the world and, while he
had told neither side what it should be doing, he had told both of them
what he would do to solve the problem.
The President said it was very helpful that President Tito had had discussions with both sides. He pointed out that the impression that the Indians were all right and the Pakistanis were wrong was inaccurate, just as it was not true that the Pakistanis were all right and the Indians all wrong. The problem really went beyond that of the refugees, and it involved other matters that could never be settled. He also believed that every effort should be made to avoid war, especially since a war would not be limited to India and Pakistan. In his view, China, being so close to Pakistan, could not stand by if Pakistan were to be losing the war, as it probably would. At the same time, the Soviets, with their great influence in India, had also a big stake in this situation. As regards the United States, the President pointed out that we had done twice or even three times as much as anybody else to help the refugees. He was not complaining about this and believed that we should do everything we could. In fact, he had asked Congress for $250 million to assist the refugees. He also believed that it would be useful if the UN came in, perhaps to supervise the distribution of food. In general, he thought that two things could be done, things which President Tito was already doing. First, we should do everything we can for the refugees. Unfortunately, a number of other countries, including some in Europe, were more talking than actually doing. Second, we should use our influence to prevent war. If a war were to break out it would be won by India, but it would also spread.

President Tito interjected that from his discussions with Brezhnev he had deduced that the Soviets also did not want a war. The President commented that, without going into Dr. Kissinger’s talks with the Chinese, he believed that Dr. Kissinger would agree that the Chinese would not stand by because the Pakistanis would be on the losing end. Dr. Kissinger said that he supported this view. President Tito said it would be useful if both the Soviets and the United States were to tell the two sides that they would not be assisted in any military conflict. The President pointed out that the temper in the United States today was such that it would make clear to both sides that we would provide humanitarian help but if they went to war they should simply forget it. In this connection, he observed that the United States had some influence in India too. The U.S. had a $1 billion aid program in India but this would be jeopardized if war were to break out.

President Tito said that in his talks with both Mrs. Gandhi and Brezhnev he had inquired about the Soviet-Indian treaty, in particular whether that treaty was a military pact. Both of them had said that it was only a treaty of friendship and cooperation. Since Mrs. Gandhi was coming to Washington next week, she would probably say the

5 Apparent reference to their August 2 Treaty of Amity.
same to the President personally. President Tito continued that, in
response to a question, Mrs. Gandhi had stated that the treaty was con-
sistent with non-alignment because it was not a military pact. He had
told her that if the treaty was indeed not a military pact, it was all right.
However, he wished to stress again to the President that there was a
strong pro-war faction in India, although not within the government
itself.

Turning to Brezhnev’s visit to Yugoslavia, President Tito noted that
there had been a great deal of speculation about Soviet intentions and
threats as regards Yugoslavia. He had talked with Brezhnev alone and
also with the two delegations present. He wished to point out that the
draft declaration Brezhnev had brought with him—and the Yugoslavs
had had no draft of their own—it had already clearly reaffirmed Yu-
goslav independence and sovereignty and stated that the 1955 princi-
iples\textsuperscript{6} remained valid. The final text as it emerged from the talks made
clear that the USSR and Yugoslavia were dealing with each other as
two sovereign states and that Yugoslavia had the right to develop its
own social system.

The President inquired if this applied only to Yugoslavia or went
beyond it. He noted in this connection that there had been press re-
ports suggesting that the Brezhnev doctrine had been changed. Presi-
dent Tito replied that the other Eastern European countries were mem-
ers of the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, he believed that the Soviets
were changing their policies. Brezhnev’s personal position was now
much stronger, and he was now less restricted by the collective. Brezh-
nev had said specifically that the Soviets wanted best possible relations
with the United States. He had also said that whether the Soviet Union
wanted it or not, the U.S. and the USSR were the main partners in the
world who could assure peace. Brezhnev had known that he, President
Tito, was going to the United States, and therefore had repeated this
several times. While earlier the Soviets would not have been at all
happy about his going to the United States, now not only had they
raised no objection but Brezhnev had also asked that the Soviet desire
for good relations with the U.S. be conveyed to the President. This was
also a sign of change in the Soviet policy. Noting that Brezhnev was
now in Paris,\textsuperscript{7} President Tito said that, in his view, the whole situation
and constellation was changing, and that the President had contributed
a great deal to this development with his initiatives concerning China,
the USSR, etc.

\textsuperscript{6} For text of the June 2, 1955, declaration, see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives,

\textsuperscript{7} October 25–30. Brezhnev held meetings with French President Pompidou and
other French officials.
The President inquired if, in President Tito’s view, the Soviets were interested in good relations with the United States for pragmatic reasons. In other words, did they believe that the two superpowers have no choice but to talk and try to agree where they can, or, where agreement is not possible, at least to talk. President Tito replied in the affirmative, adding that the Soviets were also greatly interested in reducing arms expenditures and other commitments so as to be able to develop their economy. In general, his impression from his talks with Brezhnev was very good. This was not the first time he had met with Brezhnev, but never before had Brezhnev talked so openly as during this last meeting. Recalling Soviet maneuvers in Eastern Europe, President Tito said that he had told Brezhnev that the Yugoslavs were not afraid of them. He had said to him that since there were troops there they had to have exercises, but he had also pointed out that Yugoslavia would also conduct maneuvers, something it had not done for a long time. Yugoslav maneuvers had been very successful, especially because they had tested for the first time the new Yugoslav doctrine of combined operations by both regular troops and territorial defense units. To avoid any misunderstanding, the maneuvers had been conducted along a vertical line across the country so that no one could say they were against the East or the West.

The President asked about the Soviet reaction to Yugoslav relations with China. President Tito replied that when Yugoslavia had first exchanged ambassadors with Peking, the Soviets had not liked it because they had believed that it was directed against them. However, Yugoslavia had told the Soviets that it wished good relations with everyone and that its relations with China were not aimed against anyone. The President commented that the same applied to the United States. While some believed that the forthcoming visit to Peking was a move against Moscow and that the planned trip to Moscow was a move against Peking, this was not so. As a Pacific power, the United States had to regard its relations with China as a very important factor. As an Atlantic power, we were interested in our relations with the Soviet Union. At the same time, it was obvious that the Soviets and the Chinese had differences between themselves and we should therefore be careful. The President said that both in his conversations with Gromyko in preparation for his trip to Moscow, and in Dr. Kissinger’s discussions with the Chinese about the visit to Peking, it had been made clear to the parties that while we wanted good relations with them we did not want any condominium. In this connection, the President said

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8 Regarding the U.S. response to the August Soviet maneuvers, see Document 206.
9 On April 16, 1970, Yugoslavia named a new Ambassador after a 12-year hiatus in its representation at Beijing.
he wanted to stress that U.S. relations with the Soviet Union would not be developed at the expense of any smaller nation. As President Tito had said in one of his recent speeches, smaller nations were fully entitled to independence and sovereignty. The United States also deeply believed in this, so that in the discussions in Peking and Moscow we would cover bilateral subjects, arms control and other matters, but not at the expense of any nation. President Tito observed that in his conversations with Brezhnev, not one word had been said about China, with neither Brezhnev nor himself raising this issue.

Turning to his recent visit to Cairo, President Tito said that it had been very brief. Sadat had just been to Moscow, and he could tell the President that Sadat continued to support the search for a political solution. As regards the Suez Canal, Sadat accepted the proposal for the reopening of the Canal after the Israelis withdraw 60 kilometers from the Canal. Concerning Sadat’s recent statement that the UAR must now use other means to achieve its objectives, Sadat had said that this statement had been misinterpreted in the international press. He would therefore make another statement after the end of the year. That statement would also say that the UAR would have to search for other means but, although Sadat had not specified those means, it was quite clear that he did not mean war. President Tito also observed that, according to Sadat, the US had failed to respond to some of his messages, although he had not identified them. Personally, President Tito said, he believed the United States should continue its efforts in the Middle East, but that the dialogue should involve not only the US and the UAR but also the USSR. Asked by the President if he had discussed the Middle East with Brezhnev, President Tito replied that he had and that the Soviets also did not want a resumption of hostilities. Referring to accusations that the Soviets wanted to stay permanently in the Middle East, Brezhnev had stated that the Soviets had too many expenses anyway and that they would withdraw all their experts and advisers as soon as a settlement was reached. President Tito said that this further strengthened his impression that the Soviets were seeking a relationship of greater trust with the United States.

The President commented that the Middle East situation had not changed since President Tito and he had discussed it last year. He agreed that the Soviet role in the Middle East could be constructive. As regards the US, we were continuing our efforts, including to main-

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10 Apparent reference to Tito’s comments made as a toast at a reception honoring Brezhnev during his September 22–25 Yugoslav visit.
11 October 11–13.
12 Extracts from Sadat’s July 26 speech are in Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1971–1972, p. 25031.
tain the truce. The Middle East situation was even more serious than that between Pakistan and India, since it involved the great powers in a more immediate way. However, he would be less than candid if he did not add that while our objectives were the same, namely to maintain peace in the area and to seek a temporary solution concerning Suez as a step towards a settlement, there was some very rough sledding ahead. What was required was more than talking; some major decisions on the part of the two governments and those beyond them were needed. The US would do everything to maintain the momentum and continue the dialogue with Sadat. The President said that he wanted to be completely frank: while he did not regard the situation as hopeless it was clearly very difficult.

President Tito said he had been told by Brezhnev that the first step would be to reopen the Canal after the Israelis withdrew so many kilometers. Then, following Israeli withdrawal to the June 5 borders, a four-power guarantee of Israel’s borders should be given. That guarantee would not involve stationing any foreign troops but would have to be so strong that no one would dare even to spit across the border. Asked by the President if this meant that no Soviet troops would remain in the UAR, President Tito said that it did and that the Soviets would withdraw everything. He also pointed out that he was not trying to be a mediator but was merely conveying what he had heard. The President said this was very useful and that he fully understood Yugoslav interest in the Middle Eastern situation since Yugoslavia was a Mediterranean power. President Tito commented that Yugoslavia was interested in the Middle East not only from the standpoint of preserving peace but also economically. While his meeting in Cairo had been very short, it was clear that Egypt was not interested in a military solution, although the Egyptian leaders did not know what their people would say if no solution was reached by the end of the year.

The President asked about Sadat as a man. President Tito said that Sadat was somehow faster and more dynamic than Nasser. The latter, however, had been more reflective and perhaps also more profound. Sadat had risen to the situation, but he was also under considerable pressure. Asked by the President if Sadat could lead his people, Tito replied that he could and that his popularity was increasing. However, no one knew how long this would last if nothing changed; Nasser could have withstood pressures longer. President Tito said he agreed that the Middle East situation was one of the more delicate problems. The two main international problems he had been discussing lately were the India-Pakistan situation and the Middle East. Yugoslavia had always had good relations with Pakistan but he had had to be very frank with Yahya Khan. The same, of course, applied to India. He had told the Indians that East Pakistan was an internal problem India should not
interfere in, but that the Pakistanis needed assistance and encouragement in searching for a solution. Yahya Khan had said that he would have new elections, but those elections would be under Army control and obviously Yahya Khan could not find leaders in East Pakistan who would be pro-West Pakistan. The worst thing that could happen would be a death sentence for Rahman because that would provoke civil war. Dr. Kissinger interjected that the Pakistanis had promised that this would not happen.

Noting that President Tito had to go to lunch, the President said that as regards bilateral matters, he had instructed Secretary Rogers and Mr. Peterson to be as forthcoming as possible on questions President Tito and he had discussed last year. The same applied to questions concerning military cooperation. If after these meetings President Tito were to hear from his associates that there were still some difficulties, he should be free to raise them with the President personally during the next meeting on October 30. As regards other international questions, the President said he would talk with President Tito on October 30th, or perhaps during dinner tonight, about Vietnam—a problem he knew President Tito was interested in. He would also discuss SALT, which indirectly involved all European countries, including Yugoslavia, and the situation in Europe, in particular European security.

The meeting ended at 12:45 p.m.

Note: Early in the conversation, the President said that he wanted to assure that the conversation be completely open and that, therefore, a copy of our record of the conversation would be provided to the Yugoslav side. The record would be only for the two Presidents and, as far as we were concerned, would not receive further distribution.

13 No record of their dinner conversation was found.

233. Editorial Note

Secretary of State William Rogers called President Richard Nixon at 10:36 a.m. on October 29, 1971, to recount a conversation he had had with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac during a reception the previous evening. Relevant portions of a transcript prepared from a tape recording of the conversation read:

Rogers: “You should know this in case you talk to Tito again.
Nixon: “Yeah.
Rogers: “Yesterday, in my meeting with the Foreign Minister, I again pressed him on whether they were encouraged or not as a result of the Brezhnev visit and he indicated yes and he indicated President Tito was satisfied, as he had done in New York.

Nixon: “Yeah.

Rogers: “And so forth. Last night when we were up in your gold room, he took me aside.


Rogers: “Yeah, he took me aside, spoke in English.

Nixon: “Uh huh.

Rogers: “He doesn’t speak English very well, but he didn’t want the interpreter there. And he said: ‘I want you to know, for your own ears, and your ears only, the meeting with Brezhnev did not go well.’


Rogers: “And then I said to him to say it again and he said: ‘The meeting with Brezhnev did not go well.’ He said: ‘You should know that.’ And he said: ‘You’re the only one I have told it to.’ And, I said, ‘Well, of course, I want to tell President Nixon.’ He said, ‘Yes, President Tito told me to tell you so you could tell President Nixon.’

Nixon: “Isn’t it interesting that Tito, of course, he’s a little gingerly, but he did not indicate that much. He said it did not go well?

Rogers: “That’s right.


Rogers: “Now the reason that I’m sure that he did it that way, was so that he could say that he, Tito, had never told you, had never told anybody that.

Nixon: “Exactly. Shows you how scared they are. Well, let me tell you an interesting side light to that. After the dinner last night, I had the, I had him, I went over and talked to him.

Rogers: “Uh huh.

Nixon: “Now the interpreter, you know, the very distinguished—


Nixon: “—man—

Rogers: “The white-haired fellow.

Nixon: “The white-haired guy who was in Yugoslavia—was with him in Yugoslavia. So, I think he was trying to do double talk. But the message came through very, very clear. He said, he said, he said: ‘You know, I know I only have a few moments.’ And, actually I spent all the time in the coffee hour with him, except for about the last 3 or 4 minutes when I met a few of those outsiders. He said a few moments. But he said: ‘I want to tell you that we in Yugoslavia may face some very great problems.’ He said that ‘President Tito is a very old man and when
he dies, when he goes, I mean when he retires, then we may be confronted with the attempts of some of our neighbors to capitalize on that.'

   Rogers: "Uh huh.

Nixon: "He said, he said: 'What I would strongly hope is that as far as U.S. policy,' and he was referring to my toast about independence and [unclear], 'as far as U.S. policy is that, that ah, that we, you would be aware of this and, and, and could use all your influence.'

And I said, ‘Well, let me say just one thing. First, you can be sure that we will never threaten your independence and so forth.'

   Rogers: "Uh huh.

Nixon: "‘And, second, that we will use our influence to see that others have,’ or I put it this way: he used the word ‘hands off’ Yugoslavia. I said that ‘you can be sure that our hands will always be off Yugoslavia and we will use our influence to see that others keep their hands off.’

   Rogers: "Uh huh.

Nixon: "He said: ‘You get the message.’ ”

After a brief discussion of the physical characteristics of the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, the President continued:

Nixon: "I’m telling you he didn’t speak in English to me.

   Rogers: "Oh, I see.

Nixon: "So the interpreter was there, so he probably wasn’t as frank with me.

   Rogers: "I see, yes, yes.

Nixon: "But I could tell that what he was trying to tell me and now I see the picture. What he was trying to tell me was, probably, it fits in with what you had said, that they fear the Russians.

   Rogers: "That’s right. Well, very much so. He said to me after my meeting in which I said that we would be happy to cooperate in the military way with them as we have been this year, on an accelerated basis as long as it wasn’t disruptive, as far as they were concerned, and as long as consistent with our policy. He said afterwards when I met with Tito at lunch. Tito said to me, the Foreign Minister told me about his conversation with you and we feel very much better. Now, at that time, I didn’t know what he was talking about, but, ah, this was a very interesting thing and he didn’t even have the interpreter, and he [unclear].

Nixon: "And I, when he was with me, he did not speak English at all, but he did have the interpreter. But he did, but I think now that the two conversations, that the two conversations fit together.

   Rogers: "Right.

Nixon: "When he said we are, when he says I am, he used the word fearful, of what will happen after Tito goes.
Rogers: “Yeah.

Nixon: “He says that he just hopes that hands off Yugoslavia [laughs] and, so I see exactly and in view of what he said, the meetings did not go well, the point [be]cause I pressed Tito in, in the dinner, at dinner we got into the question of what sort of man Brezhnev was, and all that sort of thing. Whether or not the Brezhnev Doctrine, really, did it mean, I said it would be very significant if, if the reports were that the Brezhnev Doctrine had been modified. And, he, he, of course he has the girl interpreter there, who is probably an agent of both sides, and he’s, he said, and he left the implication, yes, that the Brezhnev Doctrine was modified or had been modified but what the Foreign Minister tells you would indicate it certainly had not.

Rogers: “I gathered that it had not and he was really, had an ominous tone in his voice. As I say, this was not, this was a very, he took me aside.”

Secretary Rogers then repeated the account of his talk with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister.

Nixon: “It’s interesting how Tito, probably because he figures that everything is going to be reported, took, took the line that he did. I suppose he doesn’t trust that, the interpreter. He didn’t trust her.

Rogers: “I think that’s right. And, he doesn’t want word to get out either publicly.

Nixon: “That’s right. Oh God. He can’t. He’s scared to death.

Rogers: “He can’t afford it. He can’t afford it.

Nixon: “Very interesting. Well, at least we’ve, but now I see the two conversations fit together like a glove.

Rogers: “Yes.

Nixon: “He was trying to tell me exactly the thing: hands off Yugoslavia. I am afraid. You know, and he, he always talks in an ominous way, I notice. I like him though. He’s tough. Tough and strong.

Rogers: “Oh, he’s tough and strong.

Nixon: “And, I was so glad and I sought him out, actually, I saw him, or the aide did, you know our Assistant Chief of Protocol, brought him over—”

Rogers: “Good.

Nixon: “And, and, so this fits in very well.”

Nixon and Rogers then agreed not to pursue this issue during talk with Tito, because, Nixon concluded, “Tito is afraid to say what he thinks of the Russians.” The editors prepared the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Rogers, October 29, 1971, 10:36 a.m., Conversation No. 13–25)
Washington, October 30, 1971, 10:05–11:05 a.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting Between President Nixon and President Tito

PARTICIPANTS
President Nixon
Alexander Akalovsky, Department of State
President Tito
Miss Lijana Tambaca, Interpreter

In opening the conversation, the President commented that President Tito had had a busy time, including an appearance at the National Press Club. President Tito said that he had been asked many questions at the Press Club and that in his responses he had told the press what he thought, which might not have satisfied everyone. The President said that President Tito had handled the questions very well indeed, and that answers which satisfied everybody were not good because they said nothing.

Asked by President Tito if he was satisfied with the joint communiqué, the President responded that he was, commenting that it might be much more difficult to work out a joint communiqué when he went to Peking and Moscow. The President then asked President Tito if his associates were satisfied with the talks they had had on economic and other bilateral matters. President Tito replied that they were, but that there was one problem, that of the import surcharge. He felt this problem was especially important because the third UNCTAD session was to convene soon and also because there was a meeting of 77 nations in Lima. He felt that it would be very useful from the standpoint of U.S. prestige if something were done in this matter. The President said that we were working on this problem to take care of less developed countries and that appropriate actions would be taken fairly soon. The actual problem was only with the UK, France, the FRG, Italy and Japan,
and there was no problem as regards other countries. We had this matter very much in mind, and when Secretary Connally returned from his trip to Japan\(^5\) something would be worked out.

President Tito observed that he was very satisfied with the discussion he had with Secretary Stans and a number of American businessmen.\(^6\) The rather extensive and detailed discussion had been about the possibility of increasing U.S.-Yugoslav trade and economic cooperation. In this connection, he wanted to point out that Yugoslavia had amended its legislation concerning foreign investments so as to encourage such investments. Referring to OPIC, the President noted that we were also working on the necessary legislation. As President Tito knew, it was difficult to work out trade arrangements with socialist states because they had no private corporations. Yugoslavia, however, was different. In fact, during the meeting with Ceausescu,\(^7\) the latter had asked why the U.S. could not accord the same treatment to Romania as it had given Yugoslavia, and he, the President, had told Ceausescu that this was because Yugoslavia had a different system. Thus, if President Tito could influence other socialist states to make arrangements similar to those in Yugoslavia, trade with those states would go up. President Tito observed that he would soon visit Romania,\(^8\) with the President noting that while Ceausescu was a very intelligent and tough person, he did not fully understand the intricacies of international investment. The U.S. would like to help Ceausescu but the Romanian system created difficulties in this regard.

The President then said he wanted to tell President Tito very frankly about our attitude towards the Soviet Union and the Vietnam problem. In this connection, he stressed that his remarks would be of a strictly private nature and that he would be grateful if the record of this conversation, a copy of which would be provided to the Yugoslav side, was issued only to the two Presidents and not distributed further.

The President continued by noting that President Tito had participated in more international meetings than any living statesman. Indeed, he had also participated in more international meetings than any dead statesman, if only because the number of nations had increased. The President said he knew that the polite thing to do was to gloss over the differences that might exist between interlocutors, but he wished to tell President Tito straight from the shoulder about his views on the world and the dangers as he saw them.

\(^5\) November 10–12.

\(^6\) No record of this discussion has been found.

\(^7\) See Documents 183 and 184.

\(^8\) September 22–25.
First, the President said, he believed that President Tito knew that, while the U.S. had many faults, it was not a threat to the independence of smaller countries. It was certainly not a threat to Yugoslavia, which could have trade and other relations with the U.S. but should not fear any interference on the part of the United States. The U.S. was not saintly, but from the standpoint of its own self-interest—and any country must act on the basis of its self-interest—it believed that its interests would be served by the existence of strong independent nations like Yugoslavia. We realized, however, that Ceausescu, with his big neighbor to the North, and Yugoslavia, which was in the same sphere but somewhat further removed, had a special problem. While he did not know Brezhnev or Kosygin personally, there was no question in his mind that, because of its self-interest, the USSR would continue its efforts to bring its neighbors under increased influence. The independence of Yugoslavia and Romania, regardless of these two countries’ internal systems, was consistent with U.S. interests but was not consistent with Soviet interests.

President Tito interjected that there were great differences between Romania and Yugoslavia, with the President commenting that President Tito would still admit that he had been a thorn in the USSR’s side, not because he wanted it but because his independent policy was disliked by the Soviets. The problem of the countries in that area was to have good relations with the United States but without going so far as to provoke the Soviets into using their might to stop movement toward independence. In this connection, the President observed that one of the major questions to be discussed in Moscow would be the U.S. attitude towards the Eastern bloc. Our position would not be that of liberation; as Hungary had shown, liberation meant suicide.9 However, the President stressed, his position would be to avoid any kind of understanding with Moscow that would give the Soviets encouragement to fish in troubled waters in Yugoslavia or elsewhere. He felt that he did not have to say more than that. President Tito said he fully understood what the President had in mind and noted that he had not yet told the President about Brezhnev’s comments concerning blocs. He said that Brezhnev had told him that if such security could be assured in Europe as would stabilize the situation, then the Soviets would agree to the elimination of both blocs and to have different arrangements among European states, for example, on a bilateral basis. President Tito commented that these remarks had surprised him because previously the Soviets had been very tough on this issue. The Presi-

9 Reference is to the 1956 Hungarian revolution.
dent said that while this might be what Brezhnev said, he personally strongly believed that from the standpoint of their self-interest the Soviets could not tolerate any division or independence inside their bloc. For example, the differences between the USSR and China were not because of the long borders or different nationalities, but because the Soviets were unable to tolerate another strong power in the communist bloc. The President said that he was not criticizing and that he understood this.

President Tito said it was true that the Yugoslav independent position inevitably had repercussions in the neighboring countries and that it was, as the President had said, a thorn in the Soviet side. However, little by little the Soviets were coming to adjust themselves to change, although the President was right that they would never allow those states to leave their orbit. The President recalled that he had told Ceausescu frankly that he could not go so far as President Tito had gone because if he did he would be stamped by the Soviets. But what the Romanians could do was to make some internal adjustments that would facilitate the development of their relations with other countries. President Tito observed that the Romanians were greatly dependent on Soviet raw materials.

The President said that another question he wished to discuss with President Tito was our arms talks with the Soviets, because those talks were very important from the standpoint of what other states would do for their defense. Noting that we hoped to reach agreement with the Soviets on limiting both offensive and defensive strategic armaments, the President said that he wished to point out at the same time that if no such agreement was reached he would have to make a decision to increase our armaments. As things stood now, the Soviets were making great efforts to enlarge their arsenal of ICBMs, SS–9s and SLBMs. While we could not object to Soviet efforts to reach parity with the United States, we could not stand by if another nation was gaining superiority. Therefore, if no agreement was reached, we would have to increase our arms spending by $15 to $20 billion, and he, the President, was prepared to do it. President Tito expressed the view that it was important for the U.S. to discuss arms control with the Soviet Union because if agreement was reached in this area, that would make it easier to reach agreement on other issues as well.

The President continued that in certain parts of the world, some seemed to believe that given our winding up some commitments, our Vietnam policy, the Nixon Doctrine,\(^\text{10}\) and our moves regarding China

\(^{10}\) See footnote 19, Document 220.
and the USSR, he was so concerned about peace that he would make a move for peace even if that should weaken U.S. defenses. This, the President emphasized, was a gross miscalculation. The U.S. was a Pacific power, and it intended to remain such a power because it had interests in the area. If others were to limit their armaments, the U.S. would do the same, but it would not do it unilaterally.

The President recalled the remark in his toast the other night, that President Tito was a man of peace. In a very personal way, he wanted to say that although President Tito’s and his own backgrounds were different and his role in history had not been as great as President Tito’s, there were also some similarities. Both President Tito and himself had come up the hard way. President Tito was for peace, and he considered himself to be a man of peace too. President Tito was for independence, just as he was a strong believer in independence. He also respected different social systems; President Tito might be a communist and he a capitalist but this did not matter. However, one thing should be clear, and that was that he, President Nixon, was not a soft man. The U.S. was not interested in peace at any cost, and this would be made very clear in the forthcoming discussions with the Chinese and the Soviets. Nor would the U.S. make any arrangement with the Chinese or the Soviets at the expense of third countries. The President continued that it was his firm conviction that a weak United States would be a danger to peace, although some Senators held a different view and called for unilateral disarmament. He did not believe in such disarmament, especially if the other side was building up its armaments. In this connection, the President noted that some leaders on which President Tito had influence might criticize the United States for increasing its military strength, but that he firmly believed that this served the interests of peace. President Tito said that the nations the President was referring to did not criticize the United States for strengthening its defenses but rather for its inadequate participation in their development. Many of those nations were tired of hearing only words about such participation and wanted to see some action.

The President said that he now wished to comment briefly on Vietnam. He recalled that at the time he had come to office there had been over 500,000 American troops in Vietnam, with 300 killed every week. Now, however, we had less than 200,000 troops in Vietnam, and last week there had been only seven killed. This was not accidental. Late in 1969, after making a peace offer, we had warned North Vietnam that if it failed to negotiate we would have to take measures to protect

U.S. forces. In August of 1969, during his conversation with Ceausescu, he had also told him that he would have to do that. Following that, the talks continued for several months with nothing happening. Consequently, he had ordered the liquidation of North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia, and the result of that action had been that our casualties had dropped from 300 to 100 a week. In October 1970, the U.S. had made another peace offer. Here again, the North Vietnamese had been told privately that unless they really negotiated we would have to take military action. During his visit in October of 1970, Gromyko had been informed that this was what we were going to tell the North Vietnamese. However, the other side had made no response and only increased its infiltration. As a result, the Laotian operation had had to be launched. That operation had been conducted by the South Vietnamese Army and its result had been North Vietnam’s inability to launch its offensive this year and a decrease in U.S. casualties to the present average of less than 20. The President continued that we had offered the North Vietnamese assistance in rebuilding their country, which was badly damaged not only by war but also by recent floods. Our condition, however, was that the 400 American prisoners be returned. The North Vietnamese had again failed to answer, and now they had been told that we needed a reply by the end of November. The President said that he did not expect President Tito to comment on Laos, Cambodia or Vietnam because he knew that those opposing our position on Vietnam said that the U.S. should withdraw, turn the country over to North Vietnam, and also bring down Thieu in the process. This, however, the U.S. would never do.

President Tito interjected that this was not his position. His position was that a solution should not be sought only by military means and that a government should be formed including all elements in South Vietnam. Such a government would not be communist but a democratic one, and there were democratic elements on both sides in South Vietnam. The President noted that we had made an offer to set up a government that would be acceptable to the people of South Vietnam. The offer provided for international supervision and, while he did not wish to go into further details, was generally a very forthcoming one. The President said that he did not wish to leave any mistaken impression as to what would happen. He considered himself a man of peace, just as President Tito did. But, as President, he had to use power to protect U.S. interests. If the North Vietnamese failed to answer and did not release our prisoners we would act, this time not

12 For text of the October 7 offer, see ibid., 1970, pp. 825–828.
13 Reference is to the Lan Som operation of February 1971, in which 16,000 South Vietnamese troops with U.S. air support tried to cut off the Ho Chi Minh trail.
against Laos or Cambodia but against North Vietnam. The idea that the U.S. had no choice but to get out was totally fallacious. We did want to get out but we also intended to get our prisoners back. Consequently, if North Vietnam did not even answer our very forthcoming offer, which went beyond anything that had been said publicly, we would have to act.

President Tito expressed the views that the U.S. should discuss this with both the Soviets and the Chinese. While he had never had discussions with the North Vietnamese, he had talked with Madame Binh. However, the South Vietnamese could not make North Vietnam move if the latter did not want to. Noting that President Tito saw many leaders, the President said that those leaders might be interested in his evaluation of President Nixon just as he, President Nixon, was interested in President Tito’s evaluation of Brezhnev and other leaders. He thought that the main point to put across was that he, President Nixon, was a man of peace who would consider strengthening of peace as the greatest contribution, but that his desire for peace should not be mistaken for weakness. President Tito was also a man of peace, but he was also a strong man for otherwise he would not be here today. The President continued that, for his part, he would use all power at his disposal to obtain the release of our prisoners. He stressed that while he would not ask President Tito for any comments, he wanted to be completely frank and let President Tito know what would happen.

President Tito said he was grateful for the President’s remarks. As a man of peace, he could not encourage any warlike action and believed that peaceful solutions should be sought. He understood U.S. difficulties, and it was a mistake to say that he believed the U.S. should get out at any cost, because that would be regarded as weakness. At the same time, every effort should be made to obtain a peaceful solution. President Tito said that he was optimistic in this regard because of the President’s forthcoming trips to Peking and Moscow and also because of Soviet willingness to talk. As Galileo had said, “The earth is moving just the same.”

President Tito said that, in conclusion, he wished to stress that Yugoslav policy was not based on the ideas of one man or one group of people. Rather, it reflected the desires of all Yugoslav people, who wanted good relations with the United States, relations which had been a tradition in the history of both countries, and also as good as possible relations with other great powers. Consequently, he President Tito, could not change Yugoslav policy in any other direction. The President replied that he fully understood this. Noting that his approach was a very pragmatic one, he said that the U.S. was not interested in every nation having the same system of government as our own or in having every nation voting with us in the United Nations. It was clear that every nation had to proceed on the basis of what it regarded as its best
national interest. All we wanted was equal treatment for both sides, without the U.S. being vilified while the other side went scot free.

As asked by the President when he was returning to Yugoslavia, President Tito replied that it would be around November 6. The President stated that he had made our last and best offer to North Vietnam and that he wished President Tito to know that if we received no response until the end of November we would have to act. President Tito commented that it was very useful for him to know this.

The meeting ended at 11:05 a.m.

235. Memorandum from Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT
Legislation to Remove Findley Amendment Restrictions on Title I PL 480 Sales to Yugoslavia

Assistant Secretary Palmby has asked for White House views on approaching the appropriate Congressional committees with a view toward removal of restrictions which now prevent PL 480 sales to Yugoslavia. At present, the Findley amendment excludes from PL 480 sales any nation whose ships transport goods to or from Cuba or North Vietnam. Yugoslavia permits its ships to transport materials to Cuba, and exports to Cuba as well. However, Agriculture would like, in accordance with the President’s desire to be helpful to Yugoslavia and at the same time do something to increase agriculture sales abroad, to provide PL 480 agricultural products to Yugoslavia. Congressional action would be necessary to do this and Palmby wants to approach the Congress to determine how best to proceed to get the proper legislative authority.

You should be aware, however, that this action would probably seriously erode our restrictive policy on trade with Cuba by other Latin

American countries. There is considerable pressure from Latin American countries for us to countenance expanded trade relations on their part with Cuba. If we do so with Yugoslavia, it will be difficult to resist in Latin America.²

Recommendation

That you approve Palmby’s approaching the Congress on this matter. Pete Peterson and all interested agencies concur.³ (A directive from Pete Peterson approving Palmby’s request is at Tab A.⁴)

² Haig highlighted this paragraph and wrote a note that reads: “HAK: Could be problem?”
³ Haig checked the approval option. Sonnenfeldt and Hormats informed Kissinger in an April 27 memorandum that Congressman Findley had informed the President that he supported removing Yugoslavia from the list of nations disqualified for dollar credit sales of U.S. agricultural commodities. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 734, Country Files—Europe, Yugoslavia, Vol. III 1 Sept 71)
⁴ Not printed.

236. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State¹

Belgrade, April 20, 1972, 0700Z.


1. In course of Ambassador’s April 13 conversation with Dolanc, latter claimed US had condemned invasion of Czechoslovakia but had done nothing about it.² He then asked what US attitude would be if country outside Warsaw Pact were invaded by USSR. Ambassador replied that response would depend on a variety of factors (e.g. identity of country attacked, circumstances of invasion, willingness of people of invaded country to resist, attitude of US public and Congress) and that concrete answer to such a broad question could not be given. Dolanc expressed his understanding and moved to another topic.

² For documentation relating to the U.S. response to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XVII, Eastern Europe, Documents 80–95.
2. Same topic has been raised by high GOY spokesmen several times before in recent months, during conversations with important visitors from West. In course of conversation with Ambassador Forthomme of Belgium during latter’s January visit, Foreign Sec Tepavac reportedly volunteered observation that prospects for help from West in event of Soviet invasion are slim. Early in February FSFA Deputy Sec Petric took same line with Senator McGee, as did Bogdan Osolnik, Federal Assembly foreign affairs spokesman.

3. Interesting to conjecture concerning reasons for such expressions of concern at this point in time. Relations with USSR have improved considerably since last summer. GOY spokesmen have told Emb that military pressure from Soviets in the Balkans is generally at low point (e.g., no hints being made to Yugoslavia about overflights or base rights); economic as well as inter-Party relations have developed steadily since Brezhnev visit. However, very fact that economic and other ties with Soviets are growing probably stimulates this kind of conjecture on part of GOY; it is both reflection of their concern and an implied explanation for Western ears.

4. Recent events inside Yugoslavia and outside have also probably played a role. Croatian party crisis this winter afforded dramatic evidence of strength of centrifugal forces here and heightened concern over possible Soviet mischief-making. Dismemberment of Pakistan has impressed some Yugoslavs with helplessness of country beset with internal strife which is invaded by stronger power bent on dismemberment. Finally, while actively promoting CSCE as well as discussion of troop withdrawals from Europe, Yugoslavs are queasy about sort of new power balance which will emerge. Aware of desire of USG to achieve further improvement in its relationships with USSR, they fear we will agree to arrangements which ignore their interests and leave them more vulnerable to Soviet pressures. Talk of new “isolationism” in US and Congressional call for unilateral troop withdrawals from Europe add to uneasiness. Thus they raise these questions with Western spokesmen, against a background of general concern, as part of probing effort during period of internal and external shifts.
Washington, April 26, 1972.

SUBJECT

Tito’s Views on Soviet Policy

Our Ambassador in Belgrade, Malcolm Toon, met with Tito on April 14 in Brioni.\(^2\) He found Tito in good spirits and good health. Rumors about Tito’s illness were either false or else he has completely recovered.

Tito had the following comments on the Summit and Soviet policies:

—The Soviets are now taking a more realistic view of the world. Brezhnev’s speech to the trade union’s congress, which had been encouraging to Tito and had differed radically from what a Brezhnev speech would have been a year ago, comments to Tito by Grechko, the Soviet Defense Minister who recently had been in Yugoslavia, and Tito’s exchanges with the Soviet leadership all evidence this new realism.

—The prospect of true relations between the US and USSR is reassuring to all Yugoslavs, who remember Soviet brutality in 1968.

—Grechko had initiated his conversation with Tito by saying that the Soviets had no intention now or in the future to press the Yugoslavs for overflight or base rights, as had been speculated in the press.

Tito also told our Ambassador that he deeply appreciated our offer to brief him on our Moscow Summit preparations and hopes. A prompt post-Summit briefing would also be of great help, since he is planning to visit Moscow himself in June.

Tito also discussed possible visits to Yugoslavia by Secretary Rogers, whom he would be delighted to see next summer, and by Secretary Laird or his successor, whom he would be glad to see but preferably not until next spring.

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\(^2\) Reported in telegram 1827 from Belgrade, April 14. (Ibid.)
238. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia¹

Washington, July 25, 1972, 0211Z.

134026. Subject: Secretary’s Talk With Tito: Part II of IV.

1. At the start of the business session, Secretary Rogers thanked the President for receiving him, apologizing for the intrusion on his time on the same weekend when he had just received the President of India.² Tito indicated there was no need to apologize and that he welcomed the Secretary.

2. US Relations With USSR and China: The Secretary said that he and Secretary Tepavac had talked extensively the previous day³ and he did not wish to repeat their discussion. However, he said, President Nixon had asked him to come to Yugoslavia to assure President Tito that we had made no agreements with the USSR behind the backs of our friends.

Tito said the Soviets had said the same thing.

The Secretary referred to the Moscow Declaration of Principles and the Communiqué⁴ and indicated they contained many points that can serve to assist in a CSCE.

Tito said that Brezhnev had said that we had agreed to start a CSCE.

The Secretary responded in the affirmative, indicating that exploratory talks could start in November or December with a conference in 1973. He asked if Brezhnev had said anything about a fight on GDR participation in the conference.

Tito said that Brezhnev had indicated that both Germanys should be represented at the conference. The Yugoslavs, he said, think this might not be too difficult to achieve once we see how the dialogue between the two Germanys develops. He added that most Europeans want both Germanys to attend.

3. The Secretary asked if Tito had any questions to raise with him about the summit.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Springsteen (EUR) on July 9 and approved in S/S. Repeated to Moscow. A brief summary of the talks and detailed reports on the other portions of the discussion covering the CSCE and the Mediterranean and the Middle East were reported respectively in telegrams 134025, 134027, and 134028 to Belgrade. (Ibid.)

² President V.V. Giri, who met with Tito July 22–23.

³ A memorandum of conversation of Secretary Rogers’s discussion with Foreign Minister Tepavac on July 8 is contained in telegrams 770 and 771 from Dublin, July 12. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 953, VIP Visits, Secretary of State’s Visit to Mid-East and European Countries, 28 June–7 Jul 72)

⁴ For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 633–642.
Tito replied that the Soviets had told him that we were disposed to cooperate and avoid competition. They had also said that we agreed on the need for a political settlement in the Middle East. Both the Soviets and the Yugoslavs believe that the US should put more pressure on Israel to be more flexible. He said that it is his personal impression that there may be some evolution in American policy on Israel after the U.S. elections. Moreover, there are rumors in Israel that responsible people there say that if the U.S. put pressure on Israel it would give. So, he said, the “key is in your hands.”

The Secretary responded that we always hear that.

4. The Secretary then gave President Tito the letter he had carried from President Nixon. President Tito read it, referred to his correspondence with the President and expressed his appreciation.

The Secretary said that President Nixon has no higher regard for any leader than he has for President Tito. He stressed that President Nixon took fully into account Yugoslav policies at the summit and sought to assure that nothing happened there that would be adverse to Yugoslav interests. Moreover, the President wanted to assure this point with the Soviets in writing and this was done in the Declaration of Basic Principles, particularly in points 3 and 11. The Secretary asked that these be translated for President Tito. He noted that the U.S. had insisted on the inclusion of the word “all” rather than just using the word “countries” alone. The resulting language is more specific than any previous formulation. They “recognize the sovereign equality of all states.”

5. Tito said all this has helped with the Soviets. When he was in Moscow the Soviets agreed about Yugoslav sovereignty. There was no problem when it was discussed. There was no request for bases in Yugoslavia.

The Secretary asked if this last trip to Moscow was better than previous trips.

Tito said much better. Many things were clarified. They accepted “us as we are. They want good relations with us.” We are now seeking, he said, to better our economic relations. We now have a balanced trade of $700 million. We can sell in the USSR what we can’t sell in Western markets. The West wants only to sell, not to buy.

6. The Secretary asked Tito to comment on the future of the USSR and leadership problems. He noted that at the time of the summit we detected problems internally in the leadership but could not define what they were.

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5 A copy of the July 18 letter is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 766, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Yugoslavia, Pres. Tito Corres.
Tito said that the strongest man is Brezhnev and that he will continue to be so in the future. He is also taking more and more interest in foreign policy. The policies of the USSR in recent years have been those of Brezhnev and he has sought support for them within the leadership.

The Secretary noted that Kosygin did all the talking at the summit on trade and economic matters but that Brezhnev handled all else. The Secretary asked about the younger leaders, noting that Polyansky and Mazurov seemed to be strong.

Tito said both have prospects.

The Secretary noted that few in the leadership have traveled abroad and few have been in the U.S.

7. Tito asked for the Secretary’s impressions of the USSR, aside from the summit meeting “where no great conclusions were reached” and particularly about the future of U.S.-USSR relations.

The Secretary said that the most important agreement reached was on Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT). It means that neither side will be tempted to start a nuclear war because neither side can defend its population.

Tito said that the Soviets had said the same. It is important that both agree on this.

Continuing, the Secretary noted that neither side can violate the agreement without detection because it takes too long to build an ABM system.

When Tito said that agreement permitted defense of the capitals and one ICBM base, the Secretary responded that the only reason for this aspect is political. It has little significance. We had two ABM sites under construction. The Soviets had one around their capital. But neither defense of the capital or of an ICBM site has any significance because a nuclear attack upon either Moscow or Washington would be successful regardless of an ABM system. What this all means is that both sides realize that if either launches a nuclear attack, the other would be destroyed by retaliatory strikes.

Tito indicated that this is clear.

The Secretary noted that the continued buildup in offensive systems on both sides will be largely political to assure that neither side has an advantage. However, when you talk of advantage you must take into account destructive ability. The U.S. now has an overall numerical superiority in warheads. The Soviets will build up over the next five years and approach our level. But this still does not change the basic conclusion, the Secretary said. And it may be that in phase II of SALT talks we can get a further limitation of offensive weapons. This would save both sides a bit of money.
8. However, the Secretary continued, starting with the premise that neither side can start a war, U.S. relations with the USSR should improve as we go along. He said we believe that the Russians are concerned about the Chinese and would like better relations with us so as not to be concerned about us. The Russians are also worried about consumer goods for their people. They look at Yugoslavia and know that they are behind in this area. Therefore, they want to develop greater ability to produce consumer goods and think the U.S. can help them. They have raw materials the U.S. needs and the U.S. could be a good market for them if better relations develop.

Tito said that the economic and political are connected together.

The Secretary noted, however, that as things open up, the Soviets will have more problems. They know that, but we are not sure how they will cope with them.

9. Tito indicated that there is a mutual fear in USSR-Chinese relations so that out of this fear for each other both look for good relations with the U.S. He said that the Soviets have no intention to threaten the Chinese but the problem is territories which the Chinese want.

When the Secretary asked if it wasn’t more than that, Tito responded by saying it also included ideological factors. The Chinese are penetrating areas in Asia and Africa. There are several elements involved as China more and more becomes a key power. Moreover, the Chinese have had good results. They participated last year in the Zagreb Trade Fair, displaying electronics which they are developing for use in atomic weapons.

Tito agreed that the Chinese had started far behind as a poor country and so they want to get ahead. Like the USSR, they need consumer goods. But in the USSR, industry is badly in need of modernization.

The Secretary noted that it was interesting that the U.S. got along better with both the USSR and China than they do with each other. Tito noted that this is because the USSR and China are neighbors.

The Secretary indicated that each is competing for position in the socialist world and each is worried about the other in terms of territory. However, the Chinese are more worried about the Russians because they fear that the USSR will use the territories problem to terrorize the Chinese and eventually seize upon it as an excuse for actually taking over the disputed territories.

Tito said both must develop and neither has any need for additional territory. However, he noted that there seems to be some contact between them now. When the Secretary said that this was an encouraging development since Tito had last discussed it with President Nixon, Tito responded that in improved relations there are opportunities for avoiding catastrophe.

Rogers
Eastern Mediterranean

Greece

239. Letter From the Deputy Chief of Mission in Greece (McClelland) to the Country Director for Greek Affairs (Brewster)

Athens, January 2, 1969.

Dear Dan:

I've been wanting to get off a good letter to you for a long time, but as I expect you're aware, performing satisfactorily as DCM in Athens involves a good deal of generalized activity—attending to personnel questions, administrative problems, American community relations, representational work, and the like, which limits the time I can devote to important policy matters such as the "$64 question" of where do we go from here in US-Greek relations? (Such secondary issues as the Georgopapadakos and Father Panteleimon cases, which arise periodically, also take up a great deal of time.) Now that we have an excellent Political Counselor in the person of Arch Blood, it is also better, I think, that I not get too directly into the business of policy recommendation, which is more properly the bread and butter of relations between POL and the Ambassador. I don't mean to imply by this that the Ambassador doesn't welcome my views and give me ample opportunity to present them, but simply that a lot of other matters inevitably land in my lap related to the operation of the Mission which prevent me from giving the sort of undivided, intensive attention to policy questions which should underpin valid judgments on them. With this preamble, let me nevertheless deliver myself of some thoughts about the future of our relations with Greece which have been accumulating over the weeks and which your letters of November 26th

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1 Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 71 D 509, Correspondence to and From Athens. Confidential; Official–Informal. A notation on the letter reads: “A very good think piece by R. McClelland.”

2 The reference to Georgopapadakos was not identified. Bishop Panteleimon had refused to officiate at ceremonies attended by junta officials and had been disciplined by the government-controlled Holy Synod of the Greek Orthodox Church.
to Arch and of December 10th to the Ambassador prompt me to formulate. 3

I detect a definite note of urgency, Dan, in your letters about receiving further, and hopefully, regular evidence of “concrete progress” on the part of the GOG in the well-known directions. Whereas I’m not sure what is specifically at the root of this (other than the commendable desire of an efficient and concerned officer such as yourself to get on with the show), I imagine that one element is the constant weight of Congressional, press and public pressure on the Department, generated and kept alive by the police-state aspects of the present Greek regime. I sincerely wish we could be more responsive and helpful to you in relieving this pressure with more precise, frequent and reassuring evidence of moderation and relaxation on the part of the GOG. As you well know, though, our leverage in this touchy area is very limited. About all I can call attention to positively at the moment in this respect is the fact that the Strasbourg fiasco 4 seems definitely to have made the regime somewhat more gun-shy and to have caused them, advisedly, to pull back on the almost uninterrupted series of trials they have been conducting. (And incidentally, there is no evidence that the Strasbourg mess was the result of anything more sinister than the general obtuseness of the Greek police in respect to public relations and the lack of proper coordination between them and the Foreign Ministry people in preparing this undertaking.) I think it’s encouraging, however, in terms of the GOG’s increasing awareness of the importance of its foreign image, for example, that they decided not to execute Panagoulis; sent Theodorakis back to the Peloponnesian mountains; and postponed (possibly indefinitely) the trial of old General Argyropoulos. 5 These moves could, of course, be more in the nature of a tactical retreat than indicative of any fundamental policy changes. Still, I believe that they are manifestly beginning to “wise up.”

3 Copies of the letters are in the Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 71 D 6, Correspondence to and From Athens.

4 Apparently a reference to the resolution adopted by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, September 26, 1968, calling for an end to martial law and parliamentary elections in Greece and recommending that the Council consider suspending Greece from membership at its January 1969 session.

5 Alexander Panagoulis, who was convicted of an August 1968 attempt to assassinate Prime Minister Papadopoulos, had his death sentence commuted. Mikis Theodorakis, the composer and anti-junta activist, was released from prison during a December 1968 amnesty but rearrested in April 1969. General Archimedes Argyropoulos was convicted by a military court of planning civil unrest in the event that national elections scheduled for May 1967 had been rigged.
If anything is clear at this juncture, in the aftermath of the Prime Minister’s December 14th speech, and even more so of the Stamatelopoulos–Ladas hassle, it is that the Papadopoulos government is indisputably in control of the country, and is accordingly going to proceed in the course of the coming months, or possibly even years, at a pace of its own choosing, which is likely to be slow and deliberate. The Prime Minister has won the first round with his recalcitrant hard-line Secretaries General (if, indeed, a really serious conflict has ever existed in this area) and seems to see eye-to-eye with General Angelis, who has emerged with the reorganized HNDGS in a very powerful and independent position. In the circumstances, what compelling reasons has Papadopoulos to act otherwise?

There are two potential lines of development (or a combination of the two) which could force him to do so: 1) the growth of serious and organized internal opposition (generated by protracted oppression and/or grave economic deterioration); and, 2) the rise of similarly serious opposition externally, including in particular, that of the United States, plus some of the other major NATO powers, like West Germany or Italy, where there are vocal domestic political forces opposed to the present GOG.

It must be conceded, on examining the situation dispassionately, that neither of these adverse developments is taking place, or at least shows any signs of doing so in sufficiently acute or immediate form to worry the GOG. Certainly no serious domestic political opposition is at present on the horizon. On the contrary, we are beginning to see some evidence of a willingness on the part of the old political forces to reach some sort of accommodation with Papadopoulos. Admittedly, this development is in a very incipient stage and could well break down or come to naught, particularly if Papadopoulos is not sincere, but proves merely to be “playing games” for his own tactical purposes. While the intellectual establishment remains unalterably and articulately opposed to the regime (and this is not a negligible factor because a potential leadership element is involved), there are a great many small people (perhaps even a majority), especially in the country but also in the cities, who don’t find the present GOG too bad, in fact are often reasonably enthusiastic about it.

On the economic front conditions could go down hill seriously somewhere along the road, a year or two from now, if the Government

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6 The Embassy provided an analysis of the speech in telegram 8308 from Athens, December 16, 1968. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 GREECE)
7 Dimitri Stamatelopoulos and Ioannis Ladas, two members of the original conspiratorial group of military officers. Stamatelopoulos had become an outspoken conservative critic of the junta while Ladas, an Under Secretary in the Ministry of Interior, was one of its foremost spokesmen.
persists in certain of its foolish and short-sighted policies such as indiscriminate borrowing at high interest rates to improve its balance of payments image. It will also have to guard very carefully against inflation which, paradoxically, could become a threat if confidence in the economy is restored to the extent that a boom in consumers spending takes place with the money now being cautiously held. But the economic oligarchy (and this represents a significant power factor in Greece) has unmistakably cast its lot with the regime and, for obvious reasons, is not going to try to undermine it (unless the Government tries to promote really radical, share-the-wealth schemes). We have the large projected Onassis investment, meanwhile, together with a concerted effort on the part of the GOG, offering concessions that no previous government has been willing to make, to attract the money of other wealthy Greek shipping operators. Quite conceivably this could succeed. Even Litton’s investments seem at long last to be picking up.\(^8\)

And underlying these more striking economic indicators, the everyday things that matter to the bulk of the Greek population, such as the consumer goods price level, the absence of labor unrest and better treatment at the hands of the bureaucracy, remain not only tolerable, but probably more favorable than before April 1967.

As we all realize, at the same time, there are a variety of imponderables in the Greek equation—the Colonels’ painful lack of a sense of humor, their public relations ineptitudes, their streak of anti-intellectual vindictiveness, their patronizing conviction that they know what’s best for the Greek people in all respects, and the confused, pseudo-ideological pronouncements of the leader himself that pass for policy blueprints—all of which, if not tempered or corrected, could end by working against the Government. These must, however, be reorganized [recognized] for what they are: largely secondary, psychological manifestations that undoubtedly grate on the intellectuals but are hardly of a nature to rally people to counter-revolutionary barricades. One has to be careful not to lose sight of the forest for the trees!

In summary, there are, to the best of our knowledge, no present or prospective internal developments, either political, economic or military, of a nature to seriously threaten or unseat the Papadopoulos government. The persistence of this situation, naturally, will depend on the regime becoming progressively less, rather than more oppressive, and on the maintenance of tolerable economic conditions. Yet it is fair to say, I believe, that Papadopoulos is smart enough to recognize these needs himself and the corresponding importance of working toward

\(^8\) In May 1967 Litton Industries announced that it had signed an agreement with the Greek Government to promote economic development in Crete and the western Peloponnesus.
there is the added factor that he manifestly features himself as a sort of a latter-day Greek savior, whose aspirations transcend going down in history as just another short-lived military dictator.

To turn now to the external side of the picture. While Papadopoulos is confronted with more trouble on this front than in the domestic one, again, none of it at this stage has reached dimensions which could seriously jeopardize his position. His greatest vulnerability, in my estimate, would be if Western Europe, with or without U.S. support, ganged up on Greece economically, or undertook to implement a thorough-going boycott, say, of Greek shipping (e.g., the ITF initiative). The EEC action last year in refusing Greece any further project loans\(^9\) was symptomatic of the sort of politically motivated move with economic implications which, if renewed and intensified, could be dangerous for the GOG. There is also the Strasbourg, Council of Europe, action against Greece which may well (provided Greece’s opponents are able to muster a two-thirds majority, which is by no means a foregone conclusion) end with a recommendation for Greece’s expulsion on grounds of violating fundamental human rights. But this remains only a recommendation, even if it does go through, and as such not binding on member countries. To become more than a matter of moral censure and develop any real teeth it would have to be adopted by the Council of Ministers and then translated into specific action against Greece on the part of individual countries. And, as we all know, Dan, from the tactical accommodation by a government of domestic Socialist agitation to the carrying out of concrete sanctions, particularly in the economic field, as a matter of national policy, is a long and difficult step. Such actions, moreover, cut both ways.

With regard, now, to the more important NATO forum. The shoddy image which the present Greek regime projects abroad by its police-state methods, does represent, certainly an irritant in NATO, and potentially, if they persist in these practices (such as the Thessaloniki Nestor–Zannas sentences), a divisive element which neither we nor Greece can afford to permit to reach seriously disruptive proportions. While the apprehension resulting from the Soviet move against Czechoslovakia will doubtless tend to overshadow criticism of Greece on internal political grounds, and highlight her strategic, military importance to the Alliance, the GOG’s continued failure to make any progress toward representative, democratic government which we and Western Europe can point to as genuine, does represent a potential danger to NATO. It is also, in my view, one of the most convincing arguments to

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\(^9\) The EEC suspended Greece’s loan authority immediately after the coup although Greece could continue to utilize its existing loans.
use with Papadopoulos in attempting to persuade him to become more
democratic: “Whereas we do not presume to tell you what’s good do-
mentally for Greece, it is our duty as friends and allies to point out
that your internal policies could create serious friction within NATO
and thus end by harming Greece and the Alliance. Given our strong
common concern with deterring further Soviet encroachment in SE Eu-
rope by presenting a strong, united front in NATO, we believe you
must do more about restoring individual and political liberties at
home.” It is along these lines, I’m persuaded, that our tactical handling
of the present GOG should proceed. (The Ambassador’s use of this line
in his December 28th talk with Papadopoulos10 drew the discouraging
response, I’m sorry to note, that: “Well, too bad for NATO, until it
changes its ideas.” In other words, take us or leave us, as we are!)

Two complementary courses of action are open to us in this re-
spect: 1) we can attempt to accelerate democratic progress within
Greece; and 2) we can try to slow down the adverse reaction to the
Greek situation in NATO. Neither will be easy, but our aim should be
to bring these two lines of action into some tolerable policy balance.
Up to the present we have concentrated primarily on pushing Pa-
padopoulos rather than on enjoining our NATO friends to avoid ini-
tiatives which, however satisfying to their sense of democratic right-
eousness, do not make a notably constructive contribution to the
solidarity which free Europe still badly needs. The use of the some-
what specious argument that Greece’s present behavior is unworthy of
true NATO membership is about as unrewarding as leveling the same
charge against the Soviet Union (and a lot of other countries) with re-
spect to their UN membership. Granted, we don’t like the way they
act and therefore should try to get them to mend their misguided ways.
But the most effective way of accomplishing this is not by reading them
out of the club but rather by keeping them in it so we can continue to
influence them. I recognize, of course, that the best way to avoid trou-
ble in NATO over Greece is to get the GOG to be less repressive; but I
think we should also devote some attention to advising our NATO al-
lies (and one thinks primarily of Norway and Denmark, who are the
most vociferous) against allowing domestic politicking to prejudice in-
ternational security.

In debating the ever-present question of how much, and what kind
of pressure we should put on the GOG to return to democratic meth-
ods, I have always felt rather strongly, Dan, that we have generally ig-
nored an important factor which might be described as the “legitimacy
of the Revolution.” To a large extent, we and the Western Europeans

10 See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Docu-
ment 375.
have been inclined to treat what’s going on in Greece now as a temporary and illegitimate departure from some democratic norm (and it might well be asked here: what democratic norm?), as a sort of shabby political aberration to be replaced by something better as soon as possible. Whereas this interpretation is doubtless objectively correct, from Papadopoulos & Company’s subjective viewpoint, it is not only erroneous but keenly resented. (I know I’m sounding suspiciously like a confirmed Regime apologist at this point, Dan, but please hear me out.) Papadopoulos obviously regards his revolution as a desirable and necessary stage in Greece’s political evolution to something better and more stable; and in order to achieve this greater good, (in his eyes), some price and sacrifice, in terms of temporary restraints on the past degree of liberty enjoyed in Greece (which he clearly regards as excessive to the point of being pernicious), are not only justified but beneficial. Meanwhile, our approach to him has been to act as though the whole enterprise, both means and ends were bad and misguided and should therefore be got over as rapidly as possible. While we may well be right (although a number of points here could be interestingly argued, such as the effect of the return to complete freedom of the press in Greece—on a possible Cyprus settlement, for example), Papadopoulos is convinced that he’s right, and since he’s in control of the country it behooves us, for tactical, if for no other reasons, to make some concession to his viewpoint. The added fact that we do not ourselves have any specific formula for a more successful political future in Greece to propose (and indeed would probably be well advised to keep out of the business of telling the Greeks what sort of government they should have) reenforces, in my opinion, the importance of at least acting toward Papadopoulos & Company as though we recognized some justification in what he is trying to do. Obviously we’re not going to accept the legitimacy of government based on force (and over the long run I’m not sure that he does either), and are certainly correct in pointing out to him the fundamental advantages of government-by-the-consent-of-the-governed.

A definite time element is moreover involved in this whole process which, I think, must also be taken into account. As the lives of governments go, this one has only been in undisputed control of the country for just over a year now (since December 13, 1967), which is not a very long time as historical perspective goes. The Metaxas dictatorship, as I recall, lasted for over four years. The feeling that they need

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11 Reference is to King Constantine’s attempted counter-coup against the junta.
12 General and Prime Minister Ioannis Metaxas seized power in August 1936 with the support of then King George II. He held power until his death in February 1941. A successor government was subsequently driven into exile in May 1941 by the German invasion of Greece.
some reasonable length of time (which I would be inclined to put at a minimum of a couple of years from now) has been emphatically and repeatedly expressed from the outset by this revolutionary group. And yet we tend to act toward them as though this whole slightly despicable affair should be brought to an end within a matter of months. While I realize that keeping them under a certain amount of pressure is conducive to forward motion and hence tactically desirable, I think we shall have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that they want, and intend to take a certain amount of time “to achieve the aims of the Revolution,” as they put it. Roufogalis developed the thesis to me the other night, for instance, that it should not be unreasonable for the regime to demand as much time to carry out its political plans as it has projected to implement its five-year economic plan. Although this is somewhat specious, it is characteristic of their thinking, and once more points up for me, at least, the necessity of conceding them some reasonable time-frame. If we don’t, I fear we will simply generate irritation and resentment, as well as engaging in a good deal of lost motion. In advancing these arguments I do not mean to imply that we should stop reminding them periodically of the problems they create for their friends and allies, bilaterally and in NATO, by failing gradually to restore at least basic personal liberties. I do argue, however, that this should be done against a background of explicit recognition that the enterprise on which they are embarked has some raison d’etre of its own and is entitled to a certain amount of time.

As Arch recommended in his tactical paper (enclosed with his letter of December 11), I think the advent of our new Administration (and presumably, in due course, of a new American Ambassador) will afford us an excellent opportunity to start off on a footing which takes the foregoing considerations into account. The formula we developed in connection with the MAP restoration continues to be a good one, and we should certainly make quite clear at the outset that the US remains no less interested in a return to a democratic and representative process of government in Greece. We should also reiterate our conviction that the continued denial of fundamental human liberties is not only at variance with valid Western political ideals but contrary to the best interests of Greece in the long-run. At the same time, I believe we must admit the legitimacy of the aim of the Papadopoulos Government to change certain features of Greek political life to avoid, if possible, a return to the irresponsibility, instability and sterility of the past. We must also concede that this process will require a certain amount of time. Finally, we should express our own firmly held belief that

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13 A copy of the letter is in the Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 71 D 6, Letters to and From Athens.
whereas certain temporary constraints may well be required, the ultimate success of their undertaking will rest on convincing the Greek people of the necessity and desirability of the proposed reforms rather than on coercing them into accepting them. One supposes, after all, that Papadopoulos knows his Greek psychology as well, or better than we do, and hence will not act in a manner calculated ultimately to produce an explosion from which no one, certainly not he, would profit.

One last topic, Dan, in a letter which I’m afraid is now getting terribly long and rambling: that of the internal reaction in the United States to the Greek situation. While it is generally conceded that the Nixon Administration will be more relaxed about Greece, and probably less inclined to badger the GOG, the Congressional opposition (Fraser, Edwards & Co.)\textsuperscript{14} will remain pretty much what it has been in the past, and might even become more activist since it will be sharpened by party differences. It seems to me, though, that if the new Administration takes a firm and reasonable stand on Greece from the beginning (recognizing that what really counts on balance is Greece’s strategic loyalty to us more than the internal form of its government), there’s not very much that the liberal minority in Congress can do about it other than make noise. I hasten to admit, however, that this is easier said than done, and all very well for me to advance from the safe distance of Athens out from under the gun of the Congressional pressure to which you fellows in the Department are regularly subjected. Still, I doubt (especially if Papadopoulos helps us a little, by mitigating the state of siege and gradually bringing some of the key articles of the Constitution into force, which he, incidentally, shows every sign of intending to do)\textsuperscript{15} that opposition on the Hill would go to the lengths of advocating further suspensions or cutbacks in the MAP for Greece. With the Middle East as jittery as it is and the Soviet suppression of Czech freedoms still being actively pursued, it would not make any policy sense to jeopardize the strategic support we receive from Greece. I would therefore hope that under the new Administration we could successfully complete the process of delinking MAP from internal political performance. We shall have to keep our “cool” and continue the job of bringing our Greek policy into more realistic focus.

\textsuperscript{14} Congressmen Donald Fraser (D–Minnesota) and Don Edwards (D–California), both members of the House Committee on Foreign Relations.

\textsuperscript{15} On July 11, 1968, the junta published the text of a 138-article Constitution. It was approved by plebiscite on September 29 and officially put into effect on November 11 with certain of its articles held in abeyance. For text of the 1968 Constitution, see D. George Kousalas, \textit{Greece: Uncertain Democracy} (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1973), pp. 103–152.
I hope you will find some of this of interest, and perhaps even useful, Dan; and I apologize for carrying on at such length.
With my very best to you.
Sincerely,

Ross

240. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
Visit by Ambassador Mosbacher with King Constantine in Rome at his residence

PARTICIPANTS
King Constantine of Greece
Ambassador Emil Mosbacher, Jr., Chief of Protocol

At the dinner Ambassador Ackley held for the advance party, I was given a message that King Constantine had suggested I might like to come over and have a drink with him afterward. I called and he was most cordial in his invitation that I do just that.

After dinner, I went to his home and spent a most pleasant hour and a quarter to an hour and a half in conversation with him. The Queen was present at the beginning and again for a few moments at the end.

Our talk covered subjects ranging from the fact that he is planning to get a Soling (an olympic-class sailboat), to the Americas Cup and the Greek position in regard to that. We did spend considerable time discussing the fact that he had had a number of emissaries from Athens over a period of time, including one or two of high rank. According to the conversation, he still has an interest in returning and they would seem to have considerable interest in having him do so. He indicated that it was a matter of negotiation as to the terms on which this could be brought about, the most important of which would be holding national elections. He expressed great fear that the strong right wing police methods of the ruling junta might bring about a commu-
nist reaction and precipitate Greece once more into civil war. He feels he still has the affection of most of the people, especially the young ones and recounted several anecdotes that would seem to substantiate this.

He did not make any request to see the President during his visit to Rome.² He did, however, say that down the line he would like to have further discussions with our people about the Greek situation. I asked him to inform me further of his desires for discussion and that I would try to see that any such request be passed along to the proper officials.

Emil Mosbacher, Jr.

² President Nixon visited Rome February 27–28.

241. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 1, 1969, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT
Greek Ambassador’s Call on the Acting Secretary; U.S.-Greek Relations

PARTICIPANTS
H.E. Christian X. Palamas, Greek Ambassador
Mr. Michael-George Mazarakis, Counselor, Greek Embassy
The Acting Secretary
H. Daniel Brewster, Country Director for Greece
Robert O. Homme, Staff Assistant, Office of the Under Secretary

After the opening amenities, Ambassador Palamas, in discussing the capabilities of NATO, noted that Greece, for one, places much greater reliance on the United States as a source of defense against possible aggressors than on NATO as an organization.

Turning to internal developments in Greece he stated that the April 21, 1967 revolution had averted the danger of another bloody round with the Communists. The new constitution was now in effect with the exception of certain articles relating to civil rights which are still to be applied. The new institutional structure for political parties was being built and he hence believed the present situation was transitional. Political life in the future would be governed by new rules. Internationally

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 GREECE–US. Confidential. Drafted by Brewster on March 3 and approved in U on March 5.
Greece still stood as a bulwark against Slav expansionism to the Mediterranean.

The Ambassador added that the delivery by the United States of certain major military equipment had been suspended immediately after the coup. In his view this policy had not yielded anything politically but had affected the strength of the Greek armed forces. Last October the suspension had been partially lifted and he hoped that the new Administration could speed up the delivery of the balance of the heavy equipment. He also hoped that Greece would be treated sympathetically by the Administration in connection with new foreign aid allocations. Ambassador Palamas underlined that there was no anti-Americanism in Greece and that the U.S. could rely on Greece’s strong commitment to its NATO obligations.

The Acting Secretary stated that the question of arms supplies for Greece was under active review. In reaching its conclusions, the U.S. would, among other factors, take into account the position of Greece in NATO, the strategic aspects of the problem, relationships with the Greek Government, and the traditional friendship for the Greek people. We were also watching constitutional progress and, as the Ambassador knew, had to reckon with certain elements of U.S. public opinion on this score. We would have to help each other in this matter and make progress on a reasonable basis.

\[2\] Shipments of military aid to Greece were originally suspended on April 24, 1967. (Telegram 181282 to Athens, April 24; ibid., POL 23–9 GREECE) President Johnson approved a partial resumption of assistance on October 8, 1968. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 371.

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242. Memorandum for the President’s File


SUBJECT

Early-afternoon Meeting in the President’s Office with Honorable Thomas A. Pappas (1:00–1:15 p.m.)

\[1\] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Memoranda for the President. No classification marking. Drafted by Butterfield.
Mr. Pappas and the President sat on the couches near the fire. The meeting was quite short—the following excerpts representing the essence of the conversation:

**On Greece**

Mr. Pappas—“I saw the King recently and he wanted to know what was going on at home... among the Greek people. I think the King should go back eventually, but meanwhile he should travel. It would be good for him and for the Greek people if he would travel.”

The President—“The King could do a lot for the people, psychologically, if he would go back.”

Mr. Pappas—“What Greece needs in the worst way is something like the Peace Corps. Couldn’t you send a peace corps there, Mr. President?”

The President—“I’m not sure what all we have there, Tom, but we’ll look into it.” (The President asked me to make a check on what we had in Greece at the present time and what, along the lines of a peace corps, we might be able to put there without a long delay.)

Mr. Pappas—“It would also be a wonderful gesture, Mr. President, if you would receive the Foreign Minister here in your office... just for a few moments.”

The President—“Certainly, I’d be delighted to see the Foreign Minister.”

**On Cyprus and the Greek-Turk Controversy**

Mr. Pappas—“Cyprus is a separate and very serious problem. It divides the Greeks and the Turks. The US must get the Greeks and Turks together as allies. Those are the two big problems—Cyprus first, the Turkish-Greek alliance second.

**On Italy**

Mr. Pappas—“I think there is a real danger that Italy will soon turn completely to the Left.”

The President: “Yes, I realize there is a strong Leftist element there and yet it’s strange, for they have no real economic reason for turning to the Left and Saragat impressed me as being a good man.”

**On Ambassadorial Appointments**

Mr. Pappas—“Mr. President, whom have you selected to serve as your Ambassador in Greece?”

The President—“We haven’t worked that one out yet, Tom.”

Mr. Pappas—“Well, you need the very best you can get—the very best there is for both Greece and Italy.”

Just prior to leaving the President’s office, Tom paid the President high compliments on his successful European visit, and on his recent
(crackdown) statement on students. He then asked the President if he would grant a favor—the favor being to permit him to serve later on in the year as national coordinator for all of the ethnic groups in America (referred to by Tom as “All-American Groups”). Tom said that he had hundreds of friends among the ethnic groups and that he had worked in this same area several times before. The President agreed that Tom would do a wonderful job in such a capacity and assured his visitor that he would keep the request in mind. He (the President) then turned to me and asked that arrangements be made to send an autographed picture to Tom and his wife, Bessie.

2 References are to the President’s European trip February 25–March 2, and the President’s letter to the President of the University of Notre Dame, February 24. For text of the letter, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, p. 141.

243. Memorandum of Conversation


PRESENT

The President
Henry A. Kissinger
Maj. Gen. Walters
Deputy Prime Minister Pattakos
Mr. Daniel Brewster

The Deputy Prime Minister recalled the President’s trip to Greece in 1967 as a private citizen and the good conversation they had at that time. The President said that he also recalled it. Part of the conversation

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Yellow Oval Room at the White House. Pattakos also met with Vice President Agnew and Secretary Rogers on April 1. Memoranda of those discussions are ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 GREECE and POL GREECE–US, respectively. A record of a Pattakos–Laird conversation of April 2 is in the Washington National Records Center, RG330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 72 A 6309, Greece, 121–333, 1969. A general report on Pattakos’s Washington visit is in telegram 5121 to Athens, April 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 GREECE)

2 Nixon visited Greece in June 1967 during a trip to Africa and the Middle East. He met with King Constantine and other senior leaders of the junta on June 21.
had been in the garden and part of it in the Deputy Prime Minister’s office. He later talked about his conversation with Tom Pappas.

Mr. Pattakos said that things were going well in Greece in spite of what the newspapers said. Greek policy toward the United States was frank and clear. They would continue to be friends even if the United States did nothing for them and they understood the stoppage of arms supplies. They knew the President and also knew that he was a good man. They understood what we were doing in Vietnam and realized that communism had to be fought. They, the Greeks, would fight against it even if no one helped them.

The President said there was a new Administration and we were conducting a review of our policies and programs particularly in the field of military assistance. This was being considered in the National Security Council of which Mr. Kissinger was the head. We were aware of the fact that Greece was a strong partner in NATO and had been helpful on Cyprus and other matters. In our dealings with other countries we were principally involved in external affairs rather than in political matters.

Mr. Pattakos repeated that Greece would stand with the United States. The U.S. was the Athens of modern times. It must be strong. He had mentioned these matters in a letter which he had written to the President. The U.S. must be strong in order to protect freedom. Greece would stand by her side. He recalled the ancient Greek soldier who had seized hold of a Persian ship and when the Persians cut off his hand he had grasped it with the other hand and then his feet and finally with his teeth at which point the Persians had cut off his head.3 He told this story to illustrate the determination of the Greeks.

The President then asked Mr. Pattakos his opinion of the attitude of the Communist world today. Mr. Pattakos said they were as dangerous as ever and would do everything they could to lull the western world into a sense of security. He told the fable of Esops in which a Lion wanted to marry a man’s daughter and the daughter was afraid of the lion so when the lion came to see the girl’s father, the father explained that the girl was afraid of the lion’s teeth and nails and that if he got rid of them then they could be married. The lion disarmed himself and when in this condition he came back to ask for the girl’s hand, the father easily killed him.4 This was what the communists were trying to do to the western world. They were using the students as a spearhead. They were only children, smoked marijuana and had little

3 Reference is to an elaboration on a story found in Herodotus.
4 Pattakos was apparently melding together Aesop’s story of Androkles and the Lion with other Greek fables.
sense of reality. One should not pay attention to them but rather to the real danger of communism which was still seeking to conquer the world. The Deputy Prime Minister fired a blast at exiled Greek politico Andreas Papandreou, saying that he was a complete political eccentric and somewhat deranged. He was against everything and for nothing. Reaffirming Greece’s determination to fight communism and support the United States Mr. Pattakos took his leave of the President.

244. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
Call on the Secretary by King Constantine of the Hellenes—U.S.-Greek Relations

PARTICIPANTS
His Majesty King Constantine of the Hellenes
Ambassador Leonidas Papagos, Marshal of the Court
The Secretary
Suart W. Rockwell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for NEA
H. Daniel Brewster, Country Director for Greece

The Secretary asked the King for his assessment of the situation in Greece and prospects for its future. The King described the steps he had taken while in Greece to move the GOG toward constitutionalism. He underlined the fact that he had never signed the decree abolishing the 1951 constitution and had insisted on the early appointment of a drafting committee for a new constitution made up of eminent jurists. The constitution had been voted on by referendum in September 1968 but no date for elections has been fixed. The Regent was appointed for a period until elections were held or until the King returned on the basis of an agreement with the Greek Government.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL GREECE–US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Brewster and approved in S on April 7. King Constantine and Pattakos both attended the funeral of former President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Pattakos was the official representative of the Greek Government. In a March 29 memorandum to Kissinger, Walsh noted “that the King’s visit to the United States carried the enthusiastic endorsement of Foreign Minister Pipinelis. We therefore see no alternative to Constantine’s being accorded the treatment appropriate to his position, which is that of Chief of State of Greece.” (Ibid., POL 6–2 US/EISENHOWER)
The King then briefly described his meeting on March 31 with Deputy Prime Minister Pattakos which had taken place at the Greek Embassy. In response to Mr. Pattakos’ statement that the King should not press for his return to Greece, the latter had replied he was not pushing for this, but thought he and the government should now start talking about the future of Greece. The King was surprised to hear Mr. Pattakos say that it was not possible for the Greek Government representatives to meet with the King because if this became public the government would be overthrown. The King had nonetheless asked Mr. Pattakos to tell Prime Minister Papadopoulos that he still felt it would be useful for the two of them to meet. The King observed that the Prime Minister was under the strong control of the younger officers in the junta. The King also sensed that the Prime Minister was worried as to what the younger officers might do if Papadopoulos should win any eventual elections.

The Secretary asked for the King’s views on what the U.S. attitude should be towards the Greek Government. The King responded that the U.S. should keep up strong pressures for constitutional evolution, because if there was no pressure on the Greek Government, it would just play for time, stay in power a long while, and continue the process of removing senior army officers. It would also take advantage of any opportunity to enhance its image, such as the fact that the President had had a private meeting with Mr. Pattakos at the White House reception but not with himself.

The Secretary noted that there was a limit as to what the USG should and could do in this regard. The USG had repeatedly been asked to become involved on different sides of international problems, (e.g., the Nigerian-Biafran issue) and the USG was very reluctant to do this. It would be inappropriate to become involved in what was a domestic matter. The Secretary continued that the USG respects the King’s role as Chief of State and the importance of having a strong Greece as a member of the NATO alliance. This stance poses a dilemma for the United States on the issue of deliveries of military equipment to Greece.

The King stated that the Greek Government needs the equipment both for military strength and also for psychological reasons. He suggested the USG tell the Greek Government that it should either implement the constitution fully or there would be no military aid. He added that the Greek Government is extremely sensitive to United States views. Such a posture on military aid would also help the rest of the army who would then realize that the USG meant to link constitutional evolution to military aid.

The Secretary responded that we would be reluctant to tie our assistance to a NATO partner strictly to Greece’s internal affairs. He added, however, that we had made clear to Greek Government officials that
we expected progress on implementing the Greek constitution and restoring civil liberties and that this had been our posture for the past 23 months.

Mr. Rockwell said that the question of the relationship between the King and the Greek Government was obviously a significant factor in the Greek problem. With regard to our military aid policy, it looked as if the Greek Government was not prepared to give up the essence of its position in exchange for military equipment. The Greek Government believes it has a mission to accomplish and does not seem prepared to make basic adjustments in its policies simply to obtain military aid. It is proceeding at its own speed. Mr. Rockwell’s personal view was that pressures from within Greece would require the Greek Government in time to adjust its policies in a desirable manner. This would not happen overnight, and was something to be worked out between Greeks, including the King and the Government. The United States could not do this. The King dissented, saying that in another year the Government’s control would be so tight that it could act as it pleased toward the Greek people. Only United States pressure could prevent this.

The Secretary noted that it was very difficult to put the question of MAP deliveries bluntly in terms of “either you do what we want or you do not receive MAP.” We wanted to see Greece progress to constitutionalism but at the same time did not want to see Greece weakened militarily as a NATO ally. Although we had a basic interest in political evolution and constitutional development in Greece, we questioned whether our voice could be decisive in achieving these objectives. It was our policy not to intervene in domestic matters of this sort, and it must be for the King and the Greek Government to work out the political future of Greece.

The King said he now understood our policy and if this had been made clear to him when he was in Washington in September 1967, he might not have undertaken his action of December 13 and would have instead stayed in Greece to continue influencing the government. He went on to say that he was in touch with other Greek leaders abroad about steps to move things back to political normalcy. He hoped that whatever decision was reached by the USG regarding U.S. policy in dealing with the Greek Government, and particularly on the question of military deliveries, might be conveyed to him. He wanted to be sure to be in step with whatever the USG was planning because his actions would be affected in large measure by the United States stance. The

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2 See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968,* volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 301.
Secretary noted this request but made no commitment that it would be feasible to meet it.³

³ In an April 4 memorandum for the files, Brewster noted a “delicate matter” that the King raised with Rogers. The King expressed deep regret that he was not given a private audience with President Nixon, like all other heads of state at the Eisenhower funeral. Complicating the situation, Pattakos had a private meeting with the President. The King told Rogers of “the great psychological problems the Greeks were having these days, and the control being exercised by the Greek Government.” The King regretted that the Greek people would read significance into the President’s slight against him. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 GREECE)

245. Memorandum of Conversation¹


PARTICIPANTS
   Panayotis Pipinelis, Foreign Minister of Greece
   Christian X. Palamas, Ambassador of Greece
   Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
   Mr. Harold H. Saunders

The conversation opened with a brief exchange of remarks on the President’s briefing of the morning’s NATO meeting.² That led to the Foreign Minister’s saying that Greece is fully prepared to accept its obligation in NATO regardless of what help it does or does not get from the others. Dr. Kissinger commended that position.

The Foreign Minister felt that Greece is an important island of stability in the midst of serious change on either side. He said he is deeply concerned about the leftist movements in both Turkey and Italy. He felt that Italy is rapidly approaching the condition of Greece two or three years ago.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office at the White House. Drafted by Saunders on April 22. Pipinelis was attending the NATO Ministerial meeting April 10–11.

² Apparent reference to President Nixon’s address to the NATO meeting April 10. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 272–276. The President’s Daily Diary indicates he attended the NATO meeting from 2:06 to 2:50 p.m. and delivered remarks. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)
Dr. Kissinger asked what the situation in Greece is today. The Foreign Minister spoke of the energy and dedication of the present Government. He noted that, despite criticism from the outside, and despite perhaps a lack of sophistication on the part of the present government, it is made up of men who deeply believe in their mission of reform, eliminating corruption and simplifying administration. They are moving gradually back toward elections but they will take time.

Dr. Kissinger asked under what circumstances the King might return. The Foreign Minister said that is up to the Government. He suggested, however, that the King’s return would probably coincide with the ultimate holding of elections.

The Foreign Minister then said that the King had regretted that he had not had a chance to meet with the President. Dr. Kissinger explained the “technical difficulty” since the President had had to limit himself to seeing heads of Government. He assured the Foreign Minister, however, that the President had “the highest personal regard” for the King. He said he himself had called the King to convey this regard before the King had departed and he had told the King that if he were to come to the United States on a private visit a meeting on a private basis could be arranged with the President. However, we just could not be in a position of being put in the middle of current political maneuvering in Greece. If the Government of Greece had asked us to receive the King, that would have been an entirely different proposition.

The Foreign Minister picked up this point and said that he felt it is not productive for the U.S. Government to continue to press the present Government for an early return to full constitutional Government. He noted that the Vice President and officials in the State Department had continued to press this point and that the question of continued U.S. military assistance to Greece had become involved in it. He suggested that the U.S. Government should help its NATO partner with military assistance regardless of its political system. Dr. Kissinger said that he could report categorically that the policy of the President is for the United States not to involve itself in the political affairs of other countries. There was one qualification to that—when the political affairs of Greece became an issue which others in NATO used to weaken the alliance, then we had to take account of that. For the most part, the policy of the President is for the U.S. to concern itself only with the foreign policy of another country.

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3 Memoranda of Pipinelis’s conversations with Richardson, April 9, and with Agnew, April 11, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 GREECE and POL GREECE-US, respectively. The Department sent the Embassy in Athens an account of Pipinelis’s visit to Washington in telegram 56393 to Athens, April 12. (Ibid.)
Dr. Kissinger in an exchange of pleasantries said that when he had visited Greece, he had concluded that perhaps the U.S. and Greece should exchange political leaders. Our leaders are pragmatists and Greece has many practical problems to be solved. The leaders of Greece are men who like to operate in terms of wide vision and the United States could use some of that.

The conversation ended with Dr. Kissinger’s reassurance of the President’s policy.

246. National Security Study Memorandum 52

Washington, April 26, 1969.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
Military Aid Policy Toward Greece

The President has requested a review of our current military aid policy toward Greece.

The President has directed that a study be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East which presents arguments pro and con on the resumption of full military assistance.

This study should include an assessment of the present political situation in Greece as it affects U.S. interests.

This study should be forwarded to the Review Group by May 16.

Henry A. Kissinger

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–150, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 52. Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
247. Letter From the Chargé d’Affaires in Greece (McClelland) to the Country Director for Greek Affairs (Brewster)¹

Athens, April 28, 1969.

Dear Dan:

Arch and I have reapplied ourselves over the week-end to the important question raised in your letter of April 14th,² and reiterated in your telephone call of Friday,³ of whether continuing the current U.S. policy of withholding delivery of suspended MAP items can still serve to impel the GOG to make more rapid and genuine progress toward representative government.

In summary, it is our conclusion that, whereas we can probably extract some further short-range, tactical mileage from a continuation of this policy (i.e. until a new Ambassador arrives and has been able to assess the situation, in other words, for perhaps another 3 months), we believe this would be unlikely over the longer range to have any appreciable effect on the pace and nature of internal political evolution in Greece. As was noted in NEA/GRK’s succinct March “Memorandum for the President” on the subject of “Policy on Military Deliveries to Greece”: “the Regime clearly...is not prepared to make basic concessions in return for a lifting of the arms suspension.” Persisting with suspension would moreover retain all the inherent disadvantages of this policy.⁴

A second part of our conclusion—and we regard this as an important concomitant—is that by abandoning the MAP withholding policy, we do not necessarily need at the same time to abandon significant leverage over the GOG which could be exerted in other ways. We believe that this conclusion is reinforced by recent evidence, in particular the exaggerated interpretation in the controlled Greek press of the significance of Pattakos’ visit, and to a lesser extent that of Pipinelis and General Angelis,⁵ to Washington, together with the disproportionate reaction to the seemingly minor Viewpoint episode,⁶ that it is

¹ Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 75 D 227, U.S. Policy Towards Greece. Secret; Official-Informal.
² Not found.
³ No record of this conversation on April 25 was found.
⁴ The Department of State memorandum was not found. The President ordered a study of military aid to Greece on April 26; see Document 246.
⁵ Angelis accompanied Pipinelis to Washington April 9–11. A memorandum of his conversation with the Vice President is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL GREECE-US.
⁶ This USIA publication had printed an article critical of the Greek junta.
not so much the intrinsic military content of the suspension policy (although this obviously plays some part) as it is the psychological evidence of political disapproval on the part of the U.S. which the withholding of arms represents, that exerts the real pressure on the GOG. It should be feasible, we think, to exercise such pressure, if perhaps less tangibly, through other means and avoid the obvious dilemma of simultaneously depriving the Greeks of the means of defending themselves which the fulfillment of their NATO commitments requires.

We therefore believe that while a restoration of the MAP items should take place after a suitable interval, it ought to be accompanied by some very specific political and psychological conditions. The principal of these is that it should be made clear to the GOG that the USG will not countenance any public acclaim of this action on their part as evidence of unqualified USG approval of the domestic political policies of the GOG. We would stipulate that when the decision is made to restore the balance of the MAP, the USG will issue a statement, as we did in October 1968, to the effect that this action is primarily motivated by military considerations and is unrelated to the Greek domestic political situation. The USG’s position in this respect remains one of continuing concern and of advocating more genuine and rapid progress toward constitutional normalcy and representative government. Arch and I believe that by following this course we could retain the essential advantages of keeping the GOG under psychological pressure to improve its political performance and also avoid the various disadvantages of continuing the MAP suspension policy.

As we have all previously recognized, there are several of these of a serious practical nature: the undercutting of the military effectiveness of the Greek armed forces; prejudicing joint planning with the United States; encouraging the GOG to acquire non-compatible equipment elsewhere; the diversion of limited resources from economic development; and possibly, risking restrictions on the free use of U.S. military facilities in Greece. Even more important, we believe that shifting our pressure from the questionable grounds of withholding military equipment to the diplomatic and psychological arena would avoid the danger of alienating the Greek military leadership (i.e. Angelis, Tsoumbas, Kostakos, Margaritis and Co.). Under present conditions the only potential source of meaningful internal pressure on the GOG toward political change is the Greek armed forces. We have every interest therefore of keeping them on our side. Supplying them with the weapons

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7 At the October 21, 1968, daily briefing, Department of State Spokesman Robert McCloskey read a statement that certain types of military aid were being restored to Greece in light of NATO requirements and recent events in Eastern Europe (a reference to the crisis in Czechoslovakia).
they need to play an honorable and effective role in the defense of their national territory is an indispensable part of this aim. One of the critical aspects of the MAP withholding policy has indeed been its implicit affront to Greek military pride. If handled discriminately, this tactic can be effective, up to a point, but if carried too far, without really convincing justification, it could end by being seriously counterproductive. You know the arguments the Greek military put forward: “You Americans obviously fear the Russians as do we, so why do you cut off our weapons?”, or the invidious conclusion: “Your actions clearly reveal that you do not consider the Greek officer corps sufficiently trustworthy to refrain from using these weapons against their own people.” In addition, permitting the Greek military establishment to fall notably behind that of Turkey could have highly undesirable repercussions by prejudicing the current painstaking effort to improve Greek-Turkish relations.

We therefore believe that an important adjunct to the foregoing tactic would be to make clear to the Greek military leadership, as distinct from Papadopoulos & Co., that whereas we are restoring our arms deliveries in recognition of the value of Greece’s NATO role, this action has considerably strained domestic political tolerances in the United States and does not at all signify uncritical acceptance of the GOG’s internal policies. The Greek military should be informed that we will accordingly continue to press for a return to constitutional government. Here one could adopt the line that the failure of Greece to return to democratic practices increases the prospect of internal political instability which, in turn, tends to make Greece a less reliable strategic ally of the U.S. and in NATO. While we shall obviously have to be very careful in any such attempt to drive a wedge, however subtly, between the Greek armed forces and the “Colonels,” it should undoubtedly be considered as a possible policy instrument.

In support of the psychological aspects of a policy of restoring the MAP and disassociating it from political performance, I have always felt, as you know, Dan (without, I’ll admit, any very profound insight into the Greek psyche), that one is on firmer psychological grounds with a Greek in manifesting friendship and trust toward him than in treating him in a manner which casts doubt on his personal reliability. This is doubtless part of the old, if overused, business of “philotimo.”8 Having given concrete evidence of such confidence, it seems to me that one is then in a stronger position to criticize, with some expectation that the Greek will listen to, and possibly even accept such advice. At least the chances of his resenting it would appear to be less. I suspect, on the other hand, that the Greek also responds to the Middle Eastern

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8 Dignity, self-esteem, or sense of honor. Literally “love of honor.”
“carpet trading” approach; but I’ll have to rely on the last analysis on your superior familiarity with the Greek character to judge which technique is the best.

Another advantage of the course we recommend of restoring the MAP but also making quite clear that this does not imply acceptance, let alone approval, of the GOG’s domestic policies, is that it would retain many of the favorable features of the old withholding policy. We should clearly begin by disabusing the proponents of the present suspension policy of the notion that withholding MAP weapons has had any appreciable effect on the ability of the GOG to carry out a policy of internal repression. The GOG has always had more than enough of the type of weapons necessary for this purpose. By making clear that the resumption of full MAP deliveries does not imply political approval, we should be able to satisfy the domestic critics of this move within the United States (i.e. in Congress, the press and the intellectual community), as well as internationally in the ranks of our NATO partners.

If anything has driven home to me, Dan, the almost pathetic eagerness of the present GOG for evidence of U.S. approval, it has been the exaggerated lengths to which their controlled press went in attempting to interpret the fact that high officials in Washington were willing politely to receive, listen, and talk to Pattakos as conclusive evidence of unequivocal U.S. acceptance of the present GOG and all its works. Conversely, the disproportionately sharp reaction over the rather minor evidence of U.S. disapproval which the publication in the USIS’s Viewpoint Bulletin of the Department’s fairly mild effort to set the record straight brought home with equal force, and in a context unrelated to MAP policy, the GOG’s acute unhappiness over any public U.S. censure. One is frankly at a loss to understand why it is that a regime which is so relatively firmly in the saddle and not seriously threatened by any organized internal or external opposition, manifests such patent insecurity. One wonders what in the world might happen were the President of the U.S., for example, to issue a resounding official condemnation of the Greek regime. This almost lends credence to Andreas Papandreou’s contention that the junta would collapse as a result!

From our Athens vantage point we are not in a position to estimate how serious the flak would be which the Executive Branch would run into on the Hill in restoring the suspended MAP items or, indeed, how willing and able the White House might be at the present time to accept the repercussions. In the declining days of the past Administration, the Executive Branch was unwilling to incur these risks. If I recall correctly the substance of the position Mr. Katzenbach took in a memorandum to the President on the subject, the Department feared that the entire Foreign Aid bill might be jeopardized if it pressed for a restoration of full military deliveries to Greece. From what we hear
now, however, I gather that Congressional opposition on this score is perhaps not quite so strong or vociferous as it was in the past, although we’ve had quite a spate of antagonistic press stuff of late and have not noted any reluctance on Senator Pell’s part to jump into the fray. Yet, with the increasingly unstable condition of the Middle East, the continuing Soviet pressure on Czechoslovakia and the augmentation of the Russian fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean, I should think we could put up a strong case at this time for maintaining cooperative military relations with Greece.

I hope that these recommendations, Dan, will be of value to you in attempting to devise a workable alternative to our current unsatisfactory MAP policy toward Greece.

With all the best to you.

Sincerely,

Roswell D. McClelland

PS. I enclose an excellent memorandum of Arch Blood’s which serves to underpin the central recommendations of this letter and corroborate the essential arguments which I have advanced.

George Warren, with whom this has also been discussed, is in basic agreement with our views.

RDM

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9 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
10 Attached but not printed.

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248. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh)


SUBJECT

Appointment for Andreas Papandreou

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 30–2 GREECE. Confidential. Drafted by Brewster and cleared by Handley.
I have just heard that Henry Kissinger telephoned you to report that he has had a request to receive Andreas Papandreou. I have weighed all the pertinent factors and decided on balance not to receive him.

Although I basically believe in maintaining an open-door policy on receiving visitors, this case seemed very special. Mr. Papandreou has attacked the U.S. role in Greece in public statements on a number of occasions. He might exploit an appointment to bolster his standing among potential Greek émigré leaders. He is a controversial person who, as head of the Pan-Hellenic Liberation Movement, last year entered into an agreement with a known Greek Communist, Mr. Brillakis. We estimate the majority of Greek-American opinion in this country is unsympathetic to Mr. Papandreou. The Greek regime at this point would be very sensitive to any recognition given by the Department or the White House to Mr. Papandreou.

I strongly believe that we should hold to the same line at State and at the White House on this subject. I would appreciate it if you would convey State's position on this matter to Mr. Kissinger.

2 According to a May 8 memorandum from Saunders to Moose: “Larry Eagleburger . . . requested . . . [a] memorandum for the sole purpose of having the State Department recommendation in the file here. HAK has already decided not to see Papandreou.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. 1 Jan 69–Oct 70) A copy of the May 7 Department of State memorandum recommending against a Papandreou meeting is ibid.

3 A handwritten notation by Sisco at the bottom of the memorandum reads: “John, assuming Secretary agrees with my companion memo.” The May 2 memorandum to Rogers outlined Sisco’s opposition to receiving Papandreou. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 GREECE)

249. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Military Sales to Greece

State Department has just about completed a memo laying out your options with regard to our continuing military aid program in Greece. However, there is one action that must be taken before the end of the fiscal year if we are to take full advantage of the funds appropriated for the FY 69 program.

As you know, our shipments of major military aid items were suspended after the April 1967 coup. Spare parts and non-major items (like trucks) continued to flow.

Last fall the Johnson Administration in a one-shot decision released about 40% of the equipment that had been withheld. This 40% consisted mainly of aircraft and a few ships. Items for the army which could be associated with political repression, such as tanks, were withheld. All of this was funded from grant military aid.

Now there is a possibility of concluding a $20 million sales agreement for equipment other than that on the suspended list—the spares and other items that were never cut off. This money is available from FY 69 appropriated funds but will have to be allocated before June 30 if it is to be used.

We would not bother you with this issue except for the Reuss Amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act. This states the sense of Congress that foreign military sales authorized under the Act shall not be approved where they would have the effect of arming "military dictators who are denying social progress to their people." The Amendment states that the President may waive this limitation if he determines that it would be important to the security of the United States.

In the future, we may decide on procedures under which you would personally make such determinations. For the moment, since this is a "sense of Congress" amendment, it is possible for State Department to make this finding. However, because of the political sensitivity of the military aid to Greece, we want to put the issue to you.

We can go in one of three directions in our Greek military aid program:

Option 1: Cut it off altogether. This would mean, in addition to maintaining suspension of major items, even cutting off the flow of non-major items which has gone on uninterrupted. Congressional liberals and friends of the Greek politicians silenced or exiled by the military government urge us to disassociate ourselves completely from the military government by totally suspending our military aid relationship. Even this sale of non-major equipment would meet some objections in

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2 For the response to NSSM 52, see Documents 256 and 257.
the Congress. The Reuss Amendment was written in response to these pressures. While such pressures do not seem to dominate the Congress, they are strong enough to prompt an effort to tighten restrictions, perhaps extending them to the grant aid program as well this year. At least, we may get some Congressional criticism from going ahead with this sale.

Option 2: Shipping non-major items but continuing the suspension of major items. This means continuing both the basic flow of non-major items and completing shipment of the major items released from the suspended list last fall—but not releasing anything more from the list. The rationale for maintaining the partial suspension last fall was to indicate our continuing displeasure over the slow pace at which the military government is moving back toward constitutional government. The rationale of the past Administration in trying to keep some pressure on the military government was to respond in some way to Congressional critics of the program while at the same time trying to maintain our NATO relationship with Greece.

Option 3: Resumption of full military aid. Since January 20, the Greek Government has mounted a persistent campaign to persuade us to remove the pressure for return to constitutional government and to resume a full military aid program. The Greek Foreign Minister argued this case when he was here for the NATO meetings; Deputy Prime Minister Pattakos stated the argument to you at the time of General Eisenhower’s funeral; and Prime Minister Papadopoulos has written you urging it.4 In NATO terms this makes sense, but in deciding on this course, we would have to consider its effect on all of those here and in Western Europe who are pressing to have Greece suspended from its formal membership in European organizations.

I believe the real choice is between options 2 and 3 above. This choice will be the main subject of the NSC paper that will be coming to you in a few weeks. No one in the Executive Branch has recommended that we cut off our military supply program altogether. Although this is obviously in the minds of some of the Congressional critics of our maintaining a working tie with the military government, the majority of Congress seems to recognize the need to maintain that tie.

I lay these options out in this way because your acquiescence in this sale will foreclose option 1—the choice of cutting off even the supply of spares and non-major items which has never been interrupted. It would commit us to continue the flow of at least $20 million in spares

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4 See Documents 243 and 245. The text of Papadopoulos’s April 4 letter to the President and Nixon’s June 3 non-committal reply were transmitted in telegram 90814 to Athens, June 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL GREECE)
and non-major items. I believe we have to do at least this much in order to preserve our NATO relationship with Greece, but you should be aware that there are those in the Congress who would prefer our getting out of the military aid business altogether in Greece.

Recommendation: That you concur in the finding that it is important to our security to maintain at least this minimal military aid relationship with Greece. Budget Bureau concurs. Then we shall hold a full-scale review for you of the choice between options 2 and 3.\(^5\)

\(^5\) The President drew a line through the approval/disapproval lines and wrote: “RN—approves option 3.”

250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece\(^1\)

Washington, June 19, 1969, 0143Z.

100283. 1. Ambassador Palamas paid farewell call on Sisco June 17.\(^2\)

2. Sisco, saying he anticipates questions during his forthcoming testimony before Congressional committees, asked how Palamas would describe developments in Greece. Palamas replied that so far GOG has kept its promises and accomplished quite a bit in two years. It has stopped drift toward communism, preserved institution of monarchy in spite of King’s counter-coup, and a new democratic constitution has been adopted which strikes balance between individual freedoms and state authority. Constitution is being applied although some articles remain suspended. It will be applied in full when implementing legislation is ready. But, said Palamas, one must have no illusions that all can be as it was before. It may be for example that the Army will undertake to engage directly in politics. Those critical of present regime should keep in mind that if present regime should go, it could be replaced by regime which those who dislike present regime would like even less. US would be well advised to avoid interference in Greek affairs.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL GREECE–US. Confidential. Drafted by Vigderman on June 17; cleared in draft by Rockwell; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, USNATO, USDOCOSOUTH, and by pouch to Nicosia and Ankara.

\(^2\) Palamas was returning to Greece to assume the post of Deputy Foreign Minister.
3. To Sisco’s question about election prospects, Palamas replied that those who press the government for elections are committing themselves to the consequences. Elections could involve a disruption of discipline which might in turn bring consequences which those who insist on elections would not appreciate.

4. To Sisco’s question about the attitude of Greek people toward regime, Palamas replied that it is passive on the whole. One can understand this passivity when one considers situation which prevailed before. Fact remains economic situation is good, prices stable, social progress being made.

5. Sisco pointed out that if moving swiftly toward parliamentary democracy might cause disruption, moving slowly created difficulties in terms of the regime’s gaining general support. Palamas responded that the present situation ought to be satisfactory to the U.S. and NATO. GOG had avoided war with Turkey. In fact relations with Turks had improved. No other GOG could have accomplished this. Palamas warned that if the present stability were to break down it would be much worse for everyone.

6. Sisco asked what problems would be posed by free elections. Palamas responded that the problem would be to contain the communist effort at disruption and to gain advantage from elections. The danger lies not with the 10 to 15 per cent of the Greeks who are the hard core support of the communist party but rather with those who cooperate with communists, concealing themselves under other labels.

7. Rockwell asked whether the GOG satisfied with American policy, apart from question of suspension of some military assistance. Palamas responded that U.S. military assistance policy very troublesome indeed. This apart, GOG feels wounded by unfairness of obloquy cast on it by such developments as recent article on torture in Greece in Look magazine. In general, though, he thought that US policy on right track, alleging particularly that Pattakos had been told on occasion of recent visit to Washington that US policy towards Greece was one of non-interference and cooperation with NATO partner, leaving Greek domestic problems for Greeks to solve. Palamas added that the restoration of military aid would eliminate last obstacle to cordial relations.

8. Sisco noted that certain elements in U.S. proposed simple solution—cut off aid to Greece and thus cause GOG to topple. Palamas responded this a childish conception. Reaction in Greece would be strong, particularly on the part of the Army which would then have to consider other alternatives. Attempting topple existing regime would be bad for Greece, bad for US and bad for NATO. Sisco then noted oth-

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ers suggested US should manifest its displeasure toward GOG by not helping it in the UN, condemning its behavior, and taking every occasion to say publicly that we were pressuring GOG to reform. Palamas said this would alienate GOG, shake its stability, reinforce communists.

9. In parting shot Palamas noted that Karamanlis still held great prestige but he doubted whether Karamanlis would move so long as he had to count so much on support of “foreign factors.”

Rogers

251. Memorandum From the President’s Military Aide (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT

Foreign Military Sales to Greece

1. The memorandum you sent to the President (Tab B)² mentioned the three general options we have in military assistance policy for Greece:
   a. cut it off altogether;
   b. ship non-major items but continue the suspension of major items;
   c. resume full military aid.

2. Your memo simply asked the President to eliminate “option a” and to concur in a credit sale of non-major items (which would be part of “option b”). The memo stated that we would leave the choice between staying at option b and going on to option c for the NSC Review which we now have scheduled for the last half of July. Nevertheless, the President jumped to option c.

3. After talking with Hal Saunders about this, I conclude that we should allow the NSC paper to come forward as scheduled. In the meantime, however, it is clear that the President is quite willing to see us go ahead with credit sale of non-major items. Since that is the only

² Document 249.
subject we addressed in this memo, I suggest that we consider the President’s response an approval of this limited action.

4. It is important that we respond to State’s memo of June 11 (Tab C) quickly so that negotiation of this sale can be completed before the end of the fiscal year. Only if we meet that deadline can we take advantage of the funds still available under the Foreign Military Sales Act which expires June 30.

Recommendation: That you sign the memo at Tab A.

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3 Attached but not printed. In it the Department found that the Greek regime was a military dictatorship within the meaning of the Reuss amendment, but recommended that continued military sales to Greece were important to U.S. security.

4 Attached but not printed. The June 23 memorandum, addressed to John Walsh of the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State, informed the Department “to proceed as proposed in your [June 11] memorandum. The President agrees that the sale proposed is important to our security.”

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252. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Vice President Agnew


SUBJECT

Your Letter on Prime Minister Papadopoulos’ Concerns

I hope you will excuse the delay in replying to your interesting July 1 letter, but I did not receive it until July 9.2 With regard to the points you report in that letter:

1. On the reply to Papadopoulos’ letter to the President, it is possible that your informant talked with Papadopoulos before he had received the President’s reply. But as you see from the President’s letter (attached),3 it was sent June 3, more than a month ago.

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2 Not printed. In it Agnew passed along observations from a “prominent Greek-American businessman” who had returned from Greece after having five conversations with Papadopoulos. (Ibid.) A July 3 letter from McClelland to Vigderman indicates the businessman was Tom Pappas. (Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 71 D 509, Correspondence To and From Athens)

3 Not printed. See footnote 4, Document 249.
2. As far as the Prime Minister’s offense at our not appointing an Ambassador is concerned, we understand the special reason for his concern. The appointment of an Ambassador will be seen by all Greeks as a US endorsement of the junta—which he wants—whether we intend it to be or not. He must know that his opposition is urging us to withhold the appointment to show displeasure with his government. The fact of the matter is that it has simply taken time to find the right man, as has been the case in several other important posts.

3. On Papadopoulos’ desire to have an arms decision in the very near future, we are close to such a decision. The arms policy issue is scheduled for the NSC Review Group in mid-August and would go to the President as soon afterward as we can arrange for NSC discussion. Meanwhile, the President approved a sale of $20 million in equipment at the end of June.4

4. Papadopoulos’ offer of a timetable for elections is interesting.5 I would suggest that we discuss how to handle this and other informal approaches of this kind in the context of our NSC review.

5. Sending a high level official to talk to Papadopoulos could be useful, depending on what posture the President decides to take in the course of our NSC review. We can discuss this during that review as well.

I shall be glad to discuss this subject further with you whenever you wish.

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4 See Documents 249 and 251.
5 The sentence under reference in the Vice President’s letter reads: “The Prime Minister told our business contact that he is willing to provide President Nixon with a timetable for elections, and that he would hold to such a timetable, but that his intentions in this regard must be kept a secret so that he can effectively rule the country in the interim period.”
253. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT: Your Query About Effectiveness of Greek Forces

You asked about a statement in the Christian Science Monitor that “the Greek army no longer exists as a stable, organized force in being. It is divided and humiliated and its effectiveness as an instrument of the Greek nation is broken.”

Attached is the Defense Intelligence Agency’s judgment that except for problems resulting partly from our suspension of arms, “there is no indication that any of the Greek Armed Forces have had their capabilities degraded as a result of the internal political situation.”

CIA feels that there may be some damage to morale because of Junta interference with the officer corps, but that this would make little difference in a foreign war and has not affected the basic capability of the army.

State feels that the army might even be more effective than before the coup, because the junta has removed some dead wood at the top.

Stories like that in the Monitor appear regularly and often seem generated by anti-junta expatriates.

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2 August 28, 1969.

3 Attached but not printed.
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Message from King Constantine

Tom Evans in the attached memo has passed on to you a message from King Constantine. The King requests that the newly appointed Ambassador to Greece stop off for a chat with the King on his way through Rome. Constantine argues that this would not upset the Military Government in Athens because the Ambassador will be presenting his credentials to a Regent who is the King’s representative in Athens. (Tab A)

I will take no action unless you disagree.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files, Middle East—Greece, Vol. 1 Jan 69–Oct 70. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted by Saunders on September 23. A notation on the memorandum indicates it was returned on October 6. In a note attached to Saunders’s copy of this memorandum, Haig commented: “HAK—This looks like more dynamite. I suspect we should thank this fellow and tell him to let it drop.” Kissinger minuted: “I agree. HK” (Ibid., Saunders Subject Files, Box 1234, Greece 6/1/69–9/30/69)

2 Not printed. Evans’s discussion with the King took place at a dinner party in Copenhagen, Denmark during the last week of July.

3 Henry J. Tasca. The Senate confirmed his appointment on December 20, 1969.
255. Letter From the Chargé d’Affaires in Greece (McClelland) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rockwell)\(^1\)

Athens, September 25, 1969.

Dear Stuart:

I have understandably been doing some thinking lately about Ambassador Tasca’s forthcoming arrival and the conduct of our relations with Greece thereafter. Since I know you’ll be involved in briefing him, and since the Greek NSC papers on which Alfred [Vigderman], and others, have been working in NEA/GRK strike me as having become unnecessarily tortuous and complicated, I thought perhaps it might be helpful to share my own, somewhat less complex thoughts with you.

There are two facets to the matter: policy and tactics. Under policy, as you well know, the two main issues are: the nature of our future military assistance to Greece, and constitutional advancement within the country. On the policy side, I continue to believe rather strongly that our best course would be to de-link military assistance from the question of internal political progress. For having examined the issue pretty exhaustively, I believe that the advantages of this course considerably outweigh the disadvantages, and that it should be possible to overcome the latter. The most compelling argument, to my mind, is that the MAP suspension policy has not been successful and has not produced the political evolution it was intended to promote. It helped, perhaps, at the outset, to prod the Junta into drafting the new Constitution; but there has been almost no genuine forward movement since that time.

Continuing the suspension, on the other hand, has had a number of increasingly adverse consequences. The most obvious one is that it progressively undermines the credibility of the Greek military deterrent in NATO. Less apparent, perhaps, is its tendency to alienate ranking Greek military officers whose good-will we may well need at some future stage of developments here. Although Greek “philotimo” is a frequently overdone national trait, it is nonetheless true that denying responsible Greek officers the weapons they need to fulfill their NATO obligations (which they take seriously), including the invidious implication they can’t be trusted not to use them internally on the Greek people, has a particularly devastating psychological effect. General Angelis is a strong case in point. In my brief experience of dealing with

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL GREECE–US. Secret; Official–Informal. A copy was sent to Vigderman.
Greeks, one of the most important things is to manifest friendliness, if not affection, toward them. If this sort of rapport has been established, it is then possible to be much more critical with a correspondingly greater chance that such criticism will be heeded and accepted. Another element of this equation which is seldom mentioned is the risk of allowing the Turkish MAP to get disproportionately out of line with the Greek one. The continued suspension of tanks, in particular, is having this result. The potentially adverse impact of this state of affairs on Greek-Turkish relations, and on the Cyprus problem, needs no elaboration. The Greeks don’t mention this one (nor do the various “pro” and “con” lists drafted in Washington), but it’s unmistakably in the back of their minds. Having very closely escaped the disaster of a Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus in November 1967, we cannot afford to relax on this score.

Naturally there are “cons” to adopting a policy of restoring the suspended MAP items. The most serious of these, in my view, is the U.S. domestic political one. You’ll recall, Stuart, that when the issue of whether to restore the balance of the Greek MAP came up at the tail end of the Johnson Administration, the decision not to do so was based on the fear that if we took such action the opponents of the present GOG on the Hill would vote against the entire Foreign Aid Bill. We accordingly adopted the “intensive review” gambit we’ve been using ever since. We in Athens do not have enough of a feel for the power relationships between the present Administration and the Congress to judge whether a comparable situation exists now with respect to Greece.

I fully recognize that restoring the MAP for Greece will have to be accompanied by some form of continued pressure on the GOG to improve its constitutional performance, not only because we believe that this is an intrinsically desirable course if Greece is to achieve political stability, but because we must maintain a satisfactory modus vivendi with the democratic opponents of the present GOG within Greece, in our own Congress, and in key NATO circles. Although I hope to obtain some clarification of this aspect of the problem from Ambassador Ellsworth when he visits us at the end of this week, I’m inclined to doubt that restoring the MAP would create serious, or at least insurmountable, difficulties in NATO. The primary purpose of this Organization, after all, is to maintain an effective defensive alliance in which

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2 For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Documents 285–322.

3 In a September 26 letter to Vigderman, McClelland reported: “We’re in the midst of Ambassador Ellsworth’s visit. He got a load of General Angelis this morning and had a good talk with Pipinelis later.” (Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 71 D 509, Correspondence To and From Athens)
Greece, willy-nilly, continues to play a necessary role. I can hardly imagine that responsible NATO member governments like the British, the Germans, and certainly the French, would tax us too severely for contributing to adequate Greek military preparedness, however unsatisfactory a government the country may have.

A U.S. decision to restore the full Greek MAP will unquestionably have to be matched by a parallel decision to make clear to the GOG that this move is based essentially on military and strategic considerations, and does not signify U.S. approval of their internal policies. (The formula we used in October 1968 of “remaining no less interested in constitutional progress” is still a perfectly useable one, in my view.) There will be no problem about doing this privately in conversation between Ambassador Tasca and Prime Minister Papadopoulos, or between the Ambassador and other ranking members of the Junta. The trick will be to get this key point over to the internal Greek Opposition and to the exercised parties in our Congress and in NATO. This might well call for a public statement, depending on whether the GOG tries to distort the significance of the decision. Or if we don’t want to go this far, there are several other means (press backgrounders, planted queries, etc.) of disseminating our position. I would personally favor a somewhat bolder and firmer stand in this respect than we have taken in the past, for, despite our frequent assertions that we continue to “press” the GOG to make democratic progress, the pressure has been largely private and pretty mild. In sum, it should not exceed our ingenuity to devise some formula which would achieve the twin purpose of getting out from under the disadvantages of continuing the MAP suspension, and at the same time of indicating forcefully that the type of friendly and cooperative relations between Greece and the United States which we desire will continue to depend on further movement in Greece toward representative government. This would be easier to do, I think, if we had signified our confidence in them militarily.

Let me turn briefly now to the tactical side of the picture. I think it’s very important that Ambassador Tasca be given the maximum leverage from the outset; and even if a decision to restore the MAP should have been taken before he arrives in Athens, this ought to be withheld temporarily from the GOG. He should indicate to them early in his talks that the final decision on this important matter will depend on the recommendations he makes to the President and Secretary of State after he has had an opportunity to review the whole question sur place. I believe the Ambassador ought, however, to be in a position to assure the Greeks that a definite decision will be reached by some specific, early date, such as December 1. I have serious misgivings about trying to string the GOG along much further, and certainly not beyond the end of the year at the latest. I would suppose, incidentally, that the business of Ambassador Tasca’s confirmation by the Senate, (given Sen-
ator Fulbright’s pronouncement), may tend to speed up the process of reaching an Executive Branch decision on the MAP question.

While I have no particular illusions that a tactic of this sort will produce notably greater political progress on the part of the GOG, it could serve to force Papadopoulos & Co. to improve somewhat on the constitutional timetable the GOG recently submitted to the Council of Europe. Although it is not yet clear whether the GOG, if the initiative fails (which it apparently will), will maintain this timetable for use in other contexts, I think they probably will do so since the Junta is no less anxious, and probably even more so, to conciliate the United States than the Council of Europe. In many ways, their relationship to the U.S. is more important to them than their relationship to an essentially parliamentary, and hence rhetorical body, like the Strasbourg organization. We should also not overlook the GOG’s concomitant offer, (related to Article 3 of the Human Rights Convention), to permit free access by the ICRC to political detainees in Greece. It is curious that this almost equally significant offer was not conveyed to us (when Grigoriades came to see the Secretary) along with the constitutional timetable but seems to have been limited mainly to Bonn. If they make good on this matter alone, it could go a long way toward improving their shabby public image in the United States and in Western Europe.

I hope you will accept these views and recommendations for what they are, Stuart: an effort to focus attention as precisely as possible on the key issues which will confront Ambassador Tasca when he takes over the management of our relations in Athens. As you know, I myself have exercised pretty much of a holding brief during this interim period, but I believe it is time we came more actively to grips with the problem. I’m afraid that from a personal standpoint, our new Ambassador’s job is not going to be either an easy or a particularly pleasant one. But he is happily a skilled professional, and this will be a great advantage.

What steps in the right direction we can prod this unattractive government into taking will be small, slow and unsatisfactory at best, but I think it’s the only course open to us since we clearly do not propose to adopt either of the extreme courses of attempting actively to displace them or of accepting them as they are. As is so often the case in our trade, the result has to be a compromise.

With my warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

Ross

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4 Pipinelis presented the timetable on August 25. It called for a multi-stage reintroduction of basic liberties to be completed with the election of a new parliament in mid-1971.

5 For text, signed September 3, 1953, see 213 UNTS 221.
256. Minutes of the National Security Council Review Group Meeting

Washington, October 2, 1969, 3:10–4:14 p.m.

SUBJECT
Military Assistance to Greece (NSSM 52)

PARTICIPATION
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
William I. Cargo
Donald McHenry
Stuart W. Rockwell
Defense
G. Warren Nutter
CIA
Edward W. Proctor
JCS
LTG F. T. Unger
OEP
Haakon Lindjord
USIA
Frank Shakespeare
Treasury
Anthony Jurich
NSC Staff
Harold H. Saunders
Robert E. Osgood
Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS
—Mr. Saunders should prepare a summary paper which would project two courses:
1. Continue present policy, or
2. Resume military deliveries.

If latter, consider two general approaches:

a. a quid pro quo approach which would lift the embargo as the Greek regime takes steps toward constitutional government; or

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

2 See Document 257.
b. resumption of full deliveries while avoiding public endorsement of the present regime.

—Scenarios will be prepared showing how Options 2a and 2b would work in practice.

—This paper will be circulated to the Review Group members who will decide whether it may be cleared for transmittal to the President for his decision or whether an NSC meeting should be held on the issue.

Mr. Kissinger opened the meeting, saying we have both a bureaucratic and a substantive problem. The bureaucratic problem was whether this issue need go to the NSC or whether, following the Review Group discussion, we could submit a memorandum to the President, subject of course to the right of appeal. He described the situation in which the U.S. has delivered $100 million in equipment under grant assistance, plus $47 million in excess stocks and $36 million in sales. We have suspended military items amounting to $52.6 million.

General Unger commented that that was generally correct.

Mr. Rockwell pointed out that we have not, in fact, made $36 million in sales.

Mr. Kissinger asked what we are proving by withholding the $52.6 million worth of equipment.

Mr. Rockwell said that following the coup we were uncertain where the new regime was heading. We were concerned about the possibility that tanks marked with American flags might be paraded through the streets of Athens by what might turn out to be a fascist government. We had arbitrarily decided to continue to furnish some spare parts and ordnance items but to hold back major items of heavy equipment including tanks, aircraft, etc. We later came to envisage the suspension of these items as a means of pressuring the government toward a more constitutional situation. He noted this had not been particularly effective.

(Mr. Kissinger was called from the meeting at this point and returned 10 minutes later. During his absence there was a general discussion of the source of the $36 million figure for sales and of possible alternative sites for U.S. bases in the Mediterranean. When he returned, Mr. Rockwell resumed.)

Mr. Rockwell said at the time of the Czech crisis\(^3\) when we were calling on our NATO allies for support, it was decided to release to Greece some military equipment directly related to its NATO responsibilities. Some equipment was still held back so as not to foreclose the

\(^{3}\) Reference is to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia August 20–21, 1968.
options of the new administration and also because of concern over congressional attitudes.

Mr. Kissinger asked why should Congress object more to release of the $52.6 million worth of equipment than they had to the $100 million worth—was it because the former included tanks?

Mr. Rockwell thought provision of this equipment was considered symbolic of the U.S. attitude toward the present regime. Those members of Congress hostile to the regime have made maintenance of the embargo a symbol of the U.S. attitude, which had had significant influence on both sides in US-Greek relations. He thought personally it would have been simpler to release all suspended items at the time of the Czech invasion.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the program goes on year after year—is it voted on year after year? How would provision of the items be noted in the Congress?

General Unger replied that there is a requirement to report deliveries of such equipment.

Mr. Rockwell said Senator Pell plans to introduce legislation that no new funds should be authorized for Greece this year on the grounds that there was ample money in the pipeline.

Mr. Kissinger asked if any other country had been treated in this way. Have we ever before used military assistance program to reform governments? Is there any precedent that military assistance is reserved for constitutional governments?

Mr. Cargo and others cited the withholding of arms from India and Pakistan, acknowledging that this was during an actual war situation, and the situation in Peru.

Mr. Rockwell noted that the State Department opposed Senator Pell’s resolution.

Mr. Kissinger commented that we do not give military aid to support governments but because a country is important to the U.S. He asked if the equipment is needed by Greece.

General Unger replied that it was.

Mr. Rockwell agreed that Greek implementation of its NATO program was held back by the fact that this equipment had been withheld.

Mr. Nutter noted animosity toward Greece among NATO countries, citing the attempt to throw Greece out of the Council of Europe, based partly on the preamble to the NATO Treaty which refers to “democratic governments,” etc.

Mr. Cargo noted that this was more a question of NATO governments reacting to political pressures than any feeling about the preamble. He agreed anti-Greek sentiment existed in Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, in Italy and the UK.
Mr. Shakespeare suggested that, in line with the President's regional policy, we might ask NATO to review the military assistance to Greece to determine whether or not it is essential.

Mr. Cargo objected that that would be a highly divisive action in NATO in this context. He thought this was generally done as a part of NATO planning activity in determining force goals. He thought this would lead to an awful row in NATO.

Mr. Rockwell confirmed that it would be putting our friends in an extremely awkward position.

Mr. Cargo added that NATO was a political instrumentality which would not produce dispassionate judgments on a matter of this kind.

Mr. Kissinger asked if this equipment was required from a military point of view.

Gen. Unger and Mr. Nutter replied that it was, and Mr. Cargo added that MAP does not even meet minimal Greek priorities.

Mr. Kissinger asked if this was a one-shot problem or a continuing problem.

Mr. Rockwell noted that of course the funds were appropriated each year and Mr. Cargo added that the political issue would arise each time.

Mr. Kissinger noted that he had been horror-stricken in the Middle East Contingency Planning exercise to learn that Greece was the only possible staging site in the Mediterranean. He asked if we were jeopardizing this by holding up these items.

Mr. Rockwell thought that the Greeks would probably not deny U.S. access to Greek facilities on the grounds that they count on us for support and that their NATO position is dependent on U.S. assistance. They would be removing a prop that they count on for their security.

Mr. Kissinger pointed out that Italy relies on us but denies us transit rights for the Phantom aircraft being delivered to Israel.

Mr. Rockwell acknowledged that the Greeks might react with one specific incident.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the Greeks might confine U.S. use of their facilities to NATO purposes. General Unger agreed it could happen.

Mr. Shakespeare asked what our situation would be in the Mediterranean in the worst circumstances.

General Unger replied we would have to rely on Turkey.

Mr. Shakespeare asked what the alternative to Turkey would be. General Unger replied “none.” Mr. Nutter added possibly Cyprus for communications.

Mr. Shakespeare noted that the left in Turkey would likely be inhospitable to the U.S. If Tunis and Wheelus go we would be down to the short hair.
General Unger agreed that the security interest is paramount.

Mr. Kissinger asked if State agreed with this and Mr. Cargo and Mr. Rockwell replied that they did.

Mr. Kissinger asked if it was true that most members of the Group were in favor of resumption of deliveries if we can find a non-costly way to do so.

Mr. Rockwell noted that, although Secretary Rogers had not focused personally on the issue, he thought State would generally favor resumption and that the question was how it should be done.

Mr. Cargo agreed.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we could eliminate options 1 (cut off all military aid and mount a campaign for return to democratic government) and 3 (continue present policy). He thought the President would not consider option 1.

Mr. Cargo said the consequences of Option 1 would be quite serious, particularly in NATO.

Mr. Rockwell confirmed that State would not advocate Option 1 which he thought would greatly increase the chances of real danger to U.S. interests. He thought, however, that some Congressional opponents, some newspapers including the New York Times, and even some in government would advocate Option 1. With regard to Option 3 he said we had been continuing our present policy in the absence of any decision to do otherwise.

Mr. Kissinger said the President then has two real choices: to continue present policy or to resume military deliveries and, in the latter event, he could choose between Options 2, 4 and 5. He asked if the paper states well the arguments for and against various options. All

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4 Reference is to options B and A in the approved paper (NSCIG/NEA 69–35) submitted by the Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia to Kissinger on September 26. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1235, Saunders Chronological File, Greek Military Supply, 1/20/69–12/31/69)

5 Kissinger is apparently referring to Option C in NSCIG/NEA 69–35: “A Two-Pronged Orchestrated Quid Pro Quo Policy.” Release of specific U.S. military equipment would be linked to specific steps taken by the Greek regime toward the restoration of representative government.

6 Kissinger is apparently referring to Option D in NSCIG/NEA 69–35, “Temporary Lifting of the Arms Embargo.” It differed from Option C in that it allowed the embargo to be re-introduced if Greece did not make measured progress toward democracy. Option 5 is presumably Option A of NSCIG/NEA 69–35, “Continuation of Present Policy,” withholding major military aid while maintaining a “cool but correct relationship with the Greek regime.” This option contemplated privately urging the Greek authorities to make good on their promises of returning to a more normal political situation without endangering the U.S. military facilities in Greece by “pushing the Greek regime into a corner.”
replied ‘yes’ except for Mr. Shakespeare who thought the paper did not state clearly enough the potential danger to U.S. interests in the Mediterranean.

General Unger submitted an additional paragraph for insertion on page 2 of the paper immediately preceding the paragraph headed “Security Interests,” which gave more emphasis to this point.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the major argument for continuing present policy is that it gives us a lever on the existing government.

Mr. Rockwell agreed, saying also this was less painful to NATO. It was, however, opposed by some of the more vociferous members of the Congress and by Greek opponents of the regime.

Mr. Kissinger asked if there wasn’t a risk that we would wind up by alienating everyone. That if we give them a substantial amount of military aid the opposition would protest while the Junta would consider we were discriminating against them.

Mr. Rockwell admitted that if we turn on the supply of tanks and heavy equipment it would be considered a sign of approval of the Greek government; however, he thought our security interests outweighed this disadvantage.

Mr. Cargo noted that the NATO problem was not too serious. NATO attitudes would not result in less support for Greece since the other NATO countries did not give assistance to Greece in any event.

General Unger commented that the NATO countries think Greece is a greater advantage to the U.S. than it is to NATO. He thought they looked on Greek and Turkish accession to NATO as a U.S. gift.

Mr. Shakespeare asked what the effect of Karamanlis’ recent statement would be.  

Mr. Rockwell said that we would have to wait to see what the political influence would be of Karamanlis’ call on the military to overthrow the present government, particularly if the King should join such a move. He noted that the government has banned publication of Karamanlis’ statement and that the Prime Minister has called a press conference.

Mr. Shakespeare noted that the VOA would have to cover the Karamanlis story if its credibility were not to be completely shot in Greece.

Mr. Kissinger asked if this could be done on a one-shot basis, and Mr. Shakespeare replied that it could.

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7 On September 30 Karamanlis issued a statement calling for the overthrow of the junta and expressed his willingness to head an interim government. For text, see Greece Under the Junta, pp. 116–118.
Mr. Rockwell thought that the regime would not be shaken to any real degree by the Karamanlis statement and General Unger noted that the possibility of a military takeover was considered in about the fourth order of probability.

Mr. Rockwell thought Karamanlis’ statement would have most effect on the older members of the army who were fairly well isolated in any event. He commented that one reason for Karamanlis’ action is the fear of the erosion of his own position as the regime becomes more entrenched.

Mr. Kissinger commented that Karamanlis’ natural appeal is not to the army.

Mr. Rockwell noted there was some discontent in the army but it was not a major issue.

Mr. Kissinger asked how we would go about implementing Option 2.

Mr. Rockwell thought this would depend a great deal on the relationship which our new Ambassador would be able to establish with the Prime Minister and the government. He thought they might cooperate with a view to easing the problems step by step.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the Greek government could afford to admit that they were changing their policies under U.S. pressure.

Mr. Rockwell replied that the government was already committed to return to constitutional government but they were in fact not meeting their stated timetable. He thought the success of Option 2 would depend on the powers of persuasion of our Ambassador.

Mr. Kissinger asked, “and if he does not succeed?”

Mr. Rockwell replied we would then have to decide whether to continue to withhold or release the suspended items.

Mr. Cargo asked if, once we had made the pitch, the Greeks do not respond, can we in fact resume deliveries?

Mr. Rockwell thought that if, indeed, the effort is a failure there would still be no reason why we could not release the equipment.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we would then be going through the option 2 exercise to quiet American domestic opinion.

Mr. Rockwell said we would be attempting to use the leverage we had to bring about advantageous political change.

Mr. Kissinger said that if, in fact, aid is given in U.S. security interests, and the result of option 2 would be no aid, we would be hurting ourselves.

Mr. Rockwell thought we might be postponing delivery of aid but it would probably eventually go, depending on the Ambassador’s view at the time.
Mr. Kissinger commented that option 2 would be an effort rather than a precise quid pro quo policy. If it fails we would probably still resume. In this regard he thought option 4 was more threatening than option 2.

General Unger thought option 4 would give the Ambassador a chance to establish rapport with the government and that it would in fact encourage the government to help us. He cited the question of F4 flights to Israel.

Mr. Kissinger asked if there were a real difference between options 2 and 4.

General Unger replied that under option 2 we might release one-third of the equipment for one Greek step, two-thirds for a second Greek step, etc.

Mr. Shakespeare commented that this would create eternal haggling over the adequacy of the steps, the timing, etc. Mr. Cargo agreed.

Mr. Kissinger asked about the time period for withholding aid. General Unger replied possibly two years, commenting that Greece and Turkey really needed the aid on a yearly basis.

Mr. Cargo thought we would get in an awful box by giving aid and then taking it away. He thought relations would deteriorate drastically.

Mr. Kissinger asked why we should go through the exercise. He thought we could not resume aid without telling someone, including the Greeks, that it is conditional. If we can’t tell anyone, then we might as well resume, with the understanding that we could always stop. Option 4 gives us a chance to tell people of the conditional nature of the resumption. Can the Greek government accept such pressure either in a public statement or in private bilateral discussions? If the government did not move quickly, would we have an obligation to stop the program? Under Option 2 the $52.6 million could trickle out. Under Option 4 he asked if the idea were to get the equipment as quickly as possible before all hell breaks loose. Once it is there, then what is there to cut off?

Mr. Nutter replied that we could of course cut off future military assistance.

Mr. Kissinger asked why not Option 2 or 5 if we wanted to go the reform route?

General Unger replied that he personally favored Option 5.

Mr. Cargo said Option 5 was unrealistic in the sense of refraining from public comment. If you do it, it would be necessary to stress U.S. security interests both to the public and to NATO. We would have to make it clear both publicly and privately to the Greeks that resumption does not constitute approval of the present regime. This would, however, fall short of saying “shape up.”
Mr. Rockwell commented that releasing the equipment without quid pro quos would be inconsistent with U.S. policy. It would not be good for our image to say that we did not urge return to constitutional government.

Mr. Nutter agreed this would produce a yearly Congressional threat.

Mr. Rockwell commented in this regard that the present Greek government is probably not permanent.

Mr. Kissinger thought this suggested Option 2. He thought the trouble with Option 4 was that in order to justify release of the equipment we may have to say things that would be more galling to the Greeks than under Option 2.

Mr. Jurich asked if under Option 2 we would specify the stages of desired improvements to the Congress? He thought this would not stop Congressional criticism since the criticism was not that rational.

Mr. Rockwell replied that if the Greeks took certain steps, we would release the equipment regardless of Congressional criticism.

Mr. Jurich asked if, given the irrational nature of the Congressional objection, would we not be better off without giving them specifics?

Mr. Shakespeare thought Option 2 was interesting in theory but would be hard to handle. He thought the public relations implications would be difficult and there would be constant arguing whether or not the Greeks had done what they were supposed to do. He thought we were in effect asking the regime to bring itself down.

Mr. Rockwell agreed that all alternatives had some disadvantages and it was a question of which had the least.

Mr. Kissinger said he did not think we should pass on options which the President would not consider and asked if he could exercise this prerogative in not passing option 1 to the President. He pointed out, of course, that any principal officer could present the President directly with this option if he chose. He suggested preparation of a summary paper for Review Group clearance which would project two courses: (1) continue present policy, and (2) resume military deliveries in some fashion. If the latter course were accepted, there would be two general approaches. It would help the President make up his mind if we had a more precise description of these approaches.

Mr. Saunders suggested we could take Options 2 and 5 and prepare a scenario for our Ambassador.

Mr. Jurich asked if, under Option 5, we would refrain from public comment.

Mr. Cargo thought this was unrealistic.

Mr. Kissinger thought our comment could be that we give military assistance to Greece for U.S. interests, not Greek interests, noting
that we give aid to Yugoslavia but do not necessarily approve of the government.

Mr. Cargo thought some public comment would be required to the effect that we were giving military aid to further U.S. military or security interests in the Mediterranean and that it does not mean we approve of the regime. We would continue privately to urge steps toward representative government.

Mr. Kissinger commented that, in fact, the latter point would be none of our business.

Mr. Cargo confirmed that we would do this only privately.

Mr. Kissinger said we could take the position that we prefer to give assistance to governments we approve of, and that we do not approve of the present Greek regime, however, military assistance to Greece is in our interests.

Mr. Nutter thought under Option 5 we could merely avoid endorsement of the regime.

Mr. Rockwell thought the President need only approve the principle and need not approve the words used.

Mr. Kissinger agreed, but thought the President would want to consider how strong a statement we should make. He asked Mr. Saunders to prepare a summary along the lines discussed and circulate it to members of the Review Group, then we could either decide that the President could make a decision on the basis of the paper or that we should use the first half-hour of an early NSC meeting to discuss the issue. He asked if this were satisfactory.

Mr. Rockwell remarked that Secretary Rogers had not yet been personally involved in the paper.

Mr. Kissinger assured him that the Secretary would, of course, see the paper and that if he wished an NSC meeting it would of course be held.

Mr. Cargo agreed to this procedure.

Mr. Kissinger said we would then have the basic paper and a summary which would pose the questions of continue present policy or resume deliveries, and if we resume deliveries, how do we do it.

Mr. Rockwell thought that no one at the table had said we should continue present policy. He thought the consensus of the group was that our security interests require resumption of deliveries.

Mr. Shakespeare thought that the Congressional stir would be so great that we should carefully consider the timing of resumption, particularly with regard to any upcoming votes.

Mr. Saunders noted the page on Congressional attitudes in the basic paper and suggested we might ask for an elaboration.
Mr. Cargo agreed that the timing would have to be carefully considered but asked if this need go to the President.

Mr. Kissinger suggested we might give the Under Secretaries Committee a crack at this issue and that a brief operational scenario could be attached to the paper.

Mr. Nutter asked for a review of the mechanics.

Mr. Kissinger confirmed that the summary paper would come back to the Review Group members for clearance. They could either clear the summary for transmittal to the President for decision or could indicate their desire for NSC discussion. He confirmed that he had no interest one way or the other.

Mr. Cargo suggested State might indicate which option was favored by the Secretary. He also suggested that Option 5 be modified to include reference to an appropriate public statement that the U.S. action does not constitute endorsement of the present Greek government.

Mr. Jurich commented we should not use NATO interests as an argument.

Mr. Cargo agreed.

257. Draft Memorandum for the President


SUBJECT

Military Supply Policy Toward Greece—The Issues

The NSC Review Group has discussed the issues and options laid out in the Interdepartmental Group paper at Tab C. The following reflects the Group’s view of the problem and discussion of the issues:

I. Background

A. The “suspension” of military aid: What has it meant?

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. 1 Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Nodis.Drafted by Saunders. Davis sent the draft memorandum on October 10 to those who attended the Review Group meeting of October 2; see Document 256. Davis asked for comments and concurrence and a recommendation on whether the issue warranted a full NSC discussion or could be handled as a memorandum to the President. It was handled as a memorandum to the President; see Document 261.

2 See footnote 4, Document 256.
After a group of colonels took over the Greek government in April 1967, the Johnson Administration suspended shipment of major items under our military aid program. Equipment valued at $52.6 million now remains suspended. However, the flow of other items and spare parts has continued at substantial levels:

1. From April 1967 through June 1969, the US delivered about $100 million in equipment under grant assistance.

2. Grant assistance has been supplemented by $75 million in U.S. excess stocks programmed for delivery at no cost to the Greeks and $35 million in sales, including $20 million on credit terms. These represent a significant increase over the pre-coup levels.

3. Overall, the value of U.S. military shipments programmed for Greece—while it dipped in the year after the coup—now stands at pre-coup levels, although a gradual shift from grant aid continues and the withholding of some major items of equipment (RF–5 aircraft, M–48 tanks, M–113 personnel carriers) has slowed modernization of Greece’s armored units.

B. The political parallel to “suspension.” All the while that the US was withholding major items of equipment, the Johnson Administration took the position with the Greek government and with the US Congress that full resumption of military shipments would be possible only as it was clear that Greece was returning to constitutional representative government. This policy was an attempt to bridge the gap between two conflicting interests—strategic interest in the Eastern Mediterranean and preserving Greece as a NATO ally and, on the other side, pressures on the Administration from a number of places including Congress to oppose military dictatorship.

C. The sum of US pressure. Thus, while the Johnson Administration did suspend some military aid shipments and have its Ambassador repeatedly urge return to constitutional government, the sum of actual US pressure was more symbolic than real. The US could have cut off the entire flow of military equipment and created an atmosphere in which American private investment and tourism declined sharply. Instead, it expressed dissatisfaction through repeated ambassadorial admonitions and partial suspension of military shipments without exerting enough pressure to risk jeopardizing the US-Greek alliance.

D. The present situation.

1. In Greece. The Greek government has promulgated a constitution, is slowly putting its provisions into effect but has not yet set a date for elections and the return to parliamentary government. The government seems firmly entrenched. Opposition is passive and not united. The government has so far shown little sign of being able to broaden its popular base and win active support.
2. **Outside Greece** expatriate opponents of the military government—most recently ex-Prime Minister Karamanlis—continue to press for return to constitutional government, either by urging opposition action in Greece or by urging US and western European action to isolate Greece. They continue to seek signs of US support.

3. **US-Greek relations.** The Greek government has in essence asked the Nixon Administration to stop pressing it to return to constitutional government. It says it will do so as soon as possible, but it argues that pressure from outside will not help and will only irritate US-Greek relations.

E. *The issues, therefore, are:*

1. What are US interests in Greece? (Section II)
2. Do these interests require us to maintain a full-scale military assistance program? (Section III)
3. How does the nature of government in Greece affect US interests? (Section IV)
4. What are our options? (Section V)

**II. What Are US interests in Greece?**

A. US *economic* benefits from Greece are relatively small. US direct investment by private firms is only $155 million. We maintain a small surplus in our trade with Greece, but obtain no resources through trade that we could not obtain elsewhere.

B. Specific US *political* benefits from Greece are negligible aside from firm Greek support for a strong NATO and aside from a general interest in any government that is not a source of international disorder and is willing to do business according to general international practice. The present Greek government has little influence over other governments or in international forums. Opposition to military government in some quarters has turned our normal relationship with a NATO partner into a political issue.

C. In contrast to US economic or political interests some of our *strategic* benefits from continued close association with Greece are significant:

1. Greece’s military forces (160,000 men) are capable of a conventional defense against attack by Bulgaria (159,000 men) without significant US assistance or the use of nuclear weapons. Besides defending Greece itself, these forces could help divert Warsaw Pact forces or substitute for US forces in a US-Soviet conflict. [*2½ lines not declassified*]

2. Greece could provide base and staging rights to the US for the Middle East. The US bases in Greece are both suitable and probably available for the staging of humanitarian, peace-keeping or military intervention missions into the Middle East.
With the increasing restriction on US use of its bases in Libya or Turkey, we have no other bases near the Middle East with comparable ease-of-access.

3. Greece also provides the US and NATO with a number of military facilities including communication links for the 6th Fleet and Turkey, [1½ lines not declassified] and logistics bases for support of the 6th Fleet. However, unlike staging rights to the Middle East, there are theoretical alternatives to these facilities, although they are subject to the unsteadiness of Italian policies and the willingness of Congress to appropriate either for new [less than 1 line not declassified] facilities or for satellite communications systems.

4. Voice of America depends heavily on relay stations in Greece for its Arabic and Eastern European broadcasts.

D. Conclusions:

1. Apart from general interest in the ability of a NATO partner to defend itself, the main US interest in Greece lies in maintaining unrestricted access to bases for US staging into the Mid-East and—unless unique—to communications [less than 1 line not declassified] facilities there.

2. Insofar as the military regime in Greece arouses hostility in some NATO capitals—as well as in the US Congress—and could over time become a source of international disorder, the US must recognize that the US freedom of maneuver is somewhat limited by the existence of authoritarian government.

E. These conclusions raise two issues which are examined in greater detail in the two following sections:

1. Do US strategic interests require a full-scale US military assistance program? (Section III)

2. How does the nature of the government in Greece affect US interests? (Section IV)

III. Do these interests require us to maintain a full-scale military assistance program?

A. Pro.

1. US access to Greece will depend on a close political relationship and a continued sense of common objectives.

2. Because of Greek inability to produce or purchase all of the sophisticated equipment it needs, the Greek forces cannot be modernized without continued assistance from the US on major items of equipment, such as F–5s, M–48 tanks, etc.

3. A continuing military aid program, therefore, is one concrete way of demonstrating that a close political relationship exists. This is especially true as long as the Greek government is controlled by army officers.
4. A continuing military aid program is also necessary to assure Greece’s ability to defend itself as well as to carry out its NATO responsibilities. A program of present dimensions affects that capability by . . . [Defense to fill in specifics.]³

B. Con.

1. A conventional attack on Greece by its Communist neighbors with or without Soviet support is extremely unlikely in the near future.

2. The most likely threat to Greek stability is internal disruption. The present Greek forces could fight a civil war, even one supported by its communist neighbors, without further help from the US.

3. Even if there were a conventional attack, the Greek forces could be maintained for a time at a level satisfactory to meet it without significant force modernization or the delivery of major items of new and sophisticated equipment. As long as spare parts continue to flow along with some new equipment on a sales or excess basis, the degree of degradation of Greek capability would not present too great a risk.

4. On the political level, it can be argued that even continued partial suspension of military shipments probably does not jeopardize US access to Greek bases. The US presence in Greece is a sign of the government’s international “legitimacy” and contribution to NATO—international recognition that is valuable to the isolated Greek government.

C. Conclusion: Something close to the present level of military shipments probably is necessary to preserve US access to Greek facilities, but the most immediate issue is not so much the level as the political relationship it signifies. On purely military grounds, there is some flexibility in the level of US deliveries under grant military assistance, though continued delivery of spares is essential and some new equipment is important in preventing too serious degradation of Greek capability. A somewhat reduced program could maintain the conventional capability of Greek forces and US influence with the Greek government. However, at some very low level of US shipments, the Greek government might conclude that their benefits from the US could not justify the continued extension of liberal staging and base rights to the US.

IV. How does the nature of the government in Greece affect US interests?

A. Political stability in Greece is important to pursuit of US interests. If the present government does not over time gain active popular
support, pressure for a change will increase. Failure of the present government to provide for orderly change will increase the likelihood of a sudden change which would probably increase instability.

B. As long as Greece remains divided between the military government and its opponents, the US is caught in the middle. Any move the US makes involves taking sides—whether intended or not—and therefore affects US ability either now or later to maintain the close political relationship necessary to pursue US interests. Although we have no desire to involve ourselves and might prefer to make clear that we ship arms solely in the NATO context, the following are facts we have to cope with:

1. Most Greeks have always believed that there is an “American factor” in Greek politics. Almost nothing we can say or do will change this view.

2. The junta considers some sign of US support important. The opposition feels that significant US pressure could remove the regime.

3. Whatever we do will be read in Greece as the US taking sides regardless of our intent.

4. What we do will therefore adversely affect our relations either with this government or with its successor.

C. The Administration’s attitude toward the Greek government can have some effect on the success of its general legislation in Congress and on the legislative authority for carrying on a military aid program in Greece. While the majority of the Congress has not been involved, resuming full military aid to Greece could, for example, disaffect some of the liberal Democratic Committee members who are traditional supporters of foreign aid and thereby affect the prospects for the Foreign Assistance Act. Some influential senators who oppose military aid in general have threatened to kill the appropriation for Greece altogether.

D. Continuing opposition to the junta in European capitals generates pressure to isolate Greece from the European Community. While not in itself crucial in the near future, this is a trend opposite to what the US would judge to be in its general interest.

E. Conclusion: Ideally, the US would like to maintain a normal NATO military aid relationship with whatever government is in control in Athens without prejudice to its interests. However, the situation in Greece is such that whatever the US does puts it in a position of taking sides and thereby prejudices either our present or future position in Greece as well as the cooperation of influential members of our own Congress in continuing general overseas programs. Finally, continuation of the present situation for long has within it the seeds of instability.
V. What are our options?

A. The first choice is between continuing present policy—symbolic suspension of major items, continued flow of lesser items and spares—and removing the suspension. The pros and cons of continuing present policy are:

1. Pro:
   —This policy has enabled us to maintain the desired access to Greek facilities.
   —It may have contributed to the junta’s efforts to appear to be moving toward representative government.
   —Even if it has not, it has enabled the US to straddle the fence between continuing basic supplies to a NATO partner while maintaining a semblance of disapproval for domestic political purposes.
   —More important, it has enabled the US to maintain a bridge to a succeeding representative government. The civilian politicians who will presumably one day govern Greece again, are constantly looking for signs that the US has thrown in its lot with the military government. This policy permits us to maintain a posture that our military aid is exclusively for NATO purposes and does not constitute political endorsement.

2. Con:
   —The junta is becoming more and more annoyed with the present policy. While it may not soon deny US access, it has already begun seeking additional sources of arms, and this will over time erode the cooperative relationship desirable to maintain that access.
   —It has made clear that it will follow its own timetable regardless of the US position and that US policy is achieving nothing more than to irritate US-Greek relations.
   —Storage costs for suspended items for FY 1970 are estimated at $950,000.

3. Conclusion: The present policy of symbolic suspension will not hurry the return of representative government to Greece. It may not immediately jeopardize US access to bases and facilities but it increases the chances over time that the government in Athens will begin to harass or restrict that access. To continue the present policy is to take that risk for the sake of maintaining a semblance of disapproval of the military regime, primarily to maintain a bridge to a future representative government.

B. If the decision were to end the symbolic suspension of major items, a second choice would then remain between two methods of resuming shipment of all equipment programmed.

1. Option 1: A quid-pro-quo policy, looking toward lifting the present embargo as the regime takes specific steps toward constitutional, representative
government. [A scenario showing how this policy would work out in practice is at Tab A.]

a. Pro:

—This policy would tell the junta exactly where the US stands, thus putting an end to the no-answer situation of the past nine months. It would thereby release some of the tension created by present policy.

—At the same time, it would permit the US to continue straddling the fence between working with the regime and yet not appearing fully to endorse it. It would maintain the possibility of building a bridge to the next Greek government.

—If the Greek government, in response, moved steadily back toward representative government, this would gradually restore Greece’s firm relationship with NATO and Western Europe.

b. Con:

—The Greek government might well interpret this as unacceptable pressure. It might prefer to do without the suspended items rather than jeopardizing its tenure for items that could be bought elsewhere.

—If the regime agreed, it would play up the fact of resumption and play down any conditions the US might impose on resumption. The US would be tagged with resumption without necessarily gaining any move in Athens impressive enough to justify resumption in the eyes of the Greek opposition.

—Moreover, the government’s timetable might take so long to work out that we might feel the risk to our security interests too great for us to go on holding out for definitive progress.

c. Conclusion: This policy would be very difficult to make succeed. It stands a good chance of earning us the worst of two worlds—continued irritation of the military government, failure to move it and perhaps even publicity on US willingness to resume aid. At the same time, it offers US cooperation with the present regime as long as it progresses along the course which it professes to have mapped for itself, and it maintains enough distance between the US and the junta

—Brackets in the original. The scenario in attached Tab A contained an illustrative list of possible steps. The first stage would include passage of a press law easing current restrictions on the press and admission of technicians into the government. The next stage would be abolition of the courts martial and establishment of a Constitutional Court. The third and final stage, allowing the United States to release such items as tanks and fighter aircraft, would include validating the suspended articles of the constitution and thus restoring civil liberties, holding municipal elections, and reactivating political parties although with some circumscription of their freedom of action.
to keep alive the potential for a reasonable relationship with a successor government.

2. **Option 2: Resumption of full military deliveries while avoiding public endorsement of the present Greek government.** [A scenario showing how this policy would work out in practice is at Tab B.]^5
   a. **Pro:**
   —It would assure US access to Greece, thereby securing our highest priority interests in Greece as long as the present government remains in power.
   —It might prolong the regime’s tenure while giving it the kind of security which could encourage it to relax its repressive tactics and begin working seriously toward an orderly transition to representative government.
   b. **Con:**
   —It would cast our lot decisively with the present government and jeopardize our interests when Greece returns to representative government.
   —We would have no further leverage except to reimpose suspension, which would almost certainly cause a sharp reaction from the military government.
   —There would be some Congressional opposition in the U.S.
   c. **Conclusion:** This is the best way of securing our interests in the near term but it leaves us with very little reinsurance against the inevitable day when civilian government returns to Greece.

**VI. Conclusions.**

A. The situation, US interests, US capability:

1. The present situation in Greece is adequate in the short term for preserving US interests, although it carries with it increasing risk over time that US access to Greece will be restricted.

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^5 Brackets in the original. The scenario in attached Tab B would have Ambassador Tasca announce to the Greek authorities that the MAP was being resumed in full, but explaining the U.S. desire to see a return to parliamentary democracy. Tasca would also explain that restoration was being made in good faith in the expectation that Greece would take substantive steps to reestablish democracy as soon as possible. U.S. public comment would stress the overriding U.S. strategic interests in Greece, but make clear that the United States would push for reforms. Subsequently, U.S. official public comments would express satisfaction or dissatisfaction over the evolutionary process in Greece. These statements would be carried by the Voice of America. The “cool but correct” posture would continue until general progress was made in the restoration of political life in Greece and, until then, U.S. officials would avoid statements that gave the appearance of embracing the regime. Tasca would develop a relationship with the regime permitting him to “exercise influence for democratic reform without involving himself unduly in Greek internal affairs.”
2. But the present situation has in it the seeds of instability and difficulty for us in pursuing our interests unless a gradual transition is arranged to a more broadly based government.

3. We are not going to change the situation in Greece much one way or another.

4. We want to maintain a cooperative relationship with the present government. We also want to leave the door open to a cooperative relationship with future governments.

5. We do not want to take sides sharply in the present political dispute in Greece because that will jeopardize our position either with the present government or with future governments.

6. Anything we do in Greece will be read by one side or the other as taking sides.

B. The elements of an appropriate policy would, therefore, seem to be these:

1. the minimum movement from present policy necessary to maintain a cooperative relationship with the present government without dramatically taking sides with it;

2. a US posture that assumes the importance of Greek transition back to representative government, thereby holding the door open to cooperation with the next government;

3. acceptance of a pace in transition that does not return Greece too quickly to the instability of 1967.

258. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, October 7, 1969, 1636Z.


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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL GREECE. Confidential; Limdis.

2 Not found. In telegram 169560 to Paris, October 6, the Department of State commented: “Obviously too soon to judge effect on internal developments in Greece of Karamanlis initiative and succeeding moves. As long as Karamanlis working at his objectives, he is keeping up desirable pressure on the Greek regime.” (Ibid., POL GREECE–US)
I attended a lunch of ten persons in honor of my wife and me at Caramanlis’ apartment. Before sitting down, Caramanlis drew me aside and said the following:

1. The situation in Greece could still be saved but there was not more than between 3 and 6 months left. At the end of that time the situation would become impossible to change in a peaceful way. It would only be possible to change by violence.

2. He had made his statement out of a “sense of duty” because he considers himself to be “permanently retired from politics.” He had had an excellent reaction to his remarks. Reports reaching him indicated that 80 percent of the people in Greece applauded what he had done. He would be willing to serve if elected, but he believed strongly that not only must the colonels go but that all the old parties and politicians must go too. There had to be a new constitution and a new political structure.

3. Greece today, he said, had the type of military dictatorship which occurs frequently in Latin America. And yet, he said, Greece is very different from Latin America. The colonels were ignorant of politics and frivolous and impulsive in political actions of which they obviously did not foresee the consequences.

4. I tried to draw him out on the question of whether the colonels would allow him to come back and conduct a political campaign. There was, I said, not much use in being popular if you could not run. After several attempts, I failed to get him to answer this in an even remotely intelligible way. Perhaps Caramanlis believes that if there was a great sentiment for him abroad, the colonels would be inclined not to prevent him from coming back to run.

Lodge

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3 See footnote 7, Document 256. In telegram 4516 from Athens, October 10, the Embassy expressed the view that the Karamanlis initiative was “aimed primarily at influencing forthcoming U.S. policy decision.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. 1 Jan 69–Oct 70)

Dear Stuart:

I refer to Rome’s 6315 giving an account of my talk with King Constantine on October 11 with respect to the Karamanlis initiative.² There were several other comments which the King made which I thought I would pass on to you.

1. The King referred to his various trips to see Pipinelis in Switzerland last summer.³ He said that curiously enough, his calls on Pipinelis had taken place on June 28, July 28, and August 28. The first two had been entirely secret. However, the third one had leaked, possibly because by this time Pipinelis had moved to a hotel. In any event, shortly thereafter the regime had launched press attacks on the King and Queen Frederika, accusing them of being involved in a plot with the military to overthrow the regime. When the King had seen this, he had immediately called Pipinelis and told Pipinelis that he saw no reason for Pipinelis to remain in the government and that he should resign forthwith. He demanded that the attacks on him should stop immediately, or otherwise the regime would force him “to the wall,” in which case it was hard to know what the results might be.

2. The King also told me that some weeks ago the Greek military attaché, who has since been transferred, had called him at his house around midnight to say that General Angelis had heard reports that the King and his sisters were on the Ionian Islands. The King said he responded that he assumed the General was calling on instructions, that he was surprised at the regime’s bad intelligence if they did not know that unfortunately he was still in Italy, and that if indeed, he were in Greece, it would be none of the Attaché’s business. The King then recalled his talk with General Angelis in late June and the proposals

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 30 GREECE. Confidential; Exdis; Official–Informal. A copy was sent to McClelland.
² Telegram 6315 from Rome reported on the King’s pleasure with the Karamanlis initiative. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70)
³ The Greek Foreign Minister, whose health was deteriorating, had spent much of the summer in Switzerland and reportedly held a secret meeting of Greek representatives abroad there August 26.
the King had made to him at that time (Rome 4079, July 2). The King said he was still awaiting a reply from Angelis on these proposals.

3. The King also mentioned that he had not so long ago sent word to the regime that if there was to be a plebiscite to determine whether there should be a republic or a monarchy, he would insist that it must be entirely free and that he must be allowed to return and to address the people directly. He said he had added, for the purpose of teasing the regime, that if the people chose a republic, he would run for president and that, if he were elected, he would have Karamanlis as his Prime Minister and Andreas Papandreou as his Finance Minister.

4. Finally, the King again inquired whether I had passed on to Washington his hope to see Henry Tasca before he went to Athens. I told him that I had done so, but that I had no indication of what Tasca’s plans would be. The King laughed and said he assumed that Tasca would not come to see him. I did not disabuse him of this view. The King then noted that the Philippine Ambassador in Rome, who is also accredited to Athens, had called on him here before going to Athens to present his credentials. The Ambassador, according to the King, was going to make a particular point of informing the regime in this sense.

5. The King was very pleased that the astronauts were not going to Athens. He said he was surprised by our decision, but was clearly happy about it.

Sincerely,

Wells

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4 Telegram 4079 transmitted King Constantine’s version of meetings held with Pipinelis and General Angelis. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, FN 15–1 GREECE)

5 See Document 254.

6 The astronauts, who were making a world tour, visited Athens October 19–20.
260. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹


SUBJECT
Military Supply Policy Toward Greece

Before making a decision on the question of whether to resume full military deliveries to Greece, I believe that we should attempt to persuade the Greek Government, in its own interest and in the interest of facilitating the release of the suspended military items, to take some meaningful steps toward political reform. I would have our Ambassador discuss the matter with the Greek authorities, in a friendly and constructive atmosphere, along the following lines:

a. The U.S. would like to have better relations with Greece and to resume fully military shipments, but this is not possible unless we get some help from the Greek Government.

b. Examples of the kind of help we have in mind would be such steps as abolition of the courts martial, establishment of the Constitutional Court, and validation of the suspended articles of the Constitution.

c. In continuing frank discussions the Ambassador would explore with the Greek authorities the need for a real improvement of the image of the Greek Government.

I further suggest that we should await Ambassador Tasca’s reports, and his recommendations, before deciding what to do about the suspended military shipments.

WPR

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1235, Saunders Chronological Files, Greek Military Supply 1/20/69–12/31/69. Secret; Exdis.
261. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Military Supply Policy on Greece

Attached is a paper on Greece cleared by the members of the NSC Review Group. It details the issues and arguments fairly.

The situation. The Johnson Administration after the April 1967 coup suspended shipment of major military aid items. Equipment valued at $52.6 million remains suspended. However, a flow of $165 million in basic items has continued—about $100 million in grant aid. The suspension was paralleled by the ambassador’s urging the military government to move as quickly as possible back to constitutional government. The suspension of major items has slowed the modernization of Greece’s armed forces, although it is far from being a “cut-off” of military aid. The government has moved gradually in implementing its new constitution but still has not set a date for elections.

Your first choice is whether to continue present policy—suspension of $50 million in major items, continuation of lesser items—or to remove the suspension.

The argument for continuing present policy: It enables the US to continue basic supplies to a NATO partner while maintaining a semblance of disapproval for Congressional purposes and to maintain a bridge to a succeeding representative government.

The argument for removing the suspension: The Greek government is becoming increasingly annoyed with present policy. At the same time, we are becoming increasingly dependent on Greek bases. The main purpose of our military aid is to preserve our access to those bases.

If you wish to remove the suspension, there are two options (detailed at black tabs in Review Group paper; pros and cons attached to this memo):³

A. Tacit “quid pro quo” policy. Tasca would say that Greek movement toward a constitutional situation would make it easier for you to

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² Document 257.
³ Attached but not printed. The pros and cons of the two options are identical to those listed under Options 1 and 2 in Document 257.
remove the suspension. He would not link release of equipment with specific liberalizing steps. But as the government took steps, we would quietly release suspended items.

**B. Resumption of normal military shipments.** Tasca would tell Papadopoulos we were resuming full military aid in expectation that the government will re-establish genuine democratic forms as soon as possible. Publicly we would stress the overriding importance of US security interests while saying we will keep urging return to democracy.

The following views have been stated in the course of my review:

— **Secretary Rogers** (next memo)\(^4\) believes that, before deciding to resume full military deliveries, Tasca should try to persuade the government to take some steps toward political reform. Tasca should say that the US would like to resume full shipments but this is not possible unless the government improves its image. He suggests awaiting Tasca’s report before deciding.

— **Defense** favors full resumption while recognizing the desirability of managing this move to put the best possible public face on it and even to enhance the ambassador’s influence in urging further progress toward constitutional processes.

— **The Vice President** suggests releasing some suspended items to show good faith and then asking the government to make some liberalizing moves to help minimize criticism both in the US Congress and among our NATO allies. He has learned informally through continuing, high-level contacts in the Greek-American community that Papadopoulos appears willing to give you secretly a schedule for reform, including a tentative date for elections.\(^5\)

_The issue_ is the degree to which release of the suspended items is made conditional on further Greek steps in implementing the constitution. Secretary Rogers’ approach—while skirting a clear decision now—could give the Greeks the impression that we are making the release conditional. Defense and the Vice President lean toward unconditional release, while still trying to get some constitutional movement in return.

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\(^4\) Document 260.

\(^5\) In a November 7 memorandum to Kissinger, Saunders noted the Vice President’s contacts with various figures in the “Greek community” and recommended that Kissinger brief him personally on the President’s decision on military aid. “The choice is probably between his getting some mileage with his contacts and Tasca being the bearer of the President’s decision. I recommend splitting the difference—asking the Vice President to hold off until Tasca has touched down in Athens and then telling his contacts simultaneously with Tasca’s first appointment with Papadopoulos.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1235, Saunders Chronological Files, Greek Military Supply 1/20/69–12/31/69)
My solution would be to weave these options together to release the suspended equipment without condition but urge the government to make some moves to improve the public atmosphere for our action. It is the issue of conditional release which most alienates the Greek government.

Recommendation: That you authorize the following course of action which I would record in a decision memorandum:

1. Authorize Tasca to tell Papadopoulos he is prepared to discuss the resumption of normal military shipments, including suspended items.
2. Instruct Tasca to explain privately that you understand Papadopoulos’ political problems and applaud his intentions to move to fully representative government as quickly as possible. You remain interested in his plans.
3. Instruct Tasca to say that movement toward a constitutional situation would ease US political problems in releasing the suspended equipment. [But this linkage is not a condition.]
4. The US would, after Ambassador Tasca’s report of the government’s response and your approval, begin shipping the suspended items gradually beginning with the smaller and avoiding a dramatic resumption.
5. After your approval, the following public line would be taken: Overriding US security interests were the principal factor in our decision. The US will continue urging the government to move toward a constitutional situation.
6. Tasca would attempt to develop a relationship with the government that would permit him to exercise influence for democratic reform and a relationship with the civilian political leaders that would maintain a bridge to possible future leadership.

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6 Brackets in the original.
7 Nixon initialed the approval option on November 11.
262. National Security Decision Memorandum 34


TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

US Policy Toward Greece—Military Assistance

With reference to the memorandum of September 26, 1969, from the Chairman NSCIG/NEA to the Chairman, NSC Review Group entitled “US Policy Toward Greece: Military Assistance—Response to NSSM 52,” and the memorandum of the Secretary of State on this subject dated October 30, 1969, the President has instructed that:

1. Ambassador Tasca tell Prime Minister Papadopoulos that he is prepared to resume normal military aid shipments, including all items which have been suspended.

2. Ambassador Tasca make clear that movement toward a constitutional situation would ease US problems in speeding the release of the suspended equipment. [This linkage is conceived as a means of improving the atmosphere for removing the suspension of military shipments.]

3. The US Government, after the President has reviewed Ambassador Tasca’s report of the Greek Government’s response, begin shipping the suspended items gradually, beginning with the less dramatic items.

4. After the President’s final review and approval, the following public line be taken with members of the Congress and press as necessary: Overriding US security interests were the principal factor in the decision to lift the suspension. The US Government will continue urging the government to move toward a constitutional situation.

5. Ambassador Tasca attempt to develop a relationship with Greek government leaders that would permit him to exercise influence for

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Nodis. Copies were also sent to the Directors of Central Intelligence and the Bureau of the Budget and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This version replaced a November 11 memorandum on the same subject that was rescinded by the White House.

2 The report and its conclusions are summarized in Document 261, to which the memorandum of September 26 was attached (see footnote 4, Document 257). Secretary of State Rogers’s memorandum is Document 260.

3 Brackets in the original.
democratic reform and a relationship with civilian political leaders that would maintain a bridge to possible future governments.

6. The Under Secretaries Committee assure the coordinated execution of this policy.

Henry A. Kissinger

263. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

Presentation of Credentials by Greek Ambassador

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Ambassador Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol
Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
H.E. Basil Vitsaxis, Ambassador of Greece

The President welcomed Ambassador Vitsaxis and noted American admiration for Greece as well as real concern over certain internal problems. The President noted that he had visited Greece three times, most recently in 1967, and was aware of the antecedents of the present situation. The United States could not involve itself in Greek internal affairs; it was with Greek international relations and our own bilateral relations that we were properly concerned. If Greece could solve some of its internal problems, then it would be possible for us to have more complete relations. The President noted that Ambassador Vitsaxis had made an effective presentation of Greece’s case before the Council of Europe and he knew how well qualified the Ambassador was to represent his country in Washington.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 GREECE–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Davies. A notation on the memorandum reads: “Approved by WH/Kissinger per David White to HBrown 1/16/70.” In a November 26 memorandum attached to a copy of this memorandum, Saunders, recommending clearance, wrote: “Neither HAK nor I was present, so we have to take Rodger’s word for it.” Saunders continued: “The President’s crack at the press on p. 2 is the only questionable statement as far as distribution is concerned. But since the Department has this already, I think Secret/NODIS is probably tolerable.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1235 Saunders Chronological Files, Greece, 10/1/69–12/31/69.)
Ambassador Vitsaxis noted his previous service in the United States and his great love for this country. He assured the President that the Greek regime, having rescued Greece from the chaos being wrought by the Leftists, had a fixed timetable for a return to a viable democracy within the framework of the Greek Constitution. Last summer he had participated in drawing up this timetable. As scheduled, the new press law had just been released. In March, two of the three suspended articles of the Constitution would be made effective and the third in September. This would restore full constitutional life to Greece and make possible elections and organization of a new parliament.

Ambassador Vitsaxis noted that the Greek Government had recently welcomed an ICRC team, knowing that its investigations would help it cope with the slanders and distortions being fabricated about conditions in Greece. He assured the President that there had been and would continue to be a steady, orderly, and inevitable move to democratic constitutional government.

The President said that he hoped Ambassador Vitsaxis would press this line not only with his diplomatic colleagues but, also, with the press. He conceded that sometimes the press applied double standards. Had a Leftist regime taken over in Greece, any suspension of civil liberties would have been defended by most of the press on the grounds that they were essential to stabilize the regime. He was pleased to hear that the government planned to move toward full restoration of civil rights, and he hoped they would move quickly. Systems of democracies differed and it was not for him to say that what we tried to make work in America was the system for Greece or any other country. But, a regime based on individual rights seemed the objective of most democratic systems.

Ambassador Vitsaxis said there were indeed many forms of democracy but only one standard for liberty.
264. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
Greece Adherence to Constitutional Timetable and NATO

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Greek Ambassador Vitsaxis
Stuart W. Rockwell, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
Marion K. Mitchell, NEA/GRK

Ambassador Vitsaxis called at his request to explain the Greek Government’s withdrawal from the Council of Europe and to give his Government’s “official assurance” that it will proceed with full implementation of the timetable for restoration of constitutional norms, which it had presented to the members of the Council of Europe and to the U.S.

Noting that he had received a personal message for the Secretary from Foreign Minister Pipinelis, backed up by a message from the Prime Minister, Ambassador Vitsaxis reiterated that Greece will not deviate from the program it has set for return to constitutional government. The dates given in the timetable will be respected, and in fact the Government will try to accelerate the program.

The Ambassador referred to Foreign Minister Pipinelis’ speech before the Council of Europe in which Pipinelis had analyzed past efforts of his Government and had focused on future prospects. Although Pipinelis rejected the Council’s demand for a date for Greek national elections, he reassured the Council that elections will take place and that democracy will be restored. He noted in this connection that the British had reversed themselves in Paris by demanding a date for elections as they had not done before, and he wondered at that. He also rejected a proposal by the German Government that Greece be suspended for a three-month term until it should meet the Council’s demands. Mr. Pipinelis was quoted by Ambassador Vitsaxis as saying the Greek departure from the Council of Europe was “a bad thing.”

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15 GREECE. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Mitchell and approved in S on December 24.
2 On December 12 Greece withdrew from membership in the Council of Europe. The decision was taken after a majority of member states lined up in support of a German resolution suspending the Greek Government. Pipinelis’ hour long speech of protest failed to sway member states, and the Greek Foreign Minister then announced the decision to withdraw.
Greece wants to be a member of European bodies. The only aspect of the Greek departure, which could be considered good, was that the foreign ministers of the participating countries will no longer face the unpleasantness of having to deal with the Greek case.

The Secretary noted some general apprehension that the Greek question may come to the surface in NATO. He pointed out that it had arisen repeatedly in his recent discussions in Brussels. He was sorry that a solution other than the one arrived at could not have been achieved. He had been given to understand that there were a number of derogatory comments in the Human Rights Commission’s report to the Committee of Ministers and he asked whether that report had been made public.

Ambassador Vitsaxis confirmed that the Commission’s report had not been made public. He noted that the conclusions of the report were substantially: a) that the Communist danger the Greek Government cited as justification for suspending civil liberties in Greece had not been proved. (The Ambassador noted that had been only part of the Greek Government’s argument. It had also pointed to the imminent danger of chaos just prior to the coup); b) regarding the second charge of the practice of “torture” in Greece, Ambassador Vitsaxis claimed that the Commission’s conclusions had been badly construed in the press. He maintained that out of 250 cases put forward, the Commission singled out 30, which they considered could be examined prima facie. Of those 30 they pointed in turn to 11 in which “the presumption was strong” that these 11 principals had been mistreated. Further, Ambassador Vitsaxis said that one of the 11 was quoted by the newspaper Le Monde two days ago to the effect that his testimony about the Greek Government had been a lie and that he had never been tortured by the Greek Government.

Also with regard to press reports of disagreement between the Greek Government and the ICRC, Ambassador Vitsaxis noted that the International Committee of the Red Cross had issued an official statement on December 5, 1969, noting that it had visited a number of prisons in Greece and had met with no impediment on the part of the Greek Government.

The Secretary expressed the hope that the Greek Government could make some substantial moves in the direction of return to constitutional government before the NATO spring meeting. He noted that

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3 Reference is to discussions held at the NATO Ministerial meeting December 4–5. Documentation is in the National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1969, CF 396.

4 The report, which was leaked at the end of November, reported on 213 individual cases of the use of torture on prisoners. It is summarized in The New York Times, December 1, 1969.
the U.S. will not bring the Greek question up in that forum but he was afraid that others might do so. He pointed out that it is the impression of a number of countries that time is slipping by and that no real progress is being made in Greece.

Ambassador Vitsaxis said that between now and April some steps are contemplated. He wondered whether there was any way to satisfy Greece’s critics other than to fulfill to the letter the pledges the Greek Government had made. He said that whether Greece satisfies these critics depends really on whether the critics want democracy in Greece or a change of government. In the event it is a change of government they want then that must be construed as interference in internal Greek affairs.

Ambassador Vitsaxis noted that the draft law on political parties is now ready, and that the Prime Minister had declared that elections will be announced a year in advance. He said there had been a liberalization of the press, and promised to send a file documenting that point. As regards so-called political prisoners, he noted that some were still under administrative detention because they are considered dangerous. This is not a new situation in Greece. In 1952 there were three times as many in detention as there are now. Most of those still detained have been trained in Moscow and they can be released upon signing a paper that they will do nothing to disturb the public peace and security.

When the Secretary asked whether the Greek Government had thought of issuing a kind of White Paper on the Greek situation Ambassador Vitsaxis said he thought the speech of Foreign Minister Pipinelis before the Council of Europe might constitute such a document and he promised to forward it to the Department.

Regarding Greece’s legal position in the Council of Europe, about which the Secretary inquired, Ambassador Vitsaxis noted that Greece is now out of the Council, it is no longer a member. He explained that according to the statutes a member which withdraws can exercise its rights of membership for one year following that withdrawal, but that Greece has abjured that right. Ambassador Vitsaxis would not say that Greece is permanently out of the Council of Europe. He noted that there had been a Council of Europe resolution expressing hope for the return of Greece when political life in Greece would allow that. His personal opinion was that there would be no difficulty in Greece’s rejoining the Council at some future date, but he could not give any official position on that.

Ambassador Vitsaxis assured, in conclusion, that there has been no change whatsoever in Greece’s attitude to NATO and that Greece will continue as in the past to uphold its NATO commitments.
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Your Meeting with Ambassador Tasca—10:00 a.m., December 20

The main purpose of Ambassador Tasca’s call—apart from the usual opportunity to have a photo taken—is to hear directly from you the policy you want carried out toward the military government in Greece. As you know, it is necessary to strike a delicate balance, and the Ambassador is the one man who can inject discipline so that our mission in Athens will speak with one voice.

You will recall that you approved the following instructions to Ambassador Tasca.2

1. He is to tell Prime Minister Papadopoulos that we are prepared to resume normal military aid shipments, including all items on the suspended list.
2. At the same time, he is to make clear that movement toward a constitutional situation would ease our problems in speeding the release of the suspended equipment.
3. Ambassador Tasca is then to report the Greek government’s response and, after you have reviewed his report, shipment of the suspended items could begin gradually, beginning with the less dramatic items.
4. In general, the Ambassador would attempt to develop a relationship with the Greek government leaders that would permit him to exercise influence for democratic reform and a relationship with civilian political leaders that would maintain a bridge to possible future civilian governments.

The key issue to be discussed with the Ambassador is the degree to which you see a linkage between (a) release of the suspended items and restoration of a normal relationship and (b) Greek movement toward fully constitutional government. This boils down to the question: If the government gives him little satisfaction about future movement, will we release the suspended equipment anyway?

My understanding of your position is that the answer is that the decision has been made to release the equipment and that Ambassador

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2 See Document 262. Nixon met with Tasca from 10:30 to 10:50 a.m. on December 20. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Daily Diary) No substantive record of the conversation has been found.
Tasca is to use that decision to seek Greek cooperation in improving the atmosphere for that release. What the Greek government objects to most is the idea of a conditional release, while they seem willing to be cooperative.

Talking points. If this is an accurate statement of your views, then Ambassador Tasca should understand the following:

1. You regard the release of suspended equipment as unconditional.
2. You hope your decision will provide the basis for cooperation with the Greek government.
3. You hope one element in that cooperation might be improving—insofar as possible—the atmosphere for the release. (This has added importance in view of Greece’s recent resignation from the Council of Europe.)
4. The main reason for your decision is the overriding interest the US has in its military rights and installations in Greece.

3 See footnote 2, Document 264.

266. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)


Dear Joe:

Now that Ambassador Henry Tasca has arrived in Athens, I consider it appropriate that we initiate the necessary steps toward full resumption of military assistance to Greece, so that we are prepared for immediate supply of important items once the President sees the Ambassador’s report on the Papadopoulos regime’s attitude toward reform.

2 Tasca presented his credentials on January 15.

There are several factors which I deem important enough to warrant this preliminary work by our staffs:

(a) The overriding US security interests in Greece;
(b) Greece’s undiminished role in NATO (value of major military equipment currently suspended is $52.6 million);
(c) The effect of the suspension policy on the combat capability of the Greek forces committed to NATO; and
(d) The paucity of MAP funds, requiring their use for valid military requirements instead of payment for storage and maintenance costs arising out of the suspension policy.

I therefore recommend that appropriate action officers in State and Defense initiate the first necessary steps toward full resumption of military assistance to Greece without further delay. The first actions would involve the selection of the initial items to be removed from the embargo when the new gradual policy actually begins to operate.

Sincerely,

G. Warren Nutter

3  Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

267. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, January 19, 1970, 1700Z.

226. Subject: Return to Greece of King Constantine.

1. Following his latest round of talks in Athens Archbishop Makarios flew to Rome January 18 to meet with King Constantine and returned to Nicosia same day. At my meeting with Foreign Minister Pипinelis today (other subjects reported septels)2 he told me in confidence he had received word from Makarios that Constantine wishes to return to Greece and sets no conditions. According to Makarios’ message

1  Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Exdis. Another copy is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30 GREECE.
2  Telegram 224 from Athens, January 19, reported on efforts to promote a return to democratic government. (Ibid., DEF 18–6 GREECE) Telegram 225 from Athens, January 19, reported on discussions about Cyprus. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)
Constantine wishes to have a confidential talk with “someone” in GOG (presumably Papadopoulos himself) prior to his return. I gathered that the King wants some assurances from GOG in advance, but Pipinelis did not elaborate on what these might be. This was such fresh news, Pipinelis said, that he hadn’t yet had a chance to pass it on to Prime Minister.

2. Foreign Minister commented that King Constantine’s decision is a very important event and most timely. He believes it is a matter of urgency that the King return to Greece now. Pipinelis gave number of reasons to support his view that time is ripe for King’s return. I tried to sound him out as to what the timing might be, but he merely reiterated his view that the best time is right now.

3. Comment: King’s wishes are one thing and chances of authorization for his return by GOG are quite another. As Department is aware, single internal issue about which feelings run strongest among some key members of present regime is return or non-return of King Constantine to Greece. Certain “hard-core” members of Junta are dead set against any such return. Although it is possible that Papadopoulos personally favors King’s return (eventually if not now) he might have grave difficulty in trying to sell idea to his associates, and he would run serious risks if he acted on this issue without full backing of important military personalities. Makarios’ report that King now sets no conditions is of course measure of his eagerness to return and it also makes a favorable GOG response much easier. King’s comment to Ambassador Hill (State 004696) that he thought US should resume heavy military aid shipments to Greece may have been intended as further indication of his flexibility.

Tasca

3 Dated January 16. (Ibid., POL 1 GREECE)
268. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, January 26, 1970, 1615Z.

324. Subj: My First Meeting with Prime Minister Papadopoulos.

1. This morning I paid my initial call on Prime Minister Papadopoulos. We had more than an hour of substantive discussion in which USG and GOG positions laid out frankly and fully. With complete frankness I outlined for Papadopoulos problems of mutual concern facing USG in maintaining and strengthening our general relations with Greece, and in preventing any erosion from affecting Greece's important contribution to NATO. Meeting was a cordial one and I think decks are now cleared for proceeding to more detailed discussion in our next meeting of the specifics affecting the problem of the Greek image in the US.

2. After brief exchange of amenities, I proposed that we begin what I hoped would be a series of frequent and frank discussions by outlining for each other the basic elements, as we each saw them, in the Greek-American relationship. The Prime Minister asked that I lead off. I said that first of all I would like to say that I brought the personal regards of President Nixon who had expressed to me his desire for a relation of friendship with Greek Government. I would do everything possible to work towards such a relationship within the fundamental context of Greece's role as faithful and important member of the NATO Alliance. The USG fully appreciates exceptional efforts made to fulfill this role on part of Greek people and Greek Government. It is fundamental aim of US administration for Greece to continue to play this role, the importance of which is further increased by growing Soviet penetration in the Mediterranean. The position of the US in these respects is shown by continued flow of military assistance in recent years, as well as administration's position in supporting appropriation for military assistance to Greece in FY 70.

3. However I hoped Prime Minister appreciated strength of forces in US which might hamper seriously USG efforts towards these objectives. When thirty-eight Senators could vote against further appropri-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GREECE–US, Secret; Limdis. A summary of this telegram was included in the President’s briefing of January 27 (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70)

2 On December 30, 1969, Ambassador Tasca submitted a report on Soviet penetration in the Mediterranean to President Nixon. The President, in turn, relayed it to Kissinger as an “excellent analysis.” (Ibid.)
ation of military assistance to NATO ally, situation was serious indeed. Letter from fifty Congressmen to Secretary of State was another example extent feeling against Greek Government. Congress ultimately responsive to US public opinion and Greece’s image with public appeared to be deteriorating. Public opinion is being strongly influenced by American press, which admittedly may have failed to appreciate fully precarious state of affairs in Greece prior to Army takeover. But regardless how well informed critics are, Prime Minister should fully recognize that USG basic position of good will towards NATO ally is under powerful attack in US. We realized they had problems, but I wished them to understand our problem as well, since latter were of mutual interest and fully relevant to our common objective of maintaining and strengthening our relations. I expressed the deep satisfaction of the USG with the firm assurance given Secretary Rogers regarding Greek determination to proceed on its path toward full constitution expressed by their Ambassador immediately after the unfortunate Council of Europe meeting in December.

4. Prime Minister replied rather soberly that Greece’s NATO role and especially relationship with America of utmost importance to Greece. While recognizing full well that Greece small country that should feel honored be able play significant role in Western defense, Greece’s friends must also recognize that Greek Government will not allow its NATO role to be tied in any way whatsoever to Greek internal situation. This matter on which there absolutely no room for compromise. In fact, Greece attaches so much importance to its role in defense of West (much more than some of our European allies) that rather than let other countries meddle in Greece’s affairs, country would go its separate way, if necessary putting its defense relationship with US on bilateral basis.

5. I told Prime Minister, in reply, that it firm position USG that internal Greek political situation not appropriate subject for NATO debate, and we would vigorously defend this position, on this he could rely.

6. Turning to internal situations in US and Greece, Papadopoulos said he could assure me I would not find it necessary to emphasize to him the problem posed for Greek-American relationship by US Congress, press and public opinion. While fully recognizing the problem, he would have to frankly say that it would not always be possible to

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3 Reference is to legislation banning military aid to Greece. It passed in committee but was defeated in the Senate.

4 Reference is to a July 30 letter calling on the United States to take action to achieve the fall of the junta.

5 See Document 264.
listen to “our great friend” on questions of internal political development in Greece. He would gladly do so when possible, but GOG would basically have to decide for itself how things progress. The Prime Minister compared himself to man walking through a minefield. This minefield was 1968 Constitution and steps toward its full implementation. He was sure that I, as a former naval officer, would appreciate that plotting course through loaded mines required greatest of care and caution.

7. In reply I said our common objective of friendly relations and of maintaining a strong NATO could require our best efforts. I fully understood that Greece would have to determine its own policies in their national interest and my comments were made in the sense of what related to our common interest. It seemed to me that our aims could best be served by frequent and frank discussions. The Prime Minister responded that he held identical views on this subject. He would like to make it clear he available any hour of day or night for consultation. He would provide me with number to private line on which he might be reached at any time, and we would like to propose that I set the date myself for another meeting which he hoped would take place over dinner at his home. However, if this were in any way embarrassing to me, his feelings would not be hurt if I wished to make other arrangements. I said that I would be most pleased to accept his invitation and I would call him within a few days to set an exact date.

8. I think initial frank, even blunt, exchange with Prime Minister cleared air and meeting ended quite cordially. I see no reason why our next meeting, which I am glad to see he wishes be on more informal basis, should not begin come to grips with specific problems in Greek-American relations.

9. Prime Minister raised specific problem regarding May Ministerial meeting of NATO, which I will cover in separate message.

Tasca

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6 Tasca served as a staff officer in the Mediterranean during World War II.
7 Telegram 325 from Athens, January 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 NATO)
269. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, March 2, 1970, 1618Z.

970. 1. The speed with which the Greek regime carries out its publicly expressed desire to put the 1968 Constitution into full effect is likely to be very much affected by the relative strengths of the forces within the regime which favor a return to constitutional government, as opposed to those who prefer to prolong the present regime indefinitely. In this context the present Greek regime should not be viewed as a personal dictatorship but rather as collegiate in its make-up. Prime Minister George Papadopoulos plays the main role, but he by no means enjoys a free hand. He has shrewdly manipulated the other key players in the regime so that his freedom of action has been steadily increased. Those who collaborated with him most closely on 21 April and 13 December 1967 still count very heavily in terms of influence and political power, but Papadopoulos has managed to consult with the Revolutionary Council as a whole less and less and to broaden his base by relying more on civilian ministers and senior army officers such as General Odysseus Angelis, while keeping a wary eye on the young commanders of combat units.

2. Furthermore, in understanding the regime it is essential to keep in mind that its leaders and supporters consider themselves a revolutionary regime empowered to make revolutionary reforms, and not merely as another coup group taking power as an interim measure prior to handing affairs back to the politicians.

3. At this time the Greek regime functions roughly as follows:
   A. Papadopoulos is the undisputed leader.
   B. Next in line of authority are his fellow Revolutionary Council members, Vice Premier Stylianos Pattakos and Minister of Coordination Nicholas Makarezos. They are often joined by Vice President Patilis (who “saved Thessaloniki for the revolution” on 13 December 1967), and Lt. General Odysseus Angelis, who is the highly respected commander of the Hellenic Armed Forces, to form the top five.
   C. After the top five we would place the three members of the twelve-man Revolutionary Council who elected to remain in the army and who fill key functions as follows:

      (1) Colonel Mihail Roufogalis, who is the most intimate friend of Papadopoulos and who as “coordinator” of the Greek Central Intelligence

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2 GREECE. Confidential; Limdis.
Service acts as Papadopoulos’ Chief Counsel in affairs dealing with the security of the revolution. 

(2) Colonel Antonios Lekkas, who screens army personnel assignments and keeps an eye on the senior generals, and 

(3) Lt. Colonel Dimitrios Ioannidis, who as Director of Military Police is responsible for the reliability of the army, who transmits to the Prime Minister the views of the younger unit commanders, and who in turn explains the revolution’s policies and actions to these officers.

D. The six other members of the Revolutionary Council, who in December 1967 were persuaded to resign their army commissions and become secretaries-general but not ministers, are probably still next in political power. They derive power from their prestige as members of the Revolutionary Council and resist Papadopoulos’ tendency to overlook the Revolutionary Council as a corporate body. Constantine Aslanides, the Director General of Athletics, who is establishing a considerable reputation for himself in this field, figures prominently in this group.

E. They are however being challenged by the civilian ministers who may in the long run have greater influence in shaping the future of Greece than any of the above outside the top five. The Prime Minister consults the Council of Ministers for hours at a time each week, and the Council not only thrashed out the 1968 Constitution article by article, but is doing the same with its enabling legislation, which will be the law of the revolution. Some of the new civilian secretaries-general are being drawn from what appears to be an embryonic political party loyal to Papadopoulos. Among the ministers, Foreign Minister Panagiotis Pipinellis enjoys considerable freedom of action in foreign affairs, as does Finance Minister Adamantios Androutsopoulos in matters of budget and taxes.

F. Senior army officers who hold senior commands or staff positions or have left the army to assume key jobs in civilian agencies provide Papadopoulos with a core of executives. They look to Papadopoulos for guidance and they tend to support his moves toward implementing the Constitution. This group includes the directors of the State and Armed Forces radios, directors in the Prime Minister’s and Regent’s offices, the directors of the Central Intelligence Service and of the National Security Directorate and the Citizens’ Commissioner.

G. Important policy decisions are usually made by the top five, taking into account the pressures of the various “constituents” of the revolution. The most important of these “constituents” are:

(1) The officers who now command the combat companies and battalions, mainly those officers who pulled guns on their superiors on 21 April or 13 December, and who have reason to fear for their careers, if not their personal safety, should the regime falter. They very much fear that the King will return with vengeance in his heart. Their cur-
rent slogans are “no elections, no King, and forward with the aims of the revolution.” They are especially against elections because they associate them with a return to the status quo ante, and with both the loss of their present influence and perhaps even the return of old politicians and retired officers. These younger officers tend to form loose associations by cadet school classes, and from among the Revolutionary Council they feel closest to the class of 1943 and Lt. Colonel Dimitrios Ioannidis. They also share a common interest with the Regent, Lt. General George Zoitakis, who perhaps may not look forward to the King’s return either, and has shown a concern for the “purity of the revolution.”

(2) Army officers who did not take a direct part in the revolution, but who generally support Papadopoulos and appreciate the enhanced status of the Army since 12 April 1967. They may resent the assertiveness of the younger unit commanders, but they lack the power to confront them.

(3) Civilians who have embraced the revolution, including some publishers and journalists, virtually all the mayors, village presidents, etc., who were appointed by the regime, who are enthusiastic executors of new public works and who look confidently to playing a part under the new Constitution. The ties between the village and town leaders and the army officers are generally strong—the army officers having spent many years at army posts in the countryside.

4. Papadopoulos has gradually widened his own base of support so that he is already somewhat less vulnerable to a challenge by a member of the Revolutionary Council. He has thus far weathered the storm of Revolutionary Council member Dimitrios Stamatelopoulos’ resignation, but Stamatelopoulos remains a threat on the sidelines around whom disgruntled revolutionary officers could coalesce. Today Papadopoulos must cater more to the commanders of army combat companies and battalions. He is still their acknowledged leader and will probably continue to be so as long as he does not do things which seem to threaten their positions or weaken the army. However, he must continually demonstrate that his regime promotes clean government which does not discredit the army, and that the army receives the arms and other support to fulfill a defense mission which the younger officers deployed along the frontier with communism feel very deeply. On several occasions, notably just before his December year-end speeches in 1968 and 1969, he was forced to delay his speeches and modify portions of them in deference to the pressures of the revolutionary officers. Thus, these officers have shown at times an ability to provide very compelling collective pressure.

5. I believe that Papadopoulos is clearly in charge, that he represents the best choice among the available leaders within the regime,
but that his room for maneuver depends on his ability to cope with his less politically minded colleagues—some of whom carry guns. His future may well be influenced by factors beyond his control. I believe this is what he meant when he told me that he must pass through a mine field in his progress toward implementing the Constitution.

6. In sum, our best current information is that the tenure of the present regime is not likely to be seriously challenged inside Greece for some years. Every ambassadorial colleague I have spoken with shares this view. American interests would seem to be best served by encouraging Papadopoulos to implement the 1968 Constitution as rapidly as possible, and by using our influence to strengthen his hand against any opposition to that course from among his revolutionary colleagues.

Tasca

270. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca)


Dear Henry:

I have read your letter of February 27th with great interest. 2

Let me try to state very simply my understanding of the mandate, and what is expected back here.

I understood the NSC decision of November 14, 1969 (NSDM 34) 3 to mean that it was decided, in principle, that we were prepared to lift the suspension of arms shipments. This decision to resume shipments was not conditioned on concrete steps by the Greek Government in the direction of constitutional democracy. But you were to make clear to the Government that movement toward a constitutional situation would ease U.S. problems in speeding the release of the suspended

1 Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 75 D 227, U.S. Policy Towards Greece. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only; Official–Informal.

2 Attached but not printed. In it Tasca recounted a conversation with Shakespeare and requested clarification regarding the implementation of the policy outlined in NSDM 34.

3 Document 262.
equipment. The suspended shipments were to be resumed, but only after the President reviewed your report of the Greek Government’s response to your representations about movement toward a constitutional situation, beginning with the less dramatic items.

My understanding was that in accordance with this mandate you would explore this whole matter in a cooperative way with the Greek Government, and we would await your report of that exploration. When that phase was over, you would then be in a position to recommend when Papadopoulos should be informed that we had decided to lift the suspension of shipments, and to recommend, as well, the speed with which deliveries should be resumed, and what items ought to go beginning with the less dramatic items.

Some of this scenario, thanks to your efforts, is now behind us. I suggest that you could bring it nearer completion by immediately taking the following steps: Send us (a) a succinct synthesis of all your conversations with the high-level people; (b) your evaluation of the current attitude of the Greek Government with special reference to the prospects of its moving in a constitutional direction; and (c) your recommendations as to when and how the arms embargo should be lifted.

We would then bring your evaluation and recommendation to the attention of the White House, following which we should be in a position to transmit to you the appropriate go-ahead to inform Papadopoulos of our plans.

We not only do not believe it is necessary, but believe it undesirable and contrary to what was contemplated by the November NSC decision, for this whole matter to be reassessed in the context of a broader study of the Mediterranean. If this were your recommendation, you would in effect be asking the President to reassess a decision which had already been made.

Sincerely,

Joseph J. Sisco

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4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
271. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, March 7, 1970, 1047Z.

1076. Subject: Meeting with Lt. Colonel Dimitrios Ioannidis.

1. On March 4 I had a private talk with Lt. Colonel Dimitrios Ioannidis who was a prime mover in the 21 April 1967 Revolution, is a key member of the Revolutionary Council, and as director of military police is responsible for the reliability of the Greek army. His organization acts as the eyes and ears of the regime in the armed forces and investigates any signs of anti-regime conspiracies involving the army—including both active and retired officers. I would stress the sensitive nature of his comments to us.

2. I took the opportunity to speak with him very frankly about the importance of meaningful progress toward implementing the 1968 Constitution, and the detrimental effect to Greek prestige abroad of apparently arbitrary arrests and the detention of retired army officers who have distinguished military and anti-Communist records.

3. In a far-ranging discussion of the security aspects of implementing the 1968 Constitution, I was able to lead him over such issues as the ability of the regime to maintain security without martial law by the strict enforcement of existing civil laws. Ioannidis accepted that martial law could gradually be dispensed with, although he avoided committing himself to a date. He said that martial law is now applied less and less, and that period of calm “without bombs” would permit the regime to end it. He tried to justify martial law as preventing the return of petty political quarreling and thus promoting reconciliation of old hatreds. He agreed with my analysis that the 1968 Constitution included strong safeguards against abuse by irresponsible political elements and provided a framework in which new political institutions could safely evolve.

4. Ioannidis made the point that many of the younger army officers are very forceful in expressing to him their fears and anxieties about any return to the past. He said that implementing the Constitution means to him the holding of elections. The country is not yet ready for elections which the younger officers would certainly oppose as a return to the past. The regime does not want rigged elections, and he does not believe that Prime Minister Papadopoulos wants to be the leader of a political party.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GREECE–US. Confidential; Limdis.
5. Ioannidis then developed the theme of reconciliation of old divisions within the country and said that a dialog was now becoming possible between the regime and its opponents—namely the old politicians. However, by way of criticizing the old politicians as selfish, he said he had recently had an indirect approach from Evangelos Averof proposing the rule for a few more years without elections by the present regime plus Averof and Spyridon Markezinis—but excluding all the other politicians. Throughout, Ioannidis showed a strong desire that the 21 April revolution should appear in history as beneficial to Greece and that the democratic successor to the present regime should be strong and healthy.

6. Ioannidis made a strong case for the Greek army’s need of new and modern weapons. He said that the Greek people would make sacrifices if necessary to buy them. However, no matter what happened about military aid, the United States could count on the love and respect of the Greek people.

7. I described to Ioannidis the harm that was done to the prestige of the Greek regime by acts in the name of security which aroused protests abroad from cultural, scientific, or journalistic groups, among which fraternal bonds are strong. Ioannidis acknowledged the argument, but vigorously defended himself as follows:

A. The thirty cashiered officers who are being held by the military police are not being held without charge. The charges, however, have not been made public, which is perfectly legal by Greek military law—when a conspiracy against the security of the state is under investigation—and even by Greek civil law when the court so orders.

B. His action in detaining rather than bringing the arrested officers to a speedy trial is “moderate” and humane. “Due process of law” would mean a court martial which would deprive these officers of their pensions and no doubt hand down severe prison sentences—to the great hardship of these officers and their families.

C. As a further example, he said that ex-deputies John Tsirimokos and Cleanthis Damianos had confessed to putting out with Averof an illegal anti-regime publication and to conspiring with Averof to burn down the military court house. Because of a regime desire to reconcile old differences, however, none of these politicians would be court-martialed—and Averof might have legally received twenty years for his part had he been brought to trial.

8. In response to my strong plea for an Easter amnesty—in the spirit of resurrection—for the anti-Communist officers now detained,

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2 Evangelos Averof was a former Greek Foreign Minister and leader of the ERE.
he said he would consider so recommending, but that these officers had already benefited from a previous amnesty (for their 13 December 1967 acts). When released then they had signed statements foregoing any intention of opposing the regime by force. He stressed, however, that such acts of magnanimity must be at Greek initiative, and for Greek reasons and not appear to follow foreign pressure. I concurred fully with this thought.

9. I told him that I would not intervene in matters of internal security—which is a Greek problem—but as the representative of an old ally, I wished to give him friendly advice as to the need to strike a balance between the security needs of the country, which might call for someone’s arrest, and the damage to Greece’s reputation abroad, which the arrest might cause. It might be better at times to accept a minor security risk rather than arrest someone and then creating hostile feelings toward Greece among her allies.

10. Ioannidis spoke of the need for greater economic and educational progress before democracy could be restored, but listened attentively to my counter arguments on the need for giving youth a chance to participate more directly in national and public life as equally important as economic progress in protecting against a resurgence of communism.

11. In general, Ioannidis impressed me as tough within a modest and polite exterior. He appears to see issues in fairly stark black-and-white terms, to hold very strong convictions about what is best for Greece and to be a man of considerable tenacity and self-confidence. His expressions of good will toward the United States and his advocacy of reconciliation of all anti-Communist elements in Greece seemed very genuine. On arrival he said that the way to persuade a Greek to do something is to let him believe it is his own idea. I believe that Ioannidis’ receptivity to some of the points we subsequently discussed augers well for his taking up at least some of them as his own.

Tasca
272. **Response to National Security Study Memorandum 90**


GREECE

NSSM 52 (April 26, 1969) called for a review of our current military aid policy towards Greece and an assessment of the present political situation there as it affects US interests. The decision resulting from that study (NSDM 34, November 14, 1969) may be summarized as follows:

The United States is prepared to resume full military aid shipments to Greece. Our Ambassador is to make clear to the Greek Government that movement towards a constitutional situation would ease United States problems in speeding the release of the suspended equipment. The Ambassador is to report to the President the Greek Government’s response to his efforts to influence the Greek Government in the direction of a constitutional situation, and, in compliance with NSSM 90, recommend the degree of speed with which we should move in resuming military shipments.

**Developments since November**

There have been few significant developments towards the restoration of a constitutional situation in Greece since the issuance of NSDM 34, and the tide of sentiment against the Greek regime in Western Europe (and in some Congressional circles in the United States as well) is not falling. On the other hand, the loss of Wheelus Air Force Base has increased the strategic interest of the United States in Greece even beyond the high levels described in NSSM 52.

**Probable Future Developments**

Without disregarding the lessons from Greece’s volatile past, we anticipate as the most probable development for the foreseeable future a period of relative stability within Greece and as regards Greece’s relations with her neighbors.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–170, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 90. Secret; Nodis. This section of the response to NSSM 90, “U.S. Interests in and Policy Toward Mediterranean Area,” February 26, was prepared by the Interdepartmental Ad Hoc Group on the Mediterranean. The Chairman of the Group, William Cargo, forwarded it to Kissinger with the explanation that it was being handled separately from the rest of the response to NSSM 90 because of its more restricted classification.

2 Document 246.

3 Document 262.
On the Greek domestic level we foresee no radical political development in any direction. At best we anticipate a slow and spotty political evolution which may give back to the Greek people some measure of political freedom and of political activity. As far as we can see, political opposition within Greece, and its counterpart abroad will not change the situation decisively. The present Greek leadership, in one form or another, will be around for some time to come. As long certainly as economic prosperity continues, the attitude of the mass of the Greek people will probably continue to be colored by their abhorrence (based on experience) of civil strife, and by unwillingness to risk very much for ideological principle.

Greece’s economic prospects look good for the long run. Like any developing country with fairly limited resources Greece has a number of economic problems, the most crucial being that of its balance of payments. Servicing on borrowing to cover that endemic deficiency will in the middle run put a considerable squeeze on the Government and perhaps even cause some revamping of its current ambitious development plan. Given Greece’s trading patterns and experiences, it is fairly certain that it will not embark on any adventurous course but will follow traditional methods in facing its problems.

GNP grew by 8.3% in 1969. This may be too high a rate for continuing sound growth, but Greece will probably continue to try for substantial rates of increase and probably has the capability of achieving it. Per capita income is now almost $800, and the regime hopes to increase this to over $1,000 by 1974.

A potentially serious problem of both economic and political dimensions is the discrepancy between the urban and rural sectors. If the regime should face serious trouble in the future it would most likely come from that imbalance and the problems inherent in resultant urbanization.

On the international scene we can expect Greece to continue to display a strong sense of identification with the West and particularly with the United States. Whoever controls the Mediterranean determines Greece’s orientation. As long as the United States is dominant or holds its own in the Mediterranean, Greece’s traditional ties and security considerations reinforce one another.

At the same time Greece will continue to try to improve or “normalize” its relations with all its immediate neighbors especially as far as trade is concerned. It will also continue to try to enhance its relations with Turkey. These are small ways it has of reducing its necessary dependence on a great power and it can be expected to follow this course, especially as the US military grant aid program comes to an end.

As Greece pursues these aims it will show somewhat greater independence, but almost certainly within the framework of its NATO
commitment. The nature of that independence, and how much will eventually remain of the unique access the United States today now enjoys to Greek facilities, will depend to a large extent on United States attitudes and the manner in which Greece is weaned from past high levels of dependence on the US.

**Implications for the Future**

Since his arrival in Greece in early January, Ambassador Tasca has had his first round of discussions with Greek officials, emphasizing the value to them and to us of moving ahead to implement the new Greek constitution. He has pointed out the difficulties under present circumstances of trying to maintain and strengthen ties on a bilateral basis and within the NATO alliance.

Subject to Ambassador Tasca’s evaluation and recommendations, our conclusions are that:

— for the foreseeable future we will be dealing with the current regime in Greece in one form or another;
— the regime will continue to give top priority to Greek defense needs and its economy will be able to sustain the present level of defense spending (just under 25% of budget expenditures) while still maintaining respectable economic growth;
— the Greek Government has shown some intention, and ability, to slip the net of our arms embargo by negotiating to purchase arms from West European sources, notably France. To the extent Greece succeeds, our current policy of withholding arms will no longer exert major influence on internal Greek developments;
— the considerations which led to the decision to resume arms shipments in principle are even more impressive today than they were in November, particularly as a result of the denial to us of Wheelus, the Middle East situation, Turkish sensitivity regarding US fleet visits and continuing Soviet activity in the Mediterranean. In other words Greece is essential to NATO and Greek real estate is important to United States interests elsewhere in the area.
273. Report by the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca)\(^1\)

Athens, March 31, 1970.

REPORT ON GREECE

Contents

I. Background

1. Internal Situation in Greece
2. Relations Between the U.S. and Greece; Greece’s Other Foreign Relations

II. Present U.S. Policy Toward Greece

III. Conclusions and Recommendations

Summary

1. Background

1. Internal Situation in Greece. After almost three years the military-backed regime which seized power in April 1967 in a bloodless coup retains firm control over the country. Such domestic military intervention has however been a recurrent phenomenon in modern Greek history. The present government enjoys the predominant support of the Greek armed forces; and opposition to it, both internal and abroad, which is concentrated mainly in intellectual circles and among ex-politicians, appears marginal. While the regime is certainly not popular, it enjoys widespread public toleration, a situation aided by favorable economic conditions and a popular fear of any recurrence of the violence of the 1940’s. There is a strong internal security apparatus operating presently under martial law which however is applied in special, defined cases relating to the protection of the state. A new government-promulgated constitution was adopted by referendum in September 1963, but it is not yet in force pending completion of implementing laws. These are promised by the end of 1970. The present Greek leadership has also embarked on an ambitious and long-range “revolutionary” program aimed at reforming the structure of Greek political and social life, with heavy emphasis on Christian virtues, law and order, and stamping out what they regard as the corruption and irresponsibility of the past.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Nodis. The report was submitted to the President as an attachment to an NSC Under Secretaries Memorandum, May 21, not printed.
2. Relations Between the United States and Greece. Friendship between the U.S. and Greece is still deep, indeed unsurpassed in my experience of our relations with the peoples of other countries. It rests on the broad foundation of over two million American citizens of Greek extraction; some 25 years of close economic and military association, begun under the Truman Doctrine in 1947, which contributed about 3.5 billion dollars to Greece’s postwar rehabilitation, economic progress and defensive reinforcement; substantial U.S. private investment in Greece and an expanding market in it for U.S. exports; and a strong identity of views on the defense of the Free World against further communist encroachment. In consequence Greece is a resolute member of NATO, has committed forces to the defense of the Alliance’s S.E. flank, and granted the U.S. valuable facilities in support of our strategic objectives in the increasingly critical Eastern Mediterranean region.

Greece’s Other Foreign Relations. The Western Europeans, especially those countries with influential socialist parties and narrow governmental majorities, have been politically antagonistic toward the present Greek regime. This reaction culminated in forcing Greece to withdraw from the Council of Europe in December 1969 on the charge of having violated political and human rights. While this European pressure may have played some part in engendering constitutional progress in Greece, on balance it appears to have been psychologically counterproductive. Having driven Greece out of the Council of Europe, the Europeans are now showing signs of shifting their attack to the more critical NATO forum. They have however not allowed such moral indignation to prejudice bilateral trade with Greece, which happens to be a substantial net importer of EEC goods. France’s attitude has been characteristically apolitical; and the GOF is willing to sell Greece Mirage military aircraft and possibly tanks. The Soviet Union has bided its time politically with respect to developments in Greece, and otherwise maintained a business-as-usual stance. The present Greek Government, shaken by the November 1967 Cyprus crisis, has made a concerted effort to improve relations with its important Turkish neighbor by working constructively toward a solution of the unstable Cyprus problem. Greek relations with Yugoslavia are good; tolerable with Bulgaria; and the GOG has recently made overtures for commercial relations with Albania. The GOG, finally, plans to establish full, de jure diplomatic relations with Israel soon.

II. Present U.S. Policy Toward Greece

For the lack of other tangible leverage—U.S. economic aid having been terminated in 1962—and as a mark of official USG disapproval,
the USG stopped the delivery of certain “high visibility” military equip-
ment items to Greece following the April 1967 coup. While this tactic
may initially have contributed to internal political progress on the part
of the GOG, notably the promulgation of the 1968 Constitution, it has
not otherwise appreciably accelerated a return to democratic govern-
ment. On the other hand it has produced several side-effects increas-
ingly adverse to U.S. security interests: (1) tended to strengthen the
radical anti-democratic faction within the Greek revolutionary gov-
ernment against Papadopoulos’ seemingly more moderate constitutionalist approach; (2) by undercutting Greece’s military potential has
degraded the credibility of NATO in Soviet eyes on the strategic south-
east flank; (3) prejudiced U.S.-Greek military cooperation and thus
weakened U.S. influence over Greece’s military dispositions; and (4)
led the GOG to look elsewhere for military equipment with good prom-
ises of satisfaction. At the same time, the U.S. MAP curtailment policy
has been popular with domestic and foreign opponents of the Greek
regime, particularly in Western Europe and the U.S. Congress and has
kept lines open to sincerely democratic elements whose views and sup-
port cannot be ignored. On balance the evidence does not sustain their
unrealistic thesis that more drastic pressure on the Greek Junta, by the
U.S. in the first instance, would lead to the Colonels’ rapid demise.
They appear to be firmly in the saddle.

III. Conclusions and Recommendations

1. Restore Suspended Equipment and Continue U.S. MAP for Greece
   at Adequate Level. Since the U.S. MAP withholding policy has proved
   ineffective in accelerating a return to democratic government in Greece,
   and is beginning to undermine the country’s NATO-committed de-
   fensive strength, it should be abandoned. I also recommend that fu-
   ture year U.S. military aid to Greece be maintained at a level calculated
to strengthen Greece’s contribution to NATO. Such a policy constitutes
a necessary element of the U.S. objective of preventing further Soviet
penetration of the key Eastern Mediterranean area. If U.S. aid is not
forthcoming, either as grant or sales, the Greek Government will ob-
tain such military equipment elsewhere. The resulting diversion of
scarce foreign exchange could retard Greece’s economic development
and thus favor the ascendancy of anti-democratic forces in Greece. Re-
gional political equilibrium requires a fair balance between U.S. mili-
tary assistance for both Greece and Turkey.

2. Continue to Press Greek Regime to Return to Constitutional and Rep-
   resentative Government. Concurrently, we must continue to press the
Greek regime to return to the form of representative government which
best meets Greece’s needs. American friendship is more important to
the GOG than military equipment; and the GOG’s failure to make in-
ternal political progress is eroding this friendship in the U.S. We should
therefore substitute this leverage for the questionable tactic of restricting military aid. Restoring the MAP first and then pressing earnestly, as an ally and friend of Greece, for progress toward effective implementation of the Constitution promises to be the most advisable course psychologically.

3. Prospects for Further Constitutional Progress. The return to constitutional government in Greece will be slow since the GOG is master of its own house and will be exceedingly careful to keep the reins of control firmly in hand. The Papadopoulos Government, in accordance with its avowed aim of restructuring Greece’s political life, gives evidence of planning to adhere to this course. The GOG is nevertheless still apprehensive over holding parliamentary elections which are therefore very unlikely for some time to come. This process will require a continuous and intimate dialogue between ourselves and the GOG at the highest levels, and with key elements in Greece outside the present establishment.

4. Future U.S. Policy Toward Greece. There is no feasible alternative for the U.S. to pursuing the dual policy of supporting Greece militarily and pressing it politically in the interest of U.S.-Greek friendship to return to constitutional government. Since the GOG is neither running the country into the ground nor following foreign policies contrary to U.S. national interests, the policy of partial MAP restriction, coupled with quixotic public criticism, tends to be self-defeating. While the state of affairs in Greece is not without serious inadequacies and certain dangers, especially of political polarization, real improvement is possible. Insofar as American influence may be a key factor, the necessary rapport toward this end has been established with the present Greek leadership.

[Omitted here is the body of the report, consisting of 25 pages with a 3-page annex on tactical handling of the decision.]

Henry J. Tasca
274. Letter From Greek Prime Minister Papadopoulos to President Nixon

Athens, April 9, 1970.

Mister President,

A year has elapsed since my last written communication with Your Excellency.2

During this period, Greece has proceeded along the road towards state normality with steady steps. It has also been able to proceed satisfactorily in its economic development, due to the untroubled internal order. In the first sector, the achievements have been in accordance with the dictates of the rules of national security in combination with the promises given. In the second, they have been commensurate with the potentialities offered by Greek reality.

In the meantime, the United States of America have effected a new approach of the great problems of mankind, under your Presidency, and have given a new content to their historical mission, with a high sense of responsibility, broadness of spirit, and constructive realism.

Your February 18 Report to Congress on United States foreign policy for the 1970’s,3 and on a new strategy for peace, sums up this significant fact in a manner extremely eloquent and explicit, and endows the United States with a moral stature which is quite unprecedented.

I have studied your Report with the utmost attention, and am addressing the present letter to you for the very purpose of expressing the great satisfaction felt by the Greek Government for the principles defined in it. As the Government of an allied and friendly nation—one which has suffered the ordeals of war as few others have, and bears a sincere love for peace—it shares these principles without reserve.

Our attention was particularly drawn by your enlightened observations concerning the aims of the Atlantic Alliance, which remain basically unaltered (“the defense of Western Europe against common challenges, and ultimately the creation of a viable and secure European

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. No classification marking. A typed note at the bottom of the last page reads: “Official Translation, The Prime Minister’s Office,” and a handwritten note by Tasca on the first page reads: “Given to HJ Tasca personally evening of April 15—See Athens Exdis 1342, 17 Apr.” No indication of the method of transmission to the White House was found. Telegram 1342 from Athens, March 23, reported on discussions between Tasca and Papadopoulos on the state of Greek-U.S. relations, including Papadopoulos’s comment that he might send a letter to President Nixon. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GREECE–US)

2 See footnote 4, Document 249.

A more responsible participation on the part of the friends of the United States in their own defense and progress is indeed imperative. Every nation is in duty bound to mobilize the resources and energies of its people, and any economic assistance it gets should simply be a means of helping and supplementing its own efforts.

The declaration of the principle of partnership, dictated by the circumstances of our times, is proof that, in fulfilling their mission in world history, the United States possess the priceless faculty of taking that course of action which is most appropriate for the benefit of all mankind, in every historical era.

Greece notes with concern the difficulties in harmonizing the defense policies of the Atlantic Alliance, which have arisen in recent years. So far, she has fulfilled her obligations towards NATO faithfully, and remains devoted to it without reserve.

Greece is aware that the crucial geographic position which she holds in the outposts of the Western World as well as in the Eastern Mediterranean—an area teeming with dangers—creates additional duties for her. Greece believes that she fulfills these duties successfully, and that she provides ample proof of this.

Greece considers that the interests of both the Western World as well as her own make it imperative for her to give first place to the problems of security in connection with her economic development. In the post-war period, she faced repeated armed attempts against her independence. In 1967, in the midst of anarchy, she would have slipped towards communism, had she not been restrained by the Revolution, which was not brought about for the satisfaction of personal ambitions, or for the imposition of a regime removed from the fundamental principles of the Free World.

Having first made the public financing sound, the Greek Government set the basis for a promising economic development which is now proceeding undisturbed, and has carried out a series of decisive social reforms, benefiting both the weaker strata of society as well as the whole.

At the same time, the nation is being led with steadfastness toward political normality and parliamentary government on the basis of the November 15 Constitution, voted by the overwhelming majority of the Greek people. Most of the institutional laws which are indispensable for its full implementation have already been voted. Those remaining will have passed by the end of the present year. 4

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4 In telegram 1903 from Athens, April 17, Tasca wrote: “I invite the Secretary’s particular attention to second paragraph of page 3.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70)
In addition, the remaining few suspended articles of the Constitution are being put into force, one after another. Thus, the articles already implemented are: Article 13, concerning the inviolability of domicile; Article 14, concerning freedom of the press—censorship of which has been abolished since December last—and Articles 18 and 19, concerning the rights of assembly and association. Article 10, concerning the Habeas Corpus, will be put into force in the course of this present month, and Articles 111 and 112, concerning the adjudication of crimes and the jurisdiction of courts martial, in the course of the present year.

The Greek Government has no intention whatsoever to deviate from the full restitution of political normality, or to slacken its pace. As I have repeatedly declared in my speeches, the aim of the Revolution is to create wholesome economic conditions in Greece, to reorganize the Administration, and to accomplish the necessary social reform so that the regime may henceforth function normally, and so that the national effort which was undertaken may be turned into good account.

The application of a broad program of civic training of the Greek people was begun last month, with the publication of a special systematic work written by Mr. Papaconstantinou, sociologist and historian, and former Secretary of Education. This book is being distributed to all state functionaries and organized classes, and will be the basis for free and elucidating discussions. A translation of its Table of Contents will be sent to you. Through this, it is plainly manifest how genuinely democratic is the training of the Greek people which is effected by the Revolution.

I am happy because your Report to Congress, which was of such historic importance, has provided me with the opportunity to bring the above mentioned thoughts and assurances to your consideration, and I remain,

Yours sincerely,

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5 The translation of the letter is unsigned.
275. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, April 11, 1970, 1244Z.

1747. For the Secretary and Dpty Asst Sec Davies (NEA). Subject: Signs of Constitutional progress in Greece. Ref: Athens 1342 and 1613.2

I wish to invite your particular attention to our telegram 1743 of April 103 reporting Prime Minister Papadopoulos’ announcement that key Article 10 of Constitution on habeas corpus is now in force and laying down specific timetable for completion by end of year of laws necessary fully to implement the Constitution and thus open way for ultimate elections. This represents concrete response to one of points (Athens 1342, para e) I urged upon him in my confidential message of some weeks ago. It also reinforces validity of basic course of action recommended in my March 31 report on Greece for the President which you have doubtless already seen.4 As noted in my recent telegram no. 1613 of April 4, it further strengthens my conviction that we must not be deflected by temporary setbacks and aberrations arising from GOG actions from our central aim of pressing Papadopoulos to move ahead with implementing the Constitution. While I realize that this progress may be erratic and not always as clear cut as might be desired, we have no feasible policy alternative, in my view, but to continue along course of keeping the Government’s nose firmly to the Constitutional grandstone. The Prime Minister’s April 10 move encourages me to believe that ultimately we can be successful.

Tasca

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. I, Jan 69–Oct 70 Secret; Exdis. Another copy is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GREECE.

2 In telegram 1342 from Athens, March 23, Tasca reported that Papadopoulos had told him that he might send a personal message to Nixon. (Ibid., POL GREECE–US) For the message, see Document 274. In telegram 1613 from Athens, April 4, Tasca reported he was having doubts about “this strange and inept government,” particularly in light of its prosecution and conviction of the publisher, editor, and managing editor of Ethnos. Tasca stated that this case, while not conclusive evidence of political retrogression, suggested that the United States should support Greek moderates and lean harder on the government to achieve constitutional progress. (Ibid., POL GREECE)

3 Not printed. (Ibid., POL 29 GREECE)

4 Document 273.
276. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies)

Washington, April 22, 1970.

SUBJ
EUR Position with respect to the possible Resumption of Shipments of Heavy Military Equipment to Greece

I am setting forth below the likely effects upon Western Europe of the possible resumption of heavy military shipments to Greece. Given the importance of this question to our position in Europe as well as the cohesion of NATO, the formulation of alternative courses of action relating to the implementation of this policy should take account of these consequences.

Public knowledge in Western Europe of an increase in U.S. military aid to Greece will damage NATO solidarity and the NATO image, regardless of how the matter is handled tactically.

1. Continued Trouble about Greece in NATO

The Junta has been severely damaging to NATO’s image in Western Europe, particularly among young people. Nevertheless, by strenuous backstage maneuvers by some of the Governments concerned, discussions of the Greek situation have been kept to a minimum in NATO fora. NATO members have recognized that open discussion either of the Greek issue or the policy of individual NATO members towards Greece would be explosive and divisive and could lead to a walk-out by Greece; the resulting constitutional question for NATO because of the absence from the Council of a Member State could be serious. Indications are that, for the foreseeable future, sentiments among NATO countries on the Greek issue will run so high that it would be dangerous and possibly permanently damaging to NATO if discussion of Greek internal matters were allowed to arise in any NATO meeting.

2. Immediate Consequences for the Spring NATO Meetings

If the Greek question were to be brought into prominence by a U.S. decision to resume heavy military shipments to Greece before the NATO Ministerial Meeting of May 26–27 and the June 11 DPC Ministerial level meeting, it is very probable that one of the Western European countries, probably one of the Scandinavians with the support of

1 Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 75 D 227, Tasca’s Report on Greece. Secret. Drafted by Tibbetts and Streator on April 21 and cleared in EUR.
some of the others, would attempt to raise the Greek question, arguing that the question of military assistance to Greece is basically political in nature and that it is not possible to ignore public opinion in their countries on the issue. Even if the Greek question itself did not come before NATO, the side effects of indirect attacks in proposed communiqué language, in ministerial statements and in corridor discussions would dominate these two meetings and effectively prevent progress on other matters. We could in effect anticipate Donnybrooks and expose the U.S. Delegations to highly emotional debates.

3. Adverse Effects on a possible Spanish Link to NATO

Preliminary discussions have already made it clear that our attempts to further a Spanish link to NATO will be handicapped, if at the same time the Greek question becomes active because of the resumption of shipment of heavy arms. Some NATO Members believe that to have both the Greek issue and the Spanish link prominent unduly emphasizes the issue of NATO’s relationship to “dictatorships.” For the near future, it appears wise to soft pedal the Greek issue if we wish to promote acceptance of a NATO relationship to Spain.

4. Modalities of handling a Decision to resume Arms Shipments to Greece

a) NATO Consultation: If we consult our NATO colleagues, we must take it for granted that much—or most—of the advice given will be negative. A NATO endorsement of our resuming arms shipments to Greece will be out of the question. Therefore, to consult in the North Atlantic Council would cause difficulties. If resumption is decided, however, the Allies, as a matter of courtesy, should be informed in advance.

b) U.S. Announcement to NATO that it intended to resume Arms Shipments: If we were to inform but not consult our NATO colleagues of our intention to resume arms shipments, we would, of course, relieve them of any responsibility for our decision. Attracting to ourselves the lightning in this way would not, however, really spare NATO, since in a number of Western European countries criticism of the U.S. tends to spill over into general criticism of NATO because of the dominant role of the U.S. in NATO, accusations that the U.S. does not take into account the wishes of its NATO partners in the formulation of its policies, and finally, accusations that NATO is a U.S. tool in the latter’s support of dictatorships and “repressive” policies. However, this course would be less difficult than to consult.

c) Timing to minimize adverse Consequences for U.S. Policy in NATO: As indicated above, it is imperative that no announcements be made about the possible resumption of heavy military equipment deliveries before the NATO meetings scheduled now for May 26–27 and June 11. Laying the groundwork with our NATO colleagues before those dates could bring on the very discussion we wish to avoid.
The Italian regional and local elections are scheduled to take place on June 7. It would be desirable that news of any possible resumption of shipments by us not be announced before that date because inevitably the Communist and other anti-NATO candidates in the election would have a field-day citing the Greek issue.

To inform our NATO colleagues of the resumption of arms shipments at a time when we would attract a minimum of attention and potential Parliamentary critics are away on vacation would be best for NATO and minimize the sort of debate which will lacerate Greek feelings; the ideal time would be, therefore, in early or mid-August. If we wish to avoid the particular problem of the Scandinavian Parliaments but cannot wait for August, we should at least wait for June 22–23, when the Scandinavian Parliaments have risen for the summer.

5. Background

a) Depth of Feeling concerning the Greek Question in the European Area: Feeling concerning Greece in Western Europe runs deep and hot in most Western European countries except Spain and Portugal. Sentiments hostile to the present Greek Government spread over the entire spectrum of political opinion in the Western Europe democratic countries; it is particularly intense among Social Democrats, intellectuals and young people. None in high public positions in these countries can risk supporting the regime publicly, and many increasingly feel constrained by public pressures to openly oppose it.

Recent liberalizing moves by the Greek Government have not yet made any significant impact in alleviating anti-Greek sentiments, at least in part because they have been obscured by Greek regime actions that appear to negate what otherwise might be regarded as advances. Moreover, we expect that for some months at least skepticism concerning the extent and effects of these liberalizing moves will be widespread in Western Europe. Generally speaking, over the last three years the Greek Government has handled its public relations atrociously insofar as Western European opinion is concerned. Thus, under the best of circumstances, it will take some time for European opinion to change in a favorable direction, and if political democracy is not restored, the majority of West Europeans and their leaders will continue actively hostile. Since Greece already has been read out of the Council of Europe, liberal activists in Western Europe will now tend to turn their efforts to inspire action against Greece in NATO, with attendant risks to the future effectiveness of the Alliance.

b) Individual Country Positions: Norway and Denmark have been particularly opposed to the Greek Junta from the beginning. In both countries there is increasing Parliamentary pressure upon the Government to move against Greece in NATO. The Netherlands, along with
Norway and Denmark, has also disassociated itself from a military sub-committee report recommending military assistance to Greece; in all three of the BENELUX (Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands) countries the present Greek regime is highly unpopular. Dutch officials, for example, are increasingly pessimistic about their ability to contain Parliamentary pressures for action against Greece at the May 1970 NATO Ministerial Meeting.

Public and Parliamentary opinion in Italy is also strongly anti-Greece, particularly among the Government parties. In the U.K. Labor Party and in Germany among the German Social Democrats, anti-Junta feeling is also strong; Conservative parties in both countries are more realistic. Given the fact there is almost certain to be an election in the U.K. this year, the British Government can be expected to be reluctant to take the lead in action which appears to favor Greece, although the British Government thoroughly agrees as to the undesirability of NATO discussion of Greece. Of the Western Europeans in NATO only France and Portugal can be described as more or less favorable to the Greek Government, and there is a good deal of anti-Greek sentiment among the French public, recently fanned by outspoken opponent and leading journalistic figure Servan-Schreiber.

277. Letter From the Country Director for Greece (Vigderman) to the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca)


Dear Henry:

The Under Secretaries Committee met on Thursday to consider recommendations to the President following the receipt of your report.

Under Secretary Richardson presided, Art Hartman was Secretary, and in attendance were Joe Sisco, Frank Shakespeare, Warren Nutter, Robert Pranger, Rodger Davies, Margaret Tibbetts, General Chapman and me.

The discussion seems to have led to the following conclusions: (I need to stress that what the group concluded can only be tested following the

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1 Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 75 D 227, Resumption of Military Aid to Greece. Secret; Nodis; Official–Informal. Cleared by Hartman (S/PC) in draft.
2 April 30.
3 Document 273.
circulation of a paper which is now in preparation.4 The precision of decision which is set down here may be somewhat misleading.)

1. It was agreed that there should be no public disclosure of the decision to resume aid until after the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting which takes place on June 11.

2. The timing of the announcement of a decision to resume aid would have to be appraised thereafter in the light of the then existing Congressional situation. (Opportunity to attack and danger to Administration measures, particularly Foreign Military Aid bills.)

3. In the context of the delivery of the President’s reply to the Prime Minister’s letter, you might be authorized (a) to tell the Prime Minister that the President was taking him at his word on constitutional reform, (b) explain our strategy for avoiding a divisive NATO discussion, (c) advert to the Congressional problem, and (d) say that we hope to have a decision some time in June, and, finally (and without commitment) suggest to the Prime Minister that once we have the NATO and Congressional problem behind us, we will be in a position to examine in a very positive spirit the question of resuming arms shipments, including a public announcement.

Sincerely,

Alfred G. Vigderman5

4 See Document 278.
5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

278. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Resumption of Deliveries of Suspended Military Shipments to Greece

The Under Secretaries Committee has been asked to consider courses of action for carrying out the recommendations in Ambassador Tasca’s “Report on Greece.”

Background

Last November you instructed Ambassador Tasca to tell the Greek Prime Minister that you were prepared to lift the suspension of all items of military aid. At the same time our Ambassador was to make clear that movement by the Greek Government toward a constitutional situation would ease our problems in speeding the release of the suspended equipment. Ambassador Tasca was to report the Greek Government’s response, and, following your review and approval, we were to begin to ship the suspended items at a gradual pace beginning with the less dramatic items.

Ambassador Tasca’s report has now been received (Enclosure No. 1). Ambassador Tasca has also transmitted a letter to you from the Greek Prime Minister (discussed below) which bears on the question of movement toward constitutional normality in Greece.

Ambassador Tasca’s Report

Ambassador Tasca concludes:

— that our policy should be based on the assumption that the present regime in Greece is here to stay,
— that the withholding of military equipment has proved ineffective in accelerating the return to democratic government and is indeed beginning to undermine Greece’s strength,
— that if the United States does not provide Greece with military aid, the Greek Government will turn to other countries to buy the military equipment Greece needs, thus creating logistics problems for the Greeks, and weakening United States ties with the Greek military establishment and government.

We should therefore

— lift the suspension on the delivery of military equipment and continue grant military aid for Greece at an adequate level.

At the same time we should continue to press the Greek regime to return to representative and constitutional government. The regime attaches primary importance to the approbation of the United States and the American people. We should use this far more positive tool in dealing with Athens, rather than the unrelated and counter-productive one of restricting military aid. Forceful, persistent, but friendly persuasion will be our best tactic.

The Ambassador is satisfied that the Greek Government does indeed intend to move forward, albeit at its own often reluctant pace,

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2 See Document 262.
with its program to implement the constitution and return Greece to a more representative form of government. He also doubts that progress towards representative democracy will be sufficiently dramatic or rapid to satisfy fully Greece’s vocal critics here and abroad. Only the fixing of a date for elections would suit them.

Developments in Greece Since November

The Greek Government has taken some positive steps in the direction of the restoration of civil liberties. But the Greek Government has only a very primitive understanding of what it must do to improve its image in Western Europe. It tends to announce measures which would earn it credit at precisely the moment when it is attracting hostile criticism to itself for its arbitrary behavior in suppressing political opposition.

We agree with Ambassador Tasca that the Greek Government does indeed intend to move forward with its program to return Greece to a more representative form of government, though its progress so far is slow and the record is spotty. This conviction is not shared by some of Greece’s NATO partners (chiefly the Norwegians, Danes and Dutch) nor, broadly, by certain elements in the Congress, some of whom show intense concern on this question. These critics assert that the Greek Government has retrogressed instead of making progress toward constitutionalism and that the United States (and NATO) should disassociate itself from a regime which has earned so much moral obloquy.

The NATO Problem

Public knowledge in Western Europe of an increase in United States military aid to Greece will damage NATO solidarity and the NATO image, regardless of how the matter is handled tactically.

If the Greek question were to be highlighted by a United States decision to resume heavy military shipments to Greece before the NATO Ministerial Meetings of May 26–27 and June 11, it is very probable that one of the Western European countries, probably one of the Scandinavians with the support of some of the others, would attempt to raise the Greek question, arguing that the question of military assistance to Greece is basically political in nature and that it is not possible to ignore public opinion in their countries on the issue. Even if the Greek question itself did not come before NATO, indirect attacks on Greece could harmfully dominate these two meetings and effectively prevent progress on other matters.

Public opinion in Western Europe generally with respect to Greece has not improved in recent months; and there is already mounting political pressure upon some NATO governments (Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands) to raise the question of Greece in NATO, alleging that the undemocratic nature of the regime is a matter of concern to the Alliance. Together with the British, Germans and Italians we have
made démarches in the Scandinavian and Benelux capitals to stress the need to avoid raising Greece in NATO. We are hoping that these démarches will succeed but we cannot be sure.

With respect to NATO, we conclude therefore:

a) The damage to NATO from an increase in United States military aid to Greece can be reduced if the decision is announced after the May and June NATO Ministerial Meetings.

b) Our efforts to further a Spanish link to NATO will be handicapped if consideration of the link comes at a moment when the Greek question is active, simply because of the emphasis the two issues would give to NATO’s relationship to two “dictatorships.”

c) In order to avoid implying that our NATO partners can share the responsibility for the decision to resume arms shipments, it is better to inform our NATO partners rather than to consult with them since we could never secure a favorable NATO verdict on this question.

d) A disruptive and noisy NATO discussion on the subject of Greece would complicate our Congressional problem by highlighting Greece as a weakness of the Alliance rather than as a positive element.

The Congressional Problem

The problem with Congress raised by the resumption of the shipment of the suspended military equipment is at least of equal gravity, posing a major public relations problem for the Administration vis-à-vis the Congress. Severe emotional attacks both in the Congress and the press are anticipated. It seems inevitable that the decision to lift the suspension of arms shipments will trigger an effort on the part of Congressional critics to restrict the freedom of the Executive through amendment of one or another pieces of legislation then before the Congress. The targets for such action might include the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and the Second Supplemental Appropriation.

The intensity of public feeling in the United States and among our allies in Western Europe and the consequent impact on the Congress suggests the virtue of a joint State-Defense presentation of the decision on the resumption of arms shipments to the Congressional leadership, augmented by the Chairman and ranking minority members of key committees.

The Prime Minister’s Letter

The Greek Prime Minister has transmitted a letter to you (Enclosure No. 2) relating to the restoration of parliamentary government in Greece. The key language in the letter is the Greek Prime Minister’s assertion that “the situation is being led with steadfastness toward political normality and parliamentary government on the basis of the November 15 constitution...” In another place the Prime Minister asserts that the “Greek Government has no intention whatsoever to deviate from the full restitution of political normality or to slacken its pace.”
A suggestion for your reply is enclosed at Enclosure No. 3.3

It is not yet clear the degree to which the exchange between you and the Prime Minister can be used to help persuade critics of the regime that the regime does in fact firmly intend to return the country to parliamentary democracy. The effective use of the exchange depends in part on the Prime Minister’s willingness to agree to the publication of the text of the two letters or, alternatively, the substance of the letters.

Recommendations

The Under Secretaries Committee recommends:

1. That no announcement be made public concerning the resumption of arms shipments before the NATO Ministerial Meeting and the Meeting of NATO Defense Ministers are behind us (the latter meeting takes place on June 11).

2. That after the June 11 NATO meeting, we will resume the shipment of the arms now withheld (and make a public announcement of our decision) unless it appears that the resumption of arms shipments would seriously jeopardize any of the legislation in the Administration’s foreign aid program, and also taking into account other Congressional foreign policy considerations.

3. That Ambassador Tasca be authorized to inform the Greek Prime Minister of the decision along the following lines:
   a) that the President was taking him at his word on the question of constitutional reform.
   b) that the President is prepared to resume the normal shipment of military equipment to Greece, including all the items which have been suspended.
   c) that there is a serious problem with some elements of Congress who are in a position to attack and perhaps to endanger foreign aid legislation which neither the Greek Government nor the United States Government would like to see endangered; this is a fact of political life in the United States which must be recognized.
   d) that we will keep the developing Congressional situation under intensive review in order to choose the earliest appropriate moment at which it will be possible to begin the resumption of arms shipments, and to make a public announcement that we are doing so. As is obvious, premature advance speculation from Greek sources about the President’s intention to resume arms shipments will necessarily delay the resumption of arms shipments to Greece.

As regards timing, it is proposed:

   a) that Ambassador Tasca speak to the Greek Prime Minister in the sense of these instructions promptly after you have authorized Am-
bassador Tasca to transmit to the Greek Prime Minister your reply to the Prime Minister’s letter.

b) that when a decision has been made as to an appropriate time to proceed to resumption of the shipment of the military equipment on the suspended list we would inform selected Members of Congress as well as our NATO partners shortly before the public announcement.

ELR

279. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 8, 1970.

SUBJECT

Greek Resistance Journalist Wants to See You and Mrs. Nixon

Mrs. Eleni Vlachou, a prominent Greek newspaper woman widely known for her disapproval of the present Greek government, is in Washington this week and is asking to see you and Mrs. Nixon. State would like to have your views on both of these appointments.

Mrs. Vlachou was well known as the owner of two Athens dailies which she suspended in protest immediately after the 1967 coup. Thereafter arrested for insulting the new government, she evaded authorities and went into exile in London where for two years she has been lobbying hard against the junta, both in speaking engagements and in her writings. (I see from the New York Times Book Review yesterday that she has just published a book called House Arrest.) Her contact in Washington—also an anti-junta personage—is Elias P. Demetracopoulos, a not-too-responsible journalist and leader of the Greek resistance movement in this country. He has been trying to arrange prominent appearances for her on the Hill, at the National Press Club and on “Meet the Press.”

She is apparently here to ascertain the true U.S. feeling about the situation in Greece, presumably for future writing in Europe. State (attached)² feels that on the one hand, open reception by high government

² Not printed.
officials here would cause some unhappiness in Athens; on the other, they believe that hearing her out would signal that this Administration is willing to listen to all sides. They have therefore recommended (1) that she not see the Vice President (which she is trying to do) because of the possibility of journalistic exploitation by her of such a meeting; (2) that she not see Mrs. Nixon (Mrs. Nixon should not be subjected to this kind of problem); but (3) that a meeting with you would pose no difficulties.

Recommendations

1. I feel that this is not the kind of situation which we want to involve Mrs. Nixon in and recommend against the appointment.3

2. I do not see the necessity of your seeing Mrs. Vlachou either. I doubt you have much to say to the exiles or want to be exploited for their purposes. I recommend against your seeing her.4

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3 Kissinger initialed the approval option.
4 Kissinger initialed the approval option on June 15 and added in a handwritten note: “In other words neither of us sees her.”

280. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, June 10, 1970, 1536Z.

2965. Subject: Pipinelis’ meeting with King Constantine.

1. At our meeting today Pipinelis gave me a fill-in on his meeting with King Constantine in Rome. He said this was frank and complete account and he requested I respect his confidence.

2. Prior to his departure for Rome Pipinelis had informed Prime Minister Papadopoulos of his intention to see King. He told him he would review agenda of NATO meeting with King and would indicate position of Greek Government on various items on agenda. This was cause of lengthy meeting. Pipinelis commented that he found the King very well informed regarding the various items on the agenda.

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3. He then suggested to the King that he seek a meeting with Prime Minister since time ripe for his return to Greece, pointing out to King regime now firmly established, economy booming in extraordinary fashion, and his return important with respect to future stability of country and firmness of timetable for return to parliamentary democracy. In an aside, FonMin told me he greatly concerned that King come back to guarantee that Papadopoulos’s commitment to return to parliamentary democracy, which he is deeply convinced is sincere, be backed up by King in Greece on throne, since disappearance of Papadopoulos could be catastrophic for future of Greek democracy.

4. King said he eager to meet with PM. In reply to my question why King did not come out publicly for arms aid to Greece, which we knew he favored, FonMin said that King ready and eager to back up arms aid to Greece, but that this must come after a meeting with PM reviewing entire situation but based upon an implementation of the 1968 Constitution.

5. Pipinelis then revealed that meeting between the two almost took place last year but that PM backed out at least minute. During their December meeting last year Pipinelis again suggested to King a meeting with PM. He said he had made clear to King that meeting would not necessarily lead to immediate action. King was also informed of opposition on part of younger, middle grade officers to his return. When asked by King what he should talk about, Pipinelis told King there was nothing regarding his return to talk about since Constitution contains necessary provision regarding return of King.

6. Pipinelis firmly denied any differences with King or any instructions by Papadopoulos in the nature of an ultimatum. He believes hostile press deliberately seeking to drive deeper wedge between King and the regime.

7. In reply to my question as to where a meeting between King and Prime Minister might take place, FonMin said “early aboard some ship, as absolute secrecy must be preserved.”
Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, June 12, 1970, 1608Z.

3034. Subject: Meeting with Prime Minister Papadopoulos.

1. I met with Prime Minister Papadopoulos today accompanied by Admiral Richardson, whom PM expressed desire to see. The PM expressed his fears regarding Soviet intentions in Eastern Mediterranean, particularly possible effort on part of Soviets to open up Suez by driving Israelis back from Canal. PM also said that in his view major target of Soviets in this decade is Africa, particularly North Africa. PM was also concerned that in face of rising Soviet threat cohesiveness of Alliance shows signs of serious weakness as reflected in political attacks on NATO member Greece inspired ultimately by political warfare tactics of Soviets, as well as in increasing weaknesses of military contribution to common defense on northern flank. PM said in reply to Admiral Richardson’s expression of appreciation for facilities granted US Navy in Crete that there was no need to mention or even thank Greece for these facilities now. Our interests were common and it was in Greek interest to make these facilities available.

2. In reply we stressed importance of Greek contribution within a strong alliance, whose cohesiveness is indispensable to NATO strength. PM countered by saying that cohesiveness was important but could be purchased at disastrous price if prerequisite for Scandinavians of bringing back Papandreou were to be fulfilled, a possibility which he completely excluded. PM asked where would cohesiveness principle be for Scandinavians if US were to request NATO assistance in extreme contingency arising out of Middle East conflict.

3. I told PM I might be leaving for US in next several days on consultation. He said he would never again raise question of US military assistance because he questioned seriously whether US had the capacity to overcome resistance to aid to Greece, such a denial of aid being a high priority Soviet political warfare objective against the US. Greece would be faithful to the alliance but it would buy to the extent necessary the arms it needed to defend the country against communism, however costly these might be.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. I. Secret; Exds. Another copy is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 GREECE.

2 Admiral David C. Richardson, Commander of the Sixth Fleet.
4. In reply I noted President’s deep preoccupation with Vietnam and the repercussions from his great and courageous decision to move against Hanoi’s forces in Cambodia,3 a problem which would not have arisen had his predecessors acted to move against the use of the Communist sanctuaries to attack our own and allied troops in South Vietnam. I also pointed to the problem of NATO cohesiveness, the maintenance of which is an objective worth supporting. Finally, I stressed again the importance of public opinion in the US, particularly as it affected the Senate.

5. At this point I sought to put question of military aid into perspective, noting our mutual obligations under the Alliance and stating that no country could stand alone. Thus, it most important that we keep strategic aspects of our friendship continuously in foreground. An alliance of free countries required above all patience and understanding for success. This was more important than military requirements, vital as the latter might be.

6. Comment: I found PM deeply friendly as usual towards the US, but clearly depressed by inability of US to act at a time of great danger to the West. His attribution of our inabilities to Soviet political warfare tactics may appear far-fetched, but the fact is he does not understand what he appears to see as our political incapacity to face up to public opinion in face of the growing Soviet threat, while taking into consideration the great dedication of Greece to NATO and even more its friendship with the US, and its status as a country publicly committed to a democratic course. I think we should take very seriously indeed his statement that Greece will purchase arms elsewhere (particularly from France). With French attitude toward the Mediterranean and the Arab-Israeli crisis being what they seem to be, in addition to the other reasons set forth in my report to the President, I fear we may even lose a good deal of the flexibility which we have enjoyed to date in this most friendly country. This is not to mention the loss of bases for the US which are important to the balance of payments equilibrium and currency stability.

7. Request Dept pass this message to USMission NATO.

Tasca

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3 On April 30 President Nixon announced that U.S. forces had entered Cambodia to destroy the North Vietnamese Army’s line of communications. The decision set off a serious protest in the United States. For the text of Nixon’s statement, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 405–410.
282. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Your Talk with Ambassador Tasca—Wednesday, June 17

Background. You decided in principle last November to resume normal military shipments to Greece but asked Ambassador Tasca to work out the delicate relationship between resumption and Greece’s return to constitutional government. This relationship is important in blunting liberal criticism in NATO and in our Congress.

Ambassador Tasca has sent you a report (in your NSC book) recommending that Prime Minister Papadopoulos be told that your decision to resume has been made and that actual shipments will begin as soon as we are in a position to claim Congressional support. He believes the government can then be encouraged to continue toward elections.

Secretary Rogers came back from the Rome NATO meeting feeling that implementation of the Tasca report should be delayed because of the strong feeling against Greece in NATO capitals.

The tactical issue is how to stage resumption so as not to trigger a sharp reaction in NATO capitals or a further attack on the Foreign Military Sales Act.

—Many in State argue that we must wait until both the authorization act and the appropriation have passed.

—Tasca is arguing that we move as soon as the Hartke amendment to the act is voted on and, presumably, defeated. [This would prohibit aid to Greece. Tasca argues that we should interpret its defeat as a Congressional green light and quietly go ahead.] He feels, as far as NATO is concerned, that we just have to argue hard the importance of

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2 See Document 262.

3 Document 273.

4 Brackets in the original. The Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted this amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1971 banning sales to Greece. The amendment was defeated in the Senate on June 29, 50–42.
Greece to maintaining a strong US–NATO position in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Ambassador Tasca has been working while here on an inter-departmental memo to you detailing a plan for carrying out his proposal, including a message from you to Prime Minister Papadopoulos. This memo should come to you in a few days and will be useful in preparing your decision memorandum.

The points to make to Tasca today are:

1. You still favor early resumption, as you told him last November.
2. You will want to hear Secretary Rogers’ views on Congressional and NATO opinion but will make a decision in a few days.
3. You will clear a reply to Prime Minister Papadopoulos as soon as you get the inter-departmental memo.

The points to make at the NSC are:

1. Greece is increasingly important, given Soviet pressures in the Eastern Mediterranean.
2. You will be making a decision on this issue shortly and would like to have the inter-departmental memo this week.

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5 A note attached to the memorandum reads: “Mr. President—Henry wants the following item added to the points you should make to Amb. Tasca: ‘You want him to return to Greece immediately. You do not think it advisable that he appear before the Senate For. Relations Committee.’ a. 2:30 p.m.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. I, Jan 69–Oct 70)

6 See Document 283.

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283. Editorial Note

On June 17, 1970, the National Security Council met in the Cabinet Room of the White House with President Richard Nixon to discuss U.S. policy toward the Mediterranean, with particular reference to Italy and Greece. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 3:11 to 4:44 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) Ambassador Henry Tasca, who was in Washington for consultations, attended.

The meeting began with a briefing by Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, who stressed U.S. interest in the southern flank of Europe, the security of Israel, and the security of oil shipments for Europe from the Middle East. Helms then noted that the Soviet Union in the 1950s provided arms to radical Arab states and in the 1960s estab-
lished a naval presence in the Mediterranean. Helms stated that the Soviets were planning to stay in the Mediterranean. After noting the Soviet provision of air defense to Egypt and the continued strength of the Communist Party in Italy, Helms turned to Greece and Turkey:

“In Greece and Turkey—Turkey is firmly committed to its NATO ties and is almost certain to remain in NATO. But while they will exert more vigorous influence in the Alliance, they will probably continue to expand their relations with Moscow, particularly in the economic field. Moscow has played both sides in the Cyprus situation.”

The President then called upon his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, who stated that while the NSC had made an extensive examination of the whole area, the discussion at the meeting on the operational side would concentrate on Italy and Greece. Kissinger noted that the United States faced a number of questions including the following: “To what extent that we continue to seek containment of Soviet power, can we afford not to have firm relations with Greece and not to look at it from a security point of view?”

After a discussion of Spain, North Africa, and Malta, Secretary of State William Rogers raised the issue of NATO and Greece:

“Brosio is very worried about the future of NATO. He wanted to head the Scandinavians off to avoid a Greek walkout. It was a tough meeting. The Dane was concerned about the U.S. giving military aid to Greece. We urged the Greeks not to walk out. The Dane finally decided on a milder speech than he earlier planned. The Greek thanked me and agreed to ask his government to move as much as it can. The Norwegians and Danes wanted us to get the Greeks to do something visible before we go ahead with military supply.

“President: The decision has to be in two different parts: NATO-related arms, and arms related to internal defense.

“Rogers: The decision is as to timing. It’s possible that Norway and the Danes may leave. If we could get the Greeks to do something, we’d be O.K. They have already said they will stop the military courts and return to civilian rule. If they could announce this, that would be all that’s needed for us.

“Amb. Tasca: They will do it.

“President: The idea is not to blackjack them but to work out a deal privately.

“Tasca: We want to avoid a situation where those who are against us charge that we haven’t done anything.

“President: [To Sec. Rogers]: Do the Europeans understand the dangers in the situation?

“Rogers: Yes, they understand. Any weakening will be a source of great concern.”
The President then led the discussion toward the issue of U.S. military posture, especially if the United States received a request for support from Lebanon or Jordan. The President then returned to Greece as follows:

“President: What about the King of Greece? What’s his situation?
“VP: It’s hard to judge, but . . .
“Tasca: He’s had many faults in the past. There is great opposition to him among the younger and middle officers.
“President: What do they want?
“Tasca: They want a Republic. The Army is more of this mind than the others because of their background. They think the King might put in older exiled officers. If the King was prepared to make a statement that he wants the Greeks to have arms, that could help reconcile the various groups.
“President: I know him reasonably well. He has strong qualities. His father was a decent man. He has good points but was pulled and hauled by the radicals. He’s idealistic but he was exploited. Could he be persuaded to do that? The symbol of the King is good in Greece. In his self-interest, he doesn’t have the political sophistication to know that those outside really don’t support him. If he could get a statement on arms, action on arms, and go ahead with a promise to have a constitutional government by the end of the year . . .
“Tasca: They never had made a promise before to do this by the end of the year.
“Rogers: The NATO people don’t believe they’ll do it.
“VP: What is the Soviet attitude?
“Tasca: They are knocking on two doors: They’re trying to discredit this government, and at the same time they’re trying to queer its relations with the U.S. to get us out of Greece.
“VP: Who stimulates the public relations figures in the U.S.? The Greek-American Committee is amazed.
“Tasca: The International Red Cross tell us—they have free access—that they don’t believe the torture stories. This may have been in the first 18 months—on Communists who were in the ‘40s civil war—but not anymore now.
“Rogers: We have to realize that regardless of the facts, the young people in Europe believe them. We can’t afford to lose them all. The Europeans say they haven’t done anything.
“Tasca: They do have serious problems. They don’t understand their image problems abroad.
“VP: I don’t believe there are groupings of ‘young people,’ ‘poor people.’ These constituencies don’t exist. They are diverse.
“President: One thing is relevant: The USIA people say that the only major U.S. paper they see in Europe is the Herald-Tribune. That’s basically the New York Times and Post. The TV in Europe is state-controlled and leftist-oriented. What is involved is a barrage of propaganda unfavorable to the U.S.—and also a negative picture of the Greeks. The idea is that the U.S. shouldn’t give arms and then the Greeks would change. They’d change alright, but the wrong way. In 1947 I visited Greece as a young Congressman. I talked to guerrillas—who were probably properly coached—and I came back convinced that the Greek-Turkish Aid program should go forward. I got a barrage of cards and letters saying, ‘Don’t give arms, give food to Greece.’ The left was against giving arms. The major difference is that in the 1950’s it was unfashionable to support Communists but it is no longer so. People now say they don’t care about the security of Europe; they want the Greeks to be pure. I don’t know what would happen at the lower levels in Europe. I know what I’d do—we need the Greeks because of 10 divisions, and the Mid-east. We don’t like the government but we’d like its successor less. We can’t do this, of course. Papandreou is a cold-eyed tough guy of the left. We have to do it right. Constantine should come back for his interest and Greece’s interest and tell them we believe they should move and say they will move.

“VP: Has the media and opinion effect really been examined? The media here are not representative. Couldn’t this be true in other countries, too?

“President: The American leader class—the intellectuals, the media, etc.—they have a viewpoint that makes them no longer fit for leadership. The strength of America is in the ‘hard-hats’—the stevedores, the working people, some in the colleges. But American opinion in a hard decision could be with you. It’s not so in Europe. Luns, who’s a tough man, said that on TV.

“Rogers: One thing of the difference between the young and the old: The young don’t remember the war and they have no sense of history.

“President: Tasca, you go back and try to get it done. If we follow the Danes, the Norwegians and other Socialists, the French and Italians, we do nothing. They are weak; we’ve got to lead. We’ve got to support the Greeks. It must be made palatable. The others all know if we weren’t there, they’d be terrified. We look all the more important because the Europeans can’t sell security to their own people.

“Rogers: All they really ask us to do is do it wisely—not the Danes and Norwegians—but they help us by taking our problems into consideration.

“Tasca: We care about it but we want to talk and bring the Greeks along. The Greeks are very friendly.”
The discussion then turned to the role of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–028, NSC Meeting—The Mediterranean 6/17/70) The full account of this NSC meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.

284. National Security Decision Memorandum 67


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT
Military Supply Policy Toward Greece

Based on the NSC discussion of June 17\(^2\) and the memorandum from the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, “Resumption of Deliveries of Suspended Military Shipments to Greece,”\(^3\) the President has approved the following as the principal elements in a course of action to implement the decision to resume arms shipments to Greece:

—Prime Minister Papadopoulos may be told in advance and in strictest confidence of the U.S. intention to resume military shipments after, in our judgment, such resumption will no longer seriously jeopardize the Foreign Military Sales bill and assuming legislative authority for such resumption.
—In this connection, he may be told that our target for resumption is about September 1.
—The Prime Minister should be further informed that in connection with the resumption it is anticipated that there will be further specific steps which we can cite as further evidence of progress toward full constitutional government. The Prime Minister can be told that the U.S. takes at face value and accepts without reservation his assurances on moving toward parliamentary democracy.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–217, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 67. Secret; Nodis; Exclusively Eyes Only. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
\(^2\) See Document 283.
\(^3\) Document 278.
The U.S. Ambassador in Greece should be given discretion on the question of timing of (a) the delivery of the letter from the President to the Prime Minister; (b) advice to the Prime Minister of our intention to resume shipments; and (c) informing him of the necessity of specific further evidence of progress toward constitutional government in Greece.

Henry A. Kissinger

285. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, July 6, 1970, 1615Z.

3586. Ref: State 105703. For Assistant Secretary Sisco From Ambassador Tasca.

1. While I appreciate fact that there widespread belief both within Executive branch and Congress that Greek Government would be in far better position to normalize its relations with its allies if King were to return, I would like you to have some thoughts of mine on the practical problems involved. I think these might be useful for you and your colleagues in NEA when the subject is raised by members of Congress and others.

2. Question of regime normalizing its relations with King runs into three important obstacles, most formidable of which is that there is widespread animosity within regime towards King. Feeling runs so high that Papadopoulos could only normalize his relations with the King at this time by running risk of endangering his own position and at the least his program for Constitutional progress. From what we know of internal situation within regime there are substantial number of coup group members who simply will not agree to King’s return at this time. If they were convinced Papadopoulos working to bring King back, it might no longer be possible to carry them along on question of Constitutional implementation, to which they have only reluctantly agreed at best.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. 1 Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Exdis.

2 Dated July 2, it reported Sisco’s meeting with the Under Secretary of the Prime Minister. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 GREECE)
3. Regime, I am convinced, is firmly entrenched, and it is only through regime that we can hope to achieve our objective of making Greece again fully acceptable to European governments and peoples and American public opinion; and for this reason alone question of King’s return involves serious problems for us. But, in addition, it should be remembered that King is not the unifying force he may appear when removed in time and space from the Greek scene. Constantine was always highly controversial, and he opposed the very progressive forces which we would like ultimately to play a role again in Greece’s development. It is not only the left which would be incensed by US efforts promote King’s return but the solid majority of progressive moderate opinion. They consider King as bearing large share of responsibility for breakdown in democracy prior to coup, and quite rightly so.

4. Finally, even on right of political spectrum and within army King is by no means the unifying force he might be. Serious doubts are entertained about Constantine by a number of influential rightists (Eleni Vlachou is one example that comes to mind); and in middle grade of Greek army officer corps, King is thoroughly unpopular. He has in fact showed consistent immaturity in action and lack of the intellectual qualities that would enable him to deal with delicate situation in Greece today. His continuing flirtation with enemies of regime is typical, and we should bear in mind that regime leaders are intelligence officers by profession and are quite well informed on King’s activities.3

5. In addition to his activities which displease regime, perhaps even more important is King’s failure to speak out in favor of full military assistance for Greece, so that Greek people may be defended against external aggression regardless of type of government which they may have at moment.

6. Having said this, I would like to make it clear that I am not implying that King has no role to play in Greece. But this role can only come about when and if regime feels it must regularize its relations with the monarchy. It may well be that we will have to play an intermediary role between King and regime. However, based on my analysis of situation, this can only take place to extent climate improves in regard to King, and even then we must act only with closest agreement.

3 In telegram 3758 from Athens, July 13, Tasca reported that during a July 11 meeting with Papadopoulos, the two men discussed the future of the monarchy. The Greek Prime Minister expressed strong personal dislike for King Constantine but stressed his own monarchism. Tasca concluded that abdication might be the regime’s answer and that “Prime Minister’s almost totally negative attitude on King may reflect belief that at this point King is mainly Trojan Horse for regime opponents.” (Ibid.)
Prime Minister Papadopoulos. Despite his faults, King may be needed
in this situation at some point. (As Department aware King, in interim,
is being kept financially by regime; and Constitution provides for his
return after elections.) But our first requirement must be that he return
under conditions that do not prejudice US interests here. In no case
should it ever appear that US instrumental in any way in his return. I
have King very much in mind as I follow the Greek scene, and I think
you can count on me to give you every indication of opportunities that
may arise for using his position to further our interests here.

Tasca

286. Message From the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca) to the
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)¹

Athens, July 10, 1970.

SUBJECT
[less than 1 line not declassified] Action to Support U.S. Policy Aims in Greece

1. In my report of March 31,² I analysed the Greek situation and
submitted my recommendations. Essentially, I proposed—

a. Restoral of the suspended portion of MAP for Greece and the
future maintenance of MAP at adequate levels, and

b. Continued pressure on the Greek Regime to encourage the ear-
liest possible implementation of the 1968 Constitution.

2. Basic assumptions—The present Government is firmly in con-
trol of the Greek internal situation, the opposition within Greece has
no effective short-range means at their disposal to effect the overthrow
of the present Government. Soviet long-range policy towards Greece
aims at separating Greece from NATO, isolating Greece from its natu-
ral allies in Europe, denying use of Greek soil to the U.S., thus neu-
tralizing Greece as a U.S. ally, then hopefully leading Greece into the
neutralist camp and ultimately the Communist sphere of influence à la the Arab world.

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Greece, 1969–1972. Secret;
Sensitive.
² Document 273.
3. Supplementary assumptions—

   a. Papadopoulos, as the leading figure in the collegiate Greek Regime, has the greatest breadth of those in his group. I believe he sincerely intends to implement the constitution and restructure Greek political life, though he has not been explicit as to the timing of the last step—elections.

   b. Some of the other Revolutionary officers are less enthusiastic than Papadopoulos about implementing the 1968 Constitution. (For a discussion of the dynamics of the present Regime, see my telegram Limdis Athens–970 of March 2, 1970.)

   c. In addition to our quiet diplomacy and personal persuasion, to advance the date of full implementation of the 1968 Constitution, and to influence the Greek Government to take other public steps to improve its reputation at home and abroad, 

      (1) To influence Greek authorities to relax security restrictions, to reduce resort to and hopefully to end martial law, and to adhere to its commitments to implement the 1968 Constitution.

      (2) To influence the Greek authorities to avoid other repressive measures which do political damage to Greece without filling a decisive security need.

      (3) To promote the concept of a reconciliation of the various non-Communist factions within Greece.

4. The time has now come to move even more positively in direct support of our aims here in Greece as well as in opposition to the well identified Soviet and other Communist tactics. Specifically, I therefore recommend that the Department obtain interagency approval for a program which would embrace these five points—

   a. steps to facilitate implementation of the 1968 Constitution by convincing doubtful elements within the Regime of the practicality of this move, encouraging those elements who are already disposed in that direction and building up momentum in public media in Greece and abroad for a sincere implementation of the Constitution.

   b. steps to counter Communist efforts to exploit the Greek issue to split NATO and to isolate Greece by breaking her economic, political, and military ties with Western Europe and North America.

   c. steps to assist in rebuilding democratic institutions in Greece through the provision of advice and assistance and the persuasion of key Revolutionary officers that elections under the 1968 Constitution will be in their long-range interest. (It is in U.S. interest to see healthy institutions created and a return to the chaotic period of 1966 avoided.)

   d. steps to encourage closer ties of Greece with the non-Communist Western world, ties which have been strained in the period since April 1967.

3 Document 269.
e. [less than 1 line not declassified] steps to expose Communist and Soviet tactics and duplicity and to thwart Soviet purposes in Greece.

5. The above program would not be expensive. Indeed it is not today a question of large sums of money. Rather we need approval of a modest program (of perhaps $35,000 in FY 1971) designed to keep matters in Greece moving in such a direction that we may avoid much more serious and disturbing problems at a later date.\(^4\)

\(^4\) In a July 14 message to Tasca, Sisco and Davies indicated “interest” in the proposal and requested a more detailed analysis of the “types of activity and what you have in mind.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Greece, 1969–1972) In his August 5 reply, Tasca outlined a series of steps that could be taken to employ the Greek and foreign press to build support for implementation of the 1968 Constitution and to expose Communist propaganda operations. He also suggested providing advice to junta leaders on the creation of viable political and economic-social movements to support their continuance as a force in a restructured democratic state. (Ibid.) In an August 19 memorandum to Christopher Van Hollen (NEA), James Gardner (INR) reported that a message to Tasca had been approved authorizing implementation “of those parts of the Ambassador’s proposal that are aimed at leading the regime toward regular constitutional practices and those that are directed against Communist forces. It disapproves those that are designed to popularize the regime with the Greek people or to arouse perhaps unjustified hopes among the Greek people about the future course of the regime. The response also concludes that none of the approved actions is so unusual or serious as to require interagency consideration in the 40 Committee.” (Ibid.)

287. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece**\(^1\)


119968. Ref: Athens 3994 and 3996.\(^2\) For Ambassador from the Secretary.

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\(^2\) In telegram 3994 from Athens, July 22, Tasca warned Sisco that putting excessive pressure on Papadopoulos for liberalization would play into the hands of extremists within the ruling group. (Ibid.) Telegram 3996 from Athens, July 22, reported on efforts by Tasca and Ellsworth in discussions with Papadopoulos to secure Greek political cooperation within NATO in an effort to head off further challenges from the Nordic states to the regime. (Ibid.)
1. I have read your telegram reporting your meeting with the Prime Minister in company with Ambassador Ellsworth, as well as your message to Sisco on what we can and should expect from the Greeks in connection with the resumption of the suspended arms shipments.

2. I do not need to tell you how serious is our continuing problem in NATO because of the Scandinavian drive in various ways to get at the Greeks. In this connection, I am concerned that Papadopoulos has reacted to the latest complication in NATO created by the Danes to announce that he will postpone further constitutional progress until the issue with the Danes is resolved. This suggests that the Prime Minister does not yet really fully comprehend our own deep need for speed and conviction in Greek moves in the direction of political normality. We cannot accept a link between action on the DPC report and further constitutional progress.

3. Our second problem is of course domestic and Congressional opinion. The situation remains as before. In the Senate we have had another demonstration (too close for comfort) of the strength of the minority which would cut off shipment of military items to Greece.

4. Our decision to resume arms shipments reflects our willingness to accept a considerable risk in our relations with our other allies as well as with the body of our domestic critics. We believe it is reasonable to expect that the Greek Govt should be willing to accept some risk on its part to help create the atmosphere in which we can live with these risks. I hope that we can have some indications very soon of specific steps the Greek Govt can take which would be incontrovertible evidence of relaxation. Lifting of martial law and the announcement of a date for municipal elections come to mind as steps which should not greatly disturb the course of the “revolution” and would have considerable impact.

5. We are relying on the excellent relations you have established with the Greek Govt to permit you to discuss this with the members of the regime on a friendly, helpful and firm basis. I fully appreciate the special delicacy of your job.

Rogers

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3 The Danish Government raised the issue of the suitability of Greece for NATO membership.
4 Apparent reference to the defeat of the Hartke amendment.
288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, August 11, 1970, 2041Z.

129729. For Ambassador from Secretary. We note with interest GOG has announced, with some fanfare which has been well noted in our press, release of 500 prisoners.\(^1\) I have reviewed carefully your telegrams on your talks with Papadopolous in which you have pressed him to take two steps as a means to help us go ahead on the announcement of the raising of the suspension of the arms embargo. In view of this step on the prisoners, I would like you to go back to Papadopolous and tell him that if he can move quickly on one, not necessarily both of the above steps, this would provide us with sufficient help that we could then announce at the end of the month the lifting of the suspension. Either lifting of martial law or announcement of municipal elections combined with announcement of release of prisoners should provide us with enough ammunition to go ahead on decision with respect to arms you have already given him. I leave to your ingenuity how to put this to PM to avoid implication that we are establishing direct conditionality.\(^3\)

Rogers

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I, Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sisco; cleared by Silva, Davies, Tibbetts, and Eliot; NEA, EUR and S, and approved by Rogers.

\(^2\) On August 18 the junta announced it would release 500 Communist prisoners.

\(^3\) In telegram 4600 from Athens, August 20, Tasca reported that he had had discussions with Papadopoulos on the issue of the lifting of martial law even before receiving the Secretary’s telegram. “Indications that I have received have definitely been on the discouraging side. Nevertheless I intend to make another direct approach.” The Ambassador added that he feared that he had pushed Papadopoulos as far as he safely could “without seriously risking provoking adverse reaction.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70)
289. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, August 26, 1970, 1746Z.


1. I saw PriMin Papadopoulos last night and discussed with him in detail question of further liberalization measures by GOG. In this context, I referred to greatly improved relations between our two governments as shown by exchange of presidential letters,3 the role of U.S. regarding action by the Council of Europe, our attempt to persuade opposing countries in NATO that DPC report on Greece4 should be treated as defense not political issue, as well as efforts in Senate regarding both Pell and Hartke amendments, and finally, imminence of action on military aid issue. I pointed out problem not supply of military aid but totality of relations between administration and Congress and ability of Congress to exert its power at any time on individual issues of high priority to U.S. national interest. I stressed our concern was in consolidating our friendship and that I spoke as friend of PriMin and government. I repeated again we had to take public opinion into account, and GOG should realize their actions of crucial importance insofar as they affected public opinion. I noted President had recently specifically designated Apollo XIII astronauts to visit Greece. Finally, as evidence that U.S. has sought to give positive assistance to creating favorable image for GOG abroad, I added we had made clear to all NATO governments that only way to progress was to work with present Greek Government.

2. Within this context, I reported the Secretary of State and USG very pleased with release of 500 prisoners. We hoped that they would now decree entry into effect of Articles 12, 111, and 112 coupled with a specific statement that remaining “shadow of martial law” removed. I added opinion that combined with release of detainees, such action would sound most convincing note to opposition abroad that new regime here to stay and that progress lay through not against them. It would be especially helpful, I continued, if such an announcement came before the DPC meeting in September. I added that in any event we considered that meeting did not present an insurmountable problem.

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2 Telegram 137363 to Athens, August 22, provided instructions for Tasca to use in his discussion about regime liberalization with Papadopoulos. (Ibid.)

3 Apparently a reference to the Nixon–Papadopoulos exchange of letters. See Document 274.

4 For information.
3. PriMin began his reply with preface that what he had to say would unfortunately have to be unpleasant. GOG was unable understand U.S. posture, particularly delay of USG in regularizing relations. Resumption of military aid (i.e., suspension of embargo) did not depend on public opinion or action of Congress. It required simple decision by USG. Moreover, USG had been able to conclude an agreement with Franco Spain,\(^5\) and undertaken Cambodian operation without being blocked by hostile opinion of a minority in Congress. Why had USG hesitated on Greece? Even worse, we had taken the place of Denmark and the Scandinavians in seeking to pressure Greece and to intervene in Greek internal affairs. He asked how Denmark with one regiment could be allowed to exercise so much influence. Did U.S. really care more about Denmark in NATO than Greece? Greece had its public opinion also and if he told Greek people arms, urgently needed for NATO defense, were being withheld by USG because of GOG internal policies, Greek people would be upset with U.S. and react negatively. It was for this reason that he had not to date made arms issue clear to Greek people. If President favored strong relations with Greece, why did he not deal with the minority frankly and straightforward? Bulgaria was building up military strength and gap growing greatly. He was really fighting to move forward toward constitutional government. Did we want him to be replaced through the type of pressure we were exerting? What would take his place? We might have someone else tougher to deal with. Had we really thought this through? PriMin continued that DPC a matter for NATO and that U.S. action on this matter essentially a NATO matter not a bilateral question, since in U.S. interest to keep Greece in NATO. If NATO wished to expel Greece through DPC, then that was decision for its members.

4. As for my specific question, he emphasized there was nothing further to tell USG at this time. When time came for action, he would tell us and Greek people, implying that he would not inform U.S. Government before he told Greek people.

5. In my comments on his lengthy statement, which was made with obvious emotion, I repeated positive aspects our relations, my conviction that we were at a key turning point, and my sincere hope he would understand my comments as coming from a friend conveying a message from President Nixon, the same man who told me last December prior to my departure for Greece that he considered PriMin Papadopoulos a friend of America and his friend and who had expressed his disagreement with action by Council of Europe against

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\(^5\) Reference is to the cooperation agreement signed August 6. For text, see 21 UST 1667. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.
Greece. With regard to Denmark, we were in an alliance and it was only natural for U.S. to try to keep alliance together and to eliminate or reduce divisive factors. I asked PriMin again whether he could tell me anything about martial law and Articles 12, 111, 112 of the 1968 Constitution. He said he had nothing more to add and that next move was up to the United States (meaning clearly the elimination of the embargo on arms shipments to Greece). I said we had confidence in PriMin Papadopoulos’ leadership and that we believed in the constitutional direction he had charted for Greece. Finally, I said that objectively I saw no reasons to doubt there would be further progress along the lines we had discussed earlier and that I was essentially optimistic regarding future developments.

6. Comment: (A) I believe PriMin and new establishment which he leads greatly annoyed with our delay in lifting embargo and decidedly unhappy about what they regard as our initiative in putting pressure on Greece to move forward toward constitutional government. They see us taking on role and all the qualities of the Danes. It is this aspect which they find particularly obnoxious. PriMin obviously under great pressure by the new establishment to take strong position against U.S. at this time (see septel) regarding internal liberalization, which important members of revolutionary group consider moving far too rapidly. These people are not eager to see a date fixed for elections at this time, nor do they wish to see the King returned, nor are they happy about the release of Communists from prison camps.

(B) As I suggested in my report to the President, the retention of the arms embargo is counter-productive and can only serve to weaken moderate forces within the new establishment. Since the embargo is not favored even by strong internal opposition to the regime, I would hope that we could forthwith eliminate embargo, citing the Senate victory, exigencies in the Middle East, and the implicit obligation of the U.S. not to deprive Greece of arms available and needed to defend itself if attacked by the Warsaw Pact or if obliged to go to the aid of its NATO allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, both contingencies which are totally independent of the progress of the present regime back to parliamentary government—a course already accepted as the fixed goal of the GOG.

(C) At this time I should think that our position on lifting of suspension would be largely determined by our assessment of our strategic needs in Eastern Mediterranean. At stake are goodwill and privileged U.S. military position in Greece upon which we now rely heavily.

6 Tasca reported on “signs of growing tension within the regime” over U.S. pressures in telegram 4724 from Athens, August 27. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. 1 Jan 69–Oct 70)
Moreover, as I pointed out in my report to the President, I consider the embargo a hindrance to our efforts to persuade GOG to implement 1968 Constitution. In any event, I have made abundantly clear to GOG importance of Greek constitutional progress to public opinion in the U.S. and NATO.

Tasca

290. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)

Athens, August 27, 1970.

1. In the course of an informal discussion with the Prime Minister on 8 August, which was reported in Athens 4388, I told the Prime Minister that speaking personally it was my view that if the GOG fixed an election date—although I had nothing specific in mind—we would want to be as helpful as possible and appropriate in helping him in his efforts to prevent a return to the chaos of pre-April 1967 situation.

2. I did this as a means of laying the ground work for our proposal that we provide advice [less than 1 line not declassified] on the organization of political parties, etc., which would have the effect of encouraging the regime to implement fully the 1968 Constitution. Such a statement in itself would have the positive effect of helping to assure him that we are not leading him down path of elections with the hidden aim of reestablishing an unimproved version of the pre-April 1967 political system.

1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Greece, 1969–1972. Secret. No time of transmission is indicated on the message.

2 Telegram 4388 from Athens, August 10, reported that Tasca had stressed the need to end martial law and hold early elections to Papadopoulos. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70)

3 See Document 286.
291. Note From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


Mr. President:

In view of the Middle East situation this is an ideal time to proceed rapidly with the announcement of resumption of U.S. military assistance to Greece. It will also assist in creating a favorable climate in the event we have to call on Greek cooperation should a contingency occur.

Henry A. Kissinger

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. I, Jan 69–Oct 70. No classification marking.
2 On August 26 fighting broke out between Palestinian and Jordanian forces. Beginning on September 6, a series of Western airliners were seized by terrorists and flown to Jordan where the crews and passengers were held hostage. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 45.
3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

292. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, September 14, 1970, 1951Z.

150171. For Ambassador from the Secretary.

1. Please inform Prime Minister Papadopoulos that public announcement of the resumption of deliveries of suspended military items will be made on Tuesday, September 22 and that instructions have been given U.S. military services to arrange for expeditious delivery of the items which are now to be released for shipment to the

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Vigerman on September 11; cleared by Davies, Springsteen (in draft), Pranger (DOD/ISA), Sisco, Eliot, and Johnson; and approved by Rogers. Haig wrote on the telegram: “HAK—looks OK—Greeks told now but announcement held until NATO DPC meeting over on 22nd.” Kissinger also initialed the telegram.
2 For text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 12, 1970, p. 413.
GOG. You should ask the PM to keep knowledge of our intention confidential until the 22nd.

2. If queried why September 22 was chosen, you may tell him we wished to avoid complicating the arrangements which now seem to be successfully in train for dealing in the DPC on Sept 18 with the report on Greek forces. We wished to avoid taking public action which would no doubt unravel the delicate and carefully worked out compromise.

3. You may also tell the PM that we will be informing Congressional leaders and our NATO allies sometime after Sept 18 and before the 22nd, asking them to keep announcement in confidence until public announcement is made.

4. The press release which will be handed to news media on Sept 22, approved at the highest level, reads as follows:

5. Begin Text. United States policy towards Greece has been under review by this Administration for the past 18 months. During that time the United States has continued to withhold major items of equipment in the Military Aid Program for Greece, a policy established by the previous Administration shortly after the coup in Greece in April 1967.

6. The Administration has now decided to resume normal military shipments to Greece. The resumption of such shipments will enhance the ability of the Greek forces to carry out their responsibilities in defense of the NATO area, and thus contribute importantly to the cohesion and strength of the southern flank of NATO. Greece offers strategic advantages to the NATO alliance and to the United States which are of great importance to the security of the West. This importance has been sharply underlined in recent months by events in the Eastern Mediterranean. The decision to resume the shipment of suspended items rests entirely on these considerations.

7. Although the United States had hoped for a more rapid return to representative government in Greece, the trend toward a constitutional order is established. Major sections of the constitution have been implemented, and partial restoration of civil rights has been accomplished. The Government of Greece has stated that it intends to establish parliamentary democracy. The United States shares the concern of its NATO allies for steady progress toward restoring the country to political government. This is a policy to which we remain firmly committed. End Text.  

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3 Printed from an unsigned copy. Tasca reported on Papadopoulos’s initial positive reaction to the policy change in telegram 5164 from Athens, September 17. He suggested a Presidential or Secretary of State visit to Greece and Turkey. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70) The U.S. decision was formally conveyed to Vitsaxis by Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies on September 21. A memorandum of their conversation is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 GREECE.
293. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, October 4, 1970, 1129Z.

5509. Subject: Meeting with Greek Prime Minister. From SecDef Laird.

1. This morning I met for more than hour and half with Prime Minister Papadopoulos in company with Chairman JCS, CNO and Ambassador Tasca. Meeting was quite cordial and also quite frank. I began by conveying message of friendship from President Nixon, and explained that purpose President's visit to Mediterranean was to underline resolve of US administration to honor its commitments to its allies and to negotiate from position of strength with Soviet Union. Unfortunately, in some areas Soviets seemed to be talking in one way and acting in another. Mediterranean one area where this was case, and President wished allies in Mediterranean be aware importance we attach to peace and stability in this area.

2. Prime Minister replied warmly, endorsing the recent US moves in the Mediterranean and Mid-East and indicating they were convincing evidence of US resolve. He noted US and Greek goals of preventing Communist aggression identical. He said we could be assured that every weapon put into a Greek soldier's hands was as good as in hands of an American soldier. Greece had no territorial designs or ambitions of its own, and importance of strengthening Greek Armed Forces related entirely to Greece's NATO role. Greece giving its limit in men and matériel for defense effort, and it expected same total commitment from other members Alliance. Greece could not however meet all of its needs, particularly since country in front line of NATO defense, facing three Communist neighbors. It expected help from its NATO allies in the common interest of the Alliance, but even without such help it would do its best to live up to its commitment.

3. To this I replied that from very beginning I personally made clear in my testimony before Congress that I favored resumption arms shipments to Greece. Now happily this had been done, and we would...
be working closely with his military to do the best possible job of strengthening and modernizing the Greek Armed Forces within the limitations which existed; and I hoped that Greek MAP would not be affected too adversely by our Cambodian and other requirements. I agreed that we must all stand fast by our NATO commitments and we would certainly live up to ours. Admiral Moorer took occasion of this meeting to mention to Prime Minister importance of Sixth Fleet facilities in Greece to our common interests.

4. I mentioned fact that within US Congress there is some opinion not as concerned as it should be with the vital importance of NATO. Some elements in US reflected also, as he knew, some hostility towards the present Government. For example, some members had asked him about existence of martial law. I believed however that we had enough support in Congress to permit us to maintain our policy regarding military cooperation with Greece. We intended to stick by this policy, and he could be of help to us in this regard. However, I wished Prime Minister to clearly understand that US administration not in business of telling its NATO allies how to run their affairs, and internal Greek situation entirely a matter for Greeks.

5. Prime Minister’s reply was that Government had said what it intended to do. Its friends would have to be content, as regards return to more liberal form of government, with evidence of liberalizing measures as they were taken. Prime Minister made it quite clear that he not prepared make any predictions about timing of future moves, although he also made it clear that Government’s aim of returning to fully constitutional rule remains fixed. He said that he hoped that this would be sufficient for Congressional critics but if not, that would not be Greece’s problem. In any case his Government intended arm itself as best it could to carry out its NATO role.

6. Prime Minister then went on to say that at risk of seeming to interfere in our internal affairs, it seemed to him that Congress too had responsibility to uphold US commitment to NATO. Congressional attitude reminded him of man who hired guard for his farm only to discover that man had black hair. Owner then refused to give guard rifle and let him enter on duty since he wished have blond. Man said in fact he had blond hair but it had been dyed. Owner said, “Fine, come back in two months when dye has grown out and you can have rifle to guard my property.” In meantime owner’s crop stolen. In interchange on applicability of the parable to the current situation involving Greece, Prime Minister replied that unfortunately it happened to be true story.

7. Additional substantive matter I raised was importance Greek-Turkish cooperation in NATO and its relation to Cyprus problem. Prime Minister said his position was that Greece could never live at ease and in security without friendship of Turkey. Greece making every effort
in this direction, but unfortunately Turkey still mistrusted Greece. He
hoped this situation would gradually improve. I said I most impressed
both in Turkey and in Greece with degree of awareness of common
Communist threat to both countries, placing Cyprus issue in second-
ary position, and I found it encouraging that both countries took such
realistic view of situation.

8. In closing, Prime Minister asked that in any statement we might
make about my visit to Athens, we be careful not to give impression
that significant decisions taken during my conversations with his gov-
ernment, particularly if such remarks might encourage speculation that
discussions related to Greek internal political matters. In Greek at-
mosphere this would immediately lead to press and old politicians
jumping to conclusion elections had been agreed on. On other hand,
he hoped that we would not by our silence indicate that our meetings
had ended in disagreement.

9. My impression from meeting with Prime Minister is that he re-
mains totally committed to NATO, and friendship with the US. He be-
lieves that US administration will stand by its policy on military co-
operation with Greece. While he recognizes Congressional problem,
this cannot be decisive factor in how fast and in what specific ways
Greece moves towards more liberal form of government which basi-
cally an internal Greek matter, to be decided by the internal political
needs of Greece. I think he appreciates that while we take essentially
same view of situation, in warning him of Congressional problem our
aim is to protect our ability to continue and strengthen our military co-
operation with Greece. I recognized special needs of Greece as regards
its internal political development relating to Soviet and Communist
threats resulting from its geographic position.

10. Saturday morning I also called on Regent [Zoitakis], Chief of
Armed Forces Angelis, Deputy Prime Minister Pattakos and Coordi-
nation Minister Makarezos. I was given particularly useful military
briefing by Angelis (septel),4 and my meetings with other senior offi-
cials were marked by warm atmosphere. I saw Prime Minister and his
principal associates again at lunch Saturday hosted by Ambassador and
at dinner hosted by Prime Minister.

11. Please pass SecDef, CINCEUR and US Mission NATO.

Tasca

4 The Embassy reported on Laird’s discussions with Greek officials in telegrams
5542 and 5568 from Athens, both October 6. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Ma-
terials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70)

SUBJECT
Sale of Phantom Aircraft to Greece

In my memorandum to you of May 26, 1970 (enclosed) I indicated that we thought there were compelling arguments favoring the sale of F4(E)F Phantoms to Greece but that we believed the decision on the sale should await the resumption of normal military assistance relations with Greece.

On September 22 we announced the lifting of the partial embargo on military aid shipments to Greece. Other reservations about the sale which existed in May of this year appear to have been largely overtaken by events. The provision of Phantoms to Israel subsequent to our May memorandum has canceled out any difficulty we might have otherwise faced on this score in providing them to the Greeks. The sale of Phantoms to the Greeks will nevertheless likely stimulate a probable Turkish request for the provision of these expensive aircraft under grant aid. But the seriousness of Greek negotiations for the purchase of high performance aircraft from France likely makes the Turkish problem inevitable whether or not we sell Phantoms to the Greeks.

The military case for selling Phantoms to Greece remains strong. We will, in the circumstances, proceed to inform the Greeks of our willingness to sell these aircraft to them. In any case, deliveries will likely not begin before two years from the date of acceptance of the offer to sell.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
295. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS
Under Secretary Christos Xanthopoulos-Palamas, Under Secretary, Greek Foreign Ministry
Basil Vitsaxis, Ambassador of Greece
Michael Cottakis, Chef du Cabinet
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff

Under Secretary Palamas opened the conversation by saying he brought a message of friendship from Greece, from the government and from the people. Lately, he felt, there had been some rather hopeful developments. Always there has been friendship in Greece for the United States, although there have been some rough spots in our relationship. However, the re-establishment of full military shipments and the visit of Secretary Laird had been important demonstrations of U.S. interest in the area. There are really two important sides of the problem in that area—the NATO element in Europe and in the Eastern Mediterranean and then the problems beyond in the Middle East. The Greek government considers it an asset that U.S. policy shows strength in both parts of this area. Greece feels that this will help improve the political climate in the Balkans. It is not possible to separate the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. The Greek people, owing to the trip of the President to the Mediterranean, know that the Americans have decided to play a strong role in this area and are pleased that the USSR will have to take that into account.

Dr. Kissinger said he felt the Under Secretary’s statement of the situation was generally correct as was his characterization of the purpose of the President’s trip.

Under Secretary Palamas said there were two points on which he wished to know Dr. Kissinger’s views. The first was how he viewed NATO as a factor in the Mediterranean.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. I Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office. In an attached memorandum requesting Kissinger’s approval of the memorandum of conversation, Davis recommended distribution to the Department of State. Kissinger, however, initialed the box disapproving distribution.
Dr. Kissinger said he wished to say at the outset that the U.S. greatly appreciated the cooperation of Greece in the recent period. The sense that we could count on Greek cooperation helped us in the formulation of our own policy. Going on, he felt that it is difficult to distinguish NATO Europe and the Middle East. The U.S. remains committed to NATO. We will, as was said at Naples, not unilaterally reduce our commitment without consulting with our allies. With the increase in strategic weapons, the forces available to NATO should be strengthened rather than reduced.

Under Secretary Palamas asked whether Dr. Kissinger expected the same view from the allies. He said that Greece’s troubles in NATO seemed to be starting to subside, even with the Scandinavians. This is one more aspect among recent developments which is favorable. The key question in Greek minds is whether in a crisis the NATO Council would be a good vehicle for decision.

Dr. Kissinger asked whether the Under Secretary had an alternative organization in mind.

Under Secretary Palamas said that he had not. Greece always felt the alternative would be what the U.S. could do by itself.

Dr. Kissinger said that personally he found it hard to imagine that if Greece was attacked we would let assistance be vetoed by Denmark, for instance.

Under Secretary Palamas replied that Greece trusts the U.S.

Dr. Kissinger said it was incredible to him that the U.S. would stand idly by while Greece was being attacked.

Under Secretary Palamas said that at the same time Greece is trying to smooth its relationship with its neighbors. He then asked how Dr. Kissinger viewed the situation in the Middle East.

Dr. Kissinger said it looked as if circumstances favored the extension of the Arab-Israeli cease-fire. The U.S. certainly does. He did not feel that any country would want to be responsible for breaking it, even the UAR.

Under Secretary Palamas said the Greek communities in the Arab world give Greece an unusual position there. There are twenty-five thousand in the UAR. There are technicians in Libya, and the Libyans have asked for technical assistance in maintaining some of their aircraft.

Dr. Kissinger said there are many problems in the Middle East. The Arab-Israeli problem is the most immediate, but there also the problems of the future of the Persian Gulf and of the various radical

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2 For text of the President’s September 30 statement, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 786–787.
movements in the area. During the Jordan crisis, one of the purposes of the U.S. was to demonstrate that we could not be pushed out of the area.

The Under Secretary asked whether Dr. Kissinger felt the Suez Canal would be opened.³

Dr. Kissinger replied that he thought it would be if there were a peace settlement. He could not exclude its opening without a peace settlement. There is some chance that Israel might be interested at some point.

The Under Secretary said that Greece is not directly involved in the Middle East problem. It is not possible to find a general solution of the problem but there might be sectors of the problem which are susceptible of solution. He felt that the situation is improved now in Jordan and that it was good that Hussein’s hand had been reinforced. When the Under Secretary noted the difficulties caused by the Fedayeen, Dr. Kissinger replied that it is difficult enough to negotiate with governments; it seems all but impossible to negotiate with non-governmental forces such as those.

Under Secretary Palamas noted the possibility of turning the West Bank into a Palestinian state, and Dr. Kissinger replied that there was some fear that the Palestinians would try to destroy Israel if they had their own state.

The Under Secretary said it will be important how the UAR develops. Greece has its own information that there is an increase in anti-Soviet feeling there.

Dr. Kissinger agreed that it is hard to imagine that the Nationalists in the UAR are anxious to trade British imperialism for Soviet imperialism.

The Under Secretary agreed that there had been a natural reaction against the Soviets, “who are everywhere.”

Dr. Kissinger asked how the Under Secretary would explain the violations of the standstill agreement in the UAR. Dr. Kissinger said he could not understand why the UAR had not waited until a deadlock had developed in the talks before violating the agreement.

When the Under Secretary asked whether the violations were important, Dr. Kissinger said that they were “massive.” There are large numbers of sites that did not exist before the cease-fire came into effect; there are sites that had been started before the cease-fire and had been completed since; there are sites that were completed before the cease-fire but which had had no missiles in them and now did have

³ The Canal had been closed since the June 1967 war between Egypt and Israel.
missiles in them. At first, Dr. Kissinger said he thought that the violations were technical, but as time passed and our knowledge of them became clearer it became impossible to describe them that way. Also, these violations, we think, would have been impossible without the Russians. Moreover, there has been no attempt at concealment.

The Under Secretary asked how Dr. Kissinger evaluated the Soviet move.

Dr. Kissinger replied that the Soviets must feel that an Israel alive is better than an Israel dead. The Soviets, however, may not know how to apply enough power to push Israel back without killing Israel.

The Under Secretary said that the Soviets, it seemed to him, wanted to avoid war but not to have peace. Greeks are concerned about the increase in pressure on Greece as a result of Mid-Eastern developments. There is the question of the Straits and the need of the Soviets for free communication. He feared that the enhanced Soviet position in the Middle East would bring Greece under increased pressure as the Soviet need to keep open its lines of communication became more pressing. It has always been a Soviet dream to be in the Mediterranean. The fleet was not so dangerous but it was a base for Soviet operations.

Dr. Kissinger replied that the fleet is dangerous to Israel and a nuisance to the U.S. The U.S. could probably destroy the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean at some price.

The Under Secretary said that the question of the Soviets having a permanent establishment on the ground in the Mid-East is of important concern to Greece. Dr. Kissinger replied that we are going to be very insistent in any peace settlement to bring to their attention the inappropriateness of such a permanent Soviet establishment.

Changing the subject, Dr. Kissinger said that we sometimes tend to harass the Greeks about their internal problems, “which I will not do.” At the same time, he hoped that the Greeks would remember U.S. problems. The U.S. ability to work with Greece is affected by the internal climate in the U.S., and that in turn is affected by developments in Greece. The Under Secretary said that the U.S. has a friendly government in Greece. Governments change but people remain friendly. There is a real feeling of friendship among the people of Greece.

Dr. Kissinger, concluding the conversation, said that when he was in Greece in 1961 he enjoyed himself very much, and the conversation ended with a series of pleasantries.

H.S.
Telegraph From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, October 28, 1970, 2147Z.

177500. From Secretary for Ambassador. Subj: Next Steps.

1. Now that the arms embargo has been lifted, and the Greek Government reassured by our recent actions and by the visit of Secretary Laird and others of the deep concern we have for the security of the Eastern Mediterranean, we should have reached a new and more friction-free relationship.

2. I hope this new relationship will permit us to be even more persuasive than we have been up now in influencing the Government to move in the direction we wish to see it go. Though criticism of the regime has lately been rather muted, it seems bound to arise again in serious proportions and in a way which will once again threaten the smooth functioning of NATO and create difficulties on the Hill. These considerations are apart from our long-range policy interest in the development of a more broadly based and supported government in Greece, which offers a better prospect for long-range stability than a government whose stability depends on the survival capability of one clever man.

3. We have publicly been taking the regime's promises at face value as I believe we should. But now we are faced with an instance of failure to meet a commitment in an important particular—the lifting of martial law, promised for last month. Palamas has now promised that martial law will be lifted before the NATO meeting in early December. I believe it essential that the Greek Government be reminded of its default and that it take action very soon and in no case later than the end of November to get rid of martial law.

4. More disturbing is the recent gambit announcing the "election" of a "small parliament." As you suggest (Athens 5815) this seems a move away from rather than toward meaningful elections. It provides ammunition to the persistent skeptics about the regime's intentions, since it involves the pseudo-election of a pseudo-parliament. We have been freely repeating Papadopoulos' assertion that by the end of December 1970 all the laws necessary to the implementation of the

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Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 593, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. I, Jan 69–Oct 70. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Viggerman; cleared by Davies, Tibbetts, Sisco, Eliot, Folger (H), and Abshire; NEA, EUR, S, and H and approved by Rogers. Another copy is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GREECE–US.

Dated October 19, it reported on the Greek Government’s announcement of the creation of a "small parliament." (Ibid., POL 14 GREECE)
Constitution will have been promulgated. They may indeed achieve this desirable goal, but if the move back to representative democracy is to be put off into the indefinite future by means of a transparent and almost cynical imitation of the real thing, we shall be in a bad case. I hope you will find an early opportunity to canvass this subject with the Prime Minister and let him know how strongly we feel about this.\(^3\)

Rogers

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\(^3\) Tasca reported a discussion he had with Pattakos in telegram 6856 from Athens, December 23. The junta leader had indicated that martial law would remain in force for some time. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971)

### 297. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca)\(^1\)

Washington, October 30, 1970, 0217Z.

WH2108. During the President’s discussions with Lopez-Bravo in Spain,\(^2\) Bravo expressed an interest in improving Spanish relations with Greece. The President assured Lopez-Bravo that he would attempt to be as helpful as possible in facilitating the improvement of relations between the two governments.

In view of the foregoing, the President would like you, sometime in the near future, to find a convenient excuse to visit Spain with the view toward meeting with Lopez-Bravo. From your perspective as U.S. Ambassador to Greece you could exchange ideas on how best to assist in the improvement of relations and in making Greece feel that in the Mediterranean area they have a friend in Spain.

This exchange with the Spanish is to be held exclusively between you, the President and myself. Would you please check your calendar and give me your views through this channel as to the feasibility of

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\(^2\) The President was in Spain October 2–3. For his discussion with Yugoslav President Tito, see Document 221. Additional documentation on the trip is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976,* volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.
making a trip to Spain. I will then make arrangements for you to see Lopez-Bravo. I would also be grateful for any ideas you might have on steps which you or we here in Washington might be able to undertake to be helpful in this matter.\(^3\) Best wishes.

\(^3\) In an unnumbered backchannel message, October 29, Tasca outlined a briefing he could deliver to Lopez Bravo on Greek affairs and the general situation in the Mediterranean. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Subject File, Backchannel Files—Backchannel Messages, 1970–Europe, Mideast, Latin America)

In telegram 57 from Athens, November 4, Tasca suggested a visit during the last part of November or early December. (Ibid.)

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298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, November 10, 1970, 2225Z.

184935. Subj: Palamas meeting with the Vice President.

1. Greek Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Palamas, accompanied by Ambassadors Vitsaxis and Cottakis, called on the Vice President October 21. After exchange of amenities Palamas made special point of praising Vitsaxis as one of their most effective ambassadors who, he said, enjoyed the admiration and respect even of his colleagues in the Greek diplomatic service.

2. Palamas said that Greek-American relations had reached an excellent plane now that the U.S. had removed the arms embargo. It remained only to continue to foster the excellent existing relationships.

3. The Vice President responded that both our governments were convinced of the necessity of safeguarding the Mediterranean area from Soviet efforts at encroachment. With this in mind, the Vice President had urged on the President to speak strongly and favorably about our Greek friends during his Mediterranean trip. Palamas replied that along that line the recent trip of Defense Secretary Laird had been very helpful indeed.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Vigderman; cleared by Kent Crane (Vice President’s office); and approved by Curran (S/S). Repeated to Nicosia.
4. The Vice President expressed amusement at comments Palamas had made to Secretary Rogers concerning the Danes’ interest in proposing a candidate for NATO Secretary General. Palamas replied that Lord Hume had asked Palamas what he thought of the current position of Greece within NATO. Palamas said he told Hume that he felt things were definitely improving and that Greece’s antagonists were now adopting a less aggressive posture. He added that Greece may have waited too long to leave the Council of Europe, because that action had seemed to startle other Europeans into a new sense of reality and it had certainly not hurt the Greek regime in any way. Finally, Hume had asked about elections in Greece and indicated an early resolution of that problem would be most helpful to Greece’s friends abroad.

5. The Vice President remarked that we, too, were hoping the Greek Government would continue to move toward elections. We had no wish to interfere in the interval affairs of Greece. Nevertheless, if the Greek Government were to move in the direction of elections, it would help to undercut the criticism of the regime here in the United States, as well as in NATO. At the moment, opposition elements are deliberately trying to misconstrue the administration’s friendship with Greece as evidence that we condone “repressive” governments and actions abroad—and by implication perhaps also at home. Thus any steps taken toward popular participation in government in Greece would not only help the Greek image, but also Greece’s friends. The Vice President said all reports indicate that the Government is in firm control, that most people are happy and that progress is being made; so the only problem the Greeks have is with their image. Palamas responded his Government was concerned that when elections are held, the old Greek politicians would allege that they were not held under fair conditions. Starting from that premise the former politicians would try to undermine what had been accomplished and recreate the confusion of the past. Palamas was certain the current government would never allow a confused and unstable political situation to reemerge, so prior to elections a sound democratic system must be developed within a framework of stability.

6. The Vice President said he was concerned about the image of Greece in the United States citing the impression left by the film "Z." He wondered why the Greeks did not counter such propaganda by making movies presenting a truer picture of the situation in Greece.

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2 A memorandum of their October 12 conversation is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 GREECE.

3 Reference is to the film by Greek director Constantine Costa Gavras, based on the novel by Vassilis Vassilikos.
Perhaps famous Greek-American movie makers like Spyros Skouras would be willing to help if asked. The Vice President added that our own administration has considerable difficulties with the press, so he in no way meant to imply criticism of the Greek Government’s handling of their image problems, but rather hoped he might be suggesting a useful idea to them. Palamas explained that the incident upon which the film “Z” was based actually happened during the rule of Prime Minister Karamanlis. The Vice President said this was not common knowledge, although he certainly knew the true origin of the events depicted. He felt it was insufficient to try to counter the effects of a film like “Z” by simply making an announcement that it was a distortion. The opposition drills home its points by repetition, and we must be prepared to do the same thing. We must not sit by complacently just because we are in the right. Continuous efforts must be made to counter socially destructive activities by our vocal opponents—not only in Greece, but in the United States as well. Palamas concurred in this general appraisal and Vitsaxis said that the Greeks’ record in fighting both fascism and communism just in the past generation alone had had a tremendous beneficial impact on the history of the Western world and should make excellent material for a film.

7. Palamas mentioned how pleased the Greek Government would be if the Vice President were in a position to accept an invitation to visit Greece in the spring. An invitation would be promptly forthcoming whenever the Vice President considered it possible to accept such an invitation. Without making a firm commitment, the Vice President responded that a visit to Greece in the spring was certainly a most interesting and delightful idea.

8. For Nicosia: President Makarios extended a similar informal invitation to the Vice President during the White House dinner commemorating the 25th anniversary of the UN and received the same generally favorable response.

9. The meeting closed following a brief discussion of the existing instability in Italy, the situation in France, and the importance of the forthcoming elections in the United States.
299. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, November 23, 1970, 1631Z.

6356. Ref: State 190828. For the Secretary.

1. As you know, I remain skeptical about prospects of future role for King in Greek politics for variety of reasons including his own behavior and extent of feeling against him among key leaders here. At same time I recognize that 1968 Constitution provides role for him and I can envisage circumstances in which his return might occur. There is good evidence, as [less than 1 line not declassified] has reported, that there have been occasional contacts with King involving individuals in or close to present government.

2. As Embassy and [less than 1 line not declassified] have reported, however, there is considerable internal ferment within government at present, outcome of which remains uncertain. Some of forces involved naturally consider King as one element to be reckoned with in arriving at future political establishment and are interested in exploiting him in their own interests. Others probably continue to regard him as hostile to “purposes of revolution” in view of his aborted December coup. Fluid situation means that any move by forces outside of Greece which can in any way be interpreted by Greeks, on whatever side, as evidence of U.S. “manipulation” of situation or of particular direction of U.S. interests is bound to have adverse ramifications.

3. Consequently I do not believe timing would be propitious for you to have conversation with King in Brussels. Since one of purposes of such meeting would be, as reftel states, to show interest in alternative other than present establishment, and meeting would receive publicity, we could anticipate that all elements of political spectrum here would unite in criticism asserting such conversation involves interference in Greek domestic politics. I would have no objection, however,


2 Dated November 20. In it, Rogers requested Tasca’s views on whether he should meet privately with the King during the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels. (Ibid.)

3 The Embassy reported on possible divisions within the Greek regime in telegrams 6212 from Athens, November 13; 6385 from Athens, November 24; and 6467 from Athens, November 30. (All ibid.)
to discreet contacts with him being arranged for purpose of our hav- 
ing independent assessment of his views on present situation.4

Tasca

4 In telegram 6922 from Athens, December 30, Tasca suggested that Ambassador Martin set up a meeting with the King when he returned to Rome and discuss the points made in paragraph 1 above. (Ibid.)

300. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1


60. Ref Athens 059.2

1. Pursuant to guidance contained in your several messages,3 I met with Foreign Minister Lopez-Bravo on December 9 and had a long and useful private discussion with him.

A. The Foreign Minister greeted me cordially and opened the substantive discussion by recalling his meeting with President Nixon in Naples in September,4 and by commenting on his luncheon about the same time with King Constantine, whom he had found to be clearly interested in establishing rapport with the Spanish Government and in seeking advice as to how he should proceed to get back to Greece.

B. Explaining my mission in detail following the outline of referenced message, I expressed the President’s interest in closer cooperation between Greece and Spain for defense against Soviet expansion, detailing the strategic importance of Greece and Turkey not only to Soviet ambitions in the Mediterranean but also in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The Foreign Minister followed this explanation keenly.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Backchannel Files—Backchannel Messages, 1970–Europe, Mideast, Latin America. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Transmitted to Kissinger at San Clemente on December 28. Received in the White House at 0021Z on December 16.

2 Dated November 30. It reported Tasca’s itinerary. (Ibid.)

3 Document 297 and backchannel message WH2209 from Kissinger to Tasca, November 27. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Backchannel Files—Backchannel Messages, 1970–Europe, Mideast, Latin America)

4 See footnote 2, Document 297.
C. Since he had opened the discussion by referring to King Con-
stantine, I also took up that theme remarking that the question of the
King was for Greece to decide, that the King might play a constructive
role in the future, but that his future is clouded by the stormy history
of the monarchy in Greece as well as events of the recent past, and that
he would have to work very hard to get back on his throne. I explained
frankly the King's problems in Greece and how important it was for
the King coming out clearly for U.S. military aid to Greece, for imple-
mentation of the 1968 Constitution and in opposition to violence as a
means of overthrowing the present regime. The Foreign Minister
sought out my views on the durability of the present Greek regime, its
popular support and the morale of the armed forces. He was surprised
to learn of the very impressive economic growth record this regime
was building up.

D. On the Arab-Israeli problem I noted the capabilities of Greece
and Spain in the Middle East and underlined that both countries, con-
cerned as they were with the Soviet threat in the Mediterranean, had
a common interest in helping the Arabs and Israelis reach a peace set-
tlement. I stressed that such a settlement would be a major step toward
limiting and diminishing the Soviet threat. The Foreign Minister said
that he agreed and then asked whether I thought the peace talks would
be resumed at an early date. I replied, giving him details of our posi-
tion as outlined recently by Assistant Secretary Sisco to various Am-
bassadors in Washington.

E. I repeated at several points that we were hopeful that Spain
would see fit to strengthen her ties with Greece within a framework of
supporting the eastern defense flank in the Mediterranean. I also told
him I had reason to believe Prime Minister Papadopoulos would be
quite receptive to deeper relations with Spain. On completion of my
exposition and our ensuing discussion, the Foreign Minister said that
he had found it all impressive and that he himself would seek to visit
Greece in the near future. He added that he would be getting in touch
with me at an early date on this matter.

F. The Foreign Minister turned briefly to Morocco\(^5\) and asked my
views on the strength of the nationalist Istiqlal party, clearly concerned
about that party's agitation for the expulsion of the Spanish from the
enclaves and for pressing a claim in the Spanish Sahara. I said that I
thought that King Hassan was firmly in control and the King was a
real friend of Spain and the best leader we could hope for. I also added
that I was certain that as with Greece and Turkey, the United States
was keenly interested in strong and friendly relations between Morocco

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\(^5\) Tasca had served as Ambassador to Morocco from 1965 to 1969.
and Spain. The Foreign Minister said he fully agreed and considered Hassan the best possible leader in Morocco, in fact he was expecting the Moroccan Foreign Minister to visit him shortly in Madrid for a friendly exchange of views.

G. In summary, I believe the Spanish Government would be definitely interested in a program of closer cooperation with Greece. In fact, I detected gratification on the part of Lopez-Bravo that the United States was encouraging Spanish Government to take such an initiative which would demonstrate Spanish desire to be a major, positive force in the area. On the other hand, prior to my departure from Greece, I mentioned briefly to Prime Minister Papadopoulos that I was going to Spain on a visit and that the United States would like to see a closer relationship between these two countries in the struggle against Soviet attempts to subvert and expand their influence in the entire area. He indicated that he would welcome such closer cooperation.

H. My overall impression was that Lopez-Bravo was flattered by the President’s action in sending me to discuss this subject and that the mission should produce effects beneficial not only to relations between Greece and Spain, but also to our own relations with each of these countries.

2. I briefed Ambassador Hill\(^6\) fully before and after my discussion. He preferred not to accept my invitation to accompany me, saying he thought Lopez-Bravo might be more forthcoming if I went alone. He was somewhat concerned that one of the Embassy secretaries had inadvertently let others in the Embassy know of my appointment with the Foreign Minister. However, we agreed that there was no need to provide anyone with information as to the purpose or substance of my visit, and that my appointment could be passed off as a normal enough, informal exchange of views, given the fact that I have friends throughout Europe who invite me to drop in to see them when they hear I am in town.

3. As to next steps, I plan with your approval:
   A. To give Papadopoulos a briefing on what I told Lopez-Bravo.\(^7\)
   B. To stimulate some intelligence exchange and contact, and,
   C. Providing you think it feasible, to look into the matter of off shore purchase.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Greece.]

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\(^6\) Robert C. Hill, Ambassador to Spain.

\(^7\) In backchannel message 61 from Athens, Tasca reported that he would be meeting Papadopoulos within a week to discuss his visit to Spain and asked for instructions. Kissinger wrote on the telegram: “Proposed agenda in Athens 060 seems excellent. No suggestions from here.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Backchannel Files—Backchannel Messages, 1970–Europe, Mideast, Latin America)
I would appreciate any suggestion or comment you may have.  
With warm personal regards.

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8 In backchannel message WH2251 to Tasca, December 28, Kissinger approved plans for a briefing of Papadopoulos. (Ibid.)

301. National Security Study Memorandum 116


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
Policy Toward Greece

The President has directed a review of progress in executing the decisions made by him in June 1969 in connection with the resumption of full military shipments to Greece. The principal question to be addressed is what options the U.S. now has vis-à-vis Greece in the light of recent developments there.

A paper should be prepared in the NSCIG/NEA and submitted to the Senior Review Group by January 29, 1971.

Henry A. Kissinger

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1265, Saunders Subject Files, Greek Military Supply, 1/1/71-12/13/71. Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2 In telegram 1521 to Athens and Rome, January 2, the Department authorized Ambassadors Tasca and Martin to pursue contacts with King Constantine. (Ibid., Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970-31 Dec 1971) Kissinger was informed of Tasca’s intention in a January 7 memorandum from Richard Kennedy. Kissinger noted: “I want to take up with President. Totally, utterly unacceptable. Sisco will either lead in or there’ll be a show down.” (Ibid.) A January 8 memorandum for the record by Kennedy stated that Kissinger instructed Haig to call Sisco and inform him that “this is contrary to policy and any such instructions should have been cleared by the White House.” (Ibid.) In telegram 17382 to Athens, February 2, the Department instructed Tasca that in view of the fact that “question of calls on King seem to be an element to be considered . . . visits must be deferred until [the NSC] review completed.” (Ibid.)

3 In a January 27 memorandum from Davis to recipients of this memorandum, the due date was changed to February 16. (Ibid.) See Document 306.
302. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, February 8, 1971, 1555Z.

624. Subj: U.S. policy towards Greece: U.S. security interests should be our main concern in coming year.

Summary: As year 1971 begins, fluid political situation produced by Prime Minister’s announcement of liberalization measures in April seems to be hardening. Number of uncertainties remain, but broad outline of future situation has begun to emerge. We view Prime Minister’s December 19 speech (Athens 6808) as logical outcome of developments following his announced course of liberalization measures. Prime Minister may have run into serious trouble in moving ahead at rate he proposed. He now seems to have overcome, at least temporarily, his opposition within the regime. We regard his statement that there will be no change in political situation in 1971 as assuaging the hard-line opposition and a call for army to back him in his effort to maintain and consolidate his leadership. If he succeeds in latter efforts, progress towards constitutional government may resume at satisfactory rate. And we should not exclude completely possibility of significant steps towards democracy in 1971 should circumstances permit Papadopoulos to reinforce his position by moving in that direction. Outside public pressures on Greek Government, however, are likely to have little effect in 1971.

In these circumstances U.S. policy should continue to focus on our security needs in Greece and take into account strategic situation in Eastern Mediterranean. Fact that Greek foreign policy complements that of U.S. in this respect works to our advantage. Quiet, private pressures on Greek Government during coming year should be directed principally to questions of release of remaining prisoners held without trial or for non-violent minor anti-regime activity, and to complete lifting of martial law. If marked pressure for organization of early elections sometime in 1971 were effective, which we doubt, it would probably produce crisis within regime of sufficient proportions to jeopardize Prime Minister’s position. If Papadopoulos were replaced, it would be by another person or persons already in regime. While we cannot now be sure how it would affect U.S. interests, we are skeptical whether

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2 Dated December 21, 1970, it provided a summary and analysis of Papadopoulos’s December 19 “State of the Union” year-end speech. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 GREECE)
U.S. interests would be as well served. Until situation evolves to point where we have better prospect to influence events constructively, protection of our security interests should be chief objective and primary concern of U.S. policy toward Greece. On this basis Greek policies toward U.S. and in foreign policy field will continue to concern us more than internal political situation and its possible liberalization, although the latter continues to be a primary objective of American policy. End summary.

1. In his December 19 “State of the Union” message, Prime Minister Papadopoulos announced release of about half of political detainees and held out prospect for release of all detainees by end of April 1971. However, he not only did not hold out any promise for political evolution during 1971; he specifically stated that martial law would not be lifted for offenses against state security nor would there be any political change during year. On surface, making such a statement publicly might seem to be gratuitous, as well as unnecessary, regardless of Government’s intentions. It does reinforce charge of Greek Government’s critics that present regime has no intention of returning to parliamentary situation. We find, however, that Prime Minister’s declaration, “no change in 1971” flows naturally from the series of statements that began with his preceding major speech on April 10, 1971.

2. At that time Prime Minister announced several liberalizing measures and held out prospect for considerable more late in year. He also announced major reshuffle of Government, strengthening his own personal position but giving no rewards to his colleagues in the revolution. (These former colonels still generally hold office at the secretary general level.) Although we were gratified to see Papadopoulos take lead in direction of return to more democratic situation, many of his colleagues obviously were displeased. Moreover, three years having elapsed since coup, his compatriots’ festering personal ambitions were beginning to erupt. Soon afterward Papadopoulos was attacked almost openly in Greek press by regime dissident Stamatelopoulos, particularly on grounds of his having ignored views of his loyal associates while bringing such individuals as former Communist Georgalas into Government in key positions. Criticism of Papadopoulos’

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3 In this speech, Papadopoulos announced that articles regarding human rights in the 1968 Constitution would come into effect immediately and that the government would establish a “Consultative Committee” to serve as a parliamentary substitute. Elections for a portion of the committee’s membership took place on November 29, and the Prime Minister announced further nominations to the group on December 31.

4 Dimitri Stamatelopoulos, a dissident former junta member, in a May 11 article in the daily Vradyni.

5 George Georgalas, appointed Under Secretary to the Prime Minister and Director of Communications in June 1970.
personal life and particularly of interference by his wife in government affairs\(^6\) began to mount among Government’s supporters.

3. Situation reached crisis stage in early autumn. Papadopoulos reportedly submitted his resignation only to have it refused when his colleagues found there was no qualified replacement who could maintain essential support of army. This incident may have marked beginning of strengthening of Papadopoulos’ hand, enabling him to continue as Prime Minister with authority to arrive at, and implement his own decisions. However, it appears that as price for establishing his preeminence, he was compelled to give his revolutionary colleagues equal voice in any decisions involving elections or return of King, and possibly in some less critical areas. When martial law was not lifted in September, it became apparent that Prime Minister had been obliged to retreat to more defensible position in order to manage his adversaries within the Government. His critics presumably were able to convince at least some elements in army that Papadopoulos was moving too swiftly towards return to civilian rule, thereby jeopardizing the future careers of all who took part in coup and the officer corps in general.

4. Another direct challenge to the Prime Minister occurred in early November, but again Papadopoulos held his position. Certain of his colleagues, particularly Stamatelopoulos and Makarezos, tried to create other centers of power as a first step toward his replacement. Charges of his personal corruption, again in part centering upon the activities of his wife, as well as efforts to upset certain economic arrangements with Onassis and other businessmen, were made. There was a flurry of speculation about a potential role for Karamanlis and even King, but momentum was lost and Papadopoulos weathered storm by skillful exploitation of differences among his adversaries.

5. Prior to December 19 speech, Prime Minister is believed to have told his revolutionary colleagues in categorical terms that henceforth he intended to make his own decisions on the course of the regime (but again with the exception of scheduling elections and any matter relating to return of King). We believe that at this juncture Papadopoulos sounded out extent of his personal support within army, decided it was secure, and acted accordingly. Certainly his December 19 speech was very much addressed to army, as well as to his colleagues, as we interpret it as skillful ploy to maintain his position against those who would like to oust him by giving assurances to army that there will

\(^6\) In 1970 Papadopoulos divorced his first wife and married his long-time mistress, Despina. She made her first public appearance as the Prime Minister’s wife at the March 25 national day celebrations. Questions about the canonical legitimacy of the marriage had been raised by junta members in an August 1970 attack on Papadopoulos.
not be precipitate return to civilian rule. This need to ensure continuing support from the army we believe motivated Papadopoulos’ explicit statements on political progress and martial law during 1971.

6. We are now entering a period in which Papadopoulos will try to consolidate his power. (We already have report he is planning Cabinet reshuffle in near future.) We are skeptical whether he will be able within next twelve months to make moves in constitutional field that will change the attitude of Greece’s critics abroad; but Papadopoulos is very much an improviser, and we do not exclude possibility that he could make some dramatic move forward if he sees an opportunity to strengthen his own position in this way. In any case, we do not believe that we should now assume that we are necessarily in for a long period of one-man rule. Should Papadopoulos succeed in disarming his opponents within regime by continuing to play his cards only after assuring their trump value, by beginning of 1972 or even earlier, he may make further moves in direction of constitutional government. In our judgment he remains the one individual within the present government most likely to move toward democracy, and we continue to see no prospect for any external opposition forces to affect regime’s position in short term.

7. Security services have nipped in the bud every attempt to mount active resistance in Greece, and even such signs of resistance as have been manifested (bombings, pamphlets, etc.) have not lifted the apathy of the Greek people to calls for resistance to the regime. Externally, Communist opposition has become more fragmented. Theodorakis’ performance since he was allowed to leave Greece has not been impressive, and Andreas Papandreou has increasingly discredited himself both by his irresponsible calls for violence, which have alienated many of his followers, and his more open cooperation with the Communists, which has perhaps done him even more harm with Greek people. While European Socialist opinion remains adamantly opposed to regime, Greece’s withdrawal from Council of Europe is only positive accomplishment of European opponents of regime. Attempts to mount campaign against Greece in NATO have had only indifferent results and future prospects do not at this point look much better. Karamanlis has not been willing to make himself the focal point of non-Communist opposition. The King’s failure to rally support on December 13, 1967 and ambivalent attitude since have likewise prevented him from becoming a symbol of resistance. What could seriously bother the

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7 Theodorakis had been released on orders from Papadopoulos and flew to Paris on the personal aircraft of French political leader and journalist Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber. Papadopoulos claimed that Theodorakis had agreed to refrain from political activity as the price of his release.
regime is an agreement between major elements of ERE and CU to join forces with Karamanlis and the King in an appeal to the Greek people and particularly the army. But this remains only a prospect. If such a combination were formed, however, it would be possible to speak of the beginning of a real opposition.

8. We cannot be sure what is in Papadopoulos’ mind, although it is worth noting that within Government he seems to be key individual who publicly expresses intention of returning to democracy. He also apparently has better grasp on risks of clinging to arbitrary authority than some of his colleagues. Moreover, relatively hard line in his December 19 speech probably gives him greater flexibility for deciding whether and when to take new or relax existing security measures. This assumption borne out by reiteration of similar line in his January 22 speech.

9. There are obvious risks for Papadopoulos in his chosen course of putting himself squarely at head of Government. Serious misstep could give his opponents opportunity to challenge his preeminence again, and we can envisage certain circumstances in which he could be replaced. His reaction to unfolding events will test his ability to maintain leadership or acquiesce in return to collegial rule. It is premature therefore to seek to judge now whether he is in fact stronger than before, though his tactical position may have improved. We do not think that U.S. likely to improve its position here or benefit in any other way from any such change in regime leadership, nor are we able at this time to take seriously claims by Stamatelopoulos or others that they would move faster in restoring democracy. Such assertions may be tactical ploys linked to personal ambition. If Stamatelopoulos and his adherents, for example, did make a move to restore collegial rule, we consider it likely to be in combination with group of individuals who would be less disposed towards return to democracy. While this does not imply that alternate leadership would be anti-U.S. or anti-NATO, our view is that it would not improve Greece’s image abroad or reduce our problems here. Some of officers who criticize Papadopoulos, for instance, are outspoken in opposition to parliamentary system.

10. If our analysis is accurate, we believe best U.S. posture is one of continued private pressure, particularly on such questions as maintenance of martial law, which becomes increasingly difficult for Greek Government to justify on security grounds after four years of rule. We should hold out publicly no prospects for concrete programs [progress] towards constitutional government in 1971 but leave no doubt that we continue to expect that Greek Government to evolve in this direction. We can best press constitutional issue privately, however, and in general terms, which means for present staying away from most delicate
issues of elections and return of King. Public pressure will not be effective in present circumstances, and it could precipitate crisis between Papadopoulos and those whose views on return to democracy appear less favorable from U.S. standpoint.

11. We should continue to urge Greek Government to clear up question of administratively held political detainees completely by end of April as Prime Minister promised, subject to caveat of no deterioration in security situation. We should also urge release of persons sentenced for minor and non-violent political offenses, speedy resolution of case of those arrested in December and prompt trial or release for persons arrested for political offenses in future. This would eliminate one of principal targets for foreign critics.

12. We think such a posture is best calculated to safeguard our principal interests which are our own security and our strategic position in Eastern Mediterranean. We should increasingly cite these as foundation of U.S. policy towards Greece, and we should continue to be cautious in any predictions of future Greek political developments, particularly in the area of elections. Prime Minister promised that all important institutional laws for implementation of Constitution would be gazetted by beginning of 1971, and this has now been done. Only remaining step which Government could take is application of constitutional articles concerning political parties and Parliament, which means holding elections. It would be unrealistic to anticipate any such developments in 1971, although we do not completely exclude outside chance that Prime Minister could make some move in this direction if his position of leadership remains secure. For example, a move for local elections might be manageable in certain circumstances.

13. Greece is well aware of its importance to Alliance in the face of growing Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean. Greek Government undoubtedly feels that army must play strong role in present situation. This view not only based on changing strategic situation but on events throughout world during past year or so. Martial law has been applied in such countries as Canada, civil disturbances have plagued Italy, Turkey, and numerous other countries, and even such a figure as General de Gaulle was unable to control internal dissidents.8 None of this has been lost on Greek Government, which has smug attitude about degree of law and order in Greece, and it makes for even less propitious climate in which to press for restoration of parliamentary government. The apparently prosperous economy and steady economic development also contribute to this smugness and at same time

8 Reference is to student unrest and massive labor demonstrations in France in May 1968.
provide present regime with justification for maintaining authoritarian government.

14. From here we judge that Greece will be even more important to us in coming year on security grounds. Our concern about negative aspects of Prime Minister’s speech should not distract us from our essential aims or cause us to lose sight of nature of our primary interests in Greece. Greece remains basically friendly to U.S., is a strong supporter of NATO, and holds a key position in Eastern Mediterranean. We must live with facts that our ability to influence internal developments is limited not only by internal situation, including government’s increasing confidence, as reflected in Prime Minister’s speech, that it need no longer defer to outside pressures of the kind that had been typical in Greek history, but also by the development, both in this area and throughout the world, of new kind of nationalism. Finally, [garble—thrust] of American foreign policy, as evidenced by Nixon Doctrine, has not gone unnoticed here. The Greeks will welcome the opportunity to play a vital part in the implementation of this new approach of responsibility and self-reliance on country’s own strength and resources in the first instance.

Tasca


303. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, February 19, 1971, 1101Z.

794. Subject: Report of visit of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff consultants Lowenstein and Moose. Ref: Athens 705.


2 Dated February 12, it stated that the Embassy was preparing a report on the mission of Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffers James Lowenstein and Richard Moose. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, LEG 7 LOWENSTEIN)
1. As reported ref tel Embassy has prepared detailed airgram on visit of Lowenstein and Moose. Ambassador has now decided that this matter sufficiently urgent that telegraphic transmission essential, both because of indications from Washington that important hearings may soon take place before Senate Foreign Relations Committee and because, according to this morning’s press, Lowenstein and Moose have already made preliminary report to Committee which will be followed by published report. While we regret having to burden Department’s communication facilities with this lengthy message, we feel that circumstances warrant it. Recently air pouch material has taken minimum of two weeks.

2. **Summary:** Two staff consultants of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, James Lowenstein and Richard Moose, visited Greece from February 1 to February 7 for purpose of reporting to Committee “on general situation in Greece, considerations affecting continuing military assistance programs, and status and future prospects of U.S.-Greek relations.” Lowenstein and Moose (hereafter referred to as Staff Del) had extensive contacts with opposition elements in Athens, most of which were arranged without assistance or even knowledge of Embassy. These contacts, however, soon became public knowledge and, together with unhelpful press reports, adversely affected willingness of Greek Government officials to meet with Staff Del. An interview with Prime Minister Papadopoulos, suggested by Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Palamas, failed to materialize; and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Angelis, who had promised to see Staff Del if Prime Minister were not available, bluntly told Embassy that he would not see them because of “inadmissible” character of Staff Del’s mission. The Staff Del did on last day meet with Undersecretary to Prime Minister Georgalas, but he was obviously under instructions to take tough line that did little to refute opposition claims of lack of constitutional progress.

3. During their visit, Staff Del sought views of various Mission elements and listened to them attentively and politely. However, from their line of questioning, from fact that Staff Del particularly sought out some of the most outspoken critics of regime, and from remarks made by Staff Del to Mission officers and others, it is apparent that—despite their assurances to the Department to the contrary (State

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3 Airgram A–83 from Athens, February 23. (Ibid.)
5 The Greek decision to cancel the meeting with Papadopoulos, and Angelis’s refusal to meet them, was reported in telegram 597 from Athens, February 5. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 394, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971)
—they came to Greece to make case against Greek Government and probably also against administration’s policy. Although we can only speculate on content of report Staff Del will produce, we expect that its main thrust will be that Greek Government does not enjoy support of Greek people, is not moving toward constitutional government, and in fact has not kept what promises it has made as regards restoration of personal liberties. It must also be anticipated, as now announced by Senator Fulbright, that report will be published.

4. Staff Del may also argue that U.S. Government is mistaken in tying its security interests in Eastern Mediterranean to such a regime,possibly alluding to Greece’s desire to maintain friendly relations with Arab countries as being a factor inhibiting Greek support for any U.S. policy involving Israel. Staff Del may also attempt to show that U.S. Government is poorly informed on situation in Greece because Embassy does not have sufficient contact with opposition elements.

5. We believe that Staff Del had developed general lines of its case before coming to Greece. They obviously had had contact with Greek exiles and came supplied with voluminous notes and lists of persons to see. Embassy attempted to refute arguments put forward or implied by Staff Del where we found them to be mistaken or biased. Occasionally there seemed to be emotional involvement on part of Staff Del regarding conditions in Greece as evidenced by such statements as that conditions in Greece are more oppressive than in Poland, and some of this tone may creep into their report. (Greek Government did not help situation by heavy-handed surveillance of Staff Del.)

6. Since we anticipate that the report will be critical of U.S. policy and will have a bearing on future Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, we are giving a detailed chronology of Staff Del’s activities in Greece, questions put to Mission officers, and their responses. This material should be useful to the Department in preparing for any hearings on Greece that may be called by Senate Foreign Relations Committee. *End summary.*

[Omitted here is the 20-page body of the cable providing a detailed chronology of the visit.]

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6 Dated January 26. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, LEG 7 LOWENSTEIN)


Dear Henry:

On 24 February 1971, we received [1½ lines not declassified] a report credited to a reliable source and reflecting comments in mid-December 1970 by General Angelis following his conversation with the President in Naples last fall. General Angelis told our source, [less than 1 line not declassified] that the Greek regime would probably make certain “cosmetic” gestures toward greater democratization but that they were not about to introduce basic changes that could result in loss of control. This would be true even in the absence of foreign pressures.

In this latter connection, General Angelis said that he did not anticipate pressure from the U.S. Government. He based this view on his conversation with the President last fall, saying that Mr. Nixon had made a special point of seeing Angelis and had told him emphatically that the important thing was that the Greeks had twelve divisions in NATO.

General Angelis seemed not to be concerned about Greek developments but rather about the mood prevailing in Europe and in some degree in the U.S. He deplored a spirit of indecisiveness and of turning to the left.

[less than 1 line not declassified] comments that the President’s meeting with General Angelis has been a remarkably well kept secret, although it is likely that General Angelis’ report along the above lines may well have been accepted within the inner circle of the regime as the last word on U.S. policy. Our representative suggests that this should be considered in any estimate of the probable effect on the Greek Government of various courses of action the U.S. might follow in pressing for an early return to parliamentary government.

I am making no other dissemination of this information.

Cordially,

Richard Helms

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 78–07173A, Records of the Office of the Deputy Director for Operations, Box 1, Folder 8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Karamessines on February 27.

2 The report was not found. Nixon and Angelis met during Nixon’s September 29–30, 1970, visit to NATO headquarters in Naples. No record of the conversation was found.

3 Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.
305. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, March 5, 1971, 1628Z.

1034. For Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies from Ambassador Tasca.

1. I would hope in light of continuing pattern of his remarks that you would review the conclusions in your letter of December 4 that we do not have enough evidence to support representations to friendly governments regarding Andreas Papandreou’s calls for violence against Americans in Greece. Since that time, Papandreou has repeated his call for “dynamic resistance” against the Greek regime and its U.S. supporters on at least three occasions (Deutsche Welle, December 10; Munich Radio, December 22; BBC, January 3). In addition, we have recent report that main obstacle to Papandreou’s group cooperating with Communist resistance group PAM is that latter will not agree to campaign of violence [less than 1 line not declassified].

2. I realize the problems raised for the Department by making representations about Papandreou to a government which depends on liberal support, such as Canadian Government, but American lives are at stake. Leaflets are again being distributed calling for violence against American installations. There were, as you know, four bombs planted recently, intended to destroy American automobiles, and on the evening of February 26 we received another bomb threat which fortunately did not materialize. Papandreou in a letter to Senator Case associated himself by implication with the bombing attempt not only on the Embassy but also with that on September of Defense Laird while he was meeting with the Prime Minister here.

3. I believe that we could raise this subject with the Canadian Government without making representations. The facts of Papandreou’s calls for violence against the installations and representatives of a friendly country should be of concern to a government which has granted him residence, particularly since the Canadian Government has only recently had firsthand experience with senseless violence. I think the least we should do is bring the facts to their attention.

Tasca

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2 Not found.

Policy Toward Greece: Summary

The dilemma of United States relations with Greece has broader implications than the simple contraposition of our desire to preserve important security interests in Greece with a wish to see a restoration of representative government in Greece.

The continued unreserved participation of Greece in the North Atlantic Alliance and the concomitant availability of Greece’s strategic geography to the Alliance plays an important role in providing the United States and the Alliance with the ability to respond quickly and effectively to events in the Middle East and offers the U.S. and the Alliance the tactical flexibility necessary to serve as a deterrent to Soviet adventurism in the Eastern Mediterranean. But pressure on the Greek regime to move more quickly toward the restoration of parliamentary democracy could lead to a loosening of Greek ties to NATO and the U.S.

Conversely, the failure of the Greek regime to take steps which would convince its critics within the Alliance and in the U.S. Congress of its intention to restore representative government in Greece and the failure of the United States to adopt a more visibly energetic policy of encouraging that restoration could lead to reactions within the NATO Alliance, in European and American public opinion, in European parliaments and in the U.S. Congress which could develop into real obstacles to the continuance of a cooperative relationship between the U.S. and Greece.

Military aid to Greece, curtailed by a partial embargo for 41 months, was restored in full in September 1970 in accordance with NSDM 34 of November 14, 1969 and NSDM 67 of June 25, 1970. Although the decision was made on the basis of U.S. security interests, our interest in the return of representative government in Greece was clearly stated.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–181, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 116, Secret; Nodis. This response to NSSM 116 (Document 301) was prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia and submitted to Kissinger by Chairman of the Group Sisco. Davis sent it to the members of the Senior Review Group on March 11 indicating it would be discussed at the March 22 SRG meeting. It was discussed at the March 31 meeting of the SRG; see Document 310.

2 Documents 262 and 284.
A Greek commitment was clearly made to take certain key steps in the direction of constitutional order. This commitment took the form of a timetable made public in April 1970.\(^3\) The commitment was also frequently privately stated to U.S. officials as well as in an April 1970 letter from the Greek Prime Minister to the President.\(^4\) To a great extent the Greeks met the letter, if not the spirit of the commitment. With one key exception—martial law remains in force. In addition, it now appears as though the prospect for a return to parliamentary government has receded farther into the future. In any event critics of Greece in NATO and in the Congress remain unconvinced that the regime plans ever to return the reins of government of a freely elected parliament or that the regime will abandon the repression of which it has been accused.

The Greek regime remains in firm control of the country. A healthy and burgeoning economy continues to dampen any incipient grass roots movement against the regime. Although the Prime Minister has faced some threats from within the regime to his continued primacy he appears at least for the time being to have overcome them.

To the extent possible, we should chart a course in our relations with the Greeks which would both preserve our security relationship and make it possible to exert as much influence as possible for the restoration of civil rights in Greece and for a return to a more normal political situation. Serving both these objectives severely limits the viable options available to us, eliminates the possibility of attempting to use Military Aid as leverage as well as the possibility of adopting a position of indifference to internal Greek affairs.

\textit{Options}

In theory we have action alternatives ranging from a severe (and high risk in terms of the Greek regime’s attitude) approach at one end of the spectrum to a strict policy of non-concern for internal Greek affairs (with high risk in terms of NATO and Congressional attitudes) at the other. Practically, our options are more limited and can be expressed as two alternatives: do somewhat more or do somewhat less.

Option II calls for a somewhat more energetic application of our present two-pronged policy, calculated to preserve access to security facilities in Greece while exerting as much pressure on the regime as is possible without jeopardizing those interests. This course of action has the advantage of providing evidence to our critics in Congress and

\(^3\) The timetable was first made public to the Council of Europe in August 1969; see footnote 4, Document 255.

\(^4\) Document 274.
within the Alliance that the U.S. is concerned with and working toward the return of representative government in Greece. It would enhance our ability to control attempts by some allies to introduce divisive debate on Greece into the Alliance. At the same time, the very nature of the ad hoc approach to selecting pressure points makes the risk of applying the policy manageable. Ambassador Tasca believes pressure to lift martial law should continue as should our efforts to seek a reduction or commutation of sentences against political prisoners.

Option III, our present essentially passive policy, has assured access to facilities in Greece but has not proved effective in either satisfying our critics or in moving the Greek regime. To do somewhat less is to move in the direction of Option IV, to drop all attempts to influence events in Greece, which, though it would offer the best assurance of continued access to Greek facilities, would significantly elevate the risk of serious division in NATO and arouse strong reactions among some elements of the Congress.

[Omitted here is the body of the response to NSSM 116, and three annexes entitled “Pressures for United States Policy Changes,” “Greek Options in the Face of Increased Pressures,” and “King Constantine of Greece: His Role in United States Policy Toward Greece.”]

307. Research Study Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research


GREECE: IMPLICATIONS FOR US-GREEK RELATIONS OF JUNTA’S CONTINUATION

The military regime in Greece enters its fifth year in power in April 1971. This paper, prepared at the request of the Greek Country Directorate, examines the directions in which the junta may move in its effort to institutionalize its values and political authority. Some of the strains that may envelop US-Greek relations along the way are also examined.
Abstract

The original members of the April 27 movement have demonstrated impressive cohesiveness over almost four years in power, and Prime Minister Papadopoulos has proven to be a tenacious and effective leader. The Greek economy continues buoyant, and resistance to the regime is divided and ineffective both within the country and abroad. The regime’s confidence in its ability to remain in power and to manage Greek affairs over the longer term has been increased by its success in having normalized relations with the US without the restoration of parliamentary government. The Prime Minister’s determination and energy, the military’s desire to preserve its perquisites and influence over government decisions, and the need to restrain centrifugal forces beginning now to emerge among the original supporters of the coup, together with the current absence of effective foreign pressures, suggest that Papadopoulos may be readying an institutional framework that will govern the junta’s course for some years to come. In the pursuit of permanency, the regime may move in one of four principal directions of political development: these include institutionalizing the status quo or gradual shifts toward a more repressive, populist, or democratic system. Each of these possibilities can be evaluated in terms of five measurements of Greece as an ally: its degree of cooperation with US military needs, its overall diplomatic support of the US, its willingness to accept the status quo or a negotiated settlement for the Cyprus problem, its influence—intentionally or inadvertently—upon US prestige with the Greek people, and its financial demands on the US. The findings, based on varying weights for each of the five factors, are that the populist political model would be most costly to the US over the next five years. The range of costs among all four models is not extreme, however, and the US could probably do business with any one of them. Although American prestige is likely to be eroded regardless of political development in Athens, US influence should continue to be a significant force upon the regime.

[Omitted here is a discussion of the issues outlined in the Summary.]

SUBJECT
SRG Meeting on Greece—March 22

Purpose of the Meeting
The NSSM 116 exercise which culminates in this meeting was launched to review our posture toward Greece. As you recall, there was a flurry of activity at the end of the year in which State began thinking in terms of getting closer to King Constantine, partly as a means of showing displeasure over the fact that the military regime in Athens had not met all of its pledges on progress toward constitutional government. The purpose of this meeting, therefore, is to inject as much precision as possible into our strategy toward Greece. The objective of the meeting, therefore, is to develop an exact statement of what we are trying to do and what we are not trying to do.

The Papers
At the Tabs in this book you will find the following three papers:

—Analytical Summary. This paper outlines the IG paper and discusses the current problem in setting policy toward Greece, as well as the options in selecting a general posture and the options vis-à-vis King Constantine. This summary also provides a guide to the few pages you will want to read in the IG paper.

—IG Paper. This contains two real options in connection with our general policy toward Greece and an extensive discussion of the role of the King. The first paragraph of the Analytical Summary provides a guide to the pages you need to look at. A recent cable from Ambassador Tasca commenting on the paper is included.

1. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


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1. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

—Senate Report. This is included to give you the flavor of the Moose–Lowenstein report which is probably reflective of the current mood on Capitol Hill.6

Talking Points for Opening the Meeting

1. There is no crisis in Greece and the choice among options is fairly narrow. However, it seemed worthwhile to review the situation since it has turned out somewhat differently from what we anticipated when the President made his decision to resume a normal military assistance relationship last June.

2. You find on reading the IG paper that the choices are really relatively narrow. Since the basic assumptions underlying policy have changed, you would like to focus in the meeting on discussing whether the basic elements of our strategy are still valid. The tactics will have to be left to the State Department, but it does seem worthwhile here to discuss basic objectives.

3. You would like, therefore, to aim at some sort of statement of what it is we are and are not trying to achieve in Greece.

4. You would like to divide the discussion into two parts:

— the question of our general posture toward the military government;
— the question of our posture toward King Constantine.

General US Posture Toward Greece

Background. The IG paper does not really distinguish clearly between the two main options that it suggests. Option II is what Ambassador Tasca says he is doing now—prodding the regime privately on issues related to return to constitutional government. Option III is what the IG paper says is our current policy—a “passive” policy of prodding only modestly when the opportunity arises. We need to arrive at a fairly precise statement of exactly what is going on and what we will try to do within what limits. The following talking points are suggested:

— The IG paper outlines four options, but it points out that only Options II and III represent a real choice. Can we all agree on that?

— What is the difference between Options II and III? The IG paper describes Option III as our present policy, while Ambassador Tasca has sent in a cable [copy on top of the IG paper]7 saying that Option II reflects accurately the policy he has been following. Can someone

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6 See footnote 4, Document 303.
7 Brackets in the original.
describe exactly what it is we are doing now and what the real distinction between these two options is?

—Can any amount of US prodding really change the pace of the regime’s movement toward constitutional government? If the answer is that our influence is marginal, then why should we keep prodding?

—If our influence is marginal, is there some distinction to be made between pretending that we can achieve real progress and simply trying to change the regime’s behavior on those smaller tactical questions which affect its image abroad?

—If our influence is marginal, are there strong arguments against dropping back entirely into a passive mood of showing no concern whatsoever for the state of government in Greece?

—Is it fair to summarize what we want to do as follows: We do not expect to be able to change the pace of events in Greece. We will do enough prodding to keep the regime aware of our concern for progress toward constitutional government but not enough to jeopardize our interests. If this is a description of our policy, then is it correct to say that we are really choosing Option II rather than Option III?

—If we are choosing Option II, then this raises such questions as whether the President should write a letter to the Prime Minister or whether we should more actively pursue the King. Let’s move on to the question of the King’s role.

The Role of the King

Background. The IG paper ends up with at least the State Department favoring having Ambassador Tasca not only pay a courtesy call on King Constantine but discussing with him ways to mend his fences and improve his position in Greece. The issue, therefore, is not so much whether the Ambassador pays a courtesy call on the King—most ambassadors accredited to Athens have—but what he says if he does. The following talking points are suggested:

—Is it absolutely essential that the Ambassador call on King Constantine? Is it simply a matter of courtesy?

—If it is a matter of courtesy, can the Ambassador restrict himself to a discussion of developments in Greece without getting into the business of talking about the King’s improvement of his position in Greece and his potential return to Greece?

—The IG paper characterizes the King as very ineffective. Why should we want to stick our necks out to help him return to Greece? Do we really want to create any implication that we are encouraging him to go back?

—Can we agree that if Ambassador Tasca calls on the King he should limit himself to a survey of developments and stay away from the subject of the King’s return? Are there arguments to the contrary?
Summary

The ideal would be to have something like the following consensus expressed:

1. We will continue to pursue a relatively low level Option II strategy. This will be limited by the judgment that we do not feel we will be able to change the course of events but that there is some value in continuing to encourage the regime to improve its image in the US and in Western Europe.

2. The US cannot say definitively now that it has an interest in the return of King Constantine to Greece. Therefore, the US should not now get into the business of encouraging his return.

309. Editorial Note

On March 25, 1971, President Richard Nixon held a wide-ranging discussion of domestic and international affairs with Attorney General John Mitchell and Greek-American businessman Tom Pappas. According to a transcript of the conversation prepared by the editors specifically for this volume, after a discussion concerning the naming of a new Ambassador to Italy, in which Pappas proposed Henry Tasca, the discussion turned to Greece:

Pappas: “Nobody could save Greece but Tasca. He says I know what the President wants, he says, and I’m going to do it. And I don’t give a damn what the State Department or anyone else says. [unclear] lose Italy. I don’t like it, but you’ve got to live with it. You got the generals or the Commies.

Nixon: “Listen, I’m with you all the way, and incidentally, I must say, you know, I’m watching the Spain situation very closely.

Pappas: “And it needs watching desperately.”

After a discussion of Spain, the conversation returned to Greece:

Pappas: “I know what these people promised. I believe that they feel embarrassed. I believe that by 1972 they will have set up their affairs so that they can start parliamentary procedures. I think that by the end of the year an announcement of some kind, I have no authority on that. Nobody told me that they were going to do that.

Nixon: “That would be very helpful if they would.

Pappas: “Yes.

Nixon: “You see, look, I am the best friend they got.

Pappas: “I know that.
Nixon: “And, if I had not been in this office, they’d be put right
down the tubes.
Pappas: “Right.
Nixon: “Now, I’ve defended and John knows all this and the NSC
and all the rest, everybody wants to kick the Greek around. And they
said, ‘Well, the Danes.’ And I said—
Pappas: “Who are the Danes.
Nixon: “What are you going to do—exchange one battalion for 20
divisions?
Pappas: “20 divisions.
Nixon: “Or whatever it is, 15? We’re with them, but they don’t
make it any easier for us.
Pappas: “I know, I told them that.
Nixon: “Well, keep on telling ’em.”
The President then outlined a scenario for an approach to the junta.
Nixon: “We understand what they have to do. Make it appear
something else. See. You tell ’em strong. Take a look here, boys, we,
you have American politics, you know they’ve got a very good friend
here, but they’re hanging all this up.
Pappas: “I’m going to tell them in no uncertain terms. I’m going
to tell them in a nice way. Because I’ve tried my best to guide them, to
do everything I possibly could. And I said to [unclear] the strongest of
martial law, but don’t call it martial law, you can’t have that, martial
law. And I think that Tasca’s done a good job. Now, Greece is going
along well, and I think things can go along the road to a semblance of
[unclear]. I think by 1972 they will have parliamentary program. Of
course, the King’s not helping them either, unfortunately.
Nixon: “We haven’t done anything about that. I’m sorry about that,
he’s a nice fellow.
Pappas: “He’s a nice, young—
Nixon: “But you think he should stay out of it?
Pappas: “Oh, absolutely.
Nixon: “Can’t come back?
Pappas: “I believe—
Nixon: “He can’t come back?
Pappas: “Not now. Not now. Not now. He’ll be against his own
image.
Nixon: “Yeah.”
The conversation then turned to Yugoslavia and Turkey. (National
Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording
of Conversation Among Nixon, Mitchell, and Pappas, March 25, 1971,
Oval Office, Conversation No. 473–10)
310. Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting

San Clemente, California, March 31, 1971, 11:55 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Greece and Pakistan

PARTICIPATION
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Defense
Mr. David Packard
Mr. James S. Noyes
JCS
Lt. Gen. Richard T. Knowles
CIA
Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
Mr. David Blee
VP Office
Mr. Kent Crane
NSC Staff
Col. Richard T. Kennedy
Mr. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Greece

1. The SRG agreed that there was not much scope for the United States to influence internal developments in Greece but that the United States Ambassador and other U.S. officials should, when appropriate opportunities arise, prod the Greek Government about returning to constitutional government. However, the U.S. should not make any public show of pressure against the Greek Government.

2. The SRG agreed to seek Presidential approval for Ambassador Tasca to pay a courtesy call on King Constantine. The call would be arranged through the Greek Foreign Office.

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 149, Senior Review Group. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the conference room of the Western White House in San Clemente. There is a briefer account of this meeting in the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01086R, Executive Registry, Subject Files, G–6, Greece.
Pakistan

1. The SRG briefly reviewed current developments in East Pakistan.

Greece

Dr. Kissinger: I have read the IG paper\(^2\) and have noted the four choices presented. The IG seems to have come down on Options 2 and 3 although the distinction between those two is not self-evident. I think that what we are doing is carrying out Option 3 while Ambassador Tasca says that our present policy is Option 2. I don’t care how we label our policy as long as there is agreement on what we are doing. There is no acute crisis in Greece now. Our choice remains the one we have always had: how to keep in touch with the Greek Government without losing our future options [in Greece]\(^3\) or losing too much at the present time in our relations with other countries.

Mr. Packard: If we push them [the Greeks] along, we might save some trouble later. I don’t know what we can do other than what we are now doing.

Mr. Johnson: That is our [the State Department’s] feeling.

Dr. Kissinger: An additional point is that when the President saw General Angelis, he didn’t exactly send him charging out to undertake reform.\(^4\)

Mr. Johnson: I know of only one issue, but it is the very, very major one of whether Ambassadors Martin, Lodge, or Tasca should see the King.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s decide first on the basic line to follow with the Greek Government. Is it correct to sum it up by saying that we want to prod them without any public show of pressure?

Mr. Johnson: I think that is okay.

Mr. Packard: Okay.

Dr. Kissinger: We also should recognize that our scope for action is not very great.

Mr. Packard: I think we should keep pressing them.

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Lt. Gen. Knowles: Could we say that the policy is one of private prodding and public persuasion?

Mr. Packard: We are not doing anything to them publicly.

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\(^2\) For the Summary of the NSSM 116 Response, prepared by the IG/NEA, see Document 306. See also Document 308.

\(^3\) See footnote 2, Document 304.

\(^4\) All brackets, with the exception of the ones describing omitted material, are in the original.
Mr. Johnson: Perhaps it is more correct to say that we will take advantage of every opportunity that presents itself to exert pressure. Didn’t the Greeks make some commitment to the President [about returning to constitutional government]?

Mr. Blee: That was to the Council of Europe.5
Dr. Kissinger: They told Tasca they would do certain things.
Mr. Johnson: My briefing says something about commitments to the President.
Dr. Kissinger: Can we find out what is meant by “commitments to the President”? I remember only two Presidential conversations on Greece. One was at the Eisenhower funeral.6
Mr. Johnson: Here it [the reference to a Presidential commitment] is on page 4 [of the NSSM 116 study]: “The commitment of the Greek regime to a schedule for the return of constitutional guarantees . . . was first made in a ‘timetable’ presented to the Council of Europe in August 1969. In a letter to the President of April 9, 1970, the Prime Minister wrote . . .”7
Mr. Blee: Lifting of martial law is the only item the Greeks haven’t carried out.
Dr. Kissinger: What we are saying is that when the Ambassador has a chance, he should press the Greek Government on this.
Mr. Johnson: Not only the Ambassador but other U.S. officials, including particularly those on the military side.
Dr. Kissinger: With some delicacy.
Mr. Packard: We can tell the Greeks that if they don’t show some movement, our ability to help may be jeopardized.
Mr. Johnson: Yes. Denmark is going to join Norway in attacking the Greek regime at the next NATO meeting.
Mr. Packard: I don’t think the President needs to weigh in.
Dr. Kissinger: My certain conclusion is that the President is not going to press hard.

The next question is what to do about calling on the King. From what I have seen, [less than 1 line not declassified]. What are you proposing?

5 See footnote 4, Document 255.
6 See Document 243.
7 This quotation is not in the Summary printed as Document 306. For Papadopoulos’s letter, see Document 274.
Mr. Johnson: That Ambassador Tasca pay a courtesy call. This would be handled through the Greek Foreign Office. This is the standard procedure. The Foreign Office won’t be happy, but they will have to say yes.

Dr. Kissinger: This seems the most straightforward way of handling it.

Mr. Johnson: Have we sent you a memo on this?

Dr. Kissinger: Let me check this with the President. He wasn’t eager when [Ambassador Gardner] Ackley wanted to call on the King a year ago. I will explain that it is the normal thing and that it is not Martin or Lodge who will be involved but our Ambassador in Athens, who will be paying a call as a matter of courtesy as arranged through approved Greek Government channels. Let me check. I think it is likely he will approve.8

Lt. Gen. Knowles: It would be abnormal if the Ambassador doesn’t call, wouldn’t it?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t know what utility the King has. He might be of some use during a transition, but the opposition wouldn’t want him back. I am sure Papandreou wouldn’t want him.

That is all I have.

[Omitted here is discussion of Pakistan.]

8 See Document 315.

311. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, April 23, 1971, 1635Z.

1920. For the Secretary.

1. Recently I have taken a major initiative to move the Papadopoulos regime along toward full implementation of the 1968 Constitution. Papadopoulos is influenced by the opinions of leading busi-
nessmen and I have found it especially effective to use carefully selected industrialists as part of that effort.

2. Greek industrialist Athanassiadis-Bodossakis, whose mining and industrial projects are doing very well and earning Greece substantial amounts of foreign exchange, enjoys a strong position with Prime Minister George Papadopoulos. He was not demanding economic concessions from Government and, on the contrary, has willed considerable personal property—including his own residence—to the state on his death.

3. With the above in mind, early in April I secured his confidential cooperation to help this initiative and briefed him on the considerations which argue for progress toward elections. Thereafter he sought a discreet meeting with the Prime Minister.

4. Just before Greek Easter, Bodossakis gave me a summary of his private talk with Papadopoulos. After noting the improvement in GOG relations with the USG, he warned Prime Minister that the US administration faced strong criticism of its policy toward Greece in the US press and Congress. Such criticism would persist until elections were held in Greece.

5. Prime Minister replied that he appreciated Bodossakis’ arguments, and that, if progress continued to be made in country and if everyone “remained in his place,” he hoped to be able to make the key decision no later than the fall of 1972.

6. Bodossakis also told Prime Minister that he had sounded out various army unit commanders in Greece on the subject of political evolution and found them sharing his views. Comment: This opinion is somewhat more optimistic than Embassy’s present assessment. We believe Papadopoulos enjoys wide support among the officers but that among the younger revolutionary officers the slogan persists of “No King, no elections.”

7. Bodossakis told me that, in his view, the further relaxation of martial law at Easter was another step in the right direction. He himself felt elections would be held in 1972. He also noted that the issue of King Constantine remained very sensitive and USG should deal with it warily. Constantine is highly mistrusted by Papadopoulos and his intimates. Bodossakis, therefore, speculates that the Prime Minister may decide to hold national elections and then follow up with a plebiscite on the return of Constantine. A plebiscite would go against Constantine and perhaps lead to a further regency. Constantine’s son, Prince Paul, might be retained, but this was by no means certain as

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2 Apparent reference to Papadopoulos’s decision to permit some 250 political figures to return to Greece.
with the passage of time and further erosion of the institution of the monarchy, he might also be dispensed with.

8. The Prime Minister’s apparent consideration of elections in 1972 represents a welcome and we believe significant reading of his present intentions. It is the first time we have seen him discuss the touchy question of a date for elections. It also highlights the high value he puts on actions needed to improve his government’s relations with USG. We believe he faces strong resistance to elections from within his regime, but he is proving to be an able maneuverer in coping with his colleagues on political problems. We will continue our private pressures, but clearly the whole effort could be torpedoed by premature publicity which would put Papadopoulos on the defensive. Hence my desire to restrict severely knowledge of the above initiative and its progress.

Tasca

312. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Athens, April 23, 1971.

1071. 1. I hope you have seen my telegram, Athens 1920 to Department (Nodis) describing the discreet efforts we are making via confidential intermediaries to stress to Prime Minister Papadopoulos the need to take steps toward elections by the fall of 1972.

2. For your own information, and for the President if you find it appropriate, we have been couching arguments to Papadopoulos in terms of his reciprocating the expressions of friendship and good will which the President has shown to him. Our intermediary in one instance spoke directly of the delicate and difficult elections coming up in 1972 and the criticism which President Nixon faces in some quarters over his policy toward Greece. He urged Papadopoulos to keep all this in mind and pointed to the desirability of real political progress to-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Backchannel Files—Backchannel Messages, Europe, Middle East, and Latin America, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. There is no time of transmission or receipt on the telegram.

2 Document 311.
ward elections in Greece to remove a troublesome and contentious element before the U.S. elections. My intermediary reported that the Prime Minister had received the above with interest and had shown a wish to be as cooperative as he could. Specifically, Papadopoulos replied that he hoped very much he could be helpful, that progress continued to be made in Greece and that if everyone “remained in his place” he hoped to be able to make the key decision within the framework of President Nixon’s schedule.

3. While all this is encouraging and I intend to pursue energetically the opportunity it represents, I must also point out the pitfalls ahead. Young Revolutionary Army officers still follow the slogan “no King and no elections,” and there are many in Papadopoulos regime who lack his political sense as to evolution and prefer to dig in where they are. This means that we must be careful not to embarrass him further by public statements appearing to put him under foreign pressure and thereby undermining his prestige with his colleagues.

4. Similarly, we must treat the issue of Constantine with care and always with out prime objective of the implementation of the Constitution foremost in mind. All this could change, but Constantine has not yet seized any of the opportunities to make his peace with the regime. I see signs of disillusionment among even Royalist circles with him and with his prospects. But with all the above in mind I recommend that whatever the USG does in its relations with Constantine be closely coordinated with me. A mis-step with Constantine could set back our whole effort to get the Constitution fully applied. This effort requires reconciliation of the nationalist elements—not further divisions—and must go forward in harmony and in accordance with existing realities in Greece.

5. I have written to you in this private fashion to report the aspects of the problem that are politically sensitive for the administration. The basic intelligence information in this letter has been reported via regular Department of State channels.

With warm regards.
313. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Letter to Deputy Secretary Packard Requesting Review of U.S. Military Activities Planned in Greece—ACTION MEMORANDUM

Discussion
We are being asked by the military services to approve or at least consider an increasing number of new activities (homeporting, additional exercises, naval air station, Special Warfare Training Unit deployment, fleet marine force training base, etc.) involving Greece. These activities are for the most part bilateral although to a degree they fall within the NATO framework. The rationale supporting these new projects is linked to the Soviet fleet buildup in the Mediterranean, contingency planning for Middle Eastern crises, and our commitment to maintain strength within NATO including the southern flank.

At the same time those members of Congress critical of our policy toward Greece can be expected to view with concern any increase of U.S. military operations. In the opinion of certain critics we are successfully achieving our military/security objectives at the expense of our political goals. While there appears to be little anti-American resentment among the Greeks as a result of U.S. military presence now, the consequent risk of a continuing buildup cannot be overlooked. A comprehensive overview of anticipated military requirements involving Greece would provide perspective in the totality of our relations with Greece.

Recommendation
That you sign the attached letter to Mr. Packard\(^2\) requesting a comprehensive review of military planning involving Greece.

\(^1\) Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 75 D 227, Def 15. Confidential. Drafted by David Rowe and George Churchill (NEA/GRK) on May 6, and cleared in EUR/RPM, PM/ISO, and NEA/RA. Johnson initialed the memorandum and wrote: “Return to NEA.” In an attached handwritten note to Sisco, May 11, Davies explained that the Department of the Navy had been going forward with plans for an increased military presence in Greece without the knowledge of either the Department of State or White House staff. When questioned about this activity by Johnson, Zumwalt replied that during the fall of 1970 Moorer and Laird had briefed the President on this possibility following their return from Athens (see Document 293) in the presence of Secretary Rogers and Johnson and had been told to “go ahead” by Nixon. No record of this conversation was found.

\(^2\) Not attached.
PROSPECTS FOR GREECE

Conclusions

A. The military junta appears firmly in control. The leaders show great cohesion; opposition groups are weak and fragmented. The junta’s decisive base of power lies in the Greek Armed Forces, purged of potential opponents and awarded new perquisites.

B. The regime claims that its mission is to purify the nation’s political and social life. But its reforms have been few, and it remains a military dictatorship, though a more permissive one than in its early days.

C. The government has promulgated a new constitution, but refuses to put into effect such key provisions as parliamentary elections and guarantees of civil liberties. Partly in response to foreign pressures, the leaders are likely, over time, to decree new measures giving the appearance of greater liberalization. They will probably not, however, do anything which they believe might lead to their loss of their ultimate political authority.

D. Thanks both to favorable outside developments and to reasonably good domestic management, the Greek economy is booming. Formerly difficult balance of payments problems have been eased; foreign investment, tourism, and exports increased.

E. Sporadically attempting to mollify its foreign critics, the regime still seeks the best possible working relations with its NATO allies, and especially with the US. Foreign criticism continues, though it appears at the moment to have lost momentum. The regime’s leaders calculate that the US and NATO need Greece as much as Greece needs them, and probably see their present relations with the US and the larger NATO powers as satisfactory.

\[\text{Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1265, Saunders Subject Files, Greece, 9/1/71–12/31/71. Secret. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA prepared this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with it with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction.}\]
F. Despite the regime’s several strengths, certain contingencies could weaken or even topple it—among them a falling out within the junta, a serious setback in a conflict with the Turks over Cyprus, or the economic repercussions of a recession in Europe.

DISCUSSION

I. The Junta

A. Who They Are

1. On 21 April 1967 a group of Greek Army officers staged a surprise coup; the same group has since ruled the country. They had originally drawn up plans for a takeover a decade or so earlier, and finally carried it out in a period of political uncertainty when many feared the possibility of a communist-influenced government coming to power. There were probably several hundred officers involved, mostly majors and colonels.

2. Of these, a dozen or so members of the so-called Revolutionary Council (RC) rank as the most important. The RC’s leading figures are Prime Minister Papadopoulos, Deputy Prime Minister Pattakos, Coordination Minister Makarezos, and (a more recent and very important addition to the top group) General Angelis, the present Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Most of the remaining RC members have become civilian Secretaries-General, i.e., supervisors or watchdogs in various government ministries.

3. At the time of the coup the Prime Minister was, with Pattakos and Makarezos, one of a triumvirate. Since then, Papadopoulos’ stature and power have increased very considerably and his colleagues’ relative stature has declined, though his authority over his RC colleagues is far from absolute. Moreover, after ruling Greece for four years, Papadopoulos remains a somewhat enigmatic figure; he has shown himself to be tenacious of purpose, but he is regarded by many Greeks as “complex” or even “devious.”

4. The colonels’ origins and background give some clues as to the type of rule they favor. They come from small towns, are mostly from the lower middle class, and are generally unsophisticated. All graduated from the Greek military academy in the early 1940s and have had little education or experience outside the army. They believe in the firm hand of traditionalism, in authority and obedience; they are horrified by the antics and styles of much of the youth in Western Europe and the US. Not for them the permissiveness which they feel leads to radicalism. Accompanying this attitude is a militant anticommunism which is in part the product of their participation in the bloody Greek civil war of 1946–1949.

5. Beyond this, their political outlook and biases are less precise. Self-proclaimed “revolutionaries,” their announced mission is to pu-
rify Greek political life, to instill new standards of morality and social responsibility in the Greek people. But in four years their actual reforms have been rather few in number. They have purged the church of some unsavory clerics and have made efforts to improve the educational system, especially through rural school construction and expanding technical and vocational training. They have cracked down on tax evasion, formerly a Greek national pastime. But for the most part the junta’s efforts have been hortatory; in public speeches, news releases, new textbooks, and the like, the colonels continue to urge the people of Greece to reform themselves and adopt new high moral standards. They have sought no significant changes in Greece’s social or class structure. The established economic community continues to enjoy official favor and to thrive. The regime also favors international capitalists such as Onassis and Tom Pappas.

6. Their regime remains an authoritarian one, despite some changes in the nature of their rule since seizing power. The most notable change has been the promulgation of a new constitution. Though somewhat less liberal than the preceding one, it nonetheless provides for a basically democratic form of government, albeit with much stronger executive powers. The constitution reflects in part an effort to mollify the regime’s foreign critics, but its most important provisions go into effect only when decreed by the government.

7. The regime shows extreme reluctance to issue some of these decrees. Several critically important sections of the constitution remain in limbo, notably those calling for free parliamentary elections and those protecting civil liberties. Some of the latter provisions have been activated through implementing legislation, but their effect has been vitiated since martial law remains in force. Greece is still a military dictatorship, though a somewhat more permissive one than in the early days of the regime. Thus it has permitted some of its less hostile critics to speak out, but it shows no signs of softness towards those it thinks dangerous. Precensorship of the press has been abolished, and a few newspapers have been openly critical of some aspects of the regime. However, severe penalties are still inflicted on journalists who write something the military rulers consider subversive. The detention camps were closed in April 1971, and almost all the political prisoners held there were released. However, the regime continues to arrest political critics on various charges.

8. We can make no precise assessment of how much popular support the regime has; free elections and public opinion polls are not permitted in Greece. The government is almost certainly less popular in the cities than in the more conservative rural areas from which the colonels come and where they have sharply increased government development spending. In the 3 years following the coup the investment budget increased by 79 percent as compared to 33 percent in the 3 years
prior to it. Whether the bulk of the Greeks are enthusiastic or not about the ruling regime, they accept their government; they have no choice. Further it has benefited a large number; for example through the cancellation of farmers’ debts. The groups whose interests have directly suffered, such as former politicians and some journalists, form a relatively small proportion of the total populace. In any case, Papadopoulos’ decisive base of power lies in support from the military—purged of dissenters and awarded attractive new perquisites—and in the efficient activity of the police and the security services.

9. There is evidence of some disagreements among the RC members, though reports of such are generally fragmentary. A group of more puritanical, hard-line officers seems strongly to oppose liberalizing the political system, releasing political prisoners, allowing greater public freedom of expression, preparing for the King’s return, or setting a date for general elections. We do not know the exact lineup in the RC on these matters, though Papadopoulos is often alleged to be in conflict with the hard-liners. But it is far from clear that Papadopoulos himself is as determined an advocate of liberalization as he wants to appear. The principal differences in the RC may well center around personal rivalries and involve conflicting personal ambitions. Nonetheless, it remains true that the military officers who seized power have so far shown great cohesion, with no major splits, purges or arrests—in distinct contrast to most comparable groups which have seized power elsewhere.

B. Their Strengths

10. The military rulers of Greece have a fair amount going for them. Their claims with respect to the corruption, unpopularity, irresponsibility, and ineffectiveness of the preceding Greek governments, though exaggerated, are not unfounded. Many Greeks who would vote against the regime in free balloting probably appreciate the relative stability and peace and quiet which prevails in the country. The turbulence in neighboring Turkey as compared to the quiet in Greece is seen to justify the junta’s firm rule. However much publicity they receive abroad, opposition and resistance groups are small, ineffective, poorly organized, and mostly in exile. Despite recurring terrorist threats and bombings, the regime appears to have the internal security situation under control. The favored armed forces, the police, and the purged and intimidated civil service show no signs of transferring their loyalties. In the eyes of the Greek people, the regime has at least the passive backing and probably the active support of the US. This is a matter of great importance, since the “American factor” is still regarded in Greece as a potent determinant in the country’s political life.

11. Further, Greece is now enjoying considerable economic prosperity, owing in part to the stability prevailing under the regime and
to economic policies followed by Coordination Minister Makarezos. In April 1967, Greece was in the midst of a recession, which had been brought on in part by political uncertainties and a series of strikes. By 1969, Greece had fully recovered. Gross national product at constant prices rose over eight percent in that year and only slightly less than that in 1970. Prices have remained relatively stable.

12. In part this improved situation—particularly in the balance of payments—resulted from developments outside the control of any Greek government. West Germany has recovered from a mild recession, permitting a large number of Greek workers to find jobs there in the last two or three years, and to send home substantial remittances, amounting to $343 million in 1970. Greece’s booming tourist trade—amounting to $194 million in 1970—has been little affected of late by the bad publicity given the junta in North America and Western Europe. The closure of the Suez Canal and the world-wide shortage of tankers have boosted revenues earned by Greece’s large shipping fleet—though this may have been offset by losses sustained by ship repair and bunkering facilities. In any case, foreign exchange reserves are now 14 percent higher than the pre-coup level.

13. But economic recovery has been due to more than fortuitous circumstances. Another important factor in easing Greece’s balance of payments problem has been a sharp rise in exports, resulting partly from new government policies designed to make Greek goods competitive on the world market, and to prepare the country over the long term for entry into the European Common Market. In agriculture, the regime has encouraged increased exports of such profitable crops as fruit and vegetables in place of wheat and tobacco. Financial incentives have been provided to export industries, and industrial policy has encouraged the inflow of foreign capital. Fiscal incentives and other forms of support have been given to encourage further growth in tourist facilities and in the shipping industry.

14. The regime has followed basic policies favorable to economic growth: a) reliance on free enterprise; b) observance of their agreements for adherence to the Common Market; c) use of normal monetary and fiscal controls rather than more direct intervention in the economy; d) removal of balance of payments restraints on growth through borrowing. Since early 1968, the regime has been implementing, as a guideline, a five year plan based on that of Andreas Papandreou, with such ambitious long-term goals as raising income levels to those of advanced countries, improving income distribution, and increasing social services.

2 In 1970, some $51 million came in under the investment law. This compares with about $48 million in 1966, the last year before the coup. [Footnote in the original.]
15. On more specific structural problems of the Greek economy, the regime is making more headway than any government since the Karamanlis era, but is still hampered by such traditional obstructions as bureaucratic inertia, shortages of trained personnel, and vested interest groups. These basic problems include fragmentation and small size of land holdings, rapid displacement of the rural population to the cities and related regional imbalances, and a distorted investment pattern. Success in the economic field does not of course automatically bring about political popularity. Nonetheless, the current economic boom has made the regime more palatable even to those Greeks who wish a return to parliamentary rule.

C. Their Weaknesses

16. The regime remains vulnerable in many respects. Though it has showered the Greek people with considerable laudatory propaganda about itself, it does not appear to have acquired a mass following; the public appearances of the leaders inspire little enthusiasm. Most of the old regime politicians continue to shun them. The cooperative relationships with the principal business leaders are probably based on expediency rather than on any deep-seated identification with or loyalty to the present government. Indeed their ties with figures like Onassis have probably alienated many smaller businessmen, particularly those involved in the import-export field. The latter, though sharing in the general prosperity, are relatively less favored than are the tycoons.

17. The junta’s stated goal of purifying Greek political life is probably sincerely meant, but it is also unrealistic and utopian. It has made the leaders quite vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy, since the private lives of some of the colonels are anything but models of probity. The means used by the regime to achieve its lofty aims have included, among others, censorship, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment without trial, and—according to its bitterest critics—police torture. In any event, there is a considerable gap between the colonels’ words and their performance, a fact frequently pointed out by foreign critics and almost certainly known to most Greeks.

II. The Junta and the World

A. Turkey and the Cyprus Dispute

18. The regime’s Cyprus policy has been a cautious one; it has sought no more than to prevent the situation from leading to Greek-Turkish hostilities. Thus it acceded to Turkish demands that most regular Greek troops be removed from the island, and forbade anti-Turkish propaganda in the Greek media. But the situation on Cyprus remains volatile; no real reconciliation between the Greek and Turkish communities there is in sight, and major trouble is always a danger.
The new Erim government in Turkey has taken a hard line—particularly on the subject of intercommunal talks—which may raise the level of tensions considerably. Were the situation to heat up, there is very little that the Athens Government could do alone to restrain Archbishop Makarios and his Greek Cypriot followers. However, Athens has about 1,700 military personnel on the island, including 950 in the Hellenic Army contingent and some 600 officers and non-commissioned officers serving with the Greek Cypriot National Guard. They could play an important role under certain circumstances, such as providing a measure of control in the event of Makarios’ assassination.

19. There are periodic talks between the Greek and Turkish Governments on the Cyprus issue. Both Athens and Ankara would of course find it difficult to arrive at a mutually acceptable formula, and even more difficult to impose it on unwilling Cypriots. This would be particularly the case with the Greeks, who would almost certainly have to make unpalatable and hitherto unacceptable concessions to the Turks, perhaps even an agreement to partition the island between the two countries. Such a solution would not be popular in Greece, where the goal of union of the whole island with the mother country (“enosis”) still has strong emotional appeal, but the junta probably has enough strength to repress any public protests over the issue in Greece.

20. Athens has apparently not worked out a modus vivendi with Ankara to insure an untroubled succession to the 86-year old Athenagoras, the Ecumenical Patriarch resident in Istanbul, in case of his death or resignation. The prestige of Greece is intimately tied to the Patriarchate, and Turkish authorities hold a virtual veto over the succession election. If controversy should attend the first patriarchal succession in more than 23 years, relations between the two governments could be seriously worsened, even to the point of jeopardizing the continued residence of the 20,000 Greek citizens in Istanbul.

B. Europe, NATO, and the United States

21. From the first, the conduct of foreign affairs has been a vexing task for the junta. Most Greeks place a very high premium on maintaining good relations with the US and with West European states. They also want to maintain an honored place in NATO and other West European multinational organizations. The colonels were probably surprised as well as chagrined at the hostile reactions in the Western World to their seizure of power. The temporary suspension of some US military aid, the harsh criticism (particularly by The Netherlands, Norway and Denmark) in NATO meetings and other European bodies, the sequence of events which finally led Greece to walk out of the Council of Europe, the denunciation of the junta by much of the press and many prominent political figures in both Europe and the US have seriously disturbed the regime’s leaders. Such protests, and the pressures they
have generated, have been one (though not the only) cause of the steps taken towards the restoration of constitutional government. At least for the moment such criticism appears to have lost momentum, although attitudes, especially in the more liberal circles of Europe, remain basically unchanged.

22. Athens is sensitive to outside criticism, and has made some concessions to it. But it is not likely to make any fundamental shifts in domestic policy in response to such attitudes. Its leaders probably calculate that there are limits, with respect to actions against them, that their NATO allies would choose to take, and that the latter need Greece as much as Greece needs them. With the US and NATO bases already in Greece, the inhospitable attitudes of the other states in the eastern Mediterranean to US use of facilities, and the rising Soviet air and naval strength there, the government believes that Greece is an area of primary strategic importance for NATO and US forces, including the Sixth Fleet.

23. Though Athens has sought to normalize and improve its generally cool relationships with Eastern Europe and the USSR, it has not threatened to turn Eastward if ties with the West were loosened. In bargaining with the US, the junta has not used threats—say to close the airfields or to shut certain installations. While resisting US pressures toward political liberalization, the government has not responded by suggesting possibly harmful moves against Washington. Rather the leaders seem to share the sentiments of many of their countrymen and feel there is a special tie—cemented by the large and sometimes prominent community of Greek descent in the US—between the two countries. Thus while continued frictions and difficulties will manifest themselves, a rupture of Greek-American relations is unlikely.

24. At the same time, the colonels will seek to retain the best possible relations with France and West Germany, both as shields against criticism from some of the smaller NATO powers, and as alternative sources of military supplies were US equipment to become unavailable or too expensive. While the present Greek regime would probably walk out of NATO altogether rather than accede to political pressures stimulated by its critics in NATO, there now appears no serious likelihood of its being forced to do so. At least for the present the junta probably views relations with the US and most other NATO countries as on the whole satisfactory and sees no need to change its present course.

3 Most equipment in the Greek Armed Forces is of US origin, and Athens, knowing the logistical problems of servicing equipment from different sources, would like to keep it that way. Nonetheless, the Greeks are mindful of the previous partial cut-off of arms supplies, of the reduction of US grant aid programs, and of the competitive prices being quoted by European arms manufacturers. [Footnote in the original.]
The Arab World and Africa

25. Impelled by such factors as the need to broaden diplomatic support for Greece and concern for Greeks living abroad, the junta has made efforts during the past two years to improve its standing with Arab and sub-Sahara African governments. Greece has entered a supply and training agreement with the Libyan Air Force and has exchanged high-level visits with several West African countries.

III. Prospects and Contingencies

26. In more than four years of power, the leaders have shown themselves adept in maintaining their control. Their prospects for continuing to do so now appear good. Such factors as their own cohesiveness, a passive populace, a contented army, an efficient police, no strong foreign pressures for change, and a booming economy all point towards their continued survival. But any of these and other favorable ones could change unexpectedly, bringing on a new situation. Some combination of internal failures, outside developments, and foreign pressures could cause serious trouble for the leadership; it is even conceivable that the entire military regime might be ousted altogether. For example:

a. The cohesiveness that has characterized the military leadership since the 1967 coup could erode in time or fracture suddenly over some major issue. In such circumstances Papadopoulos might be replaced by another member of the junta or by another secret army clique; or the present system might give way to some form of “collective” leadership with no single individual exercising much influence over events.

b. If over time resistance groups in exile and the traditional party politicians now inactive were able to coordinate their efforts and organize popular support, they might pose a threat to the junta, encourage divisions between it and the armed forces, or at least constitute a source of serious harassment, possibly by terrorist tactics.

c. The Greek economy and political system will remain heavily dependent on developments taking place outside the country or over which its government has no control. For example, a serious setback in a conflict with the Turks over Cyprus could lead to the junta’s downfall. A serious recession in Europe would sharply reduce worker remittances from West Germany, cut tourist revenues, contract a principal market for exports, and bring on depressed economic conditions in Greece, with consequent trouble for its rulers.

d. In addition, the regime—already an international pariah in the eyes of some groups and smaller countries in Europe—would be vulnerable were it to face concerted opposition from the principal European powers. It would be very much more so were it to encounter active hostility from the US Government as well. In such circumstances the junta’s survival could be seriously threatened.
27. Over time, the junta will probably seek to increase at least the appearance of greater popular support. To this end it might ordain the establishment of one or more political parties, perhaps including a putative opposition one. It may permit the election of a new parliament. Such measures would offer many advantages; Papadopoulos could hope, in so doing, actually to broaden his base of public backing at home and to spike the guns of his critics abroad.

28. But such measures would more likely be tokens of the government’s good intentions than an actual turnover of power to a civilian government. Thus any new political parties would probably be tame affairs, manned by politicians pledged to the continuation of the “revolution” and to the primacy of the colonels. Similarly a new parliament would probably be designed to provide the regime with little more than a constitutional facade.

29. Another kind of move—less likely—would be to seek some kind of rapprochement with exiled King Constantine, even allowing him to return. The King is, to the regime, a known and distrusted quantity. The junta seized power without his prior knowledge and against his wishes. After several months of wary coexistence, the King (who had formerly played a very active political role in his own right and who would probably seek to do so again) tried to throw them out; his counter-coup failed and he was exiled, though Greece officially remains a monarchy. Whatever Constantine were to promise as a price for his return, in the junta’s mind there would always be a danger that he would begin demanding a truly free press or elections, or start soliciting support from civilians and military men of prominence. This would pose a real threat, a fact which makes his return at the regime’s behest doubtful.4

30. In any case, the leaders will probably be guided in their decisions principally by concern for their continued tenure in office. While taking any number of measures to enhance their public image or to pursue specific political or economic policies, they will be highly unlikely, on their own, to do anything which they thought could lead to their loss of ultimate authority over Greek political life.

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4 The 1968 constitution provides for the monarch’s return after elections are held. A possible resolution of the problem would be the deposition of Constantine and the recognition of his young son as King. [Footnote in the original.]
Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
 Calls on King Constantine

You will recall that at the last SRG on Greece it was generally agreed that Ambassador Tasca could pay a strictly protocol call on King Constantine.

At Tab A is an instruction to Ambassador Tasca to work out an appointment through the Greek Foreign Office. It instructs him to limit his conversation to an exchange of courtesies, solicitation of the King’s views, briefing on the internal Greek situation as Tasca sees it and explanation of the present US posture. The instruction rejects the idea of Ambassador Tasca’s offering King Constantine explicit advice on his role in the present Greek situation. If the subject arises, it tells Ambassador Tasca that he should simply suggest that the King maintain a statesmanlike stance above party politics. [You will note that this telegram has been signed off by Secretary Rogers and is a telegram from him to Ambassador Tasca.]3

At Tab B is a memo I sent to you earlier in connection with a call on the King by the regular liaison officer who maintains occasional contact with him from the embassy in London. You approved provided the King approves of US military assistance. He did last September, but I have added your thought to the telegram [see notes at Tab B].

Recommendation: That you clear the message at Tab A if it squares with your understanding of the President’s wishes.4

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2 See Document 310.

3 All brackets in the original.

4 Kissinger initialed the approval option.
Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, June 21, 1971, 1632Z.


1. I fully share your view on the usefulness of contacts with the opposition for the reasons you give. It is my intention to continue to see various former politicians at the residence on a regular basis. We have also invited a substantial number of the opposition to our Independence Day party on July 2.

2. As you point out, our contacts with the opposition must be handled in such a manner as not to impair our good working relations with the Government which are essential to the promotion of our important security interests in Greece. We must also avoid letting these contacts be exploited by the hardliners or the opposition for purposes that do not accord with our interests. The Greek Government will always be sensitive to Embassy contacts with the opposition, but I am confident that by judicious handling we can avoid undue difficulties, especially since, as you note, the Prime Minister is seeing members of the opposition.

3. My contacts and those of other officers of the Embassy with opposition figures are generally known around Athens diplomatic, political and press circles and some of my meetings have been noted briefly in the press. As we continue with further meetings, I would expect additional press reporting and we will discreetly try to stimulate some, but I suspect news interest will gradually wane.

4. I realize that contacts with the opposition have become a bone of contention with some Congressional, press and public critics of the present Greek Government, but I cannot help feeling that it has been to a large extent a fabricated issue and that it is not the real issue. We have never lost touch with opposition figures and we have always been aware of their views. My door has always been open. The real issue concerns the present two-pronged policy towards Greece. Regardless of the extent of Embassy contacts with the opposition, Greek and foreign opponents of the present Greek Government will continue to ag-

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2 Dated June 7, it instructed the Embassy to increase its contacts with opposition figures in order to better display U.S. efforts to promote democracy to both Congress and the press. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 GREECE)
itate for a shift in U.S. policy that would imply the application of sufficient U.S. pressure to force return to parliamentary government with or without the consent of the present ruling establishment in Greece. It would set this target as a priority ahead of broader political-military considerations regardless of the practical problems of implementing such a policy. Needless to say, such a policy would be fraught with great risks to security interests, with quite doubtful chances of success on the political side. The Consensus: As the Embassy was reluctant to have me see anyone in the government and left me totally to my own devices (with some caveats as to who in the opposition I ought not to see because of “the Ambassador’s sensitivities”) I was inevitably left with calls in Athens on persons whom I previously knew (and their friends) who inevitably were in opposition to the present regime. Most of them were Center Union/Venizelist/liberals. The following views were generally held by all of them—they are not reported as facts but as indicators of mood and opinion.

3 In an April 25 backchannel message to Kissinger, Tasca commented: “I attach great importance to the way in which these contacts are handled, as in this area there may be greater hazards to our interests than would be noticeable at first glance.” He asked for Kissinger’s “personal attention” to the issue. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971) Tasca’s concern was apparently stirred by a June 2 meeting between Sisco and Demetracopoulos. (Telegram 3136 from Athens, June 23; ibid.) In a subsequent message to Davies (telegram 3470 from Athens, July 11), Tasca outlined his meetings with opposition figures. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GREECE)
On Violence: Everyone matter-of-factly expected increased violence and accepted the need for it as the only way out of the present impasse. It was generally believed that the violence was necessary because of the indifference to or complicity of the U.S. in the situation.

On Anti-Americanism: It is difficult to judge how wide or deep anti-American feelings run among those people with whom I talked. Without exception they blamed the U.S. for making the situation possible. They are disillusioned at our cynical abandonment of principle and to some extent disenchanted with us as the “leaders of the free world”—one University professor asked, “What free world? Spain, Portugal, Latin America, Greece?” Without exception, however, they described the Greece of the future as still allied closely with the U.S. and NATO. Most of them saw the future relationship between Greece and the U.S. as quite different from that which obtained in the past. Greece must, they felt, make its own decisions based on its own self-interest and its own self-interest does not include over-dependence on the U.S. The decisions of the U.S. are obviously made entirely on the basis of what the U.S. believes to be in its own interest without regard for the welfare of other countries. Greece is the example. We will always be friends but the relationship must be as equals. In a few instances I was told that there was in fact wide-spread hatred of the U.S. among Greek intellectuals and cultural leaders. But they observed, once things got back to normal in Greece, we could expect that most of them would come around again. “The Greeks don’t hold grudges” (sic!!). There are too many close ties between us.

A few University students both in Athens and in Thessaloniki—probably fairly representative—had rather interesting views. Anti-Americanism exists certainly but only as part of the anti-establishment posture of Greek youth. Students are not even anti-regime particularly. This government like all governments before it—is corrupt and despotic—the whole system must be changed. If the government lifted martial law the students would burn down the University. On the other hand I heard reports of small groups of far-leftist “maoist” students whose first order of priority is the overthrow of the regime. Though much of the talk is probably bombast, many of them are seriously plotting violence directed against the regime and against the Americans whom they identify with it. They lack the resources at the moment, but it would not take much to get them to go to work.

On the Embassy: The constant inescapable theme, right left and center, is that the Embassy, and most particularly the Ambassador, supports the regime. American policy toward the regime is seen as the product of the position of the Embassy, which can always be counted on to come to the defense of the regime. In many cases the condemnation was carried higher and laid at the doorstep of the administra-
tion. The President and Mr. Kissinger were cynics without scruple ready to sacrifice the Greek people to the needs of their “cold war politics.” But in any event, they observed, the Ambassador was to blame. He cannot but know what is going on in Greece. If he could not get the administration to change its policies then he should resign. There was nobody in the Embassy they could talk to. “None of them want to hear the truth.” A couple of people described Jim Potts as the evil genius behind the present situation. They saw special meaning in his reassignment to Greece at this time since he had served earlier in Athens and they assumed knew Papadopoulos in his earlier KYP incarnation.

On Corruption: Every educated Greek I talked to made a point of the corruption of the regime. One person asserted he had it on unimpeachable authority that the last time Minister of Mercantile Marine Holevas went to Japan he placed an order for his third tanker. All the members of the government are on the take. Even Pattakos, I was told, has bank accounts in Switzerland. The corruption permeates the whole system. At the highest levels the deals are made with the economic oligarchy, with Bodossakis, Andreadis, Angelopoulos and others of that ilk who are further enriching themselves through their close relationship with the government. In the middle reaches of the government bribes are the order of the day. In the villages, army officers are guilty of the pettiest chicanery and venality, stealing lepta, as one man put it, while their bosses in Athens steal millions of drachma. One University professor philosophized that rather than cleansing the Greek body politic the regime had introduced the new “favlokratia” (political corruption) to levels and sectors of Greek society previously untouched—it permeates the society, the church, the school system, the military, to a degree hitherto unknown and they have set democracy in Greece back another decade.

The Prisoners: I met several of the wives of prisoners. They are a remarkable group, reinforcing my view that the finest thing Greece has ever produced has been Greek women—both in marble and in the flesh. Wives of University professors and military officers, they were all young, relatively well-educated and possessed of enormous courage and dignity. They would of course like to see the Department of State and the Embassy take up their husbands’ cases with the regime. Mrs. Papanicolao (wife of Col. Nicholas Papanicolao who was arrested early on presumably for complicity in the King’s counter coup) described his treatment calmly, in detail. As soon as he was arrested the beatings began. He managed to escape from the room in the suburban hotel

3 James M. Potts, member of the Political Section of the Embassy in Athens.
where he was being held and got as far as the courtyard—his plan was to get to the American Embassy where he hoped to find sanctuary. He didn’t make it. He was taken to another room where he was manacled high on the wall for a total of twenty-five days (with a three day break to heal his wrists) during which he was deprived of water and food for long stretches and subjected to intensive psychological pressures. A loud speaker blared continuously suggesting that his colleagues had told all and implicated him to save themselves, that his wife was taking advantage of his absence by bedding down with some of his old friends, etc. He was beaten regularly with a cane on his legs and ribs. Other wives described similar treatment their husbands had reported receiving usually at the hands of the military police.

On the question of the manner of arrest, Mrs. Maronitis, wife of Demetrios Maronitis, former professor (ancient Greek literature) at the University of Thessaloniki, replied that the military police arrested her husband in the dead of night in mid-March and without a warrant. She and her husband both asked the arresting officers for a warrant, referring to PM’s assurances on Article 10 of the Constitution. There was none, either for the arrest or for the ensuing search of their home. Her husband was a member of PAK, she was told, and they wanted to find evidence of his collaboration. They went through all his papers and found nothing, confiscated all the books and articles he had written in order to search for references which might prove him Andreas’ [Papandreou] man.

The Universities: The Professors I saw of both the universities were uniformly pessimistic about the general situation, unhappy with U.S. support for the junta, highly critical of the condition of the universities. One of them called his university a time bomb set in the dark—no one knew when it would go off. The students seem quiescent, the work load is great, the value of the degree generally recognized—but the great majority are rabidly anti-junta. All that is lacking for an explosion is leadership and opportunity. Through their Commissars in the Universities for regime manages to control the universities entirely—retired General Polyzopoulos at Thessaloniki University is fundamentally a decent man but he is the junta’s man in the University and gets into everything. The result is a totally intimidated faculty which will be cautious and avoid any innovation or discussion which might be interpreted by the government as somehow counter-revolutionary. Classes are still enormous, contact with the students virtually impossible and as a result the schism between faculty and students grows. Both universities in order to do what they are set up to do should drastically reduce their student bodies. Otherwise the education this generation of Greeks is getting will continue to be mediocre at best. One young professor at a medical school insisted that the graduates do not deserve the title of MD and it is a crime to turn them loose on the public.
TO
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of the Interior
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Labor
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
The Secretary of Transportation

SUBJECT
Official Visits to Greece

I remain concerned at the failure of the Greek regime to carry out its commitment to move ahead toward a constitutional order, and as you know there is also Congressional concern over developments in Greece. Thus, in order to avoid misunderstanding or misinterpretation of our attitude in this matter, both within Greece and in the Congress, I consider it desirable to limit visits to Greece by senior U.S. Government officials to those cases where overriding need clearly exists.

I would therefore appreciate if we could be kept informed of proposed visits by any senior officials of your agency to Greece, and consulted before accepting invitations or scheduling such visits.

William P. Rogers

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2 In a November 18, 1969, letter for Nutter, Sisco had requested that the Department of Defense clear all official, including general officers’, visits with the Department of State. In a December 4 reply to Sisco, Nutter had agreed to clear all civilian visits but insisted that military officers would not be subjected to this clearance. (Both are in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Subject Files: FRC 330 72 A 6309, Greece, 121–333, 1969)
319. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, July 11, 1971, 0855Z.

3469. 1. Mrs. Tasca and I called upon the King and Queen of Greece July 8. After exchange of usual pleasantries King welcomed me and said it was a tradition for royal family of Greece to have close and excellent relations with US Ambassador to Greece.

2. I opened by stating my pleasure with opportunity of meeting him and the Queen. US policy towards Greece was clear and based upon the two sound principles of security and democracy. We believed there was no better alternative.

3. I described Soviet threat in the Eastern Mediterranean and importance of Greece to NATO security and to our bilateral security interests which had to take priority over all other interests. Greece was a member of NATO with obligations in the NATO area under the NAT. Those who opposed military aid to Greece were willy-nilly undermining Greek membership in NATO as it could not be accepted that the Greek people should be deprived of the means of defending themselves.

4. The second pillar of our policy was to promote a return to democracy. Since I had arrived in Greece I had seized every opportunity to make clear to the regime that the maintenance of strong bilateral relations depended upon a solid majority behind the President’s policies. This required an early return to parliamentary government in Greece. The American people, I observed, simply feel differently about Greece for historic and philosophical reasons than they do about other countries; hence the great US interest in early return to democracy.

5. Our policy involved working with PM Papadopoulos and had to take account of the realities of the power situation in Greece. The vehicle at hand must be the 1968 Constitution which was basically sufficiently democratic in approach for it to be key element in evolution. The withholding of military aid would be and had been counterproductive. There had been much misunderstanding publicly regarding US policies and the American Embassy in Athens, some in good faith but some also in bad faith.


2 Prior to his departure for Rome, Tasca discussed his visit to the King with Palamas. He reported on this meeting in telegram 3367 from Athens, July 6. (Ibid.)
6. The King said he was pleased to hear my views. He had been puzzled by Barbour’s reference to Wayne Hays and latter’s implying King opposed military aid.\(^3\) On the contrary he considered that military aid was highly essential to Greece’s national defense. He could not recall having talked to Wayne Hays on the subject and seemed even doubtful where he had seen him. The King considered the 1968 Constitution fully adequate but said he and opposition could not support it publicly until some agreement reached with GOG on its implementation. (He may have been referring to operation of constitutional court and setting date for elections.) He added that military aid should somehow be tied to progress on the constitutional front in some general, not specific way.

7. I countered by saying GOG was firmly in saddle (point he accepted), and was now in its fifth year. I repeated that military aid basically was not a useful element of pressure; it had been tried and failed; the GOG could get attractive military credit from French who were eager to sell arms to Greece. Moreover, there was a growing nationalistic feeling, particularly among some of younger officers. Pressure would strengthen these officers against Papadopoulos, and excessive pressure might even bring a new military group to power who were not bound to the traditional concepts governing the country as were present top military rulers.

8. In fact, I continued, our main influence had to be quiet persuasion with the PM on the basis of (1) his desire to see the aims of the revolution achieved through implementation of the 1968 Constitution; (2) the indispensable link between democracy in Greece and strong relations with the US. Under present circumstances these relations were undermined by GOG failure to implement fully the 1968 Constitution. If the foregoing were correct, I said, then opposition leaders in good faith should concentrate on bridge-building to PM through the 1968 Constitution. After all, none of them wanted to go back to 1967, to which King expressed his agreement by nodding, and perhaps the differences between the enlightened opposition and the PM were not really so great. If this were so, I continued, pointing to PM’s contacts

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\(^3\) Robert Barbour, Minister Counselor at the Embassy in Italy. Citing the King’s reputed comments, Congressman Wayne Hays (D-Ohio), Chairman of the House Rules Committee, introduced an amendment to the foreign assistance appropriations bill for 1972 that would have cut all aid to Greece. The Hays amendment was defeated in committee by a 14–12 vote but the Congressman reintroduced it once the legislation reached a vote in the full House where it won passage and subsequent Senate approval. The amendment banned aid to Greece unless the President affirmed the assistance was “in the overriding requirements of the national security of the United States.” For text of the relevant portion of P.L. 92–226, amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, approved February 7, 1972, see 86 Stat. 27. President Nixon signed the waiver for assistance to Greece on February 17.
with politicians from last parliament, perhaps present phase may be one of reconciliation, in which case all should consider how to encourage PM to move ahead on this basis and tailor their activities accordingly. I may have persuaded the King in this sense.

9. King had earlier asked whether I knew what Papadopulos wanted. Before I could answer, he said it was unlikely anyone could answer this question. I noted that one could take the position of recent article in London Observer and come out with convincing line that PM planned to do nothing, or one could look at the public and private statements of the PM and at the fact Cabinet had met nearly every Friday last year working out the implementing legislation for Constitution. I thought it was the better part of wisdom to proceed on the assumption that the PM intended to implement the 1968 Constitution and to encourage action in that direction. I noted that the Constitution provides for return of King.

10. The King said he agreed with my comments on 1968 Constitution. He realized clearly the obstacles to his return, but he indicated he was willing to talk to PM. Latter, however, had had no contact with him for two years in spite of King’s expressed interest in opening such a dialogue. King noted that his return should be based upon an agreement to implement the Constitution with elections, but he was willing to be reasonably flexible on a date. He observed that his return would legitimize the Government and would be generally helpful.

11. I asked him what happen in 1967. He explained he had visited Washington in September and had asked for help during a meeting with President Johnson, Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow. He said he made plain all he was seeking was moral support since US force would have been unthinkable; the President told him that he could count on his moral support if he moved against the junta. He had decided to move in December because he could not get the junta to agree to a specific program for return to parliamentary government. The result had been a disaster because the effort had failed. He assumed full responsibility for failure. He would not go into details, but one of reasons for failure he mentioned was his determination to avoid bloodshed.

12. Since that time had had gone to Washington for Eisenhower funeral and found Vice President Agnew sympathetic and understanding. However, he was greatly disappointed because he had been unable to see President Nixon, particularly since latter saw Pattakos. King again returned to the need for evolution now, noting risks in delay, and mentioning especially danger of younger officers ousting PM.

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4 See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 301.
5 See Documents 243 and 244.
13. I agreed, adding my assessment that if PM fell, his successors might well talk somewhat, perhaps a great deal less, about democracy. I repeated again that our major influence would have to be quiet and effective persuasion. I asked whether King did not think that US public posture which appears to pressure the government strongly on the return to parliamentary government might not inflame nationalistic sentiment among younger officers, thereby undermining the PM’s policy of close ties with the West in general and US in particular. The King nodded agreement.

14. During the course of our conversation the King expressed the view that the Greek armed forces would like to stay out of politics and to restore full military discipline. He spoke highly of General Angelis, who had been military aide to his father, and thought General Zagorriannakos, head of Third Corps, who had been his aide for two years, a real comer. King was aware that some in Greek armed forces, particularly younger officers, fear his return on ground that it will affect their future. I said this was also my impression. He hoped we could help to dissuade officers of this idea. He seemed to be convinced that if he returns, bygones must be bygones and no distinction should be made which could be divisive; it would be completely contrary to the interest of Greece, and he wanted to look forward. In this connection he commented that efforts should be made to persuade middle grade officers to support the 1968 Constitution and to support PM if he decides to proceed with its full implementation.

15. King spoke in highly derogatory terms of Andreas Papandreou who was beyond consideration for any future role in Greece as far as he was concerned. He recalled father’s sad comments on Andreas who King said blackmailed father, a son who threatened to keep grandchildren from him if he did not comply. This was principal reason for failure to form coalition government just prior to Kanellopoulos Cabinet which overturned by April 1967 coup. Coalition might well have prevented this disaster. [5½ lines not declassified]

16. In concluding our discussion we agreed that our talk had been quite useful in creating a better understanding of our positions and interests. I asked him to give our Counsellor of Embassy in Rome Barbour any further thoughts he might have to pass on. They would reach me.

17. King asked about latest events in Cyprus. We both agreed there was no alternative to continuation of intercommunal talks. King said good relations between Greece and Turkey vital. I agreed and praised PM’s attitude in this regard. King was critical of Makarios’ trip to Moscow. 

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6 For the condensed English text of the communiqué from Makarios’s visit to the Soviet Union, June 2–9, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXIII, No. 23 (July 6, 1971), pp. 9–10.
and his seeking to enlist Soviet aid, although King said his own relations
with Makarios were excellent. He did not think Makarios’ opening to
Communists significant as Greece would never go in that direction.
This was generally true, I agreed, but Soviets followed salami tactics
and would be happy with modest first-slice gains such as somewhat
lessened accessibility of Greek facilities to US military, i.e. of profiting
from stress in Greek-US bilateral relations. Their economic aid to
Turkey supported my point on the matter, and they stood to gain from
delay in solution from present Greek situation.

18. Comment. I believe meeting was useful. King seemed pleased
with meeting. I found him unquestionably strongly pro-US, pro-West
and anti-Communist. He is interested in returning to Greece and prof-
iting from his past mistakes which he freely acknowledges, although
he still does not sound altogether like constitutional monarch. If he
were to return, he might provide some guarantee against any unto-
ward political deterioration here. My feeling is that we should pursue
course of reconciliation under 1968 Constitution and see pragmatically
where chips finally fall regarding King’s future. After all, picture of
King and Queen hangs over Prime Minister Papadopoulos’ desk, as
well as in each of the monarchs’ offices throughout the country, and
full implementation of 1968 Constitution provides for his return. Even
though I continue to believe that his chances of being accepted by pres-
ent establishment remain relatively small, Greeks are volatile, senti-
mental and unpredictable people.

19. Department may wish to repeat to American Embassy Rome.

Tasca

320. Memorandum for the President’s Files¹


RE

Meeting between the President, U.S. Ambassador to Greece Henry Tasca, and
General A. M. Haig, August 4, 1971 (2:56 p.m.–3:49 p.m.)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594,
Drafted by Haig. The memorandum was not initialed by Haig because it was retyped
by the White House staff on August 11. A tape recording of this Nixon–Tasca conversa-
tion is ibid., White House Tapes, August 4, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 554–8.
In welcoming Ambassador Tasca the President complimented him on his excellent performance in testifying before the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees. Ambassador Tasca replied that he was confident that the House action designed to prohibit military grants or sales under the Foreign Assistance Act would not necessarily inhibit the President. The President would be able to take the actions necessary to insure that U.S. security was not jeopardized by a cessation of military shipments to Greece. Ambassador Tasca stated that the House Committee understood that the President would exercise the waiver and intentionally provided for this contingency in the draft amendment.

The President then noted that the compulsion in Washington to inflict changes in government upon Greece was on the whole self-defeating. At the same time, he noted that it would be especially helpful if the Greek Government were to announce elections sometime in the future and improve its stance with respect to martial law. He suggested that Ambassador Tasca consider informing the Greek Government that President Nixon, who remained their staunch friend, would welcome in the near future some significant step towards the liberalization of the regime.

The President then commented that he had finally authorized the Vice President to visit Greece and that the visit would take place some-

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2 For a sanitized text of Tasca’s August 3 testimony, see Greece, Spain, and the Southern NATO Strategy. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 92d Congress, 1st session, pp. 303–322. In a June 25 memorandum to Haig, Saunders reported that the Department of State was inclined to bring Tasca back from Athens to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee “because some critics in Congress have tried to drive a wedge between Tasca’s policy and State Department policy.” Saunders noted that Tasca was “closer to the President” and therefore the White House would be involved by inference. Haig saw no objection to Tasca testifying and noted: “Tasca can take care of himself.” In backchannel message 1087 from Athens to Kissinger, June 29, Tasca offered to testify to refute critics of the administration’s policy in Greece. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 423, Backchannel Files—Backchannel Messages, Europe, Middle East, Latin America, 1971) Sonnenfeldt advised Haig on July 1 against “an open hearing on Greek policy.” Saunders, however, recommended to Haig on July 2 that since the House Foreign Affairs Committee had also requested that Tasca testify, they should agree rather than risk a confrontation with the Congress. (Both memoranda are ibid., Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971)

3 Reference is to the Hays amendment; see footnote 3, Document 319. According to a transcript prepared by the editors specifically for this volume, Tasca told the President: “I tried to get across to them the point that much as we don’t like the kind of government they’ve got, there’s no alternative to our policy and the only way we’re going to get to democracy is through them, because they’re firmly in the saddle. And so we’re going to have to work with them. If you want security [and] democracy, you’re going to have to work with these fellows.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, August 4, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 554–8)
time in October.\textsuperscript{4} The President suggested that Ambassador Tasca might wish to indicate to the Greek leadership that the Vice President’s visit would provide an outstanding opportunity for making an announcement on the government’s intention to conduct elections. Ambassador Tasca answered that he was not confident that such an approach would succeed and suggested that perhaps the elimination of martial law would be more palatable to the Greek leadership. President Nixon reiterated that the Ambassador should discuss this matter with the Greek leadership, emphasizing the President’s staunch friendship and support for their regime but also making it clear that our own domestic problem here made some movement necessary if we are to retain the kind of flexibility necessary to provide military and economic assistance to the regime. Ambassador Tasca said that he would undertake this mission.\textsuperscript{5}

The meeting adjourned with Ambassador Tasca expressing his appreciation to the President for his continuing support.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{4} In telegram 3175 from Athens, June 24, Tasca reported that he had been informed of the Greek Government’s displeasure that a forthcoming visit by Agnew to Europe did not include a stop in Greece. Tasca had suggested attention to the Greek desire for a vice presidential visit. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971)

\textsuperscript{5} A transcript of this portion of the conversation, prepared by the editor specifically for this volume, reads: “Tasca: I've gotten the word to him [Papadopoulos] through some of his very close business friends that he ought to help [you?] between now and the end of 1972. It would be useful for him to fix a date for elections. Nixon: Absolutely. You tell him that when you get back. First of all, I'd put it to him this way: you say he's got a friend here but it's damned important.” The Ambassador then turned to the possibility of an Agnew visit to Greece and the President told him to inform the Greeks that “It would be a great thing, a really big thing . . . if they could make a symbolic [gesture?] before he came.” Nixon then returned to his need for some political help from the junta if he was to continue battling Congress over issues relating to Greece. (Ibid., White House Tapes, August 4, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 554–8)

\textsuperscript{6} In an August 6 letter to Nixon, Tasca stated that he believed his Congressional testimony had reinforced the administration position on Greece before Congress and indicated his desire to continue to serve the President in “an assignment of equal importance . . . with similar challenge.” In an August 6 letter to Kissinger, the Ambassador described himself as a “lightning rod” for critics of the President’s policies. In an August 25 reply to both letters, Kissinger responded with “good wishes on your return to what is one of our most challenging diplomatic assignments to say the least.” (All in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971)
321. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS
   Henry Tasca, US Ambassador to Greece
   Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
   Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff

   Dr. Kissinger opened the conversation by saying with some emotion that if he could go to Peking he could not understand all the fuss about not allowing people to go to Greece. If you are a dictator, he said, it is only safe to be the enemy of the US. It is none of our business how they run their government. He could understand the necessity for some cosmetics to keep our allies happy. But Greece is certainly freer than its northern neighbors.

   Ambassador Tasca replied with equal emotion, “You ought to see some of the instructions I get.” He noted the last instruction that he should see some members of the opposition and make sure his meetings got to the Greek Press.2

   Dr. Kissinger with even more emotion said, “How the hell would we like it if the Greek Ambassador here started running around with Senator Fulbright and publicizing that?” Then he said, “That Sisco operation is the worst disaster I’ve seen.”

   Ambassador Tasca said that it is difficult to carry out instructions such as the ones he sometimes gets.

   Dr. Kissinger suggested that Ambassador Tasca, the next time he gets an instruction that he doesn’t feel is in line with the President’s policy, send a message to the White House by the back channel. Such instructions do not represent the President’s policy. We will try to monitor the outgoing cables better here.

   Ambassador Tasca said he couldn’t agree more. He described it as the “surrealism” of diplomacy.

   Dr. Kissinger said that the Vice President would probably be coming to Greece in October.

   Ambassador Tasca said that if we are to achieve the policy objective we want, we should “work it my way.” Sisco had written him

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2 Apparent reference to instructions in telegram 99827 to Athens, June 7; see footnote 2, Document 316.
urging him to see Rowland Evans, the columnist, and Tasca had been decent to him only to have Evans write in the most derogatory fashion. Tasca said that he had become a political target and he had to have the support of the people here in Washington. He noted that the exiled Greek journalist, Elias Demetracopoulos, was orchestrating a campaign against him. Demetracopoulos had told him (Tasca) he would get the Ambassador out of Greece.

Dr. Kissinger, again with emotion, said that there is no question of Tasca’s being pulled out of Greece. Of course, we want constitutional rule in Greece, but it is “indecent to suck around Sadat” and then to beat the Greeks over the head.

Ambassador Tasca said that the Greek government had let 2,500 people out of jail during the year, and there is now considerable freedom of the press. He noted that the press had printed the Moose–Lowenstein report.3

Dr. Kissinger at that point said that he had to go to another meeting. But he assured Ambassador Tasca that it was not the US policy to give the Greek government a hard time.

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3 See Document 303.

322. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, August 6, 1971, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Deputy Secretary of Defense Meeting with Ambassador Tasca

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State
United States Ambassador to Greece—Ambassador Tasca

Department of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense—David Packard
Director, NESA Region—Brigadier General Devol Brett, USAF
Country Director, NESA Region—Mr. Charles W. Quinn

1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Subject Files: FRC 330 75–157, GR–7 Greece. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Pentagon. Drafted by Quinn and approved by Brett.
As in the case of his courtesy call on Secretary Laird, Ambassador Tasca reiterated his recent activity with Congressional Committees and Congressman Hays (see attached Memcon covering these matters).

After Ambassador Tasca reviewed his concern over Congressional reaction on the Greek issue and the role being played in this matter by Elias Demetracopoulos, the self-styled Greek resistance leader, Mr. Packard asked the Ambassador what DOD could do to counter this situation. Ambassador Tasca indicated that we should be aware of such activities by Demetracopoulos.

Ambassador Tasca expressed a preference for a resolution expressing the sense of Congress rather than an amendment curtailing military assistance to Greece. Mr. Packard agreed that the latter course of action was counterproductive.

Mr. Packard then handed Ambassador Tasca a letter relating to the Hawk missile system. Mr. Packard indicated that there was a lack of political support for overriding the Army's position on the availability of this system. However, the Ambassador might wish to suggest to General Angelis that the Greeks might again talk to Raytheon and this might set the stage for more discussions on this matter with the Greeks.

Mr. Packard expressed some concern over the ability of the Greeks to finance the acquisition of F–4 aircraft. Ambassador Tasca suggested the possibility of the FRG assistance to Greece on the F–4. Mr. Packard agreed to look into the matter.

Ambassador Tasca raised the possibility of an air defense survey team to look at Greek air defense requirements. The possibility of providing some air defense expertise to the Greeks will be considered at the appropriate time, probably after September. General Brett indicated

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2 No record of this meeting was found.
3 Not found attached.
4 Dated August 6, it explained that due to a shortage of the upgraded HAWK system, DOD prioritization for assignment would go to U.S. military units. However, the Department had no objection to Greece approaching Raytheon Corporation to acquire "completely new equipment." (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Subject Files: FRC 330 75–157, GR–7 Greece)
5 In a July 22 letter to Angelis, Packard had indicated the readiness of the United States to sell F–4 aircraft to Greece subject to working out details of financing. (Ibid.)
6 In telegram 4542 from Athens, August 30, Tasca reported that he had discussed the possibility of German financing with FRG State Secretary for Defense Mommsen. In telegram 4717 from Athens, September 8, Tasca suggested that President Nixon directly intervene with Chancellor Brandt to secure financing. In telegram 4849 from Athens, September 15, Tasca suggested further moves that might be made to secure West German cooperation. In telegram 117514 to Athens, September 27, Under Secretary Johnson ruled out a presidential appeal while supporting Tasca’s objectives. (All in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. II 1 Nov 1970–31 Dec 1971)
that in view of the presence of (4) F–4 squadrons in Europe, USAFE might be tasked for this survey. In any event the team might be deployed to Greece under a NATO aegis. Mr. Packard suggested some consideration might be given to the Redeye. Previously we had been reluctant to release this item.

Mr. Packard inquired about Greece’s relations with Libya, particularly its military training programs. Mr. Packard was informed that the arrangements have been established that will enable the Libyans to acquire F–5 spares which will make it possible for the Greek F–5 maintenance team to carry out its maintenance contract with the Libyans.

Ambassador Tasca expressed concern over the fact that in the past visits of high level U.S. military personnel to Greece had created some problems for him in that such visits conveyed the idea that the U.S. supported the current Greek regime. Mr. Packard assured the Ambassador that DOD policy and procedures are in effect that will enable such visits to be conducted in accordance with the Ambassador’s policy. Military to Military visits will be the rule unless the Ambassador desires to make an exception.

Ambassador Tasca also expressed concern over the Cyprus situation in view of the range of cards that Archbishop Makarios might be able to play in “heating up” the situation.

In conclusion Mr. Packard expressed his appreciation to the Ambassador for the hospitality and substantive talks during his recent Athens visit.

323. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Straightening Out Our Policy Toward Greece

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As a result of Ambassador Tasca’s two visits in the White House, there is again a confusing set of signals on Greece:

—The President apparently told Tasca that he wanted him to persuade Papadopoulos to set a date for elections in connection with Vice President Agnew’s visit.2 Tasca went away wondering whether the President’s policy had changed so that he was now supposed to be pressing the Greeks for major concrete steps toward a democratic government.

—Your talk with him3 left him with the clear impression that we were not supposed to be beating the Greeks over the head. Since he prefers this policy himself and since it is easier to carry out, the reason for his great pleasure in his talk with you was his relief in feeling that perhaps he had some relief from the pressures of what the President had said.

Now Tasca has sent you the back channel message at Tab B4 suggesting a trip by Robert Murphy in early October to make a general pitch to Prime Minister Papadopoulos on taking some convincing action to implement the 1968 constitution before our 1972 elections.

I, at least, am not sure how to put these two positions together. The attached memorandum for the President is one possible way of trying to get these positions into balance.

Recommendation: That you send the memo at Tab A to the President unless you have a more precise sense of what our policy really is. [It may be that it will be better to kill this memo and sort the issue out in connection with a separate memo on the Vice President’s visit.]5

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2 See Document 320.
3 See Document 321.
4 Tab B, attached but not printed, is backchannel message 1099 from Athens, August 13.
5 Brackets in the original.
Subject
Policy Toward Greece

After talking with you, Ambassador Tasca has suggested the possibility of a visit to Greece by Robert Murphy. By Tasca’s design, Murphy would go to Greece ostensibly on a business trip but he would see the Prime Minister and develop the theme that it would be useful if the Prime Minister could take some clear and convincing action to implement the 1968 constitution before the 1972 U.S. elections.

This suggestion brings us back to the familiar question that plagues our Greece policy—what balance should be established between accepting Greece as it is and attempting to move it further to fully constitutional government. We know that our position in our own Congress and in NATO would be made easier if the Greeks were to continue to move. On the other hand, it seems that there is little we can actually do that will budge them on a matter the Greek leadership considers vital to its political survival.

There would be no harm in a Murphy visit if he were simply to explain your general problems. But, if we are really going to go all out to try to trade the Vice President’s trip for some significant political move, then we must be fairly sure that we have some chance of success. Otherwise, the Vice President’s trip, along with our general relationship, may be soured.

Since I did not sit in on your meeting with Tasca, I am not sure exactly what you had in mind when you spoke with him. I realize the Vice President thinks he may have some chance of creating a trip for a political move, but I need to know whether this is what you wish to have done or whether you prefer just to let this situation go along fairly much as it is on the assumption that there is little we can do to change it.

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6 Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted by Saunders and Hoskinson on August 17. A note on the covering memorandum to another copy of this memorandum reads: “Hal [Saunders]—Haig decided memo to the President not necessary but neither could he enlighten me re. what our Greek policy is! I assume memo went to Henry [Kissinger] but I am not absolutely sure. SH [Samuel Hoskinson]” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1264, Saunders Subject Files, Greece 4/1/71–8/31/71)
324. Editorial Note

In a September 20, 1971, meeting in the White House, President Richard Nixon made reference to aid to Greece in the context of a discussion on aid to South Vietnam.

“Now on Vietnam we can well understand that they’ll say ‘That’s different, there are Americans fighting there.’ With Greece it’s a straight foreign aid proposition. And so they say we should cut off aid to Greece. Why? Because Greece doesn’t have a leader democratically elected. And, when I was checking into this, when I heard all this yacking about [South Vietnamese President] Thieu, that he wasn’t going to be elected—I just checked. In the ninety-one countries in which we provide aid there are only thirty of them today that have leaders that are there as the result of a contested, democratic election.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, September 20, 1971, 3:01–4:40 p.m., Cabinet Room, Conversation No. 76–4; transcript prepared by the editors specifically for this volume)

325. Telegram From the Vice President’s Party to the Department of State

Athens, October 18, 1971, 2310Z.

Vipto 36/5590. Subject: Memorandum of Conversation Between Vice President and Prime Minister Papadopoulos, October 16, 1971, 5:30 p.m.  

Summary.
Warm but intense two hour meeting between Vice President and Prime Minister Papadopoulos highlighted by discussion of link between strength of NATO and Greek domestic politics. Emphasizing that he came in true friendship without slightest intention to criticize or intervene, Vice President asked Papadopoulos to explore with him means of making domestic policies less vulnerable in effort to disarm critics and strengthen Alliance. Vice President promised he would not reveal

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2 At 10 a.m. that morning the Vice President had been Papadopoulos’ guest at a briefing on NATO and defense issues at the Greek Pentagon Center. The meeting was reported in telegram Vipto 38 from Athens, October 19. (Ibid.)
publicly that he had discussed domestic politics while in Greece, if Prime Minister so wished. Prime Minister gratefully accepting Vice President’s pledges of friendship, secrecy, and non-interference, agreed to discuss problem further in subsequent talks. Remainder of conversation devoted to discussion of Communist threat, necessity for NATO, and special friendship between Greece and United States.

2. The Vice President began by thanking Prime Minister Papadopoulos for the warmth of his welcome in Athens; describing the history of Greek-American relations from World War Two through the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the Korean War; and extolling the close links between the two countries (“the best friends come out of adversity”). His primary purpose in the talks, the Vice President added, was to discuss the security relationship between the two countries and find out how the Prime Minister viewed the Alliance, its cohesion and progress.

3. The Prime Minister agreed that the bonds between the American and Greek people had been forged in history. The warmth of Greek feeling about the Vice President’s visit, he continued, was due not only to the origin of the Vice President’s father, but also to Greek respect for America’s position as the leader of the free world and protector of the threatened ideals that both countries hold dear.

4. The Prime Minister began his review of Greek attitudes toward the NATO Alliance by quoting statement “if you love peace, prepare for war.” He next cited the saying of the ancients that the strength of a people is measured by the strength of their belief in what they are called upon to defend. The Prime Minister said that he was anxious about both the state of preparations and the strength of beliefs within NATO. There were elements within the NATO Alliance that did not take the threat seriously and others that did not believe in it at all.

5. The situation was far from hopeless, the Prime Minister continued. What the NATO countries had to do was activate what President Nixon described as the silent majority, prepare for the ultimate threat and maintain faith in the U.S. as the cornerstone of the NATO Alliance. American leadership, rather than dollars, was the absolute necessity in the current situation. In fact, U.S. leadership had in the past often been more effective when dollars not at issue.

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3 Telegram Vipto 37 from Athens, October 19, reported: “By mutual agreement Vice President met privately Sunday, October 17 with Prime Minister Papadopoulos at his house for three hours. Earlier meeting in Persepolis with King Constantine main focus of discussion. Substance both conversations will be reported personally.” (Ibid.) Regarding the meeting with the King on October 15 and Papadopoulos on October 17, see Documents 326 and 328. In an October 26 memorandum to the President, Agnew forwarded his observations on the talks and enclosed copies of the memoranda of conversation with the King and with Papadopoulos concerning the King’s future. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1329; NSC Unfiled Material 1971 11 of 12)
6. The Vice President said that he felt Prime Minister’s perception of the threat was reasonable. Too many people in the U.S. believe that you can talk the threat away by advocating unilateral disarmament. Some of these people have deep-seated guilt complexes and believe that the tough problems of the past could have been solved without bloodshed. Though wrong, they have considerable influence with a generation of American youth brought up in an atmosphere relatively devoid of stress and marked by plenty. Some of the youth believe the benefits will continue even if they do not defend them.

7. President Nixon is a careful and experienced leader who is fully aware of the dangers, Vice President continued. However, his efforts to gain better communications with our adversaries are being misconstrued by our enemies and misunderstood by some of our friends. The Vice President wished to assure the Prime Minister that the U.S. was not naive and that the President had no intention of giving the game away. Mr. Nixon recognized that the U.S. has the burden and the honor of free-world leadership at this point in history and that to maintain this he must convince significant elements within the U.S. that his course is correct. This major task of persuasion is made more difficult because of certain currents running within the intellectual community and the press. During this difficult time, with all the problems caused by the Vietnam War, the President needed all the support he could get in Congress and among the people.

8. Greek and American goals, the Vice President continued, are the same. We must concentrate on the means by which to achieve these goals. Realizing that the attitudes of some of our mutual allies toward the Communist threat had softened, the paramount requirement is still unity. Criticizing our allies certainly would not help.

9. The Vice President said that his credentials as a friend of Greece were not subject to question both because of his background and philosophy. He had not come to Greece to criticize or intervene in her political affairs. Rather, his primary interest was to determine whether the Prime Minister saw any means of stopping the erosion of support for the NATO Alliance. How do we change the sincere but misguided opposition in Congress to aid, the Vice President asked. How do we persuade our critics that they are wrong? The Vice President assured the Prime Minister that these questions were not posed as criticism of the GOG.

10. Accepting without question the Vice President’s credentials as a friend of Greece, and respecting his refusal to interfere, Prime Minister said he would love to be able to tell the Vice President and the NATO Allies that Greece would hold elections tomorrow. However, if the elections meant a return to the economic and political stage of 1967, they would have no purpose. There is another course beside elections,
the Prime Minister continued, which does not involve the surrender of our principles. Principles were most important. If a man with a gun entered the room and demanded that we throw down our weapons, we would do so unless we felt he threatened the basic principles that guide our existence. Then we would fight. We are now on a course that will lead us eventually to complete implementation of the 1968 Constitution. However, situation is complicated by internal and external factors. If it had not been for shouts of critics in U.S. Congress, Prime Minister continued, martial law would have been lifted everywhere but in Athens and Thessaloniki by now and would have been ended throughout the country by next April. To lift martial law now, however, because of pressure from abroad would be to encourage the critics of Greece, the Communists, and subversive elements.

11. Prime Minister said that he did not believe that any measures he took would end the struggle waged by the liberals outside the country against the Greek Government. Even if he lifted martial law, so-called friends like Representative Hays and Senator Hartke would always find reasons to attack the Greek Government. Faced with this situation, there was no other course but the one he had chosen. Prime Minister wanted personally to assure Vice President and President Nixon that the sincere objective of his government was to stay in power for the shortest possible time. When the revolutionary organization launched their movement, they kissed their children goodbye with a firm belief that they would see them only once again—just before they were shot. The risks were enormous, the Prime Minister said, and they were ready to sacrifice their lives. “Given this background, how can the leaders of Greek Government break oaths, tell lies or act as cowards?”, Prime Minister asked. The only thing that could force the Government out was realization that it was leading Greece astray.

12. Americans and Greeks, Prime Minister said, are tied by common ideals rooted in the traditions of ancient Greece; imagine how the Greek people feel when accused of censorship and detaining large numbers of political prisoners. The U.S. Embassy in Athens knows how many detainees there are. There would be fewer if more would cooperate. Mr. Zygdes for example has been granted the right to appeal but has refused it. If he appealed, his request would be considered favorably. As for censorship, pick any newspaper and look at it. These lies against us have made us wary of others and liable to withdraw into our shell.

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4 John Zygdes, a leader of the Center Union Party.
13. Vice President said he was convinced beyond question that the Prime Minister was a sincere patriot. In 1967, “the name Papadopoulos was not exactly a household word,” and some felt he was “the man with the gun” of the earlier anecdote but the people had been reassured when he promised that return to constitutional government would be achieved as soon as conditions would allow. Any student of the 21 months of dissension and instability that characterized Greek history between 1965–67 could see logic behind the sudden events of 1967.

14. A considerable amount of time has passed since then, however, Vice President added. He said he could not question Prime Minister’s judgment on when the time would be ripe for the return of constitutional government; however, the difficulty was not so much in what has been done on this score but in “what appears not to have been done.”

15. Vice President knew Papadopoulos as a military man would seek to avoid frontal action when attacking would decimate his forces. Rather, he might think about flanking attacks which would disarm his enemies without great cost and buy time.

16. Prime Minister Papadopoulos had said U.S. leadership was more important than provision of dollars; however, Vice President stated U.S. would remain for the foreseeable future the major source of dollars to underwrite the defense of Greece within NATO. Would not our mutual efforts to strengthen NATO be furthered if Greek domestic policy were rendered less vulnerable to attack? Although he had no concrete measures to suggest, Vice President said he would like to discuss matter in greater detail later, if Prime Minister agreed. If he disagreed and considered this entire subject none of Vice President’s business, Vice President would understand. However, he was anxious to explore ways that the U.S. and Greece could better understand and help each other, and find ways of persuading critics that the path which Greece was on was correct.

17. Finally, Vice President assured the Prime Minister that he would not use the occasion to embarrass him. He pledged that when he left he would never publicize that he had discussed domestic questions while in Greece. The Vice President repeated that he had found in this discussion a link between the security of NATO and the domestic and the political scene in Greece. He asked again whether there were no measures which the Prime Minister could take which would weaken critics without jeopardizing attainment of his objectives. The Vice President said he had been criticized for coming to Greece because his visit would be seen by many as a sign of support for the present Greek Government. In reality, his deep concern was NATO and the preservation of the Alliance. Anything we could do to strengthen our position would be worthwhile.
18. Prime Minister said that he accepted the Vice President’s pledge not to announce that he had discussed domestic politics. He would, however, like to talk more about this subject and discuss with the Vice President the strategies and tactics of “flank attacks.” He would be most interested to hear how one could face reasonably an enemy who was deprived of reason.

19. The Vice President said he was most willing to discuss the subject further. He had no concrete solutions but thought a fresh point of view would be helpful. He felt that he and the Prime Minister had established communication without becoming enmired in diplomatic language. They should go on with their talks at an early opportunity.

Participants: Greek—Prime Minister Papadopoulos, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Xanthopoulos-Palamas, interpreter; U.S.—Vice President, Mr. Sohmer, General Dunn, Mr. Platt (reporting officer), Mr. Barrington King (Embassy political officer).

Agnew

326. Editorial Note

On October 26, 1971, President Richard Nixon and Vice President Spiro Agnew discussed the results of the latter’s trip to Greece, Turkey, and Iran. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. Here follows the portion of the conversation related to Greece:

Agnew: “I think we did some good in these conversations. First of all, Constantine has matured a tremendous amount since he was here at the Eisenhower funeral. He’s much more realistic about his situation. He wants to go back. Very much.

Nixon: “But, they don’t want him?

Agnew: “Uh, they don’t want him except under certain circumstances and maybe not circumstances he can reach, but they were, he made a definite proposal. What he’s suggesting is he’ll go back and that Papadopoulos [will] come to welcome him, come to the palace and present his resignation as Prime Minister. He will have in his pocket a reappointment as Prime Minister. To provide a, something to cut out all this criticism about the steps to returning to democracy. Papadopoulos doesn’t trust him very much. He’s afraid of him.

Nixon: “Too soft. [Unclear]

Agnew: “Well, he says he has consorted too much with—
Nixon: “Émigré groups.

Agnew: “Yeah. But I think it’s possible to solve the thing. I, I hit Papadopoulos head on with this.

Nixon: “Wish it were.

Agnew: “I think it looks encouraging. [Unclear]”

The President then referred to news summaries of the Agnew trip before returning to Greek issues:

Nixon: “I was goddamn mad, you know, and after you were there, the State Department was still extremely critical of the Greek Government and so forth. And I [unclear] and I must say Rogers was good at it too. But, I say anytime, I say ‘Now look here, I’m not going to criticize the Greek Government. My interest is in what the government’s attitude is toward the United States, not what it does in its own country. I would prefer that they do other things, but that’s their, it’s something I’m not going to get into.’”

After further discussion of this position, Agnew again brought up the issue of the King’s future:

Agnew: “With the King—

Nixon: “I like him incidentally, he’s—

Agnew: “Constantine?

Nixon: “Yes I do. He’s precise.

Agnew: “Oh, yeah.

Nixon: “When I was out of office in ’63. Well, he [unclear]—

Agnew: “It’s a problem of non-communication. For example, the King wants them to send him a colonel of their choosing. To stay with him all the time in Italy. And send him some money. He says, I could use some protection. Then he recites a case to show that he is violently against Papandreou where . . .

Nixon: “He’s the bad boy.

Agnew: “Yeah. He is a bad boy. He points out a case where he was king and George Papandreou was premier. Word came down that Andreas was consorting as a member of the government with the Communists. So, he braced George with this and demanded that George stop it and get rid of him. Also he has, the King has said, authorized us to say publicly, and this is something that the regime has never said, that he supports our aid to NATO, or aid to Greece. He says it would be an unpatriotic act for him to oppose aid to Greece.

Nixon: “Oh, good.

Agnew: “But that not generally, these things are not generally known. But I was able to tell Papadopoulos in these 6 hours of private conversations a lot of things, positions that the King took that he didn’t really understand.”
Nixon: “Do you think you [fazed?] him?
Agnew: “I think we did, yes. He had a very conciliatory, I didn’t press him. I tried to get his confidence.
Nixon: “Yeah, yeah [unclear].
Agnew: “And I said . . .
Nixon: “How did the Ambassador [unclear]. What’s his name?
Nixon: “Oh, Henry Tasca. Of course, I forgot. I’m impressed with him. What’s the trouble? He just doesn’t—
Agnew: “He talks to you, he talks your game. He talks to someone else, he talks their game.
Nixon: “Ah!
Agnew: “It’s the old State Department routine.
Nixon: “Really? That’s—son of a bitch, I’m surprised at that.
Agnew: “I may be wrong, but that’s my—
Agnew: “Going over there, he came back to me three times. They had a reception, and he and State wanted invite some people that the regime was on the ‘outs’ with, that had been highly critical of them, and I said: ‘No, don’t invite anybody that’s going to make them leave the reception. I’m going out to make friends, get as many people in as you can but don’t insist on people that they’re not going to get along with. After all, this is a state visit.’
Nixon: “Yeah.
Agnew: “He came back to me three or four times trying to cancel the reception. It was bad business. We stuck it out and finally we got only about five people that had no [unclear] and these were people who had greeted me on my arrival with a public statement asking me what the hell I was doing in Greece.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Agnew, October 26, 1971, Oval Office Conversation No. 601–36)
SALE OF F–4E’S TO GREECE

On October 7, 1970, we informed the White House\(^2\) that, consistent with the NATO commitments to modernize forces, State and Defense were agreeable to selling F–4E (Phantom) aircraft to Greece to replace obsolete aircraft and help Greece meet its NATO commitments. Mr. Packard officially informed the Greeks of this in a letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Hellenic Armed Forces dated July 22, 1971.\(^3\) The Greek Air Force has now asked the Department of Defense for a letter of offer for 36 F–4’s (two squadrons) and indicated that the Greek Government desires to buy 36 more at a later date.

The Department of Defense is currently preparing the requested letter of offer. We believe, however, that the cost of the planes (approximately $90 million per squadron) will temper the Greek appetite and that the eventual sale will depend on our ability to provide substantial financing under our military assistance program for Greece.\(^4\)

On October 22, the *New York Times* reported that the Vice President, responding to the press on board his aircraft in Greece, “dismissed as ‘fantasy’ an American press report that the Nixon Administration was preparing to provide Greece with Phantom jet aircraft.” However, the transcript of the actual exchange shows that the Vice President simply denied that he had reached an understanding with the Greeks on the acquisition of Phantoms.

The question of sale of Phantoms to Greece, although not officially confirmed, has been a matter of press attention. The Greek request for negotiations is certain to become public knowledge, and some press and Congressional elements will charge that our decision to sell

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 GREECE. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Robert Goold (NEA/GRK), Silva, and Davies; concurred in by PM, NEA, and S and by the Department of Defense. Rogers wrote the following note on the top of the first page next to Sisco’s initials: “Please speak to me at your convenience on this. WPR.” Eliot also initialed the memorandum.

\(^2\) In a memorandum to Kissinger, attached but not printed.

\(^3\) A copy is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330 OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 75 157, GR–7, Greece.

\(^4\) In telegram 270 from Athens, January 17, 1972, the Embassy reported initial Greek shock at the costs of the purchase of F–4 aircraft. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 GREECE)
is further evidence of United States support for the present Greek regime. These elements may also conclude that the Vice President’s recent visit to Greece figures in the decision to sell the planes to the Greeks.

We will respond to any criticism from the position that the sale of Phantom aircraft to Greece has been under routine consideration for some time as part of the NATO-supported effort to modernize the armed forces of Greece. The sale of Phantoms to Greece will allow Greece to replace obsolescent aircraft and to meet its NATO commitments more effectively.

328. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot)¹


SUBJECT

Vice President’s Talks with King Constantine and Prime Minister Papadopoulos

During his trip to Turkey, Iran and Greece, the Vice President cabled accounts of all his official talks with the exceptions of his conversations with King Constantine and his second meeting with Prime Minister Papadopoulos. The main points of these two conversations are summarized below for your information, but should be closely held because of their sensitivity.

On October 15, 1971, the Vice President met with King Constantine at the latter’s request. During the course of the conversation the King made the following major points:

—He described his strong support for U.S. military aid to Greece. He denied having ever told anyone otherwise and said he could not imagine any action more unpatriotic.

—His own position had deteriorated since he had last seen the Vice President at the Eisenhower funeral.² Despite the fact that he was always open to contacts, he had not been approached directly by any

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GREECE-US, Secret; Nodis.

² No record of this meeting was found.
member of the Greek Government for some two years. He thought that they believed he was conspiring against them but this was not true. To alleviate their concern he was willing to accept any Colonel they might appoint as his personal aide who could report on his activities or to even have a detail of several young Greek policemen guard him and provide the same function.

—The King suggested that a balance was badly needed in the visible relations the U.S. has with the regime in Athens and himself. Ambassador Tasca, for instance, could have visited him some two years earlier. One frequently sees pictures of admirals, generals and Cabinet ministers visiting Athens.

—He hoped to persuade the present Greek regime to return to normal political life and to persuade the people to further patience. But change was necessary and the time for force might well come. In that case, he would not seek material aid but would require a U.S. moral commitment to support him. The Vice President indicated in the strongest possible way that the U.S. would not support the overturn of the present GOG by force under any circumstances nor was any sort of moral commitment at all likely.

—If asked he would very seriously consider returning to Greece. He felt the need very strongly for Greece to have a king as a unifying power and that it was essential that the monarchy survive. He thought the most likely arrangement for his return would be a scenario in which he would be given a cordial reception. Papadopoulos would then resign and the King immediately would reappoint him and give him full backing. If Papadopoulos had any doubts he could have a letter of reappointment in his pocket when he resigned. After reappointment, Papadopoulos would infuse the government with new blood, with people whom both could trust and all could go forward to build for the future. The King asked the Vice President to mention his ideas on returning to Greece to the Prime Minister and to also say that he had no intention of bringing back the officers that had left the armed forces since his departure and that he contemplated no punishment for those who had taken part in the seizure of power.

During the afternoon of October 17, 1971, the Vice President met for three hours by mutual agreement with Prime Minister Papadopoulos to continue their conversation of the previous day. The following are the highlights of this conversation:

—The Prime Minister indicated that he was searching for some gesture that might throw the critics of his regime off balance and give the press a new focus. For example, he had considered bringing some very prominent person into his government but so far had been unable to find someone who could project the proper image and not, at the same time, impede the attainment of the objectives of his government.
—In reaction to the Vice President's suggestion that the return of King Constantine might suit the Prime Minister’s purposes, the Prime Minister described this as impossible now and indicated that he is clearly disenchanted with the King. The Vice President laid out in detail and without attribution the ideas the King had expressed to him on how he might return. The Prime Minister did not see this as a feasible scenario. At the same time, the Prime Minister stressed that he was the protector of the monarchy and believed that it could be an important stabilizing influence for Greece in the long run.

—The Prime Minister indicated that the gradual process of implementing the constitution would continue. As of the end of last year, he had thought that it would take until the end of 1974 to prepare for elections, but now, because of the international situation, he could not say how long would be required.

—The Prime Minister said that in his opinion the pressure for return to parliamentary democracy in Greece would decrease in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere abroad over time. The Vice President expressed his doubt that this would be true in the strongest possible terms. On the contrary, he felt more, not less, opposition could be expected from the U.S. Congress.

—The Prime Minister made clear his determination to complete the “revolution” and the mission of his government as they saw it at all cost. If the U.S. Congress were to cut off aid, he would seek help elsewhere and if it were not forthcoming he would take whatever other solutions were necessary. The Government of Greece would not act adversely to Greek national interests, as they saw them, for any reason whatsoever. He understood the importance of NATO and its value to Greece, but he could not accept the responsibility to solve NATO problems at the expense of Greek national interests. If his allies chose to abandon him, he would rather struggle alone than to do what he knew was wrong for his country.

—The Prime Minister asked the Vice President to be absolutely sure of two points. First, he was completely aware that Greece cannot survive “if she finds herself a passenger on a ship manned by insane men whose captain is also mad, and which is therefore destined for the bottom of the sea.” Secondly, he was totally aware of his responsibility not only to his country but to the world as a whole. He had always tried to have his advancement of national interest conform to broader interests.

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Washington, February 8, 1972.

SUBJECT

Homeporting in Greece

Under Secretary Johnson has written informing you (Tab B) that State and Defense have reached agreement to go ahead with the “homeporting” of a carrier task force in Greece.

State has opened discussions with the Greek government and plans to notify Congressional leaders in the next few days.

The Homeporting Proposal

The “homeporting” of a carrier task force in Greece involves the permanent stationing of 6,000 naval personnel and some 3,100 dependents in Athens. Our current presence in Greece is about 6,100 personnel including dependents. Thus, homeporting involves a 150% increase in our presence.

As you know, the “homeporting” of a carrier task force in Greece could have significant political liabilities. Ambassador Johnson describes them as follows:

—It would significantly reduce our policy options in dealing with the Greek regime.
—It would presumably require an increase in MAP or a program of comparable benefit to the Greeks.

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2 Attached but not printed at Tab B is Johnson’s December 30, 1971 memorandum to the President. Johnson noted that during the last 12 months, the Navy had been vigorously pursuing a solution to its personnel retention problems caused by family separations by homeporting selected combat units in overseas locations. The Departments of State and Defense had collaborated on a successful homeporting agreement with Japan for a U.S. destroyer squadron in Yokosuka. They were considering homeporting in the United Kingdom or the Netherlands and also wanted to begin negotiations with Greece to homeport one of the Sixth Fleet’s carrier groups in Athens. A more detailed explanation of the issue is contained in a memorandum from Director of the Office of Political-Military Affairs Spiers to Johnson, December 23, 1971. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF POL GREECE–US)
—It would result in some criticism from the Congress and some of our NATO allies:

The State/Defense judgment is, however, that these political liabilities are outweighed by the military advantages of the proposal.

On the other hand, however, the homeporting proposal will have substantial strategic benefits:

—Our present force enables us to maintain 5 carriers continuously forward-deployed in peacetime: 3 carriers in the Pacific and 2 in the Mediterranean.

—With the reduction to 12 carrier force level already planned by the Navy, we will be able to maintain only 4 continuously deployed compared to 5 at present. This would probably mean a return to the pre-Vietnam war level of 2 carriers forward deployed in the Pacific.

With homeporting, however, we would be able to maintain 5 carriers forward deployed in peacetime even with the planned reductions in our carrier force levels.

Another military benefit foreseen by the Navy is to improve the retention of Navy personnel to whom the absence from their families during deployment must be an important consideration.

Given these military advantages, I agree with the State/Defense judgment that the homeporting proposal should be discussed with the Greeks. If the cost demanded is too great, however, we should be prepared to modify or drop the proposal.³

If you approve homeporting in principle, I will issue the attached directive to State/Defense starting preliminary negotiations with the Greeks. (Tab A)⁴

³ Nixon initialed the approval option.
⁴ See Document 331.
330. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, February 11, 1972, 1839Z.

24396. Subject: Soviet Démarche on Home Porting in Greece.

1. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin called on Secretary February 10 and gave him following oral statement:

"The Soviet Government deems it necessary to address the U.S. Government in connection with its intentions to establish bases for the U.S. 6th fleet on the territory of Greece.

"Realization of such intentions would have serious consequences both militarily and politically. It would in fact constitute a step toward increasing tension in Europe, a step contrary to the trends which have appeared there of late.

"All this can hardly be reconciled with the statements by the U.S. Government about its favorable attitude to détente in Europe, as well as with those beginnings in Soviet-American relations which have recently appeared.

"Such actions on the part of the United States cannot but cause, of course, a corresponding reaction on our part, the more so that the matter entails establishment of new U.S. naval bases in immediate proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union and of other socialist countries. It should be clear to the U.S. Government that on questions concerning security of the Soviet Union we have the right to count on the same behaviour of the United States which the American side expects from the Soviet side."

2. Comment will follow.
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT
Homeporting in Greece

The President approves, in principle, the homeporting of a U.S. carrier task group in Greece.\(^1\)

The President wishes the U.S. government to implement this decision in the following manner.

—These proposals shall be discussed with the Greeks in the near future.
—The State Department shall prepare a report as soon as preliminary negotiations with the Greeks are completed. This report should assess the Greek position and alternative approaches to further negotiations.
—The Department of Defense should evaluate the U.S. and friendly tactical air capability required in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the alternative approaches to meeting these requirements.

Upon completion by March 2, 1972, this work shall be forwarded for the President’s consideration before further discussions or negotiations are held with the Greek government.

Henry A. Kissinger

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. III, Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Exdis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

\(^2\) See Document 329.
332. Letter From the Ambassador to Greece (Tasca) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies)


Dear Rodger:

We have been considering some of the problems that are likely to arise in any hearings in the Congress on homeporting, particularly those of the Rosenthal Subcommittee. The line of attack and of questioning seems quite predictable, and we should not lose sight of the opportunity this occasion affords to reiterate certain points that can be particularly helpful, both in meeting critics of Greek policy in the U.S. and in assuaging Greek sensitivities.

I have in mind in particular the recent sharp reaction here provoked by the statement of the Department press spokesman, Charles Bray, reiterating our disappointment about Greece’s slow progress toward restoration of democracy. More statements of this kind could begin to cause real damage to our relations. To the extent possible I hope in the hearings we will continue to emphasize, as you did in your excellent statement before the House Committee last July, the key points (a) in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter we have carefully avoided interference in the domestic politics of Greece, and (b) in the final analysis only the Greeks can determine what kind of government they want. I am not suggesting, of course, that there should be any uncertainty as to where the U.S. stands on the issues of civil liberties and parliamentary rule, but simply that there must be no misunderstanding that the real need in this regard is for the Greeks themselves to act.

It would also be useful to highlight various other points for the record. In particular I have in mind the fact that for several years now...

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 GREECE–US. Confidential; Official–Informal.
3 At the March 13 press briefing, Bray noted that the homeporting agreement did not alter U.S. disappointment with the lack of democracy in Greece.
there has been a continuing significant U.S. Navy presence in Greece through ship visits. The requirements for ship repairs in Greek shipyards are also increasing. Both points will bring out clearly that for some time we have relied heavily on Greek ports to sustain Sixth Fleet operations so that permitting homeporting for dependents to reside in Greece will not change the present situation in any major way. It is really a question of degree, particularly since homeporting will be on an austere basis. In the same connection I believe we should stress the administrative aspects of implementing homeporting.

The hearings can also provide the occasion to underscore the fact that the GOG will not in any sense control or influence Sixth Fleet operations; complete freedom of action in deployments will continue.

Finally, homeporting should be described in the context of our overall commitment to NATO. This will enable us both to emphasize that no further specific commitments to Greece are involved, and that we are not undertaking any new commitments beyond those already recognized under Article V of the NATO Treaty.

We should, of course, stress homeporting is to provide for families of men and officers of the Sixth Fleet and does not involve any new strategic considerations.

I hope the Embassy will have an opportunity to cooperate with the Department on the preparation of any statements for the record, and there may be other suggestions to pass along in this process. One idea that occurs to me (since in the past both you and I have appeared before the Rosenthal Subcommittee) is that this would be a first-rate occasion for Joe Sisco to carry the Department’s position forward, particularly since he can address the problem from the standpoint of the broadest strategic considerations applicable to American policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Sincerely,

Henry

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5 Tasca added the handwritten notation, “Best,” over the typed closing.
Athens, March 22, 1972, 1648Z.

1623. Department please pass DIA, CINCEUR, and USDOCSOUTH. Subj: Further Analysis of Papadopoulos’ Assumption of Regency.2 Ref: Athens 1584; Athens 1585.3

1. Summary. Facts surrounding dismissal of Zoitakis and Papadopoulos’ assumption of regency still not clear. Most Greeks will not accept official reason for change, but there is in fact long history of friction between PM and former regent. Papadopoulos now absolute ruler of Greece. There are few if any precedents for assumption of regency by PM. Papadopoulos now has number of options open to him, including: maintaining present situation; moving against King or even proclaiming a republic; or using his increased powers to implement Constitution, while presumably assuring continuation his own position as political leader of country. In foreign affairs field GOG may become more demanding of its allies. However, Papadopoulos has favored close ties with US, and he may now be in better position resist pressures diversify sources of arms supply. First reaction here to Papadopoulos’ move has been surprise at brutal character of dismissal of Zoitakis. Opposition will see move as further proof Papadopoulos has no intention returning Greece to parliamentary rule. Papadopoulos has now made himself more of a target for those of his colleagues who resent his increasing monopolization of power. Key question is effect Papadopoulos’ assumption of regency will have on unit commanders in army. End Summary.

2. Facts surrounding Papadopoulos’ dismissal of Zoitakis as regent and his own assumption of regency in addition to position of Prime Minister (and Defense and Foreign Minister) are not yet clear. We doubt that most Greeks will accept Government’s explanation that Zoitakis was obstructing legislation as real reason for his replacement. However, as we will examine later in this message, this may provide at least partial explanation. As we noted in our preliminary assessment, it is

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2 On March 21 the Council of Ministers, chaired by Pattakos, stripped Zoitakis of his position and appointed Papadopoulos regent.

3 Both dated March 21. The telegrams reported on the replacement of the regent. (Both in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 GREECE)
possible Cyprus may also have played a role in dismissal of regent. Whatever real reasons for Papadopoulos assuming regency, key question at this point is what effect this move will have on Greek political life both domestically and internationally.

3. First fact is that Papadopoulos has now become absolute ruler of Greece. At time of coup power was in hands of group which called itself the Revolutionary Council. By autumn of 1970 a crisis between Papadopoulos and this group led Prime Minister to proffer his resignation as Prime Minister. However, after period of time he consolidated power by shuffling Government and removing ministerial powers from key opponents while consolidating his links with army unit commanders. We have now reached new state in which all constitutional powers of Crown and Prime Minister are in Papadopoulos’s hands—and powers of Crown are not insignificant. Important question is how Greeks will view this dual role of Papadopoulos. Greek history offers few parallels.

4. Greece has had five regents in the last 48 years: Admiral Koundouriotis (January–March 1924), General Kondylis (October–November 1935), Archbishop Damaskinos (December 1944–September 1946), General Zoitakis (December 1967–March 1972), and now PM Papadopoulos. With the exception of Damaskinos, all had military backgrounds, and all were publicly prominent figures at the time of their appointments. Although in two cases (Kondylis, Damaskinos) same man briefly held regency and prime ministry simultaneously, they did so in parliamentary circumstances totally different from present situation: as PM, Kondylis assumed regent after parliamentary vote in October 1935 proclaiming Greece again a constitutional monarchy. He continued as regent though late November 1935 while GOG held plebiscite, results of which were foregone conclusion and until King could return from exile abroad. Damaskinos reluctantly served for few days as “caretaker PM” in 1945 during prolonged Government crisis. As we recall King George II also assumed prime ministry for some days in similar circumstances. In any event, Zoitakis served as regent longer than his three predecessors combined, and there is no historical precedent in Greece for removal of one regent and his replacement by another.

5. Nevertheless, Papadopoulos may have felt dismissal of Zoitakis was unavoidable, following series of semi-public and private clashes between the former regent and PM. As early as February 1968 [less than 1 line not declassified] Papadopoulos expressed the view that Zoitakis lacked “some of necessary qualities required of a regent.” In August 1970 [less than 1 line not declassified] a disagreement between Papadopoulos and Zoitakis reportedly stemmed from Zoitakis’ fear that Papadopoulos was moving too rapidly toward release of political de-
tainees and other liberalization measures. Zoitakis apparently took no decisive stand in September 1970 confrontation between Papadopoulos and dissident members of the “Revolutionary Council,” from which Papadopoulos emerged stronger than before; however, in late 1970 and early 1971 there were reliable reports ([less than 1 line not declassified], e.g.) indicating that Zoitakis had made common cause with frustrated “Revolutionary Council” dissidents and had begun to adopt an increasingly hostile stand toward Papadopoulos’ personal rule. [less than 1 line not declassified] reported in early February 1971 that Zoitakis had gone so far as to consult with dissident revolutionaries concerning the feasibility of ousting Papadopoulos; and Papadopoulos reportedly had learned of the consultations and was seeking to provoke the regent’s resignation.

6. [less than 1 line not declassified] reported the failure of Zoitakis to clear his New Year’s message with Papadopoulos before its release, Papadopoulos’ subsequent sanctioning of press criticism against the substance of Zoitakis’ message, and Zoitakis’ efforts to inspire counter-criticism of the Prime Minister. In March 1971 Papadopoulos did not appear publicly with Zoitakis on Independence Day to take the salute. This non-event provoked much comment at the time and [less than 1 line not declassified] was occasioned by Zoitakis having told Papadopoulos shortly before Independence Day that he would no longer swear in cabinet officials if he were not given the opportunity to review names proposed and to veto those to whom he was opposed.

7. In June 1971, [less than 1 line not declassified] quoted then Minister of Coordination Makarezos as stating that he, Zoitakis, and the dissident secretaries general had agreed that should Papadopoulos again offer to resign (as he had done in September 1970), they would accept Papadopoulos’ resignation and replace him with Makarezos. Differences continued to manifest themselves, but in August the Prime Minister temporarily patched up his differences with Zoitakis, clearing the way for the governmental reorganization of August 26. It is also well known that there has been considerable friction between wife of the regent and the influential wife of PM.

8. While there may have been in PM’s view more than sufficient reasons for removing Zoitakis, why did he himself assume regency? Until we know the answer to this question it would be premature to venture any prediction as to future course Prime Minister will take. He has number of options. These include: (A) maintaining present governmental structure with Constitution suspended and full powers concentrated in his hands; (B) at some stage arranging for Crown Prince eventually to accede to Greek throne, in meantime maintaining himself as regent governing in his name; and (C) proclaiming a republic with himself as President with or without accompanying referen-
dum; and (D) using his increased powers to move towards constitutional implementation while, presumably, assuring continuation his own position as political leader of country.

9. A key question for USG is what effect Papadopoulos’ becoming regent will have on Greece’s foreign policy. We suspect overall result will be that GOG will be more demanding of its allies while at same time more conciliatory towards some of its potential enemies. On other hand, Papadopoulos has strongly favored close bilateral ties with U.S. and has been willing to see U.S. continue as principal arms supplier. Of possible interest in this regard is fact that Makarezos and Zoitakis have been fairly close, and that Makarezos has been one of chief advocates of Greece diversifying its arms supplies, particularly in direction of France. On Cyprus issue, Government may now be more able to speak with one voice, assuming, of course, that dismissal of Zoitakis does not reflect serious split within GOG over handling of Cyprus problem.

10. Reactions here to change in regents so far focus heavily on offensive and brutal character of dismissal of Zoitakis. Point has been made to Embassy officers that Prime Minister made genuine tactical error in his manner of handling removal, i.e. nothing was done to save Zoitakis’ face and in effect he left regency in disgrace. Given Zoitakis’ original role on April 21, 1967, as well as fact he has been leading military personality, Papadopoulos’ tactics seem particularly incomprehensible. Moreover, way in which Prime Minister moved on this occasion has not been characteristic of other changes in Government so that he is more vulnerable to criticism this time.

11. At this juncture, although we will be collecting reactions from former politicians as dust begins to settle, we would judge there will be almost universal reaction that this simply represents further move to reinforce personal dictatorship under Papadopoulos and proves that he has no intention of moving Greece toward parliamentary democracy. Wait-and-see attitude so far as impact on eventual status of Greece as monarchy probably will continue. At same time fact that removal of regent disclosed existence of first major falling out within original revolutionary group will be taken by some to mean that prospect of future falling out among members of present regime might precipitate crisis of proportions that would lead to other changes. Some may be encouraged to mount campaign of active resistance against Papadopoulos rule.

12. Within the revolutionary group we cannot ignore the possibility of the growth of opposition to the Prime Minister brought about by the increasing gap between him and the men who cooperated with him in achieving the 1967 coup. His military colleagues may be more critical of any missteps by Prime Minister in executing his absolute power,
but their attitude may be tempered by example of decisive way in which he dealt with Zoitakis. It remains to be seen how unit commanders will react and whether PM can continue to maintain their loyalty on which he must continue to rely.

Tasca

334. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, April 21, 1972, 1137Z.

2222. Subj: Future of King Constantine and Greek Monarchy.

1. Summary: Chances of King Constantine returning to Greece appear increasingly dim, although we have no way to determine just what moves Prime Minister may decide to make. Papadopoulos may find it advantageous to keep Constantine dangling on string in Rome, both as means of neutralizing him and keeping his own options open. We now believe there greater likelihood that Papadopoulos will eventually declare republic but doubt that he will move precipitately in this direction. In any case, PM will assure himself of solid support in armed forces before making any move. For time being he probably has decided to do nothing. End Summary.

2. We view King’s chances during Papadopoulos’ tenure as poor, and even if a transitional government should eventuate, we doubt that his prospects would improve greatly. Although it is conceivable that institution of monarchy, embedded as it is in traditions of past 150 years of Greek independence, may survive in some restricted form, Constantine’s personal prospects must be considered on different basis in light of his role before 1967 coup, in abortive counter-coup of December 1967, and legitimate apprehension that were he to return he could again present obstacle to independent course charted by Prime Minister.

3. We have been inclined to believe preponderant evidence supported conclusion that immediate interests of present regime were probably best served by leaving King in Rome, keeping him dangling about prospect of his possible return to Greece and in this way insuring that

he would be reluctant to reengage himself in the political process in any overt way so as to avoid giving present regime any pretext for denouncing him. Regime would presumably have continuing interest in leaving him in this ambiguous status and not moving actively against him so that he cannot become vocal in behalf of, or rallying point for opposition.

4. On other hand, in light of dismissal of regent and assumption of regency by Prime Minister Papadopoulos, he is probably in improved position to move directly on issue since it is only question of his own tenure as regent that is involved. On this basis several courses of action merit attention: (A) to remove himself as regent in favor of King Constantine on basis of certain advance understandings limiting authority of monarch (we consider this quite unlikely); (B) to continue as regent on basis of arrangement anticipating accession of Crown Prince Paul when he comes of age (this has advantage of keeping issue on ice but leaves little room for political evolution); or (C) to eliminate institution of monarchy altogether on basis of popular referendum following declaration of republic with Papadopoulos as President (probably most likely choice). At same time we continue to believe it is prudent to assume that Papadopoulos (see Athens 1937)\(^2\) wants to keep his options open until such time as he is prepared either to announce date for elections or decides to arrange referendum on issue of King.

5. In long run there are various circumstances that support our present conclusion that greater likelihood is for declaration of republic. Papadopoulos clearly wants a free hand in devising Greece’s future political structure. Apparently even Zoitakis was obstacle in this respect, and history demonstrates that Greek monarchy would be even more so. Current two-part article by Former Deputy Stiropoulos proposing new constitution providing for republican form of government suggests timing of such a move could come relatively sooner than we have previously been inclined to believe. There are number of risks, however, in moving rapidly, and articles may be no more than trial balloon or part of a process of conditioning; they also give Papadopoulos chance to make it seem as if something is happening without actual commitment to any action. Probably many Greeks, irrespective of political views, would like to see monarchy end. However, if choice is republic under presidency of Papadopoulos or monarchy, there is no assurance such republican sentiment would prevail and indeed

\(^2\) Dated April 6, it provided an assessment of the Greek political situation in the light of Zoitakis’s dismissal. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GREECE)
opposition might exploit opportunity as chance to register its anti-Papadopoulos stand.

6. In any case on assumption Papadopoulos will be compelled to begin at some point to build new Greek political structure he must settle question of monarchy one way or another at outset before elections can take place. In this sense issue of King appears to be massive impediment to elections under present Constitution.

7. We believe too much significance should not be attached to such points as omission of royal family from prayers on occasion of national holidays, removal of royal chair from cathedral, decrees downgrading in which royal portraits shall be displayed in public buildings, etc. Greek regime tends to operate in rather capricious and free-hand fashion, and same significance cannot be attributed to such actions as would be case in monolithic state governed by all-powerful bureaucracy such as USSR. GOG runs such matters in essentially slovenly way and probably does not even have administrative apparatus organized to arrange details of this character on such a basis as to comprise first elements in policy decision involving eventual abolition of monarchy.

8. Among other considerations which are relevant is attachment that former political world continues to show for institution of monarchy, principally because they see the King as providing an orderly transition back to democratic future, but in some cases with an effective transfer of power away from Papadopoulos and his followers. Transitional role for monarchy would not serve interest of Papadopoulos and would seem to us to constitute additional negative factors favoring move to republic.

9. We have also been interested in observing general touchiness of regime with respect to publicity concerning official contacts of any character with King Constantine, including particularly those of U.S. Department will recall press play at time Ambassador Tasca visited King in Rome. Similarly, press reaction to presidential messages on occasion of Greek Independence Day both this year and last, as well as Christmas holiday greetings, has been sharply critical, and pro-government press has taken line that King Constantine effectively supplanted by mechanism of regency and that regent rather than King is proper recipient of such gestures of courtesy.

10. Last and probably most important is position of army on monarchy. Greek military is probably less divided than Greeks generally on this question. We have impression that military in general opposed to King, particularly at higher ranks. Senior officers who chose to side with Papadopoulos rather than King at time of attempted counter-coup would additionally be motivated by fear of retaliation should Constantine return and eventually regain influence. We believe
passage of time has severely eroded historical loyalty of armed forces to monarchy, but PM would unquestionably assure himself that he has solid support in military before raising issue of abolishing monarchy or deposing Constantine.

Tasca

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335. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, April 26, 1972.

SUBJECT
Status of Homeporting in Greece

In case your discussions with the Soviets touch the point of our respective military presence in the Mediterranean, I thought you should be up to date on the present status of the Navy’s homeporting proposal for Greece. Also, it is not going smoothly and could either fail altogether or reach a point of friction with the Greeks. The main purpose of this memo is to give you a chance to inject any thoughts that may arise from your dealings with the Soviets.

Background: You will recall that the Navy’s Greek homeporting proposal is justified purely as an administrative measure to improve morale and increase personnel retention. It will not substantially increase the number of ships deployed in the eastern Mediterranean or our military capabilities in the region.

We now have in Greece about 6,100 personnel including dependents. Homeporting, if fully carried out, would boost that permanent presence by some 3,500. The main elements of the original proposal were:

—Phase I—Within Six Months After Agreement: Assignment of a Carrier Task Force headquarters staff, involving some 56 personnel and 22 families (57 dependents) in Athens.

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2 Apparently at the Moscow Summit May 22–30.
—Phase II—Six to Twelve Months: Homeporting of a destroyer squadron (six ships) and a dependent support ship (reconfigured hospital ship), involving some 2,554 military personnel and 528 families (1,400 dependents) in Athens.

—Phase III—Nine to Twelve Months: Homeporting of a carrier and air wing and possibly a small number of miscellaneous support ships, involving some 4,500 military personnel and 800 families (2,100 dependents).

At the turn of the year, State concurred in Secretary Laird’s decision to homeport in Greece, subject to informal discussions (but not “consent”) with appropriate Congressional leadership. State quickly laid on a scenario in January to (1) seek Greek agreement in principle and agreement that the arrangement be handled as an exchange of notes extending our 1953 Military Facilities agreement, rather than as a new and separate agreement, and (2) brief Congress.

—Towards the latter part of January, Ambassador Tasca had secured Prime Minister Papadopoulos’ assent in principle as well as that of General Angelis. The general reaction in Athens was relatively positive, even among opposition who accepted the arguments for homeporting but took standard umbrage at the fact that the agreement would be concluded with an “undemocratic” government in Greece.

—State, with Admiral Zumwalt, then briefed Congressional leadership in late January. The big blasts have come in hearings run by Congressmen Rosenthal and Hamilton, respectively Chairmen of the Subcommittees on Europe and the Near East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; they have been previously highly critical of U.S. policy towards Greece. They say they are not finished with the issue.

As the news began to filter to the press after the Congressional briefings, Ambassador Dobrynin made his oral démarche to Secretary Rogers and reiterated it to Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand (Tab A). State instructed our embassy in Moscow to clarify homeporting as an administrative measure, noting it does not imply a change in the U.S. defense posture in the Mediterranean in any appreciable way (Tab B). Palamas told Tasca that the Soviets had lodged a parallel protest in Athens but were told by him that Greece would act in its security interests. Greek spokesmen denied allegations that any U.S. “bases” were being established.

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3 See footnote 2, Document 329.
4 For text, see 4 UST 2189.
5 Tasca reported on his discussions with senior Greek officials in telegram 1158 from Athens, February 29. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72-Oct 73)
6 See Document 330.
7 See footnote 3, Document 330.
The timing of the publicity on homeporting coincided with tensions on Cyprus. The Soviets also put that angle on it by linking our homeporting agreement with alleged NATO intrigues against Cyprus, a sentiment which also found its way into Sadat’s public rhetoric. The Greeks again turned this publicly aside by denying that any bases were involved and reaffirming their friendly ties with the Arab states. It seems quite likely that, whatever the general Soviet purpose may have been, the Soviets were retaliating for the comments in the President’s foreign policy report on Soviet facilities in Egypt.

**The Present Situation:** The present situation results primarily from discussions at a technical level between our Navy and the Greek authorities. It turns out that, as the Greeks look closely at what is involved, they are not anxious to have many more Americans crowding into the Athens area. This may simply be a problem of what the domestic economy will bear, but it may also be concern over having a large fleet in the waters around Athens. In any case, the Hellenic Navy has agreed to homeport the staff of our task force commander in Athens, but this would simply be the twenty-two families described above as Phase I. For the main portion of the task force, however, they have said that congestion in the broader Athens area makes it desirable to carry out the bulk of the homeporting program in some other part of Greece. The Navy has said it would be willing to host a technical survey group to find some other such area. The farther that area moves from Athens, the less attractive and more expensive it will become for our Navy.

The Navy says it would like to go ahead and move its headquarters group into the Athens area, regardless of whether the rest of the homeporting plan is carried out or not. It will probably also want to send the survey group that the Hellenic Navy has invited. State and Defense may soon authorize those two actions.

At that point, however, the issues are reached which could become a source of friction between us and the Greeks. The U.S. Navy is not in a mood to take no for an answer and wants to be as close to Athens as possible. The Greeks apparently do not want the bulk of the exercise close to Athens and the temptation then will arise for our Navy at the service level to begin squeezing the Greeks.

The alternative, of course, would be to return to some of the other possible sites in Italy—Naples, Syracuse, Augusta. There is no indication yet that our Navy has come to that point.

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8 The Embassy outlined Greek objections in telegram 2071 from Athens, April 14. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73)

9 In a May 17 memorandum to Kissinger, Saunders updated information on negotiations with Greece and secured Kissinger’s approval to proceed with Phase I of the project. (Ibid.)
336. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, June 14, 1972, 1655Z.

3335 Subj: Further Comments on the Position of Prime Minister Papadopoulos.

1. Recent developments tend to confirm our earlier reports that while PriMin Papadopoulos has ostensibly strengthened his position by taking over regency, he has in fact isolated himself further from his colleagues and stimulated further potential opposition within the establishment. He continued to be concerned about the loyalty of his combat unit commanders and has now taken steps to institute his own independent surveillance over the activities of these units (see [less than 1 line not declassified]). He has irritated both Makarezos and Pattakos, stripping them of their ministries in his effort to consolidate his personal power. In addition, it is becoming clear that while General Angelis is still loyal, he has an independent position. The PriMin tried to induce Angelis to take his man as deputy, but Angelis was able to insist on naming his own deputy. Further, the precipitous appointment of Colonel Roufogalos over some general officers as head of the intelligence service (KYP) seems to have been designed to pre-empt that position before the selection board assigned another officer there. This has not strengthened the PriMin’s position in a critical area within the regime.

2. In my view, Roufogalis is unsuited for this sensitive position. He is emotional and impulsive whereas the Prime Minister needs even reporting and straight analysis. Moreover, Roufogalis is not particularly liked by his colleagues in the establishment.

3. Another indication, always reliable during my tour of duty here, that the PriMin feels insecure is the marked stepup in press and TV coverage of his meetings with top U.S. military. This appears to be message to his colleagues that U.S. military is supporting him. One recent example was awkward way in which he requested permission to have General Burchinal and himself photographed with myself at beginning of recent special briefing by Burchinal. Another recent example was insistence that General Ryder, newly arrived MAAG Chief, place wreath on tomb of unknown soldier with TV coverage, although this had not been included in original U.S. program.


2 Tasca discussed the stability of the Greek regime in telegram 2842 from Athens, May 19. (Ibid.)
4. Moreover, his health has apparently been bothering him, which led him to have a basic examination not long ago. This tended to coincide roughly with period of Burchinal briefing. He is deeply concerned about his personal safety and security precautions have obviously been increased in recent months, which contribute to his growing isolation.

5. His position is likely to be improved by recent military promotions. However, larger than usual number of retirements combined with stirrings among both officers in grade for lengthy periods and some indications of growing restlessness among younger officers, also probably increase his feeling of insecurity. It may be that it is this feeling of insecurity that leads him to some extent to take measures which in fact, by increasing his isolation, only serve to make situation worse.3

6. All of this must be measured against the background of a regime that has had its successes, notably in the economic field, but that as yet has failed to give a clear indication of the nature of the regime’s basic objectives and measurable achievements against these objectives. The failure to implement the 1968 Constitution has been a key factor in this context. There is thus an atmosphere of attentisme in the country with a growing uneasiness that the regime lacks political direction and momentum.

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3 The Embassy provided an analysis of discontented elements within the Greek armed forces in telegram 5586 from Athens, September 29. (Ibid.)
337. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, June 19, 1972, 1459Z.

3416. Ref: State 108826; Athens 3340. Subj: Briefing of military students. GOG reaction through General Angelis now appears to involve Prime Minister Papadopoulos more than I had first assumed. Reaction clearly in tune with character of Angelis. However, I now am inclined to believe PriMin has assumed leading role. His growingly serious opposition within the regime makes the alleged allegation of corruption very difficult to accept. With three officers directly involved and the High Hellenic Military Command, as well as Foreign Office and Greek Embassy Washington, it is now rather likely that incident will become widely known and certainly to his opposition within the regime. PriMin knows in fact corruption is occurring within his circle and that he is highly vulnerable on this issue with other leading and still potent conspirators of the April 21, 1967 coup. In my view, he again has acted unwisely and by his exaggerated reaction will find that incident may hurt his position far more within the regime than if he had played it down and accepted the Dept’s eminently-wise handling of this case as a “misunderstanding.”

Tasca

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2 Telegram 108826 to Athens, June 17, instructed the Embassy to hold up delivery of a letter from Moorer to Angelis. Telegram 3340 from Athens, June 15, had suggested holding up the delivery. (Both ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6–9 US)
3 On May 10 three Greek officers attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College visited the Department of State for a briefing during which, according to the Greeks, an official of the Department of State criticized Greek arrest of student demonstrators and stated that the regime was “corrupt.” The Greek Government withdrew the students and filed a series of protests with U.S. officials. In a June 12 letter to Rogers, Laird expressed his displeasure over the incident. (Washington National Records Center, RG 350, OASD/ISA Subject Files: FRC 330 75–0125, Greece 000.1–333, 1972)
Athens, October 13, 1972.

Dear Mr. President:

Under your inspiring leadership, we have clearly strengthened our bilateral security relations with Greece, as well as the integrity of the southern flank of NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, we have made unequivocally clear in every appropriate way our support for the return of Greece to some form of stable, democratic and representative government. I have traveled all over Greece and from innumerable contacts, I have been deeply impressed by the strong bonds of friendship which exist between our two countries. Incidentally, I have also been struck with the high quality and impressive leadership of the Greek Orthodox Church as a vital element in this friendship. Our present posture in Greece is such that whatever changes might occur in the internal political picture, there are no likely developments, in my view, which would jeopardize our vital interests in this country.

Tom Pappas, my dear friend, thought I should write to you regarding plans for the future. He has talked, I believe, to both you and John Mitchell on this subject. The last time I saw you, in the summer of 1971, you indicated you had another post in mind for me.2

Tom and John Mitchell both have indicated you would probably send me to Rome after my service here. If this should materialize, I would be pleased to undertake this assignment because I believe Italy’s internal political problem is desperate, and also because it could affect Vatican attitudes, particularly through the Italian clergy, which in turn can influence internal developments in many Catholic countries.

I have been pleased to have had the opportunity to explain why the Nixon policy towards Greece was and remains the only valid approach to our relations with this country. As Tom knows, I should be happy to be helpful in any other way to you during the period ahead, particularly in explaining our completely valid policies in the Eastern Mediterranean.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. No classification marking. Tasca sent a more detailed letter to Kissinger, outlining his qualifications for a posting in Rome, Paris, or Bonn. (Ibid.) In a backchannel message to Tasca, Kissinger acknowledged receipt of the two letters and stated that he had “put them in the right hands.” (Ibid.)

2 See Document 320.
I would not want to end this message without a word about the wonderfully humane and understanding way in which Tom Pappas has contributed, at times with real personal sacrifice, in maintaining and strengthening the strong ties of friendship between the Greek and American peoples.

With warmest personal best wishes.

Sincerely,

Henry

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339. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to Secretary of State Rogers


Dear Bill:

As you will recall, in my letter of 24 November 1971, I recommended that we initiate negotiations with the Government of Greece for the incremental homeporting of a carrier task group in Athens. Following the Greek Government’s January 1972 approval in principle of the concept, we have completed Phase I, which included the homeporting of Commander Task Force Sixty (CTF–60), Commander Destroyer Squadron Twelve and staff, Destroyer Squadron Twelve, and the establishment of the U.S. Navy Fleet Support Office in Athens. I have now approved, subject to certain conditions, the Navy’s plan and we are ready to proceed with Phase II which includes the homeporting of the USS Independence (CV–62), Carrier Air Wing Seven (CVW–7), and the dependent support ship USS Sanctuary (AH–17) in Athens.

Phase II will involve approximately 5000 military personnel assigned to the afloat units and air wing, approximately 100 MILPERS (including one U.S. civilian) assigned to shore based support functions, and about 2550 dependents (1000 families). The military personnel can be accommodated within the Navy’s share of the western European military manpower ceiling. This program, when completed (i.e., implementation of Phases I and II), will introduce a total of approximately

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2 Not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 GREECE–US)
7100 MILPERS, 35 U.S. civilians, and 3800 dependents (1550 families) into the Athens area.

The existing support facilities—which have been able to accommodate Phase I—are now taxed to, if not beyond, their limits. Therefore, to avoid serious degradation of the quality of support, the implementation of Phase II will require the Navy to provide additional commissary, exchange, medical, dental and school facilities. The Navy proposes to homeport the dependent support ship USS Sanctuary (AH–17) in Athens to augment the existing medical and dental facilities. The Navy intends to lease or lease-construct the remainder of the required support facilities.

Since there is sufficient non-government housing available on the local economy, this should present no problem as long as the introduction of dependents is phased to ease their assimilation into the area.

There is a requirement for airfield support for the air wing, particularly during the carrier’s maintenance periods or other periods of shorter duration when the carrier is in port. Since the carrier to be homeported will be CV configured (both attack and ASW mission capable), the Navy’s operational concept envisions a satellite airfield operation, using Elefsis airfield as a logistic/maintenance adjunct to the carrier, in conjunction with the use of the Hellenic airfield at Souda Bay, Crete for the majority of air wing training. This concept of operations and requirements has been presented to the Chief of the Hellenic Air Force Command. Though no response has been received, Ambassador Tasca has indicated that he is optimistic that the airfield location problem will be successfully resolved since the GOG has approved the overall homeporting concept.

The concept for berthing the homeported carrier is merely a continuation of berthing arrangements traditionally employed during routine carrier visits to Athens. The carrier will anchor in Phaleron Bay and utilize the fleet landing there for support. There are, however, informal indications that Phaleron Bay may be developed into a tourist area and closed as an anchorage for shipping in the post-1973 time frame.

Costs associated with the full implementation (Phase I and II) of the Athens homeporting program are in consonance with those previously presented to you and the Congress. The costs, which include the USS Sanctuary, and estimated airfield and alternate fleet landing costs, are now estimated to be $13.6 million one-time, and a six year average of $10.95 million for annual recurring costs. The cost estimates previously provided to Congress were $14.4 million one-time, and $13.4 million annual recurring. The International Balance of Payments deficit attributable to this homeporting program is now estimated to be $11.8 million as compared to the $13 million originally estimated.
There are some weaknesses and uncertainties in this plan; however, I believe they can be resolved satisfactorily with time. The lack of an airfield confirmed for our use is a decided weakness that could ultimately entail additional facilities and costs. Resolution to the airfield requirement is, of course, subject to the outcome of the on-going service-to-service negotiations between the U.S. and Hellenic Navies. The carrier berthing is also somewhat uncertain over the long term if the Greeks should close the Phaleron Bay anchorage. Such an eventuality would, of course, be an overall Sixth Fleet matter as it would affect routine carrier or other large ship visits to Athens as well as a homeported carrier. Should a move to an alternate site be required, we might propose that the Greeks support the costs involved, at least in part.

I also appreciate the concerns that have been expressed regarding the inability of the existing support facilities to accommodate the personnel and dependents associated with Phase II. This problem—a lesson learned from Phase I—is clearly recognized. We must now clear the way for the Navy to proceed with development of the facilities that will be required so that they can be fully manned and operational prior to the introduction of the Phase II dependents.

In view of the uncertainties and concerns involved, I have conditioned my approval of the Navy plan. First, a resolution to the airfield issue must be accomplished before any leases for Phase II facilities can be executed. Second, adequate support facilities (including Sanctuary) must be in being, fully staffed and operational before Phase II dependents are introduced. Third, the Navy should revise its schedule to permit implementation of the carrier and air wing homeporting in March 1974, instead of July 1973 as proposed. This will permit careful planning for and orderly execution of Phase II. Should the Navy resolve the airfield and support facilities requirements well in advance of the March 1974 date, the Navy has been instructed to make a specific recommendation to the Secretary of Defense for an earlier implementation date. I have also cautioned the Navy that the overall costs should be kept in consonance with those presented to the Congress.

On the political side, the Athens homeporting program was expected to draw considerable press and Congressional interest and some criticism. We seem to have weathered the storm of Congressional opposition which was based on the overall concept of the program; therefore, the implementation of Phase II, though it can be expected to draw additional criticism, would not appear to be an issue at this point. I believe that we have already paid the major political price for homeporting in Athens.

Internationally, the Soviets, after their initial reaction, have been relatively quiet on this subject. They may, however, attempt to raise the specific issue in MBFR, having already raised the general issue of FBS
and forward deployed carriers in SALT II. We should not be deterred by speculation on this issue.

We also recognized that the influx of additional U.S. service personnel into the Athens area would create some problems in Greece. Currently, any civil incidents involving U.S. military personnel—homeported or not—become highlighted. We can reasonably expect this to continue for awhile as the number of U.S. personnel increase in the Athens area. I do not believe, however, that the reaction either here or in Greece has reached—or will reach—unmanageable proportions.

In summary, I believe that homeporting in Greece makes little, if any, sense unless we carry through with our plans to homeport a carrier there. I am also confident that the problem areas and uncertainties can be resolved successfully with time and that the Navy implementation plan is feasible if the implementation is delayed.

I strongly support the Navy’s desire to move forward with the implementation of Phase II; therefore, I request your early and favorable endorsement.

I believe that we should move quickly to seek Ambassador Tasca’s concurrence in this plan and to have him reaffirm with the Greek Government their previous agreement in principle and solicit their support to resolve the airfield problem. It is essential that we have GOG concurrence as soon as possible to permit early declassification of the plan.

I am prepared to discuss this matter with you, at any time, and have instructed my staff to provide whatever additional information you or your staff may desire.

Melvin R. Laird
Cyprus

340. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of
State

Nicosia, March 24, 1969, 1530Z.

439. Subject: Cyprus: Settlement Effort (or lack thereof). Reference: (A) Athens 1185; (B) Ankara 1906.2

1. As Mississippi prison farm warden used to say to inmates, “what we got here is a problem of communication.” Embassy Ankara (ref B) is correct that so far there is little substantive change in GOC position (same is true of Turk Cypriots). Embassy Athens is correct that GOG “is standing behind roadblock it thinks Makarios has erected” (on local autonomy). Point of exercise we are proposing is: to get GOT to help persuade Turk Cypriots to make compromises which can be traded off for GOC compromises, and to get GOG to help persuade Makarios to make compromises which will elicit Turk response (in words of ref A we want GOG to help us in getting Makarios to take down “roadblock”).

2. Maintenance of niceties of U.S. non-involvement in Ankara and Athens while we fairly heavily involved here in informal way with Greek and Turk Cypriots and GOG and GOT Embassies seems to us of questionable utility. Influence of Athens on Greek Cypriots and of Ankara on Turk Cypriots is undeniable. If GOT is going to continue to support Kuchuk and TCPA majority in their original position on local autonomy and GOG is going to support Makarios and Council of Ministers majority in their original position on local autonomy, then we have no ball game. What we are suggesting is help for moderates (led fortunately by two negotiators—Clerides and Denktash—on both sides) from respective motherlands by at least informally requesting GOT and GOG to support in general terms kind of compromise we have suggested.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Ottawa, USUN, and USNATO.

2 In telegram 1185 from Athens, March 22, the Embassy commented that it did not believe the Greek Government was forcing its views on Makarios but was supporting what it understood to be the position of the Government of Cyprus. In telegram 1906 from Ankara, March 21, the Embassy reported on discussions regarding the administrative grouping of Turkish Cypriot villages. (Both ibid.)
3. Timing for quasi-initiative (which does not involve formal dé-marches) we recommend is fortuitous. GOT Chargé Yavuzalp left yesterday (March 23) for Ankara and policy review with Chaglayangil in preparation for latter’s anticipated meeting with Pipinelis in Washington in connection NATO anniversary. Before leaving he called to ascertain our views on possible compromises on local autonomy question. On Greek side, special committee of Council of Ministers now preparing paper on local autonomy which Clerides will take to Athens during his upcoming trip (now leaked to press). Would seem both Yavuzalp consultation with GOT FonOff and Clerides consultation with Pipinelis offer unique opportunities for GOT and GOG to give boost to compromise on local autonomy. Both Athens and Ankara claim they sincerely want get Cyprus problem off their backs. Only way to do so is to get local constituents to compromise. To be noted our thoughts on fundamentals of compromise (Nicosia 429) are midway between parties’ current positions and are quite general as well as informal so USG not liable be accused of trying propound a specific compromise or of unfairly pressuring one party at expense other.4

Crawford

3 Dated March 21, it reported on a Cyprus airways strike. (Ibid., LAB 6–1 CYP)
4 In telegram 45225 to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia, March 24, the Department instructed the Embassies “to weigh in with all parties” emphasizing U.S. concern with the lack of progress in negotiations and suggesting possible elements of an accord “without intimating we are presenting a preferred solution.” (Ibid., POL 27 CYP) In telegram 47944 to Ankara, March 28, the Department reported that its approach had created the impression that a U.S. plan existed and necessitated apologies from Sisco to the Turkish Ambassador over the misunderstanding. (Ibid.) Komer defended his approach in telegram 2082 from Ankara, March 28. (Ibid.)

341. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State1

Ankara, May 1, 1969, 1047Z.

2896. 1. Even my brief revisit to Cyprus2 was depressing with respect Turk Cypriot predicament. The Greek sector’s economy is boom-
ing, while the Turk Cypriots stagnate barricaded in their enclaves. The growing economic disparity between the two communities is even more visible. Despite this, I sense little give among the Turkish community in Cyprus or their backers in Ankara. Indeed Denktash’s remarks almost suggested that the greater the economic disparity the more determinedly the Turk Cypriots would insist on the full measure of their “rights.”

2. Ambassador Belcher has reported on our brief talks with Denktash and Clerides. His rapport with the key actors on the scene is impressive indeed. He and I have also suggested in Nicosia 627 some new financial device to help break the deadlock. I would only add that in default of some such new catalyst to stimulate a compromise solution, GOC has powerful incentive to sit tight for another 2–3 years of gradual erosion of the Turk Cypriot position until latter are worn down. I need not remind Department of the possibilities of flareup implicit in the growing hopelessness of the Turk Cypriots. It is for this reason, and because their economic weakness and enforced idleness seem to be impressing itself more and more on Turk Cypriot thinking, that some kind of financial sweetener might have powerful appeal.

3. I know how hard it is for Washington (or any other potential donor) to think of new commitments at this time. In fact, however, any settlement which could be achieved by investing $25–50 million over 2–3 years would be cheap at the price. Current dispute is costing US, UK, Greece, Turkey and UNFICYP countries, and the two Cypriot communities a great deal more than that. We would all probably end up saving money if we could substitute rehabilitation and development for what we are investing in now. Moreover, by directly tying any such package sweetener to an across-the-board settlement, we could avoid spending our money until we saw what we would get for it.

4. I recognize the difficulty of designing a financial package purely for the Turk Cypriots. However, for it to have appeal to them and Ankara, they must be given clear assurances that the bulk of it will be spent on them. We must also guard against the GOC using it as an excuse to avoid providing GOC funds which would normally be provided anyway to the Turkish community. But these pitfalls could no doubt be skirted by ingenuity and imagination.

Komer

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3 Belcher reported on the two Ambassadors’ discussions with Denktash in telegram 627 from Nicosia, April 30. He concluded that the disparity in economic situation might provide the “sugar coating” in the form of economic assistance for a “bitter pill” of compromise the Turkish community might have to swallow. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 CY)

4 Telegram 626 from Nicosia, April 30. (Ibid.)
Nicosia, June 20, 1969.

Dear Bill:

As I leave Cyprus and you arrive in the area, I wanted to welcome you to the club and to pass along some thoughts that may seem parochially Cypriot from where you sit in Ankara, but that have been concerns of ours during the whole period I have been here.

To be completely frank, we have never felt—and this has been more the case recently—that our Embassy in Ankara was managing to get a penetrating look into the Turkish Government thought processes about Cyprus. As a concomitant, we have seldom felt that the Embassy went much beyond listening to Turkish presentations. The whole relationship has seemed to lack the continuous, candid and close give-and-take that one would expect between two friendly nations regarding one of their half-dozen problems of greatest mutual concern.

Seeing Bulak is all well and good, although there again we seldom see much indication that anyone questions his obiter dicta. Bulak is certainly a key figure in the execution of GOT-Cyprus policy. But unless the Turkish Embassy here is leading us astray, that is his main role. We know that the subject is taken up periodically by the Ambassador and Chaglayangil, and certainly he is a key player although Osorio-Tafall and others have discovered that his propensity for moderate generalizations let his visitors go away happy but with little of substance in their pockets, and his words often belie much harder underlying Turkish positions. Obviously the Prime Minister is also useful on Cyprus. But from several sides we hear that the real architect of Turkey’s broad policy approach toward Cyprus is President Sunay himself with day-to-day details followed for him by a general on his staff. We reported this to you in Nicosia A–109.3

It is not my business to suggest any specific paths but I do feel there is a problem and I hope that you, as the newly-arrived Ambassador, will move to remedy it. The trouble in the past has always been that Cyprus stayed on the back burner of our diplomatic discourse with

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1 Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 72 D 476, Pol Turkey. Confidential; Personal. A copy was sent to Folsom. A notation on the letter reads: “Seen by Frank Cash, NEA/TUR, RSF.”
2 Belcher left post on June 23. Popper was nominated as his successor on May 27 and presented his credentials on July 18. Komer left Ankara on May 7. Handley was appointed on May 1 and presented his credentials on July 1.
3 Dated May 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 TUR)
the Turkish Government until on several different occasions it erupted to become our central concern with Turkey, costing us dear in scarce credit, and sidetracking other issues of importance. I can remember Ray Hare expressing sympathy with my views back in 1964 on the need to get into closer touch with the Turks on the Cyprus problem and his comment that this would be done but would take time. Years later we still apparently have no such dialogue despite the fact that at several times we have come very close indeed to war.

One other thought I would leave with you. There are obvious connections between certain aspects of and events in Turkish domestic politics which have either direct or indirect bearing on this problem. We have not had the advantage of reading Embassy Ankara’s “think pieces” on the domestic scene—I do feel they would be helpful to us in interpreting this one—in view of the major if not controlling role played by the GOT as regards the Turk Cypriot community.

Dave Popper will, I am sure, appreciate anything you can do to keep all this in mind as you go about your arduous tasks.

With warm personal regards and best of luck in Ankara.

Sincerely,

Taylor G. Belcher

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4 Printed from a copy that bears Belcher’s typed signature.

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343. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, July 1, 1969, 1325Z.


1. In June 1968 outlook for and atmosphere surrounding Cyprus problem were optimistic. Positive attitudes prevailed in spite of nearness in time of violent events of 1967.2 Today Cyprus has witnessed

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2 For documentation on the crises in Cyprus of 1964 and 1967, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey.
virtually no violence for unprecedented period of eighteen months and, in spite of this, atmosphere and outlook are not as good as in June 1968. In fact, in our darker moments we (and some of our diplomatic colleagues) experience disturbing feeling of uneasiness, of deja vu, regarding situation. What has happened?

2. One important factor is that nothing positive has happened lately. First half of 1968 witnessed real progress including substantial normalization and deconfrontation moves by Greek Cypriots and establishment of local talks. Since June 1968 precious little progress, particularly visible progress, has been made. Bloom is definitely off rose. Local talks are widely viewed as stalled on local administration issue. Normalization is practically dead letter since Greek Cypriots regard Turk Cypriots as completely unresponsive to earlier series of unilateral GOC normalization moves. In spite of repeated efforts by UNFICYP (particularly in Artemis Road area) there has been no real military deconfrontation since early 1968.

3. In short forward momentum has largely been lost. With public realization of and official disenchantment over lack of progress, hardliners—both Greek and Turk in official and non-official circles—have been regaining influence. For instance:

A. Intelligence reports (being circulated by MinInt DirGen Anastassiou, well-known hawk) claiming Turk Cypriot intention to provoke GOT military intervention which were disregarded in mid-1968 are now gaining currency. MinInt Komodromos appears believe this canard fervently (see NKI 326) and there are many other hardliners in GOC who want to believe it. National Guard G2 also taking line that Turk Cypriots preparing for offensive action and his view has infected Greek Embassy here.

B. Sensationalist press, primarily Makhi, repeats daily “big lie” of Turkish military preparations and partitionist intentions. This line is creeping into other papers and is beginning to be believed by less sophisticated Greek Cypriot readers. Entire press campaign is making Turk Cypriots uneasy as well, and beginning provoke reaction in Turkey (see para 1 Ankara 4401).

C. Turk Cypriot press now beginning to respond by accusing Greek Cypriots of “war-like preparation” and of intention to break off talks after Turk reply on local administration, simultaneously blaming Turkish military activity for this action.

3 Not found.
4 Dated June 30, it reported Turkish views on the status of intercommunal talks. (Ibid.)
4. As we enter period of summer recess additional negative factors on slate are:

A. Fact that during their recess the Clerides–Denktash mechanism will not be available to adjudicate differences (e.g., as in Naoussa Street patrol episode).5

B. Lack of progress in subcommittees on electoral process and reintegration of Turk Cypriots into semi-government bodies.

C. Apparent judgment by Archbishop that departure of Pipinelis will preclude additional meaningful Greek pressure on GOC since colonels will be otherwise occupied.

D. Upcoming events which may be problem-making, such as human rights seminar (June 26–July 9) and Turkish elections (mid-October).

E. Possible loss of heart and concentration by Clerides due tragic illness of his only child.

5. In spite of foregoing, picture not completely black. We have indications that Turk Cypriot counter-proposals on local administration will move somewhat forward from their original position. Moreover, Denktash has now admitted that Clerides’ compromise offer did, in fact, have some good points. Despite public view that talks stalled, fact is these are not dead and potential exists for further forward progress, however slow and painful, when Clerides and Denktash resume meetings.

6. Furthermore, neither National Guard nor TMT seems to have policy of looking for trouble. Solution of Naoussa Street patrolling issue and speedy defusing of recent shooting incident (UNFICYP reports National Guard did not return fire) tend to support this view.

7. All factors considered we would describe situation as in very delicate balance. It could go either way. Significant change in military status quo (such as large arms importation by GOC) or violent incident involving loss of life could cause serious deterioration. On balance, we moderately hopeful that UNFICYP and Western Embassies can contain situation and preserve calm until local talks back on track. In short, chances are we will get through summer without serious trouble. However, chances are not as good as they were last year.

Crawford

5 Reference is to a confrontation at Omorphita between Greek Cypriot and TMT fighters between February 10 and 12.
344. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, July 22, 1969, 1030Z.

1081. Subject: Cyprus: Makarios’ Views.

1. Summary. In prompt follow-up to credentials presentation July 18, FonOff arranged my initial private discussion with Archbishop morning July 21. Makarios obviously sought convey impression of reasonableness, magnanimity and restraint. Portraying Turkish community as misguided, he foresaw probability of deadlock in intercommunal talks and proposed both sides agree refrain from use of force in this eventuality.

2. President received me alone, without customary interpreter, for interview lasting almost one hour. He began conversation with congratulations on Apollo XI success thus far and hoped for astronauts’ safe return. There no doubt he deeply impressed with every aspect of flight.

3. Turning to substance, I told Makarios that as I had said to Acting FonMin July 16, I brought with me no preconceived notions and no dramatic proposals for settlement. I assured Makarios of keen interest of Secretary and other Washington officials in a successful solution of Cyprus problem. Archbishop’s wise guidance and leadership had, I noted, been a major factor in progress which had occurred since late 1967. We were confident that, given his unique position among his own people, he would continue to guide them toward a settlement which would assure interests of all parties in an independent Cyprus. I knew that President Nixon and the Secretary would be interested in his analysis of situation as it now stood.

4. Archbishop replied he thought matters had reached a difficult stage. He had hoped communal talks would have resulted in agreement three or four months after they had started. Instead, he feared they might be deadlocked. Turkish Cypriot leaders did not wish to clear ground for any agreement at least until after elections in Turkey. What would follow then he could not predict, but what he saw did not encourage him.

5. Archbishop particularly regretted that no great progress had been made on critical local government issue. Problem was that Turks
were attempting to use negotiations on this matter to set up what amounted to a federation, in order to set stage for ultimate partition. Turks insisted that local government units be created on purely racial basis, even though this would result in quite infeasible administrative situations. He had no problem with drawing lines which would give Turks majority in certain areas and Greeks in others. But Turks wanted to go much further.

6. Resulting stalemate could only harm Turkish Cypriot community. Maintained by Turkish Government subsidy, it was being reduced to a parasitic status. Cyprus was in period of rapid development, with growing industry and prosperity. If Turks waited too long, they might never obtain their fair share of benefits.

7. This was why, Archbishop said, he especially regretted failure of Turks to accept Greek Cypriot proposal that local government issue be put aside and agreements on police and judiciary be implemented at once. Turks had assented, he continued, to police arrangements which would ensure that police stations in Turkish area were manned almost exclusively by Turkish policemen, with corresponding token Turkish representation in police posts in Greek Cypriot areas. This would enable each community to police itself, while giving the other the opportunity to keep watch over what was happening. Under such conditions, further steps could be taken to pursue deconfrontation, with mixed police units as well as UNFICYP forces patrolling areas from which two sides would withdraw their military personnel. But this obviously required Turkish agreement, of which no sign was forthcoming. Kuchuk and Denktash were moderates who might have been expected to be attracted by such a proposal; MinDef Orek, on contrary, was hardliner who, Archbishop understood, was taking position that Turk Cypriot community had nothing to gain from agreement with Greek Cypriots since it was doing quite well as things now stood.

8. If his fears were realized, Archbishop added, and deadlock occurred, he would propose that both communities agree that despite their differences they would not resort to force to solve them. “We must live together,” he stated, “we are on the same ship.” UNFICYP could continue to play an important role. In this connection, he could understand why states providing men and money for UNFICYP might wish reduce costs of UNFICYP operation. If they should find it necessary to do so, Greek Cypriot community would not object. He understood, however, that Turkish community desired force to remain at present level. This was good sign, since it indicated Turks did not intend to resort to violence. Greeks of course would have no objection if force were maintained at existing strength.

9. In tune with Archbishop’s mood, I assured him US wanted to do all it appropriately could to facilitate a solution. We were convinced
it was not beyond ingenuity of negotiators to work through complex of details regarding local government issue and come up with something which would give satisfaction to both sides. It would be mistake for anyone to despair at this point, despite inevitable past frustrations. We hoped Turk Cypriot replies to Greek local government proposals would provide basis for new impetus toward agreement. With spiritual strength and goodwill I could see in Archbishop’s approach to problem, I felt encouraged to believe this was not “impossible dream.”

10. Concluding, I told Archbishop I was at his disposal at any time. He could count on me to do my best to keep USG fully informed, and he could count on continuing interest of USG in cause of just and lasting solution of Cyprus problem.

Popper

345. Memorandum of Conversation

SecDel/MC/7 New York, September 23, 1969, 4:45–5:15 p.m.

SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September 1969

SUBJECT
Bi-laterals with Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
Secretary Rogers
Ambassador Phillips
Mr. James Irwin
FOREIGN
Foreign Minister Kyprianou
Ambassador Rossides
Mr. Jacovides
Mr. Anthoulis

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Irwin on September 23, and approved by R.L. Brown on September 25. Rogers and Kyprianou were attending the UN General Assembly meeting.
Foreign Minister Kyprianou spent almost the entire thirty minutes briefing the Secretary on the past and present situation in Cyprus. Nothing new arose in the talks other than possibly clearer statements by the Foreign Minister on just where the Cypriot government now stands on certain issues.

In discussing the past, Kyprianou said that of course the best solution for all concerned (Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus) would have been enosis. In 1967 they realized that since talks on enosis could only result in war between Greece and Turkey enosis would have to be set aside for at least the foreseeable future. Instead the Cypriot government felt it should concentrate its efforts on building an independent and sovereign state.

Kyprianou said there were two reasons why the London-Zurich solutions failed and why any future solutions will fail if they include them.

a. Cyprus was made an independent state which wasn’t independent. Its sovereignty was curtailed.

b. The internal structure of the state was on a basis of division which went beyond ensuring mere civil rights.

He added “Cyprus is a small island and cannot have a state within a state. It should be a unitary state in which the minority have useful civil rights.”

Kyprianou said that the relative peace and calm since January 1968 was due in large measure to the normalization steps taken by the Greek Cypriots. He referred specifically to the elimination of road blocks and the opening of roads. He then pointed out that the Turkish Cypriots still have some road blocks. Kyprianou really thought this was a useless act on their part for as he put it “enclaves are not a negotiating position. They can keep them.” He felt that the Turkish Cypriots were really not happy with the existing situation. He recalled how he and his wife were warmly received and besieged with questions at a Turkish Cypriot reception. Kyprianou thinks their positions are imposed from the outside and that possibly after the Turkish elections the Turkish Cypriots could then go to Turkey and tell them how they really feel.

Although he did not want to be quoted Kyprianou felt that the communal talks had really reached a deadlock. He implied they may have made a mistake in encouraging the Turkish Cypriots to present proposals which, it turned out, the Cypriot government could not possibly accept. Ambassador Rossides pointed out the impossible political and economic problems inherent in the Turkish proposals. Kyprianou was quite clear in stating that the Cypriot government had “gone to the maximum.” He said they had also possibly made a mistake by making all their concessions to begin with. Kyprianou stated that the logical compromise between Greek enosis and Turkish partition was the creation of an independent state. Since they had foregone much in giving
up enosis the Turks should respond likewise and forgo their demands for separate autonomy. Regardless of the fact that the communal talks were at an impasse they were providing peaceful conditions and should definitely continue. This peaceful climate might permit “action in the field (further normalization) which in turn might enable the talks to make progress.”

When asked by Ambassador Phillips regarding the size of UNFICYP Foreign Minister Kyprianou replied “we are happy with the force as it is. However, if the Secretary General feels it can be cut down it is okay with us.”

The Secretary concluded the meeting by telling Foreign Minister Kyprianou that he thought the solution to their problem was reason and the passage of time.

346. Letter From the Ambassador to Cyprus (Popper) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)

Nicosia, October 11, 1969.

Dear Joe:

I appreciate your thoughtfulness in sending us State 169787 and 172042, detailing your conversations with Ed Tomkins and Ambassador Ronne. They are fine summaries of the existing state of play in your negotiations, and most helpful as background here.

We will be alert to the possibility of using Cyprus as the site of Rhodes-type negotiations, if you can iron out the points still at issue with the Russians and the Parties. As you know, Jarring still maintains his offices at the Cyprus Hilton. This island is the obvious place for Rhodes-type meetings, unless one wants to leave the area altogether in favor of places like Geneva or Vienna. I should think it would be better to keep the Parties closer to home.

Meanwhile you have a cheering section in Nicosia rooting for you as you work on this intractable subject.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis; Official–Informal. A copy was sent to Folsom.
2 Telegrams 169787 and 172042 to Nicosia, October 7 and 10, both reported on the Jarring mediation effort. (Ibid., POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR)
3 Reference to the negotiation of an armistice between Israel and the Arab states, January–March 1949, at Rhodes with Ralph Bunche serving as UN acting mediator.
Locally, as we have reported, we are in a deteriorating phase. The Clerides–Denktash talks are at a stalemate. Both sides are saying publicly that they will make no further concessions. The Government is orchestrating a tough publicity line, which culminated this week in three speeches by Makarios to National Guard audiences calling for resolute preparedness in any eventuality if the talks fail, extolling the old Greek virtues, and rejecting the idea of outside intervention either by the Greek and Turkish Governments or a five-power conference.

All this is quite disturbing. It does not please the Greek Government, which has had its Ambassador here comment to the Archbishop and which must be uncomfortable at the Archbishop’s hints that he is being supported by Athens. Moreover, during a day-long field trip to outlying UNFICYP posts yesterday, I learned from the Deputy Commander that the attitudes of the two military organizations have perceptively hardened. At many points, magazines are now inserted into automatic weapons, and where local commanders would talk to UNFICYP officers they now hang back. I cite this not because I think any military action is imminent, but to illustrate the essential fragility of the current situation and the ease with which tensions can be raised here.

Why the Archbishop is doing all this is anybody’s guess. My own feeling is that one prominent purpose must be to put more pressure on the Turkish community to make concessions. (The Archbishop has a strong case here; as we reported in our 1555, the Greek side has done virtually all the conceding so far.) The trouble is that the saber-rattling may have the opposite effect of making the stubborn Turks still more stubborn.

We believe the most helpful step in the near future might come from the Greek and Turkish Governments. We are encouraging another meeting of Pipinelis and Chaglayangil. The British are sending a new Ambassador to Ankara and will use the occasion to try to persuade Ankara to lean on the Turkish community here. Peter Ramsbotham will be travelling to Ankara at the beginning of December to lend a hand.

We think this is a useful approach. The Turkish community here is so dependent on Turkish Government support that they should be susceptible to strong pressures from that direction. Ankara has shied away from an activist role of late, but with the election behind us, maybe they can be induced to step up to the problem. We will keep you informed.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

Dave

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4 In an October 6 Official–Informal letter from Popper to Sisco. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)
5 Reported and analyzed in telegram 1555 from Nicosia, October 9. (Ibid.)
5127. Fm: Popper. Subject: Cyprus: GOG Concern re Alleged U.S. Connection With Georkadjis.

1. At our meeting with FonOff Director of Turkish and Cypriot Affairs Theodoropoulos this morning, conversation turned to question of Cyprus National Front terrorism and difficulty in combating it because of weakness in Cyprus police. Theodoropoulos explained GOG was not happy about Makarios using retired Greek National Police to advise Cyprus police but recognized necessity of some technical assistance.

2. Theodoropoulos then said he wanted to speak frankly about one aspect of terrorist situation which especially concerned GOG. They were distressed at possible consequences of developing feud between Georkadjis and Archbishop and were especially worried by former’s political ties with Clerides. In all candor, Theodoropoulos added, he had to say that there were persistent reports that Georkadjis was working with or for Americans. He could not see how this could help situation.

3. Popper said he had heard such rumors, but that they were without foundation. USG was aware of danger of any association with a man of this background, and Popper could assure Theodoropoulos we would have no part of any such intrigue.

4. Comment: Foregoing is latest and most authoritative in series of allusions to alleged American support for Georkadjis we have heard in recent weeks. It underscores importance of keeping our skirts absolutely clean in this matter if U.S. interest in Cyprus is not to suffer severe injury. This is particularly essential at moment when Makarios–Georkadjis controversy is intensifying, with clear possibility that Clerides and United Party may become involved in murky, terrorist connected political maneuvering.

McClelland
348. Letter From the Ambassador to Cyprus (Popper) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)  

Nicosia, November 20, 1969.

Dear Joe:

I returned late last night from a most interesting six-day visit to Ankara, Istanbul and Athens, and am hastening to get this short note off to you before the pouch closes this morning.

The trip was enormously helpful for general orientation purposes, as much with our Embassy people in Ankara and Athens as with top Foreign Office officials in the two capitals. We have a perennial difference in point of view with Bill Handley and company, which we talked out fully, so that we at least understand why we hold our respective viewpoints. I was impressed with the scope, complexity and urgency of the bilateral Turkish-American problems with which Embassy Ankara deals, and I appreciate why they would not wish to make a difficult series of negotiations any more difficult by dragging in discussions on Cyprus. I hope Embassy Ankara understands our feeling that in the overall US interest, we would be remiss if we were to let the Cyprus problem drift or to refrain from full contact with the Turks about it. We are perfectly happy to do this here in Nicosia if that is most helpful.

In Instanbul, I explored the relationship between the status of Greek and Turkish ethnic minorities resident in Turkey and Greece, and the Cyprus problem—a facet of the situation which is not critically important but nevertheless real. In Athens, we found a rather more confident mood than we had among the stubbornly determined Turks. We tried to impress on both sides the need for further accommodation if the Clerides–Denktash talks were not to wither away.

1 Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 74 D 476, Pol US in Cyprus. Confidential; Official–Informal. Copies were sent to Folsom and Crawford. A notation on the letter reads: “Mr. Cash FYI.”

2 According to a November 21 letter from Popper to Handley, the issue in dispute was the passage of information provided to the United States by one government to representatives of another: “We feel obliged to do this sort of thing fairly often because Nicosia is so much the center of discussion of the Cyprus problem” but the respective states involved frequently did not communicate directly. (Ibid.)
We have reported more fully on all the foregoing by telegram and memcon. It leaves the Embassy and me personally in a much better position to carry on. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to make the trip, and am happy that I was able to maintain the low profile that we all desired.

While I was away, a news agency carried a report that you might be making a trip to some Arab capitals. Evidently this was untrue, but the Foreign Office here thinks you might visit Cyprus in February. Naturally, all of us devoutly hope that you will find it possible to stop in Cyprus when you make the trip. I would of course love to see you personally, but equally important we relish every opportunity to remedy a certain feeling of remoteness and isolation which sometimes settles over us. So I am extending to you right now a most cordial invitation to put aside a little time for us when you make your visit.

My only regret about my recent trip was that I could not take Flo along. She has been in bed for several weeks with severe sciatica. She is coming along, but slowly. The Sherman Maisels will be here over Thanksgiving; I know that will help.

Warmest regards to Jean and to you.4

Sincerely,

David H. Popper5

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3 See Document 347. Popper also reported on talks with Pipinelis in telegram 5139 from Athens, November 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP) Boyatt, who accompanied Popper, summarized the talks in a November 24 memorandum to the Ambassador. (Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 74 D 476, Pol US in Cyprus)

4 In a December 1 reply, Sisco suggested that visits by Tasca and Handley to Nicosia might improve coordination and understanding among embassies and indicated that he would try to work a visit to Cyprus into future travel to the region. (Ibid.)

5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
349. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/1               Brussels, December 3, 1969, 10:15 a.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE
FORTY-FOURTH MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Brussels, Belgium, December 3–5, 1969

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary of State
Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Gerald B. Helman, First Secretary, U.S. Mission to NATO
Turkey
Foreign Minister Caglayanili
Ozdemir Yigit (Interpreter), Turkish Foreign Ministry
Oktay Iscen, Turkish Foreign Ministry

The Foreign Minister reviewed the course of communal talks on
Cyprus. He said that when the talks started, the two communities were
on an equal footing but that the talks have shown the Greek commu-
nity wants to make Cyprus into a Greek state. The Turkish community
wants local autonomy but the Greeks offer nothing beyond local ad-
ministrative facilities. The Turks want to maintain their identify as
a community while the Greeks are willing only to grant some self-
evident human rights, and those as a favor.

In brief, the Foreign Minister felt that the Greek community was
trying to do through negotiations what it could not accomplish by force.
They have sought to do this in various ways: by refusing to pay the
salaries of Turkish state employees; by failure to spend anything on
public works in the Turkish area; by denying the facilities of the state
to the Turkish community; and by channeling foreign aid solely to the
Greek community. The result is prosperity in the Greek community at
the expense of the Turks. If there is to be normalization it must begin
with these matters.

Secretary Rogers hoped that the two communities would work to-
ward mutually acceptable arrangements.

¹Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP. Confiden-
tial. Drafted by Helman and cleared by McGuire and Brandt on December 4. The mem-
orandum is Part III of IV. Parts I, II, and IV are ibid. The meeting took place at the U.S.
Mission to NATO.
In January 1970 the United States Government became aware of credible evidence of a plot directed against the life of Cypriot President Makarios by former Interior Minister Polykarpos Georkadjis. Information on the reported plot was passed to Archbishop Makarios on January 15 at Nairobi while the Cypriot President was making a stopover during an African tour. Cypriot officials increased security precautions and, following his return to Nicosia, Makarios ordered an investigation. He subsequently thanked Ambassador David Popper for passing on the information. According to a March 17 memorandum prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Directorate of Operations, of the Central Intelligence Agency, “The decision to warn Makarios was based on the fact that whatever one may think of him his continued survival is vital to the stability of Cyprus and this is in the interests of U.S. foreign policy.” The memorandum added that the decision was also motivated by a belief that if Makarios had independently discovered the plot, he would have suspected U.S. involvement since Georkadjis had close contacts with U.S. officials during his long service as Interior Minister. (Central Intelligence Agency, Records of the Office of the Deputy Director of Operations, Job 79–01440, Near Eastern Division)

In a subsequent interview, Makarios confirmed that he had been warned by U.S. officials of a plot: “We were about to have lunch. I was late in arriving and someone in the American Embassy insisted that he had an urgent message. We were in a hurry and I was not very pleased at the interruption, but I agreed to hear him. The message was this: ‘According to reliable sources, when you go back to Cyprus there are plans for your assassination at the airport in Nicosia.’ This was the first time I had heard of an attempt being made on my life. I smiled and said ‘Thank you very much, but I don’t think it is probable.’ Actually, I didn’t think the airport would be a suitable place for an assassination. But the American said, ‘Be careful.’” (Lawrence Stern, The Wrong Horse, pages 86–87)

Additional documentation on the attempted assassination plot against Makarios is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Records of the Directorate of Operations, [file name not declassified]; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30 1974; and ibid., Box 1235, Saunders Subject Files, Greece, 10/1/69–12/31/69.
351. Intelligence Information Cable

TDCS 314/02703–70


COUNTRY

Cyprus

DOI

8 March 1970

SUBJECT

Reaction Following Attempted Assassination of Makarios

ACQ

[less than 1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[4½ lines not declassified]

1. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: At 0710, 8 March an attempt was made to kill President Makarios by shooting him as he departed in a helicopter for Makhaeras Monastery. See Nicosia Embassy telegrams 288, 300 and 322).2

2. Shortly after noon, 8 March 1970, President Makarios returned to the Archbishopric from his visit to Makhaeras Monastery and closeted himself with some of his closest associates. The group of about a dozen people included Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, his personal physician; Andreas Azinas, Cooperatives Commissioner; Nicosia Mayor Odysseas Ioannides; Miltides Christodoulou, Government public information officer; Vaso Loiza, a female employed in the Office of the Director of the Cyprus Information Service; Ourana Kokkinou, a spinster long associated with EOKA and confidant of Makarios; and some of Makarios’ relatives. Although Makarios was calm and in reasonably good humor considering his narrow escape earlier in the day, the others in the group were excited, angry and shouting to be heard. Makarios asked if the persons he had ordered arrested before he left for Makhaeras were in custody. Loiza said she had passed his message to the police, but did not know what had been done. Makarios was highly irritated, and told the group that he had ordered the arrest of former Interior Minister...

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Records of the Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Information Cables. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the CIA and sent to members of the Intelligence Community.

2 Telegram 288 from Nicosia, March 7, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Telegram 300 from Nicosia, March 8, and telegram 302 from Nicosia, March 9, are ibid., POL 15–1 CYP.
Polykarpos Georkatzis and several others immediately after the attempt on his life. The group began shouting. During the bedlam of accusations against Georkatzis, Makarios abruptly left them saying he wanted to see a few of them privately.

3. Later, [less than 1 line not declassified] Makarios said he had felt very ashamed that his friends had so totally lost control of themselves. Concerning Georkatzis, Makarios said he had strong reason to believe that his former minister was behind the attempt to kill him. However, he did not think that Glafkos Clerides was involved or was even aware of the plot. Explaining further, Makarios said Georkatzis had conspired with men who were not known to be associated with him such as Costas Ioannides, an editor of “Gnomi” and supporter of Dr. Takis Evdokas. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: Makarios did not intend to imply that Evdokas was conspiring with Georkatzis.) Upon reflection, Makarios decided that investigation and arrests should be made “in all directions” so that the general public would not conclude he was acting against Georkatzis for political motives. This would give the impression of an impartial investigation. In due course, when the police completed their investigation and advised him that they had sufficient evidence to convict Georkatzis and his fellow conspirators, the public would be informed. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: of the 11 men in custody at noon, 9 March, several are National Front leaders: Costas Haralambous and Michaliakis Rossides, Costas P. Ioannides, presumably the person referred to above, is also in custody.)

4. By the evening, 8 March, Makarios was no longer certain whether Georkatzis should be arrested, and discussed his doubts at some length with his advisors. Lyssarides and Azinas contended that Georkatzis should be arrested. Makarios also had difficulty in deciding whether to make a public announcement that Georkatzis’ apartment had been searched by the police. [1½ lines not declassified] In the end, he concluded that an announcement should be made to avoid hysteria, and vied with each other in trying to get Makarios’ attention. Makarios himself was calm. He did not discuss what concrete steps he planned to take in response to the attempt to kill him.

6. [1 line not declassified]
352. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, March 17, 1970, 1200Z.

1. We have carefully sifted reports available here relating to involvement of GOG or elements thereof in plan, perhaps connected with attempt on Makarios’ life, to promote double enosis solution. There is increasing evidence that some Greek National Guard officers, and some Greeks on mainland notably Aslanides, were plotting to achieve what they considered quiet solution to Cyprus problem and to cause trouble for present junta leadership in Athens. [less than 1 line not declassified] appear most authoritative reports we have seen on this score.  
2. What now seems fairly certain, however, and what perhaps is causing much of speculation about existence of a GOG master plan, is that some Greek mainland officers have been carrying on activities at variance with officially expressed GOG policy. As attested by several good reports received by DATT Nicosia (C–051), March, 1970, TR6823001670, March 2, 1970), there are some GOG officers who have at minimum (A) talked up Cyprus

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limdis; Noforn. Repeated priority to Ankara and Athens.

2 Telegram 37841 to Nicosia, March 14, requested Embassy comments on the involvement of Greek officers and agents of the KYP in “double enosis” schemes. (Ibid.) In telegram 1245 from Athens, March 18, the Embassy responded to the Department’s query by suggesting that while the senior Greek leadership was committed to a negotiated resolution of the Cyprus situation, officers stationed on Cyprus were probably involved in plots against Makarios. (Ibid.) Intelligence Information Cable TDCS DB 315/01245–70, March 18, reported that Makarios was skeptical about Greek officers’ involvement in the attempts against him. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. 1 Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)

3 Not found.

4 Not found.
enosis and (B) been involved with National Front in manner that appears to constitute somewhat more than surveillance of its activities which could be considered a justifiable KYP assignment. Perhaps most compelling evidence of mainland officer activity contrary officially stated policy is to be seen in GOG FonMin Pipinelis’ comments to UK Ambassador Stewart (Athens 864).  

3. Evidence increasingly points to Georkadjis as man behind March 8 attempted assassination of Archbishop, even after bearing in mind Makarios’ transparent effort to cast Georkadjis as the villain in mind of Cypriot public. What is more difficult to establish is connection Georkadjis may or may not have had with mainland elements.

4. One report from a previously reliable GOC source received by DATT March 13 and transmitted to addressees as C–052 Mar 70 joins these two primary strands of prevalent suspicion by tying prominent junta officials into Georkadjis attempt and portraying the whole as part of coup plan against Papadopoulos. This is a tempting theory in that it would explain both paras (2) and (3) above. Indeed, Papadopoulos opponents may feel they can get at regime only by outside diversion (Cyprus). However, there seem many questionable elements to this thesis, e.g. why would disorder in Cyprus make junta more vulnerable instead of putting it more on its guard?

5. In short, we discern increasing evidence of Greek officer involvement in developments of last ten days. We believe these officers were pursuing some political objective looking toward creation of chaos in Cyprus as an avenue toward enosis with Greece and opposition to present Greek junta leadership. If their thinking went beyond this point—to the international consequences of an attempt to alter the political status of Cyprus—we have very little knowledge of it. We have no indication that double enosis was ever discussed with the Turks. Even if it had been, we seriously doubt Turks would be inclined to hook up with desperate, quixotic types involved here or would trust them to safeguard interests of Turk Cypriot community or of Turkey in probable bloody aftermath had attempt on Archbishop succeeded.

6. This is an unfolding scenario. Within a few days we expect to be able to evaluate more precisely the roles of the various players—dead and alive.

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5 Dated February 25, it reported on Papadopoulos’ meeting with the British Ambassador to Greece. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)

6 Not found.
Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

Cyprus—Recent Developments and Current Assessment

Recent Developments:

On March 8 as-yet unidentified assailants narrowly missed assassinating President Makarios when they peppered his helicopter with bullets as it took off from the Archbishopric in Nicosia. After the attempt, suspicion focused on former Interior Minister Polycarpous Georkadjis and a right-wing terrorist organization, the National Front. Makarios forced Georkadjis to resign his ministerial post in 1968 after the Greek Government implicated him in an abortive attempt to assassinate Prime Minister Papadopoulos. The National Front is a secret terrorist group that vehemently opposes Makarios’ policy of abandoning enosis (union with Greece) and negotiating with the Turkish Cypriots on the basis of a “feasible” (independent) solution to the Cyprus problem.

After being prevented by police from leaving Cyprus on March 13, Georkadjis was gunned down outside of Nicosia on March 15. The murderer or murderers have not been identified but the most plausible theory at this point suggests that co-conspirators in the Makarios assassination attempt were responsible for Georkadjis’ death.

Greco-Turkish Implications:

Since Turkish Cypriots are not suspected of involvement in either of the recent shootings, the impact on the volatile intercommunal situation has been marginal. The negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities are expected to continue although little progress is expected in view of the entrenched positions of the respective protagonists.

While Athens and Ankara are concerned over recent events, they appear determined to continue their commitment to resolving the Cyprus question peacefully through the local talks. In spite of a growing volume of evidence implicating mainland Greek military officers

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in Cyprus in the recent shootings, we believe that Papadopoulos government does not condone such activities and that it is taking steps to bring such dissidents to heel.

Outlook:

We expect Makarios to retain his preeminent position as political and spiritual leader of the Greek Cypriots and to continue to play a major role in the sensitive on-going negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots. For all his faults—and they are many—only he commands the overwhelming popular support that is a stabilizing factor within the Greek Cypriot community and a base from which compromise and flexibility are at least possible in the talks. In the longer run, however, his narrow escape will set a precedent and remove a psychological restraint on others with similar intentions.

The Georkadjis murder is likely to lead to more intracommunal bloodletting as loyal former EOKA henchmen seek vengeance for the slaying of their patron and leader. Again, however, although it cannot be completely ruled out, we do not foresee this violence spilling over to the Turkish Cypriot community which is still uninvolved in the gun-toting turmoil of the Greek Cypriot community.

U.S. Position:

We are monitoring events closely and encouraging Athens and Ankara to continue pursuing their positive approach to this problem. We see little benefit in actively inserting ourselves into the situation in Cyprus at this time. In fact, we would like to conserve our capital at this time since we may find more pressing occasions to spend it in the future.
Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Cyprus Affairs (Davis) and the Officer in Charge of United Nations Political Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)


SUBJECT

Possible Cyprus Coup: U.S. Options in UNSC

The following options would present themselves under the various circumstances of a coup d’etat in Cyprus.

1. Assumption: Coup d’etat engineered by Greek officers in Cyprus, with enosis as objective, but without Greek Government approval.

Under these circumstances, the Cyprus Government would very likely request Security Council action. It is conceivable, as suggested in Ankara’s 1633, that the Greek and Turkish Governments would join in such a request. In this situation U.S. support for the request for Security Council consideration would seem to be adequate to counter any similar Soviet request.

2. Assumption: Coup d’etat engineered by Greek officers in Cyprus, with enosis as objective, but with Greek Government approval.

In this contingency, Turkish military intervention would be almost inevitable. In the face of such developments, it would be desirable for the U.S. and the U.K. to move quickly for Security Council consideration, prior to any USSR request for a Security Council meeting. Presumably the Cyprus UN representative would in any event request UNSC action. Whether we and the British would join in a formal request for a meeting or simply support a Cypriot request would best be determined in light of the precise circumstances at the time.

3. Assumption: Cooperative action on the part of the Greek and Turkish Governments designed to bring about double enosis.

Once again the Cypriot Government could be expected to request Security Council action. Moreover the Soviet Union would probably

1 Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 74 D 139, Pol 26. Secret. Drafted by Jones and Torp (NEA/CYP) and sent through Davies.

2 In telegram 1633 from Ankara, March 19, the Embassy reported that Turkey had informed it of a Soviet démarche which laid blame for the attempt on Makarios on the Greek Government or its officers; that Turkey was receiving reports of planning for a coup against Makarios; and that the Greek Government had approached Turkey regarding joint action in the event of a coup attempt. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)
join in or strongly support such a request. In such circumstances we would wish to move quickly in support of a Cypriot request, or on our own initiative but in cooperation with the U.K., to request Security Council action in order to beat the Soviets to the punch.

The precise terms of any UNSC Resolution would, of course, have to be designed to meet the exact situation. However, in any of the above circumstances we would seek action critical of the coup d'état calling for the end to any hostilities or violence, urging peaceful settlement procedures, and perhaps providing for some specific immediate UN measures to assist in restoring peace. Unless the specifics of the developing situation make it impossible, both in terms of the realities of the situation on the ground and broader political considerations, we would seek both in direct talks with the parties and in the UN to have the status quo ante restored.

355. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, March 28, 1970, 0915Z.

481. Subject: Cyprus: Analysis of Current Situation.

1. Summary. March 8 attempt on Archbishop and March 15 murder of one of island’s key power figures have brought realignment of several elements in situation on Cyprus, affecting US interests. This tel analyzes changes that have taken place and seeks assess where we stand in regard future. Our conclusion is that normal conditions are being restored but that our position and prospects for intercommunal settlement may have been somewhat impaired.

2. Assassination Attempt/Georkadjis Murder: From his conversation with me March 26 (Nicosia 475) and many other indicators it quite clear Makarios has chosen line he will use for diplomatic and quasi-public (press) consumption: Georkadjis organized unsuccessful attempt on President’s life and was in turn eliminated by one or more of his co-plotters to prevent exposure. Greece was not involved although some involvement by disloyal individual mainland officers not...
to be entirely ruled out. However, role of “foreign forces” unclear (leav-
ing residue of ambiguity as to whether or not this could conceivably include Greece).

3. In fact, of course, situation with regard to assassination attempt and Georkadjis murder is anything but clear. Georkadjis does indeed appear responsible for attempt on President’s life, but where the lines go from him, if they go anywhere, remains to be proved.

4. GOG line, exemplified by its Embassy here, is that the plot stops with Georkadjis; no Greek officer did anything wrong; there certainly is no conspiracy tracing back to mainland. In reality we know that GOG suspects some of its officers misbehaved and is quietly investigating. If it finds traces of their associations with Georkadjis or improper eno-
sist activity—or more—it will certainly remove culprits unostenta-
tiously. Indeed we know (DATT C–072)\(^3\) that UN has already spotted a couple of mainland officer billets which seem to have been vacated recently without explanation.

5. Makarios doing his own quiet investigating, with different mo-
tives. He apparently has quite a lot of raw material to sift through in-
cluding evidence provided by his involuntary palace houseguest, Kyr-
riacos Patatakos, right hand man of Georkadjis during his last days, and
various Georkadjis memorabilia including 50 tape recordings. One of
President’s main objectives is certainly to root out all the domestic par-
ticipants in plot against him. Another is to uncover every possible trace
that may exist of mainland or other foreign involvement. He must try
to satisfy himself either that there was none or at least that it was in-
volvement of individuals unconnected with Athens. If any questions
remain unanswered, his suspicious nature will cause him calculate that
GOG or elements thereof may have been behind Georkadjis and that
there may be repetition of March 8. But even if he should uncover some-
thing, we doubt he would expose it or take any action that would bring
open clash with Greece. A falling-out could fatally impair military po-

tion of his government. More likely, he would hold information in
hope of someday using it against opponents.

6. Makarios’ Internal Position: All considered, Makarios standing
with his people about back where it was before March 8, or has even
perhaps slipped somewhat. Assassination attempt produced outpour-
ing of sentiment for him. However, this perhaps more than offset by
simple public distaste for fact that at Archbishop’s orders Georkadjis
was pulled off plane that would have taken him to self-exile and safety
and 36 hours later he was dead. Georkadjis was after all an authentic
EOKA hero in the struggle for Cypriot independence, and for eight

\(^3\) Not found.
years thereafter Makarios’ strong man in cabinet. Yet there was not a
word of sympathy or commemoration from the Presidential palace
when he was killed. UNCI POL has heard echoes of disapproval
around island. For the moment, this probably makes little difference
to Makarios, who has seen his most dangerous enemy disposed of, and
Glafcos Clerides, his only conceivable rival for presidency, compelled
to disown his own past association with Georkadjis and virtually to
suspend the activities of his own party.

7. Intercommunal Talks: Trauma of recent events has caused many
to re-examine fundamentals and conclude as do Pipinelis and Clerides,
among others, that a major corrosive factor leading up to recent events
was lack of progress in talks and frustrations produced thereby. Ergo,
these argue, as I did March 26 with Makarios, a decisive new push is
called for in weeks ahead. His answer indicated that some new sense
of momentum may be imparted and perhaps some small progress will
result. But we cannot honestly believe it will be very much. Events of
March have fortified conviction of Turks (Nicosia 393)\(^4\) that it would
be folly again place themselves under a Greek administration, and there
is not much chance that under present circumstances Makarios would
consider granting them degree of autonomy they seek. On GOC side,
we have noted weakening of Clerides, who has led voices of moder-
aton seeking to offer Turks reasonable compromise. With the Arch-
bishop, outside suggestions for greater flexibility have shed like water
from duck’s back in past and we see no particular reason why this
month’s happening will have changed his views substantially. Only
dim possibility is if he concludes GOG was in some way behind at-
ttempt on his life and judges he had better get moving lest in frustra-
tion the junta tries again. And even in this far out case his penchant
would be for manoeuvre rather than movement. Nevertheless, we are
inclined to believe that interested third parties must continue to ex-
probe every possible approach to an intercommunal accord.

8. Off island, Pipinelis speaks with conviction of this being time
for progress but we doubt his sentiments echoed in Ankara, which we
assume likely be more cautious in handling Cyprus problem, not less.

9. Soviets and Communists: Russians and their friends have been
both lucky and skillful. By adroit behind-scenes work, full extent of
which only beginning to come to light (e.g. Moscow 1344)\(^5\) and timely
propaganda they have asserted role as champions of independent
Cyprus (and to certain extent of Turkey) against suspected US–UK–
GOG machinations.

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\(^4\) Dated March 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 CYP)
\(^5\) Dated March 18; the Embassy reported the text of a Soviet statement on Cyprus.
(Ibid., POL 27 CYP)
10. From here, the scenario has probably not yet fully played itself out. Rational Cypriot oligarchy has firmly concluded that it patently nonsense to think US had anything to do with recent events. Makarios would have US believe he thinks so too. At same time, we expect he will opportunistically continue to keep open his options for public insinuation of unspecified foreign complicity, including US and UK. Communists are cleverly keeping alive public speculation about a past USG association with Georkadjis. This and their general propaganda line condition at least some of Cyprus public to credit charges that US and in broader sense NATO had some role.

11. Possibility of More Violence: Instinct tells most Cypriots with whom we in contact that a period of calm lies ahead. They approve Government’s apparently vigorous actions to disarm private armies. They aware that surviving captains of Georkadjis’ organization have acknowledged their dead leader’s part in attempt on Archbishop and have preached against revenge. At same time, no one has confidence that cycle of violence is at an end or that there will not be another attempt against President at some later stage.

12. Conclusion: In short, except in negative sense, there is little cause for satisfaction to US in what has happened or changes that have taken place over past weeks. Archbishop was not killed, and Greece and Turkey did not fall out. Talks will go on. But Clerides has been weakened; Turks and Turkey are more suspicious than ever; Soviets have made gains; USG is in minds of many identified in some nebulous way with Archbishop’s apparent would-be killer; NATO in general and Greece in particular are mildly suspect. This is not a situation in which we can expect easy progress toward a Cyprus solution. Our effort should be to minimize disruptive factors and work carefully in many quarters to move things slowly back in direction that advances our policy objectives, particularly progress in talks.

Popper
356. Letter From the Ambassador to Cyprus (Popper) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies)


[Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 74 D 139, Pol 17 US in Cyprus. Secret. 3 pages not declassified.]

357. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey

Washington, September 24, 1970, 0109Z.

156982. Subject: Cyprus: Greek and Turkish Influence in Intercommunal Talks. Ref: Nicosia 1671 and previous.

1. We note as described reftel and related messages from Athens and Ankara that phase 4 which envisioned package deal proposals for solution appears have little steam behind it and little chance of proving more successful than previous stages in talks. Principal reason obviously is unwillingness of either Greek Cypriots or Turk Cypriots to make compromises required if solution is to be found. Both not only appear believe time is on their respective sides but to prefer situation as it exists today rather than compromise their positions.

2. Athens and Ankara appear resigned to acceptance status quo for time being. Therefore although we appreciate analysis and recommendations contained Nicosia’s 1671 we do not feel this would be appropriate time to use US leverage to bring about Caglayan/Palamas meeting or to push for vigorous Greek/Turkish action, as we believe forcing a meeting at this time would not be beneficial. To contrary, our

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Davis on September 23; cleared by Cash and Vigderman and in substance by Feldman (IO/UNP); and approved by Davies. Repeated to USNATO, EUCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, London, and USUN.

2 Dated September 22, it reported that an “atmosphere of bleak pessimism” infected both the ethnic communities and the Embassies of Greece and Turkey on Cyprus and urged efforts to get the two “mother” states to promote movement toward a solution. (Ibid.) In telegram 5279 from Athens, September 23, Tasca endorsed these views. (Ibid.)
reaction is that GOG and GOT fully aware of dangers inherent in situation and remain committed to preventing deterioration. We would hope that with negotiations at this low point, however, all parties concerned will do some hard thinking without our intervention with possibility subsequent GOG/GOT discussions as they feel advisable.

3. On other hand, addressees should continue encourage concerned parties toward compromise and maintenance of positive attitude re continuation intercommunal negotiations. Rogers

3 In telegram 1699 from Nicosia, September 26, Popper suggested that one means available to the United States to forward its objectives was arranging a Nixon–Makarios meeting at which the President would urge movement toward a settlement. (Ibid.)

358. Letter From the Ambassador to Cyprus (Popper) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)

Nicosia, October 6, 1970.

Dear Joe:

It was a pleasure to see you in Naples and to see how well you were coping with the various trials and tribulations of the world’s most unsettled areas.

I know from my own talks with the other Ambassadors that the meeting with the President was a great morale builder. This was not only because the President was so obviously buoyant, relaxed, and thoroughly master of the situation. It was also because he listened

1 Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 74 D 139, Pol 17 US in Cyprus. Secret; Official–Informal. A notation on the letter indicates that Sisco, Davies, and Davis also saw it.

2 President Nixon visited Europe September 27–October 4. The meeting with the Ambassadors took place on September 30. No record of this conversation was found. Briefing papers, including a draft Presidential speech Nixon heavily underlined, are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 468, President’s Trip Files, Presidential Visit to NATO Headquarters (AFSOUTH), Naples, Italy. According to an October 6 letter from Popper to Davis, the Ambassador came away with a sense that the decision for a Nixon–Makarios meeting had already been made prior to his presentation. Popper had informed Makarios that approval was likely. (Ibid.)
so knowledgeably to each of us and took note of our particular concerns.

I was of course delighted to get the President’s indication that he would be seeing the Archbishop. Following up on the President’s questions, we are preparing a Talking Paper giving our ideas on the points which might be brought up in a Nixon–Makarios conversation.3

We are considering here just how the more visible presence of the US in the Eastern Mediterranean should affect our operations in Cyprus. The change brought about by the President’s visit and the movements of the Sixth Fleet is still too new to have produced any very obvious effect in Cyprus. This change coincides with evidence that the Soviets, on their side, are showing increased interest in Cyprus. When we have the results of the Archbishop’s trip to the US, we will want to analyze carefully the possibilities for a somewhat higher profile on the island. But we will of course be very careful not to jump the gun on this until we are sure that the circumstances are right.

Meanwhile, we will plug away at the old themes—urging serious pursuit of the intercommunal negotiations, more normalization and de-confrontation measures, and greater contacts between the two sides. We will also be looking into ways in which we can more effectively counteract local Communist influence and propaganda. This last is not easy, but it must be done.

All hands appreciate your letter of commendation in connection with the passage through Nicosia of hijacked aircraft passengers.4 We were fortunate to be able to help. This is certainly one case in which the work itself was its own reward.

Every good wish.

Sincerely yours,

Dave

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3 Transmitted in telegram 1758 from Nicosia, October 8. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)

4 Not found. Fighting between Palestinian and Jordanian forces broke out on August 26. Beginning on September 6, Palestinian terrorist units seized a series of Western airliners, flew them to Jordan and held crew and passengers hostage. Syria invaded Jordan in support of the Palestinians. By September 27 Jordan had succeeded in releasing the hostages, expelling the Syrians, and defeating the Palestinians. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–72, Documents 45–77.
Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

SUBJECT
Your Meeting with Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus

Background
The principal U.S. concerns in Cyprus have been: (1) that tension between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities not erupt and draw Greece and Turkey into war; (2) that the well organized Communist party not achieve predominance. As long as Makarios is there, the latter seems under control. But in 1964 and 1967 when Turkey was on the brink of invading Cyprus to protect the Turkish minority (20%), it was to a large extent the intervention of the U.S. President or his emissary which helped to resolve the crisis. The main purpose of this meeting is to establish a personal relationship—which Makarios has sought—as a basis for such future action if unhappily it should become necessary.

Director Helms also points out that Cyprus plays an increasingly important role as we search for friendly territory from which to support our Mid-East intelligence, communications and other efforts such as the U–2 flights monitoring the UAR standstill.

Makarios follows a non-aligned foreign policy but inclines toward the West. He speaks English well.

Issues Makarios May Raise

1. He may ask that the U.S. press Turkey to force more flexibility into the Turkish Cypriot line in the negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. [These talks began after the 1967 crisis to try to rewrite the constitution and devise a governmental structure so as to provide more workable guarantees for the rights of the Turkish minority. We have tried to stay out of the middle.]

2. Although Makarios acquiesced in our U–2 flights, the Cypriot press this week picked up the story that they are flying from the British sovereign base areas there. Makarios may cite it as a source of embarrassment.

2 A copy of Helms’s September 23 letter is ibid.
3 All brackets in the original.
Talking Points

1. I appreciate the opportunity to establish personal ties. These have been important in times of past crisis. I also value the views of a non-aligned leader who understands the Western view of the world.

2. Your Beatitude appreciates our concern over Soviet presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and our hope that Cyprus will maintain its independent and non-aligned stance. The main objective of the U.S. vis-à-vis the USSR is to achieve a balance which will permit the nations of the area to make peace and to enjoy freedom from external domination.

3. I appreciate your government’s facilitating reception of the hijacking hostages and cooperation in “helping us with our peace initiative” [a delicate way to refer to our U-2 flights]. We will continue our efforts to get peace talks started. We negotiated a basis for talks last summer, but that has been undercut.

4. The negotiations between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities on Cyprus are for President Makarios and his countrymen to work out. The U.S. cannot help but have a concern for their successful outcome—both because of our desire to see violence avoided among our friends and because of the importance of a stable Cyprus to the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean. I am counting on Your Beatitude’s wisdom to achieve a positive result.

5. I appreciate removal of Cypriot ships from trade with North Vietnam. Trade with Cuba remains a continuing concern of the United States and I hope that it may be possible for Cyprus to reduce its involvement in that commerce. These restrictions are both important to U.S. policy. [The U.S. has pressed persistently for the removal of ships flying the Cypriot flag from the North Vietnam trade (successfully) and from their growing involvement in the Cuban trade (65% of non-Communist shipping).]

Secretary Irwin’s memo is attached. Its main points are reflected above.

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4 Attached but not printed. The President met with Makarios on October 25. See Document 360.
360. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 25, 1970, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The President opened the conversation by giving background on his offices in the White House and Executive Office Building. He then turned to substance.

The President said, “We follow your development with great sympathy. We understand your foreign policy of technical neutrality.” Archbishop Makarios replied “Because of our geography and our peculiar conditions we follow a non-aligned policy but by history and tradition and conviction we belong to the West. We are not like other non-aligned countries that are really pro-east. At the Belgrade conference of non-aligned countries we defended the Western point of view so much that I was afraid we would lose our non-aligned status.”

The President said he hoped that the Middle East would not explode. He appreciated Cyprus being made available as a staging place during the evacuation of the airline hijacking hostages from Jordan. Archbishop Makarios responded that Cyprus was always available for any peaceful purpose in the area. He added that while, of course, he was strongly for peace in the Middle East it was important to understand the Israeli point of view. Israel felt extremely threatened.

The President then said, “We are working very hard to get the ceasefire extended and eventually to get talks started,” and asked for the Archbishop’s advice. Makarios said, “I don’t give advice to the President of the United States. However, peace in the Middle East will take time. First, some Arab countries disagree with the initiative for domestic reasons; these are usually countries far away. Second, the U.S. proposal provides a good and fair basis for a settlement. However, in your desire for a settlement you may have been too pro-Arab and therefore may have emboldened them too much. The crisis would be more easily settled if the two super-powers would agree.” The President

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2 See footnote 3, Document 358.
added: “Still the moral influence of small countries is important. We are grateful for your support of the decent principles in the West.”

Makarios commented, “Some people feel we are moving left. Of course, Communists exploit every problem but we will not become like Cuba, partly because Cypriots are a deeply religious people.” The President said, “The tragedy in the world is the flight from religion. You can’t fight Communism with materialism.”

Makarios said, “People who are for Communists are not necessarily the pro-Communists. They don’t know what Communism is. For example, I had banned atheists from the voting rolls and a Communist had protested to me that he was not an atheist. Most Cypriots think it means improving life, but the main thing to remember is that Communists support me because I am popular; I don’t support them to become popular; I have never appointed a left-wing person to any significant post. They support me because they can’t do otherwise and I accept their support because it is a good way of keeping them under control. The simple people of Cyprus have more confidence in me than in anybody. I don’t rely on the army or on the police force; my strength is my goodness. I am Archbishop for life, and the fact that I don’t particularly want to continue as President makes me stronger.”

Makarios commented that the U.S. Ambassador to his country “is an excellent person.” The President said, “I want very close relations.” In response to Makarios’ remark that Cyprus was one of the smallest countries in the world, the President said, “But it has a wise leader.”

Makarios then spoke about his plans to visit Japan and about his education at Boston University where he had had to interrupt his studies to return to Cyprus for the independence struggle. He noted that “They brought me back, even thought I didn’t have the degree, to get an honorary degree.”
361. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, December 1, 1970.

SUBJECT
The Cyprus Situation

Early last month we reported that intercommunal tension between Greek and Turk Cypriots had been mounting, primarily because of recent hardening in the Cypriot government’s attitude toward the Turks. Our Embassy in Nicosia continues to report that Makarios is assuming a “steadily more defiant attitude.” In a recent speech, the Archbishop—who has hitherto refrained from acknowledging deadlock in the talks—openly blamed Turkish intransigence for the stalemated talks, asserted that he had reached the limit of his concessions to the Turkish Cypriots and claimed that, on no account, would he accept a solution imposed from the outside.

Two explanations have been suggested:

1. Ambassador Popper feels that Makarios may have simply concluded that the Turk position is at a disadvantage and that the governments of Greece and Turkey are too preoccupied with domestic matters to bother about Cyprus. Additionally, the Archbishop may feel bolstered by whatever international recognition and acceptance he earned as a result of his high-level contacts during his recent travel abroad.

2. An alternative explanation is that Makarios is simply taking a hard line to deflect right-wing enosists during the trial of those associated with the assassination attempt on him last summer.

On the Turk Cypriot side, their gloom and frustration has been increased by the government’s apparent harder stand, a situation which could erupt into some more violent measures on their part. They continue to believe that little progress is in store for them as long as Makarios—whom they believe wants to retain the status quo—is on the scene.

Operationally, this problem resolves itself into the fact that the issue will be discussed on the sidelines at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels with an eye to urging the Greeks and Turks both to try to help keep the lid on with their respective clients. The British have

told us that they will press discussion of the subject with Turk Foreign Minister Caglayangil at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels, and Secretary Rogers will speak to both Caglayangil and Palamas. However, both U.S. and UK agree these approaches should be low-key.

2 The meeting took place December 2–5 in Brussels. No record of bilateral discussions of Cyprus was found.

362. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, February 6, 1971, 0740Z.

201. Subject: Cyprus: Makarios Takes Hard Line on Intercommunal Problem.

1. At the end of my Feb 3 meeting with President Makarios I told him that on return to US for consultation I would like to carry back with me his latest thinking on general status of intercommunal problem. Speaking personally, it seemed to me Archbishop could look to future in two different ways. On one hand, he could conclude that with all its faults, existing situation was best that could be obtained from Greek Cypriot standpoint. This would mean dragging intercommunal negotiations on indefinitely, and hoping that in course of time through superior numbers, talent and economic strength, Govt might gradually consolidate its control of entire island.

2. I said that while this course had advantages, it also entailed serious dangers. Intercommunal peace could never be assumed: any incident or irresponsible act might lead to violence. No one could guarantee that destabilizing developments would not cause trouble either from inside or outside country. Moreover, over time, Turk Cypriot provisional administration seemed to be slowly consolidating its position. All in all, status quo was bound to have a fragile foundation.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USNATO, EUCOM, USDCOSOUTH, and USUN.

2 Reported in telegram 187 from Nicosia, February 4. (Ibid.) Popper also held meetings with Clerides, reported in telegram 225 from Nicosia, February 9; with Denktash and Inhan, reported in telegram 237 from Nicosia, February 11; and with Panayotakos, reported in telegram 224 from Nicosia, February 11. (All ibid.)
3. In these circumstances I suggested Archbishop might well take advantage of his current position of strength, within his own community and generally, to follow an alternative course: i.e., to make an extraordinary effort now to reach intercommunal agreement. Turk Cypriot side had agreed that Cyprus should be unitary state. Denktash had been talking to Clerides in terms of “image of partnership”; to me this meant that it might be possible by cosmetic means to satisfy Turk Cypriots without bifurcating central govt authority. If Greek Cypriot side could give Turk Cypriots some kind of voice at central govt level which would not impair functioning of central govt on majority basis within limits of constitutional guarantees for Turk Cypriots, then it might be possible to reunite all Cypriots under GOC control. Was this not, I concluded, the more desirable objective for him and for Cyprus in longer terms?

4. Archbishop’s reply was that, since he did not want violence and did not believe that Turk Cypriots did, he would be prepared to tolerate present de facto situation for a long time to come. It was far from ideal, but GOC could live with it. He was not willing to pay price demanded by Turk Cypriots to move toward intercommunal settlement. He simply would not agree to anything which could lead to partition, cantonization or federalism. Turk Cypriots could have local autonomy in form offered by Clerides, or they could have representation in executive branch of central govt in form of vice president and some ministers, but they could not have both. He could defend local autonomy proposal since it could be said that Turk Cypriots were already exercising local autonomy. But he would make no further concessions because he thought Turk Cypriots were trying to whittle down Greek side’s position bit by bit. Turk Cypriots would have to choose among alternatives as he had just outlined them.

5. I came back to “image of partnership” concept and said that surely some way would have to be found for Turk Cypriot community to have a voice, though not a veto, at central govt level. Archbishop was very firm: if Turk Cypriots obtained local autonomy, they could not be represented as a community in central executive. They would elect members to House of Representatives, but would have no vice president and no Turk Cypriot community representative in Council of Ministers. I closed conversation by saying that I frankly did not see much possibility of progress in intercommunal talks unless this position was changed—in ways in which I thought GOC could well afford to move.

6. **Comment:** This is hardest official version of GOC position I have heard. We must assume Archbishop wants us to believe he would rather go on indefinitely as at present than make any substantial concession to produce an intercommunal settlement. His attitude may be the upshot of his difficulties in contending with Greek Cypriot right-wing extremists. More probably, it is only latest reflection of his
consistent and stubborn refusal to approach intercommunal problem in magnanimous spirit which could lead to agreement. Conclusion we reach is that progress toward settlement is unlikely in absence of very strong internal or external pressures. We see no evidence that such pressures will be generated in near future, unless GOG–GOT dialogue develops in that direction.

Popper

363. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, March 15, 1971, 1155Z.


Ref: Nicosia 362, 237; A–07.2

1. My conversations with Clerides and Denktash in last week have thrown into sharper relief what we consider fundamental point of difference between Greek and Turk Cypriots in intercommunal negotiations: the ultimate locus of decision-making authority for settlement of intercommunal differences.

2. As previously reported, Denktash has responded to Clerides’ Nov 30 plan providing for local Turk Cypriot authority at village and area level by suggesting it be supplemented by exercise of Turk Cypriot community authority at central govt level. He has introduced series of alternative proposals with this objective. Common feature of all of these is that in last analysis intercommunal problems must be “coordinated,” probably by Greek President and Turk Cypriot Vice President acting together to maintain “partnership,” which (as contrasted with “minority rights”) GOT and Turk Cypriots say is sine qua non of a satisfactory constitutional settlement.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USNATO, EUCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, and USUN.

2 In telegram 362 from Nicosia, March 4, the Embassy reported on the Ambassador’s March 2 talk with Denktash. (Ibid.) Telegram 237 from Nicosia, February 11, reported on Popper’s February 11 discussion with Denktash and Inhan. (Ibid.) Airgram A–7 from Nicosia, January 16, reported Clerides’ views. (Ibid., POL 15–5 CYP)

3 Not further identified.
3. The word “coordination” in this context entails a requirement for agreement by the two sides. This seems to us to amount to a demand for a Turk Cypriot community veto in specific fields. Existence of such a veto under London-Zurich Constitution, though for different range of subjects, had been major factor in 1963 constitutional breakdown. Early in intercommunal talks Denktash renounced London-Zurich veto; now he seems to have reintroduced concept.

4. Denktash’s latest version central intercommunal institutional structure provides for creation of central authorities of local govt by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, with representatives of these authorities to coordinate settlement of intercommunal problems. When Clerides objected on Mar 8 that this involved formation of “govt within a govt” and that structure was not connected with existing central govt machinery, Denktash said he had suggested that the two authorities report to President and Vice President respectively. Alternatively, he proposed that joint secretariats drawn from officials of various ministries could act as a standing committee for all local govt matters and advise President and Vice President.

5. Current status is that Clerides has told Denktash he thinks latter’s proposals involve a veto, and that each man has said ball is in other’s court to make further proposals. Denktash has told us (Nicosia 362) that where agreement between President and Vice President could not be reached, courts would be asked to rule, applying constitutional provisions which would spell out Turk Cypriot rights. Clerides’ rejoinder is that, while human rights cases may be susceptible to judicial determination, local improvement and development projects involving allocation of funds and resources, as well as other types of contentious political issues, are not. Discussion has stalled at this point.

6. Clerides has made logical point that failure under Denktash proposals to create a single decision-making authority is inconsistent with agreement by all parties, including GOT and Turk Cypriots, that there should be a unitary govt in Cyprus. When I pressed Denktash on this matter, he took line “unitary govt” meant a govt of the London-Zurich type, which included concept of veto. To Greek Cypriots, this means Turk Cypriots are demanding 50–50 partnership in most critical area of dispute.

7. We have felt that 18 percent Turk Cypriot minority cannot realistically expect to enjoy such privileges; indeed, Turk Cypriots appeared to have abandoned them in agreeing in 1968 to renounce London-Zurich vetoes and in accepting idea of unitary state. We believe Turk Cypriot community must have a strong voice, but not a veto, at the center—that in last analysis govt must be able to make necessary decisions. Rights of Turk Cypriot community would have to be preserved by guarantees: internal, through constitutional provisions and
recourse to courts wherever possible; external, through maintenance at least temporarily of mainland Greek and Turkish army contingents in Cyprus, treaty guarantees like those of London-Zurich agreements, and provision for a UN or other channel to receive and handle allegations concerning denial of human or community rights.

8. I will continue to explore with the protagonists the implications of Denktash’s proposals, in order to determine whether any further progress can be made. This will at least make underlying issue quite clear and may help to set stage for new mediation effort, which we foresee looming up as intercommunal negotiators eventually conclude they have reached end line in their talks.

Popper

364. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, April 13, 1971, 1511Z.

1764. Subj: Cyprus: Greek-Turkish Bilateral Agreement. Ref: Athens 1630.2

1. I asked Palamas flatly today whether Greece and Turkey intended to negotiate agreement on Cyprus, pointing out that experience had seemed to show that continuation of intercommunal talks best present approach to Cyprus problem. Palamas said that Makarios in fact wanted no agreement, and his intemperate talk about enosis could only be harmful. If no agreement could be reached through intercommunal talks, Greece and Turkey would have to look for other solution. In fact, present situation one of de facto partition. Alternatives were return to London-Zurich agreements, which Makarios had already rejected, agreement through intercommunal talks, which Makarios refused to allow to succeed, or continuation of present de facto partition. However, as Pipinelis has made clear, in deadlock of this kind, with its inherent dangers, Governments of Greece and Turkey could not stand idly by.

2. I observed that bilateral Greek-Turkish agreement unlikely to be accepted by Makarios who had big potential for causing trouble.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Limdis; Noform. Repeated to Ankara and Nicosia.

2 Dated April 7; the Embassy reported on a conversation with Chorafas who hinted that Greece and Turkey were considering bilateral talks on Cyprus. (Ibid.)
Palamas said that basically any agreement reached by Turkey and Greece should be acceptable to Cypriot population who most involved. I reiterated my concern and noted that if Governments of Turkey and Greece able to reach far-reaching agreement of this kind, they should seek to exert such influence as they had to assure the success of the intercommunal talks.

3. In reply to my query, Palamas said he looked quite favorably upon new Turkish Government which he considered quite capable, referring specifically to the new prime and foreign ministers. He disagrees with opinion expressed by Greek Cypriots that this government would be more difficult to deal with on Cyprus issue. Palamas said GOG seeks to broaden basis of relations between the two governments, which now as in past continue to express themselves to too great a degree through the Cyprus issue.

4. Comment: While I doubt Governments of Greece and Turkey will reach an agreement in near future over Makarios’ head, situation clearly calls for renewed effort to push intercommunal talks. While Ambassador Popper can undoubtedly shed light on this point, I can hardly believe that Makarios would take an agreement involving double enosis without fierce resistance with, at the present time, unforeseeable consequences. On the other hand, the Prime Minister here attaches great importance to good relations between Greece and Turkey because of the Soviet threat, and he wishes to get the Cyprus issue removed as the determinant of relations between the two countries. It is clear that bilateral talks have taken place over Cyprus and will continue in future. We are analyzing in separate cable political implications in Greece of an effort to achieve bilateral settlement. We would be interested in Ankara’s and Nicosia’s views on this subject.4

5. Request addressees give fullest protection to this information and source.

Tasca

3 On March 12 the Turkish military intervened to force the resignation of Prime Minister Demirel. Nihat Erim formed a multi-party coalition government on April 7.

4 In telegram 655 from Nicosia, April 24, Popper commented: “I believe Amb. Tasca is absolutely right in urging caution regarding any rash Greek-Turkish bilateral action which would result in Makarios precipitating a new Cyprus crisis. At the same time, since Greece and Turkey are obviously going to step up their bilaterals on Cyprus . . . situation demands we seek to induce Athens and Ankara to focus their talks on ways and means of producing some progress in Cyprus intercommunal negotiations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP) In telegram 2608 from Ankara, April 16, Handley commented that Erim’s government would be more active on Cyprus issues and was conducting a policy review. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 392, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)
365. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, April 27, 1971, 2207Z.


1. We agree with your succinct analysis that our major Cypriot objective is solution which will remove Cyprus as point of contention between Greece and Turkey, thus ensuring latter’s cooperation within NATO and maintenance of our security position in Eastern Mediterranean.

2. For accomplishment this objective we believe solution to intercommunal problem must be one acceptable to both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. It should not be assumed as Palamas has suggested that whatever is acceptable to Greece and Turkey would be acceptable to two communities. Attempt to bring about solution contrary to wishes of either community could set off crisis resulting in very Greco-Turkish confrontation which we have been striving to avoid since 1960.

3. We believe that Athens and Ankara do have substantial role to play in working out solution acceptable to Cypriots and that Greco-Turkish discussions parallel to intercommunal talks would be acceptable to both communities, if it is clear from beginning that intention of Athens and Ankara is to facilitate Cypriot negotiated settlement. In this connection we note that Pres Makarios during April 23 meeting with Amb Popper (Nicosia 646) indicated he would find such discussions acceptable.

4. As you have noted, in addition to parties referred to above other elements within and outside Cyprus occupy important positions vis-à-vis implementation of solution. This includes of course the 30 percent of Greek Cypriot population which adheres to Communist Party, and which would have considerable potential for troublemaking should search for solution appear to be for other than an independent Cyprus.

5. Your further thoughts and those of other addressees welcome, especially in context current policy review (State 069411).

Irwin

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Davis; cleared by Cash, Churchill, and Curran (S/S); and approved by Davies. Repeated to Nicosia and Ankara.

2 Dated April 23; the Embassy suggested that the major U.S. objective was to prevent Cyprus from becoming a point of contention between Greece and Turkey, thus ensuring Turkey’s cooperation with NATO and security in the Eastern Mediterranean. (Ibid.)

3 Ibid.

4 Dated April 23; in it the Department outlined a program to review Cyprus contingency plans and requested Embassy comments. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1–1 CYP-US)
366. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, May 11, 1971, 1153Z.

744. Subj: Cyprus: Intercommunal Talks. Ref: State 78126.²

1. It may be natural for us on the scene to be more impressed with new potentialities for trouble in Cyprus than others. Nevertheless, we believe Cyprus situation has materially changed since advent of Erim govt.³

2. What is new is that Govt’s vigorous assertion that it will give intercommunal talks one last clear chance. If as Turks expect this produces no agreement, talks would presumably be broken off and other measures starting with enhanced separate status for Turk Cypriot community, with Turkish support, would follow.

3. This may be only war of nerves technique, but on a “worst case” planners’ basis we think it must be taken with some seriousness. Turks have not merely resumed square one position, as Deptel asserts; they have thrown up prospect of a Cyprus without the stabilizing presence of the intercommunal talks—a new situation as compared with the status since Spring 1968. If Greeks and Greek Cypriots do not respond in some way to Turk demands, it will be difficult for Turks not to follow through on their threats.

4. We are not predicting dire developments in the short term. But we do think that urging all concerned to keep the talks going—which is obviously right as far as it goes—will not in itself prove sufficient in the longer run. Contingencies and options paper lays out various courses of possible action which merit re-examination in light of changed circumstances.

5. Paras 3 and 4 State 78126 suggest that no one except possibly Turk Cypriots would see advantage in breaking off intercommunal negotiations, and that GOT could control them. We agree GOC/GOG have much to gain from keeping talks in being indefinitely, in belief

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USNATO, EUCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, and USUN.

² Dated May 6, 1971; ibid.

³ In a May 4 letter to Sisco, Popper commented: “Over the last six months we here have been of the belief that the existing de facto situation in Cyprus could be prolonged for months, or even years: Makarios clearly wanted that way and a weak and preoccupied Turkish Government did not seem able to stir up any trouble by decisive action. The Erim Government has changed all this. It speaks with a voice which is at once far more knowledgeable and technically more proficient than its predecessor, and with a vigor that has been quite lacking on the Turkish side since intercommunal talks started.” (Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 75 D 41, Pol 17 US in Cyprus)
that Turk Cypriot community will gradually crumble. This GOT is now saying it is determined to exclude developments which would lead to talks’ collapse, through chain of events in which either side might take the decisive step.

Popper

367. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers


Cyprus

We have received reliable information that the Turkish Government has abandoned its three-year policy of relying on the intercommunal talks in Cyprus to bring about a solution of the problem there and are instead looking toward a negotiated solution based on partition of the island between Greece and Turkey (double enosis). You will be briefed separately on the intelligence information which leads us to this conclusion. As you know Ankara and Athens are now moving toward a Greco/Turkish dialogue aimed at resolving the Cyprus problem. We have stressed to both Governments that their discussions should be supportive to the on-going Cypriot intercommunal talks.

Double enosis has long been Turkey’s preferred solution to the Cyprus problem, for it would not only insure the status of the Turkish-Cypriot minority on the island, but would also permit the basing of Turkish troops in Cyprus and thus resolve their security concerns. The Greek Government has from time to time favored this solution as well, but in general has failed to push the double enosis solution. The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, are very strongly opposed to partition and double enosis. They have successfully resisted prior attempts to resolve the Cyprus problem on these grounds.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Long and Davis and concurred in by Churchill, Cash, and Davies. Sisco did not initial the memorandum and a note on another copy indicates it was not sent to the Secretary. (Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 75 D 41, Pol 1–1 Contingency Planning)

2 Not further identified.
We believe that President Makarios, with the full support of the Greek Cypriots, will react vigorously if he suspects that the Ankara/Athens dialogue is designed not to play a supportive role to the intercommunal talks, but rather to formulate a double enosis solution which would then be imposed upon the Cypriots. The Turkish Government has been unable to accept the fact that the Greek Cypriots are the controlling factor in this situation in that the Greek Government cannot force the Greek Cypriots to accept a solution which is so basically opposed to their policy aims. In the event that such an imposition is attempted, the Greek Cypriots could foment a crisis on the island, knowing that the great powers would be forced to intervene unilaterally and through the UN and would probably return the situation to the status quo ante.

In the next few days, we will be taking action here and in the capitals to strongly re-state our basic policy line that the only viable solution to the Cyprus problem is one agreed on by the Cypriots themselves, that intercommunal talks seriously engaged in by both parties represent the most feasible means to achieve such a solution, that the Greco/Turkish dialogue can be helpful only if it plays a supportive role to the intercommunal talks, and that imposed solutions are not feasible. We will be asking you to take this line with the Greeks and Turks at the NATO Ministerial Meeting next month.

368. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers


Background Information on the Cyprus Issue

Since early 1968, the Turk and Greek communities have been engaged in a long and difficult series of discussions designed to reach a new constitutional arrangement for the island. These talks were initiated

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Long on May 26 and concurred in by Davis, Cash, Churchill, Floyd (EUR/RPM) and Van Hollen (NEA). A notation on the memorandum indicates that Sisco signed it. Eliot sent a copy to the White House on May 27. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin–Kissinger, 1971, Vol. V)
after the serious crisis which erupted late in 1967. Our primary interest in Cyprus is to achieve a Cypriot solution which will remove Cyprus as a bone of contention between our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.

The basic constitutional question which stubbornly resists resolution is the conflict between Turk-Cypriot demands for bi-communal autonomy and Greek-Cypriot demands for a unitary government within which the Turkish minority would be guaranteed fairly extensive civil rights. Neither party, nor their respective “parent countries,” have budged from these basic stances. As a result, there have been no constitutional breakthroughs in the intercommunal talks, during the three years they have been underway. The negotiators from time to time have been forced to concentrate on less basic issues (e.g. partial refugee resettlement, freedom of movement between the two communal areas, and dismantling of quasi-military barricades).

There are now danger signs that mounting frustration on both sides may bring about complete impasse in the talks, and thus threaten renewed intercommunal strife. There are also intelligence indications, reported to you separately, that the new Turkish Government under Prime Minister Erim has come to the conclusion that partition and double enosis (annexation of the two parts to Turkey and Greece) represent the best solution to the Cyprus problem. The Turks are seeking a direct dialogue with Greece to discuss the future of Cyprus and will be meeting with the Greeks in this connection at the NATO Ministerial.

We believe, and are emphasizing with the Greeks and Turks, that the Cypriot intercommunal negotiations continue to represent the best procedure for resolving the Cyprus problem. We believe a Greco/Turkish dialogue could serve a useful supportive role if restricted to giving new impetus and breathing new life into the Cypriot negotiations.

In the meantime we are consulting with our concerned Ambassadors in the interest of sharpening our contingency studies, and in Brussels have shared our apprehension with the Secretary General at NATO. Brosio also believes that the only practical approach to the problem is to plug away at the intercommunal talks, and will so stress at Lisbon in conversations with Olcay and Palamas.
369. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

Washington, June 4, 1971, 2104Z.

100122. Subject: Cyprus: Review of Contingencies and Options.

Refs: (A) State 90020; (B) Nicosia 826; (C) Ankara 3781; (D) Athens 2733; (E) State 88843; (F) USNATO 2291; (G) State 88485; (H) Moscow 3311; (I) State 88810; (J) USUN 1411.2

1. We wish to commend all action addressees for their excellent responses to our request for a “no-holds-barred” review of selected options on Cyprus. Result has been extremely useful and thought-provoking series of cables which have been of great value to us. Following summarizes results of this review, with comments on situation as we see it.

2. All seem agreed that although intercommunal talks in danger, they will probably continue through summer months. Continuing stalemate in talks, however, appears to have induced Turkish side to cast about for alternative to status quo which works against them. One such alternative is now being explored—a direct dialogue with Greece as a means of breaking the impasse. This dialogue itself as it gets underway may produce (a) nothing, (b) referral for consideration

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Noforn; Exdis. Drafted by Davis and Long; cleared in NEA, INR, EUR, and S/S; and approved by Sisco. Sent to Ankara, Nicosia, Athens, Moscow, USNATO, and USUN. Repeated to London, EUCOM, and USDOCOSOUTH.

2 In telegram 90020, May 21, the Department of State requested the three Embassies’ (Ankara, Athens, Nicosia) thinking on ways to proceed with the Cyprus issue given the dangerous stalemate on Cypriot intercommunal talks. The Department believed, despite rising frustration on all sides, that the talks were the best solution. In telegram 826 from Nicosia, May 21, the Embassy expressed pessimism about the outcome of intercommunal talks and suggested the United States should be prepared to seek an accommodation with the Soviet Union on the Cyprus issue at the United Nations. In telegram 3781 from Ankara, May 29, the Embassy suggested encouraging dialogue between Athens and Ankara with the option of U.S. mediation if the dialogue matured. In telegram 2733 from Athens, June 3, the Embassy, while agreeing with Nicosia’s outlook, suggested a low profile approach while waiting for developments in Greek-Turkish discussions and the intercommunal talks. The Department, in telegram 88843, May 20, requested the three Embassies’ comments on policy in the event of a breakdown of intercommunal talks and joint Greek-Turkish efforts to divide Cyprus. Telegram USNATO 2291 from Brussels, May 22, reported Brosio’s views on Cyprus. In telegram 88455 to multiple posts, May 20, the Department commented on possible Soviet reaction to the breakdown of intercommunal talks. In telegram 3511 (not 3311) from Moscow, May 26, the Embassy assessed likely factors in a Soviet response to a renewed Cyprus crisis. In telegram 88810, May 20, the Department requested the three Embassies’ comments regarding the impact of the breakdown of intercommunal talks. In telegram 1411 from USUN, May 27, the U.S. Delegation reported on the attitude of UN member states toward Cyprus. (All ibid.)
by communities of points of agreement reached between Greece and Turkey, or (c) agreement to attempt a dynamic solution through pressure on Makarios and the GOC, perhaps looking toward double enosis.

3. Should Greece and Turkey decide on latter following would appear to be most likely result, dependent on nature and extent of pressure: Significant portions of Greek Cypriot community (Makarios, right-wing total enosisists, and AKEL) would oppose the move despite Greek pressures to accept it and could probably prevent a swift, painless accomplishment of Greco/Turkish objective. This would in all likelihood activate international community in face of probable Cyprus crisis.

4. We note your unanimity of opinion that it would not be in USG’s interest if such contingency came to pass, i.e., dynamic solution such as double enosis could not be easily imposed and an attempt to do so would almost surely result in another crisis, which would (a) draw Soviets into Cyprus situation more deeply than ever before, (b) expose our Greek and Turkish allies to intense pressure for public retreat, and (c) place US in position in which high expenditure of political capital and an alienation of one or more of parties would likely result.

5. **Comment:** From your analyses, which closely parallel our own, it clear that it is in interest USG to forestall such a contingency, but without alienating Greece or Turkey and without slamming door to possible alternatives to exclusive reliance on deadlocking intercommunal talks. Thus, USG should encourage Greco/Turkish dialogue—but as a means to help breathe new life into intercommunal talks, not as replacement for them. We should make our view clear to Athens and Ankara but in positive sense of supporting a dialogue supportive to intercommunal talks, rather than in negative sense of coming down against any particular Greco/Turkish agreement or action at this stage. Since dialogue probably will take some months to mature and we should be able to gauge its progress, no action on our part at the moment other than continuation of present stance would either be necessary or helpful.

6. Some discussion was also carried out in reflets as to actions USG might consider relative to mediation effort or use of Nicosia’s constitutional compromise proposals (A–31, 1970).\(^3\) Consensus would appear to be that time is not right for either US, UN, or third-party mediation. We agree with assessment that present situation is such that mediation

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\(^3\) Dated March 3, 1970; in it the Embassy discussed the constitutional organization of Cyprus. (Ibid., POL 15–5 CYP)
would likely fail. Basic prevailing conditions will have to change before it will be possible to bump one or both of communities from their bedrock positions. In our view, Greco/Turkish dialogue will present best means for imparting such movement.

7. We expect to have contingency/options exercise completed within next days and will be sending you results. Exercise has benefitted materially from your efforts.4

Irwin

4 Further comments on contingencies were forwarded to the Department in telegram 929 from Nicosia, June 7, and in telegram 2799 from Athens, June 7. (Both ibid., POL 27 CYP)

370. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1

Nicosia, June 4, 1971, 0755Z.


1. Summary: For reasons not yet entirely clear but presumably related to Archbishop’s current trip to Moscow,2 GOC has decided complain formally about alleged pro-Turkish bias of US policy toward Cyprus. In preliminary response we have strongly rebutted.

2. Over past month FonOff DirGen Veniamin has obliquely referred to unspecified “unsatisfactory” Embassy action vis-à-vis Turkish community and said he would be calling us in to review these in their totality. On June 3 Veniamin did call in DCM and made following formal oral presentation “at request of President Makarios and FonMin Kyprianou”:

3. Veniamin began by listing several instances of Embassy contacts with Turkish community in Cyprus which in the aggregate, he asserted, lent support to Turkish efforts win recognition for their administration as in some way legal and permanent. Veniamin chronicled

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USNATO, EUCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, and USUN.

2 June 2–9.
Agricultural Attaché visits to “self-styled” Agriculture Minister Plumer; donation of books to union of Turkish Cypriot architects and engineers “without intention to do so having been previously communicated to FonMin”; donation of medical books to six Turkish hospitals “which are illegal,” again without prior information to GOC; donation of books to “self-styled” DefMin Orek for use of his “Ministry”; designation of Second Secretary Arthur Giese in TCPA Information Bulletin as American Embassy officer “responsible for Turkish Cypriot administration”; call on TCPA member for education Suha by Giese and his replacement Michael Austrian—“without prior call by latter on GOC MinEd”; invitations extended by US DefAtt to May 27 “dinner” to GOC DefMin Komodromos, to Orek also as MinDef and to General Tanyar as Deputy Commander of Cyprus Army—“a force which no longer has status.” (Note: this last was not a dinner but large reception for US Armed Forces Day. To such receptions, in keeping with our position that constitutional situation is frozen until solution reached we always invite GOC officials and such few Turks as held constitutional positions between 1960 and 1963. Customarily Turks do not appear because of presence of officials representing “illegal” GOC. In this case neither Komodromos nor Orek came. Tanyar did, but in Turkish not Cyprus army uniform.)

4. Veniamin then referred to USG use of term “unified” instead of “unitary” Cyprus on three occasions: Ziegler’s statement at time of Makarios’ visit;3 Amb Phillips’ address to Security Council at Dec 1970 meeting on UNFICYP renewal,4 and statement of Amb Bush at similar May 26 meeting.5 Veniamin said US is only country in world to use word unified rather than unitary and implications of this seem clear; USG obviously has in mind the imposition of a federal system on Cyprus.

5. Wrapping up this catalog, Veniamin said GOC forced conclude that USG has decided propitiate Turkey at expense of duly constituted Govt of Cyprus for reasons of military expediency. Despite GOC’s high regard for USG and value it attaches to US friendship, it has been subjected by US to “pressures and provocations” and is a “victim of appeasement.” With specific regard to intercommunal talks, USG has pressed GOC concede more and more to Turks without urging matching concessions from them.

4 For text, see Department of State Bulletin, January 11, 1971, pp. 70–71.
5 For text, see ibid., June 28, 1971, pp. 842–843.
6. Veniamin repeated that démarche had been long in preparation and was being presented at personal instruction of Makarios. We should not think its timing related in any way to President’s current visit to Moscow. Amb Rossides being instructed make parallel presentation to Dept.⁶

7. DCM said he would convey details of this formal presentation to Amb Popper, etc. Formal reply might be expected from him. DCM asked, however, that his own following interim observations be passed upward:

8. It highly regrettable that GOC seems to have developed such misconceptions re USG Cyprus policy. Greece and Turkey are our friends; we do not measure our friendship in terms of size of armies; our relations are in balance. In Cyprus we recognize only one Govt with which we seek closest friendly relations as symbolized by meeting between President Nixon and Archbishop last year.

9. In interest of GOC, of Cypriots generally, and of peaceful solution to this island’s problem we maintain certain contacts with leadership of Turkish community. We have done this since 1963 and will continue to do so. Ambassador has instructed all Embassy officers not to make any change in past patterns or lend themselves in any way to present efforts of Turkish community’s administration to win recognition as an entity equal to sovereign Govt of Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots know this. Indeed, they complain bitterly that our undiluted recognition of President Makarios’ govt has contributed substantially to failure resolve Cyprus problem.

10. We are not a party to intercommunal talks. We have offered become involved in any useful way if parties wished, but they have firmly said they do not. In these circumstances we have followed policy of benevolent surveillance. This has permitted us to make suggestions from time to time, but the record shows absolute impartiality of such suggestions. For example, our position at present stage of negotiation, as communicated to both parties, is that Denktash should take a step forward to match that of Clerides on Nov 30. There has been no pressure, provocation or appeasement.

11. We have attached no legalistic significance to use of “unified” as opposed to “unitary.” We have used both in the past. There is no hidden meaning in this.

12. As to specifics of GOC dossier, we recognize Orek and Plumer individually as “ministers” and will continue to do so in absence constitutional solution. We deal with GOC ministers also holding these

⁶ No record was found.
portfolios as representatives of a recognized govt—there is a material difference. We give books to groups in both communities without regard to politics. We will continue to do so. We have a Turkish language officer as we have several officers who speak Greek. Our officers work in fields where their abilities lie. Regardless of what TCPA Bulletin may say neither Giese nor his replacement Austrian is the Embassy representative to a “Turkish Communal Administration.”

13. Finally, fact that there is one stable and recognized Govt of Cyprus today and that we have situation of relative stability on Cyprus is due in no small measure to exercise of United States’ influence as a world power working impartially between friends. This contrasts with role of others who rely on propaganda rather than engaging in friendly, helpful persuasion.

14. Veniamin expressed appreciation for these remarks which he said constituted welcome reaffirmation of US policy approach to Cyprus problem. He promised this interim reply would be conveyed upward.

15. Comment: While Veniamin denies it, seems obvious to us that timing of his démarche was dictated by Makarios’ present visit to Moscow. Makarios could be trying to justify to us his current warming to Soviets; or he could be trying to nudge us out of our balanced position and towards GOC’s, through implicit threat of still greater pro-Soviet gestures if we do not comply. Perhaps there are other motives. Whatever the purpose, we feel we must resist this transparent pressure ploy. It is first evidence of Makarios’ change in position toward us in response to recently altered Cyprus situation, and sharpest presentation Embassy has received in my two years here.

16. Obviously we could not allow this sort of distortion of US policy to go without firm reply. I know Dept will answer Rossides’ presentation when made in similar vein. In terms of further action locally I will request appointment with Makarios promptly after his return from Moscow to reinforce essentials reply already made.7

Popper

7 In telegram 970 from Nicosia, June 11, Popper reported on the verbal protest he delivered to Kyprianou. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)
Cyprus 903

371. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)\(^1\)


Cyprus Policy Assessment

The Problem

While intercommunal peace has been maintained on Cyprus since the 1967 crisis, there has been little progress toward establishing a new constitutional order in which Greek and Turk can live together. Intercommunal negotiations have limped on since June 1968, without significant consequence, with both Athens and Ankara experiencing growing frustration with the continuing stalemate. In response to this frustration, a Greco-Turkish dialogue has been initiated for the purpose of expanding the search for resolution of the Cyprus Problem which has twice brought the two countries into confrontation.

The Dialogue: Hopeful, But Not Without Dangers

We encourage close Greco-Turkish association on the Cyprus problem and believe that a Greco-Turkish dialogue can serve a useful supportive role for the purpose of breathing new life into the talks. The GOG and the GOT may be able to reach compromises which the communal negotiators for domestic political reasons can not reach themselves. Also, compromises already reached by the “parent” countries could have increased chances of acceptance on the island.

Looking ahead, however, we see potential dangers in the Greco-Turkish dialogue; dangers which we intend to carefully monitor and be prepared to raise with the parties if necessary: (1) Greece and Turkey, if frustrated in their attempts to resolve the constitutional impasse, may seek subsequently to bring about a dynamic solution such as partition; (2) Makarios and the GOC may suspect that the Greco-Turkish dialogue poses a threat and overreact; and (3) Turkey may overestimate Greece’s ability to secure Greek Cypriot acceptance of the results of the dialogue and become disillusioned with future prospects of working with Greece for peaceful resolution of the problem.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Davis and Long on June 8; concurred in by Churchill, Pugh, and Davies.
U.S. Posture

After considering the inherent opportunities and dangers involved, we have decided our interests will be best served through a policy which continues our positive support for the intercommunal talks, while stressing with Athens and Ankara the need to use their dialogue in support of the intercommunal negotiations as a means of breathing new life into the Cypriot talks. As we monitor the Greco-Turkish dialogue, we should be able to identify emergence of any of the dangers cited above, and will be prepared as appropriate to make known our strong belief to both Athens and Ankara that a viable solution must be based on Cypriot acquiescence; and pointing out as may become necessary that an attempt to impose a solution would not only be dangerous to carry out, but could generate the very crisis we all are striving to avoid.

The attached telegram outlines the exchange of views we have shared with the field and our joint conclusions reflected in the above analysis. In addition you may want to read Part I of our as yet un-cleared revised policy statement.

2 Telegram 100122, printed as Document 369.
3 Attached but not printed is the country policy statement on Cyprus.

372. National Security Study Memorandum 130


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
Cyprus Planning

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–185, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 130. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The President has directed a review of our policy toward Cyprus in the light of recent changes in the situation. A paper should be prepared under the NSCIG/NEA which would explicitly address:

—likely developments in the situation with which the U.S. may be confronted;
— the effects of those developments on U.S. interests; and
— the options open to the U.S. in each possible situation.

This should be submitted to the Senior Review Group by July 2, 1971.²

Henry A. Kissinger


373. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Cyprus Affairs (Davis) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹


SUBJECT
Cyprus: Makarios Maneuvers

Background

The Greeks, in what appears to have been a ham-handed try at pressuring Makarios, have sought the GOC’s acceptance of an Athens-formulated constitutional compromise. The GOC Council of Ministers, after reviewing the proposal which was presented by Athens as a demand on the GOC, rejected it.²

¹Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 75 D 41, Pol 1 Cyp. Secret. Sent through Davies.
²The proposals were made in the form of a June 18 letter from Papadopoulos to Makarios that was published in the July 12 issue of Der Spiegel. On June 24 Makarios replied with a letter rejecting the proposals. Extracts were also published in Der Spiegel, September 6.
Analysis

In rejecting the GOG’s you-must-accept-this proposition, Makarios has again demonstrated that he will not bend to outside pressure. In advance of what was almost a certain GOC refusal, Makarios leaked parts of the Greek proposal, portraying the latter as betrayal of the Hellenic ideal and an attempt to sacrifice Cyprus to Turkish demands. According to intelligence reports, Makarios, in discussing the Greek proposal with his colleagues, stressed that if the junta is determined to compromise the Cyprus cause, it must first find a way to remove him.

This may be precisely what the junta has in mind. According to Dountas, the Greek DCM in Nicosia, the Greek proposal never stood the slightest chance of acceptance by Makarios and was handled under instructions from Athens in such a manner that rejection was a foregone conclusion. A possible conclusion is that Athens deliberately handled the proposal in a manner to provoke a GOC rejection, thus relieving Athens of a long-standing commitment to pursue a joint policy on the Cyprus problem. An intelligence report indicates that the Greek proposal was presented to Makarios with the admonition that if he rejected it, Athens would be freed from its earlier commitment.

On the other hand, it may well be that, facing pressure from Ankara for Greek intervention with Makarios, the junta used this on-the-surface clumsy approach to demonstrate its lack of influence in Nicosia and to provide Makarios with an opportunity through the Cypriot press to surface a threat of outside intervention.

Regardless of Athens’ intention, Makarios is proceeding, as Embassy Nicosia points out, to cover his rear while striking out on all fronts. With the leftist and rightist press in full cry identifying the threat as emanating from Turkey, NATO, and the United States, Makarios has informed UN representatives on the island that the GOC will not submit to outside pressure, that in event of the latter he will raise the matter with the Secretary General and the Security Council. The Communist press, as might be expected, has named the United States as behind current threats to Cyprus and Makarios, and reminded the Cypriots that the Soviet Union, as in the past, stands between Cyprus and NATO sponsored machinations.

Separately, but obviously not unrelated to the Greek proposal and alleged pressure, Clerides is said to be preparing a constructive re-

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3 Not further identified.
4 Intelligence Information Cable TDCS 315/03466–71, June 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)
5 Reported in telegram 1044 from Nicosia, June 21. (Ibid.)
The Clerides response could intentionally bring about some flexibility in the intercommunal negotiations as a means of assisting Makarios to frustrate pressure from Athens and Ankara. In a conversation with Ambassador Popper immediately before the latter’s current trip, Clerides said he intended to propose to the Council of Ministers a new approach. He added that he personally favors the handling of Turk Cypriot communal affairs by Turk Cypriot members of the Cypriot House of Representatives sitting separately; with their legislation to be promulgated by the Vice President and administered by a Turk Cypriot Minister of Communal Affairs. He would foresee a Ministry of Local Affairs headed by a Turk Cypriot to be nominated by the Turkish community. This Ministry would have authority over all District Officers, one of whom would be Turkish, and over all local government affairs. There would be a unified police force, of which 20 percent would be Turk Cypriot, except in exclusively Turk Cypriot areas where the police force would be entirely Turkish Cypriot.

Although Ambassador Popper doubts that Makarios or the Council of Ministers could be persuaded to give Turk Cypriots such a large voice in the Cyprus Government, Clerides’ thinking, if sincere, does indicate more flexibility than we have previously seen or heard.

U.S. Role at This Time

Given Makarios’ rejection of the Athens constitutional compromise proposal, the ball is in his court. If Clerides’ response to Denktash’s April 27 letter results in some flexibility in the negotiations, Makarios will anticipate some degree of relaxation of the pressure which he is currently under. If the Clerides proposals have merit, we should be prepared to wade in with Ankara for an equivalent step.

In the meantime, we should actively pursue our policy of stressing with Athens and Ankara that we see their own cooperation and dialogue as a useful input for the intercommunal negotiators. At the same time, we should be prepared should we be approached by either Athens or Ankara in the interests of other than a negotiated solution to point out our fears that an attempt to resolve the problem through means other than negotiations would be dangerous indeed and could seriously threaten our mutual interests.

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6 Reported in telegram 1006 from Nicosia, June 16. (Ibid.)

CYPRUS SITUATION

The negative elements always inherent in the Cyprus situation are more pronounced now than at any time since 1968. There are three new factors to be considered.

First, the evidence is very strong that the Government of Turkey has decided that the status quo on Cyprus operates to its disadvantage and that of the Turk Cypriot community on the island. As time passes, more Turk Cypriots emigrate and more are re-integrated into Cypriot economic life, thus weakening the Turk Cypriot enclaves. In addition, the enclaves are not economically viable; it costs the GOT $25 million in hard currency annually to keep them afloat. If it is correct that the Turks/Turk Cypriots are not prepared to accept the Cypriot status quo much longer, we can anticipate increasing pressure for a “solution” through the successful (from the Turk point of view) conclusion of the local talks, or, failing this, through the imposition by Greece and Turkey of a previously agreed arrangement, or through unilateral action by Turkey forcibly to partition the island.2

Second, since the overthrow of the Demirel Government, the military in Turkey has assumed a more direct and influential role in the policy-making process. The Turkish General Staff is more oriented toward direct action (read military intervention) on the Cyprus problem than are civilian political leaders. I think we can safely assume that voices calling for a forcible solution of the Cyprus problem are heard more frequently and nearer the center of power in Turkey than in the past.

1 Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 75 D 41, Pol 1. Secret; Exdis. The memorandum was prepared by Boyatt. A note on the first page reads: “Hold for Sisco. Do not send.” Sisco wrote: “I agree with recds—JJS. An attached note text reads: “JJS—For your use in orally briefing the Secretary—Roger Long.” The memorandum was concurred in by Pugh, Churchill, and Davies. A summary of the information in this memorandum was forwarded to Kissinger in a July 30 memorandum from Eliot. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. 1 Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)

2 The Embassy in Cyprus reported on growing talk about Turkish partition plans in telegram 1214 from Nicosia, July 14. In telegram 4869 from Ankara, July 15, the Embassy in Turkey commented that it had no indications of Turkish preparations for a move against Cyprus. (Both ibid.)
Finally, Turkey’s new Prime Minister, Erim, is himself a factor. He has a long and intimate association with the Cyprus problem and was the chief Turkish negotiator in 1963–64, a period when solving the Cyprus problem by geographically partitioning the island and giving a piece to Turkey and one to Greece was much in vogue (this was the essence of the Acheson Plan of 1964). Archbishop Makarios foiled partition attempts in the mid-60’s and, in my judgment, he would make every effort to do so again—including bringing Greece and Turkey into conflict to avoid what to him is anathema. The Archbishop’s implacable opposition to partition and the GOT’s apparent belief that partition may be the only acceptable solution are cause for concern.

Counterbalancing these negative elements is the fact that the local talks during the past three years have made substantial progress, although the currently crucial problem of local autonomy remains unsolved. The two local negotiators, Clerides for the Greek Cypriots and Denktash for the Turk Cypriots, are in basic accord on the organization of the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government. They have also reconciled differences on organization of the police force (a major step) and the definition and constitutional enshrinement of various communal rights for Turk Cypriots. There is still substantial disagreement on the very important issue of how local autonomy—which all sides agree the Turk Cypriots should have—is to be structured. However, the fact that agreement on local autonomy has not yet been reached should not obscure the great progress already made in the local talks on other important and difficult areas.

I do not believe that the situation is acute at the present time, although it could become so in very short order. The local negotiators, Clerides and Denktash, have another scheduled meeting on July 26, and Turkish Foreign Minister Olcay will be meeting with his Greek counterpart, Palamas, in New York in late September during the General Assembly session. After we have the results of the July 26 meeting on the island, it might be well for me to call in the Greek, Turk, and Cypriot Ambassadors to review with them the progress that has already been made in the local talks (a fact often forgotten in the flurry of propaganda and negotiating postures) and to urge them to continue to intensify and support the local talks, particularly since they have come so far. Proceeding in the above fashion would make clear our continuing support for the local talks and by implication our rejection of adventurous “dynamic” solutions. By the same token it would not close out any future options. I will take another look at this after the July 26 meeting on Cyprus and before Olcay and Palamas meet in New York and recommend how I think we should proceed.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

Cyprus Contingencies

Introductory Comment

In response to NSSM 130, the IG/NEA has submitted the paper at the next tab, "US Policy Toward Cyprus Contingencies and Options."

The framework for contingency thinking in the IG paper begins with the last line of page 17 and continues through page 35. The rest is background. It was written as a broad framework for handling any possible contingency, not just those arising from the present situation. So one of the purposes of this Analytical Summary is to relate that rather abstract presentation to the present situation.

The Analytical Summary which follows is in two parts:

—Part I describes the present situation, how it came about and the contingencies it is most likely to produce. It weaves in material from the first half of the IG paper but does not attempt to summarize or parallel it.

—Part II is a direct summary of the IG paper’s discussion of the most likely contingencies. Again, we have concentrated on those contingencies more likely to arise from the present situation. We have skimmed over—after describing them—three which seem more remote.

In short, trouble could come in one of two ways: (1) As the talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots communities about a permanent constitutional arrangement move closer to impasse, Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots with or without Greek cooperation will be increasingly tempted to make some move that could precipitate a crisis. This is the slow-burning fuse, more likely leading to a crisis, if any, after September than now. (2) Incidents between the two communities on Cyprus have increased and, although Ankara has told the Turkish community not to respond to recent Greek Cypriot provocations, and CIA has no evidence of Turkish military preparations, accidents could ac-
quire a momentum of their own. Such incidents in 1964 and 1967 led ultimately to the threat of Turkish invasion.

The issues for discussion are these:

1. With impasse in the intercommunal talks foreseeable, should there be an effort to rejuvenate them or rather to find an alternative? What role should the US play? [Contingency A]\(^4\)

2. If Greece and Turkey or Turkey alone decide, as an alternative to the talks, to try to impose a solution after their talks in September, what should be the US posture? [Contingencies B and C]

3. What should the US do if a local incident escalates, especially if Turkey threatens to invade? [Contingency F]

\(^4\) All brackets in the original.

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376. Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting\(^1\)

Washington, August 11, 1971, 3:55–4:18 p.m.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
John N. Irwin, II
Joseph Sisco
Christopher Van Hollen
Thomas Boyatt
Defense
Armistead Selden
Brig. Gen. Devol Brett
JCS
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
Brig. Gen. Francis J. Roberts

\(^1\) National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. No drafting information appears on the document. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Davis sent these minutes to Kissinger on August 16 with copies to Kennedy and Saunders. (Ibid.)
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that the State Department would prepare:

— a paper on possible ways to prevent an outbreak of fighting over Cyprus;
— contingency planning in the event of an outbreak;
— a scenario for possible UN or European mediation, including what we would wish to see come out of such mediation. 2

Mr. Kissinger (to Mr. Sisco): Can you bring us up to date on the situation. I understand there is no immediate decision required, but we want to know what preparatory work we should do and where we would like to see things come out.

Mr. Sisco: I would like to start with 1960 and the independence of Cyprus. There were three main forces involved: (1) the Greek Cypriots, backed by Greece, who wanted union with Greece; (2) the Turkish Cypriots, backed by Turkey, who generally favored partition; and (3) the British whose objective was to preserve their military and strategic position. The Bible for independence was the London-Zurich agreements of 1960, which contained three elements: (1) it left the British in occupation of their sovereign bases; (2) a treaty of guarantee, which gave the right of intervention to the Greeks, Turks and British if any move were made to alter the constitutional status; (3) a treaty of alliance which permitted the stationing of Greek, Turkish and British troops on the island.

The first crisis came in 1963 when Makarios tried to alter the constitutional basis of the government by trying to eliminate the veto of the Turkish Cypriot Vice President in foreign affairs, defense and fiscal matters. In 1964, there was a second crisis, and we intervened very directly. George Ball and I flew to the island and defused the situation at a great price. The situation became more heated, and we called on the Security Council and got a UN force on the ground. We had to intervene with the Turks in the most forceful manner—you may have heard of the famous (President) Johnson letter. Subsequently, we

2 See Tabs A and B to Document 378.
launched Dean Acheson, who came up with a plan for a form of partition which was sensible but didn’t work.

We had a similar crisis in 1968, when Cy Vance went out and succeeded in defusing the situation. Following that, we launched the inter-communal talks which are now foundering. Makarios was looking at the increased Turkish activity and was concerned at the possibility of the Greeks and Turks getting together and “imposing” a solution. As you know, he went to Moscow.

If we assume that the inter-communal talks will end, we need to do some planning on possible ways to prevent an outbreak, and also some contingency planning if shooting starts. We also need to develop scenarios for a substantive meeting, probably focussed largely on the UN. I think we have three options here:

(1) Get the UN involved in some form of mediation. Makarios is likely to move in this direction, since the UN has historically broadly supported his position. This would deflect moves by either Greece or Turkey.

(2) U.S. mediation, and we will develop some pros and cons on this for you.

Mr. Kissinger: And what we would try to bring about.

Mr. Sisco: (3) Mediation by a prominent European such as Brosio or Lester Pearson. We could get together with key European countries, since this is a NATO problem, and try to stimulate mediation in some way. Of course, these ideas have not been staffed out.

Mr. Irwin (to Mr. Sisco): Would you comment on the status of the negotiations and the possibility of Makarios moving to the UN. Would this be good or bad and what specifically would it mean?

Mr. Sisco: It is possible that Makarios may move quickly to the UN.

Mr. Kissinger: How?

Mr. Sisco: There is a UN presence on the ground in Cyprus. He could inform the UN representatives there or he could move directly to the Security Council, asking them to launch a mediation effort. In this connection, the Turks are as nervous about the UN as the Israelis are.

Mr. Kissinger: What would we do?

Mr. Sisco: We would be in a difficult position. This would preempt the situation for Makarios and close off the other options.

Mr. Kissinger: Would we support his move to the UN?

Mr. Sisco: We would be hard put not to go along. It would be difficult for the U.S. to try to block UN mediation, although the Turks would be sure to ask us to.

Mr. Kissinger: With whom would we pay a price if we opposed it?

Mr. Sisco: With Cyprus.
Mr. Kissinger: My impression of Makarios is that he is a very cool customer. We can’t antagonize him.

Mr. Sisco: He is an evil man of the cloth. Even though the Greeks are more amenable now to cooperation with the Turks on Cyprus, when the chips are down they will inevitably back the Greek Cypriots.

Mr. Kissinger: So we would have to choose between Turkey and Cyprus.

Mr. Sisco: We have generally supported Turkey all along.

Mr. Kissinger: If we came out against UN mediation, what would be the cost?

Mr. Sisco: It’s a question of the impact on Greece and Turkey. I believe we would have to give some support to Turkey. If we supported Makarios’ efforts—which would mean, in effect, supporting the status quo—we would increase Turkish nervousness and possibly encourage Turkish thinking that they might have to take military action. We would inevitably be in the middle of two of our principal allies. Tom (Boyatt), what do you think?

Mr. Boyatt: If we were faced with UN mediation, we would have to offer the alternative of European mediation.

Mr. Sisco: Makarios wouldn’t buy U.S. mediation. It’s a question of what adjustments we might make in the form of UN mediation.

Mr. Irwin: And what suggestions we might make to make it a positive mediation.

Mr. Kissinger: What do we consider a reasonable posture? Does anyone have any ideas?

Mr. Irwin: We don’t know.

Mr. Sisco: We have some ideas but we haven’t surfaced them yet.

Mr. Kissinger: Certainly any agreement by the two sides is better than anything we might do.

Mr. Irwin: It’s a question of how we can take advantage of the mediation.

Mr. Kissinger: It’s essential that we know in what direction we want the mediation to go. Are we agreed that if Makarios goes to the UN, we would try to tilt toward Turkey? Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Sisco: It’s fair as a generality.

Mr. Kissinger: We wouldn’t necessarily go along with UN mediation?

Mr. Sisco: We would have great difficulty in taking a position against it.

Mr. Irwin: If we would move the UN mediation in the direction we like, it might be possible to get the Turks to go along.

Mr. Sisco: We could take the position that although it might not be the best possible undertaking, what could they lose?
Mr. Kissinger: They would have the majority of the UN against them.

Mr. Sisco: The UN can’t prejudge the substance in any way.

Mr. Kissinger: Unless Makarios goes back to the UN with a proposed formula. I wouldn’t underestimate his deviousness.

Mr. Sisco: That’s quite possible. While there is a greater Greek desire to work with the Turks than before, they have always broken off at the critical point to support the Greek Cypriots.

Mr. Irwin: If they are pushed to the point of conflict, they will always support their brothers.

Mr. Sisco: But they might support the UN. We have no concrete judgments, but we will produce a paper for you very quickly on this.

Mr. Kissinger: We’ll wait for that. (to Mr. Saunders) Do you agree?

Mr. Saunders: Yes.

Mr. Sisco: We might counsel the Turks that the intercommunal talks are still the best vehicle to maintain flexibility. This might have a good effect on the Turks and buy a little more time. We want to avoid U.S. mediation. The final Acheson formula was that we would accept anything the parties would agree to, and that is where we are now.

Mr. Kissinger: Once Makarios launches himself, persuasion alone won’t help. What could we do to him?

Mr. Sisco: The thought of Turkish invasion scares hell out of him. That’s why he is playing the Moscow game.

Mr. Kissinger: Moscow won’t support him far.

Mr. Sisco: They’re fishing in troubled waters. They don’t want a war there, but they’re willing to exploit the situation. They would give strong support to UN mediation.

Mr. Irwin: The Russians will use their new-found strength in the eastern Mediterranean.

Mr. Boyatt: We might have some interest in opposing UN mediation before Makarios acts.

Mr. Kissinger: But once we mention mediation and say European, he will say UN.

Mr. Sisco: That would get us out ahead, and we don’t want that.

Mr. Selden: We could let someone else do it.

Mr. Sisco: That’s what I mean by European mediation.
Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, August 25, 1971, 1105Z.


1. Summary: In response to your request for my views on Cyprus mediation effort, I suggest that we consider having Secretary urge Greek-Turkish agreement on mediation effort for submission to UNSYG. Prospects for SYG’s developing agreement on mediation with Greece, Turkey and Cyprus seem slight, but at least it might buy us time if, as appears likely, intercommunal talks cannot be revived. My recommendations made on assumption that Makarios still holds most of trump cards and can spoil any initiative he does not like; that Turkish Government believes time is working against it on Cyprus and that it will take unilateral initiative at some point to prevent further deterioration of its position; and finally that it is unlikely Makarios and Turkish Government will agree on terms of reference for mediation effort which could lead to a solution. In circumstances our best hope may be to involve our two NATO allies in formulation mediation proposal which would, to some extent, preempt Makarios recourse to UN and might inhibit both Makarios and Turkey from taking unilateral action on Cyprus. End summary.

2. My thoughts on next steps in Cyprus are based on three assumptions. I believe that we must keep foremost in our thoughts fact that Makarios still holds most of the trump cards. He has Greek Cypriots behind him, some degree of support from Soviet Union and broad support in the UN. He has demonstrated that he is not subject to dictation by Greece and, indeed, he has the capability for resisting any initiative which is unacceptable to him. Second thought we need to keep in mind that regardless of whether Turkish Government has decided on some course of unilateral action Turks recognize time is working against them on Cyprus. It is doubtful whether Turkey can acquiesce in continuation present situation if intercommunal talks cannot be revived or if some other form of negotiation cannot be initiated.


2 Dated August 12, it requested comments on the possibility of a new mediation in the Cyprus dispute. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)
Third point I see as basic to this situation is irreconcilability of Makarios and Turkish Government’s views on bases for negotiations and therefore on role for mediator.

3. I think that the time has come for U.S. to consider taking more active role before events move in new and adverse direction. Recent messages (USUN 2310 and Nicosia 1482) have further clarified situation following Makarios’ public statement of what has been implicitly recognized privately: Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot positions are virtually irreconcilable through medium of intercommunal talks as presently constituted. It is now clearer that GOT objections to UN mediation remain as strong as ever; Makarios is being propelled by his fear of Greek-Turkish understanding in precisely this direction; and Greece is closer to Turkish position on UN involvement than to that of Makarios, but must for reasons of Greek-Cyprus relations maintain certain degree of ambivalence.

4. In view of present facts of situation I must remain basically pessimistic over Cyprus mediation effort. Perhaps best that we can achieve is to buy some more time, which in the case of Cyprus is always worthwhile. What I am suggesting is that we approach the question of mediation with our eyes open and that, as in the case of intercommunal talks, we make the process of entering into mediation as protracted as possible, since such an effort is, under present circumstances, unlikely to succeed. One of valuable aspects of merely entering into mediation effort is to inhibit both Makarios and Turkish Government from taking unilateral action.

5. We should also, of course, strive to make mediation meaningful, and best prospect it seems to me lies in bringing Turkey in at the initial stage. In this regard, timing may be crucial, in view of exaggerated hopes Turks seem to attach to Olcay–Palamas talks. Secretary might want to consider suggesting to Olcay and Palamas that they try to reach agreement on mediation proposal in their talks in New York. If they succeed they could then approach UNSYG to see whether he would be prepared to undertake mediation effort and to explore ways in which it could be launched. U.S. would of course be in position also to weigh in with SYG at that juncture to urge him to accept task. Greece and Turkey would be able to view mediation effort as their creation, knowing it also enjoyed endorsement of U.S. It would then be up to the Secretary General to negotiate with Makarios on the acceptance of the Greek-Turkish proposal. Alternatively, Greece and Turkey could

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3 Telegram 2310 from USUN, August 18, reported on comments made by Turkish representatives on the Cyprus situation. Telegram 1482 from Nicosia, August 18, stated the Embassy’s preference for a UN rather than a U.S. mediation effort. (Both ibid.)
transmit to SecGen their ideas of mediation and at same time request those of Makarios. SecGen would then be charged with negotiating out agreed terms of reference, or some other solution or approach based on the principle of negotiation rather than unilateral action. Thus Makarios’ demand for UN mediation would have been met in circumstances which should keep UN situation manageable.

6. I realize that approach which I am suggesting is filled with complications, particularly finding suitable mediator, but I can see no alternative means of launching mediation effort that would not be rejected out of hand by at least one of parties involved. Positive advantages of this formula are that Turkish objective of prior agreement with Greece before next stage in negotiations would be met, while Greece would be extricated from predicament of having to guarantee agreement of Makarios to Greco-Turkish understanding. Fact that mediation launched by joint proposal of our two NATO allies involved would help protect U.S. interests.

7. I may have further thoughts after I see Palamas on Cyprus. In my discussion with him (State 152029) I do not intend to allude in any way to U.S. policy review. There are other bases for exploring further with Palamas question of Greek position on intercommunal talks, mediation, and London-Zurich accords, which are areas in which we need further clarification of GOG’s current thinking.

Tasca

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4 Dated August 19; in it, Sisco instructed Tasca: “In approaching Palamas re GOG position on future of Cyprus problem, your discussions should be couched in terms of recent press speculation on possible UN mediation rather than of US policy review. We should not like to tip our hand in this still very tentative stage of our thinking.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)
378. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers

Washington, September 1, 1971.

Cyprus: Strategy Papers

In accordance with the consensus at the August 11 SRG meeting on Cyprus, NEA has prepared two papers dealing with the evolving situation.

At Tab A is a strategy paper exploring options for controlling the Cyprus situation by diplomatic mediation designed to sustain the ongoing local talks. I recommend that the U.S. role involve quiet and indirect support of mediation under some form of UN aegis.

At Tab B is a contingency paper outlining appropriate U.S. responses to outbreaks of violence on the island. Our reactions would vary depending on circumstances, but generally involve direct U.S. diplomatic activity (usually in conjunction with the U.K.) in Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and Washington, and support of UN efforts on the ground in Cyprus and in New York.

Recommendation

That you approve the approach outlined in the strategy paper at Tab A. This approach, and the contingency paper at Tab B will be discussed at an SRG meeting now scheduled for September 8.

Tab A

Cyprus: Strategy Paper for Next Steps

Situation

Ten years of experience with the Cyprus problem demonstrate one constant: when the parties to the dispute are not negotiating, the
probability of violence increases exponentially. Since June 1968, the local talks have kept the Cyprus problem in a negotiating context. In addition, this instrumentality has provided what is the unique advantage of having the people directly concerned discuss those problems which directly concern them.

On August 9, the Turk Cypriot negotiator, Denktash, tabled a paper setting forth the “final” Turkish Cypriot position. He insisted on and made all Turk Cypriot compromises made thus far contingent upon the establishment of a separate and autonomous Turk Cypriot administration from the village to the national level. He also raised the need for a specific GOC disavowal of enosis (union with Greece) and injected the question of international guarantees. Archbishop Makarios subsequently declared the talks “deadlocked,” although neither party has made a move to break off negotiations.

With the local talks approaching termination and frustration levels rising on all sides, the possibility of an outbreak of violence is greater than at any time since 1968. Rather than react to a violent development the Cyprus situation would be better dealt with by seeking to revive US/UK/UN diplomacy. The goal of such a diplomatic effort would be preservation of negotiations to avoid a confrontation on the island which would sooner or later bring in Greece and Turkey on opposite sides. There are several options and variations thereon; all of them involve some form of mediation.

Mediation Option I: UN

UN mediation has clear advantages. First, the UN is already seized of the problem and is on the spot. Both the Secretary General and the Security Council are involved in the Cyprus problem as a result of the March 4, 1964 (and subsequent) Resolutions and the presence of the United Nations Force (UNFICYP) on the island. Second, with the UN out in front, Greek, Turk, and Cypriot fire would be concentrated on that organization rather than any specific country. Third, the UN provides a broad cover for both neutral mediation and, at a later stage, perhaps the guaranteeing of the results of that mediation. There are, however, problems with the UN being the focus of activity. The Turks/Turk Cypriots have already expressed their antipathy toward UN mediation, preferring instead the convening of the London-Zurich guarantor powers. Moreover, in a UN mediation effort US inputs would necessarily be diluted by the views of others, and it is difficult for the UN as an institution to bring pressure to bear on the parties.

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**Variant A.** By far the most preferable variation of the UN mediation option would involve consultations among the Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots which would result in joint agreement on a mediator and the principles upon which mediation would be based. The initiative for the consultations could be undertaken by any one of the parties, preferably Turkey, or perhaps could be jointly undertaken by Greece and Turkey through their dialogue. Once the parties had agreed on a person and on guidelines, U Thant could formally give the individual his blessing and the mediation would proceed. A retired senior statesman (e.g., Lester Pearson) or an internationally-renowned legal expert (e.g., Edward Hambro of Norway or Pierre Laline of Switzerland) would be preferable to a currently active “super star.” The latter might raise hopes too high with the danger that the failure of his mission would bring increased tension.

**Variant B.** Archbishop Makarios could unilaterally request U Thant either to undertake a mediation effort on the basis of the March 4, 1964 Resolution or to activate his good offices under the December 22, 1967 Resolution. The problem here would be that the Turks might reject the concept of mediation because it was a Makarios proposal. In any case, were the Archbishop to take a UN initiative, the US would be forced to support the effort.

**Variant C.** It is possible that U Thant or his Special Representative on the island, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, might take the initiative to regenerate the SYG’s good offices. The local talks were convened by Osorio-Tafall, acting under the SYG’s good offices mandate, and he then withdrew stating that he would be available for mediation should the sides reach a deadlock. U Thant’s next report to the SC on Cyprus will be in December in connection with renewal of UNFICYP’s mandate. He could choose to move in this framework.

**Mediation Option II: US**

The argument for US mediation is that our position as NATO leader and primary ally of Greece and Turkey, as well as our active mediatory roles via the Ball and Vance Missions to defuse crises, give us the primary responsibility for the Cyprus problem. Since the US is the repository of a great deal of experience with the Cyprus problem and the country most able to influence all the parties, it is incumbent upon us to shape the Cyprus situation in a positive way before there is a crisis and before we are compelled to intervene under the worst possible conditions. Theoretically, this position has much merit. However, as a practical matter in the present circumstances there should be no direct

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*Security Council Resolution 244; text is ibid., 1967, p. 372.*
US mediation. The reasons are that such an effort would immediately put the US in the middle of a three-cornered struggle of Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots and expose us to criticism from all sides. In addition, our influence would be wasted too early in the game. A direct US intervention should be preserved as a last ditch option in the case of an uncontainable outbreak of violence.

**Mediation Option III: Independent**

A third variant on mediation would be the appointment of a neutral, non-political third party (preferably European) as mediator. This option would probably not emerge spontaneously, but could be stimulated by the US, acting in concert with the UK, or within the NATO framework. For example, Italy, with its interest in playing a significant role in “Mediterranean” diplomacy, might be stimulated to perform the mediatory function. Also, Italy has outstanding candidates such as elder statesman Manlio Brosio or legal expert Roberto Ago. Independent mediation, like a UN effort, has the advantage of placing someone else out in front. Another positive factor is that lack of direct involvement with the UN would make an independent mediator more palatable to the Turks. The main problems would be the difficulty of finding a willing candidate and again the inevitable dilution of US inputs and lack of influence on the countries concerned.

**US Diplomatic Strategy**

Given the dangers inherent in the situation on the ground, the need for the US to keep the Cyprus problem in a negotiating context and the considerations involved in mediation, it would be best for the US quietly to reactivate its diplomacy vis-à-vis Cyprus. In general terms, our goal should be to insure that in the case of a real stalemate in the intercommunal talks and increasing violence on the Island a mediation effort can be quickly and efficiently mounted. The ideal kind of mediation would be that outlined in Option I A, i.e., a UN-sponsored effort stimulated by the parties and involving a mediator and guidelines previously agreed upon. The next most feasible approach would be Option III. In either case the US role should be that of an amicus curiae providing behind the scenes ideas and support.

At the very minimum, if we are successful in proceeding with mediation, the negotiating process will be spun out and time will be gained. At the maximum, breakthroughs might be achieved which would either solve the Cyprus problem or provide for a more stable modus vivendi.

**Next Steps:**

1. We believe Assistant Secretary Sisco should call in the Turkish, Greece, and Cypriot Ambassadors (with supporting actions in the cap-
itals) and ask them to clarify their positions as reflected in the latest documents exchanged in the local talks. In addition, he should discuss with them where we go from here on the Cyprus problem, emphasizing the U.S. desire for diplomacy and negotiation, and probing reactions to UNSYG good offices (which Makarios has already floated in the press).

2. The next step would be determined by events in the coming weeks. The Foreign Ministers of all the parties will be in New York for the UNGA and, if stalemate and crisis seem imminent, Secretary Rogers will consider exploring with the Foreign Ministers (particularly Olcay of Turkey) some form of mediation as generally outlined in Option I A.

Tab B

CYPRUS: CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR VIOLENT INCIDENTS

The historical record shows that serious intercommunal violence has often erupted in Cyprus. An action-reaction escalation of violence could bring Greece and Turkey into confrontation as in 1964, 1965, and 1967. With the local talks between Greek Cypriot and Turk Cypriot negotiators now approaching deadlock and with frustration and uncertainty increasing, the coming weeks and months will be particularly delicate.

Our contingency plans are based on past Cyprus crisis management and are geared for quick reaction to contain violence. U.S. responses vary depending on the kind and scale of the incident, which side initiated the violence and for what reason.

Procedure in Case of Accidental Incidents: In the case of an accidental shooting incident, a small scale provocation, or a loss of control by the Greek or Turk Cypriot leadership of a sizeable portion of its military forces or civilian population, initial US responses would appropriately focus on Cyprus itself.

1. The United Nations force on the ground (UNFICYP) has in the past, and could today, successfully interpose its troops between the local opposing groups.

2. Our Embassy in Nicosia would encourage rapid UNFICYP interposition and would make strong representations (probably in conjunction with other Embassies and U Thant’s Special Representative) calling for either the GOC and/or the Turk Cypriot leadership to restore discipline and order within their ranks.

7 Secret. Drafted by Boyatt on August 27, concurred in by Rodger Davies and Sisco; in substance by Churchill, Pugh and Richard Davies; and in information by Armitage.

Procedure in Case of Premeditated Violence on a Small Scale: Premeditated violence, by either the GOC or the Turk Cypriots, is always a possibility. Because the vast majority of the mainland Greek troops on Cyprus were withdrawn in the wake of the 1967 crisis, Cyprus is today virtually defenseless relative to Turkey. For this reason Makarios would surely not go so far as to generate incidents which might invite mainland Turkish intervention. However, it is conceivable that His Beatitude might stimulate incidents simply to get the UN more involved by obtaining an increase in the size of UNFICYP and/or diplomatic intervention by the Secretary General or the Security Council. In such an event, the scale of violence would probably be kept as small as possible and U.S. reaction would be as described in steps 1, 2, and 3 in the above paragraph.

Procedure in Case of Large-Scale Violence: By far the most dangerous contingency would be a decision by the Turk/Turk Cypriot side to provoke violence as a prelude to Turk military intervention for the purpose of forcibly partitioning the Island. In this event our primary task would be to persuade the GOT that such a violent course of action would be self-defeating.

1. We would encourage UNFICYP to interpose its forces. If the fighting is on a large scale UNFICYP interposition might be futile (as in 1967). Certainly in the case of an invasion from Turkey UNFICYP would not take preventive action.

2. In concert with the UK, and other interested parties, the U.S. would make representations in Ankara, Washington, and London to convince the Turks that the GOC’s ability to generate a full scale international crisis would inevitably bring mainland Greece into conflict with Turkey, activate the international community against what would be regarded as stark aggression, and possibly involve the Soviet Union in a manner inimical to Turkish interests.

3. A corollary diplomatic move would be to activate the United Nations. U Thant’s Special Representative on the Island and UNFICYP would no doubt be involved ab initio in efforts to stop the fighting. In addition, we could consider an emergency session of the Security Council with a view to mobilizing support for an immediate cessation of hostilities.

4. NATO would be involved in a full-blown Cyprus crisis. Since the 1963–1964 period, the Secretary General has maintained a Watch-Brief. If serious hostilities were to occur, we would activate the NATO Secretary General (as in 1967) to support our diplomatic efforts to counsel moderation and achieve an end to the fighting.
5. Finally, our ace in the hole in a crisis on the scale outlined above remains the Special Presidential Mission. Both were crucial in stopping the shooting in 1964 and 1967 respectively. This option should be preserved as a last ditch effort to avoid or resolve a Greco-Turk confrontation caused by serious fighting on the Island.

*The Soviet Dimension:* The attitude of the Soviet Union in the event of serious intercommunal violence is difficult to predict. The Soviets appear to have two distinct and partially conflicting policy goals. On the one hand, a constant in Russian policy has been preservation of the independence and territorial integrity, i.e., the “non-NATOization,” of Cyprus. On the other hand, the USSR has courted Turkey fairly consistently in recent years. The most probable course of Soviet diplomacy would be to make threatening noises against outside interventions while attempting to cool off Makarios in order to avoid the possibility of such interventions. In any UN activity they would probably come down on the side of a small independent nation but not strongly enough to badly irritate Turkey. In short, in the case of a Cyprus crisis, I would anticipate that the Soviet policy would be verbal as indeed it was in 1967.

*Converting a Crisis Into Progress:* In the past, Cyprus has presented opportunity in crisis. If the situation, either by accident or design, should deteriorate to the point where there is large scale fighting and the threat of Turk invasion, and if such a crisis can be defused by diplomacy, then we should give active consideration to steps which might subsequently by taken to assist in removing the basic causes of strife between the two communities. An example of this procedure was the successful US/UK/UN drive to initiate the local talks in 1968 following the Vance Mission’s successful resolution of the 1967 crisis.
379. Telegram From the Embassy to Greece to the Department of State

Athens, September 7, 1971, 1620Z.

4691. Ref: Athens 4625. Subj: Cyprus: My Meeting with Palamas Following Makarios Visit. Department please pass EUCOM and USDOCOSOUTH.

1. Summary: Palamas has told me that Makarios visit did not go well. Prime Minister was quite blunt with Archbishop, and they parted with differences unresolved. However, he thought Makarios now recognized Greece would have final say in any question over Cyprus in which its vital interests involved. This particularly true of any attempt by Makarios further to involve Soviet Union in Cyprus problem. If Makarios takes any initiatives that get him into trouble with Turkey, he will be on his own. On the other hand, Greece will not permit Turkey to alter London-Zurich agreements by unilateral change in status quo. Palamas does not know what proposals Olcay may put forward in their coming talks in NYC. Makarios now expected to abandon intercommunal talks and sit tight in Cyprus, trusting on Soviet Union to prevent Turkish intervention, while instructing Kyprianou to seek UN involvement. Turkey opposed to UN mediation, and Greece itself doubts usefulness of new UN involvement. My chief impression from meeting with Palamas is that GOG will now take tougher line with Turkey, but there at least common ground of London-Zurich accords. However relations with Makarios are in bad state indeed, and we cannot exclude reaction by Greece to any future moves by Makarios that involve Greek interests. Under circumstances we should give closer consideration to question of our own Cyprus policy. End summary.

2. On September 6 I met with Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Palamas for more than an hour in discussion devoted almost entirely to Cyprus. I began conversation by asking Palamas to brief me on Makarios visit, which had ended only a few hours before. Palamas said that official communiqué indicative of how visit had gone. For first

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, Moscow, USNATO, and USUN.
2 Dated September 2, it reported the importance the Greek Government attached to Makarios’s visit. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)
3 September 3–6. In telegram 1647 from Nicosia, September 9, Popper reported on the meeting from the perspective of Kyprianou. (Ibid.)
4 A notation on the telegram reads: “Not passed.”
time in meeting between Makarios and Greek Prime Minister, it had been impossible to issue usual communiqué stating that there was complete identity of views between Athens and Nicosia. In fact, Makarios visit had fully exposed differences that existed between Greek and Cypriot Governments. Makarios not prepared to make meaningful concessions to Turks, not prepared to return to London-Zurich accords, and apparently thought he could sit out situation without Turks taking action. Not only had Archbishop discounted possibility of Turkish intervention, but he had said Soviet Union would prevent such intervention even if it were attempted. I asked Palamas whether he believed Makarios had commitment from Soviet Union. He replied that he had no way of knowing, but he was convinced that communiqué issued after Makarios’ Moscow visit did not reflect what really agreed upon by Makarios and Soviet leaders.

3. Palamas said Prime Minister Papadopoulos had done an excellent job during his meetings with Makarios. He had been extremely tough with Archbishop. Palamas thought that for first time Makarios aware that he could no longer manipulate Greece to suit his own aims. As an example of tone of meetings, Prime Minister had pinned Makarios down on question of his provocative statements. After Archbishop had made it plain he prepared to ride out any storm, Papadopoulos had said that if this were his intention, why did he continue to make statements about enosis? Did he really want enosis? Archbishop said that in his heart he desired enosis, but given realities of situation he would have to say he was against it. Prime Minister had retorted, “Then why don’t you just come out and say you want independence and have done with it?” Makarios had given usual excuses of his vulnerability to criticism by his own community. Papadopoulos had said that was Makarios’ own problem, but he wanted to make it clear that where Greece's vital interests were involved, Greece intended to have the final say.

4. I asked Palamas what he expected next, given situation he had described. He replied that he expected Makarios to go back to Nicosia and “sit there and do nothing,” and in certain circumstances doing nothing was itself a kind of action. At same time he expected that Kyprianou would be instructed to inform UNSYG that intercommunal talks had reached impasse and to ask that UN take more active role in Cyprus situation. Makarios’ recourse to UN could take several forms. He might ask UNSYG to use his good offices, or he might make more formal approach which could involve Security Council. I said that UN good offices could conceivably involve some form of mediation. What were Greek Government’s views on mediation? Palamas said he doubted that new UN initiative would prove useful, but in any case Turkish objections to UN mediation were well known. In general Greece would not be happy with bringing Cyprus problem back into UN. However,
during his visit to New York he would take opportunity for discussion with UNSYG on what should be done next.

5. Palamas said that he would be leaving Greece on September 19 for two-day official visit to London, where he had been invited for conversations with Foreign Secretary. He would then travel to New York by ship, arriving September 29. He would have to return to Athens on October 10 or 11. In addition to meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Olcay, he would like opportunity to discuss Cyprus with Secretary Rogers. I said that I thought such a meeting would be useful, and I would certainly pass along his request.

6. On meeting with Olcay, I asked Palamas what position he expected Turks to take. Palamas said he did not really know what GOT would propose. He did know, however, that Turkish Foreign Ministry was still talking in one way and Turkish military acting in another. From reports GOG receiving from Ankara it obvious that Turkish military activities on Cyprus have full approval of Turkish military leadership. At this point Palamas said that he wanted to make one thing quite clear. If Makarios embarked on initiatives on his own without consulting Greece and these provoked reaction from Turkey, he should not expect help from Greece. On other hand, if Turkey takes initiatives that involve its relations with Greece, then it no longer a matter for Makarios. For example, Greece does not intend to permit Turkey to alter London-Zurich agreements. Any attempt to establish by administrative means a permanent Turkish Cypriot enclave would be de facto partition and violation of London-Zurich agreements, “and this we will never permit.”

7. I asked Palamas where Greece stood on London-Zurich accords, in view of impasse in intercommunal talks. Palamas replied that Greece took view that London-Zurich accords were valid. Greece would be prepared to consider any improvements in them, but until such improvements agreed upon, all parties still bound by accords. In this regard Greece would not permit Turkey to take any steps that would “make them worse rather than improve them.”

8. I then asked Palamas if he could enlighten me on what PM had in mind when he spoke at Thessaloniki about “bitterness” over Turkish failure to reciprocate friendly gestures by Greece. Palamas said that he had not been informed in advance of what PM had intended to say about Cyprus, but that he had raised question with PM afterwards. PM said he was angered that after having made conciliatory gestures, Denktash’s last letter to Clerides had contained preposterous claims for equal partnership of Turkish Cypriot population of 18 percent with Greek 80 percent. This had played right into Makarios’ hands. Palamas said that Archbishop in his meeting with Prime Minister obviously delighted with Denktash reply, saying it proved what he had said all along:
that Turks were not prepared to negotiate. Prime Minister’s views on Denktash reply had been communicated to Turkish Ambassador, who had tried to claim that Denktash’s views not necessarily those of GOT. Palamas said he dismissed this argument as disingenuous.

9. Summing up his gloomy view of situation on Cyprus, Palamas said that extremes aid each other. Turkish rigid and unreasonable attitude encouraging Makarios’ stubbornness and vice versa. In circumstances the Alliance, and particularly U.S. and U.K., would be well advised to take closer interest in developments on Cyprus. Greece had been doing its best to moderate situation but there real danger that Makarios would try to involve Soviet Union, which together with growing strength of local Communists on Cyprus, could create dangerous situation. (See [less than 1 line not declassified] on Greek concern over Makarios’ intentions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.)

10. Palamas said that when he had spoken of Greece having final say in questions involving Greece’s vital national interests, his statement meant to cover such situation as Makarios involving Russians. I said that Makarios had independent ability to take initiatives which Greece could not easily control. Palamas replied, “And the Prime Minister, in that case, has some initiatives that he can take in Cyprus.” Palamas went on to say that while U.S. and U.K. most closely concerned, NATO as a whole needed to be informed on current Cyprus situation, and he believed Secretary General should under his watching brief bring to attention of NATO members dangerous situation developing in Cyprus following other unfavorable developments in Iceland and Malta.

11. Finally, I asked Palamas what he could tell me about Grivas’ disappearance.5 Palamas said PM informed on September 1 and had immediately gotten in touch with him. They had decided that Makarios should be told right away and this was done. PM quite disturbed by this development. Greek Government trying to find out what Grivas planning and where he was, but so far without success, “although it seems he is in Cyprus.” Palamas asked if we had been able to find out anything, and I said that we had no information on Grivas’ whereabouts or intentions. I asked Palamas what he expected to come of Grivas affair and he said, “Nothing good, of that you can be sure.”

12. Comments: Palamas apparently reflecting not only his own views but those of PM. He is pessimistic, frustrated, but, I felt, also determined that Greece is not going to be made to suffer the consequences

5 Grivas, the former leader of EOKA and ex-commander of the Cypriot National Guard, who had been living in retirement in Athens since his departure from Cyprus in the aftermath of the 1967 crisis, disappeared from his home around September 1.
of Cypriots’ refusal to compromise. He is obviously unhappy with Turkish unwillingness to be more forthcoming in its relations with Greece or in negotiations on Cyprus. But it seems Palamas—and PM—have even bitterer feelings toward Makarios. The main message that I believe Palamas wanted to get across was that Greece is no longer prepared to have Makarios determine its Cyprus policy and reserves its position on what it will do if Makarios again involves Greek interests. This would be particularly true, I feel, of any attempt by Makarios to more deeply involve Soviet Union in Cyprus problem. At same time Palamas emphasized that Greece will not stand idly by if Turkey attempts alter status quo on Cyprus.

13. I have three specific recommendations following my conversation with Palamas:

   A. Generally, I think my conversation with Palamas strengthens the view that U.S. interests likely become more involved in Cyprus and that we should give greater urgency to review of U.S. policy and options.

   B. Given Greek mood, it would be particularly useful for Secretary to meet with Palamas in New York and I strongly urge such a meeting.

   C. I suggest we discuss with NATO SecGen usefulness of his reporting to Alliance on current Cyprus situation.

   Tasca

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380. Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting


SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Secret. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room from 4:27–4:37 p.m. Jeanne Davis sent the minutes under a covering memorandum to Kissinger on September 10 and also sent copies to Kennedy and Saunders. Kissinger initialed the transmittal memorandum.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that, while we should try to keep the parties engaged and that almost any instrumentality would be acceptable, there is nothing we need do at the moment.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Boyatt) I see you have a map. What does it tell us?

Mr. Boyatt: (Referring to a map of Cyprus) The areas in red are the Turkish Cypriot enclaves within which the writ of the Cyprus Government does not run.

Mr. Kissinger: Are the groups in these areas armed?
Mr. Boyatt: Yes.
Mr. Kissinger: Where do they get their arms?
Mr. Boyatt: From Turkey.
Mr. Kissinger: Illegally?
Mr. Boyatt: Technically illegally. They make some of their own also. As you can see from the map, this is a good argument against partition: these enclaves are too spread out.

Mr. Kissinger: And they want a Minister for Communal Affairs who is theirs?

2 Not printed
Mr. Boyatt: They want what amounts to ethnic autonomy, with a chain of command from the village level to the Turkish Cypriot Vice President. As a minimum, they want the institutionalization of the status quo. Their compromise position is a Minister for Turkish Affairs, which Makarios won’t accept.

The blue areas are the British sovereign bases.

Mr. Kissinger: If I understand correctly, the intercommunal talks are deadlocked now and there will be a meeting between the Turkish and Greek representatives at the UN. Makarios may try to sabotage this meeting by making a preemptory move into the General Assembly. I assume there is no way to prevent such a move?

Mr. Sisco: The situation isn’t quite that explicit. If Makarios moves in the UN, it is more apt to be to the Security Council. I think the situation will remain calm until after the General Assembly meeting. Although we should try to keep the parties engaged one way or another, we have no substantive position to sell and there is not much for us to do at the moment.

Mr. Kissinger: I thought we were going to talk to the parties at the UN?

Mr. Sisco: Only in the normal course of the Secretary’s discussions with the Foreign Ministers in New York.

Mr. Kissinger: You’re not going to call in the Ambassadors?

Mr. Sisco: We haven’t decided yet.

Mr. Kissinger: What would you say to them if you call them in? Could we see a telegram of talking points indicating the approach you might take?

Mr. Sisco: We don’t know yet since we haven’t decided whether or not to call them in.

Mr. Kissinger: Would you decide to call them in first and then decide what you’re going to say?

Mr. Sisco: Not necessarily. I think it would be largely a listening exercise.

Mr. Irwin: I think the situation has evolved somewhat. When we thought there was a possibility of Makarios moving quickly into the Security Council, we were thinking of calling in the Ambassadors. Now Joe’s bureau (Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs) thinks that Makarios won’t go to the Security Council until after the September General Assembly meeting, so it is less urgent.

Mr. Sisco: I think the Greeks and Turks will get together. The Greeks will say that the only thing that would create a crisis would be if the Turks take some step to upset the status quo. It is difficult to see how the Greek and Turkish Governments could agree on some action which would stimulate a crisis. I assume the Cypriots in New York may explore with U Thant the possibility of some new UN mediation effort, and we could then look at it in that context. There is nothing we
can do at the moment that would have any real meaning. The Cypriots are dedicated to the status quo, and the Greeks are not interested in upsetting it. If there are any new moves, the parties will come to us and to the other Security Council members. We have no substantive solution to sell. We are satisfied with the status quo, but any instrumentality of engagement agreed between the parties ought to be acceptable. But there are differences even here. The Cypriots want to go to the UN, but the Turks are very reserved about that. The Turks want to use conferees under the authority of the London/Zurich agreements, but Makarios is very reserved about this. The Greeks have told Makarios that the greatest danger stems from his playing footsie with the Russians and bringing in Russian political support. We don’t know what impact that might have had on Makarios. However, contrary to usual practice, there was no communiqué following Makarios’ recent trip to Greece and Makarios has said very little about it, so there were obviously some differences.

Mr. Kissinger: So it is agreed there is nothing we need to do now.

381. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey

Washington, September 13, 1971, 1722Z.

167530. For Ambassadors Tasca and Chargés Crawford and Cuthell. From Sisco. Subj: Cyprus.

1. As a result of very good and detailed reporting, I believe we now have a clearer picture both of the results of the Makarios–Papadopoulos talks and the strategy which GOC intends to pursue over the coming weeks. It seems clear that GOC will “seek the advice” of the SYG and that there is not apt to be too much common ground between GOG and GOT as to how to keep the parties engaged as an alternative to possible further deterioration in the situation.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 69–June 30, 1974. Secret; Exds. Another copy is also ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by DePalma and Eliot, and approved by Rogers. Repeated to London, USUN, USNATO, USDOSOUTH, and EUCOM. In a September 13 memorandum to Kissinger transmitting the telegram to the White House, Eliot stated: “I am attaching for your information a telegram the Secretary today sent to our Embassies in Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia which I thought you would like to see in light of the recent Senior Review Group meetings on the subject.” (Ibid.)
2. In reviewing all of the cables carefully, and you are all to be congratulated on the reporting, it is clear that we need to focus on two ideas that have come from you at this stage. First, Ambassador Tasca’s sensible thought that when Secretary sees Palamas and Olcay he encourage them both to come up with some kind of a mediation proposal that is somewhere within the ballpark in so far as GOC is concerned. It seems to me also that this idea can be combined with the other idea which your cables elucidated, namely the idea of a third party presence at continuing intercommunal talks. The trick, of course, will be to try to find the right balance in “UN involvement or noninvolvement” plus having the Secretary General designate an individual who would have sufficient stature, force, and subtlety to inject some fresh ideas in the situation. We are under no illusions that the Cyprus issue is immediately susceptible to political solution. But it is clear that our interest would best be served if some form of continuing instrumentality keeping the parties engaged can be found.

3. I have not had an opportunity to discuss this matter fully with the Secretary but will do so before we go to New York, since not only will he be heavily involved as in the past in Arab-Israeli talks, but much of his time will also (in addition to Chinese representation) be taken up with India-Pakistan matters, and now Cyprus in a much more intensive way.

4. Assuming that we will want to encourage GOG and GOT to develop a mediation proposal along the above lines, what are your thoughts as to the individual that might be named by Secretary General. While I personally know and have respect for Osorio-Tafall he does not strike me as the kind of individual that can give talks the new starch that is required. In preparation for the Secretary’s talks in New York, I would like your views on this and any other thoughts you may have.

5. I hope you would include in your observations the relative advantages and disadvantages of a non-American as against an American being designated. From this end, I can tell you our preference would be in any next stage that it be a non-American, though we obviously cannot afford to close any doors since Cyprus issue can reach a new and more serious stage over coming months.

Rogers

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2 See Document 379.

3 In telegram 1682 from Nicosia, September 15, Popper reiterated a preference for using a UN mediation to restart intercommunal talks. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. 1 Jan 1969–June 30, 1974) In telegram 4866 from Athens, September 15, the Embassy stated its view that a non-American mediation was preferable. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP) No response from the Embassy in Turkey has been found.
New York, October 7, 1971, 1514Z.

Secto 80/3245. Memorandum of Conversation: Under Secretary Palamas (Greece). Part II of III: Cyprus. October 6, 1971; 5:00 PM. 35 A Waldorf.

1. Participants: Greece—Under Secretary Palamas, Ambassador Pesmazotlu; US—The Secretary, Mr. Sisco, Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Boyatt (reporting officer).

2. Summary: Palamas and Olcay have developed compromise procedure for sustaining negotiating process on Cyprus problem which involves: (A) continuation of local talks; (B) addition of Greek and Turk technical experts as participants; (C) utilization of SYG good offices as framework for continuation of talks and addition of mainland participants. USG supports this positive approach by parties concerned in dealing with problem. End summary.

3. Palamas opened discussion of Cyprus problem by summarizing his talks with GOT FonMin Olcay which characterized as conducted in spirit of compromise. Although GOG and GOT differ on substance of Cyprus problem they agree on need for procedural device to preserve negotiations and avoid outbreaks of violence leading to crisis. Specifically two governments in agreement on three points:

   (A) Inter-communal talks constituted best negotiating procedure and should continue.

   (B) Inter-communal talks should be re-enforced by participation of GOG and GOT technical experts who would join as observers.

   (C) GOG and GOT agreed that most viable framework within which local talks should be continued and expanded to include Greek and Turk experts was SYG’s good offices mandate.

4. On procedural details Palamas stated that Archbishop Makarios would be inclined to reject anything proposed by Greece or Turkey. Therefore, to avoid this negative reaction U Thant should take initiative and propose continuation of talks and addition of GOG and GOT

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 GREECE. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated priority to Ankara, Athens, London, Nicosia, and USNATO.

2 Separate memoranda of conversation, dealing with the Chinese representation question and the progress of democratization in Greece, reported in telegrams Secto 88 and 92, both October 8, are ibid.

3 The talks took place in New York where both men were attending the UN General Assembly session.
experts. Fact is both Ankara and Athens want compromise and can contribute to progress by inducing both communities to compromise.

5. Palamas reported that in his earlier talks with U Thant latter proposed that he issue report containing his ideas on substance of Cyprus problem. Greece would not object formally because U Thant’s concepts would undoubtedly support GOC position. However, Palamas said he personally believed substantive comments by U Thant at this stage and in this form will be definitely unhelpful because they would undoubtedly generate GOT rejection of UN views and possibly UN procedural role as well. Palamas expressed hope US would be able to help with U Thant in this regard.

6. Secretary responded by expressing pleasure that allies had made positive progress on difficult problem. US had been thinking along similar lines and procedure outlined by Palamas seemed to us to be very good idea indeed. Palamas interjected thought that not only would this procedure keep talks going it would also keep the Cyprus problem out of SC and therefore keep the Soviets out of it.

7. Pursuing question of UN role further Palamas added his personal thought that any UN substantive views could be folded into procedure by addition to local talks of UN technical expert. December resignation of Osorio-Tafall and need for UN SYG to appoint new special representative might provide opportunity for such a move. Sisco noted that this last idea gave additional balance since it went a long way toward meeting desire of Archbishop Makarios to have active UN role.

8. Secretary closed by stating USG would support in every way creative effort by parties directly concerned to deal with Cyprus problem.
383. Letter From the Counselor of Embassy in Cyprus (Crawford) to the Officer in Charge of Cyprus Affairs (Boyatt)\(^1\)

Nicosia, November 19, 1971.

Dear Tom:

“How can we come to any conclusion other than that Greece supports Grivas when every instrumentality responsive to Greek control is being used to support Grivas against Makarios?”

These words to me by Chris Veniamin some days ago prompt this letter. I am not sure that our disseminated telegraphic reporting has conveyed the full flavor of the picture we here see emerging ever more clearly. In part, our reporting hesitancy has been deliberate: we would not like to be charged with building a completed edifice from straws in the wind. We also know that [less than 1 line not declassified] Athens will not buy any suggestion that something could be afoot of which they were not aware. Therefore, our efforts gradually to convince must be based on fact as facts accumulate. Let’s see what we have in hand as of this moment:

Item—The Communists’ 40% showing in the 1970 elections shocked and angered the GOG. According to the Greek Embassy here, the conclusion was reached that something had to be done about Cyprus. At that time, the concern about building assets was related more to the spread of Communist influence on the island, under the umbrella of Makarios’ bland detachment, than to solving the Cyprus problem in the interests of good relations with Turkey, although this, of course, remained an important Greek interest.

Item—One of the first manifestations of the GOG’s stepped up anti-Communist action program was the suddenly improved financial position of SEK. The GOG Labor Minister visited Cyprus and from that time on money was no obstacle in SEK’s drive to expand.

Item—Erim’s entry in March 1971 led to a new sense of urgency on the part of both GOT and GOG in terms of the search for a solution. I speculate that this reinforced the GOG’s earlier conclusion based on its anti-Communism that existing assets had to be strengthened and new ones created.

Item—In the press field, Greece bought Mesimvri, helped Aghon, and possibly acquired some influence in Eleftheria even before Grivas’ return. Coincidentally with his return, Proini sprang into being and Patris suddenly discovered enough money to start publishing twice a week to

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Official–Informal. Copies were sent to Brown and Draper.
increase its circulation. Last week Cosmos Simera, glossy and skillful as a bi-weekly magazine, reappeared in the stands after an 18-month suspension caused by financial difficulty. To no one’s surprise, it boosts Grivas and runs down Makarios in a sophisticated way. In December, we are to have a visit from GOG Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister, Byron Stamatelopoulos. His visit will wrap up already agreed arrangements under which the Athens News Agency will start to service all the Greek Cypriot newspapers, at a subsidized rate of £40 each monthly.

Item—Sports. We hear that Col. Papapostoulou (the name sounds familiar) recently “retired” from the Greek army and has gone to work for Aslanides. Aslanides set up in Cyprus the extension to Cyprus of Pro-Po, the Greek football pool. The extension was a thinly disguised device to channel funds to the anti-Communist clubs.

Item—Commerce. Michael Savides and a strong team representing the Chamber of Commerce returned last week from a visit to Athens at the invitation of their opposite numbers. On his return, he announced that a new dynamic program of commercial and economic cooperation had been agreed. Extensive new private investment in Cyprus by Greeks is forecast, etc.

Item—Education. GOC Education Minister Frixos Petrides was invited to Athens at the same time as the Savides team. Returning, he announced that there will be new programs to coordinate Cypriot education more closely with the mainland.

Item—Fighters. In September, Elias Ipsarides and a large PEMA group was given red carpet treatment in Athens and an expenses-paid trip around Greece. As you know the ex-Fighters clubs subsequently came out strongly in favor of Grivas.

Item—Youth. PEON in mid-summer was invited on a trip similar to PEMA’s. According to Tassos Papadopoulos, who is close to PEON’s leadership, the association was assured of unstinting financial support. PEON’s present position on Grivas is that both he and Makarios are good fellows and must work together for advancement of the national cause.

Item—National Guard. From many sources we hear about the kind of indoctrination mainland officers are giving Cypriot recruits. In this, Makarios is portrayed as the man who sacrificed the national cause—which could have been achieved by the Acheson Plan—for the sake of personal ambition, and who is prepared to undermine Hellenic interests by his encouragement of AKEL and invitation to the Soviets to in-

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2 In a December 2 reply to Crawford, Boyatt noted that Papapostoulou was “widely rumored to have been involved in the March 1970 attempt to assassinate Makarios and the subsequent successful murder of Georkadjis.” (Ibid.)
volve themselves in the Cyprus problem. Grivas is depicted as the au-
thentic national hero who has returned to steer the island back to the
enosis course. To achieve this goal, it is acknowledged, Greeks must
be realistic. A territorial price will have to be paid to Turkey, but this
involves little more than recognition of the present reality, which is that
the Turks are independently administering their own portions of the
island thanks to Makarios’ past blunders. You will note the parallelism
of this line and that taken by Ambassador Panayotacos with Ambas-
sador Popper on November 19 (Nicosia 2053).3

Item—the biggest one—Grivas.

Let us look at another dimension. From a variety of reports, you
know that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are ready on short notice
to have the former support the latter in a move out of their existing
enclaves in NE Cyprus, to consolidate themselves in a solid zone of
physical control based on a line running from Kyrenia through north-
ern Nicosia and down to north Famagusta. The Turkish Embassy here,
for example Counselor Tunabas, acknowledges that some blood would
be spilt on both sides but points out that creation of a demarcation line
will in the end be the only solution and that “a solution must entail
some sacrifices.”

And a final dimension. We have had some glimpses into private
channels of communication between Athens and Ankara. During a visit
here, Acet’s deputy referred to a link using Papadopoulos’ private sec-
retary (name not given) and Ambassador Türkmen. Specifically, he
spoke of a message received on this channel in which Papadopoulos
had signified his support of double-enosis as the only solution. A mil-
tary channel also seems to exist, using the Greek military Attaché in
Ankara. At a higher level, we would be curious to know the content of
exchanges now taking place in Athens between TGS Chief of Staff Gen-
eral Tagmac and his Greek counterparts. Locally we are aware of a “hot
line” between “Bozkurt” and General Kharalamvopoulos. For example,
General Leslie4 tells us of tense situations in which he has found his own
(inimitable) phrases used with the Turkish Fighter leadership coming
back at him an hour or two later from Kharalamvopoulos.

At the present time the facts carry us only to the conclusions
that: Greece is embarked on a coordinated effort to build its assets in
Cyprus; these are essentially being used in support of Grivas and
against Makarios; Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are militarily ready
to carve out control of northeastern Cyprus; there exist coordinating

3 Dated November 19, it reported that the Greek Ambassador had informed Pop-
per that Grivas was ready to settle for a partial enosis solution. (Ibid.)
4 Edward M. Leslie, Chief of Staff, UNFICYP.
mechanisms between the GOG and GOT; and, while Greece and Turkey are willing to give negotiations and diplomacy a further try, they are telling us it’s the last, that June 1972 is the limit, and that double-enosis may in the end be the only way of solving the Cyprus problem once and for all.

Most of the foregoing is not new to you. It is the summation that, I feel, provides useful food for thought.

I ask myself if, when the time comes, if it does, or before it does, our Government wants to stay silent, say “no” with conviction, say “no” with tongue in cheek, or say covertly “yes” to buy into the planning of our allies. As you know, there are the very faintest of indications that the British may already be privy. A whole separate letter could be written concerning the script that could be devised were we ever to decide to say “yes.” I do not believe we need decide now or hastily. Greece and Turkey are still on the diplomatic track and our efforts should be to help that succeed. But if and when it shows signs of not paying off, we judge that they are likely to consider putting into motion the alternative machinery that is being readied. By that time we will need a USG position carefully thought out and approved at the White House level.

The Ambassador has seen the foregoing and agrees that it summarizes the situation, as we see it, fairly. He suggests that you show this letter to Rodger Davies.

Warmest regards,
Sincerely,

Bill

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5 In a December 7 letter to Boyatt, Draper found himself in “general agreement” with Crawford’s presentation, but noted some evidence that the Turkish Government was not sold either on the idea of a double enosis solution or on cooperation with the Greek junta. (Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 75 D 41, Pol 26–1)
214961. Subject: Cyprus: Grivas Situation. Ref: State 214614.

1. We have carefully considered point made in Athens 61873 that GOT pressure on Greece is main factor in increasing consensus within GOG for double enosis “solution” to Cyprus problem. While it is clear that GOT is, of course, keeping up pressure for solution to Cyprus problem, Department does not feel this is primary causal element in GOG’s attraction for double enosis. In fact, increasing sympathy for double enosis among prominent Greeks seems to have momentum all its own, based on equal parts of pressure for a solution, dislike of Makarios, desire for enosis even if flawed enosis and fear of Communist penetration of Cyprus.

2. Department’s reading of developments over past several months is that GOT pressure for Cyprus solution peaked late last summer shortly after Erim government took over. At that time GOT at all levels appeared to be pushing for “dynamic” solution to accompaniment of cheers from Turk-Cypriot community. We believe firm representations by USG initially in Ankara and later in New York and Washington emphasizing that USG continued strongly to support peaceful, negotiated settlement of Cyprus problem was very important factor in defusing Turkish demand for solution to Cyprus by end of 1971. In any case, we feel that further representations in Ankara on this subject are not necessary, at least for present.

3. Department would also like to comment on points made in para 8 of Athens 6177.4 We agree wholeheartedly that US approach to GOG on Grivas be presented in way that does not bring into question Greek veracity. Démarche outlined in reftel was drafted with this in mind.

4. Athens 6177 also recommends that US not leave impression “that we prepared to make contribution to solving Cyprus problem substantial enough to give us voice in such considerations as future of

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Boyatt; cleared by Silva, Dillon, and Fry (S/S–O); and approved by Davies. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, USNATO, London, and USUN.

2 Dated November 11, it reiterated concern about Grivas’s actions even in the event that he was ready to support a Greek Government plan for “double enosis.” (Ibid.)

3 Dated November 19, it commented on the need to lessen Turkish pressures on Greece. (Ibid.)

4 Dated November 19, it stated the Embassy’s view that Papadopoulos had not sent Grivas to Cyprus and discussed options for dealing with Grivas. (Ibid.)
Grivas.” We believe USG efforts from 1963 to present to bring peace provide basis for this manifestation of interest. Fact is that over period of almost a decade USG has made substantial contributions to efforts to solve the Cyprus problem. Ball, Acheson, and Vance missions of 1963, 1964, and 1967 are high points of a whole series of US initiatives, most recent of which have been our efforts to get local talks started in 1968 and our continuing efforts to revive them at present stage. As historical record clearly indicates, USG involvement in Cyprus problem both in crisis resolution and problem solving terms does give US voice in anything bearing on problem including “future of Grivas.” It is worth recalling that prior to November 1967 crisis there was discussion within USG as to whether or not USG should request GOG to recall Grivas. While debate was in progress, with many claiming status of Grivas was not US concern, Grivas directed violent attack on Turk-Cypriots which caused 1967 crisis and this, in turn, involved USG directly in Cyprus situation under worst possible conditions.

Irwin

385. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus

Washington, December 8, 1971, 0514Z.

221062. Subject: GOT Ambassador’s Call on Sisco: Cyprus.

1. GOT Ambassador Esenbel raised subject of Cyprus with Assistant Secretary Sisco by drawing attention to statement in SYG’s report that latter would discuss his procedural proposal in more detail during SC meeting on UNFICYP renewal. Esenbel also mentioned critically SYG’s invitation in report to SC to discuss substance of Cyprus problem.

2. Esenbel emphasized that GOT very much opposed to substantive intervention by SC into Cyprus problem and expressed GOT’s desire for automatic UNFICYP renewal without substantive debate.

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3. Assistant Secretary Sisco replied that he had examined carefully text of SYG’s initiative and text of GOT reply. In light of imminent SC consideration of Cyprus he wished to make following points:

A. First and foremost, Sisco emphasized he agreed with Esenbel that it was in no one’s interest to have substantive, extended and heated SC debate. Frankly, this would benefit only Soviet Union.

B. In our view, decisive element in containing SC situation would be acceptance by all parties of SYG’s proposal on SYG’s terms.

C. Sisco went on to point out that we considered GOT response as positive although it was true that GOT was basically restating its position, particularly in relation to details of mandate. Sisco offered opinion that SYG’s proposal was formulated in sufficiently positive terms to permit GOT to take strongest possible posture of accepting it without qualifications. Obviously there would be differences on modalities, but these could be discussed later once talks had begun.

D. Sisco said that while US not party in this arrangement, we did believe that if GOT could endorse SYG’s proposal in more unqualified way, this would give US opportunity to urge U Thant to make very strong representation to Makarios to accept SYG’s initiative. In this situation USG was also prepared to weigh in with Makarios.

4. Ambassador Esenbel then asked Sisco how USG would like scenario to proceed over next several days. Sisco responded that most positive development would be unqualified acceptance of SYG’s initiative by all three parties before SC meeting. Next best would be for GOT to make very clear it accepted fully SYG’s proposal. Esenbel interjected that he considered Turkish acceptance to be positive statement. Sisco replied that there could be no question about this, as he had indicated earlier. However, Sisco noted that Turkish qualifications had been registered. Sisco then reviewed the language of the SYG initiative to point up how close it was to Turkish position and Turkish interest. SYG language emphasizes that talks principally between two communities with SYG representative providing good offices and GOT and GOC participating via constitutional experts.

5. Esenbel emphasized extent to which GOT had already compromised on UNSYG’s proposal by recalling that when subject of UN participation in local talks had first been raised by Sisco, Esenbel had said to him this type of an approach would probably not be accepted by GOT. Now GOT had accepted and Esenbel saw no need for SC intervention which could only be unhelpful.

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2 On October 4 the Greek Government announced that both it and the Government of Turkey had accepted the Secretary General’s proposal for the appointment of a UN Special Representative to the intercommunal talks.
6. Sisco then summarized by stating that at this juncture US, like GOT, would like to see automatic renewal of UNFICYP and limit action of SC consideration to nonsubstantive discussion on Cyprus problem. However, best way to achieve this was to get local talks revived before SC met. If GOT could make contribution in this area then SYG and US could press Makarios to accept also.

Johnson

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3 At its December 13 meeting, the Security Council adopted Security Council Res. 305 by a vote of 14–0 with China abstaining. The resolution funded UNFICYP for a further 6 months with the expectation of a scaling down of its operations. Meanwhile, the Secretary General announced he would send representatives to Athens, Nicosia, and Ankara in an effort to reactivate the stalled intercommunal talks.

386. Memorandum of Conversation¹


SUBJECT

Denktash Views on Cyprus Situation

PARTICIPANTS

Rauf Denktash, Leader of Turk Cypriots
Thomas D. Boyatt, Director of Cypriot Affairs
Roger A. Long, Political-Economic Officer

Rauf Denktash, Turk Cypriot leader and negotiator for his side in the intercommunal talks, called on Deputy Assistant Secretary Herz of International Organizations on December 14. Although NEA officials were fully engaged with Indo-Pak and Middle East crises,² Assistant Secretary Sisco saw Denktash for a brief “hello.” Messrs. Boyatt and Long of the Cyprus country directorate accompanied Denktash on the call. The conversation was reported in State 225745.³

Following Denktash’s call on Deputy Assistant Secretary Herz, I took him to lunch where he, Roger Long and I had an extended, varied, and lively discussion. The following points of interest emerged.

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Long and Boyatt. Copies were sent to Ankara and Nicosia.

² Reference to the December 4–12 clash between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The United States sent elements of the Seventh Fleet into the crisis area.

³ Dated December 15. (Ibid.)
1. SYG Proposal—Denktash was quite relaxed about the new negotiating procedure in which representatives of the UN, Greece and Turkey would participate. He felt this would be helpful in that the added participants could suggest fresh approaches as stalemates occur. He also accepted the idea that, since Greece and Turkey would have to live with any eventual settlement, it was good to have them participate in the formulation of such a settlement. In addition, the participation of the “mother” country and the “father” country would give the Greek and Turk communities respectively added confidence in any compromises reached.

2. Prospects for Settlement—Several times Denktash said that the time to have reached a settlement was in 1968 when he and the Turk Cypriot community were psychologically prepared to make fairly major concessions to the Greek Cypriots. He said that if he and Clerides had gone away by themselves for a few months they could have reached a settlement. His only demand would have been recognition of Turk Cypriot partnership status, which he said would not have been as detailed or as strong as his 1971 local autonomy demands. He stated that he would have conceded everything else to Clerides. Instead, he and Clerides talked on Cyprus and it gradually became clear that Makarios was controlling Clerides. In the three years since the talks started Denktash’s views had changed. He now is much more of the opinion that Makarios will not permit a settlement acceptable to the Turk Cypriots.

I told Denktash that in my personal view he could have either the kind of autonomy he wanted or the kind of guarantees he felt necessary, but not both. I asked, on a hypothetical basis, whether Denktash would choose full autonomy or the present set of international guarantees if the choice had to be made. Denktash replied that he would choose the guarantees. I told Rauf that in that case it was a good thing that he was prepared to start de novo on constitutional issues as he had told the press before leaving Cyprus and had confirmed to Martin Herz.

3. Normalization—A good bit of the discussion was devoted to “normalization.” In general, Denktash was receptive to the idea of normalization which would include not only concessions by the Greek community but by his community as well. Of course, things got a bit more sticky once details were discussed but at least Rauf was prepared to discuss the establishment of a variety of normalization subcommittees under UN aegis not excluding one on “that damned Kyrenia Road.” I repeated the point I made earlier (State 225745) that a visible normalization move by the Turkish side was important in getting a lot more normalization out of Makarios.

4. Deconfrontation—On the subject of disengagement and deconfrontation of military forces, Denktash made the usual Turk Cypriot
point, viz., it is unfair to ask Turk Cypriot fighters and Greek Cypriot National Guard to each withdraw 100 yards when the Turkish position is only 200 yards deep and mobile Greek forces have the entire island into which they can withdraw. I acknowledged Denktash’s point and suggested that deconfrontation should be approached in a different way. I asked Rauf what would be his reaction, for example, to the proposition that National Guard troops withdraw into their barracks and in return the Turks would replace TMT fighters with policemen. To my surprise Denktash replied that he thought this suggestion had merit and was certainly worth exploring. 

Comment: I think we should follow up on this one with UNFICYP and Denktash when he returns.

5. Internal Political Situation in Turk Cypriot Community—The most important point on this subject was Denktash’s frank admittance that his ability to “impose” an intercommunal settlement had decreased radically since 1970. He said that particularly in the 1968 period, the Turk Cypriot community felt that a settlement could be reached and that the right man to reach that settlement (i.e., Denktash) was available to reach it. As time has dragged on without a settlement, however, more and more Turk Cypriots have lost faith not only in the general prospects for reaching a settlement but in particular in Denktash’s (or anyone’s) ability to do so. When asked if this meant that Turk Cypriots are becoming more belligerent in their interaction with the other community, Denktash said this was not the problem but that a certain lack of confidence in the possibility for reaching a settlement had developed.

6. Comment—Both in his call on Martin Herz and later during our follow-up luncheon and talk, Denktash was his usual articulate, forceful and intelligent self. He did, however, generally come through as much more positive and creative than he has in recent Embassy reporting. Perhaps he consciously tried to project a constructive aura or perhaps release from the confines and demands of the community makes him more statesmanlike. Either way, Rauf Bey put himself across as a determined, but sensitive and rational, leader of his community. Denktash was definitely in good spirits and enjoyed the give and take of our discussions. Physically, he said he was in good shape and said his health was 80 per cent improved. He did, however, complain that the constant pressure of his many responsibilities and lack of progress on the Cyprus problem had induced a certain malaise. As an example, Denktash explained that he simply was no longer interested in recreation or entertainment and everything seemed rather flat. I got the impression that Rauf could use a vacation.

SUBJECT

Progress on the Cyprus Problem

The news of crises invariably receives total attention while news of progress usually gets buried. I would like to call your attention to some quiet, but hopeful developments.

For several months we have been working hard to avoid another crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean. As you know, this summer the local negotiations which were basic to the containment of the Cyprus problem broke down and violent incidents began to increase. In the face of a deteriorating situation, we suggested a third-party presence to reinvigorate the negotiations. This idea was developed by Greece and Turkey and then elaborated and formally proposed by U Thant as a new negotiating procedure. I supported this proposal during my bilateral meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus in October. Subsequently, we made diplomatic representations here and in Athens, Ankara and Nicosia urging acceptance by all parties.

On December 13 the Security Council met to consider Cyprus. We were successful in getting a noncontroversial resolution extending the UN force on Cyprus for six more months, which will aid greatly in maintaining a peaceful atmosphere in which negotiations can proceed. In addition, Cyprus accepted the Secretary-General’s proposal without qualifications. This breakthrough together with earlier acceptances by Greece and Turkey (the latter with qualifications) will in my view make possible the resumption of the negotiations in the near future. I believe our representations were very important, if not crucial, in getting the parties back to the negotiating table.

We will, of course, closely monitor the evolving situation in order to assist the parties whenever our efforts would be appropriate and helpful. On the Cyprus front the new year has a hopeful cast.

William P. Rogers

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2 See Document 382. Rogers’s talk on Cyprus with Kyprianou was reported in telegram Secto 149, October 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CYP-US) His talk with Olcay was reported in telegram Secto 117, October 8. (Ibid., POL 7 TUR)
388. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, January 21, 1972, 1535Z.

145. For Assistant Secretary Sisco from Popper. Subject: Cyprus: Need for Progress on Deconfrontation.

1. I think your proposal for a new pitch on deconfrontation\(^2\) comes at a propitious time and that it will be helpful to broach it to parties in near future.

2. I would, however, justify the proposal on grounds somewhat different from those you have cited. Increased tension in Cyprus today is due less to intercommunal conflict and differences than to clandestine activity within Greek Cypriot community itself. Recent Green Line shooting has again demonstrated what Aug 1970 Trilomo incident indicated—that each community, acting under mainland patron’s guidance, can confine and control incidents when they occur, if it wishes to do so. UNFICYP is an important adjunct of the process. As I see it, your proposal is particularly useful now because it would come at a time when all parties are casting about for some suggestions or steps which would serve them as alternatives to flatly negative confrontation when new intercommunal talks get underway. Apparently with this objective, both sides are talking in terms of deconfrontation, normalization, “freeze,” or modus vivendi as subjects for early discussion.

3. Thus, Denktash has hinted at the possibility of replacing fighters by police on Green Line (Nicosia 132).\(^3\) Makarios is looking toward demilitarization which would end with disbandment of on-island military forces (Nicosia 2228 and 137).\(^4\) And within the last few days General Haralambopoulos, Greek National Guard commander, mused to UNFICYP Acting Chief of Staff Thornton that he wondered how UNFICYP would view a unilateral voluntary pull-back by National Guard forces to their camps throughout the island, adding that he might

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2. In telegram 9607 to Ankara, Athens, Nicosia, and USUN, January 20, Sisco suggested a deconfrontation proposal based on the following points: 1. All Greek Cypriot National Guardsmen withdrawn to barracks and where necessary replaced with policemen; 2. All Turk Cypriot fighters at points of confrontation replaced by Turk Cypriot policemen; 3. Prohibition of automatic weapons in areas of close confrontation; 4. No change in territorial status quo; and 5. Above four points guaranteed by UNFICYP. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)

3. Ibid.

4. Telegram 2228 from Nicosia, December 22, 1971, is ibid. Telegram 137 from Nicosia, January 21, was not found.
be willing to consider this. (Predictably, indication that Haralam-
bpoulos has raised matter with Cyprus Government. We wonder
whether he has discussed it with GOG during his recent shuttle trips
to Athens.)

4. It is important to recognize that each party approaches decon-
frontation on a basis strongly tilted against the other side. Makarios
links it to withdrawal of mainland contingents, thus increasing free-
dom of Greek Cypriot majority to deal with Turk Cypriot minority on
its own. Denktash thinks of it in connection with financial advantages
to Turk Cypriots. It is possible that mainland Greek officers are toying
with it in terms of future moves by enosis-double enosis groups. In
short, when both sides are presented with a balanced and compre-
hensive formula, the odds are that they will boggle at it rather than
agree. Nevertheless, as indicated above, I think the time is right to make
a real try.

5. I believe the formula contained in your telegram is equitably
balanced. I would suggest that formula be made more specific with re-
spect to how far back Turk Cypriot fighters move. In enclaves this
should be a meaningful distance, though in an area like Artemis Road,
Larnaca, it would have to be less. UNFICYP would monitor and su-
pervise rather than guarantee execution, and it would have to be un-
derstood that if either side took advantage of situation to change ter-
ritorial status quo, the other would be automatically freed from all
deconfrontation restrictions and guarantor powers (and/or UN Secu-


6. I fully agree that a proposal of this character would be more ef-
fective if it were made by the UN and supported by others. But rather
than raise it in New York and Nicosia simultaneously, I suggest that it
might be better if the proposal were worked out in New York with
Guyer alone and if then Guyer brought it with him as he went round
the Nicosia-Athens-Ankara circuit. Depending on initial reactions, Os-
orio could then unveil best possible official proposal at early state in
resumed talks.5

Popper

5 In telegram 338 from Athens, January 19, and 484 from Ankara, January 20, the
Embassies in Greece and Turkey endorsed the proposals contained in Sisco's telegram.
(Both ibid.)
1 In early February 1972, President Archbishop Makarios disclosed to his closest advisors that he had purchased arms from the Government of Czechoslovakia. He later confirmed the arms purchase to the Commander of the Cypriot National Guard, Lieutenant General Haralambos Haralambopoulos. In disclosing the purchase, Makarios said that the arms are intended for use by the Cypriot police in countering any attempts at armed violence by groups loyal to retired Lieutenant General Georgios Grivas. Makarios said that the arms had been delivered by ship to Cyprus in late January and were off-loaded in the vicinity of Xeros. The arms were then taken by truck to the Archdiocesan located within the old walled city of Nicosia. The President stated that the cost of the arms package was 500,000 pounds sterling (approximately U.S. $1.3 million). Although he did not indicate the type of arms involved, Makarios said that the transaction was similar in terms of type and quantity to the 1966 arms purchase from Czechoslovakia. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: The figure of 500,000 pounds appears very high. The 1966 purchase of Czech arms amounted to approximately U.S. $427,000. This purchase consisted of both arms and 2.5 million rounds of ammunition—the major arms items included 1500 rifles, 100 submachine pistols, 700 submachine guns, 140 light and heavy machine guns, 30 anti-tank guns, and 30 82–MM mortars.) (Source Comment: The President did not specify the date he had completed the transaction for the date of delivery. Although he did not mention the quan-
tity of arms purchased, Makarios noted that it took 50 truckloads to complete the transfer from the Xeros area to the Archbishopric. The transaction was made in the strictest secrecy.)

2. (Headquarters Comment: See TDCS DB–315/00977–72 from another reliable source for a report in which Makarios was reported to have said that the arms transaction cost over 600,000 pounds.) ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: An additional reliable source has reported that according to a unit of the Greek Central Information Service /KYP/ in Cyprus, the subject of acquisition of bloc arms arose first following the return of Makarios from Moscow in June 1971, then again in connection with the October 1971 trip to Czechoslovakia by Dr. Vasso Lyssarides. This source believes that the Lyssarides trip was for the specific purpose of arranging the details of the arms purchase on behalf of the Cypriot Government. Source further believes that Makarios decided to purchase these arms for three reasons: because of his uncertainty following his disagreement with the Greek Government in June 1971; because of his suspicion that the Cypriot National Guard does not fully support him; and because of the internal developments in Cyprus since the arrival there of Grivas.)

3. [1½ lines not declassified]

2 Dated February 4, it reported that on February 1, Grivas supporters had informed the Greek Government of the Czech arms shipments, and that Makarios had confirmed that the shipments were being made. (Ibid.)

390. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, February 7, 1972, 1615Z.

258. Subject: Consequences of Makarios’ New Arms Deal with Czechoslovakia.

1. Summary: Assuming information that Makarios has imported a large new consignment of arms from Czechoslovakia is correct, we conclude that an important new element of tension has been added to an

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already most unstable situation. There will be deleterious effects on imminent Turkish contingent rotation, enlarged intercommunal talks, prospects for U.S. deconfrontation proposal, GOG relations with Makarios, and to much lesser extent on GOT relations with GOG. Makarios’ bid for more security in the longer term could precipitate and hasten the very kind of challenge he is seeking protect himself against.

2. It now seems almost 100 percent sure that Makarios has secretly imported new weapons to arm an internal protective force of approximately 2,000 men, that these arms came from Czechoslovakia, and that transaction is at least double the size of that concluded in August 1966. Being a shrewd analyst as well as a determined brinkman, Makarios undoubtedly calculated the angles closely and concluded this move was essential to protect himself against a direct challenge from Grivas, whom he believes to be backed by Greece. But the medicine is of a sort used in extremis; it could provoke the challenge he seeks to defend against; and it will cause a lot of headaches to others, not least to USG. To take a quick look at some of the most likely consequences:

3. Next rotation of Turkish treaty contingent (TURDYK) is scheduled for Feb 23. (Since there was 7 month gap between last two rotations of 50 percent of contingent, there is 5 month interval this time, to keep on 12 month cycle for rotation of entire contingent.) Usual negotiations—angry bickerings would be a better description—are going on about list of equipment GOC will authorize for import with contingent. According Turkish Embassy, GOC, trying make up for its display of relative reasonableness last time, has been especially picayune in initial cuts this time. Also from Turkish Embassy we aware TGS has long been restive with having submit its equipment requirements for contingent to GOC scrutiny and—in its eyes—demeaning cuts. Makarios’ import of arms gives GOT every excuse to be very tough, perhaps to point of saying contingent will import what it wishes without GOC scrutiny, and interference will be met with force. We are already hearing noises along this line and UNFICYP, which is the traditional middleman in working out rotations, is very apprehensive.

4. It goes without saying that psychological boost given atmosphere by Guyer’s successful trip, with its resultant prospect that new talks will begin later this month has been blunted by arms importation. Fortunately, everybody had been brought on board before the news broke; otherwise Turkish Cypriots and probably Turkey would have been a lot harder to convince. As it is, Turks both mainland and local will start new phase with an even more than usually bitter taste in their mouths about Makarios’ life style.

5. The U.S. deconfrontation proposal has been dealt a particularly hard blow. From UNFICYP Commander General Chand we understand Guyer carried the ball as we had asked, speaking to the parties in a general sense and leaving the specific suggestions, in writing,
with UNFICYP for appropriate follow-up. One half of this was done promptly after Guyer’s departure. National Guard Commander Haralambopoulos promised Chand complete cooperation if Turkish Cypriots were willing move as proposed. Turks, as Chand noted to us February 5, would have been very hard to move anyway. Now they have intense emotional and some real justification to perpetuate their preferred intransigence.

6. It seems hard to believe that the state of real, as opposed to oratorical relations between the GOG and Makarios could get worse than it has been since last summer’s refusal by Makarios to accept Greek suggestions for compromise, and Grivas’ subsequent return. (We’re not saying the two are necessarily related, but such is now the case.) From Greek Embassy, which is undoubtedly understating the case, we are aware GOG feels Makarios has disregarded its strong advice against purchasing arms from the bloc; has acted behind its back; is throwing down a public gauntlet by showing that he does not trust intentions of mainland National Guard officers and therefore of Greece itself; and is playing his old game of building up Communists against “nationalists.” Despite public denials, some harsh words have already been said by Haralambopoulos and Panayotacos, and more are likely to be.

7. GOG–GOT recent and cautiously evolved understanding, about not letting Cyprus be the determinant of their relations and a possible cause of war, is not very robust. The suspicions, particularly in Ankara, that Greeks will in the last analysis get together against Turks, whatever the temporary realism and reasonableness in Athens, is omnipresent. GOT will, we suspect, feel GOG should have done more to prevent this, and will expect more than is possible to remedy it. We doubt the better understanding about Cyprus will rupture because of arms transaction, but there seem likely to be some strains.

8. Finally, the core issue is whether Makarios has really improved his security situation. Once 2000 or whatever number of men he intends for special constabulary have been recruited and trained in use of these new weapons, the answer will probably be yes, whether one is considering a threat from Grivas and/or a dynamic solution push by Greece and Turkey. Until his new force has been created, however, Makarios’ deterrent is an intense irritant that could have an effect opposite from that he intends.

9. We will comment in a separate message on what steps USG might take to minimize the potentially disruptive consequences, reviewed in foregoing, of Makarios’ latest move, and to keep process of negotiation moving forward.²

Crawford

² Not found.
Athens, February 9, 1972, 1710Z.


1. Summary: Greek Government has so far shown restraint, but Czech arms import, growth of Communist Party on Cyprus, and threat of Soviet involvement may be beginning tip scales in favor of some Greek initiative to protect its national interests in Cyprus. In such event Greece may make further attempt, either alone or in concert with Turkey, to induce Makarios to abandon his intransigent position on compromise solution. We should be prepared to put forward suggestions of our own in this context that will keep situation in path of negotiation. End summary.

2. Until now we have sought to avoid speculating on possible Greek moves once it concluded that situation in Cyprus was threatening important Greek interests. While Greek Government’s relations with Makarios were precarious they were manageable, and a complementary feeling of good will between Greece and Turkey was slowly growing. Greek interests seemed temporarily best served by a continuation of intercommunal talks, even if prospects for reaching a solution through them were not great. Under those circumstances, attempting to determine what might cause change in Greek position and what action Greece might take as a result was highly speculative exercise indeed. Now, however, in wake of import of Czech arms by Makarios we consider time has come to offer some thoughts on how Greeks may assess their interests in Cyprus and what steps they could take. We caution, however, that our comments are based more on logic of situation than on evidence.

3. Cyprus at present time mainly important to Greece for negative reasons. While Papadopoulos could become national hero through successful union of island with mother country, risks are too great. Cyprus remains extremely important to Greece, however, because of (A) possibility of military conflict with Turkey over Cyprus; (B) effect of national crisis over Cyprus on tenure of present Greek regime; and (C) threat of Cyprus to Greece should it become center of Communist subversion and potential Soviet base.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia and Ankara. Another copy is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–CYP.
4. Any of these problems could be serious for Greece, the regime,
and Papadopoulos personally. Until now, however, the Greek Govern-
ment has shown considerable restraint in dealing with Cyprus. Dan-
gers of taking initiative, whether in concert with Turkey or alone, have
outweighed dangers of allowing Cyprus problem to remain unsolved.
It is now beginning to appear, however, that scales may have come
even or perhaps even tipped the other way. Thus, from point of view
of its own national interests, Greece may decide that some action is bet-
ter than allowing situation to continue to drift to point of possible no
return.

5. Since past experience has demonstrated that Greece cannot
reach an agreement with Makarios that is satisfactory to GOG nor can
it coerce him into doing what it wants, the question will arise whether
stronger pressures on Makarios could succeed.

6. Greek Government may soon reach conclusion that importation
of Czech arms, (which they may fear for distribution to leftist and Com-

munist elements supporting Archbishop), growing strength of AKEL,
and possibility if not probability that situation will develop in such a
way that Makarios will call for Soviet help are creating situation which
Greece can only neutralize by inducing Archbishop to give in on com-
promise solution. In such event, following courses are open to GOG:

A. Arrange Makarios’ removal from power, possibly to some other
ecclesiastical position, and hope that ensuing confusion on Greek
Cypriot side could be brought under control before it degenerated into
chaos;

B. Reach an agreement with Turkey on the terms for an interim
settlement and present Archbishop with form of ultimatum, while tak-
ing steps to prevent violent reaction by forces under his control;

C. Reach an understanding with General Grivas that Greek Gov-
ernment would not look unfavorably on a mounting campaign of in-
timidation against Cypriot Government, which would eventually so
weaken Makarios’ position that he would be forced either to resign or
acquiesce in Greek proposals for intercommunal solution giving Turk
Cypriot greater autonomy than he is now prepared to concede; and

D. Mount political action campaign to discredit Makarios with his
own community and to build up prestige of alternative leadership, pre-
sumably Clerides, with expectation that—under a somewhat longer
timetable—Archbishop could be forced out of office.

7. There are obviously variations and combinations of possibili-
ties enumerated above. All are dangerous, and we strongly doubt that
Greek Government would resort to any of them unless it concluded its
interests seriously threatened by Makarios’ policies and actions. We
have no evidence that GOG has embarked on new campaign of pres-
sure on Makarios, but possibility that it will feel obliged to do so is
becoming real. Question then arises what should U.S. do once evidence is in that Greeks are preparing to move.

8. If a situation such as we have described should develop, then we can assume that Greek Government has reached a very difficult and serious decision based on its own interests. Under these circumstances U.S. counsel of moderation, support for intercommunal talks, and expressions of concern that NATO allies may be drawn into conflict will no longer suffice.

9. We believe we should begin now to consider how we can work in conjunction with our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, with British, and with UN to bring maximum influence to bear on Cyprus situation. We favor strong effort involve UN in custody of Czech arms and concerted effort to induce Greece and UK take more serious view of threat to peace on Cyprus from Grivas.

10. In addition, time has clearly come, as Nicosia has already suggested, for USG to do some serious contingency planning. We would welcome Department comments, as well as those of Ankara and Nicosia.

Tasca

2 See Document 390.

392. Intelligence Information Cable


COUNTRY
Cyprus/Greece

DOI
January–Early February, 1972

SUBJECT
Makarios’ Views on the Current Internal Cyprus Situation

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1292, Saunders Subject Files, Greece 1/1/72–4/30/72. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad. Prepared in the CIA and sent to members of the Intelligence Community.
Summary: President Makarios feels that he has won the first round in what he considers to be the preliminary activity preparatory to a coup attempt against his government by the followers of retired Lieutenant General Georgios Grivas. Makarios bases his feeling on recent conversations which he has had with former Greek Ambassador, Constantinos Panayiotakos, with the Commanding General of the Cypriot National Guard, Lieutenant General Haralambos Haralambopoulos,2 and on the reporting of the Cyprus Information (Intelligence) Service (CIS). Given this, Makarios has outlined a program which he hopes will lead to a reduction of inter-island tension, while leaving no room for doubt by the Grivas’ forces that he intends to deal them a death blow if given the opportunity. End summary.

1. President Makarios is confident that he has out-maneuvered the forces of Lieutenant General Grivas, which the President believes are preparing a coup d’etat. The President believes that the victory is only one round in what may become a bloody struggle, and that the victory was won essentially on the political front. He feels, nonetheless, that he has set back the planning and timing of the Grivas forces. The President’s confident attitude is based on a number of considerations, but primary among them is the impression which he has gained through conversation with former Greek Ambassador, Constantinos Panayiotakos, and with National Guard Commander Haralambos Haralambopoulos. The President is not totally convinced of the sincerity of the Greek Government (GOG) but feels that there now exists a better atmosphere for the establishment of a basic understanding and cooperation between the GOG and the Cypriot Government (GOC). The President has been most concerned over the lack of cooperation between these governments and discussed the subject with Panayiotakos on 4 February. Panayiotakos stated that prior to his return to Athens to assume his position as Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, he wished to assure Makarios that the GOG was anxious for better relations with the President. To this end, Panayiotakos stated that incidents involving Greek officers at the time of the unloading of the Czech arms could

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2 These discussions were reported in Intelligence Information Cables TDCS DB 315/01167–72, February 10, and TDCS DB 315/01053–72, February 7. (Both Central Intelligence Agency, Records of the Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Information Cables)
have been avoided had the President seen fit to inform Haralambopoulos of the arrival of the arms and had requested assistance for transportation and storage. (\textit{less than 1 line not declassified} Comment: The Cypriot daily \textit{Eleftheria} reported on 3 February that an unidentified Greek major had been arrested in the vicinity of the Mitsero Mines magazine area, where the arms were first stored. The article stated that the officer had refused to disclose his identity and was later released following representations by Haralambopoulos.) President Makarios replied that it had been impossible to inform Haralambopoulos, as he did not wish to include the Greek side in a matter as delicate as importation of arms. Makarios also recalled for Panayiotakos' edification, a September 1971 conversation which he had had with Haralambopoulos concerning Makarios' desire to import Eastern European arms. Based on this conversation, Makarios stated, he had felt that the GOG did not wish to be involved. (\textit{less than 1 line not declassified} Comment: TDCS DB–315/01092–723 \textit{less than 1 line not declassified} reported the September 1971 conversation between Makarios and Haralambopoulos.) Makarios assured Panayiotakos that the arms were under his control and were intended for use only by the Cypriot security forces. During a second conversation with Panayiotakos, on 6 February 1972, Makarios received assurances that GOG would not allow Grivas to move against the President. In later conversation with Haralambopoulos, Makarios was told that the Greek forces in Cyprus (ELDYK) are in a position to cut short any move by Grivas against Makarios. (\textit{less than 1 line not declassified} Comment: The assurances of Panayiotakos and Haralambopoulos have not given the President cause to rest any easier. The statements, to the contrary, lead him to believe that perhaps as he had suspected, the GOG has Grivas under its direct control, perhaps in an ELDYK camp. The important aspect of the exchanges is the fact that Makarios feels he may have Athens worried. The representations of Panayiotakos and Haralambopoulos, and the recently announced ten-day delay in Panayiotakos departure date from Cyprus reflect Athens' concern.) (\textit{less than 1 line not declassified} Comment: Panayiotakos was scheduled to depart Cyprus for Athens on 9 February 1972.) Makarios thus feels that his decision to import arms from Czechoslovakia served notice to the followers of internal Cyprus affairs, that he is not going to be muscled into accepting a settlement to the Cypriot problem and, based on CIS reporting, he understands that the importation of Czech arms has both demoralized and confused the coup plotters.

\footnote{Dated February 8, it provided background on the Cypriot purchase of Czech weapons. (Ibid.)}
2. Given the position in which he now finds himself, Makarios has decided that the time is right to move for a relaxation of tension in the Greek-Cypriot community. To this end, Makarios has outlined a short-termed program which, he hopes, will have the desired effect in calming inter-island tensions, while not leading those who plot against him to believe that he has grown less resolute in his resolve to meet force with force. The program is intended also to clarify the GOC’s position on the question of a settlement to the Cyprus problem, presenting Makarios as a leader of all the people of Cyprus. The program will take the following lines:

   A. President Makarios will make a public statement dealing with internal conditions. He will outline the position of the government on the reconvening of intercommunal talks and cover the activities of the followers of General Grivas.

   B. Government spokesmen will portray the internal situation as improving, while seizing on the reconvening of the intercommunal talks to focus public attention from recent events.

   C. The GOC will attempt to enter into official exchanges with the GOG on GOC/GOG relations, with the hope of reaching agreement on a common approach to the solution to the Cyprus problem.

   D. Measures will continue to be taken by Cyprus security forces against the activities of all illegal organizations. The police force will be strengthened by the addition of one thousand new recruits.

   E. President of the House of Representatives and leader of the United Party, Glafkos Clerides, will undertake to unite the Cypriot rightwing under his leadership. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: TDCS DB–315/00596–72 [less than 1 line not declassified] reported that Clerides has refused the urging of representatives of rightwing groups to organize them under his leadership. Apparently Makarios now sees it in his interest to have Clerides attempt this union. An earlier, similar attempt was reportedly made by Makarios and Clerides.)

3. [1½ lines not declassified]

SUBJECT
The Cyprus Situation

You have been reading in your brief of new elements of tension in Cyprus. We promised you a fuller picture. The situation is beginning to move more quickly; the following should bring you up to date.

The talks

The new and expanded intercommunal talks have been held up by haggling over their format. Turkey’s final assent is expected soon, and talks could begin before the month is out unless present tensions prevent that.

The new talks would have a UN representative, a mainland Greek and a mainland Turk constitutional law expert join the Greek and Turk Cypriots. As you may recall, the genesis of this was in the meeting between the Greek (Palamas) and Turk (then Olcay) foreign ministers at the UNGA last fall. They agreed to add the mainland representatives, thereby creating a four-party format. U Thant insisted on the inclusion of a UN person in order to make the format sellable to Makarios who sees protection in a UN role. It is this five-party arrangement that has bounced around for several months.

The Greeks accepted outright and have said they will go along with any arrangement which would launch new talks. Makarios agonized at the thought of being pressured in new talks by mainland representatives; he sought assurances that the UN would indeed be involved and then stole the thunder from Turkey by promptly accepting. Turkey was left as the chief hold-out.

Turkey’s problem is the inclusion of the UN representative. They feel this will undercut new pressure on Makarios injected by the mainland representatives. Recalling their problems with past special UN mediators, Turkey has insisted on clarifications from the Secretary General’s special advisor on Cyprus that any UN representative not be a
“mediator” per se but be on hand with his “good offices” and that the mainland representatives be actively involved. Turkish Foreign Minister Bayulken said this week that Turk needs on this score were on the point of being met and opined that talks could begin by the month’s end. Matters stand there.

This procedural debate has been lengthy, but even if talks now begin, there will be a long debate over the agenda. On the one hand, Makarios has made it clear he does not believe mainland representatives belong in talks between the local parties on the constitutional questions at stake, on which he believes he has already made maximum concessions to the Turk Cypriots. He is lobbying for broad discussion including the international aspects of the problem such as withdrawal of Turk mainland support. The Turks, on the other hand, are adamant that new talks zero in precisely on the constitutional stalemate; they want none of the past treaties (London-Zurich accords) or constitutional points already agreed upon undercut. Assuming progress at that level, they could envisage broadening the agenda at a later date.

The UN special representative who will be involved has been turning over possible new approaches to the talks beyond the simple reliance on the trading of position papers between the two locals which characterized the last phase. He is thinking of (a) trying to consolidate areas of common agreement from past talks and (b) talking about interim or permanent measures which would help the communities live together without confrontation in the current situation of de facto separation. State has also been developing some ideas on deconfrontation—mutual withdrawal by the two communities from lines of confrontation around the island—if there came a time when they might help the UN representative. Interest by the parties in deconfrontation has been evident but Ambassador Popper now feels the issue has been dealt a blow by the reports of Makarios’ new Czech arms.

**Grivas**

The clandestine re-appearance of General Grivas on Cyprus and the resulting war of nerves between him and Makarios has added a new element of tension.

To put this in perspective, Grivas was the famous pro-enosist and fanatical anti-communist Greek Cypriot who fought against the British in the mid-50s, almost hand in glove with Makarios’ struggle on the political level. With independence and the guarantees given to the Turk Cypriots he pressed on for enosis and became heavily involved in the terrorism of the sixties which twice brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war. Those events convinced Makarios and Greece to drop their campaign for enosis and turn to intercommunal talks. Grivas, anathema to the Turk Cypriots and to Makarios by them as a political
rival, was moved to confinement in Greece where he remained until his “escape” last fall.

A number of factors have made Makarios certain if not all but sure that Greece is behind the plot. We do not really know.

For one thing, Grivas’ escape came shortly after Makarios’ resistance to Greek pressure last summer to be more forthcoming in the talks, immediately before the Olcay/Palamas talks in New York. These facts against a backdrop of increasing Greco-Turk consultation on the Cyprus problem have led the Archbishop to suspect a plot against him unless he reaches a compromise, presumably satisfactory to the Turk Cypriots. The alternative would be to risk confrontation with Grivas leading to enosis and, again assuming Greco-Turkish dialogue, satisfactory results for the Turk Cypriots, i.e. double enosis or partition.

In reaction, Makarios has stiffened in the face of a threat. As you know, he has clandestinely imported sizeable quantities of Czech arms almost certainly for the arming of a private police force outside the Greek-controlled National Guard.

The introduction of these new arms has sparked reactions in Turkey and Greece. Whether these flow from the fact that they have been involved in the Grivas episode with the idea of precipitating double enosis or whether they view it as a further eroding factor for the new talks, the issue is that our allies are once again concerned enough about Cyprus perhaps to be moving toward some drastic step which would confront us with difficult choices.

Greek-Turk Relations and the New Situation

On the one hand, Greece and Turkey have recently embarked upon a new period of cooperation over Cyprus. Both sides have privately and publicly insisted that Cyprus not become an issue between them and both shared the initiative in reviving the intercommunal talks as the best framework for solution. It has been their reasonableness which has kept negotiations over procedures for the talks from breaking down. The US has encouraged these efforts.

On top of this cooperation, we have had reports that officials on both sides continue to talk about a so-called “dynamic” solution ending in double enosis (partition) as the best way out. Ambassador Popper hears this not only from Turks and Turk Cypriots but also from mainland Greeks and elements of the Greek-Cypriot establishment.

Makarios’ recent importation of arms has upset both Greece and Turkey and reopened the possibility of a solution imposed on Cyprus by the two of them.

—The Turks have gone on record to express their grave concern and to indicate privately that they may have to ship new arms to their community. The Greeks are aware of this. We also have a reliable
report that in its dialogue with Greece, Turkey has indicated that Makarios must go.

—Palamas has told Tasca Greece is urging Turkey to keep cool while it tries to deal with the situation. He also implied that Makarios was the obstacle. Tasca gained the impressions Greece would like to see him replaced.2 Greece plans on the following steps:

—Makarios will be told tomorrow that he must turn the Czech arms over to UNFICYP control and that he must form a government of “national unity” (presumably involvement of the Turk Cypriots) in Cyprus.

—If Makarios refuses, the GOG will make its demands public and will also inform the UN and UK.

—Greece does not want violence nor will it make use of Grivas but if Makarios resists, the GOG will take its case directly to the Greek Cypriot people.

—If Makarios refuses to form a government acceptable to Greece and is backed by Greek Cypriots, then Greece may withdraw from the island.

Ambassador Tasca, who has already expressed hope to the GOG that they are not entertaining the thought of a “dynamic” solution, has now told Palamas he believes that the GOG plan is highly dangerous given the support Makarios has among Greek Cypriots.3

To buy time, State—with our clearance—has instructed Tasca to make the following points to Papadopoulos: The GOG scenario may have the effect of consolidating support behind Makarios and impelling him towards Soviet support. All diplomatic options to resolve the Czech arms problem should be exhausted. One course could be a GOG–GOT démarche to the UNSYG which the US is prepared to support and would ask the UK, Canada and others to make parallel approaches to the UN. At a minimum, the US hopes that Greece will hold off with its scenario to permit discussions among the NATO allies.4

Meanwhile, a Greek Cypriot official has told Ambassador Popper that Makarios had acquired the arms because of overwhelming evidence of Greek complicity in Grivas’ movement to precipitate double enosis. He maintained that Makarios had every right to defend himself and his regime and urged the US to help stop Greece from talking about a political settlement on the one hand while conspiring with Grivas on the other. He did suggest that there could be a trade-off of the Czech arms for a return of Grivas to Greece and urged the US to play

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2 Reported in telegram 690 from Athens, February 8. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–6 CZECH–CYP)

3 Reported in telegram 742 from Athens, February 10. (Ibid.)

4 See footnote 2, Document 394.
a role in working this out. But he also said it is obvious to Cyprus that the Greeks are using the arms pretext as a first step toward partition in collusion with Turkey; he believes it would never work and would only set Greece and Turkey against each other.5

The Situations the US May Face

We have traditionally maintained that the intercommunal talks best address the US interest in defusing tensions on Cyprus and hence tensions between Greece and Turkey. We have taken a position of supporting Cypriot independence, and we have cultivated a relationship with Makarios in that context.

The situation we now face is one of apparent increased Greek and Turkish interest in imposing a solution regardless of the fate of Makarios, or possibly even regardless of the independence of Cyprus. At the very least it seems that Greece and Turkey may have agreed that (a) Makarios must settle this problem in a way satisfactory to the Turks and Greeks (a national unity government which could mean either Turk Cypriot participation in it or, a step further, partition) or (b) Makarios must go. In short, if Greece and Turkey are determined to force a situation which would violate Makarios’ view of a unitary independent state, or, further, partition Cyprus, the US will face difficult choices between the wishes of our allies and our established opposition to dismemberment of UN members.

The following are the situations we may face and the principal implications:

Situation 1: There remains a chance simply to diffuse the tensions created by the arms issue. This could come about if we could focus attention on the tensions raised by the arms problem and get everyone back on the track towards resuming talks and forgetting any dynamic overall solution now. Our instructions to Ambassador Tasca to urge the GOG to hold off on its ultimatum to Makarios and concentrate instead on exhausting diplomatic options to resolve the arms problem are one step in this direction. The suggestion has also been made on Cyprus that a trade-off to diffuse tensions be arranged by returning Grivas to Greece in exchange for Czech arms being turned over to UNFICYP. The Cypriots have asked us to become involved in working this out with the Greeks.

Implications: The US definitely has an interest in isolation of the arms issue and getting on with the talks. However, it is much less clear that we want to be in the middle in a dispute within the Greek-Greek

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Cypriot community. If we tried to negotiate the return of Grivas to Greece, we would have to take into account that Greece may well be taking advantage of Grivas’ presence on Cyprus to pressure Makarios and may not want such a trade-off. [Intelligence reports suggest that the Greeks may even have Grivas in one of the Greek Cypriot National Guard camps—for release at the proper moment. 6] Athens has already tried privately to force Makarios on the arms question and has now surfaced its proposal to issue an ultimatum to him. We would have a question whether:

— we want to pressure Athens off a course it may have already decided on;
— we want to line up with an initiative on trade-off that essentially meets Makarios needs but may not do much to produce his flexibility in the talks;
— we want at all costs to see the talks resumed even though Greece and Turkey are fed up with Makarios.

The argument for involving ourselves is that this may be far easier than dealing with either of the two situations that follow.

Situation 2: The Greeks go ahead and issue their ultimatum to Makarios to conform or step down; he resists, rallies his people against external pressure and perhaps takes his case to the UN. The assumption here is that the Greeks take a strong stand hoping Makarios will acquiesce but waver before following their strategy through to the conclusion of quickly deposing Makarios.

The main implication here would be that the US would be caught between Makarios’ call for support in the face of external pressure and Athens’ defense that it is attempting to solve a problem as it sees fit. Makarios would get Soviet and perhaps Chinese support (their position is that the local parties solve their own problem) at the UN. The US would be allied with Greek and Turkish intervention. This situation would be the worst of two worlds. It would not involve decisive enough action to solve the problem and it would generate worldwide pressure on us to pull the Greeks and Turks off. Whereas there is a theoretical option of acquiescing in a decisive Greek move, the proposed Greek action of issuing an ultimatum and waiting for reaction seems doomed to failure.

Situation 3: Greece and Turkey have already decided to cooperate in a dynamic solution to impose a solution or partition Cyprus. They are beyond backing off from this course, actively engaged in deposing Makarios and installing a new Cypriot government.

This would put us squarely between our interests in having Greece and Turkey resolve the issue to the benefit of good relations between

6 Brackets in the original.
them and in not seeing intervention in or dismemberment of Cyprus by our two NATO allies. The US in the least would be faced with weathering the storm of intervention on Cyprus by NATO allies who would justify their moves as guarantor powers of the London-Zurich accords or worse, face a situation of partition or double enosis in opposition to our principle of not endorsing the dismemberment of UN nations. If there is to be action, however, this would be better than some indecisive intermediate step. The additional argument against acquiescing in any such move is that it stands a good chance of failing.

In Conclusion

This memo is intended simply to provide background on steps taken to date and a framework within which to think about where events might go from here. If this heats up any more, it may be necessary to call a WSAG meeting.

394. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, February 10, 1972, 2321Z.

750. Ref: State 023559.² For Secretary from Ambassador Tasca.
1. On receipt your message I immediately sought interview with Prime Minister, explaining that despite late hour I had important message from Secretary which could not wait until morning. Few minutes later I received answer that PM in bed, not well, and could not see me before morning. I replied that unfortunately this not good enough. Washington taking very seriously question of note to Makarios, which in fact constituted ultimatum. It essential I be able to discuss this problem with PM.

2. Prime Minister’s private secretary and interpreter, who closest confidant, shortly called back to say PM could see me at 0830 tomor-

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2 Dated February 10, 1950Z, it instructed Tasca to call on Papadopoulos and urge him to use all diplomatic channels to find a solution to the Czech arms crisis. At a minimum, Tasca should request that Greek action be postponed to allow for discussion with the United States and the NATO allies. (Ibid.)
row morning (February 11). I said I wanted to know for certain that
this would allow time for me fully to discuss problem before Panayotakos carried out his instructions. Reply to this message was that PM
could not meet me before 0830 tomorrow.

3. In course of passing my messages to PM I got through to
Papadopoulos content of your message, and there no question but what
he fully aware our position. I will deliver your message in person to
him at 0830 tomorrow, which should give PM time to change Panayotakos’ instructions, if he is willing to do so.

4. British Ambassador has just called me (0120) to say he has re-
ceived instructions to take same position as US with GOG and was
seeking to do so.

Tasca

395. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, February 11, 1972, 1000Z.

288. Subject: Czech Arms.

1. Panayotacos is with the Archbishop now. Call began at 1000 hours local (0800 GMT).

2. From here it seems patent that Czech arms transaction is only
a pretext for achievement of a long held GOG (Papadopoulos) desire
to unseat Makarios. It looks very much as if Greece has set the wheels
in motion and is unlikely to be talked out of its plans. Full picture is
not yet in, but it would seem that National Guard units loyal to Greece
are being positioned to take over key installations in Nicosia on sig-
nal. We assume the signal will come sooner rather than later. GOG must
realize that delay will give Makarios more time to marshal his physi-
cal and diplomatic defense.

3. As a matter of naked power—which it was said it will not
use—Greece may be able to pull this off. If Greece intends to use the
National Guard for this purpose, is not really counting on mass sup-
port and is willing take the international onus, it can probably seize

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594,
Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Re-
peate immediate to Athens, Ankara, USUN, London, and USNATO. Another copy is
ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 CZECH.
control of the Presidential Palace and other vital Govt installations. But if this is not its intent, its planning is based on some incredibly bad estimates. Two comments made by Palamas to Amb Tasca stand out.2

4. Palamas quotes Panayotacos as being "quite certain Greek Cypriots would choose Greece over Makarios." If we are talking in terms of popular will rather than recourse to violence that is ridiculous. The feeling for Hellenism is strong here, but the junta is held in low esteem and the admiration which Greek Cypriots have for Makarios would, if translated into votes, turn any Western democratic politician green with envy.

5. Palamas’ other statement which seems baseless is that because of Czech arms deal Makarios is in a weak position to appeal to UN. To us the case seems to be quite the contrary. Makarios should not be hard put to demonstrate that arms were imported to counter a conspiracy aided and abetted by Govt of Greece. In a Security Council context we think he would find many supporters, not the least the Soviets. We would not be surprised to see Soviet Amb Barkovsky be Makarios’ next caller after Panayotacos.

Crawford

2 See footnote 2, Document 393.

396. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, February 11, 1972, 1121Z.

762. Subj: Cyprus: Meeting with Prime Minister on Delivery of Greek Note to Makarios. Ref: Athens 760; State 023559.2

1. I called on Prime Minister this morning at 0830, in accordance with appointment we arranged last evening. I went over Secretary’s message with Papadopoulos point by point. Under point (C) I ex-
plained why we viewed Greek initiative as potentially highly danger-
ous, pointing out again, as I told him I had pointed out on other oc-
casions to Palamas, options open to Makarios in reacting to any pres-
sure. I presented point (D) by stating that an indication of how seriously
the U.S. felt about issue of Czech arms was not only our view on de-
sirability that all diplomatic possibilities be exhausted, but that we pre-
pared to make all-out effort to see that such diplomatic possibilities for
settling the issue had the maximum chance of success.

2. Prime Minister then made lengthy statement of his position on
problem which he introduced by asking what it was that made U.S.
consider Greek initiative highly dangerous. I gave him possible sce-
nario of what could happen if Makarios felt undue pressure were be-
ing placed upon him, referring as I developed the scenario to state-
ments made by Palamas supporting our fears that events might actually
develop in this way. I mentioned publication of letter, possible demonstra-
tions of support for Makarios, reaction by Grivas, possibility of vi-
olence, and prospect of Security Council being quickly drawn in where
Makarios would have friends strongly supporting his position against
Greek Government’s unbearable pressures upon him. I then gave PM
my own personal estimate that China and Soviets and many countries
of Third World would support Makarios against efforts of the Greek
Government to put him in extreme difficulty.

3. Prime Minister, after this explanation, said he was surprised by
our characterization of Greek action program as “highly dangerous,” and
he was surprised by U.S. position on Greek program. He said facts were
that Makarios bought arms to give to the Communists in Cyprus be-
cause they were solidly backing his policies with Lyssarides’ men, and
it certain that bloodshed would ensue. Greek Government not only one
of the forces for guaranteeing peace on island but is also government of
country with blood relationship to Cypriots. Greek Cypriots are also
Greeks. It is an historic fact that Hellenism has been cursed by civil war
and fratricide. It historical necessity to find as soon as possible peaceful
way of dealing with situation and to find most appropriate measures to
avert clear dangers which could ensue. This action program had been
very carefully studied and cannot be taken as action by one government
interfering in internal affairs of another government.

4. Prime Minister said letter, which would be delivered at 1000
this morning to Makarios, is a statement, a kind of announcement, to
Cypriot Government urging them to deliver Czech arms to the United
Nations and also then urging them to undertake actions within their
Government which would restore national unity. This action could be
whatever ways and means Cypriot Government feels would be best,
and only very very delicately is it implied and hinted that one of the
means for restoring national government would be reshuffle of Cypriot
Government. No mention whatever made of Makarios having a major or minor role in it. The only mention of government is that it should be composed of men of great integrity and trust.

5. Prime Minister added: “If this action is considered as a highly dangerous one, I just wonder what action wouldn’t be? Would you rather we left the field to the Turks and allowed them to carry out their threat of sending arms in turn to Turkish Cypriots, which they will probably do at the time of rotation of Turkish contingent, which would encourage highly dangerous situation?” To back his certainty that Ankara considering sending arms to Cyprus, he quoted from report of conversation between American Ambassador in Ankara and Greek Ambassador there, who had spoken to officials of Turkish Government. American Ambassador had said that Foreign Minister Bayulken told him that GOT was considering restoring balance which had been upset by sending arms to Turkish Cypriot community. Turkish Ambassador to Washington had said much the same. Prime Minister added that contacts of American officials in Ankara show that Turks not intending to take hasty action, and in any event no action in the immediate future. However, Turkish Ministry of Defense appears far more worried about issue of Czech arms than Turkish Foreign Ministry.

6. With this picture in mind and with logic and sequence of his views expressed briefly, and with real surprise at characterization given to GOG action program as “highly dangerous,” he felt obliged to state that Greek Government feels “national imperative to keep same stand regarding letter which will be delivered at 10 o’clock today.” However, Prime Minister said letter would not be made public today or tomorrow, February 11 or 12. He hopes that within next 24 hours U.S. will do its best to urge and convince Makarios to hand over arms.

7. In response I expressed my deep regret to Papadopoulos that he did not see fit to postpone sending letter, until we could have further opportunity for discussion. He said he would be pleased to discuss matter further, perhaps even later today. I said I thought this would be most useful.3 I asked him whether I could report to my government that he fully supported principle in para (D) on the desirability of exhausting all diplomatic possibilities. His answer was “most certainly.” Finally, I asked him if we could have copy of letter. He said he would send a copy to me later in morning after letter had been delivered to Makarios.4

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3 No record of a subsequent meeting was found.
4 Telegram 772 from Athens, February 11, 1324Z, contained the text in addition to an Embassy commentary. (Ibid.)
397. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

WSAG Meeting on Cyprus—February 11

The Situation

The view from Athens: Papadopoulos has set the wheels in motion for a squeeze play against Makarios and seems determined to follow through. He turned down flatly our request that he at least delay presenting his ultimatum on the grounds that it was a "national imperative." In Nicosia there is evidence the Greek Cypriot National Guard units loyal to Greece are being positioned to take over key installations and it is assumed that the signal to do so will "come sooner rather than later."

The view from Nicosia is that if Greece really intends to move with the National Guard, is not really counting on popular support and is willing to take the international onus, it can probably seize control of the Presidential Palace and other vital government installations. But if this is not its intent and it is depending on popular support, its planning is based on some "incredibly bad estimates." Ambassador Popper points out that contrary to the apparent Greek view, the Greek government is held in low esteem in Cyprus and Makarios has strong public support. Most observers believe that Makarios will turn down the Greek ultimatum, thus forcing the crisis to a head.

The view from Ankara is that the Turks are upset about the situation, especially the importation of more arms in the Greek Cypriot community, but for the moment at least intend to let the Greeks settle their own problems. They are treating the whole affair in unusually low key and say they will try to leave the whole matter to the parties directly concerned as long as the security of the Turk Cypriot community is not threatened. From all indications the Turks and Greeks have been in close communication as the crisis has developed and it is just possible that there is more collusion than we know.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–084, Senior WSAG Meeting Cyprus, 2/11/72. The tabs and appendixes to the memorandum are attached but not printed.

2 See Document 396.

3 See Document 395.
The Issue

The issue in the Cyprus question arises from two factors:
—The government in Athens appears to have decided to make a major effort to change the character of the Cypriot government or even to force Makarios to resign. They feel they are in a position to do this by use of the military on the ground—the Greek Cypriot national guard and the terrorist forces responsive to General Grivas. Such a change would, in Athens’ eyes, be a prelude to a Cyprus settlement along one of two lines: (a) it could presage formation of a cabinet which would be more flexible than Makarios has been in negotiating a settlement with the Turkish community; or (b) it could be a prelude to partition of the island between Greece and Turkey. In the first case, the independence of Cyprus would be preserved; in the second, Cyprus would cease to exist as an independent nation.
—As this Greek plan moves ahead, the following elements will come into play: If Makarios is still free, he will turn to the international community in the UN Security Council and ask for protection against an attack on the integrity of his state. If he is jailed, the Soviets or some third-world power may take the case to the UN. In either case, the Soviets will back Cyprus in the UN and might conceivably even use Soviet naval forces to intimidate Greece. The US could then be called on to defend a NATO ally against this kind of Soviet threat. At the same time, NATO opinion and much opinion in the US Congress—which are already unfriendly to the government in Athens—would stand against the Greek action. While the Turks would probably remain silent on the Greek effort to achieve a Cyprus solution, they would be concerned by the Soviet involvement.
This collection of elements explains why US policy has been to try to push a Cyprus solution ahead of us rather than supporting dramatic solutions. For this reason, we have supported intercommunal talks between the Greeks and Turkish Cypriot communities. We knew that a solution which the Turks could accept was unlikely to come out of those talks but feeling that the talks could help to avert violence and keep open the door to an ultimate settlement. Coupled with these slow talks, we have recently thought about introducing the idea of steps toward deconfrontation between the two communities on the island in order to reduce the possibilities of violence there and permit the island to lead a more normal life.
Against this background, the principal issue now is whether the US is to confront the government of Greece to back away from following the course on which it has embarked to its logical conclusion, the forceable removable of Makarios. The vehicle for a way out could lie in an arrangement which would have Makarios turn over the arms he has acquired to the UN while the Greeks take General Grivas off the island and remove the military threat to Makarios.
The issues to be discussed at the WSAG, therefore, are whether we get into that kind of confrontation with the Greeks, and, if not, how we might handle the problem that we would then be faced with and may be faced with in any case.

Your talking points (at tab) cover the options that follow from the above.

Also included in this book are:
—“Situation and Cables.” The latest CIA sitrep as it becomes available and key cables.
—“Background Paper.” This is the general paper you read last night.
—“Contingency Papers.” These are general papers prepared for your last SRG meeting on Cyprus. At this tab is a guide to the relevant portions.

398. Minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting

Washington, February 11, 1972, 2:34–3:14 p.m.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPATION
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Mr. John N. Irwin, II
Mr. Joseph Sisco
Mr. Thomas Boyatt
Mr. Martin Herz
Defense
Mr. G. Warren Nutter
JCS
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
CIA
Mr. Thomas Karamessines
Mr. John Waller

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–084, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1972. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
It was agreed that:

—We would send a cable to our Embassies in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, giving our analysis of the situation and asking for their views.2

—We will not take any actions during the next 24 hours.

—Ambassador Tasca will use his meeting with Prime Minister Papadopoulos as a listening exercise.3

Dr. Kissinger: What’s the problem?
Mr. Karamessines: I can give you a brief rundown on what’s been happening, although it has been slightly overtaken by events. We also have two Embassy cables which just came in.4 Do you want to start with the briefing or the cables?

Mr. Sisco: Let me go first because I have the cables, and they give us the most up-to-date information. Essentially, the Greek Government has given Makarios an ultimatum—and I don’t think it is inaccurate to describe it as an ultimatum—which is composed of two elements. First, the Greeks want Makarios to place the arms which he just received on a secret basis from Czechoslovakia under UN control. Second, they want to see a new government in Cyprus, a government of national unity without Makarios. I think the Greeks are using the Czech arms issue to bring about a new Cypriot government which will be more responsive to Athens.

Dr. Kissinger: Why are the Greeks doing this now?
Mr. Sisco: Primarily, I think, because the arms issue has given them a pretext. I am also sure that Greece and Turkey have talked about this situation, and I feel—although I am waiting for Tom [Karamessines]5 to provide the evidence—that there has been a certain amount of collusion.

Mr. Karamessines: You are right, Joe. The Turks have indicated that the Greeks have talked with them. Turkey has agreed to stand by for the moment.

Mr. Sisco: Last night we cleared a cable with you, Henry, setting out the line that Tasca [U.S. Ambassador to Greece] has already

2 Document 399.
3 As instructed in telegram 25233 to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, USUN, and Moscow, February 12. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. 1 Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)
4 Telegrams 760 and 762 from Athens; see Document 396 and footnote 2 thereto.
5 All brackets in the original.
Tasca pointed out to the Greeks that their move could be dan-
gerous and that it could precipitate a crisis. He asked them to hold off
giving the ultimatum to Makarios. The Greeks came back today, say-
ing they were going ahead with it.7

Dr. Kissinger: What is the deadline? How much time are the Greeks
giving Makarios?

Mr. Sisco: There is no deadline. They don’t say they are giving
Makarios 24 or 48 hours.

Adm. Moorer: They just say “after a new government is formed.”

Mr. Sisco: The latest cable we have says that Makarios rejected the
ultimatum.8

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I saw the cable.

Mr. Sisco: Let me give you my analysis. Makarios has hinted,
through his Under Secretary, that if the U.S. offers its good offices, he
would consider making a deal. He would turn the arms over to the
UN in return for General Grivas leaving the island.

Dr. Kissinger: What kind of arms did he get from Czechoslovakia?

Mr. Karamessines: He received enough light and medium
weapons—including ammunition—to equip 2,000 men. We estimate
that the total deal is worth $1.3 million. About 6,500 crates were de-
livered, and approximately two-thirds of them contained ammunition.

Dr. Kissinger: How did Makarios do it? What are our choices?

Mr. Sisco: First I think we should see what we can do to encourage
the UN—with a new Secretary General—to play a role of good offices.
Or we can play the role of good offices ourselves. The Cypriots will pull
out their Russian support very early in the game. We should expect the
Russians to give a good deal of support to Makarios, and we can also
expect the Chinese to take a position parallel to that of the Soviets.

I guess that if there is no quiet diplomatic process underway to
tone down the situation, the Cypriots are likely to take the problem to
the Security Council—where they will try to prove that Greece is dis-
membering Cyprus. They will try to get all countries committed to an
independent Cyprus. We will probably be under pressure from Greece
and Turkey to give them support. The public attitude will probably be
that Greece is trying to change the government of Cyprus.

From the point of view of domestic politics in the U.S., it will be
easy to draw an analogy between Greece vis-à-vis Cyprus and India
vis-à-vis Bangladesh. Critics will say, for example, that we tried to get

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6 Reference is to telegram 23559 to Athens, February 11; see footnote 2, Document 394.
7 See Document 396.
8 Not further identified.
India because of Bangladesh, and they will say we are responsible for the dirty colonels in the Greek Government.

Dr. Kissinger: You can follow the Bangladesh model very well.

Mr. Sisco: I was just trying to draw the analogy. You know, it’s very tempting to make the argument that we should just stand by now and do nothing. It’s tempting to say we should let Greece do what it wants—and if that means that Makarios falls, so be it. Makarios has been a thorn in the side of all concerned parties, anyway. If Greece pulls off a fait accompli, there probably won’t be many tears shed.

But, of course, everything is not so simple. Early on in the game, this whole situation will be put into a U.S.-Soviet framework, a free world-communist framework, a neutral-NATO framework.

Dr. Kissinger: When will that happen?

Mr. Sisco: It has already started, Henry. And it will move even faster. I think we have only two real alternatives. We can go with the good offices of Waldheim and the UN or we can go with American good offices. If you want, I can lay out the pros and cons of both approaches for you.

Mr. Karamessines: There is one other factor I would like to mention at this point. As you probably know, the intercommunal talks are due to resume, under a new formula, in late February. (to Dr. Kissinger) You were asking before why the Greeks are moving now. The Czech arms issue is one reason. It is also a fact that both Greece and Turkey have compatible systems of government now. It may be that the Greeks want to move before the new talks start. Otherwise, actions taken after the talks begin would look worse than they do now.

There is one other thing. Makarios may be prepared to turn over the arms to the UN. But I understand there may be periodic UN inspections. How would he react to that?

Mr. Sisco: We can be flexible. It’s not a great problem. We must remember that this situation can lead to a war, even viewed in the context of the Peking trip.

Dr. Kissinger: Who would be fighting? I thought Greece and Turkey were in agreement.

Mr. Sisco: Let’s say Makarios turns down the ultimatum. There have been hints from Greece that they would pull out and let Grivas go at Makarios. There could then be Turkish intervention. This would then mean that Greek forces could go in.

Dr. Kissinger: They can’t pull out and then go back in.

Mr. Sisco: When the Greeks talk about pulling out, they are referring to their officers in the National Guard.

Dr. Kissinger: How would it be possible to have a scenario like this if the Greeks and Turks agree?
Mr. Sisco: One way it could come about would be if the Soviets did some saber-rattling and if the Turkish Government backed Cyprus, against another NATO member trying to dismember Cyprus.

Dr. Kissinger: Greece and Turkey presumably would not move in. Presumably, the Greek National Guard and Grivas would go after Makarios. Isn’t that right?

Mr. Sisco: In my judgment, that may be the first round. There are different points of view, though, about which side has the most popular support. There are different points of view, too, about the loyalty of the National Guard—and to which side it is loyal.

If Grivas is unleashed, the Turkish minorities in many areas will be attacked by Greek Cypriots. Where the Turkish minorities are concentrated, they will hit Grivas. Grivas doesn’t have more than a couple of hundred men. He is banking on a strategy of mass support. Does he have this support? That is a difficult judgment to make. If Grivas is unleashed, how long will it be before Greece and Turkey intervene to finish the job?

Mr. Karamessines: I don’t think there is any danger of this becoming an international war. After all, Greece and Turkey are in cahoots.

Dr. Kissinger: Isn’t it better that they are in cahoots?

Mr. Karamessines: I’m not so sure about that. The Greeks have the firepower to seize the situation if they want to. There is a big question, though, about whether the population will be content with this type of a solution.

Dr. Kissinger: If it is such a big question, why would the Greeks attempt to do it?

Mr. Sisco: They are trying to remove Makarios, within the concept of a unified Cypriot Government. If it doesn’t work, there is a possibility of getting direct Greek and Turkish intervention. That would result in enosis, a carving up of Cyprus.

Dr. Kissinger: Why do we care about that? It wouldn’t be a great disaster.

Mr. Sisco: I basically agree with you.

Mr. Irwin: The danger, I think, is a possible Soviet involvement.

Dr. Kissinger: The real danger is a protracted civil war, essentially a guerrilla war, in Cyprus. If the problem can be solved in 24 hours, though, why would it bother us?

Mr. Sisco: Because it will be presented as NATO aggression directed against a neutral country.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we have two problems. The first is what will happen, and the second is how it will be presented. If we have a fast-moving situation, that will present one set of problems. If it is a
prolonged situation, developing over a period of weeks, we will have another set of problems. What is our expectation?

Mr. Sisco: My guess is that we will have a prolonged problem.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Irwin) Jack, what do you think?

Mr. Irwin: One issue we have to consider is what the Soviet interest is in all of this. What did they [the Soviets] do the last time?

Mr. Sisco: We never really knew what they were willing to do because our good offices brought about a political solution.

Dr. Kissinger: Weren’t our good offices used after the civil war started?

Mr. Sisco: That was in the first round. The second round was different. Makarios upset the status quo, but there was no actual Turkish intervention.

Dr. Kissinger: What year was that?


Dr. Kissinger: Isn’t that when Vance went out there?

Mr. Sisco: Yes. I don’t think the Soviets are anxious to get involved to the extent that they would have to supply forces. My guess is they would provide a lot of political support. There are, as you probably know, a number of communist elements in Cyprus.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) Joe, are you leaning to the good offices of the UN or the U.S.?

Mr. Sisco: I’m leaning first to the UN, mainly because they have a new Secretary General and because there are a lot of lumps to be taken. I think we should lean in the direction of the UN, but I also think we should keep open the option of our providing good offices—if all three parties want us to play a role. We have prepared a cable—and I will send it to you for clearance in an hour or so—giving a brief analysis of the situation and asking the Embassies for their views.9

Dr. Kissinger: Who is the cable for?

Mr. Sisco: Our Ambassadors in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. If you want, we can add some guidance for Tasca to use in his meeting with Papadopoulos tomorrow morning. I think Tasca can simply use tomorrow’s meeting as a listening exercise.

Dr. Kissinger: Leaving aside for the moment who should undertake the role of good offices, we should decide (1) whether it is in our interest to get involved and (2) if it is in our interest to get involved, when should we do so? Should we do it now, or should we wait to see other reactions? Suppose your predictions come true and Makarios

9 Document 399.
Mr. Sisco: That’s right. I suggest we follow for the moment a wait-
ing strategy. In the meantime, we should establish a dialogue with our
Embassies. Tasca is not doing anything. When we first heard about the
problem, we told him to do nothing.

Dr. Kissinger: Who are our Ambassadors in Turkey and Cyprus?
Mr. Sisco: Handley is in Turkey and Popper is in Cyprus. All three
Ambassadors are very competent.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they are. But Tasca gets excited.
Mr. Sisco: I suggest that we listen to Papadopoulos tomorrow.
Maybe Greece is right. Maybe they can pull off a fait accompli.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we keep the Ambassadors calm?
Mr. Sisco: Yes.

Mr. Karamessines: It’s possible Greece may react quickly to Makar-
ios’ rejection and send in its forces.

Dr. Kissinger: So what?
Mr. Karamessines: Nothing. I just mention it because I think we
ought to take it into account.

Mr. Sisco: We do need some indicators from CIA because the in-
telligence I have says that the Turks could intervene—with paratroop-
ers—within 24 hours. In order to send troops over by ship, they would
need 72 hours. I think Tom should supply us with the latest military
indicators.

Dr. Kissinger: What are we trying to prevent? Is it in the U.S. in-
terest to take action to prevent a quick solution to a problem—even
though we don’t like the solution? Is it in the U.S. interest to prevent
a long drawn out situation from developing and which may involve
other countries? I think the answer to the latter question is yes. The
mere fact that Greece and Turkey agree on the solution is not in itself
conclusive, although I think we should discuss it. We don’t want a pro-
tracted civil war, with outside forces involved. That would be a repe-
tition of the India-Pakistan problem in Cyprus.

Mr. Nutter: If Greece and Turkey are working together, how long
will it take them to get a military solution?

Mr. Karamessines: The Czech arms just arrived, and Turkey said
it would stand by. Therefore, the Greeks can take over promptly if they
want. Popular support, though, would be an iffy thing. A fair per-
centage of the people—about half—are committed to Makarios. After
the initial shooting is over, these people might constitute a large base
for guerrilla war. This is something we shouldn’t ignore.

Dr. Kissinger: Therefore?
Mr. Karamessines: I was just trying to point out that the Greek forces would probably have no great difficulty in taking over once they decide to make the move.

Dr. Kissinger: I think Joe’s proposal is reasonable. (to Mr. Sisco) Can we see the cable?

Mr. Sisco: Sure. Do you agree that Tasca should just listen to Papadopoulos tomorrow?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, if he can do it. Is there anything else we have to consider?

Mr. Boyatt: Even if Greek forces can take over in 24 hours, Makarios could still go to the Security Council and start a debate.

Dr. Kissinger: Why is the U.S. protecting Makarios against Greece and Turkey at such an early stage of the game? I have nothing for or against Makarios, but the implication of everything you are all saying is that we should be protecting him. Why?

Mr. Saunders: We have to think about what we would do if the issue is taken to the Security Council.

Dr. Kissinger: What do the British think about this whole thing?

Mr. Sisco: We talked to them, and they made the same points to the Greeks that we did—mainly that the Greeks were making a “dangerous” move.

Mr. Herz: We will have a bad time at the UN getting the seven blocking votes we would need to prevent a vote of condemnation against Greece.

Dr. Kissinger: How do we know that’s what we want to do?

Mr. Irwin: I suggested that we not do anything during the next 24 hours.

Dr. Kissinger: If Makarios is overthrown it will be a different situation in the Security Council than if he is still in power. The question is do we want to get involved now?

Mr. Sisco: I wouldn’t put the question in terms of getting involved now. I would say that we should proceed with caution. I don’t know if we want to get involved at all.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Adm. Moorer: It seems to me that for the first time Greece and Turkey are working together—and now we are unhappy about that.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) I remember, Joe, last spring you were saying if we could only get Greece and Turkey to work together at the UN. That’s been done—and the two of them are now working against Makarios. Does everyone agree that the first thing we have to do is get the information from our Embassies?

All Agreed.
Mr. Irwin: We should also wait to see what happens during the next 24 hours.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s right. The situation may not play out at all the way we expect it to.

Mr. Irwin: Will we have a meeting tomorrow?

Dr. Kissinger: We may. In any case, I want to talk to the President.

(to Mr. Sisco) Joe, you will send over the cable?

Mr. Sisco: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Okay. We are tilting towards sending out the cable.

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399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey, and the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, February 12, 1972, 2307Z.

Tosec 23/25316. Please pass Secretary Rogers at Key Biscayne. For Ambassadors Tasca, Handley, Popper and Phillips.

1. We have reviewed the situation once again and will continue to do so on a day-to-day basis.

2. We share fully GOG/GOT concern at Czech arms importations and support them in the move already made by them to the UN to get arms under effective UN control.

3. Thus far, we have pointed out to our Greek friends the dangers in the present course and the need to exhaust peaceful remedies. We welcome GOG assurance peaceful remedies will be exhausted. A peaceful settlement of the situation to mutual satisfaction of Greece and Turkey would constitute positive achievement in terms of strengthening the cohesiveness of the southern flank of NATO as well as the American position in the Eastern Mediterranean. Whether Greeks can achieve that objective, it is difficult to judge, particularly since there seems to be a difference of assessment as to whether Makarios can whip up public support on his own behalf or whether GOG assessment that

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it will have broad support is correct one. Significance of action by Clerides urging Makarios in effect to agree to Greek demands to form government of national unity is difficult to assess. At minimum, Makarios’ delay in surfacing this matter publicly indicates that he is sufficiently concerned to try to find some peaceful way out.

4. In these circumstances, we wish all of you, pending further developments, to maintain a posture of cautious, watchful waiting and a low silhouette. These should be no assumption that US intends to play a leading good offices role since this time, unlike the previous two crises, this is not a matter in which a war seems likely between our two NATO allies—Greece and Turkey. This means being readily available to talk to your governments and in the case of Phillips to be available to talk to Waldheim, but at this juncture avoiding any US initiatives. If there are attempts to involve US directly, we will wish to weigh on their merits individual requests, such as passing along messages or similar role.

5. If Veniamen or Makarios takes the initiative with US to suggest that a deal would be possible on the basis of the Czech arms being taken over by the UN in exchange for Grivas’ leaving, Popper should in first instance urge GOC to convey this proposal directly to GOG. He should not offer to pass on message, and, if asked to do so, should not give encouragement but seek instructions.

6. With respect to the UN, we note report that GOT and GOG have gone to UN asking it to take steps to put Czech arms under UNFICYP custody. Without taking the initiative and only if Waldheim asks US views, USUN should make clear that if UN can get this done, it would be a constructive contribution in current situation. If GOG and GOT have doubts on this score and raise the issue, Tasca and Handley should make clear our position, but should take no initiative to raise subject.

7. We will, of course, watch closely indications of possible Soviet involvement and generally share Moscow’s assessment of possible Soviet position as described in Moscow 1282.

8. If addressees have any comments on this message, thoughts or suggestions, please send them along in Nodis category.

Irwin

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2 For documentation, see Secretary General’s Special Report, March 16, 1972, UN doc. S/10564 and Add. 1, 2.

Nicosia, February 13, 1972, 1147Z.

313. For the Secretary From Popper. Ref: Athens 793.2

1. I am glad Henry Tasca invited Nicosia comment on Athens 793, substance of which he and I discussed when I passed through Athens yesterday Feb 12.

2. All of us agree on importance of strong NATO southern flank and of Greek-Turkish cooperation as regards Cyprus and other potentially disruptive issues. We would agree, too, that a Cyprus settlement acceptable to Greece and Turkey would bolster US position in Eastern Mediterranean against Soviets and generally.

3. I think Henry oversimplifies the picture when he suggests that because Makarios is intransigent and thus stands in the way of such a settlement, he should be brushed aside. If we look at the matter solely in this way, we are taking a very big gamble. We are writing off the possibility that Makarios may dig in and resist; that a civil war may be started among the Greeks of Cyprus; that it may very well spill over to involve Turks; and that the Soviet Union will move in.

4. Moscow Radio (FBIS Kyrenis of M122012) is already setting the stage for possible action. It is saying that the strings of the plot against the lawful government of Makarios originate in the US and NATO and pass through Athens. GOG activity is described as intervention in internal affairs of an independent member of the UN in order to replace Makarios with a Cyprus Govt obedient to US and NATO, with the island to become a US and NATO base. The USSR continues to oppose such moves on principle.

5. While distorted though all this is, it points up the basic question we need to face. It is perfectly legitimate to look at the Cyprus problem in balance of power terms, but we had better be sure we have thought through the risks of a Greek power play directed against Makarios. If Makarios digs in and the Greeks roll over him, is it our estimate that the USSR will simply rant publicly and grumble privately and let another NATO foothold be established in an area it now claims is within its security zone? Will this be helpful in the talks the President will be having in Moscow in May? Can we just write off the
UN reaction, and its exploitation by the Communists, so soon after we went to bat in the UN for the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan?

6. What I am suggesting is that there are more facets to the problem than reftel indicates. There are enough difficulties involved in simply ratifying the Greek plan of action as it unfolds (except for Amb Panayotacos here, they apparently did not even hint at it to us) for US to be justified in at least trying to hold the Greek Govt down a bit. There is still a good chance to work this problem out by diplomacy, and I think we can play a part. This entails risks for US, too, but I hope that both sides of the equation will be fully weighed in the next few days.³

7. Dept please repeat as desired.

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³ In telegram 312 from Nicosia, February 12, 1005Z, Popper reported that Makarios appeared to be looking to the United States for assistance in the crisis and requested authorization to schedule a meeting with him. (Ibid.) In telegram 25339 to Nicosia, February 13, 2153Z, drafted by Sisco, the Department of State responded to both telegrams 312 and 313 from Nicosia: “1. You can be assured that the factors cited in your para 5 of Nicosia’s 313 are and will continue to be weighed as our day-by-day review continues. 2. If you receive a direct or indirect request from Makarios, you should attempt to delay the meeting as long as possible, hopefully at least until February 15. If meeting unavoidable, you should listen and report. We should avoid any indication of possible U.S. role.” (Ibid.)

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401. Memorandum From Richard Kennedy and Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT

WSAG Meeting on Cyprus—February 14

The latest sitrep is immediately attached.²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–085, WSAG Meeting Cyprus 2/14/72. Secret.

² Dated February 13, as of 1200 EST, attached but not printed.
The Issues

There are two issues which provide the framework for the discussion:

—The basic one is whether we are prepared to acquiesce in a Greek-Turk solution to the Cyprus problem whatever it may be or whether we have a sufficient interest in avoiding the worst consequences of that course to try now to promote a negotiated solution. A negotiated solution would be one in which the Cypriot Government might change, but Cyprus would remain an independent nation.

—The secondary question is: If we are prepared to keep our hands off and to let events take their course, how long can we do this without being forced into a position of apparent collusion with Greece and Turkey with the Soviet Union taking the side of Cyprus, perhaps even with a show of naval forces?

As you can perceive, the debate is beginning to shape up this way:

—One view is that the US has an interest in heading off a Greek-Turk solution which could end in the partitioning of Cyprus. Two sentences in a draft cable Saturday (not cleared)\(^3\) capture this concern: “The US is publicly committed to the political independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The US cannot afford to associate itself as a matter of principle with a move that extinguished the independence existence of Cyprus.”

—Another view is that we would be prepared to acquiesce in whatever solution Greece and Turkey work out, although we would take a public posture opposing any solution that threatened Cyprus’ existence.

The arguments made for the first approach are that a Greek-Turk solution would give the USSR an opportunity to pose as protector of Cyprus and to face the US down unless the US were prepared to back Greece and Turkey firmly. US backing for them would put the US in collusion with what might become a blatant outside effort to change the nature of the Cypriot state.

The arguments made for the second approach are that there can be no real stability between Greece and Turkey until there is a Cyprus solution that meets the concerns of both. They are much closer to the situation, and we should stand aside for the time being and take whatever risks are involved from standing aside rather than risk aborting a move that might improve chances for stability.

Your talking points\(^4\) cover these issues and the ramifications they open up as well as the operational issue that arises from Ambassador Popper’s concern that he will have to see Makarios soon.

\(^3\) Not further identified.
\(^4\) Attached but not printed.
402. Minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting

Washington, February 14, 1972, 11:36 a.m.–12:12 p.m.

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
John N. Irwin
Joseph Sisco
DOD
Armistead Selden
James H. Noyes
JCS
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
CIA
Thomas Karamessines
John Waller
NSC Staff
Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Haig
Col. Richard T. Kennedy
Mr. Harold Saunders
Mr. Mark Wandler

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
It was agreed that:

—Dr. Kissinger will discuss the Clerides report with the President and obtain his guidance.
—Agency spokesmen will respond to questions by saying that we are “following developments.”

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Karamessines) Can you give us a brief rundown on the current situation?

Mr. Karamessines read the attached intelligence briefing. When Mr. Karamessines read “the Soviets doubtless see in the latest flareup on Cyprus an opportunity to pose as a defender of small nations against

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–085, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1972. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2 Clerides reported that the Greeks were planning to move against Makarios that night. See footnote 6 below.
3 Attached but not printed.
efforts to extinguish the sovereignty of any UN member," Dr. Kissinger asked him: "How do we know that?" Mr. Karamessines answered that it was just speculation.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) Joe, what do you think?

Mr. Sisco: I think that as long as there is hope of any kind of negotiation between Greece and Cyprus, with Clerides in the middle, it is obviously in our favor. I also think that any time they come to us, we should try to encourage them to seek a peaceful solution to the problem. This is the line we have adopted, and we should try to maintain it as long as possible. This, of course, is the immediate problem, as I see it. We will also have to address some long-term questions.

Mr. Kissinger: What kinds of questions?

Mr. Sisco: For one thing, we have to consider what we would do if the impasse continues. Interestingly enough, we learn something new from each of these crises. They rarely develop from the same set of circumstances as the previous crisis.

Mr. Kissinger: But they are all in your area.

Mr. Sisco: That may be. You know, I get no pleasure from working Saturdays and Sundays. With all of you going to China in a couple of days, it is important to get some answers to the questions I was talking about before. I don’t have the answers. First, are we still committed to the territorial integrity and political independence of Cyprus? Second, is it in our interest to stick as close as possible to Greece and Turkey, our NATO allies? How far will we go in giving them our support?

Personally, I draw the line in disassociating ourselves from military intervention on the part of Greece and Turkey in carving up Cyprus. It is possible that Greece could pull off a solution of the arms issue and come up with a new government which would be more responsive to Athens. Assuming the current negotiations result in a solution which preserves the political independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, from our point of view, this would be satisfactory. But can this be done, and what is our role? I think the question Popper raises in paragraph 5 of his telegram [Nicosia 313, 13 February]⁴ gets to the guts of the thing.

As Henry puts it so often, we have to ask ourselves where we want to come out and what are we going to do to see that we come out where we want?

I have one other point. Makarios has not yet pulled out his Soviet card. I tend to think that the Soviet card will be more limited than it
has been in the past because Greece and Turkey are together now. If, procedurally speaking, we play a minimum role—for example, support the UN effort—this will give Makarios a choice, and he may decide to pull out the Soviet card.

Mr. Kissinger: What do you mean by Soviet card?

Mr. Sisco: It will be political support, largely in the UN. I don’t mean that the Soviets would intervene militarily in Cyprus.

Mr. Kissinger: I think that [Soviet military intervention] is out of the question.

Mr. Sisco: There are many things they could do which would have an effect on the President’s trip and our overall relations. Therefore, I think we must take this into account.

Mr. Kissinger: The Soviets have to take it into account, too.

Mr. Sisco: Sure they do.

Mr. Kissinger: I appreciate the thoughts Popper gives us in paragraph 5 about the balance of power. We have to remember, though, that the Soviets have the same problem we do.

Mr. Karamessines: We have had reports that the Greek forces in Cyprus can move at a moment’s notice. They just need the word to start moving.

Mr. Kissinger: Are we interested in the territorial integrity of Cyprus? The answer to that question is not “no.” But if the answer is “yes,” so what? What conclusions can we draw? We have no evidence of an impending attack.

Mr. Sisco: In the short-run I don’t think we should be associated with any action which will result in the dismemberment of Cyprus. And in the long-run, I don’t think we should be associated with the use of force which will result in enosis.

Mr. Kissinger: We are talking right now about Greek and Turkish forces landing on Cyprus. We’re not talking about actions the Cypriot National Guard may take.

Mr. Sisco: That’s right. But if there is a civil war, you have to consider what actions the various elements would take. The right-wing elements would be under Gen. Grivas. The National Guard has about 9,000 men, commanded by 600 Greek officers. In my judgment, Makarios cannot rely on the National Guard. Because of this situation, Makarios has taken in Czech arms, for his own personal Guard. If a civil war breaks out, he will probably give these arms to his own people and to left-wing sympathizers and communists. In a civil war, the communists would support Makarios, hoping, of course, to exploit the situa-

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5 Brackets in the original.
tion for their own good. Objectively speaking, the way the National Guard goes will determine the need of Greece and Turkey to intervene militarily. They could do this with contingents they already have on the island or with the deployment of contingents from their home bases.

Mr. Kissinger: What do we do if we assume there is a real threat to the territorial integrity of Cyprus? There is no evidence that this is the case yet, except for the theory that this is something they could do.

Mr. Sisco: We don’t have hard evidence yet.

Mr. Kissinger: Then what kind of evidence do we have?

Mr. Sisco: The evidence comes from a close examination of all the cables. Greece says it will pull out its Ambassador if Makarios doesn’t offer any concessions. The implication is that this could lead to civil war. And to me, at least, there is an implication that other actions could be taken, as well.

Mr. Kissinger: All it means is that the Greeks are applying pressure.

Mr. Sisco: Yes, but I was not referring to the immediate issue.

Mr. Irwin: When Clerides says “the Greeks are planning to move tonight,” is he referring to Greek forces or the National Guard? [This is a reference to Nicosia 319, 14 February.]

Mr. Kissinger: I think Clerides is just trying to get us involved. He wants us to act as if we think a Greek move is underway.

Mr. Karamessines: We have nothing [less than 1 line not declassified] indicating that the Greeks are planning to move tonight.

Mr. Kissinger: Have we asked [less than 1 line not declassified]?

Mr. Karamessines: We have, but there is no answer yet.

Mr. Kissinger: I would like to talk to the President about this when I see him at 1:00 p.m. It’s already 7:00 p.m. in Cyprus. If they are planning a move, it will be very soon. Suppose we do go to Clerides and ask him to give us the evidence he has about a Greek move. If he gives us his evidence, what do we do? We have asked for all the intelligence information—and that is perfectly right under the circumstances. What else could Clerides give us?

Mr. Sisco: Don’t you think it is a good idea to ask him what evidence he has?

Mr. Kissinger: Why? If he gives us the evidence, what would we do?

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6 Brackets in the original. Telegram 319 transmitted Clerides’s report. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 69–June 30, 1974). In telegram 25489 to Nicosia, February 14, the Department instructed Popper to inform Clerides that it had no information confirming an imminent Greek move. (Ibid.)
Mr. Sisco: They have come to us and told us they have evidence of a Greek move. Do we disregard them entirely? Frankly, I don’t believe the report. I was just looking for a way to temporize.

Mr. Kissinger: I don’t believe this report either. Why don’t we wait for our intelligence reports to come in? Then, if there is evidence, we can go to Clerides. If there is no evidence, why should we go to him and stir the pot?

Mr. Sisco: I don’t think we would be stirring the pot if we went to him.

Mr. Irwin: How much evidence can there be? Tom [Karamessines] says the Greeks can move as soon as they are given the word.

Mr. Kissinger: Suppose we go to Clerides and he says they can move in ten minutes. What would we do? What is the next step?

Mr. Sisco: I don’t know, Henry. This whole situation is in a delicate balance. We want to stay as close as possible with our Allies, yet we don’t want to give the impression that we are in collusion with them.

Mr. Kissinger: With whom would we be in collusion? We haven’t done anything.

Mr. Sisco: It’s a question of what kind of contacts we maintain.

Mr. Karamessines: For whatever it’s worth, the Russians have already put out a little squib, linking us with the Greeks.

Mr. Kissinger: They would do that anyway.

Mr. Sisco: I think that if we could give some low-key indications of sympathy, this would contribute—in the context of the Cyprus picture—to not having Makarios come to the conclusion that we were playing any kind of role in what was happening. It would also help prevent him from saying that the only way to save his skin—or Cyprus’ skin, because the two things are different—would be to turn to the Soviets for help.

Mr. Kissinger: What do you mean? What kind of help?

Mr. Sisco: Basically, political operations—and support in the UN. Makarios may, however, also ask for additional arms.

Mr. Kissinger: I can’t believe that he would ask them for help, unless he thought he was in real trouble. Let’s assume that is his state of mind. If we can’t protect him, and he thinks the Soviets can, he will turn to them. He strikes me as being a shrewd, tough customer. We can’t play games with him. His decision to go to the Soviets for help will be based on his assessment of what the Soviets can do for him. I’m bringing all these things up because I’m just trying to understand our analysis of the situation.

7 Brackets in the original.
Mr. Sisco: We are not yet in the position to make a judgment about when we will do more, as against the Soviet option. We just haven’t reached that juncture yet.

Mr. Kissinger: Against what options? What are we trying to prevent?

Mr. Sisco: We would be satisfied if Greece and Turkey could achieve a settlement which would put the arms issue away and which would come up with a framework for a unified government more responsive to Athens. We can’t associate ourselves with anything beyond that.

Mr. Kissinger: No one is arguing that point.

Mr. Sisco: I know. We have a very delicate balance here. We can’t appear to be undermining the territorial integrity of Cyprus by giving support to our Allies.

Mr. Irwin: Joe is saying that we have to be concerned with appearance. It’s not that we did anything, or that we are going to do anything, or that Greece might do something quickly. Joe is just saying that we should avoid giving the impression that we are helping Greece—or that we did nothing when we had information about Greece’s plans.

Mr. Kissinger: I know of no law that says we have to do something in every instance. Many times, in fact, we have information about something, but do nothing.

Mr. Sisco: I am simply suggesting that at some point we have to face the choices about what kind of supporting role we will play.

Mr. Kissinger: What kind of support are you talking about?

Mr. Sisco: Support for a peaceful resolution of the problem, along the lines I have already described. I’m talking about the possibility of an American role, as compared to leaving the situation open for violence and leaving it open for the Russians to make some political capital.

Mr. Kissinger: How do we translate that into operational terms? If we indicate to Makarios that we will support him, it will not necessarily settle anything else. We want to see what evidence our own intelligence turns up, and Tom is trying to get it. This is perfectly right. In the meantime, is it in our interest to give Cyprus the idea that we will get involved?

Mr. Sisco: We have not done that. We are trying to stay as uninvolved as possible.

Mr. Karamessines: What Joe is driving at, I think, is that we might be put into a difficult propaganda position.

Mr. Kissinger: With whom?

Mr. Karamessines: With the world at large—for not preventing two allies from dismembering Cyprus.

Mr. Sisco: I think I am clear about our objectives.
Mr. Kissinger: That’s right. The statement of objectives is clear to all of us.

Mr. Sisco: Fine. It is also my judgment that we should go to Clerides and ask him to pass on to us any intelligence he has. If we disregard him, they would wonder what our silence means. They would wonder what we are up to.

Mr. Kissinger: I will see the President at 1:00 p.m., and I’ll discuss this with him.

Mr. Sisco: I agree with you, Henry, that the report [of Greek intervention tonight] is not true. I don’t think the Greeks are ready to move.

Mr. Irwin: I read the cable as Clerides asking us to take action.

Mr. Sisco: Exactly. He’s doing this to get us involved.

Mr. Kissinger: He’s doing it because he wants a response. He sees how nervous we are.

Mr. Sisco: If we do as Popper suggests, Clerides will take it as a cautious reaction on our part.

Mr. Kissinger: I’ve done all this probing, Joe, because I wanted to get to the heart of your recommendation. I talked to the President yesterday about your cable, and I will talk to him again on the matter we are discussing now. I think we’re all in agreement on what we should try to do. (to Mr. Sisco) I will call you at 1:30 p.m.

Mr. Irwin: Henry, how would you phrase what we are trying to achieve?

Mr. Kissinger: I would say that if the outcome is a broad-based government and a resolution of the arms issues, this would be satisfactory to us. If there is an attack, though, and if Makarios goes to the UN, we will have no choice; we would try to use our good offices.

I met Waldheim at a cocktail party last night. He claims there are 10,000 crates of ammunition on the island. He said the UN may get involved, but that he didn’t think there was much for it to do yet. I didn’t tell him what our thinking was.

Mr. Sisco: Phillips is going to a lunch today, and Waldheim will also be there. I told Phillips not to give any information whatsoever. I told him not to probe or volunteer any information.

Henry, I also wrote that statement on political independence that went out in the cable over the weekend because I want the record to be absolutely clear if this eventually becomes public.

Mr. Kissinger: That’s all right. I was worried about how your Ambassadors feel.

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8 Brackets in the original.
Mr. Sisco: We are all in line now. I have one other thing. Fred Hoffman has an article [AP 9, 14 February] out stating that U.S. officials are worried about the arms deal. I told the Department spokesman that he should not give out any information—not even factual information. He should only say that we are following developments.

Mr. Kissinger: That’s absolutely right. We should do that in the Pentagon, too. (to Mr. Selden) Can you see to it?

Mr. Selden: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: We should keep the lowest possible profile on this issue. We will have one more meeting before we all go away. In the meantime, Joe, I think you have it in good shape.

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9 Brackets in the original.

403. Intelligence Information Cable


COUNTRY
Cyprus/Greece

DOI
12–13 February 1972

SUBJECT
Appraisal of Present Situation and Likely Developments

ACQ
[1 line not declassified]

SOURCE
[1 line not declassified]

Summary. President Makarios now intends to delay for some time his reply to the note of the Greek Government (GOG), delivered to him by former Ambassador Constantinos Panayiotakos. The President feels that the GOG has worked itself into an extremely difficult and delicate

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Records of the Directorate for Intelligence, Intelligence Information Cables. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad. Prepared in the CIA and sent to members of the Intelligence Community.
position. Makarios does not intend to allow the GOG to extricate itself from this position until he feels confident that he has successfully reversed the situation to his favor. Makarios feels that the GOG has acted foolishly in making its intentions a matter of international record, for by doing so the GOG has assured victory for Makarios in this round.

End Summary.

1. President Makarios believes that the GOG has made a series of blunders in its handling of its efforts to effect changes within Cyprus. He feels also that the GOC has been reacting effectively and has already won the battle on the international level. Thus, Makarios does not intend to hurry his reply to the note of the GOG which called on him to change his government, to turn in to the National Guard the arms which he purchased from Czechoslovakia, and to recognize the right of the GOG to assume the leadership in future negotiations concerning the Cyprus problem. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: The President feels that international support is with him. His case is simple; as the duly elected President of a sovereign state he feels he has every right to conduct state business and to take appropriate measures to insure a continuation of peace and tranquility in his country.)

Makarios recalls that when the return to Cyprus of General Georgios Grivas was first reported in September 1971, he had called on Athens to bring the General under control and, if he was present in Cyprus, to effect his removal. At that time, the GOG replied that the presence of Grivas in Cyprus was an internal-Cyprus problem, pointing out that General Grivas had been retired from GOG military service and was no longer under GOG control. The President made public this reply of the GOG, noting his acceptance of the GOG position, and his appreciation of the GOG’s acceptance of Grivas’ return as being an internal-Cyprus matter. Makarios followed this exchange with a public request to Grivas that he appear publically and state his reason for returning to Cyprus. Makarios offered to take Grivas into his government, and noted that if Grivas wanted more, Makarios was prepared to stand against Grivas in open election. Grivas did not reply. The importation of Czech arms had a serious effect on the plans of the Grivas plotters, and forced the issue. The reaction of the GOG brought the whole affair to international attention. The note, forwarded to Makarios via Panayiotakos, greatly angered Makarios but he remained cool. The content of the GOG note was leaked to the Cypriot press, and was reported as an ultimatum. The reply of the GOG to the press account was delivered by Panayiotakos on 12 February to representatives of the press. Panayiotakos stated that the note which he brought from Athens was simply a communication from the “national center,” and should not be construed as an ultimatum. Panayiotakos continued, however, that the communiqué urged the formation of a National Front Government, stating also that Grivas has a right to be interested in internal Cyprus
affairs and that therefore his followers must be represented in the government. It is on this press conference of Panayiotakos that Makarios now centers his program. If, as Panayiotakos stated publically, the GOG note was not an ultimatum, Makarios is free to answer the note in his good time. If, as the GOG stated in late 1971, the presence of Grivas in Cyprus is an internal matter, how is it now that the GOG feels it can interfere. Since Grivas has not seen fit to reply to Makarios’ public offers and challenges, as the elected representative and Ethnarch of his people, Makarios will continue to discharge his responsibilities, confident that his position in the current situation demands the support of the international audience. He has stated that he will not give the Czech arms to the National Guard until Grivas is returned to Athens. He does not intend to abrogate to the GOG his right and duty to determine the future of the country of Cyprus. He is perfectly willing to work with the GOG on a common approach to an eventual settlement and, where differences of opinion occur, to attempt to work them out on individual basis and on individual merits.

2. Although Makarios feels relatively confident that he has won this round of the battle, he does not think the fight is over. He has instructed his advisors that he expects the next move will be a direct attempt on his life. Head of the Cyprus Information (Intelligence) Service (CIS) Georgios Tombazos, has instructed his officers guarding the President and other key Cypriot officials, to be particularly careful in the coming days. (less than 1 line not declassified) Comment: Although recent CIS reports indicate that Makarios’ support within the country has grown since the receipt of the GOG’s note, these reports also indicate that Grivas’ followers are continuing preparations for a coup.)

3. [1½ lines not declassified]

404. Diplomatic Note From the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Government to the United States Government

Washington, undated.

In Moscow there is a serious concern over the new complication of the situation around Cyprus.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 493, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 9. No classification marking. A notation on the note reads: “Delivered by Mr. Sokolov to Gen. Haig, 5:30 p.m., 2/15/1972.”
The matter concerns the unpermissible interference by the Greek Government into the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus and the attempts of that Government to force the Cyprus Government to give up independent policy.

The demands made by the Greek side February 11 on the Government of Makarios, including the demand that the Government of Cyprus be reorganized by way of including into it the supporters of the so-called “enozis,” are nothing but an overt ultimatum, an attempt to impose on the people of Cyprus decisions running counter to their lawful national interests. The Soviet Government which consistently comes out in support of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, deemed it necessary to warn Athens against interference into the internal affairs of Cyprus. It also addressed the Government of Turkey on this question.

It should be emphasized that the Soviet side cannot remain indifferent toward such a development of events which may still further aggravate the situation in Eastern Mediterranean where the situation is already complicated enough. In the belief that this would not serve the interests of the United States either, it has been decided in Moscow to address President Nixon on this question. We proceed from the fact that the U.S. has possibilities to exert a restraining influence on the Government of Greece in order to prevent a crisis situation around Cyprus.2

2 A reply to this note, delivered by Haig to Sokolov at 11:15 a.m., February 17, reads: “The President wishes to assure the Soviet leaders that the United States opposes any actions that would aggravate the situation in Cyprus or in that general region of the world. The efforts of the United States are designed to bring about a restoration of calm and a normalization of the situation. To this end it has endeavored to use its influence to urge restraint on all the parties concerned and will continue to do so.” (Ibid.)

405. Minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting1

Washington, February 16, 1972, 3:15–4:04 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–116, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1972. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Mr. John N. Irwin, II
Mr. Joseph Sisco
DOD
Mr. G. Warren Nutter
Mr. James H. Noyes
JCS
Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt
CIA
Mr. Thomas Karamessines
Mr. John Waller
NSC
Gen. Alexander M. Haig
Mr. Richard Kennedy
Mr. Harold Saunders
Mr. Mark Wandler

It was agreed that:

—Mr. Sisco would prepare a cable,\(^2\) giving guidance to our Embassies in Cyprus and Greece.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Karamessines) Let’s start with your briefing.
Mr. Karamessines read the attached intelligence briefing.\(^3\)
Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) Joe, what do you think?
Mr. Sisco: I think we should continue to play out the same string we have been playing.

Dr. Kissinger: Does that go for Popper, too? [referring to Nicosia 358, February 16]\(^4\)

Mr. Sisco: Yes. If it’s all right with you, though, I will get to this a little later.

\(^2\) Apparently a reference to telegram 27708 to Athens and Nicosia, February 17, in which the Department suggested keeping a “low profile” and avoiding “any implication of possible US role” and requested Tasca’s assessment of Greek objectives in Cyprus in light of Makarios’s reaction to their ultimatum. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 GREECE)

\(^3\) Attached but not printed.

\(^4\) All brackets in the original. Telegram 358 from Nicosia reads: “With lapse of time and temporary decrease of tension, I think it is important that Embassy begin to read itself back into local thinking re situation. Unless Dept objects I plan to seek appointments with Clerides, Denktash and other sources before weekend, though I will not ask for appointment with Archbishop until things become a bit clearer. Staff will similarly begin to loosen up.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)
Dr. Kissinger: It seems to me that he is planning to do exactly what we told him not to do on Monday.  

Mr. Sisco: I would like to discuss this in a little while. In the meantime, let me review what we have done. First, we told the Greeks they were doing something risky. Second, we told them that if they published the note, it would make the diplomatic process of seeking a peaceful solution even more difficult. Third, we have made it clear to Waldheim that we would support a UN effort to gain control of the Czech arms. Our Ambassadors have been told to play this whole situation in a low-key way.

Dr. Kissinger: What can Waldheim do about the arms?

Mr. Sisco: He has two basic ways in which to handle the situation. The first is for the UN to actually take control of the arms. That, of course, would be the action most favored by Greece and Turkey. The second is to follow the pattern which has been used during the last year—periodic inspection of the arms.

Dr. Kissinger: How has that worked out?

Mr. Sisco: It has been quite effective. I should point out, Henry, that we have not discussed details with Waldheim. We just told him that anything he can do would be good, and he has told the Greeks and Cypriots that he is ready to do whatever is necessary. I think we should temporize because the play is still between the Greeks and the Cypriots at the present time.

Dr. Kissinger: Joe, can you tell me what you think the Greeks are doing? What do they think they are doing?

Mr. Sisco: Let me try. First, though, I want to say that Tasca has not gone in—and I think we are playing it right. The Greeks evidently assumed they had the mass support for their actions. But as the crisis continues, the Greeks assume Makarios is taking steps to bring public support to his side. I also think the Greek objectives are more tailored now than they appeared to be when the note was delivered. You can see this, in part, from the latest comments they—especially Ambassador Panayotakis—have made.

Dr. Kissinger: The objectives are more tailored to what—to control of the arms?

Mr. Sisco: Possibly. There might also be some element of bringing about a face-saving situation with regard to the make-up of a new government.

Dr. Kissinger: Why have the Greeks done all of this—and why has nothing happened?

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Mr. Irwin: We don’t really know, Henry. We have to figure out now what we do next week when all of you are away. What are your feelings? I think we should still hold off. If the Greeks move, they will probably move fast. But even if Makarios is overthrown, we should not get involved. What if the Greeks bungled a coup attempt? A civil war could follow, and Greek mainland forces might intervene. What would the Turks do then? The UN is seized of the desirability of resuming the talks and of controlling the arms—but it will not get into the question of bargaining with Gen. Grivas. Considering all of this, is there anything the U.S. can do to encourage a more active UN role, or—if there are military operations—should we take any steps vis-à-vis Greece?

Dr. Kissinger: And now the Soviets have entered the picture, too, with their expression of support for Makarios.6

Mr. Irwin: That’s right. Sadat also said something. We may have reached the point where it is in our interest to ask the UN to take a more active role.

Dr. Kissinger: If the Cypriot National Guard moves, will it be seen as foreign intervention in Cyprus?

Mr. Sisco: Not primarily. I have to hedge a bit here, but I think it would be seen substantially in internal terms. It is well-known that the Guard is commanded by 600 Greek officers who owe their primary loyalty to Athens. The line between internal action and international intervention would be the direct involvement of the Greek troops on the island. Under the terms of the London-Zurich accords, as you probably know, Greece and Turkey have certain rights if the status quo is upset.

Dr. Kissinger: Does that include military activity?

Mr. Sisco: Yes. They can quell “civil strife.”

Mr. Karamessines: They can take actions to restore the provisions of the agreement if those provisions have been upset.

Dr. Kissinger: Greece and Turkey would have better grounds for intervention, then, if they say they want to solve the arms problem than if they say they want to replace Makarios.

Mr. Sisco: Absolutely.

Mr. Irwin: Under the Treaty of Guarantees, Greece, Turkey and Great Britain can move to restore the constitutional status quo.

Mr. Sisco: That’s why the Greeks argue that the arms alter the delicate balance on the island. It gives the Greeks some semblance of legality under the London-Zurich accords.

6 See Document 404.
Mr. Irwin: From the world point of view, a National Guard move would be seen as a Greek move, largely because there are Greek forces stationed with the Guard.

Mr. Sisco: Plus the ultimatum the Greek Government gave Cyprus.

Dr. Kissinger: What would it all mean? What would happen in the UN?

Mr. Sisco: In the UN, it would almost certainly mean a 100+ vote for the territorial integrity of Cyprus.

Dr. Kissinger: Wouldn’t the vote depend to some degree on what the National Guard did? If you extinguish a state, that’s one thing, but if you install a new government—one which is broadly based—that’s another thing. What would the Soviets do?

Mr. Sisco: They would surely make loud noises in the Security Council.

Dr. Kissinger: Why don’t they do that now?

Mr. Sisco: I don’t think they are doing that now because Makarios is taking this whole situation very seriously—since Greece and Turkey are together. I have a news item here which says the “Makarios government received expressions of support today from the Soviet Union and Poland.” The Soviet Ambassador probably called on Makarios.

Dr. Kissinger: How do you think the situation will develop? How long can the situation continue in the present course?

Mr. Karamessines: The present course can continue for the next several days. Makarios will try to string it out. Each passing day, though, puts the Greeks in a more uncomfortable and embarrassing position.

Mr. Sisco: We surmise that—there is no evidence for it.

Mr. Irwin: If the present situation drags on, there is no problem for us. But if it drags on—and if the Greeks make a move—then the question arises about what we should do. Would it be better to wait and see what happens, or would it be better to do what we can—probably through the UN—to try to defuse the issue? If the arms issue can be settled, it may be possible to force Grivas off the island.

Mr. Nutter: What will happen if the Greeks back down?

Mr. Irwin: Then I think it would become a question of what Turkey would do—because the arms issue would still have to be settled.

Mr. Sisco: That’s right. The main thing is to get the arms under UN control. I can’t conceive of the Greeks backing down without seeing the arms issue settled.

Mr. Karamessines: Turkey undoubtedly feels the same way.

Mr. Sisco: They do.
Mr. Irwin: I lean to trying to get the UN to work out something between the Greeks and the Cypriots rather than riding the whole thing out and hoping for a good solution. No progress has been made so far.

Mr. Karamessines: Maybe we should have Tasca go to the Greeks and ask them if they are really sincere in claiming that their only objective is to bring the arms under control. If they say that is their only objective, we could ask if they want us to use our good offices to help settle the issue.

Dr. Kissinger: But they have already stated they have additional objectives.

Mr. Sisco: You’re right. They said in their ultimatum that they wanted a new government on Cyprus. I think Tom’s [Karamessines] proposal goes too far right now. The Greeks won’t come to us.

Dr. Kissinger: I get the impression the Greeks either know very well what they are doing or they are colossally inept.

Mr. Sisco: In the two previous crises, they started out with thunderous moves, and then they collapsed.

Mr. Irwin: That may be true, but it is different now—because the Turks are there to bolster them.

Mr. Sisco: That is a big difference.

Mr. Noyes: Is it likely there may be a joint Greek-Turk operation?

Mr. Sisco: I think if one side moves, the other side will also move.

Mr. Karamessines: I agree.

Mr. Nutter: We haven’t encouraged them.

Mr. Irwin: Turkey and Greece both know we haven’t interfered. From the brief cable we sent out the other day [State 025489], Makarios knows we had no information about a Greek move. He may even have thought we were instrumental in stopping the Greeks. We played it just right.

Dr. Kissinger: That depends on what we want. If this is a game of chicken and if we want Makarios to cave in, it should be done quickly. We may have encouraged him to hang on. I am just speaking hypothetically.

Mr. Sisco: It is a game—and he is a good poker player.

Dr. Kissinger: There are a number of things we could do to make life easier for Popper and his staff, but that may not be our objective. If our objective is to bring about control of the arms, I think we can steer things in that direction.

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7 See footnote 2, Document 343.
8 To Nicosia, February 14; see footnote 6, Document 402.
Mr. Irwin: My impression of Makarios is that he will not give in. Maybe the Greeks will give in.

Dr. Kissinger: Makarios is a good poker player, as you say. But why should he give in now. If he were going to give in, he would wait till the last moment and not tell us now.

Mr. Irwin: He is also a stubborn man.

Dr. Kissinger: But he never had the Greeks and the Turks against him before. I don’t know how he will act.

Mr. Karamessines: February 23 is a key date. That’s when the new Turkish contingent moves into position on the island. They may bring in heavy guns with them.

Mr. Sisco: Tom is right. The 23rd could be the next crisis point. The Greeks said they would move in heavy guns if the Turks did.

Dr. Kissinger: This could put some pressure on Makarios.

Mr. Irwin: To do what?

Dr. Kissinger: To yield the minimum he would judge necessary in order to prevent that from happening.

Mr. Irwin: Do you mean giving up the arms?

Mr. Sisco: He could do that, and he could also insist that Grivas get off the island. And a short time after this immediate problem blows over, he could announce a change in the cabinet. I think he can save face by making some government change.

Mr. Karamessines: Makarios was reportedly planning to make a change, anyway. But he said the crisis made it impossible to do it now.

Mr. Sisco: Henry, I’d like to get your reactions to a couple of things. If the Greeks come to us and say they want us to go to the UN, there is no problem. Suppose, though, that they tell us they are willing to make some kind of a deal. They ask us to carry a message to the Cypriots, which we do. Then the Cypriots ask us to carry a message back to the Greeks. We would be right in the middle before we know it. What is your instinct to us getting involved in something like that?

Dr. Kissinger: My instinct is to avoid getting involved and to see if the UN can do it. Suppose the Greeks say they would be glad to see the UN step in. What would we do?

Mr. Sisco: They won’t say that.

Dr. Kissinger: The consequence of our message-carrying will be that we are drawn into a substantive position.

Mr. Sisco: That’s exactly why I raised the point, Henry. If Makarios comes to us, Popper should tell him that this issue should be settled between the Greeks and Cypriots. But what do we do if both our allies come to us?
Dr. Kissinger: If that happens, we would be forced to carry messages—and to take sides. And if Makarios reads into this that we are simply acting as an errand boy, it wouldn’t make Greece or Turkey happy. I can talk to the President about all of this. But as I just said, my instinct is not to get involved.

Mr. Irwin: The question is whether we should encourage Waldheim to take a more active role.

Mr. Sisco: Waldheim can play a more active role on the arms control issue. But Greece and Turkey came to us because the other element in the note—the element about a new government—is something Waldheim can’t touch. It is not in his mandate, and I don’t think he would touch it with a ten-foot pole.

Mr. Irwin: He can’t touch the Grivas issue, either.

Mr. Sisco: That’s right.

Dr. Kissinger: If the Greeks come to us and tell us to relax because they are not planning any drastic actions, can we help them come up with a face-saving solution?

Mr. Sisco: Yes, I think so, if they are prepared to cooperate on the arms issue and on getting Grivas off the island. They may even insist on our helping them.

Dr. Kissinger: Can they do that? My instinct is to stay out of the whole thing as long as we possibly can. Otherwise, we will get nothing but grief from Greece and Turkey (who may accuse us of a stab in the back) and Cyprus and the Soviet Union. However, if outside forces intervene and if the problem goes to the Security Council, we will have to part company with Greece and Turkey.

Mr. Irwin: If, as the situation develops, we feel we can avoid the use of force by bringing it to the UN, we should support such a move.

Dr. Kissinger: Joe says, though, that the Greeks don’t want the UN.

Mr. Sisco: That’s right. They may throw in a hooker, too. They may tell us that unless we do something, they and the Turks might have to use force. It’s a possibility, you know.

Mr. Irwin: The UN has already talked about resuming the intercommunal talks and about the arms issue.

Dr. Kissinger: What have we told Waldheim?

Mr. Sisco: We told him that we know the Greeks and Turks have come to him. We said we would welcome anything he could do on the arms problem. We haven’t gone beyond that, and we haven’t said anything about the other part of the note.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Irwin) On the one hand, the UN may be able to prevent the situation from deteriorating. On the other hand, the whole problem could become worse if the negotiations fail, and the use of force may be hastened.
Mr. Sisco: Even if the Security Council is in session, the Chinese may temper their public position because you are there, but I think the Soviet Union and China will have parallel positions.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s true. One thing the Chinese are allergic to is a piece of territory being split off from a country.

Mr. Sisco: And from the Soviet point of view, intervention would be viewed as NATO aggression against a neutral country.

Dr. Kissinger: What would be the issue in the Security Council if there is no military intervention on the part of Greece or Turkey?

Mr. Sisco: For one thing, there would be a condemnation of Greece for the note. There would also be a reaffirmation of the territorial integrity and political independence of Cyprus. There would not be any mention of the Czech arms. In effect, it would be an effort to mobilize the Security Council in support of the status quo.

Dr. Kissinger: Why hasn’t this been done yet?

Mr. Sisco: Because Makarios is afraid of Greece and Turkey working together. Also, he thinks that the Security Council action may push the button on military intervention. If it goes to the Security Council, the Greeks may feel they have nothing to lose, and they may make their move.

Dr. Kissinger: You are saying that the situation may become worse if it goes to the UN.

Mr. Sisco: Yes. Don’t forget, either, that the Turks have the same feeling about the UN as the Israelis do.

Dr. Kissinger: If all this happens, what would we do?

Mr. Sisco: Send a cable to Peking. In the first instance, we should tell them that they should try to work it out themselves. Second, we can try to move it to the UN. If that doesn’t work, we would have to see what kind of role we could play ourselves—although I hope it wouldn’t come to that point.

Dr. Kissinger: Who would we send out there?

Mr. Sisco: We haven’t gone that far yet.

Dr. Kissinger: If we send you, everyone would think you had an undercover role in regard to the Egyptian-Israeli talks.

Mr. Sisco: If I got within 200 miles of Cairo, Sadat would send someone to talk to me. We could go to the Greeks and ask them if they don’t really want the UN to handle the situation. Then Waldheim could quietly get involved. This would be much better than having Cyprus bring it up at the Security Council.

Gen. Vogt: I, for one, am worried about Makarios distributing the arms.

Mr. Sisco: We are, too, and we’re watching the situation.
Dr. Kissinger: If he does distribute the arms, could Greece and Turkey intervene?

Mr. Sisco: If he did that, the fat would be in the fire. Greece would probably unleash the National Guard, which is basically loyal to Athens.

Dr. Kissinger: What about the point Tom [Karamessines] made earlier? Would it be possible for Tasca to ask the Greeks if control of the Czech arms is their principal objective?

Mr. Sisco: I don’t think we should be that specific. We could send a message to Tasca, asking him if he detects any changes in Greek objectives. We can tell him to talk to Palamas and try to feel out the current situation. We shouldn’t go beyond that point, though.

Dr. Kissinger: That sounds okay to me. Will you send a cable over here for clearance?

Mr. Sisco: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: What about Popper? Can we calm him down?

Mr. Sisco: Yes. We can send him a cable telling him not to see Makarios. We can authorize him to see Clerides, to get a current reading of the situation. We should tell him not to take any initiatives to see anyone else. If he receives any initiatives, though, he should ask us for instructions.

Dr. Kissinger: I have the impression he will make sure that Clerides takes the initiative.

Mr. Sisco: No. That wouldn’t happen. Popper is an activist, and he is very intelligent. He also follows orders.

Dr. Kissinger: I’m not saying he would disobey orders. He would just see that the initiative came from Clerides.

Mr. Sisco: Popper is playing it straight.

Dr. Kissinger: What about his staff? Can it be restrained?

Mr. Sisco: Sure.

Dr. Kissinger: The Embassy personnel always want to be well-liked by the people they are accredited to—and this is only normal.

Mr. Sisco: Henry, this has always been an effective and efficient Embassy. When something has occurred, they have always found out about it and let us know. Popper’s worry is that the Embassy’s pattern of reaction in this crisis has evolved differently from the way it has in other crises. He is worried that Makarios will read something into that. I think we can tell him to see Clerides and to use the meeting as a listening exercise to find out where the talks stand. Popper can live with instructions like that.

Dr. Kissinger: It makes sense to me.

Mr. Sisco: I can put it all in one cable for you.

Dr. Kissinger: What about Turkey?
Mr. Sisco: Handley is alright. Turkey is off to one side, anyway. Also, their Ambassador came in to see me yesterday.9

Dr. Kissinger: I will go along with you. If you think Turkey is not the principal mover, you don’t have to include Handley in the cable.

Mr. Sisco: It doesn’t really matter. Handley will give me some indicators next week, if we need any.

Dr. Kissinger: Next week will be a happy week—with this crisis, and Vietnam, among others. At any rate, the food should be good.

Mr. Sisco: We have a delicate situation here. We will do the best we can.

[Omitted here is a discussion on Bangladesh, Jordan, and Iran.]

9 No record of this meeting was found.

406. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, February 18, 1972, 1614Z.

971. Subj: Cyprus: Present GOG Objectives on Cyprus. Ref: State 027708.2

1. Summary: Papadopoulos has staked a good bit of his prestige on his Cyprus initiative. His past history has shown him to be patient and careful. We believe he has other cards to play. After events of past week alternatives now available to GOG not particularly attractive. Those involving force or threat of force might have been successful last weekend but timing now bad. Makarios seems in fairly strong position against other forms of pressure. Greeks might be wise try to shift issue to that of immediate resumption of intercommunal talks. Possible compromise would be UN control of Czech arms and Greek guarantee that Grivas’ forces will not disturb peace, followed by some personnel changes on Greek Cypriot side and Greek-Turkish agreement to move for immediate resumption intercommunal talks. Question is


2 See footnote 2, Document 405.
how GOT would react to various Greek options. Next danger point may be Turkish contingent rotation. **End summary.**

2. Papadopoulos has staked a good bit of his prestige and that of his regime on achieving a drastic resolution of the Cyprus issue, which was launched with fanfare and trumpets. I can hardly believe he will stop there. Although in Byzantium anything is possible, everything which occurs does not always mean what it should mean. The Prime Minister’s game plan is, therefore, probably not played out.

3. In judging what GOG will do next, we should keep several things in mind. First of all, Papadopoulos has a bit of patience and knows how to wait. The highlights of his career prove this. His method is to plan, wait, observe carefully, and if possible let the situation itself develop in his direction. He is also a man who prefers to avoid violence and solutions involving force. He prefers what appear to be agreed solutions and usually makes every effort to respect his opponent’s philotimo in struggle of this kind, and takes appropriate measures to this end.

4. Thus I believe that Prime Minister will develop his tactics to meet current situation. It is hard to be convinced that Prime Minister put all his eggs in one basket, i.e., Panayotakos’ appraisal of Greek Cypriot reaction. Papadopoulos simply not trained by his life experience to act in this way. Makarios could make a mistake by putting on large demonstrations of public support against Athens. If he continues to do this, pari passu, Prime Minister will be encouraged to sharpen his tactics to defend his own posture and objectives. We recognize, however, that Makarios is a master poker player, and while maneuvering to save his own position never neglects opportunity to take offensive.

5. Although Papadopolous will, we believe, make further moves, most of alternatives available to GOG at this point do not appear particularly attractive. Note was delivered to Makarios a week ago today. By avoiding an answer and demonstrating certain amount of international and local support, Makarios has left Greeks in position of having to take additional steps that will either escalate situation or lower the temperature. If Greece decides not to press its demands on disposition of Czech arms and formation of new government on Cyprus, Papadopoulos and GOG will have suffered serious loss of face that could have consequences here. It is our opinion, however, that GOG having finally thrown down gauntlet to Makarios is not likely to let matter rest there. Perhaps Papadopoulos now expects the Turks to increase pressure on Makarios.

6. GOG built up expectations of a spontaneous rallying of Greek Cypriots to Greek cause and intimated that major political figures in Cyprus would desert Makarios. So far this has not happened, and GOG is now tactically and legally on far shakier grounds in trying to force issue of Makarios government than in attacking problem of Czech
arms. We assume therefore that whatever next step Greeks take will more likely involve arms. We see following among the options available to Greece.

A. Quarantine of arms. As Palamas has said this would be “awkward.” Archepiscopal Palace under heavy guard. If National Guard (which it must be remembered manned by Cypriots even though officered by Greeks) surrounded Palace, possibilities of violence considerable. Makarios’ forces could also possibly wait this one out for lengthy period. Greeks cannot even be sure what proportion of Czech arms are in Palace. Moreover, simple quarantine, with Greeks guarding Greeks, may not satisfy Turks.

B. Provoke incidents by Grivas supporters as pretext for National Guard takeover. This alternative would have made some sense last weekend, when Czech arms issue was fresh. Now such tactic would appear blatant attempt to take over Cyprus Government, particularly if Makarios had entered into discussions with UN on disposition of arms. Any Grivas action following some other action threatening Greek Cypriots, such as Turkish introduction of both troops and arms, would of course be a different matter.

C. Instigate Turkish threat to ship arms or men into Cyprus as pretext for National Guard takeover. Threat already exists and no response of this kind in sight. Moreover, objection here is that it difficult to believe, unless there is a firm GOG–GOT agreement, that at this point Turks are going to let themselves be pushed out in front.

D. Play religious card. While Holy Synod may be anti-Makarios, GOG would be moving into an arena in which Makarios is the acknowledged all-time champion.

C. Play Hellenism card with Cypriot people. Makarios can play this game, too, and in fact by holding out for ultimate enosis he promises Greeks the whole pie of Cyprus.

E. Alienate Greek Cypriot political leadership from Makarios. We cannot be sure of state of play, but it seems that Greece may have missed whatever chance it had. Clerides growing increasingly cautious.

G. Press Makarios to broaden government. Makarios can spin this one out and eventually refuse. Nevertheless, this an objective which GOG undoubtedly will continue to pursue. Link to internal Communist problem and Soviet influence on the island will serve to keep this issue alive.

H. Retreat, claiming success on arms question by involving UN. This would eventually be seen as defeat for Greece.

I. Remove Makarios from scene physically. This would not be naked intervention, which could provoke strong reactions. Extremely risky.
J. Use Turkish rotation to provoke incident allowing National Guard to take over or declare martial law. Same objections as to (C), but not be excluded. If Turks decide to use rotation to put steam behind question of Czech arms, this could provide Papadopoulos with immediate next step.

K. Shift gears and make immediate resumption of intercommunal talks, with strong role for Greece and Turkey, the main issue. By changing the game Greeks just might be able both to save face and put Makarios on the defensive, particularly if UN involvement in arms question had partially neutralized that problem.

7. A vital factor, of course, which we are not in best position to judge from here is how Turkey would react to various Greek initiatives or failure of Greece to act. We share view in Nicosia’s excellent 370\(^3\) that Turkish contingent rotation potentially dangerous in this connection. In any case, if Czech arms not soon removed from Makarios’ control Turkey may supply Turkish Cypriots with further weapons, possibly by air drop. If Greece and Makarios had at that point been unable to reach some compromise as outlined above, it might be necessary to accept introduction of Turkish arms as part of new situation. Supply of Turkish arms would be seen as element in achieving new equilibrium, which however would present greater risk to maintenance of peace on island.

8. We believe that option (K) above not only offers opportunities for defusing situation along lines we suggested in our original analysis (Athens 800),\(^4\) but would also be desirable from point of view of protecting U.S. interests. Events of past week have demonstrated to all parties how close we are to serious blow-up on Cyprus, and steam which has built up could possibly be used to generate some positive results from present crisis.

9. A possible compromise at this point might be for Makarios to enter into negotiations with UN for UNFICYP control of Czech arms. Greece would not attempt to remove Grivas from island but would agree to use National Guard to prevent Grivas supporters from disrupting peace. Next step would be for Makarios to make limited personnel changes, perhaps replacing Kyprianou, and certainly reducing influence of Lyssarides. Combined with firm commitment for an

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\(^3\) Dated February 17, it noted a “small but distinct possibility” that the Greek or Turkish Governments might use the imminent Turkish troop rotation to stage an “incident” that would permit intervention against Makarios’s government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–4 CYP/UN)

\(^4\) Dated February 12, it expressed the Embassy’s view that Makarios held the key to a peaceful settlement of the crisis. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)
early resumption of revised intercommunal talks this approach holds some promise.

10. Finally, it would be necessary for Greece and Turkey to work closely together on getting intercommunal talks under way quickly. Makarios would have to accept significant role for GOG and GOT in these talks. Right of intervention under London-Zurich agreements would thus be brought out from the backroom into the shade, but visible, and might serve to induce greater realism on Makarios' part.

Tasca

407. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers


Cyprus: Bishops Demand Makarios' Resignation as President

The Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus met today. At the conclusion of the meeting the three Bishops issued a proclamation calling for Archbishop Makarios to resign from the presidency.

In the continuing power struggle between Makarios and the Athens regime it appears that the three Bishops have sided with the Colonels. The Bishops are all classical Hellenists, political conservatives, and personal opponents of the Archbishop. They have also been directly in touch with the Government of Greece.

It is difficult to predict how this situation will unfold, apart from saying that the action of the Bishops will certainly increase tension and enhance the chances for violence. The Bishops' declaration is a challenge to the demonstrated popular support for Makarios. I think we can anticipate additional public manifestations in favor of the Archbishop and against the Bishops. On the other hand I believe that this internal challenge is in some senses more serious for Makarios than the challenge of Greece in its February 11 note. The Bishops are, after all,

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Boyatt and cleaned by Davies.
Cypriots and, after Makarios, they are the leaders of the Church, an institution which is 1500 years old.

There is an outside chance Makarios might resign and leave public life; I am not confident any successor could contain the situation. Resignation, however, would not be in character for the Archbishop. I tend to think that after the smoke clears Makarios will remain in control of the situation. He may be “persuaded” by popular acclamation to remain as President. He might resign, call for an election, and challenge Grivas and the right-wing to come into the open in a presidential contest. He might sit tight, ignore the Bishops and continue to negotiate with the UN to resolve the Czech arms question.

408. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, March 3, 1972, 1622Z.

1231. Subj: Cyprus: Hellenism, Papadopoulos and Makarios.

1. An important characteristic of present Cypriot crisis is that it is primarily Greeks that are involved on both sides. It would be a mistake, therefore, to deal with the issue as involving Cyprus and a foreign state. Makarios and Papadopoulos both represent different views, or perhaps more accurately are competitively seeking to speak as defenders of Hellenism in Cyprus. Both have shown that they regard relations among Greeks as special in character as clearly reflected by original GOG approach and Makarios’ reaction to date.

2. As Greeks they will be motivated by value standards appropriate to Hellenism, which has roots dating back to the pre-Christian era. There is much mysticism, myth and history wrapped up in this, one of the most ancient and persistent of ethnic motivations. Thus, the thought that Makarios might go to the UN to request any specific action against Greece must be viewed in this context. With Czech arms the original symbol of the confrontation, any recourse to the UN invokes memories of the bloody and costly war of the Greek people against the efforts of the Stalinist-directed Greek Communists to take

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over Greece. Moreover, the demand for action against the Communists will also inspire a keenly sympathetic note on the part of the generally conservative clergy of the Orthodox Church. Grivas, a Cypriot, is still a hero to many in this context. Greek reaction in Cyprus and here could be that Makarios would be considered by some as less than loyal to Greek Hellenism. Some might feel he also not sufficiently Christian in his approach. In addition, there would be others, particularly among the military, who would frown upon the importation of Communist arms in a struggle against Papadopoulos—the avowed exponent of God, country and family (underlining added). This thinking, backed by likely tremendous psychological impact on the morale of Greeks in Cyprus of any possibility that Athens would “wash its hands” of Cypriot situation in event it is unable to realize its objectives of normalization of the Cypriot question, will cause Cypriot Greeks to listen carefully with both their hearts and their minds to the call from Athens for unity of Hellenism at this time.

3. The most positive element I find is that Hellenism’s leadership in Athens wishes to enlist the support of the Greek people but oriented towards making possible at long last the establishment of deep and special relations with Turkey. The negative element is that both Ankara and Athens are now military-backed regimes without a democratic basis. Will Makarios grasp the significance of the present movement? If he does not, it will be another excerpt in the long and dreary history of how the spirit of division among the Greek people has caused them to pay dearly in security and well being. Moreover, he could act in a way which would preserve the basic freedoms of the Cypriot people as well as the principle of election as the basis of power. But, I believe we are approaching the spirit which animated Ataturk and Venizelos to seek deep and permanent reconciliation in the thirties after the monumental disaster of the twenties. This offers exciting prospects indeed for the peace and stability of the Eastern Mediterranean taken within the context of our vital security interests in the cohesiveness of this flank.

Tasca

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2 No underlining in the original.
409. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, March 8, 1972, 0845Z.

556. Subject: Cyprus: Czech Arms. Ref: Nicosia 539 (Notal). 2

1. Summary: Czech arms to be placed under UN inspection. Greeks helped prepare original arms list. They could now effectively control the arms.

2. UNSYG Special Rep Osorio-Tafall, as well as Ambassadors of Austria and Spain and Canadian High Commissioner, saw Makarios March 8.

3. Osorio tells me Makarios confirmed that GOC willing to place Czech arms under UNFICYP inspection as a first step. Osorio now negotiating with FonMin Kyprianou to determine how and when this commitment should be formalized. Cypriots are resisting a formal agreement, but Osorio wants at least an exchange of notes detailing UNFICYP right and obligation to carry out periodic inspection.

4. In course of discussion with Archbishop Osorio asked how UN could be sure arms to be inspected represented entire quantity of arms imported. Makarios said this was simple matter. GOC would give UNFICYP list contained in original contract. It could be checked with Greek National Guard Commander Gen. Haralambopoulos, with whom list had been worked out by Cypriots.

5. Comment: Osorio speculates, rightly we believe, that Haralambopoulos was originally under impression arms would be given to National Guard. At some point, probably after arrival of Grivas, the signals were evidently changed. If this version of events becomes public and goes unchallenged, GOG case on the arms will lose some of its force. GOG will not be able to maintain that Cyprus Govt erred in secretly and independently ordering arms, which on arrival have impaired Cyprus stability and prospects for intercommunal settlement. It will logically be compelled, we would think, to limiting its protest to fact that Makarios has kept arms out of mainland Greek control—quite a different point and one which would be much less reassuring to Turks.

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2 Dated March 7, it reported the willingness of the Cyprus Government to let the UN take control of the Czech arms. (Ibid.)
In actuality, Greeks are able to assume effective control of arms since they are now located in Athalassa compound, headquarters of both police and National Guard. A raiding forces battalion of National Guard has just been moved from Bellapais to Athalassa.

Popper

410. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, March 10, 1972, 1515Z.

593. Subject: Cyprus: End of Round Two.

1. Summary: We think round two in Greek Govt’s confrontation with Makarios has effectively come to an end. Round three could, though it need not necessarily, involve violence.

2. For analytical purposes, Cyprus events since presentation of Greek demands to Makarios on Feb 11 can be considered to fall into phases. First began with presentation of Greek note, and was characterized by Makarios’ adoption of posture of bland immobility in face of Greek demands, coupled with assiduous cultivation of popular support against Athens. Second round was introduced by March 2 action of Holy Synod, instigated by Athens, requesting Archbishop’s resignation. This was followed, on March 3, by GOG’s demand, submitted to Makarios by Greek Chargé through Clerides that Makarios immediately accept and implement Greece’s Feb 11 conditions.

3. As of March 10, our feeling is that round two is now essentially over. We know, and can only assume that Greeks do as well, that Makarios’ written reply to Feb 11 demands, when it is delivered, will show him unyielding on essentials relating to sovereignty of Cyprus and prerogatives of his office. We expect that within next day or two Makarios and UNFICYP will have concluded and published a reasonably satisfactory agreement on Czech arms—not going as far as to provide for UNFICYP custody but nonetheless an improved and tighter version of

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1967 arrangement for inspection. (Septel.) Revelation through news media that GOG Rep Gen Haralambopoulos conspired with Cypriots to import arms and then deny knowledge of deal is telling blow at confidence of Turkish Govt in Greece.

4. Archbishop’s probable tactic in dealing with Holy Synod’s request is also now coming into focus. His approach likely be two-fold. With request itself, he will temporize acknowledging that there may, in canon law, be grounds for debate on propriety of holding a presidential as well as ecclesiastic office, but that for him to resign as “suggested” after twice being duly elected would be to throw Cyprus into chaos. Other prong of his approach seems likely to be maneuver to unseat Yennadhio, Bishop of Paphos, and win acceptance of thesis that three septuagenarian bishops are not the Church of Cyprus, which is Cypriot people and priesthood in totality.

5. Unless GOG is much less well informed or more self-deceiving than we think, we judge that it is reading events about as we are. We consider that sudden return to Athens of Greek Chargé Zaphiriou morning of March 10 is relevant.

6. What of round three? Again, it is Papadopoulos’ move. Cards he played on Feb 11 and March 2 have not produced the desired results. We have no way of knowing whether he will seize opportunity of Archbishop’s reply, which we are sure will be drafted with an eye to leaving Greece some graceful exits, to reduce confrontation and seek compromise, or whether he will escalate using violence. Some Cypriots fear that being a military man and frustrated by seeming failure of his first two moves, he will resort to preplanned violence using, in first instance, Grivas. In this regard, interesting article in GOG controlled Misimvori Mi March 9 (FBIS M092018) could be construed as telegraphing the punch. Article says Grivas getting ready to strike because he cannot tolerate Cyprus slipping further toward Communist anarchy and enslavement . . . Grivas supporters adequately armed and ready to move . . . Makarios must go . . . timing of the impending strike is up to Grivas.

7. On his side, Makarios is acting as if he almost welcomes a sharpening of confrontation brought on by his refusal to bend. He can even be seen in some respects to be goading Greece on. In past couple days the Makarios controlled press in Cyprus has begun intensive needling of GOG, suggesting splits within the military elements of Athens regime, discreditation of Palamas and Panayotakos, Grivas’ alleged refusal lend himself to Greece’s traitorous, anti-enosis objectives, etc.

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2 The terms of the agreement were reported in telegram 599 from Nicosia, March 11. (Ibid.)
Kanellopoulos, Mavros, Zigdhis, et al, are being cited as the true voices of Greek people. And in another jab, Papadopoulos is challenged to let anyone who doubts this go to the polls.

8. In sum, it seems to us that we are moving into third round—round in which likelihood of violence is substantially increased. Compromise is still possible, but odds in favor of it seem smaller. We wonder whether Embassy Athens would share this assessment.3

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3 In telegram 1450 from Athens, March 14, the Embassy reiterated the analysis made in telegram 971 from Athens, February 18 (Document 406) and warned that the Greek Government would ultimately be ready to use violence to secure its ends. The Embassy lobbied for a policy of U.S. non-involvement in the Cyprus crisis. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–6 CZECH–CYP)

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### 411. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, March 17, 1972, 1546Z.


1. We think it might be useful at this point, particularly in view of upcoming Erim visit to Washington, briefly to summarize this Embassy’s assessment of current Cyprus situation. Basically, we see situation as follows:

2. Makarios has scored a number of points. However, rather than easing crisis, Archbishop’s apparent tactical victories have made it even more likely that Greece will pursue aims set forth in its February 11 note.2

3. Turkish Government has made it quite clear that its security interests and those of Turkish community on island will be protected. At same time, GOT has taken stance that has encouraged Greek Government in its attempt to get Makarios to meet its demands. At this point much good will exists between our two NATO allies. (We note from

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2 See footnote 4, Document 396.
Ankara 1890\(^3\) that Turks seem to be mellowing somewhat even on ques-
tions of ecumenical patriarchate and minorities.) However, this good
will could be quickly dissipated if GOG is unable to deal constructively
with Cyprus issues important to Turks.

4. Our fundamental interest in this situation is in maintaining and
strengthening friendly relations between Greece and Turkey. If Makar-
ios can sit tight and continue to score propaganda points, thus frus-
trating both Greek and Turkish aims, it is not likely that our interests
will be well served.

5. Most immediate problem is Czech arms. If arrangement agreed
on between Makarios and UN not satisfactory to Turks, GOT may put
strong pressure on Greek Government to settle this question. GOG then
might issue ultimatum to Makarios that arms must be handed over to
National Guard or UN. If, however, Turks accept present arrangement,
or if they do not and Makarios subsequently agrees to improved
arrangement, we may surmount immediate problem. Crisis would then
enter new phase.

6. As we suggested at time current crisis began (Athens 971),\(^4\) best
solution from our point of view may be for entire argument to return
to arena of intercommunal talks (and this also probably best way of
preventing eventual outbreak of violence). If arms question settled, best
next development might be concerted effort by Greece and Turkey to
get intercommunal talks immediately under way. If this could be ac-
complished we would assume, after what has taken place in past
month, that Greece and Turkey would be able to play strong and con-
structive role in developing compromise solution.

7. We cannot predict what direction events will actually take. We
should continue to avoid direct involvement, allowing our NATO al-
lies, Greece, Turkey and U.K., to carry most of the burden. Neverthe-
less, to extent we can quietly influence events it should be in direction
of getting intercommunal talks going—if and when arms question sat-
isfactorily resolved.

Tasca

\(^3\) Dated March 16, it reported that Turkey expected Bishop Meleton to succeed the
Patriarch. (Ibid., POL GREECE–TUR)

\(^4\) Document 406.
1018  Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX

412.  Intelligence Information Cable

Washington, March 27, 1972.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Controlled Dissem. 8 pages not declassified.]

413.  Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, April 27, 1972, 1525Z.

3080. Subj: Meeting with Foreign Minister: Cyprus Intercommunal Talks.

Summary: While Government of Turkey in principle favors intercommunal talks, Bayulken says circumstances make it politically impossible for GOT agree resumption at present moment. These circumstances include (1) unsatisfactory settlement of Czech arms question (Bayulken credited UN SYG Waldheim with “great effort” and “step forward,” but not enough); (2) continuing bickering and disarray in Athens-Makarios relations which create feelings of insecurity in Turkish Cypriot community; (3) role of Grivas, in particular his reiteration, in concert with Makarios, of enosis as sole goal.

Bayulken said these conditions would make it political suicide for any Turkish Government to agree to resumption intercommunal talks at present. He said Turks were in process of making proposals to Waldheim aimed at eliminating these impediments. Proposals would be simultaneously made known to governments in Washington and London. While Bayulken did not spell out nature of proposals, appears Turks will seek great power (“U.S., U.K. and others”) backing of some kind. End summary.

1. During my meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Bayulken on April 26, I asked him what he had to say about the current status of the Cyprus intercommunal talks question.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. III Jan 72–Dec 73. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated immediate to Nicosia, Athens, London, USNATO, and USUN. Another copy is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP.
2. Bayulken began lengthy reply by observing that question was now at very difficult stage. Difficulties involve three major elements:

A. Czech arms. UN SYG Waldheim had made “great effort,” but his approach was limited by his need to treat Greek Cypriot administration (i.e. Makarios government) as full government. Turkey considers it “government in quotes.” Either Cypriot constitution exists or does not exist. Turkey had sought full UN custody or export of arms from island. Waldheim’s solution was step forward but not far enough. Bayulken repeated that Waldheim had made “good effort.”

B. Continuing disarray in Athens-Makarios relations created sense of insecurity among Turkish Cypriot community. This was intensified when Greek Cypriot press announced that Czech arms were for use against the Turks. Position of Athens itself was confused. Were they or were they not seeking Makarios’ departure? Well-being of Turkish community was at stake.

C. Third element rendering current situation unsuitable for resumption of talks from Turkish vantage point was role of Grivas, Bayulken continued. It had been clear all along that his sudden flight from Greece to Cyprus must have been connived at by GOG. Grivas had surfaced several days ago and met Makarios, then announced last weekend in his public message to Makarios that bonds between himself and Makarios had been strengthened. Grivas also made clear that the two were in full accord on enosis as sole goal.

3. Bayulken then described history of earlier efforts to arrange intercommunal talks. He stressed two points. First, major consideration for GOT was to carry along Turkish Cypriot community. This was not easy. Second, Greeks had played games with Turks. Bayulken illustrated this with instance in which Olcay, after approach by Palamas, had agreed on how two governments would present proposals on modalities of intercommunal talks to UN, only to have Greeks back off subsequently from their jointly agreed position.

4. Bayulken painted picture of heavy domestic political pressure in Turkey, particularly on arms issue. Parliament and elements of Turkish military were accusing Government of softness and asking why GOT had not shipped arms to Turkish community, thereby forcing UN to deal with arms of both sides, not just one. He concluded that any government agreeing to resumption of talks under current circumstances would be toppled.

5. Bayulken said Ministry would on April 27 instruct Turkish Mission UN approach Waldheim with suggestions aimed at clearing atmosphere so that intercommunal talks could take place. These proposals would at same time be communicated to USG and HMG in Washington and London. Their adoption would make Turkish acceptance resumption intercommunal talks defensible before Parliament and
Turkish community Cyprus. GOT hoped great powers, U.S., U.K. and others, would support Turkish proposals and “give assurances” that would enable talks to resume. In a few weeks Turkey would have a government and Waldheim would have had opportunity to move forward with Turkish proposals. What was needed now was a cooling-off period and action by Waldheim “with your help.”

6. Throughout his comments, Bayulken expressed great impatience with Government of Greece, which he said constantly shifted position and had deplorable tendency leak key developments to press. As to Makarios, at one point Bayulken remarked with sly smile that Turks knew him well and had private channels of communication with him.2 Difficulty was that what he said through private channels was not reflected in his public statements.

7. I confined myself to noting that as Bayulken had observed in Washington, U.S. favored intercommunal talks, and that it was my personal view that Waldheim formula on Czech arms had been a major step in literally defusing problem.

Handley

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2 In telegram 3130 from Ankara, April 28, the Embassy reported more fully Bayulken’s comments on Makarios, Denktash, and Grivas. (Ibid.)

414. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)1


SUBJECT

Cyprus Situation

I understand that you asked Sam about the attached cable2 reporting that Ambassador Bush, at Joe Sisco’s apparent instigation, had

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2 Telegram 76361 to USUN, May 2. Attached but not printed.
told Waldheim we do not support Turkey’s “tougher line” on the Cypriot-Czech arms and resumption of the intercommunal talks. I understand the concern that State may be edging instinctively toward unconsidered involvement in the Cyprus situation, and we need to keep a hand on that. We also have an interest in not souring our relationship with Turkey, especially after the Prime Minister’s successful visit. Those concerns stand alongside our general interest in avoiding a confrontation over Cyprus and since some of the elements in the situation seem to have changed in recent days, it may be worth putting the present problem in perspective.

Background

Early last week the UN finally got Makarios to agree to an arrangement for its control over the Czech arms which also satisfied the Greeks. It goes considerably further than a simple UN “inspection” arrangement worked out in a similar situation in 1966, and the UN representative in Cyprus felt that it should satisfy Turkish requirements and clear the way for resumption of the intercommunal talks.

With the Czech arms issue presumably resolved, Waldheim then issued an appeal for resumption of the intercommunal talks according to the format agreed upon before the recent crisis broke last February. That format, you will remember, called for participation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, mainland Greek and Turk representatives and a UN representative. Waldheim was especially concerned to get the intercommunal talks restarted before the semi-annual Security Council meeting next month for renewal of the UN peace-keeping mandate on Cyprus. He is particularly worried that some of the governments that contribute troops to the peace-keeping force will begin withdrawing them if there seems to be no effort to move toward a settlement. The Canadians, who supply one of the most effective units, are talking about pulling out this summer.

The Greek Cypriots and Greece have both indicated their interest in starting the new intercommunal talks. But—to the UN’s surprise—the Turks have shifted now to a much tougher posture which threatens the whole concept. To begin with, the Turks say that the UN-Makarios agreement on control of the Czech arms does not go far enough and is not satisfactory. Then in a reversal of their agreement last fall, the Turks are demanding that Waldheim obtain advance assurances from Makarios that (1) the Greek and Turk Cypriots negotiate on the basis of full...
equality; (2) the intercommunal talks be predicated on the understanding that the outcome will be an independent Cypriot state in which the two communities are “partners”; (3) enosis as an eventual solution be explicitly excluded; (4) the agenda focus on Turk interests (constitutional compromise) only. These Turkish preconditions are probably more than Makarios, or even the mainland Greeks, can accept. They actually amount to getting advance substantive commitments which the UN assiduously avoided in arranging the five-party format last fall and winter.

The toughening of the Turkish position results in part from the change of government in Turkey. There is, in effect, no government right now, and none of the caretakers wants to shoulder responsibility for beginning talks on a basis that would make them look soft on the Cyprus issue.

It was under these circumstances that Sisco and Bush decided—without asking us—to inform Waldheim that we do not support the tougher Turkish line. Sisco has laid down the principle that we do not want to get out in front and therefore want Waldheim to carry the ball. However, he has taken the line with the Turks—again without checking with us—that we thought the UN-Makarios agreement on the Czech arms was sufficient and that we felt the intercommunal talks were the best hope for progress. He has also pointed out the desirability of Turkey’s avoiding the appearance before the Security Council debate of being the party that killed the intercommunal talks.

Conclusions

The problem is how to keep the Turkish position from isolating Turkey, damaging Greek-Turkish harmony and creating a renewed sense of crisis on Cyprus. Whereas in February the Turks stood back with some confidence that the Greeks would not double-cross them, the present situation re-introduces the old aspect of Greek-Turkish confrontation. The Turks seem disillusioned with Greek handling of the Cyprus issue in the last two months and suspect that Athens, Makarios and Grivas may all be secretly lining up behind enosis. The fact that Turkey is without a government means that no one is available with the courage to put down those suspicions.

State is naturally concerned to see a new impasse in the way of talks, but the issue is how far we go in making this an issue in US-Turkish relations. State has started out taking the position that the Turkish stand is too rigid and has suggested to the Turks that they not get

5 Erim resigned on April 17 over opposition to the expansion of government powers to combat terrorism.
themselves in a box. Ambassador Handley in Ankara notes, however,
that the prospects of successful démarches at this time are “very dis-
mal.” To begin with, the government crisis immobilizes them for the
moment. Moreover, they appear determined not to see the Cypriot in-
tercommunal talks restarted just for the sake of reducing immediate
tension but want them to deal constructively with the Cypriot prob-
lem. Until now the Greeks have been doing Turkey’s work of softening
up Makarios, but now the Greeks seem to have backed off and the
Turks apparently may be moving to apply pressure themselves—if one
can ascribe any strategy to their moves at all in the current political

crisis.

The danger in State’s approach is that if we oppose the Turks too
obviously, it will appear that we are ganging up with the Greeks and
Makarios against them. So the art is not to encourage them on their
present course but to avoid confrontation with them.

As I deduce your position, it would be that:

— we should let Waldheim carry the main brunt of the argument
  with the Turks now;
— we should not give the Turks the impression we are ganging up
  against them;
— we could talk to the Turks when the new government gets its
  feet on the ground about avoiding isolation when the Security Coun-
  cil debate nears;
— we can take a straightforward position, as we have for some
  time, of favoring intercommunal talks as long as we can do so in a low-
  key way without putting ourselves in open opposition to the Turks.

Is this a fair statement of the position? 7

Recommendation: If you have not already done so, that you call
Sisco and make sure he understands that we want a crack at any ad-
ditional moves he is considering concerning Cyprus. Unless he gets
this word from the right level he is likely to keep moving us into a po-
sition that challenges Turkey. 8

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6 In telegram 3231 from Ankara, May 3. (Ibid.)
7 Kissinger initialed the “Yes” option and added the handwritten note: “But above
all I want the firmist possible démarches and I want all of them cleared here.”
8 In telegram 2871 from Athens, May 22, the Embassy reported that it had been in-
formed by Greek officials that Turkey had dropped its preconditions to the resumption
of intercommunal talks. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)

1. Following views are keyed to questions in ref tel and are based on most recent info available to Embassy and [less than 1 line not declassified].

   (A) By his letter of June 10 to Bishops (septel)3 Makarios has as expected defied Synod in a manner which conveys his disdain. Various courses now open to Bishops are described at some length in a separate message. Politically significant factors here are that Makarios has decided not to be bothered by anything Bishops can throw at him, and that there is, therefore, no chance of their succeeding in forcing his resignation from presidency. In fact, our understanding is that if they continue to press and annoy him, Archbishop considering going on offensive to remove Bishop of Paphos and charge the two others with various infractions of canon law. Archbishop has reportedly received word from Palamas that GOG, while not admitting contact with Bishops, will nevertheless work in appropriate ways to try to have them ease their stand.

   (B) Announcement re formation of new cabinet expected June 15. Apparently Greece has signified its approval of principal appointments.

   (C) Public support for Grivas since his return to Cyprus last fall has never been large and what support he had at first has been steadily eroding as Cypriots, by nature opportunistic, conclude Grivas not likely be a winner in this, his third Cyprus reincarnation. Nevertheless it is assumed Grivas has a hard core of gunmen and some strike by him at any time remains a possibility. We understand Makarios has no specific game plan as regards Grivas. His intention is to wait Grivas out, playing for time in an awareness that Grivas’ support is steadily slipping away.

   (D) Atmosphere in which expanded intercommunal talks getting under way is not good or conducive to fresh thinking. We do not think Makarios is much interested in compromise. To him, resumed talks are a convenient device to paper over his conflict with Greece, distract at-
tention from Bishops and keep him at center stage in a continuing world problem. His posture of ostensibly earnest cooperation in new negotiation process has already won him one handsome dividend, a visit by UNSYG.\(^4\) We doubt Makarios’ postural forthcomingness will prove translatable into accommodations of substance.

Clerides and UN are understandably annoyed at GOT and Denktash for having violated agreed terms of reference for June 8 inaugural meeting by heavy-handed injection of substance. Turks seem to be approaching coming negotiation with hard-nosed stand, emphasizing their insistence on separateness of Turkish-Cypriot administration. In short, present situation is not auspicious.

Left to their own devices, parties would probably do little this summer (Clerides is planning one-month vacation in August) and progress would be negligible. However, UNSYG Special Rep Osorio-Tafall will be anxious to produce movement. Understandings resulting from Bonn meetings of Greek and Turkish FonMins\(^5\) may be helpful. Particularly if Osorio has behind-the-scenes backing of USG he can keep parties’ noses to the grindstone and perhaps achieve progress.

(E) As noted, Grivas is the main short-term threat to stability. GOG intentions remain obscure \(\text{[garble]}\) GOG is seen by many here as ultimately determined to remove Makarios by one means or another. Next rotation of Turkish contingent is expected in August and such rotations invariably add to tensions. However, weight of evidence is that Greece and Turkey presently disposed use their considerable influence for calm. This is very much a plus factor both as regards rotation and possibility of incidents (created by Grivas or otherwise) escalating. Beyond the 3–6 months period specified, a new phenomenon will bear watching. That results from a possible interaction between a resident ChiCom diplomatic mission and hitherto largely dormant left-wingers in Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities who are dissatisfied with conservatism of their elders, e.g. Maoists in AKEL and unemployed Turkish Cypriot university graduates. However, ChiComs will need some time to familiarize themselves and can be expected move cautiously.

2. As indicated para “D,” we believe USG role can be quite important in determining whether enlarged intercommunal talks, for which everyone has worked so hard, succeed or fail. We would hope to see USG influence used discreetly but strongly in direction of a positive outcome.

Crawford

\(^4\) Waldheim visited June 6–8 during a June 6–9 trip to Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey.  
\(^5\) They met May 30–31 during the NATO Ministerial meeting.
DISCUSSION OF CYPRUS PROBLEM

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Popper
Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies
Deputy Assistant Secretary Herz
Mr. Armitage, IO/UNP
Mr. Churchill, NEA/GRK
Mr. Boyatt, NEA/CYP
Mr. Dillon, NEA/TUR
Mr. Stoddard, INR/RNA/NE
Mr. Kimball, IO/UNP
Mr. Silva, NEA/GRK
Mr. Austrian, Embassy Nicosia
Mr. Rotklein, INR/RNA/NE
Mr. Long, NEA/CYP
Miss Vunovic, IO/UNP

Summary
The meeting was set up more to air views than to make policy decisions. The consensus of the meeting was the following:

1. A constitutional settlement is not in sight.
2. A modus vivendi or status quo settlement will probably be more realistic, but first the parties must go through the motions of trying for a constitutional settlement.
3. US influence is limited and should be reserved for the moment, awaiting a moment when the parties would be most receptive.
4. There may be a real argument in favor of reducing UNFICYP now.
5. We should be prepared to live with basically the present situation for a long time.

Discussion
Boyatt: The Greco-Turk dialogue contains dangers, especially since the massive withdrawal of mainland Greek forces in 1967, because Greece can’t deliver on agreements with or promises to Turkey. The dialogue increases Turk expectations and makes the chances of Greece getting reckless more likely. The Bonn Greco-Turk agreement is not acceptable to Makarios. The USG would be better advised to

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Long, approved by Davies on July 3, and distributed to the participants.
encourage a GOC/GOT dialogue, as they are the only real players in the game.

There is a tendency for people to think that all that is needed in the talks is for Makarios to compromise. He has already made some compromises, and while he may be the major obstacle to a settlement, he is by no means the only one. The Turks and Turk Cypriots must also compromise.

I don’t think a constitutional solution is coming, as neither seem prepared to compromise enough. As a result, the USG should not engage its diplomatic capital on such a settlement unless the parties appear very near to agreement and need only a final push. We would be better advised to work for a modus vivendi settlement. I suggest a return to London–Zurich with demilitarization save police forces. This would be a real victory for Turkey in public opinion terms, wouldn’t change the status quo against the Turks, and would give Makarios the plus of wiping out the politico/military borders of the enclaves.

(Note: At this point it was decided to discuss three major topics: (a) The role of Greece, (b) Makarios as obstacle, and (c) when and how to expend US diplomatic capital.)

THE ROLE OF GREECE

Churchill: Beyond the certainty of Papadopoulos desiring better relations with Turkey, everything is very murky.

Davies: Greece has lost its assets in Nicosia, but the threat of a Greco-Turk move to double enosis remains as a threat in Makarios’ mind, thus giving Greece some influence with him. We should also bear in mind that Greece might well receive Western support if it imposes a Cyprus solution.

Popper: The lesson of the latest crisis is that Greece is not a monolith. As a result, Greece might make a move in Cyprus, but I doubt that it would be as a result of a real scenario. In order to really move, Greece and Turkey must first agree on what they want done, and they don’t seem to have so agreed.

Austrian: The military strength of Greece on the Island should not be underestimated.

Boyatt: I agree the National Guard can take all key points, but then what?

Popper: Let’s agree to disagree.

Herz: We should bear in mind that the White House in the event of a Greek move would probably “let nature take its course” without either helping or hindering. We would simply be forced to then take our lumps in the UN, etc.
Popper: I doubt if we could maintain a “hands off” policy as a crisis proceeded, particularly in light of the Moscow meeting atmosphere. The White House might now be more sympathetic toward discouraging a dynamic solution.

Dillon: Since the latest crisis Turkey is fairly discouraged with the Greek ability to deliver. I would have problems with us saying this to Turkey, however. I also agree that Turkey should talk with the GOC, but I don’t know how to achieve this.

Popper: How much initiative on Cyprus can we expect from the Melen Government?

Dillon: None; they are not that interested in Cyprus.

Popper: But they are sending considerable funds to Cyprus, making belligerent statements, etc.

Stoddard: This is reactive.

Boyatt: (Referring to Herz comment above), the assumption behind such a White House attitude is that a dynamic move would go surgically, cleanly. It won’t; instead there will be a long messy period which would elicit some Soviet reaction.

Popper: The longer it takes, the worse it will get.

Herz: Please understand I was not advocating a “hands off” policy.

Boyatt: We should in fact expend capital to avoid the kind of dynamic move that would put us in such a situation.

**MAKARIOS AS OBSTACLE**

Popper: How much do we need Makarios to achieve a settlement? How stable would the GOC be without him? Could the GOC negotiate and agree on a settlement without him?

It is clear to me that Makarios can deliver a settlement, but that the GOC would negotiate more flexibly without him.

Silva: There are two traps here: First, assuming Greece has a single policy and, second, assuming that if Greece moves against Makarios, it will do so militarily. This is nonsense, since Turkey will prevent a Greek military move. It is much more likely that Greece will launch a conspiracy against Makarios (i.e., assassinate him).

Popper: This is always possible.

Boyatt: I don’t think Clerides could hold power; there are too many Cypriot leaders who are not willing to accept him.

Popper: Without Makarios I would expect Cypriot politics to become as individualistic as Greek politics. With him there is stability.

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2 Reference is to the Moscow summit May 22–30.

3 Ferit Melen formed a government on May 22.
U.S. ROLE

Popper: A possible return to London–Zurich would be difficult to achieve because it is a difficult system resting on the idea of a joint government. I see few signs of movement in that direction; rather the movement is toward a stable separation.

Boyatt: The latter means the continuance of two armed camps facing each other.

Popper: How about disarming at the same time?

Boyatt: This could be done, but what does Turkey get from that. London–Zurich, on the other hand, gives the Turks a diplomatic victory. Turkey wants too much; under a return to London–Zurich, they would retain the international guarantees and no longer have to pay the $25 million dole. What they would not retain is the separation of the communities.

Popper: The real problem, however, is the willingness of the Turk Cypriots to give up the separation which they see as their protection.

Dillon: Turkey would like the symbol of London–Zurich, but there are other problems. With the enclaves you do have a certain stability in the sense that with the existence of two armed camps, all must be careful in their dealing with each other. If something happens to the Turk Cypriots when there are no enclaves, there would be more danger of a Turk intervention because Turk public opinion would insist on defense of the then defenseless Turk Cypriots.

Boyatt: Keeping the enclaves raises the risk of an accidental explosion.

Austrian: The Turk Cypriots will not give up the enclaves.

Boyatt: But will Ankara?

Austrian: I believe the Turk Cypriots could sell their point of view in Ankara.

Popper: Denktash says that once trust and confidence is built, you can move forward.

A basic question concerns whether we ought to encourage either a beefed-up local autonomy scheme or a tacit agreement to maintain the status quo.

Davies: At this point perhaps we should discuss Xenia Vunovic’s proposal (attached)\(^4\) which, while maintaining the enclaves and the London-Zurich guarantees, gives the chance to work out problems of co-existence in Nicosia.

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\(^4\) Not attached.
Popper: Cyprus is too small to separate out Nicosia. In addition, Nicosia is too central to the problem.

Vunovic: I chose one city because I felt the Turk Cypriots could not accept a loss of security in villages, many of which are remote. In addition, I felt that bringing the Turk middle class in Nicosia into the economy would be helpful.

Popper: Nicosia is the heart and center of the Turk Cypriot community.

Austrian: I agree. If the Turks were to accept this plan, the whole Cyprus problem would be settled. (Also, most Turk refugees are in Nicosia.)

Popper: What about Limassol?

Stoddard: It would seem odd to do it there.

Herz: An alternative would be to take smaller steps, to creep up to this in stages.

Rotklein: The Turks would object.

Popper: The problem is finding an acceptable trade off.

Herz: In Vienna after the War we had no trouble arranging joint police patrols, and decisions on who should have jurisdiction where. Could we achieve this in Cyprus by getting the GOC to extend economic benefits to the Turks. If this works, we could move onward.

Rotklein: Aren’t we overlooking the forest for the trees? We have a bad atmosphere on Cyprus. If we could alleviate this atmosphere by, for example, getting a declaration from Greece that there will be no enosis . . .

Silva: Greece can’t do it.

Davies: Could they make such a declaration in terms of Hellenism over-riding physical boundaries?

Rotklein: With the Turks declaring against partition.

Silva: It would have to be more positive in nature.

Dillon: Enosis is not the issue; Turk Cypriot fear of a shot in the back is.

Popper: This kind of declaration would have to be a part of a settlement.

Dillon: How far will Makarios go on local autonomy?

Popper: He is in no hurry.

U.S. POLICY

Popper: What and how much of a role should we play? Our suggestions, which we can easily keep making, have no great weight.

Davies: What capabilities do we have in fact?

Popper: Basically, we will be the last step, when all else has failed.
Stoddard: We could draw up a scheme of our own. We shouldn’t be the cushion nor should we work through Greece.

Vunovic: Neither negotiators have any new ideas in mind. What happens if a deadlock now occurs? Either we, the UK, or the UN should do something now.

Popper: It is no problem for us to feed in ideas, to illustrate our continued interest and good will. If there is a deadlock on local autonomy, we should push small steps involving a trade off of economic benefits for the Turk Cypriots and a partial opening up of the enclaves for the GOC; at the same time we should discourage any evidence of a dynamic solution. Finally, we should accept the fact that the situation will continue like this for a long time.

Silva: Isn’t there now a stronger threat of the UN putting pressure on Greece and Turkey?

Armitage: Just continuing as we are is dangerous with UNFICYP contributors getting restless, etc. If the talks deadlock shortly, I am not sure the contributors won’t say enough is enough.

Popper: UNFICYP will probably decrease in size in the future. Since 1967, it has been proven that the communities can regulate their affairs and that 3,000 UN troops aren’t necessary to keep the peace. There’s no reason why we can’t go to a 500–1,000 man observer force without an interpositionary role.

I don’t think decreasing UNFICYP would now be a real source of pressure on the parties to compromise.

Davies: I think we should do a planning exercise on decreasing the force to an observer/dispute-resolving force.

We must continue to support the talks, I see no real change in our action scenario except in the sense of doing some contingency planning.

Vunovic: Will Turkey put up with a continuation of the talks?

Popper: Everyone is afraid of a vacuum. Besides, there is nothing they have to gain from stopping the talks.

Dillon: There would have to be a radical change in the GOT (e.g., a coup by younger officers).
1717. Subject: Arms Delivery to Grivas.

1. **Summary:** Acting Pres Clerides informs us that security situation on island has sharply deteriorated. Grivas has received large clandestine arms import and crystallized his plans to strike against Makarios.

2. Acting Pres Clerides took DCM aside at social event Sep. 15. Said he had kept regular Council of Ministers meeting Sep 14 in session for several hours overtime, partly to brief Ministers on sharp deterioration in security situation on island. Through its penetrations of Grivas’ organization, GOC has learned that large clandestine shipment of arms has arrived and been partially distributed to Grivas groups. Negotiations for this shipment, valued at 180,000 Cypriot pounds (US $468,000) took place with an unidentified party in Lebanon. Shipment was delivered by three caiques to a point on the southeastern coast near Xylophagou River. Arms, believed to be largely but not entirely of Soviet manufacture, are thought to include 500 automatic weapons; heavy machine guns and bazooka-type weapons are believed to have been part of shipment.

3. Clerides stated at least partial distribution of weapons to Grivas supporters is indicated by visit paid to Makarios by small group of Grivas supporters who boasted of their new acquisition. GOC has report that further transaction, to include mines and explosives may be in the mill.

4. According to Clerides GOC intelligence service (CIS) first learned of shipment shortly after arrival through penetrations in Grivas entourage, and immediately informed Makarios and Clerides himself. Knowing that Greek services (KYP) are equally able to monitor Grivas activities, it was decided to keep this affair closely guarded secret and wait to see if KYP would inform GOC of its own accord. In fact, this occurred quite promptly but, in Clerides’ view, it is not conclusive one way or the other. Clerides recalled that Greece informed Archbishop of Grivas absence from Athens very promptly after his disappearance from home last fall. At the time Clerides noted, Greek services, to his positive personal knowledge, had known for approximately two months of Grivas’ plans to return to Cyprus.

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5. Question in his mind, Clerides told DCM, was whether arms importation had been supported covertly by Greece as a signal that Makarios had better agree to a solution developed in intercommunal talks, or else. If GOG in some way involved and this was its intention, Clerides thought a serious error in calculation was being made. Clerides proceeded to explain why.

6. GOC, Clerides said, now has evidence that Grivas has crystallized his plans for action against Makarios. These are that he will strike to unseat Govt by force if Makarios should, between now and scheduled presidential election in Feb 1973, accept a solution ruling out enosis “as any viable solution must.” If a solution has not been reached by Feb and Makarios holds the election and declares his candidacy, Grivas will strike then.

7. This plan, Clerides commented, runs directly counter to GOG’s interest in a solution premised on an independent Cyprus and evolved between now and the end of the year in expanded intercommunal talks. If negotiators agree on a package proposal (Clerides discussion on this point is included in septel)\(^2\) and Makarios decides to resist, he and Grivas will become natural allies.

8. Clerides stated that, ideally, Greece should cease to think of Grivas as potential leverage on Makarios, if it does, and use its influence to get him out of Cyprus before a solution is worked out in the talks. Clerides said he had made this point to GOG representatives.

9. Rermarking on other aspects of Grivas’ organization and financing, Clerides said GOC believes Grivas thinks he can count on loyalty of 500 to 600 men. Actual number who would stand up and fight, however, is in GOC’s opinion considerably less than that. Grivas’ forces are by no means homogeneous. They include some committed enosist fanatics, a hard core of personal followers, a large number of Makarios penetrations, and a body of followers of the late Interior Minister Georkadjis. Many of last named retain allegiance to Unified Party (Clerides’ own) and would not commit themselves in an effort to upset Govt by force without party approval. (This, Clerides implied but did not explicitly state, would not be forthcoming.)

10. On financing, Clerides stated that Grivas has received 50,000 Cypriot pounds (US $130,000) from the Bishop of Kyrenia, 10,000 pounds (US $26,000) from Bishop of Kitium, and a very large personal contribution from a mainland Greek shipping magnate.

11. As an example of the thoroughness of Makarios’ penetration of Grivas’ organization (belied, we would note, by failure to obtain

\(^2\) Not further identified.
advance information on arms shipment) Clerides cited recent instruction given by Grivas to a subordinate to prepare report on means of bugging telephones of Pres and other senior Govt officials in such a way as to both eavesdrop on conversations and permit disruption of telephone services at such time as Grivas chose to attack. This request was in hands of Makarios and Clerides in less than 24 hours. Govt has been able to establish identity of individual concerned and has him under surveillance.

12. Comment: We are inclined to credit Clerides’ report of clandestine arms shipment to Grivas although he has tendency to exaggerate somewhat. We will be seeking confirmation through other channels.

Popper

418. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State

Nicosia, December 1, 1972, 1530Z.

2181. Subject: General Grivas. Ref: Rome 7306, rptd as State 217750.2

1. Following comment from Cyprus vantage point on King Constantine’s remarks re Gen. Grivas may be helpful in assessing info contained refel.

2. We believe Grivas is as well prepared as he is ever likely to be. While his political front is shrill, poorly organized and unimpressive, his clandestine military force of some hundreds of armed conspirators is now trained, equipped and deployed for action on short notice. At least that is what high Govt officials tell us in their more nervous moments, and other evidence corroborates it.

3. We estimate Grivas forces could carry out isolated acts of violence such as attempts on lives of Govt leaders, seizure of police stations, telecommunications, utilities, and airport; but critical factor for success of any coup would be posture of mainland Greek-officered National Guard and of large Cyprus police force. This remains something

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Confidential; Nodis.

2 Dated November 30, it reported that King Constantine had stated that he had information that Grivas was “fully financed, fully armed, and ready” to move against Makarios. (Ibid.)
of an enigma, but we tend to believe reports that as long as intercommunal talks are proceeding with prospects of success, Greek Govt and National Guard will keep Grivas under control.

4. Contrary to what King said, Makarios and Grivas have had only one meeting, on March 26, as far as we know. It produced no agreement.

5. King apparently saw FonOff DepDirGen Pelaghias while in London. If Pelaghias said Cyprus Govt could not move against Grivas because of his “foreign” (evidently Greek) support, he was taking a line in sharp contrast with Makarios. Latter tells us he could move effectively against Grivas if he wished, but states he is holding his hand in order not to provoke Grivas into military response which could upset tranquility, divide Greek Cypriot community, destroy prospect of intercommunal agreement, and perhaps ultimately result in partition of island.

6. Very difficult to estimate when Grivas might make his move. On the one hand, he cannot sit still indefinitely. On other, he does not presently seem to have clear Greek Govt support which would be essential for his purposes. His publicity organs have come out against holding presidential election scheduled for next February, on ground this would confirm Makarios—whom they regard as traitor to Hellenism—in office for five more years. Yet they are unable to present a candidate who would make an impressive showing against Makarios. In this context, we can see King’s point that Grivas might feel compelled to strike against Makarios before elections take place. Should he do so, we think it would be a desperate operation, with Greek Govt reaction through National Guard and Cyprus police the crucial factor.

7. From our info we are unable to judge extent to which Constantine or Monarchist elements are involved in Grivas’ movement.

8. Dept may wish pass this cable to Athens and Rome. 

Popper

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*In telegram 6975 from Athens, December 6, the Embassy stated that a Greek Government decision on support for Grivas would depend on circumstances at the time he made a move against Makarios. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)*
Turkey

419. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Steps to Emphasize U.S. Interest in, and Friendship for, Turkey

At your request, we have reviewed a variety of suggestions and possibilities for emphasizing U.S. interest in, and friendship for, Turkey. While there are certain specific actions which I cite below, we will rely principally on patient and traditional diplomatic means in seeking to improve our relations with Turkey, including continued considerate and responsive attitudes toward Turkish interests, intensified efforts to solicit the Turks’ views, and to engage their energies in as many common endeavors as possible.

More specifically, however, I submit the following thoughts:

1. The Turkish Ambassador has requested an agreement in principle to a visit by Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel to the United States in late November or early December of this year. You will soon be receiving recommendations for visits of various Chiefs of States; I will include a recommendation that you approve such a visit at a time mutually convenient to both governments. An early indication to the Turks of agreement in principle to such a visit is desirable.

2. The uncertainty concerning the U.S. Ambassadorship in Ankara, resulting from the withdrawal of Mr. Komer’s nomination to the Senate, should be resolved as soon as possible. I will be submitting recommendations to you at an early date.

3. We are working with the Defense Department to get from the Turks a decision to take over Cigli Air Base so that Defense can release as quickly as possible $2.8 million to remove U.S. military headquarters facilities from the center of Ankara to the outskirts. The latter move is desired by both the Turks and ourselves and is designed primarily to reduce the visibility of the large U.S. presence in the capital.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL TUR–US. Confidential. Drafted by Cash and cleared by Rockwell and Sisco.

2 Komer, a non-career official, was serving on a recess appointment made by President Johnson on October 28, 1968; he presented his credentials on January 3, 1969.

1036
4. The Turks were greatly moved by the flight of Apollo 8, and I am planning to include Turkey if there is another astronaut goodwill trip abroad.

5. The Turks are quite sensitive to Armenian efforts to keep alive the memory of the Armenian massacres in Turkey after the First World War. They have asked us to do what we can to convince the Congress not to pass the pending resolution to make April 24 “Armenian Martyrs Day.” We will do our best in this regard.

6. The levels of military and economic assistance have a very direct and strong impact on our relations with Turkey. This will be a most important aspect of our current review of the over-all assistance programs.

7. I am seeing the Turkish Ambassador at his request this Thursday and will at that time personally stress our friendship and interest.

WPR

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3 The resolution was not passed.

4 February 13; a memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 632, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. I through May 70.

420. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 1, 1969, 4:40–5:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

Turkish Prime Minister Calls on President

PARTICIPANTS

Turkish:
His Excellency Suleyman Demirel, Prime Minister
His Excellency Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Foreign Minister
His Excellency Melih Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador

United States:
The President
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Frank E. Cash, Jr., Country Director, Turkish Affairs

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 632, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. I through May 70. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Cash on April 2. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.
The President began by saying we were most honored that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister had come for the funeral; General Eisenhower had had a warm spot in his heart for Turkey.2

The Prime Minister said the Turks had felt it their duty to pay their respects to a great man, who had served the entire free world. They were grateful the President had had time for this meeting, which was a good occasion for an exchange of views.

The President said a lot had happened, and the world had changed. One thing he wished the Turks to be aware of was that the US and Turkey were good friends, and his philosophy was not to take friends for granted. He knew the Turks had been required to face great risks with great courage and hoped the US could reciprocate. If the Turkish Government should ever feel that its relations with the US were not what they should be, the President hoped matters would be discussed at the ambassadorial level or at the top level.

The Prime Minister commented that as a matter of fact very good relations are maintained by the respective governments and people; he saw no reason why this should not continue, as he felt it to be beneficial to both countries. New conditions are being created all over the world, and new generations which have not known the sufferings of war want a better life. Today most countries desire peace wherever freedom of press, elections, and a multi-party system exist. One fact, however, should not be missed; international communism has not changed its objective, but merely its tactics.

These new tactics, the President commented, are more difficult to deal with than the old.

The Communists, the Prime Minister continued, now prefer to create problems inside developing countries taking advantage of the democratic system, itself, in order to undermine it. If a government tries to curb these efforts, there is a loud outcry. In such a situation, all democratic countries should stick together; things are not less difficult today than they were twenty years ago. For example, there is China, about which we know very little.

The President agreed saying it would be better if we knew more. Countries should cooperate in informing the public better. What, he asked, should we be doing about all this?

Development, Demirel responded emphatically, is the only way out. If this is successful, things will be fine; if not, we have problems. Turkey is a good example. The Turks will succeed and are grateful for what the US has done to help.

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2 Former President Eisenhower died March 28.
The President responded that the Turks had done a lot to help themselves.

Demirel said that in six or seven years Turkey hoped to be a contributing country.

The President asked whether there was time; young people today are very impatient.

There is no alternative, Demirel responded.

The President said he thought the Prime Minister’s analysis was very perceptive. The world has indeed changed in the last twenty years, and Soviet tactics—but not objectives—have changed. However, Soviet needs have also changed. They now need friends in the West since they must watch both West and East. What would be the effect, the President asked, of possible US–USSR talks? As that kind of détente develops—if it does develop—is this going to weaken other countries’ desire to remain strong?

The Prime Minister said he felt talks were fine but should be conducted carefully so as to avoid the possible danger the President had indicated, in order that other countries not lose confidence in the Alliance.

The President said he wanted to emphasize that the US is keenly aware of its responsibilities to have the fullest discussion with its friends in order to get their advice and suggestions, not just to inform them. US decisions vis-à-vis the Soviets will have an enormous effect in the US, but also on other countries counting on the US. Therefore, we think we have responsibilities going beyond just the US and the USSR, and we wish to have the closest of relations with the Turkish Government as we proceed.

The Prime Minister said his Government felt that all countries which believe in freedom should not create problems for their allies. Sometimes, however, this cannot be helped. During the last couple of years the Turks have developed better relations with the Soviets, but this has nothing to do with Turkish commitments to friends and allies. These will continue in the future.

The President said he thought Turkish interests were the same as US interests. The Soviet Union is Turkey’s neighbor. There may be difficulties, but they can be discussed. The President said he had always believed in frank talks with the Soviets making clear that each had a different view of the world. Each had a right to such views, but both must try to reduce the risk of conflict over their differences. This, in the President’s view, was what the Turks were doing.

The President mentioned that Iran was acting similarly.

The Prime Minister commented that Iran and Turkey have good relations and are both members of CENTO, but the latter organization is not as strong as it once was.
In response to the President’s request for advice on the Middle East, the Prime Minister said the President was, of course, aware of the situation in the Mediterranean and the Soviet presence. Syria is becoming worse and worse. Turkey is trying to keep Iraq from developing in this direction. Middle East crises should not become international crises; they should be settled locally. Both sides, including the Arabs, should be listened to and understood. Israel should withdraw from the occupied territories. It is difficult for one Arab nation to begin talks alone. Pressure must be put on both sides.

While the UN can serve as the locus of a settlement, it cannot settle the problem.

In response to the President’s question about the situation in Egypt, the Prime Minister commented that the UAR is wholly dependent on the Soviets.

The meeting concluded at 5:10 P.M. with the Prime Minister saying that Turkey and the US are good friends and allies, and the President saying we hope to keep it that way.

421. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 9, 1969, 5:35–6:45 p.m.

SUBJECT
Call of Turkish Minister of Defense Ahmet Topaloglu on Secretary Laird

PARTICIPANTS

Turkey Side
Minister of Defense—Ahmet Topaloglu
Assistant Secretary General for International Security Affairs—Sukru Elekdag (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Assistant Director General, NATO Department—Muammer Akcer (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

United States Side
Secretary of Defense—Melvin Laird
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—G. Warren Nutter
Director, Near East and South Asia Region (ISA)—Brigadier General John W. Baer
Country Director for Turkey, NESA Region (ISA)—Captain Edward C. Krebs

The conversation opened with an exchange of pleasantries during which the MOD and the Secretary noted their common background as politicians. Secretary Laird remarked that as early as 1954 he had visited Adana and had had the opportunity to travel through the political district from which Minister Topaloglu was elected that year. The Minister said that he hoped the Secretary would have another opportunity to visit Turkey.

Minister Topaloglu then changed the subject to military assistance. Noting that the US, over a period of 20 years, had given Turkey military aid in the amount of 2.5 billion dollars, he wished on behalf of his countrymen to thank the US for this assistance. He also wished, however, to explain the current situation in view of Turkey’s importance on the southeastern flank of NATO. Secretary Laird replied that he had great respect for the Turkish armed forces. He had watched them train and knew they were good. He had also inspected some of their port and military facilities and knew how important they were.

The Minister said he appreciated the Secretary’s awareness, and believed that what was needed at present was an examination of the extent the Turkish armed forces had been improved by US aid and what more needed to be done to improve them in the face of the current threat—a threat that was not Turkey’s alone but of all the allies. He went on to say that the aid which had been given through 1966 had averaged $144 million a year and had been given to the armed forces in general. Since 1966, however, US military assistance had been based on a five year program and fixed force goals for the Turkish armed forces. To achieve this program, a decision taken in the US Senate set the aid level at $134 million a year. This was determined to be the minimum level to achieve the NATO Bravo force goals established at that time.

The Minister then said that since these decisions had been taken some important changes have taken place: 1) the situation in the Middle East has become worse; 2) the USSR naval forces in the Mediterranean have become a threat; and 3) the hope of NATO that we could reach a détente with Russia has been dashed with the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Subsequently, when NATO met last fall, it was decided that member countries should do more to meet the new situation. In the NATO meeting of last January it was agreed that NATO members who could not meet their goals and who were receiving assistance should get more aid. In spite of this, US military assistance to Turkey dropped to about $95–97 million, while costs of equipment rose very sharply.

Minister Topaloglu next pointed out that, while Turkey understood the US situation with respect to Vietnam, the US balance of payments problem, and US efforts to protect her allies over the past 20 years, the US had taken on herself the leadership to protect the West and western
ideals. She must, therefore, understand the position and difficulties of her allies. He went on to say that when he attended his first NATO meeting in 1966 he was surprised to hear that most Ministers of Defense spoke more like Finance Ministers than Defense Ministers. Their talk was always of curtailing expenditures. Now, while Turkey does not expect the US to impose more taxes to defend NATO and Europe, there remains the common problem of protecting the peace. Turkey intends to cooperate with the US towards this aim.

The Minister next focused on the situation on the southeastern flank of NATO. He pointed out that Turkey has fought more wars with Russia and knows Russia better than other NATO countries. He likened Turkey to a “rock” which prevents Russian encroachment into the Middle East and Africa. Whether Turkey receives aid or not, it intends to preserve itself as a “rock,” as it has done for centuries. Since the US has taken steps to prevent the expansion of communism into SE Asia, it is aware that the next area for communist expansion is the Middle East and Africa. Turkey is sure the US is going to prevent this, but if Turkey does not receive external assistance now it will be too late later on for Turkey to assist in this task. The MOD then said he had some constructive suggestions to make in this respect:

1. During the visit of the late Mr. McNaughton, the US and Turkey had agreed that a proper level of military assistance should be about $134 million a year. We do not want more but only that which we had agreed upon. This level should be resumed.
2. Bring down the price of military equipment. This would not involve the Senate but lies within the power of the Administration.

Minister Topaloglu next presented a memorandum which he explained set forth the condition of the Turkish armed forces following curtailment of military assistance and some suggestions for improving this condition. He highlighted these suggestions by stressing the need for Fletcher class destroyers and Guppy II–A submarines, accelerated supply of F–100 A/C to replace obsolescent F–84s, and faster delivery of heavy vehicles and equipment for the ground forces. Referring to the policy of flexible response, the MOD spoke of the Bulgarian and Russian capability to attack without warning as underscoring the need to improve and make ready the Turkish armed forces.

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2 Force goals for the Turkish armed forces were agreed upon between the United States and Turkey. According to an undated memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations: “The goals were originally proposed by Assistant Secretary McNaughton to the Greek and Turkish MODs in February 1966. This policy was not announced to NATO but was treated as a bilateral matter between the US … and Turkey.” (Ibid., FRC 330 75–0125, Turkey 000.1–333, 1971) Documentation on the McNaughton goals is ibid., FRC 330 75–0009, Turkey—McNaughton)
In concluding his remarks, the Defense Minister said that while he is convinced the US will never leave Turkey alone and defenseless, he felt it was his duty to inform Secretary Laird of the weaknesses of the Turkish armed forces. He then noted that the US had the means to implement the program agreed upon over two years ago, and if implemented it would eliminate many hardships.

Secretary Laird thanked the Minister for his frank remarks on the Turkish armed forces. He said that the new administration was reviewing the worldwide military situation and that this review encompassed not only our own forces but our military assistance programs as well. He added that our commitment in Vietnam certainly gave us problems. Nevertheless, President Nixon, by his trip to Europe, has shown that he is interested in improving and strengthening the NATO alliance. Secretary Laird went on to say that we realize how important it is to maintain our force levels in Europe, and President Nixon has made it plain that these will depend on security requirements rather than financial hardships.

Making reference to the memorandum the MOD had submitted, Secretary Laird said he was interested in the remarks the Minister had made concerning the Navy and Air Force and that we would look into them. He continued by saying we have not finalized our military assistance programs and we recognize your needs as important not only to Turkey but to NATO as a whole. Secretary Laird completed his remarks by saying that Congressmen often asked whether US aid did not permit the recipient to do less. In the case of Turkey he knew this was not the case.

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422. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, May 7, 1969, 1546Z.

3068. For President and Secretary from Komer.

1. On leaving Turkey after an active five-month tour, I wish to report on what I regard as the quite unsatisfactory state of our relations with a key ally, and offer my final recommendations for repairing them.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 632, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. I through May 70. Secret; Limdis.
2. Few would deny that Turkey is very important to us. Moreover, a review of the record shows that my predecessors and I have repeatedly warned of the gradual erosion of our position here and the growth of anti-American sentiment. See for example my 1116 of 19 Feb 1969. But somehow, amid the press of other business, the US has been slow to react with policies and programs commensurate to the need.

3. The problem here is not just one of US-Turk relations, but of Turkey’s whole westward orientation, which in turn plays a key role in the stability of its democratic regime. For unless Turkey gradually joins Europe, it will probably not be able to solve its deep-rooted economic and social problems within a democratic frame. Since the 1960 revolution successive Turkish Governments and Turkey’s politically articulate minority have been reappraising Turkey’s role in the world and its alliances, in which the US plays by far the largest part. The main conclusions they appear to have reached are that (a) Turkey’s interests require substantial improvement of relations with the Soviet and Arab blocs; (b) sharp cuts in US military and economic aid represent loss of US interest in Turkey; (c) the present size and scope of US activity may harm rather than contribute to Turkey’s security, and (d) the US cannot be relied on to support an acceptable resolution of the Cyprus issue or even to come to Turkey’s aid in event of war.

4. Despite all these reservations, most Turks still believe that Turkey has no realistic alternative but to rely on the NATO umbrella to protect it against unpredictable Soviet pressures. But the fact that most Turks, and above all the GOT itself, are still pro-US and pro-NATO should not blind us to the forces at work beneath the surface. Though still quantitatively small, they are qualitatively more significant among the press, students, and the educated elite.

5. Turkey’s growing reservations about the West have combined with the democratic freedoms established under the 1961 constitution to stimulate a revival of Turk xenophobia. This has provided the far left with a highly favorable environment for attacking not only the American presence but also all Turkish institutions, including the present regime, whose policies support a continuing close alignment with the West. Even the EEC is now under attack. Growing reservations among the Turkish public, and even many soldiers and officials, about the efficacy and value of this alignment have placed both us and the Turks who support us increasingly on the defensive. Particularly worrisome is the likely leftward swing in the chief opposition party after Inonu.

6. To counter this trend and preserve our fundamental interests, I see two major lines of action as required. The first is actively to counter
the extremist anti-Western campaign through a comprehensive program to expose its distorted propaganda, set the record straight on our own activities, propagandize the continuing advantages to Turkey of its cultural, economic, and mutual security associations with the US and the West, and finally to remind the Turkish public constantly but subtly of the risks of drifting into neutralism. In short, we must deny to the Turkish left its enormous advantage in holding the initiative in the propaganda battle. Many will say that this is the GOT’s job, not ours. But unless we show the way their own efforts will remain half-hearted and, if past experience is any guide, largely ineffective.

7. I believe that we have made significant progress in this area during the five months I have been in Turkey. A purposeful Mission effort to refute lies, correct distortions, and describe the truth about the American presence has made the far left’s propagandists aware that they can no longer peddle their wares with impunity. The Turkish press now presents at least a somewhat more balanced picture than it did five months ago, and the irresponsibility of the extreme left publicists has been made more apparent. For example, the public now accepts about 20,000 as the number of Americans in Turkey, whereas a few months ago auditors were citing figures of 36,000 and 48,000. Contributing to an improved US image have been our readiness to reconsider 6th Fleet visits before the October elections and to reduce the highly visible US military presence especially in urban areas. But a great deal more can and must be done. I urgently recommend that our information and political action efforts be sharply stepped up.

8. Second, we must readjust our policies and programs to the changes in Turkish attitudes. By concentrating on preserving those elements of our relationship which are essential to our [garble] and modifying all other elements to meet the insistent Turkish demand for a sense of greater independence, we can save money to boot. Highest priority should go to restoring Turkey’s faith in the US as its chief ally. To achieve this in the current environment of growing scepticism about American purposes requires, in my judgment, three major policy adjustments:

A. Prompt conclusion of a revised bilateral agreement sufficiently favorable to Turkey to credibly symbolize a new relationship. This matter has become urgent, and if we fail to complete the job before the Turk Parliament adjourns in three weeks, we will have lost a major political opportunity.

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3 Apparent reference to the U.S.-Turkish Bilateral Cooperation Agreement, signed March 5, 1959. (10 UST 320)
B. Restoration of military aid to something more like the McNaughton level of $134 million. However understandable, past sharp cuts have seriously weakened Turkey’s military posture and had a sharply adverse psychological impact.

C. Reduction of our own military presence to the minimum required by our strategic interests. Over the past few years we have closed down three [less than 1 line not declassified] facilities and plan to eliminate two more. We expect to vacate one of our two air bases. Reductions have been made, and others planned, in our military support facilities, but these are occurring too slowly and without adequate prior consultation with the GOT. I am convinced that most of our military functions here could—with American guidance, training and technical support—be gradually assumed by Turks. At a minimum let us aim toward eliminating US-exclusive installations and paring down the ubiquitous support structure which is primarily responsible for our “visibility” problem. Next to restoring military aid levels, nothing would help more than to urge that Turkey gradually assume the military [less than 1 line not declassified] missions which we now carry out ourselves. Even for those limited operations which for security or technical reasons must remain under US control, we should accept (as we have in other countries) “cover” arrangements provided by the host government. Not only are the advantages to our balance of payments and image in Turkey obvious, but we will end up sooner or later having to do this anyway. Why not gain from doing it faster now?

9. Finally, the Cyprus issue remains a major contribution to the deterioration of US-Turkish relations and could again seriously damage our position here. More than likely, at some time in the next year or two the US will again have to decide whether or not to throw its power and prestige into the scales of a solution. In approaching such a decision we must recognize that failure to intervene, or intervention that appears to Turkey to be in favor of the Greeks, could seriously risk losing Turkey as an ally. It may be parochial to say so, but I fear that we have based our Cyprus policy more on the concept of Greek majority rule than on our strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

10. I have addressed this final dispatch to you, Mr. President and Mr. Secretary, because I have learned from over ten years of high policy experience that one of the great flaws of our system is the failure to flush up emerging major problems to the top level until they have reached the flash point. Turkey is as yet far from that point, but the trend is sufficiently adverse that more aggressive skillful preventive

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4 See footnote 2, Document 421.
medicine is needed now. If we play our cards right, we can retain an
effective ally. If not, I predict a continued erosion of Turkey’s westward
orientation. I would not be surprised to see a neutralist Turkey within
five-seven years.

Komer

423. Intelligence Information Cable¹


COUNTRY

Turkey

DOI

16–18 May 1969

SUBJECT

Turkish Military Plans To Assume Control of Government

ACQ

[1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[4 lines not declassified]

1. Following several days of meetings with various political fig-
ures and deliberation within the Turkish General Staff (TGS), the mil-
itary establishment reached a final decision on the night of 16 May con-
cerning the proposed legislation which would restore political rights
of Celal Bayar and other discredited politicians and amend the constit-
itution.² This decision is to assume control of the Government of Turkey
if, the Senate passes the legislation at its scheduled meeting on 20 May.
President Sunay his been consulted and is a party to this action.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 632,
Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. I through May 70. Secret; Priority; No Foreign
Dissem. Prepared in the CIA and sent to members of the Intelligence Community.
² The 1961 constitution banned Beyer and a number of other politicians associated
with the suppressed Democratic Party. Legislation to amend the constitution and per-
mit them full citizenship rights had support in both of Turkey’s major parties. The Em-
bassy analyzed political alignments within the Turkish Parliament in telegram 3619 from
Ankara, May 19. (Ibid., Box 1244, Saunders Subject Files, Turkey 1969)
2. The TGS, under the signature of General Tagmac, has notified all army, corps and division commanders by secret order of the military’s intention. Appropriate air force and naval commands also have been notified. The military would act on the night of 20/21 May, notifying the nation by Turkish Radio probably during a regular newscast, of the military’s action.

3. In the meantime, the military has let all political leaders, including Prime Minister Demirel, know that it intends to take this action and has been especially active in working on the Senate and individual Senators. TGS already has been given assurances by Republican People’s Party (RPP) Senator Hifzi Oguz Bekata and RPP Deputy Kenal Satir that the RPP will vote against the bill in the Senate thus denying the 2/3 vote necessary. The military has a number of intelligence officers in civilian clothing hounding Senators of all political persuasions and is predicting that it will be very difficult to raise a quorum in the Senate in the near future. The military believes that the Senate will effectively kill the action and that they will not have to act. If, by chance, the law passes despite everything, the military will act—their warning and preparations are not merely bluff.

4. (less than 1 line not declassified) Comment: There is no doubt that the military is greatly agitated by the present situation. Their wrath is directed primarily at RPP President General Ismet Inonu, and amazingly Prime Minister Demirel has not been greatly abused in the proceedings. A military take-over probably would entail only dissolving Parliament, but leaving Sunay in office and permitting Demirel and the cabinet to remain as caretakers until elections can be held. There is no apparent intention to make military control a long-term thing, although any ensuing election campaign probably would be more curtailed and more “dignified.” The military only wants to put across the message that “its” constitution cannot be tampered with.

5. (less than 1 line not declassified) Comment: President Sunay delivered his 19 May holiday message on Turkish Radio and released it in time for publication in morning papers. In his message he noted that “there is no scope for change in the constitution.” There has been some rumor Sunay might use his authority to dissolve Parliament and order elections within 60 days in order to circumvent Senate vote.

6. [2½ lines not declassified]
424. National Security Study Memorandum 75\(^1\)


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator of the Agency for International Development
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget

SUBJECT
Program Analysis of Turkey

The President has directed that a program analysis of Turkey be undertaken in accordance with the procedures described in NSDM 4.\(^2\)

The study will:

1. Analyze U.S. programs in Turkey and evaluate their contribution to the achievement of U.S. policy objectives.
2. Prepare a statement of the key policy and program alternatives with their rationales for consideration by the National Security Council.

The study should analyze U.S. policies and programs in Turkey including:

1. Military assistance and the development of Turkish armed forces.
2. Economic assistance and Turkey’s social and economic development.
3. Requirements for U.S. personnel and bases in Turkey and their effect on U.S./Turkish relations.
4. U.S. military forces required to support Turkey and the Southern flank of NATO.
5. U.S. [less than 1 line not declassified] related to Turkey.
6. The programs of the U.S. Information Agency and the Department of Agriculture.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–218, NSM 75. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

\(^2\) NSDM 4, “Program Analysis Studies,” called for program analysis of various countries and regions to be performed by ad hoc interagency groups. The NSDM was originally issued on January 20 and was revised on September 4. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Documents 13 and 71.
The study will be performed by an Ad Hoc Group chaired by the Department of State. The members of the group will be designated by the addressee agencies.\(^3\)

The Department of State will provide administrative support for the Ad Hoc Group.

The study should be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by December 1, 1969. Subsequently, the study will be referred to the NSC IG/NESA for comment prior to consideration by the Review Group.\(^4\)

Henry A. Kissinger

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\(^3\) In a September 30 memorandum to Kissinger, Laird objected to the original sentence that read: “Members of the group will be chosen from the addressee agencies by the Chairman.” Laird preferred to retain the option to chose his designate to the ad hoc group. The sentence was changed on October 11 to accommodate Laird. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–218, NSSM 75)

\(^4\) The study was prepared but was not reviewed by the Review Group and no action was taken on it. (Ibid., Box H–162, NSSM 75)

425. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Narcotic Imports from Turkey

Pursuant to discussion at our meeting of December 4\(^2\) on narcotics, I have now thoroughly discussed the Turkish situation with Ambassador Handley, and there is enclosed a proposed plan of action\(^3\) prepared by Mr. Harry Schwartz, Chairman of the Working Group.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1244, Saunders Subject Files, Turkey 1969. Secret. A copy was sent to all members of the Narcotics Task Force.

\(^2\) No record of the meeting was found.

\(^3\) Attached but not printed.
Briefly, I suggest that on his return to Turkey Ambassador Handley make a renewed effort to obtain Demirel’s agreement to plow under the present crop. To strengthen his hand on this, we have worked out with AID authority for Handley to make a firm offer of a $5 million grant-financed commodity import program to help the Turkish Government pay for plowing under the crop. Ambassador Handley’s hand will, of course, be greatly strengthened by his ability to say that the President has personally discussed this matter with him. Additionally, in view of our inability to work out a Washington visit for Demirel until the middle of next year, it would be a dramatic and most forceful back-up to our efforts in Ankara, if the President were to call in the Turkish Ambassador here directly to express to him the President’s concern over the situation.

If the foregoing course of action is not successful, we should seek to have the Turkish Government agree that all opium poppy crops after the 1970 crops are illegal and have legal purchases by U.S. pharmaceutical firms from the 1970 crops increased to a level sufficient to siphon the entire Turkish crop into legal channels. It is understood from BNDD that our pharmaceutical firms would be willing to do this and that it would not involve any outlay of U.S. Government funds. There is, of course, no guarantee that some Turkish opium would nevertheless find its way into illicit channels; but it is estimated that the amount should be about one-fourth of the previous level.

If neither of the foregoing courses of action are successful, we shall then need to reconsider the whole situation.

In the meantime, we have, through the French Embassy here, requested that the French Government support all efforts that we are making with the Government of Turkey.

Jack Ingersoll, who is in Paris, has not seen the attached. You may wish to get his reaction when he returns on December 15.

UAJ
426. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Opium Production in Turkey

Ambassador Handley’s visit with you on December 22 will undoubtedly assist him in his efforts to convince the Turkish Government to destroy the 1970 poppy crop prior to harvest in the spring. If this effort is not successful, as may be likely, our fallback position is to arrange for an increased legal purchase of the 1970 crop and thereby reduce by 75% the amount of opium finding its way into the illegal traffic. This pre-emptive purchase scheme would be coupled with an effort to get the Turkish Government to make poppy planting illegal following the 1970 crop.

Under Secretary Johnson has recommended that you call in the Turkish Ambassador directly to express your concern over the harmful effects of the Turkish opium production. He suggests that this would be dramatic and forceful support to our other efforts.

While such an action would add a dramatic touch, it seems to me that it might engage your prestige too much, particularly since there is little likelihood of the Turks agreeing to destroy the present crop. It might be better for you to consider calling in the Turkish Ambassador after we have received the Prime Minister’s response to Ambassador Handley’s next approach. At that time the impact of receiving the Turkish Ambassador would increase the chances of the Turks accepting our fallback position.

Recommendations

1) That you approve the game plan described in the first paragraph.
2) That you call in the Turkish Ambassador after we have received the Prime Minister’s response. 

Approve
Disapprove
Prefer to see the Turkish Ambassador now

4 The President circled “after” and checked the approval option.
5 On January 7, 1970, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Johnson stating that the President agreed with Johnson’s suggestion that Handley “make a renewed effort to obtain the Prime Minister’s agreement to destroy the present crop” and offer $5 million assistance to help the Turkish Government plow under the crop. If that was not successful, Kissinger agreed that “we seek to increase legal purchases of the 1970 crop coupled with an agreement by the Turkish Government to stop poppy production after the 1970 crop.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1244, Saunders Subject Files, Turkey 1969)

427. Memorandum From Egil Krogh, Jr. to Frank Cash


SUBJECT
Memorandum of Conversation Between President Nixon and Ambassador Handley with Dr. Daniel P. Moynihan and Egil Krogh

The President indicated his support for maintaining close, friendly relations with the Government of Turkey. The President and Ambassador Handley both emphasized the “gutsy” nature of the Turks’ support in the Middle East.

Ambassador Handley reported that in his judgment, the Turkish Government have “pulled up their socks” in an effort to cooperate with the President’s deep concern about the drug problem. Handley mentioned to the President that this visit would help him considerably when he goes back to discuss the question with Prime Minister Demirel.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1244, Saunders Subject Files, Turkey 1969. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Erlichman, Patrick Moynihan, and Arthur Downey of the White House staff and Harry Schwartz (S/NM).
2 Not attached.
3 The astronauts visited Turkey October 20–21.
The President advised Ambassador Handley to tell Prime Minister Demirel that he is looking forward to a visit with the Prime Minister next year. The President indicated that the date would be somewhere between June and October of next year, but that he is not certain about what dates are available. Ambassador Handley stated that he felt Turkey would welcome a visit by the President if he could make it.

The President gave a clipping from The New York Times dated December 22, 1969 to Ambassador Handley for transmittal to Prime Minister Demirel from the President. A copy of this clipping is attached.²

Ambassador Handley reported in response to the President’s question that the Astronauts were extremely well-received in Turkey.³ Handley mentioned some of the minor problems with Sixth Fleet visits in Turkey, but this was low-keyed.

Egil Krogh, Jr.⁴

Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs

4² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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428. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 29.2–70


TURKEY OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS

Note

This estimate assesses likely developments in respect of Turkey through the mid-1970s, with particular attention to Turkey’s international relationships.

Conclusions

A. [2½ lines not declassified] The government will be concerned primarily with trying to improve living conditions and also with tackling

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R1012A, NIEs and SNIEs. Secret. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted it with the concurrence of all members of the USIB, except the representatives of FBI and AEC who abstained on the grounds it was outside their jurisdiction.
fundamental economic problems. Turkey’s economy is basically sound, but Turkey will continue to have a substantial trade deficit and, for several years at least, will need more foreign aid than it appears likely to get, if it is to maintain recent growth rates. [2½ lines not declassified] Direct military intervention in political affairs is, however, unlikely.

B. Turkey retains its historic suspicion of Russian designs against the Straits and rates highly its continued membership in NATO. At the same time, the Turks, like other NATO members, want more independence in foreign policy and will move toward better relations with Moscow. Nonetheless, Turkish-Soviet relations will be far short of warmth, and the Turks will take care to restrict Soviet presence and influence in Turkey.

C. Turkey will remain a useful ally of the US for the period of this estimate and probably for much longer, but it will have at least some ideas which are not in harmony with US views. The Turks want US forces to stay in Turkey but are concerned about the visibility of these forces. US-Turkish relations will depend in considerable part on questions of US economic and especially military aid, discussed in paragraphs 29–32.

Discussion

[Omitted here are sections I. “Introduction” and II. “The Domestic Scene.”]

III. Turkey’s International Position

20. Turkey’s westward orientation reached its peak in the 1950s when Turkey became uniquely committed to a special bilateral relationship with the US within the framework of NATO membership. Ankara adopted this policy in response to a number of aggressive moves in Turkey’s vicinity after World War II—the communist rebellion in Greece, Moscow’s attempt to establish a Soviet Republic in Azerbaijan, and the USSR’s demand that Turkey give Russia a predominant role in the Straits and hand back the border districts of Kars and Ardahan, whose return to Turkey had been conceded by the Bolsheviks in 1921. In these circumstances, alliance with the US and West European states appealed to most Turks, especially to the Menderes regime and to the military leadership, and Turkey joined NATO in 1952. Even then, there were some critics of Turkey’s move to a foreign policy substantially different from that of earlier years.

Changing Attitudes

21. For some years, growing numbers of Turks have come to feel that Turkey needed more flexibility in its foreign relations and have increasingly questioned the value of a foreign policy exclusively tied to the US and NATO. These views were influenced by similar earlier shifts
in opinions in Europe on the major issues concerning relations among Europe, the US, and the USSR. In the mid-1960s, Turkey’s feeling of isolation over the Cyprus dispute further strengthened these sentiments, which have gradually had their effect on the attitude of the Turkish Government itself. Although Menderes entertained the idea of improving relations with the USSR, changes in Turkish Government foreign policy had to wait for the termination of the military takeover which ended the Menderes regime and for the improving atmosphere of East-West relations of the early 1960s.

22. Turkey is certainly not about to leave NATO. Its civilian leaders—in government, the business community, and intellectual circles—are too oriented toward the cultural, political, and social values of European and Atlantic society. Its material interests are with Western Europe and North America; 75 percent of its yearly trade, $3.5 billion of economic aid over the past two decades, and all its foreign military supplies come from its NATO allies. Turkey’s military leaders are even more disposed in these directions than their civilian counterparts. Stalin’s hard-line pressure tactics of 1943–1953, though quickly and clearly repudiated by his successors, reinforced persistent Turkish feeling that the Czarist dream of controlling the Straits remains Russia’s goal.

23. Both the JP and the RPP consider that some loosening of relations within the Atlantic Alliance is desirable, that Turkey should have a larger voice within the alliance, and that a better relationship with the USSR is in Turkey’s interests. The RPP—partly because it is not in office—is generally more disposed to these views than the JP. While many factors have entered into the changes in Turkish government policy, the principal catalyst was the Cyprus crisis which began at the end of 1963. Turkish opinion was shocked by what it considered a US failure to support an ally. Moreover, in 1964 Turks generally were gravely affronted by what they considered an unnecessarily harsh letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Inonu. This letter, which became widely known in the country, implied that the US would withhold support for Turkey—even if Turkey were attacked by the Soviets as a result of an action such as a military intervention on Cyprus. Then in 1965, the USSR, after initially favoring the Greek Cypriot position, came out in support of the separate identity of the Turkish Cypriot community—a position close to Ankara’s and one which Moscow still holds.

The USSR

24. The warming trend in Turkish-Soviet relations is likely to continue in several fields. Once most of the presently planned Soviet-

\[2\]Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 54.
supported projects are well under way, there almost certainly will be more such offers by Moscow. Visits back and forth by high officials will become more commonplace. Official Turkish policy stresses strict compliance with the terms of the Montreux Convention governing use of the Turkish Straits by the Soviets, but the Turks will continue to permit minor infringements in the interest of the new Soviet-Turkish relationship. Yet all this is likely to be carefully controlled and kept within bounds by Ankara. Turks going to the USSR will continue to be screened as to membership and limited as to type—e.g., civil servants rather than independent trade unionists. Ankara is not about to give the Soviets free run of the Straits and will on occasion remind Moscow of Turkey’s sovereign rights by strictly enforcing regulations concerning transit. Within limits, the Turks will want the US periodically to show its flag in the Black Sea, but they will probably be more sensitive to US activities there which they think would seriously offend Moscow. In sum, the prospect is for a growing regularization of Turkish-Soviet relations, but one which falls far short of warmth and cordiality and which will limit Soviet access to Turkey.

25. It is probable that any attack on Turkey by a member of the Warsaw Pact would be made only as part of an overall assault against NATO. In conventional warfare, Turkey is capable of fighting a limited delaying action (approximately one week) against Warsaw Pact forces in European Thrace but could not hold out longer without outside assistance. A simultaneous attack in Eastern Turkey could be contained for a longer period, but Turkey soon would need outside assistance in this area as well. The Turkish Army is well aware of its deficiencies vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact powers and will continue to urge that Turkey be given the equipment necessary to counter such an attack.

The Middle East

26. Turkey’s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors are likely to become more complex than the kind of “either friend or enemy” approach which once characterized Turkish attitudes in the area. Turkey does not have the worries about enemies in this area which impel the Shah of Iran to seek allies. Though CENTO still exists as a defense pact, the defense aspect is much less important to Turkey than commercial and communication links with Iran and Pakistan. Turkish-Israeli relations are good and likely to remain so, but Ankara will see no particular benefit in closer relations with Israel at the expense of impairing its efforts to improve relations with Arab states.

27. [1½ lines not declassified] Ankara has more comfortable relations with conservative Near Eastern states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia than with Syria and Iraq. It dislikes the radicalism of government in the latter states but does not believe they constitute a threat to Turkey itself. Turkish relations with Egypt have been untroubled but fairly
distant since the breakup of the UAR in 1961. Turkey will probably continue low key political and economic ties with its Arab neighbors, but will seek to avoid too close an involvement in inter-Arab affairs. It will probably continue recent moves to improve ties with the four North African Arab states.

Turkey and the US

28. The process of modifying the relationship between the US and Turkey inevitably involves strains. Difficulties between the two countries do not arise from differing assessments of the USSR’s long-term policies and intentions. Rather they arise out of differing views about the current usefulness of various aspects of the alliance. The Turks value the presence of US forces on Turkish soil. There are, however, about 18,000 US military personnel and dependents in the country, mostly in or near the major cities, and the Turks are concerned about the visibility of these forces. For similar psychological and domestic political reasons, Turkey wishes to create some national forces which would not be committed to NATO. Nevertheless, for most purposes, e.g., defense of the Straits, the mission of national and NATO-committed forces would be identical.

29. Another major factor in the Turkish-US relationships is the question of economic and military aid. Since 1948, the US has provided Turkey with about $3 billion in grant military aid and some $2.5 billion in economic aid. While annual amounts have declined in recent years, US aid is still very important, both in itself and as a stimulant to OECD donors. The Turkish Government resents advice by US and other aid donors to the effect that drastic economic reforms in the fields of taxation and industrial efficiency are at least as important for rapid economic progress as is aid. [2 lines not declassified]

30. In 1966, the US undertook, subject to Congressional action, to provide $670 million of military aid over the period 1967–1971, an annual average of $134 million. This amount (the so-called McNaughton level) was considerably less than the Turkish military establishment desired. The Turkish military leaders, however, accepted—with some doubts—the argument that Turkey’s allies would quickly come to its aid in a time of crisis. But the McNaughton level was met only in the first year; in 1968 and in 1969 MAP was only about $100 million. The Turks have accepted the exigencies of the Vietnam situation as a reason for this decline, but they expect the gaps to be made up when possible. Even if new aid levels included making up shortfalls, however, the Turkish military establishment would continue to feel that it lacked sufficient modern equipment.

31. It is in part US military aid that induces the Turks to accept the present visibility of the US military presence. A substantial drop in military aid would generate fairly widespread resentment within the Turk-
ish Armed Forces. [3 lines not declassified] A return to something like
the McNaughton levels would probably prevent this eventuality and
make it easier to deal with the Turkish Government. Turkish dissatis-
faction might also be mitigated to a degree by increased arms sales on
concessionary terms. Even such sales would, however, add to Turkey’s
already large foreign debt burden. A drop of a few million dollars from
the current aid level would probably not have much impact. However,
a drop of tens of millions would not only affect military relationships
but would also cause political friction in Turkey’s relations with the
US, though the level of such friction would probably be about the same
whether the cut were 20 or 40 million. Except in the case of a virtual
cessation of MAP, however, there is almost no possibility of complete
termination or interdiction of US activities.

32. Large reductions in US military aid would also affect economic
and political affairs within Turkey. The military establishment would
be inclined to press the government for funds to purchase military
equipment abroad. With a tight foreign exchange situation, the ad-
ministration would face the unpleasant alternatives of reducing im-
ports needed for the economy or of rebuffing the military. Military lead-
ers would probably regard a large drop in US aid as at least partly
stemming from JP failures in conducting relations with the US. [2 lines
not declassified]

33. Despite these negative aspects, Turkey will remain a commit-
ted member of NATO and a useful ally of the US for the period of this
estimate and probably for much longer. Far more than in the past, how-
ever, it will be an ally with ideas of its own, some of which will not be
in harmony with US views. For example, Turkey would be unlikely to
assent to US use of bases in Turkey to support military operations in
the Middle East. Ankara will pursue the path of regularizing relations
with the USSR. It will continue to seek improvement of relations with
countries in the Mediterranean area, such as the Arab states on the
North African coast, and in time probably with other countries in Asia
and Africa. Turkey will probably seek commercial markets in such ar-
eas for goods it cannot sell in the EEC market. In the next five years at
least, these steps will be limited.

IV. Cyprus—The Troublesome Contingency

34. The foregoing estimate is in many respects reassuring. One is-

 issue which could radically alter much of the outlook for Turkish for-
gien affairs is Cyprus. Since the last flareup of hostilities between the
Greek and Turkish communities on the island at the end of 1967, mat-
ters have been fairly quiet. The present Greek Government has not sup-
ported the union of Cyprus with Greece, and almost all of the Greek
illegal armed force left the island early in 1968. Representatives of the
two communities have been engaged for 18 months in talks designed
to explore means of constructing a new political order in Cyprus. Some progress has been made, but the chief contribution of the talks has been to damp down tensions between the two communities by giving a sense of hope that some non-violent solution may in time be reached. Yet Greek and Turk on Cyprus are still far apart.

35. There is an outside chance that the talks between the two communities will achieve enough progress on marginal issues to permit movement toward settlement of the central question. This boils down to the degree of autonomy, of freedom from Greek administrative and police control, that the Turkish community would have under a new constitution. On the whole, the chances are fairly good that the combination of the talks themselves, some progress within them, and the generally benevolent attitude of Greece and Turkey will suffice to keep the situation from erupting into serious hostilities. Yet there remain within the Greek Cypriot community die-hard advocates of union with Greece. And there is a chance that an accident—and shooting incidents occur from time to time—could escalate into a major communal confrontation, despite the desires of many on both sides to avoid one and despite the presence of the UN force on Cyprus. If Ankara perceived a large-scale threat to Turkish Cypriot lives, it would feel under strong pressure to intervene. We do not think such a development is likely, but it cannot be ruled out.

36. If the Turks did come to feel a need to use force, their first choice would be selected application of it, e.g., through airstrikes, as a warning. If that tactic failed, it is at least possible that they would invade Cyprus. Since the Turks would undoubtedly have local air superiority, the Greeks would probably not seek to reinforce their compatriots on the island. But some form of hostilities between Greece and Turkey would be probable, and in any case there would be serious disruption of the eastern wing of NATO. To repeat, however, this is a contingency, not a likelihood.
Washington, April 1, 1970, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT
Opium

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
His Excellency Melih Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador
S/NM—Mr. Harry Schwartz
NEA/TUR—Frank E. Cash, Jr.

The Secretary began by expressing his regrets about the earthquakes in Turkey. Ambassador Esenbel said his Government was grateful for the assistance provided by Embassy Ankara. The Secretary said we would continue to do everything we could.

The Secretary then said that he, the President, and all Americans are seriously concerned about the narcotics problem in the United States. Its consequences are tragic. Any delay in control efforts is destructive. Ambassador Handley wishes to discuss the illicit opium arriving in this country from Turkey further with Prime Minister Demirel just as soon as possible. We would like to move very fast on this. Public and Congressional pressure is building up. This is really the only problem existing between our two Governments. Everything else is going smoothly. We don’t think money is a problem. We’re prepared to compensate Turkish farmers.

In response to the Secretary’s question as to whether Mr. Schwartz had anything to add, the latter said what we fear is the loss of a generation.

Ambassador Esenbel said the GOT has taken some control measures at its borders. A new security force is being equipped to cope with the illicit traffic. Turkey has cooperated for many years with the U.S., France, and Germany in this field. Poppy cultivation in Turkey has been gradually reduced from an initial forty-two provinces down to nine at present and will shortly be restricted even further. The Foreign Minister has been dealing with this matter very confidentially, and the

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO–DRUGS 17 US TUR. Confidential. Drafted by Cash and approved in S on April 7. The meeting took place in Secretary Rogers’s office.

2 The earthquakes struck western Anatolia March 28–29 destroying and damaging a number of towns and leaving 1,200 killed and 90,000 homeless.
Ambassador did not have precise information on the program. He did know, however, that a high-level decision has been made to eradicate poppy cultivation completely, but he did not know how rapidly this could be done. Turkish farmers have grown poppies for cooking oil for 800 years. It is, therefore, not so easy to uproot such a tradition. It will take time. It is not really a question of money.

The Secretary said that inasmuch as 80% of the illicit heroin coming into the U.S. is believed to originate in Turkey, we would be willing to cooperate in any kind of control system.

In response to the Ambassador’s question, Mr. Schwartz said the UN machinery is not effective in producing the results the U.S. must have.

The Secretary said the only real solution is the cessation of poppy cultivation. We could compensate—or more than compensate—any loss. There is bound to be more and more public discussion of this issue, and Turkey’s reputation in this country will suffer. This we would regret. We know the Turkish Government is trying to be helpful, and we are not unappreciative. But speed is essential. And, once again, we are willing to help in any way we can. Ambassador Handley will be discussing this further with the Prime Minister.

Ambassador Esenbel said he would report the Secretary’s remarks. He believes his Government is fully aware of this problem.

The Ambassador said that, at the request of the Robert College Board, he would like to mention the fact that the College needs about a million dollars more a year in AID funds in order not to be forced to cut back its operations, which would be a shame.

Mr. Cash explained that we and the College are caught between spiralling cost of education and limited amounts of AID funds.

The Secretary told the Ambassador we would see what we could do.
430. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
FY 1970 Economic Assistance Program for Turkey

Secretary Rogers (Tab A) requests your approval of a $40 million AID program loan to Turkey. The funds will finance imports of capital goods, raw materials, and spare parts required by Turkey to expand its industrial and agricultural capabilities. All agencies, including Budget (Tab B), concur.2

U.S. development lending to Turkey is provided in the framework of a consortium of aid donors sponsored by the OECD. For 1970, as in the past two years, other bilateral donors will provide $60 million in new program loans, and the U.S. is expected to again provide $40 million.

More than two years ago, Turkey announced a plan to end reliance on concessional loans by 1972. The U.S. subsequently reduced its bilateral lending level (project and program loans) to Turkey from $125 million in FY 1967 to $68 million in FY 1968 to $40 million in FY 1969. The current proposal does not further reduce the total largely because the Turks have not yet devalued the lira and made the economic adjustments required to become more self-reliant.

There is general agreement among consortium members that the most urgent development issue for Turkey is the need for a comprehensive reform of trade policies and a substantial devaluation of the lira. The Turkish Government is fully aware of the views of the consortium members, recognizes that this is a crucial development policy issue, and has recently begun serious negotiations with the IMF on these matters. The Secretary feels that, while supporting the IMF, the U.S. should avoid direct involvement in these politically sensitive negotiations and that we should not make the U.S. loan, or any part thereof, dependent upon Turkish devaluation or reform.

I fully agree, since any such pressure might cause political friction and jeopardize the negotiations. Prime Minister Demirel is having

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Confidential. Bergsten sent this memorandum to Kissinger under a June 1 covering memorandum recommending it be sent to the President.
2 Tabs are attached, but not printed.
political difficulties and devaluation will be difficult enough without resentment of U.S. pressure. Besides, he understands the need; his problem lies mainly in finding a way to manage this step politically.

Should devaluation be effected, substantial supplemental financing would be needed to counter possible speculation and permit a measure of import liberalization. Secretary Rogers suggests that we stand ready to contribute up to $25 million as our share of such assistance and AID is prepared to make such funds available if they are required.

Secretary Kennedy had originally raised an objection to providing this loan until Turkey had agreed to eliminate its opium production. Treasury subsequently withdrew its objection for this year and agreed with State that withholding our aid loan might aggravate political relations and restrict Demirel’s ability to be helpful on the opium problem. This is being actively pursued with Demirel and Foreign Minister Caglayangil.

In addition to the requested $40 million, the U.S. is providing Turkey $45 million under PL 480 and $4 million in technical assistance for a total FY 1970 economic aid program of $89 million. We are also providing $150 million in grants of military equipment and supplies, including excess stocks.

This continues to be one of our most important aid efforts. Turk performance remains spotty, but it is sound enough to justify the aid, and our joint objective of preparing Turkey for eventual full membership in the European Community continues to be of high strategic importance.

Recommendation

That you approve the proposal for a $40 million AID loan to Turkey for an additional $25 million as part of special consortium financing if necessary in the event of Turkish exchange reform.3

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3 Kissinger initialed the approval line for Nixon on June 8.
431. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Turkish Affairs (Cash) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)

Washington, June 18, 1970.

SUBJECT
Let’s Not Throw the Turkish Baby Out With the Narcotics Bathwater

Last December Moynihan told Bill Handley and me that we should bomb the Blue Mosque in retaliation for the way the Turks are “aggressing” against us with opium. (The same day, incidentally, the President told Bill in low key, “do your best.”) We thought at the time Moynihan was joking. Now, I’m not so sure.

I am becoming increasingly concerned that various people in the Government (including Rossides, who has demonstrated his disregard for US-Turkish relations, and Kleindienst) without responsibility for US foreign relations, but understandably anxious and frustrated over our horrendous narcotics problem, may be fully prepared to see irreparable damage done to all our other interests in Turkey in the attempt to solve this problem. And—worst of all—without any real prospect that our narcotics problem will thus be solved.

At least with the “Johnson letter” there was a real chance that a Greek-Turkish war would be prevented. This was accomplished and, therefore, the risk—and the high price paid in damage to US-Turkish relations—was, in my view, justified.

But if Turkey produced not one more poppy, our problem would not be solved. Opium is produced in Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, India, etc. etc. As long as there is a demand, there will be a supply. Furthermore, even if the USG can agree internally that opium should be eliminated worldwide, which is very doubtful, and could achieve this, which is even more doubtful, the experts say addicts would find a substitute—any substitute (LSD for example)—because their need is so compelling.

1 Source: Department of State, Turkish Desk Files: Lot 74 D 29, Soc 11–5. Confidential. Drafted by Cash and sent through Davies (NEA). A copy was sent to Saunders.

2 No record of this conversation was found. Sisco drew an arrow from this line and annotated: “I agree. Pls be sure I’m on clearance for everything. Stay alert. I’m willing to confront Moynihan. JJS.”

3 Eugene Rossides, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.

4 Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst.

5 Reference is to President Johnson’s June 5, 1964, letter to Prime Minister Inonu warning against military intervention in Cyprus. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 54.
In other words, this is a problem that must be solved primarily at the heart, i.e. the user in this country, and secondarily by attempting to control what comes in over the borders of this country, not what goes out over the borders of any number of other countries throughout the world.

The argument is made that if an abrupt cessation of Turkish production could be obtained (which it can’t), narcotics dealers would be flushed out in their attempts to rearrange their supply lines to other sources. It seems incredible that as adroit as these criminals are, and with all the publicity our efforts with Turkey have been given—over our and the Turks’ objections—that other arrangements have not been made. Surely contingency planning is not a government monopoly.

All of this is not to say that we should not urge the Turks to do everything possible that will be of real assistance to us; we should and are. And we should be willing to pay the price the achievable results are worth.

The questions are: what will be of real assistance to us; what is achievable; and what should we pay?

Since 1966 we have been putting heavy pressure on Demirel (to the point of irritating him considerably), and he has: been progressively reducing the provinces in which poppies may be grown (with a resultant loss of votes); cooperating with us in improving control, including permitting US agents to roam Turkey (a considerable risk for both him and us); and promised to end production in ’71. He, incidentally, is the only one who has been willing to commit himself to eradication. All other Turks have emphasized increased controls only. If we lose Demirel—a real possibility even if we don’t add to his present serious difficulties—we lose the Turkish commitment to eradication.

Bill Handley says—and I think his telegrams show—that he has used every arrow in his quiver with the Turks on opium. Although they have been stupid in not sending someone from Ankara to the CCMS, we are convinced that they are doing as much as they can to help us.

I am certain from the various noises that have been made that we will quite soon be under very heavy pressure to use AID, PL 480, MAP, and anything else available as blunt instruments to bludgeon the Turks into doing our bidding. Anyone who knows the Turks knows this simply won’t work. They are just not amenable to that kind of persuasion. Worse yet, if there are even indications of this kind of direct pressure, such as a holdup of the program loan or a delay in PL 480, this will get the Turks’ backs up and may well cause a slackening in the cooperation we are presently getting on narcotics. If such pressure were to become public knowledge—as would almost certainly be the case—our other exceedingly important interests in Turkey would suffer.

Our relations with Turkey can’t stand another “Johnson letter” with so little prospect of accomplishing what we wish.
Dear Dave:

I know that your Department is extremely concerned, as are we all, over the drug problem in this country. You of course have a most important role to play through the Bureau of Customs in combatting the movement of drugs into the United States.

The most damaging drug, it goes without saying, is heroin. Since the illicit, as well as the legal, supply of heroin comes from abroad, the foreign policy implications of our domestic problem are considerable. An estimated eighty percent of the illicit heroin originates in Turkey, and therefore we have been conducting intensive negotiations with the Turkish Government with a view to controlling the legal crop or eliminating all production.

It is in our interest to induce the Turkish authorities to accelerate their steps to restrict or to eliminate all opium production and to improve their control over existing poppy crops, in order to stem the flow of illicit opium into France, where it is converted to heroin. Our negotiations and our three million dollar loan to provide equipment for enforcement and crop substitution are to this end.

However, I feel very strongly that any measures we take that are considered by Turkey to be punitive in nature would not advance our goal of stemming the illicit diversion of opium and would do extensive damage to other exceedingly important aspects of our relationship with Turkey. On October 20, 1969, Attorney General Mitchell and Elliot Richardson sent a memorandum to the President, in response to his request for a report on the narcotics problem, which reviewed, among other subjects, the possibility of sanctions. In the case of Turkey, they pointed out the extensive foreign relations costs of withholding assistance to Turkey. In my opinion, the same situation exists today.

With this in mind, we have learned with some concern from members of your staff that, at the time Turkey’s recent request for 850,000 tons of wheat under PL 480 wheat comes up for interagency consideration,
Treasury is prepared to delay approval of the request. The reason, as we understand it, is that the United States should provide no further assistance to Turkey until the Turkish authorities are more forthcoming on restricting, or eliminating, opium production.

I strongly urge you not to tie approval of Turkey’s request for PL 480 wheat to the steps the Turks are taking concerning their opium production. The following are my reasons for asking you to agree to this position.

1) Elliot Richardson has informed me that his recent conversations with Turkish officials have convinced him that we have already exerted about as much bilateral pressure as the traffic will bear. This is one of the reasons we have moved into a multilateral framework. Substantial further pressure will, in my opinion, get the Turks’ backs up, not advance us any further down the road toward greater control or eradication, and do considerable damage to other aspects of our relationship.

2) Prime Minister Demirel has weathered an intra-party dispute in a weakened condition, following a very close vote of confidence in March. This makes it much more difficult for him to take dramatic steps in curtailing or eliminating opium production, since he faces a reaction from his rural constituency in the provinces concerned. It also makes him more vulnerable to criticism that he is bowing to foreign pressure. Our failure to ship wheat when the harvest has been unfavorable and the need becomes critical could affect the survival of his government, in the context of a domestic situation which shows considerable signs of instability. Any successor to Demirel would almost certainly be less cooperative on the opium question.

3) Taking into consideration the very high priority this Administration attaches to stemming the flow of illicit heroin into the U.S., there are still other vital aspects to the United States-Turkish relationship. Turkey is an essential element in NATO’s southern flank. In a June 11 meeting of the Defense Planning Committee in Brussels, Defense Secretary Laird referred to the President’s February 18 foreign policy message, “in which (the President) reiterated that the security of NATO remains the most important foreign policy interest of the United States.”

There are forces at work in Turkey seeking its withdrawal from NATO and from its western orientation, and a refusal of U.S. assistance considered to be critical would certainly accelerate this tendency. Furthermore, we wish not to affect adversely the continued existence of [less than 1 line not declassified] installations, our overflight arrangements.

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3 Richardson also described these conversations, April 22 and May 13, in a May 19 memorandum to Kissinger. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO-DRUGS TUR)
4 For the text of the President’s message, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 116–190.
(Turkish airspace is critical to our access to the Middle East), and Sixth Fleet access to Turkish ports. The continuation of a relatively stable and friendly Turkey in the volatile Middle East is certainly in our interest.

4) The Turks are cooperating with us in our mutual efforts to prevent the illicit diversion of their opium production. They are not progressing as rapidly as we would like, but they are progressing. Turkey is continuing to restrict the number of provinces where legal production is authorized. Efforts to tighten the collection of this year’s crop reportedly have been good, and the Government has committed itself to purchasing as much of the crop as possible. At considerable risk of public disapproval, the Turkish authorities have agreed to an augmentation of the number of our narcotics officials in Turkey to help with their enforcement efforts.

In conclusion, I believe that we are proceeding in the right direction by pursuing the narcotics problem in an international framework. It is not necessary, and it would be highly counterproductive, to adopt such drastic steps as withholding assistance in order to press the Turks to be more forthcoming. I hope that you will agree, and that we can allow the current Turkish request for wheat under PL 480 to be considered under the usual criteria.

Sincerely,

Alex

433. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, July 18, 1970, 1110Z.


1. Prior to his departure Friday, Ambassador had intensive discussions Thursday with principal Turkish officials concerned with present and future production of opium in Turkey. This included late evening session between Ambassador and Foreign Minister, with


2 Dated July 15, it reported that the Ambassador and Caglayangil had agreed to meet to discuss the narcotics issue. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11–5 TUR)
Eralp and Esenbel present on their side and DCM accompanying Ambassador. Discussions were detailed, very frank, and at times heated. Foreign Minister was well briefed on situation, including use of maps. Meeting, which lasted one and half hours was in private quarters of Foreign Minister’s official residence. Earlier in day, Ambassador had two-hour session with Prime Minister’s assistants Ozansoy and Fer on subject. All conversations were held against background of Ambassador’s being recalled to Washington for consultation on subject, and preceded by Ambassador’s exposition of problem as presented by Assistant Secretary Sisco to Esenbel (State 106419).

2. Discussions indicated that Turks deeply aware of importance subject to US. Esenbel, who had lunch with Ambassador Thursday, told him that he had had long discussions with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Monday night on subject.

3. It clear that GOT feels that it is now running into heavy weather on subject, both with US and in terms domestic politics, and that, with full understanding of importance to US, it not in position to eliminate production opium in foreseeable future. GOT is, however, making major effort (a) to buy up this year’s entire crop and (b) to enact legislation on licensing (copy of bill was given to Ambassador Thursday and now being translated). Major element that concerned them is that members their own party, as well as opposition, now seizing on issue of US interference in local and internal Turkish matter as reported septels.

4. Conclusion we reached as result these discussions is that fine print in current existing legislation, which requires GOT to give one year’s notice in advance to opium cultivators before restrictions on plantings can be made in their provinces, made it impossible for GOT to go beyond seven provinces this year, since last year’s announcement stipulated that cultivation would continue in seven provinces for planting in fall of 1970.

5. Critical issue will be collection this year, enactment of legislation, and GOT decision as to what it will announce one year from now regarding future plantings. Yesterday’s discussion gave us indication

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3 In telegram 108983 to Ankara, July 9, the Department informed Handley: “The President has expressed his strong disappointment in progress made to suppress illicit drug traffic and has made clear that notwithstanding the defense and political components of the problem, he places the highest priority on this issue. Accordingly, you should inform the GOT that because of grave concern over problem you have been asked to return for consultation.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971.)

4 Dated July 3, it reported on Sisco’s July 2 discussions with Esenbel regarding narcotics issues. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11–5 TUR)

5 Not further identified.
that GOT believes it can comply with 1961 Single Convention, assuming present law on licensing passes Parliament this year, and that area which it might consider for opium cultivation to be announced before June 30, 1971 will be limited to Afyon and Isparta. Their view is that with licensing, with controls, and with good record of farmers in these areas selling their opium crops to government, and not to black marketers, Turkey could be in position to restrict opium sales entirely to legal purchasers.

Cuthell

434. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Economic Assistance for Turkey

Issue

On Sunday, Turkey is expected to devalue the lira. The IMF, with our strong support, has been urging this for years as the most critical step needed to bolster the Turkish economy. An IMF meeting on Sunday will ask a number of donors to make new aid contributions to support the devaluation; our share will probably be about $25 million.

Devaluation

Devaluation will make the Turkish economic system much more competitive, enable her to liberalize her import controls, and promote an increase in exports. It is therefore of critical importance to her economic development. It has been urged on her for years by all outside observers, but has not happened before because of the extreme political sensitivity of the exchange rate in Turkey.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret. Sent for action. An attached August 7 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger recommended that if Kissinger wanted to raise the issue with the President, he send this memorandum. Kissinger wrote on Bergsten’s memorandum: “File, don’t forward. HAK.”

2 August 8.
However, substantial financial assistance will be required to counter the possibility of speculation against the lira after the devaluation, and permit a measure of import liberalization. As part of a special multilateral assistance package designed by the IMF, we would be asked to provide approximately $25 million to the Turks.

In June I approved, on your behalf, Secretary Rogers’ recommendation for an aid loan to Turkey of $40 million with the understanding that an additional $25 million would be provided if Turkey devalued. I continue to feel strongly that we should respond positively, on both economic and foreign policy grounds.

I raise the issue only because of our narcotics problem with the Turks. Secretary Kennedy had originally raised an objection to providing the loan until Turkey had agreed to eliminate its opium poppy production, although Treasury subsequently withdrew its objection and agreed with State that withholding it might aggravate political relations and restrict Demirel’s ability to be helpful on the opium problem.

Demirel, in the subsequent months, has sharply reduced the number of provinces in which opium could legally be grown. He could ideally have done more. However, the opium producing provinces are important strongholds of his Justice party, which has only recently emerged from a divisive political crisis in which forty of its members voted with the opposition, defeated the budget, and forced resignation of the Government. Had Demirel banned opium production in all provinces, it is probable that he would have been unable to survive politically.

Despite the severity of the narcotics problem, I continue to believe that support for Demirel and his efforts to gradually end opium poppy production will serve both our foreign policy interests and our domestic interests better than utilizing aid as a leverage factor over the Turks. The Turks will require the $25 million to support the devaluation which we have long encouraged, and which is crucial to our long-term interests in Turkey. Withholding these funds could severely damage the Turkish economy and our relationship with Turkey which, as a NATO ally, is important to us. A major aggravation of our relationship with the Turks would also make it more difficult for Demirel, or a successor, to cooperate with us on the opium problem.

Recommendation

That you approve the additional $25 million in economic assistance to Turkey. John Ehrlichman, Pat Moynihan, State, and Treasury agree. (Pat suggested that, in doing so, we make clear to the Turks that

3 See Document 430.
this by no means indicates that we are not serious about the opium problem. I have instructed the agencies and our representative at the IMF to do so.)4

4 Kissinger initialed the approval line: for Nixon.

435. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, August 17, 1970, 1:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
William Handley, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
Emil Mosbacher, U.S. Chief of Protocol
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff

After general conversation during a photo session, Ambassador Handley opened the substantive part of the meeting by explaining to the President the recent restrictions which the Government of Turkey has decreed to decrease the number of provinces in which the opium poppy is grown. He showed the President a page-size map indicating the provinces in which it is still legal to grow opium and those in which growing has recently been prohibited. He then explained that the next step is for the Turkish Government to pass a licensing bill which would provide stricter measures for enforcing the limitations on growing.

The President responded by saying that it is very important that we cut off as many sources of these drugs as we possibly can. The drug problem has become a serious one not only in our cities but in our suburbs.

The President then asked how our relations are generally with Turkey.

Ambassador Handley replied that they are fundamentally sound. The Turkish Government still bases its policy on the NATO alliance. It is devoting more of its GNP to NATO goals than any other of our NATO partners. When the U.S. was recently forced to withdraw from Wheelus...

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.
Base in Libya,\(^2\) the Turks quietly permitted us to expand our range facilities at Incirlik Airbase. There has recently been a backlash against the Turkish left following its challenge to the army in recent public disorders. The President indicated his understanding that the army occupies a special place in recent Turkish history as a defender of the republic. Ambassador Handley said that anti-Americanism by itself is not a major problem but that the leftists use that issue for their own purposes in attacking the Turkish establishment.

The President asked who makes up the left in Turkey. Ambassador Handley replied that since there is no legal Communist party, the formal left is the Turkish Labor Party with a base among the young and among the Marxist element in the Turkish labor movement.

Ambassador Handley volunteered that we had recently “run into something of a buzz saw” in relation to the opium question and Turkish public opinion. A number of those who wish to attack the Turkish establishment have tried to capitalize on the charge that the Demirel Government is bowing to American pressure in reducing opium growing.

The President reiterated that it is very important for us to close off as many sources of narcotics as possible but said that we do not want to embarrass the Demirel Government. He repeated: “You tell them that we won’t embarrass them publicly. But privately you should say that this issue is terribly important to us.” The President concluded by saying, “That is the line.”

Ambassador Handley noted that he had briefed several Congressional groups during his present consultation. He explained the pressures that are building up in the form of amendments to trade and aid legislation which would throw the whole issue back into the President’s lap to decide whether Turkey, for instance, is taking adequate measures to control opium growing. The Ambassador said he felt that, at this point, Turkey could be judged to be taking serious steps. He explained some of the details of the licensing bill that the Government will attempt to have passed at the next parliamentary session—how it provides for Government collectors of the crop to pay cash, provides per diem for them, and so on.

The President indicated his understanding of this improved collection effort, noting the importance of quiet cooperation. He likened the Congressional pressures to those against military assistance to Greece. There were those here—as well as the Danes and others—who felt we should not aid Greece. But with the situation what it is in the

\(^2\) Reference is to the demand for U.S. withdrawal from Libya made following the 1969 overthrow of the government of King Idris by officers of the Libyan army.
eastern Mediterranean, one looks at the Danish forces and at Greece’s 10 divisions and the choice is pretty clear. One looks at the Turkish forces and dedication to NATO and it is plain that we cannot jeopardize our fundamental relationship.

H.S.

436. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, October 5, 1970, 1200Z.

6301. Subject: Ingersoll Visit to Turkey—Presidential Letter. Ref: State 159705 and 163371.  

1. I have serious doubts about having the President write a “secret letter” to the Prime Minister of Turkey on the opium question. Letters of this kind do not stay secret very long, and it will be recalled that my own instructions were to discuss the matter personally with the Prime Minister and deliver only an oral message from the President to him.

2. In the present atmosphere surrounding opium, it is absolutely essential that there be no indication of heavy unilateral US pressure on the Prime Minister at a moment when he is girding himself for a major political fight at his convention this month and facing the opening of Parliament the first week of November. Moreover, a letter from a former President of the United States (i.e., the Johnson letter on Cyprus) still remains the single most painful event (as far as the Turks are concerned) in our history since World War II.

3. There is no doubt in the Prime Minister’s mind of the President’s personal interest in this matter. I have communicated that a number of times, and against the risks I do not see anything to be gained at this time by having a personal written letter from the President to Prime Minister Demirel delivered by Mr. Ingersoll.

4. With regard to the suggestion in para 5 (State 159705) that Mr. Ingersoll be given a Presidential letter to be shown here and elsewhere,

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2 Telegram 159705, September 9, 1970, to Ankara outlined plans for Ingersoll’s visit to Turkey. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/INGERSOLL) Telegram 163371 to Ankara, October 3, reported that Ingersoll had told Turkish representatives that he would carry a letter from President Nixon to Prime Minister Demirel on the issue of narcotics. (Ibid.)
I do not have strong feelings one way or the other. I do think, however, that its use might be awkward here since I do not know how it would be used in practice. Simply to show it to the Prime Minister and retain it for use elsewhere makes it look like a passport. However, I do not feel strongly about this, and it may be of use in opening doors elsewhere. Frankly, I believe that it would be more tasteful and less awkward if Mr. Ingersoll, when he sees the Prime Minister, were to say something like this: “As you know, Ambassador Handley has told you of the deep interest that the President has in this matter. The President has asked me, following the recent meeting of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, to make a trip through various capitals in Europe, and it is for that reason that I am here.” Certainly he will not have to show credentials. They will be assumed.3

Handley

3 In telegram 167166 to Ankara, October 9, the Department forwarded the text of a Presidential letter that conformed to Handley’s suggestions. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971) A copy of the letter is ibid.

437. Editorial Note

On November 10, 1970, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel postponed his visit to the United States, citing among other reasons his desire to be in Ankara when the Turkish Parliament voted on an opium licensing bill.

438. Memorandum of Conversation1


SUBJECT

Military Assistance for Turkey

1 Source: Department of State, Turkish Desk Files: Lot 75 D 65, DEF 19 MAP. Confidential. Drafted by Pugh on January 4, 1971. Esenbel read his comments from a prepared aide-mémoire. A copy is attached but not printed.
PARTICIPANTS
His Excellency Melih Esenbel, Ambassador of Turkey
Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary, NEA
Frank E. Cash, Jr., Country Director, Turkish Affairs
Robert L. Pugh, Desk Officer, Turkish Affairs

Ambassador Esenbel drew on a telegram which he said had been sent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Turkish General Staff, and the Office of the Prime Minister. He indicated that the Government of Turkey noted with satisfaction that the message President Nixon sent to the Congress transmitting the request for a supplemental appropriation to the 1971 Foreign Assistance bill2 made specific reference to the defense posture in the Eastern Mediterranean, and in particular to Turkey, in its indication that part of the funds requested were to restore the Turkish MAP program to the level projected before the emergency situation in Cambodia caused the diversion of $25.5 million.

The Ambassador then referred to the NATO Defense Ministers’ call for increased effort to assist the defense of the southeastern flank.3 He pointed out that the Turkish armed forces in order to maintain an agreed standard within NATO, and thus insure a creditable deterrent, required a programmed level of continuing assistance. He noted that this level had been mutually calculated to be $670 million worth of equipment and other forms of assistance for a period of five years beginning in 1966. This was according to the McNaughton Plan, which foresaw a yearly allocation of $135 million worth of such military assistance. He stated that during the last four years the level of assistance had fallen short of that figure and amounted to only $427 million of military assistance in total. Ambassador Esenbel recalled that during the visits to Ankara of Secretary of Defense Laird and Assistant Secretary of Defense Nutter4 this problem had been reviewed and the possibility of surplus military assistance had been considered. Ambassador Esenbel characterized the long supply and excess (LS&E), or surplus material, program as an additional point but noted that this could not be planned ahead and could never replace programmed military assistance. He stated that when one dealt in surplus assistance, it was in emergency circumstances—in that it was necessary to take whatever was offered when it was available—and that there was no comparison with programmed aid.

With the preceding as background, Esenbel said that the Turkish Government deemed it appropriate at the moment to bring to the

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3 At the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels December 3–4; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, January 4, 1971, pp. 2–6.
4 December 1–2.
attention of the United States Government that while the reinstatement of funds to bring the FY 1971 MAP level to $100 million would improve the existing situation, the urgent needs of modernization of the Turkish armed forces would still remain an acute problem. He felt these needs were well known to the USG through continuing discussions between the US Military Mission in Turkey and the Turkish General Staff. He stated the wish of the GOT that the USG again make an effort to reach the McNaughton level of military assistance.

Mr. Sisco observed that: (1) the final disposition of the MAP supplemental was not yet clear, as there were differences to be sorted out, and he felt that it would be clear that day whether action would be taken immediately or deferred until the week of December 28; (2) the USG would continue to do the best it could; (3) the LS&E program was never conceived as a full substitute for MAP, but was suggested because the USG was concerned about the temporary cut from $100 million to $74.5 million; and (4) while it was not conceived as a permanent substitute for MAP, it did fit in to Turkish force goal needs. He counseled Esenbel to await Congressional action, following which the situation would be examined once more.

Ambassador Esenbel said that the point he was trying to make was that when Ambassador Handley went to the Foreign Minister during the past summer with word of the cut to $74.5 million, it caused a shock within the Turkish Government. Esenbel (who was in Turkey for the summer) reported that he had talked on this topic with the Prime Minister who, he said, had felt that the US could have obtained the needed funds elsewhere. Ambassador Esenbel noted that he had told the Prime Minister that the time (July 1970) was not ripe for the US Government to ask for legislation to provide the additional military assistance funds needed for Cambodia, but that he anticipated it would be done later. Ambassador Esenbel stated that when the interested officials of the GOT saw that the request when finally submitted was for one billion dollars, a problem was created. They could not understand why if one billion dollars was attainable, the Turkish MAP level could not be restored to the McNaughton level of $135 million. In response to Ambassador Esenbel’s question about the adjournment of Congress, Mr. Sisco noted that it was making a major effort to get critical items through before Christmas, but that it would return to work December 28, if necessary.
POLITICAL SITUATION IN TURKEY

Background

There is a fundamental dichotomy in Turkey’s political life between the elitists of the urban, educated minority and the mass-based politicians. The elitists feel that only they are capable of giving Turkey the enlightened, progressive leadership it needs, while their political opponents are better characterized as populists. Among the elitists are the Republican Peoples Party (RPP), the principal opposition party. It is flanked on its left in the political spectrum by the small, Marxist, Turkish Labor Party (TLP) and by a congeries of splintered, radical-left student groups.

The 1965 election victory of the Justice Party (JP) marked the return to power, after a five-year lapse, of representatives of the same segments of Turkish society which had been removed from power in the 1960 military revolution. This military intervention was largely supported by the elitists and was brought about by economic mismanagement and political repression.

The Democrat Party (DP), which was deposed by the 1960 military revolution, and the JP, its successor, were brought to power with the support of the conservative peasantry and of the commercial class. The JP has been led throughout its five years in office by Suleyman Demirel, who has exhibited during his tenure unusual skill in economic policy and an unanticipated ability to maintain an effective working relationship with Turkey’s military leaders.

Current Situation

In the past year, charges of corruption on the part of Demirel’s brothers gave a convenient issue to some within his party and to the opposition to use in trying to remove him. However, Prime Minister Demirel, himself, precipitated the latent intra-Justice Party (JP) crisis by excluding from his post-1969 election cabinet representatives of his party’s more conservative right wing. This faction, in turn, deprived the JP Government of its large majority in the National Assembly by making an open break with Demirel. They did this by voting against

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret. The paper was sent to Kissinger on December 23 by Eliot who indicated it was “prompted by recent developments.”
the budget in February 1970, and then adding their weight to the intractability of the opposition. Turkey’s National Assembly has managed to accomplish little since this event.

The November 1 reconvening of the Grand National Assembly produced an immediate crisis when agreement could not be reached on presiding officers for either house. Party discipline failed because of the secret balloting, allowing JP dissidents still within the Party to frustrate with impunity the election of the legislature’s leaders. The first month of the new session was thus wasted, as no other matters could be taken up until the leadership issue was finally resolved. This was succeeded as a pre-empting issue by various attacks on, or charges against, Demirel, including the corruption issue. He overcame the corruption charge, perhaps temporarily, in a Grand National Assembly vote supporting a committee report that the corruption issue was not valid.

The violence perpetrated in recent years by radical-left students stimulated the growth of countervailing violence by radical-right elements, and Turkey’s universities have suffered greatly in the attendant atmosphere of coercion and chaos. A number of deaths, many injuries, and considerable property damage have been the physical result of this chain of circumstances. Turkey’s urban populace, at first benevolently neutral in the main toward the radical-left actions—including a number of anti-American incidents in which the United States was basically a surrogate target for the JP Government—seems to have had enough of student violence. In addition, there apparently is widespread dismay at the irresponsibility and ineffectuality of the Grand National Assembly in the face of Turkey’s many problems, not the least of which is continued student violence.

Demirel’s compatibility with the Turkish military establishment was never universal, and over the years since 1965 there have been intermittent CAS reports of coup-plotting. This usually has been at the colonel level and sometimes associated with members of the coup group of 1960, who appointed themselves life Senators before returning government control to civilian hands in 1961. Widespread frustration with the unhappy state of Turkish politics and the JP Government’s inability to tackle many of Turkey’s problems, especially student violence, has recently given rise to widespread rumors and further CAS reports of an increasing willingness of the Turkish military to intercede in the political process. These reports have begun to involve many of the top leadership, suggesting that Demirel’s modus vivendi with them has been attenuated by the scale and intractability of the problems he has been unable to solve. Most recently, there have been reports of specific suggestions to President Sunay by the Air Force Commander, General Batur. In his capacity as a member of Turkey’s NSC, he advocated changes in Turkey’s governing institutions to permit more effective leadership of the nation.
Prognosis

The attempt to unseat Demirel doubtless will continue and is likely to be more vigorously pursued by the elitists and by the JP right-wing spin-off group, which formed the Democratic Party on December 19. The majority of the JP will be extremely reluctant to withdraw support from Demirel, since they realize that—as Foreign Minister CaglayanGil has analyzed the situation—the withdrawal of Demirel as Prime Min- ister will only encourage redoubled attacks on any JP successor, and the JP would have sacrificed Demirel in vain. If the JP Government is unable to reassert its control, perhaps because of further defections from the party’s right flank, the calling of new elections is a probability. These could be held as early as May 1971.

The military remains a somewhat unpredictable factor. Intervention of some kind is a distinct possibility if the JP Government fails to come to grips with the critical issues, such as student violence, and if the Grand National Assembly continues to act irresponsibly. A limited intrusion by senior officers to bring about changes designed to induce greater stability and responsibility in government, such as an altered elections law, seems most likely. This might well be through the assumption by President Sunay, with the National Security Council, of much of the executive function. However, the field grade ranks were the locus of plotting for the 1960 military revolution, and the emergence of another such group cannot be excluded.
440. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Kidnappings in Turkey—As of 5:00 p.m. Saturday

The search in Turkey is still on. After the campus disturbances and deaths yesterday, our embassy reports Ankara as “remarkably” calm today. Local press accounts have been condemning the kidnappers but have taken the opportunity for a few punches at the U.S. presence in Turkey. Your position on not pressing Turkey to negotiate has been given coverage.

There has been no further word from the terrorists since a message Friday addressed to the U.S. embassy which reiterated conditions for release and enclosed four—believed authentic—messages from the kidnapped airmen. This message did not explicitly threaten execution and now that the deadline has passed, it is generally felt in Turk circles that it will be extended de facto. The danger, of course, will continue until they are released.

Prime Minister Demirel has conveyed to Ambassador Handley that Turk efforts were being broadened today. The men are believed to be somewhere in the greater Ankara area and Turk police have raided local homes on the basis of “tip-offs.” There are no government plans to negotiate with the kidnappers. The Turks have also ruled out plans to impose martial law for the time being.

Ambassador Handley, in line with our policy, has told the Turkish government that we do not intend to pay ransom. This policy has come under attack here by families of the airmen speaking to the U.S.


2 At 1:30 a.m. on March 4, four USAF airmen were abducted with their vehicle by “radical leftists” armed with automatic weapons. On the morning of March 4 messages were sent to Turkish news agencies and the Turkish radio organization demanding $400,000 ransom by 6 p.m. on Friday and that a revolutionary manifesto the group provided be read over Turkish radio. The Department of State instructed the Embassy in Ankara to inform the Government that the United States would not pay the ransom, a decision that coincided with the Turkish Government’s unwillingness to pay ransom. (Memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, March 4; ibid.)
press. The Air Force prepositioned an aircraft in Athens containing the ransom sum on an extremis contingency basis pending any change in our policy, but it would not move without such a change.³

³On March 8 Kissinger sent the President a memorandum, which Nixon saw, informing him that the kidnapped airmen had been freed unharmed. (Ibid.)

441. Intelligence Information Cable¹


COUNTRY
Turkey

DOJ
10 March 1971

SUBJECT
Meeting of Command Council of the Armed Forces

ACQ
[1 line not declassified]

SOURCE
[7 lines not declassified]

1. An unprecedented meeting of the Command Council of the Armed Forces, chaired by Turkish General Staff (TGS) Chief General Memduh Tagmac, took place at TGS headquarters in Ankara on 10 March from approximately 1000 to 1800 hours. The meeting was attended by the Commanders of the Ground Forces, the Air Force and the Navy, by the Commanders of the First, Second and Third Armies, all Corps Commanders, all Air Force Area Commanders and a number of other general officers.

2. This meeting was convened at the insistence of a large number of senior officers to discuss and reach a firm decision on measures to

be taken by the armed forces in the face of continuing deterioration of
the political situation following the kidnapping of four American air-
men on 4 March and subsequent student-police clashes at Middle East
Technical University and elsewhere.

3. Lieutenant General Hayati Savasci, Chief of Staff of the Ground
Forces stated that the meeting would reach one of two decisions. Either the proposal by a number of younger gener-
als for a military takeover of the government apparatus would be ap-
proved, or the solution favored by General Tagmac and others for dic-
tation by the army to President Cevdet Sunay and Prime Minister
Suleyman Demirel of specific and immediate control measures to be im-
plemented with a facade of civilian rule would have to be adopted. Savasci added that there were no other remaining alternatives.

4. Savasci further said that there no longer was any question of
whether the army would intervene in the political situation. The army
was intervening and it was merely the form that remained to be de-
cided. He said it was important that a clear consensus be reached dur-
ing the 10 March meeting. He explained that if divisions remained, a
dangerous situation could result in which the disappointed parties
might decide to try to force their own decisions on the others. Whichever result is reached, Savasci said, it will be rapidly communicated
down the line to all commands.

5. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: Air Force command-
ers, in particular, are quite heated up in favor of immediate military
intervention and are expected to oppose strongly the Tagmac solution.)

6. ([less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: See [less than 1 line not
declassified] (TDCS DB–315/01243–71) for another account of this meet-
ing. As of 2400 hours 10 March, Ankara was quiet and there were no visible signs of a military alert.)

7. [2½ lines not declassified]

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2 See Document 440.
3 Not found.
4 After receiving the military ultimatum, Prime Minister Demirel and his Cabinet
resigned on March 12.
Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for Domestic Affairs (Krogh)¹


SUBJECT

Turkey’s New Government and the Opium Problem

In response to your memos,² I asked CIA to give us its reading on the new Turkish government’s³ possible attitudes and capabilities in relation to the problem of further reducing the flow of illegal opium from Turkey. The main conclusions of the CIA analysts are:

—The new Prime Minister’s immediate preoccupation will be to regain control of public order by suppressing political radicals. The opium licensing bill now awaiting parliamentary consideration and the organizational changes in the collection and enforcement agencies will necessarily have lower priorities for the moment.

—Nevertheless, these programs have already achieved a momentum of their own. If the more violent dissidents can be brought under control and calm restored to college campuses, there is nothing to prevent the opium control program from moving forward or even accelerating during the next few months.

—Conscious of being under the watchful eye of the military, Parliament may now move ahead on the opium bill with far less debate in the pre-voting phase than was usually the case while Demirel was in office and each move became hostage to opposition efforts to make life uncomfortable for him.

—The military will set priorities in Turkey for the foreseeable future and are the final arbiters, even if they choose to go on as they are now working through a parliamentary government. They are essentially uninformed on the international opium problem as it affects Turkey. They have taken no stand. As you know, President Sunay has been initiated into the problem and his influence with the present top military leaders remains strong.

—Thus, the way is now open to convincing the military decision-makers of the urgency of the opium problem. We should encounter no


² Additional documentation relating to narcotics policy for Turkey is ibid., White House Special Files, Staff Members Office Files, Egil Krogh, Subject Files, Heroin/Turkey. Also see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Documents 143–227.

³ Following Demirel’s March 12 resignation under military pressure, President Sunay designated Nihat Erim to form a new government. Erim resigned from the Republican Peoples Party and formed a coalition government with representatives from both the RPP and Justice Party, which won a vote of confidence on April 7.
particular pre-conceptions or resistance, although the generals will
probably be more receptive if they expect some tangible return to
Turkey for their cooperation.

—Little is known of Prime Minister Erim’s personal attitude to-
ward this problem. He is, however, an expert on international law, and
his recognition of Turkey’s need to live up to its commitments under
the 1961 UN convention can be used to encourage his support. He is
genuinely well disposed toward the U.S. His political base is secure,
and he would probably be far less deterred from acting than was
Demirel by charges of subservience to U.S. interests.

Our program thus falls now under three objectives, and I have noted
below each what I have asked State to do in respect to it:

1. The most urgent aspect of the program is to improve the en-
forcement and control measures in order to achieve the complete col-
lection of this year’s crop. This is critical because an effective program
for buying up production would provide “insurance” against failure of
the government to make other desired moves toward licensing and
eradication. It would also have more immediate impact. As you know,
a program for doing this came out of Jim Parker’s Division visit to
Turkey. At the same time, the Turkish Soil Products Office (TMO), which
is responsible for buying up the crop, has developed a program for en-
larging its organization and increasing the collection force in each of the
seven provinces where poppies are now grown legally. All of this can
be done in the absence of a licensing law under the previous law that
sets up the system for declaring opium to be grown. This law contains
enough teeth to permit the government of Turkey to be sure the farmer
fills out an honest declaration and then to collect everything declared.

Action being taken: Ambassador Handley has been authorized to
say that the U.S. would meet the costs of this program. So far the Turks
have acted as if they are prepared to handle these themselves. Unless
BNDD sees technical deficiencies we can correct or further encourage-
ment we can provide, this seems on the tracks.

2. The objective of second and almost parallel immediacy is the
passage by parliament of the licensing and control law. Ambassador
Handley has already made some approaches to the military and key
members of parliament, stressing the importance which we attach to
the passage of this legislation. If it does not seem to be moving as we
would like, Secretary Rogers will put it on the top of his agenda when
he goes to Ankara on April 30 for the CENTO ministerial meeting.

Action being taken: In addition to the above, I have asked that Am-
bassador Handley submit a plan for impressing on the military, as well

4 An officer of the BNDD.
as on members of the new government, the international significance of this legislation and the importance to U.S.-Turkish relations. This plan is due early next week.

3. The last action—chronologically—will be the approach we take to the Prime Minister’s proclamation, legally required by June 30, on the number of provinces where planting will be permitted for the following year. You will recall that Demirel last June stated his intention in his announcement this June to reduce to four the number of provinces where poppy could legally be planted in the fall of 1971.

The main issue will be whether, as soon as the new government gets its feet on the ground in a couple of weeks, to make a major approach to the Prime Minister urging him to declare total eradication in his proclamation this June 30. The State Department informally feels that the best we could persuade him to do is to confirm planting in four provinces in this coming year, as Demirel had intended, and then announce reduction to one or two in the following year. If this were done, and if he followed up in his announcement in June 1972 of intent to reduce to zero the following June that would still permit the President to say before the 1972 conventions that Turkey had agreed to complete eradication, although there would still at that time be some production. Undoubtedly, however, there will be pressure here for a reduction to planting in no provinces in the announcement of this June.

Action being taken: I have asked State to begin drafting the instructions to Ambassador Handley on this approach. Unless there is unexpected agreement within our own ranks, I think this may well be the occasion for the next meeting of the Heroin Task Force, but let’s see how the instructions develop.

This leaves one question untouched: How to counter some of the more adverse publicity now developing on this problem. State is conducting a series of press and Hill briefings now. However, it seems to me that we really ought to gear ourselves to capitalize on some concrete move such as passage of the licensing bill. If that happens, then there should be a major effort to focus attention on that achievement.

If you have further thoughts on the above, please let me know.

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5 The instructions were sent in telegram 62159 to Ankara, April 13. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971)

6 No response was found.
443. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

Washington, April 13, 1971, 1945Z.

62159. For Ambassador Handley from the Secretary. Subj: Opium. Ref: Ankara 2208.1

1. Greatly appreciate helpful and comprehensive message on steps we should take in initial contacts with new government. We endorse your view that opium is number one question, particularly in light estimate that strong likelihood of little if any change toward our other interests.

2. We agree with your basic analysis and strategy contained para 3 ref tel. Given the lengths taken to maintain thread of constitutionality during recent crisis, we see no possibility that new government will contravene the decree which designates reduction from seven to four provinces for planting in 1971.

3. Concur that it wise and useful to summarize our discussions with GOT since 1966. You should indicate that GOT had informed us in 1967 that its goal was eradication to be accomplished over three to four year period to minimize adverse impact on Turkish farmer. Since new leadership has told us that it envisions continuity in foreign policy we hope that it will endorse goal of eradication. We believe that both on tactical grounds and as follow-on of our conversations with Demirel government you should inform Erim government we continue to feel eradication is best ultimate solution. Therefore you should ask Erim’s plans in this regard, and in ensuing discussion propose no further planting beginning in 1972. If the GOT indicates that this timetable for eradication is not feasible, you should urge the reduction to one, or at the maximum two provinces in 1972 with corresponding decrease in acreage, coupled with assurances of an effective licensing, control and collection system.

4. It would be obviously unfair to make Turkish farmer suffer from economic dislocation that will result from eradication. We would prefer assistance to Turkey, if desired, move through the UN or other international institutions. The new UN fund for drug abuse control envisages assistance in law enforcement as well as pilot projects in

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Ogden; cleared by Sisco, Cash, H.R. Wellman (S/NM), Davies, Johnson, and Eliot; cleared for information by Ingersoll, Eugene Rossides (Treasury), MacDonald, F.A. Bartimo (OSD/COUNS), and CIA; approved by Rogers.

2 Not found.
development of economic alternatives to opium production. USG will, if other sources cannot provide, stand ready consider assistance to ameliorate impact of eradication.

5. We agree that it would be most useful to continue broaden base of contacts within Turkey, building on your representations to major political parties, leaders of Grand National Assembly and discreet contacts with senior military leaders. We, too, see no advantage in actively involving military leaders and agree that any effort on our part to get them to take more active role will be resisted. However, we should definitely make sure they are kept will informed of our concerns. We will also attempt to stimulate greater activism on part of Germans, French and others to broaden third country contacts along lines you suggest.

6. We have already involved Turkish Ambassador more deeply and more frequently. Problem of opium raised with Esenbel by Under Secretary Johnson on March 22 and at greater length by Asst Sec Sisco April 1. Sisco pointed out public sentiment reflected in Congress were about forty measures pending aimed at stemming narcotics flow into US. Noted it important that pending licensing and control bill be enacted promptly, and equally important that a comprehensive plan be developed and adequate resources made available to collect the entire crop this year. Also urged that further reductions (number unspecified) be made in number of poppy provinces for 1972 planting.

7. Please advise soonest results your initial conversations with Foreign Minister and Prime Minister.3

Irwin

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3 On April 22 the Embassy reported on a long conversation with Foreign Minister Olcay on that date in which Handley made the points mentioned in this telegram. (Telegram 2796 from Ankara, April 22; ibid.)

SUBJECT
Turkey Aid Loan for FY 71

Secretary Rogers (Tab A) requests your approval of a $40 million development loan for Turkey to include a program loan of $25 million for commodity imports and a project loan of $15 million to expand the Eregli steel mill.

At the Turkish Aid Consortium’s April 27 pledging session, the US will be called upon to announce its pledged amount of aid for Turkey in FY 71. Failure to do so at that time would be interpreted by Turkey’s new government as an indication of our lack of confidence in it. We have no reason to show any such lack of confidence and want to get off to a good start with Prime Minister Erim, who has reaffirmed Turkey’s strong ties to NATO.

There is, however, a persuasive economic case for the loan. Last August Turkey, after considerable urging by the IMF, World Bank and ourselves, undertook a major economic reform program including a 40 percent exchange devaluation, institution of an incentive system for encouraging exports, removal of some restrictions on imports, and measures to hold down inflation. At this point it is too early to tell whether the reform will yield the significant results Turkish planners hope for, but preliminary indications point to some important successes. The proposed $25 million AID program loan, coupled with similar loans from other donors and the multilateral institutions, should provide Turkey with adequate foreign exchange to continue its liberalization of imports, and increase the stability of the Turkish lira.

The Eregli steel mill, a private sector company with substantial Turkish government participation, was begun in 1962 and subsequently expanded with the participation of AID, the World Bank, and US private industry. Further expansion, designed to double its capacity, will be financed in part (roughly $120 million) by Ex-Im and the World Bank; AID under the proposed project loan, would pick up $15 million of the cost.

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2 Attached but not printed.
The only issue that has arisen in connection with this loan was the question of whether the US pledge should be conditioned on a Turkish promise to announce this June an end to the planting of opium poppies in 1972. Secretaries Connally and Rogers have agreed that we should go ahead and make our pledge at the aid consortium meeting Tuesday—that it would not be wise to raise this issue in this international forum. They further agreed that Secretary Rogers would raise the question with the Turks when he is in Ankara at the end of the week. Although we have no commitments, the initial attitude of the new Turkish government on the opium question has been encouraging.

Recommendation: That you approve pledging $40 million in aid for Turkey at the consortium meeting April 27 as recommended by Secretary Rogers. [The concurrence of the Office of Management and Budget is at Tab B.]³

³ Brackets in the original. The President initialed the approval option on April 26. Tab B is attached but not printed.

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445. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


Moynihan’s idea of buying the entire Turkish opium crowd is one that seems intriguing. I realize there are problems here, but would you have a check made to see what, if anything, could be done. Connally seems to like the idea, provided it does not have other foreign policy implications which would militate against it.²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 341, HAK/President Memos 1971–. No classification marking.

² The idea was endorsed by Secretary of the Treasury Connally during an April 27 meeting with the President. (Memorandum from Haig to Sonnenfeldt and Saunders, April 28; ibid.)
446. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, May 18, 1971, 1145Z.

3498. Subj: Opium Eradication Proposals, Meeting With Prime Minister Erim. Ref: A) State 84563; B) Ankara 3357.  

1. Summary: Prime Minister Erim recd me May 17 at 1630 in response my request for meeting which I had indicated would be on subject opium. Throughout our conversation he was entirely cordial, forthcoming and positive. Our proposals he said provided "answer" to question he had raised in our last meeting on substitute for opium if cultivation to be banned. Subsidy scheme especially interesting, he said, "could gain us a year." At conclusion our talk he referred to paper I left with him (based on paras 3 through 8 reftel B) and instructed his aides (Asim Akyamac and Resat Arim, Director and Deputy Director General, IO Affairs, Foreign Ministry) to study it with interested ministries and put it "in proper form" soonest, in any event "before end of June." *End summary.*

2. In 40 minute meeting with Prime Minister Erim late afternoon May 17 I presented our proposal for eradication opium production as outlined paras 3 through 8 reftel. Recalling our last meeting, when he had asked for our ideas on what might be offered peasant producers as substitute if poppy banned, I said we wished propose a program which seemed to us to be feasible way for banning further planting altogether this year. Control is difficult, demanding and expensive, I said, and as long as any production permitted some illicit traffic virtually inevitable. Even with tight controls some would get out and Turkey would be held accountable in world opinion. Total eradication best. I also recalled that since 1967 Ambassador Hart and later I had discussed this subject with Demirel. He had told us he hoped eliminate all planting within 3–5 years, i.e. by about 1972. Subject had also been discussed both here and in Washington with Foreign Minister Caglayangil, who had agreed eradication best solution. Prime Minister nodded acknowledgment these points but made no comment.

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2 Telegram 84563 to Ankara, May 14, reads: "We agree with you that discussions need to be initiated soonest. Your proposals are an excellent beginning and suggest you present them GOT ASAP." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO–DRUGS–TUR) Telegram 3357 from Ankara, May 12, outlined the statement on opium eradication that Handley intended to make to Erim at their meeting. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971)
3. I then proceeded review fully our proposal for decree banning further production, subsidy payment scheme, announcement development plan for region centered on Afyon, and financing possibilities, including all elements paras 3 through 8 reftel B and concluded with expression willingness discuss details at any time with Turkish officials. During my discussion financing I took occasion, at mention of possible recourse to UN CND fund, to give him full page ad from New York Times, “The Poppy is also a Flower,” showing serious effort in US to increase UN funds for opium control. I did not attempt go into details on financing beyond those included paras cited reftel. I concluded with assurance that “If you, sir, are interested, we think it can be done.”

4. Prime Minister listened attentively to my presentation, without interruption, nodding occasionally his appreciation particular points. He appeared understand fully. Only when I had concluded did he speak up, saying it was true his idea was to “to prohibit all further cultivation” poppy plant but, as he had said in our first meeting, problem was what substitute could be offered producers. Now, he said, “your proposal provides answer.” It must be carefully studied.

5. During ensuing discussion Prime Minister said draft control bill “going well,” will provide that Turkish poppy production from seed to harvest will be controlled by single agency, TMO, in manner similar current sugar beet controls. But, he said, our proposed program has “most impressive element” in its proposal pay subsidy adding “this could gain us a year.”

6. Reminded by his aide (Akyamac) that GOT Ministry Public Health has mentioned internal need for medicinal opium products Prime Minister said this could be taken from current stock or “it can be bought from another country.” Control measures he said are not enough. Turkey has just raised price it will pay this year for current crop but traffickers will only raise their price to TL 500 or more; on Iranian border price already TL 2,000, he said. As he had noted in GOT program, Prime Minister continued, this humanitarian question and humanitarian considerations must always come before economic.

7. Prime Minister said twice during conversation he was troubled by question does GOT have legal authority ban planting altogether? Is such authority in new control bill? Akyamac said requirement was for one year advance notice before ban effective but then noted that subsidy scheme would seem eliminate need for such notice. I suggested new control bill (which Prime Minister said is planned become effective July 1 this year) could be used assure full collection this year, then ban production next year. As for application subsidy scheme, I said, four provinces listed for next year, and especially two of them (Afyon, Isparta) are principal growers, hence most desirable make ban effective there soonest.
8. In discussion what provinces would be affected Akyamac mentioned that while he was working on substitution plans with Ministry Agriculture, Ministry officials had said provinces recently taken out of production, not merely seven current or four authorized for next year, would want share in any substitution program. He also mentioned opium growing interest in Malatya was especially “persistent” and Prime Minister interjected that people from Konya had also pressed him for renewal authorization grow poppy at least in northern part. He then added, however, they must be made to “forget” poppy growing. In his own province 40 years ago people grew opium, now it is “forgotten.” This has been done in other provinces where growing progressively banned; it can be done with remainder.

9. At conclusion my initial presentation our proposals I had handed him copy of paper quoting almost verbatim from paras 3 through 8 ref tel B which he accepted with expression appreciation. As our meeting drew close he pointed to this paper and instructed his aides to take it up with Ministers Agriculture and Commerce, work it over with them to “put it in proper form” and do this “as soon as possible, before end of June.” Turning to me he said these are “good proposals” and he hoped they could be made to work.

10. Comment: I am greatly encouraged by positive attitude shown by Prime Minister Erim. Although we had some earlier indications he was being influenced to accept continued production with controls he seemed in our talk convinced that total eradication provides only answer to opium problem. Moreover, he seemed more than willing to accept our idea for immediate ban, if it could be done legally.

11. We must realize however that our proposals will now go to technicians for “study” and that what may finally emerge is unknown. We know some these technicians still believe strict controls should at least be given a chance. They may well try to delay implementation any eradication scheme on legal or technical grounds. There are also political pressures which will be brought to bear.

12. We should also be prepared for possibility Turkish version eradication plan will be costly, calling for additional aid input. I think it unlikely technicians will merely accept use of accumulated PL 480 counterpart, for example, foregoing chance to go for new project loans and additional help. These demands will presumably be negotiable but in final analysis we must be prepared to be generous.

13. All this being said I found Prime Minister Erim’s words most encouraging and I think we can proceed with greater confidence that some solution to opium problem in Turkey at any rate is attainable. Goes without saying public premature disclosure gist of our proposals and of Prime Minister’s positive reaction must be avoided.

Handley
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Turkish Position on Opium

Before returning for your meeting on narcotics, Ambassador Handley met with Turkish Prime Minister Erim and his top advisers on opium. As of now, their position—which is still subject to further evolution—includes these elements:

—A major effort underway to collect this year’s harvest.
—Passage of the licensing and control bill assured by June 30.
—Reduction of this fall’s planting from seven provinces to four with the strong possibility that the government, before the end of June, will announce that production of opium after the 1971 planting season will no longer be in the hands of private farmers but might, if not eliminated altogether, be confined to one province on state farms only.

Handley notes that the precise Turkish position is still under discussion in Ankara. The issue seems to be how far they can announce now that 1972 plantings will be cut back. One proposal is to allow legal planting in one or two provinces; another is to allow it only in one and there on state farms. The procedure being adopted in the three provinces to be eliminated this fall is a subsidy to be paid to former growers and the introduction of labor-intensive industry, e.g. apparel, leather and industry based on animal husbandry. Following Handley’s expression of deep disappointment that they could not take a dramatic step now, the Turks after this meeting sent him a revised plan which would add voluntary elimination of planting and compensation in the four remaining provinces this year if the US were able to cover financing for the compensation scheme.


See Document 448.

As reported in telegram 4090 from Ankara, June 12. (Ibid.) Handley arranged this meeting in response to an instruction from the Department, in telegram 100799 to Ankara, June 8, that he give Erim a personal message from Nixon expressing the President’s concern with the heroin problem in the United States. (Ibid.) In the message the President explained U.S. domestic efforts to attack the problem and asked that Erim respond with decisive action to proposals suggested by Handley on May 17; see Document 446.
This first Turkish position does not go as far as we had hoped it would. However, the government for the first time is seriously engaged in the problem and in developing a position for moving on a broad front. While there are some hardliners, the Prime Minister seems well disposed toward our view. There is now room for negotiation of a solid step forward—even if not all we would like—before the end of the month. It seems important to give this negotiation every chance.

448. Memorandum for the President’s File


SUBJECT
Meeting with Ambassadors and State Department Officials on International Narcotics Trafficking, June 14, 1971, 10:10 a.m.–11:45 a.m.

The President opened the meeting by saying that the presence of senior members of the Cabinet, plus Ambassadors of five countries underlines the importance the President places on the drug problem. The Administration’s program will emphasize reduction in the supply of dangerous drugs through the arrest and prosecution of pushers, treatment of addicts and education programs.

The President placed the drug problem in the perspective of a national rather than a military problem. He pointed out that the problem of supply of heroin is outside of the U.S., for the U.S. does not produce any opium poppy.

[Omitted here is discussion of the domestic drug problem and heroin in Southeast Asia.]

Ambassador Handley briefed on the subject of U.S./Turkey relations and the long history, dating back to 1932, of negotiations between the U.S. and Turkey on the reduction of poppy cultivation. In 1967, there were 21 provinces in Turkey cultivating poppy. By 1971, the number of provinces was reduced to 7; and in 1972, the provinces will be reduced to 4. It is noted that these 4 provinces are the most productive. Where the Government of Turkey has banned the cultivation of
the poppy, this ban has been effective. In fact, the number of acres in production went up down? from 1970 over 1968.

The U.S. policy is to have Turkey eradicate completely its poppy crop. Prime Minister Demirel tried to do this over 4 to 5 years, but was not successful. Prime Minister Erim also wants to eradicate the poppy crop.

By the end of June of 1971, there will be an announcement from the Government of Turkey that only 4 provinces will be allowed to cultivate the poppy starting in September of 1971. Unprecedented efforts have been made by the Government of Turkey to buy up the crop. Ambassador Handley expressed some reason for optimism.

Ambassador Handley suggested that $50 million over the next 3 or 4 years would suffice to get Turkey out of poppy production. The Government of Turkey is concerned, however, that the farmer be given a better life.

President Nixon asked whether Prime Minister Erim could move immediately in eradicating poppy cultivation with this $50 million. The President suggested that we could not wait 3 or 4 years to end poppy cultivation. The President asserted that it is worth $50 million to the United States if we can get it done. The President asserted that the United States will not be blackmailed, but he is willing to pay the price that must be paid in order to eradicate the poppy.

Ambassador Handley stated that the Prime Minister must give a one-year notice before he can tell the Turkish farmers that they cannot plant the poppy. This is a legal requirement.

Secretary Connally suggested that the crop could be purchased for $3 million. Ambassador Handley said that the Turks use the oils from the poppies for other industrial purposes and that there is no addiction to speak of in Turkey. He feels that the Prime Minister must be able to offer the farmers something better than poppy production, for instance sugar beets or onion plants. There is also discussion of the possibility of constructing textile plants so that textiles can be shipped to the U.S.

Secretary Richardson stated that the production of poppy has a cultural meaning for the Turks, for in 1969 the U.S. pharmaceutical companies were going to buy up the entire crop. Secretary Richardson asked why, if India can prevent diversion, cannot the Turks.

Ambassador Handley replied that in India a farmer is denied a license if he claims that he had a small crop. The rationale is that the farmer is either a liar or a poor farmer.

Ambassador Handley speculated that within 2 years there should be a total end of production of poppy in Turkey.

President Nixon stated that Congress could cut all foreign aid to Turkey because of the drug problem in the United States.
The President instructed that we explore at the very highest levels:

1. What would be the price to buy the Turkish poppy crop.
2. Will that work to effectively stop illicit diversion.

The President said that we should not pay a high price for something not worth the price. However, the price is cheap now because the price later can be the destruction of our NATO alliance.

Secretary Richardson stated that whatever the cost is, Congress will pay the bill if we can be assured that the crop can be eradicated.

Ambassador Handley stated that the Turks cannot buy the crop and control the crop this year; that we should take the toughest stand next year and demand total cessation of production.

The President remarked that Thailand, Laos and Turkey cannot control their own territories and therefore control of production would be difficult. The President admitted that part of the problem is that Americans demand heroin and we must educate our own people. He stated that marihuana gets young people into the drug culture and then it become easier to move on to heroin.

Ambassador Handley stated that he was convinced that Prime Minister Erim is trying to manage and curtail poppy production and that Turkey should not be singled out for retribution or criticism.

President Nixon stated that it would be interesting to know how many addicts enter Vietnam and how many addicts leave Vietnam who are not theretofore addicted to heroin.

Ambassador Handley felt that it would not be wise to accept Secretary Rogers’ suggestion that the President send a letter to Prime Minister Erim asking that production of poppy is terminated. The Ambassador felt that the Prime Minister could not comply and therefore there would be needless tension between the President and the Prime Minister.

President Nixon asked that the Secretaries of State, Agriculture and Treasury and the Attorney General get together to decide whether the subsidy being paid by the Turkish Government to the farmers is adequate and whether we can purchase better performance. The President said that he is willing to spend $50 million in one year if that will do the job.

[Omitted here is additional discussion of the domestic drug problem.]

SUBJECT
Opium Eradication in Turkey

Following your meeting on June 14 on narcotics, Ambassador Handley has had a series of exchanges with Turkish Prime Minister Erim and his key Cabinet advisers as a result of which the GOT has agreed to issue a decree no later than June 30, 1971, announcing that opium poppy cultivation will no longer be permitted after this year’s planting (under the present law the Turks are committed to four provinces for the Fall 1971 planting); i.e., eradication effective in the Fall of 1972. As instructed, Ambassador Handley has indicated in return our willingness to extend assistance to meet foreign exchange losses to the Turkish Government and to help compensate farmers for their loss of income for a transition period of three (with a possible stretchout to four) years, for which a grant of up to $15 million would be available. A program of voluntary abstention from planting in the final year could increase this somewhat. In addition, we would pledge grant aid of $10 million for FY 1972 and $10 million for FY 1973 to assist the Turkish Government program to restructure the economy of the opium producing area in order to provide a new way of life for the families involved. We have also agreed to enlist the cooperation of international organizations and private foundations to help Turkey in this effort.

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2 See Document 448.
3 In telegram 4337 from Ankara, June 21, Handley reported on a “long and frank discussion” with Erim on June 21 at which time Erim agreed to the three U.S. proposals: complete eradication by June 1972, full purchase of the current opium crop by Turkey, and legislation making poppy farming illegal provided that the United States was prepared to provide long term assistance to farmers affected by the ban on poppy growing. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970-31 Dec 1971) In telegram 4302 from Ankara, June 24, the Embassy reported that Turkish experts were floating $400 million as the figure for compensation for lost opium production. (Ibid.)
4 In telegram 113776 to Ankara, June 24, Rogers and Sisco stated that “the idea of including substantial compensation for assumed losses from illicit production is unconscionable.” They suggested the figures cited here. (Ibid.) In telegram 4439 from Ankara, June 24, Handley reported that he and Erim had reached preliminary agreement on these terms. (Ibid.)
The Prime Minister feels that it is a key element of his proposal to have a public statement by you after the Turkish decree is issued and his own statement is made explaining his decision to the Turkish people. He would like to see included in your statement the following: reassurances of U.S. friendship; full recognition of his Government’s efforts to control and eradicate opium; a promise of U.S. help in the affected areas, including enlisting the help of international organizations and private foundations; and a reiteration that military collaboration between the U.S. and Turkey will continue. Erim has also suggested that he would like to have a high-level agricultural mission to assist and advise in the basic agrarian reforms his Government will propose.

On June 26, in his last meeting with Ambassador Handley, Prime Minister Erim said he wished you to know that you have a reliable ally in Turkey, and that in the end it was not money but friendship that induced him to make the decision for eradication.

Recommendation

1. That you confirm the financial arrangements that would provide a total grant of up to $35 million ($15 million in a three-year compensation program and $10 million for investment in each year of FY 1972 and 1973).

2. That you approve the statement in the attached telegram, along the lines suggested by Prime Minister Erim, to be issued shortly after the Turkish decision is announced.

3. That you endorse in principle sending a high-level agricultural mission to Turkey, with the details and timing to be worked out later.

The Secretary of Treasury, the Attorney General and the Administrator for AID concur in these recommendations, which reflect the discussions in a conference attended by the Secretary of Treasury and the Attorney General, where agreement was reached on the instructions for Ambassador Handley.5

William P. Rogers

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5 Nixon approved these recommendations and the statement. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, June 28; ibid., Box 358, Subject Files, Narcotics, (1971) Vol. IV)
Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, June 30, 1971, 1215Z.

4518. For the Secretary from Handley. Subj: Narcotics: Meeting With Foreign Minister Olcay. Ref: A) State 116137; B) Ambassador’s tel-cons with NEA/TUR and Egil Krogh, White House, June 29.2

Summary: Foreign Minister and I, at virtually last minute session at his residence June 29, reached agreement that Turkey would, after fall of 1972, no longer grow opium poppy. We agreed on few relatively minor changes in USG proposal contained reftel. This in no way altered basic fact that for grants of about $35 million over three–four year period, GOT will grow no more poppies after harvesting of crop to be planted this coming fall and spring. End summary.

1. At end of long day during which we were in almost constant contact with GOT officials, I met at 1930 with Foreign Minister Olcay. At end of meeting, we had arrived at agreement on eradication of Turkish opium as of fall of 1972.

2. Meeting of one hour and 45 minutes took place at Foreign Minister’s official residence. FonMin Deputy Dir Gen Arim was with Olcay; Hill, Toner and Greene came with me.

3. Olcay had just returned that morning from three-day official visit to Iran and was not, therefore, fully briefed on our June 26 meeting with Prime Minister Erim nor on other weekend developments. I opened meeting by giving him copy of proposed statement by President Nixon (State 116136).3 Our discussions about it were useful in bringing Olcay up to date.

4. In lengthy review of proposed Presidential statement, Olcay had two broad problems: a) he said Prime Minister would want more specifics about long range assistance and b) he wondered what would happen if the two grants of $10 million each were not enough “to take care of the problem.” To first point, we noted Presidential messages are never detailed and we thought this was unusually strong one. He agreed. I reminded Olcay that message covered all subjects which Erim had wanted.

2 Telegram 116137, June 29, set out U.S. understanding of the terms of the agreement with Turkey on opium planting suppression. (Ibid.) No record of the telephone discussions with either NEA/TUR or Krogh was found.
3 Dated June 29. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO–DRUGS–TUR)
5. As for money, I reminded him that what was involved was $10–$15 million to compensate farmers and cover foreign exchange losses (noting that this was now for three–four year period) and $10 million grant in each of FY 72 and 73. “This amounts to maximum of $35 million for a fraction of your farmers who are fractionally engaged in poppy farming.” I concluded that seemed generous offer to me. Olcay said he personally also thought the two $10 million grants would be sufficient, but “others” disagreed. As I had said to Erim on June 26, the opium issue now encompassed entire range of US-Turk relations. “$35 million is not small amount when you consider what else Turkey is getting.”

6. We then turned to slightly expurgated version of my instructions (paras 2–10 ref tel) which we had informally shown to Erim at Foreign Ministry that morning. On request for legislation banning further opium poppy cultivation (para 3 ref tel), Olcay said he found suggestion “undemocratic.” He asked “How can govt in democratic country promise to pass a bill?” After discussing several word changes, we suggested and Olcay accepted “undertake to seek enactment of legislation banning further opium poppy production.”

7. Turning to amounts of money listed in paras 4 and 5 of ref tel, Olcay reviewed his and Prime Minister’s doubts about longer range. “How can you make promise of precise long range assistance?” I reminded him of many Congressional proposals to cut off aid to Turkey because of opium production.

8. Foreign Minister said he was worried about $10–$15 million range and possibility lower figure might be used. Likewise he was not convinced that full $20 million grant would be forthcoming from other two amounts. I then agreed that three amounts could read “minimum of $15 million,” “minimum of $10 million,” and “minimum of $10 million,” on understanding this did not in any sense commit US to any higher figure but would help GOT presentationally in explaining US undertaking to Turkish political leaders.

9. Olcay then brought up one of most familiar Turkish themes in our discussions—necessity to earn, over long run, foreign exchange equal to that now earned by opium. He reported that Deputy Prime Minister Karaosmanoglu still believes that this is a crucial point and that investments replacing opium must include factories for such things as shoes which could then be exported to US and elsewhere. Toner reminded Olcay of our earlier proposal related to onion and garlic dehydration plant and said AID studies indicated there would be good market for such products in Europe. As means of meeting GOT concern without expanding US commitment, we agreed on adding at end of para 4 following phrase: “and help create new sources of foreign exchange.” This seemed satisfy Olcay.
10. There were no problems with paras 6 and 7 reftel. Olcay did note that Erim considers visit by agricultural experts important.

11. Re para 8, we discussed timing of statements to be made on June 30. Later that night, after Arim brought us copy of Prime Minister’s statement, we agreed on following: GOT decree (Ankara 4498),\(^4\) to be released during morning June 30; Prime Minister’s statement (Ankara 4499)\(^5\) to be released at noon June 30 Ankara time and to be reported on Radio Ankara news reports; President Nixon’s statement to be made at noon Washington time (subsequently changed on basis telcon to 0900 Washington time), which would mean it could be reported on 1900 radio news program, Ankara time.

12. Olcay professed not to understand para 9 (re proposed further grant if voluntary program in 1971–72 season at least 35 percent successful). He had earlier mentioned “35 percent” in telephone conversation with me and we had agreed that word “significant” might be better than using actual figure. We now confirmed that earlier agreement.

13. Olcay wondered about condition in para 10. I replied “If there 100 tons of illegal opium from this year’s crop, President Nixon would have great difficulties in explaining to American public any assistance to GOT.” Olcay replied he not objecting to principle stated there, but perhaps to grammar, but he then passed on to other subjects.\(^6\)

14. Arim then gave us advance copies of Turkish decree which GOT would issue June 30 and gave oral summary in English. He promised to bring copies of Prime Minister’s statement to my residence later in evening.

15. Comment: After I read Prime Minister’s statement brought to residence by Arim late last night, after my meeting with Olcay, I and my colleagues felt that he had said as eloquently and persuasively as anyone could why Turkey should permanently prohibit poppy planting beginning in the fall of 1972. In terms of overall figures, I made no concessions, but in conversations with NEA/TUR and in telephone call I received from Deputy Assistant to President Krogh, I identified those specific changes from my instructions which I felt were necessary to close the deal. The issuance this morning of the decree, the first

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\(^4\) Dated June 30. (Ibid.)

\(^5\) Dated June 30. (Ibid.)

\(^6\) In telegram 4641 from Ankara, July 7, Handley noted the desire of Turkish officials for a written statement outlining the terms of the U.S.-Turkish agreement and proposed wording for such a statement that he could deliver to Erim. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971) The Department of State granted authorization for the letter in telegram 127415 to Ankara, July 15. (Ibid.)
substantive paragraph of which proclaims to all of Turkey the definite forbidding of the planting and production of the poppy within the borders of Turkey beginning with the autumn of 1972, seems to me to be a statement which countries other than Turkey may well consider and makes me proud of the courage shown by the present leadership in Turkey in taking such a giant step.

16. I do hope that the suggestions I made in last para Ankara 4441 to encourage prominent American personalities to make public congratulatory statements about Turkey’s historic decision can be given high priority. It is my impression that the Prime Minister would like to be internationally recognized for an act that he considers to be a major contribution to humanity.

Handley

7 Dated June 27. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO–DRUGS–TUR)

451. National Intelligence Estimate


[A prefatory note reads: “This estimate examines prospects for Turkey against the background of deep-seated social and economic issues which are profoundly affecting Turkish domestic and to a lesser extent foreign affairs. In assessing political matters it gives emphasis to developments between now and 1973 when parliamentary elections are scheduled to be held.”]

TURKEY’S PROSPECTS

Conclusions

A. Turkey’s intractable social and economic problems threaten the multiparty political system erected over the past 50 years. The Justice
Party, which represents the political alliance between the rising business and professional groups on the one hand and the more modern peasants on the other, wins elections. It cannot rule, however, without the acquiescence of the military elite and the bureaucratic reformers represented by the Republican Peoples Party (RPP), which governed Turkey until 1950. While the RPP leadership remains committed to democratic procedures, the military establishment takes seriously its role as protector of the regime against internal as well as external enemies and has intervened twice in the decades since the Second World War to bring down the government. The basic conflict of interest between these forces is not susceptible to early or easy solution.

B. Prime Minister Erim, though brought to office by military intervention, is no mere puppet of the generals. He is pledged to restore law and order and to carry out a wide ranging program of reform— involving principally land reform and strengthening the executive power of government. He is likely to accomplish very little of his ambitious program, however, and political tension will probably continue high.

C. The military establishment will almost certainly remain the final arbiter of Turkey’s politics for many years to come. But if civilian politicians cooperate to pass some reform measures, the present military leadership is unlikely to seize direct power. If a military government is established, however, it is likely to be long-lasting. The senior generals would probably continue many of the Erim government’s policies; a regime dominated by lower ranking officers would be more nationalistic in outlook and less predictable in direction.

D. Turkey is now engrossed in a debate on its place in the world. Many Turks feel that they have long been taken for granted by the US. Thanks to martial law the loudest critics of the US have been silenced and the climate for US activities in Turkey has somewhat improved under the Erim regime. [6 lines not declassified]

E. Measures to control opium are also linked to US assistance; and the Turks have expectations for substantial and continuing aid that are likely to be very hard for the US to meet. If US economic aid declines and indications appear that opium growers in other countries are increasing production, pressures inside Turkey to continue production would rise significantly. There is potential here for a clash of interests with the US on an issue which touches Turkish national sensibilities.

[Omitted here is the body of the estimate.]
1186. Subject: Visit of Turk FonMin: MAP/F–4 Sale to Greece. Following is uncleared and subject to revision:

1. Summary: Turk FonMin Bayulken paid brief call on Secretary Rogers in his office before attending working luncheon which Secretary gave for him. Also present during call were Turk Ambassador Esenbel, newly-arrived Turk Embassy Counselor Yegen, AsstSec Sisco and Country Director Dillon. Bayulken presented letter from President Sunay addressed to President Nixon and asked Secretary to deliver. (Text being sent to Ankara by septel.)

2. Letter describes Turkey as surrounded by Soviet Union, Bulgaria and countries of “dubious friendship like Syria and Iraq.” Says that Turk neighbors being supplied “latest modern armaments,” thus “possibility of concerted attack on Turkey” increases danger to southeast flank of NATO. Letter adds there no prospect peaceful solution in near future to Arab-Israeli conflict or Cyprus problem. Soviet Union exploits both these questions in order to establish “firm military and political foothold in area,” and “claims right of exercising influence in Mediterranean where she maintains considerable naval presence.” Turkey while seeking to maintain democracy and realize economic development is making sacrifices in order to play an effective part in NATO. Turkey, however, not in position to provide for defense against threat described above through her own resources and Sunay asks President to take “close look into defensive preparedness of Turkey so that our close cooperation in this field be continued without being allowed to be jeopardized and imperiled with considerations of economy.” Letter then refers to proposed visit of Prime Minister Erim, concluding that during that visit “common problems and concerns” can be reviewed.

3. At following luncheon, Secretary, noting that Congress had not taken final action on security assistance and consequently he did not know what final MAP figures would look like, observed that judging from letter GOT’s primary concerns were security and military aid matters. Bayulken agreed. He observed that Iraq and Syria had “500 mod-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. III, Secret; Exdis; Noform. Drafted by Dillon; cleared in NEA, PM/MAS, EUR/RPM, and S; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Athens, London, Nicosia, Sofia, USUN, USNATO, Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, SecDef, JCS, USCINCEUR, and USDOSOUTH.

2 Transmitted in telegram 1442 to Ankara, January 5. (Ibid.)
ern planes.” Furthermore it was the judgment of analysts that “they” (presumably the Bulgarians) could “thrust to Istanbul in five days.” This had to be a concern to all members of NATO. Furthermore, there was “naturally a certain anxiety on our part relating to news (concerning MAP) from the Congress.”

4. Bayulken then expressed GOT’s concern about possible sale of F–4’s to Greece. These planes, which could range over Turkey and Cyprus and safely return to bases in Greece, would alter delicate balance between Greece and Turkey which had existed since Lausanne and which had been “kept by NATO.” GOT appreciated Greek needs, but Greeks did not need F–4’s. Bulgarian border close and short range aircraft would suffice. Furthermore, Greek possession of F–4’s might also have effect on solution to Cyprus, i.e. GOG might be less willing to pursue compromise solution. Secretary then asked question about Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations, and discussion shifted to Cyprus (septel).³

³ Apparent reference to telegram 805 to Nicosia, January 3. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 2 CYP)


453. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹


SUBJECT
Advanced Aircraft for Greece and Turkey

During the past few months the Greek Government has moved steadily toward the purchase of a significant number of advanced aircraft from the US (you approved the sale of F–4’s to Greece in October 1970). The imminence of this sale has had a galvanic effect on official attitudes in both Greece and Turkey, and we expect the issue to figure prominently in discussions with Prime Minister Erim of Turkey when he visits Washington next month.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Subject Files: FRC 330 75-0009, T-87 F-4 Greece/F-5 Turkey. Secret.
If Greece buys advanced aircraft either from the US or France, we anticipate a sharp reaction in Turkey where in addition to an acute awareness of Turkish versus Warsaw Pact tactical air deficiencies, any change in the relative balance of Greek-Turkish forces poses both real and psychological problems. The situation will likely be exacerbated by a significant reduction in US military aid in FY 1972. Moreover, implementation of the proposed USN and USAF homeporting and basing arrangements in Greece and Crete could pose a further irritant.

The Turks already perceive what they believe to be actions which will give the Greeks a military capability they heretofore have not possessed. When the USN and USAF proposals become public, it is likely the Government of Turkey, and Turkish public opinion, will conclude that we have decided to root the preponderance of our interests in the eastern Mediterranean in Greece. They may further conclude that these moves are to be followed by a more general shift of US policy to favor Greece at Turkey’s expense. We cannot predict with any confidence the ultimate consequence of such a Turkish perception, but it could well involve an adverse impact on valuable US [less than 1 line not declassified] military rights in Turkey.

The requirement to modernize Turkey’s Air Force is equal to, if not greater, than that of Greece. Although part of Turkey’s modernization requirement could be met by provision of F–5E aircraft, a valid need remains for all-weather fighter aircraft such as the F–4. ISA is currently reviewing world-wide air modernization requirements with a view to isolating the funding problem for priority attention within the military security assistance program. It is unlikely, however, that this problem can be resolved prior to the FY–74 budget cycle.

In the meantime, we believe that despite the cost and complexity of the F–4’s, their psychological significance to the Turks could become so great that we must now weigh certain options that might be available to retain Turkish cooperation if the F–4 sale to Greece is consummated. In evaluating such options it must be understood that their feasibility is dependent upon sufficient grant/FMS funds being available to the Department of Defense. The options, with pros and cons, that might be considered are as follows:

**Option I. Continue with the F–5E program for Turkey which would fund 72 aircraft (4 squadrons) in the FY–74/75 timeframe and provide delivery during FY 76–77.**

**Pros**

Would satisfy modernization requirement for 4 fighter squadrons.

Provides new versus used or rehabilitated aircraft; thus the life span is longer, certainly is less costly and easier to maintain and operate than F–4 series.
Provides maximum quantitative modernization at given cost. ($115 million buys 4 squadrons of F–5’s; one squadron of F–4’s costs $120 million.)

Cons

Turkey might not be satisfied with anything less than F–4’s if Greeks get F–4’s.

If an “F–5 or nothing” deal offered to Turks, they might reject and turn to the French Mirage.

Option II. In addition to 4 squadrons of F–5E’s (or as offset to the provision of 1 or 2 of these squadrons), divert F–4C and D’s to meet Turkish requirement when the 23 F–4E’s currently on loan to Australia are returned (FY 73–74) to the USAF inventory.

Pros

Would assuage Turkish feelings, and weaken case for Greek-Turk imbalance.

From the standpoint of Turk ability to “fly” F–4’s, they would very likely be more successful with F–4C and D’s than the F–4E.

Cons

F–4C and D’s freed by returning F–4E’s are intended for U.S. Air National Guard; diversion would delay modernization of ANG.

F–4 aircraft are expensive to operate and maintain and, in terms of money and technology, would impose severe demands on Turk resources.

Diversion of Turkish funds to an F–4 purchase program could jeopardize other important armed forces modernization efforts.

Heavy investment in F–4’s would stimulate requests and demands for additional grant assistance to compensate for the drain on resources.

Would irritate the Greeks because they were not first offered a “used” F–4 squadron at a bargain price.

Option III. In addition to 4 squadrons of F–5E’s (or as offset to the provision of 1 or 2 of these squadrons), utilize the 23 F–4E’s from Australia to fulfill the Turkish requirement.

Pro

Would enable F–4E’s to be included in both Turk and Greek inventories thus maintaining “balance.”

Cons

Would deprive USAF of anticipated update in F–4E inventory, and ANG update in F–4C/D inventory.
Increased sophistication of F–4E would severely tax Turk resources. As a combat “package,” the 23 F–4E’s would be considerably more effective in the USAF.

Would irritate Greeks because they were not offered “used” F–4E squadron at a bargain price.

Recommendations

I. On balance, I believe the F–5E would be a more suitable aircraft for the Turks than would the F–4. Moreover, provision of this aircraft would be in consonance with current projections in the overall F–5E program. Accordingly, appreciating the variables involved, and in line with existing guidance to the Country Team, if approached by the Turks, we should promote the F–5E. In lieu of attempting to discourage the Turks from acquiring the F–4 aircraft, we would make arrangements for JUSMMAT to brief the Turks on the cost factors of the two aircraft and let the Turks make their own decision. Hopefully the disparity in costs, paucity of Turkish resources and dwindling world-wide MAP grant resources might persuade the Turks to opt for the F–5E.2

II. In the event the Greek F–4 sale is consummated, we recognize that the Turks may not be satisfied with anything less than F–4’s. In this circumstances, it is also possible that USG interests would dictate that we make available F–4’s to the Turks. Therefore, we should, without reference to the Turks, commence now to identify possible sources of F–4’s that might be made available and the essential balancing program adjustments. To this end, it is recommended that we request USAF views relative to Options II and III above. We would seek also information regarding other all-weather aircraft that might be considered as possible alternatives.3

III. West Germany for a number of years has provided a measure of military aid to Turkey and has shown real sympathy for Ankara’s lack of resources to meet pressing modernization needs. In view of the FRG’s major F–4 procurement program, I propose that we explore Bonn’s willingness to assist the Turks in this area, perhaps by providing German-produced components as grant aid or by facilitating a Turkish buy by offering long term, low-interest credit.4

G. Warren Nutter

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2 Secretary Laird initialed the approval option on March 3. In a March 31 letter to Prime Minister Erim, Laird suggested a briefing by U.S. officials comparing the costs and performance of the two aircraft. (Ibid., FRC 330 75-0125, 000.1–333 Turkey, 1972)

3 Secretary Laird initialed the approval option on March 3.

4 Secretary Laird initialed the approval option on March 3 and added by hand: “after trying No. I.”
454. Memorandum for the President’s File

Washington, March 21, 1972, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Nihat Erim of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS
President Nixon
Prime Minister Nihat Erim
Mr. Celal Akbay (Director General of the Department of Research and Policy Planning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkey)
Major General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

The meeting opened with the press photographs.

President Nixon then began the conversation by expressing his pleasure that the Prime Minister’s visit could be arranged. The meeting was especially significant, the President added, coming as it did between his Peking and Soviet trips. The President noted the difficulties which Turkey’s extended border with unfriendly and potentially unfriendly powers involved. He stated that he would visit Turkey at some time in the future. Turkey had always been a great ally of the United States and a loyal and important member of the NATO Alliance. He noted that this was near the first anniversary of the Prime Minister’s tenure.

Prime Minister Erim wished to touch upon the internal situation in Turkey. A kind of subtle subversion, which remained active and virulent, was the main issue for his Premiership. While external intimidation could not succeed because of Turkey’s strong NATO ties, subversion did—as it did in Czechoslovakia—present a serious threat to his country’s viability. On 9 March 1971, there had been a systematic effort to overthrow the forces of stability and democracy in Turkey. There were attempts at assassination and kidnapping, with the activity and leadership coming from the universities and even the high schools. It was at this time that the Armed Forces of Turkey took over and asked the Prime Minister to govern. Shortly thereafter, the Israeli Consul General was murdered, banks were being robbed at the rate of one a week, and political kidnapping continued. For this reason, martial law had to be adopted in six of Turkey’s regions.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 938, VIP Visits, Turkey, Turkey Prime Minister Erim, March 21, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Haig. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Erim made an official visit to the United States March 21–22. Briefing papers for the President concerning the visit are ibid.

Since that time, the situation had improved but it was still dangerous. Subversion continued.

The Prime Minister emphasized that he was strongly in favor of democratic processes in Turkey. For this reason, he was frequently criticized as being too soft on extremist elements. Nevertheless, he remained determined to abide by the Constitution which provides for a Parliament and independent judiciary. The situation in Turkey did not draw its virulence from internal sources but was rather fed from abroad; there was a large Turkish “liberation movement” based in Stockholm, and activity also in East and West Germany. There were, in fact, some 500,000 Turkish citizens working in the Germanies.

President Nixon noted that they were valuable workers in labor-shortage areas. The Prime Minister agreed, but noted that they were also targets for subversion. There was even a subversive center among Turkish nationals in Palestine. The question was, who is behind it? While irrefutable evidence was lacking, logic could only suggest that it was supported by powers who wished to weaken Turkey and NATO. Last year’s demonstrations against the Sixth Fleet were all the results of the leadership of international communism. Just this past week, 58 young officers were arrested due to their involvement in subversive activity. It was not simply a manifestation of youthful revolutionaries who have been captured by the philosophies of Mao, Marx or Guevara. The virulence of the movement and its tactics suggested a far more sophisticated guiding hand.

For this reason, the Prime Minister continued, he was attempting to modernize Turkey’s military forces. The morale of the military was essential to Turkey’s stability, and a collapse of the military would be fatal. Nikita Khrushchev had long held that Communist takeovers would not be by direct military means but by the victory of internal Socialist forces. France and other countries had the same problem, and the main challenge for the West today was to disrupt these subversive efforts. Unfortunately, many of Turkey’s friends did not grasp the seriousness of the problem. Within Turkey proper, the forces for democracy were timid and self-conscious, while the Marxists were militant and aggressive. The major force for stability remained the senior military.

President Nixon asked what the Prime Minister thought of the policies of the Greek Colonels. The Prime Minister replied that in his view Turkey’s way was the right way. A military dictatorship had no long term viability and more often than not resulted in feuding among the military, with increasing risks of instability. The Turkish military was professional. It kept out of politics to the degree that this was possible. The Junta route was unstable.

Prime Minister Erim continued that Turkey, in addition to its subversion problem, was troubled by economic problems. Population
growth had been extremely high, and the territories bordering Iran, Iraq and Syria were backward and underdeveloped. Turkey’s five-year plan was an effort to raise the standard of living, but much remained to be done. Turkey had even had to export laborers to foreign markets because of her rampant unemployment. Therefore the economic assistance of the United States was vital. This was not a plea for cash or credit, but primarily for investment and above all, know-how. For example, the discontinuation of the poppy crop was best compensated for not by cash but by new techniques for substitute crops. Turkey’s program was now going well in this area.

President Nixon stated that the United States wanted to be as helpful as possible because it was most grateful to the Prime Minister and the Turkish people for their enlightened approach to this international problem.

The Prime Minister stated that he had been subjected to much criticism because of his decision on poppies. Nevertheless, it was a sound decision. On the 6th of March 1971, the Prime Minister read of the difficulties the American youth and society in general were having. Based on this appreciation, he barred opium and had now adopted a program of compensation for the farmers. The difficulty was that the farmers were demanding more in the way of compensation than they had ever received from the illicit traffic. Nevertheless, Turkey would succeed with this program. Another economic development program of great significance to Turkey, the Prime Minister continued, was the U.S. road mission of 1947, which had really established the basis for Turkey’s internal road network. Similar assistance in the agricultural area would be a great legacy for the United States. Careful analysis confirmed that the military situation and security situation were closely linked with economic viability, and when the young military saw that the country was growing and prospering, its morale was high and its loyalty unquestioning. Nevertheless, the task ahead was severe. It would not be until 1995 that Turkey could hope to achieve the level of individual income of Italy today. Turkey would not be a full member of the European Economic Community until 1995. The Prime Minister mentioned that he would see the World Bank President, Mr. McNamara, tomorrow morning and would impress upon him Turkey’s need for investment, not charity.3

President Nixon expressed his appreciation for the Prime Minister’s analysis. It was insufficient merely to look at surface problems. The realities of Turkey’s economic situation must be understood. The President then directed General Haig to contact Mr. McNamara and

3 No record of this meeting was found.
urge him to take a most sympathetic view of Turkey’s problem. He instructed General Haig to contact Secretary Connally and be sure that Secretary Connally or Mr. Volcker spent 15 minutes with the Prime Minister in an effort to better understand his problems and be of assistance. In addition, General Haig was to contact Dr. Hannah of AID to be sure that Dr. Hannah contacted a member of the Prime Minister’s Delegation to outline what additional specific steps could be taken in the agricultural area to assist Turkey.4

The President pointed out that the current mood of the U.S. Congress was one of isolation. For example, the FY 1972 grant military aid package for Turkey had been cut from $100 million to $60 million. The President was now seeking to restore this cut or to find other means of compensating for the Congressional action. The United States was interested in Turkey not only because of its key NATO role but because of the importance of Turkey’s internal stability. Military assistance was important, but so was economic assistance and technical advice, as well as support from international lending bodies. The United States was prepared to give all possible help along this broad front.

The President then said he would like to turn from specific problems to more general ones. The world was in a very dangerous period. The non-Communist world panted for peace. False euphoria could result from Presidential trips to Moscow and Peking. Nevertheless, these trips were being undertaken without any illusions about Chinese or Soviet policies and goals. It was significant that the PRC in the communiqué did not omit the Chinese intention to support revolutionary movements.5 For this reason, the United States and the free world had to talk from strength. The NATO Alliance was as important as ever. The threat of subversion continued worldwide.

The critical question of modern times, the President said, was how the free world was to deal with détente. Free peoples derived hope from détente, and at such a time their fears diminished and unity consequently suffered. This was the phenomenon with which the free world must cope during periods of détente. Both the Prime Minister and the President obviously were aware of this problem, and the Prime Minister could be assured that when the United States President spoke with the Soviet leadership it would be with the full realization of this real-

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4 In a March 21 memorandum to the President, Haig reported he had talked to McNamara who stated he would give his full support to Turkey’s economic requests and also had contacted Hannah who would contact the Turkish Agriculture Minister. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 938, VIP Visits, Turkey, Turkey Prime Minister Erim, March 21, 1972)

5 For text of the February 27 communiqué, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 376–379.
ity. There were no illusions. Regardless of what agreements were arrived at, the Socialist camp has not abandoned its objective to take over through “peaceful means.” It was no longer wisdom to confront this phenomenon, but our guard must remain strong and our economic base must be strengthened. The Soviets also had their problems. Eastern Europe was unsettled. The Soviets also worried about their flank with China, and the Soviets were uncomfortable with the U.S. initiative.

The U.S. policy was a deliberate one, the President emphasized. It sought good relations with both Moscow and Peking—not to concert with one against the other, but to maintain an even-handed approach with both. This was the cornerstone of United States policy. It must be based on real friendship between all peoples with similar philosophies. It must also be guided by self-interest, and it was obvious that similar philosophies generated mutuality of interest which could not be abandoned in search of improved relationships with potential enemies. Similar philosophies permitted a greater cooperation and trust. Therefore, Turkey must understand that the discussions with the Chinese and Soviet leaders would not be conducted at the expense of old and trusted friends. That was why the Prime Minister’s visit to the United States between the two summits was so important. Turkey had been a staunch friend. It had stayed the hard course despite insurmountable odds. As long as the current leadership was in Washington, this would be the United States policy.

The Prime Minister called the President’s China visit a masterful diplomatic stroke. He had heard President Nixon’s voice at the time the announcement was made, when the President stated that America could no longer ignore 800 million Chinese. The Soviet Ambassador in Turkey was shaken by the announcement. But the Prime Minister knew precisely what President Nixon was doing. Turkey also knew that the United States could not let Turkey go Marxist. Turkey thought of itself as a “firewall” for the free world. It recognized that the United States could not lose this bastion. For this reason, Turkey was resolved to stay with the West but Turkey also needed military, economic, moral and social defenses. It had to overcome the danger of subversion or the free world would be faced with a fait accompli. The Turkish military now supported the Prime Minister, but there was strong propaganda seeking to overthrow the status quo. Thus, Turkey needed help, and all of its friends must be aware of Turkey’s problems.

It was nothing less than a war—a moral war and not one with guns—but the need for concerted action was just as strong, the Prime

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6For text of the President’s July 15, 1971, announcement, see ibid., 1971, pp. 819–820.
Minister emphasized. The Soviets might agree to strategic arms limitations but they still sought the moral erosion of the free world. Germany was one of the Soviets’ main targets, for it was an historic dagger pointed at the Soviet heart. The Turkish military were particularly concerned about Bulgarian armored divisions equipped with tanks with a range of 430 kilometers. The Turkish tanks provided by the United States could travel only 170 kilometers without refueling, and it took an armored division 10 hours to refuel. Thus, the Turkish military wanted longer range tanks. Iraq and Syria were also being equipped with modern Soviet armaments. The United States must not let the military assistance program lag.

President Nixon instructed General Haig to prepare a completely frank report on the relative capabilities of United States and Soviet-supplied armament.7

Prime Minister Erim noted that Communist propaganda maintained that the United States would not defend Turkey but would rather use Turkish blood to gain time. Turkey had structural problems with F–84 aircraft, and the Turkish military now wanted Phantoms. They were urging the Prime Minister to buy French Mysteres and Mirages if the United States sources was not forthcoming. Communist propaganda highlighted the obsolescence of Turkish military equipment. President Nixon commented that it was a standard line for the Communists to maintain that Turkey was a vassal of the United States.

The conversation then turned to Cyprus. Prime Minister Erim stated that Turkey was not seeking partition or a new solution. Turkey signed an agreement which it wanted respected. The new Greek Government was more enlightened on the problem, and Papadopoulos was anxious for good relations with Turkey. Good relations between Turkey and Greece strengthened NATO. Nevertheless, even though Cyprus was a small island, in 1959 and 1960 a mixed rule had been agreed to with mixed leadership and a mixed legislature.8 This was a good solution, for Makarios, who was little more than an 18th century chauvinist, had sought to upset the agreements. The Prime Minister had asked Secretary Rogers on his visit to Turkey to urge restraint on Makarios. The Archbishop had been the subject of Soviet flirtations; most recently, Czechoslovakian arms had been shipped to Cyprus. They fished in troubled waters.

7 No report was found. In a March 27 memorandum to the President, Haig reported that a study was underway. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. III Jan 72–Dec 73)

8 Reference is to the London Accords of February 1959; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 765–775.
Compromise was the best answer today, the Prime Minister felt. Makarios and the Greeks were at odds, and the Greek Religious Council was after Makarios. Turkey tried to keep out of the quarrel, but now was the time to push Makarios to make a settlement. Turkey wanted nothing new but merely implementation of existing agreements. What was required was a just solution. The Prime Minister had raised this with Vice President Agnew and had asked the Vice President to express Turkey’s views to the Greeks. The Vice President had made a fine impression in Ankara.

President Nixon pointed out that the United States had been trying to keep out of the internal affairs of Cyprus, although it was obvious that our interests converged. The problem was that we could not permit the Soviets to exploit this issue. The Prime Minister noted that 35% of the Cypriot vote was Marxist.

The Prime Minister then turned to the question of the Soviet fleet and the Straits. President Nixon remarked that the Soviets were not building their presence in the Mediterranean just to look at the beauties of Cairo. They wanted increased presence in the eastern Mediterranean. Therefore the United States was maintaining a strong fleet presence of its own and resisting Soviet penetration. Certainly the Middle East crisis was far bigger than a dispute between the Arabs and Israelis. The stakes were the entire Mediterranean, Turkey and Africa. For this reason, we could not allow Soviet domination of the eastern Mediterranean.

The Prime Minister said that the Government of Turkey proclaimed a good-neighbor policy but this could be viable only so long as Turkey remained strong. For this reason the joint communiqué published in conjunction with this visit9 should include a strong declaration for Turkish independence, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs. In 1947 it was the Truman Doctrine which saved Turkey. President Nixon said that he had voted for this policy. Dean Acheson, the President noted, had been the author of the so-called Truman Doctrine. Prime Minister Erim said that President Johnson had departed from it.

The Prime Minister mentioned that he had been a drafter of the Cypriot Constitution.

The Prime Minister then told the President that Pakistan’s President Bhutto had visited Ankara recently. The Prime Minister had asked Bhutto about his attitude towards CENTO. Bhutto’s reply was that it depended on the United States. President Nixon instructed General Haig to be sure that President Bhutto was aware of our support. He had just reiterated this support to the new Secretary-General of

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CENTO. The President added that CENTO was no longer a purely military organization but it was no less important because of its symbolic significance.

The Prime Minister informed the President that Turkey would recognize Bangladesh in April. President Nixon replied that the United States would also recognize Bangladesh after Indian troops had left its territory. Bangladesh, the Prime Minister pointed out, was now the largest Muslim country in the world. The President felt that the policies of Turkey and the United States were parallel with respect to Pakistan. During the recent crisis in South Asia, U.S. policy had saved West Pakistan.

Prime Minister Erim stated that he would see Soviet President Podgorny in April and that Podgorny would wish to proclaim a good-neighbor policy and non-aggression treaty. Turkey, however, would reply that as a member of NATO it would not enter into unilateral arrangements with the Soviet Union. Despite this, the Soviets would probably continue, as in the past, to press Turkey for a non-aggression pact. Failing that, they would press for a consultation arrangement, but here again Turkey could not check each of its moves with the Soviet Union. Turkey would stay within the Alliance framework and merely accept a good-neighbor statement. President Nixon thought this an excellent strategy. It was important that Turkey did not permit the Soviets to pick off an essential ingredient of the NATO flank.

As the meeting drew to a close, the President said that the two leaders could continue their discussion at the State dinner that evening. The Prime Minister thanked President Nixon for his hospitality, and said he had drawn great comfort from his discussions with the President. The President stated that this indeed was the right time for a visit from the Prime Minister. He reassured him that the United States was in Turkey’s corner and would do all it can. The Prime Minister said that Turkey must be strong and bright like a star. This was the Prime Minister’s goal, and for this Turkey needed the understanding of the United States. President Nixon stated that U.S. understanding would not come from compassion but self-interest. This was the underlying reality of continuing U.S.-Turkish cooperation.10

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10 Turkish Foreign Minister Bayulken held a simultaneous meeting with Rogers in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Accounts of their discussions are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 TUR.
455. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey**

Washington, July 10, 1972, 2145Z.


1. Evening of July 9 Turk Chargé Yegen telephoned NEA/TUR Director Dillon at home to say he had received instructions from Ankara to tell USG that decision re entry of Archbishop Iakovos had been reviewed at highest level of GOT; that Iakovos would not be permitted to enter Turkey; that Iakovos was ex-Turkish citizen who had lost citizenship and who had worked against best interests of Turkey; that his presence in Turkey during delicate period following death of Patriarch was considered particularly undesirable. Yegen added that “in our opinion” Iakovos wanted to gain entry in order to politick for succession to Patriarch, which was matter of “great sensitivity” in Turkey. Yegen then stressed that he under instructions to make clear that Greek Orthodox communicants, or church officials, other than Iakovos, were welcome to attend the funeral; his government hoped that the other members of the ecumenical delegation would feel free to come.

2. With some embarrassment, Yegen then said that he had reported his informal conversations of July 7 and 8 with Dillon, and that he was instructed to say that Dillon’s remarks on Saturday had been received with “astonishment and regret.” Under probing Yegen said that the specific remarks were Dillon’s reference to the possibility of negative press treatment in the United States, and to the possibility that Archbishop Iakovos might be coming to Istanbul without a visa.

3. Dillon replied that he was equally astonished at FonMin reaction. As Yegen knew his remarks had been in context of informal discussion of what kinds of problems might be presented by Turkish refusal to grant entry to Iakovos. Dillon pointed out that if representatives of friendly nations could not discuss these kinds of problems without

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. III Jan 72-Dec 73. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Dillon and approved by Davies and Miller (S/S). Repeated to Istanbul.

2 Dated July 9, it reported that Turkey had no objection to the attendance of a U.S. ecumenical delegation at the Patriarch’s funeral but would not permit Archbishop Iakovos to enter Turkey. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 12–1 TUR)

3 In telegram 4847 from Ankara, July 9, Handley reported that he had presented the Turkish Government with an appeal to permit Iakovos to attend funeral services for the Patriarch who died July 7, noting that the Archbishop was an American citizen and the ranking member of his faith in North America and that “it was only natural for the Archbishop to want to pay respects to the spiritual leader of his faith.” (Ibid.)

4 No record of these conversations was found.
words like “astonishment and regret” being used, there would be lit-
tle communication. Yegen agreed and said he had reported to Ankara
the informal nature of the discussion, but that the FonMin reply illus-
trated the great sensitivity in Ankara on the issue.

4. Dillon then informed Yegen that he understood that Iakovos
was definitely not going, and that he also understood that other mem-
ers of ecumenical delegation would almost certainly not go, although
that was decision for each man to make separately. Dillon added that
he had just heard that number of Greek-Orthodox communicants had
applied for passports and would be going to Istanbul for funeral. He
had also heard that there would be at least two chartered aircraft, one
from Chicago and one from East Coast. Yegen replied that of course
all such communicants were welcome “as long as they not on pre-
scribed list,” and that he would pass information to Ankara.

Irwin

456. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National
Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Ecumenical Patriarchate and Iakovos

Yesterday, Archbishop Iakovos sent Ambassador Bush a cable requesting
his “immediate personal expression of protest to the United Nations in reac-
tion to the unprecedented Turkish Government interference in the election of
the Ecumenical Patriarch by virtue of their demands that the next Patri-
arch be approved by them and that elections be finalized within 72
hours.”\(^2\)

The desirability of our continued non-involvement seems clear. The purpose of this memo is simply to give you the facts on the suc-
cession as they relate to Iakovos’ approach.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box
633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. III Jan 72–Dec 73. Secret; Exdis. Sent for
information.

\(^2\) Attached but not printed.
The understandings between Greece and Turkey on the continued existence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul are a spin-off of understandings stated in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. This provided, among other points, for the present Greek/Turkish border and for exchange of populations, including protection and rights of minorities which remained. The treaty does not mention the Patriarchate. However, the minutes of the Lausanne Conference do contain a discussion of the Patriarchate laying out Turkey’s strong opposition to its continued presence in Turkey but also the UK appeal that Turkey not remove it. Thus, it was permitted to remain but has been under strong Turkish surveillance and control, including the custom of Turk veto over the selection of a patriarch as had been the case under the Sultan since 1862.

The main Turkish point being asserted in this situation, therefore, is that the Ecumenical Patriarchate is a Turkish institution on Turkish soil and subject to Turkish law—not a Vatican with extraterritorial rights. The present episode began in 1970 when, in anticipation of Athenagoras’ death and possibly the succession of another strong Patriarch, the Turkish government issued a memorandum setting forth guidelines for the selection of the new patriarch: The Holy Synod of bishops in the Patriarchate would convene, draw up a list of possible contenders within a set time and submit it to Istanbul’s civilian Governor; he would edit it, removing offensive types and return it to the Synod. They would vote on remaining candidates which the Turks had approved.

This process has been going on since Athenagoras’ funeral on Tuesday. We understand that the Holy Synod has submitted a list (which includes Meliton, the compromise candidate) to the Istanbul Governor after the Turks insisted they do so within 72 hours. The Turkish press says the Turks, after they edit the list, may be asking that the election take place within the next 72 hours. Finally, the Turk government has indicated publicly that if its election procedures are not followed it may have to appoint a new Patriarch though it has told our embassy in Ankara it wishes to avoid this.

This is the situation that Iakovos is reacting to. He claims the Turks cannot instruct the Church in election procedures which ordinarily would permit the Synod a much longer time to elect a new successor. Iakovos probably wants more time to lobby for support and the Turks want the matter to end quickly so that it does not become politicized. In any case, whatever the merits, Iakovos seems incorrect in saying that the Turkish government’s involvement is “unprecedented.” Not only have they been involved in practice—they seem to have assured the election of Athenagoras in 1948 by pressing other candidates to stand aside. The problem today is that they are blocking Iakovos.
Embassy Ankara says the Turks have told us they will insist on their procedures being followed but will not be heavy-handed in editing the list of candidates. The Greeks seem to accept this. They have played the affair in a very low key fashion throughout the last week. Leaving Iakovos aside, they have simply sought Turkish assurances that Church sensitivities be taken into account and they have made no démarche to the US or others. However, they would probably be upset if Meliton were dropped from the list or if the Turks felt compelled to appoint a new patriarch. For the moment, they seem to be letting matters take their own course to avoid a crisis in relations with Turkey.

One very remote legality Iakovos might resort to are the 1923 conventions concerning the rights of minorities—one element of which is respect for their religious practices. But this is rather way-out since the patriarchate has followed its own customary rules for years and very few go back to the 1923 general principles on minorities. However, Ankara is alert to this possibility. They told the Greeks they hoped they would not think of that route. The Greeks agreed and said they only wanted assurances Church sensitivities would generally be taken into account.

On Iakovos’ protest that Turkey might have to select the Patriarch, Turkey has made clear that if the situation reaches that point they could amply justify it by pointing to Papadopoulos’ brushing aside of Athens Holy Synod in 1967 and installing his own junta colleague as Patriarch of Athens.

The issue for the US is simply that the Turks have made their position clear and the Greeks themselves seem for the moment to be going along—since the future of the patriarchate itself could be at stake.

Ambassador Bush, understanding the pitfalls of our intervening, mainly wants to be sure we have covered the domestic political angle. He points out that any US approach to Waldheim would shortly get back to the Turks.

The fact is that the Turks for years have been harassing the Patriarchate, half wishing it would decide to withdraw. Given the Orthodox desire to stay in Istanbul, the Greeks at least seem to have resigned themselves to living with the situation. We are not likely to be able to change it.3

3 Vice President Agnew telephoned Kissinger on July 7 at 10:25 a.m. to discuss the issue of Archbishop Iakovos’s attendance of the election of the Ecumenical Patriarch. Kissinger told Agnew that the Turkish Government considered it “a matter of great national interest not to permit him to come.” Agnew and Kissinger agreed that if did not make sense to send an American church group that excluded the top Greek Orthodox churchman, but they agreed that there was little they could do. Agnew stated he would call Iakovos and tell him he had done everything he could, but he and the U.S. Government would have to withdraw from the matter in light of the Turkish stance. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 373, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
457. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State

New York, October 6, 1972, 1841Z.

Secto 60/3715. Memorandum of conversation: FM Bayulken (Turkey), October 5, 1972, 3:15 pm, 35A Waldorf.

1. Participants: Turkey—FM Bayulken; Ambassador Olcay, UN; Ambassador Akbay, FornMinistry; Ambassador Esenbel, US; US—The Secretary, Mr. Sisco, NEA, Mr. Davies, EUR, Mr. Hirshorn, NEA/TUR (reporting officer).

2. Summary: In his discussion with the Secretary FM Bayulken covered a broad range of subjects including the current political and economic situation in Turkey. He affirmed the Melen govt’s determination to maintain the poppy ban and emphasized the internal threat from guerrilla organizations. Bayulken said that if the US maintains its current position on MBFR participation he would be forced to resign. Bayulken also asked continued US cooperation on military assistance, foreign aid, and several individual projects such as the Northrop F–5 co-production project, M–48 tanks and the purchase of ships which had been loaned to Turkey. The Secretary reaffirmed US appreciation for Turkey’s courageous decision to prohibit poppy growing. He took note of Bayulken’s points and said that US would do everything possible to be of help.

3. Terrorism: Bayulken began by referring to his speech in the GA on October 4. He said that he had agreed with the suggestions made to him by Amb Handley. He thought that the more successful approach to terrorism would be to take this issue up in the Political Committee and try to avoid the political aspects and concentrate on the practical problem of the acts of terrorism. He said he believed that the Turkish delegation could be of help. Bayulken also said that the Turkish Govt has received more evidence of centers of insurrection among Turks in West Germany, Sweden and perhaps even England and France. Bayulken said that since martial law was imposed surface terrorist elements have been controlled. However underground preparations are

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL TUR–US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ankara. Secretary Rogers was in New York attending the UN General Assembly session.

2 Prime Minister Erim resigned April 17 over the issue of extending government powers to combat terrorism. President Sunay appointed Defense Minister Ferit Melen to head an interim government the same day. After the failure of Suat Urguplu to form a government acceptable to the President, May 13, Sunay asked Melen to form a government, which he did on May 22.

3 For text, see UN doc. A/PV. 2053.
continuing. When the martial law is lifted these cells will come out into the open. He said that urban terrorism had not been supported by the peasants in Turkey. Therefore the terrorists are now looking to the unions. Most labor unions in Turkey are responsible but a small number are Communist oriented.

4. Economic Conditions: Bayulken said that the workers are relatively prosperous in Turkey where there is a high standard of living by ME standards. He said that the economy is good in spite of the fact that there have been three govs in the past two years. The private sector is beginning an upsurge. The state economic enterprises are slow to make profits but they have made good progress. Turkey is about to begin its third five year development plan and this will take close account of Turkey’s transition agreement with the Common Market. Because of the high birth rate in Turkey the Turkish economy must provide one million new jobs per year. Therefore industrialization is a must.

5. Political Conditions: Bayulken said that the anti-US vocal minority in Turkey has faded away although it may continue to exist underground. The attitude toward relations with the US is now better. American naval ships can visit Turkey freely and the Turkish Govt recently made a favorable decision on allowing US destroyers to sail into the Black Sea. Bayulken said that there was a large reservoir of good will toward the US in Turkey. Constitutional reforms will be necessary before Turkey can end its martial law. Bayulken said that the military are anxious to see civilian govt continue. They want to see the threats against democracy staved off, but they don’t want to continue indefinitely the current sui generis regime. Bayulken said that Turkey should be able to return to normal democratic govt after the next election providing the electioneering is not too emotional and that there are not too many fiery speeches. Bayulken said that the Melen govt has the sympathy of the Assembly. Nevertheless because of the coming elections the politicians do not want to see this govt be successful. Therefore the PM will have to be very patient. Bayulken emphasized that whether or not elections are held in October 1973 Turkey will hold fast to democracy, its alliances, and its ideals.

6. Security Assistance: Bayulken said that Turkish Assembly has recently approved a 10 year program of armed force modernization which will cost 16 billion TL. This will be a great sacrifice. Turkey will make the ultimate effort but will need cooperation from the US. In this connection Bayulken said that the GOT was very anxious to have last year’s $40 million reduction in MAP replaced. Sisco said that door is not closed but it is unlikely that anything would be done before the election. Bayulken said that Turkey had been promised $120 million military assistance per year and that he hoped the current figure of $100 million will not be reduced as it is an absolute minimum. He said
that Turkey would also like to maintain the same level of FMS credit. The Secretary said that the US will do everything it can.

7. M-48 Tanks for Turkey: Bayulken asked about these. Sisco said that this was a matter of administrative detail and that he would look into it. Bayulken pointed out that receiving these tanks is important in order to maintain the confidence of the younger army officers in Turkey.

8. Ship Loans: Bayulken said that it was his understanding that the new clause in the most recent ship loan legislation which prevents sale would only apply to ships loaned to Turkey after its enactment.

9. Northrop F-5 Co-production Project: Bayulken asked that the USG do everything it could to help the Northrop project for the co-production of F-5 aircraft in Turkey. He said that the establishment of an airframe factory would be beneficial to Turkish development. Ambassador Esenbel said that at some point Turkey will need FMS financing for this project. The Secretary said that the US will do everything it could to help.

10. Turkish-Greek Territorial Waters: Bayulken referred to the dispute between the Greeks and the Turks over the joint NATO command in Turkish and Greek territorial waters. The Turks intend to discuss this matter with the Greeks and hope to work out a compromise solution.

11. MBFR Participation: Bayulken said this question was a serious one for his govt. The Secretary said that he understood the Turkish position and we would take a look at it again. The US wanted Turkey to be satisfied and realized the domestic political problems. However it was also important that the talks get underway without hindrance. Bayulken then said that it would be impossible for him to go before his Assembly if the Turkish proposal were turned down. He would have to resign and, perhaps, his govt would have to resign because this is a very important issue in Turkey. He said that the rotational system accepted by 14 NATO countries requires only one extra seat at the talks and that this certainly should not cause any difficulty. He had spoken to Gromyko whom he has known for 22 years and he does not believe the Russians will object. The Secretary said that the US will try to solve this problem and Bayulken reiterated that it was impossible for Turkey to budge on this issue.

12. Poppy Ban: The Secretary thanked Bayulken for Turkey’s help on the poppy problem. He said that the Turkish Government had taken a courageous step and this had resulted in great appreciation within the US and that Turkey has clearly taken a leadership position. As a result Turkey is now getting a very good press in the US. Bayulken said that the Melen govt is very serious about maintaining the poppy ban. The GOT told party leaders that it would resign if the ban were rescinded by the Assembly.

Rogers
PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency Suleyman Demirel, Former Prime Minister
Ambassador William J. Handley

On Saturday, December 2, I called, at my request, on former Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel. I had telephoned him earlier to suggest that I would like to have an informal chat with him, and he proposed that we meet at his house. (I had seen him earlier this year, but, since I had been getting some echoes from his friends that he felt he was being neglected, I thought it a good idea to see him, especially since the most recent political crisis had passed.)

Demirel seemed genuinely glad to see me and was in good form. Our conversation pretty much followed his answers to some questions that, in advance of the meeting, I had thought I wanted to ask him.

I began the discussion with an account of my recent short trip to Iran to a CENTO naval exercise on the Persian Gulf. I mentioned how I continued to be impressed with changes I had seen through the years in Iran as compared with what it was when I first went there as a Labor Attaché in 1945.

I asked Demirel how he sized up the present political situation. He began with a general philosophical response about the problems of democratic government, and in particular of a Turkey which had only recently emerged from a one-party state to something approaching a full democracy. He spoke, as he has in the past, about the dangers to a political democracy of military intervention, making his familiar (and very credible) point that growing political and social institutions are severely damaged by military interventions, and that quite often the

1 Source: Department of State, Turkish Desk Files: Lot 75 D 137, POL 2. Secret; Limdis; Noform. Drafted by Handley on December 11. The conversation took place at Demirel’s home.

2 According to a letter from Dillon to James Spain, November 13, the Department had received intelligence reports indicating that Turkish officers were ready to block Demirel’s return to power, arguing that “the U.S. does not particularly like” him. Dillon commented: “I find this disturbing. On the one hand, I think it is important that the U.S. not embrace Demirel, thus avoiding giving the impression he is an American puppet. On the other hand, Demirel is the symbol of free democracy in Turkey and it would be a great mistake for us to permit the impression to exist that we would ‘approve’ his being denied the fruits of an electoral victory by military pressure.” (Ibid.) In a November 27 reply, Spain noted that Handley intended to make a call on Demirel prior to returning to the United States. (Ibid.)
shock to these young “plants” is enough to finish them off. He felt that the present situation was especially unusual, since the Government was like a “hermaphrodite.” It is, he said, neither male nor female; it is neither a full military intervention nor is it a politically responsible government, i.e., responsible on a party basis to the Parliament.

Demirel added that there was a very good chance that elections would take place on schedule in 1973. All the parties, he said, were for it, and it would be difficult for the military to prevent the elections. But, he added, one can never be sure. Much could happen between now and October 1973, and indeed between now and March 1973 when a new President was due to be elected. He said the military could try to find excuses to disband Parliament and call for a constitutional assembly. It was, therefore, very much a matter of urgency for his party, as well as for the others, to make sure that the reforms pressed by the military should be passed before March 1973. From his standpoint, he would do everything possible to see that these reforms were adopted so that the military could not have this excuse. It was possible, of course, he added, that the military would consider the reforms to be “mini” reforms and unacceptable, but that chance had to be taken.

Demirel spent some time in justifying his stewardship as Prime Minister and in criticizing what the military had done in March of 1971. He said that when they had come to him, criticizing him for not having maintained law and order, he had told them that on three occasions he had arrested the principal anarchists, but that the courts had let them go. Demirel said that as a Prime Minister, as head of the largest party in Turkey, as a political figure, he could not be a judge as well as an executive. It was not his responsibility to “try as well as to charge” the accused anarchists. He asked the military to show him where in any way he had violated the Constitution. He had done this, he said, because in 1960 the military had accused Prime Minister Menderes of violating the Constitution. Rather, he said, he had told the military in March 1971 that it was they who had violated the Constitution.

Following up his comments on the military, I asked Demirel whether, as some Turks had said, the military would veto him as Prime Minister even though he and his party were to win the next election. He said that this would be a major test for Turkish democracy and the “will power” of the Parliament. As Chairman of the Justice Party, he would refuse to permit the military to dictate who should be the Justice Party’s choice of the country’s next Prime Minister, assuming the Justice Party were to win the election. He stated flatly that the Justice Party would, under those circumstances, take no part in participation in the Government.

I asked Demirel who he thought would be the next President: would it be a civilian or military figure? He pondered this for a while,
but refused to make a specific guess. He said it was far too early to tell who it might be or whom he might support. It was even premature to speculate whether he would be again a military figure or whether some civilian might receive enough support to be elected by the combined Senate and House. He did not think it made too much difference whether the man would come from military or civilian life. It was a question of the man rather than of his professional background. He again referred to the dangers that were facing the Republic even now, and that the months immediately ahead up to March could be dangerous for the future of democracy in Turkey.

To my question about the present state of the RPP, he made, I thought, one of his more interesting replies. He said that what was now taking place in the RPP was far more important to Turkish democracy and to the Turkish Republic than what had occurred in March 1971. He said that the RPP, which had been a party of the state and had been the single party that had run Turkey between 1923 and 1950, was getting itself into a position where it might in the future be able to offer the Turkish voter a democratic alternative to the Justice Party. It all depended, he said, on whether or not the RPP would decide to get rid of its previous elitist notions and become a party “of the people.” In the past, he said, the RPP had always attached itself to, and in fact had ridden on the backs of, certain select “institutions” in Turkey. Among these were the army, the courts, the civil service, the universities, and the intelligentsia. This was in many ways nothing but a further application of the Ottoman division of power between the saray, the hodjas and the military. Nothing would please him more than to see the RPP really go to the people, get support from the people, and emerge as a powerful political institution, drawing its strength from a wide people-oriented base, rather than from selected institutions. He attributed to these past practices of the RPP the fact that it is “the courts” who run Turkey today, and that the executive, because of this, had very limited power.

I asked him what he thought of Mr. Inonu and his future role in Turkey. He replied rather carefully to this question, saying that one has to think of the Inonu to whom the Turkish Republic owed gratitude for favors performed a long time ago. But it was Inonu, he said, who more than anyone else had virtually ruined Turkish democracy by pushing the military into the 1960 coup, and he could never forgive nor forget that.

Turning back to the RPP and its future, Demirel said, with some pretension of sincerity, that if the RPP were to win the election in 1973

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3 On May 8 Inonu resigned as head of the RPP. Bulent Ecevit won election as his successor on May 14.
on the basis of support “from the people,” he could be a happy man. He had always hoped that such a party would some day offer the kind of strong opposition that could challenge his own party. He went on to say that he did not expect, however, that the RPP could win in 1973 no matter what they did, since the Justice Party was enormously strong, but in 1977 they might have a fair chance, and by 1981 they could possibly emerge with the majority of support with the Turkish voter, if, he repeated, they abandoned their traditional role. He said I should never forget that in the days when the RPP was the one party in Turkey the Turkish Parliament was not much more than the “Iran Shah’s” Parliament: it was hand picked, non-representative, and in many respects quite meaningless.

I asked Demirel whether he thought elections could take place when martial law was still in effect. He recalled that elections had taken place in 1961, when martial law was in effect. Martial law would still probably be needed in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir during the 1973 elections. It would take some time for the civilian security forces to be rebuilt. Their morale, he said, had been gravely weakened by the action of the military in March 1971 and subsequently. Until such time as the state civilian security forces were once again strong and competent, martial law, in at least those three provinces, would be required. He then added to this list, Diyarbakir since “this is the gateway for Barzani (a Kurdish nationalist) as well as for Palestinian terrorists.”

I asked him what would be the aims of his party during the 1973 elections. At this point, he got up and took down a book from his library and handed it to me. It was Corwin’s “The President: Office and Powers.” As I thumbed through it, he said, “you need not read the whole book; all you need to read is the inscription,” and he asked that I read it aloud, which I did. It read as follows, and the attribution was to Secretary of State Seward:

“We elect a King for four years, and give him absolute power, within certain limits, which, after all, he can interpret for himself.”

I asked him if this meant that he planned in his platform to urge an increase in the executive powers of the prime minister, and he said very definitely yes. And then he told me that, in October 1970, following the defection of the right-wing members of his party, he had wanted to dismiss Parliament and call for new elections. He was unable to do this, however, because of the constitutional weakness of the executive. He was not exactly sure just how this could be remedied, but the need was clear and he would do whatever he could to increase the authority and discipline of the Prime Minister over the governmental machine. Turkey is still, he repeated, being run “by the courts.” Even today, the military courts, he commented, showed themselves nearly as inefficient as their civilian counterparts. For example, there
are people who have been on trial on law and order charges since March
of 1971 and have not been convicted or exonerated. Another aspect of
his campaign will be to seek the improvement of the quality and speed
of justice in Turkey.

Demirel went on to point out that had he had the authority to dis-
miss Parliament in 1970 he might have succeeded in doing what In-
dira Gandhi did. He noted that 45 members of his party had defected
and set up a new party (the Democratic Party), and that while 65 mem-
bers of Indira Gandhi’s party had defected and set up one of their own
with highly respected politicians leading the pack, she had returned to
power with an overwhelming majority; and he thought he would have
had the same kind of result.

I asked Demirel what he thought of the international situation, and
he said he did not want to sound like a McCarthyite, but that he was
deply concerned about the intentions of the Communist world. He
said that one should never forget that Communism extends not only
over the Soviet Union and China, but includes North Korea, Indo-
China, the Baltic States, Central Europe, the Balkans (including Yu-
goslavia and Albania), has great influence on Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Al-
geria, is probing into Black Africa, controls Cuba, and is trying to affect
other Latin American countries, including Chile. It is therefore highly
desirable that the democratic world recognize that the threat of Com-
munism remains, although the guise may be different. Those countries
in the Western World who believe in democracy should therefore sup-
port, wherever they can, their democratic allies and friends. For this
reason, he was disturbed that the Western press had been “applaud-
ing” what was currently going on in Turkey. He said that the present
political situation in Turkey could not be anything else but a setback
for democracy, and the press was making a mistake in applauding it.
I said that his comment surprised me, since, from what I had seen in
the Western press, there had been a great deal of criticism of what had
been going on in Turkey, and there had been quite a few references to
“a thinly veiled military dictatorship.”

Demirel went on to say that he had recently been making speeches
about the failure of military regimes in Greece and Pakistan (he has in
fact made several speeches in the past month on the subject) and that
the military did not like what he had been saying, but he thought it
necessary to point out that the Greek colonels were having their diffi-
culties and that Yahya Khan had made a mess of things in Pakistan.

I told Demirel that we had been very pleased with Turkey’s deci-
sion to ban opium. As I made this point and elaborated on it, he looked
at me very carefully and seemed embarrassed by my comment that
some members of his party had been trying to rescind the ban so as to
permit growth of opium for the purpose of obtaining vegetable oil. He
said that he thought the way the Erim Government had tackled the problem was not the best way, and that it had created a number of complicated problems. But he could assure me—and he spoke very carefully at this point—that he would never permit this issue to affect Turkish-US relations. He would continue, as he has, to keep an eye on the problem. He was interested in seeing what was being done to assist the farmers. And, responding to a supplementary question from me, he did not think that there was any likelihood that the bill would emerge in the near future from the Committee. In any event, he would watch that as well, adding that it was a complicated matter and highly charged politically. He repeated once again his determination not to permit it to become an issue between them and the United States. But, he added, the Government has to avoid “polemics.” Some people, he said, had been charging that he and his party, when they were in power, had done nothing to compensate the farmers in those provinces which had been withdrawn from cultivation when he was Prime Minister. Polemics of this kind could be a “hot wind” which could cause real trouble.

Comment:

The meeting lasted about one and one-half hours and was one of the widest ranging meetings I have had with Demirel in the three and a half years I have known him. He has lost a great deal of weight, seemed even more reflective than I recalled in the past, but continued to show bounce and enthusiasm. He was, as always, an eloquent spokesman on behalf of democracy. His comments on the RPP and its possible future were, I thought, very significant, and from all I could tell he meant what he said. I would have liked him to have been somewhat more categoric about his opposition to any kind of anti-poppy ban action, but my conclusion from what he said and the way he said it was that he will not permit the Justice Party politicians to play havoc with Turkish-US relations for sectional political interests.4

4 In a December 27 attached memorandum to Sisco and Davies, Dillon recommended that they read this memorandum of conversation, noting “Demirel remains the most important civilian politician in Turkey. . . I would judge there is a better than 50-50 chance he will once again be prime minister of Turkey.” (Department of State, Turkish Desk Files: Lot 75 D 137, POL 2)
Index

References are to document numbers

Abshire, David, 50, 58
Acheson, Dean, 144, 376
Ackley, H. Gardner, 310
Ad Hoc Group on Economic Policies, 26
Africa, 214, 221, 314
Agnew, Spiro T., 243, 245, 454
Greece:
Agnew’s visit, 320, 325, 326, 328
Constantine’s meeting with Agnew, 328
Constantine’s return issue, 283, 326, 328
Public relations by, 298
U.S. Ambassador, appointment of, 252
Greece’s political liberalization:
Agnew’s visit and, 320, 325, 326
Elections issue, 298
U.S.-Greek discussions re, 298, 325, 328
U.S. insistence on political reform as condition for resumption of military assistance, 283
Greece’s resumed receipt of U.S. military assistance:
NSC study re, 261
Phantom aircraft, 327
U.S. insistence on political reform as condition for resumption of assistance, 283
Tasca, Nixon-Agnew discussion re, 326
Turkey, 456
Ahlers, Conrad, 42, 45
Akalovsky, Alexander, 221, 222, 232, 234
Akbay, Celal, 454, 457
Aker, Muammer, 421
Akyamac, Asim, 446
Albania, 24, 26
Algeria, 221
Allen, Richard, 106
American Council for Private International Communications, Inc., 52, 53, 57, 58
Anastassiou, T.K., 343
Anderson, Robert B., 203
Androulopoulos, Adamantios, 269
Angelis, Lt. Gen. Odysseus, 239, 247, 255, 259, 269, 293, 303, 304, 310, 314, 319, 335, 337
Argyropoulos, Gen. Archimedes, 239
Arim, Resat, 446, 450
Armitage, John, 66, 416
Arms control. See European security issue; Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, 220
Ash, Russell, 13, 80, 137, 195
Aslanides, Constantine, 269, 352, 383
Athenagoras, 314, 456
Austria:
Anti-Nixon demonstrations, 69
Army reorganization, 70
Chinese representation at United Nations issue, 66
Eastern Europe, views on, 63
European Community and, 63, 68
European security issue, views on, 68, 70, 71
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, views on, 68, 70, 71
Nixon’s meeting with Klaus, 62
Nixon’s visit, 67, 68, 69
Radical youth problem, 70
Soviet Union, relations with, 64
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, views on, 63, 65, 70
Terrorism policy, 71
U.S. military assistance to, 64, 70
U.S.-Soviet-Chinese relations and, 65
Vietnam War, views on, 68, 71
Yugoslavia, relations with, 70
Austrian, Michael, 370, 416
Averof, Evangelos, 271
Azinas, Andreas, 351
Babacek, 79
Baer, Brig. Gen. John W., 421
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahr, Egon</td>
<td>42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 56, 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baker, John A., Jr.</td>
<td>58, 78, 81, 82, 91, 141, 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ball, George</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbour, Robert</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnes, Harry G., Jr.</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrett, Edward</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartlett, Charles</td>
<td>39, 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashev, Ivan</td>
<td>72, 73, 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayar, Celal</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayulken, Haluk</td>
<td>413, 452, 454, 457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beam, Jacob</td>
<td>28, 79, 80, 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bebler, Alex</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekata, Hizfi Oguz</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belcher, Taylor G.</td>
<td>341, 342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellman, Henry</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Bella, Ahmed</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bergsten, C. Fred</td>
<td>9, 20, 21, 22, 85, 113, 150, 190, 197, 430, 434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh, Madame</td>
<td>221, 234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blee, David</td>
<td>51, 310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blood, Archer</td>
<td>239, 247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodossakis, Athanassiadis</td>
<td>311, 317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogdan, Corneliu</td>
<td>177, 180, 189, 190, 192, 195, 197, 203, 206, 207, 210, 213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohlen, Charles</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borman, Frank</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boster</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boumediene, Houari</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bow, Frank T.</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boyatt, Thomas</td>
<td>348, 374, 376, 378, 380, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 398, 407, 416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandt, Willy</td>
<td>17, 68, 155, 322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Free Europe</td>
<td>36, 40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bray, Charles</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brett, Brig, Gen. Devol</td>
<td>322, 376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brewster, H. Daniel</td>
<td>239, 241, 243, 244, 247, 248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brezhnev, Leonid</td>
<td>70, 97, 98, 99, 102, 166, 172, 183, 192, 194, 229, 231, 232, 233, 234, 238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broe, William</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brooke, Edward</td>
<td>22, 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brosio, Manlio</td>
<td>283, 368, 369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown, John, III</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown, R.L.</td>
<td>86, 383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckley, William F., Jr.</td>
<td>38, 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulc, Marko</td>
<td>221, 223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bulgaria (see also Eastern Europe):
- Consular convention with United States, 75, 76
- European security issue, views on, 72
- Official delegation visit to United States, proposed, 75
- Political and economic changes, 73
- Torbert’s protocol call on Zhirkov, 73
- U.S. broadcasting into, 74
- U.S. economic/trade relations with, 24, 26, 27, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76

- Bull, Stephen, 174
- Bunche, Ralph, 346
- Bush, George H.W., 370, 414, 456
- Butterfield, Alexander P., 5, 242

Caglayangil, Ihsan Sabri, 340, 342, 349, 420, 430, 433, 439, 446

Cambodia, 195

- Cargo, William L., 4, 256, 272
- Casaroli, Cardinal, 117, 118, 123
- Case, Clifford, 50, 51, 53, 305
- Cash, Frank E., Jr., 342, 348, 357, 367, 419, 420, 427, 429, 431, 438
- Castro, Fidel, 172
- Cattakis, Michael, 295
- Ceausescu, Nicolae, 187, 189, 192, 194, 206, 207, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214
- Nixon’s correspondence with, 211, 212, 215
- Nixon’s meetings with, 180, 183, 184, 199
- Nixon’s visit to Romania, 7, 176, 180, 183, 184
- Soviet-Romanian relations, 177, 183, 199
- U.S. visit, 198, 199
- Celac, Sergiu, 192, 199, 213

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (see also Helms, Richard):
- Cyprus, 380
- Greece, 253, 314
- Polish political unrest of 1970, 144, 145
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Covert CIA funding, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 52, 53

FRG-U.S. confrontation re, 37, 41, 42, 46, 48, 49

- Termination option, 33
- Turkey, 428, 442, 451
- Chaban-Delmas, Jacques, 185
- Chapin, Dwight L., 155, 157, 159, 167
- Chapin, Frank, 10, 35, 51

References are to document numbers
Cyprus (see also Cyprus’ intercommunal conflict)—Continued
Coup against Makarios, U.S. contingency planning for, 354
Crisis of 1972:
Bishops’ demand for Makarios’ resignation, 407, 410, 415
Czech arms importation by Makarios, 389, 392
Ending of, 409, 410, 414
Greek response, 391, 395, 396, 398, 403, 405, 406
Hellenism issue, 408
Makarios’ management of, 403
NSC/WSAG consideration of, 394, 397, 398, 401, 402, 405
Soviet Union and, 398, 400, 402, 404, 405
Tasca’s post-crisis assessment, 411
U.N. involvement, 398, 399, 402, 405, 406, 409, 410
U.S. Embassy assessments, 390, 395, 400, 410
U.S.-Greek consultations re, 394, 396
U.S. instructions to Ambassadors, 399, 405
Grivas insurgency, 379, 383, 384, 389, 392, 393, 403, 410, 415, 417, 418
Intracommmunal violence among Greek Cypriots, 353
Makarios’ initial meeting with Popper, 444
Makarios’ meeting with Grivas, 413
Makarios’ political standing, 355
Makarios resignation issue, 407, 410, 415
Middle East, views on, 360
Nixon’s meeting with Makarios, 357, 358, 359, 360
Soviet policy toward, 319, 354, 355, 376, 378, 379
State Department roundtable discussion re, 416
Terrorist situation, 347, 353
Turkish Cypriot community’s internal political situation, 386
Turkish policy re, 428, 454
Turkish-U.S. relations and, 422
Cyprus’ intercommunal conflict, 242
Assassination attempts against Makarios and, 355

Cyprus’ intercommunal conflict—Continued
Central intercommunal institutional structure issue, 363
Constitutional compromise, Greek proposal for, 373
Deconfrontation proposal, 386, 388, 390
Denktash’s views on, 386
Economic issues, 341
Greek-Greek Cypriot rift re, 379, 390
Greek policy re, 314
Greek-Turkish bilateral settlement option, 364, 365, 369, 371
Greek-Turkish cooperation against Makarios, 383
Independent mediation option, 376, 378
Lack of progress in resolving conflict, dangers of, 343
Local autonomy issue, 340, 344, 374
London-Zurich Agreement, 345, 379, 405, 416
Makarios’ hard-line position re, 361, 362
Makarios’ program to deal with, 392
Military confrontation, increased risk of, 346
Negotiations by communities (see also U.N. mediation effort below), 366, 373, 374, 377, 378, 382, 413, 414, 415
Nicosia co-existence issue, 416
Normalization issue, 386
Partition and annexation (double enosis) option, 345, 352, 367, 368, 369, 379, 413
Police and judiciary issues, 344
Turkish military intervention, 352, 367, 369
U.N. mediation effort, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 385, 386, 387, 393
U.N. military presence (UNFICYP), 344, 345, 385, 387, 388
U.S. alleged pro-Turkish bias, 370
U.S.-Cypriot discussions re, 344, 345, 362, 386
U.S.-Greek discussions re, 379, 382
U.S. mediation option, 376, 378
U.S. policy on, 357, 356, 369
U.S. policy review, 372, 375, 376, 378, 380
U.S. summary of developments, 368

References are to document numbers
Cyprus' intercommunal conflict—

Continued

U.S.-Turkish diplomatic communications re, 342, 348
U.S.-Turkish discussions re, 349, 385, 413
Violent incidents, U.S. contingency plans for, 378

Cyrankiewicz, Jozef, 140

Czechoslovakia (see also Eastern Europe):

Air Transport Agreement with United States, 89
Arms sales to Cyprus, 389
Catalytic cracking technology from United States, 151
Conservative hardliners' comeback, 78
Consular convention with United States, 90, 91, 93, 94
Cultural exchanges with United States, 86, 91, 93
Gold/claims issue, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 90
Husak's accession to power, 81, 82
Radio Free Europe, 28
Scientific and technological cooperation with United States, 91, 93
Soviet invasion of, 1, 2, 77, 132, 177
U.S.-Czechoslovak expulsions of diplomats, 88
U.S. economic/trade relations with, 24, 26, 27, 79, 80, 85, 86, 90, 91
U.S. NSSM/CIEPSM study on negotiation strategy, 92, 93, 94

Damaskinos, Archbishop, 333
Damianos, Caleokis, 271
Dapcevic, Vlado, 228
David, Edward E., Jr., 148, 150, 151, 170, 173, 174, 175
Davies, Richard, 10, 57, 118, 139, 141, 330, 378
Davis, Jeanne W., 152, 256, 257, 295, 301, 376, 380
Davis, Richard, 176, 178
Davis, Thomas W., Jr., 354, 357, 358, 365, 367, 369, 373

Defense Intelligence Agency, 253
DeGaulle, Charles, 102, 143, 183
Demetracopoulos, Elias P., 248, 279, 316, 321, 322
Demirel, Suleyman, 364, 423, 430, 431, 432, 434, 436, 437, 439, 440, 441, 448, 458
Nixon's meeting with, 419, 420
Denktash, Rauf, 340, 341, 343, 344, 362, 363, 373, 374, 378, 379, 388, 415
Meetings with U.S. officials, 386
Denmark, 99, 276, 287, 289
Dent, Harry, 125
De Palma, Samuel, 103
Dillon, Robert, 416, 452, 455, 458
Dobrowolski, Stanislaw, 35
Dobrynin, Anatoli F., 156, 157, 177, 329, 330
Dole, Robert, 125
Downey, Arthur, 124, 138, 198, 427, 442
Dran, Jonathan, 44
Draper, Morris, 383
Drndic, Ante, 221
Dubcek, Alexander, 63, 78, 81
DuBridge, Lee A., 6, 11, 138, 183, 186, 187
Dubs, Adolf, 1, 189
Duckwitz, Georg E., 41, 44, 45, 52, 134
Durkee, William P., 28, 36

Eagleburger, Lawrence S., 176, 248

Eastern Europe:

Austrian views on, 63
Greek relations with, 314
Narcotics control, 26
Nixon's 1970 report to Congress re, 7
Polish political unrest and, 144, 147
Scientific and technological cooperation with United States, 6, 11, 18
U.S. economic/trade relations with, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 12, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27
U.S. official visits to, 5
U.S. port security policy re, 8, 13, 15, 16
U.S. program to “cause trouble” in, 10
Ecevit, Bulent, 458
Edwards, Don, 239
Ehmke, Horst, 36, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49
Ehrlichman, John, 9, 427, 434

References are to document numbers
1138  Index

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 158, 177, 420
Eisenhower, Milton S., 53, 61
Elekdag, Sukru, 421
Elez, Jova, 228
Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., 54, 59, 87, 94, 128, 147, 148, 152, 173, 200, 294, 328, 353, 368, 374, 381, 439
Ellender, Allen J., 51, 52, 53, 55, 56
Ellsworth, Robert, 255, 287
Enckell, Ralph, 97, 99
Enders, Thomas O., 1
Erim, Nihat, 314, 364, 374, 414, 442, 444, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 453, 457
Nixon’s meeting with, 454
Esenbel, Melih, 385, 420, 429, 433, 438, 443, 452, 457
European security issue:
Austrian views on, 68, 70, 71
Bulgarian views on, 72
Finland views on, 96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103
Hungarian views on, 115
Polish views on, 132, 133, 148, 163, 167, 172
Romanian views on, 192, 195, 199, 206, 207, 215
Yugoslav views on, 220, 238
Evans, Rowland, 28, 29, 321
Evans, Tom, 254
Evdokas, Takis, 351
Feldman, Harvey J., 66
Feron, James, 167
Fessenden, Russell, 41, 42, 44, 135, 136
Finch, Robert, 225
Findley, Paul, 235
Finke-Ossiander, Renate, 35, 134
Finland:
Atomic power plant construction, 97, 101
China, views on, 100, 104
European security issue, views on, 96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103
“Finlandization” concept, 105
Kepponen’s U.S. visit, 99, 100, 101
Kissinger’s assessment of, 95, 99
Middle East, views on, 96, 100, 102
Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions, views on, 103
Neutrality of, 99
Nordic economic union, 99
Political situation, 99
Soviet Union, relations with, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102
Finland—Continued
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, views on, 96, 99, 100, 102
Trade policy, 99
U.S.-Soviet relations, views on, 102, 104
Vietnam War, views on, 96, 97, 100, 102, 105
Fischer, C.W., 30
Flanigan, Peter, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 92, 129, 168, 169, 170, 173
Folsom, Robert S., 342, 346, 348
Folten, Gen. Ferdinand, 70
40 Committee, 37, 47, 51, 53, 57, 59
Frackiewicz, Ryszard, 137
France, 185, 276, 281
Fraser, Donald, 239
Frelek, Ryszard, 153, 172
Fulbright, J. William, 51, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 255, 303
Gandhi, Indira, 232, 458
Gardner, James, 286
Gardner, John W., 28, 29, 30
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 181, 190, 199, 205
Georgalas, George, 302, 303
George II, King of Greece, 239
Georkatzis, Polykarpos, 347, 350, 351, 352, 353, 355, 383
German Democratic Republic (GDR), 24, 26
Germany, Federal Republic of (FRG), 103, 264, 276, 322
Ostpolitik policy, 17, 144, 145
Radio Free Europe, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 56
Soviet Union, relations with, 144, 145, 199
Gierek, Edward, 159, 168, 169, 172
Accession to power in Poland, 143, 144, 145
Correspondence with Nixon, 175
Nixon’s visit to Poland, 155, 162, 164, 165, 166
U.S.-Polish relations, views on, 153
Giese, Arthur, 370
Gilpatric, Roswell L., 28

References are to document numbers
Gomulka, Władysław, 10, 26, 130, 131, 143, 144, 145, 147
Goold, Robert, 327
Grace, Peter, Jr., 28
Graner, Ralph H., 2
Granfil, Toma, 221, 231
Grechko, Marshal Andrei A., 98, 237
Greece (see also Cyprus; Cyprus’ intercommunal conflict; Greece’s political liberalization; Greece’s resumed receipt of U.S. military assistance):
Agnew’s visit, 320, 325, 326, 328
Anti-Americanism in, 317
Arms purchases from non-U.S. sources, 281
Congressional staffers’ visit, 303
Constantine, U.S. policy toward, 301, 308, 310, 315, 319
Constantine’s meeting with Agnew, 326, 328
Constantine’s meeting with Tasca, 319
Constantine’s proposed meeting with Papadopoulos, 280
Constantine’s relations with military government, 259
Constantine’s return issue, 240, 242, 244, 245, 267, 280, 283, 285, 299, 309, 312, 314, 326, 328, 334
Constantine’s U.S. visit, 244, 245
Corruption problem, 317, 337
Council of Europe, withdrawal from, 264
Coup plan against Papadopoulos, possible, 352
Economic situation, 239, 272, 314
European relations (see also NATO-Greece relationship under Greece’s political liberalization), 273, 276, 314
Laird’s meeting with Papadopoulos, 293
Libya, relations with, 322
Middle East, views on, 295
Military government, 239, 269, 273, 302, 307, 314, 333
Military situation, 253
Nixon-Papadopoulos correspondence, 274, 277, 278
Papandreou’s proposed meeting with Kissinger, 248
Political opposition, U.S. contacts with, 316, 317, 321
Greece—Continued
Public opinion, Silva’s report on, 317
Public relations by, 298
Spain, relations with, 297, 300
Strategic importance to United States, 257
Tasca’s departure as Ambassador, 338
Tasca’s initial call on Papadopoulos, 268
Turkey, relations with, 293, 314
Universities, condition of, 317
U.S. Ambassador, appointment of, 252, 254, 259
U.S. homeporting of Naval task force in, 329, 330, 331, 332, 335, 339, 453
U.S. military activities in (see also U.S. homeporting of Naval task force above), 313
U.S. official visits, restrictions on, 318, 321, 322
Violence against Americans in, 305
Vitsaxis’ presentation of credentials, 263
Vlachou’s proposed meeting with Kissinger, 279
Greece’s political liberalization:
Agnew’s visit and, 320, 325, 328
Businessmen’s role, 311
Congressional interest in, 239
Constantine’s proposed return and, 285
“Cosmetic” gestures by Greek government, 304, 310
Council of Europe and, 239, 264
Elections issue, 250, 252, 275, 290, 296, 298, 311, 312
Future prospects, U.S. reports re, 272, 302, 314
Ioannidis’ views on, 271
Johnson Administration policy, 257
Martial law issue, 296
McClelland’s views on, 239, 247, 255
NATO-Greece relationship and, 239, 255, 256, 264, 268, 276, 287, 314
Nixon’s personal encouragement of, 320, 323
NSC consideration of, 256, 257, 261
Outside agitation for, 257, 258
Papadopoulos’ assumption of regency and, 333, 334, 336

References are to document numbers
Greece's political liberalization—Continued
Papadopoulos' views on, 274, 325
Pappas' views on, 309
Political prisoners issue, 255, 263, 264, 271, 283, 317, 325
Tasca's instructions for dealing with Greek government re, 262, 265, 270, 283
Tasca's views on, 273, 275, 302
Timetable for, 255, 263, 264, 275
U.S. covert activities in support of, 286, 290
U.S.-Greek discussions re, 241, 244, 245, 250, 260, 263, 264, 268, 271, 289, 293, 319, 325, 328
U.S. homeporting of Naval task force in Greece and, 332
U.S. insistence on political reform as condition for resumption of military assistance, 282, 283, 284, 287, 288, 289
U.S. national security issue, 249, 251, 256, 257, 272
U.S.-Greek discussions re, 241, 243, 244, 245, 250, 260, 268, 281, 289, 293, 319
U.S. preliminary work re, 266
Vietnam War and, 324
Greenewalt, Crawford H., 28
Greenwald, Joseph, 2
Grivas, Lt. Gen. Georgios (see also Grivas insurgency under Cyprus), 379, 394, 403, 413
Gromyko, Andrei, 8, 13, 63, 199, 228, 232
Gronouski, John A., 28, 61
Gruber, Karl, 67, 69, 71
Gruenther, Gen. Alfred, 28
Guerrassimov, Luben, 72, 73
Guillian, Edmond A., 61
Guthrie, D. Keith, 51, 144, 310
Haider, Michael H., 28
Poland:
FRG-Polish Treaty, 163
Nixon's proposed meeting with Wyszynski, 159, 160, 161, 162
Nixon's visit, 155, 156, 159, 160, 161, 162
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 50
Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, 217
Haldeman, H.R., 67, 155, 156, 159, 164, 174
Handley, William, 248
Cyprus crisis of 1972, 399, 405
Cyprus' intercommunal conflict, 342, 348, 364, 413, 414
Turkey:
Anti-Western attitudes in, 435
Ecumenical Patriarchate succession, 455

References are to document numbers
Handley, William—Continued
Turkey—Continued
Handley’s meeting with Demirel, 458
Kidnappings of U.S. airmen, 440
Political situation, 458
U.S. military assistance to, 438
U.S. military presence in, 435
Hannah, John, 186, 454
Haralambopoulos, Lt. Gen.
Haralambous, Costas, 351
Hardin, Clifford M., 9, 186
Hare, Ray, 342
Harriman, W. Averell, 221
Harris, Fred R., 204
Hartke, Vance, 106, 325
Hartman, Arthur, 277
Hays, Wayne, 319, 325
Heinemann, Gustav W., 45
Helman, Gerald B., 349
Helms, Richard, 28, 380
Cyprus, 359
Greece, 283, 304
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty:
Covert CIA funding, 30, 52
Interim funding or liquidation dilemma, 52, 55
Public funding, 50, 52
Herz, Martin F., 66, 386, 398, 416
Hill, Robert C., 267, 300
Greece, 276
Hungary, 106, 107
Poland, 135, 136, 144
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty:
FRG-U.S. confrontation re, 40, 46
Public funding, 51, 54
Ho Chi Minh, 96, 192
Hoffman, Fred, 402
Holdridge, John, 57
Homme, Robert O., 241
Hormats, Robert, 24, 89, 129, 152, 168, 235
Hoskinson, Samuel, 323, 376, 380
Houston, Robert B., Jr., 73
Hughes, Paul, 96
Hume, Lord, 298
Humes, John, 65, 66
Hungary (see also Eastern Europe), 143
Amortization of surplus property debt, 107, 108, 112
Bilateral problems with United States, review and examination of, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 115, 121
Claims settlement agreement with United States, 129
Crown of St. Stephen issue, 116, 125, 126
European security issue, views on, 115
IMF membership issue, 113
Mindszenty affair, 106, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 128
Radio Free Europe, 28
Rogers’ visit, 127, 128
U.S. astronauts’ visit, rejection of, 110, 111
U.S. economic/trade relations with, 24, 26, 27, 108, 109, 128
Vietnam War, views on, 127
Zhivkov’s views on, 73
Husak, Gustav, 78, 81, 82
Hussein, King of Jordan, 221
Hyland, William, 144
Hyvarinen, Risto, 97, 98, 101, 103
Iakovos, Archbishop, 455, 456
India, 232, 448
Ingersoll, Jack, 425, 436
Inonu, Ismet, 423, 428, 458
International Committee on Space Research, 5
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 434
Hungary membership issue, 113
Ioannides, Costas, 351
Ioannides, Odysseas, 351
Ioannidis, Lt. Col. Dimitrios, 269, 271
Ionita, Gheorghe, 203
Ipsarides, Elias, 383
Irwin, James, 345
Irwin, John N., II, 129, 144, 146, 154, 227, 359, 398
Cyprus crisis of 1972, 402, 405
Cyprus’ intercommunal conflict, 365, 369, 376, 380, 384
Turkey, 443, 455
Iscen, Oktay, 349
Israel, 221
Italy, 63, 230, 231, 242, 245, 276, 283

References are to document numbers
1142  Index

Jablonski, Henryk, 157, 164
Jakielowski, Mieczyslaw, 166
Jakes, Milos, 78
Jakobson, Max, 100, 101, 103
Janiewski, Wladimir, 166
Jankowitsch, Peter, 71
Japan, 19
Jaroszewicz, Piotr, 54, 153, 157, 164, 165, 166, 168, 169, 170
Jarring, Gunnar, 29
Jaruzelski, Wlodzimierz, 166
Javits, Jacob, 204
Jedrychowski, Stefan, 132, 140
Jelic, Branimir, 228
Jessup, John, 37, 48
Jews of Poland, 131
Jews of Soviet Union, 102
Johnson, Charles K., 66
Johnson, Lyndon B., 28, 31, 130, 241, 257, 319, 419, 428
Johnson, U. Alexis, 47, 73, 292
Cyprus, 385
Greece, 286, 310, 313, 322, 329
Hungary, 109
Narcotics control, 425, 426, 432, 442
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty:
Covert CIA funding, 29, 30, 53
FRG-U.S. confrontation re, 46
Interim funding or liquidation dilemma, 53, 57
Public funding, 51, 53, 58, 59
Study commission for, 60
Turkey, 425, 426, 432, 442
Jones, Betty J., 354
Jones, Col. John G., 70
Jones, Owen, 108
Jordan, 221
Jurich, Anthony, 256
Kaczmarek, Jan, 148, 166, 175
Kadar, Janos, 10, 111, 115, 116, 127, 128, 143, 172
Kaplan, George R., 177
Karamanlis, Constantine, 250, 256, 257, 258, 302
Karamessines, Thomas H., 49, 51, 57, 144, 304, 398, 402, 405
Karaosmanoglu, Attila, 450
Karlovo, Aarno, 101
Karlalainer, Ahit, 63, 96, 97
Katzbenach, Nicholas, 28, 30, 247
Kaunda, Kenneth, 221
Kearns, Henry, 174, 219
Kehrli, Bruce, 155
Kekkonen, Urho, 95, 98, 102, 104, 105
U.S. visit, 99, 100, 101
Kennedy, David, 430, 432, 434
Kennedy, John F., 68
Kennedy, Col. Richard, 24, 51, 57, 144, 168, 301, 308, 310, 375, 376, 380, 397, 398, 401, 402, 405
Kenyatta, Jomo, 221
Kerekes, Jozsef, 108, 112
Khrushchev, Nikita S., 68, 99, 172
King, Barrington, 325
Kirchschlaeger, Rudolph, 64, 65, 66, 71
Kisiel, Henryk, 166
Austria, 62
European Community and, 68
European security issue, views on, 68
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, views on, 68
Nixon’s visit, 67, 68, 69
U.S. military assistance to, 64
Vietnam War, views on, 68
China, People’s Republic of, 183, 206
Cyprus:
Crisis of 1972, 393, 397, 398, 399, 401, 402, 405
Nixon’s meeting with Makarios, 359, 360
Cyprus’ intercommunal conflict, 353
Independent mediation option, 376
Makarios’ hard-line position re, 361
Negotiations by communities, 414
U.N. mediation effort, 376, 380
U.S. mediation option, 376
U.S. policy review, 372, 376, 380
Czechoslovakia:
Catalytic cracking technology from United States, 151
Gold/claims issue, 85, 87
Soviet invasion, 77
U.S. economic/trade relations with, 85
U.S. NSSM/CIEPSM study on negotiation strategy, 92, 94
Eastern Europe:
Polish political unrest and, 144
Scientific and technological cooperation with United States, 6, 18

References are to document numbers
Kissinger, Henry A.—Continued

Eastern Europe—Continued
U.S. economic/trade relations with, 3, 9, 12, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27
U.S. official visits to, 5
U.S. port security policy re, 8, 13, 15, 16
U.S. program to “cause trouble” in, 10

European security issue:
Austrian views on, 68
Finnish views on, 99, 100
Polish views on, 133, 148, 163
Romanian views on, 206, 215
Yugoslav views on, 220

Finland:
European security issue, views on, 99, 100
Kekkonen’s U.S. visit, 99, 100
Kissinger’s assessment of, 95, 99
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, views on, 99

Greece, 320
Constantine, U.S. policy toward, 301, 308, 310, 315
Constantine’s return issue, 245, 312
Constantine’s U.S. visit, 244, 245
Middle East, views on, 295
Military situation, 253
Papandreou’s proposed meeting with Kissinger, 248
Political opposition, U.S. contacts with, 316, 321
Spain, relations with, 297, 300
Tasca’s departure as Ambassador, 338
U.S. Ambassador, appointment of, 252, 254
U.S. homeporting of Naval task force in, 329, 331, 335
U.S. official visits, restrictions on, 321
Vlachou’s proposed meeting with Kissinger, 279

Hungary:
Bilateral problems with United States, review and examination of, 111
Claims settlement agreement with United States, 129
Crown of St. Stephen issue, 116, 125, 126
IMF membership issue, 113
 Mindszenty affair, 106, 122, 124
 Rogers’ visit, 127

Middle East:
Greece’s resumed receipt of U.S. military assistance:
Announcement of decision re, 292
Congressional interest in, 256
Middle East situation and, 291
National Security Decision Memoranda re, 262, 284
NATO’s attitude toward, 283
NSC study re, 246, 251, 256, 261
Phantom aircraft, 294
Tasca’s instructions for dealing with Greek government re, 262, 265
U.S.-Greek discussions re, 245
U.S.-Greek discussions re, 245
U.S. insistence on political reform as condition for resumption of military assistance, 282, 284
U.S. policy on liberalization following resumption of military assistance, 301, 308, 310, 323

Greece’s political liberalization—Continued
U.S.-Greek discussions re, 245
U.S. insistence on political reform as condition for resumption of military assistance, 282, 284
U.S. policy on liberalization following resumption of military assistance, 301, 308, 310, 323

References are to document numbers
Kissinger, Henry A.—Continued
Poland—Continued
Anti-Semitism in, 131
Catalytic cracking technology from
United States, 14, 139, 148, 149,
150, 151
European security issue, views on,
133, 148, 163
FRG-Polish Treaty, 131, 133, 134,
137, 140, 146, 148, 163
Gierek’s accession to power, 144,
145
Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions, views on, 163
Nixon’s correspondence with
Gierek, 175
Nixon’s meetings Gierek, 164, 165
Nixon’s proposed meeting with
Wyszyński, 159, 160, 161
Nixon’s visit, 154, 156, 157, 158,
159, 160, 161, 164, 165, 166
Political situation, 172
Political unrest of 1970, 143, 144,
145
Radio Free Europe, 163
Scientific and technological
cooperation with United
States, 175
U.S. economic/trade relations with,
152, 163, 168, 169, 170, 173
U.S. port security policy re, 133
Vietnam War, views on, 148, 163
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty:
Covert CIA funding, 30, 34
FRG-U.S. confrontation re, 35, 37,
38, 39, 40, 45, 47, 49, 51, 56
Interim funding or liquidation
dilemma, 57
Polish concerns re, 163
Public funding, 50, 51
Study commission for, 58, 61
Termination option, 32, 33, 34
Romania, 189, 192
Catalytic cracking technology from
United States, 14
Ceausescu’s U.S. visit, 198, 199
China, U.S.-Romanian discussions
re, 183, 206
“Developing country” classification
by United States, 200
Disaster relief from United States,
194, 196, 197
European security issue, views on,
206, 215

Kissinger, Henry A.—Continued
Romania—Continued
GATT membership issue, 205
Nixon’s correspondence with
Ceausescu, 215
Nixon’s meetings with Ceausescu,
183, 184, 199
Nixon’s visit, 176, 178, 180, 182,
183, 184, 185
Press coverage of U.S.-Romanian
contacts, 206
Scientific and technological
cooperation with United
States, 186
Soviet Union, relations with, 206,
207
U.S. economic/trade relations with,
181, 182, 183, 185, 191, 199,
200, 201, 204, 205, 208
U.S.-Soviet Summit of 1972,
Romanian views on, 212
Vietnam War, views on, 184, 206,
207
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 99
Turkey:
Ecumenical Patriarchate succession,
456
Kidnappings of U.S. airmen, 440
Narcotics control, 425, 426, 434,
445, 447
U.S. economic assistance to, 430,
434, 444
U.S. program analysis re, 424
Vietnam War:
Austrian views on, 68
Polish views on, 148, 163
Romanian views on, 184, 206, 207
Yugoslav views on, 220
Yugoslavia:
European security issue, views on,
220
Middle East, views on, 220
Nixon’s visit, 220, 221
Nixon’s visit to Romania and, 216
Post-Tito prospects, 220, 227
Rogers’ meetings with Tito, 217
Scientific and technological
cooperation with United
States, 226
Soviet Union, relations with, 231,
237
Tito’s U.S. visit, 231, 232
U.S. economic/trade relations with,
225, 226, 235

References are to document numbers
Index 1145

Kissinger, Henry A.—Continued
Yugoslavia—Continued
U.S. private investment in, 217, 219
Vietnam War, views on, 220
Yugoslav émigré activities in
United States, 231
Klaus, Josef, 62
Klein, Herb, 157, 164
Kleindienst, Richard, 431
Koenig, Cardinal, 106, 117
Kokkinou, Ourana, 351
Komer, Robert, 340, 341, 419, 422
Komodromos, Epaminondas, 343, 370
Kosygin, Alexei N., 70, 97, 98, 99, 100,
101, 102, 167, 238
Koundouriotis, Adm., 333
Kovalev, Sergei, 72
Kraft, Joseph, 158
Kreacic, Miroslav, 221
Krebs, Capt. Edward C., 421
Kreisky, Bruno, 65, 68, 69
Krogh, Egil Jr., 427, 442, 450
Krol, John Cardinal, 158, 159, 162
Kuchuk, Fazil, 340, 344
Kyprianou, Spyros, 345, 370, 379, 387,
409
Ladas, Lt. Col. Ioannis, 239
Laird, Melvin R., 20
Eastern Europe, 21
Greece, 293, 305, 313, 322, 337, 339
Turkey, 421, 424, 432, 438, 453
Laitinen, Paavo, 101
Leddy, John M., 1
Lehman, John, Jr., 64, 235
Lekkas, Col. Antonios, 269
Leonhart, William, 218, 220, 221, 222,
223, 224, 231
Leskinen, Vaino, 98, 99, 101, 103
Leslie, Gen. Edward M., 383
Libya, 322, 435
Lindjord, Haakon, 256
Lipscomb, Glenard P., 28
Lisle, Raymond E., 1, 109, 110
Litton Industries, 239
Livingston, Robert Gerald, 89, 93, 154,
162, 163, 167
Lloyd, Charles T., 70
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 114, 258
Lodge, John, 116
Loiza, Vaso, 351
Long, R.A., 367, 368, 369, 371, 386,
416
Loomis, Henry, 43
Lopez Bravo, Gregorio, 297, 300
Lord, Winston, 13, 48
Lowenstein, Alan, 303
Luetgendorf, Karl Ferdinand, 70
Luns, Gen. Joseph, 156, 177
Luxembourg, 276
Lynn, Laurence E., Jr., 32
Lyssarides, Vassos, 351, 389
MacGregor, Clark, 51, 57
Mahon, George M., 28, 52, 53, 57
Makarezos, Nicholas, 269, 293, 302, 314,
333, 336
Makarios III, Archbishop, 298, 314, 319,
343
Constantine's return to Greece issue,
267
Cyprus:
Assassination attempts against
Makarios, 350, 351, 352, 353,
355, 383
Communist influence in, 360
Coup against Makarios, U.S.
contingency planning for, 354
Crisis of 1972, 389, 392, 400, 403,
405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410
Grivas insurgency, 392, 417, 418
Makarios' initial meeting with
Popper, 344
Makarios' meeting with Grivas, 413
Makarios' political standing, 355
Makarios resignation issue, 407,
410, 415
Middle East, views on, 360
Nixon's meeting with Makarios,
357, 358, 359, 360
Terrorist situation, 347
Cyprus' intercommunal conflict:
Constitutional compromise, Greek
proposal for, 373
Deconfrontation proposal, 388
Greek-Greek Cypriot rift re, 379, 390
Greek-Turkish bilateral settlement
option, 364
Greek-Turkish cooperation against
Makarios, 383
Local autonomy issue, 340, 344
Makarios' hard-line position re,
361, 362
Makarios' program to deal with,
392
Military confrontation, increased
risk of, 346

References are to document numbers
Index

Makarios III, Archbishop—Continued
Cyprus’ intercommunal conflict—Continued
Negotiations by communities, 378, 415
Police and judiciary issues, 344
U.N. mediation effort, 376, 380, 394
U.N. military presence, 344
U.S. alleged pro-Turkish bias, 370
U.S.-Cypriot discussions re, 344, 362
Turkish attitude toward, 413
Manescu, Corneliu, 178, 180, 189, 197, 198, 213
Manescu, Manea, 210, 214
Mao Tse-tung, 206
Markezinis, Spyridon, 271
Marko, Jan, 86
Maronitis, Demetrios, 317
Martin, Graham, 299, 301
Matlock, Jack, 330
Matusek, Ivan V., 86
Maurer, Ion Gheorghe, 183, 184, 192, 195
Mayo, Robert P., 30, 34
Mazarakis, Michael-George, 241
Mazurov, Kirill, 98
McClelland, Roswell D., 252, 259
McCloskey, Robert, 29, 75, 103, 247, 382
McCracken, Paul W., 20, 203, 206
McCinnis, John, 380
McGovern, George, 156
McGuire, Ralph, 228
McHenry, Donald, 256
McNamara, Robert S., 454
McNaughton, John, 421
McSweeney, John, 74
Meeker, Leonard C., 187, 193, 195, 197, 209, 212, 214
Melen, Ferit, 416, 457
Meleton, Bishop, 411, 456
Melovski, Milos, 221
Merchant, Livingston T., 28
Metaxas, Ioannis, 239
Meyer, Cord, Jr., 29, 30
Michalowski, Jerzy, 43, 133, 134, 138, 139, 141, 148, 154
Middle East:
Cypriot views on, 360
Greek views on, 295
Soviet policy re, 221, 295
Turkish views on, 420
Yugoslav views on, 217, 220, 221, 232
Mills, Wilbur D., 20, 83, 191, 206, 208, 213
Mindzsenty, Jozsef Cardinal, 106, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126
Minkkinen, Capt. Erkki, 99, 100, 101
Mitchell, John, 57, 309, 338, 432
Mitchell, Marion K., 264
Mitchell, Martha, 43
Mitran, Mircea, 210
Mladenov, Peter, 75, 76
Mondale, Walter F., 204, 205
Mooer, Adm. Thomas H., 57, 144, 293, 313, 337, 376, 380, 398, 402
Moose, Richard, 188, 303
Morocco, 300
Morse, John H., 70, 144
Mosbacher, Emil, Jr., 240, 263, 435
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 131, 427, 431, 434, 445
Mozcar, Maj. Gen. Mieczyslaw, 131, 145
Mudd, Robert C., 221
Munkki, Olavi, 99, 101, 103
Murphy, Robert D., 28, 44, 46, 53, 323
Murphy, William Beverly, 57
Muskie, Edmund, 156
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR):
Austrian views on, 68, 70, 71
Finnish views on, 103
Polish views on, 138, 163, 167, 172
Turkish views on, 457
Myerson, Jacob M., 1
Nagy, Janos, 107, 110
Narcotics control:
Eastern Europe, 26
Yugoslavia, 224
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 100, 217, 220, 221, 232
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 5
National Intelligence Estimates, 428
NIE 29-1-71, 314
NIE 29-2-71, 451

References are to document numbers
Index 1147

National Science Foundation, 6, 18
National Security Decision Memoranda:
  NSDM 15, 3
  NSDM 34, 262, 272
  NSDM 67, 284
  NSDM 82, 8, 13, 15
  Text of, 16
  NSDM 99, 23
  NSDM 173, 170
  NSDM 212, 27
National Security Study Memoranda:
  NSSM 35, 3
  NSSM 52, 246
  NSSM 75, 424
  NSSM 90, 272
  NSSM 116, 301, 306, 308
  NSSM 129, 227, 230
  NSSM 130, 372, 375
  NSSM 163, 25, 26
National Student Association, 31
Neather, Rosemary, 393
Nehmer, Stanley, 2
Nelson, William, 51
Netherlands, 276
Neubert, Joseph, 10
Nguyen Van Thieu, 184
Nikezic, Marko, 223
Nixon, Patricia, 160, 161, 164, 279
Nixon, Richard M., 268
Africa, 221
Austria:
  Nixon’s meeting with Klaus, 62
  Nixon’s visit, 67, 68, 69
China, People’s Republic of:
  U.S.-Romanian discussions re, 183, 192, 199, 210
  Yugoslavia, relations with, 232
Cyprus:
  Crisis of 1972, 404
  Intercommunal conflict, 372, 387
  Nixon’s meeting with Makarios, 357, 358, 359, 360
  Turkish policy re, 454
Czechoslovakia, 90, 93
  Catalytic cracking technology from United States, 151
  Consular convention with United States, 94
Gold/claims issue, 83, 84, 85
  Husak’s accession to power, 82
U.S. economic/trade relations with, 85
U.S. NSSM/CIEPSM study on negotiation strategy, 92, 94
Nixon, Richard M.—Continued
  Eastern Europe:
    Nixon’s 1970 report to Congress re, 7
    Scientific and technological cooperation with United States, 6, 11, 18
    U.S. economic/trade relations with, 3, 9, 12, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 27
    U.S. official visits to, 5
    U.S. port security policy re, 8, 13, 15, 16
    U.S. program to “cause trouble” in, 10
  European security issue:
    Finnish views on, 100
    Polish views on, 163
    Romanian views on, 192, 199, 207, 215
    Yugoslav views on, 220
Finland:
  European security issue, views on, 100
  Kekkonen’s U.S. visit, 99, 100
  Kissinger’s assessment of, 95, 99
  Middle East, views on, 100
  Soviet Union, relations with, 100
  Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, views on, 100
  Vietnam War, views on, 100
Greece:
  Agnew’s visit, 320, 326
  Constantine, U.S. policy toward, 310
  Constantine’s return issue, 242, 283, 309, 326
  Constantine’s U.S. visit, 244, 245
  Military situation, 253
  Nixon-Papadopoulos correspondence, 274, 277, 278
  Spain, relations with, 297
  Tasca’s departure as Ambassador, 338
  U.S. Ambassador, appointment of, 254
  U.S. homeporting of Naval task force in, 329, 331
  U.S. military activities in, 313
  Vitsaxis’ presentation of credentials, 263
Greece’s political liberalization:
  Agnew’s visit and, 320
  “Cosmetic” gestures by Greek government, 304, 310

References are to document numbers
Nixon, Richard M.—Continued
Greece’s political liberalization—Continued
Nixon’s personal encouragement of, 320, 323
Papadopoulos’ views on, 274
Pappas’ views on, 309
Tasca’s instructions for dealing with Greek government re, 262, 265, 283
U.S.-Greek discussions re, 260, 263
U.S. insistence on political reform as condition for resumption of military assistance, 282, 283, 284
U.S. policy on liberalization following resumption of military assistance, 301, 310, 323
Greece’s resumed receipt of U.S. military assistance:
Congressional interest in, 319, 320
Middle East situation and, 291
National Security Decision Memoranda re, 262, 284
NATO’s attitude toward, 283
NSC study re, 246, 257, 261
Tasca’s instructions for dealing with Greek government re, 262, 265, 283
Under Secretaries Committee’s recommendations re, 278
U.S.-Greek discussions re, 243, 260
U.S. insistence on political reform as condition for resumption of assistance, 282, 283, 284
U.S. national security issue, 249
Vietnam War and, 324
Hungary:
Bilateral problems with United States, review and examination of, 111
Claims settlement agreement with United States, 129
Crown of St. Stephen issue, 125
Mindszenty affair, 106, 118, 119, 122
Italy, 242
Middle East:
Cypriot views on, 360
Turkish views on, 420
Yugoslav views on, 220, 221, 232
Nixon, Richard M.—Continued
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, 163
Poland, 171
Anti-Semitism in, 131
Catalytic cracking technology from United States, 14, 150, 151, 165
European security issue, views on, 163
FRG-Polish Treaty, 131, 140, 156, 163
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, views on, 163
Nixon’s correspondence with Gierek, 175
Nixon’s meetings Gierek, 164, 165, 166
Nixon’s proposed meeting with Wyszynski, 160
Nixon’s Pulaski Day recognition, 174
Nixon’s visit, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 164, 165, 166, 167
Political unrest of 1970, 145
Radio Free Europe, 163
Scientific and technological cooperation with United States, 174
U.S. astronauts’ visit, 131
U.S. economic/trade relations with, 131, 163, 165, 168, 169, 174
Vietnam War, views on, 163
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty:
Covert CIA funding, 34, 52
East European émigrés and, 37
FRG-U.S. confrontation re, 39, 40, 44, 48
Interim funding or liquidation dilemma, 52, 57
Polish concerns re, 163
Public funding, 52, 58, 59
Study commission for, 58, 60, 61
Termination option, 32, 34
Romania:
Catalytic cracking technology from United States, 14
Ceausescu’s U.S. visit, 198, 199
China, U.S.-Romanian discussions re, 183, 192, 199, 210

References are to document numbers
Nixon, Richard M.—Continued
Romania—Continued
Cultural exchanges with United States, 183
"Developing country" classification by United States, 199
Disaster relief from United States, 196
European security issue, views on, 192, 199, 207, 215
Foreign policy, 183
FRG-Soviet Treaty, U.S.-Romanian discussion re, 199
GATT membership issue, 199
Nixon's correspondence with Ceausescu, 211, 212, 215
Nixon's meetings with Ceausescu, 180, 183, 184, 199
Nixon's visit, 7, 178, 179, 180, 183, 184, 185, 187, 189
Rogers' visit, 213
Scientific and technological cooperation with United States, 183, 186, 187
Soviet Union, relations with, 183, 192, 199, 207
U.S. economic/trade relations with, 181, 183, 188, 199, 202, 204, 205, 208, 210, 211
U.S. private investment in, 199
U.S.-Soviet Summit of 1972, Romanian views on, 212
Vietnam War, views on, 183, 184, 189
South Asia situation, 232
Soviet-U.S. relations, 183, 189, 192, 199, 212, 232
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 100
Tasca, Nixon-Agnew discussion re, 326
Turkey:
Anti-Western attitudes in, 435
Kidnappings of U.S. airmen, 440
Middle East, views on, 420
Nixon's correspondence with Sunay, 452
Nixon's meeting with Demirel, 419, 420
Nixon's meeting with Erim, 454
Soviet Union, U.S.-Turkish discussions re, 420, 454

Nixon, Richard M.—Continued
Turkey—Continued
Subversion problem, 454
U.S. economic assistance to, 430, 434, 444
U.S. military assistance to, 438, 454
U.S. military presence in, 435
U.S. policy of maintaining good relations with, 419
U.S. program analysis re, 424
Vietnam War:
Finnish views on, 100
Greece's resumed receipt of U.S. military assistance and, 324
Polish views on, 163
Romanian views on, 183, 184, 189
Yugoslav views on, 220, 221, 234
Yugoslavia:
Africa, views on, 221
China, relations with, 232
European security issue, views on, 220
Middle East, views on, 220, 221, 232
Nixon's meetings with Tito, 221, 232, 234
Nixon's visit, 220, 221
Post-Tito prospects, 227
Rogers' meetings with Tito, 217
Scientific and technological cooperation with United States, 221, 225, 226, 234, 235
Soviet-U.S. discussions re, 226
Tito's U.S. visit, 232, 234
Vietnam War, views on, 220, 221, 234

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 4, 138, 230
Greece's political liberalization, 239, 255, 256, 264, 268, 276, 287, 314
Greece's resumed receipt of U.S. military assistance, 276, 278, 283
Norway, 99, 276
Novak, Robert, 28, 29
Noyes, James H., 310, 380, 402, 405
Nutter, G. Warren, 144, 148, 222, 256, 266, 277, 318, 380, 398, 405, 421, 438, 453
Nyerere, Julius, 221
Nyers, Rezso, 26

References are to document numbers
Obst, Harry, 62
Ogden, Geoffrey, 385, 443
Olcay, Osman, 368, 374, 382, 387, 413, 443, 450, 457
Olechowski, Tadeusz, 166, 175
Olszowski, Stefan, 154, 166
Onaca, Emil, 182
Onassis, Aristotle, 314
Oncken, Dirk, 134
Opas, Pauli, 101
Osgood, Robert E., 256
O'Shaughnessy, Elim, 108
Osolnik, Bogdan, 236
Osorio-Tafall, Bibiano, 342, 388, 409, 415
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), 219, 230, 234
Owen, Robert I., 203
Paasikivi, Juho, 98
Packard, David, 30, 51, 57, 310, 313, 322, 327, 432
Pakistan, 232, 458
Palach, Jan, 77
Palestinians, 221
Palmby, Clarence, 235
Palshe, Arvid, 98
Panagoulis, Alexander, 239
Pan American Airlines, 89
Panayotakos, Constantine, 362, 383, 392, 395, 403, 405
Pan-Hellenic Liberation Movement, 248
Panteleimon, Bishop, 239
Papadopoulos, Despina, 302
Papadopoulos, Lt. Col. George, 384, 456
Cyprus:
   Crisis of 1972, 393, 396, 406, 408, 410
   Intercommunal conflict, 373, 379, 383
Greece:
   Agnew’s visit, 325, 326, 328
   Arms purchases from non-U.S. sources, 281
   Constantine’s proposed meeting with Papadopoulos, 280
   Constantine’s return issue, 267, 280, 285, 328, 334
   Corruption problem, 337
   Coup plan against Papadopoulos, possible, 353
   Laird’s meeting with Papadopoulos, 293
   Papadopoulos, George—Continued
   Greece—Continued
      Military government, 239, 269, 302, 314, 333
      Nixon-Papadopoulos correspondence, 274, 277, 278
      Spain, relations with, 300
      Tasca’s initial call on Papadopoulos, 268
      Turkey, relations with, 293
      U.S. Ambassador, appointment of, 252
      U.S. homeporting of Naval task force in, 335
   Greece’s political liberalization:
      Agnew’s visit and, 325, 328
      Businessmen’s role, 311
      Elections issue, 252, 275, 290, 311, 312
      Future prospects, U.S. reports re, 302
      McClelland’s views on, 239
      NATO-Greece relationship and, 239, 268
      Nixon’s personal encouragement of, 320
      Papadopoulos’ assumption of regency and, 333, 334, 336
      Papadopoulos’ views on, 274, 325
      Political prisoners issue, 325
      Timetable for, 275
      U.S. covert activities in support of, 289
      U.S.-Greek discussions re, 268, 289, 293, 325, 328
      U.S. insistence on political reform as condition for resumption of military assistance, 288, 289
      Greece’s resumed receipt of U.S. military assistance:
         Announcement of decision re, 292
         Delays in resumption, Greek response to, 281, 289
         U.S.-Greek discussions re, 268, 281, 289, 293
         U.S. insistence on political reform as condition for resumption of assistance, 288, 289
      Papadopoulos, Tassos, 383
      Papagos, Leonidas, 244
      Papandreou, Andreas, 243, 247, 248, 302, 305, 314, 319, 326
      Papanicolaou, Col. Nicholas, 317

References are to document numbers
Index  1151

Pappas, Thomas A., 242, 252, 309, 314, 338
Parker, David, 157
Parker, Jim, 442
Pasztor, Laszlo, 116, 125
Patakas, Kyriacos, 355
Patilis, Demetrios, 269
Patolichev, Nikolay, 98, 172
Pattakos, Stylianos, 243, 244, 269, 293, 296, 314, 317, 333, 336
Pauls, Rolf, 144
Paul VI, Pope, 114, 117, 118, 120, 122, 124
Pedersen, Richard F., 66
Pell, Claiborne, 247, 256
Peter, Janos, 112, 114, 115, 121, 122, 127, 128
Peterson, Frederick V.E., 95, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105
Peterson, Peter G., 22, 150, 151, 168, 169, 172, 175, 205, 208, 225, 235
Petrides, Frixos, 383
Phillips, Ruth H., 1
Piller, Jan, 78
Pipinelis, Panayotis, 244, 245, 247, 255, 259, 264, 267, 269, 280, 340, 343, 348, 352, 355
Platt, Nicholas, 325
Poage, W.R., 9
Podgorny, Nikolay, 98, 99, 102, 454
Poland—Continued
Nixon’s proposed meeting with Wyszynski, 159, 160, 161, 162
Nixon’s Pulaski Day recognition, 174
Nixon’s visit, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 199, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167
Oil exploration, 167
Political situation, 130, 172
Political unrest of 1970, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147
Radio Free Europe, 28, 35, 41, 43, 45, 54, 163
Scientific and technological cooperation with United States, 173, 174, 175
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 132
Soviet Union, relations with, 172
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, views on, 138
U.S. Ambassador’s annual report (1969), 130
U.S. astronauts’ visit, 131
U.S. economic/trade relations with (see also Catalytic cracking technology from United States above; U.S. port security policy re below), 24, 26, 131, 132, 152, 163, 165, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175
U.S. port security policy re, 133, 137, 138
Vietnam War, views on, 132, 138, 148, 152, 163, 167, 172
Polish-American Trade Commission, 168, 169, 175
Pommerening, Horst, 36, 41
Pompidou, Georges, 185, 232
Popescu, Dumitru, 199
Popov, Ivan, 75, 76
Popper, David, 242, 343, 356, 379, 383
Cyprus:
Assassination attempts against Makarios, 350, 352, 355
Communist influence in, 355
Crisis of 1972, 399, 400, 402, 405, 409, 410
Grivas insurgency, 383, 417, 418
Makarios’ initial meeting with Popper, 344
Makarios’ political standing, 355
Nixon’s meeting with Makarios, 357, 358

References are to document numbers
1152  Index

Popper, David—Continued
Cyprus—Continued
  State Department roundtable discussion re, 416
  Terrorist situation, 347
Cyprus’ intercommunal conflict:
  Assassination attempts against Makarios and, 355
  Central intercommunal institutional structure issue, 363
  Deconfrontation proposal, 388
  Greek-Turkish bilateral settlement option, 364
  Local autonomy issue, 344
  Makarios’ hard-line position re, 362
  Military confrontation, increased risk of, 346
  Negotiations by communities, 366, 373
  Partition and annexation (double enosis) option, 352
  Police and judiciary issues, 344
  U.N. mediation effort, 381
  U.N. military presence, 344
  U.S. alleged pro-Turkish bias, 370
  U.S.-Cypriot discussions re, 344, 362
  U.S. policy on, 357
  U.S.-Turkish diplomatic communications re, 348

Portugal, 276
Potsdam Conference (1945), 130
Potts, James M., 317
Pranger, Robert, 277
Preston, Gene, 307
Pribyl, Jaromir, 80
Price, Ray, 168, 169
Proctor, Edward W., 256
Pucinski, Roman C., 149
Pugh, Robert L., 438
Quinn, Charles W., 322

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty—Continued
  Interim funding or liquidation dilemma, 52, 53, 55, 57
  Polish-U.S. confrontation re, 43, 45, 54, 163
  Public funding, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 58, 59
  Public stance on funding, 31
  Study commission for, 58, 60, 61
  Termination option, 28, 32, 33, 34
  USIA involvement, 28
  U.S. troop presence in FRG and, 45
  Rahman, Mujib, 232
  Ramparts magazine, 28
  Ramsbotham, Peter, 346
  Raspopovic, Blazo, 228
  Reid, Ogden R., 50, 51, 53
  Ribicic, Mitja, 218, 221, 222, 228
  Richardson, Adm. David C., 281
  Richardson, Elliot L., 10, 32, 110, 111, 135, 136, 181, 191, 193, 201, 204, 245, 277, 278, 371, 432, 448
  Roberts, Brig. Gen. Francis J., 376, 380
  Roche, James M., 28
  Roche, John P., 61
  Rockwell, Stuart W., 244, 250, 255, 256, 259, 264, 419
  Rodman, Peter W., 206
  Rogers, William P., 243, 248, 282, 313, 399
  Austria, 62
  Eastern Europe, views on, 63
  European security issue, views on, 71
  Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, views on, 71
  Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, views on, 63
  Vietnam War, views on, 71
Bulgaria:
  Consular convention with United States, 75
  European security issue, views on, 72
  Official delegation visit to United States, proposed, 75
  U.S. economic/trade relations with, 72, 75

China, People’s Republic of, 132, 238
Cyprus:
  Crisis of 1972, 393, 400, 407
  Makarios resignation issue, 407

References are to document numbers
Index

Rogers, William P.—Continued

Cyprus’ intercommunal conflict:
- Negotiations by communities, 382
- Partition and annexation (double enosis) option, 367, 368
- U.N. mediation effort, 381, 387
- U.N. military presence, 387
- U.S.-Cypriot discussions re, 345
- U.S.-Greek discussions re, 382
- U.S. policy on, 357
- U.S. policy review, 378
- U.S. summary of developments, 368
- U.S.-Turkish discussions re, 349

Czechoslovakia, 82
- Consular convention with United States, 90, 93
- Cultural exchanges with United States, 86, 93
- Gold/claims issue, 83, 85, 90
- Scientific and technological cooperation with United States, 93
- Soviet invasion, 86
- U.S. economic/trade relations with, 86, 90
- U.S. NSSM/CIEPSM study on negotiation strategy, 92, 93, 94

Eastern Europe:
- Austrian views on, 63
- Scientific and technological cooperation with United States, 6, 18
- U.S. economic/trade relations with, 2, 17, 20, 21, 24
- U.S. port security policy re, 8, 13

European security issue:
- Austrian views on, 71
- Bulgarian views on, 72
- Finnish views on, 96, 103
- Polish views on, 132
- Yugoslav views on, 238

Finland:
- European security issue, views on, 96, 103
- Kekkonen’s U.S. visit, 101
- Middle East, views on, 96
- Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, views on, 103
- Soviet Union, relations with, 101
- Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, views on, 96
- Vietnam War, views on, 96

Rogers, William P.—Continued

Greece, 298
- Constantine, U.S. policy toward, 315
- Constantine’s return issue, 244, 299
- Constantine’s U.S. visit, 244
- Corruption problem, 337
- U.S. homeporting of Naval task force in, 329, 330, 339
- U.S. official visits, restrictions on, 318

Greece’s political liberalization:
- Businessmen’s role, 311
- Elections issue, 296
- Martial law issue, 296
- NATO-Greece relationship and, 264, 287
- Timetable for, 264, 275
- U.S.-Greek discussions re, 244, 260, 264
- U.S. insistence on political reform as condition for resumption of military assistance, 283, 287, 288

Greece’s resumed receipt of U.S. military assistance:
- Announcement of decision re, 292
- Congressional interest in, 287
- NATO’s attitude toward, 283
- NSC study re, 261

Greece’s resumed receipt of U.S. military assistance—Continued
- Phantom aircraft, 322
- U.S.-Greek discussions re, 244, 260
- U.S. insistence on political reform as condition for resumption of assistance, 283, 287, 288

Hungary, 110
- Bilateral problems with United States, review and examination of, 111
- Claims settlement agreement with United States, 129
- Rogers’ visit, 127, 128
- U.S. economic/trade relations with, 128

Middle East:
- Finnish views on, 96
- Yugoslav views on, 217, 221
- Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions:
- Austrian views on, 71
- Finnish views on, 103
- Turkish views on, 457

References are to document numbers
Rogers, William P.—Continued
Narcotics control, 429, 431, 442, 443, 449, 450, 457
Poland:

China, relations with, 132
European security issue, views on, 132
FRG-Polish Treaty, 146
Nixon’s visit, 155, 156, 164, 166
U.S. economic/trade relations with, 132, 168
Vietnam War, views on, 132
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty:
East European émigrés and, 57
Public funding, 50, 51, 58
Study commission for, 58
Romania, 206

“Developing country” classification by United States, 200
Disaster relief from United States, 196
Nixon’s visit, 189
Rogers’ visit, 213
Soviet Union, relations with, 177
U.S. economic/trade relations with, 200, 203, 208, 213
U.S.-Soviet Summit of 1972, Romanian views on, 213
Soviet-U.S. relations, 238
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks:
Austrian views on, 63
Finnish views on, 96
Terrorism, 71
Turkey, 454
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, views on, 457
Narcotics control, 429, 431, 442, 443, 449, 450, 457
Nixon’s meeting with Demirel, 419
U.S. economic assistance to, 430, 434, 444
U.S. military assistance to, 452, 457
U.S. military presence in, 419
U.S. policy of maintaining good relations with, 419
Vietnam War:
Austrian views on, 71
Finnish views on, 96
Polish views on, 132
Yugoslav views on, 221
Yugoslavia:
China, U.S.-Yugoslav discussions re, 238
Rogers, William P.—Continued
Yugoslavia—Continued
European security issue, views on, 238
Middle East, views on, 217, 221
Nixon’s visit, 221
Rogers’ meetings with Tito, 217, 218, 238
Soviet Union, relations with, 228, 233, 238
U.S. economic/trade relations with, 225
Vietnam War, views on, 221
Rohal, Ivan, 87
Romania (see also Eastern Europe):
African economic development, proposed U.S.-Romanian cooperation re, 214
Catalytic cracking technology from United States, 14
Ceausescu’s U.S. visit, 198, 199
China, U.S.-Romanian discussions re, 183, 192, 199, 206, 210
Civil Air Agreement with United States, 181
Consular Convention with United States, 203
Cultural exchanges with United States, 183
“Developing country” classification by United States, 199, 200
Disaster relief from United States, 194, 196, 197
Emigration policy, 181
European security issue, views on, 192, 195, 199, 206, 207, 215
Foreign policy, 183
FRG-Soviet Treaty, U.S.-Romanian discussion re, 199
GATT membership issue, 181, 190, 199, 205
Nixon’s correspondence with Ceausescu, 211, 212, 215
Nixon’s meetings with Ceausescu, 180, 183, 184, 199
Nixon’s visit, 7, 176, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 189, 216
Press coverage of U.S.-Romanian contacts, 206
Rogers’ visit, 213
Scientific and technological cooperation with United States, 6, 7, 183, 186, 187

References are to document numbers
Romania—Continued
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 2, 177
Soviet Union, relations with, 177, 179, 180, 183, 192, 194, 195, 199, 206, 207
Tourism industry, 203
U.S. economic/trade relations with, 14, 24, 26, 27, 181, 182, 183, 185, 188, 191, 193, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 208, 210, 211, 213, 214
U.S. port security policy re, 181
U.S. private investment in, 199
U.S.-Soviet Summit of 1972, Romanian views on, 212, 213
Vietnam War, views on, 183, 184, 189, 195, 206, 207, 209
Romanian Trade Act of 1969, 188
Ronne, Torben, 346
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 180
Root, William A., 1
Rossides, Eugene, 431
Rossides, Michaliakis, 351
Rossides, Zenon, 345, 370
Rostow, Walt, 28, 319
Roufogalis, Col. Michael, 239, 269, 336
Rowe, David, 313
Rumsfeld, Donald, 224
Rush, Kenneth, 36, 44, 70, 134
Rusk, Dean, 28, 319
Russell, Richard B., 28, 51
Sadat, Anwar el-, 232, 405
Safire, William, 164
Sampas, James G., 101
Samuels, Nathaniel, 202
Sargeant, Howland H., 28
Satir, Kenal, 423
Savasci, Lt. Gen. Hayati, 441
Savides, Michael, 383
Scali, John, 164
Schaller, Charles, 210
Scheel, Walter, 45, 103, 140
Schlesinger, James R., 57
Schmidt, Carl W., 2
Schroeder, Gerhard, 140
Schumann, 63
Schwartz, Harry, 425, 427, 429
Scott, Harold B., 22, 73, 148
Scranton, William, 53, 176
Seaborg, Glenn, 6, 110
Sebastian, Peter, 189
Selden, Armistead I., Jr., 70, 376, 402
Senior Review Group, 306, 308, 310, 376, 380
Servan-Schreiber, Jean Jacques, 276, 302
Seward, William, 458
Seymour, Whitney, 28
Shakespeare, Frank J., Jr., 35, 38, 39, 41, 43, 131, 256, 270, 277
Shaw, David G., 2
Shelepkin, Aleksandr, 98
Shelest, Petr, 98
Sherer, Albert W., Jr., 91
Shultz, George P., 20, 55, 57
Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, 195
Sik, Ota, 78
Silva, Walter J., 317, 327, 416
Cyprus, 358
Crisis of 1972, 398, 399, 400, 402, 405, 407
Makarios resignation issue, 407
Cyprus' intercommunal conflict, 340, 346, 348, 354, 366
Constitutional compromise, Greek proposal for, 373
Deconfrontation proposal, 388
Greek-Turkish bilateral settlement option, 371
Independent mediation option, 376, 378
Negotiations by communities, 414
Partition and annexation (double enosis) option, 367, 368
U.N. mediation effort, 376, 377, 378, 380, 381, 385
U.N. military presence, 385
U.S. mediation option, 376, 378
U.S. policy review, 376, 378, 380
U.S. summary of developments, 368
U.S.-Turkish discussions re, 385
Violent incidents, U.S. contingency plans for, 378
Greece:
Constantine, U.S. policy toward, 301
Constantine's return issue, 285

References are to document numbers
Index

Sisco, Joseph J.—Continued
Greece—Continued
Papandreou’s proposed meeting with Kissinger, 248
Political opposition, U.S. contacts with, 316, 321
U.S. homeporting of Naval task force in, 332
Greece’s political liberalization:
Constantine’s proposed return and, 285
Elections issue, 250, 290
Tasca’s instructions for dealing with Greek government re, 270
U.S. covert activities in support of, 290
U.S.-Greek discussions re, 250
Greece’s resumed receipt of U.S. military assistance:
Phantom aircraft, 327
Tasca’s instructions for dealing with Greek government re, 270
U.S.-Greek discussions re, 250
U.S. preliminary work re, 266
Narcotics control, 431, 433, 442, 449
Turkey, 452
Narcotics control, 431, 433, 442, 449
U.S. military assistance to, 438
Skoug, Kenneth N., Jr., 46
Skouras, Spyros, 298
Smith, Gerard, 156
Smrkovsky, Joseph, 78
Solomon, Anthony M., 1
Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, 20, 21, 22, 48, 48, 48, 56, 69, 113, 133, 152, 166, 180, 221, 235, 320, 335, 426
Austria, 64
Czechoslovakia:
Gold/claims issue, 87
Soviet invasion, 77
U.S. NSSM/CIEPSM study on negotiation strategy, 92, 94
Eastern Europe:
Polish political unrest and, 144
U.S. economic/trade relations with, 24
U.S. port security policy re, 13
U.S. program to “cause trouble” in, 10
European security issue:
Polish views on, 148, 172
Romanian views on, 195
Sonnenfeldt, Helmut—Continued
Hungary:
Bilateral problems with United States, review and examination of, 111
Claims settlement agreement with United States, 129
Crown of St. Stephen issue, 116, 125, 126
 Mindszenty affair, 122
 Rogers’ visit, 127
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, 138, 172
Poland:
Catalytic cracking technology from United States, 138, 139, 148, 150
Economic situation, 143
European security issue, views on, 148, 172
FRG-Polish Treaty, 134, 137, 138, 140, 146, 148, 172
Gierek’s accession to power, 143
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, views on, 138, 172
Nixon’s proposed meeting with Wyszynski, 159
Nixon’s Pulaski Day recognition, 174
Nixon’s visit, 156, 159
Political situation, 172
Political unrest of 1970, 143, 144
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, views on, 138
U.S. economic/trade relations with, 168, 172, 173, 174
U.S. port security policy re, 137, 138
Vietnam War, views on, 148, 172
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, FRG-U.S. confrontation re, 35, 37, 39, 45
Romania, 192
Disaster relief from United States, 194, 197
European security issue, views on, 195
GATT membership issue, 190
Nixon’s visit, 176, 185, 216
Soviet Union, relations with, 195
U.S.-Soviet Summit of 1972, Romanian views on, 212
Vietnam War, views on, 195
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 138

References are to document numbers
Sonnenfeldt, Helmut—Continued
Vietnam War:
- Polish views on, 148, 172
- Romanian views on, 195
Yugoslavia:
- Nixon’s visit to Romania and, 216
- U.S. military cooperation with, 222
Soviet Union (see also Eastern Europe), 268, 281, 283
Austria, relations with, 64
- Brezhnev Doctrine, 72, 177, 183, 220, 228, 233
China, relations with, 183, 192
- Cyprus crisis of 1972, 398, 400, 402, 404, 405
- Cyprus policy, 319, 354, 355, 376, 378, 379
Czechoslovakia, invasion of, 1, 2, 77, 86, 132, 177
Expansionist policy, 102
Finland, relations with, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102
FRG, relations with, 144, 145, 199
Greece, U.S. homeporting of Naval task force in, 329, 330, 335, 339
- Jewish population, 102
Middle East policy, 221, 229
Poland, Nixon’s visit to, 156, 157, 158
Poland, relations with, 172
- Polish-FRG Treaty, 135
- Polish political unrest, 144, 147
- Political leadership, 70, 98
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 28, 33, 56
- Romania, relations with, 177, 179, 180, 183, 192, 194, 195, 199, 206, 207
South Asia situation, 232
Turkey, relations with, 428
- Turkish-U.S. discussions re, 420, 421, 454
United States, relations with, 131, 167, 172, 183, 189, 192, 199, 232, 238
- Finnish views on, 102, 104
- Summit of 1972, 212, 213
- U.S.-Soviet-Chinese relations, 65
- Yugoslavia, relations with, 228, 229, 231, 232, 233, 234, 236, 237, 238
Spacil, Dusan, 86, 88, 91
- Spain, 276, 297, 300
Spain, James, 458
- Spasowski, Romuald, 157, 162, 166
Stabler, Wells, 259
- Stamatelopoulos, Byron, 383
- Stamatelopoulos, Dimitri, 239, 269, 302
- Standard Oil of Indiana, 167
- Stans, Maurice H., 20, 121, 139, 151, 169, 186, 234
- Eastern Europe, U.S. economic/trade relations with, 19, 21, 22
- Stein, Herbert, 210
- Stern, Lawrence, 350
- Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 26, 71, 166
- Poland:
  - Anti-Semitism in, 131
  - Catalytic cracking technology from United States, 139
  - FRG-Polish Treaty, 130, 131, 135, 136
  - Gierek’s views on U.S.-Polish relations, 153
  - Nixon’s proposed meeting with Wyszynski, 162
  - Nixon’s visit, 154, 155, 162
  - Political situation, 130
  - Political unrest of 1970, 142
  - Radio Free Europe, 54
  - U.S. Ambassador’s annual report (1969), 130
  - U.S. astronauts’ visit, 131
  - U.S. economic/trade relations with, 131
- Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT):
  - Austrian views on, 63, 65, 70
  - Finnish views on, 96, 99, 100, 102
  - Polish views on, 138
  - Strauss, Franz Josef, 44, 105, 172
  - Streator, Edward, 276
  - Stromayer, James, 1
  - Strougal, Lubomir, 78
  - Sunay, Cevdet, 342, 423, 439, 441, 442, 452, 457
  - Sundquist, Ulf, 105
  - Sutterlin, James S., 41, 46, 56
  - Svoboda, Ludvik, 84, 87
  - Swank, Emory C., 86, 109, 110, 136
  - Sweden, 99
  - Symington, Stuart, 76
  - Szabo, Karoly, 128
  - Szilagyi, Bela, 107, 108
  - Szlachcic, Franciszek, 166, 172
  - Sydlik, Jan, 166
- Tabacek, Jan, 79
- Tagmac, Gen. Memduh, 383, 423, 441
- Tambaca, Lijana, 221, 232, 233, 234

References are to document numbers
Tasca, Henry J., 274, 293, 309
Cyprus:
  Crisis of 1972, 391, 394, 396, 399, 400, 406, 408, 411
  Intercommunal conflict, 364, 377, 379, 381
Greece:
  Agnew’s visit, 320, 326
  Arms purchases from non-U.S. sources, 281
  Congressional staffers’ visit, 303
  Constantine, U.S. policy toward, 301, 315, 319
  Constantine’s meeting with Tasca, 319
  Constantine’s proposed meeting with Papadopoulos, 280
  Constantine’s return issue, 267, 280, 283, 285, 299, 312, 334
  Corruption problem, 337
  European relations, 273
  Libya, relations with, 322
  Military government, 269, 273, 302, 333
  Political opposition, U.S. contacts with, 316, 321
  Spain, relations with, 297, 300
  Tasca’s departure as Ambassador, 338
  Tasca’s initial call on Papadopoulos, 268
  U.S. Ambassador, appointment of, 254
  U.S. homeporting of Naval task force in, 287, 332
  U.S. official visits, restrictions on, 321, 322
  Violence against Americans in, 305
Greece’s political liberalization:
  Agnew’s visit and, 320
  Businessmen’s role, 311
  Constantine’s proposed return and, 285
  Elections issue, 275, 290, 296, 311, 312
  Future prospects, U.S. reports re, 302
  Ioannidis’ views on, 271
  Martial law issue, 296
  McClelland’s views on, 255
  NATO-Greece relationship and, 268, 287
  Nixon’s personal encouragement of, 320, 323
  Tasca, Henry J.—Continued
  Greece’s political liberalization—Continued
    Papadopoulos’ assumption of regency and, 333, 334, 336
    Political prisoners issue, 271, 283
    Tasca’s instructions for dealing with Greek government re, 262, 265, 270
    Tasca’s views on, 273, 275, 302
    Timetable for, 275
    U.S. covert activities in support of, 286, 290
    U.S.-Greek discussions re, 268, 271, 289, 319
    U.S. homeporting of Naval task force in and, 332
    U.S. insistence on political reform as condition for resumption of military assistance, 282, 283, 287, 288, 289
    U.S. policy on liberalization following resumption of military assistance, 319
  Greece’s resumed receipt of U.S. military assistance:
    Announcement of decision re, 277, 292
    Congressional interest in, 268, 287, 319, 320, 322
    Constantine’s views on, 267
    Delays in resumption, Greek response to, 281, 289
    HAWK missile system, 322
    NATO’s attitude toward, 283
    Phantom aircraft, 322
    Tasca’s instructions for dealing with Greek government re, 262, 265, 270
    Tasca’s views on, 273, 289
    Under Secretaries Committee’s recommendations re, 277
    U.S.-Greek discussions re, 268, 281, 289, 319
    U.S. insistence on political reform as condition for resumption of assistance, 282, 283, 287, 288, 289
    Nixon-Agnew discussion re, 326
  Tepavac, Mirko, 221, 223, 228, 233, 236, 238
  Terrorism, 221
  Austrian policy re, 71
  Cyprus situation, 347, 353

References are to document numbers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey—Continued</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon’s meeting with Erim</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political situation</td>
<td>423, 439, 441, 451, 454, 457, 458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union, relations with</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union, U.S.-Turkish discussions re</td>
<td>420, 421, 454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subversion problem</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism policy</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. economic assistance to</td>
<td>428, 430, 434, 444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. intelligence estimates re</td>
<td>428, 451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. military assistance to</td>
<td>421, 422, 428, 438, 452, 453, 454, 457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. military presence in</td>
<td>419, 422, 428, 435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. policy of maintaining good relations with</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. program analysis re</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Secretaries Committee</td>
<td>181, 191, 193, 200, 201, 202, 204, 226, 277, 278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Republic (UAR)</td>
<td>221, 232, 295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>264, 276, 398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations: Chinese representation issue</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus crisis of</td>
<td>1972, 398, 399, 402, 405, 406, 409, 410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus’ intercommunal conflict</td>
<td>344, 345, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 385, 386, 387, 388, 393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Information Agency (USIA)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ugurpulu, Suat</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valtin, Fred</td>
<td>37, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vally, Peter</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vance, Cyrus</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Hollen, Christopher</td>
<td>286, 376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vassilev, Vesselin</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vassilikos, Vassilis</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veniamin, Dirgen</td>
<td>370, 383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam War</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian views on</td>
<td>68, 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finnish views on</td>
<td>96, 97, 100, 102, 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece’s resumed receipt of U.S. military assistance and</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian views on</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish views on</td>
<td>132, 138, 148, 152, 163, 167, 172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian views on</td>
<td>183, 184, 189, 195, 206, 207, 209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References are to document numbers
Vietnam War—Continued
U.S. agricultural sales to Eastern Europe and, 9
Yugoslav views on, 220, 221, 234
Vigderman, Alfred G., 252, 255, 277, 287, 292, 296, 298
Vitsaxis, Basil, 263, 264, 292, 295, 298
Vlachou, Eleni, 279, 285
Vogt, Lt. Gen. John W., 144, 405
Volker, Paul, 454
Volpe, John A., 153
Vrhunec, Marko, 221
Vunovic, Xenia, 416
Waldheim, Kurt, 63, 399, 402, 405, 413, 414
Walker, Charles E., 380
Waller, John, 376, 380, 398, 402, 405
Walsh, John, 62, 80, 182, 244, 248, 251
Walter, Ralph, 36, 41
Walters, Maj. Gen. Vernon, 243
Wandler, Mark, 398, 402, 405
Warren, George, 247
Washington Special Action Group (WSAG), 144, 147
Cyprus crisis of 1972, 397, 398, 401, 402, 405
Weintal, Edward, 43
Weland, Adm. Robert O., 380
Well, Guenther van, 56
Wellons, A.E., 46
Wenick, Martin A., 72
Williams, Albert, 20
Winiewicz, Jozef, 54, 132, 134
Wise, Samuel G., 88
Wojtowicz, Andrzej, 154, 163, 167
Wright, Robert B., 2
Wyszynski, Stefan Cardinal, 159, 160, 161, 162
Yahya Khan, Gen., 232, 458
Yegen, Avdín, 452, 455
Yigit, Ozdemir, 349
Young, Milton R., 28
Yugoslavia (see also Eastern Europe):
Africa, views on, 221
Yugoslavia—Continued
Austria, relations with, 70
China, U.S.-Yugoslav discussions re, 232, 238
European security issue, views on, 220, 238
Italy, relations with, 230, 231
Middle East, views on, 217, 220, 221, 232
Narcotics control, 224
Nixon’s meetings with Tito, 221, 232, 234
Nixon’s visit, 220, 221
Nixon’s visit to Romania and, 216
Post-Tito prospects, 220, 223, 227, 230
Rogers’ meetings with Tito, 217, 218, 238
Scientific and technological cooperation with United States, 226, 230
Soviet Union, relations with, 228, 229, 231, 232, 233, 234, 236, 237, 238
Tito’s U.S. visit, 231, 232, 234
U.S. economic/trade relations with, 24, 26, 221, 223, 225, 226, 230, 234, 235
U.S. military cooperation with, 218, 222, 230
U.S. private investment in, 217, 219, 230
Vietnam War, views on, 220, 221, 234
Yugoslav émigré activities in United States, 231
Z (film), 298
Zablocki, Clement, 148
Zantovsky, Jaroslav, 86, 91
Zarkovic, Vidoje, 232
Zhivkov, Todor, 73
Ziegler, Ronald, 31, 164, 166, 207, 221, 370
Zoitakis, Lt. Gen. George, 269, 333, 334
Zumwalt, Adm. Elmo, 313, 335
Zygdes, John, 325

References are to document numbers